eprintid: 10105606
rev_number: 14
eprint_status: archive
userid: 608
dir: disk0/10/10/56/06
datestamp: 2020-07-21 15:02:17
lastmod: 2020-07-21 15:02:17
status_changed: 2020-07-21 15:02:17
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Moncrieff, J
title: "It Was the Brain Tumor That Done It!": Szasz and Wittgenstein on the Importance of Distinguishing Disease from Behavior and Implications for the Nature of Mental Disorder
ispublished: pub
divisions: UCL
divisions: A01
divisions: B02
divisions: C07
divisions: D79
keywords: Disease concept, Mental disorder concept, Szasz, Wittgenstein philosophy of mind, Medical model of mental disorder
note: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
abstract: The current article looks at the distinction between bodily conditions, such as diseases, which may affect behavior, and situations that comprise self-directed behavior. This distinction was emphasized by the late Thomas Szasz, who recognized that regarding a situation as a disease or illness has important consequences that flow from the association of these concepts with the body. Wittgenstein's critique of the concept of mind helps to clarify and support Szasz's intuitions. Both Szasz and Wittgenstein suggest that we misunderstand the nature of 'mind,' and that mental states and events are not independent entities that can be discovered and described by natural science, but activities of living human beings that are manifested in, and recognized through, forms of public behavior. Mental disorders, which are also manifested in behavior, cannot, therefore, be aligned with biological conditions, unless there is evidence of an underlying disease. Attempts to expand the concepts of illness and disease by separating them from their bodily context, to accommodate mental disorders within a medical framework, only denude the terms of any distinctive meaning. Wittgenstein, like Szasz, suggests that what we characterize as mental illness, therefore, refers not to an illness or disease, but to patterns of unusual but still essentially self-directed behavior. These patterns can be understood as aspects of character, although they have a complex relationship to agency. The implications of this analysis for the justification of psychiatric coercion and the treatment of common psychological complaints are explored.
date: 2020-06
date_type: published
publisher: Project Muse
official_url: https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2020.0017
oa_status: green
full_text_type: other
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 1798638
doi: 10.1353/ppp.2020.0017
lyricists_name: Moncrieff, Joanna
lyricists_id: JMMON33
actors_name: Moncrieff, Joanna
actors_id: JMMON33
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
publication: Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology
volume: 27
number: 2
pagerange: 169-181
citation:        Moncrieff, J;      (2020)    "It Was the Brain Tumor That Done It!": Szasz and Wittgenstein on the Importance of Distinguishing Disease from Behavior and Implications for the Nature of Mental Disorder.                   Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology , 27  (2)   pp. 169-181.    10.1353/ppp.2020.0017 <https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2020.0017>.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10105606/1/PPP_final%20version.pdf