A STUDY OF THE VIEWS OF SARTRE AND MERLEAU-PONTY RELATING TO EMBODIMENT, AND A CONSIDERATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE VIEWS FOR THE JUSTIFICATION AND PRACTICE OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

The thesis acknowledges the confusion that has arisen out of the various, and often extravagent, claims made to justify the inclusion of physical education in the school curriculum. It is noted that many of these are not concerned with bodily attributes but assert that physical education is instrumental in furthering a whole range of non-physical ends such as social development. The validity of these 'instrumental' claims is questioned and the profession's lack of confidence in presenting a case for the intrinsic value of its own area is identified. It is seen necessary, therefore, to consider whether such an intrinsic justification can be formulated. To this end aspects of existential and phenomenological philosophy are examined through the work of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Their general agreement on man's essential nature as embodied in-the-world issues in a significant role for the embodiment in existence. This is further supported by an analysis of Merleau-Ponty's views on the role of the embodiment in perception. The first major focus of the thesis concludes with an argument for the inclusion of physical education alongside other aspects of education. The second major focus considers the views of Sartre concerning body modes. This examination reveals the dangers inherent in others viewing one's embodiment as an object and would seem to explain the disenchantment felt for the subject by many pupils. Recommendations for the practice of physical education are then made. The thesis concludes with a reconsideration of the aims of physical education and a reassertion of its rightful place in an education of the 'whole man'.

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Section 1

A review of the justifications proposed for physical education in the school curriculum.

Physical Education in a variety of forms such as gymnastics, athletics, drill, physical training, sport and dance has had a place in education at least since the time of the early Greeks. The inclusion of some form of physical activity in schooling has in the past generally been presumed. When debate has occurred this has usually been concerned to argue what type of activity should be included. Certain activities were seen as more or less valuable in the context of the prevailing educational goals.

The situation is now changing however, and the place of physical education is under serious challenge. This is evident in a number of recent authoritative documents which reveal how little support there now is for the subject. For example, in 1983 the D.E.S. document on Teaching in Schools: The Content of Initial Training made no mention of preparing students of the 7 to 13 age range to teach physical education. Obviously the subject was not being seen as a core component of the junior school curriculum. In a recent publication concerning Inner London Comprehensive Schools a suggestion was made that after the third year, physical education might well feature only in an option programme, rather than among the compulsory elements of the curriculum. This lack of support is particularly worrying at a time when there is great pressure on schools, both to introduce new programmes, such as those directed towards the achievement of the Certificate of Personal and Vocational Education, and to give more time to certain areas of study such as science and technology. In a climate such as this, all aspects of the curriculum are subject to scrutiny, and absence of backing from central agencies could well result in an area's being at particular risk.

At the same time as those in authority are questioning the subject,

the pupils themselves are indicating dissatisfaction with it. Their disaffection shows itself in a lack of interest in physical activity, both in school and when they have completed their education. This is particularly disappointing for a curriculum area which is generally seen as closely related to recreation. Moreover, the pupil's attitude tends to reinforce, rather than counteract, the view that the subject is dispensable.

It is timely, then, to ask why confidence in physical education is declining in this way. A major source of its weakness is the inability of its proponents to reach a consensus in presenting a well argued case for the subject. A wide variety of justifications are put forward, many of which are neither directly associated with movement activity per se, nor exclusively related to this particular area of the curriculum. Among the aims by which teachers of physical education seek to justify their subject are: cognitive development, moral development, social development, aesthetic awareness, physical fitness, education for leisure, development of physical skill, the promotion of body-mind unity, enjoyment, self realization and the fostering of desirable character traits. In a recent small scale piece of research[2] eight male and eight female heads of physical education departments were asked to say what they took the aims of the subject to be. The males registered a total of thirty-five recordings, which identified eleven aims and the females made forty-seven recordings, identifying twenty aims. That so many different ends are sought by physical educators is surprising, as is the fact that individual teachers commonly adopt multiple aims.

While it is the case that throughout the history of physical education a range of aims has been identified for the subject, there has never been a time when such a wide variety have been canvassed

simultaneously. In particular countries over a period of time, it has been usual for just one or two justificatory goals to be propounded. For example, physical fitness was the aim of the structured exercises that featured in the education and training particularly, though not exclusively, of young men both in Sparta and fifteenth century Italy. The strength, endurance and nimbleness these exercises promoted were valued in being important attributes for prospective soldiers. The requirements of war in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Western Europe also brought this aim to the fore, and in England a number of government directives during this time stipulated the inclusion of drill to improve levels of fitness.

The use of exercise to improve general health was also promoted by those who judged exercise either to have a positive beneficial effect on mental faculties or to give refreshing respite to these faculties. Socrates for example saw physical activity as an "aid to philosophy". Proposing that a man's ability to think may be impaired by his physical condition, he wrote "For even in that in which you think that there is least exercise of the body, namely thinking, who does not know that many fail greatly from ill-health".[3]

In the Politics, Aristotle regards a disciplined body as conducive to a disciplined mind. "Education by habit must precede education by reason and ... training of the body must likewise precede training of the mind".[4] These views were taken up by a number of educationists over the centuries and were used to support the inclusion of various types of physical activity in school. For example in England, Richard Mulcaster in the mid-sixteenth century and John Locke in the late seventeenth century, both advocated that pupils should take part in physical activity to give them relaxation from

the "serious employment of study".[5] In 1928 Professor L. P. Jacks claimed that a thwarted body has as its consequence a thwarted mind.

Involvement in forms of physical activity in order to achieve development of 'the whole person' - his body and his mind, was advocated by Vittorino in 15th Century Italy and Montaigne in 16th Century Rome. The latter wrote that "it is not a mind, it is not a boc that we are training, it is a man, and he ought not to be divided into two parts."[6] Leibniz and Rousseau held similar views. Leibniz supported physical activity in education because, he argued, it enabled man to bring together his body and his soul in one enterprise.

The fostering of valuable character traits including 'moral fibre', has been a predominant aim of physical pursuits at various periods from early Greek times to the present day. The Spartans and the Romans claimed that participation in sport nurtured courage and initiative respectively. Rousseau in Considerations for the Government of Poland[7] argued that team games developed loyalty which could be used effectively in patriotic endeavour. This view was endorsed by Thomas Arnold, and subsequently permeated the public schools in this country. Sport, it was maintained developed disciplined behaviour, co-operation, tenacity and fair play.

The current position is quite different from that in earlier times. There is now no clear focus, no common philosophy. The profusion of aims now identified includes almost the whole range of aspirations that have guided practice through history. This multiplicity is probably the result of the efforts of physical educationists, during recent years, to justify their subject in the context of whatever the prevailing philosophy of education has been. In the 1950's, for example, when child-centred education was gaining support many physical educationists claimed their subject could be

the vehicle of many aspects of the child's development viz. physical, emotional, social, intellectual, moral and spiritual. They referred back to Jessie Fiering William's pronouncements of the 1930's which asserted that it is "education through, not of, the physical"[8] with which physical education must be concerned. Many wrote extensively in support of this case - notably Mason and Ventre, who in 1965 gathered fourteen objectives for physical education in this context.

At a time when aesthetic education was seen to be of particular importance some argued for the contribution of physical education to this area of development, or even maintained that it was itself a form of aesthetic education. In the late 1960's when an influential group of philosophers of education were advocating the central importance of the development of the intellect and rationality, other physical educationists tried to show how their area could contribute to promoting these ends. Again many wrote with conviction, for example Arnold (1968) and Morgan et al (1970). Despite a persuasive article in 1976 by Best pointing out confusions in this view, its supporters are still in evidence. For example, in 1979, Willgoose presented physical education as a vehicle for general education and included intellectual competency in his list of the subject's major objectives. The view was further endorsed in 1984 in an article in the Times Educational Supplement.[9]

Each of these recent views has been advocated by some, but not all, members of the profession, and the resulting situation is one where all the views persist with varying degrees of support. Social and moral development is championed by some, while furthering aesthetic education is argued for by others. Physical fitness as the prime goal also attracts strong support. Many do not want to identify with any specific goal of this nature, but see physical education as

contributing broadly to the development of the whole child. This diversity of aims, that has evolved through physical educationists trying "to be everything to everyone in an effort to elevate status"[10] is now in fact proving counter productive. The confused account that physical educationists nowadays present is undermining the credibility of the subject.

One attempt that has been made to dispel the confusion represents physical education as having three areas of potential. This proposes that the subject can be justified on the ground that it can promote education 'through movement', 'about movement' and 'in movement'. Education 'through movement' is achieved by physical education in its contribution to a whole range of broad educational goals, such as pupil autonomy, social competence, health awareness and intellectual development. Education 'about movement' it is argued, can make a valuable contribution to the curriculum in that it introduces children to factual information in areas such as anatomy, physiology, biomechanics and aesthetics. Education 'in movement' promotes the development of body awareness, body control and the mastery of a range of physical skills.

While this approach could be helpful in clarifying the areas in which physical education can contribute to education, its value is diminished by three misleading impressions it gives. These relate to the relationship between the areas, the steps that need to be taken to reach the various goals, and the comparative status of each area. The three dimensions of 'through', 'about' and 'in' are often taken to be mutually exclusive, but this is a mistake and tends to confuse rather than clarify the situation. An examination of the nature of each area reveals that they are closely related and that, in some cases, one is dependent upon another. For example, education

'through' movement is in some instances indistinguishable from education 'about' movement. Has a child who has acquired an understanding of the laws of motion, as a result of work in athletics, undergone education within the cognitive sphere 'through' movement, or has he been educated 'about' movement in coming to appreciate principles underlying the executon of certain skills? Another example is learning aspects of physiology through participation in athletic activities. Education 'through' movement is also closely related to and even dependent upon education 'in' movement. To gain a broader educational benefit 'through' any movement activity, the child will need to receive guidance 'in' movement; in how to operate physically in that activity. It is difficult to conceive how an increase in social competence, for example, can result from taking part in a sport unless the participants have first learnt the necessary basic movement skills. Furthermore, if the development of motor control and co-ordination is accepted as a valid aspect of a child's education, then it follows that his education as a whole will be enhanced as a result of, or 'through', his skill acquisition. In this context the notions of education 'through' and education 'in' movement are one and the same.

The second misleading impression that the tripartite presentation of potential goals gives, is that work in physical education can, by its very nature,accomplish a wide variety of non-physical goals. This is not the case. As Oliver said "... physical activity does not automatically give those qualities that are required for social and emotional development and adjustment",[11] or for the achievement of any other extrinsic goal. For example, pupils will not develop leadership skills as a natural corollary of their working in groups in gymnastics or dance, or of their playing in teams in games. True,

these activities do have the potential to foster such skills, but to achieve this end the teacher will need to create situations that depend on leadership roles being adopted. And, if every child in the class is to have the opportunity to adopt such a role, steps will need to be taken to ensure that responsibility is given to each pupil in turn. Indeed, the achievement of any specific objective will require of the teacher most careful selection, implementation and evaluation of the lesson content and teaching strategy. Regrettably, physical education teachers do not always appreciate this and often claim more for their subject than they take positive action to promote.

The misunderstanding that a range of non-physical goals can be achieved simply through taking part in physical activity also tends to lead teachers to believe that a number of these goals can be achieved simultaneously. Taking part in a hockey lesson, for example, may be claimed to make a contribution to the development of moral understanding, individual initiative, the powers of reasoning, and social skills. While such a lesson could promote each of these ends, it could not realize them all at the same time. Each will need a particular mode of approach and pattern of teacher-pupil interaction, and the teacher will need to prepare for each separately.

The greatest dis-service that the threefold approach does to physical educationists, however, is in the support it lends to the idea that the place of physical education in the curriculum can be justified purely on the ground that it is instrumental in achieving non-physical goals. The approach gives the impression that physical goals are only one of a number of possible ends and are not necessarily intrinsic to the work. It fails to identify the formally distinctive character of the subject; namely, its concern to explore and extend pupils' physical capacity for its own sake.

Through work in physical education children develop their movement skill and in so doing are introduced to a number of physical activities that are regarded by many as worthwhile pursuits. By neglecting the primacy of the body in physical education, the tripartite approach has failed to highlight the unique contribution the subject can make to education. Instead it has given added credence to a whole range of extrinsic goals.

There is no doubt that ends extrinsic to the actual improvement of physical abilities can be, and are, achieved by imaginative, perceptive and caring teachers. By their own example they can do much to foster attributes such as respect for persons and for moral standards. The adoption of particular teaching strategies may contribute to the development of a range of valuable capacities such as communication skill and personal goal-setting. And the nature of the work done can, in certain contexts, encourage determination, perseverance and the positive response to challenges. These extrinsic goals are not the central concern of physical education, however, but merely outcomes of ways in which teachers guide pupils to be engaged in movement tasks. If they were to become the chief goals of physical education teachers,there would be a danger that the child's movement capacities would be treated as of only minor importance. For example, if teachers were to employ strategies with the over-riding objective of developing verbal communication skills, the promotion of skilful movement might well tend to become secondary and suffer in consequence. The subject would lose its unique focus and the attitude adopted towards movement would be comparable to that in curricular areas such as sculpture, handicraft, metalwork and carpentry. Here movement skill is needed in the service of other ends; while a constituent of these activities, it is simply a vehicle and

carries no value in itself.

Reliance on the instrumental value of physical education is common, and there is evidence of this approach in a recent HMI paper. This opens with a brief paragraph stating that the aims of physical education are "concerned with the development of psychomotor competence in order to facilitate participation in worthwhile activities during the critical years of puberty and maturity to adulthood".[12] The second paragraph proposes that the curriculum should address a wide range of areas of experience, being the "aesthetic and creative, ethical, linguistic, mathematical, physical, scientific, social and political and spiritual". The paper then moves into its first major section, which discusses how physical education can contribute to each of these areas of experience. While it does return subsequently to consider the physical area in more detail, its order and emphasis reveal the continued need that is felt to legitimize the subject on non-physical grounds.

The persisting reference to extrinsic ends can be seen as an attempt to justify the subject in an educational environment which puts excessive value on the intellect and has little faith in the value of the physical dimension as such. These references, however, raise questions as to the integrity of physical educators. One cannot help but suspect that they are content to 'sell' their subject on extrinsic grounds, but do not practice it for the sake of them. They draw back from adopting the methods which would best achieve the extrinsic ends they cite. They are reluctant to abandon the kind of teaching which focuses specifically on the development of movement competence or on the acquisition of those movement skills that are constitutive of the activity they are teaching. Yet they still persist in justifying physical education solely or chiefly by reference to

these extrinsic ends to which they suppose it to be conducive. This discrepancy between theory and practice further undermines respect for physical education in the educational world.

In summary: the threefold approach to the potential of physical education does little to dispel the confusion caused by the wide variety of aims put forward for the subject. It does not succeed in convincing others of the value of the subject and it does not clarify for the profession the direction its work should take. The profession remains confused and is now showing a sense of unease and a loss of self-confidence. Teachers feel threatened by pronouncements that seem to involve the surrender of the very heart of their enterprise. They sense that the integrity of their subject is being betrayed by members of their own profession, and feel that the profession is becoming divided against itself.

Yet in practice - as contrasted with the realm of justification, there is little real division. In practice most teachers take the development of movement ability as their central role and structure their work to this end. What they lack is not unity, but confidence in their ability to articulate and justify their common belief in the intrinsic value of fostering man's bodily potential. There have been occasional exhortations, however, for the profession to highlight the unique experience physical education offers, but these have passed unheeded. One such by Curl is so unusual in its approach and force that it is worth quoting almost in full. "What price physical education," he writes "without its phenomenal characteristics; its prolific range of perceptual qualities, its vivid tactile, aural and kinaesthetic experiences, its multiplicity of plastic forms, shapes and patterns, its felt muscular tensions and power, its sensations of explosive speed, lift off and flight, its abundance

of textures, temperatures, colours and keen encounters ...? These qualities, intense, personal and immediate, are the basic stuff of physical education; they are the core-content of all its activities.

And yet when we examine the current justifications for physical education, what do we find? We find a medley of remote extrinsic aims: 'cognitive development', 'moral development', 'emotional development', 'social competence' and the like. Where in these bloodless categories is there any reference to the sheer exhiliration of total bodily involvement in motion, or to the profusion of acute perceptual qualities in performance, or to the keen satisfaction of physical contact with the environment? - Nowhere!" [13]

There is no doubt that members of the profession itself as well as a significant minority of the general populace, do find physical activity personally rewarding and meaningful for its own sake. This is shown in their unflagging commitment to physical pursuits, their willingness to adapt their life patterns to accommodate regular participation, and their preparedness to incur considerable expense to sustain this involvement. But this commitment by a minority has not persuaded educationists of the value of physical activity, nor is it likely to. The profession has to produce a convincing case for the particular significance of its subject. Given the general lack of respect there is for the bodily dimension, the argument will have to include a persuasive exposition that identifies for the body a central, not a peripheral, role in existence. The task is therefore a major one, encompassing aspects of ontology as well as a detailed investigation of the ways in which the body contributes to human life as we know it.

Physical educationists, however, are not alone in their belief in the significance of the bodily dimension. Jean-Paul Sartre and

Maurice Merleau-Ponty are two philosophers who have given detailed consideration to this dimension. Their views will now be examined with a view to enlisting their aid for achieving an understanding of the bodily dimension and an adequate justification of physical education.

Section 2

The centrality of embodiment

in existence as being-in-the-world.

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are identified with the schools of Existentialism and Phenomenology respectively. Existentialism with its roots in the work of Kierkegaard, and Phenomenology which can be traced back to Brentano, each have distinctive fundamental concerns, but at the same time share some similar beliefs. The potential congruence between the views of these schools can be seen in the ways in which the work of the two philosophers overlaps. Sartre adopts an existentialist approach but uses phenomenological methods in parts of his work. Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, sees philosophical investigation as phenomenological but holds certain existentialist views. While there is general agreement in many areas of their work, there are also differences in opinion over some issues. These differences, however, generally represent alternative perspectives, and rather than being problematic serve to illuminate a range of possibilities in certain situations.

The significance of the bodily dimension rests, for both philosophers, on the belief that man is by nature 'being-in-the-world.' His existence is realized and sustained in intimate relationship with the world. This view is central to Existentialism and Phenomenology but develops from a different standpoint in each case. For existentialists the claim relates to their views on the nature of man's consciousness and the initial non-existence of his essence. Man's consciousness could be described as an openness on the world, which characteristically displays a 'directedness towards something' or intentionality. In 'taking up' features of the world the intentional consciousness issues in phenomena. Consciousness can only realise itself in the form of phenomena, and so is dependent upon the world for existence. Sartre couples his conception of consciousness as intentional with the notion that it is, at root, a

nothingness. Again consciousness as a void, must be taken up with features in the world to maintain its being. He describes the for-itself, or consciousness as ever engaged in the endeavour to surpass itself towards the world.Consciousness as nothingness, then, relies on intentionality to bring it into being. Merleau-Ponty elaborates the notion of intentionality. He argues not only that man's consciousness displays a need to develop a relationship with the world, but that his whole manifest self is drawn into commerce with the world. He maintains that man exhibits a form of corporal intentionality. This unusual attribution to man's embodiment will be examined in the next section.

Existential philosophers also maintain that man must be in the world because it is in his liaison with his surroundings that his essence is realised. For the existentialist existence precedes essence, so that man depends on his relationship with the milieu in which he exists to create a nature for himself. An existent as it were, brings little into the world, and has to rely on transactions with what is already in the world to build his essence. These transactions are in the form of projects. Projects issue from man's reading of the world as holding potential for development or change. They form an important link between the existent and his environment and demonstrate the persistently active relationship between man and the world.

A project is initiated when an individual operates in relation to an aspect of the world that offers the possibility for change in a direction the individual deems appropriate to his ends. For example, a man may see a house up for sale, and decide that to move to this area of town would be most advantageous to his family. He therefore puts into operation all those negotiations and arrangements that are necessary for him to purchase, and move into, the house.

His project to move house will give rise to the various changes in the world which were necessary for its realization.

The phenomenologists conception of man's essential nature as 'being-in-the-world' develops from the view that the key to understanding existence lies in an examination of human experience. Human experience, is, at root, the issue of man's awareness of himself within his surroundings. Therefore the world as the perpetual backdrop to man's existence makes an indispensible and continuous contribution to his experience. To uncover these fundamental aspects of existence the phenomenologist is concerned to examine man's perceptions of the world. This investigation presents a particular challenge because it must in no way "decompose our relationship with the world";[1] rather it must reveal our living articulations with our surroundings. It must strive towards reachieving our "direct and primitive contact with the world".[2] For the phenomenologist man and the world are interdependent and inseparable. They exist together, in their different ways, in a "creative dialectical"[3] liaison. "The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects".[4] There is a sense in which man and the world rely on each other for their generation and clarification. Man is not an unchanging given, he is an imaginative being, whose dealings with the world effect a change in him and develop his identity. The world on its part is neither totally indeterminate nor fully determinate. Its relatively indeterminate nature gains determination as a result of its involvement in man's projects.

While Sartre would be in agreement with Merleau-Ponty concerning the critical role that the world plays in existence, he would be

unable to support the degree of intimacy between man and his environment advocated by phenomenologists. This is because one of his fundamental tenets is that there is a nothingness separating beings-for-themselves and beings-in-themselves. Beings-in-themselves are the givens of the world. They do not exhibit intentionality, they are solid and passive, unable to initiate any change themselves. Man, conceived as being-for-itself, is of an entirely different nature, and because of this he is unable to achieve any identification with the world, and stands quite separate from it. Sartre would not agree that the void he describes as being between consciousness and the world threatens the establishment of a relationship the one with the other. On the contrary, he explains, it is necessary for their contact. This is because the for-itself can only come to know things that it separates from itself by, as it were, interposing a nothingness between itself and them. Furthermore this knowledge of things that are other than the for-itself, also plays an important part in underlining the radical difference between the two modes of being. In comparing its own nature to that of beings-in-themselves, the for-itself finds at its own core no solid mass, but only a restless active emptiness. For Sartre, then, the liaison with the world is between a pure negativity and a pure positivity across a gap of nothingness. Merleau-Ponty doubts that there could be any relationship whatsoever if the situation is as Sartre describes. He says "From the moment that I conceive of myself as negativity and the world as positivity, there is no longer any interaction. I go with my whole self to meet a massive world: between it and myself there is neither any point of encounter nor point of reflection, since it is Being and I am nothing."[5]

In contrast to Sartre's views, Merleau-Ponty proposes that man and the world are manifest in a common form, and are composed of a common element he calls 'flesh'. Such a close compatibility of their natures is, in his opinion, a condition of their actual intimate communion.

Despite this variation of opinion there is agreement between the philosophers concerning the role of the world in man's existence. Both suggest that although man is born into a pre-existing world environment, this same world would be without coherence or meaning if it were totally devoid of man. It is man's perception that brings order into the world. The nature of a pre-perceptual, incoherent world is somewhat elusive, because our every perception of the world renders it meaningful. Our normal conception of the perceived world is perhaps best understood as that of a wide-ranging phenomenon. The world as a phenomenon is an issue of the relationship between the perceiver and the perceived. The perceiver gives coherence to the world as he moulds it into an interrelated environment. The perceiver is 'engaged' in the world and as a correlate to this, the world is 'situationalized'. Wherever man is he structures his environment into a 'situation'. Each particular individual is always the focal point around which the situation is organized and by reference to which the significance of the situation is understood. Situations are characteristically rich with potential for change, and are structured with respect to the projects they afford to the focal individual. My situation is grasped as a display of possible projects I could take up. Sartre describes objects in the world as having meaning displayed as a 'lack-to-be-made-good', even though this seems to contradict his description of things as pure plenitude. His suggestion that beings-in-themselves display a lack, aligns with

Merleau-Ponty's view that things are present as 'porous reality'. Merleau-Ponty does not support Sartre's description of things as beings-in-themselves, however. A thing can be nothing **in** itself because whatever characteristic or meaning it has, has been bestowed upon it by the perceiver. "The thing is inseparable from a person perceiving it, and can never be actually in-itself, because its articulations are those of our very existence".[6] Sartre's position here is ambiguous. Clearly he does see each perceiver as contributing something to the perceived and this is exemplified in his description of the way in which an individual perceives the world in general. He likens the perceived world to an instrumentally charted territory and although this "'hodological map' depends to an extent on external brute matter, and is hence the same for all people, it is also in part dependent upon a constituting consciousness".[7] Although it would appear that this description of the world in general could open up an area of close agreement between the philosophers, in fact it heralds a marked difference in perspective. Merleau-Ponty focuses on the similarities between individuals' maps and builds a picture of a shared world, while Sartre highlights the difference and proposes that these can initiate competition between individuals. The implications of these two perspectives will be elaborated shortly.

Notwithstanding their somewhat different perspectives, the two philosophers would concur that life cannot be otherwise than an "inherence in the world".[8] And this world in which existence materializes is not to be viewed as merely a functional milieu, involved only in objective support services such as the provision of oxygen and food. It is the basis for all human capacities and the ground of the significances man finds in his life experiences.

If life is at root being-in-the-world, and if our existence is

realized as an intimate relationship with the world, clearly that dimension of ourself through which this liaison is accomplished is of central importance. This dimension must have a form compatible with the world, a form through which we can readily achieve contact with our surroundings. Our embodiment is this dimension, the key that opens the door to a world of meanings. Existentialists and phenomenologists support the significance of the body on these grounds. Sartre expresses the opinion that "the very nature of the for-itself demands that it be body",[9] and further argues that the body is essential to the existence of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty explains that "Neither the body nor existence can be regarded as the original of the human being, since they presuppose each other, and because the body is solidified and generalized existence, and existence is perpetual incarnation".[10] He also argues strongly for the importance of the body to our life in the world, and says that if it were not for our body we would have no world. Sartre's comment with reference to our bodily dimension that "the case could not be otherwise, for my being has no other way of entering into contact with the world except to "be-in-the-world",[11] sums up both philosophers views well.

The nature of the two modes of contact we have with the world is given with our embodied capacities to perceive and to act. These modes play a significant role in shaping experience and fashioning life - indeed it is these modes that enable existence as we know it to come into being. Much of both Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is built from the base of our actional and perceptual relationships with the world. Merleau-Ponty argues that the two modes are so intimately related that they are almost impossible to separate. While it is the case both that a range of perceptions ~~are~~ is always implicated in any action and that all action initiates a modification in perception, to

avoid complication these two relationship modes will be considered separately. This section will look at the actional relationship we have with the world while the next will consider how this relationship is forged through our perceptual capacities.

In developing a relationship with the world, we rely to a significant degree on our capacity to initiate actions. Indeed Sartre's conception of consciousness involves a notion of action without which the for-itself would be simply a nothingness. He expresses this belief when he writes "Human reality does not exist first in order to act later, but for human reality to be is to act, and to cease to act is to cease to be."[12] Consciousness must be ever striving to achieve plenitude by projecting itself <u>via</u> action to a particular end. It is a characteristic of human intentionality to create a meaningful context or situation for this action, and this context is perceived predominantly as a practical field. A field that invites embodied action and is itself changed by that action. Langan explains that "The only way a truly intentional ego can be is to be acting - that is by actually carrying out the task of structuring a field."[13]

Action, however necessary it may be, is inconceivable unless the agent and the acted upon can establish a relationship. Sartre suggests that we can interact with the world because we share a common attribute with beings-in-themselves, viz. instrumentality. He claims that our body as a potential instrument relates to things and features in the world as potential instruments. The relationship is in fact more complex than this. Our embodiment as instrument in a sense endows objects in the world with an instrumental quality, while at the same time objects, because of their potential for use, bring into being, or call forth, our embodiment-instrument. Merleau-Ponty

and Heidegger support our appreciation of objects in this way and refer to them respectively as manipulanda and zuhanden ('ready-at-hand'). Sartre develops the idea by suggesting that we organize the world into a coherent pattern by structuring it as an instrumental complex. This complex has the embodied individual as its centre and the features of the world radiating out from this point. The world-instruments refer to each other in terms of their potential use, like pathways of possible actions. The pathways are indicative of projects that could be undertaken by the focal individual, so that they not only flow from that individual but also refer back to him. In this way the individual's world is mapped out around him as an instrument complex offering him a wide range of possibilities. Sartre describes the world in this context as an "enormous skeletal outline"[14] of routes of our potential action.

Our embodiment as an active source is therefore responsible for our ability to come to "grips with the world."[15] Every perception of the world is structured into a meaningful system through the auspices of our embodiment. Our body as a central reference point is not characterized by disengaged, passive perception, rather it is a dynamic potency that brings the world to life. The embodiment-instrument as a centre of orientation "is in the world like the heart in an organism."[16] Sartre suggests that "the world from the moment of the upsurge of my for-itself is revealed as the indication of acts to be performed."[17] The claim that this revelation occurs automatically at birth opens up an area beyond the scope of this study, but it is not difficult to picture a situation in adult life where it is, acceptably, the case. For example a shopping area in which I am standing will be understood by me as a range of action possibilities all originating from my consciousness as its centre. My intentional

nature demands I take action, but what is it to be? The options are numerous. For example; ahead is the way I shall have to push and squeeze through the crowd as I climb a slight slope to buy meat. To the left is a route where I can walk with ease across a broad pavement, through doors that open automatically and over soft carpets to buy a whole range of items in the department store. To the right an awkward journey is promised. Along that way I shall have to stop at traffic lights to cross the main road, then cross a number of minor roads, all the time competing with other pedestrians to find space to walk in this busy area. But this journey holds the promise of a coffee at my favourite snack bar, and may yet be taken. Behind me is the place where I shall stand, tired, and heavily laden with shopping to wait for the bus.

These lines of action are constructed by the individual by linking together the separate features of the display, and so their formation depends upon his grasp of each of the separate features. The grasp of an object per se, is principally related to its instrument potential. It is not understood primarily as made of a particular material and as having a particular colour; it is appreciated in terms of its use to the embodied individual involved. For example, a handbag is perceived as a large protective container, an easily transportable receptacle. It is not initially viewed as of a particular breadth, weight and texture. The meaning of the object "is not compounded of a certain number of physical characteristics belonging to the object. It is first and foremost the aspect taken on by the object in human experience."[18] Each of the constituents of the shopping area needs to be understood similarly, as it were, in its own right, before it can be linked with others to form project routes. The shop door must be appreciated as offering the possibility of

entering a building, the pavement as an area to be walked along, the pelican crossing push button as a gadget to be pressed to assist the safe crossing of the road. The kerb is to be understood as a feature to be climbed up, or stepped down from, and the seat in the snack bar as an object to be sat on.

Each feature displays an instrument potential which, through retaining an underlying character, can accommodate considerable variation. The potential appreciated by an individual can vary on at least four counts. These are the juxtaposition of the object to other features, the embodied capacity of the perceiver, the previous experience the individual has with the object, and the current attitudes and intentions he holds in relation to it.

