TY - JOUR N1 - This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher?s terms and conditions. AV - public TI - Auctions with Endogenous Initiation SN - 0022-1082 EP - 1403 IS - 2 SP - 1353 VL - 79 A1 - Gorbenko, Alexander A1 - Malenko, Andrey JF - The Journal of Finance PB - Wiley-Blackwell Y1 - 2024/04// UR - https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13288 ID - discovery10154224 N2 - We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller-initiated. Conversely, in private-value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller- and bidder-initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes. ER -