%0 Journal Article %@ 0022-1082 %A Gorbenko, Alexander %A Malenko, Andrey %D 2024 %F discovery:10154224 %I Wiley-Blackwell %J The Journal of Finance %N 2 %P 1353-1403 %T Auctions with Endogenous Initiation %U https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10154224/ %V 79 %X We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller-initiated. Conversely, in private-value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller- and bidder-initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes. %Z This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.