For example, the kerb outside my house, while still presenting the idea 'to be surmounted' more specifically signifies the lifting and carrying of the heavy wedges that I must put up against it to allow my car to mount it smoothly, and the complex manoeuvres of actually driving my car up and over it.

The kerb in the shopping area will have very different significancies for the disabled man than for an able-bodied man. For the former it will be viewed as a very significant feature, one that requires exact placement and control of his wheelchair, and a particular sequence of operating the levers to allow his chair to mount or descend from it.

The instrument potential and therefore an individual's understanding of an object will clearly depend on his capacity to use it. If he has no capacity to use an object it will normally have little action-meaning for him, and be unlikely to feature in his instrument complex. For example knitting needles could be

insignificant if I cannot knit, a tent could not be related to as having action potential if I have no knowledge whatsoever of how to erect it, and a tennis racquet would seem an incongruous object if I had never seen a game of tennis. Many of the impedimentia of western civilization would at first be a mystery to someone from a primitive society. A table lamp, a tape recorder, and a microwave oven would, for example, hold little promise beyond being capable of being carried.

The nature of an individuals previous experience with an object-instrument will also affect its meaning. A bicycle, for someone who has failed to learn to ride it, despite repeated attempts, will be an awkward unstable object to be avoided. A pair of skis to an international skier will be associated with, for example, movement precision and exhilaration.

Finally, objects, and indeed one's whole situation, will vary in its instrument potential in relation to one's current intentions. A seat in an open paved area of the shopping precinct is a welcoming resting place, when I calmly approach it with twenty minutes to wait for the bus. That same seat is an annoying obstacle as I rush through a crowd to catch the bus.

It would seem acceptable to claim that both our world environment, comprising a complex of features and objects, as well as individual objects, realize much of their meaning for us on account of their instrumental potential. Merleau-Ponty describes objects as being 'poles of action', as having character on account of the ways in which they could become involved in our projects. The body as focal instrument has a key role to play in the meaning we give to our surroundings. The body "is the fabric into which all objects are woven."[19] Our embodiment can therefore be viewed as a significant vehicle in bringing us into contact with the world and in giving

coherence and meaning to the world.

Man's action capacities not only endow the world with meaning but also provide the ground for his freedom - an important aspect of existence for Existentialists and Phenomenologists. Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty regard the embodied capacity for action as a pre-condition of freedom. Sartre endorses this in explaining that "my inapprehensible 'body' is the necessity that there be a choice at all."[20] The immensely wide choice of action that we have is in part afforded by the combination of man's nature as a versatile instrument and his ability to appreciate the world as a versatile instrumental complex. Both our embodiment and the world are seen as essential constituents of freedom. Merleau-Ponty goes so far as to imply that the world has more to offer to our freedom than we have ourselves. "My actual freedom is not on the hither side of my being but before me in things."[21] It is thought provoking to reflect that it is the world that is more often seen by man as militating against his freedom - not himself. However from the standpoint of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty this is not the case. For them it is always we ourselves who designate part of the world as an obstacle. The world of itself is never an impediment. It is only in the context of a chosen project that features in the world take on the character of difficulties to be surmounted. For example, neither a broad river between myself and my home, nor the impossibility of obtaining a visa to visit Yugoslavia are automatically impediments to my life. They only become obstacles if I so choose to involve them in a project. That is, if I decide I must reach home urgently and am confronted with the challenge of either swimming directly across the river, or driving, at speed, the twelve miles to my home via the nearest bridge. Equally obtaining a visa will become a difficulty

should I determine to visit my dying cousin in Yugoslavia. Features in the world are of themselves neutral and "There is, then, ultimately nothing that can set limits to freedom, except those limits that freedom itself has set in the form of its various initiatives, so that the subject has simply the external world that he gives himself."[22]

On a purely body-instrument level, features of the world can become obstacles because I do not have the capacity to act as I would wish in relation to them. The deep ravine in front of me is a bar to my progress because I cannot jump over it, the hill in front cuts short my walk on account of my lack of stamina. It is of course true, that had I not decided to hike from my home to my friend's, I would not have brought these frustrations upon myself. It does seem to be the case that we do constitute for ourselves the obstacles we encounter.

Having established that man is a free agent the philosophers then elaborate on the nature of human freedom. The pictures they paint are somewhat different. Sartre's view revolves around his conviction that every decision must be taken anew as each situation arises, while Merleau-Ponty is especially interested in the fact that decisions are normally arrived at in the context of past action, past situations.

Sartre's position rests on his belief that existence is characteristically played out between a consciousness that is at root a nothingness and a world that is perceived as pervaded with lacks; as an "always future hollow."[23] Life is to be a totally unfettered journey, a continuous act of completely free choice. The relations established between the self and the world through previous decisions and projects are not seen, necessarily, as to be retained and

developed. There is a sense that they are dissolved prior to every new choice and may well not be re-established. A totally new relation may be forged with the world. A truly authentic relation develops from a choice freely taken. Merleau-Ponty does not endorse this notion of freedom on the grounds that it would make of existence an incoherent sequence of unrelated episodes; a series of "heroic choices constantly maintained."[24] Merleau-Ponty himself sees human freedom not so much as a denial of relations, but as very much concerned with developing a relationship with the world. Freedom is a possibility, he argues, not because of any lack in the world, but rather on account of the world's substance. He talks of the world beckoning us to become involved with it and as presenting challenges, problems waiting to be solved. The world invites us to interact with it, to act on it. It is perhaps the case that the two philosophers views on the nature of our action relation with the world are not very far apart, in that for Sartre a feature is apprehended as incomplete, lacking, as not yet what we want it to be, whereas for Merleau-Ponty it is positively endowed, offering the possibility of action. However Merleau-Ponty develops his notion of our engagement in a situation and the influence of this on our action decisions in a direction that moves further away from Sartre's position. He argues that by the very fact that we are engaged in a situation our freedom of choice is to an extent necessarily defined by the possibilities of that situation. This does not deny us our freedom, rather the givens of the world make its realization possible. Describing man's involvement in the world he says that "without the roots it thrusts into the world it would not be freedom at all."[25] Freedom is not total indeterminism but rather the interplay between an indefinite world and a being "with the power to meet the givens of (his) situation, with a maximum of

interpretative range."[26] It is man's ability to reflect on the world and appreciate a wide range of possibilities from its display that is significant in his freedom.

Merleau-Ponty is not only prepared to modify the notion of total freedom on account of the givens of any situation, he is also happy to see it affected by what he calls 'sedimentation'. Sedimentation could be described as the impressions left by previous perceptions and actions. It is the understanding and knowledge we have of features in the world as a result of past experiences. As such it colours all our subsequent dealings with these features in that they may have augmented meaning for us. Merleau-Ponty suggests that, in some way, the instances of our previous encounters are left as traces on the features of the world themselves. Objects and situations are understood in part in terms of their involvement in previous action encounters. The world not only provides a foothold for freedom it also incorporates the footprints of earlier projects. It will be seen subsequently that these footprints are aligned with embodied capacities that cluster with others to form the individual's corporeal schema or totality of embodied actional abilities.

Sartre sees the notion of sedimentation as unacceptable and leading inevitably to a loss of true freedom. Existence for Sartre's individual, according to the view he expresses in Being and Nothingness, must be accepted as independent of the past, it must be lived in 'anguish', in the awesome realization of our responsibility to accept the challenge of total freedom. Merleau-Ponty rejects this view, asserting that a relationship to one's past can and does exist alongside a definite freedom of choice. He writes "The rationalists' dilemma: either the free act is possible, or it is not - either the

event originates in me, or is imposed on me from outside, does not apply to our relations with the world and our past. Our freedom does not destroy out situation but gears itself to it; as long as we are alive, our situation is open, which implies both that it calls up specially favoured modes of resolution and also that it is powerless to bring one into being itself."[27] He does not feel it a threat to freedom to acknowledge that we have developed, through previous experience, an attitude towards the world which achieves a somewhat privileged status. This attitude endows our understanding of a situation with a sort of atmosphere and this influences the nature of our decisions in its context. Sartre would argue that it must always be up to the individual to decide whether he chooses to capitalize on past experiences. In the light of a current dilemma an individual may well choose to disregard previous experience, because for Sartre, "it is the future that decides whether the past is living or dead."[28]

While this siutation is conceivable, it would seem that our past experiences, contributing as they have to our current essence, will always play a part in our decision making. Sartre, it seems, is taking an extreme position to warn us against the unthinking perpetuation of old choices. The truly authentic individual must make the choice anew each time. He must not presume that the facts considered relevant on a previous occasion are necessarily pertinent in a new situation. The choice could well be to build on previous decisions, but the choice must be freshly made without prejudice. For Merleau-Ponty the stress is on how we use past experience in our interests; "liberty is not an ability to create anything out of nothing but to build beyond my past by reordering it into new sense, through the use of the initiative I possess."[29] Via sedimentation,

a present builds from previous presents in decisions that herald the future. In this way he is striving to establish for man a conditional and rational,yet real, freedom, that lies between complete determinism and the total awesomefreedom to which Sartre's individual could be seen to be condemned.

Sartre does respond, in part, to this criticism by putting forward the idea that an individual's life could be directed, to a degree by a 'fundamental choice', or 'original project'. This central intention is reaffirmed each time a further choice is made that is commensurate with its ends. But although this eventuality is a possibility, it is to be understood that this original project carries no privileged weight in decision making. It can be abandoned at whim. Merleau-Ponty, somewhat similarly, develops the idea of the 'fundamental choice', but refutes the Sartrean view concerning the ease with which it can be disregarded. He suggests that while an 'original project', can be modified, this change is usually gradual and over a fairly long period of time. For example a person could be a strong supporter of his trade union and its policy. He works strictly to shift rota timetables, will not countenance doing a job not designated to his position, supports all union claims for better work conditions and pay, and follows directives about the crossing of picket lines. However at some point in his career, he may begin, every so often, to arrive at work a little early, or stay on after he should have left. He may quickly complete a small maintenance job, assigned to a colleague, in the interests of productivity. He may begin to question the wisdom of the size of certain pay claims, and he may have to be restrained by workmates from attempting to cross a picket line. His loyalty to the management may gradually begin to prevail over his previous union allegiance, and eventually

he may adopt a new guiding principle for his decisions - that of the furtherance of his company's viability. Langan describes this gradual process succinctly by saying "my present will - acts can chip away at the sedimented weight of habits and predispositions... I can use parts of my experience against other parts, thus laboriously changing the historical course"[30] along which I had seemed to be set.

Sartre for whom freedom is a more central issue than it is for Merleau-Ponty, goes to some length to describe the consequences of a man's abdicating from his responsibility to use his total liberty. Where an individual does not exploit his privilege of completely free choice he is destined to live in 'bad faith'. This is a comple: notion, but it can be divided broadly into two areas. An individual can abdicate from his responsibility either by letting others make decisions for him, or by allowing himself to be ruled by elements of his facticity. In the first case the individual would take no initiative himself but would simply follow the crowd or do as others told him. Alternatively he could live out the image other people have given him, and not attempt to develop or change in any way. Referring to the second possibility of living in bad faith, Sartre uses to term 'facticity' to cover the contingent givens that are present at any time in our life. These include the culture and family into which we have been born, our past and our embodiment as a given being-in-itself object in the world. An individual would therefore be living in bad faith if he accepted unquestioningly the values and norms of his society, and lived solely by reference to these. Equally if he dwelt on the past and let his previous experience dominate his life, he would not be capitalizing on the potential of his human freedom. Should he become preoccupied, for

any reason, with his material body for its own sake, again he would be living in bad faith. This last comment casts doubt upon the authenticity of the practice of physical education, and will need to be examined further in a subsequent section.

So far it has been seen that, for Existentialists and Phenomenologists, the body plays a highly significant role in bringing existence into being through enabling contact to be made between the individual and the world. The actional capacities of the body were seen to play a major part in giving meaning to the world and in furthering man's freedom. Three more contributions that these capacities make to existence can now be outlined. These are concerned with the way in which the embodied individual-in-the-world comes to know himself, comes to know the Other and finally attempts to establish a co-existence with others in the world.

As has been intimated in Merleau-Ponty's idea of sedimentation, each individual perceives the world in terms of the nature of his previous interaction with it. The world for me has, in fact, the meaning I have given it, and as a consequence the meaning that I perceive in my surroundings is self-revelatory. The world, as my personal action arena, reveals to me certain characteristics of my nature. Both philosophers agree that in a subtle way the world could be said to be a mirror of ourselves. We are engaged in self-structured situations and in appreciating these we come to know ourselves. Sartre writes that "My being-in-the-world by the sole fact that it realizes a world, causes itself to be indicated to itself as a being-in-the-midst of the world, by the world it realizes."[31]

The identification of our capacities and potential through our relationships with the environment is plausible when reflected on, but is passed over in everyday life. On a broad , and perhaps

principally prereflective level this dialectical relationship tends to be self perpetuating. For example, acting in a particular setting I feel at ease, and so return often, thus coming to know it more thoroughly and bringing to the fore capacities in myself that enable me to relate to it effectively. An instance could be as follows. On attending a debating club for the first time, I find that I can express myself fluently without a prepared paper. In my new found confidence I return to the club regularly and discover that, as well as being able to make my case cogently, I have the capacity to persuade others to adopt my point of view. I become a permanent member of the club. On the other hand, if I found on my first visit to the club that I am unable to make any contribution to the debate and am scorned by the other members I am unlikely to return. It may be that in both cases this situation in the world reveals something of my nature and abilities to me. This would be so if in both instances I had reflected on my experience and on whether to return to the club; but I might view the experience simply in terms of general enjoyment and satisfaction and not become aware that this aspect of the world had brought into play certain aspects of myself of which I had previously been unaware. We often do describe experiences simply in terms of our likes and dislikes of them without realising that in most cases our views are dependent on how far we have been able to operate effectively in the situations we have encountered. To say "I did not enjoy my piano lesson.", probably means that I was unable to fulfil the demands that were asked of me.

In the majority of instances the prereflective dialectic we have with the world passes unnoticed. There could be occasional instances, however, when we stand back and realise aspects of

ourself through reflecting on our preferred environments. An example could be where we have been gradually changing an attitude, without our being explicitly aware of our realignment. Our new attitude may at last be revealed as we reflect on our somewhat revised situations and projects. As an ardent conservationist I would save all forms of reconstitutable materials, conserve energy sources where ever possible, eat only what is necessary to my basic bodily needs and arrange my commitments around attending the various meetings and marches to further my cause. However on promotion to a new job where I have more money and less time, I begin to be less particular in respect of saving materials and fuel, I indulge in extravagent meals and find my diary too full to accommodate many meetings. I may still profess to hold my strong conservationist views - that is - until the day that I stand back and reflect on the world-situations my life is played out in, and realize that their every manifestation announces that my interests now lie elsewhere.

Irrespective of how far we live our relationship with the world reflectively, it seems reasonable to say that we become aware of many of our characteristic strengths and weaknesses through our dealings with the world. In line with their Existential views both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty underline the fact that we can only realize ourselves with reference to the world. Despite his earlier remarks on an underlying incompatibility of ourselves as beings-for-themselves and the world as comprising beings-in-themselves, Sartre takes our relationship to the world to its ultimate and explains that the for-itself is nothing other than its situation in the world. At the start of Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty writes that there is no inner man, man is in the world and only in the world does he know himself."[32] In the concluding chapters he develops this view and says "Both

universality and the world lie at the core of individuality and the subject, and this will never be understood as long as the world is made into an object. It is understood immediately if the world is the field of our experience, and if we are nothing but a view of the world."[33]

Not only does the world reflect our general capacities and propensities, but also highlights our more specific embodied capabilities. This view can be seen to develop from Merleau-Ponty's earlier point concerning objects being viewed principally as poles of action. Objects in the world, he argues, are not generally perceived as inert 'beings-in-themselves', but present themselves as manipulanda 'to be taken hold of', 'to be written with', 'to be sat on'. He ascribes this action-potential characteristic to objects on account of the effects of sedimentation. There is a sense in which our previous contact with things has left its mark on them. Things are always grasped in terms that incorporate a halo of our past dealings with them. By writing that things <u>are</u> correlates of our possible action with or on them, and that the body, as a dynamic centre of action "is the fabric into which all objects are woven",[34] he is suggesting that the nature of any object in the world will have an instrument-relation underpinning. Any object therefore automatically reveals to a particular individual his physical ability to relate to it. Merleau-Ponty writes "it is through my relation to things that I know myself".[35] This relationship is a subtle two-way process, usually carried out without reflection. In a sense our embodied dimension, incorporating a particular instrument potential and experience, 'reads' its environment in terms of action and projects commensurate with its powers. The environment, for its part, could be seen to reflect back to the

individual his instrument-capacities and so present him with a picture of himself as an agent with a particular embodied potential.

My embodied interaction with the world not only contributes to the awareness I have of myself; it also plays a role in others coming to know me. Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are of the opinion that the Other comes to know me as I am viewed in the context of my situation. The Other understands my intentions both through my actions and the way in which I relate to the world. I am usually apprehended in dynamic relation to the environment. If I am seen in the shopping area rushing between shops, wearing a worried expression, accruing endless packages and glancing repeatedly at my watch, others may build up a picture of me as ill-organized, harassed and in a panic. If on the other hand I am often to be seen wandering slowly from shop window to shop window, never buying any goods, and sitting for hours in the cafe, they could well designate me as aimless or lazy or perhaps relaxed.

In a similar way I come to know others as actively embodied in the world. Taking into cognizance the Other's immediate environment, I understand his behaviour as he defines his interests and projects in his actions. "To perceive the Other is to make known to oneself what he is by means of the world".[36] Merleau-Ponty describes how this is possible by pointing out that in the same way as we gather up information about ourself from our situations, we can glean from the environment the beginnings of a picture of the Other. "Myself is arrayed before me like any other thing and my consciousness constitutes it and is not enclosed within it, so that it can without difficulty constitute other (my)selves."[37] It is suggested that this can occur even if the Other is not present. For example if we go into a room exclusively used by someone, we see an assortment of

items, set out in a certain arrangement. It is certainly the case that we have a sense of the habitual occupant as we survey this display. Sartre would agree with Merleau-Ponty when he says that "we feel a close presence of others in objects".[38] While every 'presence' is different, our initial access to the Other via objects is afforded by our common mode of embodiment. Because he has a body-instrument akin to our own, his action relationship with things will be similar, although never identical, to that which we enjoy. We 'read' the Other in objects through the common denominator of our embodied potential. Merleau-Ponty says that once we are aware of the nature of our embodied relationship to the world as a form of action-liaison we have no problem in comprehending the existence of others. "If I experience this inhering of my consciousness in its body and its world, the perception of other people and the plurality of consciousnesses no longer presents any difficulty."[39]

On this view the relationship each individual has through his embodiment with the world would seem to play a significant role in people coming to understand each other. The world acts as a link between individuals, a reference point in their coming to know each other. Through our common mode of embodiment we can appreciate the meaning the Other perceives in aspects of the world. We may not be able to attain the Other's instrument relationship with certain objects, but from our common stand point his perspectives and intentions are no anathema to us. This ability to comprehend the Other through his relationship with objects has been greatly facilitated by our creation of a cultural world. Merleau-Ponty describes this world as to a large extent composed of objects made by man for man. We have constructed an instrument complex par excellence. It is one that we can relate to immediately; a vast range of

instruments which reflect very accurately our embodied instrument-potential. It is perhaps an unfortunate state of affairs that man's ingenuity to match world-instruments to his body-instrument has made our involvement with the world less imaginative and less revealing of our individuality. There is perhaps a suggestion of bad faith in the conformity we exhibit in our existence in our vast man made, cultural world. It is however interesting to reflect, first that every community from the most primitive to the most advanced has constructed its own unique cultural world, and second that while these are very different none ~~are~~ *is* incomprehensible to us in twentieth century Western Europe. I suggest that it is, in part, our common embodied form that enables us to understand each other's worlds.

It is partly because of our ready appreciation of the world as seen from the view point of others that Merleau-Ponty depicts our common environment as a shared world. He further supports the notion of a shared world by asserting that the presence of others enriches our world. The Other can reinforce my appreciation of the world because through his actions I observe "a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the world."[40] In some cases the Other may add positively to the depth or breadth of meaning I perceive in the world. In the company of others, features of the world are appreciated in a new light, possibilities materialize that would otherwise have remained hidden.

Instances can be found that show both that others add new meaning to the world and that they can make a strange environment comprehensible. For example the untidy pile of unwanted cardboard and wooden boxes in my garden shed loses its nuisance coefficient when my nephew spends a whole morning using them to build dens and

forts, and my potentially boring, uneventful day becomes an opportunity to enjoy the company of unexpected, but welcome visitors. A situation that is baffling at first could arise, for example, when I am called on, at short notice, to deputize for a friend in time-keeping at a competition. I arrive at the appointed venue to find an amazing array of equipment laid out. Alone, I survey the scene and am quite unable to realize this as a situation for anyone to operate meaningfully within. However as soon as others arrive, assemble the apparatus and begin to practise, the scene is at once understandable and I readily play my part in the contest.

In contrast to Merleau-Ponty's view that our embodiment-as-instrument plays a part both in communicating with others via the world and in establishing the world as a shared environment, Sartre argues that our nature as a potential instrument is reponsible for our alienation from the Other and his world. This is a disturbing view in the context of physical education where the individual's embodiment-instrument is central to the development of interpersonal relationships. Sartre proposes that everyone creates his own situation in the form of a personal instrument complex. The focal individual strives to have total control over his situation, and nothing in the environment must militate against his central organization. Should two people simultaneously attempt to structure complexes in the same environment, each will try to be the dominant party and, as it were, dissolve the Other's situation in favour of his own. In this process each will try to designate the Other as pure instrument-object in his own complex. If the Other can posit me as an object, my complex or situation will be shattered. This is because objects or 'beings-in-themselves' do not 'have' situations, they are simply part of those of 'beings-for-themselves'. An encounter between

two people can therefore become a threatening experience.

Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, paints a vivid picture of this form of encounter. Initiated by the 'Look' - the moment each is aware he is seen by the Other - both parties will attempt to formulate the Other as an object in his own situation. Both are aware of what Sartre calls the 'shame' of being designated as a 'being-in-itself' and both struggle not to be the one so posited. It would seem here that Sartre is describing an extreme situation of a battle of wills between two people. Instances of this nature could occur when a truculent child confronts a parent, when a group of police arrive to break up a picket line and when two people have a violent argument in relation to an action decision that implicates both of them. Unlike Sartre's description of the 'Look' encounter, the examples above may include verbal interchange, however they do serve to indicate the type of confrontation he is highlighting. Closely related to this notion of an encounter as a potential threat is the view that there is no possibility of two situations co-existing in the same environment. The world cannot be shared. It is, for Sartre's individual in Being and Nothingness, a jealously guarded terrain, a situation that is "mine because it is haunted by my possibilities".[41] Although Sartre continues to present an extreme view and take a very pessimistic stand on the possibility of amicable co-existence, his descriptions are not without example.

Clearly conflict can arise either because there is a disagreement over the 'meaning' of a shared environment, or because an individual's project has so fashioned his situation that intrusion by certain others will seriously threaten his opportunity to capitalize on that situation. An example of the first would be a straight forward disagreement about the use of a common room. One

faction might see it as for quiet study, while another group views it as for leisure activities. Should both factions appear on the scene simultaneously, no doubt conflict will result! On a world level, dispute over the ownership of territory can initiate a war.

Examples of the second eventuality for the development of conflict are not hard to find, but they do appear to be the exception rather than the rule. An instance could be as follows. A car thief sees a row of parked cars in a quiet side street as a particularly lucrative prospect. The situation is, for him, ideal. The street is long, with cars parked in the central portion. He will have time to withdraw from the situation should someone appear. The street is little used, and as there are no houses on the street no-one is likely to be keeping a watchful eye on their car from a window. All the parking meters have over half an hour on them, and by chance many of the cars are parked facing the end of the street heading to the motorway intersection. Also the thief can see at leasttwo vehicles of a make his forged keys have successfully opened before. The scene is set. He fingers his keys in his pocket, and walks purposefully up to a car. However at that moment two men appear from a warehouse alongside the parked cars. At once the thief's world is shattered. It is no longer a lucrative prospect, but is potentially a scene of recrimination and arrest. His situation is unable to withstand the definition of the street given to it by the new arrivals.*

Two interesting points come out of this example. First it is the thief's world that is snatched away from him as a result of this confrontation between situations. Is this because he is in the wrong? Does the person whose situation is more legitimate always dominate? I suspect not. Secondly, the thief does not take up the

* Sartre uses an example, not dissimilar to this, of a peeping Tom to illustrate the notion of experiencing shame.

view of the environment held by the two men. So their reading of the situation does not dominate in the sense of converting everyone to their point of view. It dominates only so far as it shatters the thief's. Is this always the case? Again I suspect not, and examples could be found where one person defines a situation, and others are drawn into sharing this point of view. There are also cases where a sense of profound unease is created when two people meet and neither is sure whom is to define the situation.

An example somewhat parallel to that of the car thief clearly shows that conflict does not always issue from an encounter. If a woman had returned to her parked car in that same street, only to find she had been hemmed in by cars on either side of her, the arrival of two men on the scene would have been to her advantage. The men's appearance would indeed change the situation, but this time for the better. It is perhaps worthy of note that the thief had chosen to put himself in his precarious position, knowing full well the possibility of his situation being dissolved. A good many examples of encounters of this nature do seem to involve the decision of one party to expose himself to this threat.

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty both start from a similar position in looking at our relationship with others in the world. Man is seen as related to the world through his embodiment-instrument, and as giving meaning to it by 'reading' it as an instrument complex offering certain projects. Notwithstanding Sartre's concern with the unusual rather than the every day, his pessimistic views are not without significance and Merleau-Ponty could be critized for disregarding the potential dangers Sartre elaborates. However much of what Merleau-Ponty has to say about our existence in a shared world does align very readily with experience. It would seem to be

the case that we do not normally view the Other as a threat, nor do we treat the world as belonging solely to ourself. As a rule we accept without problem that we live in an intersubjective, common world. The projects and situations of others are so akin to our own experiences that the other's "world slips spontaneously into"[42] ours. We come to understand our shared world as the forum where our views, intentions and projects inter-relate, where they "engage each other like gears."[43] It must surely be the case that many situations are, in fact, discussed and established by a group of people to further a project common to them all. Together they will structure a small area of the world specifically to relate to the whole group. Here the shared environment will not only easily accommodate a number of people, but because of the fact that the others, in their dealings with it, will confirm my understanding of the situation, this part of the world will become a secure and welcoming place for me.

In his later work Sartre acknowledges both the possibility and importance of harmonious relationships with others. In What is Literature he refers to the positive liaison, or 'pact of generosity' that develops between an author and a reader, and he discusses how satisfying co-existence could develop in a socialist society. In some of his last articles, also, such as The Man with the Tape Recorder, On the Idiot of the Family and Self Portrait at Seventy he paints a picture very different to that in Being and Nothingness. He "not only sees intimate understanding as possible, he calls for it", and this understanding is to encompass "love, esteem and empathy."[44] In her examination of Sartre's views on interpersonal relationships Burstow points out that there are all the seeds in his earlier work of this later point of view. She explains that "non-conflict is clearly possible in Sartre. The problem is not the impossibility of non-conflict. but the pervasiveness of conflict."[45] The possibility

of conflict is all the more dangerous because, as Sartre can be seen to argue, in many ways we rely on productive relationships with others to realize our authentic potential to the full.

It is this situation of non-conflict that Merleau-Ponty highlights throughout his work. For him the sharing of the world adds richness to our situations and reveals latent meaning. "It is in the fusion of perspectives, in the coming together of intersecting lines, the paths of my experiences and the paths of others' experiences, that the world appears. The meaning of the world is to be found in that fusion of perspectives."[46] Our shared world is the common ground of our experience and understanding and as such is a vehicle of our communication with each other. Merleau-Ponty describes the world as an instrument we all play, and through which we realize contact with others. This analogy is very appropriate because it can be developed to issue in some aspects of our being-in-the-world. Each person can play the same musical instrument but produce a different melody - or life style. The individual can only achieve his fulfilment as a musician by playing an instrument. In the same way man cannot realize himself except in relation to the world. The instrument itself only comes 'to life' when it is played. The world is only given meaning in man's commerce with it. The melody can only come into existence when the musician and the instrument come together. Life is only a reality in the relationship of man with the world. The analogy breaks down in respect of the fact that a musical instrument usually only allows opportunity for one person to play it at any one time. However, this for Merleau-Ponty is the unique attribute of the world as instrument - it can be played, with a degree of harmony by innumerable people, simultaneously.

While it is not true that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are arguing

for a bodily existence per se, it would seem to be the case that they ascribe to our embodiment, with its instrument potential, a significant role in many aspects of our existence. Broadly our action potential is presupposed in our intentionality, our necessary contact with the world and the realization of our freedom. More specifically our embodiment-instrument can be seen to make an underpinning contribution both to our dealings with the world and to our coming to know ourselves and others. The body-instrument is a significant feature in existence as we know it. Had Merleau-Ponty lived to write the definitive version of "The Visible and the Invisible" it seems likely that he would have elaborated on this view. However he leaves a clear indication of his attitude to our embodiment in asserting in his working notes that "incarnation (is) no longer a difficulty, a fault in the clear diamond of philosophy, but the typical fact, the essential articulation of my constitutive transcendence."[47]

Section 3

The role of the embodiment

in man's perception of the world.

Man's characteristic nature as being-in-the-world has been considered in examining his 'actional' relationship with his surrounndings. The roots of this relationship were seen to lie in man's instrument capacity and his subsequent designation of the world as an instrument complex. Man as an 'action potential' is united to the world as an 'action arena'. While both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty recognize this 'instrument' mode of relationship, Sartre looks at it more widely than does Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty, having acknowledged this relationship, however, moves on to consider how it is established and maintained. His investigations lead him to broaden the concept of intentionality and to identify a previously little recognized seat of perception. In respect of both these suggestions he recognizes the embodiment as having a key role to play.

In considering the instrument relation to the world Merleau-Ponty proposes that it forms an integral part of all our perceptions, whether or not actual action takes place. If an object is surveyed but not physically 'taken up', the relationship remains latent, on the other hand if the object is practically used in some way our relationship to it is immediately actualized, revealed and reinforced. The relationship is elusive because, though ever present and on many occasions, actualized, it is usually taken for granted and is seldom reflected on. Merleau-Ponty describes our prereflective practical relationship with an object in the following way:- "...when we clasp a body with our hand we conform the hand to the size and shape of the body and thereby sense the body without having need to think of those movements of the hand".[1] He also says that we only have to encounter something to know how to relate to it instrumentally. This is the case even if our surroundings are not immediately familiar. For example, if I am all alone in a strange house at dusk, and a fuse blows,

I carry out my search for the fuse box and the wire without having to consider how to manage my embodiment in relation to all the features of the house. I open doors, I lift box lids, I climb stairs, I open drawers, I push up the loft cover, I unscrew a tin lid. My preoccupation is with my searching. On seeing things I know immediately both their potential in my search and how to manipulate them or manipulate myself in relation to them. It seems that my practical relationship with my surroundings is a constant prereflective feature of my experience.

