eprintid: 10193959
rev_number: 9
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/19/39/59
datestamp: 2024-08-06 12:56:52
lastmod: 2024-08-06 12:57:58
status_changed: 2024-08-06 12:56:52
type: book_section
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Chamberlain, Colin
title: What Is It Like to Be a Material Thing?
ispublished: pub
divisions: UCL
divisions: B03
divisions: C01
divisions: F16
keywords: Cavendish, More, Achilles argument, unity of consciousness, materialism, multi-modal integration
note: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
abstract: Henry More argues that materialism cannot explain how a single subject or perceiver can have multiple perceptions simultaneously, as, for example, when we see, hear, and smell at once. In response, Margaret Cavendish appeals to the mind or rational matter—terms she often uses interchangeably—to explain the integration of sensory input from multiple senses in her materialist framework. When rational matter integrates perceptions across modalities, different parts share their knowledge so that they all come to perceive alike. When rational parts successfully communicate their knowledge, each part knows what all the others know. They pool their knowledge; they perceive alike. When someone hears, sees, and tastes, each part of her mind hears, sees, and tastes alike, in parallel and in unison. The Cavendishian mind, in short, approximates simplicity by achieving uniformity or homogeneity of perceptions across its parts.
date: 2022-11-17
date_type: published
publisher: Oxford University Press
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192884749.003.0004
oa_status: green
full_text_type: other
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 2019607
doi: 10.1093/oso/9780192884749.003.0004
lyricists_name: Chamberlain, Colin
lyricists_id: CCHAM01
actors_name: Chamberlain, Colin
actors_id: CCHAM01
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
place_of_pub: Oxford, UK
pagerange: 97-136
isbn: 0192884743
book_title: Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume XI
citation:        Chamberlain, Colin;      (2022)    What Is It Like to Be a Material Thing?                    In:  Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume XI. (pp. 97-136).   Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10193959/1/Chamberlain%20-%20What%20Is%20It%20Like.pdf