TY  - JOUR
EP  - 208
IS  - 1
AV  - public
TI  - Mutual Dependence and Expectations of Cooperation
KW  - Collective Action
KW  -  Cooperation
KW  -  Property Rights
KW  -  Land Title
KW  -  sub-Saharan Africa
N1  - This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher?s terms and conditions.
ID  - discovery10149893
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1086/720646
N2  - Why are some communities better than others at generating cooperative behavior? We argue that mutual dependence on collective social institutions (CSI) increases expectations of cooperation, a key building block for collective action. We examine the effects of mutual dependence by studying property rights institutions in rural Malawi and Zambia. We find that respondents expect their neighbors with customary property rights to be more cooperative than those with land titles?a situation of lower shared dependence on the CSI. A conjoint survey experiment with more than 7,000 respondents allows us to separate the impact of mutual dependence within the CSI from other salient characteristics, including migration status, wealth, and ethnicity. Additionally, we explore three forms of institutional obligations that help explain why reduced mutual dependence dampens expectations of cooperation. These findings provide a richer theoretical understanding of the preconditions for cooperative behavior and the interdependence that sustains collective action.
Y1  - 2023/01/01/
PB  - University of Chicago Press
A1  - Harris, Adam
A1  - Honig, Lauren
JF  - The Journal of Politics
SP  - 192
VL  - 85
ER  -