Merleau-Ponty suggests that the action relationship we have with things is indicative of the fact that they are, in a certain dimension, meaningful to us. Things hold the potential to be significant, in that we can develop a productive practical relationship with them via our embodiment. For Merleau-Ponty the attribution of meaning is the purview of perception. He rejects the notion that meaning is "the work of a universal constituting consciousness"[2] and argues that things are not perceived because, through some intellectual operation, they are grasped as significant. It is the perceptual process itself which realizes meaning. Things are meaningful because they are perceived. Therefore if objects are appreciated as meaningful in a practical instrument-relation context it is in their perception that this grasp of them is achieved. The fact that much of this practical meaning attribution is perceptual and takes place on a prereflective level is no embarrassment to Merleau-Ponty. On the contrary it supports his thesis that perceptual operations span the reflexive and the non reflexive levels, and that much of significance is to be found on the prereflective level. He observed that individuals made immediate sense out of their experience and were able to live this experience without having to ponder the

significance of everything they met. He argued that our interaction with the world is prereflectively meaningful and that, if we could explain the perceptual operations on this level, our "existential index"[3] would be found. For Merleau-Ponty philosophy is the interrogation of perception and especially its functioning on the prereflective level. He sees it his task to "rediscover...that primordial layer at which both things and ideas come into being."[4]

In investigating the origins of practical meaning Merleau-Ponty proposes that our embodiment is to a significant degree responsible for its genesis. The suggestion that this dimension of ourself has a perceptual role is unusual and poses two problems for Merleau-Ponty. The first relates to intentionality and the second to the means by which our embodiment, as distinct from our five recognized perceptual 'senses' could endow things with a form of meaning.

The problem that confronts Merleau-Ponty in respect of intentionality, arises from his view that perception and intentionality are two perspectives of one phenomenon. It follows then that to whatever is attributed perceptual capacities must also be ascribed intentionality. The phenomenon to which the two are tied is the characteristic of man that demands he be taken up with features of the world in order to give himself being. Intentionality is the motivation that secures man's constant interaction with his surroundings, and perception is the resolution of this drive. The resolution is however only provisional, because intentionality is a restless activity for which any quiescence is merely transient. Intentionality is normally attributed to consciousness and to related notions such as mind and the for-itself. Its functioning involves the exercise of our perceptual and other mental capacities acting in relation to the environment as a whole. For Merleau-Ponty to propose that our

embodiment has an intentional role is clearly to widen the concept considerably. Sartre would reject the suggestion out of hand because intentionality is, for him, one of the features that differentiates between a being-for-itself such as consciousness, and a being-in-itself such as our embodiment. However it is of interest to note that, unlike Sartre, both Heidegger and Husserl left room for a more liberal view of intentionality. They described it, respectively, as 'an openness' and as the capacity that gives rise to the constitution of an object. If it is the case, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, that our embodiment has a role to play in contributing to the meaningful constitution of an object, then on Husserl's definition this dimension of ourself would be a candidate for possessing intentionality. In discussing the feasibility of this suggestion Merleau-Ponty cites our apparent need in childhood to be actively involved with the environment. It is as if we have a need to realize our incarnate presence with its diversity of capacities, and we do this by involving this dimension of ourself in a seemingly tireless interaction with our surroundings. This activity seems to be a mode of expression of man's need to be taken up with things in the world, in order to establish and realize his being there.

In proposing this attribution of intentionality to our embodiment there is to be no implication that it is merely an extension of the intentionality of the mind, or that it is in some way "consciousness inhabiting the body."[5] On the contrary Merleau-Ponty identifies it as a specific intentionality in its own right, an operative intentionality with the capacity to endow objects with operative meaning. He writes "Beneath the 'intentionality of the act', which is the thetic consciousness of an object, and which ... for example converts 'this' into an idea, we must recognize an 'operative' intentionality which makes the former

possible."[6] The intentional capacity exhibited by our embodiment is motivity, or the drive to be active. This drive relies on the motility of the embodiment. In fact, Merleau-Ponty attributes to motility a capacity to give meaning. Things have meaning, therefore, in relation to our motile being. In discussing his case Merleau-Ponty asserts "The body's motion can play a part in the perception of the world only if it is itself an original intentionality, a manner of relating itself to the distinct object of knowledge."[7]

Merleau-Ponty's second problem with respect to attributing perceptual capacities to our embodiment is to explain the means by which these operate. In investigating an experience of practical relationships he identifies a "natural correlation between appearances and our kinesthetic unfoldings, something not known through a law but experienced as the involvement of our body in the logical structures of a world."[8] The correlation takes place on a prereflective level and so is readily overlooked. An example could be the appearance of a flight of stairs. On perceiving these we have a sense of being ready, should we so decide, to mount them. They stir in us our potential for climbing them. This potential will be actualized should we decide to go upstairs. However if we decide otherwise and our attention is directed elsewhere, these 'kinesthetic' stirrings will subside. Merleau-Ponty writes that 'we understand the things as we understand a new kind of behaviour...by taking up on our own account the mode of existence which the observable sights adumbrate before us."[9]

To effect this identification Merleau-Ponty proposes that our embodiment has developed a construct of potentials that he calls the corporeal schema. The schema does not represent in any way a consciousness of our actual physical form, it is rather, a complex of capacities. If an individual was compared to the institution of a

school, then the corporeal schema would more resemble the school's authority structure, with its potential lines of action, than its physical presence in the form of various buildings.

The schema is not simply a collection of our practical potentials, it is a coherent and versatile whole, able to underpin all our relationships with the world. It "gives us at every moment a global, practical and implicit notion of the relation between our body and things, of our hold on them."[10] The corporeal schema is able to effect this relationship through its capacity to perceive the operative meaning of an object. The operative meaning of an object could be described as the blend and range of movements that can effect the establishment of a satisfactory and profitable practical relationship with that object, given its physical characteristics. In these terms the operative meaning of a lawn mower is clearly contrasted to that of an embroidery needle, and that of a flight of stairs very different to an icy pavement. The corporeal schema effects the appreciation of operative meaning through the identification of a parallel capacity of its own. "Things have an internal equivalent in me; they arouse in me a carnal formula of their presence."[11] Merleau-Ponty sees the perceptual functioning of the corporeal schema as effecting a dynamic interplay between our embodiment and our surroundings. There is a sense in which we respond to the 'call' of objects and at the same time "a system of possible movements or 'motor projects' radiates from us to our environment."[12] This reciprocal identification of operative potential with operative meaning is effected through the motivity of our embodiment which is the perpetual intentional drive of the corporeal schema. Unless we take up an object or feature in concrete interaction our embodiment holds this operative potential in silent readiness. Merleau-Ponty refers to

this covert 'knowledge' when he writes that we can only know our embodiment by living it. It is only when we engage our corporeality in our projects that it reveals all that it 'knows'.

The above description refers to the functioning of the corporeal schema with respect to objects with which we are familiar. A totally novel object would not have this effect of highlighting a particular operative potential. Novel objects would need to be practically related to before they would be able to 'stir' us at a distance.

We are not born with this dynamic construct of operative 'knowledge', however its progressive development is a corollary of our motivity. The young child exhibits very clearly a restless intentional urge to make contact with everything he meets. He has an insatiable need to handle, touch, push, pull, climb over and crawl under the things he finds in his environment. Merleau-Ponty writes that the child's early years are lost in his body. This is true in that the child is much preoccupied with physical interaction, but his investigations are far from 'lost'. The operative meanings with which he endows objects in his world stay with him throughout life as the operative potentials that are woven into his corporeal schema. The basic structure of the corporeal schema is formed in the child's early years of discovery. This is not to imply that the schema is a fixed complex that remains constant through life. Indeed, though certain potentials will be reaffirmed in our regular dealings with the world, many will undergo change. Some will be modified as we grow, mature and age. Others will be refined as we have to adjust to slightly different operative meanings of such things as a strange car or a new fountain pen. Other potentials will be realized as we meet new features in our environment - an innovative gadget or an

unfamiliar musical instrument. The corporeal schema is involved in endowing objects with operative meaning and these new perceptions become part of its complex of potentials, and subsequently play a part in future perceptions.

The schema is described as a versatile construct not only on account of its ready adaptation to modification but also by the varied uses it can make of its potentials. This is possible because an operative potential is a capacity of the total schema, not of just one physical component of our embodiment. Merleau-Ponty describes our embodiment as a 'synergic totality' and explains that "Each contact of an object with part of our objective body, is, therefore, in reality a contact with the whole of the present or possible phenomenal body."[13] We may endow an object with operative meaning because we have used it in a certain way with a particular body part. However the operative potential then accrued by the schema can be actualized by any part or parts of our embodiment. For example if we have experienced the weight of an object with our foot, we are able to pick it up with our hands and arms with exactly the appropriate effort. In a not dissimilar way the schema allows us to use an object or relate to a feature in a number of ways. For example, without any detailed deliberation we can manipulate a knife to cut, to lever open a lid, to act as a screw driver, a piercing instrument or even a hammer. The operative meaning of the knife remains the same through all these negotiations, however the parallel operative potential within the schema can be given expression in a wide range of forms.

It is of interest to note here that implicit in Merleau-Ponty's idea of a prereflective actional relationship with things is the suggestion that an extension of operative potential is usually achieved without any conscious application. Learning to use an

implement, for example, would seem to be a trial and error exercise, a prereflective search for the operative meaning of the object. Merleau-Ponty makes little reference to learning but in one of his rare comments he claims that in learning "nothing new is achieved, rather stimuli acquire the power to initiate a response."[14] The emphasis tends to be on the object achieving a motor significance rather than a new operative potential being established. This view of learning a motor response is very different from the approach adopted in physical education. In this context every detail of the movement is spelled out by the teacher and then consciously enacted by the pupil. This issue will be returned to in Section 5.

In considering the perceptual role of the corporeal schema Merleau-Ponty proposes that it is not only responsible for establishing a certain dimension of significance to individual things and features, but it also has a fundamentally important role in making sense out of the total 'actional' context of our existence. Our being-in-the-world is not realized solely in a liaison between ourself and objects, it is also experienced in a relationship with the totality of our environmental situation. As the instrument centre of an instrumental complex we are situated at a particular place, and comprehend our surroundings in their relation to us and to each other. This grasp of our situation as a meaningful spatial construct is attributed by Merleau-Ponty to the corporeal schema. Although vision, as will be discussed shortly, has a role to play in the perception of space, the groundwork of spatial understanding is dependent upon our motile capacities. "Motility is the primary sphere in which initially the meaning of all significances is engendered in the domain of represented space."[15]

In establishing ourself spatially there are two settings in which we have to come to terms with spatial factors. The first setting is

that of the immediate space in which our operative potential is played out. This is our lived space which is an indispensible dimension of the corporeal schema, in that it is the medium into which all our capacities are woven. The schema is a dynamic spatial construct and the space it makes part of itself at any time will be dictated by the nature of the current operative interaction of the embodiment. Merleau-Ponty explains that when a new operative meaning has been grasped we experience a 'dilation of space'. There is a sense in which the object we are relating to becomes an extension of our embodiment and so the extent of our lived space adjusts accordingly. He explains that "once a stick has become a familiar instrument, the world of feelable things recedes, and now begins not at the outer skin of the hand but at the end of the stick."[16] As we explore the operative meaning of an object or feature we come to terms with the spatial context of our involvement with it. The space we live when playing the piano, driving a car, rock climbing or swimming are all different and specific to that interaction. Through movement the extent of our lived space and our orientation within it are realized. The movement experience with its attendant spacial context becomes absorbed into the corporeal schema and is subsequently used in perception of the individual's own lived space.

Once this spatial situation has been mastered we can use it as a reference point from which to establish our self meaningfully in the second setting, which is the totality of our spatial environment. It is our experience of moving in the general space that is the key to our reading it as meaningful, to our coming "to grips with the world."[17] Our world, as we survey it is not an incoherent agglomeration of forms. It is an orderly and fully comprehensive panorama of objects and features that make sense because, in some way, we know that we could

operate satisfactorily within it. We can interpret what we see as an environment where, as embodied existents, we could function with confidence. Our appreciation of any fragment of the world is from our standpoint as embodied. The world is comprehensible only in so far as it is understood as a context for embodied operation.

Merleau-Ponty sees the corporeal schema as in some way able to translate this 'knowledge' of operative meanings into an intelligible spatial construct that stretches as far as the eye can see. For example the tricks of perspective are not disconcerting. We are not surprised that what appeared small from a distance, is, in fact, three metres square, nor that what we have just handled of a metre across appears minute at a distance. As a result of all our experience moving among things we have come to appreciate the concept of constancy of size. In a similar way we read the world as composed of three dimensional features, and any view of an object is immediately substantiated to give it depth and 'solid' form. If one object is masking aspects of another, we come to know that the latter does not stop at the point where the former presents itself. Merleau-Ponty refers to our ability to appreciate depth and the totality of object form as being able to adopt an aerial view. He expresses this notion somewhat figuratively in the following description. "There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also... that which reaches vision from above like the phenomenon of flight, of swimming, of movement."[18]

Our ability to complete objects is effective whatever angle we view them from. This capacity is closely related to that which enables us to take account of our own position with respect to perceiving our environment. From whatever angle we survey a situation we formulate a coherent scene. Unusual presentations of objects are

understood in the light of our current vantage point. The party game in which objects photographed from unusual angles and often greatly magnified have to be identified shows how puzzling it is to be confronted with such distortions outside the context of one's 'normal' embodied orientation. Yet in everyday life these distortions go by unnoticed, since we readily 'read' them from our current vantage point in the general context of the everyday world.

Merleau-Ponty extends the notion that the operation of our embodied dimension provides the ground from which perceptions of the world spring by proposing that concepts that refer to spatial relationships also share this parentage. We can comprehend the meaning of concepts such as in, under and beside because we have experienced similar juxtapositions between our embodiment and objects. "When I say that an object is **on** the table, I always mentally put myself in the table or in the object, and I apply to them a category which theoretically fits the relationship of my body to external objects."[19]

In discussing the way in which we give meaning to our surroundings, Merleau - Ponty reminds us that the meaning that we realize is not **the** universal blue print of the world. Everyone's world is, to an extent, unique because it is constructed from the standpoint of a unique embodiment, situated spatially at a point essentially peculiar to itself. The world I make sense of is always relative to my perspective on it. I am my own "Zero point or degree zero of spatiality, I do not see it according to its exterior envelope; I live it from the inside; I am immersed in it."[20] Because most of what we perceive arises in a spatial context, and because his belief is that our motility is fundamental to our understanding of space, Merleau-Ponty asserts that "it is by principle that every perception is movement."[21] I feel that this is a somewhat confusing claim. A more acceptable notion

would be one that states that all meaning that is realized in perception is essentially related to the perceiver as a mobile embodied existent. Merleau-Ponty intimates that he might agree with this proposition when he writes "For us to be able to conceive space it is in the first place necessary that we should have been thrust into it by our body."[22]

I find the notion of perception as meaningful in an essentially embodied context acceptable. If one interrogates oneself as to what a particular feature is, invariably one refers to its concrete relationship to one's embodiment. The way we are instrumentally related to things is a common feature of our understanding. A chair supports our embodied structure; a door, gate, wall or fence debar our way because, as embodied, we cannot pass automatically from one side of it to the other. A brick as hard, a twig as supple and a feather as light are experienced both relative to each other and to our physical form. It also seems the case that although this relationship is part of most of our perceptions, it is seldom reflected on, and features as an implicit understanding of things. That we have a capacity which bestows this dimension of meaning on things must be accepted, but its operation still remains a mystery. However for Merleau-Ponty the operation of the corporeal schema presents him with no dilemma, as it realizes its perceptual role wholly in keeping with his broader descriptions of perception.

For example he describes the perceptual process as a dialectic in so far as he sees it as a negotiation between the sentient and the sensed. Both parties are active. With reference to the perception of operative meaning an object is described as striving to reveal its own significance by soliciting "the complicity of the body in its motoricity."[23] The perceiver is described as being "looked at"[24]

by things and as sensing a "vague beckoning".[25] While these descriptions are somewhat exaggerated they do highlight the capacity objects seem to have to bring to the fore aspects of our motility. The staircase mentioned earlier stirs in us the potential that would effect our climbing it. This prereflective response is normally overridden when we do not wish to go upstairs. The irresistible 'call' of objects is clearly seen in children who, almost automatically open cupboard doors, climb stairs and lift lids.

Looking at the dialectic from the perceiver's point of view Merleau-Ponty describes the subject as penetrating into the object and assimilating its structure to its own substance. The negotiation is well described by Langan who writes that in the sensible I find "the proposition of a certain new rhythm of existence, and in answer to it I insinuate myself into a new form of existence which is thus suggested to me".[26] Merleau-Ponty describes the perceptual relationship between the two parts as a symbiosis, a certain way the 'outside' has of invading the 'inside', and a certain way the 'inside' has of meeting the invasion. He also describes it as a form of exchange: "the sensible gives back to me what I lent to it, but this is only what I took from it in the first place".[27] In terms of the perceptual role of the corporeal schema this takes place as follows: the object presents itself with an inherent operative meaning, but this meaning has been given to it as a result of the actualization of an operative potential on the part of the perceiver. However this potential would not have been formed without initial contact with the object itself.

The perception of operative meaning can be seen to be the result of a dialectic relation between the corporeal schema and the object. The corporeal scheme as a construct of potencies is searching to

identify and modify a particular capacity to give form to the operative meaning of the object. As a result of this dialetic negotiation Merleau-Ponty sees perception as characterized by a form of fusion. The two parties involved are merged into one. In his last published work The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty begins to explore the notion of this fusion which he also calls an intertwining or 'chiasm'. He argues that it is achievable through the sentient and the sensed comprising the same elemental material or 'flesh'. With reference to the operative relationship we have with the world he explains that "Things are a prolongation of my body, and my body is the prolongation of the world".[28] He anticipated this perceptual fusion in earlier works where he wrote that one's embodiment "is caught in the fabric of the world,"[29] and is itself "the fabric into which all objects are woven".[30] The notion of 'flesh' is wider than the operative aspects of the perceiver and the world, but it can be seen as well exemplified in this area. As Merleau-Ponty writes, there is "a carnal adherence of the sentient to the sensed, and of the sensed to the sentient."[30*]

The notion of fusion is also related to the concept of a 'phenomenon', which is both the product of perception and the essential actualization of ourself as an intentional being. In perception there is a sort of dissolution of the perceiver and the perceived, both are enveloped in the phenomenon. The 'parent' cannot stand back to survey it's 'offspring' as it is the substance of its issue. In a similar way the act of perceiving cannot be divorced from that which is perceived. This is because "perception is precisely that kind of act in which there can be no question of setting the act itself apart from the end to which it is directed. Perception and the perceived necessarily have the same existential modality, since

perception is inseparable from the consciousness which it has, or rather is, of reaching the thing itself."[31] The meaningful phenomenon that is the issue of the interplay between the corporeal schema and the object is an entity with operative significance. As Gillan writes, meaning arises at "the moment of fusion".[32] The object or feature that is perceived only achieves its unique phenomenal operative meaning when the operative capacity of the perceiver fuses with the operative presence of the object. That this fusion, with its resultant significance can seem to occur without actual operative contact is something of an anomaly. However the appreciation of the operative significance of an object or feature is not fully realized unless actual operative liaison occurs.

The notions of a dialectic and the striving to achieve fusion led Merleau-Ponty to describe perception as the solving of a problem or as the answering of a question. He talks of there being confusion and tension prior to perception and of perception being a "continuous effort towards equilibrium".[33] The task of perception is to create order out of chaos, to create meaning out of an otherwise unintelligible world display. Merleau-Ponty traces this need to work towards a resolution of tension back to birth when there emerges into the world "a certain constitutive dissonance."[34] Once in the world, the individual is caught up in the perceptual dialectic, striving to make sense of his surroundings and to dissipate the confusion. The young child's agitated need to make contact with things is an examplar of this effort towards equilibrium. A state of stability is achieved in the successful operative interaction with an object.

The urge to make sense of our perception is readily shown in relation to sight. For example when an unidentifiable object is viewed at a distance, we may have to concentrate on it a little longer than

usual but we always endow it with some meaningful identity. And although we have had to add to it some features which were, in fact, not present, we are still taken aback when, on nearing the object, we find it is not a stone but a piece of paper; not a cat, but an old hat among the leaves.

Merleau-Ponty makes direct reference to the embodiment in discussing this sought after state of equilibrium in writing, "Whether a system of motor or perceptual powers, our body is not an object for an 'I think', it is a grouping of lived through meanings which moves towards its equilibrium."[35] More specifically he sees all movement as an attempt to achieve stability - not in the physical sense of balance, but in the perceptual sense. It is "as if at each moment these movements were what they should be in order to realize certain situations of preferred equilibrium toward which the forces which are at work in the sensible section tend...Thus the motor devices appear as the means of re-establishing an equilibrium".[36]

The notion of achieving an equilibrium is not incompatible with the experience of using a tool, such as a spade, effectively, nor with the almost harmonious rhythmic motion of climbing stairs. There is also a sense of resolution experienced when the 'call' of an object is answered. An object presents itself as delicate, as 'to be handled with calm sensitivity', and a shadow of a state of readiness occurs. The tension of this readiness is resolved when the object is in fact 'taken up'.

The actualization of operative meaning through concrete involvement of our embodiment with an object could be described as achieving an equilibrium of fusion. The object achieves meaning 'at our hands'. An oft rehearsed achievement of operative meaning with its accompanying rehearsal of operative potential is known as

a habit and it is often the case that habitual action relationships are devoid of stress. Paul Ricoeur in Freedom and Nature[37] describes habits as having a calming effect. In these terms habit is not being viewed as a specifiable motor pattern, but as a readily renewable operative relationship. Sartre is wary of these more stable dispositions with their close relationship with sedimented capacities of the corporeal schema. He would warn of a narrowing, a limiting, a tendency towards bad faith. However Merleau-Ponty does not demean perceptual habits in that they leave time and space for our attention to be directed elsewhere. He writes "It is by giving up part of his spontaneity, by becoming involved in the world through stable organs that man can acquire the mental and practical space which will theoretically free him from his environment and allow him to see it."[38]

The perceptual role of the corporeal schema can be seen to exemplify the dialectic fusion and the striving towards equilibrium that Merleau-Ponty attributes to perception. Finally within the notion of equilibrium there are also the ideas of fulfilment, completion and self awareness. It is suggested that in perception, that which is perceived comes into significant being, is made whole. With reference to operative aspects, it is proposed that objects only achieve their totality of form when they are merged with our embodiment. In the incidence of operative interaction the object is present in the fullness of its meaning. In its handling and use its complex of operative characteristics is fully realized.

In the case of the perceiver the experience of perception has the added dimension of achieving a highlighted self-awareness. It is said that the perceiver perceives himself in the perception of the object. This is a difficult notion, that has been alluded to earlier in relation to objects revealing a person's action potential,

but a fairly straightforward example can be found with respect of the corporeal schema. Notwithstanding the fact that the schema is generally a prereflective construct of potentials, in perception its capacities are highlighted and are more readily reflected on. Merleau-Ponty writes "every external perception is immediately synonymous with a certain perception of my body."[39] For example, on my first day up after a bout of influenza, my lack of strength is immediately highlighted in my perception of my heavy sewing machine. As Merleau-Ponty explains "The body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible task."[40] The notion that the world reveals my embodiment to me is also referred to by Sartre who explains "In one sense, to be sure, the body is what is indicated by all the instruments which I grasp, and I apprehend the body without knowing it in the very indications which I perceive on the instruments."[41]

The embodiment that is revealed is not the physical structure of my incarnate dimension but the construct of potentials that is my corporeal schema. The appreciation I have of my embodied capacities is a direct result of my operative interaction with the world. "We are through and through compounded of relationships with the world".[42] Our existence, in its endless search for perceptual equilibrium binds us to our surroundings. As we give them being, they give us being. Merleau-Ponty refers to this situation in which we live our intentional relationship with our environment as having the nature of an intentional arc. The intentional arc represents our intentional history and our intentional present, and in its co-respondence we achieve meaningful existence. This can be seen to be the case in respect to operative intentionality because, the objects and features that surround us at any time reveal to us our operative potential. They are as indispensible to our realization

of this dimension of ourself as we are to their meaningful existence.

In many respects the corporeal schema provides a satisfactory explanation to the operative ties we have with the world. In Merleau-Ponty's terms its functioning exemplifies all he thinks to be characteristic of perception. However the way in which it actually effects perception is unresolved. On a number of occasions Merleau-Ponty intimates that operative meaning is perceived visually. For example he says that "I have only to see something to know how to reach it and deal with it";[43] furthermore he writes that it is possible to "see the weight of a block of cast iron".[44] In one respect this is acceptable and has been anticipated in earlier comments that refer to the sight of objects alerting our operative potential in readiness to relate to them effectively. While I would accept that once operative meaning is established our sight is able to work in concert with the corporeal schema in perception, I cannot accept that vision can itself endow an object with this instrument-relation significance. It seems quite impossible for a non-contact mode of perception to establish how we can interact effectively, via our embodiment, with the tangible features of the world.

One sense that could be a candidate to establish operative meaning is touch. This possibility is endorsed by Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of visibility and tangibility encroaching on each other. The tangible, he explains, is not without visible existence, nor is the visible devoid of tangible aspects. If these two senses are in some sense interchangeable and the perception of operative meaning is the purview of touch, Merleau-Ponty's previous comments relating to vision and operative meaning would seem to be explained. However the perception of heat, pain, pressure and texture by the skin seems totally inadequate to endow an object with operative meaning. To

endow an object with such meaning one certainly has to come into contact with it, touch it, but there is more to establishing a productive operative relationship with something than simply touching it.

In his book Self as Agent John Macmurray makes some observations in this area that indicate a possible solution to the problem. Macmurray discusses the sense of touch, arguing that it is more critical to man as agent than is sight, because while the former is perception in action the latter is perception as pure receptivity. This concept of perception is clearly opposed to Merleau-Ponty's notion of perception as a dialectic. It also fails to recognize that vision has a not insignificant role to play in operative interaction. Nevertheless his discussion is of value at this stage in the investigation. He describes tactual perception as "the direct and immediate apprehension of the Other-than-myself",[45] and isolates the experience of resistance as its central feature. However, rather surprisingly he goes on to say that "resistance is not sense datum."[46] He describes resistance as practical experience involving a frustration of the will and "the experience of something not myself, which prevents me from doing what I am doing".[47] I would agree that frustration of the will, such as my inability to buy bread because the shops are shut, could be construed as being somewhat removed from direct sense datum, but concrete tactual resisting experience of an object is clearly sense datum of the most immediate kind. Macmurray goes on to distinguish between the perception of resistance and that of tactual discrimination, and argues that "the latter is a theoretical activity aiming to discover something about the object, not to do something to it".[48] I find this confusing, surely touching an object is doing something to it. Does he really

mean 'not aiming to lift or move it'? And to imply that perception of resistance is a practical activity as opposed to the perception of texture which is a theoretical activity is odd, not least because he has earlier described tactual perception as "discrimination through action."[49] Subsequently, however, he suggests that the perception of tactual qualities and that of resistance are integrally related. "The tactual perception of shape, size, weight, hardness, surface texture all depend upon the varying of resistance from zero to a maximum which is determined by the amount of energy which I can bring to bear."(50) Furthermore he admits that the experience of resistance is, after all, sense datum, as he continues "But such discrimination involves the co-operation of other forms of sensory awareness, in particular, the kinaesthetic awareness of movement of my body."(50)

Although some of Macmurray's comments are ambiguous, they suggest that in our perception of objects there are not only five distinguishable categories of sensory data, but possibly a sixth. This sixth is related to the resistance an object offers to our lifting, moving and handling it. Can this sixth sense of resistance be separated from that of tactile qualities? I feel that it can and that a description of weight is helpful in revealing the two distinct senses. In touching an object to discern its texture, I have no perception of its weight, to achieve the latter I must attempt to lift it and exert as much force as is necessary to counter-balance the pull of gravity. In lifting I am aware of increased tactual pressure on the skin of my hand. but this pressure only makes a somewhat crude contribution to the perception of weight, which is principally discerned by the sensory nerve endings in the joint areas. Situated in the joints are nerve structures sensitive to pressure and certain forms of distortion which are brought about by the adjustments of the joint membrane, its ligaments and associated muscle tendons. These nerve structures monitor the position of the joint and the tensions surrounding it.

Furthermore they receive particular stimulation both as joints move and as the muscles tense to hold the joint in a particular position against gravity. Muscle tension can be sensed in the tendons crossing the joint. I propose to call these sensory receptors in joints 'resistors' and to argue that, though related to the organs of touch, their perceptions are distinct enough to constitute a discrete, additional sense. Resistors play only a very minimal part in the sense of touch, and would, on their own, only supply very pronounced tactual information such as in connection with an extremely rough or adhesive surface. The organs of touch, on their part, do not contribute significantly to an appreciation of the weight or resistance of an object.

I would argue that resistors can give us information about objects and features that would not be available to us through any other sensory channel. As we interact operatively with an object, for example in handling it, we become aware, through our resistors, of its weight and balance, and its articulations with itself, such as the way in which the two pieces of metal that make up a pair of scissors allow displacement of the parts on one plane. In the operative dealings with an object we build up a perceptual dimension of it - namely its operative meaning. Its operative meaning becomes more clearly defined the more often we handle it, in the same way that we become more familiar with the intricacies of a piece of music the more we hear it. In the case of tools or instruments the operative meaning is more complex as it also encompasses specific ways that these objects are used. Once again resistor mechanisms will monitor the pattern of movements that take place and these will become an aspect of our understanding of the object. Earlier operative meaning was described as the blend and range of movements that could effect a satisfactory and profitable practical

relationship with an object, given its physical characteristics. Resistors throughout the body work in concert to realize this meaning. In physical terms they monitor the force patterns of the embodiment as it deftly counteracts the force of gravity playing both on itself and on the object with which it is interacting. At root the resistors monitor the confrontations between the force of gravity and the forces of our own dynamic capacities. Operative meaning is a dynamic force pattern that is realized by the embodiment as an operative potential. The whole range of potentials that we have achieved blend into the corporeal schema which is the appreciation we have of our embodiment as a dynamic construct in effective relation with the world.

