**A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the Electoral Success of Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe, 2000-2010**

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**DECLARATION**

I confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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**ABSTRACT**

Radical right parties are *radical* for their opposition to the principle of pluralism in liberal democratic regimes and *right* for their belief in the existence of natural inequalities among human beings. By employing the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis research technique, this study analyses for the electoral success of such parties in national parliamentary elections held in seven Central and East European countries (CEECs) during the decade from 2000 to 2010. These countries include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. In total, the study examines twenty parliamentary elections*.* It seeks to understand whether the Europeanization process, defined as the European Union’s political and economic influence on individual countries, increased the electoral strength of the parties. Despite the paramount importance of the EU’s influence on CEECs, this question receives less attention in the literature than it deserves. In addition to three demand-side conditions already examined in the literature, this study seeks to learn whether right wing mainstream parties’ position within the socio-cultural dimension of party competition contributes to electoral success. This question has also not received sufficient attention in terms of CEECs.

This study concludes that the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party was a necessary condition for electoral success, though this condition was not omnipresent. The presence of a large ethnic minority population emerged as a context-setting condition. In countries without this condition (Poland and Slovenia), the combination of the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party and the absence of a party following liberal socio-cultural policies appears to have been responsible for the electoral success of radical right parties. In countries with large ethnic minority populations (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia), the combination of the presence of a Europhile right wing mainstream party and the presence of a party following liberal socio-cultural policies only partly led to the electoral success of radical right parties. In such countries, a high level of unemployment was also a part of the configuration leading to the electoral success. They were the supply side-conditions that primarily determined electoral success in countries without a large ethnic minority population, whereas demand-side conditions proved as important as supply-side conditions in countries with a large ethnic minority population. Overall, the findings of this QCA not only confirms Mudde’s (2010) ‘pathological normalcy’ but also extend its scope by identifying a configuration leading to electoral success of radical right parties in countries without large ethnic minority groups.

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**Chapter One - Introduction**

**1.1 Setting the Scene**

Radical right parties are infamous actors in liberal democratic regimes for preaching ‘intolerance of “the others’’’ (Ramet, 1999: 4), meaning those whose ethnicity or culture is different from that of the ‘native’ population. Nativism, which Mudde (2007: 19) defines ‘*as an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (person and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous state’,* represents the core of radical right philosophy.*[[1]](#footnote-1)* This outlook favours policies that aspire to protect cultural (primarily) and economic life from outside influences. The radical right’s support of an ethnically homogeneous society, patriarchal and traditional families, and the severe punishment of ‘offenders’ exemplify such protectionist policies related to socio-cultural life (Hainsworth, 2000: 12; Minkenberg, 2009: 450). Likewise, policies that are aimed at keeping strategic industries and the banking system in the hands of the state or local entrepreneurs, and prohibiting the sale of public and personal assets to foreigners are typical examples of the socio-economic policies formulated by radical right parties (Markowski, 2002: 28; Ghodsee, 2008: 30 and 36). Some scholars argue that radical right parties attach as much importance to economic issues as to cultural ones (e.g. Betz, 1993: 414; Kitschelt, 1995: 4). Nevertheless, a consensus appears to be emerging in the literature on the view that what primarily interests radical right parties are cultural policies (Minkenberg, 2000: 173; Mudde, 2007: 119, and Kitschelt, 2007: 1178).[[2]](#footnote-2) The quasi-economic policies of radical right parties are discussed at greater length in the second chapter; suffice it to say here that the parties do not present a coherent program for ameliorating economic problems. Instead, they simply voice the problems in a populist manner that attacks other political parties. The primary place of cultural policies can also be seen in the parties’ foreign policy understandings. With the aim of protecting national sovereignty and national culture, radical right parties oppose supranational institutions such as the European Union (EU). They claim to be the only parties acting in the national interest in terms of international relations. They use this claim to rationalize their presence in supra-national institutions (such as in the European Parliament), in spite of their oppositions to them (Hainsworth, 2000: 10; Liang, 2007: 10 - 12).

The defeat of the Axis powers in the World War II discredited political parties promoting nativism for some period. [[3]](#footnote-3) Save for the exceptions, such political parties did not achieved notable electoral success until the mid-1980s.[[4]](#footnote-4) Yet, the emergence of ‘New Right’ ideas[[5]](#footnote-5) starting in the late 1960s as a reaction to the immigration problem in West Europe constituted a major turning point. Subsequently, radical right parties that firmly stuck to the ‘New Right’ began to achieve remarkable electoral successes in West Europe (Minkenberg, 2000: 179, 180, c.f. Rydgren, 2005). Those achieved by the National Front (France), the Freedom Party (Austria), the Vlaams Blok (Belgium), and the Progress Party (Norway) in the 1990s are the best-known examples (Norris, 2005: 6-8).

In Central and East European countries (hereinafter, CEECs), radical right parties also attained notable electoral success in the first decade of the new millennium. The Greater Romania Party’s share of the vote reached 19 per cent in the 2000 parliamentary election. Volen Siderov, the leader of the Bulgarian ATAKA party, took the second place in the first round of the 2006 Presidential election and vied for the presidency in the run-off. Both the League of Polish Families and the Slovak National Party joined coalition governments in their countries in 2005 and 2006, respectively. The Movement for a Better Hungary (JOBBIK) won 16.7 per cent of the vote in the 2010 parliamentary election.

All these electoral successes revived academic interest in the subject, and two key questions have overwhelmingly dominated the literature.[[6]](#footnote-6) First, a large number of studies have sought to answer the questions of how contemporary radical right parties should be defined, in what sense these parties differ from those of the interwar years, and what policies they formulate based on nativism (Beyme, 1988; Ignazi, and Ysmal, 1992, Cole, 2005). These studies commonly argue that contemporary radical right parties differ from those of the interwar era essentially for two reasons: they do not oppose democratic regimes *in toto*, and they do not support biological racism, instead emphasizing cultural differences among human beings.

Second, a large number of studies have sought to reveal those conditions that increase radical right parties’ chances for electoral success (e.g. Mayer and Perrineau, 1992; Betz, 1994, Kitschelt, 1995). The conditions thought to be responsible for these successes of radical right parties have been examined in two groups. The first group is composed of ‘demand-side’ conditions. These include socio-economic, socio-political, and socio-demographic changes that subsequently predispose certain voters towards radical right parties (Givens, 2005: 3; Carter, 2005: 3). The growth of economic insecurities due to increases in unemployment (Jackman and Volpert, 1996) and cuts in the welfare spending (Swank and Betz, 2003), the growth of public dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992; Norris 2005), the decrease in class voting and party loyalties (Ignazi, 1992), the problem of immigration and cultural protectionism (Husbands, 1992; Van Der Brug et al., 2000; Norris 2005), reaction against the post-materialist new left policies (Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Ignazi, 1992), and the declining level of social capital (Jesuit, et al. 2009) are all examples of ‘demand-side’ conditions. The second group is composed of ‘supply-side’ conditions. These conditions are related to the political structures in a polity that determine the capacity of a radical right party to transform the electoral demand into actual electoral support (Given, 2005: 3; Norris, 2005: 14; Mudde, 2007: 202). Rydgren (2007: 252) divides supply-side conditions into three sub-groups. The first group includes external conditions that are known as ‘political opportunity structures’ in the literature (Tarrow, 1998: 19).[[7]](#footnote-7) Interaction between political parties in party systems (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Meguid, 2005)[[8]](#footnote-8) and the electoral system (Golder, 2003; Carter, 2004, Norris, 2005) are examples of this kind of supply-side condition. The second and third groups include internal conditions. The efficacies of party leadership and organizations in formulating, disseminating and implementing policies that comply with nativist ideology are examples of internal supply-side conditions. (Lubbers et. al, 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2006; Carter, 2005 Norris, 2005; Art, 2011).

Scholars have revealed various conditions that increased the chance of radical right parties’ electoral success with particular attention to demand-side conditions up to the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, these conditions do not sufficiently explain variation in the electoral performance of radical right parties in countries where similar demand-side conditions were present. In his review on Betz’s widely cited study *Radical Right-wing Populism in West Europe* (1994) Messina (1996: 149) asks, ‘Why is the Britain the only major immigrant-receiving country in Western Europe without a politically significant “right-wing populist party in the 1990s?’ Such questions highlighted the necessity for scholars to extend their analyses in a way that takes into account supply-side conditions along with demand-side conditions (Givens, 2005: 3; Norris, 2005: 14; Mudde, 2007: 252). Since then, various large-*N* analyses have been made in the literature (Mudde, 2009: 336).

The development of the literature on radical right parties in CEECs has lagged. Comparative analyses have disproportionately focused on West European countries (De Lange and Mudde, 2005: 480). CEECs have appeared as a minor part of comparative analyses that develop a pan-European approach (e.g. Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007). Such analyses are, however, criticized on the grounds that they directly apply theoretical explanations based on social and economic developments in West Europe. In fact, historical, economic, and demographic differences between West Europe and Central and Eastern Europe require not only changing the context of the West European based hypotheses but also proposing hypotheses based on social and economic developments in CEECs (Kitschelt, 2007: 1198; Minkenberg 2009: 451).

A few studies in the literature have discussed what kinds of demand-side conditions are breeding grounds for radical right parties’ electoral success in CEECs (e.g. Kreidl and Valuchova, 2000; Anastasakis, 2002, Minkenberg, 2002; Beichelt and Minkenberg, 2002; Beichelt, 2003, Minkenberg, 2009; Mares, 2012). For example, Minkenberg and Beichelt (2002: 15) accentuate ‘existence of strong national minority’, ‘existence of external homelands’, ‘high transformation costs’ and the on-going influence of former communist elites as conditions increasing radical right parties’ chances of achieving electoral success. Missing in these studies is a discussion of supply-side conditions.

Bustikova and Kitschelt (2011) have recently sought to fill this gap. The authors examine how the interaction between radical right parties and their nearby competitors within the socio-economic dimension of party competition have affected the electoral support for the former. The authors’ decision to focus on the socio-economic dimension of party competition, however, overlooks the paramount importance of the socio-cultural dimension of party competition to radical right parties (Hockenos, 1993; Ramet, 1999; Minkenberg, 2002; Mudde 2007). Moreover, due to this decision, the authors could not capture the impact of mainstream nationalist appeals - a very likely tactic in CEECs (Vermeersch, 2013: 143) - on the electoral performance of radical right parties. Finally, the authors’ decision conflicts with findings indicating that economic problems such as unemployment primarily benefit left-wing political parties (e.g. Fidrmuc, 2000: 212; Owen and Tucker, 2010: 34).

Another important omission in the literature is that the Europeanization of CEECs, which this study understands as the EU’s political, social and economic influences on the countries, has not been considered as a condition for increasing radical right parties’ chances of achieving electoral success. This omission is surprising given findings obtained in studies of party-based Euroscepticism and public-based Euroscepticism, which will be summarized later in this chapter. Briefly, studies of the former suggest that opposition to Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) essentially came from radical right parties, and studies of the latter suggest that citizens who were doubtful about Europeanization were primarily motivated by cultural issues. Conflating the findings of studies on both subjects, it is not illogical to expect that Europeanization could play a role in the electoral successes of radical right parties. In fact, a single-case study on the radical right in Poland supports this expectation (De Lange and Guerra, 2009: 531-537).

This study seeks to fill the abovementioned gaps in the literature. It makes a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of the electoral success of radical right parties in national parliamentary elections held in CEECs from 2000 to 2010. The analysis includes three demand-side conditions and two supply-side conditions, the last of which is related to Europeanization. Detailed information about the study’s methodology is given below.

**1.2 Research Question and Unit of Analysis**

This study frames its research question as follows: Under which combination(s) of macro-level demand-side and / or supply-side conditions have radical right parties in CEECs been electorally successful in national parliamentary elections held from 2000 to 2010? The units of analysis are national parliamentary elections. The study analyses how conditions combined at the time of each election and which of them produced electoral success for radical right parties. In total, the analysis includes twenty parliamentary elections.

Following the conventional structure of studies using QCA, the next section begins by explaining how this study conceptualizes electoral success in terms of radical right parties. This will be followed by a discussion of the selection of conditions thought to increase the chances of achieving electoral success by radical right parties. While doing so, the discussion touches on historical and economic differences between West Europe and CEE; these differences have led this study to include some conditions that are less relevant (or totally irrelevant) to West European countries.

**1.3. Outcome: Electoral Success of Radical Right Parties**

From 2000 to 2010, the most electorally successful radical right party was the Greater Romania Party, which received 19.6 per cent of the votes in the 2000 parliamentary election. In the 2010 parliamentary election, the Movement for Better Hungary achieved another notable electoral success by winning 16.7 per cent of the vote. These levels of electoral supports are exceptional for radical right parties, which in most cases rarely gain more than 10 per cent of the vote. When comparing electoral supports for mainstream parties and support for radical right parties, the former obviously dwarfs the latter. Radical right parties are the minor parties not the mainstream parties, and the notion of electoral success is conceptualized in this study accordingly.[[9]](#footnote-9)

Duverger (1954: 288) characterizes the minor parties as ‘makeweights in office’, arguing that ‘they have to be content with a few ministerial back seats […] which may put them in the position of holding the balance, and thus give them a sudden increase in importance.’ Likewise, Sartori (1976: 122-123) suggests that the minor parties securing seats in parliament are obviously relevant actors for party competition, in that they can play a key role (or at least an ancillary role) in building a coalition government. Furthermore, major parties could be blackmailed into accepting some radical right policies. Obviously, minor parties must secure seats to have such a role. Because all countries in this study use proportional representation - wholly or partly - with a 4-5 per cent electoral threshold, this study conceptualizes electoral success as the capacity of the party to exceed the electoral threshold.

**1.4 Conditions and Hypotheses**

Historical differences between CEE and West Europe must be considered in setting up the analysis of CEE countries. Detailed discussions about these differences are embedded in the explanations for the selection of conditions that are thought to increase the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties. Suffice it to say here that the Europeanization process, the presence of large minority populations, and the corruption problem are three of the five conditions that are selected due to the historical differences. The following subsections briefly discuss the reasoning behind the selection of the conditions and presents the predictions of the hypotheses. In-depth information regarding the data sets used in the study and the transformation of scores obtained from the data sets into fuzzy-set scores (calibration) will be given in the fourth chapter.

1.4.1. Level of Unemployment (UNEMP)

In West Europe, the rise of radical right parties starting in the mid-1980s has been partly attributed to the transition from an industrial society to a post-industrial society (Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987). As a result of this transition, post-material issues such as freedom of speech, abortion and same-sex marriage became increasingly influential in terms of electoral preferences. Green parties began to emerge on the left side of the political spectrum, ultimately shaking the party systems in West Europe. In his widely cited study, Inglehart (1971) names this process a ‘silent-revolution’. Ignazi (1992) argues that radical right parties gained importance as a reaction to this silent revolution. In fact, Ignazi (1992) names the process starting in the mid-1980s in which radical right parties achieved electoral success a ‘counter silent revolution’.

This kind of transition did not occur in CEECs. Nevertheless, these countries experienced a transition process in the early 1990s that transformed not only political regimes but also economic systems. By focusing on the economic side of this transition, the transition losers approach argues that a significant number of citizens suffered the negative consequences of the far-reaching transition process from a state economy to a market economy. They lost their jobs and could not find new ones to improve their lives. The approach claims that the electoral preferences of such citizens reflect their disappointment with the new economic system. They were inclined to vote for political parties claiming to be different from those parties bolstering the existing economic system (Minkenberg, 2002. Anastasakis, 2002: Beichelt and Minkenberg 2002, Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2009).

To test this argument, this study’s fuzzy set QCA includes the average level of unemployment during the year preceding the day of the election. This condition has already been included in other analyses that have reached to contradictory findings. For example, Jackmann and Volpert (1996), and Kreidl and Vlachova (1999) conclude that the electoral successes of radical right parties are due in part to high levels of unemployment. By contrast, Knigge (1998) and Lubbers *et al*.(2002) argue that the electoral successes of radical right parties cannot be attributed to high levels of unemployment. A more detailed review of these findings will be made in the third chapter. In spite of these contradictory findings, the present fuzzy-set QCA analysis includes unemployment level as a potential condition to increase the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties. The 2009 euro crisis also makes the inclusion of this condition necessary.

This analysis develops two hypotheses related to the impact of unemployment level on the electoral success of radical right parties. The first hypothesis assumes a direct relation between the condition and the outcome of interest. It suggests that *a high level of unemployment contributes to the electoral performances of radical right parties in CEE.* The second hypothesis is formulated on the basis of an ethnic competition approach, which suggests that different ethnic groups within a society vie with each other over scarce economic resources. Ergo, economic problems such as a high level of unemployment benefit to radical right parties in countries where a large minority population resides (Golder, 2003; Rydgren, 2007; Arzheimer, 2009). Given their nativist ideology, radical right parties become an option for citizens, who blame their economic problems on a minority population. Thus, the second hypothesis suggests that *a high level of unemployment contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE where a large minority population is also present.*

1.4.2. High Levels of Perceived Corruption (CORR)

The World Bank (1997: 8) defines corruption as *‘the abuse of public authority for private gain’.*  Though corruption is a universal problem, Rose suggests that it is ‘endemic’ to post-communist countries. Hofstede (1991) argues that the plague of corruption is barely avoidable in Central and East European societies, as the source of the problem lies in their cultural code.[[10]](#footnote-10) Others argue that the problem is the legacy of communist regimes in which ordinary citizens were subordinated to the wishes of ruling elites (Sandholtz, and Rein, 2005: 109; Rose et al., 1998: 219). Public surveys conducted by Transparency International illustrate the severity of the problem. From 2000 to 2010, Slovenia was the only country whose scores were always above the average.[[11]](#footnote-11) The Czech Republic and Hungary appear to be relatively successful in coping with the problem compared to other countries such as Bulgaria and Romania (Transparency International Database: 2000-2010).

The problem of corruption has not only been a major hindrance to smooth democratization and marketization processes in CEE countries (Rose, 2001: 101), but also a primary source of public dissatisfaction with the established political systems (Pippidi, 2007: 12). Based on the protest voting approach, it is the latter effect that interests this study. This approach claims that disenchanted voters are likely to vote for radical right parties so as to punish ‘established political parties’. Indeed, an anti-corruption discourse has been given a prominent place in the campaigns of radical right parties in CEECs. By doing so, as the approach would predict, radical right parties seek to appeal to voters who harbour deep resentment towards ‘corrupt politicians’. For example, in a recent study titled *Nationalism and Identity in Romania*, Cinpoes (2010) suggests that the notable electoral success of the Greater Romania Party in the 2000 parliamentary election was largely due to the widespread corruption problem in the country. Another study also considers the corruption problem a condition that increases the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties (Bustikova, 2009).[[12]](#footnote-12)

This study develops two hypotheses about the impact of the corruption problem on the electoral success of radical right parties. The first hypothesis assumes a direct relationship between the problem and the electoral success. It predicts that *a high level of**perceived corruption contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties*. As a result of corruption being ‘endemic’ to CEE countries, voters may take the problem for granted. More explicitly, a belief that ‘all political parties are corrupt and none of them can make change’ may persist within the electorates. Nevertheless, this ‘acceptance’ is likely to turn into aggression during times of economic difficulties. Following this, the second hypothesis predicts that *a high level of perceived corruption contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties when it coincides with high levels of unemployment.*

1.4.3 Large Ethnic Minority Population (ETHPOP)

The process of ‘nation-building’ in CEE differs from that in West Europe. In the former, the ‘nation’ has largely been defined on the basis of ethnic and cultural cleavages (Minkenberg, 2002: 357).[[13]](#footnote-13) In struggles based on ethnic identity, social tensions essentially grow between the native population and historically rooted minority groups.[[14]](#footnote-14) For example, Hobsbawm (2003: 165) notes that the ‘unfinished businesses of 1918-21’ plays an important role in today’s inter-cultural tensions in CEE. Legacies of the independence movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and of the ‘nationalist-communist regimes’ of the Cold War years, along with a lack of democratic experiences before the end of the communist regimes, have substantially prevented the emergence of civic nationalism in CEECs.[[15]](#footnote-15) Based on the idea of nativism, the core of their ideology, radical right parties invariably target minority groups in CEECs. For example, they oppose the extension of cultural and economic rights to minority groups. In addition, the Roma people are also subjected to radical right parties’ antagonistic discourses against the ‘others’ in their societies. It should also be noted that radial right parties in CEECs, largely due to their lack of a civic understanding of nationalism, use harsher language against minority groups than their counterparts in West Europe (Minkenberg, 2002: 336).[[16]](#footnote-16)

The ethnic competition approach argues that tension between ‘native citizens’ and ‘the others’ of the society is likely to occur due to scarce economic resources and/or cultural incompatibility. Remember that reaction to the influx of immigrant populations into West European countries has been considered the main reason for the rise of radical right parties starting in the mid-1980s (e.g. Knigge, 1998; Arzheimer, 2009: 269). By considering this conclusion in the context of CEECs, this study formulates a hypothesis that predicts that*the presence of**a large number of historically rooted minority groups (and/or Roma people) contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE.*

1.4.4. Presence of a Liberal Right Wing Mainstream Party on Cultural Policies (LIBM)

Electoral success is not only commensurate with a political party’s leadership and party organizations. The behaviour of other political parties can also affect a party’s chance of achieving electoral success. Particularly, the interaction between political parties whose ideologies are related is likely to affect each party’s electoral performance. Following this possibility, this study suggests that interaction between radical right parties and right wing mainstream parties may contribute to or stifle the electoral success of the former.

There are two different approaches in the literature regarding the impact of the interaction between right-wing mainstream and radical right parties on the electoral performance of the latter. The first approach suggests that when the positional distance between a right-wing mainstream party and a radical right party increases (due to the moderate position of the former), the latter has a better chance of electoral success.[[17]](#footnote-17) Briefly speaking, the logic behind this suggestion is that radical right parties can appeal to voters who have renounced the right-wing mainstream party for its moderate position (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Meguid, 2005). The second approach argues the opposite. According to this explanation, it is the narrowing distance between a right-wing mainstream party and a radical right party that increases the latter’s chance of electoral success (Budge et al., 1987). As the two parties move toward increasingly similar positions, the argument goes; the right-wing mainstream party and the radical right party emphasize similar issues. The former’s emphasis on these issues, in which interest the latter, ultimately increases the saliency of these same issues in elections.[[18]](#footnote-18)

Remember that cultural issues are of the primary importance to radical right parties. They do not have promising economic programs to ameliorate economic problems. They tend to mention economic problems in a populist manner and consider them useful weapons for attacking established political parties. As a result, the ideological link between radical right parties and their voters is likely to occur in the socio-cultural dimension of party competition. Thus, the effect of the interaction between right-wing mainstream parties and radical right parties on the electoral performance of the latter should be examined in terms of the socio-cultural dimension of party competition. Following this logic, and based on the two approaches given above, this study formulates two competing hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts that *the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following culturally liberal policies increases the chances of achieving electoral success by radical right parties.* The second hypothesis predicts the opposite, suggesting that *the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following culturally illiberal policies increases the chances of achieving electoral success by radical right parties.*

1.4.5 The Presence of a Europhile Right Wing Mainstream Party (EPHILM)

External actors have played important roles in political, economic and social developments in CEECs throughout the history. The Empires (Prussian, Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian) had sovereignty over the region for centuries. During the Cold War years, CEECs (except Tito’s Yugoslavia) became part of the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact. At the beginning of the post-communist years, the European Union became influential over these countries through ‘EU conditionality’, which requires the harmonization of their political, economic, and social conditions with those of the European Union (Anastasakis, 2002: 13). It is almost a commonplace in the literature on democratization to argue that the EU conditionality has played an ancillary role (for some a critical role) in the transition from ‘one-party’ communist regimes to multi-party democratic regimes (e.g. Jowitt, 1992; Agh, 1999; Pridham, 2002 and 2007; Vachudova, 2005). For supporters of democratization, the allure of Europeanization lies in the EU’s capacity to keep illiberal parties or people at bay (Harris, 2004: 203; Rybar, 2007: 699). In this respect, the EU’s influence over the countries has annoyed nativist circles (Mudde, 2003: 2).

It is widely argued in the literature on party-based Euroscepticism that radical right parties are the leading anti-EU political parties, whose policies are classified as either soft-Euroscepticism or hard-Euroscepticism. (e.g. Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2001 and 2004; Kopecky and Mudde, 2002). As mentioned above, radical right parties’ opposition to the EU is primarily socio-culturally based (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004: 4).[[19]](#footnote-19) For example, Vachudova and Hooghe (2009: 188) note that radical right parties ‘believe that European integration dilutes national culture, brings unwanted immigration [obviously this is claimed by radical right parties in West Europe] and undermines the national community’.

Recent findings in the literature on public-based Euroscepticism indicate that the saliency of the Europeanization issue in an election may increase the chance of maximizing electoral support for radical right parties for two reasons. First, socio-cultural reasons are more influential than socio-economic reasons in shaping of public opposition to the EU (Lewis, 2006: 12; Hughes, et al., 2002: 328; Carey, 2002: 407; Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 2). Second, in terms of its impact on electoral preferences, the issue of Europeanization has a stronger impact in CEECs than has it in West European countries (Hooghe, and Marks, 2008: 17-18; Dechezelles and Neumayer, 2010: 234; Sum, 2010: 20; De Vries and Tillman, 2011: 10).

Combining the findings presented in the previous two paragraphs, it is logical to suggest that the Europeanization process can potentially affect the electoral performance of radical right parties. By emphasizing their opposition to the EU motivated by socio-cultural issues, the parties can easily appeal to voters whose oppositions are based on similar issues; electoral gains may thereby accrue to the parties (Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2002: 587; Beichelt, 2004: 34; Marks, 2004: 239; Enyedi and Lewis, 2006: 242; Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 17; Neumayer, 2008: 147; Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009: 188).[[20]](#footnote-20) For example, Almeida (2012: 133) suggests that most radical right parties in CEE tried to make the EU a platform issue in electoral competitions with the aim of appealing to voters who are sceptical about the EU’s influence (Almeida, 2012: 133). In spite of this, as mentioned before, the literature largely ignores Europeanization as a condition that can increase the level of electoral support for radical right parties.

This study formulates three hypotheses to test whether Europeanization affects radical right parties’ electoral performance in CEECs. The first hypothesis assumes that voters take Europeanization as a single issue to shaping her/his electoral preference. Therefore, the hypothesis predicts that *the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE.* The second and third hypotheses apply the same reasoning in combination with the previous condition (that is, *the presence of a liberal right-wing mainstream party on socio-cultural issues*). These two hypotheses assume a strong correlation between a voter’s views on socio-cultural issues and on EU membership. In other words, if the voter supports authoritarian, traditional, and nationalist policies in domestic affairs, she/he is likely to be sceptical about EU membership (Hooghe and Marks 2008). The second hypothesis expects that *the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party that also takes a position close to the centre in the socio-cultural dimension contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE.* The third hypothesis predicts that *the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party that also takes a position far from the centre in the socio-cultural dimension contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE.*

**1.5. Methodology: Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research Technique**

As a set theoretic method, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) has essentially three distinct features. First, it has the capacity to include an intermediate number of cases(ten to fifty cases). Thus, unlike traditional case oriented methods, qualitative comparative analysis can examine more than a handful of cases (Rihoux, 2010: 723). Second, it is particularly useful in dealing with outcomes that are the product of ‘multiple conjunctural causation’ (Ragin, 1987: 27). Indeed, it is typical in the social sciences that outcome are produced by a combination of conditions intersecting with each other in time and space. In other words, outcomes are the product of ‘conjunctural causation’. Furthermore, the same outcome may occur in different cases as the result of different combinations of conditions; this is called ‘equafinality’ or ‘multiple conjunctural causation’ (Ragin, 1987: 27; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 8). Through its key tool, namely the ‘truth table’, QCA considers all combinations of conditions and indicates which of these produces or does not produce the outcome of interest. Moreover, the truth table reveals which condition is the superset (necessary condition) and which one is the subset (sufficient condition) of the outcome. Further examination of the sufficient conditions determines the INUS and SUIN conditions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 11). The INUS condition refers to a “single condition that is insufficient for producing the outcome on its own but which is a necessary part of a conjunction that, in turn, is unnecessary but sufficient for producing the outcome.” The SUIN condition refers to “a single condition, which is unnecessary part of a logical OR combination that, in turn, is insufficient, but necessary for the outcome” (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 328 and 333). As a result, solution formulae based on QCA establish a ‘specific connection’ between a condition (or a combination of conditions) and the outcome of interest. This is the superiority of QCA over large-*N* quantitative studies that establish a general connection between independent variables and a dependent variable (Rihoux, 2010: 724-725). Third QCA presents parsimonious solution formulae by utilizing a ‘logical minimization’ of the combinations of conditions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 9).[[21]](#footnote-21) In this respect, it differs from other set-theoretic approaches such as Mill’s method or typological theory. In short, QCA answers questions such as: Which condition (if any) is necessary for the outcome of interest? Which combinations of conditions are sufficient to produce the outcome of interest? Which combination works in which case if there is a multiple conjunctural causation? Moreover, in terms of the role of a single condition in combinations, it answers whether that condition is INUS or SUIN.

Of the two main variants of QCA – crisp-set, and fuzzy-set, this study uses the latter. Fuzzy-set QCA is particularly valuable for revealing quantitative differences between qualitatively identical conditions. Thus, fuzzy-set largely addresses the critique of crisp-set QCA that conditions must be coded as either totally present or absent (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 14). For example, while corruption is endemic to CEECs, some of the countries are less exposed to the problem than others. Fuzzy-set QCA has the capacity to capture the variation among the CEECs in terms of exposure to the problem.

Many studies across a wide range of disciplines have employed the qualitative comparative analysis research technique, including comparative studies of party systems (Ishiyama, and Batta, 2012), party mechanics (Dardanelli, 2012), gender representation within parties (Lilliefeldt, 2012), ethnic minority parties (Boschler, 2011 and 2012; Gherghina and Jiglau, 2011), green parties (Redding and Viterna, 1999; Rihoux, 2006), populist parties (Stjin van Kessel, forthcoming), anti-political establishment reform parties (Hanley and Sikk, forthcoming), and, finally, the radical right (Veugelers and Magnan, 2005; Sovak and Cisar, 2011).[[22]](#footnote-22) This study differs from others examining the electoral success of radical right parties in two ways. First, it includes factors whose impacts are under-researched, such as Europeanization, and party competition within the socio-cultural dimension. Second, this study focuses on CEE states, which scholars have largely overlooked in favour of West European countries.[[23]](#footnote-23)

1.5.1 Limits of the Study (1): The Disadvantageous of Employing QCA

Like all research techniques, QCA is far from perfect. The major problem is that the number of conditions that can be included depends on the number of cases included in the analysis. This study includes twenty parliamentary elections held in seven CEECs (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) from 2000 to 2010. Therefore, the ideal number of conditions is five, which would produce thirty-two rows in the truth table (25). If more than five conditions are included, the problem of logical remainders would unavoidably emerge.[[24]](#footnote-24) This study therefore has to make a trade off between two supply-side conditions: interaction between the right-wing mainstream party and the radical right on the issue of Europeanization, and electoral systems. Because an analysis of the impact of Europeanization is an important omission in the literature, and all CEECs included in the analysis implement a proportional representation system, albeit with differences in proportionality, this study opts to include Europeanization as the fifth conditions, along with the other three demand-side conditions and one external supply-side condition. Nonetheless, one of the robustness tests in chapter four will discuss whether the variation in the degree of the proportionality of electoral system is important enough that the electoral system affects the electoral success of radical right parties.

This decision could be challenged on the grounds that there is a strong correlation between party positions in the socio-cultural dimension of party politics and Europeanization (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2008); therefore, it could be argued that looking at one of the two is enough. Yet, this is not the case. This is discussed at greater length in the fourth chapter, but suffice it to say here that a right-wing mainstream party can be pro-EU membership, while at the same time taking an authoritarian position with respect to the socio-cultural dimension of party competition, or vice versa.

For the same methodological problem, internal supply-side conditions such as strong party leadership, party organization, and following an ideologically coherent party program are also excluded from the analysis. Their inclusion would add three more conditions to the existing ones, thereby producing two hundreds fifty-six rows in the truth table. With twenty cases at hand, this would lead to a serious problem of logical remainders. Even if all three internal supply-side conditions were coded under a single score, it would produce sixty-four rows in the truth table, which is substantially more than the number of cases.

1.5.2 Limits of the Study (2): Methodological Issues Related to Selected Condition and Outcome

The analysis includes Europeanization as a condition that is likely to affect radical right parties’ electoral performance. This study understands Europeanization as the EU’s impact on the socio-economic and socio-cultural policies of a country during the accession period. In other words, as Wallace (2000) puts it, Europeanization refers to the ‘EUization’ of CEECs.[[25]](#footnote-25) The accession periods should be divided into two main time-lines by nature of relations between EU and candidate country. During the first time-line, namely accession negotiation process, the nature of relations is asymmetrical in favor of the EU. This becomes symmetrical in second time-line, namely post-membership years, starting with ratification of EU Accession Treaty by both EU and the candidate country. This analysis has to include countries that fully experienced both time-lines over the first decade of the 21st century since the different nature of relations at different times may have different effects on the outcome of interest in different countries. As a result, not all twenty-seven countries that are referred by the term Central and East Europe are included in the analysis.

There are ten CEECs that became EU members during the first decade of the 21st century. These include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic Countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However, political parties have not been durable in the Baltic countries in the post-communist years and as a result they have been largely immune from ideological constraints on frequent change of position on dimensions of party competition.[[26]](#footnote-26) Indeed, this has been considered to partly explain why there have been no electorally strong radical right parties in the Baltic countries (Auers and Kasekamp, 2009). For this reason, testing the impact of the interaction between right-wing mainstream parties and radical right parties in the socio-cultural dimension is an onerous task in the Baltic countries. Their inclusion in the analysis would likely lead to bias in the solution formula; thus this study excludes the three Baltic countries.

This study looks for explanations for the electoral success of radical right parties operating in the party systems of selected CEE countries. In the 2001 Bulgarian parliamentary elections, no political party classified as radical right existed. The National Union of Attack (ATAKA), the main radical right party of the country, was established three months before the 2005 parliamentary election. As a result, the 2001 Bulgarian parliamentary election is not included in the analysis.

**1.6 Radical Right Parties in CEECs Included in the Analysis**

This study uses Mudde’s (2007) definition of the radical right. Accordingly, the parties are *radical* for their opposition to principles of liberal democracy related to pluralist societies and *right* for their beliefs in natural (cultural) inequalities among human beings. Reviewing studies on radical right parties, this study suggests an operational definition of radical right parties that includes four criteria related to cultural and foreign policies. These criteria are anti-multiculturalism, support for strong state authority and traditional society, scepticism about EU membership and opposition to an increase in the power of supranational institutions. Criteria related to economic policies are not included in the operational definition, since economic policies are of secondary importance to the parties. They do not have economic programs that present practical solutions to overcome economic problems. As mentioned above, the parties emphasize economic problems mostly in a populist manner. Hence, it makes no sense to establish criteria related to economic policies to detect radical right parties in CEECs.

This study utilizes the Chapel Hill Expert Survey Series (1998-2010) to decide which political parties fulfil the four criteria. The major problem with these surveys is that they include only those political parties that emerged from elections as parliamentary parties. As a result, this source is not helpful in selecting radical right parties in countries where the parties did not manage to win seats in the national parliaments. This study eliminates this problem by using the lists of radical right parties compiled in two comprehensive studies developing a pan European approach (Norris, 2005 and Mudde, 2007). Studies that discuss radical right parties in CEECs (either comparing radical right parties in different countries or focusing on an individual country) are also reviewed to double-check the said lists of radical right parties.

The selection of radical right parties is discussed in the second chapter at greater length. The parties included in this study include the Bulgarian National Union of Attack (in Bulgaria), the Republican Party (Czech Republic), the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, the Movement for a Better Hungary, the League of Polish Families, the Greater Romania Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Slovene National Party.

**1.7 Contribution to the Literature**

This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature on the electoral success of radical right parties in four ways. First, it focuses on Central and East European countries, which scholars have largely overlooked in favour of West European countries. Second, it includes ‘supply-side conditions’, to which existing studies on radical right parties in CEECs have paid less attention vis-à-vis ‘demand-side conditions.’ Third, this study includes the ‘Europeanization process in its analysis as a potential influence on the electoral performance of radical right parties, which may oppose Europeanization on ideological grounds. Fourth, this study uses a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, which is capable of detecting different combinations of the conditions leading to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE.

**1.8 Findings of the Analysis**

The analysis of necessary conditions for the electoral success of radical right parties in CEECs in national parliamentary elections held from 2000 to 2010 reveals that radical right parties following anti-European Union policies benefitted from the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party (*ephilm*). Among the five conditions, *ephilm* is the only condition that passes the required threshold for being labelled as a necessary condition. Nevertheless, *ephilm* was not omnipresent. That is to say, *ephilm* increased the electoral strength of radical right parties in some CEECs before EU accession and in others after EU accession. For example, the electoral success of the League of Polish Families in 2001 (before EU accession) was in part due to the *ephilm*, whereas *ephilm* was partly responsible for the electoral success of the Slovak National Party in 2006 (after the EU accession). Whether the country in question experienced a liberal or illiberal pattern of political change from communism to democracy appears to determine when the condition *ephilm* increased the electoral strength of radical right parties.[[27]](#footnote-27) Vachudova (2005: 37, 38) defines the illiberal pattern of political change in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania as follows: ‘The absence of a strong, organized opposition to communist rule in Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia created a vacuum at the moment of regime change that enabled non-opposition governments [in which anti-communist leaders were absent] to hold power. […] Unreconstructed communists (in Bulgaria and Romania) and opportunists (in Slovakia) won power by using the fear of economic reform and the defense of the nation to forge a new political identity and maintain their political viability. They exploited lack of competition in the political system to control information and to control the new institutions of the democratic state. Illiberal democracy took hold: the elections were mostly free and fair, but the ruling elites had little interest in fostering the institutions of a liberal democracy.’ In countries where an illiberal pattern of political change occurred, the EU’s active leverage (in the transition) was more discernible than in those where a liberal pattern occurred. In the former, the EU’s active leverage largely kept illiberal policies (typically followed by radical right parties) at bay, thereby adversely affecting radical right parties’ electoral performances. This argument is discussed further in chapters five and six, particularly in the context of the 2001 parliamentary election in Poland and the 2002 parliamentary election in Slovakia. [[28]](#footnote-28) This finding is consistent with studies suggesting that the electoral successes of radical right parties in West Europe are partly due to incremental Europeanization, which Eurosceptic voters adamantly oppose (Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2002; Beichelt, 2004; Marks, 2004; Neumayer, 2008; Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009). The criticisms of Europeanization voiced by the League of Polish Families and the Slovak National Party, discussed in chapters five and six, suggests that these radical right parties oppose Europeanization for reasons similar to those of their counterparts in West Europe. Their criticism primarily centres on incremental Europeanization, which requires increased sharing of national sovereignty and EU minority policies designed to promote multiculturalism.

The analysis of sufficient conditions for the electoral success of radical right parties in CEECs in national parliamentary elections that were held from 2000 to 2010 produced two different conjunctural causations (or configurations, or paths in QCA terminology). Which aspect (presence or absence) of each condition appears in the configurations largely depends on whether a country includes a large number of ethnic populations (*ethpop*). In other words, *ethpop* is the context setting condition (Ragin, 2008: 23). Although this finding might seem unsurprising given the fact that opposition to multiculturalism is the most distinctive feature of radical right parties, it is a striking to note that some radical right parties also achieved electoral success in countries without *ethpop*. This calls into question the commonplace notion in the literature on the radical right that the presence of *ethpop* is mainly responsible for the parties’ electoral success. This study concludes that supply side conditions determine electoral success of radical right parties in countries that do not have a large ethnic minority group. With regard to countries in which a large ethnic minority group is present, demand-side conditions are at least as important as supply-side conditions in determining the electoral success of radical right parties. Thus, it appears to be easier to stymie the electoral success of radical right parties in countries without *ethpop* than to do so in countries with *ethpop*. In the latter, ethpop appears to provide a latent electoral demand for radical right parties among nativist voters, as Mudde’s ‘pathological normalcy’ approach suggests. (2010)

In Poland and Slovenia (countries without *ethpop*) the League of Polish Families (LPR) in the 2001 election and the Slovene National Party (Slovene NS) in the 2008 election benefitted from the intersection between the absence of a righ- wing mainstream party following liberal socio-cultural policies (~*libm*) and the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party.[[29]](#footnote-29) The operation of this configuration is discussed in chapter five, the first part of which focuses on the electoral success of the LPR in 2001. In Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia (the countries with the condition *ethpop*), the National Union of Attack (ATAKA) in the 2005 election, the Movement for Better Hungary in the 2010 election (JOBBIK), the Greater Romania Party (PRM) in the 2000 election, and Slovak National Party (Slovak NS) in 2006 and 2010 election benefitted from the intersections of three conditions: the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party, the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following liberal socio-cultural policies, and the presence of high levels of unemployment. The operation of this configuration is discussed in chapter five, the second part of which focuses on the electoral success of the PRM in 2000, and in chapter six, which discusses the electoral performance of the Slovak NS in 2002 and 2006.[[30]](#footnote-30)

A surprising result is that a high level of perceived corruption (corr) by the public is not a component of paths leading to the electoral success of radical right parties. This finding is important, as it throws doubts on the suggestion that radical right parties are the product of public disenchantment with established political parties. According to this approach, corruption is the main source of public dissatisfaction with established political parties in CEECs; therefore, high levels of perceived corruption predispose voters to support radical right parties. This finding indirectly suggests that radical right parties in both CEE and West Europe should not be treated as mere products of public alienation with established political parties. They should be treated as political parties with specific (particularly cultural) policies embodying a nativist ideology, and their supporters should not immediately be categorized as ‘outsiders of the established political parties’. In fact, this finding confirms recent studies on West Europe concluding that most voters support radical right parties due to the proximity between the parties’ ideas and their own.

**1.9 Outlines of the Chapters**

Chapter two explains the terms that have been used in the literature to label the political parties in question, and it justifies this study’s decision to adopt the term ‘radical right’. Based on the results of the Chapel Hill expert surveys, the radical right parties operating in the countries under examination are determined based on the four different criteria. The chapter then provides examples of socio-cultural, economic, and foreign policies followed by radical right parties. Chapter three performs two main tasks. First, it reviews the studies that aim to account for the electoral success of radical right parties operating in either in West Europe or CEE. Second, it discusses which of the conditions should be included in the fuzzy-set QCA for the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE. Chapter four begins by explaining the thresholds for the transformation of the raw data scores for each condition into fuzzy-set membership scores (calibration). This is followed by the presentation of the results derived from both the test of necessary condition and the test of sufficiency condition. The following section thereafter interprets the findings. The chapter ends by conducting two robustness tests to understand the strength of the results reached in the main analysis. While doing so, the first robustness test also determines whether the variation in the degree of proportionality of electoral system is important enough that it affects the electoral performance of radical right parties in CEECs. Chapter five focuses on two ‘typical cases’, both selected to explain how the each configuration operated. Towards that aim, the chapter discusses the electoral success of the League of Polish Families in 2001 and that of the Greater Romania Party in 2000. The sixth chapter examines one typical case and one deviant case (a case in which the outcome does not occur despite the presence of a favourable configuration), not only to explain the way the configuration works in a typical case but also to discuss possible conditions that precludes a radical right party from achieving electoral success. Towards these aims, the chapter focuses on the electoral failure of the Slovak National Party in 2002 and the electoral success of the party in 2006. Finally, chapter seven concludes the study with a general discussion about the findings obtained primarily in the main analysis, and secondarily in the first robustness test, and by making suggestions about topics that should be the subjects of future research to develop the literature on radical right parties.

**Chapter Two – Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe**

**2.1 Defining the Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe**

2.1.1 Terms and Concepts

It is commonplace to argue that terminological chaos is the defining feature of the literature in the literature on the parties in question (Mudde, 2007: 11-12; Goodwin, 2009: 322). Indeed, a large number of terms have been used in the literature so far.[[31]](#footnote-31) Nevertheless, four terms are most common. These include anti-immigrant (Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Cutts, Fords, and Goodwin, 2011; Art, 2011), extreme right (Husbands, 1992; Anastasakis, 2000; Hainsworth, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Carter 2005; Harrison and Bruter, 2011), populist radical right (Liang, 2007; Mudde, 2007) and radical right (Ramet, 1999; Griffin, 2000; Givens, 2005**;** Norris, 2005; Kitschelt, 2007; Rydgren, 2013).

Fennema (1997: 475) presents ‘anti-immigrant’ as an umbrella term covering ‘protest parties’, ‘racist parties’ and ‘extreme right parties’, to which anti-immigrant policies are common. Elsewhere, the term denotes parties employing ‘the immigration issue as the core political concern in political campaigns or that are considered by the elites of other parties to do so’ (Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie, 2005: 538). Nativist understandings of the society that ultimately embody exclusionary discourses against the ‘others’ of that society rightfully render the parties anti-immigrant. Nevertheless, the use of this term appears unsuitable for the parties included in this study for two reasons. First, the term depicts the parties as single-issue parties focusing solely on the immigration problem. This depiction is wrong, as the parties’ programs contain a wider range of issues, particularly socio-cultural ones (Mudde, 1999: 190 and 193; Cole, 2005: 212-214). Second, as mentioned in chapter 1, the immigration problem is not so visible in CEECs that it can shape electoral preferences in elections, at least for the time being (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2009: 590). Hence, this study does not use the term ‘anti-immigrant’ to refer to the parties in question.

The term ‘extreme right’ has been more commonly used in the literature than the term “anti-immigrant” (Ignazi, 1992, 2003; Ignazi and Ysmal, 1992, Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Mudde, 2000; Anastasakis, 2002; Lubbers *et al.,* 2002; Bale, 2003; Golder, 2003; Carter, 2004; Mares, 2006; Bustikova, 2009; Goodwin, 2010). The term is particularly used to underline the parties’ association with interwar fascism.[[32]](#footnote-32) This association renders them racists, xenophobic, anti-communist, and anti-democratic. Such parties strongly endorse absolute state power over individuals. They even support the idea of using violence to achieve their aims (Ignazi, 1992: 10; Bellig, 1989: 147; Husbands, 1992: 268; Szayna, 1997: 113; Hainsworth, 2000: 9; Bustikova, 2009: 223). This study does not opt for this term for two reasons. First, the parties in question are not anti-democratic in essence (Minkenberg, 1997: 174; Karapin 1998: 218; Griffin, 2000: 173; Betz and Johnson, 2004: 312; Givens, 2005: 20; Kitschelt, 2007: 1178; Mudde, 2007: 156-157; Kitschelt and Bustikova, 2011: 148). Remember that the parties in question depict an ethnocratic regime in which the rights of citizens are determined according to ethnic affiliation (Butenschon, 1993: 4). In other words, they support a specific kind of democratic regime, that is, an electoral democracy in which minority rights and the rule of law are largely ignored (Collier and Levitsky, 1997: 439-441). For example, Pippidi (2007: 11) argues that the parties in question ‘may be more violent in their language […] than West European [ones, but] none of their programs features truly anti-democratic policies’[[33]](#footnote-33) Second, leaving aside the fact that the parties are not truly anti-democratic, not all parties included in this study are truly anti-communist. For example, in Romania and Bulgaria, they explicitly praise former communist regimes for their exclusionary policies targeting national minority groups in these countries. This point is mentioned again later in this chapter while discussing policies formulated by the parties in question.

