@article{discovery10154224,
          number = {2},
         journal = {The Journal of Finance},
           title = {Auctions with Endogenous Initiation},
            year = {2024},
           pages = {1353--1403},
            note = {This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions.},
       publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
           month = {April},
          volume = {79},
            issn = {0022-1082},
             url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13288},
        abstract = {We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller-initiated. Conversely, in private-value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller- and bidder-initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.},
          author = {Gorbenko, Alexander and Malenko, Andrey}
}