The identification of the resistors as a sensory feature of our embodiment would seem to make the notion of the corporeal schema more intelligible. While Merleau-Ponty does not discuss the way in which the schema is formed in detail, he makes at least three comments that might lead one to believe that he would be sympathetic towards this suggestion. In referring to the development of body awareness he talks of the "sense of movement in the joints,"[51] while in a later work he refers to motility as having "the basic power of giving meaning."[52] In this last work he describes the resistance of things as "precisely their reality."[53]

In considering the viability of resistors as constituting a separate sense, there are at least four possible objections. These relate to its close association with touch, its 'internal' stimulation, the widely dispersed nature of its incidence and the paucity of concepts relating to its contribution to perception. In response to the first objection I would argue that the relationship between the operation of our tactile capacities and that of resistors is very similar to that between smell and taste. Although these last two

sensory areas are generally considered to be distinct, a large proportion of the finer discriminations of taste are carried out by the organs of smell. The tongue is only capable of recognizing bitter, sweet, salt and sour. The discrimination of all other nuances of taste is effected in the olfactory area. While there is some cross-referencing between the organs of touch and resistors, such as in the perception of shape, much of their sensitivity is directed towards clearly separable attributes. Touch is principally concerned with surface effects, while the resistors monitor operative interaction.

In answer to the second objection, it would seem that the resistors are not alone in their dependance on internal stimulation. Our five recognized senses are classified as exteroceptors, that is they are stimulated by aspects of our 'outside' environment. However, in at least one instance, hearing, the nerve stimulation is achieved at some remove from the outside environment, the sound waves having been 'carried' through a number of body structures before reaching the sensitive nerve endings. Resistors would seem to function in a way very similar to this. Dealings with objects change the condition of aspects of our embodiment and these changes are monitored by the resistors and then attributed to the object in question. The fact that the resistors also monitor the position of the embodiment per se is clearly a complication, but gives them the characteristic of being both exteroceptive and interoceptive organs.

The third possible objection is that resistors are too widely dispersed throughout the embodiment. However I would argue that they are no more dispersed than is our organ of touch. The fact that resistors situated in separate joints can together constitute an object's operative meaning is no more baffling than the way in which tactile sense organs from different body parts can together construct the shape

of an object.

The final objection is that resistor 'information' is dubious owing to its lack of conceptual denotation. I do not feel that this is, in fact, the case, although it is true that there are some problems here. If it is accepted that the perception of weight is an aspect of resistor awareness, then there is at least the range of concepts that refer to degrees of heaviness and to the distribution of weight or the balance of an object. In addition an object may be perceived as stiff, loosely connected or fragile. It is of interest to note that while resistors both endow objects with operative meaning, and the corporeal schema with operative potentials, it is in terms of the latter rather than the former that most resistor concepts are found. For example there is a whole range of concepts referring to manipulations of the embodiment such as extension, contraction and rotation. The predominance of operative potential concepts over operative meaning concepts is perhaps one reason why this aspect of an object is so often overlooked and taken for granted.

If, as has been argued, it is the case that resistors contribute a discrete dimension to perception, how is it that vision is able to discern operative meaning? Is it acceptable to say that "vision is a thinking that deciphers strictly the signs given within the body"[54] and that "what we call the visible is, ... a quality pregnant with a texture, the surface of a depth."[55] There is no problem here, because the ability for one sensory area to, in some way, perceive other sensory aspects, is wholly commensurate with Merleau-Ponty's view that in perception objects are always appreciated as wholes. Every perception presents the object in the richness of its every dimension. It is, indeed, a characteristic of perception, on Merleau-Ponty's terms, that in its prereflective operation objects are realized in their totality. He rejects any notion that attributes to cognition the role

of constructing objects from their separate sensory 'parts'. If this were the case, he says, we should be immediately aware of these reflective processes, but in fact we are not. Both Merleau-Ponty and Sartre deny that we can ever experience a pure, disassociated sensation. Such a thing is a pure phantom and strictly the product of reflective scientific analysis. In order to focus our attention on a single quality we have to adopt a 'highly particularized' reflective attitude, and the quality we grasp is still unavoidably an attribute of the object on which our attention is focussed. There cannot be 'red' - but only the red of the car, the red of the wine, the red of the poppy. We perceive wholes, and cannot confront a dismembered quality prior to perception. Perception is essentially synaesthetic: things are "appreciated in the form of a Gestalt - as an expressive unity."[56]

This view is made the harder to grasp because of our habitual use of adjectives that pick out separate sensations or qualities. Everyday language seems to have adopted the analytic scientific stance in its use of words such as hot, round, smooth, yellow. It is paradoxical that in order to argue the case for the perception of wholes, we have to use a form of language which itself tends to deny what it is being used to purport. For example in demonstrating that synaesthetic perception is the norm, Merleau-Ponty claims that one appreciates the hardness of a glass in its visual presentation, and equally one has an awareness of the appearance of the crystal in the sound of its breaking. Sartre says of a lemon that it is "extended throughout its qualities, and each of its qualities is extended throughout each of the others. It is the sourness of the lemon that is yellow, it is the yellow of the lemon that is sour."[57]

Both philosophers imply that a complete synaesthetic perception

is accomplished no matter which particular sense organ or organs are involved in appreciating an object. "The senses mutually translate each other without need of an interpreter and are mutually comprehensible."[58] This needs slight modification because the intersensory whole will be only as rich as the individual's experience of the object. For example, if I had never heard a whistle blown, the sight of a whistle would not incorporate its potential sound, and if I had never smelled a rose, its scent would not be part of its phenomenal whole for me. Perceptual wholes will therefore be, to some extent, specific to the perceiver.

Given that synaesthetic perception is the norm it is not surprising that operative meaning can be perceived by sight. The accuracy of our every day access to such meaning in this way is highlighted on the occasional instance when vision is deceived. For example, a large brown parcel has to be moved. I survey it as I approach, position myself firmly and brace myself ready to accommodate its great weight. I am amazed when the parcel comes off the ground with the minimum of effort, and I fall backwards clumsily as a result of the excess of tension I have generated. That this type of occurrence happens so rarely is evidence of our astute perceptual ability.

As every object has a colour, all objects have an operative meaning as a constituent dimension of the totality of their perception. The complexity of their operative meaning will depend on their physical characteristics and their potential for use. An object with an operative meaning of minimal complexity would be a birthday card: the world feature of a flat grassy field would be similarly endowed. An egg whisk and a pebbly beach are more demanding in the context of establishing a satisfactory operative relationship, and would therefore

have more compex operative meanings. At the other extreme a car to be driven and an uneven rock face to be climbed would each have complicated and extended operative meanings. Operative interaction with either of these would be demanding in that relationships with both are inevitably, to a degree, unpredictable. In the case of the rock face to be climbed it would seem that little established operative meaning can be drawn upon and the resistors would need to be involved in ongoing perception throughout the course of it being scaled.

Given that operative meaning is a constituent of every object and feature it is surprising that this aspect is little referred to in our description of things. Operative meaning is taken for granted and almost subsumed under the designation of the object. For example a lamp, a book and a paper clip are most commonly described in terms of their other perceptual attributes. A lamp would probably be described in terms of its shape, size and colour, the texture of its surface, the powerfulness of its light and the mechanisms associated with conducting electricity. If we were to add comment about its weight, overall balance, the flexibility of its spine and the stiffness of its switch we would be beginning to describe it in terms of its operative meaning. Similarly an old book would probably be described in terms of its size, thickness, colour and the fabric of its binding. If we wenton to say that the pages were very flimsy and the binding in an extremely precarious state we would be alluding to how we would have to relate to it operatively. With respect to the paper clip, the normal description would be that it was made of a bent piece of wire, was 1½ inches long and ¼inch wide and was pointed at one end and flat at the other. If pressed to describe its operative meaning we could go little farther than saying

it was of minimal weight and so constructed that the strength of its fabric tended to bring it back into line if it was pulled a little way out of shape. To explain its operative meaning any further we would have to resort to describing its parallel operative potential with respect to the use of our embodiment.* While this situation is frustrating, in that it makes operative meaning difficult to substantiate, it highlights the fact that objects only have meaning in their relationship with the perceiver. This is the case with all perception but in relation to operative meaning it can be seen very clearly, this meaning being most fully describable in terms of involvement of the perceiver. Objects are what we make of them and their meaning depends on our nature.

It follows that, since we are embodied perceivers most of what we perceive will exhibit a characteristic indicative of our embodiment. Objects and features incorporate a dimension which

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This description could run as follows:- I must hold the blunter end, firmly but without too much force between my thumb and third finger. Then having positioned the clip at the appropriate place on the pages I must first gently press down, as well as in the direction parallel to the surface of the pages, to ensure that the retracted portion of the clip is located under the pages, and the protruding portion remains on top. Once the portions have been correctly engaged, my gentle pressure can be uni-directional, in line with the surface of the paper. Once the page edges are resting up against the blunt edge of the clip and I feel the resistance of the paper, the interaction is completed.

reflects our incarnate relationship with them. Merleau-Ponty expresses this by saying that there is an "organic relationship between the subject and the world."[59] Our embodiment uses its own being to participate in the being of objects. In fact he goes further and claims that "there is no other meaning than carnal ."[60] I do not interpret this as implying that every object has a discrete carnal dimension, but rather that in our synaesthetic perception there is a carnal dimension interwoven with all the other attributes of the object. As Merleau-Ponty so clearly advocates the wholeness of perception, it would seem that this would be his view. Given this situation it is rather surprising that he has identified two distinct intentionalities. The delineation of these two would seem to suggest that there are two clearly separable aspects of every perception, one being the issue of the driving force of motivity, and the other being initiated by the openness of consciousness. Furthermore two distinct intentionalities would indicate a separation of 'bodily' functioning from 'mental' functioning. This last is certainly not Merleau-Ponty's view, as for him it is the totality of our being-in-the-world which uses its peculiar blend of capacities to achieve our particular experience of being-in-the-world. He himself says in relation to a particular perceptual problem that "we must cease to draw a distinction between the body as a mechanism in itself and consciousness as being for itself."[61]

It seems more satisfactory to abandon the notion of a separate specifically 'operative' intentionality and to argue that, as embodied beings, our intentionality pervades every aspect of our incarnate manifestation. One possible way to use Merleau-Ponty's identification of an operative intentionaly is to follow his suggestion that it highlights not a separable function of intentionality, but rather a particular layer or level of our relationship to the

world. Merleau-Ponty describes our basic access to the world, via our embodiment as a 'praktognosia' and proposes that this relationship to our surroundings could be "original and perhaps primary."[62] He develops this idea in saying that "We found beneath .... thetic intentionality, another kind which is the condition of the former's possibility: namely an operative intentionality already at work before any positing and any judgement, a 'Logos of the aesthetic world', an 'art hidden in the depth of the human soul', one which, like any art, is known only by its results."[63] This quotation perhaps underlies the reason for Merleau-Ponty's need to specify the existence of operative intentionality quite unequivocally. As a highly elusive and prereflective force it is readily overlooked.

It would be possible to argue that human intentionality is more properly thought of as operative intentionality and this is endorsed by comments such as the "perceiving mind is the incarnate mind,"[64] and "ideas could not be given except in carnal experience."[65] However, the way in which intentionality is referred to is less important than the realization that it pervades our whole being. Through the totality of its initiative it is responsible for the development of our essence, and therefore the realization of ourself. This is achieved through the rich and varied liaison with the world which it effects.

It becomes clear then, that the role of the embodiment in existence is incorrectly viewed as that of a necessary but subordinate physical mechanism. It has at least two roles, one to lay the groundwork of our interaction with the world and the other to provide an operative framework for all our perceptions. "So it can be said that my organism, as a prepersonal cleaving to the general form of the world, as an anonymous and general existence, plays, beneath

my personal life, the part of an inborn complex. It is not some kind of inert thing, it too has something of the momentum of existence."[66] Through investigating the prereflective layers of perception we have, in fact, learnt "to feel our bodies producing the very ground of existence."[67] And by reflecting on the role of our embodiment in existence, as Merleau-Ponty anticipated, we have not suppressed this dimension, rather we have revealed its critical role and have shown how this role can begin to explain certain aspects of our existence in the world. The investigation has also shown that our most concrete dimension operates at the most fundamental level of our intentional existence and realizes its full potential almost automatically, without reflection.

If our embodiment, through its practical intentional involvement and perceptual capacities is intimately involved in our relationship with the world, how does this affect our understanding of the experiences that take place in physical education and sports activity generally? These can no longer be viewed as the learning and performance of skilful manipulations of the body per se. Involvement in physical activity is far more complex. It is a subtle blend of perceptual and motile abilities structured in close relationship with the physical aspects of its context. As incorporating perception, physical activity will be a dialectic with the world; a reciprocal evolution of meaning. The goal of the dialectic will be to realize a fusion between the two parties. This will be achieved when the two patterns of forces and resistances attain a state of equilibrium and blend into one. The resulting interaction will be experienced by the mover as harmonious and satisfying,and could be described as an operative liaison pattern. It will represent the solution to a problem, and carry with it, for the

mover, an enhanced awareness of his own operative potential and of operative meaning in the world.

It would seem that some people are so endowed with physical faculties that they can readily achieve these liaison patterns in almost any activity or sports context. However for many people this liaison is realized in just one activity or perhaps in an activity area such as racquet sports. This may be the result of the opportunities they have had to become involved in activities or perhaps because they are more able to match the demands of some activities than others. In that each activity will have its own particular motile demands, it would seem to follow that each will have its own characteristic blend of operative liaison patterns. Some of these will resemble each other more closely than they do others. For example those of tennis, badminton and squash will be more similar to each other than to those of running, diving, boxing or canoeing. Boxing liaison patterns will be more akin to those of wrestling and rugby than to those of skating. Solo skating, skiing and surfing will be similar in that the relationship to the world is built purely on an interplay of the embodiment with the resistances of the various surfaces. The nature of their particular surface, however, will make the pattern of each distinct in itself. The patterns arising from these three activities will not be dissimilar to those created in gymnastics floorwork and dance, as again liaison is just with the supporting surface. With these 'pure-embodiment' activities it is difficult to identify the operative meaning that is being realized alongside the development of operative potential. This 'meaning' could relate simply to gravity and the nature of the surface. Alternatively the 'meaning' could reside in the 'embodiment-as-object in its susceptibility to gravity', and the 'potential' be attributed to the 'embodiment-in-action'.

The attribution of 'meaning' and 'potential' in these activities is somewhat problematical, in that it would seem to require the simultaneous adoption of different perspectives on the embodiment.

How far would it be legitimate to compare the experience of the harmonious liaison patterns of resistor feedback with experiences brought into being through the perception of visual 'patterns' or auditory 'patterns'? When our visual capacities are the focus of our attention we can find satisfaction in perceiving, for example, pictures, designs, architecture and landscapes. When our auditory capacities are our focus similar experiences can result from perceiving, for example music, singing and bird calls. Likewise when our embodiment is our focus activities such as swimming, running and tennis can afford rewarding experience.

In all these situations we are in close contact with the world with one perceptual mode at the forefront of the relationship. In each case we engage in a dialectic with the world to achieve the fusion characteristic of all perception. In many of our habitual dealings with the world this liaison involves many or all of our perceptual capacities, whereas the above examples are characterised by the achievement of a somewhat more specific fusion viz. a motile liaison, an aural liaison, a specular liaison. In each liaison an equilibrium in the form of a coherent pattern is achieved.

There could be a number of difficulties in aligning operative liaison patterns with those of other perceptual areas, but none seem so intractable as to make the suggestion unviable. One problem is that these liaison patterns are of a different order to, for example, musical melodies, because the perceiver in the former must in every case create the perceptual data himself. Furthermore, it can only be experienced in the actual act of its creation. The experiences of observing movement are not of the same order and therefore cannot realize

operative liaison patterns. In the case of other liaison patterns these may issue from perceiving data produced by others, for example, a pianist or an actor; or from perception of one's own work, subsequent to this being produced, in the case of a painter or sculptor. It is interesting to note that the liaison experienced by the pianist himself and the actor himself more resembles the observer of movement than its producer. In all three cases the liaison experienced brings together a combination of perceptual modes. The pianist is in operative liaison with the world as well as in aural liaison, and the observer of movement is in specular liaison alongside some mode of 'reflected' operative liaison. The exact nature of this last liaison is intriguing and warrants further exploration. Notwithstanding these comparisons and complexities the experiencing of liaison in the operative sphere is distinctive in being the only one where the individual has no alternative but to create the particular pattern and experience it simultaneously. Does this difference invalidate the comparison? I do not think so because each perceptual mode has its own characteristics which will affect the nature of the liaison it achieves. It would in fact be odd to exclude this mode of liaison principally on the grounds of the essentially active involvement of the perceiver as, from Merleau-Ponty's standpoint, the act of perception is in no way to be thought of as passive reception.

A second difficulty could be initiated by the criticism that the other liaison patterns cited arise from experiences more specifically related to one perceptual mode. In comparison it could be argued that operative liaison also involves, in addition to resistor feedback, elements of tactile, visual and possibly auditory perceptions. The first point to be made here is that given the totality of active participation needed to initiate operative liaison patterns it

is not surprising that a wide range of our perceptual capacities are involved. Second I would argue that the other perceptions provide only the backdrop for these patterns. Their instance is necessary to monitor the orientation of the activity but they do not themselves form an essential component in the pattern. That sight is not crucial to satisfying experience of these patterns is evidenced in the fulfilment blind people feel in running and swimming. I would not want to belittle the contribution made to many pursuits by the totality of their environment but I would see this as additional to, and resulting from, the development of operative liaison patterns. There is perhaps no problem here, given the synaesthetic nature of perception and the fact that there are many experiments in multi-media presentations not to mention the recognized forms of opera and drama that use an interplay of our perceptual capacities to their advantage.

A third difficulty revolves around the private nature of resistor feedback and therefore of operative liaison patterns. Is it legitimate to compare experience of these with that of sights, sounds and tastes that are publicly available? Does the fact that no one else can ever experience my operative liaison patterns debar them from being accepted as instances of fusion and equilibrium? Some people would argue that this was a non-question given that the world is unique to each individual and that no two people ever experience the same phenomenon even when presented with the same data. No perception, on these grounds, is ever verifiable by recourse to public features. Others might argue that personally satisfying and meaningful experiences are beyond doubt. The subject's word is all that is needed and if he is misinforming us, he deceives no-one but himself.

These views notwithstanding, if there is no possibility of anyone else experiencing another's embodiment in active liaison with the world,

that would put verifying the credibility of another's account, beyond reach. Meaningful operative liaison patterns could be a pure myth. However, this does not seem to be a problem in respect to some examples in other areas of perception. For example if someone claims to have found a piece of music satisfying, even though I have never heard that particular piece, the fact that I know that many other people have bought the record or that I, myself, have found another piece by the same composer satisfying, gives me ample grounds for believing my informant. Would I have any grounds to doubt him, however, if I know that he listens to the particular piece of music at least three times a day and is reliably reported to be in a relaxed state of mind after each hearing? How different is this situation from someone's telling me that he finds playing golf or tennis, or going swimming or skating rewarding? The fact that he takes part regularly in the activity is all the evidence I need to assure me that he is truthfully informing me of his actual experiences. Nor is his admission in any way extraordinary, as many people regularly take part in sport. Perhaps this is all the evidence that is needed. On reflection there is one eventuality that would make me doubt his word, and that would be where my informer had so little ability in the activity that his actions were random, unco-ordinated and virtually ineffective. His claim that he found an activity rewarding in itself would be incomprehensible if he showed no evidence of at least the beginnings of developing effective liaison patterns. Without any sign of the establishment of a relaxed and rhythmical execution of the necessary movement skills it would be hard to accept that he could realize anything approaching a harmonious liaison with the features that made up the context of the activity.

This is not to propose that only players of international level can legitimately claim to experience wholly satisfying operative liaison

patterns. It is to suggest that a minimal level of competency is necessary. For a liaison pattern to attain its particular character and so be identified as affording personal meaning, it must be at least showing signs of predictable execution. The early stages in any new learning can be awkward and tense, and far from satisfying. This possibility of less than rewarding early experiences is clearly a dilemma for physical education teachers who spend much of their time introducing new activities to pupils. Initial experiences are unlikely to be immediately satisfying and the teacher would be well advised to adopt strategies that minimize the potential for disharmony. It is, however, only the early stages of learning that suffer from this unavoidable danger. As progress begins to be made there is no reason why most pupils should not master the simple liaison patterns required for participation, provided that appropriate demands are made on these novices. The teacher will need to present steadily more challenging situations that are supported by a gradual build up of technical skill. Sadly this strategy is not always adopted and many pupils become disillusioned with physical activity when their teachers move too quickly to demanding situations. Ironically, in doing so they are often responding to the pupils' own wishes and exhortations.

Section 4

The fostering of embodied faculties as a legitimate aspect of education.

The views of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty combine to reveal our embodiment as playing a central role in human life as we know it. From the standpoint of these philosophers our life is in every respect permeated by our embodied nature: in fact being human is unintelligible apart from being embodied. These views are very different from those of earlier philosophers, influenced by the Cartesian tradition, who tended to see our embodiment as solely material and ignoble. The development of physical capacities was not thought to be of value and not considered an appropriate part of education, which was conceived as wholly concerned with intellectual development.

Even now it is against a widespread scepticism exemplified in such opinions, that those who believe that the embodiment is worthy of attention have to argue their case. The situation is very different for those advocating attention to our mental capacities - such as Paul Hirst. This aspect of our humanness is presumed to be worthy of development and very little if any justification is called for on their part. I have tried to show, so far, that the embodiment has particular significance in two areas. At the most fundamental level it is the foundation of our effective interaction with the world. This has been overlooked because of the prereflective relation our embodiment has with the world. With reflective attention being focused on the observable physical attributes of our embodiment its fundamental prereflective liaison with the world has passed unnoticed. The root of this liaison can be traced to the common 'matter' from which both the world and our embodiment are composed. Merleau-Ponty calls this 'flesh'. It was argued that the compatibility we have with the world makes possible the realization of existence, as it is only through existing in intentional interaction with the environment that

our human and personal essence comes into being. The embodiment not only founds this interactive relationship, but also exhibits its own mode of intentionality and so contributes in its own right to the relationship. This could be described as characteristically an 'embodied' relationship. By this is meant both that the individual's understanding of the world is developed necessarily from the standpoint of his own embodiment, and that his appreciation of himself is imbued with aspects of his physicality. The embodied dimension has significance, therefore, not only in being the necessary foundation of our liaison with the world but also in the contribution it makes to our perception of that world and of ourselves.

The second area of significance grows out of the first in that through its intimate involvement in our intentional relationship, the embodiment has the capacity to enrich existence - viewed as a multifaceted liaison with the world. First, being the fundamental mode of this liaison it provides the ground for development of many other modes of interaction with the world. Secondly, in the context of its specific nature, it offers the possibility of developing a particular aspect of our interactive existence - namely that between our motile embodiment and the concrete features of the world. This is most clearly seen in situations where the embodied nature of the individual is the predominant focus of a project, such as in participation in a dance composition or a sports activity. However it is also the case that embodied liaison is an important part of many other projects such as playing a musical instrument, driving a car and gardening. While it is true that the greater the demands put on an individual's embodied dimension in a situation, the more significant will be the liaison, it is also the case that we cannot escape from this mode of interaction. Existence is built upon and around our embodiment, and

its liaison with the world is an essential characteristic of our every way of life and, indeed, our life in its entirety.

These two areas of significance are good reasons for valuing and respecting our embodiment and against regarding it as inferior and unworthy of attention. They also give support to projects aimed to foster our embodied faculties. Against this view, however, it could be argued that as the embodiment is automatically involved in constituting our being-in-the-world, in its fundamental role in achieving an effective intentional relationship with that world, notions of development are out of place. Embodied liaison, being a fact of life, is in no need of particular attention. The status of our embodied capacity, however, is parallel to that of many of our other powers, in that though it plays a continuous part in existence it is also capable of development. Our capacity for aural perceptual discrimination and for using imagination are two obvious examples. These powers automatically contribute to our experience in the world, and are called upon to a greater or lesser extent according to our situation. For example in conversation with others we rely both on our ability to hear and our capacity to bring into being sentences that express our views on the matter under discussion. Through such 'routine' involvement the contribution of these abilities to our interaction with the world is maintained, but not extended. But if, for example particular attention is paid to our ability to hear, relative to some particular classes of sounds, such as in music, this facet of our perception will be enhanced; it will become more sensitive and discriminating. Similarly if attention is paid to our powers of imagination, this mental capacity will be enriched, perhaps in such a way as to lead either to problem solving through the re-description of the situation or the envisioning of alternative

possibilities, or to the creation of original ideas through the realization of "fresh insights which relate"[1] two previously unrelated pieces of information.

The development of capacities tends to open up new areas of experience, which add to the quality and vitality of our existence. The fostering of the motile and perceptual capacities of our embodiment is no exception. For example where the instrumental capabilities are increased the resulting precision in control and co-ordination makes success possible in physical tasks which would previously have been too demanding. These tasks could range from scaling a difficult rock face to constructing intricate scale models. The development of embodied capacities will extend this aspect of an individual's interaction with the world and thus contribute to the richness of his existence.

The extension of this mode of interaction can be derived from an increase in either the perceptual or the motile capacities of the embodiment. It is, however, almost impossible to separate the two as the achievement of operative liaison depends on their intimate association. Furthermore the capacities themselves are, in a sense, mutually reinforcing. For example, if attention is focused on the perceptual aspects new nuances of awareness will arise. This heightened awareness of the physical surroundings will tend to elicit a more refined response and require from the embodiment a greater precision with respect to its motility. On the other hand where a refinement in the use of the embodiment is worked towards and achieved, an increased range of motile capacities will be realized. This wider capacity will tend, up to a point, to demand more acute perception in order to identify the precise nature of the motile response required. In respect of each of the aspects a refinement could call for a more precise or a more rapid co-operation from the other. In situations

such as these one aspect is being, as it were, 'challenged' or 'prompted' to match the sophistication of the other. A tension is created which is only resolved when an appropriate match is achieved. The awareness and the motile capacity are like two sides of a coin, one is not complete without the other. Where one aspect has, in a sense, 'grown', 'moved forward', become 'elaborated', the other aspect is called on to reciprocate, to respond to the need to achieve a moment of completeness and equilibrium.

An example of where a mismatch is experienced is in learning to drive a new car, or better in changing from driving a small car to driving a vehicle such as a minibus. In the initial stages there is acute perception of the response of the vehicle to movements of the steering wheel and equally of the engine's response to the use of the accelerator and to the co-ordination between the clutch and the brake. This sensitivity to the 'handling' of the vehicle persists until the motile capacities become appropriately patterned to match the demands of the situation. Once the match is achieved, the perceptual and motile capacities work in concert and a sense of equilibrium is experienced. This resolution is in marked contrast to the experience of trying to control a vehicle that has developed an intermittent and undiagnosed fault. Perception is acute, but owing to the unpredictability of the vehicle no satisfactory motile match is achieved and the sense of disequilibrium experienced can be very disconcerting.

The possibility of refining and extending our liaison is afforded by the nature of our embodied dimension itself. The dimension is not a pre-given structure, but is a development of the corporeal schema. The schema is elaborated as the resistors perceive and respond to the interplay of forces in the world. Motility or operative ability is extended, and the range of liaison patterns we can effect with the

world is increased. In other words, as the schema develops we are able to deploy our instrumentality across a wider spectrum of situations and capitalize more fully on our embodiment as "the vehicle of being in the world."[2]

To give individuals no opportunity to explore and exploit their embodied capacities would narrow or close their way to the significant areas of experience to which those capacities give access. Situations that promote such development would incorporate a wide range of aspects and features of the world, such as different media, surfaces, obstacles, projectiles and implements. If specific objectives are devised in these situations, the demands made on the sensitivity and versatility of the embodiment may be increased. For example, if the relationship is to show a particular pattern of acceleration, or follow a complex prescribed pathway, the interaction will demand more acute perception and more finely controlled responses, than if the relationship to be executed is to show constant average speed along a roughly undirectional pathway. Equally working closely with others will demand more precision than working alone, and responding to a changing environment will be more challenging than moving in stable surroundings.

With each new situation the corporeal schema is elaborated and the individual comes to know his embodied attributes more fully. As Merleau-Ponty says: 'in learning, nothing new is acquired but a new ability is revealed.' There is a sense in which those concerned to develop physical potential construct environments within which they challenge the participants to 'find' a new aspect of their motile faculties. This notion is also expressed by Slusher who, in discussing the experience of involvement in physical activity says "In the straining and alteration from normal pursuits, man feels his body as he never knew it before."[3] The goal for the participants in an activity

situation is to match their motile response to the various forces of resistance in the environment. Ultimately the mover hopes to achieve an effective liaison pattern, with the forces of his 'external' situation and those of his embodiment blending into a single rhythm. The experience is often described as one where the mover feels part of the environment he is relating to. Sartre talks of the skier being at one with the snow and Nuuhiwa encourages his water skiers to "blend into the wave" and "become part of it."[4]

This mode of mastery of self-in-the-world is both meaningful and rewarding. To describe it as 'mastery' is perhaps inappropriate. The process is in fact, less one of imposing control over one's physical dimension than of allowing the embodiment to respond to and be moulded by the forces of the environment, so enabling an appropriate combination of capacities to come into play to a common purpose. The development of our embodied dimension lies in refining and extending its range of capacities, and in fostering its ability to draw on these in appropriate combination in relation to the current environment. Development is not a simple undirectional growth in physical abilitiy. It more resembles the build up in potential displayed in a game of chess. The strength of a player depends on his ability to martial the powers of the pieces at his disposal in response to the situation created by his opponent and in the interests of achieving his ultimate goal to win the game. The more skilfully these powers are juxtaposed the more potential they have to move into ever more effective combinations. Rather similarly, the development of the faculties of our embodiment is to be found in the ability to 'read' the environment and respond with the combination of capacities that is called for to achieve the current goal. The more perfect the 'fit' the more articulate will be the liaison; the more successful will be the outcome and the richer will

be the experience of being-at-one-with-the-world. The relevance of this analogy is limited by the facts that the goal in chess remains constant and the powers of the pieces are both all of one kind and narrowly prescribed. In contrast, the ends to which embodied liaison is put are legion, and the powers at its disposal are widely varied and rich with possibilities.

The situations described above are very closely akin to those that occur in physical education, and their specific nature and objectives are not foreign to those who work in this area. Jewett, for example, has proposed "that physical education is concerned primarily with the individual moving in interaction with the environment."[5] and a government publication in the early 1970's stressed the development of sensitivity and versatility as among the "true values of physical education."[6] There seems little double that this area of the school curriculum has the potential to develop the perceptual and motile capacities of the embodiment.

