TY  - JOUR
EP  - 288
AV  - public
Y1  - 2017/06//
TI  - II?Knowledge and Belief
PB  - Oxford University Press (OUP)
ID  - discovery10137503
N2  - In this article, I oppose the view that knowledge is a species of belief, and argue that belief should be defined in terms of knowledge, instead of the other way round. However, I reject the idea that the concept of knowledge has a primary or basic role or position in our system of mental and logical concepts, because I reject the hierarchical conception of philosophical analysis implicit in this idea. I approach the topic of knowledge and belief from a discussion of Richard Holton?s views about facts and factive verbs.
N1  - This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher?s terms and conditions.
IS  - 1
SP  - 267
VL  - 91
A1  - Hyman, J
JF  - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
SN  - 1467-8349
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akx005
ER  -