eprintid: 10086885
rev_number: 16
eprint_status: archive
userid: 608
dir: disk0/10/08/68/85
datestamp: 2019-11-29 08:57:12
lastmod: 2021-06-29 09:58:14
status_changed: 2019-11-29 08:57:12
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Ensthaler, L
creators_name: Huck, S
creators_name: Leutgeb, J
title: Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model
ispublished: pub
divisions: UCL
divisions: A01
divisions: B03
divisions: C03
divisions: F24
keywords: Games played through agents, Experiment, Quantal response equilibrium
note: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
abstract: From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people (“agents”) make decisions that affect the payoffs of others (“principals”) who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003) characterize pure-strategy equilibria of such Games Played Through Agents. Specifically, they predict the equilibrium outcome in pure strategies to be efficient. We test the theory in a series of experimental treatments with human principals and computerized agents. The theory predicts remarkably well which actions and outcomes are implemented but subjects' transfer offers deviate systematically from equilibrium. We show how quantal response equilibrium accounts for the deviations and test its predictions out of sample. Our results show that quantal response equilibrium is particularly well suited for explaining behavior in such games.
date: 2020-01
date_type: published
official_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.013
oa_status: green
full_text_type: other
language: eng
primo: open
primo_central: open_green
verified: verified_manual
elements_id: 1717580
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.013
lyricists_name: Huck, Steffen
lyricists_id: SHUCK00
actors_name: Kalinowski, Damian
actors_id: DKALI47
actors_role: owner
full_text_status: public
publication: Games and Economic Behavior
volume: 119
pagerange: 30-55
issn: 0899-8256
citation:        Ensthaler, L;    Huck, S;    Leutgeb, J;      (2020)    Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model.                   Games and Economic Behavior , 119    pp. 30-55.    10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.013 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.013>.       Green open access   
 
document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10086885/1/Huck_Games%20played%20through%20agents%20in%20the%20laboratory%20%E2%80%94%20a%20test%20of%20Prat%20%26%20amp.%20Rustichini%27s%20model_AAM2.pdf