As has been stressed earlier, this development, although centred on a specific aspect of liaison with the world is not limited in its effect to the operation of the embodied dimension alone. The capacities of man's embodiment are fundamental to his existence. They play a part in his synaesthetic perception of the world and are an integral element in many of his projects. Furthermore, development of embodied liaison gives the individual the means by which he can enrich his self-awareness and self-assurance. This awareness is characterized by an appreciation of the self as a being whose existence is essentially embodied-in-the-world. The assurance grows from an ability to co-ordinate his various embodied capacities in an effective relationship with the forces of the world. The more sensitive and versatile he is in this respect, the more articulate

will be this liaison and the greater will be the ease with which he achieves his intended goal. It is the realization of this close liaison that makes the heightened self-awareness particularly meaningful for the individual. In this dialectic there is the experience of harmony in two dimensions. One arises from the apprehension of all the capacities of the embodiment collaborating to a single purpose. This carries with it an exhilarating sense of vibrant power, or élan vital, working within the individual. There is a 'centering' of all the physical attributes into a disciplined but dynamic whole. The other experience of harmony accompanies the first and results from the embodiment's being 'in tune' with the surrounding forces of the world. Such is the degree of intimacy here that the individual no longer has a sense of being 'over and against' the world but rather there is an experience of a sort of unity, with the forces of his embodiment and those of the world, as it were, contributing to a common end. There is at one and the same time a sense of identification with the world and an experience of confidence in oneself. This simultaneous illumination of the individual as embodied, and of world in its reciprocity with the embodiment is no doubt an instance of fully lived operative intentionality, an intentional intimacy possibly of the order described by Merleau-Ponty as 'chiasm'. Such an experience has profound significance for the individual. Not only does it carry affirmation of the competence with which he can use his embodied dimension, it also tends to bring to his awareness his fundamental nature as a being embodied-in-the-world. And, since during such an experience the individual is at once at home with himself and at home in the world, it may justly be regarded as an experience of freedom, and is typically recognized as such.

With this range of potential benefits, development of our

embodied capacities through physical education can be seen to have a strong claim for inclusion in the school curriculum - not on the grounds that it develops vocational skills but in its capacity to develop a fundamental human faculty for its own sake. This form of justification is similar to that given for liberal education by the Ancient Greeks. This education was concerned to foster all aspects of the individual's natural ability and arose out of a new conception of man as being the product of universal laws of human nature. Their guiding principle was "not individualism but 'humanism', to use the word in its original and classical sense. It meant the process of educating man into his true form, the real and genuine human nature".[7] The role of education was to release "the powers of the young soul"[8] and to achieve aréte- "the sum total of all ideal perfections of mind and body"[9]

While this view would support the inclusion of physical education, it carries the implication of training the body to match prescribed standards. The significance of such a goal is, however, questionable, as development of the embodied faculties to a particular level is not an end in itself. Its principal value lies in providing a means by which the pupil can enhance his self-awareness and self-assurance as embodied-in-the-world. The development is in the interests of the individual and comparison with others is irrelevant. The goal for the individual is to work within his capacities to achieve a close liaison with the physical world. Enrichment for him, will be the greater if his liaison is more sensitively refined than he has previously achieved. His liaison neither gains nor loses anything by comparison with the performance level of others. That this is the way physical activity is perceived by many is supported by the

enthusiasm with which they engage in sports at very modest levels. A recent example of this is the popularity of running marathons. The attraction is not derived from winning but from participating in, and completing, the 'race'. This attitude seems to underline the familiar maxim: 'it is the taking part, not the winning that counts'.

Interestingly, while the concept of liberal education proposed by Paul Hirst would not include physical education, because the exclusive concern of this education is for the development of mind and rationality, certain of Hirst's comments, with slight modifications, are applicable to aspects of movement work. For example, in arguing that the development of mind via the acquisition of knowledge is central to education, he says "...knowledge itself being a distinctive human virtue, liberal education has a value for the person as the fulfilment of the mind, a value which has nothing to do with utilitarian or vocational considerations."[10] This could well be rewritten to read 'physical competence, itself being a distinctive human virtue, its fostering has the value for the person as the fulfilment of embodied faculties, a value which has nothing to do with utilitarian or vocational considerations'. He also explains that mind is to be developed through the acquisition of knowledge established in the world. Mental powers are to be fostered in a relation with forms of knowledge in the world.

This development via a relationship with aspects of the world parallels the promotion of embodied faculties in liaison with the physical environment, and in some respects is in keeping with the existentialist point of view that man's essence is realized and nurtured through interaction with the world. Man as being-in-the-world relies on the range of ways in which he can liaise with his

environment to develop his various capacities. His growth is realized only by promoting his relationship with the world. This perception of existence and human development throws a new light on what should be the preoccupations of education. To realize the inheritance of our human capacities requires not just intellectual development but calls for the fostering of our various modes of liaison with the world. Each liaison experience will provide both new insights into the world and an enrichment of the awareness we have of ourselves, our capacities and our nature. On this view fostering our embodied faculties in liaison with the physical environment is indisputably not only a part of education but also an important aim of education. Our embodiment is not inferior, but the source of a unique experience that issues in a specific understanding of the world and a particular awareness of ourself. And more, our embodied faculties are not merely one of a range of capacities we have, they are the crucial means by which we develop a relationship with the world. "The body is our anchorage in the world,"[11] it brings the world to life for us as a "heart...in an organism."[12] Through the corporeal schema the embodiment lays the ground for many of our perceptions. It is well described as the 'knowing body', it provides an essential first level of meaning, from which we build our projects. As Merleau-Ponty said "In perception...we merge into this body which is better informed than we are about the world, and about the motives we have and the means at our disposal for sythesising it."[13]

This dimension of ourself, with its far reaching effects on existence needs to be stressed and cultivated rather than neglected in favour of a superstructure of sophisticated forms of knowledge of which it is itself the essential basis. Nietzsche realized this and said "Behind

your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, an unknown sage - he is called self. He lives in your body, he is your body" and "The body is a great intelligence."[14]

Nietzsche's deep and aggressive respect for the body has been shared, at least to some degree, by other educationists. Vittorino and Montaigne for example, acknowledged man's physical attributes as integral to his being and therefore worthy of attention in education. Spinoza saw activities that promoted physical competence as contributing to self realization. Newman advocated physical activity as having value in its own right for the individual, including it in his recommendations for education. These views have been supported recently in both England and the United States. Curl's plea to look to the intrinsic value of physical activity was quoted in Section I. Kleinman holds similar views. He proposes six objectives for physical education - all focused on its value in its own right. Two of these are:- "to develop an awareness of bodily being in the world" and "To enable one, ultimately, to create on his own an experience through movement which culminates in meaningful, purposeful realization of self."[15]

While Hirst does not see physical education as part of liberal education in his view this does not automatically preclude it from education. Liberal education, he argues, does not necessarily constitute the whole of education, and if other things are seen as of equal value to forms of knowledge they could be worthy of a place in education as a whole. In an article on 'Human Movement, Knowledge and Education',[16] Hirst examines the status of movement work and concludes that it could make a valuable contribution to education within the domain of knowledge-how. This is not an uncommon view, but it is one which is based on a misunderstanding and consequently

trivializes rather than supports the subject area. The misunderstanding arises out of Hirst's view that knowledge-how cannot exist independently of knowledge that. Knowledge-how is seen as an application of knowledge-that, as merely one way in which knowledge-that can be used. Knowledge-how has value only by proxy. The actual physical execution that demonstrates knowledge-how is nothing more than a knack. Physical competence therefore has no value in its own right.

Even if dependence of knowledge-how on knowledge-that is the case in other areas, it does not hold in respect of our embodied capacities. Our ability to manage ourselves in the physical mode arises out of and develops from our prereflective liaison with our surroundings. The perceptual and motile capacities of our embodiment are independent of propositional knowledge in their deft interaction with the world. Propositional knowledge may develop from an effective embodied liaison, but our capacity to relate effectively in this way relies little, if at all, on knowledge-that.

In fact it is misleading to try to argue for the value of physical activity in terms of any form of 'knowledge' it could develop. What is acquired in developing movement competence is better described as an 'appreciation'. It is an appreciation derived from the experience of liaison with the world <u>via</u> the embodiment, and has as its objects the two parties of the liaison in their capacity to add meaning to existence. This suggestion, however, that some form of appreciation of one's personal experience gave value to physical activity would do little to persuade Hirst of its acceptability in education. His criteria for worthwhileness seem to lie in the objectivity of what is to be learnt and in its ability to conform to publicly agreed criteria. Movement competence cannot possibly have the kind of objectivity, definable only by reference to propositional truth,

which Hirst demands. It cannot exist first 'outside the person' and then be acquired by that person. There are some public criteria against which this competence could be measured such as speed, strength and endurance, but these would highlight the mechanistic aspects of the body and overlook the central purpose of achieving an effective relationship with the world. Apparently more relevant criteria would be in respect of such qualities as economy of effort, poise and grace but these would be far from easy to formulate, and their relevance would remain questionable. The general objection raised by Hirst is, perhaps, not so serious as it may at first seem since his principle of objectivity in relation to forms of knowledge has been shown to be dubious as an educational criterion, and he has himself, to some extent conceded this point.[17]

There is however, some doubt expressed by Hirst in the article on 'Human Movement, Knowledge and Education' about the value of any 'knowledge' or appreciation achieved through promoting movement competence. This is that, while the body in action might develop a mode of awareness of the world this 'understanding' is not in principle exclusive to our embodiment in its active movement, but is available to us through other channels, for example, through reading. Such a view would be profoundly mistaken. The awareness we achieve of the world and of ourself in the world through exercising our physical capacities is in fact unique. Not only just because the information we gather <u>via</u> our resistors is unavailable to other sensory areas but more significantly in its being the appreciation of the roots of our intentional relationship with the world. Merleau-Ponty explains that "Bodily experience forces us to acknowledge an imposition of meaning which is not the work of a universal

constituting consciousness." [18] This is operative meaning through which we recognize at once the fundamental nature of things around us and at once are appraised of how to relate to them. One might reflect that the general 'alertness' often claimed to be generated by physical activity on account of its beneficial physiological effects, might, in part, be a reflection of a heightened awareness of the world and of ourself in the world.

Our appreciation of the world via our embodied faculties is unique in that it alone opens the way to the elaboration of other meanings - meanings that can only arise once the fundamental nature of the feature has been formulated. That it has a pre-propositional character is not a reason for disregarding or belittling its value but, if anything makes its contribution to our meaningful existence even more remarkable. It is indeed remarkable that this same mode of appreciation is found, though at different degrees of explicitness, both at the most fundamental levels of interaction with the world and in situations where harmonious operative liaison with our surroundings provides an illuminating experience of self-realization as embodied-being-in-the-world.

Physical education has a significant contribution to make to education, not least in its capacity to develop one dimension of our being-in-the-world. This is not to the exclusion of other dimensions but alongside them, in an education of the whole man. Hirst's conception of education as centred around intellectual development does not reflect the variety of ways in which we can grow, in liaison with the world, and may be justly criticised as narrow.

Section 5

Perspectives on the embodiment and their implications in everyday life and physical education teaching.

There is one further characteristic of the embodiment that both philosophers see as important to a full understanding of its role in existence. This is that it can be viewed in a number of different ways both by the individual of whom it is a dimension, and by others. That this is worthy of detailed investigation here is signalled by Seymour Kleinman in an article where he suggests that physical education teachers are failing to promote enthusiastic participation in the subject because they are adopting inappropriate attitudes to their pupils' embodiment. He says "It appears that in our pursuit of and subservience to game and sport, the body almost acts as an obstacle which must be overcome in order that the ends of sports and games be achieved. We have come to regard the body as a thing to be dealt with rather than as an existent presence or mode of being."[1] The implication is that physical education teachers are treating the body as an in-itself object rather than as an integral part of the for-itself. These are indeed two perspectives that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty identify, with both philosophers stressing the primacy of the body as lived on a prereflective level.

Sartre, who goes into more detail in this area than Merleau-Ponty, identifies three perspectives that can be taken up on the body. Each perspective issues in a particular body mode. The first of these is the body-as-being-for-itself, or the body-for-itself. This is the dimension of the body as it is existed, the body in its lived immediacy to the for-itself. In his everyday existence man lives his body chiefly "on the level of the unreflective consciousness."[2] As man directs his energies towards a project he does not pause to consider the role his body is playing. His facility to move in a controlled and purposeful way is simply taken for granted. The body is "the neglected, the passed by in silence."[3] The body-for-itself is not only surpassed in ongoing

action it is also elusive as a subject for knowledge. In fact Sartre maintains that man can never know this dimension of the body because its existence is one with the for-itself. This "body is nothing other than the for-itself, it is not an in-itself in the for-itself."[4] As there is no gap, no constituting nothingness, between the for-itself and the body-for-itself the latter cannot be grasped as an object and therefore it cannot be known. Knowing for Sartre always involves the recognition of an object that is essentially other than that by which it is known.

In spite of the impossibility of approaching the body-for-itself thetically, Sartre acknowledges that it would seem to be this mode that provides the individual with a stabilizing centre of orientation in his environment. Furthermore it constitutes the reference point by which the world as an instrument complex comes into being and therefore plays an important part in developing a meaningful relationship with the world. This fact gives Sartre further grounds to say that it cannot be known, as it is itself a source of the realization of knowledge.

This body mode is very much in line with the first of two modes described by Merleau-Ponty. Naming this variously the lived body, the pre-objective body, the body proper and the phenomenal body he says that although it is acutely perceptive and active it is lived unreflectively as we go about our everyday business. On no account is it to be thought of as 'a conceptualized entity', but rather as a human dimension that "signifies a mode of orientation."[5] Although this mode seems parallel to Sartre's body-for-itself, some doubt arises when Merleau-Ponty explains "I know my body proper only by living it"[6] and "The body is an expressive unity which one can learn to know only by performing it."[7] However since he also refers to the body proper as essentially

'pre-objective' and 'pre-reflective' it is to be presumed that he is using the verb 'to know' at a pre-conceptual level, and that the body proper does resemble closely Sartre's unknowable body-for-itself that is always "passed by in silence."[8] And when Sartre goes on to explain that it acts as a "sign...that...is neglected for the sake of meaning,"[9] his implication of a possible intentional role for the body-for-itself, would seem to confirm the affinity between the first of the body modes described by each of the philosophers. This mode is the lived embodiment that underpins our ongoing liaison with the world.

Sartre's second mode of embodiment is the body-as-being-for-others, or the body-for-others. As its name suggests this is not a form of the body for me, it is in no way a perspective that I can take on my own body. It is the Other's comprehension of my embodied consciousness.

For Sartre the body-for-others is susceptible to at least three configurations from the viewpoint of the observer. In the first, the Other views my embodiment as an indication of a rival instrument complex within his own situation. He is aware that my situation differs from his own, and that I could well be intent on absorbing him into my world in the form of an instrument or tool. In response to this threat of being posited as a pure in-itself, the Other attempts to transcend my transcendence and designate me as an object-tool in his world. There is, then, potential conflict. At his most pessimistic in Being and Nothingness Sartre saw no ready resolution of this situation. There appeared no possibility of it being resolved satisfactorily for both parties. One party will always dominate, forcing the Other to submit to defeat and yield his transcendence. If he succumbs unwillingly he will feel severely degraded, while if he submits willingly he will be guilty of living in bad faith. In either case there is a loss of integrity and the 'defeated' party will be forced to adopt a different view of himself, a view imposed by the Other.

There are perhaps, in his second configuration of this mode the seeds of Sartre's later, modified,view of the possibility of productive co-existence. In this Sartre suggests that the Other comes to know me via my body-for-others. The Other can hold himself back from casting me in his complex and can view me as a transcendence-in-situation, as an embodied being engaged in the world. My existence is meaningful to him as I appear "within the limits of the situation as a synthetic totality of life and action."[10] In this case my body-for-others is not viewed in isolation, or as a pure object. I am seen as hurrying to catch the bus, as waiting patiently in a queue, as intent on winning a game of tennis. If the Other continues to observe me actively involved in my projects he can begin to appreciate my character. Expressed in this way it implies that I have my character, and through the auspices of my body the Other can gain access to it. However this is not the case according to Sartre. In fact my character is brought into being by the Other, and it is **his**, in so far as it is his knowledge of me in situation. The Other builds up a picture of me as he observes the way I both construct and respond to my world. He sees recurring behaviour patterns and begins to anticipate accurately the nature of my projects and reactions. My body in action does not express my character, rather my "character is identical with"[11] my body. When Sartre writes "these frowns, this redness, this stammering, this slight trembling of the hands, these downcast looks which could be seen at once as timid and threatening, these do not express anger, they are anger,"[12] his stance appears to resemble a behaviourist's point of view. However he moves away from behaviourism in asserting that these gestures are only meaningful where they form part of a whole sequence of phenomena. These include not only the project that the person is engaged in with its encompassing situation, but also

all the signs, symptoms and other principal manifestations that he has displayed as the particular episode has evolved. Furthermore integral to a man's anger are his actual feelings, which he may well indicate via his speech. Sartre's view resembles that of Austin who explained that "it seems fair to say that 'being angry' is in many respects like 'having mumps'. It is a whole pattern of events including occasion, symptoms, feeling and manifestation."[13] For example I am not viewed as overjoyed simply because of my alert posture and expansive gestures. An observer's understanding of me as in this frame of mind is a result of the way he perceives these gestures - first against a background of my aspirations in relation to present events; second as part of a developing pattern of bodily symptoms and presentations; and third as interlocking with how I feel about the situation evidenced in my speech. If the observer knows me well and is familiar with the way I respond to events, he will be particularly confident in describing me as overjoyed. My body-for-others can therefore constitute an important mode of access for the Other in his coming to know me.

In the third configuration of this body mode the Other can take a detached view of my embodiment and contemplate it as a pure object. A surgeon might well view it as an ailing structure that needed surgery, a physiologist might contemplate it as a collection of interdependent protoplasmic cells each adapted to its own function. A member of a judging panel might see it as being of the appropriate measurements to be considered for the Miss England award, or a physical education teacher could view it as an ill co-ordinated system of levers that, as yet, is incapable of producing sufficient power to clear five metres. In short, the Other could consider my body scientifically in a fashion that could be empirically verified.

These three possible configurations need careful consideration by

physical educationists. The first is an alarming proposal in the context of a teaching situation where interpersonal relations, with a body focus, are at a premium. The last is familiar, in that it resembles the designation of the body as an obstacle referred to by Kleinman.

Sartre's third mode of embodiment has been anticipated in discussing the body-for-others. As I experience the Other's 'look' I become aware of his transcendence and his propensity to objectify me. As a corollary to this encounter I come to realise that I have a body-for-others, and that this is a potential existential for me. I can "exist for myself as a body known by the Other."[14] While the first mode of the body was a prereflective counterpart of the for-itself, and the second mode was formulated by the Other, it is apparent that this final mode is of a hybrid nature depending both on the for-itself and the Other for its realization. Sartre calls it the body-for-itself-as-known-by-the-other. It would be equally possible, if not more accurate, to call it the body-for-others-as-known-by-the-for-itself.

The way in which Sartre suggests I come to know this mode is complex and relies to an extent on language. It is clarified by describing the process in stages. First, I must be aware of the Other as object, and secondly I must appreciate, <u>via</u> the transcendence of the Other, my own object dimension. Sartre refers to our appreciation of the body at this stage as a 'quasi-object' as it is not conceived of as identical with pure objects in the world. As a third stage I must come to realize that the two quasi-objects in question are analogous. Once this identification has taken place, I am in a position to enter the fourth stage. I can appreciate that concepts relating to the Other as quasi-object pertain also to my body as quasi-object. Language now enables me to build up a detailed picture

and understanding of my quasi-object, and in doing this I constitute it as my psychic-body. It is so named because my knowledge of it comes principally via my understanding of the Other's language.

Formulated in this way this body mode can be viewed as a feature distinct from my for-itself. It can therefore be an object for knowledge and is susceptible to contemplation and conceptualization. However this language that reveals and subsequently constitutes my psychic body can never illuminate my body-for-itself as this is pre-objective and out of reach. It is because these two modes are on two distinct existential levels for the individual, that Sartre explains that there is absolutely no possibility of communcation between them. This apparently total separation will need to be discussed further as much skill teaching in physical education claims to depend on a close relationship between these two modes.

There is, however, a more remarkable claim made by Sartre, viz that any contemplation by an individual of his psychic body underlines its 'otherness' and divorces it from the for-itself. "My body is designed as alienated," it "escapes me on all sides."[15] This situation is more likely to occur if others are present. Here "the shock of the encounter with the Other is for me a revelation of emptiness of the existence of my body outside, as an in-itself for the Other."[16]

While physical educationists often claim to encourage pupils to experience their 'wholeness', such an experience would seem to be impossible on Sartre's terms. In a situation where first, the teacher's 'look' can highlight the pupil's body as a quasi-object for himself; second the teacher's extensive use of language cannot but focus on the actuality of the child's psychic body: and third where his demand is for the pupil to contemplate his body as a pure instrument, there seems

considerable danger that a pupil will experience his body as divorced from himself. There are here then, further aspects of physical education teaching that need to be reviewed.

A discussion of the dilemma of a shy person in company will lay some useful ground for subsequent consideration in the field of teaching A shy person, presumably someone lacking in self-confidence in a particular setting, is described by Sartre as being over-ridingly conscious of his body "as it is for the Other."[17] This could be because he is very aware of the superior mastery of the situation by the others in his company. Their 'looks' are disconcerting to him and consequently he is alerted to his psychic body. Three options seem most immediately available to the shy person - but each will only exacerbate his situation. He could give his attention to his psychic-body but in this case it will be experienced as alienated from him and make him feel ill at ease. He could summon up the strength to take some action, but as he is unable to see his behaviour 'through the eyes' of the Other, he will not be able to judge how far his action is acceptable. Sartre describes this predicament:- "I forever act 'blindly', shoot at a venture without ever knowing the results of my shooting."[18] The apprehensive subject will certainly try to pick up cues from others to give him some indication of how they have viewed his behaviour, but he can never be certain of the appropriateness of his action and consequently he remains uneasy. Alternatively, he could shift his position in order to arrange himself "in the form and attitude"[19] that would seem acceptable to the present company. However, in this case he is manipulating his body as an instrument, and Sartre asserts that if a person takes this unnatural view of himself as an instrument, his natural apprehension of the world as a complex of instruments referring back to himself as their prereflective centre, disintegrates. In

other words his world collapses. Alienated from both his world and his body it is no wonder that the shy person often responds by absenting himself from this unhappy situation.

While this description fits the behaviour of a shy, apprehensive and self conscious person, the situation it outlines is not one that is experienced frequently by many people even if they are in strange company. The root cause of this individual's dilemma would seem to be in his feelings of inadequacy. Feeling himself inferior in a particular setting, he is very susceptible to others attitudes to him and to their potential for over-riding his personal standpoint to cast him within their situation. As a result his being-for-others, or body-for-others is brought to the fore and his discomfort is assured.

Merleau-Ponty, who identifies two, rather than three body modes, does not go to such lengths as Sartre to bring to light the potentially undesirable outcomes of certain perspectives being taken on the embodiment. He does differentiate clearly between the lived body and the objective body, however, and some of his comments on the latter are very much in line with aspects of Sartre's second and third modes. For example one of the features that separates the two modes for Merleau-Ponty is that the lived body is unequivocally a unity while the objective body is readily subject to fragmentation, particularly at the hands of the scientist. "We have seen in the body a unity distinct from that of the scientific object."[20] To support this point he explains that a body part such as the ear or lung, contemplated in isolation from the whole body has "no existence."[21] Following from this it is clear that those working in the human sciences, for example in the field of kinesiology are concerned with the objective body, not the lived body. Indeed in "The Visible and the Invisible" Merleau-Ponty states that the lived body is "beneath objective rest and

movement"[22] The body viewed as an object does not have a significant role to play in existence. It is certainly not the definitive form of the body, of which the lived body is a passing shadow, rather the reverse is the case. "The objective body is not the true version of the body that we live by: it is indeed no more than the latter's impoverished image".[23]

There is also some agreement in the way others use our embodiment as a reference point to assess our character or current disposition. For example, Merleau Ponty says that in appreciating the mood of another person, we do not see his gestures as external 'signs'. The Other does "not see anger or a threatening attitude as a psychic fact hidden behind the gestures", rather "he reads anger in it".[24] He also endorses Sartre's view in respect of the idea that all behaviour is to be understood in the context of its relationship with the world. A person is not given as meaningful, divorced from his situation.

Finally, Merleau-Ponty concurs to some extent with Sartre concerning the potential threat of objectification inherent in the Other's 'look'. However, for him, the materialization of the threat is the exception rather than the rule. There are two situations that Merleau-Ponty sees as particularly threatening. One is where a person is seen naked. In this condition he feels vulnerable, scrutinized as an object, almost as if the Other is "stealing" his body "from him"".[25] One person can present himself naked in order to fascinate the Other, but in achieving his goal he never attains a fully human relationship with the Other, as the latter is taken up contemplating an object rather than communicating with another person. Sartre makes a similar point in discussing the presentation of oneself as flesh, in order to captivate another.

The other threatening situation is one where one or both parties

involved, withdraw from communication and survey one other as isolated phenomenon. It is as "if each of us feels his actions to be not taken up and understood, but observed as if they were an insect's".[26] The significant feature here is the lack of communication. This is not a line of thought developed by Sartre in Being and Nothingness because it is a notion that relates back to Merleau-Ponty's belief in a shared world. This one, communal world is an 'instrument' we can all 'play', in our own way, but simultaneously. Merleau-Ponty says that as soon as communication is achieved with another either via a gesture or speech it becomes apparent that the Other is in meaningful relation himself with the world as I know it. The Other then becomes meaningful to me and I incorporate him into my world. For Merleau-Ponty, the world for me is, in normal circumstancea, the richer for the presence of the Other; it is not threatened by his appearance.

An example could clarify the idea Merleau-Ponty has put forward. I am sorting items into different containers ready for despatch. The room is sizeable and I am alone. I have to leave the room briefly and on returning I am taken aback by the gaze of a total stranger who is sitting motionless on a chair. The chair had not been in the room before, and I knew of no one designated to help me in my task. The stranger is positioned well away from the sorting stations and momentarily there seems no way I can relate to him. I feel stunned, locked in his gaze. As long as he sits motionless looking at me, I am strangely ill at ease, not knowing how to react. Once he speaks or performs an action however, I can begin to comprehend his intentions and the environment situates us both. My sense of perplexity will dissipate whatever he does. He could speak and inform me he had been detailed to help me. Speech, Merleau-Ponty says most readily relates people to each other because it is a

"cultural object"[27] that immediately provides common ground. Instead of speaking, however, he could simply begin to label the fully packed cartons, or suddenly throw petrol over the boxes and set fire to them, or feverishly empty the cartons on to the floor. Whatever his actions, they have at least two immediate effects on me. First, I am in no doubt that this is another human being. His actions are intelligibly related to my environment. I may not understand why he acts as he does but his intentions are understandable in the world as I know it. Secondly I appreciate that my situation has changed. My environment that was previously subject only to my point of view, now adjusts to accommodate two perspectives. The objects surrounding me "take on a fresh layer of significance: they are no longer simply what I myself could make of them, they are what this other pattern of behaviour is about to make of them".[27] Additionaly, of course, the Other's actions in the world reveal to me something of the character of my new companion and furthermore this knowledge may initiate an attitude towards him, on my part, of for example fear, disbelief, or warmth.

In describing this incident my relationship with the stranger was presented in a reasoned and reflective manner. However our normal grasp of others in the world is realized prereflectively as we conduct ourselves through our daily routine.

In looking at the body modes. As proposed by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty a number of observations have been made that are significant to physical educationists.

The most serious eventuality that has been revealed is one where an individual rejects his objective body. In this event he tries to disassociate himself from his embodiment. He sees it as distasteful and does not want it to 'belong' to him. However because he 'is' his body, he cannot succeed in his efforts. His embodiment clings to him

in his determination to be rid of it. This is a disturbing experience and one that Laing identifies as common in some forms of schizophrenia. At its worst it is experienced as "a sado-masochistic relationship"[29] of self with self. In becoming preoccupied with the body-as-object Sartre also talks of the world collapsing around us. With reference to his patients Laing explains that "such a divorce of self from body deprives the unembodied self from direct participation in any aspect of the life of the world, which is mediated exclusively through the body's perceptions, feelings and movements....The unembodied self, as onlooker to all the body does, engages in nothing directly."[30]

While this degree of disorientation and inner conflict occurs only in psychotic cases, there seems little doubt that any semblance of experience of this nature has the potential to be profoundly unsettling and distressing.

The first step in the development of this unfortunate situation is the awareness of ones embodiment as an instrument or object. This, it is suggested, is initiated by the presence of others. In addition where an individual's embodiment is more exposed in that briefer clothes are worn, and where he is looked at and attention is drawn via language to his body-object, the more likely it is that he will be taken up with this awareness. Once he is acutely aware of his body-as-object there is the danger that he will reject it. This will occur more readily if the individual feels inadequate or is dominated by others in his immediate setting.

It is not difficult to see how this chain of events could occur in a physical education setting. A child scantily clad in a leotard is very conscious of others looking at her. Attention is drawn by the teacher's instructions to the instrumental functions of her embodiment and she is forced to perceive it in this light. The child,

finding the task difficult, views her embodiment-as-object as inferior, weak or cumbersome and is very sensitive to the critical looks not only from the teacher, but also from her peers. Faced with potential derision by all around her she turns against her embodiment and tries to dissociate herself from it. The unfortunate consequences of adopting this attitude to herself leads her to dislike, if not fear, the situation in which it has arisen.

With this danger of profoundly unpleasant experiences resulting from physical education it is not surprising that throughout the history of the subject the need for it to be enjoyed has been a constantly recurring theme. Advocates of the promotion of physical fitness as far apart as Galen and Whitehead and Fox both saw enjoyment as critical to their enterprise. The former wrote "The best gymnastics is that which not only exercises the body, but delights the spirit".[31] While the latter explained that "It is clear that within this framework the real skills of the physical education teacher lie in using whatever means there are at his disposal to enhance student attitudes towards physical activity. Understanding and enjoyment are fundamental."[32] Government directives in this century in England have also endorsed this view. For example the 1933 syllabus included the comment that "Enjoyment is one of the most necessary factors in nearly everything which concerns the welfare of the body, and if exercise is distasteful and wearisome its ....value is diminished."[33] This is a perceptive remark which has been further underlined both in the United States where a publication in 1969 asserted that enjoyment and satisfaction are important in all aspects of the subject,[34] and in this country where a county chief education officer reminded the profession in 1984 that "physical education must give pleasure."[35]

Not recognizing that enjoyment is a requisite for the

achievement of any objective in physical education some writers have proposed that enjoyment is the prime aim of the subject. This proposal is readily adopted by many, as it accords with their own experiences both of fun and of intense pleasure in taking part in physical activity. The view is, however, most unfortunate, and rather than adding credence to the subject, tends to trivialize it - turning it into a mere amusement. The status of enjoyment among the aims of physical education is an important issue and will be discussed more fully in the next section.