The term ‘radical right’ is used in the literature as much as the term ‘extreme right’ (Karapin, 1998; Ramet, 1999; Griffin, 2000; Givens, 2005; Norris, 2005; Kitschelt, 2007; Rydgren, 2008).[[34]](#footnote-34) The main difference between the two terms is that the former does not describe the parties as anti-democratic. It essentially accentuates the parties’ exclusionary discourse against the ‘others’ of the society, driven by their nativist outlook. (Minkenberg, 2000: 174, Mudde, 2007: 26, Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2011: 147). The parties in question, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, favour an electoral democracy. The term radical denotes the parties’ opposition to pluralist principles of liberal democracy, which drives the parties to eschew minority rights and the rule of law. The term *right* accentuates the parties’ belief in the presence of natural inequality (particularly cultural) between ‘native’ people and the ‘others’ within the society.

The term ‘populist’ is also is also used in the literature along with ‘radical right’ (Mudde, 2007: 26; Betz, 1993: 413; Rydgren, 2002: 29).[[35]](#footnote-35) Mudde (2004: 544) defines populism as ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the pure people versus corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be the expression of the general will.’ Likewise, Canovan (1999: 3) defines populism ‘as an appeal to “the people” against both the established structure of power, and the dominant ideas and values of the society.’ By using the term populism, then, these scholars highlight the anti-political establishment feature of the radical right. The previous chapter stated that the parties in question emphasize economic issues in a populist manner. What Betz (1993: 418) argues for radical right parties in West Europe, namely that economic issues are good political weapons for attacking the established political parties, is also valid for radical right parties in CEECs. This is particularly explicit in the parties’ discourses concerning the problem of corruption. However, remember that economic issues are of secondary importance to the parties in question. As a result, this study prefers not to use a term that primarily denotes the parties’ behaviour based on issues that are of secondary importance to them.

There are two other reasons this study does not use the term ‘populist’. First, the criterion of ‘governing potential’ is mostly used to decide whether a party is anti political establishment (or populist) (Abedi, 2004: 12 and Mudde, 2007: 49). For example, Abedi (2004: 11) suggests that anti-political establishment parties are not potential participants in government or do not have actual ‘government relevance’ in the party systems. Some of the radical right parties included in this study, however, were parts of coalition governments during the period from 2000 to 2010. For instance, the League of Polish Families and the Slovak National Party emerged as minor coalition partners in the 2005 Polish parliamentary elections and the 2006 Slovak parliamentary election. Though not a part of the coalition, Bulgarian ATAKA emerged as a supporting party from the 2009 Bulgarian parliamentary election, which allowed Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) to form a single-party government.

The second reason this study does not opt to use the term ‘populism’ along with ‘radical right’ is that populism became *Zeitgeist* in European politics starting in the 1990s (Mudde, 2007: 49).[[36]](#footnote-36) If populism is the *Zeitgeist*, can we apply this adjective only to radical right parties? Other political parties may also embrace populist discourse (Minkenberg, 2000: 173; Deegan-Krause and Haughton, 2009: 822).[[37]](#footnote-37) For example, radical right parties in CEECs adopt a populist discourse on the problem of corruption. Mostly they describe themselves as the real representatives of the people against corrupted politicians who only care about their own private gains. Yet, such a discourse is not confined to radical right parties. Many political parties, especially newly founded ones, make similar claims. This study, then, prefers to use terms that apply directly to the core of ideology belonging to radical right parties only. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, this study suggests that ‘radical right’ - referring to a belief in the existence of natural inequalities among human beings (right) and an opposition to pluralist principles (radical) – is the most parsimonious and appropriate term to signify the core features of the parties in question.

2.1.2 Operational Definition of Radical Right

Remember that nativism forms the core of radical right ideology and serves to guide radical right parties in the formulation of policies on social life, the economy and foreign relations. The parties envisage a culturally and ethnically homogenous society, in which people have to conform to established moral norms, and personal freedoms are subordinated to traditions (Koch, 1991: 31). Economically, though some scholars argue that radical right parties follow left-leaning policies (Markowski, 2002: 28; Mudde, 2007: 133, Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 18), the parties’ so-called ‘economic promises’ do not go beyond an imagination of an autarkic system. In terms of foreign policy, the parties simply and repeatedly assert that they are the only parties acting in the national interest. They voice a deep scepticism about international politics on the grounds that this is the tool of (the so-called) big powers or lobby groups, who allegedly act against the interests of ordinary citizens.

2.1.2.1 Criteria for Identifying Radical Right Parties

The operational definition of radical right sets four criteria to identify radical right parties in CEECs. These criteria are 1) anti-multiculturalism, 2) support for strong state authority and a traditional society, 3) scepticism about EU membership, and 4) opposition to an increase in the power of supranational institution over nation-states. The operational definition does not set a criterion concerning economic policies, as these are of secondary importance to radical right parties. Instead, cultural policies, whose central aim is ‘internal homogenization’ of the society (Koch, 1991), are of primary interest to radical right parties (also see: Minkenberg, 2000; Mudde, 2007; Kitschelt, 2007).[[38]](#footnote-38) Therefore, though four criteria have been established to identify radical right parties in CEECs, this study attaches more importance to the first of the four criteria, anti-multiculturalism.

**2.2 Parties and Policies**

2.2.1 Data on the Criteria for Identifying Radical Right Parties in CEECs

Deciding which political parties in CEECs should be included in the set of radical right parties is a task that should be double-checked through various sources. There are two main reasons for this. First, the Chapel Hill expert survey series (like other datasets such as the Comparative Manifesto Projects) exclude political parties receiving an insignificant percentage of votes in the elections (i.e. extra-parliamentary parties). In order not to miss extra-parliamentary radical right parties, existing studies and reports in the literature should be used as supplementary sources.

Second, some political parties in CEECs that embrace nationalist policies should not be considered radical right (e.g. Minkenberg, 2002: 344, Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004: 14; Dakowska, 2010: 60; Vermeersch, 2013: 143). In addition to conservative right wing parties, those presenting themselves as ‘social democrats’ in contemporary politics (such as the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party in Romania) adopted red-brown policies particularly throughout the 1990s (see: Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009: 199-201, Shafir, 2000: 249; Ishiyama, 2010: 63).[[39]](#footnote-39) Therefore, the positions of borderline parties related to particular criteria should be compared to those of radical right parties. This comparison should zero in on the positions of radical right parties and borderline parties on the issue of ‘multiculturalism’, as strong opposition to multiculturalism is the feature distinguishing the former from the latter.

To decide which political parties belong to the set of radical right parties in CEE, this study primarily utilizes Chapel Hill expert surveys (CHES) (Hooghe et al. 2010; Bakker et al, 2012). The first CHES was carried out in 1999, with subsequent waves in 2002, 2006, and 2010. The countries of interest in this study have been included in the surveys since 2002. The experts participating in the surveys estimate party positioning separately for the socio-cultural dimension, the socio-economic dimension, and on the issue of European integration. This separation is particularly helpful in distinguishing those political parties fulfilling the criteria mentioned in the operational definition of the radical right. For two reasons, this study does not utilize the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which carries out quantitative content analyses of party programs to underline the extent to which a political party gives a specific issue importance. First, radical right parties are minor parties whose party programs are not always available for scholars. This is a major methodological problem for studies examining the electoral success of minor parties over a specific time period. A minor party can be electorally successful in the early years of a study period and therefore be included in the project; however, it may not repeat its success in subsequent elections and therefore be excluded from the project. Thus, the project is not capable of indicating possible changes in the party’s position over time. Second and more importantly, there is generally some inconsistency between what parties say and what parties do. The project, while useful in understanding the former, does not indicate whether a party really follows its stated program. By contrast, the expert surveys (including country experts on party politics) are capable of spotting such inconsistencies (Ray, 1999: 284-285). Where radical right parties are excluded from expert surveys for receiving a negligible amount of votes (e.g. in the Czech Republic starting with 2002 election), this study utilizes existing studies – mostly single case studies on radical right parties in CEECs.

2.2.1.1 Identifying Radical Right Parties in CEE states

The Chapel Hill survey question relevant to the issue of multiculturalism asks country experts whether a political party ‘strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities’ (Questionnaire, 2006: 14). A score of zero represents political parties strongly favouring multiculturalism, whereas a score of ten represents those strongly opposing multiculturalism (favouring assimilation). The survey question pertinent to party positioning on ‘pro-strong state authority and traditional society’ explains that ‘“Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties […] value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues’ (Questionnaire, 2006: 6). Parties are located on a ten-point scale where zero represents the most libertarian position and ten represents the most authoritarian position. Two more questions from the questionnaire have been selected to grasp party positioning on criteria related to foreign policy. The first question is framed as follows: ‘How would you describe general position on European integration party leadership took […]?’ (Questionnaire, 2006:2). The second question asks about the ‘position of the party leadership […] on the powers of the European parliament’ (Questionnaire, 2006: 3). Here, the experts are asked to place political parties on a scale ranging from one to seven in which one represents the strongest oppositions to EU membership and an increase in the power of the European Parliament.

**Table 2.1** Party Positioning on Criteria for Identifying Radical Right Parties in CEECs

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Oppo.to Multi. Cult** | **GAL/TAN** | **Oppo.to EU integ.** | **Oppo.to EP’s pow.** |
| **Ideal Position:** | **8 - 10** | 8.5 - 10 | 1 - 3.5 | 1 - 3.5 |
| **ATAKA** | **8.17** | 9.17 | 2.46 | 3.22 |
| **LPR** | **9** | 10 | 1.38 | 1.6 |
| **JOBBIK\*** | **9** | 8.8 | 2.3 | 2.5 |
| **PRM** | **9.75** | 9.5 | **4.2** | **4.11** |
| **SNS (Slovakia)** | **9.83** | 8.64 | 3.23 | 3 |
| **SNS (Slovenia)** | **9** | **6.8** | 2.6 | 2.6 |

**Source:** The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2006)

\*The data on JOBBIK was derived from the 2010 Survey.

ATAKA: National Union of Attack; LPR: League of Polish Families; JOBBIK: The Movement for Better Hungary; PRM: Greater Romania Party; SNS: Slovak National Party; SNS: Slovene National Party

Table 2.1 shows the CHES data on the positions of those political parties that have been described as radical right parties in CEECs by existing studies in the literature, based on the four criteria. Based on the data given in the table, all parties are strongly opposed a multicultural society. This confirms that anti-multiculturalism is the distinctive feature of radical right parties, thereby rationalizing the priority given to the criterion of ‘anti-multiculturalism’ over the other three criteria. The comparison of radical right parties’ positions with those of borderline parties on this issue (in table 2.2) further confirms this decision. With the exception of the Slovene National Party, all radical right parties closely positioned themselves on the authoritarian side of the socio-cultural dimension of party competition. With the exception of the Greater Romania Party, all parties are placed somewhere between 0 and 3.5, which is the Eurosceptic side of the scale. The irregular position of the PRM invokes Kopecky and Mudde’s (2002: 303) ‘Euro-pragmatist’ category (see: fn. 20), referring to political parties that are opposed to EU integration ideologically, but resort to supporting it as an electoral strategy. Indeed, levels of public support for EU membership in Romania were higher than in the other six CEECs during the accession negotiation years. Yet, it is important to note that both the Slovene National Party and the Greater Romania Party fulfil the primary criterion, namely opposition to multiculturalism.

The Chapel Hill expert survey poses one methodological difficulty, in that it includes only political parties that manage to exceed the electoral threshold. In other words, it excludes parties that are electorally unsuccessful. This study detects such parties by examining existing studies on the radical right in CEE (Norris, 2005: 54-57 and Mudde, 2007: 305-308; Kreidl and Valuchova, 1999; Shafir, 2000; Minkenberg, 2002; Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2009; Halasz, 2009; Hanley 2012).[[40]](#footnote-40) The review of these studies necessitates the inclusion of the Republican Party in the Czech Republic and the Justice and Life Party in Hungary (MIEP) in the present study. The similarity between the policies of these two parties with those of the parties included in the CHES in different spheres of party competition is to be shown in the following pages concerning the parties’ policies.

Thus, this study makes a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis of the electoral success of eight political parties in seven CEECs. These parties are: the National Union of Attack (Bulgaria), the Republican Party (SPR-RSC) (Czech Republic), the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), the Movement for a Better Hungary (JOBBIK), the League of Polish Families (LPR), the Greater Romania Party (PRM), the Slovak National Party (SNS), and the Slovene National Party.

2.2.1.1.1 Borderline Parties

There are some borderline parties whose positions on the given criteria should be compared to those of radical right parties. Broadly speaking, three groups of political parties can be considered as borderline parties in terms of this study. The first group includes conservative right-wing parties taking traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist positions in the socio-cultural dimension of party competition (the Law and Justice Party in Poland, the Christian Democratic Union in Slovakia and the New Slovenia Party). The second group includes parties following left-leaning (and populist) economic policies. Among the countries of interest, this group solely includes a Polish party, Self Defense.[[41]](#footnote-41) The third group includes communist parties. Consideration of parties in this third group as borderline parties may come as surprise; yet some studies underlines similarities between radical right parties and (former) communist parties in CEE for conflating nationalist statements with left-leaning economic policies. Indeed, radical right parties in Bulgaria and Romania largely the filled the gap that resulted from the former communist parties’ transformation into social democratic parties (Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009). Indeed, Ishiyama (2010) shows that one-time supporters of former communist parties make up a large share of today’s supporters of the radical right. Based on this argument, this study considers Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, and the Communist Party of Slovakia as borderline parties. As mentioned before, the comparison should be based on the parties’ positions on the issue of multiculturalism, strong opposition to which is the most distinctive feature of radical right.

**Table 2.2** Comparison of Radical Right and Borderline Parties

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Oppo.to Multi. Cult** | **GAL/TAN** | **Oppo.to EU integ.** | **Oppo.to EP’s pow.** |
| **Ideal Position:** | **8 < 10** | 8.5 < 10 | 1 < 3.5 | 1 < 3.5 |
| **ATAKA** | **8.17** | 9.17 | 2.46 | 3.22 |
| **LPR** | **9** | 10 | 1.38 | 1.6 |
| **JOBBIK\*** | **9** | 8.8 | 2.3 | 2.5 |
| **PRM** | **9.75** | 9.5 | **4.2** | **4.11** |
| **SNS (Slovakia)** | **9.83** | 8.64 | 3.23 | 3 |
| **SNS (Slovenia)** | **9** | 6.8 | 2.6 | 2.6 |
| **PiS** | 7 | 9.57 | 3.5 | 2.8 |
| **KDH** | 6 | 8.79 | 3.86 | 3.33 |
| **NSi** | 5.4 | 8.8 | 6.25 | 6 |
| **Samoobrana** | 5.75 | 7.71 | 2.29 | 2.5 |
| **KSCM** | 5 | 7.67 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
| **KSS** | 5.3 | 5.69 | 2.62 | 3 |

**Source:** The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2006)

\*The data on JOBBIK was derived from the 2010 Survey.

ATAKA: National Union of Attack; LPR: League of Polish Families; JOBBIK: The Movement for Better Hungary; PRM: Greater Romania Party; SNS: Slovak National Party; SNS: Slovene National Party; PiS: Law and Justice Party; KDH: Christian Democratic Movement; NSi: New Slovenia Party; Samoobrana: Self-Defense; KSCM: Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; KSS: Communist Party of Slovakia

Table 2.2 shows that radical right parties clearly differ from borderline parties for their opposition to multiculturalism. They are located to the farthest right point in the party systems of each country. Like radical right parties, conservative right-wing parties place themselves on the authoritarian side of the socio-cultural dimension of party competition, yet they are less opposed to multicultural society. The Eurosceptic position of the communist parties (KSCM or KSS) highlights their similarity with radical right parties, but their opposition to multicultural society is considerably weaker than that of radical right parties. It should also be noted that the primary source of communist parties’ opposition to the European Union is economic rather than cultural (Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009: 188). This result is also valid for Self Defence in Poland, which is defined as a national social populist left-wing party (March, 2011: 143). In addition, the Communist parties, and the ‘left-wing populist party’ Self Defence are less opposed to a multicultural society than the radical right parties are.

2.2.2 Party Policies

Radical right policies include distinctive content related to the abovementioned criteria, particularly ‘opposition to multiculturalism’, that must be explored qualitatively. The following sections provide examples of typical cultural, economic, and foreign policies formulated by radical right parties in CEE states. Similarly, a qualitative assessment of the Chapel Hill expert coding is made.

2.2 2.1 Cultural Policies: Anti-Multiculturalism

Radical right parties believe that minority groups should be inhibited from exercising cultural rights. The demands to prohibit the use of minority languages in education and the media is a typical example. This is especially relevant in countries where a larger minority population resides (other than Roma people), such as Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania. Romaphobia, however, is prevalent across all CEECs. Radical right parties in CEECs hold a derogatory view of the Roma population spreading across Central and Eastern Europe. They regard the Roma people as fully responsible for crime and economically ‘undesirable’. This discourse is so widespread and distinct among radical right parties that it deserves a separate section.

2.2.2.1.1 Romaphobia

Along with opposition to the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, anti-Roma rhetoric occupied a prominent place in the policies of the Republican Party in the Czech Republic. The party regarded the Roma people as ‘criminal’ and ‘lazy’, and formulated a proposal to strengthen security forces in order to impose ‘discipline’ over the Roma people (Hockenos, 1993: 228).[[42]](#footnote-42) The Slovak National Party also believed the Roma community to be responsible for crime, and describing them as a ‘pollutant’. The solutions the party suggests to the ‘Roma problem’ include a ‘big whip and a small yard’ and a social isolation (Szayna, 1997: 126 and 129, 130; Vermeersch, 2006: 98; Mudde, 2007: 87). Indeed, the party used the following slogan in the 1998 election: “Let’s vote for a Slovakia without parasites” (Mudde, 2007: 88).

In Hungary, where the Roma people is comprise around 8 per cent of the population, radical right parties have deeply engaged in Romaphobic activities. The paramilitary organization of JOBBIK, the Hungarian Guard, was established in July 2007 with the specific aim of eliminating what they call ‘Gypsy Crime’ (LeBor, 2008: 34). The organization has frequently launched local campaigns, particularly in rural areas, which have turned to violence on several occasions (Halasz, 2009: 492).[[43]](#footnote-43) The party publicly announced crimes allegedly committed by the Roma people on a website, now defunct (LeBor, 2008: 35).[[44]](#footnote-44) To a lesser degree, MIEP also used Romaphobic rhetoric. The party, for example, complained about the high fertility rate among the Roma population, which it claimed, would seriously endanger Hungarian purity. (Vermeersch, 2006: 98; Docekalova, 2007: 13; Mudde, 2007: 87; Halasz, 2009: 492). The Slovenian National Party has also bitterly expressed its hatred towards the Roma population (‘You Gypsies are not a minority’) and criticized the constitutional article granting the Roma population the status of national minority (Trplan, 2005: 246). Bulgarian ATAKA and the Greater Romania Party also drew a direct link between the Roma people and crime. Once Volen Siderov, the leader of ATAKA, claimed that the ‘Bulgarian people were the subject of Gypsy terror’ (Kanev, 2006: 3). Likewise, Vadim Tudor, the leader of the Greater Romania Party (PRM), said that ‘Roma people were criminals attacking innocent people, and [that] they did not rape their own children and parents since they were busy with raping ours’. The PRM is another radical right party suggesting the resettlement of the Roma population. The party issued a manifesto in 1998 saying: ‘the Gypsies who will not go to work […] will be sent to work camps’ (Andreescu, 2005: 188).

2.2.2.1.2 Radical Right Policies on Other Minority Groups

The CEECs of interest in this study can be divided into two groups in terms of the size of their minority populations. The first group consists of countries with a small minority population (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia). In these countries radical right parties aim to evoke patriotic feelings against ‘historical enemies’. For example, the Republican Party strongly opposed the conclusion of a reconciliation agreement with Germany in 1997 through which the Czech Republic issued an official apology for deporting Sudeten Germans in the aftermath of the WWII. Sladek, the Republican leader, publicly accused the government of acting in Jewish, Polish and German interests and voted against the agreement (Szayna, 1997: 126; Fawn, 2000: 144 and Cakl and Wollman, 2005: 32). Sladek went so far as to wish that the Czechs had killed more Germans war (Szayna, 1997: 144; Hanley, 2012: 71).

Although not significantly affecting the electorate’s preference (Ost, 1999), anti-Semitic discourse has also been widespread among radical right parties. For example, anti-Semitism played a central role for the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) (Szayna, 1997: 138; Minkenberg, 2002: 352). Inspired by the interwar *nepi urok* (folk writer movement), MIEP perceived the supposedly cosmopolitan lives of the Jews as a threat to Hungarian purity (Hockenos, 1993: 114). Another anti-Semitic and anti-German party was the League of Polish Families. A prominent figure in the party, Zygmunt Wrzodak, for example, accused liberal politicians of believing in ‘Judeo-communism’ (McManus et al., 2003: 3). Finally, it should be noted that the approach radical right parties have adopted for the problem of immigration, where it is an issue, is similar to that developed by their Western counterparts. Though electorally insignificant, the problem of immigration surfaced in the Czech Republic and Slovenia in the early 1990s. The Czech Republicans recommended that Cuban and Vietnamese workers be deported (Hockenos, 1993: 224, 225; Szayna, 1997: 126). Likewise, the Slovene National Party promised to permanently expel immigrant workers who had come to Slovenia from other Yugoslav Republics in the 1960s and 70s (Balkovec, 1993: 190; Ramet, 1993: 882; Trplan, 2005: 245).

The second group comprises the countries with larger minority groups. These countries are Bulgaria, where a Turkish minority comprises around 10 per cent of the population, Slovakia where a Hungarian minority comprises around 9 per cent, and Romania where a Hungarian minority population comprises around 8.6 per cent. ATAKA has strongly opposed the use of any language other than Bulgarian in the state media (ATAKA, Art.2). This opposition specifically applies to the Turkish language. Moreover, the party has strongly advocated banning *Movements for Rights and Freedom* (DPS), the electoral support for which comes from the Turkish minority, and expelling Ahmed Dogan, the then leader of the DPS from the country (Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009: 8, 9). Similarly, the Greater Romania Party has suggested that the Democratic Union of Hungarians must be banned.[[45]](#footnote-45) The Slovak National Party (SNS) has identified the Hungarian minority (as well as the Roma people) as its target, particularly after Slovak independence in 1993 (Cibulka, 1999: 118; Vermeersch, 2006: 98).[[46]](#footnote-46) The SNS perceived the Hungarian minority as a ‘fifth column’, and suggested, like its counterpart in Romania, banning Hungarians’ political activity in Slovakia (Wolchik, 1997: 230; Mudde, 2007: 149). The SNS was an adamant opponent of proposals drafted in the late 1990s concerning the administrative autonomy of regions densely populated by the Hungarian minority (Cibulka, 1999: 118) on the grounds that regional autonomy would be a step towards Hungarian unification (Szayna, 1997: 129, 130; Ishiyama, and Breuning, 1998: 55; Vermeersch, 2006: 91). The presence of the Party of the Hungarian Coalition in Dzurinda’s coalition governments from 1998 to 2006 was utterly unacceptable to the SNS. The party came up with the slogan ‘Replace non-Slovak elements with real Slovaks’ in the 2006 election (Rybar, 2007: 701). As a coalition partner after the 2006 election, the SNS also drafted an amendment protecting the Slovak language in official communication and prohibiting the use of the Hungarian language in naming the geographical places (Malova and Ucen, 2010: 1161). Like its counterparts in the Czech Republic, the SNS strongly opposed the Hungarian minority’s demand for compensation or an official apology for the Benes Decrees, which removed Sudeten Germans and some Hungarians from Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of the WWII.

2.2.2.1.3 Support for National Culture and Traditional Society

Radical right parties attach heavy importance to national culture and family tradition. *Our Lady Czestochowa,* the symbol of Polish unificationand *Endecja*, Dmowski’s interwar nationalist movement*,* played prominent roles in shaping the LPR program (de Lange and Guerra, 2009, p: 529).[[47]](#footnote-47) Dmoswki’s political pamphlet, *The Church, the Nation, and the State*, which argued that Catholicism and Polish nationalism were inseparable, is the inspiration behind the party’s view on nationalism (de Lange and Guerra, 2009: 529-531). According to the party, sustainable economic growth could only be achieved thanks to Polish culture, whose main source is Catholicism (WYBORY, 2005: 67). In Hungary, MIEP similarly sought to invoke the spirit of Saint Stephen, the first king of Hungary in 11 A.D, which would allegedly help in solving any social and economic problems (MIEP Program). The *Nepi irok* (Folk Writer Movement) emerging in the 1930s in reaction to the Treaty of Trianon (a peace agreement signed in 1920 that left some of the Hungarian population outside the new borders) and praising peasant culture profoundly influenced MIEP’s thinking. Inspiration coming from *Nepi Urok*, for example, shaped Csurska’s ‘Hungarian Road’ movement challenging communism, liberalism and cosmopolitanism (Hockenos, 1993: 128; Bugajski, 1995: 412; Mudde, 2000: 22-23). Likewise, JOBBIK makes references to Saint Stephen in the party program (JOBBIK, 2010: 22), and Gabor Vona, the leader of the party, is a proud member of a generation of intellectuals with a peasant background (LeBor, 2008: 35). The Slovene National Party makes reference to the *Revolutionary Organization of Julian March* (T.I.G.R) established in 1927 (SNS Program, 2008), and Zmago Jelincic, the leader of the party, was full of admiration for Partisans and Tito.[[48]](#footnote-48) The Slovak National Party claims to be the successor to historical Slovak National Party, which fought for independence against the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 19th century (SNS Program, 2006). The SNS makes explicit references to the Slovak People’s Party and leading nationalist figures from the interwar years Andrej Hlinka and Josef Tiso. In 1997, the party commemorated the 50th anniversary of Tiso’s death, and deemed him to be ‘the martyr protecting his nation and Christianity against Bolshevism and liberalism’ (Mudde, 2000: 12, 13 Milo, 2005: 213; Mudde, 2007: 46). When it was in coalition (2006-2010), the SNS contributed to introducing the ‘Patriotism Act’, requiring the presence of the national emblem, the flag, and the preamble to Slovak Constitution in each classroom (Malova and Ucen, 2010: 1161). The Greater Romania Party makes reference to all nationalist figures from Codreanu (the leader of the Iron Guard) to Ceausescu (Minkenberg, 2002: 348). Moreover, the PRM considers ex communist leader Ceausescu as a national hero who saved Romania from the secret plans executed by Jews and Hungarians (Shafir, 1999: 214).[[49]](#footnote-49) The PRM also undertook campaigns to promote peasant culture and religion (Cinpoes, 2010: 91).

The radical right attaches greater importance to family traditions and preaches intolerance and hate towards people embracing alternative lifestyles. Radical right parties have adopted policies aiming at instilling ‘moral values’ to the next generation and supporting multi-child families. They are strongly opposed to gay and lesbian relationships (e.g. JOBBIK Program, 2010; SNS Program, 2006 Program). Once, MIEP asked its candidates to sign a document stating that they were not alcoholics, drug addicts, or homosexuals (Bernarth, et al. 2005: 82). *All Polish Youth* (linked to the LPR) organized what they called a ‘tradition march’ against ‘gay pride’ in April 2006. Those taking part in the ‘tradition march’ threw eggs and stones at people taking part in the ‘pride march’. Furthermore, those in the former bore banners saying ‘Stop Deviation’ and chanted slogans saying, ‘Lesbian and gays, all of Poland is laughing at you.’[[50]](#footnote-50) Radical right parties even seek to impose severe punishment, including the death penalty, to preserve public order and national culture (MIEP Program, and Hockenos, 1993: 225, 226; Hanley, 2012: 70).

2.2.2.2 Economic Policies

Betz (1993: 418) suggests that radical right parties in Western Europe consider economic issues a ‘political weapon’ against the establishment. This is completely convincing in terms of the radical right in CEECs. The parties do not have a viable economic program that aims at ameliorating economic problems. Instead, they emphasize economic problems in a populist manner. They accuse the establishment of being ‘self-seeking actors’ and ‘collaborators with foreigners’, and repeatedly make corruption allegations, particularly concerning the privatization agreements signed during the transition period. By doing so, they seek to create a distinctive perception in the electorate’s mind that they are the parties fighting the corruption problem; but they do little more than that. Nevertheless, inspired by nativism, the parties strongly support an autarkic economic system.

The Czech Republican Party claimed that the establishment was interested in enriching themselves and foreign entrepreneurs through privatization at the expense of ordinary citizens (Hanley, 2012: 75, 76). The MIEP holds the political establishment following foreign-oriented policies responsible for the problems of corruption (MIEP program). The League of Polish Families (LPR) claimed that the shock therapy’s chief purpose was to dissolve Poland within a cosmopolitan Europe (LPR program). The party supported a generous welfare state and promised to increase subsidies for small and family run companies (Szczerbiak, 2003: 732). In addition, the party attached great importance to the agricultural sector and promised to improve it in such a way that large scale production by local entrepreneurs could meet all national demand (Mudde, 2007: 127-128). JOBBIK promised that it would be the workers, not capital, which would play a central role in production (Halasz, 2009: 493). Bulgaria’s ATAKA launched an anti-corruption campaign calling for ‘clean hands in politics’ (Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009: 8, 9; Kanev, 2006: 3). The Greater Romania Party (PRM) launched a similar campaign, and its leader Vadim Tudor ‘considers himself to be Vlad the Impaler’ while fighting corruption (Cinpoes, 2010: 105). JOBBIK opposes privatization, particularly of sectors with strategic importance, and has suggested that all existing privatization contracts should be reviewed (JOBBIK, 2010: 4). ATAKA also makes the same commitment (ATAKA, 2005).

Radical right parties resist foreign influence on national economies (Zaslove, 2004: 70). ATAKA suggested that ‘Bulgarian production, commerce, and the banking system should be in the Bulgaria’s hands’ (ATAKA, 2005). In Poland the LPR blamed the problem of unemployment on foreign investment and capital in the country (Szczerbiak, 2003: 732) and promised policies to protect the national economy from the destabilizing effects of global competition (LPR program). Likewise, JOBBIK blames the widening gap between rich and poor on economic globalization (JOBBIK, 2010). MIEP regards globalization as a mask hiding neo-liberal colonizers’ alleged attempts to thwart the development of national consciousness (MIEP Program). The party also opposes the sale of property to foreigners, and used the slogan ‘Hungarians lands must be kept in Hungarian hands’ (Beichelt, 2004: 39; Mudde, 2007: 128). The party supported a self-sufficient economy. Its founder Istvan Csurka argued, ‘We need our own project, own road constructions, own education, and own army. For that we need money that is ours and does not come from loans […] money that serves Hungarian purposes and comes from Hungarian work” (quoted in Mudde, 2007: 126). Similarly, SNS (Slovakia) has claimed that economic globalization is a tool for barons to control the world economy (Mudde, 2007: 188) and the party is against foreign investments particularly those by Hungarians (Szayna, 1997: 135, Cibulka, 1999: 119). The Greater Romania Party (PRM) has also suggested that foreign investment could endanger the national interest, and must therefore be brought under close control (Cinpoes, 2010: 91).

2.2.2.3 Foreign Policies

Radical right parties attach great importance to the national interest and seek to provide the electorate with the impression that they are the only parties acting in the national interest. The policies framed by radical right parties on membership in the EU and NATO serve as a litmus test of the parties’ views on international relations. In addition, some radical right parties in CEECs advance irredentist claims resulting from historical legacies.

2.2.2.3.1 Radical Right Policy on the European Union

Opposition to the Europeanization process, which CEECs have experienced particularly since the late 1990s, has been a characteristic feature of the radical right parties.[[51]](#footnote-51) The position that the League of Polish Families adopted on European Union could be taken as a typical example of the radical right’s opposition to the EU (de Lange and Guerra, 2009: 535). In fact, the party can be clearly distinguished from other right-wing parties by its fierce opposition to the Polish membership in the EU (Dakowska, 2010: 60). The party took this position primarily on the grounds that EU membership lets Brussels rule Poland and that EU laws do not reflect Christian values. The party argued that EU membership meant recognizing rights to same-sex relationships and abortion and legalizing euthanasia and human cloning. All of these, so the argument went, would eventually destroy family traditions and Christian values. The party argued that it would never compromise these for the sake of EU membership (LPR party program, 2003). Cultural factors occupied a prominent role in the party’s opposition to the EU (Jasiewicz, 2008: 7; de Lange, and Guerra, 2009: 537), although the party also claimed that EU membership would destroy Polish agriculture (Beichelt, 2004: 39). In line with expectations, the party voted against EU membership in a referendum held in 2003. The Republican Party in the Czech Republic claimed that EU membership would eventually bring the Czech Republic under German domination (Szayna, 1997: 127). The Slovene National Party was initially opposed to membership in the EU. The party voted against all constitutional amendments related to the accession process and refused to sign the documents confirming the country’s will to become a full member (Krasovec et al, 2006 173 and 176). However, the party took a rather moderate position after the country’s admission to the EU (Krasovec et al, 2006: 186). It explained that the shift was necessary to get on with the task of protecting national interests within the EU (SNS Program, 2006). The Hungarian Justice and Life Party’s anti-Semitic attitudes considerably influenced its view on economic integration in the EU. Istvan Csurka claimed that European economic integration was aimed at ensuring Jewish domination over the world economy (Beichelt, 2004: 39; Bernath, et al, 2005: 83). The party saw the integration as the second Treaty of Trianon. Zoltan Balczo, the party’s vice-president, accused those supporting integration of betraying Hungary (Neumayer, 2008: 147). In spite of this, the fact that the radical right in Hungary supported membership in the EU accession referendum is an apparent inconsistency. This can, however, be explained by the opportunity the EU membership provided to cement the relationship with Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 310). In fact, JOBBIK’s program (2010: 21) says that JOBBIK rejects the ‘concept of a Europe of the Nations,’ [but uses] the European Union’s […] regional policy as a tool to achieve economic and cultural unity between the Republic and Hungarians beyond the border’. The Slovak National Party did not voice opposition to European integration when it was a member in the coalition government (1994-1998) (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 314). Similarly, the party supported the legislation on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 when it was in a coalition government with the centre-left party Smer. Nevertheless, the party is ideologically opposed to political integration and suggested that the EU should remain as a union of sovereign nation states (Almeida, 2012: 140). The party’s spokesman, Rafael Rafaj, explained the party’s view on Slovak membership in the EU: ‘The SNS was [not] against the country’s accession to the [EU] since the EU has contributed to the staggering growth of Slovakia. The SNS opposes specific EU minority protection policies and what is viewed as infringements in Slovak national sovereignty, but not the EU as a concept’ (quoted in Bustikova, 2009: 229).

On the issue of EU membership, the Greater Romania Party holds a similar position to that of the Slovak National Party. Along with other parties in the country, the PRM signed the Snagov Declaration in 1993 that was the first step in applying for EU membership. The party also voted for the legislation concerning the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. Yet, the party had voted against the road map to the European Union Constitution in the European parliament in 2007 (Almeida, 2012: 140). The party set for itself the task of vociferously protecting Romanian national interests within the EU (Beichelt, 2004: 40). It has also been argued that the PRM reluctantly supported the EU membership with the aim of protecting Romania against Russian influence (Cinpoes, 2010: 104). ATAKA was established in 2005 when Bulgaria had largely completed the EU accession process.[[52]](#footnote-52) However, the party asked for a review of some chapters in the *acquis communautaire* on the grounds that they were against Bulgarian national interests (ATAKA Program, 2005).

2.2.2.3.2 Radical Right Policies on NATO

The traumatic legacy the communist regimes left behind has significantly affected the perception of military pacts in CEECs. The radical right parties falling into Shafir’s ‘radical return’ category (see fn. 57) suggest that NATO membership has compromised national independence. Broadly speaking, they believe that NATO membership acts as a substitute for Soviet domination. The Slovak National Party, for example, strongly favours a policy of neutrality (Ishiyama, 1998: 62; Cibulka, 1999: 118; Milo, 2005: 214). The group of Polish agreement, who had voted against Polish membership in NATO in 1999, joined the League of Polish Families founded in 2001 (Jasiewicz, 2008: 15). The Republican Party, ATAKA and the Slovak National Party have asked for the immediate pull out of troops sent on NATO missions (Fawn, 2000: 57;, ATAKA, 2005, SNS Program, 2006). However, the Greater Romania Party abstained on the legislation for Romania’s membership to NATO (Cinpoes, 2010: 103).

2.3.2.3.3. The Radical Right and Irredentism

Some radical right parties in CEECs have made irredentist claims resulting from historical legacies. The Republican Party was against the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on the grounds that it would considerably weaken the country, which would eventually fall under German’s domination (Szayna, 1997: 124).[[53]](#footnote-53) In addition, Sladek repeatedly urged the governments to annex sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to Greater Czechoslovakia (Hockenos, 1993: 226, Hanley, 2012: 70) He even planted the Czechoslovak flag in Mukochevo a city in Ukraine’s Transcarpathian region (Szayna, 1997: 127). The Hungarian Justice and Life (MIEP) has claimed that the territories Hungary held before the Treaty of Trianon (signed in 1920) must be re-annexed to Hungary (Szayna, 1997: 138; Minkenberg 2002: 352; Bernarth, et al., 2005: 83 Docekalova, 2007: 12; Bustikova, 2009: 230). The Slovene National Party’s symbol represents the map of Greater Slovenia whose borders of were drawn in 1853 and which includes Austrian Carinthia, Croatian Istria and Italian Trieste (Rizman, 1999: 152; Trplan, 2005: 245). The PRM’s main goal was the establishment of Greater Romania including Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia (Bustikova, 2009: 230; Cinpoes, 2010: 96 and 101). [[54]](#footnote-54)

**2.3 Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to explain how this study understands the parties in question. The thesis uses the term ‘radical right’ to label the parties and adopts the definition of radical right that is proposed by Mudde (2007: 26), which sees the parties as *radical* in their opposition to liberal democracy, and *right-wing* in their belief that constant (cultural) inequalities naturally exist. The operational definition of radical right parties in CEECs sets four criteria to identify radical right parties. As opposition to multiculturalism is the most distinctive feature of radical right, driven by their nativist understanding of the society, this study gives priority to this criterion over the other three criteria, which include 1) support for strong state authority and a traditional society, 2) scepticism about EU membership, and 3) opposition to an increase in the power of supranational institutions over nation-states. This decision helps this study to make a clear separation between radical right parties and borderline parties.

Radical right parties in CEE are clearly distinguished by their absolute belief in ethnocentrism, as can be seen from an examination of their policies on socio-cultural life, socio-economic life, and external relations. On the one hand, this indicates that the parties are located at the authoritarian side of the socio-cultural dimension. On the other hand, the parties’ economic policies are full of populist statements that blame ‘self-seeking’ politicians for all economic problems. Rather than developing a coherent economic program, radical right parties consider economic issues as a useful weapon with which to attack established political parties. Inspired by nativism, they support an autarkic economic system. Examination of their policies on external relations shows that radical right parties are full of suspicions about international politics. They perceive all kinds of foreign relations as threats to national sovereignty. They claim to be the only parties attaching great importance to the national interest and national sovereignty and accuse other parties of betraying their own countries. Such an understanding of foreign policy directly reflects the parties’ negative positions on the European Union and NATO. Some of them claim territories of other countries (irredentism) on grounds of a ‘historical link.’ Table 2.3 presents typical examples of the socio-cultural, foreign, and socio-economic policies of the radical right parties included in this study.

**Table 2.3** Typical examples of socio-cultural, socio-economic and foreign policies of radical right parties

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Party Name** | **Socio-Cultural Policies** | **“Socio-Economic Policies”** | **Foreign Policies** |
| ATAKA | Support for banning the use of Turkish language in media, education, and official correspondence etc. | Anti-corruption rhetoric, support for keeping all public or private assets in Bulgarians’ hands. | Promise to re-run the EU negotiation process; Rejection of NATO membership; Support for withdraw of all Bulgarian troops participating to NATO operations. |
| SPR-RSC | To strengthen security forces to impose ‘discipline’ over Roma people. The expulsion of immigrant workers coming from Cuban or Vietnam. | Anti corruption rhetoric: Critique of privatization for enriching self-seeking politicians. | Rejection of NATO membership; Support for withdraw of all Czech troops participating to NATO operations. |
| MIEP | Anti-Roma Policies Anti-Semitic discourse; Reference to St. Stephen and to *Nepi Urok* movement; Anti-same sex marriage; | Accusing foreign-oriented policies of leading corruption. Rejection of selling property to foreigners; support for self-sufficient economy. | Defining the EU Treaty as the second Treaty of Trianon, which partitioned the Hungarian lands as a result of the WWI. |
| JOBBIK | Anti-Roma Policies, Reference to St. Stephen and to *Nepi Urok* movement’ support for Catholic way of life | Promise to give central role to workers, not to capital, in economics. Globalization serves the increase gap between poor and rich. | Critique of Brussels for intervening domestic affairs. Promise to enforce an alternative foreign policy called *Turanism.* |
| LPR | Anti-Semitic and anti-German discourse; References to *Lady Czestochowa* and to Dmowski’s *Endecja;* Anti-same sex marriage | Describing ‘shock therapy’ as a foreign oriented project working against interests of Polish people. Foreign investment and capital leads to growing unemployment in Poland. | Opposition to EU membership due to incompatible of EU culture with Christian values |
| PRM | Anti-Roma and anti-Hungarian policies; Reference to Codreanu and Ceausescu; Support for peasant culture religious way of life | To limit foreign investment that allegedly endangers national sovereignty. | A reluctant support EU membership to save the country from Russian influence.; Rejection of legislation for signing EU Constitution. |
| SNS (SLK) | Anti-Roma and anti-Hungarian policies; Reference to Hlinka and Tiso; claim to be successor of SNS of 19th century; Anti-same sex marriage | Deeming globalization as the projects of Barons to control world economy. | Critique of EU for its support for minority right; Deeming Brussels as infringement in Slovak National Sovereignty; Rejection of NATO membership; |
| SNS | Anti-Roma policies; anti-immigration discourse; Reference to Partisans Movement and Tito | Prohibitions for selling properties to foreign buyers. | Voting against all legislation for EU membership; Critique of Brussels for overlooking Slovene national interests |

**Chapter Three: Macro-Level Determinants of the Electoral Success of Radical Right Parties**

**3.1 Introduction:**

Radical right parties enjoyed sporadic success in parliamentary elections in CEECs during the 1990s. The electoral successes of the Slovene National Party in the 1992 election (10 per cent), the Republican Party in the 1996 election (8 per cent) and the Slovak National Party in the 1998 election (9.1 per cent) are the most striking examples. Moreover, with the exception of the Slovak National Party, which was part of the second and third Meciar coalition governments, radical right parties did not play an important role in government formations. However, the importance of the radical right parties in the politics of the CEECs noticeably increased during the following decade, on which this study focuses. The Greater Romania Party received 19.6 per cent of the vote in the 2000 parliamentary election and came in second to the Social Democratic Party (Cinpoes, 2010: 91 and 92). The League of Polish Families won 7.9 per cent of the vote in the 2001 parliamentary election. The party maintained its electoral strength in the 2005 election, and also became a member in the three-party coalition government, which lasted for almost a year (Millard, 2003: 373; 2007: 213). Similarly, the Slovak National Party won 11 per cent of the vote, its highest percentage since 1990, and emerged as a coalition partner from the 2006 parliamentary election (Mudde, 2007: 46). The Slovene National Party reached its peak (of the decade from 2000 to 2010) by winning 6.3 per cent of the vote in the 2004 election. In 2005, Bulgaria witnessed the entry of a radical right party into parliament for the first time since the end of Zhivkov’s nationalist-communist regime in 1989. In the election, ATAKA won 8.1 per cent of the vote. Moreover, the leader of the party, Volen Siderov, qualified for a runoff in the 2006 presidential election (Rose and Munro, 2009: 75). The party also increased its electoral strength to 9.4 per cent in the 2009 election and provided the centre-right Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) with parliamentary support for the formation of the government (Kolarova and Spirova 2010: 911 and 915). The Movement for Better Hungary (JOBBIK) with 16.7 per cent emerged as the third party in the Hungarian parliament in 2010.

A 2010 survey conducted by the Hungarian consultants Political Capital to formulate the DEREX index (Demand for Right wing Extremism) suggested that there was a high demand for extreme nationalism in Eastern Europe, which had doubled by 2009 compared to the early 2000s (DEREX, 2010: 2). The report attributed this growth to increasing public dissatisfaction with the political establishment (DEREX, 2010: 7). However, this is only one of the reasons cited in the literature to explain the growing demand for radical right parties across Europe.

Explanations about which sociological developments have stimulated electoral demand for radical right parties are mainly derived from the analyses of the West European countries (De Lange and Mudde, 2005: 480). This resulted naturally from the upward trend in voting for radical right parties in many West European countries from the mid-1980s. The emergence of the problem of immigration (Husbands, 1992; Van Der Brug et al., 2000), the growth of public dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties and the established political systems (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992), the decrease in class voting and party loyalties (Ignazi, 1992), reaction against the post-material new left policies (Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Ignazi, 1992), the growth of economic insecurities (Jackman and Volpert, 1996) and cuts in the welfare spending (Swank and Betz, 2003) have all been suggested to explain the increase in the demand for radical right parties in Western Europe. A positive correlation between these developments and voting for the radical right has been confirmed in numerous academic studies. However, election results have shown that not all radical right parties were electorally successful in West European countries where such sociological developments occurred. Other factors determined whether the radical right parties could transform the (latent) demand into actual electoral support. This has been the main reasoning behind the inclusion of other structural variables, usually termed ‘supply side factors’, into the causal models accounting for the electoral success enjoyed by the radical right (Norris, 2005: 14; Mudde, 2007: 202). Such factors include the format and mechanics of the party system (Kitschelt, 1995; Meguid, 2005), electoral rules (Golder, 2003; Carter 2004), and the organizational competencies of radical right parties (Lubbers, et al. 2002; Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2006).

