%0 Book Section
%A Madden, R
%B The Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness
%C Abingdon, UK
%D 2022
%E Alsmith, Adrian JT
%E Longo, Matthew R
%F discovery:10138473
%I Routledge
%T Bodily awareness without the body
%U https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10138473/
%X This chapter explores the consequences for bodily awareness of a plausible and influential metaphysics of the  self. The first part of the chapter presents the animalist view that we are each identical to animals, and  clarifies its relation to superficially similar metaphysical claims made in terms of ‘one’s body’. Reasons are  given for animalists to adopt the anti-reificationist position that ‘one’s body’ is no more an independent entity  than ‘one’s mind’. Contrary reasons for reifying the body are found wanting. The second part of the chapter  proposes that bodily awareness should accordingly be conceived, not as awareness of an entity called one’s  body, but as an animal’s awareness of its own non-psychological condition. It is argued that this animal selfmonitoring conception supports the view that bodily awareness is a form of self-awareness, and, despite  certain differences from paradigm cases with respect to the independence of its objects, also a form of  perceptual awareness.
%Z This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.