What however must be investigated further here is how satisfactory perspectives on pupils' embodied dimension can be achieved in a physical education context. In this situation there are two forces at work;that of the attitude of the teacher, and the same of the pupil. Each of the two parties has a range of attitudes they can adopt, but as the embodiment in question constitutes an integral dimension of only one of the people involved, the actual range of attitudes available to each will differ somewhat. These two sets of attitudes will now be considered, first independently and then in relation to each other.

Combining the views of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty there are four perspectives that an Other can take up on my embodiment. These are the designation of my body as an object, the viewing of it as a tool, the appreciation of it as an organ evidencing my general character and current intent, and the apprehension of it as the manifestation that is the total expression of me in the world.

The Other's view of my embodiment at any particular time will relate to the part I am playing, or may be able to play, in his current situation. First, then, if I am anaesthetized and a suregon is operating on my hip joint, he will view me as pure object. A doctor

might also view me as object if he was putting a plaster cast on my leg. If I am having a dress fitted by a dressmaker, she will be concerned only with my objective dimensions; if I am a pornographic photographer's model, he also will be solely interested in my body as an object. Generally speaking it is the inert body that is viewed as an object, though in an experiment concerned to measure, for example, strength and frequency of nerve impulses from the brain to the leg in kicking, the mobile body will be viewed as an object-mechanism to be analysed. Viewing the body as an object is closely related to the second perspective of seeing it as a tool. This is adopted when the Other determines to use a person's physical potential to his own ends. It could be argued that both the dressmaker and the pornographic photographer are using my body as a tool in furthering their ends in their career - as indeed perhaps in his own way is the neuro-physiologist. However if these instances are compared with the extreme examples of using the body as a tool - such as mediaeval peasants being used to tread a mill wheel and teenage Thai girls being used unwillingly as prostitutes, the differential becomes clearer. In these last situations the threat inherent in the Other's look has materialized.

A body used as a tool is a body whose physical capacities are exploited without any concern for the wishes of the person whose embodiment is being used. Another extreme example would be in a prison labour camp. Here not only is the individual's total life-style taken over, he is made to work on tasks that cause him as much discomfort and distress as possible. It is an Other's total concentration on my bodily aspect and complete disregard of my attitude towards how my embodiment is being made to operate that characterizes viewing the body as a tool. The attitudes of the

sargeant-major relentlessly drilling his troops and the choreographer rigorously and unsympathetically training a group to master a particular routine are instances of treating the body as a tool. In all these cases there is some form of subservience, possibly coupled with fear, on the part of the abused persons who are being treated as embodiment-tools. More subtle, and less clear cut examples can be found in instances when people are persuaded to take part in some event by another individual, whose ends their participation will serve.

The third attitude that the Other can adopt in relation to my embodiment is to appreciate it as the vehicle of my intentions and character. This attitude will most often be adopted in situations where I am seen or heard by someone who knows little or nothing about me. The Other may dwell on my gestures and other behaviour reflectively, in order to try to comprehend my intentions and make sense of my behaviour in the situation he observes. The Other will be dwelling on what my body is doing, but his concern for my actions is not so much for his own ends but in the interests of coming to understand me. My actions may be all that the Other knows of me, if we are not acquainted. In a sense he only knows me as an embodied form. I am the person who ran fast enough to catch the train as it moved out of the station; I am the person who was dragging an unwilling child, staggering under a heavy load of shopping or gesticulating enthusiastically to my companion. In the earlier stages of coming to know someone we pay considerable attention to their embodiment. As they become familiar to us their embodiment appears to become less significant, however it would seem that this is the case only because their behaviour is commensurate with our expectations and is therefore not reflected upon, rather it is prereflectively assimilated.

This leads to the fourth perspective that the Other can adopt

towards my embodiment, viz. the prereflective acceptance of my embodiment as an integral dimension of my agenthood in the world. This is how Pierre is seen by me when, as Sartre explains "Pierre's body is in no way to be distinguished from Pierre for me".[36] Much person to person contact takes place on this level. We accept the Other unquestioningly, we have no recourse to reflect on his embodied manifestation, because he behaves as we anticipate, his actions merge easily into the world we share. We communicate verbally and nonverbally, in a sense bypassing the Other's embodiment. We 'read', understand, and prereflectively accept each other. It is only when someone behaves unusually that we may return to reflect on their embodied dimension. My friend's posture may denote a new attitude to his surroundings; the way he drags his legs may alert me to the fact that he is exhausted. Novel features will be picked up in any meeting and may continue to hold our attention until we have in some way come to terms with them.

In discussing another person with others we can move very quickly from one to another of these four different attitudes towards his embodiment. If we consider his views and ambitions we shall be prereflectively taking account of his manifest bodily form. Should we comment on a particular instance of his behaviour we will be reflecting on why he used his embodiment in a certain way in a situation. If we plot to incorporate him into our schemes we begin to treat him as an embodiment-tool, and if we laugh at his unfortunate physical attributes we shall designate him as object.

Any encounter with another will involve our taking an attitude towards his embodiment. Depending on how well we know someone and what part we see him as playing in our current situation we may view his embodiment as object, as tool, as vehicle evidencing his intentions

and character or as an integral dimension of his agenthood.

In respect of the ways in which an individual can live and view his own embodiment, both philosophers have identified two principal modes:- prereflective and reflective. The body as lived prereflectively was identified by Sartre as the body-for-itself and by Merleau-Ponty as the pre-objective body. I do not find either of these descriptions satisfactory. The term 'body' over-ridingly denotes a material object, while the term 'pre-objective' is unacceptable because it implies that the central significance of our embodiment is found in its object manifestation. To avoid these unfortunate connotations I propose to refer to an individual's body as lived prereflectively as his 'lived embodiment'. That we are incarnate in a bodily form is a fact, but the objective facts of this form are secondary to the all pervading role our embodiment plays in our existence.

The task of analysing an individual's experience of his lived embodiment is far from straightforward not least because it is to attempt to describe what is prereflective. Nevertheless the beginnings of a description can be formulated. The primordial experience I have of my lived embodiment is as the fundamental means by which I am able to relate to the world. It is appreciated as a centre of potential, the focal point of my existence. This experience is not achieved unilaterally, "it is given to me by a reflux of the world towards my facticity."[37] My lived embodiment as a potential is reflected back to me from the world as the instrument complex that my upsurge itself has brought into being. Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty hold this view and this lays the essential foundation for the significance of our embodiment in existence that they both advocate. All our dealings with the world build from this prereflective base. However this all pervading foundation to existence is as elusive to thought as it

is influential in our life. As Langan explains "The systematic effort to carry out such a phenomenology is new and challenging because of the intrinsic difficulty of using reflective tools... to describe what is prereflective, using the instrument of the intellect to fix what is not intellectual, because it is essentially dynamic, using the explicit abstract tools of expression to direct oneself to the immediately lived level of experience."[38]

The four forms of awareness we can have of our lived embodiment are somewhat easier to articulate. These forms are usually lived on a prereflective level but their nature can be brought to light through introspection.

The first of these is kinaesthesis which is related to the awareness of movement. Both philosophers describe the fleeting sensations we have of our motile embodiment in action. Sartre calls these feeble and short lived sensations, while Merleau-Ponty describes their occurrence as vague impressions and says "When I move my hand towards a thing" I have an implicit awareness "that my arm unbends."[39]

The use of the term 'kinaesthesis' is, in itself, not without some problems, as it is used by many physical educationists to denote a quite specific reflected awareness of movement. However research now claims that kinaesthesis, which refers to the innervation of muscle tissue, is beyond conscious levels of awareness. It is concerned with complex inter muscle co-ordination and with fine intra muscle control, both of which are roles associated with the cerebellum. Proprioception more acceptably describes the capacity we have to be aware of our movement reflectively. There seems little doubt that we do experience a measure of proprioception prereflectively, and I shall use this term in preference to kinaesthesis, for referring to this form of awareness of our lived embodiment.

The other three forms of awareness were identified by Sartre. These are Coenesthesis, Affectivity and Nausea. Coenesthetic awareness refers to experiences such as hunger, thirst, fatigue and pain. It is concerned with our apprehension of 'internal' viscera via interoceptive sensory areas. Sartre suggests that we can live these experiences prereflectively as well as reflectively. This would seem to be the case. Taking pain as an example, we can live pain prereflectively if we are either so absorbed in a project that the pain does not become the focus of our attention, or when despite pain we carry on with the task at hand. An example of the first case would be when someone, intent on digging his garden, is suddenly stopped short by the awareness of a sharp pain in his hand. On inspection he finds a large and raw blister. Clearly the sore place had been forming for some time and had been available to be reflected on as causing pain, but the gardener was so concerned to complete the job that he was hardly aware of any discomfort. An example of the second would be where I have a dull toothache. There is no immediate cure, and I have the choice to sit by the fire contemplating my unfortunate state or to busy myself in the kitchen preparing a meal. I choose to do the latter which I accomplish without distraction and I am somewhat surprised to realise on completion of the job that my tooth still aches. With reference to prereflective coenesthesis Sartre said "Pure pain as the simple lived cannot be reached; it belongs to the category of indefinables and indescribables which are what they are."[40] He goes on to explain that prereflective pain in precisely the tooth or hand, in so far as consciousness 'exists them'. In prereflective coenesthesis, exemplified in pain, we incorporate into our existence the 'living as pain' an aspect of our lived corporeality.

Affectivity is for Sartre a feature of emotion. "Emotion is a

specific manner of apprehending the world,"[41] and it is an experience in which both the world and the subject are transformed. 'Affectivity' denotes changes effected in the subject, which pervade his lived embodiment. Sartre refers to these changes as "bodily disturbance."[42] In emotion we experience our embodiment at a new pitch of dissonance or consonance. In hate there is a sensation of tightness; in anger it is more like a generation of heat; in disappointment there is an impression of sinking; and in joy of releasing. Caught up in emotion we seldom reflect on our affectivity because it is in the nature of this condition for our consciousness to be taken up by objects other than its own emotional states.

Nevertheless prereflective awareness of Affectivity is powerful and pervasive and if we did not have some awareness of its experience we would hardly describe ourselves as being emotionally involved in a situation.

Nausea, the final form in which Sartre suggests we can experience our lived embodiment is described as a state of "pure non-positional apprehension of a contingency without colour," and again as the "insipid taste of our contingency in the world."[43] We experience 'nausea' when we are not taken up with any project whatsoever, when we have disengaged ourself from any situation in the world and exist only as a contingency. Boredom is sometimes cited as a state conducive to the experiencing of 'nausea'. This is a very elusive experience because as soon as it is reflected on it issues in an awareness of affectivity or proprioception. Sartre's use of 'nausea' in this sense should not be confused with his broader deployment of the term as defining "the fundamental reaction of the for-itself against the absurdity of its own existense in the world."[44]

In living our embodiment prereflectively I would accept that we

can be aware of it in a number of ways. In most circumstances we do have some form of shadowy awareness of our lived embodiment, but there are instances of total absorption in a task when we might lose even this faint apprehension. This could be in reading a book, watching a spectacle or listening to music.

As soon as we reflect on our embodiment we designate it in a particular mode. The attitudes we can adopt towards our embodiment would seem to create a series of modes not dissimilar to those described in relation to views others can adopt towards it. I can live my embodiment as object, as instrument, as vehicle of my projects, or simply as inherent to my agenthood in the world.

Treating our embodiment as an object is not an uncommon attitude to adopt. Sartre explains that we come to know this mode, or our body-for-itself-as-known-by-the-other, via perception of the Other's embodiment and through the auspices of language. Merleau-Ponty discusses the developmental sequence in babies and young children of their coming to appreciate their body-as-object mode. In The Primacy of Perception Merleau-Ponty reviews research undertaken by Wallon and by Lacan and in so doing reveals some interesting points.[45] It is proposed that in the early months of life the baby lives "an undifferentiated group life."[46] He is unable to distinguish between interoceptive and exteroceptive stimulation, and so lives his perceptions as an anonymous collection of stimuli. He has no notion of himself as separate. It issuggested that it "is only between the third and sixth month that union occurs between the interoceptive and exteroceptive domains,"[47] and that at this stage the baby begins to become aware of his embodiment as peculiarly his own. This awareness develops as a sort of dialectic between perception of his own embodiment and the realization of the

Other as embodied, the one perception enriching the other. After six months it is suggested that the child begins to build a "specular image of himself."[48] This is a visual notion of himself as an embodied individual. This development not only depends on continued perception of others, but it is also facilitated by the child viewing his own and the Other's image in a mirror. Continued and more detailed and subtle awareness of one's embodiment as object is then achieved via language. Contemporary Western language is richly supplied with body-as-object terms of both a scientific and an affective nature, and it is no wonder that we build up such a vivid picture of our embodiment as object. Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty support the view that the appreciation of our embodiment as an object relies heavily on our perception of others in a similarly embodied form. It is interesting to speculate how retarded a child might be in this respect if he were brought up in isolation from other humans. The way that a blind child comes to appreciate his body as object would be an interesting subject of enquiry.

Our coming to appreciate our embodiment as an object must surely be facilitated by the fact that we can, as it were, turn our perception back upon ourselves. "In actuality I can see my hands, touch my back, smell the odour of my sweat."[49] That we are so constructed that we can for example, see ourselves is a characteristic of some importance in our coming to manage ourselves as instruments in an instrument complex. It seems odd that Sartre should refer to this as "a 'curiosity' of our construction" and explain that "We must realize that this possibility of seeing our body is a pure factual given, absolutely contingent. It can be deduced neither from the necessity on the part of the for-itself 'to have' a body, nor from the factual structures of the body-for-others. One could easily conceive of bodies that could not take a view on themselves."[50]

Also of revelance here is that it is the nature of our embodiment that effects our particular relationship with the world. It has been explained above, that we have the world we know because of the nature of our embodiment. If we could not see and touch ourselves, our instrument potential would be very different, and so our world and our existence would be other than we know them now. Sartre has described the body-instrument "not only as a tool to make tools but also a tool to manage tools."[51] Embodied differently the tools we would have been able to produce, and the use we would have been able to make of them, would have been of a different nature. Sartre seems right to refute those philosophers who base their whole notion of man on one of his physical characteristics - such as his hands - but the tenor of the short section addressing this issue in Being and Nothingness gives the impression, not only that the fact we can see ourself is of no consequence, but also that the actual physical characteristics of our embodiment have had little impact on the nature of human existence as we know it. This notion is worthy of further examination - but is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The current focus in Western cultures on the empirical has highlighted the object form of our embodiment. So much so that consideration of its lived existential mode appears problematic. However the viewing by man of his own embodiment in its objective mode is not a recent phenomenon. Many primitive peoples decorate their bodies and in Roman times there was a preoccupation with the healthy body-as-object. There are many instances in everyday life when I adopt an object attitude to my embodiment. For example when I am concerned with its measurements with regard to slimming; when I am trying on shoes to find a pair that fit my feet comfortably; when I sit in front of the mirror for hours making up my face; or when I meditate on its evolution or its biological mechanisms. In somewhat different circumstances I

may be forced to live my embodiment as object in illness, that is if I want to be rid of pain or defer death. For example, I must not sit asymmetrically and aggravate my strained back; I must be sure to eat only non acid foods to cure my ulcer; I must lie in a hospital bed for months while my broken hip mends. In all these cases I become preoccupied with my embodiment as object. Sartre would contend that I would feel a sense of alienation from my embodiment if I viewed it as an object. However if I do so to further my own projects, while the objective dimensions of my embodiment may feature very overtly in my existence, my incarnate form would seem to grow in significance and meaning, rather than become more remote from me. It could be the case that a sense of dissatisfaction, impatience and maybe alienation could arise during a physical illness or injury which has prevented me from proceeding with my projects as I would wish. In this case though, I would not have chosen to view my embodiment as object, the situation would have been forced upon me. Sartre would assert, furthermore that any preoccupation with my embodiment as object was an instance of bad faith and as such, not to be condoned. However if I freely elect to capitalize on an aspect of my contingency to steer my existence in the direction I have chosen, I can surely not be accused of living in bad faith.

Closely related to adopting an object attitude to our embodiment is regarding it as an instrument. In this mode my embodiment as mobile, adaptable and responsive becomes the whole focus of my attention. I watch this instrument, feel its adjustments; start it; stop it; control it; reshape its patterning to that which is desired; modify the rhythm of its functioning to that which I deem to be optimal. I operate, in a sense, on two levels, as the judge and the judged; the trainer and the trained. An embodiment as instrument attitude is adopted when there is

a new technique to be learnt and when the focus of attention is principally proprioceptive. The technique may be solely concerned with body manipulation such as in swimming or dance, or it may involve the use of implements, such as tools or machines. This focus on my embodiment could constitute a short term exercise or a long term project. Short term I could be mastering a slow backward roll. Long term my project could be to row a mile in two minutes. In this latter case I might need to test my bodily strength and stamina. I may then devise a strategy to improve my condition gradually, and throughout my training programme I may record details of my performance as well as reflect generally on my physical condition.

The two attitude categories outlined so far are very closely related and in certain cases would be hard to distinguish. For example if I planned and executed a programme of exercises to improve my figure, I would be using my embodiment as instrument in the interests of my embodiment as object. Sartre would be as uneasy about my embodiment-as-instrument focus as he was about instances where I gave my attention to my body as object. However I feel that the same arguments would hold. It seems unlikely that, involved in a project centred on using my embodiment instrument to the full, I would become alienated from it, unless of course, its performance fell far short of my aspirations. The central involvement of my embodiment in my current aims would weave it firmly into my existence as significant and meaningful, rather than tear it away from me in the form of an alienated phenomenon. And do I live in bad faith if my project explores and develops my embodied capacities? Such a freely chosen project is surely not degrading to my existence in any way.

Were this project to become my whole way of life however, and were I to be totally given over to a body-object or body instrument focus, there would be grounds for unease. The body itself is not all there is to existence. The embodiment is one facet of a range of potentials we have. Its role is to facilitate, take part in, and add richness and meaning to all our dealings with the world. To spend all our time turned inwards, focussing solely on its form and function for its own sake, would indeed be narcissistic. Various activities have been criticized on these ground - including physical pursuits. Plato, Euripides and Aristotle, though promoters of exercise, all abhorred the professional athlete with his neurotic attitude to his body-object. Galen, who advocated gymnastics to maintain fitness, warned that one could kill the mind with over attention to the body. This view was picked up by the Clarendon Commission in 1862, who warned that intellectual interests could suffer as a result of the growth of athleticism. The high status that was afforded to games in public schools, with its incumbent training cult and glorification of the top sportsmen, also had its critics. Among these were Wilkie Collins, Shaw, Wells and H. B. Gray. It would seem likely that instances of over indulgence in activity, resulting in obsessive idolization of the body, have played some part in creating the generally low regard in which the embodiment is held at the present time.

Another concern Sartre has with respect to this mode is expressed in his warning that - "When by means of universalizing thought I tried to think of my body emptily as a pure instrument in the midst of the world the immediate result was the collapse of the world as such."[52] I find it neither possible nor necessary to disagree here. Clearly if I am rubbing my bruised heel or counting how many press-ups I can do, for the moment I do withdraw from my situation. The preoccupation with my embodiment as object or instrument is totally absorbing and

the world around loses significance and drops away from me. However, I would maintain that my withdrawal, will in almost every case, be in the interests of a subsequent return to a relation with the world. My heel soothed, I remount the ladder to continue painting the ceiling; my biceps toned, I prepare to prove my strength in the rugby trial.

Notwithstanding Sartre's warnings, the treating of one's embodiment as an instrument, does not necessarily result in the disorientation experienced by the shy person described above. Where this attitude is freely adopted - in the interests of re-engaging the embodiment with the world - the individual suffers no ill effects. Sartre himself refers to a child acquiring the facility to treat his embodiment as an instrument and writes "this appearance of the body as an instrumental thing is very late in the child, it is in any case later than the consciousness (of) the body proper and of the world as a complex of instrumentality: it is later than the perception of the body of the Other".[53] The lateness of this realization is surely to be expected, relying as it does on a degree of fairly sophisticated control. It seems acceptable to suggest that the child's realization of his instrument mode would follow the awareness of his object mode and would rely heavily on the perception of others deploying their embodiment skilfully. A parent's exhortations to a child to wave or clap are examples of very early learning of the instrumental use of the embodiment.

The mention of learning highlights perhaps the most important criticism of Sartre's dismissal of this mode. A preoccupation with embodiment as instrument in adult life may not be a project the majority take up, but attention to this mode is essential for mastering some of the basic life skills in contemporary society. In learning to use the panoply of implements that feature in our world we have to pay

some attention to the instrument capacities of our embodiment. Although it may be true that we gain information about how efficiently our instrument is functioning from the degree of effectiveness of the implement in question, any improvement in the use of that implement must be achieved by modification in the deployment of our embodiment as instrument. For example: in ironing I do not remove all the creases so I must press harder with the iron - to effect this I must use my arm with more force: in learning to drive I repeatedly stall the car as a result of poor clutch control - I must release the clutch more smoothly, and so must withdraw my foot more slowly: in early house painting efforts my brush strokes are irregular and result in a very uneven spread of paint - I must try to make vertical strokes every time with the brush, and so must control my arm to ensure that its movement does not deviate to right or left.

There would seem to be two quite legitimate circumstances in which we focus on our embodiment as instrument. The first is in learning a skill in the context of a specific physical activity and the second is in situations where one's general project relies to a significant degree on one's instrument capabilities. In learning any skill we are gradually able to pay less and less attention to controlling our embodiment and to move our focus away from ourself onto features in our situation. If, however, the skill hardly deviates from our habitual use of the embodiment very little attention, if any, may need to be given to its acquisition. In this case learning will occur rather as Merleau-Ponty described it - as a prereflective response to the needs of the situation.

A learning pattern in which the situation changes from one where attention is specifically focused on the embodiment, to one in which the movement skill should be almost absorbed into the context within which it is to be applied, is the model currently used in physical

education. Motor learning is described as passing through three phases. The first, or 'cognitive phase' is the stage during which pupils come to know conceptually the co-ordination required to execute the technique. Attention is directed to their body-object instrument, and this mobile structure is reflectively guided to go through the correct movement patterns. Much of the teaching here is verbal, with every aspect of body object manipulation being conceptualized as accurately as possible. Once the learner has a thetic grasp of what he is trying to do and has been put through the motions of the technique in question, he graduates to the 'association phase'. In this stage the pupil is to provide his own feedback as to whether the movement is correct. He holds in his conscious memory a notion of the exact proprioceptive feedback that will be effected if he executes the technique properly. As he practises he must match actual feedback with the ideal feedback and make the appropriate corrections. The final stage sees the learner as having made the significant move to being able to produce the technique prereflectively, as the game or situation demands. In this, the 'autonomous phase' the movement techniques are deemed to be prereflectively monitored. This monitoring does not reach conscious levels except where a deviance is recognized. In this case the movement pattern is reflected on, and by conceptualizing the problems a righting of the action is achieved. This phasing of skill learning is thrown into question by Sartre's insistence on the impossibility of communication between the prereflective and reflective modes of the embodiment. However, as experience seems to support the case that skills that are consciously learnt do become part of our repertoire of automatically used techniques,it is Sartre's view that is to be doubted.

Notwithstanding Sartre's generally dubious view on our

embodiment-as-instrument attitude, it is a distinct and valuable category and one which is naturally taken up, more or less frequently by everyone. The richness of our appreciation of our embodiment in this mode will reflect the extent to which we have exploited it in this way. Successful exploitation will perpetuate the adoption of this mode. The more confidence I have in my embodiment as instrument the more likely I am to become involved in projects that call upon it in this way.

The third attitude I can adopt to my embodiment is one where I reflect on this dimension of myself as the vehicle by which I can interact with the world. The dividing line between this and the preceding category is extremely tenuous. In the instrument category the focus was on manipulating the embodiment itself, while this category is concerned with the possibilities and effects of these manipulations. Sartre does not live his embodiment reflectively in this mode. For him his embodiment as vehicle is always by-passed in silence. Sartre rejects the possibility of this category and would argue that one either reflects on one's instrumentality in isolation from the world, or one reflects on the world with no apprehension of one's embodiment. While I accept this last as the fourth attitude category, I feel that it is possible to identify an intermediate mode. It is odd that Sartre, who claims we are an instrument centre of an instrument complex, refuses us the experience of this relation in our ongoing existence. Just as my life is an embodied life, so my projects are embodied projects and I experience them as an embodied participant. As I reflect on past and future projects I will incorporate implicitly or explicitly, reference to my embodied state. If I contemplate my pleasing results in a cello competition or the luck I had in being in the theatre lobby when the Duchess arrived, I

am implicitly including my embodiment as vehicle into my thoughts. If I wonder if I shall have time to go shopping between classes or how I shall fare in tomorrow's long jump heat, my embodiment-as-vehicle will contribute to my deliberations. In a similar way I might pause in my involvement with a task and reflect, for example, if my father will be satisfied with my attempt to prune the roses, if this trip of mine to the bookmakers is advisable, or if I am cutting the dress pattern accurately enough. Once again the role of my embodiment-as-vehicle will be implicit in my self reflection. Again, as I am involved in a task I may have to accommodate myself as embodied in my ongoing strategy. For example: I must move to read in a position in which my own shadow does not fall across the book I am reading; I must pause in my tiring search for my lost cat to gather strength to continue; accepting that I cannot cover the distance between my home and the station in time to catch the last train of the day, I must reconsider my plans. It is perhaps when I doubt my physical ability to do something that my attention is drawn to my embodiment as vehicle. Can I carry this parcel all the way upstairs without having to have a rest? Will I be too nervous to co-ordinate my hands and feet properly in my driving test? Is my hand steady enough to complete this tracing accurately?

There seems ample evidence that I have an ongoing awarenes of my embodiment as vehicle as I reflect on and carry out my projects. It is true that I am not aware of my embodiment as instrument in my everyday routines, but surely this does not rule out any apprehension of it whatsoever. The vehicle attitude category is a very common mode of living our embodiment and the fact that our language is constructed around action words, the majority of which presume our embodiment as vehicle, supports this view. It could be that Sartre

is acknowledging this mode when he refers to our embodiment as a sign. He writes: "Consciousness of the body is comparable to the consciousness of a sign. The sign moreover is on the side of the body; it is one of the essential structures of the body. Now the consciousness of a sign exists, for otherwise we should not be able to understand its meaning. But the sign is that which is surpassed toward meaning, that which is neglected for the sake of meaning, that which is never apprehended for itself, that beyond which the look is perpetually directed."[54]

Even though Sartre may be acknowledging the vehicle attitude here, his commitment is still to the predominance of our embodiment as surpassed, neglected and passed by in silence. This attitude to our embodiment constitutes the final category. In this category I adopt an attitude of unquestioned acceptance towards my corporeality. I transcend my embodiment as I perceive and act in the interests of my projects. I exist as agent incorporating my embodiment imperceptibly into my life. In describing the attitude categories we can adopt we have come full circle with the final category beginning to resemble the mode of living one's embodiment prereflectively as a centre of potential in the world. The dividing lines between the categories are very hard to draw, none perhaps more so than between that apprehending the embodiment as enmeshed in its ongoing liaison with the world and that appreciating it prereflectively as the focal point of all meaningful relation in the world.

The range of perspectives we can take up on our embodiment, although described individually, are perhaps best thought of as lying on a circular continuum merging with those on either side. The continuum ranges from the embodiment reflected on as object, through the instrument, vehicle and agenthood perspectives to the prereflective

existing of our lived embodiment. The circle is completed where the embodiment is no longer passed by 'in silence' but is surveyed as an object. As our focus moves both readily and rapidly from one perspective to another in response to the demands of the situation, further doubt is cast on Sartre's insistence that there is no communication between body modes. His view may well result, first, from his identification of only two modes viz - the lived embodiment and the body-as-object, and second from his view, that any focus on the body-as-object divorces it from the for-itself. In this last context the possibility of communication does appear problematical. However, as has been argued above, there is no alienation from the embodiment as object or instrument when it is involved in furthering freely chosen projects. It may be regarded variously but it remains an integral dimension of the individual in the interests of the project at hand. Where there could be a difficulty in communication is between the embodiment as lived by the individual, and the same embodiment as viewed by the Other as object or tool. And yet there is still a problem. It could be that it is the individual's inability to lose communication with, to 'shake off', his body-as-object-for-the-other that gives rise to the discomfort and anguish experienced by that individual. If this is the case, there would be grounds for believing Sartre's view to be inaccurate even on his own terms.

In identifying the body modes proposed by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty a number of situations were brought to light which could cause problems in physical education and could perhaps help to explain the antipathy felt by many towards the subject. In the light of these warnings the challenge was to consider how appropriate and productive perspectives towards the pupil's embodiment could be developed in physical education. As a first step the different perspectives that

the observer and the individual could adopt to the latter's embodiment were examined in more detail. This was important because in physical education there will always be two ways of viewing the pupil's embodiment. It now remains to consider how similarities and differences in these two perspectives at any time affect the individual in question.

Where the observer endorses the perspective of the individual the situation will be wholly positive. The individual will experience support in whatever task is at hand and will benefit from the Other's interest. For example, both the dressmaker measuring me for a coat and the dentist repairing my teeth are adopting perspectives on my embodiment which are both what I would expect from them and in my interest. Similarly the golf professional scrutinizing my swing in response to my concern over its unreliability will be furthering my chosen goal. In none of these cases will I feel uneasy in experiencing the perspective taken on me by the Other. However where there is felt to be a discrepancy between the interests, and therefore the perspectives on the embodiment, of the two parties involved, there is always the possibility that the outcome will be less than satisfactory for the individual. This is because, as has become clear in the investigation so far, the observer's perspective can exert considerable pressure and in certain circumstances dominate the situation.

If there is a mismatch the outcome can either be frustrating or unnerving. Frustration could arise if, being troubled with constant headaches, I go to see the doctor to get a prescription to ease the pain, but the doctor shows no sign of prescribing a remedy for my headaches. Instead he persists in trying to extract from me an admission of tension in my life.Wanting the doctor to treat my body-

as-object, I find it irritating when he takes a holistic view of my predicament. Similarly, if I go to the golf professional to improve the technique of my strokes, I will find it exasperating if he spends the whole hour giving me advice as to which courses and links would give me valuable playing experience. My project is to home in on my embodiment as an instrument - and his is to direct me to where I can use this capacity as a vehicle to my broader project.

Again, if in planning a route up a mountain my companion persists in devising an approach that is best for seeing rare birds and flowers, irrespective of the difficulty of the climb, while I am concerned to find a way that is definitely within our capacities as climbers, I will complain that he is being impractical. Our plans, I would argue, must take account of our ability, in other words, how far our embodiment will be able to act as an effective vehicle.