However, western-centered demand-side and supply-side factors cannot be applied to CEECs directly, due to the different political history of the regions (Kitschelt, 2007: 1198). The transition to a new economic and political system, (Minkenberg, 2002), historically rooted national minority groups (Ramet, 1999), the more serious problem of corruption (Bustikova, 2009), an asymmetric candidacy process (in favour of the EU) for the European Union membership (Grabbe, 2007), and the legacy of the communist regimes (Kitschelt et al., 1999) could all warrant modification of the possible correlation between the western-centered models and the electoral performance of the radical right parties in CEECs.

The first part of this chapter reviews the existing findings about the hypothetical impact of each demand-side and supply-side factor. Based on a review of the literature, the second part justifies why three macro-level demand-side (unemployment, national minorities, and corruption) and two supply-side factors (presence of a liberal right-wing mainstream party on socio-cultural issues and presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream on the issue of Europeanization) are deemed more important and are thus included in the [fsQCA] analysis of the electoral successes of radical right parties in CEECs.

**3.2 Demand-side and Supply-side Explanations in CEECs**

Scholars have focused on the factors that increase the likelihood of electoral success by radical right parties in CEECs since the early 2000s. Until that time, the few studies that existed mostly focused on individual countries (e.g. Cibulka, 1999; Karsai, 1999; Rizman, 1999; Bell, 1999; Kreidl and Vlachova, 1999; Shafir, 2000)**.** This can be explained by the infancy of the party systems and the general lack of electoral success achieved by radical right parties achieved in CEECs during the 1990s. Initial studies focused mainly on demand-side explanations, including the negative economic repercussions of transition and relations with national minority groups (e.g. Beichelt and Minkenberg, 2002: 15).

Supply-side factors have been included in the explanatory models particularly since 2009 (Minkenberg, 2009: 455). The Leninist legacy[[55]](#footnote-55) and the European Union membership process have been deemed as intervening variables affecting the party cleavages and thereby affecting the electoral performance of radical parties (Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2009, 2011). In the meantime, the EU membership process has also been described as a separate issue that is embedded in domestic party cleavages and that could contribute to radical right electoral strength (De Lange and Guerra, 2009). The remainder of this section reviews demand-side explanations and supply-side explanations under three subheadings for each.

3.2.1 The Transition Losers Approach

The ‘Transition losers approach’ is essentially an adaptation of the ‘modernization loser’ approach in Western Europe accentuating the emerging gap between individuals’ qualification and new conditions shaped by economic and cultural paradigm shifts in societies. The latter approach specifically attributes the rise of radical right parties in West Europe to the changing political orientations of individuals who have failed to adapt to new economic and cultural conditions in post-industrial societies (Betz, 1994: 26, 27). Similarly, the ‘transition losers’ approach in CEECs takes the view that radical right parties can benefit considerably from the negative consequences of the far-reaching transition process, which involved the wholesale transformation of political regimes and economic systems (Minkenberg, 2002: 355, 356; also see: Anastasakis, 2002: 4, 5; Beichelt and Minkenberg, 2002: 15; Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2009: 460).

The transition to a market economy in CEECs has led to some negative economic consequences for certain segments of their societies, as people have suffered from rising unemployment, declining wages, and increasing economic inequality. The United Nations Human Development Report for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (1999: 21), for example, reveals that the percentage of the population below the poverty line in Eastern Europe and the CIS increased eightfold over four years (1994 to 1998). The report (1999: 20) also noted worsening inequality scores from 1987 to 1993 in all CEECs. Those individuals with skills gained through higher education (e.g. theoretical knowledge, ability to make analytical assessments, and speaking other languages etc.) were less affected by such negative consequences, whereas those with lower education levels were negatively affected (e.g. Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995: 202). Thus, the ‘transition losers’ thesis suggests a hypothesis predicting that those with less education are more likely to vote for radical right parties.

Academic studies testing this hypothesis in both West Europe and Central and Eastern Europe presented surprising findings concerning the explanations attributing the rise of radical right parties to economic problems. Cross-country analyses using micro-level variables such as education level and income level confirm the hypothesis (e.g. Lubbers, et al, 2002: 370, Norris, 2005: 139; Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2011: 166-168). However, contrary to what the ‘transition losers’ approach would predict, findings in some studies focusing on individual countries indicate that even voters with higher education sometimes support radical right parties in significant numbers (e.g. Coffe et al, 2007: 148; Ghodsee, 2008: 31; Barlett et al., 2012: 2).[[56]](#footnote-56) For example, 15 per cent of the Hungary’s JOBBIK voters and 22 per cent of Bulgarian’s ATAKA voters have some higher education (Ghodsee, 2008: 31; Barlett et al. (2012: 2).

As a macro-level variable, level of unemployment has generally been used in studies (in both West Europe and CEE) testing the correlation between economic deterioration and the electoral strength of radical right parties (Mudde, 2007: 206). Indeed, it is logical to consider high levels of unemployment a contributory factor, given the findings pointing towards the immensely influential role of the unemployment issue in shaping electoral performance in CEECs (e.g. Bell, 1997: 1282; Duch, 2001: 904; Roberts, 2008: 543; Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck, 2011: 463). Initial studies of unemployment’s impact on radical right electoral success confirmed the correlation (Jackman and Volpert, 1996: 516; Kreidl and Vlachova, 1999: 21). Yet, studies designed to highlight which party family primarily benefitted from unemployment do not confirm this correlation (e.g. Fidrmuc, 2001: 212; Owen and Tucker, 2010: 34).[[57]](#footnote-57) Similarly, many studies that directly examine the extent of the contribution of unemployment to the electoral strength of the radical right contradict the idea of linear causation between unemployment and the electoral success of radical right parties (Arzhemier, 2009: 269; Pop-Eleches, 2010: 248). Moreover, other studies conclude exactly the opposite of what is expected, instead suggesting that a high level of unemployment reduces electoral support for radical right parties (Knigge, 1998: 268; Lubbers *et al.*, 2002: 371; Arzhemier and Carter, 2006: 434; Coffe, *et al.*, 2007: 148; Greskovits, 2007: 45). This could be explained by the probability that voters are strongly inclined to vote for political parties with government experience when unemployment rates are high (Knigge, 1998: 270). Despite findings contradicting linear causation, unemployment is worthy of inclusion in the study, as many studies indicate a positive impact of unemployment on radical right voting when combined with other factors such as inter-ethnic competition (Golder, 2003: 454*,* Arzheimer 2009: 269).[[58]](#footnote-58)

3.2.2 Protest Voting Approach

Radical right parties employ inflammatory rhetoric about the established political system in liberal democratic regimes. As the samples of such anti-political establishment rhetoric presented in the previous chapter show, radical right parties consistently accuse mainstream parties of not acting in the public interest and bringing the existing political system into disrepute. Such an interpretation of the existing political order is especially appealing to voters dissatisfied with the existing political order. Protest votes cast with the intention of punishing mainstream parties, therefore, may go to radical right parties (Betz, 1994: 41 and 59, 60; Van der Brug et al, 2000: 83; Rydgren, 2007: 251; Mudde, 2007: 207). The ‘protest-voting thesis’ predicts that radical right parties become electorally successful where public trust in mainstream parties and/or the existing political regime is low.[[59]](#footnote-59)

Studies designed to test the correlation between low public trust in mainstream parties and existing political regimes and the electoral success of radical right parties report conflicting findings. For example, Knigge (1998: 158), Lubbers et al. (2002: 371) and Arzheimer and Carter (2006: 439) confirm the correlation, whereas Mudde (2007: 208) and Greskovits (2007: 45) suggest that there is no clear correlation between level of trust in democracy and the electoral strength of radical right parties. Nevertheless, those who had voted for a political party that emerged as a coalition partner from an election consider themselves ‘winners’ (Anderson et al. 2005: 91); therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that in countries where radical right parties acted as a coalition member (as in Poland and Slovakia), those who voted for the radical right were not necessarily ‘losers’. Moreover, levels of satisfaction with democracy or mainstream parties are, in fact, not the most reliable indicator in CEECs to test the correlation. The percentage of citizens disappointed by the way democracy works may increase, yet this figure does not necessarily indicate that the percentage of citizens who would opt for an authoritarian regime also increases (Pippidi, 2007: 11-12; also cf. Markowski, 2002: 28). Alternatively, governance-related indicators such as corruption should be taken into account, as these are the main determinants of public trust in mainstream parties and in existing political regimes in CEE (Pippidi, 2007: 12). Given that anti-corruption campaigns have occupied a prominent place in radical right policies in CEEC, as shown in the previous chapter, the level of perceived corruption (by public) should be included in analyses of the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE states.[[60]](#footnote-60)

3.2.3 The Ethnic Competition Approach

It was suggested in the first chapter that radical right parties can be clearly distinguished by their opposition to multiculturalism (e.g. Ramet, 1999: 4; Ivarsflaten, 2008: 17-18). The ‘ethnic competition approach’ explains the appeal of radical right parties in terms of this distinctive feature, suggesting that their electoral success relies on hostility against ethnic minorities in society. Some sources use the term ‘ethnic backlash’ instead (e.g. Betz, 1994; Mudde, 2007). Semantically, the title is accurate in underlining the reaction against growing ethnic diversity in West European societies in the post-WWII years, as a result of decolonization, labour shortages, and political upheavals outside West Europe. However, the ethnic diversity in some CEECs (e.g. Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania) is rather the legacy of history going back to the Age of Empires and their break up in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The literature cites Two major reasons for hostility against multiculturalism: first, the distribution of economic opportunities (e.g. unemployment, welfare benefits) may stimulate ethnic competition for material gains in the society (Rydgren, 2007: 250; Schneider, 2008: 54); and second, the ‘contrast’ between the cultures may fuel a climate of opinion that is in favour of defensive campaigns to prevent ‘the contamination of native culture’ (Knigge, 1998: 271; Schneider, 2008: 54). The ethnic competition approach was first developed on the basis of concerns about impacts of immigration in West Europe. Many immigrant workers from outside Europe came to West European countries to meet the growing demand for labour during the impressive economic growth experienced in the post-war years, particularly from 1950 to 1973. The decolonization processes, immigrant workers’ reluctance to return to their countries of origin, a desire for family reunions, the arrival of asylum seekers, and liberal rules loosening control of immigration (Hollifield, 1992: 4) fostered further cultural diversity in West Europe. The combination of cultural diversity and an increase in unemployment during the 1970s is argued to have stimulated ethnic competition for economic opportunities. Radical right parties then launched political campaigns that blamed socio-economic problems on cultural diversity (e.g. Koopmans et al., 2005).

However, it is the cultural interpretation of the ethnic competition approach underlining the cultural incompatibility between the in-group (native) and the out-group (national minority), which seems to be especially relevant to radical right politics in CEECs. Examples of such culture-based opposition to multiculturalism in CEECs would include the Slovak National’s Party’s opposition to the 2004 opening of Selye Janos University, whose language of instruction is Hungarian, and ATAKA’s opposition to the use of languages other than Bulgarian in broadcasting. The economic interpretation of the ethnic competition approach exemplified by the slogans such as ‘Two million immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work’ and ‘Eliminate Unemployment: Stop Immigration’ (Golder, 2003: 438), are very rare and of secondary importance in radical right politics in CEECs (e.g. Williams, 1999: 43; Hlousek and Kopecek, 2010: 200). The apparent reason for this is that only a tiny number of immigrant workers are present in the CEECs (Mudde, 2007: 214; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2009: 590). Perhaps, the only exception to this concerns the attitudes of radical right parties towards the Roma people, whom radical right parties have accused of being responsible for socio-economic problems, *inter alia.*

Many studies have established a positive relationship between cultural diversity and the electoral strength of radical right parties in both West Europe and CEE (e.g. Knigge, 1998: 258; Williams, 1999: 46; Anastasakis, 2002: 7; Minkenberg, 2002 357; Beichelt and Minkenberg 2002:10; Arzheimer, 2009: 269). In terms of West Europe, some studies conclude that the impact of cultural diversity on the electoral strength of the radical right is conditional. Golder (2003: 454), for example, suggests that a positive relationship between cultural diversity and the electoral strength of the radical right exists when the immigrant population reaches at least 6.3 per cent of the whole population and is combined with the high levels of unemployment. Others have found that the effect of unemployment on radical right support is negative (Arzheimer, 2009: 269). Yet other studies conclude that it is the presence of non-European immigrants that has a positive effect upon the electoral strength of radical right parties (Lubbers, et al, 2002: 371; Coffe et al. 2007: 153; Schneider, 2008: 62 and 63). In their work on CEE states, Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009: 467-468) take a different perspective, and suggesting that cultural diversity exerts a positive influence on radical right parties’ strength if the ‘others’ are few in number or do not have the political and economic power to challenge the radical right parties, thereby providing an easy target for the radical right.

Findings confirming the effects of cultural diversity combined with unemployment on radical right success give credibility to the economic interpretation of the ‘ethnic competition approach’, whereas those suggesting that cultural diversity per se helps radical right parties increase their support lends credibility to the cultural interpretation of this approach. However, not all research involving CEE cases finds that cultural diversity necessarily contributes to the electoral strength of the radical right (Norris, 2005: 172; Pop Eleches, 2010: 248).[[61]](#footnote-61) Norris (2005: 172), for example, suggests that ‘support for the radical right at the national level is unrelated to any of the available aggregate indicators of ethnic diversity in the societies…’[[62]](#footnote-62) Despite conflicting findings, the fact remains that opposition to cultural diversity is the most distinctive feature of radical right parties in CEE, and this warrants the inclusion of the presence of a large ethnic population as a demand-side condition in the analysis.

*Supply side explanations*

A simple ‘eyeballing’ of the raw data on the given demand-side factors and the level of electoral support achieved by radical right parties in parliamentary elections held in CEECs over the period of interest suggests that the demand-side factors alone are not enough to explain radical right parties’ electoral performance. For example, although all factors (unemployment, corruption, and ethnic diversity) were present in Bulgaria in 2001, no successful radical right party emerged from the 2001 parliamentary election. Similarly, despite favourable demand side factors (particularly high unemployment and a large minority population), the Slovak National Party was doomed to electoral failure in the 2002 election. Even though all the contributory demand-side conditions, particularly ethnic diversity and corruption, existed in Romania during the whole period of this study, the Greater Romania Party could not repeat its previous electoral successes in the 2008 election. The League of Polish Families got into the *Sejm* in the 2001 and 2005 elections despite the lack of cultural diversity in the country, where over 95 per cent of the population is ethnically Polish. The Hungarian Justice and Life Party, in alliance with JOBBIK, failed to cross the 5 per cent electoral threshold in the 2006 election, whereas JOBBIK was far above the threshold in the 2010 election under similar demand-side conditions. The inconsistency in demand-side factors’ apparent effect upon the electoral support for radical right parties underlines that, in addition to demand-side factors, supply-side factors are likely to affect the strength of the parties.

3.2.4. Interaction between right-wing mainstream parties and radical right on socio-cultural issues

Mair (2000: 30) defines, what he names ‘party mechanism’ as the interaction between political parties in the electoral arena. As discussed at greater length in the first chapter, socio-cultural issues are of paramount importance to radical right parties. Ideologically shaped electoral preferences for radical right parties are largely based on socio-cultural issues (Van der Brug and *et al.* 2000). Therefore the condition should be framed in a way that captures the impact of the interaction between right-wing mainstream parties and radical right parties within the socio-cultural dimension on the electoral success of the latter.

There are two main approaches to the impact of the interaction between right-wing mainstream parties and radical right parties on the electoral success of the latter. The first approach is based on the spatial theory of party competition (Down, 1957). This approach suggests that a shift in a right-wing mainstream party’s position towards the centre allows a radical right party to fill the previous position of the former, thereby appealing to those voters who had renounced the mainstream party due to its shift towards the centre (Kitschelt, 1995; Rydgren 2005: 418). As a result, this approach argues that mainstream parties can wage a ‘war of attrition’ against radical right parties by holding a position on the socio-cultural dimension of party competition that is similar to that of the radical right parties. As a result of such a strategy, radical right parties would ultimately be at risk of failure.

The second approach focuses on the saliency of issues shaping electoral preferences. This approach challenges the efficacy of the proposed strategy formulated by the previous approach to cripple the electoral support of radical right parties; furthermore, it argues that such a strategy would in fact increase the likelihood of a radical right party’s electoral success. The approach suggests that a shift in a right-wing mainstream party’s position towards the centre would downplay the saliency of the issues emphasized by radical right parties. Thus, a right-wing mainstream party’s move towards the centre would decrease a radical right party’s chance of having electoral success. Otherwise, the narrowing gap between the mainstream right-wing party and the radical right on the socio-cultural dimension of party competition would increase the saliency of certain issues in elections (such as the restriction of minority rights, the protection of [patriarchal] family values, and of law and order through strict rules) that radical right ideology could readily accommodate (Budge, et al., 1987; also see fn. 18 in the first chapter).

Studies examining the extent of the contribution of political party interaction to the electoral success of radical right parties present conflicting findings. Some research concludes that radical right parties’ electoral successes have been due in part to shifts in the mainstream right-wing party position towards the centre. This conclusion gives credibility to the first hypothesis (Abedi, 2002: 570, Van der Brug et al., 2005: 561; Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2009: 470). Other studies observe a different consequence of a change in mainstream party position. They argue that a widening distance between a right-wing mainstream party and a radical right party decreases polarization in the party system, and vice versa. An increase in polarization brings radical right parties into the ‘region of acceptability’. On account of such polarization, radical right parties become a viable option for the electorate and their chance of achieving electoral success increases (Ignazi, 1992: 20; Lubbers et al., 2002: 356; Norris, 2005: 196; Veugelers and Magnan, 2005: 855-856).

The inclusion of the interaction between right-wing mainstream parties and the radical right on the right side of the political party spectrum in terms of socio-cultural policies as a factor affecting the electoral strength of radical right parties in CEECs requires a brief summary of the approaches to cleavages. During much of the 1990s, a view that there was a lack of a coherent structure of party competition in CEECs prevailed. There were ample reasons to support this, including the elimination of socio-economic cleavages during the communist regime due to the lack of a liberal economy (Bunce, 1995: 92), limited knowledge among voters of which policies would benefit them (Bielasiak, 1998: 24), and splits appearing within broad anti-communist blocs once communist regimes had come to an end (Innes, 2002: 85). Nevertheless, by the late 1990s, others had more optimistically concluded that party systems in CEECs had reached a reasonable standard of competition, similar to their counterparts in West European countries (Agh, 1998: 204; Kitschelt et al. 1999: 402; Enyedi and Bertoa, 2011: 116).Besides internal factors, such as the fading of the chaotic atmosphere of the transition process and the increasing visibility of cleavages along which political parties have adopted credible positions (Zielinski, 2002: 204), the impact of the European Union has also been cited as a factor leading to normal party competition (Kostelecky, 2002: 177; Vachudova, 2008: 389; Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009: 181). The EU’s leverage played an instrumental role in strengthening the opposition against former communist elites and pushing the latter to transform themselves into ‘social democrat’ parties, particularly in countries in which the transition occurred in the absence of effective opposition and a ‘pluralistic political arena’ (Vachudova, 2008b: 864). Both the economic dimension (state vs. market) and the cultural dimension helped to structure party competition in CEEC (Marks, et al., 2006: 156-157), although the same issues did not necessarily occupy leading roles in all countries (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009: 286).

A few studies have tested the impact of the interaction between parties on the right side of the political party spectrum on the electoral strength of radical right parties in CEECs, primarily on the basis of the economic dimension (e.g. Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2009 and 2011). As stated in the first chapter, this approach conflicts not only with previously stated conclusions made in studies on economic voting (e.g. Fidrmuc, 2000, Owen and Tucker, 2010), but also with prevailing consensus in the literature that radical right parties primarily accentuate socio-cultural issues. The electoral successes of radical right parties are rarely due to economic reasons, and votes cast for radical right parties are rarely protest votes aiming to punish mainstream politicians over economic results rather than votes cast for ideological proximity between the electorate and the radical right party (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2005: 541, Norris, 2005: 192). Therefore, an examination of the interaction between right-wing mainstream parties and radical right parties in the socio-economic dimension of party competition is not appropriate for capturing the extent to which radical right parties achieve electoral success due to their ideology. Indeed, being primarily interested in socio-cultural policies (Hockenos, 1993, Ramet, 1999, Minkenberg, 2002, Mudde, 2007) and voicing quasi-economic policies that provide no viable solutions to economic problems but depict an impractical autarkic system, radical right parties are likely to establish ideological links with their voters on socio-cultural issues (Van der Brug et al. 2000: 89). The decision to pay attention to the interaction between right-wing mainstream parties and the radical right within the socio-cultural dimension of party competition is also supported by the fact that non-economic issues such as ethnicity and religion appear to have influenced electoral preferences in CEECs, usually less so than economic matters (Laver and Benoit, 2006; Marks et al, 2006: 157; Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009: 291).

3.2.4.1 Inter-party competition between right-wing mainstream party and radical right on the issue of Europeanization

Different conceptualizations of Europeanization exist in the literature.[[63]](#footnote-63) In terms of the relationship between the European Union and national systems of governance, Europeanization essentially denotes the harmonization of economic and social policies across EU member (or candidate) countries. (Olsen, 2002: 923- 924). In this sense, Europeanization has been a crucial component in the post-communist transition to democracy and the market economy (Cichowski, 2000: 1244). Many studies have been designed to investigate how national political parties respond to Europeanization (e.g. Hix and Lord, 1997; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Mair, 2000, Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2003, Marks, et al. 2006, Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009) and to what extent Europeanization shapes voters’ preferences in national elections (e.g. Tillman, 2004; De Vries and Tillman, 2011; Werts et al., 2013).The prevailing view is that Europeanization barely affected national party systems, particularly in West European countries (Mair, 2000: 36, 37), and it did not create a distinctive cleavage or establish a new context for party competition (Dechezelles, and Neumayer, 2010: 230). The reluctance on the part of mainstream parties to highlight European integration as a political issue (Hix and Lord, 1997: 26)[[64]](#footnote-64) and the widely held belief among voters that national elections are what matters – i.e. European elections are second order elections (Schmitt, 2005: 651) - could limit Europeanization’s effect in national party systems.[[65]](#footnote-65) There are, however, findings, suggesting that issues related to the EU can affect electoral preferences across Europe, and to a large extent in CEECs (Tillman, 2004: 603; Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 17-18; Dechezelles and Neumayer, 2010: 234; Sum, 2010: 20; De Vries and Tillman, 2011: 10).

Two factors explain why Europeanization has had an important impact on party systems and electoral preferences in CEECs. First, Europeanization has broadly been interpreted as a symbol of breaking away from the communist past (e.g. Ost, 2009: 13). In the general population, there have been substantial pro-Europeanization majorities.[[66]](#footnote-66) Second, the relationship between the European Union and CEECs has been highly asymmetric in favour of the former, particularly during the period of accession negotiations (Grabbe, 2007: 113).The full responsibility for fulfilling the requirements of the *acquis communautaire*fell to the government party in power, irrespective of party ideology, and this sharply limited policy options that mainstream parties could offer (Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009: 204-205; Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2011: 144). Both firm public support for Europeanization and the necessity of embracing membership conditions pushed for reform of the former communist parties to attemp to reform themselves into modern social democratic parties. Thus, Europeanization became an agent of change in the party system, whose structure was similar to West European counterparts, in the sense that with a few exceptions, mainstream parties supported Europeanization (Mark and Steenbergen, 2002: 884) and opposition came primarily from radical right and radical left parties (Hix and Lord, 1997: 50; Mair, 2000: 34). The ‘empty’ contents of party competition between the mainstream parties and the evolution of social authoritarian parties in some CEECs provided radical right parties with opportunity. With their authoritarian social policies and populist economic policies, they had the chance not only to fill the place left by former communists (particularly in Bulgaria and Romania) but also to appeal to voters who were strongly opposed to Europeanization. Indeed, there are findings indicating that the Europeanization contributed to the electoral strength of the League of Polish Families in the 2001 and 2005 parliamentary elections (De Lange and Guerra, 2009: 536).

3.2.5. Electoral Systems

Does the electoral system affect radical right parties’ chances of electoral success? If so, which electoral systems increase or decrease the chance of having electoral success? Arguments about these questions go back to Duverger’s well-known hypothesis about strategic voting, which Galbraith and Rae (1989: 126) define as ‘voting for other than one’s preferred party or candidate in order to increase the probability of a satisfactory overall outcome’. Based on this logic, it has been suggested that majoritarian electoral systems, such as first past the post or two-tier majoritarian systems, act as an impediment to the electoral success of minor parties, including radical right parties, since voters tend to use their votes strategically and are ultimately convinced to vote for mainstream parties (Mudde, 2007: 223). Many studies have confirmed this argument (Jackman and Volpert, 1996: 516; Golder, 2003: 457; Swank and Betz, 2003: 239; Givens, 2005: 132; Rydgren, 2005: 423; Veugeler and Magnan, 2005: 854-855; Norris, 2005: 214). Yet, though few in number, some studies have reached controversial findings challenging the prevailing consensus in the literature (Carter, 2004: 89; Carter, 2005: 195-196; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006: 432). Arzheimer and Carter (2006: 432-433) offer two explanations for their unexpected findings: ‘1), radical right ‘voters are simply not aware of the consequences of electoral systems’, and 2) ‘the psychological effects of electoral systems may be weaker for right-wing extremist party voters than for other sections of the electorate, as many right-wing extremist party voters vote in an expressive manner and are not as concerned with their votes being translated into seats’.

Four of the seven countries included in this qualitative comparative analysis of the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE adopted a proportional representation system: the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The formal national electoral threshold in the first three countries is equal to 5 per cent, while it is 4 per cent in Slovenia. Even though Hungary, Bulgaria (after 2005), and Romania (after 2008) have employed mixed electoral system, a large majority of parliamentarians in Bulgaria and Romania and a slight majority of parliamentarians in Hungary have been elected through the PR system (209 out of 240 in Bulgaria, all 346 members in the Lower House in Romania and 210 out 386 in Hungary).[[67]](#footnote-67) Based on this similarity across the countries, one may argue that the electoral system is hardly responsible for variations in the electoral performance of radical right parties in CEE. At first glance, this argument makes sense. Yet, proportional representation systems may differ from each other in terms of the degree of proportionality; some PR systems can be more proportional than others. Therefore, the electoral system should not be left out as a condition immediately. Nevertheless, as explained at greater length in the first chapter, qualitative comparative analysis focusing on twenty cases should include five conditions at maximum. Otherwise, the problem of ‘logical remainders’ occurs. While further explanations will be given in the next chapter, suffice it to say here that to transcend the limitation, one of the robustness tests will check the extent of variation in the proportionality of electoral systems in CEECs. If the degree in variation is important enough that the electoral system is found to be partly responsible for radical right parties’ greater success in some countries than in others, a separate analysis including this condition will be made.

3.2.6 The Internal Supply-side: Party Ideology, Leadership, and Party Organization

The endogenous characteristics of radical right parties have also been considered in studies that examine whether they possess an ability to make use of the growing public demand for achieving electoral success. Three characteristics have particularly been emphasized: party ideology, leadership, and party organization (e.g. Lubbers et al, 2002, Zaslove, 2004; Carter, 2005, Norris, 2005). Keeping a party’s ideological distance from the interwar fascism is considered to be a crucial factor contributing to the electoral strength of the parties in Western Europe (Ignazi, 1992: 16-18; Hainsworth, 2000: 1). A (non fascist) ‘clean’ image acts as a ‘reputational shield’, (Ivarsflaten, 2006: 5), which helps a party to establish credibility within the political system (Ivarsflaten, 2006: 17). Having a charismatic leader is sometimes considered to be a defining feature of today’s radical right parties, which may reflect ‘cult of personality’ in fascist regimes (Zaslove, 2004: 70). It has been suggested that a charismatic leader helps to stymie splits within the party and can convincingly communicate the party’s message to voters, thus playing a huge role in the party’s electoral success (Carter, 2005: 65). It has, however, also been suggested that while a charismatic leader may bring an electoral breakthrough, a strong party organization is also needed to repeat this initial success in the subsequent elections (Norris, 2005: 218 and 248; Mudde, 2007: 261-262). Indeed, Carter’s (2005: 99) findings lead her to the conclusion that strongly organized, well-led but factionalized radical right parties score higher than weakly organized, poorly-led, divided ones or weakly organized, poorly-led but united parties.

The likelihood of electoral success for radical right parties is largely embedded in effective and strong leadership and party organizations. Whereas external supply-side conditions play an auxiliary role, such endogenous conditions invariably play key roles in electoral success. The above-mentioned findings about internal supply-side conditions buttress their efficacy. In other words, electoral success is likely to be commensurate with strong and effective functioning of leaders and party organizations. In the sixth chapter, this study qualitatively focuses on the endogenous factors that partly explain why the Slovak National Party was unable to achieve electoral success in 2006 despite favourable demand-side and external supply-side conditions. Yet, as explained in the first chapter at greater length, the qualitative comparative analysis research technique does not allow this study to include endogenous conditions along with other external supply-side conditions and demand-side conditions in its cross-country analysis, as this would lead to the methodological problem of ‘logical remainders’.

**3.3. Conclusion**

Factors contributing to radical right parties’ electoral strength have been of increasing academic interest increasingly since the mid-1980s, when these parties began to enjoy unprecedented success in national parliamentary elections in Western Europe. The factors have been grouped broadly into two types: demand-side factors and supply-side factors. Demand-side factors comprise socio-economic developments such as unemployment, public mistrust in the political establishment and cultural diversity that is politicized by radical right parties from an ethnocentric perspective. Supply-side factors relate to the mechanics of the party system, the type of electoral system and endogenous features of parties (ideology, leadership and organization).

The electoral performance of radical right parties in CEECs began to receive more scholarly attention in the late 1990s. Some factors that have featured prominently in studies on radical right parties in West Europe have also been found to contribute to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE states, in particular high levels of unemployment and inter-party competition in the socio-cultural dimension. Nevertheless, due to the historical differences between Western Europe and Central and East Europe, not all Western Europe centered explanations apply equally in the latter. Historically rooted ethnic diversity, endemic corruption, and the highly asymmetrical nature of the EU accession process are the factors likely to affect electoral performance of radical right parties in CEECs that have no equivalent in West Europe. Three demand-side conditions (unemployment, corruption, and ethnic diversity) and two supply-side conditions (inter-party competition on socio-cultural issues and issues relating to EU membership) are used for analysis using the fsQCA technique.

**Chapter Four - A Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the Electoral Success of Radical Right Parties in CEECs**

**4.1. Introduction**

It is generally accepted in social science that social phenomena can rarely be explained through linear causation, where a single condition shows its effect on its own. Existing explanations for the radical right’s electoral success clearly illustrate this problem. As can be seen from the summary of findings made in the previous chapter, at least one demand-side condition and one supply-side condition can be expected to combine to account for electoral success. The Qualitative Comparative Analysis research technique is an appropriate method for the study of phenomena characterized by causal complexity. In addition, fuzzy-set QCA explanations recognize the possibility of variations in degree (being more in or out of a set) and of equifinality, ‘a scenario in which alternative factors can produce the same outcome’ (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 5). This makes fuzzy-set QCA effective in unpacking findings about the impact of certain factors on the electoral strength of the radical right parties that are controversial in the literature. Fuzzy-set QCA also makes an important distinction between necessary and sufficient causal conditions.[[68]](#footnote-68)

There are two main variants of QCA: *crisp-set* and *fuzzy-set*. In *crisp set QCA* conditions (causes) and outcomes are coded as either fully absent (represented by a 0) or fully present (1). *Fuzzy set QCA* considers the differences between values, that is, it allows the researcher ‘to calibrate partial membership in sets using values in the interval between (0.0) and 1.0 (full membership)’ (Ragin, 2008: 29).

When calibrating the raw data into fuzzy set scores, the researcher must begin by setting the threshold for three anchors through qualitative assessment: 1) full membership where the case is fully in the set, 2) non-membership where the case is fully out of the set, and 3) crossover point where the fuzzy set score is 0.5 and indicates ‘the point of maximum ambiguity in the assessment of whether a case is more in or out of a set’ (Ragin, 2008: 30). Calibration of the raw data on the basis of the anchors is helpful to reveal the ‘qualitative differences in kind’ (e.g. more out than in or fully out) (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 14).

This chapter aims to carry out an fsQCA analysis and to identify appropriate cases to compare in the post-QCA chapters. The first part discusses how the outcome and conditions are conceptualized and above what point (threshold) the outcome and conditions should be considered to be present. Then, the chapter goes on to conduct tests of necessity and sufficiency in order to interpret and discuss the findings. The chapter thereafter checks the robustness of the solution formula (solution terms).

**4.2. Outcome and Causal conditions**

4.2.1. Outcome ‘Electoral Success’ (*SUCCESS)*

Radical right parties have participated in national elections in CEECs since the end of the communist regimes. With the exceptions of the Republicans in the Czech Republic, the parties included in this study got into their respective national parliaments for at least one term during the period covered by this study (from 2000 to 2010). Some (e.g. the Greater Romania Party and the Movement for a Better Hungary) achieved notable electoral successes and some (e.g. the League of Polish Families and the Slovak National Party) became part of governing coalitions.

A level of electoral support of 3 per cent is the threshold for political relevancy; that is, parties having at least 3 per cent of the vote are ‘relevant parties’, while those below it are ‘fringe parties’ (e.g. Norris, 2005: 50).[[69]](#footnote-69) Nevertheless, this study is interested in the reasons for electoral success, which has already been conceptualized in the introduction chapter as *the capacity of the party to exceed the electoral threshold at the national level*. Therefore, the study sets the crossover point at a percentage that is equal to the electoral threshold. As table 4.1 shows, radical right parties gained more than 10 per cent of the vote in only four of the twenty elections included in the study. These elections include the 2000 and 2004 Romanian parliamentary elections, the 2006 Slovak parliamentary election and the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary election. Following this, the study sets a 10 per cent threshold for parties to be considered *fully in the set of successful radical right parties*. Although they did not win more than 10 per cent of the vote, Bulgarian ATAKA and the League of Polish Families comfortably exceeded the electoral threshold by winning more than 7.5 per cent of the vote; these parties are coded with a fuzzy set score of 0.8. Those parties that gained electoral support of less than 7.5 per cent but more than the national electoral threshold are coded with a score of 0.6. Parties with electoral support above 3 per cent but not exceeding the threshold are coded 0.4, and those with electoral support between 2 per cent and 3 per cent are coded 0.2. The study considers parties to be *fully out of the set* below a threshold of 2 per cent; parties at this point clearly remain on the fringe of electoral competition.

**Table 4.1** Electoral Support for Radical Right Parties (2000-2010)

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **ELECTION** | **VOTES %** | **Set Membership**  **in *SUCCESS*** |
| BUL2005 | 8.1 | 0.8 |
| BUL2009 | 9.3 | 0.8 |
| CZE2002 | 1 | 0 |
| CZE2006 | 0.33 | 0 |
| CZE2010 | 0.03 | 0 |
| HUN2002 | 4.4 | 0.4 |
| HUN2006 | 2.2\* | 0.2 |
| HUN2010 | 16.7 | 1 |
| POL2001 | 7.9 | 0.8 |
| POL2005 | 8.0 | 0.8 |
| POL2007 | 1.1 | 0 |
| ROM2000 | 19.5 | 1 |
| ROM2004 | 13.5 | 1 |
| ROM2008 | 3.2 | 0.4 |
| SNS2002\_ Slovak | 3.3 | 0.4 |
| SNS2006 | 11.7 | 1 |
| SNS2010 | 5.1 | 0.6 |
| SNS2000\_Slovenia | 4.4 | 0.6\*\* |
| SNS2004 | 6.3 | 0.6 |
| SNS2008 | 5.4 | 0.6 |

\* Hungarian Justice and Life Party and The Movement for Better Hungary (JOBBIK) formed an electoral alliance in the 2006 Hungarian parliamentary election.

\*\* With the exceptions of Slovenia and Bulgaria, electoral threshold is 5 per cent in all countries. The electoral threshold in Bulgaria and Slovenia is 4 %.

4.2.2 Causal Conditions

As discussed in chapter 3, a substantial number of academic studies seek to identify factors affecting the electoral performance of radical right parties. Conditions believed to favour radical right parties’ electoral success are thus fairly well established, particularly in terms of West European countries. The empirical findings presented in the literature have helped to guide this study significantly in picking out causal conditions. Based on the discussion made in the previous chapter, fsQCA analysis for the electoral success of radical right parties focuses on the impact of five conditions divided into two groups in accordance with the earlier practices in the literature (e.g. Veugelers and Magnan, 2005). The first group includes demand-side conditions - social conditions conducive to radical right parties’ electoral success – such as high levels of unemployment, high levels of perceived corruption, and a large ethnic minority population. High levels of corruption are selected on the basis of the ‘protest voting approach’, discussed in the previous chapter. This condition has received little attention; level of trust in democracy has more often been taken as an indicator of public dissatisfaction with the political establishment instead. Working under the assumption that it is primarily the problem of corruption that arouses strong feelings of public distrust of the political establishment in CEECs, this condition has been included in the analysis. The second group consists of supply-side conditions, which largely determining whether latent electoral demand can be translated into actual electoral support. The study includes interaction between a nearby mainstream party and the radical right party with respect to not only socio-cultural policies but also the Europeanization issue.[[70]](#footnote-70)

**Table 4.2** Hypotheses about the impact of each condition on outcome

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Hypothesis | Condition |
| High level of unemployment contributes to electoral performances of radical right parties in CEE | Unemp |
| High level of unemployment contributes to electoral success of radical right parties in CEE where a large number of minority population is also present. | Unemp \* Ethpop |
| High level ofperceived corruption contributes to electoral success of radical right parties. | Corr |
| High level perceived corruption contributes to electoral success of radical right parties when it coincides with high levels of unemployment. | Corr \* Unemp |
| *Presence of**a large number of historically rooted minority group (and/or Roma people) contributes electoral success of radical right parties in CEE*. | Ethpop |
| Presence of a right-wing mainstream party that follows liberal cultural policies increases chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties. | Libm |
| Presence of a right-wing mainstream party following culturally illiberal policies increases the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties. | - Libm |
| Presence of a Europhile right wing mainstream party contributes to electoral success of radical right parties in CEE. | Ephil |
| Presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party that also takes a position close to centre of socio-cultural dimension contributes to electoral success of radical right parties in CEE. | Ephil \* Libm |
| Presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party that also takes a position far from the centre of socio-cultural dimension contributes to electoral success of radical right parties in CEE. | Ephil \* - Libm |

4.2.2.1 High Levels of Unemployment *(UNEMP)*

Two hypotheses have been formulated concerning the impact of the problem of unemployment on the electoral success of radical right parties. The first hypothesis predicts that *a high level of unemployment contributes to the electoral performances of radical right parties in CEE.* Based on the ethnic competition approach,the second hypothesis assumes that *a high level of unemployment contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE where a large ethnic minority population is also present.*

One should not consider the level of unemployment during the month when the election is held, as, for example, a sudden increase in unemployment during this month may not affect (or have only a limited effect) on electoral preferences. To observe its impact on electoral preferences, the problem should be chronic. Ergo, this study follows the approach used by studies on economic voting, taking the average of unemployment levels over the one-year period before the election (e.g. Fidrmuc, 2000). This study does so for the countries by collecting data on unemployment levels generated by the International Labour Organization, which provides data on unemployment levels for over 200 countries. [[71]](#footnote-71)

Based on the data at hand, the countries under examination can be divided into four groups according to levels of unemployment from 2000 to 2010. The first group includes Poland and Slovakia, which experienced serious unemployment at levels always above the 10 per cent. The second group includes Hungary, in which unemployment worsened towards the end of the decade, increasing from around 6 per cent in the first half of the decade to over 10 per cent in 2010. The third group includes Bulgaria and Romania, in which the unemployment levels continuously improved. While more than 10 per cent were registered as unemployed in the early years of the decade, that percentage declined to 4.9 in Bulgaria and to 4.1 in Romania in November 2008. The last group includes the Czech Republic and Slovenia, whose unemployment levels remained below the 10 per cent throughout the decade.

The literature on economic voting suggests that unemployment begins to influence electoral preference when its level reaches double-digit numbers or at least 10 per cent (e.g. Fidrmuc, 2000: 212). In other words, countries with an unemployment level equal to 10 per cent or more should be regarded as *fully in the set of countries with the problem of unemployment.* These countries receive a fuzzy set membership score of 1. For the effective functioning of an economic system, an unemployment level of less than 4 per cent is tolerable. Hence, countries with an unemployment level equal to 4 per cent or below should be considered *fully out of the set of countries with the problem of unemployment.* Thus, these countries receive a fuzzy set membership score of 0. Based on the thresholds for *fully in* and *fully out*, the crossover point is set at 7 per cent. This point refers to a fuzzy set membership score of 0.5. Countries in which unemployment levels are below the crossover point (7 per cent) are classified as *more out than in the set of countries with the problem of unemployment.* To underline the quantitative difference between qualitatively identical countries *(more out of than in the set),* those with an unemployment level between 4 per cent and 5.5 per cent receive a fuzzy set membership score of 0.2, whereas those with an unemployment level greater than or equal to 5.5 per cent but less than 7 per cent receive a fuzzy set membership score of 0.4. The same procedure is followed for countries in which the unemployment level is above the crossover point. Because the unemployment level in these countries is less than 10 per cent but more than 7 per cent, they are *more in than out of the set of countries with the problem of unemployment.* Again, to highlight quantitative difference between qualitatively identical countries, those with an unemployment level above 7 per cent and less than or equal to 8.5 per cent receive a fuzzy set membership score of 0.6. Expectedly, those with an unemployment level equal to 8.6 per cent and above but less than 10 per cent receive a fuzzy set membership score of 0.8.

4.2.2.2 High Levels of Perceived Corruption *(CORR)*

As noted in chapters one and two, radical right parties try to create a distinct perception in the electorate’s mind that they are anti-corruption parties. This study formulates two hypotheses concerning the impact of corruption on the electoral success of radical right parties. The first hypothesis predicts that *a high level of perceived corruption contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties.* The second hypothesis assumes that citizens’ anger related to the problem of corruption becomes more intense when the problem coincides with high levels of unemployment. Thus, the hypothesis predicts that *a high level of perceived corruption contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties when it coincides with high levels of unemployment.*

Calibrating the data on the perception of corruption in the CEECs included in this study is an onerous task. On the one hand, as discussed earlier, the problem of corruption is ‘endemic’ to post-communist countries, including CEECs. Some citizens in these countries even consider the problem a cultural phenomenon.[[72]](#footnote-72) Privatization agreements have been at the centre of corruption allegations, as has been public procurement (Allnutt, et al. 2001: 126; Brusis, et al. 2003: 177). On the other hand, the problem of corruption has been alleviated in a few CEECs thanks to anti-corruption measures taken since the late 1990s. For example, some countries had ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and became the members of the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) by 2002.[[73]](#footnote-73) Therefore, the calibration of raw data should capture not the only the fact that the problem of corruption is ‘endemic’ to post-communist countries but also the progress taken in a few CEECs towards tackling with the problem effectively. The thresholds for *fully in, fully out* and *crossover* points should be determined accordingly.

Two approaches have been suggested in the literature on qualitative comparative analysis to decide anchor points. The first approach argues that these points should be determined in such a way that they reveal both qualitative and quantitative differences among the countries included in the analysis. Therefore, the threshold levels should be intrinsic to the countries of interest (Collier, 1998: 5; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 34). Implementing this approach in this study should capture the varying degrees of success of CEECs in dealing with the problem. For example, Slovenia, whose average score of which for the decade in the Transparency International Index is 6.1, should be considered *fully out of the set of countries with the problem of corruption*, whereas Romania, whose average score for the same decade is 3.1, should be considered to be *fully in the set of countries with the problem of corruption*. Yet, this approach is less capable of capturing the fact that the problem of corruption is endemic to post-communist countries, in that it not only treats Slovenia as though the country has fully eliminated the problem, but also treats Romania as though the country has not taken any steps to deal with the problem. Therefore, this study opts for the second approach, which suggests that anchor points should be determined on the basis of universally accepted criteria as much as possible (Ragin, 2008: 81, 82). This method appears to be more capable of taking into account not only that the problem is ‘endemic’ to the countries of interest, but also the variation in the success of the countries in coping with the problem.

The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index has measured the levels of perception of corruption country by country since the early 1990s.[[74]](#footnote-74) It places the countries on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 represents the most corrupt polity. Countries rarely if ever score either 10 or 0. For instance, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are examples of clean countries. The average scores for each country from 2000 to 2010 are 9.5, 9.4, 9.2 and 8.6, respectively.[[75]](#footnote-75) Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine are examples of corrupt countries. The average scores for each country for the same decade are 1.8, 2.04, 2.1, and 2.33, respectively. These scores suggest that no country can eliminate the problem of corruption completely. Yet, the problem of corruption is unlikely to be a reason for the Norwegian or Danish electorate to vote for radical right (Rydgren, 2002: 27; 2008: 740). Following this conclusion, this study sets the threshold for countries to be considered *to be fully out of the set of countries with the problem of corruption* at 8, which is the closest integer to Norway’s score. None of the countries of interest are surpass this threshold, since none reached that score during the decade from 2000 to 2010. Thus, such an anchor point captures the fact that the problem of corruption is ‘endemic’ to post-communist countries, including the countries of interest. The anchor point for *fully in the set of countries with the problem of corruption* is set at 2, which is the closest integer to the average scores for Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. These countries are similar to the countries of interest in that their attitudes could be judged as a legacy from their communist regimes, which some scholars consider the main source of corruption, as mentioned earlier. None of the countries of interest fell to this level during the decade; therefore, this anchor captures the progress they have taken to deal with the problem.

Based on the anchor points for *fully out* (the score of 8) and *fully in* (the score of 2), the crossover point is set at 5, which is also the mid-point of the scale ranging from 0 to 10. Countries with a score less than 5 but more than 2 are *more in than out of the set of countries with the problem of corruption*, whereas those with a score of more than 5 but less than 8 are *more out of than in the set of the countries with the problem of corruption.* To highlight the quantitative differences between qualitatively identical countries, those with a score more than 2 but less than 3.5 are given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.8, and those with a score equal to or greater than 3.5 but less than 5 are given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.6. For the same reason, countries with a score of more than 5 but less than 6.5 are given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.4, whereas those with a score of equal to or greater than 6.5 but less than 8 are given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.2.

4.2.2.3 Large Ethnic Minority Population *(ETHPOP)*

Remember that an opposition to multiculturalism is the essentially distinction between radical right parties and other families of political parties. As Husband (1992: 268) puts it, opposition to multiculturalism is their *raison* d’etre. For this reason, the operational definition gives priority to this feature over others in the identification of the parties in chapter two. Driven by their nativist understanding of society, radical right parties in CEECs formulate exclusionary policies towards not only constitutionally recognized minority populations but also the Roma population. Ergo, the hypothesis concerning this feature of the parties anticipates that *the presence of**a large minority group (and/or Roma people) contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE*.

