@article{discovery10053150,
            note = {{\copyright} The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Association.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.},
           pages = {165--201},
         journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
          number = {1},
           title = {Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOS? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China},
            year = {2020},
       publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell},
          volume = {18},
           month = {February},
        keywords = {Performance Pay, Public Service Delivery, Managerial Incentives, Nutrition
Programs, China},
        abstract = {Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia-as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.},
             url = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvy047},
          author = {Luo, R and Miller, G and Rozelle, S and Sylvia, S and Vera-Hern{\'a}ndez, M}
}