eprintid: 10150876
rev_number: 12
eprint_status: archive
userid: 699
dir: disk0/10/15/08/76
datestamp: 2022-08-25 14:00:07
lastmod: 2022-08-25 14:00:07
status_changed: 2022-08-25 14:00:07
type: thesis
metadata_visibility: show
sword_depositor: 699
creators_name: Williams, Thomas Edward
title: In Defence of Acquaintance
ispublished: unpub
divisions: C01
divisions: F16
divisions: B03
divisions: UCL
note: Copyright © The Author 2022.  Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).  Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms.  Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request.
abstract: The aim of this thesis is to motivate, defend and explore the consequences of an acquaintance view (AV), which holds that acquaintance with an object is required for singular thought about that object. The thesis is divided into two parts. In part one I motivate and defend AV. In part two I explore some of the consequences of adopting AV.
In part one I argue that AV is well motivated and defensible given one particular account of singular thought. I call this account ‘aboutness without properties’. I argue it is legitimate for AV to adopt this account of singular thought. I also argue that AV’s take on acquaintance—according to which there are three kinds of acquaintance: perceptual acquaintance, memory acquaintance and communication-based acquaintance—is the best account. It makes acquaintance a unified psychological kind that can explain our capacities for thought. I argue that, given this account of singular thought and of acquaintance, AV is a well-motivated and defensible view of how our thoughts about objects connect up and make contact with the external world. I identify and attempt to solve three puzzles (in part inherited from Russell) which AV faces, given that it allows acquaintance with and singular thought about ordinary objects. I also suggest how AV can deal with apparent counterexample cases, via an account of descriptive names and of thought that purports to be about the non-existent.
In part two I argue that AV is committed to structured propositions. The aboutness without properties account of singular thought only works on a structured propositions view. Given some plausible assumptions about how the problem of informative identities needs to be solved, I also argue that AV is committed to a Fregean view of propositions.
date: 2022-06-28
date_type: published
oa_status: green
full_text_type: other
thesis_class: doctoral_open
thesis_award: Ph.D
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 1963429
lyricists_name: Williams, Thomas
lyricists_id: TWILL93
actors_name: Williams, Thomas
actors_id: TWILL93
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
pagerange: 1-233
pages: 233
institution: UCL (University College London)
department: Philosophy
thesis_type: Doctoral
citation:        Williams, Thomas Edward;      (2022)    In Defence of Acquaintance.                   Doctoral thesis  (Ph.D), UCL (University College London).     Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10150876/2/Williams%20PhD%20thesis%20resubmission%20final.pdf