eprintid: 10153181
rev_number: 7
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/15/31/81
datestamp: 2022-08-04 10:46:35
lastmod: 2022-08-04 10:46:35
status_changed: 2022-08-04 10:46:35
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Woodhouse, Eleanor Florence
title: Accountability and corruption displacement: evidence from Italy
ispublished: inpress
divisions: C03
divisions: F30
divisions: B03
divisions: UCL
keywords: accountability, corruption displacement, political appointments
note: © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
abstract: One of the reasons for which corruption is so difficult to eradicate is because the actors involved are skilled in adapting their behaviour to changing institutional landscapes. However, surprisingly little is known about how corruption displacement functions across multiple levels of government. Using novel multilevel data on a political scandal in Italy and a Difference-in-Differences estimation strategy, I provide within-country evidence that a sudden increase in accountability for national deputies can impact negatively upon the behaviour of local-level public officials and politicians. In treated districts, where there is an increase in the indictment rate of national deputies, local-level corruption increases significantly as compared to nontreated districts. My results show how, in contexts characterised by systemic corruption, changes intended to enhance accountability can trigger a series of mechanisms within the political machine that exploit different levels of government.
date: 2022-07-21
date_type: published
publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
official_url: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x22000113
oa_status: green
full_text_type: pub
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 1967797
doi: 10.1017/s0143814x22000113
lyricists_name: Woodhouse, Eleanor
lyricists_id: WOODH90
actors_name: Kalinowski, Damian
actors_id: DKALI47
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
publication: Journal of Public Policy
pagerange: 1-25
citation:        Woodhouse, Eleanor Florence;      (2022)    Accountability and corruption displacement: evidence from Italy.                   Journal of Public Policy     pp. 1-25.    10.1017/s0143814x22000113 <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x22000113>.    (In press).    Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10153181/1/Woodhouse_Accountability%20and%20corruption%20displacement_AOP.pdf