eprintid: 10058353 rev_number: 16 eprint_status: archive userid: 608 dir: disk0/10/05/83/53 datestamp: 2018-10-11 15:57:55 lastmod: 2021-11-16 00:41:13 status_changed: 2018-10-11 15:57:55 type: article metadata_visibility: show creators_name: Cole, HL creators_name: Kehoe, PJ title: Models of sovereign debt: Partial versus general reputations ispublished: pub divisions: UCL divisions: B03 divisions: C03 note: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. abstract: Some economists argue that as long as governments can earn the market rate of return by saving abroad, standard reputation models cannot support debt. We argue that these standard reputation models are partial in the sense that actions of agents in one arena affect reputation in that arena only. We develop a general model of reputation in which if a government is viewed as untrustworthy in one relationship, this government will be viewed as untrustworthy in other relationships. We show that our general model of reputation can support large amounts of debt. date: 1998-02 date_type: published publisher: UNIV PENN official_url: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527230 oa_status: green full_text_type: other language: eng primo: open primo_central: open_green verified: verified_manual elements_id: 1576410 doi: 10.2307/2527230 lyricists_name: Kehoe, Patrick lyricists_id: PKEHO79 actors_name: Waragoda Vitharana, Nimal actors_id: NWARR44 actors_role: owner full_text_status: public publication: International Economic Review volume: 39 number: 1 pagerange: 55-70 pages: 16 issn: 0020-6598 citation: Cole, HL; Kehoe, PJ; (1998) Models of sovereign debt: Partial versus general reputations. International Economic Review , 39 (1) pp. 55-70. 10.2307/2527230 <https://doi.org/10.2307/2527230>. Green open access document_url: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10058353/1/Kehoe__Models%20of%20sovereign%20debt%20partial%20versus%20general%20reputations.pdf