TY  - JOUR
N1  - This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher?s terms and conditions.
AV  - public
TI  - Auctions with Endogenous Initiation
SN  - 0022-1082
EP  - 1403
IS  - 2
SP  - 1353
VL  - 79
A1  - Gorbenko, Alexander
A1  - Malenko, Andrey
JF  - The Journal of Finance
PB  - Wiley-Blackwell
Y1  - 2024/04//
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13288
ID  - discovery10154224
N2  - We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller-initiated. Conversely, in private-value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller- and bidder-initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.
ER  -