There are different estimates for how the Roma population geographically spread across CEECs. This study relies on the estimation made by the Council of Europe’s ‘Special Representative Secretary General for Roma Issue (SRGS)’.[[76]](#footnote-76) The data on the other minority groups are collected from the database of the *Joshua Project*.[[77]](#footnote-77)

The literature generally argues that a minority population making up at least 5 per cent of a country’s population is statistically significant (Norris, 2005; Gherghina, and Jiglau, 2011). Following this, this study sets its crossover point at this level. As explained earlier, the countries of interest can be divided in two groups based on their national minority populations. The first group includes Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia. A Turkish minority makes up 8 per cent of the Bulgarian population. Hungarian minorities make up 6.6 per cent and 9.8 per cent of the Romanian and Slovak populations, respectively. In addition to these national minorities, the Roma people also make up a significant portion of the populations of the countries, including 9.94 per cent of the Bulgarian population, 9.02 per cent of the Slovak population, and 8.63 per cent of the Romanian population. Based on these figures, these countries are *fully in the set of countries with a large minority population*. They are coded with a fuzzy set membership score of 1, accordingly. The second group includes the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia. Neither the Roma population nor any other minority population makes up 5 per cent of the population in these countries. The Roma population makes up 1.9 per cent of the Czech population, 0.09 per cent of the Polish population and 0.41 per cent of the Slovenian population. Based on these data, these countries should be treated similarly in their qualitative classifications. Yet, because the number of Roma people in the Czech Republic is higher than that in either Poland or Slovenia, the former is given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.2, and Poland and Slovenia are coded with fuzzy set membership scores of 0. Thus the Czech Republic is *more out of than in* *the set of countries with a large minority population,* whereas the other two are *fully out of the set.*

A parenthesis should be added for the Hungarian case. This country has a Roma population that makes up 7.49 per cent of population. Accordingly, the country is considered *more in than out of the set of countries with a large ethnic minority population*. In a recent study on radical right parties, Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009) conclude that the Roma population is the easiest target for radical right parties since they do not have the economic or political power to challenge exclusionary policies. However, other national minorities who densely reside, for example in certain regions of Bulgaria or Romania, do not lack the wherewithal to response radical right parties. Based on this argument, Hungary is coded with a fuzzy-set membership score of 0.8 instead of the score of 0.6.

4.2.2.4 Presence of a Liberal Right wing Mainstream Party on Cultural Policies *(LIBM)*

Two conflicting approaches on how the interaction between right-wing mainstream parties and radical right parties affects the electoral performance of the latter were mentioned in the previous chapters. Proponents of these approaches advise right-wing mainstream parties to formulate strategies for a ‘war of attrition’ against the radical right parties. The advice takes two different forms, however, illustrating contrasting approaches to tapering off radical right parties’ electoral support. The first approach argues that right-wing mainstream parties should hold a similar position to that of radical right parties in order to easily attract supporters of the latter. Proponents of the second approach, however, argues that this is not a foolproof strategy on the grounds that it ultimately increases the saliency of issues that radical right ideology can readily accommodate. By contrast, the second approach purports that such issues should not be the subjects of party competition. Instead, other parties should mute them, lest they play a role in shaping electoral preferences. If this happens, the electorate will perceive the extremist rhetoric of radical right parties as too marginal.

Keeping in mind the conflicting arguments of the two approaches, and considering the fact that socio-cultural issues are of paramount importance to radical right parties, this study formulates two hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts that *the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following culturally illiberal policies reduces the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties.* The second hypothesis predicts the opposite. It suggests that *the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following culturally illiberal policies increases the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties.*

Pop Eleches (2010: 225) defines mainstream parties as those whose electoral appeal lies in a ‘recognizable and moderate ideological platform rather than [in] the personality of the party leader or extremist rhetoric’. Party systems have generally been fluid in CEECs since the end of the communist regimes. Splits, formations of new parties and sudden increases or decreases in electoral support all occur frequently. This renders necessary a brief discussion on left-wing and right-wing mainstream parties in CEECs during the decade from 2000 to 2010. The Czech Social Democratic Party gradually emerged as the left–wing mainstream party in the country after the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation (Enyedi and Bertoa, 2011: 123- 124). On the opposite side, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which was a part of the anti-communist Civic Forum movement, emerged as the country’s right-wing mainstream party in the country (Hanley, 2004a: 29; Vachudova, 2008: 393). The Hungarian Socialist Party - the successor to the ex-communist party – appeared as the left-wing mainstream party. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Fidesz has taken its place as the right- wing mainstream party, particularly since the 2002 election. Similarly, the ex-communist party in Poland, the Alliance of Democratic Left, emerged as the left-wing mainstream party. On the opposite side, the Law and Justice Party has been the right-wing mainstream party since the 2001 election. (March and Mudde, 2005: 28; Enyedi and Bertoa, 2011: 123 and 125). The Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) came out of the transition period as the pivotal party and dominated Slovenian politics during the 1990s. Yet, the 2004 election marked the diminishing importance of the party and the emergence of a bipolar structure. On the left, the Social Democrats (SD) emerged as the left-wing mainstream party. On the right, the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) became the country’s right-wing mainstream party (Enyedi and Bertoa, 2011: 123). Vladimir Meciar’s nationalist-populist Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) dominated the politics of the country during much of the 1990s. Opposition to HZDS came from the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), which is strongly associated with Catholicism. In early 2000, KDH split on the account of disagreements between its moderate and traditionalist factions. This division left the traditionalist faction, which remained in the party, in a marginal position, while making the moderate faction, which formed the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) in 2000 the right-wing mainstream party of the country (Haughton and Rybar, 2004: 118 – 121 and 125-126). SDKU emerged as the party with the most electoral support as well as a major member of the two successive coalition governments from the 1998 and 2002 elections. In all five countries, the former communist parties either transformed themselves into social democratic parties and became the left-wing mainstream parties, or significantly lost their importance during the 1990s. The story, however, is different in Bulgaria and Romania, reflecting the wide range of patrimonial communist regimes of the Cold War years.[[78]](#footnote-78) In these countries, the former communist parties turned into political parties that Vachudova (2008: 394) calls ‘nationalist-communist’, though they renamed themselves the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD).[[79]](#footnote-79) Despite the fact that these parties gradually moderated their authoritarian leaning cultural policies throughout the decade, in part due to EU pressure, they pursued cultural policies in much the same way that right-wing mainstream parties did in some of the other countries of interest. The decision to consider these two parties as the nearby rivals of radical right parties can be challenged on the grounds that they have turned into a social democratic parties, which have established transnational networks within the Socialist International. This study acknowledges this as a valid criticism, yet the Chapel Hill expert surveys used in this study as the main source for determining party positions on socio-cultural issues reveal that both BSP and PSD followed more authoritarian (TAN) policies than did those parties labelled right-wing in Bulgaria (National Movement for Stability and Progress [NSDV by 2005] and Citizens for Democratic Development of Bulgaria) and in Romania (National Liberal Party [PNL]).[[80]](#footnote-80)

Based on this brief summary, the following parties are taken into account as the right-wing mainstream parties: the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Civic Democratic Party (the Czech Republic), Fidesz (Hungary), the Law and Justice Party (Poland), the Social Democratic Party (Romania), the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, and the Slovenian Democratic Party. To measure the positions of the parties within the socio-cultural dimension of party competition, this study uses the Chapel Hill expert surveys conducted in 2002, 2006 and 2010. The survey (2006) explains the difference between the libertarian (GAL) and authoritarian (TAN) sides of this dimension as follows: ‘“Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favour expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or ”authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues’. The survey asks experts to place the political parties on a 10-point scale, with values larger than 5 indicating the TAN parties.

The calibration of the raw data on right-wing mainstream parties’ positions in the socio-cultural dimension of party competition is straightforward, completely relying on the scale. A position less than or equal to 5 or below is *fully in the set of countries in which the right-wing mainstream party follows culturally liberal policies.* The position that is equal to 10 is *fully out of the set of countries in which the right-wing mainstream party follows culturally liberal policies.* Following these two anchor points, the crossover point is set at 7.5. The position between 5 and 7.5 is *more in than out of the set of countries* *in which the right-wing mainstream party follows culturally liberal policies.* To highlight quantitative difference within this set, the position less than or equal to 6.2 but more than 5 is coded with a fuzzy set membership score of 0.8. The position less than or equal to 7.4 but more than 6.2 is given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.6. The position between 7.5 and 10 is *more out of than in the set of countries in which the right-wing mainstream party follows culturally liberal policies.* Again to reveal quantitative difference within this set, the position less than or equal to 8.7 but more than 7.5 is coded with a fuzzy set membership score of 0.4. The position less than or equal to 9.9 but more than 8.7 is given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.2.

4.2.2.5 Presence of a Europhile Right-wing Mainstream Party on Europeanization *(EPHILM)*

Radical right ideology does not willingly support the Europeanization process. According to this ideology, the process has had a malign influence on national sovereignty and national culture. Driven by this idea, radical right parties appeal to voters who do not support Europeanization. Furthermore, they can take advantage of the fact that most-right wing mainstream parties are Europhile in CEECs. As a result, the Europeanization process could potentially increase the electoral strength of radical right parties. In spite of this possibility, the question of how the Europeanization process affects the electoral performance of radical right parties has not been studied adequately in the literature. This study formulates three hypotheses concerning this potential impact of Europeanization. The first hypothesis assumes that voters take Europeanization as a single issue and predicts that *the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE.* The second and third hypotheses assume the Europeanization issue is embedded in the domestic dimensions of party competition. The second hypothesis anticipates that *the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party that also takes a position close to the centre of the socio-cultural dimension contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE*. The third hypothesis predicts that *the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party that also takes a position far from the centre of the socio-cultural dimension contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE.*

This study uses the Chapel Hill expert survey series to grasp the right-wing mainstream parties’ positions on Europeanization The survey asks experts to place the parties on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour). The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) was the leading Eurosceptic right-wing mainstream party in the countries of interest throughout the decade. The position less than or equal to 2 - the point closest to the ODS’s position – is *fully out of the set of countries with a Europhile right-wing mainstream party*. The position greater than or equal to 6 is *fully in the set of countries with a Europhile right-wing mainstream party.* This point is to close to the position of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), which is described as the prototype of a Europhile party in the literature on party-based Euroscepticism (e.g. Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 27 fn.9; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004: 13; Henderson, 2008). Point 4 is set as the crossover point, which is also the mid-point of the scale. The position between 2 and 4 is *more out of than in the set of countries with a Europhile right-wing mainstream party.* To highlight quantitative difference within this category, the position greater than 2 but less than 3 is coded with a fuzzy set membership score of 0.2. Accordingly, the position greater than or equal to 3 but less than 4 is given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.4. The position between 4 and 6 is *more in than out* *of* *the set of countries with a Europhile right-wing mainstream party.* Again, to highlight quantitative differences, the position more than 4 but less than 5 is coded with a fuzzy set membership score of 0.6. Finally, the position greater than or equal to 5 or but less than 6 is assigned by a fuzzy set membership score of 0.8.

**Table 4.3** Raw Data and Fuzzy Set membership in the Causal Conditions

**Demand Side Conditions**  **Supply Side Conditions**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | UNEMP | | CORR | | ETHPOP | | LIBM | | EPHILM | |
| CASE | Data % | Fuzzy Score | Data | Fuzzy Score | Data % | Fuzzy Score | Data | Fuzzy Score | Data | Fuzzy Score |
| BUL2005 | 10.9 | 1 | 4 | 0.6 | 17.94\* | 1 | BSP 5.8 | 0.8 | 6.46 | 1 |
| BUL2009 | 5.8 | 0.4 | 3.8 | 0.6 | 17.94 | 1 | BSP 6.2 | 0.8 | 6 | 1 |
| CZE2002 | 8.7 | 0.8 | 3.7 | 0.6 | 1.9\*\* | 0.2 | ODS 3.88 | 1 | 3.77 | 0.4 |
| CZE2006 | 7.6 | 0.6 | 4.8 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 0.2 | ODS 5.0 | 1 | 2.8 | 0.2 |
| CZE2010 | 7.3 | 0.6 | 4.6 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 0.2 | ODS 6.1 | 0,8 | 3 | 0.4 |
| HUN2002 | 5.6 | 0.4 | 4.9 | 0.6 | 7.49\*\* | 0.8 | Fidesz 8.15 | 0.4 | 4.64 | 0.6 |
| HUN2006 | 7.3 | 0.6 | 5.2 | 0.4 | 7.49 | 0.8 | Fidesz 7 | 0.6 | 5.5 | 0.8 |
| HUN2010 | 10.6 | 1 | 4.7 | 0.6 | 7.49 | 0.8 | Fidesz 7.2 | 0.6 | 5.35 | 0.8 |
| POL2001 | 17.5 | 1 | 4.1 | 0.6 | 0.09\*\* | 0 | PiS 7.75 | 0.4 | 4.75 | 0.6 |
| POL2005 | 17 | 1 | 3.4 | 0.8 | 0.09 | 0 | PiS 9.5 | 0.2 | 3.5 | 0.4 |
| POL2007 | 10.4 | 1 | 4.2 | 0.6 | 0.09 | 0 | PiS 8.86 | 0.2 | 2.93 | 0.2 |
| ROM2000 | 11.2 | 1 | 2.9 | 0.8 | 15.23++ | 1 | PSD 6.2 | 0.8 | 6.1 | 1 |
| ROM2004 | 6.9 | 0.4 | 2.9 | 0.8 | 15.23 | 1 | PSD 6.5 | 0.6 | 6.2 | 1 |
| ROM2008 | 4 | 0 | 3.8 | 0.6 | 15.23 | 1 | PSD 5.5 | 0.8 | 6.13 | 1 |
| SLK2002 | 18.0 | 1 | 3.7 | 0.6 | 18.82++ | 1 | SDKU 3.53 | 1 | 7 | 1 |
| SLK2006 | 11.1 | 1 | 4.7 | 0.6 | 18.82 | 1 | SDKU 4.5 | 1 | 6.07 | 1 |
| SLK2010 | 12.4 | 1 | 4.3 | 0.6 | 18.82 | 1 | SDKU 5.14 | 0.8 | 5.2 | 0.8 |
| SLV2000 | 6.7 | 0.4 | 5.5 | 0.4 | 0.41\*\* | 0 | SDKU 5.8 | 0.8 | 6.4 | 1 |
| SLV2004 | 9.2 | 0.8 | 6 | 0.4 | 0.41 | 0 | SDKU 7.4 | 0.6 | 6.4 | 1 |
| SLV2008 | 6.9 | 0.4 | 6.6 | 0.2 | 0.41 | 0 | SDKU 7.75 | 0.4 | 5.81 | 0.8 |

\* Roma and Turkish population in Bulgaria.

\*\* Roma population in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.

++ Roma and Hungarian population in Romania and Slovakia

**4.3 Fuzzy set QCA analysis of the Electoral Success**

The Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE states begins with an analysis of necessary conditions. The aim of this analysis is to find out if any of the conditions is necessary. A condition is necessary if the achievement of electoral success by a radical right party depends on the presence of that condition. In other words, electoral success does not occur in the absence of the condition. Once the analysis of necessary conditions has been conducted, the analysis proceeds to an analysis of sufficient conditions. The aim of this analysis is to reveal which condition or combination of conditions is sufficient to yield the electoral success of radical right parties. Using a truth table showing all combinations of conditions, the analysis of sufficient conditions provides three types of solution terms explaining the occurrence of the outcome of interest. These solution formulae are ‘the most parsimonious solution term’, ‘the complex solution term’ (also known as ‘the conservative solution’), and ‘the intermediate solution term’.

A complex solution is derived from those truth table rows that are empirically observable and coded as sufficient for the occurrence of a particular outcome.[[81]](#footnote-81) The main problem with this solution term is that it does not take into account counterfactuals (logical remainders) in the truth table. A parsimonious solution term eliminates this problem, being derived from all truth table rows except those regarded as insufficient for the occurrence of the outcome of interest. Yet, the parsimonious solution formula assumes counterfactuals that conflict with the results of the analysis of necessary conditions to be sufficient for the outcome. Remember that if there is a necessary condition (or conditions), the outcome of interest cannot occur in the absence of that condition (or conditions). An intermediate solution term is immune from the abovementioned methodological problems. It is derived from empirically observable rows that are sufficient to yield the outcome and ‘easy counterfactuals’ that do not conflict with the analysis of necessity. [[82]](#footnote-82) Therefore, the discussion of the study’s findings is based on the intermediate solution formula.

Because set theoretic methods are asymmetric, an ‘explanation for the non-occurrence of the outcome cannot automatically be derived from the explanation for the occurrence of the outcome’ (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 6). Therefore, a separate analysis of sufficiency for the non-occurrence of the outcome is conducted. The chapter thereafter conducts two robustness tests. Besides measuring the extent to which the solution formula is robust, the first robustness test aims to eliminate one limitation of this study by including the electoral system as one of the conditions.

4.3.1 The Analysis of Necessity

The analysis of necessary conditions seeks to determine whether a single condition (or the absence of it) is necessary to produce the outcome. If a condition is proved to be necessary, it must be a component of each sufficient path leading to the occurrence of the outcome. Nevertheless, because the set theoretic method is asymmetric, the necessary condition for the occurrence of the outcome may occur in some paths that lead to the non-occurrence of the outcome. If this happens, it does not conflict with the result of the analysis of necessary conditions for the occurrence of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 70). The necessary condition is important in the sense that it has to be present in all cases where the outcome occurs. In fuzzy set QCA, a condition is defined as necessary as long as it has a consistency threshold that is more than 0.9 (Ragin, 2006: 297-298). Table 4.4 shows the results of the analysis of necessary conditions for the present study. The result of the analysis of necessary conditions for CEECs where radical right parties did not achieve electoral success during the decade from 2000 to 2010 is given in the Appendix 1.

**Table 4.4** Analysis of Necessary Condition for *SUCCESS*

Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Outcome variable: success

Conditions tested:

Consistency Coverage

unemp 0.836364 0.638889

~unemp 0.327273 0.642857

corr 0.745454 0.719298

~corr 0.563636 0.720930

ethpop 0.672727 0.672727

~ethpop 0.363636 0.444444

libm 0.800000 0.647059

~libm 0.454545 0.781250

ephilm **0.927273 0.680000**

~ephilm 0.200000 0.440000

The analysis of necessary conditions suggests that the electoral successes achieved by radical right parties during the decade from 2000 to 2010 were due in part to the position of mainstream right-wing parties on the issue of Europeanization. It is the only condition that passes the test of analysis of necessary conditions with its consistency value of 0.92. The coverage value of the condition, which shows the relation in size between sets of Europhile mainstream parties and sets of electorally successful radical right parties, is 0.68. This coverage value further indicates that the condition is not a trivial one.[[83]](#footnote-83)The result of the test appears to buttress the hypothesis that *the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE*.

None of the other conditions emerged as necessary conditions. At the very least, this confirms the controversy over findings concerning the impact of the conditions on the electoral successes of radical right parties in the literature, discussed at greater length in chapter three. Another conclusion is that the presence of each condition makes greater contribution to the occurrence of the outcome than their absence, because the consistency scores for the presence of each condition are higher than those for the absence of each condition. That is to say, the presence of unemployment, corruption, minority groups, and liberal right-wing mainstream parties are more likely to contribute to the electoral performance of radical right parties. Another conclusion is the fact that *the presence of large ethnic minority population* is not a necessary condition. This shows that, though opposition to multiculturalism is the most distinctive feature of the radical right parties, their electoral successes are not confined to countries with large ethnic minority populations. They can also achieve electoral success in countries without a large ethnic minority population.

4.3.2 Analysis of Sufficiency

Remember that this fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis includes five conditions - three demand-side conditions and two supply-side conditions. Ergo, the truth table has thirty-two rows (25). Each row shows a possible combination of the five conditions. This analysis includes twenty cases (national parliamentary elections) in total. The twenty cases fall into ten truth table rows (see table: 4.5). Thus, there are twenty-two logical remainders (cases that are logically possible, but not observable empirically). Remember that logical remainders emerge when the total number of rows in the truth table outnumbers the cases at hand (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 153).

**Table 4.5** Configurations of Conditions for Radical Right Parties *SUCCESS*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Conf. | Unemp | Corr | Ethpop | Libm | Ephilm | Number\* | Success | Consistency |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.875000 |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.846154 |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 0.833333 |
| 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.772727 |
| 5 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.700000 |
| 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0.692308 |
| 7 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0.687500 |
| 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.684210 |
| 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.666667 |
| 10 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0.417650 |

\* Cases: SLV2008 (first row)

POL2001 (second row)

BUL2005, HUN2010, ROM2000, SLK2002, SLK2006, SLK2010 (third row)

HUN2006 (fourth row)

HUN2002 (fifth row)

POL2005, POL2007 (sixth row)

BUL2009, ROM2004, ROM2008 (seventh row)

SLV2004 (eighth row)

SLV2000 (ninth row)

CZE2002, CZE2006, CZE2010 (tenth row)

Schneider and Wagemann, (2012: 127) suggest that truth table rows with a minimum consistency score of 0.75 should ideally be included in the test of sufficient conditions. As seen in table 4.5, the fourth row in the truth table has a consistency score above 0.75. As mentioned earlier, the analysis of sufficient conditions produces three different solution formulas. The first formula is the complex (conservative) formula. It is based on only the first four rows, in which the pillar of success is coded 1. The second formula is the parsimonious formula. It is based on not only the first four rows but also all counterfactuals (11th rows to 32nd rows). Remember that the problem with the parsimonious solution formula is that it includes all counterfactuals that conflict with the result of the analysis of necessary conditions. That is to say, it treats the truth table rows in which the condition *ephilm* is absent as if they were sufficient for the electoral success of radical right parties. The third formula is the intermediate solution formula. It is based not only on the first four rows in the truth table but also on the counterfactuals that do not conflict with the result of the analysis for necessary conditions. Finally, the truth table rows in which the pillar of success is coded 0 (i.e. from the 5th row to the 10th row) are excluded from the production of all three types of solution formulae due to their consistency scores of less than 0.75.

Table 4.6 presents the intermediate solution formulae of the analysis of sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the outcome. The full output report showing all three types of solution formulae is given in Appendix 2. As mentioned earlier, a separate analysis of sufficient conditions for the non-occurrence of the outcome is needed, as the QCA is an asymmetric method (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 279). In this analysis, special care must be taken not to include a truth table row that has already been included in the analysis of sufficiency for the occurrence of the outcome. Otherwise, a methodological problem occurs as a result of including the same combination of conditions for the occurrence of the outcome as for its non-occurrence. Table 4.7 presents the results of the analysis of sufficient conditions for the non-occurrence of the outcome. The full output report of this analysis, showing all three types of solution formulae, is given in Appendix3.

**Table 4.6** Intermediate Solution Formulas for *SUCCESS* (S)

ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop + ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp 🡪 SUCCESS (S)

Raw Coverage 0.254545 0.509091

Unique Coverage 0.200000 0.454545

Consistency 0.875000 0.756757

Covered Cases\* POL2001, SLV2008 SLK2002, SLK2006, SLK2010

ROM2000, BUL2005,

HUN2006, HUN2010

Solution Consistency 0.795918

Solution Coverage 0.709091

Uncovered Cases\*\* SLV2000, SLV2004, POL2005,

ROM2004, BUL2009

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

\* Cases with membership in path > 0.5

\*\* Cases with membership in solution < 0.5 and outcome > 0.5

**Table 4.7** Intermediate Solution Formulas for *Non- SUCCESS* (~S)

~ephilm\*libm\*~ethpop ~libm\*ethpop\*~unemp 🡪 Non-Success(~S)

Raw Coverage 0.355556 0.177778

Unique Coverage 0.288889 0.111111

Consistency 0.888889 0.800000

Covered Cases Cze2002, CZE2006 HUN2002

CZE2010

Solution Consistency: 0.840000

Solution Coverage: 0.466667

Uncovered Cases: HUN2006, SLK2002

POL2007, ROM2008

4.3.2.1 Discussion

As seen in table 4.6, the intermediate solution formula of the analysis of sufficient conditions includes two paths for the occurrence of the electoral success of radical right parties in national parliamentary election held in CEECs during the decade from 2000 to 2010. The consistency score of the solution formula, which expresses the extent to which the paths answer the question, is 0.79. Its coverage score, which shows how many of the electoral successes are explained, is 0.70. The raw coverage scores for each path, 0.25 and 0.50 respectively, show how many of electoral successes are explained by each path.

Remember that the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party (*ephilm)* is a necessary condition for the outcome. In line with this, both paths include *ephilm* as a component of the combinations. Apart from the condition *ephilm*, each condition that is present in either the first path or in the second path is labelled an INUS condition in QCA terminology. An INUS condition is a single condition‘that is insufficient for producing the outcome on its own but which is a necessary part of a conjunction that, in turn, is unnecessary but sufficient for producing the outcome’ (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 328). The INUS conditions include *~libm* and *~ethpop* in the first path and *libm*, *ethpop*, and *unemp* in the second path.

The first path combines three conditions: *ephilm*, the absence of a right-wing mainstream party following (relatively) culturally liberal policies(~libm)*,* and the absence of a large ethnic minority group (and/or Roma people)(*~ethpop*). The second path combines four conditions: *ephilm,* the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following (relatively) culturally liberal policies *(libm),* and the presence of a large ethnic minority group (and/or Roma people)(*ethpop*), and the presence of high levels of unemployment (*unemp)*. The first path (*ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop*) accounts for two electoral successes of radical right parties: that of the League of Polish Families (LPR) in the 2001 parliamentary election and that of the Slovene National Party (SNS) in the 2008 parliamentary election. The second path (*ephilm\*ethpop\*libm\*unemp*) accounts for the five electoral successes. Two of these electoral successes are those of the Slovak National Party (Slovak NS) in the 2006 and 2010 parliamentary elections. The third is that of the Greater Romania Party (PRM) in the 2000 parliamentary election. The fourth is that of the Bulgarian Nation Union Party (ATAKA) in the 2005 parliamentary election. The last one is the electoral success of the Movement for Better Hungary (JOBBIK) in the 2010 parliamentary election. This path covers two ‘deviant cases’, which means that the outcome did not occur despite the presence of the proposed configuration. The first deviant case is the electoral failure of the alliance formed by the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) and JOBBIK in the 2006 parliamentary election. The second deviant case is the electoral failure of Slovak NS in the 2002 parliamentary election.

An obvious result of this study is that the presence of a large ethnic minority group or immigrant population is not a necessary condition for the electoral success of radical right parties. Nativism forms the core of radical right party programs, which are bent on appealing to nativist voters with their exclusionary discourses against ethnic minorities. In the second chapter, ‘opposition to multicultural society’ is underlined as the most distinctive feature of radical right parties. In terms of policies, these parties’ anti-minority/immigrant rights stances embody their intolerance of multi-cultural societies. As a result, most of the earlier studies in the literature focus on countries that include a large ethnic minority or immigrant group. These studies repeatedly highlight the central role of social tensions between native citizens and ethnic minorities or immigrant populations in the parties’ electoral success (e.g. Knigge, 1998; Williams, 1999; Anastasakis, 2002; Minkenberg, 2002; Arzheimer, 2009). Similarly, in a review of studies in the literature on radical right in West Europe, Rydgren (2007: 250) came to the conclusion that ‘[e]ven if not all voters who hold anti-immigration attitudes vote for a new radical right party, most voters who do vote for such parties hold such attitudes’. The first path, however, shows that radical right parties can achieve electoral success in a country that does not include a large ethnic minority group or immigrant population. That is to say, the presence of a large ethnic minority group or immigrant population is not a necessary condition. [[84]](#footnote-84) Instead, it is a context-setting condition.

The first path suggests that in countries without a large ethnic minority group or immigrant population, the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party with an illiberal position led to the electoral success of radical right parties. This is in line with the approach predicting that the narrowing gap between the mainstream right-wing party and the radical right within the socio-cultural dimension of party competition not only increases the saliency of issues in elections that radical right ideology could readily accommodate (e.g. the restriction of minority rights, the protection of [patriarchal] family values, and of law and order through strict rules, and a strong emphasis on national sovereignty) but also legitimizes such policies in the eyes of the electorate. Despite holding an illiberal position on socio-cultural policies in domestic politics, providing support for EU policies (even for economic concerns) in international politics lessens the reliance of nativist voters on right-wing mainstream parties. Consequently, radical right parties that can develop a tangible link between their illiberal policies and Eurosceptic policies are likely to have a chance of appealing to nativist voters. For example, steps toward further EU integration, which increases the power of EU institutions over national institutions, may increase the electoral support for radical right parties if right-wing mainstream party in that country supports this process but hold an illiberal position on socio-cultural policies. Thus, in countries without a large ethnic minority group or immigrant population, a right-wing mainstream party’s illiberal position on socio-cultural issues may act as the functional equivalent of the presence a large ethnic minority group or immigrant population, thus creating electoral demand for radical right parties.

The second path offers an explanation for the electoral success of radical right parties in countries with a large ethnic minority or immigrant group. Irrespective of supply-side conditions (which were important in the first path), there is a large (latent) electoral demand for radical right parties in such countries, mostly due to the cultural differences between the native population and the ethnic minority or immigrant groups (Mudde, 2010: 1178, 1179). When a right-wing mainstream party’s support for liberal cultural policies in such countries coincides with its support for the EU’s liberal cultural policies, radical right parties have a chance to meet the nativist demands of a certain segment of the electorate. The second path also suggests that high levels of unemployment increase electoral support for radical right parties. This finding is consistent with studies attributing the electoral success of radical right parties in West Europe to socio-economic reasons (i.e. blaming ethnic minority or immigrant groups for economic problems) (Golder, 2003). Nevertheless, this study prefers to remain sceptical as to whether radical right parties’ electoral success in West Europe is associated with socio-economic problems, given the findings suggesting that socio-cultural conditions far outweigh socio-economic conditions in explaining the electoral success of radical right parties in West Europe (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2005, Norris, 2005, Mudde, 2007). Furthermore, as discussed below at greater length, this path covers the least economically developed CEECs among those included in this study (except Hungary, which experienced serious economic problems such as rising unemployment due to the Euro-crisis starting in 2009).

The more specific interpretation of the paths should shed light on why the intersections of the conditions led to radical right parties’ electoral success in countries included in this study. Toward that end, the discussion begins with the question of how the intersection of the conditions can be narrated for each path. From a counterfactual perspective, the discussion thereafter focuses on the question of how radical right parties’ electoral success might have been prevented. Finally, the discussion will summarize three main conclusions with respect to the hypotheses given in table 4.2. Besides the intersection of the conditions, a discussion on the individual role of each condition in increasing the chance of electoral success for radical right parties is also needed. This discussion is reserved for the fifth and sixth chapters that focus on some typical cases and deviant cases.

The intersection of the conditions in the first path can be narrated - in terms of the two cases the path covers - as follows: Right-wing mainstream parties in Poland and Slovenia, namely the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the Slovene Democratic Party (SDS), took an illiberal position within the socio-cultural dimension of party competition. As mainstream parties, they had more chances of appearing in the media than did minor parties. By taking an illiberal position within this dimension, both parties might have had the prospect of waging a ‘war of attrition’ against radical right parties. That is to say, they might have aimed to attract the supporters of radical right parties with minimal effort. However, the path suggests that this was not a foolproof strategy. Their illiberal position increased the salience of issues such as the protection of national identity and culture, and the promotion of traditional ways of life and family relations. Remember that these are issues that radical right ideology could readily accommodate. Furthermore, right-wing mainstream parties’ illiberal positions served to legitimize radical right parties in the eyes of the electorate. For example, the PiS committed itself to restoring law and order in the country through strict punishment and protecting national identity defined in terms of Catholic Christian values under its ideology labelled ‘Polonism’ (Pankowski, 2010: 154). These commitments were essentially the same as those of the LPR. With its fierce opposition to EU membership and strong loyalty to Catholic principles, the party almost became second to none in terms of these issues. Similarly, SDS was opposed to granting Slovene citizenship to citizens of the Former Yugoslav Republics (despite the decision of the Constitutional Court), whose registrations were erased without any official notice on the grounds that they did not apply for Slovene citizenship in 1991 when the country gained its independence (Bugaric, 2008: 194). The SDS was also against the construction of Slovenia’s first mosque, a demand of the Muslim minority in the country (Flere, 2004: 156). The leader of the party, Janez Jansa, was one of the two party leaders, along with Zmoga Jelincic, the leader of SNS, who participated in an anti-Roma protest in 2004 (BBC Monitoring European, 28 May 2004).

Some scholars argue that right-wing mainstream parties should take a close position to that of radical right parties if they want to stifle the electoral success of the latter (e.g. Kitschelt, 1995; Abedi, 2002; Rydgren, 2005; Van der Brug et al, 2005; Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2009). If so, why did the illiberal positions of the right-wing mainstream parties in Poland and Slovenia fail to leave the radical right parties on the ropes? The answer to this question lies in the combination of the illiberal position and the lack of large ethnic minority populations in Poland and Slovenia (~*ethpop*). Contrary to expectations, the adoption of illiberal socio-cultural policies by right-wing mainstream parties increases the saliency of issues owned by radical right parties related to their nativist ideology. Consequently, right-wing mainstream parties unwittingly cause the emergence of an electoral demand for radical right parties amongst the nativist segment of the electorate. Thus, in these countries, the illiberal positions of right-wing mainstream parties on socio-cultural issues act as a functional equivalent to the presence of large ethnic minority or immigrant groups. Accordingly, in countries without a large ethnic minority population, right-wing mainstream parties should take liberal positions in order to ultimately keep illiberal discourses at bay, thereby undermining the electoral credibility of radical right parties promoting extreme and exclusionary cultural policies in society.

Leaving aside the fact that right-wing mainstream parties’ illiberal positions increased the electoral strength of radical right parties in countries without a large ethnic minority population, the former’s Europhile position on the issue of Europeanization appears to have been at least as important in allowing the latter to achieve electoral success. As mentioned in the previous chapter, various studies in the literature on EU-issue voting conclude that the issue of Europeanization can affect electoral preferences not only in European Parliamentary elections but also in national parliamentary elections (Tillman, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Dechezelles and Neumayer, 2010; Sum, 2010; De Vries and Tillman, 2011). Remember that CEECs experienced the process of Europeanization starting in the late 1990s. During that period, both PiS and SDS held a Europhile positions on the issue. They advised their supporters to cast a ‘yes’ vote in EU accession referenda. The PiS campaigned in the referendum under the banner of ‘A Strong Poland in Europe’. At the time, the leader of the PiS, Jaroslaw Kacyznski, argued that ‘Poland’s integration with the EU would make it possible for the country to exert influence on European economy and international politics’ (BBC Monitoring European, 27 April 2003). Similarly, SDS’s leader, Janez Jansa, labelled Slovene membership as a good development at the ceremony, which was organized to celebrate the country’s admission to the EU. As a result, LPR and SNS became the only right-wing parties who could conceivably appeal to conservative voters who were doubtful about EU membership primarily for cultural reasons. For example, the LPR urged its supporters to cast a “no” vote in the EU accession referendum. The leader of SNS, Jelincic, refused to attend the celebration on the grounds that ‘only good deals are celebrated and accession to the European group was a bad deal’ (BBC Monitoring European, 1 May 2004).

Neither corruption nor unemployment appears in the first path that covers Polish and Slovene elections. This result buttresses the argument that it is socio-cultural issues - not economic issues- that play an important role in leading to the electoral success of radical right parties in Poland and Slovenia (Hockenos, 1993, Ramet, 1999, Minkenberg, 2002, Mudde, 2007; Van der Brug et al. 2000: 89). This result conflicts with the argument that corruption (Bustikova, 2009) and/or unemployment (Jackman and Volpert, 1996) contributes to the electoral strength of radical right parties. In addition, both supply-side conditions included in this analysis are parts of the first path, whereas no demand-side conditions appear. This result suggests that supply-side conditions rather than demand-side conditions determine the electoral success of radical right parties in Poland and Slovenia.

The second path suggests that when mainstream right-wing parties in countries with large ethnic minorities take an illiberal position within the socio-cultural dimension of party competition, they can eliminate the radical right parties from the ranks of electorally successful parties. The latter would otherwise appeal to nativist voters and have a better chance of achieving electoral success. This result conflicts with the argument that right-wing mainstream parties should avoid holding an illiberal position so as not to increase in the saliency of those socio-cultural issues easily accommodated by radical right parties (e.g. Budge, 1987, Ignazi, 1992, Lubbers et al, 2002; Norris, 2005; Veugelers and Magnan, 2005). The answer to the question of how high levels of unemployment and the Europeanization process increase the electoral strength of radical right parties lies in radical right parties’ ability to make a connection between these two factors and the presence of ethnic minorities. For example, the unemployment level increased in Hungary soon after the Euro crisis broke out in 2009. JOBBIK successfully blamed the problem on the Roma population leading up to the 2010 parliamentary election (Dunai, 2010). This conclusion confirms the argument that unemployment increases electoral support for radical right parties in countries with large ethnic minority population (Golder, 2003). The fact that the crisis came from Europe made the JOBBIK’s alternative foreign policy called *Turanism* conceivable to a certain segment of the conservative electorate. As Akcali and Korkut (2012) put it, *Turanism* was bent on strengthening economic, cultural and political relations within the Uralo-Atlantic community and stifling Hungary’s alliance with the Euro-Atlantic community.

Besides Hungary, the second path covers Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia. It is not a coincidence that all these countries have economically lagged behind the other CEECs included in this study. Considering this fact, the argument that high levels of unemployment contributed to the electoral success of radical right parties in these three countries makes sense. Radical right parties in the countries were also successful in combining their critiques of the Europeanization process with the presence of ethnic minority populations. For example, the Slovak NS opposed specific EU minority protection policies, arguing that generous minority policies would ultimately endanger the territorial integrity of the country (Bustikova, 2009: 229). The fact that the Slovak NS was the only party voicing this argument made the party the most credible ‘hard Eurosceptic’ actor in Slovak politics (Rybar, 2006: 271; Henderson, 2008: 281). Similarly, ATAKA’s critiques of Europeanization have been largely due to the generous minority policies of the EU. Like its counterpart in Slovakia, ATAKA was the only party formulating this negative approach to EU membership on the eve of the 2005 parliamentary election (Nedelcheva, 2009: 248). The illiberal Bulgarian Socialist Party had already gone to considerable length to transform itself into a ‘social democratic party’ by the 2005 election, in good part due to pressures coming from the EU. At this opportune moment, ATAKA successfully appealed to Eurosceptic voters (Spirova, 2006: 618). Indeed, 11 per cent of the ATAKA’s supporters in the 2005 parliamentary election had voted for the Bulgarian Socialist Party in the 2001 parliamentary election (Ghodsee, 2008: 31).

The right-wing mainstream parties in Hungary and Romania were also Europhile.[[85]](#footnote-85) The Social Democratic Party of Romania used slogans such as ‘*Together for Europe’* in the 2000 and 2004 parliamentary elections (Octavian, 2008: 278). Similarly, Fidesz urged its supporters to vote for membership in the accession referendum (Batory, 2008: 272). Yet, in contrast to what radical right ideology would predict, the PRM and JOBBIK were less opposed to EU membership than their counterparts in other CEECs. The main explanation for the PRM’s moderate position was its aim to protect Romania against Russian influence (Cinpoes, 2010: 104).[[86]](#footnote-86) One could certainly call this a rational decision, considering the fact that the chief foreign policy goal of the Soviets was keeping Eastern Europe under its control during the Cold War years (Mearsheimer, 2001: 192). In spite of this, the party was against EU-mandated laws extending minority rights to ethnic Hungarians (Associated Press, 17 January 2001). Sum (2010: 25) suggests that the PRM became ‘the representative of the approach many in Romania took: support the EU integration without EU-mandated reforms’. JOBBIK also took a moderate position on the issue of EU membership, as the party perceived membership as a tool to improve economic, cultural and political relations with Hungarians beyond the border. Still, remember that JOBBIK is the only party that promised a foreign policy alternative (*Turanism)* in contemporary Hungarian politics. The last word about the second path is that it bears both supply-side and demand-side conditions, differing from the first path in that regard. Ergo, it is fair to suggest that supply-side conditions and demand-side conditions equally determine whether radical right parties achieved electoral success in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.

The discussion of the intersection of the conditions should conclude by considering counterfactual perspectives. The first path in the analysis of sufficient conditions for the non-occurrence of the electoral success of radical right parties (see table 4.7) confirms that the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party was a necessary condition for radical right parties to achieve electoral success in national parliamentary elections held during the decade from 2000 to 2010. This path covers all Czech elections during which the right-wing mainstream Civic Democratic Party voiced strong Euroscepticism and called themselves ‘Euro-realists’ (Hanley, 2004: 542). The sixth row in the truth table (see table 4.5), in which the PiS took a Eurosceptic position and the LPR fell short of the electoral threshold in the 2007 parliamentary election, appears to support this argument. Yet, the electoral success of the LPR in the 2005 parliamentary election (see 6th row in the truth table, table 4.5) is an exception in that regard. The reasons behind this exception are to be addressed in the next chapter at greater length (see fn. 122). Suffice it to say here that the PiS was essentially a Europhile party in spite of a shift towards becoming a Eurosceptic party on the eve of the 2005 election. The second path in the analysis of sufficient conditions for non-occurrence of the outcome suggests that the lack of a high level of unemployment and the illiberal position of Fidesz prevented radical right parties from achieving an electoral success in Hungary in the 2002 parliamentary election (see table 4.7).

It is time to shift the focus of the discussion away from the intersection of the conditions to the individual role of each condition. Three main conclusions regarding the given hypotheses (see table 4.2) can be drawn from the solution formula obtained in the analysis of sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the outcome. The first conclusion concerns the condition *ephilm.* The introduction chapter stated that the Europeanization process is composed of two main periods during which the nature of relations between the EU and the country differ. In the first phase, an asymmetrical relationship exists between the two in favour of the EU. The nature of relationship becomes symmetrical in the second phase, which begins soon after a candidate country is officially admitted to the EU. During the first phase, the ability of mainstream parties to make political manoeuvres is largely limited. Their main task is to develop legislation with the aim of meeting the membership criteria. This provides radical right parties with an opportunity to appeal to Eurosceptic voters who have renounced the right-wing mainstream parties for their positive positions on membership. Soon after a candidate country is admitted to the EU, the limits on mainstream parties’ capacity for political manoeuvres are abolished. It has therefore been predicted that electoral support for radical right parties is likely to increase during the first phase. The PRM’s electoral success in 2000, the LPR’s electoral success in 2001, and the ATAKA’s electoral success in 2005 confirm this prediction. Nevertheless, the Slovak NS did not achieve electoral success in 2002. On the contrary, the party only emerged as a parliamentary party from the 2006 parliamentary election; the first election after the country became EU member in May 2004. Similarly, MIEP was unable to achieve electoral success in 2002, whereas JOBBIK was able to do so in the 2010 parliamentary election, which was held six years after the country became EU member. These last examples obviously conflict with the prediction. Then, the way in which the condition *ephilm* increases the electoral strength of radical right parties changes from one case to another. This important question is addressed in the fifth and sixth chapters. Suffice it to say here that *ephilm* is a contributory condition for the occurrence of the outcome, but not an omnipresent condition *(i.e. it seems to matter sometimes before and sometimes after the EU accession).* As a preliminary thought, ephilm appears to play a role in the electoral success of radical right parties in countries experiencing a liberal trajectory of regime transition during the 1990s, before the EU accession years. Among the CEECs included in this study, Poland and Slovenia are examples of such countries. It noteworthy that an important reason behind these countries’ liberal trajectories is the lack of a large ethnic minority group, whereas the presence of such groups is partly responsible for the illiberal trajectory of regime changes in countries like Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. The lack of large ethnic minority groups facilitated the democratization process in the former countries, while countries with large ethnic minority groups desperately needed the EU’s leverage. The asymmetric nature of relations between the EU and countries experiencing a liberal trajectory of regime change (in favour of the former) during the accession negotiation years strengthens the perception among nativist circles that it is Brussels, not the country’s capital city, governing the country. Such circles regard this as the suspension of national sovereignty, which allegedly damages national culture and national economy. Once these countries become EU members, the nature of relations becomes symmetric, but also the fears of nativist circles prove to be unfounded and irrational. As a result, the electoral strength of radical right parties in countries experiencing a liberal trajectory of regime change steadily declined and consequently fell to insignificant numbers after these countries became members of the EU. On the contrary, in countries experiencing an illiberal trajectory of regime change such as Bulgaria and Slovakia, radical right parties became more successful during the post-EU accession years than they had been during the pre-accession years. As mentioned above, these countries made use of EU leverage in their democratization process during the accession negotiation years. The EU’s leverage played a vital role in replacing old communist elites with pro-democracy rulers. In addition, these countries are economically less developed than those experiencing a liberal trajectory of regime. Thus, the EU had an opportunity to (more effectively) resort to a stick and carrot approach with countries experiencing an illiberal trajectory of regime change, lest they develop illiberal approaches towards minority groups. Consequently, radical right parties, which ideologically oppose liberal democracy due to their opposition to multicultural society, remained as outsiders. However, once the EU membership process of such countries is over, and the EU’s control over them weakens, EU standards for minority policies - envisaging ‘comprehensive’ rights for national minorities in the fields of administration, education, culture - predispose nativist voters to support radical right parties. After EU membership is confirmed, nativist citizens no longer fear being punished by the EU and thus increasingly opt for radical right parties.

Second, it is common in the literature on the radical right to argue that social tension between ‘natives’ and ‘others’ in the society is very likely to increase electoral support for radical right parties. The last three components of the second path confirm this. In countries where the condition *ethpop* is present, radical right parties have appealed to nativist voters by formulating discourses targeting national minorities. In fact, there is no doubt that the electoral success of radical right parties in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia occurred in good part due to the anti-minority discourses of the radical right parties. By blaming social problems on ‘the others’ of society, radical right parties in these countries acted exactly as the ethnic competition approach would predict. Yet, explanations for the electoral success of radical right parties that are solely based on the condition *ethpop* are incomplete, if not wrong. In addition to this condition, two other conditions appear to have been at least as important. The presence of a right-wing mainstream party following (relatively) liberal socio-cultural policies may provide radical right parties a way to appeal to nativist voters, who may otherwise prefer to vote for a mainstream party. Moreover, the presence of high levels of unemployment may make an anti-minority discourse – which otherwise might be in vain - conceivable in the minds of nativist voters. Based on these explanations, it is fair to say that the two hypotheses – *the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following culturally illiberal policies increases the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties* and *a high level of unemployment* *contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties where a large ethnic minority population is also present –* are supported with respect to parliamentary elections in Romania (in 2000), Bulgaria (in 2005), and Hungary (in 2010). The electoral success of the Slovak NS in 2006 appears to be an exception in this regard; this exception is addressed in chapter six at greater length. In addition, ~*ethpop* is part of the first path covering the Polish (2001) and Slovene (2008) elections. Based on this result, one can say with certainty that the electoral success of radical right parties is not confined to countries with large ethnic minority populations. As mentioned above, right- wing mainstream parties’ illiberal position in the socio-cultural dimension could also increase the saliency of issues that radical right ideology could readily accommodate. This supports the hypothesis that *the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following culturally illiberal policies increases the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties* in the cases of Poland and Slovenia.

