TY  - CHAP
ID  - discovery10057906
AV  - public
SP  - 142
A1  - McCulloch, TK
CY  - London, UK
EP  - 170
ED  - Dobson, AP
ED  - Marsh, S
Y1  - 2017///
UR  - https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315642673-8
N2  - One of the many ironies in the history of the Anglo-American ?special relationship?, as named by Winston Churchill in his iconic Fulton speech, was that in little more than eighteen months after his retirement as prime minister in April 1955 the Conservative Government of which he had been the head for almost four years was involved in the disastrous Suez episode ? considered by many historians to have been the lowest point in Anglo-American relations from the end of the Second World War down to the present day. The responsibility for this debacle on the British side is usually allocated to Churchill?s successor, Anthony Eden, and to a lesser degree his Cabinet, but what of Churchill himself and of Sir Roger Makins, the British ambassador to Washington at the time of Suez, appointed by Churchill on the recommendation of Eden? To what extent were Makins and his predecessors successful in establishing the Anglo-American ?special relationship? so desired by Churchill and why did this relationship break down during the Suez crisis?
PB  - Routledge
TI  - Churchill?s ambassadors ? from Fulton to Suez
T2  - Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship
N1  - This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher?s terms and conditions.
ER  -