TY  - JOUR
A1  - Luo, R
A1  - Miller, G
A1  - Rozelle, S
A1  - Sylvia, S
A1  - Vera-Hernández, M
JF  - Journal of the European Economic Association
PB  - Wiley-Blackwell
SP  - 165
VL  - 18
ID  - discovery10053150
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvy047
N2  - Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia?as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.
Y1  - 2020/02//
KW  - Performance Pay
KW  -  Public Service Delivery
KW  -  Managerial Incentives
KW  -  Nutrition
Programs
KW  -  China
N1  - © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Association.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
EP  - 201
IS  - 1
AV  - public
TI  - Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOS? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China
ER  -