%L discovery10194092
%K Land finance, urban governance, entrepreneurialism, land reserve institution
%J Cities
%I Elsevier
%O © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
%X Existing studies suggest that land financing has given rise to entrepreneurial
governance in China because local governments act like entrepreneurs to capture land value
appreciation. However, the new land reserve institution has recently forbidden local
governments from using land as collateral and centralized the financial management of land
reserve projects. Given this profound change in land institutions, we ask whether local
governments have become less entrepreneurial. This paper investigates the Shanghai Land
Reserve Centre. The funding restriction and declining land profitability make it more
challenging to generate land revenue. However, the local government is now adapting to the
new land reserve institution, developing new entrepreneurial tactics, and treating land
investment as a recurrent income stream. Facing the conjuncture of alarming local government
debts, re-centralizing state control, and structural limits of land finance, local governments’
entrepreneurial stance is not eliminated, but their entrepreneurial practices are reshaped.
Theoretically, this paper contributes to understanding how urban entrepreneurialism evolves
in response to changing political and economic conjunctures.
%V 152
%A Yi Feng
%A Fulong Wu
%A Fangzhu Zhang
%T New land reserve institution and changing entrepreneurial urban governance in China
%D 2024