Where the difference in perspectives is one in which the Other tends to disregard the 'object' characteristics of the embodiment, the individual concerned could well become impatient and dissatisfied. If on the other hand the Other is too narrowly concerned with these characteristics, the individual's frustration could grow into anguish. For example I experience mild irritation if my tennis partner persists in analysing my service rather than discussing which of us should serve first in the next match: or if my doctor shows no interest in me as 'a person' and simply writes out another prescription. But if I feel that I am being treated as an object or tool, against my wishes, particularly if the Other's project is in no way related to mine, I tend to experience a deeper feeling of resentment. This could occur in a situation where I have no say over how I am treated and my embodiment is being used as a pure object in, for example, a medical experiment or a pornographic context. The experience would

be profoundly distressing. To be treated as an object, against one's wishes is extremely degrading and results in a distaste for one's embodiment often to the point of trying to dissociate oneself from it. The attempt to do this brings no solution as it causes inner conflict and disorientation.

There are within the realms of possibility occurrences in physical education, which, while not so sinister, nevertheless resemble this situation. A teacher could become so concerned with his own reputation, that in his efforts to produce a winning team or a fault free performance, he begins to see his pupils as tools in his own project, and as a result treats them with disrespect. Harsh criticism would be meted out and hard practice relentlessly insisted upon. He would show little, if any, interest in the feelings of the pupils and pay no heed to their requests. If the preparation also included fitness training there is a danger that in the teacher's over enthusiasm for improved performance he becomes preoccupied with tests and measurements and adopts a highly mechanistic attitude towards the pupils' embodiment. If a pupil feels he is being used as a tool to someone else's end he could find the experience profoundly unsettling and consequently withdraw from the activity altogether.

There could also be a related situation where both pupil and teacher determine to do everything they can to enable the former to win a contest of some nature. As the preparation proceeds both parties become so single mindedly focussed on winning that the training programme reaches almost impossible levels of intensity and the pupil has to make innumerable sacrifices to continue. At this stage the pupil may well become aggrieved that he is being used purely as a device to achieve the goal to win, irrespective of the cost he is having to pay. Finding the situation demeaning he may pull out of

the contest.

While these relatively extreme situations would rarely occur in everyday physical education, they serve to highlight possible dangers. Most likely to occur are situations where the teacher adopts an 'object-mechanism' approach and expects the pupil to take up a complementary 'object' or 'instrument' perspective. The pupil, however, may not be prepared to identify with the teacher's project. She may therefore resent the object perspective he is taking up, feel alienated from her embodiment and begin to experience discomfort. The disenchanted pupil could well be one who, though initially eager, has been turned against the activity by insensitive teaching. In this the teacher may have persistently highlighted the embodiment-as-object and been repeatedly critical of pupils' efforts. Individuals may even lose all sense of pride in this dimension of themselves and attempt to reject it, along with the activity as a whole. In most cases it is probably a situation of this nature with an overemphasis on the embodiment-as-object coupled with a repeated sense of failure that initiates the dislike of the subject, and causes unwillingness to co-operate in the teacher's project.

In the light of the unfortunate consequences of there being a mismatch in how the pupil's embodiment is viewed, it will be useful to look at the teaching methods of physical education to identify those which are likely to cause problems and consider if any modifications are possible. As the root of the problem is in the pupils' resentment of their embodiment being viewed as an object or mechanism, strategies that minimize this attitude could be valuable. To effect a change of this nature will not be easy given the general perception of all concerned, of the primary preoccupation of physical education - viz. the development of

effective body management. Physical education is understood to be about conscious mastery of bodily powers such as co-ordination, flexibility and strength. As soon as the lesson starts the pupils know they are to be aware of their embodiment as an object-machine. Their corporeality is no longer to be lived with its usual nonchalant ease, it must be controlled, watched and instructed. Pupils will be exhorted to develop body-awareness - the acute perception of the placement of their embodiment in stillness and motion. Attention will be drawn to the manipulation and use of individual joints and body parts. The teacher will take hold of the pupil's embodiment to guide it along the correct pathway. The teacher's prime interest in the effective functioning of the pupil's embodiment as an object-mechanism is clear for all to see.

Given that it must be at least one of the teacher's goals to develop pupils' embodied faculties it would seem to be impossible for him to avoid an object perspective altogether. However aspects of teaching that especially emphasize the object perspective should be recognized and used with caution. Two of these will be particularly difficult for the teacher to modify. The first is the more than normal exposure of the body. As clothing has to be removed to give the embodiment freedom of movement, there is little that the teacher can do to eliminate this problem completely. The second aspect is the need for the teacher to look at the pupils, focussing on their embodiment. This situation carries with it a danger of the sort of conflict outlined in Sartre's early writings. When two people share an environment one party can feel threatened by the possibility of his situation disintegrating and the consequent casting of himself as an in-itself object in the Other's world. Any teaching encounter will have to guard against this eventuality in fostering an atmosphere of shared purpose. While it is the teacher's role to define the situation, his definition

should show sensitivity to the pupils' level of experience and capabilities. The teacher will have to look at the pupils but this regard should be sympathetic and encouraging. As was seen in the shy person, it was the feeling of inferiority and inadequacy experienced through the Other's look that brought about his intense self consciousness and awareness of his 'outside-as-presented-to-others', or his body-object. 'Acceptance' of what is looked at, and the clear communication of this acceptance are therefore very important. This also extends into situations where the pupil is being watched by peers. The teacher will no doubt be careful in using demonstration by pupils and try to ensure that there is no possibility of humiliating them. He will also be wary, when a child has not completed a task satisfactorily, of making her perform the unfinished movement in front of the rest of the class. Complete rejection of physical education rather than any improvement in motivation could well be the outcome of this strategy.

General confidence in one's performance is important in physical education where the efforts of individuals are clear for all to see. Though pupil responses in all lessons are to some extent public, there are few situations where an individual's level of achievement is so conspicuous. What is more, when a pupil fails in a physical task his embodiment becomes the object of others' 'contemptuous regard', its awkwardness and shame unequivocally exposed. Such experiences of shame, especially if frequently repeated can make a pupil reject the situation and maybe refuse to take part. It is therefore important that tasks are within reach of the pupils so that there is every chance of their succeeding. This will be particularly important during the early stages of learning when, as was proposed above (in Section 3), movement can be awkward and offer little possibility of the satisfaction inherent in effective liaison. Lack of understanding of a task can also be a cause

of embarrassment. There can be problems of this nature in the recently fashionable 'modern educational' method of teaching gymnastics and dance. This approach stresses the value for each child of solving problems in her own way and at a level appropriate to her abilities. Very general, open tasks may be set and pupils left very much to formulate their own responses. Without a clear model to work towards, in this very public setting, it is no wonder that many pupils, not knowing quite what is expected of them, feel insecure and become very self-conscious. It may be advisable, therefore, for the teacher to specify carefully the limits of the task and also be quick to reinforce acceptable responses.

A third aspect of teaching that highlights the body-object is the teacher's use of language. The more this focuses attention on anatomical and mechanical aspects of the embodiment the more the pupil will be drawn to view her embodiment as an object-machine. Once again the teacher is in a dilemma. He must use language and much of it will be concerned with the pupil's physical interaction with the world. However the nature of the language used is of considerable importance. In this context it is regrettable that in their initial training, and possibly beyond, teachers are often directed to concentrate on the object-machine dimension of the embodiment. As Ravizza explains, physical educators have tended "to objectify the body, not only in relation to physical fitness, but also in the area of kinesiology, biomechanics and motor learning. As a result individuals are conditioned to relate to the body as an object outside of themselves, to be 'whipped into shape' or disciplined in learning motor skills."[55] These scientific areas of study are important as the physical education teacher must be sufficiently knowledgeable about the body-as-object to prevent injury and set realistic goals. However the

danger is that he will focus too much on this perspective and habitually use the language of his studies with his pupils. The real value of this area of understanding is to aid the teacher's observation of movement, his diagnosis of problems and his selection of remedies. Provided that this knowledge is used to these ends it should help rather than hinder his work with pupils.

One way in which the language used in physical education highlights the body as object is in the detailed description of movement or techniques to be learnt. This specialized terminology is seen as a basic tool for the teacher, who is encouraged to make quite explicit both the nature of the inner sensations of movement and the intricacies of co-ordination required to perform a movement pattern. To suggest that the use of this terminology might be misguided would be to go contrary to widespread authoritative recommendations. However the insights of Merleau-Ponty have shown that through the auspices of the corporeal schema the acquisition of motile capacities or operative potential is usually a pre-reflective operation in which the individual responds to the needs of his surroundings. Where an instrument perspective is adopted, reflective attention will be paid to the embodiment, but this will usually take place without detailed description of the exact movements to be performed. For example it would be extraordinary to hear someone explaining the precise body object manipulations required to use a telephone. Its use is normally learnt through a combination of trial and error and the observation of others going through the correct motions. Observation would be jointly on the telephone and on the general use of the embodiment. This would usually be the case in other similar situations such as learning to tie a shoe lace or drive a car.

While it would be difficult for teachers to refrain from describing

aspects of movement altogether, there are two approaches that might help to move the focus from the embodiment. One is to direct attention to the implement, missile or apparatus being used; the other is to concentrate more on the general context of the movement - the total situation in which the individual's actions are to play a part. It is far from the case that teachers never direct attention to the implement being used but learning is frequently focused on the embodiment per se. For example requests are made to transfer the weight as the ball is struck, to bend the elbows on impact with the ball, to increase tension just prior to impact, or to extend the leg in following through after the kick. In addition when problems arise in a movement the teacher may bypass the implement and advise the mover to make this or that change in his body use or attend to certain aspects of his own proprioceptive feedback. It is probably because the movement techniques to be acquired in physical education are complex and time is short, that it has been felt, rightly or wrongly, that this form of conceptualized movement learning will be the most effective. It could, for example, take a very long time to learn a tennis serve simply by watching demonstrations and going through the trial and error process. This has been, and still is, the way however, in which many complex life skills have been learnt. The apprentice craftsman or machine operator watches the experienced worker and then tries to emulate him. Through observation and practice he gradually picks up the movement patterns. Strategies in physical education that avoid extended analysis of body movement and pay more attention to whatever form of apparatus is being used could, therefore, be an advantage. This type of approach, however, will be more possible to implement in some areas than in others. 'Apparatus', for example, is seldom used in dance, and could hardly be said to be used in gymnastic floorwork or running events in athletics.

The second proposal, of moving the attention off the individual performer to the broader situation, would give rise to a pattern of learning closely akin to that identified as the norm by Merleau-Ponty. Here the individual responds to the needs of the situation, developing the required movement to fulfil a specific function. When movement is conceptualized in this way it tends not to be viewed as pure 'body manipulation' and this could well be an asset in physical education work. This type of approach, however, is not widely used at the present time. For example in games lessons techniques are usually learnt first in isolation from any context, and only subsequently applied to the game. While it has to be acknowledged that this method of learning is relatively successful, with some pupils mastering the required techniques, very likely these more successful children are those who can, without any great difficulty, adopt an object attitude to their embodiment. For less successful, less able pupils, however, these methods could be unhelpful and add to their difficulties and discomfort.

It is significant to report that two teaching methods that have been formulated recently advocate a broader contextual approach. One of these, known as the 'Inner Game' is the brainchild of an american tennis coach Tim Gallwey. While his thesis as a whole is not convincing, he is clearly sensitive to the fact that much of current practice in teaching may not help the learner. He argues that most teaching of physical techniques is too complex and stressful. Complexity is caused by the number of demands made on the pupil at any one time. For example in learning a tennis stroke the pupil may be expected, simultaneously, to monitor her grip, her swing, the angle of the racket face, the transference of the body-object weight, and

the position she is on the court relative to the oncoming ball. The sheer fact of having so much to think about is stressful in itself, but Gallwey argues that this tension can do nothing but increase if the teacher, or the learner herself, urges that more effort should be made. The harder she tries, the more agitated and tense she gets, and the less likely she is to succeed in acquiring any movement pattern, requiring as it does, a sensitive rhythm of force and relaxation. Gallwey seems to accept that the learning strategies imposed upon pupils are unnatural. He maintains that we should set up a situation as closely akin as possible to that in which we learned to walk. In describing the learning of a technique he says "The process does not have to be learned, we already know it. All that is needed is to unlearn those habits which interfere with it and then just let it happen."[56] This plea aligns closely both with Merleau-Ponty's description of learning as the endowment of a stimuli with the probability of eliciting a particular movement response and with his idea of the 'knowing body'. Gallwey is advocating preconceptual learning carried out prereflectively by the lived corporeality. He also advocates much more use of visual demonstration by the teacher, less verbal input and a generally relaxed and encouraging atmosphere. He recommends that, as far as possible, attention should be taken off the body object and he puts forward a number of strategies to effect this. For example the pupil might listen to the sound of the tennis ball bouncing or watch the ball closely to try to see its seams. These, and other ploys concentrate the attention outside the body-object, and leave the lived embodiment to respond to the total situation in a way that more closely resembles everyday interaction with the world.

The other relatively new teaching strategy is called the 'Understanding approach to the teaching of games'. Bunker and Thorpe, writing

in an edition of a professional journal given over entirely to a review of the teaching of games, argue that the traditional approach concentrates too much on specific motor responses and fails "to take account of the conceptual nature of games."[57] Broadly the 'understanding' approach advocates that more effective learning will take place if the pupils can see the need for, and the role of, techniques before they attempt to master them.

The line of development in this method will be to start with simplified games situations and move on to the more complex forms as the children's capabilities allow. Progress would be seen to be from one game pattern to the next, rather than from one technique to another. In each game situation the teacher discusses what technical needs there might be, and from here the class work on skills. These skills will be at once meaningful and readily applied to the game. For example if a bounce pass, in netball, has been proposed as a solution to the problem of tall, agile opponents, once this skill has been learnt its appropriate use in the game will be readily recognized. Where a skill is taught in isolation, pupils may not appreciate its place in the game, and may seldom in fact ever use it. In the very first stages of the 'understanding' approach pupils would be involved in simple, technically non-demanding games. However even in these, basic aspects of the skill requirements of the game could be discussed. For example in a very simple netball game pupils will readily appreciate the advantages of being able to hold the ball securely and pass it accurately. Through question and answer between the teacher and the pupils, these points could be established and this would be followed by the class practising the skills.

This approach seems to have much to recommend it, particularly its focus on the total game context rather than on isolated skills. When

techniques are treated as ends in themselves they can appear to be body-object manipulations, and no more. But as soon as they are appreciated as fitting into a broader pattern, pupils can adopt a wider 'game-participation-project', one in which the body plays a valuable part as vehicle.

These two methods have considerable potential in attempting to move the focus off the body-as-object. They also include reference to perception of the situation which has sometimes been lacking in the early stages of games teaching. While in everyday living perception is the forerunner of action, in games teaching it is often considered only after actions have been rehearsed. The translation of these methods to other areas of physical education, however, is difficult. In activities such as dance, gymnastics, athletics and swimming, the focus is more directly on the embodiment per se, with no ready-made context from which to develop a rationale. Highlighting the embodiment as object through using detailed analytical language can be avoided if demonstrations are used instead of verbal descriptions. This could be a most valuable teaching strategy to investigate in the light of Merleau-Ponty's proposal that movement patterns can be acquired by a sort of prereflective identification of the motility of the observer with that of the demonstrator. In this way the embodiment as object is by-passed - at least in so far as reflective attention does not 'settle' on it. The lived embodiment of one person seems to be able to communicate directly with that of the Other. This is because in this mode, the embodiment is not a 'concrete' organization of matter with a distinct form that is viewed as an entity separable from its surroundings. Rather it is a dynamic system of " 'conducts' at work in the world."[58] This is the corporeal schema as viewed from the 'outside'. Earlier in this thesis the schema was described from the

'inside' as the system of operative potentials that the individual had realized through the interaction of his motile embodiment with his concrete surroundings. On the current description the Other's embodiment is not a dimension of himself the experience of which is entirely private and contained within itself. As a 'system of conducts' it is in part displayed around him in active involvement with the world. Because my lived embodiment and the Others' are both in part, 'out in the world' - and in a world that we share, communication between them is readily achieved. There is a sense in which they are superimposed on each other, or overlap, in the world. This prereflective communication has been variously described; for example Wallon refers to a "postural impregnation"[59] of my lived embodiment by the actions of the other, and Husserl talks of a "phenomenon of coupling."[60] Merleau-Ponty sees this communication as an instance of direct contact between two consciousnesses. He says "My consciousness is turned primarily toward the world, turned toward things; it is above all a relation to the world. The Other's consciousness as well is chiefly a certain way of comporting himself towards the world. Thus it is in his conduct, in the manner in which the other deals with the world, that I will be able to discover his consciousness. If I am consciousness turned towards things, I can meet in things the actions of another and find in them a meaning, because they are themes of possible activity for my own body."[61]

Acquiring a movement pattern by imitation is, then, to capitalize on one way in which consciousnesses can in a sense 'meet'. The operative intentionalities of the two parties interlock and the observer's motility seems able to 'tune in' to and 'understand' that of the other. Merleau-Ponty says that the motility of the demonstrator "speaks directly to my own unique motility."[62] In this way we can

somehow grasp 'from the inside' what we perceive 'from the outside'. Words are redundant and could detract from the natural, though mysterious, capacity we have for bringing into being new movement patterns without any recourse to reflective attention. It remains to be seen if this capacity to imitate is limited by the current sensitivity and versatility of the corporeal scheme, or if it can, itself, extend the powers of the embodiment.

Returning to the problem of trying to minimize language specifically focused on the body-as-object, this may also be achieved in those activities where there is no ready made context if whole actions can be identified by descriptive names; for example 'handstand' in gymnastics, 'western roll' in athletics and 'submarine' in synchronized swimming. To describe any of these complex actions via the body manipulations required would result in prolonged concentration on the body-as-object. A further advantage of named actions is that they can become easily identifiable models to be worked towards. Pictures, diagrams and films can be used to show pupils what they are aiming to produce and this information in itself can help to avoid uncertainty and self-consciousness. As each activity has its own specific context and characteristics, it might be valuable for teachers to consider each area of physical education and identify approaches that could lessen the use of language that focuses on pupils' embodiment <u>per se.</u>

The possibility of different attitudes being adopted towards pupils' embodiment has revealed some reasons that might explain why pupils develop a disaffection towards the subject. In the light of this discussion, proposals have been made for modified teaching approaches. One further observation can be made on how these differing

attitudes could affect performance. The situation is one where I am engaged in a project involving specific use of my embodied faculties. In this context, I am adopting an attitude of 'vehicle' or 'inherence in my agenthood', towards my embodiment. As I pursue my task I become aware that I am being watched. The perspective of my observer is not one of trying to monopolize my embodiment to his ends, but is rather an analytic attitude focused on my movements. As a result of feeling this gaze directed towards me, I tend to lose rhythm in my movements and begin to make errors.

In order to understand the cause of my loss of effectiveness the relationship between viewing my embodiment as instrument and as vehicle needs to be expanded. In most cases I adopt an instrument attitude in the interests of a project where my attitude will become one of 'vehicle'. So I tune my embodiment finely, in order to play my part in the relay race; I practice the techniques involved in shooting a goal in preparation for the football match. As I train my attention will be embodiment-centred and features of the world fade into the background. However, once I am engaged in my project I must attend to all that is going on around me, and my embodiment must enable me to respond appropriately with speed and accuracy. For example in preparing for a dance performance I will strengthen my muscles, mobilize my joints, polish the detail of my every move and perfect the mechanics of my weight transferences. But in the performance my attention must be elsewhere. I must be aware of all the significant features of the situation - the other dancers, the accompaniment, the stage space, the audience. My embodiment as vehicle must move with fluency and precision without needing my specific attention. It must be lived on a prereflective level.

If, however, as in the example above, I become conscious of someone critically contemplating my actions, I become acutely aware of my movements and so fail to pay attention to the features of my original situation. As a result I may misjudge my responses and faulter in my project. Sartre refers to a very similar situation in describing the mountaineer who becomes aware that he is being watched. As a result he fumbles, becomes less sure of himself and may even lose his footing. It is perhaps surprising that while an instrument attitude usually precedes a vehicle attitude, reverting to the former in a situation is seldom beneficial. This could, however, be an exemplification of Sartre's proposal that the withdrawal of attention from the general situation onto one's embodiment as instrument causes the world to collapse. At a time when one's focus should be very much on relating to the environment, it is therefore not surprising that one's effectiveness deteriorates if, in a sense, one is unable to maintain contact with it. Merleau-Ponty has made a related, more positive, observation on this situation. In discussing the establishment of motor habits he said that these 'stable dispositions' free an individual "from his environment and allow him to see it".[63] This is the ideal situation which is dissolved if the body as instrument becomes the principal focus of the individual in question.

Concerning the capacity of an observer to disorientate a performer, two particular situations come to mind: first, the athlete who frequently performs to large audiences and, secondly, the pupils in physical education who are always subject to observation by the teacher. How is is that an athlete can withstand the gaze of so many? Why is it that some athletes rise to an audience and in fact perform better in front of them? Can the answer to the first question be that he is not aware of the spectators? Or is it that his confidence in his

ability is so great that it can withstand the potentially critical regard of others? Or that the sense of awe in which the audience views him, with respect to his prowess, enhances his confidence and lifts him into his project? Or does the audience endorse his project and its goals, and so spur him on to further endeavour, helping him to 'raise' his game? All of these are possibilities and there are sometimes more personal considerations regarding the effect on performers of certain spectators. For example, some athletes admit to not being able to give of their best if they are not watched by someone - their spouse or coach for example, while other performers go so far as to forbid certain people (for example parents, especially) to watch them. The reasons for these circumstances will be personal to each individual, but it could be that the coach's confidence in the athlete's ability helps him to lose himself in the complexities of the task at hand, while the high expectations of his parents make him sense criticism in their regard. Aware that he can never live up to their unrealistic estimate of his potential he knows he will feel inadequate in their presence. He will be ashamed of his inability and humiliated by his less than perfect embodiment. Faced with the certainty of this deep experience of shame, and knowing that it will interfere with his performance, it is not surprising that he does not want them to watch him. The situation could also become confounded by guilt on his part. Appreciating his parents' close involvement in his athletic career he might sense that his failure would cause them pain. He therefore feels guilt both for his own failure and for its effect on his parents. While this unhappy relationship between parents and children could occur in a wide range of situations, it is particularly highlighted in a context where the embodiment has a central role to play. This is because the gaze

of the Other is literally on the individual, and on that very dimension of him in which his efforts to achieve his project are centred. Exposed in this way, every detail of his responses are immediately obvious. There is also the danger that the gaze will induce him to regard his embodiment as an instrument; and the very exposed situation carries the additional threat of the experience of a particular mode of shame Sartre identifies - namely the humiliation of losing one's subjecthood and becoming merely an object.

Concerning pupils who are constantly under the critical eye of the teacher, there is obviously a danger that this scrutiny may unsettle them, make them refocus their attention on their embodiment as instrument and cause them to make errors in their movement. With this danger, and the added fact that the relationship between the teacher and pupil is by its very nature liable to make the pupil see herself as inferior and consequently experience the shame of feeling designated as an in-itself object, it would seem that the teacher is in an almost impossible position.

This is, however, to be over pessimistic and to treat the warnings of interpersonal conflict in Sartre's early writing as being inevitable. As mentioned briefly above (in Section 2) Sartre was concerned in his later work to show not only that harmonious interpersonal relationships were possible but also that they were essential in certain situations. For example in What is Literature? he discusses the 'pact of generosity' that must develop between the author and the reader before a literary work of art can come into existence. Instead of the two parties attempting to dominate each other and thus deny the other his freedom by designating him as an object, each party relies on, or better demands, the freedom of the other to be fully exercised. The author needs the reader to 'lend him' his spontaneity,

his inventiveness and his feelings, so that the writer's project in the form of a novel can be realized. The writer needs to communicate with a human subject, not an inert object; he needs someone who can add something to his work, to give it life, to make it meaningful. Equally the reader must see the writer as a fully authentic individual, exercising freedom in his use of perception and imagination. Were the author to be viewed as writing "mechanically or automatically"[64] the reader would no longer have confidence in the honesty of the unique perspective being presented, and his "experience of the novel as an aesthetic object"[65] would vanish.

A not dissimilar pact needs to be achieved between a coach and an athlete. Both are again working to a common end - not the realization of a work of art - but a successful performance by the athlete. As the author must respect the contribution the reader makes to his work, similarly the coach must respect the contribution made by the athlete. He must view the athlete as a subject who can freely choose and then devote herself, under direction, to the fulfilment of a project. This is particularly important, as to achieve success the athlete needs to work towards living her embodiment prereflectively in an activity situation. This will be impossible if the coach's attitude is perceived by the athlete as being dominating, and thus as viewing her embodiment as an object or tool. Any alienation from her embodied dimension will almost certainly preclude the athlete from achieving an effective operative liaison in which she can deploy the sensitivity and versatility of her motile dimension to the full. It is therefore also in the coach's interests that the athlete identifies wholeheartedly with the project and lives it in her 'totality'. At the same time the athlete needs to trust the coach's competence in devising appropriate schemes of

work. If the athlete regards the coach as simply putting her through a standard schedule she will lose faith in him and deny herself his guidance. To succeed in their project both parties must enter into the 'pact of generosity', respecting the freedom of the other.

There is another dimension in which the coach should respect the freedom of the athlete, this being in the moral sphere. It would seem to be unacceptable for the coach to dominate the athlete and force her to acquiesce to living in 'bad faith' at his hands. In the case of the author there is a similar moral issue which also encompasses the integrity of the work of art. If the author seeks to dominate the reader by attempting simply to arouse his emotions, leaving him no room to bring his own meaning to the novel, then in this case, Sartre argues, the work of art is either bad, or not worthy of the title. In the case of the coach if he denies the athlete her freedom, while this may not immediately affect the standard of her performance, it will destroy its authenticity, making it the work of an agent, rather than her own product.

The situation between the physical education teacher and the pupils is very similar to that between the coach and the athlete. The notion of developing a 'pact' could, therefore, help the teacher to avoid pupils' experiencing the inhibiting shame of being designated as an object. Again, the teacher can only achieve his goal through the pupil as subject, totally, and therefore freely, adopting this goal as her own. The first step is for the pupil to understand and accept the project - to identify with it. If the goal is out of reach the pupils may well opt out of the enterprise. This is, of course, also true in relation to the coach and the athlete. Should the former set an unrealistic goal, the latter could withdraw from the enterprise. Once the project is 'owned' by both parties, the pupil must trust the teacher's freedom

to devise learning stages that are likely to be effective. The teacher, for his part, must allow the pupils to make the tasks their own, accepting as far as is feasible any modifications that this may bring about. Mutual respect and confidence in the other as a free subject, are essential.

Because the embodiment is both central to work in physical education and that dimension of the person most at risk in encounters that could arouse conflict, the importance of establishing a 'pact' in this subject area is immediately apparent. However it is just as important in all teacher-pupil relationships. To effect any development - viewed as an extension of liaison with the world, the pupil must herself be absorbed in that liaison. As before this means that the teacher needs to respect the freedom of the pupil and allow her to give herself "generously and not mechanically"[66] to the project. And she must be free to make the project her own. Equally the pupil needs to accept, and show confidence in, the teacher as a free agent. She will need to trust him in his selection of a programme of work and respect his judgement in his adoption of various teaching approaches. Sartre talks of the importance of 'understanding' in certain relationships. Burstow describes Sartre's conception of this as "experiencing the other's experiencing while at the same time retaining a sense of one's own experiencing of this experiencing".[67] To achieve understanding, Sartre claims, requires empathy which, somewhat surprisingly can be communicated in a 'look'. In The Man with the Tape Recorder[68] Sartre endorses that the psycholoanalyst's patient should be looked at in his wholeness, in a way that communicates that the observer is concerned with him as a subject, not an object. The teacher's look needs to display this empathy and his interactions with his pupils need to reassure them that he

is aware of, and can identify with, their experiences. Through developing this 'pact' therefore, the world for Sartre can be shared. Conflict is not automatic in interpersonal relationships; it can be avoided if there is a development of mutual confidence between the two parties, each allowing the other to exercise freedom and be authentically human. With respect to achieving such a positive relationship between the teacher and his pupils, this will be facilitated by empathy displayed in the teacher's 'look'.

The moral dimension alluded to in discussing the coach and the athlete also applies in all teacher-pupil relationships. According to the moral view prevailing in education in this country, an authoritarian, dominating relationship is not acceptable.

The challenge that these various proposals present to the physical education teacher is considerable. Indisputably, and wholly legitimately, his principal focus is on the pupils' embodied dimension. The pupils' physicality is the medium in which he works to promote their self-awareness and self assurance. To request, in this context, that the teacher should be cautious about emphasizing this dimension of his pupils, or critically evaluating its performance, is obviously problematical. But the unfortunate consequences of strategies that highlight this dimension per se are real and account needs to be taken of them. It seems essential that the teacher should be able to see the situation from the pupils' point of view. If he can devise goals which they can readily make their own there will be more likelihood of their willingly adopting an object or instrument focus on their embodiment. This is important as it will avoid discrepancies between the attitudes of the pupils and the teacher. Compatability is made difficult as the perspectives that can be adopted by each party are not identical. While 'object', 'vehicle' and 'agenthood' perspectives

are common, the pupil cannot adopt a 'tool' approach, and the teacher cannot adopt a true 'instrument' approach. The pupil cannot accept as 'her' embodiment a mechanism 'working for someone else', and the teacher cannot relate to the pupil's embodiment as 'instrument' as that mode is specific to the for-itself of which this dimension is an integral part. If the pupil adopts an instrument perspective, the teacher can act to support this via an object-mechanism perspective. But if the pupil resists this perspective the teacher's attention will be interpreted as viewing her embodiment as a 'tool'. The ideal situation would be one in which both parties are adopting a 'vehicle' perspective to the pupil's embodiment. This would provide the rationale for any 'more mechanical' focus that needed to be assumed, and would thus lessen the possibility of the pupil experiencing alienation from her embodiment. The 'vehicle' perspective, however, can only be adopted in the context of a person who is being viewed as a 'subject' - a committed, free individual, and this in turn depends on the development of a 'pact of generosity' between the teacher and the pupil.

In investigating the body modes identified by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Kleinman's observation has been found to be perceptive and to have far reaching effects on the promotion of positive attitudes to physical activity. If as proposed above (in Section 4) the fundamental value of developing embodied faculties lies in the contribution this can make to the liaison between the lived embodiment and the world, it will be important for physical education teachers to appreciate the nature of this prereflective mode of living the embodiment and be able to differentiate it from others. It will be of value for them to be aware both of the significance of this mode, and of the problems that could arise from insensitively promoting

reflective attention on the embodiment as an 'object' or 'mechanism'.

Section 6

A reappraisal of the justifications for physical education in the school curriculum

The insights of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty reveal both the significance and the ambiguity of our embodied dimension. These perceptions are of particular value in their suggestion of a clear direction for physical education. In addition they serve to explain aspects of its history and help to clarify the present confused situation which obtains in the subject. Most important of all they reveal what lies at the basis of physical educationists' intuitive appreciation of their subject's unique potential to enrich the lives of their pupils. As these teachers have been unable to discover this basis, they have remained unable to articulate their intuition convincingly and in a manner which is not misleading.