Third, recall the two hypotheses formulated regarding the impact of the corruption problem on the electoral success of radical right parties. The first hypothesis assumes that *a strong**public perception of corruption contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties.* As mentioned earlier, because the problem of corruption is so endemic in CEECs that the electorate may take the problem for granted; in other words, they may view corruption as a problem impossible for politicians to solve. Yet, this ‘acceptance’ may turn into aggression during times of economic strife. Based on this, an alternative hypothesis was formulated. It assumes that *a strong public perception of corruption contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties when it coincides with high levels of unemployment.* The fact that neither the first nor the second path involves the condition of corruption (*CORR)* undermines both the first and the second hypotheses. This is a surprising finding, since it is quite common in the literature to argue that the problem of corruption is the main source of protest voting in CEECs, in which voters move to radical right parties for their anti-political establishment rhetoric (e.g. Bustikova, 2009, Cinpoes, 2010). Instead, the result appears to confirm the argument that voters who are dissatisfied with the established system do not go to the polls at all (Anderson *et al.,* 2005). In addition, a poll conducted in early 2000 shows that the right-wing mainstream Law and Justice Party (PiS), not the League of Polish Families (LPR), which took advantage of public anger over the problem of corruption (Millard, 2003: 371; Szczerbiak, 2007: 212; Pankowski, 2010: 152). The argument that voters believe that political parties with a chance of winning elections (e.g. mainstream parties) can in fact solve problems and are therefore more inclined to vote for these parties during times of serious problems, can possibly explain why the problem of corruption benefited radical right parties (e.g. Knigge, 1998: 270; Vermeir et al., 2007: 144). Nevertheless, among the countries of interest, Romania, which is the least successful polity in dealing with corruption, seems to be an exception in this regard. This exceptional situation is discussed at greater length in the fifth chapter, where the case labelled ROM2000 is taken under close scrutiny.

To summarize the discussion, the condition *ephilm* is a necessary condition for increasing the chance of electoral success of radical right parties. Nevertheless, the impact of this condition is not confined to a particular phase of the Europeanization process (i.e. the first phase or the second phase). How and when it affects the outcome can change from one case to another. Therefore, this condition is not omnipresent. The answer to the question of whether it is the liberal or the illiberal position of right-wing mainstream parties in the socio-cultural dimension of party competition that increases the electoral strength of radical right parties lies in the answer to another question, that is, whether the given country has a large ethnic minority population. From this perspective, the condition ‘ethpop’ appears to be a context-setting condition. The illiberal position of right-wing mainstream parties in countries without large ethnic minority populations increases radical right parties’ electoral strength, while the opposite is true in countries with large ethnic minority populations. High levels of unemployment increase the chance of electoral success for radical right parties in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, whose economies continued to lag behind those of other CEECs. Hungary appears to be an exception in this regard, yet it should be highlighted that soon after the euro crisis broke out in 2009, JOBBIK achieved a remarkable electoral success. Finally, the problem of corruption does not appear to increase the electoral strength of radical right parties, despite widespread agreement among scholars of party politics that this condition allows anti-political establishment parties -including radical right ones – to achieve electoral success.

4.3.3 Robustness of the Results

The conditions included in an analysis should capture the reasoning behind the occurrence of the outcome of interest. Therefore, the selection of conditions should be based on strong theoretical explanations already discussed in the literature. In addition, as stated in the first chapter, the number of conditions depends on the number of cases at hand in a qualitative comparative analysis. After all, if the number of rows in the truth table (2X: X = number of conditions)greatly outnumbers the number of cases at hand, the problem of ‘logical reminders’ emerges. Because this study has twenty cases in total, the maximum number of conditions is five. Remember that before making the main analysis, this study had to make a choice between two conditions - the impact of Europhile mainstream parties and the impact of the electoral system - for this reason.

Ultimately, the study decided to include the former condition*, ‘ephilm’* in the analysis. All CEECs under examination in the analysis fully experienced the two phases of Europeanization (discussed above) within the study period. Nevertheless, the potential impact of this condition has received less attention in the literature on radical right parties than any other conditions in terms of the CEECs. In the end, the solution formula obtained in the analysis proves that the condition *ephilm* was a necessary condition for radical right parties to achieve electoral success in national parliamentary elections held during the decade from 2000 to 2010. Another reason for including the Europhile mainstream party condition is that all countries under examination essentially use a proportional representation system.

The second reason the analysis did not include the electoral system as a condition potentially affecting the electoral performance of radical right parties could be challenged on the grounds that although all countries use the PR system, changes in the degree of proportionality may ultimately affect the outcome. Moreover, this study is aware of the lack of agreement among scholars of party politics regarding the claim that the election system does not affect the electoral success of radical right parties. Therefore, the first chapter acknowledges this deficiency as one of the limitations of this study, stemming from methodological reasons. The above analysis cannot explain how the solution formula would look, if the potential impact of the electoral system were included as one of the conditions. The absence of the corruption problem in the first and second paths, however, allows this study not only to eliminate this limitation, but also to check the robustness of the solution formula. Therefore, raw-data scores (and their calibration into fuzzy-set scores) related to degree of proportionality of the electoral system during the period this study covers must be presented as to decide whether the cases included in this QCA study vary among each other substantially. If so, the analysis should be re-run by replacing the corruption problem with the electoral system (specifically, its degree of proportionality).

Leaving aside the fact that the inclusion of different conditions may change the solution formula, setting the thresholds (which distinguish the sets in which a condition or the outcome is a member) at different levels may also change the solution formula. Therefore, the analysis should be re-run by setting the thresholds at different levels to see how much the solution formula changes, thereby determining whether the solution formula produced in the main analysis is robust (Skaaning, 2011: 393, 394). Yet, the criteria established to set the threshold levels should be based on existing theoretical explanations in the literature. In other words, the researcher is not limitless when making changes to threshold levels. The existing theoretical explanations in the literature allow this study to change only one of the criterion applied to make a division between electorally successful and failed radical right parties. The reasons for this are explained below.

Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 285) suggests that a solution formula in the main analysis can be regarded as robust if re-running of the analysis (either with different conditions or different threshold levels) meets the following two points: 1) the solution formula must involve similar necessary conditions and statements of sufficiency, and 2) the consistency and coverage level of the solution formula should be so close to that of the main analysis that no substantially different interpretation is needed.

4.3.3.1 Robustness Test 1: Should Electoral System be Included as a Condition?

As was mentioned in chapter three, the hypothesis concerning the impact of the electoral system on radical right parties’ electoral performance goes back to Duverger’s well-established concept of ’tactical voting’. In majoritarian systems, voters are inclined to vote for major parties, which have better chances of reserving seats in parliament than minor parties, lest their votes go to waste. In proportional representation systems, however, voters may vote for minor parties, including radical right parties, being aware that their electoral support will give the parties seats in parliament albeit fewer than those of major parties. Ergo, the hypothesis predicts that *radical right parties achieve electoral success in countries where the degree of proportionality in the election system is higher.*

The new condition is conceptualized as the degree of proportionality of the electoral system and is labeled ‘*prelect’*. This study uses data based on the least square index, which is obtained from Gallagher’s data on election indices.[[87]](#footnote-87) The least square index ‘measures the disproportionality between the distribution of the votes and of the seats’ (Gallagher, 2013).[[88]](#footnote-88) There are two reference points with which to calibrate the data using the least square index. The first reference point is based on the French elections during the 1980s. This reference is adopted to determine the threshold for *fully out of the set of PR systems*. France used a majoritarian (double-ballot system) electoral system in its 1981 and 1988 parliamentary elections. In the 1986 election, the country used a proportional representational electoral system. At the time, the radical right party in the country, the National Front, made a major electoral breakthrough, when its electoral support reached 9.8 per cent in the 1986 election, up from 0.2 per cent (in 1981). In the 1988 election, the party maintained its electoral support at the level of 9.8 per cent, although the country once again began to use a majoritarian system.[[89]](#footnote-89) The changes in the electoral system during the 1980s expectedly rendered the least square index considerably different. When the majoritarian electoral systems were in effect, the least square index score was 14.9. When the proportional representation system was implemented in 1986, the score dropped to 7.4 (Gallagher, 1991: 46). The second reference point is based on the Dutch elections, whose least score index has stayed between 0.9 and 1.73 since 1946 (see Gallagher, 2013: 26). The Dutch elections guide this study in setting the threshold to consider a case *fully in the set of PR systems.* Based on the two reference points, a least square index score equal to 15 is set as the threshold for being *fully out of the set of PR systems*. A score equal to 1 is set as the threshold for being *fully in the set of PR systems.* Thus, the scale ranges from 1 to 15. The mid-point of this scale, a score of 8, is set as the crossover point. All cases scores between 1 and 8 are *more in than out of the set of PR systems.* Those cases with scores of more than 1 but less than 4.5 are assigned a fuzzy set membership score of 0.8. Those with scores greater than or equal to 4.5 but less than 8 are given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.6. Any cases with a score between 8 and 15 are *more out than in the set of the PR systems*. Those with scores above 8 but less than 11.5 are given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.4. Finally, cases with a score greater than or equal to 11.5 but less than 15 are given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.2. Table 4.8 shows the data on the least square index and the fuzzy set membership scores for all twenty cases included in this study. Table 4.9 shows the result of the test of necessary conditions.

**Table 4.8** The data on least square index and fuzzy set membership scores for twenty cases (Elections from 2000 to 2010).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Case | Raw data on LSI | fs membership score |
| BUL2005 | 3.97 | 0.8 |
| BUL2009 | 7.00 | 0.6 |
| CZE2002 | 5.73 | 0.6 |
| CZE2006 | 5.72 | 0.6 |
| CZE2010 | 8.76 | 0.4 |
| HUN2002\* | 8.2 | 0.4 |
| HUN2006 | 6.69 | 0.6 |
| HUN2010 | 6.03 | 0.6 |
| POL2001 | 6.33 | 0.6 |
| POL2005 | 6.97 | 0.6 |
| POL2007 | 4.97 | 0.6 |
| ROM2000 | 8.56 | 0.4 |
| ROM2004 | 3.74 | 0.8 |
| ROM2008 | 3.32 | 0.8 |
| SLK2002 | 6.97 | 0.6 |
| SLK2006 | 5.53 | 0.6 |
| SLK2010 | 7.46 | 0.6 |
| SLV2000 | 1.51 | 0.8 |
| SLV2004 | 4.79 | 0.6 |
| SLV2008 | 3.89 | 0.8 |

\* Hungary used a mixed electoral system. The least index score is the one calculated on the basis of the election of 152 (out of 386) members by PR system. The rest of the members are elected by single member district system.

Table 4.8 presents the fuzzy-set membership score for each case in terms of prelect. Only three cases have fuzzy-set membership scores slightly below 0.5; all other cases have scores above 0.5, thereby having the same qualitative meaning. This suggests that ‘prelect’ is not necessarily an important condition affecting the success of radical right parties, since the cases only slightly differ from each other qualitatively. This conclusion appears to be consistent with empirical evidence on radical right parties’ electoral success in some West European countries.The electoral successes of radical right parties are not confined to ‘immigration host countries’ that use a proportional representation system, such as Austria, Denmark or the Netherlands. For example, in the Westminster Model, which includes a prototype of majoritarian electoral system (see: Lijphart, 1999: 14-15), the recent electoral breakthroughs of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2014 local election and the 2014 European Parliamentary elections throw doubt on the argument that the majoritarian electoral system is a major hindrance to radical right parties achieving electoral success (e.g. Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Golder 2003, Veugelers and Magnan, 2005).[[90]](#footnote-90) Providing even stronger evidence, the change in the French election system in 1988 (from a PR system to a majoritarian system) did not stymie the electoral success of the National Front. On the contrary, the party had success in 1986 when the PR system was used, and then in fact increased its electoral support during the 1990s.[[91]](#footnote-91)

4.3.3.2 Changes in the threshold of calibration of raw data on *SUCCESS*

Setting different threshold levels either for the conditions or the outcome may change the solution formula in QCA studies. Yet, the threshold levels must be determined rationally, meaning that the reasoning behind them must not go beyond existing theoretical explanations in the literature. Otherwise, they would be regarded as the product of arbitrary decisions. Existing theoretical explanations for the conditions and the outcome suggest that this study can perform a robustness test only by changing the threshold level applied to determine whether a radical right party should be considered electorally successful. Changing threshold levels for the conditions, however, is not supported by existing theoretical explanations in the literature. To make this point clearer, readers should be reminded about the reasoning behind the threshold level, which has been set in the main analysis, for each condition.

The first condition is the level of unemployment. The threshold level for this condition was set on the basis of theoretical explanations in the literature on economic voting. In the literature, one widely accepted argument suggests that the problem of unemployment is likely to affect electoral preferences when it reaches to double-digit numbers. By contrast, an unemployment level of 4 per cent or less can be ignored. Moreover, an unemployment level of 4 per cent is needed for the effective functioning of the market. Changing the threshold level for the condition of unemployment to pass a robustness test would be an arbitrary decision. The second condition involves the problem of corruption. Remember that threshold levels for this condition were set in such a way as to capture both the argument that corruption problem is ‘endemic’ to CEECs and the successful efforts of some CEECs to deal with the problem during the post-communist regimes. A new threshold level would not capture these two facts about corruption problem in CEECs. The third condition is the presence of ethnic minority populations. In the literature on radical right parties, a country in which ethnic minorities make up at least 5 per cent of the populations is considered to have the condition. The threshold levels for this condition were set, accordingly. In addition, considering the percentage of ethnic minorities in the populations of the countries of interest, a change in the thresholds levels for this condition is unlikely to change the set of the countries qualitatively. Perhaps a quantitative difference could be made (for example the fuzzy-set score for the Hungarian cases could decrease from 0.8 to 0.6), yet this change would not make a substantial difference in the solution formula.[[92]](#footnote-92)

Two other conditions were supply-side conditions: 1) the position of right-wing mainstream parties within the socio-cultural dimension of party competition and 2) the position of right-wing mainstream parties on the issue of EU membership. Chapel Hill expert survey results were utilized to decide the parties’ positions on the two issues. Any change in the threshold levels for these conditions would conflict with the result of the surveys. For instance, a party that experts consider to be pro-EU membership could be treated as if the party was Eurosceptic, and vice versa.

Making a change in the threshold levels for the outcome (i.e. electoral success), however, appears to be plausible due to the presence of different conceptualizations of electoral success in the literature. Remember that radical right parties are examples of minor parties; therefore, their electoral success cannot be conceptualized in the same way as that of major parties. Minor parties can affect the political system particularly when they enter parliament, thereby having a chance of playing a role in the formation of coalitions, by being either a coalition partner or a supporting party. Accordingly, this study equates the electoral success of radical right parties with their success in exceeding electoral threshold, which reserves seats for them in national parliaments. Nevertheless, a minor party could be regarded as electorally successful when its electoral support reaches 3 per cent of the vote, which renders that party relevant to the party competition (e.g. Norris, 2005: 50).

Setting the crossover point at the level of 3 per cent highlights the qualitative differences between levels of electoral support for radical right parties. Any parties with electoral support below this level are considered electoral failures, while those above this level are deemed to be electoral successes. To highlight the quantitative difference between electoral failures, electoral supports below 3 per cent, but greater than or equal to 2 percent or equal to 2 percent are assigned the fuzzy set score of 0.4. Those less than 2 per cent but more than 1 per cent are given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.2. Those less than or equal to 1 per cent but more than 0 per cent are considered *fully out of the set of successful radical right parties* and given a fuzzy-set membership score of 0, accordingly. To underline the quantitative difference between electorally successful radical right parties, electoral supports of more than 3 per cent but less 5 per cent, which is the electoral threshold in most of the countries under examination, are given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.6. Those with more than 5 per cent but less than or equal to 7.5 per cent are given a fuzzy set membership score of 0.8. Finally, those above 7.5, where the party substantially exceeds the electoral threshold, are considered to be *fully in the set of* *electorally* *successful radical right parties*, and given a fuzzy-set membership score of 1, accordingly. Table 4.9 compares the newly calibrated scores of the electoral success of radical right parties with those given in the main analysis.

**Table 4.9** Comparison of Fuzzy-set membership scores (the main analysis and the 2nd robustness test)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Case | Raw Data | Main Analysis | 2nd Robustness Test |
| BUL2005 | 8.1 | 0.8 | 1 |
| BUL2009 | 9.3 | 0.8 | 1 |
| CZE2002 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| CZE2006 | 0.33 | 0 | 0 |
| CZE2010 | 0.03 | 0 | 0 |
| HUN2002 | 4.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
| HUN2006 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| HUN2010 | 16.7 | 1 | 1 |
| POL2001 | 7.9 | 0.8 | 1 |
| POL2005 | 8.0 | 0.8 | 1 |
| POL2007 | 1.1 | 0 | 0 |
| ROM2000 | 19.5 | 1 | 1 |
| ROM2004 | 13.5 | 1 | 1 |
| ROM2008 | 3.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
| SLK2002 | 3.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
| SLK2006 | 11.7 | 1 | 1 |
| SLK2010 | 5.1 | 0.6 | 0.8 |
| SLV2000 | 4.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| SLV2004 | 6.3 | 0.6 | 0.8 |
| SLV2008 | 5.4 | 0.6 | 0.8 |

As a result of setting a lower crossover point for the electoral success of radical right parties, the fuzzy set membership scores of some electoral successes increased either quantitatively or qualitatively, while others remained same. The fuzzy set membership scores of ATAKA’s electoral successes in the 2005 and 2009 Bulgarian parliamentary elections increased from 0.8 to 1. That of the MIEP and JOBBIK alliance in the 2006 election increased from 0.2 to 0.4. Those of LPR’s electoral successes in the 2001 and 2005 Polish parliamentary elections increased from 0.8 to 1. That of Slovak NS’s electoral success in the 2010 parliamentary election increased from 0.6 to 0.8. Similarly, those of Slovene NS’s electoral success increased from 0.6 to 0.8. The electoral performances of MIEP (in 2002), PRM (in 2008) and Slovak NS (in 2002), which were more out of than in the set of successful radical right parties in the main analysis, are now more in than out of the set. The fuzzy set membership score of each increased from 0.4 to 0.6. The electoral performances of SPR-RSC (in all Czech elections), and LPR (in 2007) are fully out of the set of successful radical right parties, as in the main analysis. Finally, the electoral performances of Slovak NS (in 2006) and JOBBIK (2010) remained fully in the set of successful radical right parties. Table 4.10 presents the result of the analysis of necessary conditions. Table 4.11 shows the truth table and table 4.12 shows the solution formula of the analysis for sufficient conditions. The full results of the analysis, including conservative (complex), intermediate, and parsimonious solution formulae, appear in Appendix 4.

**Table 4.10** Analysis of Necessary Condition for *SUCCESS* (lower crossover point for success)

Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Outcome variable: success

Conditions tested:

Consistency Coverage

unemp 0.803030 0.736111

~unemp 0.318182 0.750000

corr 0.681818 0.789474

~corr 0.515151 0.790698

ethpop 0.666667 0.800000

~ethpop 0.363636 0.533333

libm 0.727273 0.705882

~libm 0.409091 0.843750

ephilm **0.909091 0.800000**

~ephilm 0.166667 0.440000

**Table 4.11** Configurations of Conditions for Radical Right Parties *SUCCESS* (lower crossover point for success)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Unemp | Corr | Ethpop | Libm | Ephilm | Number | Success | Consistency |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.900000 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 0.900000 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.875000 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.846154 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.818182 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0.812500 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0.692308 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.684210 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0.666667 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0.411765 |

**Table 4.12:** The Analysis of Sufficient Condition (lower crossover point for *SUCCESS*).

ephilm\*~libm + ephilm\*ethpop\*corr + ephilm\*ethpop\*unemp = success

Raw Coverage 0.378788 0.515151 0.515151

Unique Coverage 0.166667 0.075758 0.106061

Consistency 0.925926 0.918919 0.850000

Covered Cases: HUN2002 ROM2000, ROM2004, BUL2005,

ROM2008 ROM2000,

POL2001 BUL2005, BUL2009 HUN2OO6, HUN2010

SLV2008 HUN2002, HUN2006 SLK2002, SLK2006

SLK2002, SLK2006 SLK2010

SLK2010

solution consistency: 0.881356

solution coverage: 0.787879

Uncovered Cases: POL2005,

SLV2000, SLV2004

Remember that the results of the main analysis can be regarded as robust, as long as the results of the new analysis (with lower crossover point for electoral success) do not require a substantially different interpretation. That is to say that the new analysis should define similar necessary condition(s), and its solution formula should bear similar conditions. Table 4.14 reveals that *ephilm* is a necessary condition for radical right parties to receive more than 3 per cent of the vote in elections. The main analysis reached the same conclusion. Nevertheless, table 4.16 shows that the solution formulae produced in the analysis are different from those yielded in the main analysis. The crucial question is whether this difference requires a substantially different interpretation. If the answer is no, the solution in the main analysis can be regarded as robust.

The first difference between the main analysis and this analysis is that the latter has higher consistency and coverage scores. Because it has a higher consistency score, this analysis has only one deviant case (HUN2006), whereas the main analysis has two (HUN2006, SLK 2002). Because it has a higher coverage score, the number of uncovered cases (POL2005, SLV2000, SLV2004) is smaller than the number of uncovered cases in the main analysis (POL2005, SLV2000, SLV2004, ROM2004, BUL2009). There are two reasons for these differences. First, as a result of the lower crossover point for the electoral success in this analysis, SLK2002, which was a ‘deviant case’ in the main analysis, appears as a ‘typical case’ in this analysis. Second, the solution formula of this analysis has three paths, whereas that of the main analysis has only two. Table 4.16 shows that the problem of corruption is a component of the second path. As a result, all Romanian elections, and the 2009 Bulgarian election (the cases that are more in than out of the set of the countries with the problem of corruption) are included in this analysis. Moreover, on account of setting a lower crossover point for the electoral success, ROM2008 emerged as a typical case, whereas the main would be a label it a deviant case.

Remember that the first path in the main analysis was ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop covering two cases: POL2001 and SLV2008. The first path in the new analysis is different in that the condition ~ethpop is not a component of the configuration. Besides POL2001 and SLV2008, this path covers HUN2002. Actually, the inclusion of HUN2002 caused the condition to disappear. With its Roma population (about 8 per cent), Hungary is more in than out of the set of countries with large ethnic minority populations. While discussing the first path of the main analysis, it was stated that in countries without the condition *ethpop*, the position of the right-wing mainstream party in the socio-cultural dimension of party competition plays an ancillary role in the electoral success of radical right parties by leading to an increase in the saliency of socio-cultural issues strongly embraced by radical right ideology. The interaction between this condition and right-wing mainstream parties’ Europhile position, as the argument went, ultimately paved the way for radical right to reserve seats in national parliaments during the decade from 2000 to 2010. This causal mechanism is to be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter in terms of the Polish 2001 election. This explanation is also valid for the first path reached in the new analysis. Moreover, remember that the electoral performance of MIEP in 2002 was more out of than in the set of successful radical right parties, with the crossover point for the outcome set 5 per cent. Thus, the slight difference between the first path in this analysis and that of the main analysis offers a similar explanation and does not require a substantially different interpretation.

The most important difference between the main analysis and this analysis is that the solution formula of the latter includes two paths to explain the electoral success of radical right parties in countries with large ethnic minority populations. The first of these is *ephilm\*ethpop\*corr,* and the second path is *ephilm\*ethpop\*unemp.* Because they both include the conditions both *ephilm* and *ethpop*, the paths could be merged as: *ephilm\*ethpop (corr + unemp).* Nevertheless, the third path (which is the second path in the main analysis) has higher unique coverage than the second path. This means that the former contributes to the explanation more than the latter. This gives credibility to the solution formula reached in the main analysis. The appearance of the condition ‘*corr’* as a component of the second path in this analysis is largely due to the change in the membership of the case ROM2008 from more out of the category to more in the category, which is the result of setting a lower crossover point for electoral success. In the main analysis, ROM2008 was considered more out of than in the set of successful radical right parties. Moreover, the fact that the problem of corruption is a part of the path covering all Romanian cases supports the argument that the problem did not contribute to the electoral success of radical right parties, with the exception of Romania. As mentioned earlier, this issue is to be discussed at greater length in the fifth chapter.

As stated in the discussion on the solution formula of the main analysis, cultural differences between the minority and native citizens in countries with a large ethnic minority population essentially increase the electoral demand for radical right parties. Furthermore, by opposing EU membership, particularly for the EU’s generous minority policies, and by blaming socio-economic problems on minority populations, radical right parties become a strong alternative for nativist voters. The path *ephilm\*ethpop\*corr* and the path *ephilm\*ethpop\*unemp* supports this explanation. Finally, it is important to remind the reader once again that explanations based on the solution formula reached in the main analysis were suggested to account for radical right parties’ success in exceeding the electoral threshold (requiring at least 5 per cent of the votes) not in being a relevant party (requiring at least 3 per cent of the votes).

**4.4 Conclusion**

This chapter has carried out a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of radical right parties’ electoral success in CEECs during the period 2000 to 2010. The analysis included three demand-side conditions and two supply-side conditions. The demand-side conditions include the presence of a high unemployment level (*unemp*), the presence of a strong public perception of corruption (*corr*), and the presence of a large ethnic minority population (*ethpop*). The supply-side conditions include the presence of a right-wing mainstream party that follows culturally liberal policies (*libm*) and the presence of a Europhile mainstream party on the issue of Europeanization (ephilm).

The analysis of necessary conditions revealed that the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party (*ephilm*) was a necessary condition for the occurrence of the outcome. This result buttresses the hypothesis that the Europeanization process increased the strength of radical right parties, which hold a Eurosceptic position in line with the radical right ideology. None of the other conditions were necessary. The intermediate solution formula of the analysis of sufficienct conditions involves two paths that lead to the occurrence of the outcome. The first path combines three conditions: *ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop.* This path covers the Polish 2001 parliamentary election and the Slovene 2008 parliamentary election. The second path is *ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp*. It covers five typical cases and two deviant cases. The typical cases are the Slovak 2006 and 2010 parliamentary elections, the Romanian 2000 parliamentary election, the Bulgarian 2005 parliamentary election, and the Hungarian 2010 parliamentary election. The deviant cases are the Slovak 2002 parliamentary election and the Hungarian 2006 parliamentary election.

The study had predicted that Europeanization contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties particularly before the candidate country is admitted to the EU. The reasoning behind this prediction was that the nature of relations between the EU and the candidate country is asymmetric in favour of the former during the EU accession years. This asymmetry limits political manoeuvres by right-wing mainstream parties, which mostly hold a Europhile position. At this opportune moment, radical right parties have a chance to appeal to Eurosceptic voters, thereby increasing their electoral support. The intermediate solution, however, did not confirm this prediction fully. It includes elections held once the countries became EU members in which radical right parties achieved electoral success. The Slovak 2006 parliamentary election, and the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary election are examples of such elections. Based on this, the study concluded that Europeanization is a contributory condition, but not an omnipresent one.

The presence of a Europhile mainstream party is a necessary condition, but insufficient on its own. In countries that lack large ethnic minority populations (Poland and Slovenia), the interaction of the condition *ephilm* with the absence of a right-wing mainstream party that follows liberal cultural policies accounts for the electoral success of radical right parties (*ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop*). This result supports the hypothesis that *the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following culturally illiberal policies increases the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties*. In addition, it appears that the supply-side conditions primarily determine the success of radical right parties in these countries.

In terms of the countries with large ethnic minority populations, the interaction of the condition *ephilm* with two other conditions – the presence of right-wing parties that follow liberal cultural policies (*libm*) and high levels of unemployment (*unemp*)- explains the electoral success of radical right parties (*ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp*). Unlike the first path, the second path supports the hypothesis that *the presence of a right-wing mainstream party that follows liberal cultural policies increases the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties*. As mentioned above, the second path covers the economically least developed countries with the exception of Hungary. It seems that radical right parties in these countries benefitted from high levels of unemployment by blaming the problem on minority groups. Likewise, a high level of unemployment plays an ancillary role in JOBBIK’s electoral success in Hungary, where unemployment began increasing soon after the euro crises erupted in 2009. Therefore, the second path also supports the hypothesis that *a high level of unemployment contributes to the electoral performances of radical right parties in CEE*. Finally, the second path shows that the demand-side conditions are as important as supply-side conditions in leading to the electoral success of radical right parties in those countries the path covers.


Neither the first path nor the second path includes the problem of corruption *(corr)* as a part of the configuration. Therefore, both paths cast doubts on the hypothesis that *a strong**public perception of corruption contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties.* Yet, the second robustness test, which set a lower crossover point for electoral success, produced an intermediate solution formula having three paths. One of these paths is *ephilm\*ethpop\*corr*, which included all Romanian elections. Considering the fact that Romania has been the least successful country among the countries of interest in dealing with the problem of corruption, it appears to be an exception to the argument that the problem of corruption did not contribute to the electoral success of radical right parties.

**Chapter Five - Two Typical Cases: Electoral Success of the League of Polish Families in 2001 and the Greater Romania Party in 2000**


**5.1 Introduction**

An ‘XY plot’ displaying the extent to which a conjunctural causation (i.e. a ‘path’) was present in a case (the X-axis) and in which cases that causation led to (or did not lead to) the occurrence of an outcome (the Y-axis) helps the researcher to decide which cases to focus on and for what purpose. Figure 5.1, for example, shows cases in which a combination of the conditions ‘*the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party*, ‘*the absence of a right-wing mainstream party that follows liberal cultural policies’* and ‘*the absence of a large ethnic minority population’* was present and indicates where that combination led to (or did not lead to) the electoral success of radical right parties. Likewise, the figure 5.2 shows cases in which a combination of the conditions ‘*the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party’, ‘the presence of a right-wing mainstream party that follows liberal cultural policies’, ‘the presence of a large ethnic minority population’ and ‘the presence of a high level of unemployment’* was present and indicates where that combination led to (or did not lead to) the electoral success of radical right parties.

**Figure 5.1** Cases with fuzzy membership in *ephilm\*-libm\*ethpop*

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**Figure 5.2** Cases with fuzzy membership in *ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp*

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The shaded area above the main diagonal in both figures covers the ‘typical cases’ with X > 0.5 and Y > 0.5, which are ‘both in line with the statement of sufficiency [path] and good empirical instances of the outcome (electoral success) and causal condition’ (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 307). The shaded area below the main diagonal in the figure 5.2 covers ‘deviant cases’ with X > 0.5 and Y < 0.5. These cases are deviant since the outcome did not occur, despite the presence of the proposed statement of sufficiency.

This chapter focuses on typical cases with the aim of revealing how the causal mechanisms suggested in the QCA output operate to produce the outcome of interest (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 309). Figure 5.1 illustrates that the configuration *ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop* paved the way for the electoral success of radical right parties in Poland’s 2001 parliamentary election and Slovenia’s 2008 parliamentary election. For this path, this chapter focuses on the Polish election for two reasons. First, the fuzzy set membership score of the Polish case (Y-axis, 0.8) is higher than that of the Slovene case (0,6), making the Polish case a better instance of the outcome. Second, the Polish 2001 election was followed by the 2003 EU accession referendum, when the electorate heard the parties discuss Europeanization intensively; the case thus provides insight into the parties’ positions on Europeanization.

Figure 5.2 shows that the configuration *ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp* led to the electoral successes of radical right parties in Romania’s 2000 parliamentary election, Bulgaria’s 2005 parliamentary election, Slovakia’s 2006 parliamentary election and Hungary’s 2010 parliamentary election. For this statement of sufficiency (path), Slovakia’s 2006 election is the best instance of the outcome (Y-axis, 1) and (X-axis, 1). The Slovak cases, however, are discussed in the sixth chapter, whose main purpose is to compare a typical case and a deviant case. Therefore, the focus here shifts away to other typical cases instead (ROM2000, BUL2005 and HUN2010). Of the last three cases, the Romanian 2000 parliamentary election has a higher fuzzy-set membership score for the outcome (Y-axis, 1) than the Bulgarian 2005 parliamentary election (Y-axis, 0,8), and a higher fuzzy-set membership score for the causal condition (X-axis, 0.8) than the Hungarian 2010 (X-axis, 0.6) In other words, the ROM2000 represents a better instance of the causality and outcome. Accordingly, the chapter examines the electoral success of the radical right in the Romanian 2000 parliamentary election to interpret the second path.

This chapter includes three parts. The first part essentially aims to explain how the configuration *ephilm*\*~libm\*~ethpop helped the League of Polish Families (LPR) achieve electoral success in the 2001 parliamentary election. Though the main focus of this part is the 2001 election, two key successive developments in Polish politics since the early 2000s should be noted: 1) the decline in the salience of the post-communist versus anti-communist cleavage, which predominated Polish politics during much of the 1990s, and 2) the party campaigns for the 2003 EU-referendum on the Polish membership in the EU. These two developments are significantly relevant to the interpretation of the causal condition, as they led to the following three outcomes: 1) the disappearance of the common ground holding the conservative segment of the electorate together, namely their hostility towards the communist regime, 2) an increase in the parties’ discussion of the EU-related issues, culminating in a division within the conservative segment between soft-liners and hard-liners over the issue of membership, with the latter considering EU membership a threat to Polish culture based on Catholic principles and 3) the consolidation of the LPR’s place in the Polish party system as the ‘second to none’ party for voters opposed to EU membership for cultural reasons (e.g. protection of national culture, sovereignty). The first part is divided into three sections ordered chronologically. The first section briefly discusses the decline in the salience of the post-communist versus anti-communist cleavage. The second section focuses on the 2001 election in which LPR achieved electoral success. Finally the third section examines the difference between the campaigns of LPR and the Law and Justice party (PiS) to more clearly explain the parties’ different perspectives on the issue of EU membership.

The second part of the chapter aims to explain how the configuration *ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp* allowed the Greater Romania Party (PRM) to achieve electoral success in the 2000 parliamentary election. The interpretation of the this path begins with a discussion of growing public dissatisfaction with established political parties due to the presence of socio-economic problems in the country.[[93]](#footnote-93) This is followed by a discussion of the Europhile and liberal socio-cultural policies of the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PSDR), which subsequently provided the PRM with an opportunity to appeal to conservative voters. The last part focuses on the anti-minority and Eurosceptic policies of the PRM, which predisposed the conservative segment of the electorate towards this party in the election. The final part of the chapter presents concluding remarks on how the conditions intersected within the first path and within the second path and led to the electoral success of radical right parties in the two countries.

**5.2. Electoral Success of the League of Polish Families in the 2001 Parliamentary Election**

On the eve of the 2001 parliamentary elections, no one expected the League of Polish Families (*Liga Polskich Rodzin*, LPR*)* to gain seats in the *Sejm*. Mainstream media coverage of the party was very limited; a report on media coverage published in the Polish News Bulletin just a week before the elections did not even mention the LPR. Similarly, a poll carried out by CBOS in June 2001 to estimate the levels of electoral support for various parties did not include LPR (Reuters News, 8 June 2001). Yet, the party managed to win 7.9 per cent of the vote and to secure 38 seats in the *Sejm*. Based on the causal condition formulated in the fourth chapter, this chapter explains this unexpected electoral success by focusing on the socio-cultural policies of the right-wing mainstream party the Law and Justice Party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc*, PiS), and on the PiS position concerning Polish membership in the European Union. Accordingly, the chapter suggests that the combination of PiS’s socio-cultural policies, namely those backing a strong state and stressing moral and family values, and its relative Europhile position concerning Polish membership in the EU helped the LPR to exceed the electoral threshold and secure seats in the Sejm in the 2001 parliamentary election. Yet, the decline in the salience of the post-communist versus anti-communist cleavage in Polish politics starting in the early 2000s was also crucial, in that it led Polish conservatives to lose their common ground against post-communist circles.

5.2.1 ‘Old Division’ and ‘New Division’ in Polish Politics

The legacy of the communist regime has played a critical role in Poland, as the cleavage between left-wing and right-wing parties in the early post-communist years reflects a socio-cultural debate between the post-communist and anti-communist parties. Several factors contributed to these dynamics. First, the restrictions upon the opposition circles in the Eastern bloc were relatively loose in Poland during the communist regime. The Church was fairly independent of the state, and the anti-communist opposition circles, which had roots in the inter-war democratic experience, were able to avoid complete disappearance; both of these factors helped to push through reform initiatives beginning in the late 1970s. Second, the communist party had already been forced to make concessions related to the economic system in the 1980s, and the importance of the cleavage between left-wing and right-wing parties over economic policies diminished substantially as a result. Moreover, the country’s policies aimed at cultivating a relationship with West European countries in the 1990s left the mainstream parties with no alternative but to utterly transform the economy according to market principles. Grabowska explains the impact of the post-communist vs. anti-communist cleavage on voting behaviour as follows: ‘[despite the high cost of the economic transition], electoral preferences and voter behaviour in Poland are not determined by the position in social structure and interests related to that. They are determined by historically conditioned identities, values and convictions’ (quoted in Pankowski, 2010: 12; also see: Markowski, 1997: 235-236).

In relation to the post-communist vs. anti-communist cleavage, the Polish right, based on its evaluation of the previous regime, remained adamantly opposed to communism and emphasized the importance of Christian values within society (Kitschelt, 1995: 455 and 462; Zarycki, 2000: 858).[[94]](#footnote-94) Because the majority of the general population was anti-communist, the high visibility of this cleavage primarily benefited the major right-wing parties. In addition, these parties came together under the umbrella of anti-communist mobilization, as shown by the example of Solidarity Electoral Action.[[95]](#footnote-95)

5.2.1.1 Decline in the Importance of the Post-Communist vs. Anti Communist Cleavage

On the eve of the 2001 parliamentary election, the division based on the post-communist vs. anti-communist cleavage decreased significantly in its importance to party competition in Poland. A lustration law aiming to keep many former communists outside of politics was enacted in 1997, and NATO membership, symbolizing the irreversible end of communist influence over these countries, was granted to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in March 1999 (Ryborova, 1999). In addition, public opinion about the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) changed substantially. According to a poll carried out by CBOS, many people thought that the SLD no longer represented the communist regime; instead they began to regard it as a social democratic party (Polish News Bulletin, 6 January 2000: 1).[[96]](#footnote-96) Equally important, growing economic problems such as unemployment, along with Electoral Solidarity Action’s failure to address these problems during its governance from 1997 to 2001, and the consequent widespread public perception that Solidarity no longer represented the general interest, also contributed to the diminishing importance of the post-communist vs. anti-communist cleavage (BBC Monitoring: Political, 30 August 2000: 1).

Two important consequences of this change emerged related to the conservative segment of the electorate in Poland. First, the unification of conservatives against the ‘post-communist actors or parties’, which had occurred particularly during the 1995 presidential election and the 1997 parliamentary election, was no longer applicable. In the meantime, Europeanization, the process by which the candidate countries were expected to conform to EU norms, became an increasingly salient issue in the early 2000s (Mudde, 2003: 3-4). Thus, as anti-communism decreased in importance, Europeanization became a divisive issue between hard-liner conservatives electorate and soft-liner conservatives.[[97]](#footnote-97) While hard-liner conservatives rejected EU membership on the grounds that the EU, with its ‘western style of life’, threatened Polish national culture and national sovereignty (Zarycki, 2000: 861), soft-liner conservatives were not against Polish membership in the EU as long as the EU remained an intergovernmental institution comprising equal and sovereign nation states. As discussed in the following section, the pro-membership image of the PiS and its illiberal socio-cultural policies helped the LPR to emerge as a viable option for hardliner conservative voters in the 2001 parliamentary election.

5.2.2. PiS with Illiberal Cultural Policies in the 2001 Parliamentary Election[[98]](#footnote-98)

The Law and Justice Party (PiS) was established by Lech Kacyznski and Jaroslaw Kaczynski in June 2001. The Kaczynski brothers were not new actors in Polish politics. They began their political careers in the 1970s as activists in the anti-communist Worker’s Defence Committee (KOR, *Komitet Obrony Robotnikow*). In 1989, the brothers were appointed as advisers to Lech Walesa, who was then the chairman of Solidarity (*Solidarnosc*). In May 1990, while Lech Kaczynski was deputy chairman of Solidarity, Jaroslaw Kaczynski established the Center Agreement (PC, *Porozumienie Centrum*), which included various conservative groups such as the Christian National Union and the Liberal Democratic Congress (Pankowski, 2010: 151). Later, the party became a part of Electoral Action Solidarity (*Akcji Wyborczej Solidarnocs,* AWS), which emerged as an umbrella party bringing many conservative groups together before the 1997 election (Szczerbiak, 2004a: 70). After the 1997 election, AWS emerged as the largest part of the coalition government until June 2000, when it formed a minority government lasting until October 2001. Lech Kaczynski served as Minister of Justice in the minority government from June 2000 to July 2001. He significantly boosted his popularity during his tenure with his struggle against corruption. A poll carried out by CBOS in February 2001 showed that he was the second most trusted politician in the country, after President Kwasniewski (Polish News Bulletin, 21 February 2001). He was even given the nickname ‘Mr. Clean’ (Agence France-Presse, 18 June 2001).[[99]](#footnote-99)

In the 2001 parliamentary election, PiS had high aspirations of becoming a mainstream party. In its electoral campaign, the party mostly relied on the Kaczynski’s popularity, and fighting corruption occupied a prominent place in its electoral campaign (Millard, 2003: 371; Pankowski, 2010: 152). Given the party’s aim to attain mainstream status, its decision to place considerable emphasis on corruption seems reasonable based on the following theoretical points. First, a mainstream party should adopt a vote-maximizing strategy rather than an ideology-oriented strategy, and its policies should be designed in such a way that the party appeals to different segments of the electorate.[[100]](#footnote-100) In addition, in election campaigns, a recently established political party should particularly emphasize an issue likely to bring the party an advantage over its rivals (Tavits, 2008: 49). Given the high level of perceived corruption in Poland (see table 4.3), and Kaczynski’s popularity in this area, the party rationally put a strong emphasis on the corruption problem during its electoral campaign, thereby claiming its superiority over other parties and appealing to Polish voters with various ideological views but a common view of corruption as a serious problem (Szczerbiak, 2003: 731; Pankowski, 2010: 153).

The aspiration of PiS toward mainstream status also required the party to keep its distance from the nationalist party, the League of Polish Families (LPR). This factor affected its position on Polish membership in the European Union. Unlike the LPR, which adamantly opposed EU membership, PiS parried the issue by defining EU membership as an important foreign policy goal in one paragraph of its program (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 312, Szczerbiak and Bil, 2008: 17). The party had not voiced reservations concerning European Union membership during its campaign for the 2001 parliamentary election. Nevertheless, as discussed in footnote 122, the PiS became strongly critical of European integration (i.e.. the deepening process of the EU and the adoption of the Euro as a common currency) during the post-membership years (Szczerbiak, 2011: 16-17). In fact, PiS has been categorized as a ‘soft-Eurosceptic’ party in studies and expert surveys examining party policies toward the European Union (e.g. Kopecky and Mudde, 2002: 312; Szczerbiak and Bil 2008: 11).[[101]](#footnote-101) One theoretical explanation for the lack of Eurosceptic discourse in the party’s program in the early 2000s lays in the ‘moderation thesis’, which argues that political parties adopting vote-maximizing strategies in elections tend to downplay uncompromising discourses in order to appeal to different segments of the society (Rupnik, 2007: 24; Almeida, 2012: 15).

The PiS aspiration toward mainstream status, however, was undermined by the ideological views of the party’s leadership, who had known nationalist, traditional and authoritarian tendencies. This outcome was not surprising, given the theoretical insight that political parties should not be regarded as ‘empty vessels’, and that their ideological affiliations influence both their position in the party system and the electorate’s perception of them (Marks, Wilson and Ray, 2002: 586). Kaczynski’s (proposed) way of handling corruption, for example, reflected his views about law and order policies. Besides institutional reforms such as revision of the Monetary Policy Council and an anti-corruption law, Kaczynski argued that punishment for corruption must be harsh, and even that capital punishment must be restored (Grajewski, 4 July 2001: 2; Szczerbiak, 2003: 732). In addition, the party produced rhetoric on socio-cultural policies similar to that of the League of Polish Families (LPR). Kaczynski, for example, declared PiS to be the best option for backing family values and increasing politicians’ standards of morality (e.g. Reuters, 8 June 2001). Moreover, like the LPR, PiS strongly criticized existing privatization policies for allowing the growth of foreign influence over the country’s economy, arguing that it only supported privatization provided that Poland’s own industry retained the lion’s share of control over the economy (BBC Monitoring European: Political, 17 September, 2001).

The PiS discovered the pitfalls of ‘moderation’, something that political parties with radical views can hardly avoid when they downplay their ideological views in order to maximize electoral support. According to this theory, the major pitfall involves the potential alienation of a party’s ideologically committed voters due to a decreased emphasis on the party’s ideology with the aim of appealing to voters other than the party’s ‘loyal’ ones (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004: 167-168; Almeida, 2012: 15). By applying this logic to the PiS case, it can be suggested that the incompatibility between the party’s aspiration towards mainstream status and the ideological views of the leadership led to an ambiguity, particularly for hardliner conservative voters. In other words, although the PiS presented itself as a supporter of traditionalist and authoritarian socio-cultural policies (e.g. family values, and moral politics), its affirmative position on Polish membership in the EU led to a sense of alienation among hardliner conservatives.

In line with the causal condition formulated in the third chapter, two outcomes of PiS’s inconsistent electoral campaign eventually helped the League of Polish Families. First, as implied by studies confirming the increasing ‘electoral connection’ of the EU issue particularly during the accession process (Hix, 1999: 69; Tillman; 2004: 593; Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 5; Werts et al. 2013), the positive position of PiS towards EU membership contributed to LPR’s success by predisposing hardliner conservative voters, who were against membership, towards the LPR. In fact, the LPR was the only party to put up a determined opposition to Polish membership in the EU, particularly for cultural reasons, in the 2001 parliamentary election. The party also attracted people like Jan Lopuszanski, who ran in the 2000 presidential election on an anti-EU ticket (Polish Bulletin News, 23 August 2001, Szczerbiak and Bil, 2008: 9). This explanation is consistent with that of De Lange and Guerra (2009), who also attribute the LPR’s electoral success to the party’s view on European integration. Yet, as the causal condition suggests, such an explanation is incomplete. Indeed, the issue of Europeanization has never been the primary determinant of electoral preferences in Poland (Szczerbiak, 2011: 131).

