eprintid: 10150876 rev_number: 12 eprint_status: archive userid: 699 dir: disk0/10/15/08/76 datestamp: 2022-08-25 14:00:07 lastmod: 2022-08-25 14:00:07 status_changed: 2022-08-25 14:00:07 type: thesis metadata_visibility: show sword_depositor: 699 creators_name: Williams, Thomas Edward title: In Defence of Acquaintance ispublished: unpub divisions: C01 divisions: F16 divisions: B03 divisions: UCL note: Copyright © The Author 2022. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request. abstract: The aim of this thesis is to motivate, defend and explore the consequences of an acquaintance view (AV), which holds that acquaintance with an object is required for singular thought about that object. The thesis is divided into two parts. In part one I motivate and defend AV. In part two I explore some of the consequences of adopting AV. In part one I argue that AV is well motivated and defensible given one particular account of singular thought. I call this account ‘aboutness without properties’. I argue it is legitimate for AV to adopt this account of singular thought. I also argue that AV’s take on acquaintance—according to which there are three kinds of acquaintance: perceptual acquaintance, memory acquaintance and communication-based acquaintance—is the best account. It makes acquaintance a unified psychological kind that can explain our capacities for thought. I argue that, given this account of singular thought and of acquaintance, AV is a well-motivated and defensible view of how our thoughts about objects connect up and make contact with the external world. I identify and attempt to solve three puzzles (in part inherited from Russell) which AV faces, given that it allows acquaintance with and singular thought about ordinary objects. I also suggest how AV can deal with apparent counterexample cases, via an account of descriptive names and of thought that purports to be about the non-existent. In part two I argue that AV is committed to structured propositions. The aboutness without properties account of singular thought only works on a structured propositions view. Given some plausible assumptions about how the problem of informative identities needs to be solved, I also argue that AV is committed to a Fregean view of propositions. date: 2022-06-28 date_type: published oa_status: green full_text_type: other thesis_class: doctoral_open thesis_award: Ph.D language: eng primo: open primo_central: open_green verified: verified_manual elements_id: 1963429 lyricists_name: Williams, Thomas lyricists_id: TWILL93 actors_name: Williams, Thomas actors_id: TWILL93 actors_role: owner full_text_status: public pagerange: 1-233 pages: 233 institution: UCL (University College London) department: Philosophy thesis_type: Doctoral citation: Williams, Thomas Edward; (2022) In Defence of Acquaintance. Doctoral thesis (Ph.D), UCL (University College London). Green open access document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10150876/2/Williams%20PhD%20thesis%20resubmission%20final.pdf