TY  - GEN
PB  - Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
TI  - On Feasibility and Performance of Rowhammmer Attack
CY  - New York, NY, USA
N1  - This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher?s terms and conditions.
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1145/3139324.3139330
EP  - 58
Y1  - 2017/11/03/
A1  - Papaioannou, V
A1  - Courtois, N
AV  - public
KW  - Side channel attack
KW  -  rowhammer
KW  -  DRAM
KW  -  DFA
KW  -  perturbation attacks
ID  - discovery10133816
N2  - In this paper we study the Rowhammer sidechannel attack and evaluate its feasibility on practical exploitation scenarios in Linux. Currently, all the implementations released, capable of performing the Rowhammer attack, require elevated privileges. This is a very strong requirement which, in a sense, puts ths attack into the theoretical spectrum. The purpose of this report is to explore different techniques that would allow the execution of the Rowhammer attack in userspace. More specifically, we provide two implementations, each of them having different strength of requirements but with one characteristic in common: the capability of executing the Rowhammer attack without elevated privileges. At the end, we see that not only it was possible to reach similar levels of performance with the programs that required elevated privileges, but in some cases even outperform them, in both native and virtual environments.
SP  - 53
ER  -