eprintid: 10137503
rev_number: 19
eprint_status: archive
userid: 608
dir: disk0/10/13/75/03
datestamp: 2022-01-26 14:02:47
lastmod: 2022-01-26 14:02:47
status_changed: 2022-01-26 14:02:47
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Hyman, J
title: II—Knowledge and Belief
ispublished: pub
divisions: UCL
divisions: B03
divisions: C01
divisions: F16
note: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
abstract: In this article, I oppose the view that knowledge is a species of belief, and argue that belief should be defined in terms of knowledge, instead of the other way round. However, I reject the idea that the concept of knowledge has a primary or basic role or position in our system of mental and logical concepts, because I reject the hierarchical conception of philosophical analysis implicit in this idea. I approach the topic of knowledge and belief from a discussion of Richard Holton’s views about facts and factive verbs.
date: 2017-06
date_type: published
publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
official_url: https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akx005
oa_status: green
full_text_type: other
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 1821797
doi: 10.1093/arisup/akx005
lyricists_name: Hyman, John
lyricists_id: JHYMA62
actors_name: Jayawardana, Anusha
actors_id: AJAYA51
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
publication: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
volume: 91
number: 1
pagerange: 267-288
issn: 1467-8349
citation:        Hyman, J;      (2017)    II—Knowledge and Belief.                   Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume , 91  (1)   pp. 267-288.    10.1093/arisup/akx005 <https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup%2Fakx005>.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10137503/1/Hyman_H-K%26B.pdf