TY - JOUR EP - 288 AV - public Y1 - 2017/06// TI - II?Knowledge and Belief PB - Oxford University Press (OUP) ID - discovery10137503 N2 - In this article, I oppose the view that knowledge is a species of belief, and argue that belief should be defined in terms of knowledge, instead of the other way round. However, I reject the idea that the concept of knowledge has a primary or basic role or position in our system of mental and logical concepts, because I reject the hierarchical conception of philosophical analysis implicit in this idea. I approach the topic of knowledge and belief from a discussion of Richard Holton?s views about facts and factive verbs. N1 - This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher?s terms and conditions. IS - 1 SP - 267 VL - 91 A1 - Hyman, J JF - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume SN - 1467-8349 UR - https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akx005 ER -