eprintid: 10178180
rev_number: 7
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/17/81/80
datestamp: 2023-10-04 14:51:01
lastmod: 2023-10-04 14:51:01
status_changed: 2023-10-04 14:51:01
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Merlo, Stefano
title: A republican fiscal constitution for the EMU
ispublished: pub
divisions: UCL
divisions: B03
divisions: C03
divisions: F30
keywords: demoicracy, monetary union, fiscal rules, domination, macroeconomic externalities
note: © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
abstract: The democratic management of macroeconomic externalities between Members of the Economic and Monetary Union requires abandoning the legal entrenchment of fiscal rules as well as their technocratic administration. The fiscal constitution of the EMU can instead become an instrument that guarantees European citizens’ and peoples’ reciprocal non-domination. This republican goal can be attained once a core set of fiscal principles are agreed upon and later interpreted in a political way by the Council and the European Commission. To be non-dominating the interpretations of these executive bodies on the management of macroeconomic externalities must be subject to a ‘dual contestatory system’. Citizens should not only control, through their national parliaments, what their own governments decide, but also what a collective of governments decide at the EU level. This requires stepping up of the contestatory powers of the European Parliament. Finally, this kind of democratic control should be epistemically supported and facilitated by a network of national Independent Fiscal Institutions who should allow citizens and parliaments to monitor what executives decide both at the national and at the EU level.
date: 2023-09-21
date_type: published
publisher: Informa UK Limited
official_url: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2260235
oa_status: green
full_text_type: pub
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 2092576
doi: 10.1080/13698230.2023.2260235
lyricists_name: Merlo, Stefano
lyricists_id: SMERL05
actors_name: Kalinowski, Damian
actors_id: DKALI47
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
publication: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
issn: 1369-8230
citation:        Merlo, Stefano;      (2023)    A republican fiscal constitution for the EMU.                   Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy        10.1080/13698230.2023.2260235 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2023.2260235>.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10178180/1/Merlo_A%20republican%20fiscal%20constitution%20for%20the%20EMU_AOP.pdf