TY  - UNPB
UR  - https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10018509/
TI  - Meaning theory and the problem of the acquisition of a first language.
KW  - Language development
KW  - Philosophy of language
KW  - Semantics
KW  - Rationalism
KW  - Empiricism
N2  - The thesis begins by making two distinctions which are
central to its methodology. The first is that between valid
and invalid criticism, the second between philosophy of
language and meaning theory. These distinctions combine to
produce the methodology which informs the thesis, namely
that a theory of meaning can be validly criticised in terms
of its account, implicit or explicit, of first language
acquisition and, conversely, an account of first language
acquisition can be validly criticised in terms of its
theory, implicit or explicit, of meaning. The thesis
continues by testing the appropriateness of the methodology
against the classical empiricist and rationalist accounts of
meaning expressed in terms of Ideas, arguing that the
majority of criticisms of these accounts misfire as they do
not operate within the framework of the positions they
purport to criticise. Such invalid criticism is replaced
with that argued for here, the conclusion being that the
classical accounts of meaning are to be rejected on the
grounds that they make use of a phenomenon, language, whose
acquisition they cannot, within the terms of their own
position, explain. Modern, post-Fregean, empiricist and
rationalist positions, those of Quine and Chomsky
respectively, are then subjected to similar treatment. Both
of these positions have explicit accounts of first language acquisition and so the conclusion to this section of the
thesis reverses that reached when discussing the classical
positions, in that the explanations of first language
acquisition given by modern empiricists and rationalists are
based on meaning theories which, for a variety of reasons,
do not justify their explanations of the phenomenon of first
language acquisition.
In an attempt to move towards a more positive position two
alternative accounts of meaning theory, the formal and the
descriptive, are then examined. The formal account,
Davidson's, is defended against those critics who produce
attacks centering upon its meaning theory as being, in the
sense described above, invalid. However, as it is then
shown not to be able to account for first language
acquisition, it is eventually rejected. The descriptivist
account is identified by tracing the development of
Wittgenstein's philosophy to support a particular
interpretation of his later account of meaning as being a
descriptive one and a defence is offered to a number of
criticisms of that position. A poorly worked out
experiential account of first language acquisition is then
identified, and this is developed further by introducing the
area of non-linguistics, where meaning can be given without
words. The thesis concludes by suggesting that this area's
account of first language acquisition, although having a
number of difficulties with its implied meaning theory, can be combined with the later work of Wittgenstein to produce
what is at least a descriptively adequate account of both
meaning and first language acquisition. Moreover, it points
to an area of enquiry where philosophical techniques can be
utilised to great effect so as to add new dimensions to
PB  - Institute of Education, University of London
Y1  - 1991///
A1  - Gilroy, David Peter.
M1  - Doctoral
ID  - discovery10018509
N1  - Unpublished
EP  - 388
AV  - public
ER  -