The second outcome of PiS inconsistency relates to its position on socio-cultural policies. Although the PiS adopted a vote-maximizing strategy requiring less emphasis on party ideology, as mentioned above, the party did produce traditionalist and authoritarian rhetoric on socio-cultural matters. Such rhetoric led to a divergence in the socio-cultural dimension of party competition; this divergence eventually increased the ‘space elasticity’ of party competition and polarized the party system in terms of this dimension (Abedi, 2002: 555). In this way, PiS brought the LPR into the ‘region of acceptability’ and provided the LPR with a ‘reputational shield’ (Ivarsfalten, 2005). As a result, the LPR’s radical policies strictly based on Catholic principles became justifiable.[[102]](#footnote-102) Otherwise, the PiS could have signaled to voters that the radical policies formulated by the LPR based on strict Catholic principles lacked merit (Meguid, 2005: 349).

Many students of radical right politics argue that right-wing mainstream parties can easily attract supporters of radical right parties if the former emphasize issues raised by the radical right parties as well (e.g. Kitschelt, 1995). Contrary to this argument, the illiberal position of PiS did not stymie the electoral success of LPR in the 2001 election. The answer to this contradiction lies in the intersection of the third condition, the absence of a large ethnic minority population, with the other parts of the statement of sufficiency (*ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop*). This argument is based on countries that have either a large number of economically driven immigrant workers or a historically rooted ethnic minority populations. After all, the discussions of the electoral successes of radical right parties both in Romania in the 2000 election (see below) and in Slovakia in the 2006 election (see the sixth chapter) confirm this argument Yet, this QCA analysis shows that the argument does not fall in line with the expectation in countries like Poland that do not have large ethnic minority populations. Instead, the illiberal positions of right-wing mainstream parties in such countries helped radical right parties to achieve electoral success by causing an increase in the saliency of issues strongly emphasized by radical right parties.

Studies examining the profile of LPR voters also support the causal condition discussed here. The majority of the party’s voters lived in constituencies such as Lubelskie, Malopolskie, and Podkarpackies, all strongholds of Catholic culture. In addition, most of the electorate in these regions voted for the LPR, opposed Polish membership in the EU – largely owing to issues such as abortion, and same-sex marriage - and urged the Church to play a central role in daily life (e.g. Millard, 2003: 371; Szczerbiak, 2003: 735, 737-738; McManus et al, 2003: 17; De Lange and Guerra, 2009: 535-536). In the words of Zygmunt Wrzodak, a leading figure in the party, the LPR succeeded in the election because ‘the core patriotic and Roman Catholics went to the polls’ (BBC Monitoring European: Political, 23 September, 2001).

5.2.3. Europhile PiS and Europhobic LPR: 2003 EU Referendum

It was predicted in the early days of 2003 that accession to the European Union would be the main issue in Polish politics that year (Polish News Bulletin, 2 January 2003). Prime Minister Miller placed a high priority on EU integration and preparation for an accession referendum (Interfax Poland Business News Service, 7 January 2003). Accession to the EU was seen as highly symbolic to many citizens in post-communist countries, in that it appeared to mark the end of the process of integration with Western Europe (Szczerbiak, and Taggart, 2004: 563; Ost, 2009: 13). The Polish EU accession referendum was held on 7-8 June 2003. The turnout was 58.85 per cent, with 77.45 per cent voting ‘yes’ to Polish membership in the EU, and 22.55 per cent voting ‘no’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2004: 560).[[103]](#footnote-103)

The following discussion of the LPR and PiS campaigns leading up to EU accession referendum aims to clarify each party’s perspective on the issue of Europeanization. The most important consequence of the EU referendum for the LPR was the party’s consolidation of its (already reserved) place in the Polish party system as the most viable alternative for the hardliner conservatives. Although PiS voiced certain reservations regarding Polish membership in the EU in late 2002, the party later became a supporter of membership. As discussed below, neither the consistency nor the content of the PiS opposition proved sufficient for the party to appeal to hardliner conservatives. Indeed, in the first Polish election for the European Parliament held in 2004 - which had a disappointing turnout of around 20 percent - the LPR became the second party, gaining 15.9 per cent of the votes (Jasiewicz, 2004: 36; Markowski and Tucker, 2005: 411).

As mentioned above, PiS had presented a pro-membership image in the 2001 parliamentary election, albeit less so than did the liberal right-wing Civic Platform. Nevertheless, the party had shifted towards ‘soft-Eurosceptic’ opposition afterwards. The main reason behind this change involved the increasing influence of the conservatively disposed leadership, especially Lech Kaczynski, whose popularity was further boosted after being elected mayor of Warsaw in the 2002 municipality election (Polish News Bulletin, 3 January 2003). Just after being elected mayor, Kaczynski said ‘It is too early to say [PiS would back entry in the referendum], but surely PiS has the political courage to speak up against accession if it came to that” (Reuters News, 13 November 2002).

Despite Kaczynski’s Euroscepticism, many party activists were pro-membership. Likewise, 73 per cent of those who had voted for the PiS in the 2001 parliamentary election were strongly pro-membership (BBC Monitoring European, 13 January 2003).[[104]](#footnote-104) As a result of this strong support for membership, the party’s soft-Eurosceptic position wavered and consequently weakened as the referendum date approached (Riishoj, 2007: 517). In a party congress, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who was elected as the new party leader once his brother had been elected mayor, also voted to take a pro-membership position during the campaign for the referendum. The party officially launched its campaign in March 2003 using the slogan ‘A Strong Poland in Europe’. Just before the referendum, the new leader of the party argued that ‘Poland’s integration with the EU would make it possible for the country to exert influence on European economy and international politics’ (BBC Monitoring European, 27 April 2003).[[105]](#footnote-105)

Despite PiS being a mainstream right-wing party with illiberal socio-cultural policies, the content of their opposition to EU membership (or more accurately their reservations about membership), differed significantly from the content of the opposition expressed by the LPR. PiS primarily criticized the EU accession terms for economic reasons. For example, after being elected mayor, Lech Kaczynski stated, ‘We are decisively pro-EU, but decisively against these entry terms. […] [The] proposed financial terms would leave Poland no better off in the first years of membership, while small subsidies for its farmers would threaten the livelihood of the country’s large, poor rural community’ (Reuters, 13 November 2002). Given that 70 per cent of Poles thought that EU agricultural policy conflicted with the interests of the Polish agricultural sector (Reed, 2002), the criticism voiced by Kaczynski could be regarded as a viable campaign strategy. Nevertheless, such criticism during the campaign came primarily from Self-Defence, another anti-EU party, which centered its critique heavily on economic reasons (Riishoj, 2007: 20; Szczerbiak, 2007: 212; Markowski and Tucker, 2010: 527).[[106]](#footnote-106)

By contrast, the LPR’s bitter criticisms of the EU discussed in detail in the second chapter, primarily centered on identity and religious-based issues, emphasizing the protection of Polish identity against the German threat, of Polish families against same-sex marriages and abortion, and of Christian values against Islam (De Lange and Guerra, 2009: 539).[[107]](#footnote-107) Despite the strong support for Polish membership coming from Pope John Paul II (Szczerbiak, 2004b: 680), the party consistently followed anti-EU policies and firmly placed itself as the ‘hard-Eurosceptic party’ in Polish politics. Thus, the LPR consolidated its place as the most viable option for hardliner conservative voters who were against the membership on the grounds of cultural incompatibility.[[108]](#footnote-108)

**5.3 Romanian 2000 Parliamentary Election**

The 1996 parliamentary election had marked the victory of the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) against the post-communist elites led by Ion Iliescu. This result had brought fresh hope to Romanians who cherished the features of liberal democracy (Pippidi, 2001: 231). Yet, the performance of the CDR in office had not fulfilled their hopes. Contrary to expectations, the government’s poor performance had led to severe socio-economic problems. The country had experienced an inflation rate reaching 40 per cent and an unemployment rate reaching double-digit numbers. These conditions proved absolutely dreadful for Romanians, whose average income per month was only about 100 USD (Alexe, 24 November 2000). A lack of structural stability within the CDR contributed to the government’s inability to deal with the problems. Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea had been forced to resign in 1998, and his replacement, Radu Vesile, was dismissed by President Emile Constantinescu about one and a half years later (West LB Investment Review, 14 February 2000). Alexander Athanasiu’s Social Democrat Party, a minor partner in the Convention, had engaged in negotiations to form an electoral alliance under the leadership of Ionescu’s the Party of Social Democracy of Romania, the main opposition party (Rompres, 9 November 2000).[[109]](#footnote-109) By early 2000, the tie between the CDR and its supporters had been loosened. Three months before the 2000 Presidential election, President Constantinescu, who had been elected as the candidate for the Convention in the 1996 Presidential election, decided not to run for a second term to avoid an electoral crush, which was very likely (Rompres, 18 July 2000). Without exception, all polls had indicated that the Convention was about to face a drastic electoral failure in the 2000 parliamentary election.[[110]](#footnote-110)

The parliamentary election was held on 26 November 2000. On the one hand, the election proved a complete disaster for the Convention, which remained outside the parliament. On the other hand, the results confirmed the pre-election prediction that the alliance of Social Democrats including, PSDR and the Romanian Humanitarian Party (PUR), would emerge as the winner. The alliance gained 36.6 per cent of the vote. Yet, the alliance was short of the requisite majority in the parliament to form a single party government. The most striking result of the election, however, was that the Greater Romania Party (PRM) achieved a major electoral breakthrough by winning 19.5 per cent of the vote and securing 84 seats (out of 345) in the parliament (Pop Eleches, 2001: 157). The leader of the party, Vadim Tudor, qualified for the run off presidential election by taking second place with 27.3 per cent of the vote (Rompres, 26 November 2000). Such a high level of electoral support exceeded even the party’s own expectation (Pippidi, 2001: 238). After the election, PSDR formed a single party minority government by signing a pact with the Democratic Party (PD), the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) (Rompres, 27 December 2000). As a result, the PRM became the main opposition party in the country. The aim of this second part of the chapter is to explain the reasons behind the PRM’s electoral success.

This study suggests that four conditions paved the way for the PRM’s electoral success, namely *1)* *the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party*, *2) the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following liberal cultural policies, 3) the presence of a large ethnic minority population* and *4) the presence of a high level of unemployment*. More concretely, socio-economic problems led to a general dissatisfaction with the established parties. The PSDR’s liberal position within the socio-cultural dimension allowed the PRM to appeal to the conservative segment of the electorate. The PRM took advantage of this opportunity by combining its anti-political establishment and anti-minority rhetoric with its criticism against the EU’s ‘generous’ policies on minority rights.

5.3.1 Socio-economic Problems and Rampant Public Dissatisfaction with Politics

The austere budgetary policies in 1999 and 2000 placed a heavy economic burden on ordinary Romanian citizens. As mentioned earlier, the unemployment level reached double-digit numbers (over 11 per cent). A poll conducted about three months before from the election revealed that the biggest problems in the country were the economic crisis, poverty and unemployment (Rompres, 7 September 2000). Public complaints focused in particular on politicians’ total indifference to socio-economic problems. Together with severe socio-economic distress, the problem of corruption, though not part of the configuration (*ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp*), had long been a problem in the country and also gave rise to public dissatisfaction with the established political parties (Pippidi, 2001: 230). Just two weeks before the 2000 election, a press investigation into the ‘fight against corruption’ carried out by the daily *Jurnalul National* concluded that, ‘corruption continues to exist under “the stolid eyes of lawmakers”’ (Rompres, 10 November 2000). The EU regarded corruption as one obstacle to the country’s integration, along with the child protection crisis, and ineffective public administration (Reuter News, 6 November 2000). Similarly, a poll conducted by Gallup-Romania in June 2000 found that Bucharest residents considered corruption a daily activity. According to the poll, two-thirds of Bucharest’s population stated that they had bribed doctors to receive treatment, and one-third of the population had bribed policemen. Also, 80 per cent of the city’s residents thought that professionals deliberately refused to provide services unless they were given money (Associated Press, 26 July 2000).[[111]](#footnote-111) All these developments ultimately damaged the people’s trust in political institutions. For example, a poll carried out in October 2000 showed that the election was of no interest at all to 14 per cent of the electorate, while it held little interest for another 20 per cent of the voters (Rompres, 23 October 2000). In fact, the election’s turnout rate was 65.3, the lowest turnout rate compared to all previous elections held since the end of the communist regime in Romania.[[112]](#footnote-112)

General public dissatisfaction with the established political parties benefitted the PRM. This was not because the party gave voters a prescription to ameliorate the socio-economic problems. Instead, as Pippidi (2001: 239) puts it, the party’s anti-political establishment rhetoric attracted voters with different profiles. For example, the PRM’s leader, Vadim Tudor, blamed all of the country’s economic problems on corrupt politicians, which he called the ‘Mafia’, and said in one of his speeches: ‘…I am born, shaped, and genetically programmed to be the terminator of the Mafia’ (Cinpoes, 2010: 105). Although Tudor himself also appeared at the centre of various scandals, the lack of any verdict proving the allegations provided a further boost in his popularity amongst the electorate (Cinpoes, 2010: 105). A poll released just a day before the election suggested that Tudor had doubled his electoral support within two months by appealing to disappointed Romanians who were tired of corrupt politicians (Alexe, 2000). A micro-level analysis of the profile of PRM supporters also supports this. The party managed to gain the support of not only of traditional right-wing voters (such as low-educated, unemployed, older people, particularly living in rural areas) but also of younger voters, those with moderate education (particularly those with a vocational school diploma) and those living in urban areas (Pippidi, 2001: 250).

5.3.2 The Europhile and Culturally Liberal Party of Social Democracy of Romania

The rise of general public dissatisfaction in Romania coincided with a shift in PSDR’s position on socio-cultural issues towards a more liberal stance on the eve of the 2000 election. Unlike the early 1990s, in 2000 the PSDR defined itself as a European oriented, modern social democratic party, giving priority to reforms to consolidate the democratic regime in Romania.[[113]](#footnote-113) The Chapel Hill expert surveys in both 2002 and 2006 labelled the party ‘strongly pro-EU’ with scores of 6.1 and 6.2 (out of 7), respectively (see: table 4.2).[[114]](#footnote-114) The Comparative Manifesto dataset shows that positive statements about multiculturalism appeared for the first time in the PSDR’s program before the 2000 election (Volkens et al. 2013). For example, the leader of the Roma Party, Madalin Voicu, stated that the PSDR was the only party ‘that had committed itself to solve the Gypsies’ issues’ (Rompres, 30 October 2000). After the election, as mentioned earlier, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania was one of the parties that supported the minority government formed by the PSDR.

There are both external and internal reasons behind this shift, which provided the PRM with an opportunity to appeal to conservative voters. The external reasons had been present since the mid-1990s. At that time, the international community made it clear that it would be reluctant to work with post-communist parties that embraced strong nationalism, unless they transformed themselves into modern social democratic parties.[[115]](#footnote-115) This condition forced the PSDR to review its foreign policies, which had a strong nationalist inclination before the 1996 election. The party became a leading supporter of the globalization process (Rompress, 27 June 2000) and Romanian integration into the European Union. For example, Iliescu, the party’s leader, made the following statement two months before the election: ‘Romanian foreign policy has to play an essential role in the creation of the new European destiny of our country. We have made an essential option for the integration in the EU and NATO’ (Rompres, 11 September 2000). Similarly, the Iliescu repeatedly argued that EU accession was the number one priority of his party’s program (Rompres, 6 November 2000).

The formation of the Social Democratic Pole under the leadership of PSDR and the emergence of the Greater Romania Party as the main rival for the Pole appear as the main internal reasons that explaining the PSDR’s shift in the socio-cultural dimension of party competition. First, the merge between Iliescu’s PSDR and Athanasiu’s PDSR opened the way for the former to improve its transnational networks with European social democrat parties, particularly with the German Social Democrats (Rompres, 20 September 2000; Pippidi, 2001: 234). In addition, the participation of the Romanian Humanist Party (PUR) in the Pole could also be seen as an important factor for preparing a reform-minded program before the election (Rompress, 7 September 2000; Rompress 17 October 2000). Second, the rise of the PRM concerned both external and internal circles supporting the democratization process in the country. These groups were gripped by the fear that a possible return of the alliance between Iliescu’s PDSR and Tudor’s PRM, which had been in effect from 1994 to 1996, would adversely affect the process (West LB Investment Review, 14 February 2000). To ease the concern, the PSDR kept its distance from the PRM. At its annual congress in February 2000, Iliescu made it clear that PSDR had decisively ruled out seeking cooperation with PRM either in the pre-election period or the post-election period (West LB Investment Review, 31 July 2000). Keeping its distance from the PRM was a strategic move for the PSD; by doing this, the party’s presidential candidate, Iliescu, could easily attract the support of those Romanian voters worried about the rise of the PRM, particularly in the second round of the election.[[116]](#footnote-116)

5.3.3 The Anti-minority and Eurosceptic Greater Romania Party

Unlike the Party of Social Democracy of Romania, the Greater Romania Party (PRM) followed anti-minority policies during its campaign for the 2000 parliamentary election. The party played the ‘anti-Hungarian card’ and the ‘anti-Gypsy card’ effectively by appealing to uneducated or lower-educated voters in rural areas, who were more likely to believe the party’s statements blaming all social and economic problems on Western Europe and ethnic minorities (Pippidi, 2001: 250-251). The PRM opposed any legislation that would enhance the socio-cultural rights of minorities in Romania. It boycotted parliamentary sessions discussing legislation that would allow the use of minority languages in places where a specific minority group composed at least 20 per cent of the population (Associated Press, 17 January, 2001). In a press conference held after he qualified for the second round of the 2000 presidential election, Tudor argued that no university holding courses in Hungarian should be established, since this would breach the Romanian constitution. He argued that Hungarians must accept and respect the fact that the only official language was Romanian, as declared in the constitution (BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe & Balkans, 29 November 2000). Furthermore, Tudor went so far as to argue that Hungarians and Gypsies should live in ghettos. Tudor made derogatory statements toward the Roma population, the second largest minority in the country, in particular. Once, he even argued that ‘Roma people were criminals attacking innocent people, and [that] they did not rape their own children and parents since they were busy with raping ours’ (Andreescu, 2005: 188).

The PRM, however, held an erratic position on the issue of EU membership. On the one hand, the party believed EU membership would strengthen national unity in Romania and improve citizens’ living standards. On the other hand, the party argued that the EU membership requirements endangered Romania’s national interests (Cinpoes, 2010: 103). This inconsistency is reflected in the results of the Chapel Hill expert surveys that placed the party in a ‘neuter position’ in terms of its support for EU membership (see: table 2.1). Holding a neuter position on the issue of EU membership essentially contradicts what radical right ideology would predict. Driven by the core of radical right ideology of nativism, radical right parties are expected to be against the EU membership.

The lack of clarity in the PRM’s position on the EU membership is reflected in the inconsistency between the party’s strategy-driven and ideology-driven statements. Pursuing a purely ideology-driven policy on EU membership would not work well strategically, as the great majority of Romanian voters supported membership. For example, in 2001, 80 per cent of Romanians thought that the EU membership was a ‘good thing’ (Eurobarometer, 2002: 56). At the time, this was the highest level of support amongst all candidate countries to the EU. The same trend was observed in a 2002 survey as well (Eurobarometer, 2003: 3).[[117]](#footnote-117) Yet, having an ideology that put stronger emphasis on ‘nation states’ forced the PRM to be against the harmonization of domestic laws – particularly those concerning to minority rights – with those of a supranational institution. Sum (2010: 24) suggests that the PRM’s opposition to EU membership thus contributed to the party’s electoral success in the 2000 election, by becoming the voice of citizens who supported membership, ‘but not [the] spirit of the EU-mandated reforms’.

The fact that the PRM became successful in constituencies with relatively heterogeneous populations supports the argument that anti-minority and anti-EU (in terms of criticizing the EU’s ‘generous’ minority policies) positions helped the PRM in achieving electoral success in the 2000 election. In constituencies such as Cluj, Maramures, and Mures, where the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) was also relatively strong, the party enjoyed much more electoral support than at the national level (see table 5.1). Likewise, in constituencies such as Dolj and Olt, where Roma people densely reside, the PRM gained a substantial number of votes (see table 5.2). Yet, table 5.1 shows that the PRM also managed to be successful in constituencies such as Bacau, Botosani, Neamt and Braila, where Hungarian minority populations do not densely reside; therefore, electoral support for the UDMR remained insignificant. This result supports the argument based on the solution formula presented in the previous chapter. Accordingly, the electoral success of the PRM in 2000 was in good part due to the presence of large ethnic minority populations in the country and the Europhile and liberal positions of the PSDR regarding these minority populations *(ephilm\*libm\*ethpop)*. Yet, this explanation is incomplete. The dissatisfaction of the Romanian electorate, related to the perception that the established politicians were self-seeking actors indifferent to socio-economic problems (such as unemployment), also contributed to the party’s electoral success, as predicted by the configuration formulated in chapter four (*ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp*). In other words, inn the absence of the unemployment problem, it would hardly be possible for PRM to get such a significant proportion of votes (19.5 per cent), an exceptional result for minor parties, including radical right parties.

**Table 5.1** The PRM’s electoral support (in %) in constituencies in which UDMR was strong (The 2000 parliamentary election).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Constituency** | **PRM (2000)** | **UDMR (2000)** |
| Country Level | 19.6 | 6.8 |
| Bihor | 16.78 | 22.95 |
| Cluj | 20.39 | 18.33 |
| Maramures | 22.13 | 9.06 |
| Salaj | 18.41 | 23.60 |
| Mures | 21.12 | 38.84 |
| Bacau | 16.72 | 0.50 |
| Botosani | 19.20 | 0.18 |
| Neamt | 21.16 | 0.16 |
| Braila | 20.52 | 0.15 |

**Table 5.2** The PRM’s electoral support (in %) in constituencies in which Roma population densely reside (The 2000 parliamentary election).

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Constituency** | **Electoral Support for the PRM (% )** |
| Country level | 19.6 |
| Calarasi | 18.16 |
| Dolj | 19.88 |
| Maramures | 22.13 |
| Mures | 21.12 |
| Olt | 23.74 |

**Sources: European Election Database available at:**

**http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fStudy/ROPA2000\_Display&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fCube/ROPA2000\_Display\_C1&top=yes**

**5.4 Conclusion**

This chapter focused on one typical case for each of the two paths formulated in the QCA analysis to explain the electoral success of radical right parties in CEECs. The first path represents the configuration composed of three conditions: the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party(*ephilm*), the absence of a right-wing mainstream party following socio-culturally liberal policies (*~libm*), and the absence of a large ethnic minority population (*ethpop*). The Polish 2001 parliamentary election was examined to explain how this configuration operated. The second path refers to a configuration composed of four conditions: the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party (*ephilm*), the presence of a right-wing mainstream party following socio-culturally liberal policies (*libm*), the presence of a large ethnic minority population (*ethpop*), and the presence of high levels of unemployment (*unemp*). The 2000 Romanian parliamentary election was examined to explain how this configuration worked.

According to the first path (ephilm*\*~libm\*~ethpop*), the fact that League of Polish Families (LPR) was the only party opposed to Polish membership in the EU made the party a viable alternative for hardliner conservatives. The discussions of the PiS and LPR’s campaigns for the 2001 parliamentary election and the 2003 EU accession referendum showed that the PiS argued that Poland should be a part of the EU while LPR insisted that the EU would have malign influence on Polish national culture, which should be strongly loyal to Catholic principles. This condition was associated with the illiberal position of the right-wing mainstream party Law and justice Party (PiS) within the socio-cultural dimension of the party competition. The PiS developed similar approaches on socio-cultural issues to those of LPR. For example, the PiS emphasized the necessity of protecting patriarchal family values, national sovereignty and law and order. The LPR also emphasized these issues, actually in a stronger way. In this way, the PiS - as a mainstream party with a greater chance for media appearances than a minor party such as the LPR - not only increased the saliency of illiberal approaches to socio-cultural issues, but also legitimized LPR’s approach in the eyes of the electorate. In other words, the PiS pulled the LPR into the ‘region of acceptability’. Otherwise, the PiS could have signalled to voters that illiberal approaches were inapplicable in a globalizing world and were a product of extremism that would likely be supported by an insignificant number of voters. The final component of the configuration (*~ethpop*) is important in that it determines which of the right-wing mainstream party’s positions on socio-cultural issues contributed to the electoral success of radical right parties. In Poland – a country without a large ethnic minority population – the illiberal position of the right-wing parties is most likely to contribute to this success. However in countries with this condition, as the second path argues, a right-wing mainstream party could attract supporters of the radical right parties by taking an illiberal position, since some degree of electoral demand always exists in such countries due to a historically rooted cultural incompatibility between native and ethnic minority populations.

The presence of the condition *ethpop* in the second configuration, *ephilm*\**libm*\**ethpop*\**unemp,* underlines the fact that in countries with large ethnic minority populations, nativist circles demand political parties that promote nativist ideas and target ethnic minority populations. The Greater Romania Party’s (PRM) anti-minority discourse appears to have worked in its favour in the Romanian 2000 parliamentary election. This condition intersected with a shift in the position of the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PSDR) on socio-cultural issues from an illiberal point of view to liberal one. International pressure, particularly from the EU, and the party’s pre-election alliance with Athaniasiu’s Social Democratic Party and the Romanian Humanitarian Party (PUR) seem to be the main reasons behind this shift. This shift, however, opened a space for the PRM to appeal to conservative voters who had renounced the PSDR for its moderate position. Finally, an increasing inflation rate reaching 40 per cent, an unemployment rate exceeding 11 per cent and the widespread public perception that established politicians were completely indifferent to these problems ultimately increased popular dissatisfaction with the established political parties. The fact that no verdict had been issued confirming the corruption allegations against Tudor, the leader of the PRM, further boosted the popularity of the party within a negative atmosphere for the other parties, particularly those in the Romanian Democratic Convention. As a result, the PRM enjoyed a level of electoral support (19.5 per cent) that was exceptionally high for a minor party.


**Chapter 6: A Comparison between a ‘Deviant Case’ and a ‘Typical Case’: Electoral Failure of the Slovak National Party in 2002 and Electoral Success of Slovak National Party in 2006**

**6.1 Introduction**

As stated in the previous chapter, ‘typical cases’ in qualitative comparative analysis are those ‘that are in line with the statement of sufficiency (the causal condition) and good empirical instances of the outcome Y and condition X’. By contrast, ‘deviant cases’ contradict the statement of sufficiency, in that the statement of sufficiency or causal condition does not operate in line with the expectations (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 307). Focusing on both typical cases and deviant cases is fruitful, since it allows the researcher to identify missing conditions in the statement of sufficiency that lead to a divergence in the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 309).

Remember that the qualitative comparative analysis yielded two paths that led to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEECs in national parliamentary elections held from 2000 to 2010. The first path is *ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop,* which covers two typical cases: the electoral success of the League of Polish Families in the 2001 parliamentary election and that of the Slovene National Party in the 2008 election. This path covers no deviant cases. The second path is *ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp*, which covers five typical cases: the electoral successes of the Slovak National Party in 2006 and 2010, the Greater Romania Party in 2000, National Union Attack (ATAKA) in 2005 and the Movement for Better Hungary (JOBBIK) in 2010. The path covers two deviant cases: the electoral failures of the Slovak National Party in 2002 election and the MIEP-JOBBIK alliance in 2006.[[118]](#footnote-118) Figure 6.1 shows how the typical cases and deviant cases scatter in response to the path *ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp* in the XY plot.

**Figure 6.1** Cases with fuzzy membership in *ephilm\*libm\*etpop\*unemp*

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This chapter makes a comparison between the case labelled SLK2002 (deviant case) and that labelled SLK2006 (typical case). There are two reasons behind the selection of these cases for comparison instead of the cases labelled HUN2006 (deviant case) and HUN2010 (typical case). First, the figure 6.1 shows that the Slovak cases have higher membership scores in the path (statement of sufficiency) (X=1) than the Hungarian cases (X = 0.6). Second, while developing the hypothesis about the impact of the presence of a Europhile mainstream party on the outcome, it was stated that the condition would be stronger in favour of the radical right parties just before the EU accession years, since EU-related issues become more salient at that time than during the period following the accession year. This prediction can be explored by comparing the Slovak cases, since one occurred in 2002 (before accession) and the other occurred in 2006 (after accession). By contrast, both Hungarian cases occurred after accession, in 2006 and 2010. In addition, as mentioned in chapter four, this prediction appears to be confirmed by the Polish 2001 parliamentary election but falsified by the Slovak 2002 election. Contrary to the prediction, the Slovak National Party managed to achieve an electoral success in 2006 (after accession), but not in 2002 (before accession). To find out an explanation for the falsification of the prediction, a discussion of the Slovak cases is needed. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to determine the missing condition leading to a divergence in the outcome (electoral failure / success of the Slovak National Party) even though the same statement of sufficiency was present to the same degree in both the 2002 and 2006 Slovak national parliamentary elections.

This chapter is composed of two parts. The first part discusses the intersections between the conditions included in the statement of sufficiency. To this end, the chapter examines the policies of the right-wing mainstream party, the Slovak Christian and Democratic Union (SDKU), concerning Europeanization and socio-cultural issues. It also mentions the policies of the Slovak National Party on the given issues to reveal the different perspectives of the two parties. This is followed by a discussion of how socio-economic problems affected the electorate’s preferences with respect to the unemployment problem in the country. The second part shifts the chapter’s focus onto the deviant case. It aims to determine why, despite the presence of the same statement of sufficiency paving the way for the Slovak National Party’s electoral success in 2006, the party failed to achieve electoral success in 2002. The section argues that two main reasons led to this divergence. First, leading up to 1998 election, the European Union explicitly gave a signal to the Slovak electorate that the country’s accession to the EU would not be possible as long as illiberal political parties including the Slovak National Party remained in office. This signal predisposed a great majority of the electorate towards parties with which the EU was willing to cooperate. Thus, illiberal parties were kept at bay during the accession years. Second, a personality clash between two leading figures of the party, Jan Slota and Anna Malikova, culminated in the dissolution of the party on the eve of the 2002 election. As a result, two radical right parties with no ideological differences competed in the 2002 election, sharing the total percentage of radical right voters in the election almost fifty-fifty.

**6.2 The 2002 and 2006 parliamentary elections**

The Slovak 2002 parliamentary election confirmed the continuation of changes that had occurred in the 1998 election. Therefore, a brief explanation of what happened in 1998 is needed. The 1998 election had been a turning point for the democratization process in Slovakia in that it replaced illiberal coalitions led by Meciar and supported by the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the Party of Democratic Left (ZRS) with a liberal coalition of four parties called the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK). The SDK involved several leading politicians, including Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, who established the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) in 2000 (Meseznikov, 2005: 126). During the 1994-1998 term, Meciar-led coalition governments had adopted an authoritarian style of ruling. For example, they developed policies to eliminate the opposition parties and frequently violated the pluralism principle of liberal democracy by using state power firmly concentrated in the hands of the coalition (Meseznikov, 2003: 1078). Such policies made the coalitions so infamous in the international community that the European Union delayed the opening of EU accession negotiations with Slovakia for two years. The 1998 election brought the electoral alliance of anti-Meciar parties, the Slovak Democratic Coalition, into the office. The first task of the SDK coalition government was to eliminate the Meciar-led coalitions’ illiberal practices in order to recover the country’s image in the international community. Towards that aim, as discussed below, the SDKU-led coalitions made various liberal-minded reforms starting in the late 1990s; these resulted in the opening of EU accession negations in February 2000 (Pridham, 2001: 204).

The 2002 Slovak parliamentary election was held on 20-21 September. The election resulted in the success of three right-wing parties (SDKU, KDH and ANO) and the Hungarian Minority Coalition (SMK). Together they secured 78 of 150 seats in the National Council, and swiftly established a new four-party coalition government (Haughton, 2003: 65-66). The results also marked the continuity of a pro-EU membership coalition government led by SDKU, whose election slogan stated, ‘We’ll finish what we have started. We are on the right path’ (Haughton, 2003: 66).[[119]](#footnote-119) Likewise, the title of SDKU’s manifest for the 2002 election was ‘Opportunity for a Better Life: Continuation of a Democratic Government’ (SDKU, 2002). As mentioned above, the results were also interpreted to have ‘systematic importance’ in eliminating hindrances to progress in the consolidation of a liberal democratic regime (Harris, 2004: 194). The election result was catastrophic for the SNS, however (Meseznikov, 2002: 2). It remained outside the National Council with 3.3 per cent of the votes for the first time since the end of the communist regime. The SNS’s failure in the 2002 election was surprising, given the relatively positive public perception of party leader Anna Malikova;[[120]](#footnote-120) polls conducted in 2000 placed her among the top-five most trusted politicians.[[121]](#footnote-121)

The 2006 Slovak parliamentary election was held on 17 June. It was the first election held after Slovakia had become a member of the European Union. The result of the 2006 election produced a political landscape differed substantially different from those of the previous two elections, as the winners of those elections lost their positions in office. Haughton and Rybar (2008) interpret the results as a ‘change of direction’ in the country. The left-wing populist party, Direction-Social Democracy (*Smer-socialna demokracia*, SMER), won the election with 29.1 per cent of the vote (50 seats). The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union–Democratic Party (*Slovenska demokraticka a krestanska unia- Demokraticka Strana,* SDKU-DS), which had ruled the country since 1998 as the major partner of two successive coalition governments, came in second to SMER by winning 18.4 per cent of the vote (31 seats). Besides the SMER, the Slovak National Party was the clear winner of the election, achieving an electoral success that is very rare for minor parties (Rybar, 2007: 702). The SNS gained 11.7 per cent of the vote (20 seats) and emerged as the third party from the election. The People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS), the pivotal party of the 1990s, took only fifth position by winning 8.8 per cent of the vote (15 seats). As the National Council has 150 seats, no party managed to secure the requisite number of seats to form a single party government. As a result, SMER, SNS, and LS-HZDS formed a three-party coalition government (Deegan-Krause, 2012: 197).[[122]](#footnote-122) The return to office of parties that had been criticized for their illiberal policies and populist tendencies initiated a scholarly discussion about whether the democratization process in Slovakia, through which important steps had been taken since the 1998 election under the auspices of the EU, was backsliding. The *Journal of Democracy* dedicated a specil issue to this discussion (2007, Volume 18, No. 4).

6.2.1 Europhile and Liberal SDKU versus Eurosceptic and Illiberal SNS

The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) was formerly part of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), which has a strong affiliation to Catholic principles. An internal party quarrel between moderate and hardliner members of the KDH led to the establishment of the SDKU in 2000. In time, SDKU emerged as the right-wing mainstream party of the country and became a member of the European People’s Party group in the European Parliament (Henderson, 2005: 16). During its term as the major partner of the coalition governments, the SDKU followed liberal economic and cultural policies that paved the way for the membership of Slovakia in the EU in May 2004 (Houghton and Rybar, 2009: 543-544, Meseznikov, 2003: 1079).

The SDKU followed liberal cultural policies and took a Europhile position on the issue of EU membership during its term, largely due to EU pressure on the country. Before the 1998 election, by delaying the opening of accession negotiations with Slovakia, the EU clearly signalled that as long as political parties that follow illiberal policies remained in power, the country’s membership to the EU would not be possible. This was a clear message not only for Slovak voters, who were advised not to vote for Meciar’s HZDS or Slota’s SNS, but also for political parties to adopt liberal economic and cultural policies if they wanted to work with the EU towards membership.

The SDKU had rightfully received the EU’s message, and the party had kept its distance from the illiberal parties since its formation. For example, the leader of SDKU, Dzurinda, ensured before the 2002 election that SDKU would not cooperate with Meciar’s HZDS or Slota’s SNS under any circumstances (SITA, 27 October 2001). In its manifesto for the 2002 election, SDKU argued that the primary goal of the party was to complete the democratization process in Slovakia (SDKU, 2002: 1, 2). Towards that end, the party described itself as a liberal party fighting against any extremist ideas in Slovak politics (SDKU, 2002: 2). The party frequently emphasized its belief that no democratic regime could be established in the absence of a pluralist society (SDKU, 2002: 20). Based on this belief, the party argued that the self-determination rights of minority groups must be respected, and reforms for protecting minority rights must be enforced (SDKU, 2002: 2). In fact, the Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK) formed a part of two successive SDKU-led coalition governments from 1998 to 2006; furthermore, Pal Casky, a member of the SMK, had been appointed as deputy prime minister for human rights, minorities and regional developments (Vermeersch, 2003: 896).

Following this understanding, the SDKU-led coalition governments amended the Slovak constitution to prevent an authoritarian style of governing, which had been very common during the Meciar government (Meseznikov, 2005: 126). For example, as no seats had been reserved for opposition parties during Meciar’s term, the coalition opened seats in the parliamentary committees to opposition parties, with the aim of strengthening the check and balance system in the country (Pridham, 2002: 217). SDKU also initiated positive legislations (partly or entirely) concerning minority rights and the Roma issue in the country (Pridham, 2002: 218). For example, they established the ombudsman institution to benefits all Slovak citizens irrespective of their ethnic background (Meseznikov, 2003: 1080). In 1999, they also passed a piece of legislation called the ‘Language Law’ permitting the use of minority languages in official correspondence (Pridham, 2002: 218).

The SDKU-led coalition governments also aimed to address the Roma problem. For example, they established a position called the ‘Government Commissioner for the Solution of the Problems of the Romani Minority’. Romani activists such as Vinchent Danihel and Klara Orgovanova were nominated to head this body. The Commissioner prepared a document, entitled ‘Strategy of the Government for the Solution of the Problem of the Roma’, that the government officially adopted (Vermeersch, 2003: 896). Although the measures to address the problems facing the Roma were insufficient to fully eliminate the problems, they were sufficient to please the EU. For example, in February 2001, the EU Commissioner Gunter Verheugen stated that the EU was aware of and supported the SDKU-led coalition government’s effort to eliminate problems related to the Roma, yet a comprehensive solution to these problems before the Slovakia’s accession to the EU would be a miracle (Pridham, 2002: 219).[[123]](#footnote-123) It appears that the measures taken by the SDKU-led coalition governments satisfied many Roma citizens, who later declared that they would vote for SDKU in the 2002 election (TASR, 15 May 2002). The fact that the SDKU-led coalition governments did not manage to solve the problems of the Roma does not conflict with the liberal position of the party on socio-cultural issues. After all, Slovakia is not an exception in this regard, as the problem still exists in all CEECs included in this study (Pridham, 2002: 219).

SDKU’s liberal position on socio-cultural issues was due in large measure to the decisiveness of the EU not to cooperate with illiberal parties during Slovakia’s EU accession process. Yet, the presence of significant public support for EU membership appears to have been at least as important. After all, it is not a coincidence that the highest percentage of ‘yes’ votes in EU accession referenda, which were held in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2003, occurred in Slovakia. Indeed, 93.71 per cent of those who voted in Slovakia cast ‘yes’ votes. (Henderson, 2006: 149).[[124]](#footnote-124) In this context, it is not surprising that SDKU was one of the leading Europhile parties amongst the CEECs. For example, the Chapel Hill expert survey series (in 2002 and 2006) assigned SDKU scores of 7 and 6.07 on a scale ranging from 1 (most Eurosceptic) to 7 (most Europhile) (please see table 4.3).

After being elected to office, SDKU devoted itself to recovering Slovakia’s reputation within the international community, which had been substantially damaged during the Meciar’s rule. In addition, the party regarded this aim as the *sine qua non* for making the on-going democratization process irreversible. Towards that aim, the party fully supported Slovakia’s accession not only to NATO but also to the EU (SDKU, 2002: 1). Haughton (2003: 73) argues that, in spite of socio-economic problems (particularly an unemployment level close to 15 per cent), the success of the SDKU-led governments in winning two successive elections (1998 and 2002) lies in its decisiveness in making Slovakia a part of the EU. After all, this goal was so important for all coalition members that they managed to turn a blind eye to various disagreements amongst themselves over domestic issues, thereby protecting the cohesion of the SDKU-led coalition, which nevertheless came to the brink of collapse many times. The SDKU acknowledged this fact during its campaign for the 2002 election, saying that ‘we managed to keep the coalition together. Thanks to that we are on the verge of NATO and EU’ (quoted in Houghton, 2003: 73).

The Slovak National Party developed anti-minority and anti-Roma policies against the SDKU’s liberal policies concerning minority rights. In line with the theoretical explanation that ‘the Other lies at the heart of radical right politics’ (Ramet, 1999: 4), the ‘anti-Hungarian card’ held a prominent place in the election program of the SNS (Rybar, 2007: 702; Haughton and Rybar, 2011: 141). In reference to its criticism of the presence of the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) in coalition governments since 1998, the title of the SNS’s electoral program was, ‘We are Slovaks: A Slovak Government for Slovak People’ (SNS, 2006). During the campaign, Slota stated that he would resign as party leader if the SMK kept its place in the government after the election (TASR, 1 June 2006). He promised to dissolve the SMK, and suggested that only a single seat within the National Council should be allocated to represent the Hungarian minority in Slovakia (BBC Monitoring European, 22 April 2006). He argued that the SMK worked against Slovak national interests, so it should not hold ministerial posts in the government. He frequently claimed that the SMK was in collaboration with more than two hundred Hungarian secret service agents operating in Slovakia with the aim of declaring autonomy in Southern Slovakia, which would subsequently lead to the establishment of ‘Greater Hungary’ (BBC Monitoring European, 26 March, 2006). Despite being labelled ‘ridiculous’ by other political parties (Reuter News, 15 June 2006), such policies seemed to appeal to some voters: one survey revealed that 30 per cent of Slovaks agreed that Hungarians had a secret agenda aiming to dissolve Slovak territorial integrity (Pytlas, 2013: 168). Besides anti-Hungarian policies, the SNS also formulated policies targeting the Roma population in Slovakia. For example, the SNS promised to solve the ‘Gypsy issue’, by force if necessary. The party suggested that the birth rate among the Roma people should be tightly controlled, as should any ‘positive discrimination’ toward Roma people. For example, SNS was clearly against subsidies to Roma people and promised to abolish them upon taking the office (BBC Monitoring, European, 23 February 2006).

SNS’s illiberal stance concerning minority issues affected its position on the issue of Europeanization as well. The party conflated its ethno-centric outlook on society with its nativist understanding of foreign policy. In particular, it opposed the EU requirements demanding the extension of minority rights in Slovakia. For example, the party opposed the approval of the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages in the National Council, on the grounds that the Charter would allegedly put ‘the Hungarian language above the other minority languages’ (BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe & Balkans, 22 January 2001). Yet, the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey assigned a score of 3.23 to the position of the SNS on the issue of Europeanization, a very close to the midpoint of the scale ranging from 1 (most Eurosceptic) to 7 (most Europhile). In fact, in the literature on party-based Euroscepticism, the SNS has been classified as a ‘soft-Eurosceptic’ party for its position during the campaigns for the accession referendum (Rybar, 2007: 700). Indeed, the party preferred (or had) to remain mute during the accession referendum campaign.

Actually this ‘soft’ position conflicts with the position predicted by radical right ideology. As in the example of the League of Polish Families, discussed in the previous chapter, based on its nativist understanding of foreign policy, the SNS would be expected to hold a ‘hard Eurosceptic’ position. This anomaly can be explained in large part by the presence of a high level of public support for EU accession in Slovakia. As already mentioned, 93.71 per cent of the electorate supported EU membership in the referendum, the highest rate amongst all candidate countries that held EU accession referenda at the time. Such a high level of public support for EU membership forced the political parties to arrive at an artificial consensus regarding EU membership; this consequently largely deactivated the party-based opposition to EU membership that might have been inspired by the radical right’s nativist understanding of foreign policy (Harris, 2004: 195; Henderson, 2006: 152; Houghton and Rybar, 2011: 140). From a strategic point of view, as Houghton and Rybar (2011: 130) note, a political party is likely to make pro- or anti-EU references if that party thinks that such references will ensure an electoral benefit.

6.2.2 The Problem of Unemployment and the SNS

As already discussed in chapter four and five (in the example of Romania), the liberal policies of right-wing mainstream parties benefited radical right parties in countries with large ethnic minority populations. In line with this expectation, SDKU’s liberal position on socio-cultural policies and its Europhile position on the issue of Europeanization appear to have benefitted SNS particularly in the 2006 election. Thanks to the SDKU’s position, the party had the opportunity to appeal to nativist voters, who always appear in countries with large ethnic minority populations and usually do not support positive legislation concerning minority rights. This condition in Slovakia coincided with the presence of a high level of unemployment during the decade from 2000 to 2010. The average rates of unemployment one year before each parliamentary election held in the decade were consistently above 10 per cent (18 per cent in 2002, 11 per cent in 2006 and 12.4 per cent in 2010). Yet, the problem of unemployment emerged as a leading determinant of electoral preferences particularly in the 2006 election, even though it appears to have been more severe in 2002 (Rybar, 2007: 699). This was largely due to the paramount importance of the EU membership issue before accession (in 2004). Party politics in the country became highly polarized between around this issue, with Europhile parties in the coalition governments (SDKU, SMK, and the Christian Democratic movement [KDH]) on one side, and opposition Eurosceptic parties (mainly SMER, HZDS, and SNS) on the other. A survey conducted by the Institute for Public Affairs (*Institut pre Verejne Otazky*, IVO) in early November 2005 highlights this polarization as well. The survey indicates that ‘ties of trust’ at the level of the electorate were holding the parties together in each camp (SITA, 3 January 2006).

