TY - INPR N2 - This paper systematically examines how access of business groups and NGOs to the executive branch of the European Union varies across political heads, civil servants, and an understudied yet critical intermediary figure of the executive branch: political advisers. Building upon exchange theory, we argue that the occurrence of a meeting between public officials and interest groups depends on information and legitimacy sought and offered by both types of actors, the public officials? public exposure, and the interest groups? lobbying strategies. The empirical analysis is focused on the executive body of the European Union (i.e., the European Commission). Our results show that, while political advisers and civil servants are more likely to meet with business groups than with NGOs, political heads are not biased in favor of any of these two groups. ID - discovery10158817 UR - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/business-and-politics TI - Business Lobbying in the Executive Branch: Unpacking access to political heads, political advisers, and civil servants SN - 1469-3569 Y1 - 2023/04/03/ AV - public KW - executive branch KW - political heads KW - political advisers KW - civil servants KW - interest groups KW - access KW - European Union PB - Cambridge University Press JF - Business and Politics A1 - Albarenda Sanz, Adria A1 - Saz-Carranza, Angel A1 - Van Acoleyen, Michiel A1 - Coen, David N1 - This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher?s terms and conditions. ER -