The significance of the embodiment lies in its key role in existence. It is the ground of the person's essential interaction with the world and makes its necessary and distinctive contribution to this bond throughout life. Life can be described as interaction with the world that is supported and maintained by a continuously renewed embodied relationship. This significance provides physical education with its underlying rationale and is the foundation of its case for inclusion in the school curriculum. Its case can be further supported by the fact that our embodied faculties are the means by which we establish a particular mode of liaison with the world. If the purpose of education is to enable individuals realize the richness and diversity of their human capacities, there will be a need to explore with pupils all the essential ways in which we interact with the world. Each mode of interaction enhances existence in its particular way; operative liaison developing for each individual a heightened appreciation of the concrete world around him and, as a corollary, a greater awareness of himself as embodied-in-the-world. Physical

education therefore has a unique contribution to make to education in its fostering of this mode of liaison, a mode which is in fact fundamental, since our very essence springs from our incarnate liaison with the world.

The ambiguity of the embodiment is evident in the various perspectives that can be taken up on our embodied dimension, both by ourselves and by others. These perspectives are generally adopted unreflectively and their very familiarity has prevented the appreciation of their implications and interconnections. As was seen above, they can provide a possible explanation for pupil disenchantment with the subject. They can also offer an explanation for the variety of claims that have been made through history for the educational value of physical activity. Those who have argued that the exercise undertaken in physical education is valuable because it respects the wholeness of the child, contributes to a balanced education, effects a body-mind unity or achieves a mode of self-realization are, in effect, conceiving the embodiment as an integral aspect of a person's existence. Their focus is not one which emphasizes the embodiment as an object or instrument, but one which sees this dimension in its lived mode, as an all pervading human attribute.

Those who have supported physical education on the grounds that it promotes body management, co-ordination or psycho-motor competence have, in effect, been concerned to emphasize the instrument mode. They show an appreciation of the significance of our physical capacities in grounding many of our projects. This approach is also seen in the work of remedial gymnasts, physiotherapists, and to some degree in that of occupational therapists, the life opportunities of whose pupils and patients are limited by their impaired 'instrument capability'.

Those who have identified the primary aim of physical education as general fitness have, in effect, adopted a perspective in which the embodiment is seen as an object. They fall into two sub-groups. One group is interested in physical fitness per se; the other emphasizes mental competence and sees physical fitness as a means to this end. The latter group is impressed by the thought that an efficiently functioning embodiment tends to enhance and preserve mental alertness, whereas an under-exercised or ailing embodied dimension has the opposite tendency. The perspective common to these groups is very similar to that of the medical profession and of those who seek to promote fitness in clubs, industry and the community generally.

The existence of these different perspectives can, in addition, help to explain why physical educators at the present time tend to advocate a wide and seemingly miscellaneous range of objectives and are reluctant to omit any. No doubt they feel at least implicitly that to exclude any one of these objectives would be to neglect a legitimate aspect of their work or to deny its importance arbitrarily. This attitude arises because the objectives advocated appear to be distinct in nature. Once the perspective being adopted is discriminated for each objective, however, and the interdependence between the body modes is properly understood, the objectives fall systematically into place and can be seen as serving a single end.

This can be exemplified in considering one commonly proposed group of objectives, viz: the development of overall movement competence or 'movement sense', the acquisition of motor skills and the promotion of physical fitness.

The goal of developing 'movement sense' refers to the achievement of "a general condition of motor sensitivity and competence."[1] This is compared to musical sense and is described as a personal characteristic

manifested in the way in which an individual perceives and responds to aspects of his physical surroundings, whether familiar or unfamiliar. The actual movement of a person with a well developed 'movement sense' is co-ordinated and harmonious, both in itself and in relation to the forms of resistance in the world. It is argued that through developing the perceptual and motor capacities of his embodiment the individual comes to know himself and the world more intimately. In its concern with the effect that this 'sense' has on the individual's life as a whole - particularly in offering him a fuller experience of himself as embodied in the world - this goal shows itself to be closely related to the perspective on the body as lived embodiment. This relationship is indicated, further, in the description of this 'sense' as a personal characteristic, evidenced in the individual's ease of relationship with his physical environment.

The second objective exploits the manipulative potential of the instrument mode of the embodiment. The mastery of motor skills demands precision in the control of force, the timing of movements and the orientation of parts of the embodiment in space. It requires the individual to be reflectively engaged in training his embodiment to perform a whole variety of manoeuvres. The acquisition of motor skills from activities such as games and athletics, forms the focus of this work with techniques being put under pressure in competitive situations which may also demand appropriate responses to a constantly changing sequence of events.

The third objective, like the second, is a means of fostering an aspect of the physicality of the embodiment but, rather than with 'instrument' capacities, it is concerned broadly with the physiological and mechanical functioning of the embodiment as an object, or better, a mechanism. The exact definition of the term 'physical fitness'

is the subject of much debate, but most physical educators would include under its head the development of mobility, strength and stamina, and the improvement of cardio-vascular efficiency. These goals are worked towards in carefully planned programmes engaging the individual in increasingly demanding tasks.

Each of these objective is argued for in its own right, but they are not in fact three separate goals that can be pursued in isolation from one another. Rather, each represents a preoccupation with one particular aspect of one and the same phenomenon - being an individual's embodiment. The modes of embodiment are misunderstood if they are thought of as discrete. They are simply views that single out particular potentialities which are inter-related. The closeness of their relationship is, ironically, indicated in the ideological practice of physical educationists who, notwithstanding their insistence on presenting separate objectives frequently claim to be promoting all simultaneously.

A brief consideration of how the objectives can be achieved will reveal how they are inseparable in practice, and also show how an individual's embodied capacity is, at any time, the product of the abilities that characterize the three modes of embodiment.

The development of 'movement sense' for example can only take place within the context of a movement activity - ideally one that requires alertness and accurate response. Instances of such situations can readily be found in the execution of motor skills. Indeed, the varied demands made on the embodiment's instrument capacity in performing these skills - such as the need for co-ordination, control and precise placement - all make a positive contribution to the development of 'movement sense'. At the same time the acquisition of motor skill itself is dependent upon the individual's level of

'movement sense'. The more sensitive the mover is to all the cues that surround him, the more readily he can respond to these and the more adept he will be at mastering the skill in question. Similarly, an individual's level of physical fitness has a bearing on the ease, or lack of it, with which he acquires skills. While cardio-vascular efficiency is necessary for all effective movement activity, mobility, strength, explosive power and endurance also contribute in varying degrees to the performance of techniques. Developing the capacity of the embodiment as an instrument cannot be achieved, therefore, without appropriate support from abilities that are associated with the lived embodiment and with the embodiment as a mechanism.

The third objective, being the promotion and maintenance of fitness can be achieved in a number of ways. Significant among these, however, are situations in which the individual is engaged in a skill-based physical activity such as swimming or squash. Where motor skill in these activities is limited, contribution to fitness promotion will be restricted. As instrument capacity relies to some extent on mechanical functioning, the converse is also true.

Developing the potential of the lived embodiment in the form of 'movement sense' was seen to benefit from contexts focusing on efficient 'instrument' use of the embodiment. This development will also be affected by levels of fitness, not only through the influence of these on motor skill acquisition, but perhaps more importantly through their beneficial effect on the overall vitality and sensitivity of the embodiment. These last capacities are essential if the individual, through his lived embodiment, is to move in harmony with his surroundings.

Once it is recognized that the three objectives are not discrete, the question arises as to the value of spelling them out individually. Again, reference to the modes of embodiment to which the objectives

are related helps to find an answer to this question and to a further one concerning the proper role of these objectives within physical education as a whole, conceived as the promotion of a unique form of liaison with the world.

While all the modes of embodiment have important functions in human existence it is through our lived embodiment that effective liaison with the world is most fundamentally achieved. In this mode our embodiment has far reaching significance in very many of our projects, enhancing our experiences in a wide range of situations. The instrumental and mechanical capacities of the embodiment contribute importantly to the practical effectiveness of the lived embodiment, but of themselves are limited in their potential. The priority and predominance of the lived mode over the other two is demonstrated by the everyday pattern of perspectives we adopt. In most situations the role of the embodiment is presumed; the embodiment as lived is not reflected on, but of itself enables the individual to relate effectively with his surroundings. However, should an individual suffer an injury to his embodiment he can no longer live it unreflectively but must adopt an object attitude towards it. An aspect of his embodiment must, as it were, be perceived 'at a distance' and be contemplated in-itself. This changed perspective may involve the individual's taking steps to repair the damage, such as going to the doctor or bandaging the injured part. Once the individual is cured his embodiment will no longer demand specific attention and can again be 'passed by in silence'. This pattern of attitudes adopted towards the embodiment is not dissimilar to Heidegger's presentation [2] of the different ways in which a tool can be viewed. In general use an implement is seen as 'ready-at-hand' (zuhanden), available to be incorporated into whatever possibility the individual

wishes to pursue. If, however, it breaks and needs to be mended it is viewed quite differently. In Heidegger's terms it becomes 'present-at-hand' (vorhanden). It becomes the focus of a project rather than a means by which one may be achieved. In the case of the embodiment, 'remedial' action is not taken to return this dimension to a mode of instrumentality but to return it to its lived mode; the mode in which its instrumental potential is unreflectively incorporated into an individual's perceptions of, and dealings with, his surroundings.

In a similar way, should an individual see it to be to his advantage to acquire or master a particular skill, he will adopt an 'instrument' attitude and set about learning the new movement pattern, reflecting on the ways he must manipulate his embodiment. Once the skill has been mastered it becomes, as it were, absorbed into the individual's movement behaviour. It becomes a constituent of his embodied faculties and so part of his totality as an individual. For example once an individual has learnt the movement skills involved in driving a car, these abilities become capacities of his lived embodiment and thus an aspect of those behaviours that make up the individual as a car driver. The learnt skills have no value in themselves. They are only of significance when they are drawn upon in response to the needs of a particular situation.

The same pattern of attention is seen very clearly in physical education where fitness is promoted in the service of performance and techniques are learnt for the sake of putting them to use in, for example, a game or a dance. Ideally, the skills used in, for example, tennis, should be part of the embodied capacities of the player, actualisable without reflection. The embodiment-as-instrument perspective, while appropriate in the learning stages, is counter productive in the game where attention needs to be directed not to

particular limbs and movements but to the total situation.

In being directly associated with the ultimate goal of achieving effective operative liaison, objectives concerned with attributes of the lived embodiment have a strong case for being primary, with those focused on the instrument or object mode secondary. This does not belittle these last two but acknowledges that their role is to enrich the capacities of the lived embodiment. It is acceptable to have all three objectives, but only so long as it is remembered that there is little value in promoting motor skill or physical fitness except as a means of enhancing movement sense generally. No doubt some would resist this suggestion and attempt to make a case for retaining the last two objectives in their own right. There are, however, difficulties for such a view. What is the intrinsic value of a range of complex physical skills or a very low heart rate? Beyond their contribution to general 'movement sense' or to specific requirements in an activity context, there seems to be none. A preoccupation with either objective diverts the individual from his natural liaison with the world. Both focus upon the pure physicality of the embodiment and constitute a preoccupation with an aspect of being-in-itself which has affinity with that reification of the embodiment which Sartre describes as 'bad faith'. The embodiment ought not to be fixed as the object of an obsessional or narcissistic regard, but lived in its essential relation with the world as having the potential to make a unique and necessary contribution to the great variety of transcendent projects which constitute our being-in-the-world.

In addition to resistance from those wanting to retain, in their own right, objectives concerned with skill and fitness, there is a further group who would be dubious about the overriding centrality

proposed for objectives concerned with the lived embodiment. These are the many who cite the experiencing of enjoyment as a result of participation in physical activity as an important objective. The promotion of enjoyment has long featured as a goal in physical education often as the central aim to which other objectives have been related. Indeed, the three objectives discussed earlier are regarded as means to foster in children "delight in movement"[3] - although how they contribute to this end is not made clear. Allegiance to this point of view is however, short-sighted, for the emphatic significance given to the hedonistic objective has done little to persuade people not actually engaged in teaching physical education to take the subject seriously. The promotion of pleasure per se is not normally regarded as of educational value and any subject that bases its case for inclusion in the school curriculum principally on this ground is liable to be excluded from education altogether, or at best relegated to extra-curricular recreational programmes. The hedonistic justification is particularly unfortunate because physical education already tends to be identified with leisure activities, as 'purely for fun'. Furthermore, appeal to the idea of pleasure does not identify the unique feature that physical education has to offer. Rather, it offers something else, not unrelated to it, and more easily comprehensible, in its place.

It seems that physical educationists have been somewhat insensitive and imprudent in promoting an 'enjoyment of movement' objective so widely, but the question can well be asked why they have held so confidently to this view. Whilst it is not improper to hope that pupils will get pleasure from engaging in the work in a particular subject - and indeed this is a goal of all teachers in every subject - to place emphasis on pleasure rather than on

engagement or mastery reveals a misunderstanding of the relationship between the two. Pleasure usually accompanies an experience of a particular nature, it is not a 'free standing' phenomenon. Aristotle's account of pleasure[4] as identical with successful activity, as the crown of consummation of such activities, is applicable to physical activity. A sense of real satisfaction or pleasure is indeed experienced that both adds to and 'completes the activity'. The pleasure, as concomitant with a particular activity, is peculiar to that activity and has a distinctive character of its own. Hence, it is legitimate to claim that there is a unique satisfaction to be gained from effective participation in physical activity, but it is a mistake to give the impression that pleasure in itself is to be promoted at all costs. To do this trivializes the enterprise, bringing it down to the level of an amusement. It is salutary to reflect that while all other subjects could offer the pleasure concomitant with mastery of their specific activity, as a goal in their work, they do not do so. Far from resting their case on this goal they seldom mention it, highlighting instead values specific to their subject. Why, then, do physical educationists, virtually alone among teachers persist in attempting to justify their subject hedonistically? There are at least two reasons for this. The first is based on an understanding of the love/hate relationship pupils often have with the subject. Without necessarily appreciating the acute unhappiness that can be experienced by pupils when the teacher adopts an 'object' or 'tool' perspective on their embodiment, there is an awareness that unless pupils relish physical activity, they are likely to turn away from it altogether. Above all else, the teacher feels he must make all lessons enjoyable. Sadly without an understanding of body modes, the teacher

has no theoretical insight to help him achieve the hedonistic end, but has to rely on some form of intuitive empathy. This is not always easy for those teachers who, by their own particular strengths and attributes, have seldom experienced distaste for their embodied dimension to the point of near rejection.

The second reason relates directly to the teacher's own experience of physical activity as profoundly fulfulling and pleasurable; as providing them with a rich source of self-awareness, self-assurance and self-enrichment. Without reflective understanding of the nature of the interaction that takes place in physical activity between themselves and their physical surroundings, there is nothing for them to identify as the intrinsic value of physical activity except pure pleasure. Without this understanding there appear to be two separate phenomena - their active involvement in, for example, a game, and the deep satisfaction they get from it, with nothing more than a simple causal relationship between the two. In their apparent view that pleasure <u>per se</u> is their ultimate goal, they leave themselves with no defence against those who reason that if pupils get more pleasure from chemistry or painting than physical activity they should devote their time to the former rather than the latter. Physical educationists have responded to this threat by propounding a whole range of extrinsic justifications, such as moral development, and even in extreme cases construing physical education as a form of knowledge or a form of Art. Yet they are still reluctant to abandon the hedonistic justification, and continue to emphasize it despite the dis-service it does to their case. It seems to them essential since citing it is the closest they can get to identifying the real intrinsic value of physical activity.

But I very much suspect that what they are really so concerned

to cite, they are incapable of articulating, namely the achievement of successful liaison with the world via their embodied dimension; or to be more exact, between their motile embodiment and the concrete features of the world. It is certainly true that a particular pleasure accompanies this liaison. As described above in Section 4, this derives from the dual experience of harmony - of the embodiment as an integrated whole and of the embodiment and the world eminently in tune with each other. The experience of these two is in fact inseparable, and results in a rare sense of liberation from the physical constraints that usually reduce the effectiveness of our movement, coupled with a sense of assurance in our embodied capacities. But the real value of physical education does not lie in this pleasure. It lies in the development of a specific mode of relating to the world. This involves building from the prereflective operation of the embodiment that provides the essential ground for our interaction with the world, towards an ever more articulate operative liaison. A liaison that is not lived with the usual casual presumption, but one in which the mover is acutely aware of his embodiment in its reciprocal interaction with the patterns of force and resistance in the world. The embodiment is no longer 'passed by in silence' but, in a sense, captivates the attention of the mover in its effective and powerful sensitivity. This is not to imply that the embodiment, in these situations, is operating under especially precise and deliberate conscious control. The patterning of motility may be no more under such control than in the more routine movements of everyday life. Indeed if particularly acute conscious control was operating it would be impossible for the indiviudal to appreciate his liaison in its essential totality. As in all operative liaison it is the prereflective lived embodiment that interacts with the world. What

occurs in really articulate liaison is that the mover is unusually conscious of his intimate relationship with his concrete surroundings. Within this apparent 'fusion' he is, as it were, living his embodiment simultaneously on two levels - the prereflective and the reflective.

It should not be forgotten that the embodied faculties that are at work in highly articulate interaction are also responsible for our everyday operative liaison. The perceptual and motile powers of the embodiment that underpin routine movements concerned with such operations as walking, dressing, packing a suitcase and swatting a wasp, are also those which enable someone to participate successfully in what would be recognized as outstanding achievements in the 'physical' sphere such as white water canoeing, high diving and mountain climbing. And indeed in supreme physical accomplishments outside sport as in war situations and highly precarious feats in face of great danger. There seems in everyday life a sort of minimum level of use of these powers. (A level that western civilization appears determined to reduce still more.) They operate from within their already established perceptual and motile capacities and are neither challenged nor stretched in any way. The range of liaison patterns required is restricted and similar embodied faculties are repeatedly drawn on. For example the supporting surface is even and firm, movement is predominantly forwards and on a medium level, and objects can always be positioned within easy reach. The embodiment can remain upright and loads are seldom of great weight. While the perceptual and motile powers of the embodiment will be continually in action during our waking hours, they will seldom be called on to respond with particular speed or precision or to effect interaction from anything but a sitting or standing position. But these powers have latent capacities that might well go unsuspected in their rarely

extended routine operation. The embodied faculties can function with acute sensitivity and fluent versatility to achieve effective liaison in situations where speed, accuracy, co-ordination and control are of great importance. Successful interaction can also be achieved in less usual spatial orientations, in a wide range of challenging contexts and in highly unpredictable settings.

The aim of physical education is to develop these embodied faculties to enable pupils to achieve effective liaison in progressively more complex and demanding situations. This development must build from pupils' present level of articulacy. Any increase in sensitivity or motility can only be a refinement of existing capacities - a gradual unfolding of innate powers. Notions of comparison with others or the reaching of prescribed standards are out of place. Progress and success must always be judged in relation to each individual's current ability. What is important for the individual is the extension and enrichment of his routine operative liaison towards a goal of more versatile, articulate and significant interaction.

This development of innate human powers from their habitual use to their refined and sophisticated use is exactly parallel to the concerns of intellectual education. Here certain mental capacities are nurtured and challenged to operate in progressively more complex and demanding contexts. This can be exemplified in the development of our powers of imagination. Imagination, it is proposed, relies on our ability to make associations and synthesise ideas. These capacities "are the basis of our existence as thinking beings,"[5] enabling us, for example to construct and understand simple sentences. However it is these same powers, much refined and developed, that give rise to imaginative endeavour of the highest order, such as the formation of

hypotheses leading to the unification of different branches of science or the creation of a symphony.

The development of both embodied and intellectual faculties also share the capacity to enhance an individual's self-awareness and self-esteem. In fostering embodied faculties a closer relationship with our concrete surroundings is achieved. As a result we come to realise the extent of these faculties and appreciate more fully the aspects of the world with which they interact. In other words we have a sense of 'being-at-home' in the physical world and an awareness of our effective relationship with that world. This experience gives rise to a growth in confidence in our embodied capabilities and thus in general self-confidence. Likewise in the intellectual sphere developing competence in using, for example, mathematical concepts and formulae, gives the individual a sense of 'being-at-home' in the subject area of mathematics. He operates with increasing ease in the area and has an appreciation of his growing mastery. Again this realization of effectiveness promotes a sense of self confidence. The fostering of our innate intellectual powers and the subsequent growth of self assurance is seen to be of value, and there seems no reason why similar growth of the embodied faculties should not be viewed in the same way. Both contribute to the development of distinctly human capacities, thus enriching existence and promoting self fulfilment.

What counts as 'development' in both of these areas is similar and includes attention to depth and breadth. It includes an increase in awareness and appreciation; progress towards mastery and progress towards the understanding of the fundamentals of the area. But there must also be a wider understanding, a grasp of the extent of the area.

Both types of capacities have numerous facets that can be fostered singly or in various combinations. Intellectual faculties encompass abilities in the spheres of mathematics, linguistics, chemistry, ethics and the arts - to name but a few. Embodied faculties include abilities specifically related to effective liason in a variety of situations, for example, in rapidly changing and unpredictable contexts, and those involving surmounting obstacles, projecting missiles or propelling oneself through space. Just as it would be very dubious to call someone 'intellectually educated' if he had reached a sophisticated level of competence in just one sphere such as mathematics, and had very minimal competence in other fields, it would be unacceptable to consider an individual 'physically educated' if he was highly skilled in one athletic event, such as the pole vault, but had paid scant attention to developing skill in any other physical activity.

The arguments put forward for breadth in the intellectual sphere hold true for that of the embodiment. Peters, for example, sees an educated person as one whose breadth of understanding enables him to connect "up these different ways of interpreting his experience so that he achieves some kind of cognitive perspective."[6] This does not imply that he views all situations from, for example, a purely mathematical perspective, but rather that his 'mathematical appreciation' of the world plays a part in his understanding, alongside other modes of viewing the world. In this way he can appreciate more fully the rich complexities of his environment. In a parallel sense, to achieve a rich dialectic with, and understanding of, the concrete world, the individual needs to develop a range of his embodied capacities. Someone who had concentrated all his energies into improving his capacity as a weight lifter would lack the sensitive versatility to relate closely with very many aspects of his surroundings. Narrow

specialization is often referred to as training - and indeed the weight lifter would agree with Peters here in describing his specialized physical skills as resulting from 'training' and not being susceptible to the designation of 'educating'.

Ironically, Peters' claim that " the saying that 'education of the whole man' is a conceptual truth in that being educated is incompatible with being narrowly specialized"[7] exposes the inadequacy of the predominant current view of education as to do with developing the mind. On his own terms what happens in today's schools more resembles 'intellectual training' than education. If education is to be 'of the whole man' it will have to be concerned with all those human faculties that enable man to 'hold on to the world', to use Merleau-Ponty's expression; that is all those fundamental powers that promote man's characteristic intentional existence as embodied-being-in-the-world. Man's embodied faculties are a mode of access to external being with which we interact to create a meaningful existence. They would need to be developed alongside the intellectual and other faculties if pupils are to achieve a balanced development and undergo an education which is not seriously defective.

This, however, is too modest a claim for the inclusion of attention to our physical attributes in education. As Merleau-Ponty reveals, perceptual capacities underpin all intellectual capacities. "The perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all existence."[8] The primacy of perception would seem to indicate that human capacities concerned with perception have a prior claim to development, for without the product of these sensitivities cognition has no basis, indeed "we can only think the world because we have already experienced it."[9] As providing

a fundamental constituent of perception, our embodied capacities therefore warrant serious attention throughout education. And there is no indication in Merleau-Ponty's work that these sensitivities of the embodiment are in any way of less value than our other modes of access to the world. Rather, the reverse is the case. The operative aspects of our intentional relationship with the world are frequently described as the ground of this interaction. He writes "We found beneath the intentionality of acts, or thetic intentionality, another kind which is the condition of the former's possibility: namely an operative intentionality already at work before any positing or any judgement, a logos of the aesthetic world', an 'art hidden in the depth of the human soul', one which like any art, is known only by its results."[10] More specifically he claimed that it was motility in its pure state that "possesses the basic power of giving a meaning."[11]

Thus our embodied faculties, being at the heart of perception and perception providing the essential foundation for all that we call 'intellectual', have a very strong claim to be a central concern in education. To belittle or neglect our embodied dimension is an expression of contempt for the ground of educational endeavour, and a denial of our essential nature, the very foundation of our multifarious existence in the world. The 'intellectualist's' perception of the promotion of explicit cognition and rationality as the basis for all other human development has been found to be wanting. The onus is on them to argue a case for devoting so large a proportion of the curriculum to their various 'forms of knowledge', rather than merely to assert their position dogmatically.

There is perhaps one line of argument that they could take up. While accepting the fundamental role of the perceptual and

actional capacities of the embodiment, they could claim that attention need only be paid to them in so far as this is necessary for other modes of development to take place. Physical education would be retained for the instrumental contribution it made to education, but, having no independent value it would need only minimal time devoted to its study. Implicit here would be the view that the development of embodied powers (and thus embodied liaison) was not in itself a valuable project. Such an attitude to our embodiment would be extremely insensitive, however, and it is hard not to see it as based upon prejudice.

Far from being inferior instrumental capacities our embodied powers are central to existence in their fundamental role in giving meaning to the world. It is surprising that along with other intellectualists, R. S. Peters should overlook these bodily powers, given his view that reverence is an appropriate attitude towards those human capacities shared by all normal individuals which, as the foundation of public traditions, have given structure and coherence to the world.[12] He argues further that the world into which we are initiated in our youth represents "centuries of effort by our ancestors"[13] and that we should regard this world with reverence, taking our place with appropriate humility in our "shared inheritance."[14] He extends this respect to 'public traditions' also, through which the world as a cultural product is constituted. He describes the sciences as "perhaps the finest product that yet exists of the sustained and controlled imagination of the human race"[15] and as "the supreme example of reason in action."[16] Peters acknowledges that the shared world has been created "through our perceptual apparatus,"[17] and that the sciences, for example, have their basis in agreement in shared observational judgements through which they are able to acquire

the high degree of objectivity that is characteristic of them. Other forms of knowledge such as aesthetics, morals and religion, rest upon what Peters calls "shared responses"[18] and "common reactions drawing from a shared human nature,"[19] by which he means the same or similar feelings on contemplating the same objects or situations. These aspects of our contingency - common perceptions and shared responses - in their ability to enable us to "make some sort of sense of the world"[20] are regarded as worthy of respect. This respect does not extend, however, to our embodied capacities, which Peters ignores. Yet what we call 'the world' has its ground in our embodied relationship to (external) being and neither language in general, including the forms of knowledge, nor even perception itself, in any but the most primitive sense at best, would be possible without our bodily capacities, including the capacities to manipulate things and those various capacities which we describe collectively and very inadequately as 'the powers of movement.'

It is surprising that being so much in agreement with Merleau-Ponty as to the nature of being in general, Peters should disregard aspects of (subjective) being which Merleau-Ponty identifies as an essential ground of the world. Merleau-Ponty argues, for example, that we have "to acknowledge an imposition of meaning which is not the work of a constituting consciousness."[21] He identifies the body as the medium through which we have a world and motility as the possessor of the basic power of attributing meaning. Our embodiment is the first and most fundamental key to the world, enabling us to relate to it, make sense of it and adapt it in large degree, to our design. Since the nature of the world in which we live and its further development and enrichment rests on our embodied capacities one would have thought that they were as worthy of awe

and respect as any of our other capacities.

There is another sense in which Peters should have acknowledged aspects of our embodied capacities as being of value. Just as the forms of knowledge 'make sense' of aspects of our existence, our motile ability or physical adeptness enables us to come to terms with and give meaning to the world. Where the thorough grasp of a form of knowledge opens up new avenues of experience and a corresponding enrichment of our interaction with the world, the development of our physical capacities opens up new possibilities of experience and offers an extension of our understanding of a particular aspect of the world. Both forms of knowledge and our motility are modes of access to the world, means by which we can become more 'at home in the world'. Had Peters looked more broadly at the totality of our relationship with the world, or had he examined in depth Morris' view, with which he identified, "that education consists in the discovery of what it means to be human,"[22] he might not have been tempted to interpret man's creativity and achievements in so narrowly intellectual a way as he did. Far from ignoring this dimension of human nature, he might have joined Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty in their profound respect for its powers, achievements and potentialities.

One might ask why the powers of our embodiment have attracted so little attention. Why are they thought to differ so radically from other abilities, the development of which is readily assumed to be of value and an end in itself? Is it perhaps that activities pertaining to this dimension of our human condition in some way fall short of criteria generally used to define 'worthwhileness'? These criteria though variously expressed, usually centre around the following notions. First, an activity is seen as worthwhile if there is the possibility that it can be practised "with more

or less skill, sensitivity and understanding."[23] Secondly, that it has the capacity to challenge and absorb an individual in providing "unending opportunities for skill and discrimination,"[24] third that its participants show a respect of, and care for, the standards inherent in its operation, and finally that it is pursued purely for its own sake, for the satisfaction it gives to the participant. These criteria are normally used to describe involvement in activities such as the study of archaeology, biochemistry or linguistics. However, activities focused on exploring and extending a particular mode of operative liaison such as team games or sailing have no difficulty in satisfying these same criteria. For example sailing can be carried out with degrees of 'skill, sensitivity and understanding'; it undoubtedly offers unending challenges to the participants, who in their turn show care for, and respect of, the standards and conventions of its practices. And it is pursued for its own sake , in giving individuals the satisfaction of having extended their capacities and achieved an effective liaison with their surroundings.

That 'movement based' experiences are indeed viewed as worthwhile is evident in the incidence in many cultures, not least that of Great Britain, of a wide range of physical activities such as sport and dance. Participation in these is an important part of the lives of some people. There is a sense in which these individuals want to go beyond simply deploying their embodiment to purely utilitarian ends. There is a desire to take part in activities that enable them to reaffirm their fundamental nature as embodied, to challenge themselves to create a harmonious dialogue with the forces of the world, and to take delight in the sensitivity and versatility of their motility. In short to proclaim and celebrate the being and capabilities of their embodiment.

It is perhaps because the embodiment is something of a mystery in its subtle, yet pervasive role in existence, that the 'intellectualist' finds it difficult to come to terms with. In its prereflective operation in both routine and supremely demanding operative liaison it does not require continuous detailed control and monitoring by consciousness. It attributes meaning, gives coherence and rises to the occasion with uncanny acuity. Its functioning almost defies explanation. Our embodiment is indeed an 'art hidden in the depth of the soul', a 'great intelligence' that evades, perplexes or perhaps humiliates the 'intellectualist' so that he reacts to the thoughts of it with ridicule or cursory dismissal, or at best by assigning it some strictly subordinate place and function. Yet the powers of the intellect are equally mysterious in their origins and operations.

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