The problem of unemployment also held an important place also in the SNS’s electoral program (Haughton and Rybar, 2011: 141). During the campaign, the leader of the party, Jan Slota, promised to support young families, arguing that they should be provided with homes and entitled to financial aid at the birth of their first child (SITA, 23 February 2006). The party also promised to boost investment in the construction and infrastructure industries, which would create job opportunities, thereby decreasing unemployment to around 8.5 per cent (SNS, 2006: 17, 18). The previous chapter’s discussion on the Romanian 2000 election argued that the presence of high levels of unemployment in the country at the time increased general public dissatisfaction with established political parties. In Slovakia, however, the story appears to be a bit different. The leader of SNS, Slota, is from the city of Zilina, one of the leading industrial centres in the country. During his political career, Slota enjoyed local popularity in this constituency. In fact, before 2006, he was the mayor of the city. During his term, the South Korean company KIA Motors launched a factory in Zilina (SITA, 8 June 2006). The company hired 3,000 people living in Zilina and neighbouring cities such as Trencin. In these constituencies, the party gained 18.8 per cent and 15.9 per cent of the votes, respectively, well above the party’s average electoral support in the country as a whole in the 2006 election (11.7 per cent). Nevertheless the electoral benefit to SNS provided by the high level of unemployment should not be interpreted from the perspective of the ethnic competition approach, which argues that radical right parties increase their electoral support by blaming socio-economic problems on ethnic minorities. There are two main reasons behind this. First, unlike JOBBIK, which frequently blamed rising unemployment in Hungary on the Roma population starting in 2009 (see chapter four), SNS formulated anti-minority policies essentially based on cultural issues, as mentioned above.[[125]](#footnote-125) Second, in both Zilina and Trencin, the overwhelming majority of the population (95 per cent) is ethnic Slovaks. Ergo, it seems fair to suggest that the high levels of unemployment likely contributed to SNS’s electoral support, and that in the absence of this condition the party would likely have received less electoral support in the 2006 election. This suggests that the Slovak 2006 election could be an exception in terms of the findings, proving that socio-economic problems are unlikely to contribute to the electoral success of radical right parties (e.g. Fidrmuc, 2001; Owen and Tucker, 2010). Yet, the question of whether the SNS would have managed to exceed the electoral threshold in the absence of this condition goes beyond the scope of this study. A micro-level analysis of Slovak voters in the region would be required to reveal their motivations to vote for the SNS in the 2006 election.

**6.3 Deviant Case: SNS Electoral Failure in the 2002 Election**

The SNS did not manage to achieve electoral success (i.e. to exceed the electoral threshold) in the 2002 elections, despite the presence of *ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp*, one of the configurations suggested in chapter four to account for the electoral success of radical right parties in CEECs during the decade from 2000 to 2010. Yet, the party managed to succeed in the 2006 election under the same circumstances. This section essentially asks why the SNS did not achieve electoral success in 2002. To answer this question, it starts by focusing on the differences between the two elections that potentially led to this discrepancy. Broadly speaking, the 2002 election essentially differs from the 2006 election in one respect that hurt the illiberal parties, including the SNS. The on-going Europeanization issue dominated the 2002 election, when Slovak citizens, the great majority of whom wanted Slovakia to join the EU, opted for the continuation of the Europhile governing coalition led by SDKU. They believed that illiberal parties such as Meciar’s HZDS or Slota’s SNS might hinder the Europeanization process, as had occurred in 1997. Slovak citizens turned a blind eye to the problem of unemployment, which topped 18 per cent, and continued to support the incumbent for the sake of EU membership (Rybar, 2007: 699).[[126]](#footnote-126) In connection with the Europeanization process, the anti-minority policies forming the core of SNS’s discourses were not as influential in 2002 as they would be in 2006, when Slovakia’s EU accession process had already been completed (Harris, 2004: 203). This partly explains the electoral failure of the SNS in 2002 despite the presence of favourable conditions. The personality-based quarrel between Malikova and Slota appears to have been at least as important. As a result of the quarrel, the SNS divided into two parties, namely the True Slovak National Party (PSNS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS), which gained 3.7 per cent and 3.3 per cent of the vote, respectively, in the election. Nevertheless, this division came to an end before the 2006 election. Certainly this re-unification played a vital role in the SNS’s electoral success in the 2006 election.

6.3.1 The SNS as an outsider to Europeanization

In his seminal essay, Jowitt (1992: 293) argued that the ‘Leninist legacy’ of authoritarianism would prove a major hindrance unless West Europe and the United States took an active role in the democratization process in Eastern bloc countries. This legacy-based, pessimistic view can be criticized for being too deterministic, and for ignoring the structural domestic diversity among the Soviet Bloc countries.[[127]](#footnote-127) Nevertheless, the lack of a strong liberal democratic opposition, a legacy left behind by patrimonial communist regimes (Kitschelt et al., 1999: 36), helped post-communist elites hold on to power in Slovakia. For example, in 1995 the nationalist populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) emerged as the pivotal party in the transition to a democratic regime; it also cooperated closely with the Slovak National Party (SNS) (Vachudova, 2005: 105). These parties’ illiberal understanding of civic liberties and foot-dragging attitudes in enhancing minority rights and guaranteeing the rule of law put Slovakia in an ‘illiberal pattern of political change’, thus leading to a delay in Slovakia’s ‘return to Europe’ (Vachudova, 2005: 105).[[128]](#footnote-128)

The character of Europeanization in Slovakia differed from that in other Visegrad countries in that the asymmetric nature of the relationship in favour of the EU was much more discernible. As Henderson (2008: 279) puts it, the issue of EU membership in Slovakia was ‘not whether Slovakia wanted to join the EU, and what sort of EU it wished to be a member of, but rather, whether the EU wanted Slovakia to join, and if not, whose fault this was’ Particularly on the eve of the 1998 election, the EU directed fierce criticism towards the illiberal parties and clearly signalled to voters that integration with the EU would not be possible as long as such parties remained in power.

The Slovak electorate, who favoured EU membership by a landslide majority, took the EU’s stand very seriously.[[129]](#footnote-129) In fact, as mentioned before, Slovak citizens confirmed their support for EU membership by setting a record for ‘yes’ votes with the 93.71 per cent in 2003. (Henderson, 2006: 149). Therefore the 2002 election re-confirmed public support for pro-EU membership parties, particularly the mainstream centre-right party SDKU.[[130]](#footnote-130) In this context, anti-minority policies, particularly those targeting the Hungarian population in the country, were unlikely to benefit the SNS, since the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) was a part of the Europhile coalition. Otherwise, the coalition, which came to the brink of collapse many times and only protected its cohesion through the common goal of EU accession, might have collapsed. In fact, as mentioned above, that coalition government, backed by overwhelming public support, associated the Slovak national interest with integration into the EU and achieved considerable progress towards EU membership during the accession years (Harris, 2004: 189; 194-195).

6.3.2 Dissolution of the Party Cohesion in the SNS

In addition to the euphoria surrounding Slovakia’s EU membership and the consequent disablement of its ethno-centric policies, the dissolution of the SNS in September 2001 was a fatal blow to the party, which then failed in the 2002 election. Three reasons can be underlined to explain the split within the SNS (Haughton; 2003: 82). The first involved party leader Malikova’s marriage to Russian businessman Alexander Belousov, who had been chased by Interpol for some time. Eight of twelve members of the party’s parliamentary group denounced this relationship and claimed that it would adversely affect the party’s popularity (BBC Monitoring European-Political, 13-14 February 2001). The second reason was the sexism of ex-leader Slota, who suggested that, ‘women’s role in politics should be restricted to making tea’ (Haughton, 2003: 82). Slota, who had been replaced by Malikova in 1999, also stated that his consent to her leadership was the greatest mistake of his political career and accused her of taking the party away from its original program (TASR, 20 September 2001). Related to this criticism, Slota disapproved of the ‘opposition agreement’ signed between HZDS and SNS to act together against the government on the grounds that HZDS aimed to liquidate SNS (SITA, 17 February 2000). The third reason involved Malikova’s authoritarian way of ruling. For example, Slota called her a ‘monster’ upon her decision to expel various leading figures from the party (SITA, 28 July 2001). The leading figures sacked by Malikova, such as former educational minister Eva Slavkovska, sued Malikova for ‘harsh insults’ (BBC Monitoring European – Political, 31 July 2001).

The fight between Malikova’s camp and ex-party leader Slota’s camp ended in the ‘expulsion’ of the latter, which subsequently established the Real Slovak National Party (PSNS) (SITA, 24 September 2001). As the above discussion implies, this split was led by personality feuds rather than an ideological disagreement. Indeed, the parties would merge under the leadership of Slota on the eve of the 2006 election. Actually, many predicted that the split would bring electoral failure to both parties. Therefore, activists from both parties made efforts towards unification or an electoral alliance, yet such efforts came to nothing due to a disagreement between Slota and Malikova over the candidate list (CTK, 1 June 2002). As a result, as mentioned above, the SNS and the PSNS competed in the 2002 election separately, receiving 3.3 per cent and 3.7 per cent of the vote, respectively. Failing to exceed the electoral threshold (5 per cent), the Slovak nationalists remained outside the parliament for the first time since the end of the communist regime.

**6.4 Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the Slovak National Party’s electoral performance in the 2002 and 2006 elections with respect to the configuration *ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp.* As mentioned in chapter four, this configuration is expected to have provided the SNS with an opportunity to achieve an electoral success (i.e. exceeding the electoral threshold). Nevertheless, the party did not manage to do so in 2002, although the expectation was met in 2006. The discussion showed that there were essentially two main reasons behind this discrepancy. The first involves the change in the character of Europeanization between 2002 and 2006, as Slovakia joined the EU in May 2004. The second reason was that an internal party quarrel based on a personality clash between leading figures in the SNS gave birth to two different radical right parties before the 2002 election, ultimately splitting the total percentage of the votes cast based on radical right ideology. In the 2002 election, the True Slovak National Party (PSNS) led by Slota got 3.7 per cent of the votes, while Slovak National Party (SNS) led by Malikova obtained 3.3 per cent of the votes.

The discussion confirmed the argument that the nature of the Europeanization process is a contributory condition to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEEC, but it is not an omnipresent one (see chapter four). As discussed in chapter five, the presence of a Europhile mainstream party played its role in favour of a radical right party in Poland before accession. This argument could potentially apply to Slovenia as well, since the Slovene National Party reached its peak of electoral success (during the decade from 2000 to 2010) in the 2002 elections, which was held before the accession. Yet, in Slovakia, the condition helped the Slovak National Party in achieving electoral success only once the county had been admitted to the EU in 2004. This divergence appears to be due in part to the advantages of some CEECs over others in various aspects of the process of becoming a EU member, and the similarity of EU accession requirements irrespective of these differences. Contrary to the Polish and Slovene cases where the numbers of Eurosceptic voters were higher than in Slovakia, a great majority of the Slovak population supported EU membership. Because the EU – rather than Slovakia itself – had to power to decide whether the country would be accepted, the country kept its illiberal policies targeting minorities largely at bay; the electoral failure of the SNS is partly tied to this fact. Furthermore, voters largely turned a blind eye to the presence of socio-economic problems such as high levels of unemployment in the 2002 election for the sake of EU membership and kept supporting the Europhile incumbents. The coincidence of this condition with a split within the SNS due to a personality clash between Malikova and Slota prevented the SNS from achieving electoral success in 2002, despite the presence of a configuration that is expected to have provided the party with an opportunity to do so.

The division within the SNS came to an end before the 2006 elections. Moreover, once Slovakia became a member of the EU in May 2004, the nature of relations between the country and the EU became symmetrical. These developments not only provided for the cohesion of the SNS but also made illiberal policies much more salient compared to the previous elections. The liberal position of the right-wing mainstream party, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), allowed the SNS to appeal to nationalist voters by voicing its anti-minority discourses (without fear of the EU) targeting the Hungarian and Roma people in the country. Also, these conditions coincided with the presence of socio-economic problems such as high levels of unemployment, which became much more influential over electoral preferences compared to the 2002 elections. In the meantime, the decision by KIA motors to launch a factory in Slota’s city of Zilina, slightly easing the problem of unemployment, boosted Slota’s popularity as well. As a result, the SNS achieved a remarkable electoral success in 2006. Receiving 11.7 per cent of the vote, the party returned to office after 10 years, once again a minor partner in the governing coalition.

**Chapter 7: Conclusion**

Radical right parties strongly believe in a nativist ideology depicting a society in which economic and social rights should primarily belong to members of the native group, and in which any non-native elements are considered to have a malign influence on the purity of the native group (Mudde, 2007: 19). Unlike extreme right parties, radical right parties are not anti-democratic in essence, yet their policies prioritizing native members of a society over ‘non-native elements’ obviously conflict with the pluralist principles of liberal democracy. In this regard, the political regime favoured by radical right parties could be labelled ‘ethnocracy’ (Butenschon, 1993; Minkenberg, 2000) or ‘ethnocratic liberalism’ (Griffin, 2000). In short, radical right parties are *radical* for their opposition to pluralism, a principle of liberal democracy, and *right* for their belief in the existence of natural inequalities between cultures.

Their nativist understanding can easily be detected in the radical right parties’ domestic and foreign policy approaches. For example, they support not only an ethnically homogenous society but also the maintenance of the ‘imagined’ society in accordance with patriarchal and traditional values. The Slovak National Party’s (Slovak NS) electoral manifesto for the 2006 election, ‘We are Slovaks: A Slovak Government for Slovak People’, combined with its rejection of the presence of the Hungarian Coalition Party in the coalition government at that time, is typical of radical right nativist ideology. The Greater Romania Party’s (PRM) strong opposition to conducting education in the Hungarian language in Romanian universities is another example of the nativist understanding of radical right politics. Driven by their nativist understandings, radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe often target the vulnerable Roma people. For example, JOBBIK, which made a major electoral breakthrough in the 2010 elections, frequently blamed the ‘laziness’ of the Roma people for increasing unemployment in the country. Expectedly, radical right parties are sceptical about any supranational institutions, which allegedly endanger national sovereignty and national culture. For example, the League of Polish Families (LPR) strongly opposed Polish membership in the EU, because the party believed that membership would ultimately destroy a Polish national culture based on Catholic principles. The party described its anti-EU policies as a useful weapon to protect traditional ways of life against same-sex marriages, abortion, and euthanasia. Similarly, JOBBIK formulated an alternative foreign policy called *Turanism* against Hungary’s integration with West Europe. Likewise, the PRM, though following fewer anti-EU policies than LPR, opposed the EU’s minority policies on the grounds that the policies granted rights to ethnic minorities that would allegedly endanger territorial integrity of Romania.

Socio-cultural policies are of utmost importance to radical right parties. By contrast, they do not have promising economic programs to ameliorate socio-economic problems; indeed, they discuss economic policies only in the context of attacking the established political parties in a populist manner. Radical right parties in CEECs focus their criticisms on two socio-economic subjects in particular: privatization and corruption. For example, the Czech Republican Party (SPR-RSC) accused established politicians of having no interest in anything else but enriching themselves. Similarly, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) argued that all corruption in Hungary stems from foreign-minded politicians of the established system. If radical right parties have an economic policy at all, it is merely a promise to establish an autarkic system, which is not applicable in today’s context of economic globalization. For example, LPR argued that the only solution to socio-economic problems in Poland is the deportation of foreign investment and capital from the country. Similarly, one motto of the National Union Attack (ATAKA) in Bulgaria involves the elimination of ‘foreign influence’ on the economy. Likewise, the Hungarian Justice and Life party (MIEP) opposes selling property to foreign buyers in Hungary.

Recognizing that socio-cultural policies rather than socio-economic policies are of primary importance to radical right parties, this study’s operational definition of radical right parties focuses on four main features of radical right parties in CEECs. First and foremost, radical right parties are anti-multiculturalist parties. This feature obviously distinguishes radical right parties from other party families. Second, radical right parties support a strong state authority and traditional society. Third, radical right parties are sceptical concerning their countries’ membership in the EU. Fourth, radical right parties dislike sharing national sovereignty with supranational institutions; therefore, they oppose any increase in the power of the European Parliament. By utilizing the expert survey series conducted by Chapel Hill University, this study focused on the following eight radical right parties: 1) Bulgaria’s ATAKA, 2) the Czech Republicans Party, 3) the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, 4) the Movement for a Better Hungary, 5) the League of Polish Families, 6) the Greater Romania Party, 7) the Slovak National Party, and 8) the Slovene National Party.

**7.1 Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis for Electoral Success of Radical Right Parties in CEECs.**

The main purpose of this study was to understand the conditions that allowed radical right parties to achieve electoral success in CEECs in the national parliamentary elections held during the decade from 2000 to 2010. The study conceptualized electoral success as radical right parties’ capacity to exceed the electoral threshold. In other words, any radical right party that managed to emerge from an election as a parliamentary party was regarded as successful irrespective of the number of seats gained. The study employed the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis research technique. Based on existing theoretical explanations in the literature on the radical right, this fsQCA included five macro-level conditions considered likely to affect the electoral performance of radical right parties. Three of the five conditions are demand-side conditions representing those socio-economic and socio-cultural developments in CEECs considered likely to increase electoral demand for radical right parties. These include high levels of unemployment (*unemp*), high levels of perceived corruption (*corr*), and the presence of a large ethnic minority population (*ethpop*). The remaining conditions are supply-side conditions and refer to any institutional arrangements concerning party competition likely to affect radical right parties’ electoral performance. These include the position of right-wing mainstream parties within the socio-cultural dimension of party competition and the position of right-wing mainstream parties on the issue of Europeanization. In total, the analysis examined twenty parliamentary elections, each of which represented a single case. Thus, the study formulated its research question as follows: ‘*Under which macro level demand-side and supply-side conditions did radical right parties in CEECs achieved electoral success in national parliamentary elections held during the decade from 2000 to 2010?’*

By carrying out an fsQCA for the electoral success of radical right parties in CEECs, this study contributes to the existing literature on radical right parties in five ways. First, the study focused on CEECs, which have been largely ignored in the literature. Accordingly, it discussed the conditions that have affected radical right parties’ electoral success in seven CEECs: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. This study could not include the Baltic States, a limitation that is addressed below. Second, the study includes the two supply-side conditions that have either been ignored or discussed from different perspectives. Third, by including a supply-side conditions concerning the Europeanization process, along with four conditions related to domestic politics, this study considered whether this process increased the electoral strength of radical right parties; and if so, how and when. Fourth, unlike the common tendency in the literature to apply West Europe-centred explanations directly to CEECs, the study took into account the historical differences between the two regions in order to focus on the proper conditions. As a result, conditions commonly included in studies on West Europe, such as low levels of public trust in political parties or political regimes, were replaced with the condition high levels of perceived corruption (by the public), as the problem of corruption is ‘endemic’ to the countries in question *and is regarded as the main source of public dissatisfaction with established political system*. Fifth, the study’s methodology (fsQCA) allowed it to examine different combinations of conditions that led to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEECs with different domestic features. It is common in the literature on radical right parties to argue that a single condition cannot be responsible for the electoral success of radical right parties. Instead, a set of conditions combining with each other in time and space produces the electoral success of radical right parties. Nevertheless, structural diversity among European countries leads to the conclusion that no single set of conditions can explain the electoral success of radical right parties. For example, as discussed below, a combination of conditions including the ‘presence of a large ethnic minority group’ and leading to the electoral success of a radical right party does not work in countries that do not have a large ethnic minority group. Similarly, economic problems such as a high level of unemployment partly contribute to the electoral success of radical right parties in economically backward countries, but not in affluent countries. In the latter, post-material issues (such as anti-abortion, anti-multiculturalism, anti-same-sex marriage) might play a larger role than material issues. By making use of this virtue of QCA, as discussed below, this study offered two combinations of conditions leading to the electoral success of radical right parties in two kinds of countries classified based on whether they have a large ethnic minority group or not.

This study primarily aimed to discuss what specific combination of conditions led to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEECs. Yet, for methodological reasons this study has limits – described at length later in this chapter – that prevent it from offering a full explanation. Therefore the results of this QCA should not be treated as definitive, but must be supplemented by further qualitative or quantitative studies. For example, the analysis did not include certain internal supply-side conditions, such as having a coherent party ideology and strong party leadership and organizations. In fact, in chapter six, the post-QCA analysis comparing a typical and a deviant case partly attributed the variation in the electoral performance of the Slovak National Party in subsequent elections, even though the same combination of conditions was present, to a split within the party’s organization. In addition, this analysis is not interested in discussing to what degree a condition, as a component of a combination, is important for the electoral success of radical right parties. To answer this question, the QCA should be supplemented by quantitative research methods, such as regression analysis.

7.2 Hypotheses and Findings

Mudde (2010: 1178, 1179) suggests that radical right parties must be perceived ‘as a pathological normalcy’, a certain level of electoral demand for which is ‘naturally generated by complex multiethnic western societies’. That is to say that although demand-side conditions are important for creating a latent demand for radical right parties, the supply-side conditions primarily determine whether that latent electoral demand can be translated into actual electoral support. The findings of this QCA for the electoral success of radical right parties in CEECs confirms that supply-side conditions largely determine whether radical right parties can achieve electoral success. Indeed, a supply-side condition, namely the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party, emerged as a necessary condition for the electoral success of radical right parties. Moreover, the position of the right-wing mainstream party on socio-cultural issues appears to play a key role in determining whether radical right parties can achieve electoral success.

Mudde’s ‘pathological normalcy’ argument appears to be valid only in multiethnic societies in which cultural differences between the native population and other ethnic minority groups are the main source for the (latent) electoral demand for radical right parties. The findings of this QCA extend this scope by identifying a combination leading to the electoral success of radical right parties in countries without a large number of ethnic minority group. In such countries, as discussed below at greater length, a favourable combination of supply-side conditions related to interparty competition between right-wing mainstream parties and radical right parties on both socio-cultural issues and the Europeanization issue has the capacity to produce electoral success for radical right parties.

The analysis for necessary conditions produced two striking results that prove the necessity of filling the abovementioned gap in the literature. First, as mentioned above, the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party (*ephilm*) was the only condition to pass the threshold (0.9) to be considered a necessary condition for radical right parties to achieve electoral success. In other words, every time a radical right party achieved an electoral success, this condition was present. This suggests that the Europeanization process contributed to the electoral success of radical right parties. Nevertheless, as the analysis of sufficient conditions shows, this condition worked in line with expectations in some cases before EU membership and in some cases after the EU membership. Therefore, the condition does not appear to be an omnipresent one. For example, while the League of Polish Families achieved an electoral success in 2001 (before EU membership), the Slovak National Party managed to do so in 2006 (after the EU membership). *Further comments on the reasons behind this variation are made later in this section.*

Second, although the literature commonly argues that radical right parties achieve electoral success in ethnically heterogeneous societies, the presence of a large ethnic minority population (*ethpop*) did not emerge as a necessary condition for the electoral success of the radical right. That is to say, radical right parties achieved electoral success in countries without this condition, thanks to a combination of supply-side conditions that have been largely ignored in studies on CEECs. The electoral successes, achieved by the League of Polish Families in 2001 and the Slovene National Party in 2008 illustrate this situation.

The analysis of sufficient conditions produced two different combinations of conditions (configurations) that led to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEECs during the decade from 2000 to 2010. In line with the result of the analysis of necessary conditions, the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party (*ephilm*) emerged in both the first and the second configurations. The first configuration includes the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party (*ephilm*), the absence of a right-wing mainstream party that follows liberal cultural policies, and the absence of a large ethnic minority population (*ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop*). This configuration accounts for the electoral successes of LPR in 2001 and the Slovene National Party (Slovene NS) in 2008. The second configuration combines the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party (*ephilm*), the presence of a right-wing mainstream party that follows liberal cultural policies, the presence of a large ethnic minority population (*ethpop*) and the presence of a high level of unemployment (*unemp*) (*ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp*). This configuration explains the electoral successes of Slovak NS in 2006 and 2010, the PRM in 2000, ATAKA in 2005, and JOBBIK in 2010. This configuration also covers two deviant cases, in which electoral success did not occur despite the presence of the configuration, namely the electoral failure of Slovak NS in 2002 and the MIEP-JOBBIK electoral alliance in 2006.

A comparison between the first configuration and the second configuration revealed that, apart from the condition *ephilm*, none of the conditions emerged in either the first configuration or in the second configuration in the same aspect (presence or absence). While the first configuration includes the absence of the conditions *libm* and *ethpop*, the second configuration includes the presence of the conditions *libm*, *ethpop* and *unemp*. Therefore, apart from the condition *ephilm*, each condition appearing in one of the two configurations is labelled an ‘INUS condition’ in QCA terminology. An INUS condition is a single condition that is insufficient for producing the outcome on its own, but which is a necessary part of a conjunction that, in turn, is unnecessary but sufficient for producing the outcome.

As mentioned in chapter one, the notion of ‘others’ lies at the heart of radical right politics. Radical right parties ideologically oppose a multicultural society; therefore, they express hostility towards people whose cultural background is different than that of the native population. An increase in the electoral demand for radical right parties is thus often attributed to their anti-immigrant policies in West Europe and anti-minority policies in CEECs. Yet, the first path showed that radical right parties have achieved electoral success in countries that include neither an economically driven immigrant population nor a historically rooted ethnic minority population, when a favourable combination of supply-side conditions was present. In such countries the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party that supports illiberal socio-cultural policies contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties. By supporting illiberal socio-cultural policies (e.g. the restriction of minority rights, the protection of [patriarchal] family values and of law and order through strict rules, and a strong emphasis on national sovereignty), which are easily supported by radical right parties due to their nativist ideology, right-wing mainstream parties both increase the saliency of such issues and legitimize them in the eyes of electorate. Despite right-wing mainstream parties taking such a position in terms of domestic politics, these parties’ support for Europeanization; thus, promotion of liberal socio-cultural policies in an international context decrease nativist voters’ confidence in these parties. Such voters subsequently vote for radical right parties, whose illiberal socio-cultural policies and Eurosceptic position regarding Europeanization coherently overlap.For example, the League of Polish Families achieved electoral success in 2001 due to Law and Justice’s illiberal position on socio-cultural issues and their Europhile position on the issue of Polish membership in the EU. The similar positioning of the Slovene Democratic Party (SDS) on both issues helped the Slovene National Party to achieve electoral success in 2008. The theoretical explanation behind this intersection is that compared to minor parties, including radical right parties, mainstream parties have a much higher chance of appearing in the media during election campaigns. Their discourses help to determine which issues play a role in shaping electoral preferences. For example, the post-QCA discussion on the electoral success of the League of Polish Families in the 2001 election concluded that when the Law and Justice Party developed illiberal policies concerning to socio-cultural policies (such as the restriction of minority rights, the protection of [patriarchal] family values, and the protection of law and order through strict rules), they in turn increased the saliency of these issues. Furthermore, the PiS expanded the range of party competition in the socio-cultural dimension. By doing so, the PiS not only legitimized LPR’s radical stance on socio-cultural issues but also brought the party into the ‘region of acceptability’. It is generally expected that a party that holds an illiberal position on socio-cultural issues is also likely to hold a Eurosceptic position on the issues related to the EU. In fact, the PiS had begun to act in line with this expectation particularly after Poland joined the EU in May 2004. Nevertheless, the PiS took a relatively Europhile position both in the 2001 election and in the 2003 EU accession referendum. From the beginning, the PiS supported Poland’s membership in the EU and advised its supporters to cast a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum. The League of Polish Families, however, not only promoted illiberal socio-cultural policies but also remained decisively against EU membership. The inconsistency in PiS’s positions on socio-cultural issues and on the issue of the EU membership gave a unique opportunity to LPR in appealing to hardliner conservatives in Poland in the 2001 election. In the end, the LPR did not miss this opportunity and entered into the *Sejm* by obtaining 7.9 per cent of the vote in 2001.[[131]](#footnote-131) Thus, particularly given the conclusion reached in the post-QCA case study on the electoral success of the LPR in 2001, this study supports the hypothesis that *the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party that also takes a position far from the centre on socio-cultural issues contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE.* Nevertheless, the examples obviously cast doubt on the hypothesis that *the presence of**a large historically rooted minority group (and/or Roma people) contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE*. It is important to note that the QCA research technique respects the notion of equifinality. Because the condition *ethpop* appears in the second configuration, the solution formula of this QCA study does not entirely refute the hypothesis concerning the presence of a large ethnic minority population in a polity. It should be underlined once again that the only conclusion that can be derived from the Polish and Slovene examples is that radical right parties can achieve electoral success in countries without a large ethnic minority population.

The explanation for the electoral success of radical right parties in countries without large ethnic minority populations, based in particular on the LPR’s electoral success in the 2001 election, was also supported from a counterfactual perspective. Because QCA is an asymmetric research technique, an explanation for the non-occurrence of an outcome cannot be derived from the explanation for the occurrence of an outcome. Therefore, among other things, chapter four performed a separate analysis with the same conditions for the non-occurrence of the electoral success of radical right parties. One of the two paths (configurations) produced in this analysis covered the elections held in the Czech Republic from 2000 to 2010, all of which resulted in the failure of the Republican Party (SPR-RSC) to have electoral success. Unlike the Law and Justice Party (PiS), the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) held a liberal position on socio-cultural policies and a Eurosceptic (or ‘Eurorealist’ in the party’s own words) position on the issue of EU membership during the decade from 2000 to 2010. The Republican Party in the Czech Republic thus lacked the opportunity that the League of Polish Families had in 2001.

The second path offers an explanation for the electoral success of radical right parties in countries with a large ethnic minority group. In such countries, irrespective of supply-side conditions (which is the case in the first path), there is a large (latent) electoral demand for radical right parties on account of the mostly cultural differences between the native population and ethnic minority groups. The path explains under which supply-side conditions this latent demand could be turned into actual demand. Accordingly, the presence of a right-wing mainstream party taking both a liberal position on socio-cultural issues and a Europhile position on the issue of Europeanization allows radical right parties to appeal to nativist voters, who have renounced the right-wing mainstream party for its liberal position. The path included another demand-side condition (high levels of unemployment) contributing to the electoral success of radical right parties. This finding is consistent with studies attributing the electoral success of radical right parties in West Europe to socio-economic conditions (i.e. blaming ethnic minority or immigrant groups for economic problems) (Golder, 2003). Nevertheless, this study remained sceptical as to whether radical right parties’ electoral success in West Europe can be attributed to socio-economic problems. In fact, some studies underline that socio-cultural reasons far outweigh socio-economic reasons in accounting for the electoral success of radical right parties in West Europe (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2005, Norris, 2005, Mudde, 2007). Moreover, this path covered CEECs that economically lagged behind not only the other CEECs included in this study (except Hungary), but also West European countries.

Large ethnic minority populations reside in Bulgaria, Hungary (the Roma people), Slovakia, and Romania. Anti-minority discourses in these countries occupy a prominent place in radical right party programs. For example, Koev (2013) concluded that the presence of a political party whose electoral support comes mainly from a minority population helped radical right parties in achieving electoral success. This study confirmed this explanation and supported the hypothesis that *the presence of**a large, historically rooted minority group (and/or Roma people) contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties*. Yet, the statement of sufficiency suggested that the electoral successes of radical right parties in these countries were due in part to anti-minority discourses. On its own, opposition to multiculturalism does not fully account for the electoral success; in addition, right-wing mainstream parties in these countries must also take a liberal position on socio-cultural issues. By doing so, they gave radical right parties an opportunity to appeal to conservative voters who renounced the right-wing mainstream parties for their liberal position. Therefore, this result supports the hypothesis that *the presence of a right-wing mainstream party that follows liberal cultural policies increases the chance of achieving electoral success by radical right parties.* For example, liberal discourses concerning socio-cultural issues embraced by the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party of Romania paved the way for radical right parties’ electoral success in these countries. The analysis showed that the free space given to radical right parties on the far right was further secured thanks to the Europhile positions of right-wing mainstream parties. Particularly by conflating an anti-multiculturalist disposition with anti-EU policies, which is primarily based on the EU’s (allegedly) very generous minority policies, radical right parties managed to appeal to hardliner conservatives, whose nativist outlook overlaps with that of radical right parties. This gives credibility to the hypothesis that *the presence of a Europhile right-wing mainstream party that takes a position close to the centre of the socio-cultural dimension contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties.* For example, as Sum (2010) argues, the Greater Romania Party became the voice of Romanian citizens who thought that the EU’s minority policies granted so many rights to Hungarians as to potentially endanger territorial integrity. The Slovak National Party was suspicious about the EU membership for similar reasons, as well.

Finally, the coincidence of these conditions with the presence of socio-economic problems (i.e. high levels of unemployment), which causes a substantial increase in public dissatisfaction with established political parties, increases the electoral strength of radical right parties that emphasize socio-economic problems in a populist manner.[[132]](#footnote-132) Thus, this study also supports the hypothesis that *a* *high level of unemployment contributes to the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE where a large ethnic minority population is also present*. For example, the post-QCA case study on the electoral success of the Greater Romania Party in the 2000 elections concluded that the negative public perception about the total indifference of established political parties to socio-economic problems pulled many supporters away from the Romanian Democratic Convention and towards the Greater Romania Party in the 2000 election. Similarly, JOBBIK’s electoral strategy blaming the rising unemployment level in Hungary on the ‘laziness’ of the Roma population appears to have played an important role in its electoral success in the 2010 national parliamentary elections. This explanation concurs with the argument that the 2009 Euro-crisis is partly responsible for JOBBIK’s electoral success in the 2010 election.

From a counterfactual perspective, the analysis for the non-occurrence of the electoral success of radical right parties also supports the given explanation regarding the countries that include the condition *ethpop*. Despite the presence of a large ethnic minority population in Hungary, the Justice and Life Party (MIEP) did not manage to achieve electoral success in the 2002 elections. The analysis concluded that the combination of two conditions - the relatively illiberal position of FIDESZ on socio-cultural policies (compared to subsequent elections), and the lack of high levels of unemployment - precluded MIEP from achieving electoral success in the 2002 election.

This study initially predicted that the Europeanization process would be a contributory condition to the electoral success of radical right parties during the accession negotiation process. The logic behind this prediction was that, much like discussions by political parties and civic society institutions, discussions within the general public related to EU accession intensify during the accession years. Moreover, the number of people reaching the conclusion that EU membership is unfavourable for their country or for themselves is likely to increase during the discussion. Voters with a negative outlook on EU membership might support radical right parties that are decisively against the EU. Once the membership process is over, the number of such citizens would then decrease in parallel with the declining importance of matters related to EU accession in party competition. Indeed, the Polish examples confirmed this prediction. Nevertheless, the post-QCA study on the electoral performance of the Slovak National Party in the 2002 and 2006 elections showed that the prediction might also work in reverse. Slovakia, along with Bulgaria and Romania, experienced an illiberal pattern of political change from communism to democracy (Vachudova, 2005). The EU’s active leverage in the establishment of a liberal democracy and a market economy was more discernible in such countries than in those that experienced a liberal pattern of political change (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia). Citizens living in countries that experienced an illiberal pattern of political change either willingly or reluctantly supported EU membership with an overwhelming majority.[[133]](#footnote-133) For example, the European Union clearly signalled to the electorate in Slovakia before the 2002 election – in fact since the late 1990s - that as long as political parties with illiberal policies remained in office, Slovakia would not become a member of the EU. This signal encouraged the Slovak electorate, the overwhelming majority of which already favoured membership, to support political parties with liberal policies; these parties remained in office from 1998 to 2006. Under these circumstances, illiberal policies, along with the political parties promoting them, remained at bay. This partly explains why Slovak National Party did not manage to succeed in the 2002 elections, despite the presence of the proposed configuration (*ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp)*.[[134]](#footnote-134) Once the membership process ended in 2004, the Slovak National Party had an opportunity to make its illiberal, Eurosceptic policies a platform of electoral competition with the aim of appealing to conservative Slovak voters. Consequently, the party gained 11.7 per cent of the vote and emerged as a governing coalition partner in the 2006 election.

7.2.1 Should Electoral System be Included as a Condition

One limitation of the main analysis was that it did not discuss whether the type of electoral system contributed to the electoral successes of the radical right parties in question. One of the robustness tests conducted in chapter four aimed to eliminate this limitation. The test replaced the condition of high levels of corruption (*corr*), which was neither a part of the first nor the second configuration, with the condition of degree in proportionality of the electoral system (*prelect*). The hypothesis about the impact of the electoral system on the electoral performance of the radical right parties recalls Duverger’s well-known tactical voting approach. According to this theory, in a proportional representation system, voters are more inclined to vote for minor parties (including radical right parties) than they are in majoritarian electoral systems (such as winner take all systems), in which minor parties have no chance of winning the elections. Although the CEECs that are included in the main analysis have employed, either partially or fully, a proportional representation system, they differ from each other in terms of the degree in the proportionality of the electoral system. Yet, this differentiation is not important enough that electoral system must be included in this study.

**7.3 Avenues for Further Research**

This study aimed to explain under which macro level demand-side and supply-side conditions radical right parties in CEECs achieved electoral success in the national parliamentary elections held during the decade from 2000 to 2010. To avoid the methodological pitfall known as ‘ecological fallacy’ (Mudde, 2007: 201), this study does not include micro-level conditions, such as education, family, income, age and sex. Micro level conditions are at least as important as macro level conditions in studies on radical right parties. For example, this study could not answer two specific questions due to the lack of micro level conditions, namely ‘Did a low degree in the proportionality of the electoral system predispose towards other parties those voters who otherwise would vote for MIEP in 2002?’ and ‘Did Slovak voters residing in constituencies in Zilina or Trencin decide to vote for the Slovak National Party in 2006 because they supported the party’s anti-minority policies or because they were dissatisfied with the incumbents due to the presence of unemployment problem?’ Despite the importance of micro level conditions for fully grasping the reasons behind the electoral success of radical right parties, very few studies in the literature on radical right parties focus on these conditions in terms of the CEECs.[[135]](#footnote-135) A fine-grained examination of micro level conditions would explain not only the profile of the segment of the electorate supporting radical right parties but also the main motivation behind the decision to opt for radical right parties in CEECs.

Another limitation of this study is that internal supply-side conditions, such as strong and effective leadership and party organization, and following an ideologically coherent program that gives credibility to the party in the eyes of its supporters, are not included in this study. This allowed the study to avoid a well-known methodological problem in QCA studies known as the ‘presence of too many logical remainders’. Yet, the electoral success or failure of political parties is likely to commensurate with the presence or absence of internal supply-side conditions. For example, the post-QCA case study on the 2002 and 2006 elections in Slovakia concluded that the electoral failure of the Slovak National Party in 2002, despite the presence of favourable conditions for electoral success, was due in part to the internal party quarrel that ultimately shattered the party’s unity. An examination of internal supply-side conditions would explain the ‘deviant cases’, or those in which radical right parties failed despite the presence of favourable conditions for success.

A final limitation of this study was that it did not include the Baltic countries, as political parties in these countries were largely free from the ideological constraints that preclude parties from frequently changing their positions in the party system. Therefore, measuring right-wing mainstream parties’ positions on socio-cultural issues in the Baltic countries was difficult for the decade of interest. Given the fact that almost a quarter of the populations of Estonia and Latvia and approximately 6 per cent of the population of Lithuania are ethnic Russians, the Baltic countries could remain fertile ground for the electoral success of radical right parties down the road. In addition, the effect of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy towards Ukraine on nationalist parties in ex-Soviet countries has emerged an important topic on which to focus. The discussion on this topic should also evaluate the nativist circle’s opinions on Europeanization, regarded by many people in Baltic States as a way to escape Russian domination. Recall this study’s conclusion that Europeanization was a contributory condition, though not an omnipresent one, for electoral success in the CEECs included in the study. Future studies should test the validity of this argument not only for the Baltic countries but also for other CEECs, such as Croatia, which became an EU member in 2013, as well as Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which are on the road to the EU.

There are very few studies on radical right parties in CEECs, especially compared to studies on such parties in West European countries. Aiming to help fill this gap, this study focused on CEECs. Nevertheless, very few studies in the literature on radical right parties develop a pan-European approach. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, existing studies are criticized for paying insufficient attention to historical differences between West European and Central and East European countries. Future studies on radical right parties that develop a pan-European approach should discuss which of the conditions already presented in the literature lead to the electoral success of radical right parties (or prevent it) in both West Europe and CEE, and which conditions do so only in West Europe or only in CEE. For example, this study concluded that the presence of a right wing mainstream party was a necessary condition for the electoral success of radical right parties in CEE from 2000 to 2010. This conclusion, though confirming some studies, conflicts with studies that focus on the same period, which suggest that the issue of Europeanization does not necessarily affects the electoral performance of radical right parties in West Europe (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2009: 600). Yet, radical right parties in West Europe made major electoral breakthroughs in the 2014 European Parliament elections, whereas most of those in CEECs failed to do so. The successful radical right parties in CEECs in the first decade of the twentieth century, such as ATAKA, PRM, the Slovak National Party or the Slovene National Party, did not secure any seats in the EP in 2014. Why did this happen? Similarly, this study concluded that high levels of unemployment increased the electoral strength of radical right parties in CEECs that have large ethnic minority populations. Besides Hungary, these countries (Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania) economically lagged behind the other CEECs included in this study. Yet, many studies published between 1998 and 2009 suggest that the argument that socio-economic problems predisposed voters towards radical right parties is out-dated (e.g. Knigge, 1998; Lubbers *et al.*, 2002; Arzhemier and Carter, 2006; Coffe, *et al.*, 2007; Arzhemier, 2009: 269). In the meantime, however, the euro-crisis emerged in Europe, increasing socio-economic problems in many European countries. For example, the electoral support for the Golden Dawn Party in Greece increased from 0.3 per cent in 2009, to 7 per cent in 2013, when the party reserved 21 seats (out of 300) in the parliament. Therefore, future studies should also reassess whether socio-economic problems improve the electoral strength of radical right parties across Europe.

