TY  - UNPB
ID  - discovery10020352
N2  - Modern theories of moral education question the truth of Socrates's
belief which involves an idea of positive relationship between 'moral
knowing' and 'doing'. As a result, such theories divide moral
education between development of moral judgment and character
training. However, the division of moral education invites a more
puzzling philosophical perplexity such as the denial of a relationship
between 'knowing' and 'doing'.
The study proposes a theory of moral education which dissolves
the philosophical perplexity, through a linguistic analysis of the words
which constitute moral statements and relying on an educational
examination of the meaning of 'moral knowing' which is seriously
distorted by Socrates's inadequate definitions of the terms 'virtue' and
`knowledge' in his proposition, 'Virtue is knowledge'.
The meaning of the word 'X' in the form of moral statement such
as 'X is good', which is primarily fact-denoting, extends for its
accompanying meaning beyond that as delimited by Socrates and the
realists. Accompanying meanings are moral notions but nondescriptive,
though they may be in some cases symbolised roughly by
such 'notional words' as 'benevolence' and 'justice'. Contrasting with
the statement such as 'Benevolence is good', which constitutes itself
with a notional word, the form of 'X is good' will be meaningless
unless it is understood with moral notions.
`Knowing' in moral education is not theoretical, having regard to
the nature of moral notions. 'Moral notions' embrace both 'knowing'
and 'doing'. Therefore, education for the development of 'moral
mind' must not be confined to clarification of meanings of words and
ratiocination of judgments; it should help pupils to perceive moral
qualities in situations where such qualities are deeply embedded and to
imagine the world as it should be from the world as it is.
PB  - Institute of Education, University of London
UR  - http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.399367
M1  - Doctoral
A1  - Joh, Moo Nam.
TI  - Knowing, doing and the moral mind : development of a non-realist and non-rationalist interpretation of the meaning of moral knowing and its implications for moral education
EP  - 242
AV  - public
Y1  - 2000///
N1  - Thesis: (PhD) University of London Institute of Education, 2000.
ER  -