**Appendix 1**: **Analysis of Necessary Condition for *Non- SUCCESS* of radical right parties.**

Outcome variable: ~success

Conditions tested:

Consistency Coverage

unemp 0.777778 0.486111

~unemp 0.422222 0.678571

corr 0.733333 0.578947

~corr 0.644444 0.674419

ethpop 0.444444 0.363636

~ethpop 0.600000 0.600000

libm 0.844445 0.558824

~libm 0.466667 0.656250

ephilm 0.688889 0.413333

~ephilm 0.466667 0.840000

**Appendix 2: fsQCA output for the occurrence of radical right parties electoral success**

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS\*

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

File: C:/Users/Packard Bell/Desktop/Cagatay\_Yaz 2013/L├╝tfen.csv

Model: success = f(unemp, corr, ethpop, libm, ephilm)

Rows: 10

Rows: 6 60.0%

Rows: 4 40.0%

Rows: 0 0.0%

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.772727

raw unique

coverage coverage consistency

---------- ---------- ----------

unemp\*ethpop\*libm\*ephilm 0.509091 0.454545 0.756757

~unemp\*~corr\*~ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm 0.127273 0.036364 0.875000

unemp\*corr\*~ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm 0.200000 0.090909 0.846154

solution coverage: 0.690909

solution consistency: 0.791667

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term unemp\*ethpop\*libm\*ephilm: SLK2002 (1,0.4),

SLK2006 (1,1), BUL2005 (0.8,0.8), ROM2000 (0.8,1),

SLK2010 (0.8,0.6), HUN2006 (0.6,0.2), HUN2010 (0.6,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~unemp\*~corr\*~ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm: SLV2008 (0.6,0.6)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term unemp\*corr\*~ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm: POL2001 (0.6,0.8)

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS\*

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

File: C:/Users/Packard Bell/Desktop/Cagatay\_Yaz 2013/L├╝tfen.csv

Model: success = f(unemp, corr, ethpop, libm, ephilm)

Rows: 10

Rows: 6 60.0%

Rows: 4 40.0%

Rows: 0 0.0%

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.772727

raw unique

coverage coverage consistency

---------- ---------- ----------

unemp\*ethpop 0.545454 0.490909 0.731707

~ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm 0.254545 0.200000 0.875000

solution coverage: 0.745454

solution consistency: 0.773585

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term unemp\*ethpop: BUL2005 (1,0.8),

ROM2000 (1,1), SLK2002 (1,0.4), SLK2006 (1,1),

SLK2010 (1,0.6), HUN2010 (0.8,1), HUN2006 (0.6,0.2)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm: POL2001 (0.6,0.8),

SLV2008 (0.6,0.6)

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS\*

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

File: C:/Users/Packard Bell/Desktop/Cagatay\_Yaz 2013/L├╝tfen.csv

Model: success = f(ephilm, libm, ethpop, corr, unemp)

Rows: 7

Rows: 0 0.0%

Rows: 7 100.0%

Rows: 0 0.0%

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1

0 Matrix: 0L

Don't Care: -

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.772727

Assumptions:

ephilm (present)

libm (present)

ethpop (present)

corr (present)

unemp (present)

raw unique

coverage coverage consistency

---------- ---------- ----------

ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop 0.254545 0.200000 0.875000

ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp 0.509091 0.454545 0.756757

solution coverage: 0.709091

solution consistency: 0.795918

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ephilm\*~libm\*~ethpop: POL2001 (0.6,0.8),

SLV2008 (0.6,0.6)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp: SLK2002 (1,0.4),

SLK2006 (1,1), BUL2005 (0.8,0.8), ROM2000 (0.8,1),

SLK2010 (0.8,0.6), HUN2006 (0.6,0.2), HUN2010 (0.6,1)

**Appendix 3: fsQCA** **output for the *non-occurrence* of radical right parties electoral success**

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS\*

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

File: C:/Users/Packard Bell/Desktop/Cagatay\_Yaz 2013/L├╝tfen.csv

Model: ~success = f(unemp, corr, ethpop, libm, ephilm)

Rows: 10

Rows: 8 80.0%

Rows: 2 20.0%

Rows: 0 0.0%

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.800000

raw unique

coverage coverage consistency

---------- ---------- ----------

unemp\*corr\*~ethpop\*libm\*~ephilm 0.333333 0.266667 0.882353

~unemp\*corr\*ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm 0.177778 0.111111 0.800000

solution coverage: 0.444444

solution consistency: 0.833333

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term unemp\*corr\*~ethpop\*libm\*~ephilm: CZE2002 (0.6,1),

CZE2006 (0.6,1), CZE2010 (0.6,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~unemp\*corr\*ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm: HUN2002 (0.6,0.6)

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS\*

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

File: C:/Users/Packard Bell/Desktop/Cagatay\_Yaz 2013/L├╝tfen.csv

Model: ~success = f(unemp, corr, ethpop, libm, ephilm)

Rows: 10

Rows: 8 80.0%

Rows: 2 20.0%

Rows: 0 0.0%

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.800000

raw unique

coverage coverage consistency

---------- ---------- ----------

ethpop\*~libm 0.222222 0.111111 0.666667

libm\*~ephilm 0.400000 0.288889 0.900000

solution coverage: 0.511111

solution consistency: 0.793103

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ethpop\*~libm: HUN2002 (0.6,0.6)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term libm\*~ephilm: CZE2006 (0.8,1),

CZE2002 (0.6,1), CZE2010 (0.6,1)

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS\*

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

File: C:/Users/Packard Bell/Desktop/Cagatay\_Yaz 2013/L├╝tfen.csv

Model: ~success = f(ephilm, libm, ethpop, corr, unemp)

Rows: 8

Rows: 0 0.0%

Rows: 8 100.0%

Rows: 0 0.0%

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1

0 Matrix: 0L

Don't Care: -

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.800000

Assumptions:

~ephilm (absent)

~libm (absent)

~ethpop (absent)

~corr (absent)

~unemp (absent)

raw unique

coverage coverage consistency

---------- ---------- ----------

~ephilm\*libm\*~ethpop 0.355556 0.288889 0.888889

~libm\*ethpop\*~unemp 0.177778 0.111111 0.800000

solution coverage: 0.466667

solution consistency: 0.840000

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~ephilm\*libm\*~ethpop: CZE2006 (0.8,1),

CZE2002 (0.6,1), CZE2010 (0.6,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~libm\*ethpop\*~unemp: HUN2002 (0.6,0.6)

**Appendix 4**: **fsQCA output for the occurrence of radical right parties electoral success (Robustness test: *lower threshold level for SUCCESS*)**

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS\*

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

File: C:/Users/Packard Bell/Desktop/Cagatay\_Yaz 2013/l├╝tfen robust change in success.csv

Model: success = f(unemp, corr, ethpop, libm, ephilm)

Rows: 10

Rows: 4 40.0%

Rows: 6 60.0%

Rows: 0 0.0%

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.812500

raw unique

coverage coverage consistency

---------- ---------- ----------

~unemp\*corr\*ethpop\*ephilm 0.212121 0.090909 0.823529

unemp\*ethpop\*libm\*ephilm 0.469697 0.333333 0.837838

~unemp\*~corr\*~ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm 0.106061 0.030303 0.875000

unemp\*corr\*~ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm 0.166667 0.075758 0.846154

solution coverage: 0.712121

solution consistency: 0.870370

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~unemp\*corr\*ethpop\*ephilm: BUL2009 (0.6,1),

HUN2002 (0.6,0.6), ROM2004 (0.6,1), ROM2008 (0.6,0.6)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term unemp\*ethpop\*libm\*ephilm: SLK2002 (1,0.6),

SLK2006 (1,1), BUL2005 (0.8,1), ROM2000 (0.8,1),

SLK2010 (0.8,0.8), HUN2006 (0.6,0.4), HUN2010 (0.6,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~unemp\*~corr\*~ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm: SLV2008 (0.6,0.8)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term unemp\*corr\*~ethpop\*~libm\*ephilm: POL2001 (0.6,1)

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS\*

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

File: C:/Users/Packard Bell/Desktop/Cagatay\_Yaz 2013/l├╝tfen robust change in success.csv

Model: success = f(unemp, corr, ethpop, libm, ephilm)

Rows: 10

Rows: 4 40.0%

Rows: 6 60.0%

Rows: 0 0.0%

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1-L

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.812500

raw unique

coverage coverage consistency

---------- ---------- ----------

ethpop 0.666667 0.454545 0.800000

~libm\*ephilm 0.378788 0.166667 0.925926

solution coverage: 0.833333

solution consistency: 0.820895

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ethpop: BUL2005 (1,1),

BUL2009 (1,1), ROM2000 (1,1), ROM2004 (1,1),

ROM2008 (1,0.6), SLK2002 (1,0.6), SLK2006 (1,1),

SLK2010 (1,0.8), HUN2002 (0.8,0.6), HUN2006 (0.8,0.4),

HUN2010 (0.8,1)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~libm\*ephilm: HUN2002 (0.6,0.6),

POL2001 (0.6,1), SLV2008 (0.6,0.8)

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

\*TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS\*

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

File: C:/Users/Packard Bell/Desktop/Cagatay\_Yaz 2013/l├╝tfen robust change in success.csv

Model: success = f(ephilm, libm, ethpop, corr, unemp)

Rows: 16

Rows: 0 0.0%

Rows: 16 100.0%

Rows: 0 0.0%

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

True: 1

0 Matrix: 0L

Don't Care: -

--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---

frequency cutoff: 1.000000

consistency cutoff: 0.812500

Assumptions:

ephilm (present)

libm (present)

ethpop (present)

corr (present)

unemp (present)

raw unique

coverage coverage consistency

---------- ---------- ----------

ephilm\*~libm 0.378788 0.166667 0.925926

ephilm\*ethpop\*corr 0.515151 0.075758 0.918919

ephilm\*ethpop\*unemp 0.515151 0.106061 0.850000

solution coverage: 0.787879

solution consistency: 0.881356

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ephilm\*~libm: HUN2002 (0.6,0.6),

POL2001 (0.6,1), SLV2008 (0.6,0.8)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ephilm\*ethpop\*corr: ROM2000 (0.8,1),

ROM2004 (0.8,1), BUL2005 (0.6,1), BUL2009 (0.6,1),

HUN2002 (0.6,0.6), HUN2010 (0.6,1), ROM2008 (0.6,0.6),

SLK2002 (0.6,0.6), SLK2006 (0.6,1), SLK2010 (0.6,0.8)

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ephilm\*ethpop\*unemp: BUL2005 (1,1),

ROM2000 (1,1), SLK2002 (1,0.6), SLK2006 (1,1),

HUN2010 (0.8,1), SLK2010 (0.8,0.8), HUN2006 (0.6,0.4)

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1. Two other terms – ‘ethnocracy’ (Minkenberg, 2000: 175) and ‘ethnocratic liberalism’ (Griffin, 2000: 165) - have also been used in the literature to name the political regime radical right parties favour. Butenschon (1993: 4) defines ethnocracy as ‘… on the one hand the building of formally democratic institutions and on the other policies designed to restrict access to these institutions according to ethnic affiliation. It is the regimes, which primarily or in fundamental ways are based on the latter mode of political organization that I will call “ethnocracies.”. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Although being criticized for treating socio-economic policies as a defining criterion for radical right parties in his seminal study on the subject *The Radical Right in West Europe* (1995), Kitschelt focuses on socio-economic policies to make a classification between radical right parties. He divides the radical parties into four: the ‘new radical right’, ‘populist anti-statist’, ‘racist authoritarian’, and ‘welfare chauvinist’ and suggests that the parties in the last two subgroups promise a combination of redistributive economic polices and authoritarian cultural policies (1995: 22, 23). Yet, the problem in Kitschelt’s study (1995: 3) is the presentation of the definition given for ‘new radical right’ (which is one of the four subtypes), as if it applied to the whole party family (see: Kitschelt, 1995: Chapter 1). In fact, in his more recent study, Kitschelt (2007: 1178) suggests that economic policies should not be taken into account, when defining what the radical right is. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Of course, this does not mean that nationalism had been completely irrelevant to political developments across Europe since the end of Second World War. In fact, nationalism is an inescapable phenomenon. What changed about the effect of nationalism in the aftermath of the the war was that, as Hobsbawn (2003: 169) puts it, ‘nationalism … is simply no longer the historical force it was in the era between the French Revolution and the end of imperialist colonialism after the World War II.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Poujadism’s short-term success in France in 1956 and the significant breakthrough of Glistrupism in Denmark achieved in 1972 are exceptions to this. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Briefly speaking, the New Right supports ‘ethnopluralism’ and claims that each ethnicity should reside in its place of origin. It underlines the incompatibility between cultures (Minkenberg, 2000: 180). Mudde (1995: 211) uses the term ‘culturism’ to label this interpretation. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Other specific issues examined in the literature are the parties’ transnational networks (Mares, 2006; Startin, 2010; Almeida, 2010), their policies on the issue of Europeanization (Beichelt, 2003; Dechezelles and Neumayer, 2010; Almeida, 2010), consistency between their policies when they are in opposition and in coalition governments (Akkerman, 2012), and following the previous issue, the impacts of radical right policies on polities (Mudde, 2013).

   [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Tarrow (1998: 19-20) defines political opportunity structures as ‘consistent - but not necessarily formal, permanent or national - dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. In her article, Meguid (2005) considers radical right parties, along with Green parties, examples of what she calls ‘niche parties’. She counts three main features of “niche parties:” 1) rejection of traditional class-based political orientation; 2) emphasis on issues that are new and independent of existing cleavages; 3) emphasis on a limited number of issues compared to mainstream parties. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. In his seminal study, *Political Parties,* Duverger (1954: 283) classifies the political parties into three groups by electoral strength: parties with a majority bent, major parties and minor parties. Since the radical right parties in this study are minor parties, the main text briefly mentions this definition alone. On the one hand, parties with a majority bent are ‘those which command an absolute majority in parliament or likely to be able to command one at some date in the normal play of institutions’ (Duverger, 1954: 283). On the other hand, it is unlikely for major parties to hold an absolute majority in the parliament. As Duverger (1954: 286-288) points out, ‘if they [major parties] are alone in office they can only exercise power with the agreement and support of other parties. Normally they govern only in association, inside a coalition cabinet. But their strength allows them […] [to] share out amongst themselves the chief ministries and the key-posts’. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Hofstede (1991) suggests that a culture of corruption is likely to exist in societies where the power distance between rulers and citizens, collectivism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance (that is, the level of uncertainty about the future) are high. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The Transparency International Index assesses the problem of corruption on a scale ranging from one to ten. A score of ten represents the cleanest country. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. In studies focusing on West European countries, the level of trust in democracy or in political parties is taken as an indicator of the extent to which protest voters vote for radical right parties (e.g. Mudde 2007: 208). Remember that corruption has been a primary source of anger toward established regimes in CEECs (Pop Eleches, 2010). As a result, it appears to be an appropriate indicator of whether radical right parties benefit from the plague of corruption in elections. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. This invokes Kohn’s (1944) twofold classification of nationalism dividing ‘West Europe’ and ‘East Europe’: ‘liberal, civic Western,’ and ‘illiberal, ethnic Eastern’. On the one hand, civic nationalism suggests that individuals willing to unite with other citizens in their loyalty to the nation, could be a part of that nation irrespective of race, ethnicity, religion, etc. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism suggests that individuals become a part of the nation according to ethnic background (Ignatieff, 1994: 4, 5). This division has been criticized in the literature on nationalism on the grounds that the difference between the two is not clear-cut (Kuzio, 2002: 20). Nevertheless, given the historical experiences such as the expulsion of ethnically Turkish citizens from Bulgaria in the 1950s and 1980s, it would not be unreasonable to argue that ‘ethnic nationalism’ largely shapes how nativist circles understand nationalism in CEECs. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Cultural tension in West Europe primarily occurs between native populations and economically driven immigrant populations. Although there are a few economically driven immigrant populations in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, immigration is far from being a topic of political competition in CEECs (at least for the time being). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Some CEECs such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, experienced democracy, albeit short-lived, during the inter-war era. There are two different views on the impact of this experience on the post communist democratization process. On the one hand, from a historical perspective, some scholars argue that this can partly explain why these countries adopted liberal democracy more easily than others, such as Bulgaria and Romania (Karl and Schmitter, 1995: 974; Kitschelt, et al. 1999: 38). On the other hand, any effects of the short-lived experience of democracy were substantially eliminated through the practices of the communist regimes that lasted almost for fifty years (Bunce, 1995: 88). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Halikiopoulou et al. (2013: 109) discuss how radical right parties in West Europe make use of liberal democracy to justify their exclusionary policies towards immigrant populations, particularly those coming from outside the European continent. Accordingly, radical right parties are opposed to the influx of immigrants on the grounds that intolerant and narrow-minded immigrants are incompatible with West European societies built on tolerance, diversity and liberalism. In other words, radical right parties in West Europe ironically target immigrant populations under the cloak of ‘protectors of liberal democracy’. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Pop Eleches (2010: 225) explains the difference between mainstream parties and radical parties by focusing on the features of the former. Accordingly, a mainstream party’s electoral appeal is based on a ‘moderate ideological platform rather than […] extremist rhetoric’ (Pop-Eleches, 2010: 225). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Two points should be noted regarding the logic behind the issue-salience approach. First, all political parties have ideologies, and they take positions on a range of issues accordingly. Voters may consider a party the owner of issues that have been strongly emphasized by that party’s ideology. Thus, in spite of right-wing mainstream parties’ emphasis on particular issues, an increase in the saliency of issues such as law and order, protection of national culture and national sovereignty serve to justify radical right parties in eyes of the electorate. Second, based on the agenda setting approach, media institutions, which are inclined to allocate significant broadcast time to mainstream parties, play a crucial role in increasing or decreasing the saliency of an issue. When a right-wing mainstream party emphasizes issues that are owned by the radical right ideology, the media appearance of such issues will also increase, thereby making the issues salient in the elections (Muis, and Scholte, 2013: 25). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004: 4) describe radical right parties’ opposition to the EU as ‘national interest Euroscepticism’, which the authors argue ‘involves employing rhetoric of defending or standing up for “the national interest” in the context of debates about the EU’. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Radical right parties are expected to oppose European integration for ideological reasons. Nevertheless, for strategic reasons some political parties may pragmatically support the integration. Kopecky and Mudde (2002: 302, 303) coins the term ‘Euro-pragmatic’ to label such parties. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Logical minimization is the ‘summary of the information contained in a *truth table*, applying the rules of Boolean algebra’ (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 329) In its final report, QCA presents three types of solution formulae: the conservative (complex) solution, the intermediate solution, and the most parsimonious solution. The intermediate solution formula is superior to the others, as it takes the theoretical expectation about the impact of each condition on the outcome into account. Thus, the intermediate solution formula includes ‘easy counterfactuals’ (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 326), which represent truth table rows in which the combination of conditions is likely in line with theoretical explanations; these are excluded from the parsimonious solution formula on the grounds that none of cases included in the analysis have that combination of conditions. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. An extensive list of studies using qualitative comparative analysis has been complied on the website: <http://www.compasss.org/bibdata.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Sovak and Cisar (2011) examine the former Yugoslav countries, thereby including Slovenia. Nevertheless, considering Slovenia with other former Yugoslav republics such as Serbia, Bosnia, and Macedonia on the same platform is improper since Slovenia has sharply diverged from the others in terms of taking steps towards liberal democracy since the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Slovenia was the only former Yugoslav country that fully experienced the Europeanization process throughout the decade from 2000 to 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Logical remainders are ‘truth table rows for which not enough empirical evidence is at hand’ (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 329). For example, if six conditions were selected, there would be sixty-four rows in the truth table. Even if each case (in total twenty cases) falls into one row, there would be forty-four logical remainders. This would substantially reduce the consistency and coverage levels of the solution formulae. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Olsen (2002: 923- 924) underlines five different meanings of Europeanization that have been suggested in the literature: Europeanization 1) as ‘changes in external boundaries’ referring to ‘territorial reach of a system of governance and the degree to which Europe as a continent becomes a single political space’; 2) as ‘developing institutions at the European level […] [signifying] center-building with a collective action capacity’; 3) as ‘central penetration of national systems of governance […] [involving] division of responsibilities and powers between different levels of governance’; 4) as ‘exporting forms of political organization’ denoting the ‘exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond European territory’; and 5) as ‘political unification project’ referring to ‘the degree to which Europe is becoming a more unified and stronger political entity is related to territorial space, center-building’ domestic adaptation and how European developments impact and are impacted by systems of governance and events outside the European continent. This study bases its understanding of Europeanization on the second and third usages of the term (also see:Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. For example, all national elections in Latvia during the post-communist period (until 2006) were won by political parties that had been non-existent at the time of the previous election. This was the case to a certain extent even in Estonia, where the incumbent was able to re-win the 2007 election (Auers and Kasekamp, 2009: 251). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. On liberal (or illiberal) patterns of political change from communism to democracy, please see Vachudova, 2005: 25-61. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Based on this explanation, as Hungary is a country that experienced a liberal pattern of political change after the end of communism, one might rightfully argues that MIEP should have had electoral success in the 2002 election. Similarly, in Romania, the Greater Romania Party should not have had electoral success in the 2000 elections. Regarding the first argument, it could be said that unlike the League of Polish Families, the MIEP never followed a fierce anti-EU policy during the accession years. Instead, nativist circles in Hungary perceived the EU membership as an opportunity to develop their relations with Hungarians living in the near abroad. Regarding the second argument, it could be said that the failure of Romanian Democratic Convention (largely formed by right-wing liberal parties) in office from 1996 to 2000 substantially increased socio-economic problems (unemployment, corruption) that ultimately predisposed a remarkable number of voters to the PRM. In addition, it should be remember that the pro-EU ‘Social Democrat Pole’ led by Ionescu’s Social Democratic Party of Romania won the 2000 elections and emerged as the governing party from the election. Finally, the electoral strength of the PRM decreased as Romanian membership neared, and ultimately the party emerged from the 2008 election as an extra-parliamentary party. [The internal supply-side conditions such as the lack of a strong and decisive leadership and incapability of the party to follow an ideologically coherent program are also responsible for the electoral crash the PRM faced in 2008 [Cinpoes, 2010]). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland and Slovene Democratic Party (SDS) in Slovenia are considered the right-wing mainstream parties. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. These cases are selected for discussion due to their higher membership scores in the configuration than have the Bulgarian and Hungarian cases. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Mudde (2007: 11-12) mentions twenty-three different terms used in forty-six studies published between 1991 and 2005 inclusive: these terms are: *extreme right*, *far right, radical right, right, radical right wing populism, right-wing populism, national populism, new populism, neopopulism, exclusionary populism, xenophobic populism, populist nationalism, ethno-nationalism, anti-immigrant, nativism, racism, racist extremism, fascism, neofascism, postfascism, reactionary tribalism, integralism and antipartyism.*  [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Fascism has been regarded as prototype of extreme right ideology (Billig, 1989: 146; Ignazi, 1992: 9). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. As a radical right party, the Republicans in the Czech Republic, proposed the following administrative changes to make the democracy work for the interests of ordinary people: ‘ voter’s right of recall legislators, proportional representation electoral system without electoral threshold, decentralization of power to the level of commune, the restoration of four-fold provincial structure of interwar Czechoslovakia and reduction of center government to mere seven ministers’ (Hanley, 2012: p. 78). Nevertheless, parties like the Slovak National Party make reference to nationalist movements in the interwar regime. In my opinion, this should be regarded as a quest for historical references to excite its supporters. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. It should be noted that for some, the usage of the term radical is problematic in that it was originally associated with the left-wing movements (Beyme, 1988: 2). Yet, the term semantically marks off an immoderate belief from moderate one. Thus radical right refers to an immoderate version of moderate right-wing ideas. As Woods (1989: 124) writes, ’the moderate, conservative, concern for the preservation of institutions gives way to a rejection of the “alien” institutions of modernity such as pluralism and parliamentary democracy.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Mudde (2007) uses ‘populist radical right’, while Betz (1993) and Rydgren (2002) use ‘radical right populism’. Mudde (2007: 26) explains the difference between ‘radical right populism’ and ‘populist radical right’: the latter puts the radical right ideology at the centre and refers to a populist version of radical right, whereas the former gives priority to ‘populism’ over ‘radical right’. As radical right refers to the nativism that is the core of the parties’ ideologies, priority must be given to the term ‘radical right’, not to the term ‘populism’. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Mudde (2004) mentions at least six reasons (for example ‘increasing autonomy of media from political parties since 1970s’ and ‘increasing education level among societies’) that populism has become the *Zeitgeist* in West European politics since the early 1990s.  [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. In line with Sartori’s suggestion, the established parties are defined in terms of the parties’ relevance to governance (see: Abedi, 2002: 555). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Koch (1991: 31) defines ‘internal homogenization’ as the view that ‘only people belonging to the X nation have the right to live within the borders of state X’. To achieve this goal, radical right parties support either a complete exclusion or a complete assimilation of ‘others’. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Shafir (2000: quotes an anecdote from Daniel Chirot’s (1994) *Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age,* told by Traian Herseni (a major propagandist for the Iron Guard), ‘I used to write things praising the Captain (Corneliu Codreanu) and now I write pretty much the same thing, but praising Ceausescu. I am not a Marxist, you understand, but I have to admit that I like what he is doing.’ Likewise, Zhikov’s regime in Bulgaria played the nationalism card particularly after the 1970s in order to distract attention from economic stagnation, which ended up launching the ‘Revival Process’ in 1984 – a Bulgarification project targeting Turkish and other Islamic minorities (Bell, 1999: 243). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. The 2002 Chapel Hill expert survey also includes MIEP since the party gained seats in the 1998 election. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. In his book titled *Populist Radical Right in Poland*, Pankowski (2010) examines three parties: Law and Justice, Self-Defence and League of Polish Families. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Furthermore, the party even suggested the resettlement of the Roma population (Hockenos, 1993: 227; Szayna, 1997: 126; Fawn, 2000: 57). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. For example, the Devescer event occurred in 2011 Online sources: <http://www.hungarianambiance.com/2012/08/radical-organizations-joined-forces-and.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. The website was [www.ciganybunozest.com](http://www.ciganybunozest.com) [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. With a heavy irony, Vadim Tudor says, ‘in talking about the descendants of those barbarians, I do not think that we offend the Magyar nation, quite to the contrary, we disseminate authentic, historical documents attesting to the fact that they were originally primitives, something which Romanians have never been’ (Andreescu, 2005: 187). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. In its initial years, the Slovak National Party (SNS) concentrated intensely on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (Szayna, 1997: 129; Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998: 54; Milo, 2005: 213). Unlike its counterparts in the Czech Republic, SNS supported the secession. The party strongly supported the ‘Declaration of Slovak Sovereignty’ issued by several nationalist groups in the country (Bugajski, 1995: 336, 337). [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. The Party launched an initiative aimed at reviving *All Polish Youth,* founded in 1922 and whose honorary chair was Dmowski (Bustikova, 2009: 230). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Jelincic had a monument to Tito placed in the backyard of his home (Velikonja, 2009: 9). This admiration is quite surprising, for T.I.G.R and Partisans fought against the fascist forces. Indeed, this admiration triggered a schism within the party in 1993. The group supporting the Home Guard, the fascist group that fought against the Partisans during the course of the WWII, left the party. This schism led to the establishment of two other radical right parties before the 1996 election: the Slovenian National Right and the National Party of Labour. Both parties, however, were unable to take over the dominant position of the SNS in radical right politics in the country. In the 1996 election, the parties gained a mere 0.5 per cent and 0.3 pr cent of the vote, respectively (Trplan, 2005: 245, 246). It must also be noted that dissenters were thinking that the party must follow much more extreme policies (Rizman, 1999: 152, 153). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Similarly, in praise of Zhivkov, the leader of ATAKA, Volen Siderov, said that ‘[Zhivkov] was a gifted state-man who did a lot for Bulgaria.’ See: Sawyer, 2010, available at: (accessed: July 2012)

    <http://sofiaecho.com/2010/11/19/996264_totalitarianism-and-todor-bulgaria-grapples-with-communist-legacy>

    PMR and ATAKA are the only radical right parties praising the former communist leaders. This should remind us of the categories developed by Shafir (2000) and encompassing two types of radical right in CEECs: ‘radical return’ and ‘radical continuity’. The former makes reference to pre-communist years and fiercely criticizes the former communist regimes (Shafir, 2000: 250). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4956604.stm> [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. The period of European integration as of the 1980s could be divided into two distinct phases. In the first phase, which lasted until the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, economic integration within West European countries sped up. During that period, economic reasons were the primary drivers of public/party opposition to EU integration. In the second phase of European integration, the EU began to attach weight to political and cultural integration as well. Since then, political and cultural factors concerning national sovereignty and national culture, for example, have increasingly influenced opposition to European integration (Carey, 2002; McLaren 2002, Hooghe and Marks, 2008). Political and cultural factors are the source of radical right parties’ opposition to European integration, while economic factors are rarely mentioned (Marks, 2004: 239).

    [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. The monitoring report of the European Commission dated 2006 recommended Bulgaria’s admission to the EU, along with Romania in 2007. The full report is available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/26_09_06_fullreport.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. The party blames the division on Klaus and Meciar, who allegedly acted against the will of the Czechoslovak people (Hockenos, 1993: 226; Fawn, 2000: 57) [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. In fact, the party has been in constant contact with the figures in unionist Moldavian Popular Front such as Ilie Ilascu, who were sentenced to death for his separatist ideas by Trispol Government (Andreescu, 2005: 189). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. The ‘Leninist legacy’ means that the new institutional patterns (in CEE) will be shaped by ‘inheritance’ and the legacy of forty years of Leninism (Jowitt, 1992: 285). Pop Eleches (2007: 910) defines the legacy ‘as the structural, cultural, and institutional stating point of ex-communist countries at the outset of transition.’ Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009) discuss how this legacy influenced the competition of mainstream parties and how that competition affected the electoral performance of radical right parties in CEECs. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. It must be noted that not all cross-country studies confirm ‘the modernization losers’ approach. Van der Brug and Fennema (2009: 600), for example, state that the electoral support enjoyed by radical right parties does not come from a distinctive class but from all strata. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. These studies suggest that left-wing political parties primarily benefit from the unemployment problem. (This may suggest that voters of radical right parties are more concerned with cultural issues than economic issues.) [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. This complex causality is discussed under the heading ‘ethnic competition approach’. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Norris (2005: 149) rightly suggests that the ‘transitional loser’ (or ‘modernization loser’) and ‘protest vote’ approaches seem to be tautological, as both approaches assumes that radical right parties are supported by voters who want to express their angers toward mainstream parties accused of being in interested in private gains rather than public concerns. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. The possibility of supporting alternative parties, including radical right ones, rather than mainstream parties due to the corruption problem has already been underlined in terms of West European countries (Kitschelt, 1995: 175, Veugelers and Magnan, 2005: 855) and CEE countries (Bustikova, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. In his study, Pop Eleches examines the electoral performance of a group of parties he labels ‘unorthodox parties’. He lists national populist, new / centrist populist, extreme nationalist, and radical left groups as members of ‘unorthodox parties’ (Eleches, 2010: 229-230). Eleches (2010: 248) concludes that ethnic diversity benefits new centrist populist parties rather than nationalist parties. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Besides West European countries, Norris includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania as cases from CEE. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Cowles, Risse, and Caporaso (2001:3), for example, define Europeanization as ‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance’. Ladrech (1994: 69) defines Europeanization as ‘an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC (European Community) political and economic dynamics become part of organizational logic of national politics and policy making.’ According to Radaelli (2003: 108), Europeanization is a ‘process of a) construction, b) diffusion, c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things”, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. The possibility of internal party split could explain this reluctance. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Schmitt (2005: 19) concludes that voters still consider the European Parliamentary election as a second order election and thus are less likely to vote in this election. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. The Eurobarometer polls (2001-2009) indicate that the percentage of citizens who think that their country should be a member of the EU was always higher than the percentage of those opposed to membership. The highest percentage of support was in Romania. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. The rules are based on the data from each country, which is available at <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/>

    [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. A causal condition is necessary for an outcome ‘where instances of an outcome constitute a subset of instances of a cause’ (Ragin, 2008: 44). When it is the other way around, the causal condition is sufficient for an outcome (Ragin, 2008: 58). Let us assume that a high level of unemployment is necessary for the electoral success of radical right parties. This means that the set of electoral success is a subset of high level of unemployment. Let us assume that a high level of unemployment is sufficient for the electoral success of radical right parties. This means that the set of electoral success is a superset of high level of unemployment. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. This criterion that has been used in the literature on party politics to determine the relevant parties is adopted in this study as well, whilst conducting the second robustness test. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. The study has to exclude some factors that many studies include - such as the electoral system and endogenous factors including charismatic leadership and strong party organization - for methodological constraint. First, the parties under examination have competed under an electoral system that is essentially based on proportional representation, though Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania adopted a mixed system, which includes majority voting to a certain extent. In spite of this similarity among the countries, the difference in the degree of proportionality may affect the electoral success of radical right parties. The first robustness test aims to eliminate this limit by checking whether the variation in degree of proportionality is important enough that it affects the electoral success of radical right parties. Second, endogenous factors are absolutely vital for success, but this is true for any political party regardless of party family (i.e. it is not specific to radical right parties). Therefore, a detailed analysis on such factors is definitely needed to fully account for the electoral success of radical right parties. Indeed, the discussion on deviant case in chapter six shows the importance of endogenous conditions. Yet, these cannot be included in this QCA due to the methodological problem of ‘logical remainders’, explained in the introduction. Instead, this study suggests that these must be included in future analyses aiming to explain the electoral success of radical right parties. The following subsections in this part seek to interpret the data on each condition included in the analysis, present examples and explain how the data are calibrated in fuzzy set membership scores. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. The data are available on the website: <http://laborsta.ilo.org/> (last online access 29 May 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. For example, see the European Commission’s (2003) ‘Comprehensive Monitoring Report on the Hungary’s Preparations for Membership’, p. 15, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/cmr_hu_final_en.pdf> (last online access 21 March 2014)

    [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. See the EU’s monitoring reports on each country (for years 2000 and 2002), which are available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/> In addition, some improvement can also be observed in the data on perception of corruption provided by the Transparency International Index. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI)’s annual reports since 1995 are available at: <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview> (last online access 23 June 2014).

    [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Each country’s score year by year is available at <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2001> (last online access 21 May 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. The document (2012) prepared by the SRGS for estimates and official number of Roma numbers can be downloaded at <http://hub.coe.int/web/coe-portal/roma/> (Last online access 13 May 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. The data on other ethnic groups in CEECs are available on the website: <http://joshuaproject.net/people-profile.php> (Last online access 13 May 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Kitschelt et al (1999: 23-27) broadly categorizes the post communist countries, including those this study examines, according to their Leninist legacies. The Czech Republic is given as an example of a ‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ communist legacy. Hungary and Slovenia are examples of a ‘national accommodative’ communist legacy, while Poland is regarded as having the features of both legacies. Bulgaria and Romania are classified as having patrimonial communist legacy. Slovakia is considered to have features of both national accommodative and patrimonial legacies.

    [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. The PSD is the successor to the Democratic National Salvation Front, which was the successor to National Salvation Front. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. For a relevant discussion about the meaning of left and right in ‘post communist Europe’ please see: Tavits M. and Letki, N. (2009). ‘When Left is Right: Party Ideology and Policy in Post-Communist Europe.’ *American Political Science Review* 13 (4): 555-569*.* [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. This study uses fsQCA 2.0 software. The truth table rows that are deemed insufficient for the occurrence of the outcome due to low consistency level are coded manually in this program. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 325-326) make a distinction between counterfactuals that conflict with the analysis of necessary conditions and those that do not conflict. The authors present a detailed discussion of counterfactuals under the titles of ‘difficult counterfactuals’ and ‘easy counterfactuals’, respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. For a detailed discussion on relevance and trivialness of necessary conditions see Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 144-146). [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. This suggestion could be criticized based on two reasons. First, at the age of economic and cultural globalization it is barely possible to find an ethnically homogenous country in Europe, though different process of nation building can matter (civic versus ethnic nationalism). Second, which is specific to this study, the path including the negation of the condition *ethpop* includes only two cases - Poland and Slovenia - therefore, this conclusion - extracted from an examination on two cases - is not strong. It is certain that this conclusion must be tested by studies including other European countries where the immigration problem is a less severe problem (for example: Portugal). Nevertheless, this conclusion matters, as which combination of conditions leading to electoral success of radical right parties depends on the presence or absence of large ethnic minority group / immigrant population in a country. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Nobody can say for sure that right-wing mainstream parties made the wrong decision by taking a Europhile position. After all, a great majority of citizens in CEECs supported EU membership. They made a decision to maximize their electoral support for the sake of experiencing the electoral success of radical right parties. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. For example, in his meeting with Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, in January 2000, Tudor asked for Prodi’s support for the unification of Moldavia and Romania, the release of Ilie Ilascu, the Moldavian politician who was imprisoned for his separatist policies (BBC Monitoring, Central European and Balkans, 15 January 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. The least square index is calculated by the following formula: ‘, where is the share of *votes* for party i, is the share of *seats* for party i and m the number of parties’ (Armingeon et al, 2014). The document is available at: <http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html> (last online access 21 May 2014).

    [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Gallagher’s data on election indices are available at <http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf> (last online access: 21 May 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. All results of French elections from 1945 to 2007 are available at: <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/france2.html> (last online access 21 May 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. For a comment on the last local election in the United Kingdom see: <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/23/local-election-ukip-nigel-farage-labour-tories-lib-dems> (last online access 18 June 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. The level of electoral support of French National Front from 1986 to 1997 as follow: 9.9 (in 1986), 9.8 (in 1988), 12.4 (in 1993), and 14.9 (in 1997) (see: <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/france2.html>) (last online access 22 May 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. In addition, the thresholds levels for this condition for Hungary were determined on the basis of the ‘deterrence approach’, which is discussed in detail by Kitschelt and Bustikova (2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. The second path does not involve the problem of corruption as a component. Remember that as the least successful country in dealing with the problem of corruption among the countries included in this analysis, Romania appears to be an exception in this regard. A close examination of the Romanian 2000 parliamentary election reveals that besides high levels of unemployment, though not a part of the configuration, the problem of corruption, as a socio-economic problem, appears to have contributed to popular dissatisfaction with the established parties. In fact, the PRM emphasized this problem too much to make itself different from established parties in the eyes of the electorate. Therefore, the role of this condition in increasing general public dissatisfaction with established parties is also mentioned here [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Right wing unification was not always the norm in Polish politics during the 1990s. With the defeat of the Polish United Workers Party in 1989, the intra-bloc differences within the Solidarity bloc became discernible. Personality clashes and the cleavage over economic policies played a major role in shattering the unity among the right-wing circles. Ideologically speaking, the right wing actually split into two distinct camps in the early 1990s: one with a liberal inclination and one with a conservative inclination (Ka-Lok Chan, 1995: 133; Szczerbiak, 2004a: 58-59). [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. The ex-communists’ two successive electoral victories (in the 1993 parliamentary election and the 1995 presidential election) led to a perception among right wing-groups, particularly religiously and socially conservative groups, that Poland was falling under the communist influence once again. Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) was established out of this concern in June 1996 as a broad coalition of anti-communist parties clustered around the Solidarity trade union. AWS consisted of twenty-two right wing parties and movements in June 1996; this number reached thirty by the 1997 parliamentary election. Notable groups joining AWS included the Conservative Peasant Party, the Christian National Union, the Centre Alliance, the Confederation for an Independent Poland, the Association of Catholic Families and 100 Movements (BBC Monitoring Service Central Europe & Balkans, 1 July 1997). It should be noted that AWS did not include all members of the anti-communist bloc that had gained victory over the PZPR in June 1989. The conservative stance was quite unacceptable to liberal right-wing groups, most notably the Freedom Union (UW), which was established in 1994 by the Democratic Union (UD) and the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD). Leszek Balcerowics, the leader of the UW, criticized AWS for being an extreme right party like the Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) (BBC Monitoring Central Europe & Balkans, 28 February, 1997: 1). This division between the UW and AWS was so important that it would form the basis for a division between the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice Party, which became clearly discernible, particularly starting in the 2005 parliamentary election. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. This benefitted President Kwasniewski, who had won the 1995 presidential election with a margin of victory of less than 3 per cent against the anti-communist Walesa. One of Kwasniewski’s rivals, the AWS, supported Krzaklewski, emphasizing certain issues in an attempt to stimulate anti-communist feelings among the conservative electorate. So much effort, however, came to nothing as Kwasniewski won the 2000 presidential election by a landslide, while Krzaklewski took third place (Szczerbiak, 2001: 96; Szczerbiak, 2004a: 66). As illustrated here, the 2000 presidential election was the first election signalling the diminishing importance of the anti-communist – post-communist cleavage in Poland (Szczerbiak 2001: 78).

    [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. The labels ‘hard-liner conservative’ and ‘soft-liner conservative’ have been taken from Zarycki’s article (2000) on political cleavages in Poland. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. The 2001 parliamentary election was held on 23 September. The Democratic Left Alliance-Labour United (SLD-UP) electoral alliance won the election by a landslide, gaining 41 per cent of the vote and securing 216 out of 460 seats in the *Sejm*. (Two hundred of the 216 seats were reserved for the SLD. The UP, a small left wing party, had 16 seats.) The other parties that managed to obtain places in the *Sejm* had similar levels of electoral support. The Civic Platform (PO) took the second place by winning 12.7 per cent of the vote and reserving 65 seats. The farmers’ protests that had escalated in December 1999 clearly benefited the agrarian Self Defence Party. Andrzej Lepper, a leading figure in the protests, led the party to the third place with 10.2 per cent of the vote, ensuring 53 seats. Law and Justice (PiS) became the fourth party by gaining 9.5 per cent of the vote and taking 44 seats. The Polish Peasant Party took the fifth place with 9.0 per cent of the vote and 42 seats. Finally, the League of Polish Families finished in the sixth place, gaining 7.9 per cent of the vote and 38 seats. Full election results are available at: <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/poland2.html>. Law and Justice and the League of Polish Families emerged as the most appealing parties to cultural traditionalist voters from the 2001 election, who had been likely to support Electoral Solidarity Action in the 1997 parliamentary election. In fact the combined electoral support won in 2001 by RS-AWS, PiS and LPR, which could be regarded as successors to AWS,, was very close to the amount of electoral support secured by AWS in 1997. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. Nevertheless, Kaczynski was accused of embezzling 600,000 USD from the state budget to fund Centre Agreement in the early 1990s. Kaczynski rejected the accusation and sued Polish State Television for airing the allegation (AFP, 18 June, 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. This theoretical explanation has been discussed particularly in studies of political marketing, which classify political parties into three groups: ideology oriented, sale oriented, and market oriented (Lees-Marshment, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. As defined in the first chapter, soft-Eurosceptic parties are not against their countries’ membership in the EU, yet they are opposed to the EU itself, particularly those policies increasing the EU’s authority over nation states through deeper integration. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Antoni Macierewicz, who was the leader of the Catholic National Movement who joined the LPR before the 2001 election, for example, claimed that Catholic unification was a panacea for all of Poland’s cultural and economic problems, arguing that the country would otherwise face the danger of partition again (BBC Monitoring European: Political, 25 July 2001). In addition, LPR’s views on foreign investment were similar to those of PiS. The party strongly emphasized the ‘danger’ of falling under foreign influence and therefore remained adamantly opposed to foreign investment in the economy (Szczerbiak, 2003: 732). [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Turnouts had been lower than 50 percent in all previous parliamentary elections in Poland, except the semi-free 1989 election. The turnout in the referendum was the highest since 1990, which could be taken as evidence of the saliency of the EU accession issue. This assessment excludes presidential elections. For individual country analysis of EU accession referendums held in post-communist countries in 2003, see Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2009) *EU Enlargements and Referendums.* London, New York: Routledge.  [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. This figure was 90 per cent for the Civic Platform (Markowski and Tucker, 2005: 411). At this point, it must be noted that an analysis using two competing models – the ‘responsible party model’,, which suggests that the party shapes its voters’ opinion on issues, and ‘the Downsian model’, which suggests that voters’ opinion determines their party’s position on issues - in the context of the 1997, 2001 and 2005 parliamentary elections in Poland gave more credibility to the latter (Markowski and Tucker, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. At the party congress, Jaroslaw Kaczynski also argued that if Poland did not become a member, the country would be at serious risk of falling under Russian influence (Middle East and North Africa Today, 20 January, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Self Defence has also been labelled a national socialist populist party that combined left-wing economic policies and right-wing cultural policies (March, 2011: 142–143). In addition, a poll carried out by CBOS in late November 2002 revealed that more than half of the party’s supporters (55 per cent) opposed membership for economic reasons (BBC Monitoring European, 9 December 2002). [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. This is not to say that LPR never mentioned the problems in the agricultural sector that were expected to come with membership. Yet, opposition to EU membership for identity-based reasons was clearly the flagship of the party (De Lange and Guerra, 2009: 538-539; Markowski and Tucker, 2010: 527). This was already discussed in the second chapter, which presented some of the party policies on the issue. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Remember that the solution formula presented in the previous chapter did not cover the Polish 2005 parliamentary election in which LPR achieved electoral success by winning 8 per cent of the vote. Table 4.5 shows that the truth table row including POL2005 and POL2007 (in which LPR gained an insignificant amount of votes (1.1 per cent) refers to the following combination of the conditions: *unemp\*corr\*~ethpop\*~ephilm\*~libm.* The truth table row including POL2001 refers to the following combination of conditions: *unemp\*corr\*~ethpop\*ephilm\*~libm*. The two configurations differ from each other in terms of the aspect of the condition *ephilm.* The condition *ephilm* is absent in the former but present in the latter. Yet, LPR managed to have electoral success not only in the 2001 election but also in the 2005 election. This fact appears to conflict with the solution formula including the Polish case. The Eurosceptic position of the PiS should have hindered the electoral success of LPR in the 2005 election. This study argues that there are two reasons behind this anomaly. First, although PiS turned into a Eurosceptic party, it was not against the Polish membership in the EU in principle. Second, the issue of Europeanization was still a fresh one as a determinant of electoral preference (e.g. De Lange, 2009). In fact, once the saliency of the issue substantially diminished, the LPR was subjected to an electoral defeat in the 2007 parliamentary election. It should also be noted that, the PiS became much more illiberal in the 2005 election than it had been in the 2001 election (Selinger, 2008: 25). Chapel Hill expert surveys on party position confirm this shift. On a scale ranging from 1 (libertarian) to 10 (authoritarian), the party was placed at the 7.75in the 2002 survey and 9.5 in the 2006 survey (Hooghe et al. 2010). During its campaign for the 2005 election, the party emphasized the necessity of protecting of a national identity defined in terms of Catholic Christian values (Pankowski, 2010: 154). For example, a brochure published by the party entitled ‘A Catholic Poland in a Christian Europe’ stated that, ‘Nowadays, unfortunately, we live in times, when the civilization based on the truth of the Decalogue and of the Scripture – is more and more often questioned and attacked’ (Pankowski, 2010: 153). In addition, the party explicitly excluded alternative ways of life, and, indeed, Lech Kacynski banned a gay parade on the grounds that such events could encourage gay orientation (AFP, 18 June 2005, Szczerbiak, 2007: 213). Four reasons can potentially explain why the PiS shifted further to the right and became explicitly critical of European integration. First, the loosening of restrictions on the parties’ manoeuvrings during the candidacy period, which was completed in May 2004, might have allowed the PiS to act in a more conservative way (see: Vachudova and Hooghe, 2009). Second in the 2001 parliamentary election, PiS had been aiming to appeal to secular voters, which forced the party to downplay its position on socio-cultural policies. In 2005, Civic Platform’s policies appealing to secular voters disappointed by the SLD’s poor performance in office may have convinced PiS to adopt a new strategy to help the party appeal to conservative voters. The third and fourth reasons follow from the second. Because of Lech Kacyznski’s participation in the October 2005 presidential election, the party wanted to capitalize on its conservative image against his liberal rival Donald Tusk. Also, the PiS may have been aiming to broaden its electoral support by appealing to voters who had supported the LPR in the 2001 parliamentary election. PiS’s conflation of communism and corruption to produce anti-political establishment rhetoric can also be explained in terms of the third and fourth reasons. Through such a conflation, the party aimed to kill two birds with one stone. First, the party aimed to appeal to voters who were disappointed by corruption scandals. Second, they targeted the entire conservative segment of the electorate by inflaming their anti-communist sentiments. This condition pulled the LPR into the ‘region of acceptability’. In fact, LPR and PiS (along with Self-Defence) emerged as coalition partners from the 2005 parliamentary election. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Athanasiu’s Social Democratic Party had already merged with the Socialist Party (a minor opposition opposition party) in July 2000 (BBC Monitoring European – Political, 22 July 2000). This was the first step towards the establishment of a pole of Social Democrats before the 2000 parliamentary election. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. For example, a poll conducted by the Institute for Marketing, Analyses and Polls (IMAS) in March 2000 indicated that Ionescu’s Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PSDR) would receive 47 per cent of the votes, while the Convention would remain at 19 per cent (Rompres, 31 March 2000). Another IMAS poll conducted in July 2000 indicated that 49 per cent of the electorate would vote for PSDR, while 17 per cent would vote for the Convention (Rompres, 3 July 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. The problem of corruption has been a chronic one in Romania. Similar negative figures on corruption continued to appear on the eve of the 2004 election. For example, both foreign and national firms in the country also noted the presence of corruption in the country’s justice and public administration systems, and suggested that this triggered their hesitation to invest in the country (Reuters, 20 September 2004). Likewise, a poll carried out by the EU commission revealed that 90 per cent of Romanians believed that EU funds were distributed improperly. In fact, in 2003 the Minister for European Integration, Hildegard Puwak, had to resign after the confirmation of allegations that she had distributed EU funds to her family members (Associated Press, 31 August 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. The turnout rates in the previous elections were as follows: 86.2 per cent (in 1990), 76.3 per cent (in 1992), 76 per cent (in 1996), and 65.3 per cent (in 2000). The data are available at:

     <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/romania2.html> (last online access: 21 June 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. <http://www.psd.ro/despre/> (last online access 12 June 2014) [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. The party maintained this position in the 2004 election, as well. It strongly emphasized its executive role in preparing the country for EU membership (Stan, 2005: 4). [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. From 1994 to 1996 the PSDR and PRM were partners in the ruling coalition. The international community had strong reservations about this partnership on the grounds that their policies were not in line with liberal democracy. In particular, the policies of American Ambassador to Bucharest, Alfred Moses, played a crucial role in the termination of this partnership before the 1996 election (Pippidi, 2001: 236). [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. In the first round of the 2000 presidential election, Iliescu gained 36.4 per cent of the vote while Tudor had 28.3 per cent of the vote. In the second round, most supporters of the National Liberal Party (PNL), Democratic Party (PD) and Hungarian Democratic Union (UDMR) supported Iliescu against Tudor. Thus, Iliescu secured the presidential post with 66.8 per cent of the vote. Compared to the first round, Tudor’s electoral support increased slightly from 28.3 per cent to 33.2 per cent (Pop-Eleches, 2001: 157). [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. After all, Romania did not hold an accession referendum for the ratification of the EU accession treaty, which was ratified in a parliamentary vote in which all 438 MPs (out of 468) attending the session voted in favour (Europe information, 19 May 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Because the first path includes no deviant cases, this chapter focuses on the second path, which includes five typical cases and two deviant cases. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. The success of the SDKU-led coalition government in fulfilling the EU accession requirements particularly helped SDKU in the election. In an open question survey, 13.9 per cent of SDKU supporters stated that they preferred the party because of its support for accession to the EU and NATO (Henderson, 2006: 156). [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Malikova was elected as the leader of the party in the 1999 Party Congress in place of Jan Slota, who had been leading the party since 1993 and would become leader once again before the 2006 election. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. A poll conducted by the Institute of Public Opinion Research between 30 August and 8 September indicated that Malikova was the fourth most trusted politician in the country (BBC Monitoring European, 17 August 2000). Likewise a poll carried out by the agency MVK between 5 and 12 December placed her at the same rank (BBC Monitoring European, 16 December 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. For a detailed report on the 2006 parliamentary election, please see Haughton and Rybar, 2008,’A change of Direction and Party Politics in Slovakia’, *Journal of Communist and Transition Politics Studies*, 24: 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Deputy Prime Minister Pal Csaky explained the toughness of finding a solution to the problem within a short time by indicating that the problem could not be solved on the basis of measures taken by the coalition government unilaterally. Csaky states that ‘Roma mentality, culture, thinking, reactions do not stem from the classic Slovak culture. We have to look for mutual coexistence, and we need time to make changes inside ourselves – both Roma and non-Roma citizens’ (quoted in Vermeersch, 2003: 896-897). [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Houghton and Rybar (2011: 141) also argue that the SNS avoided voicing its opposition to EU membership in order to receive EU funds. The authors state that ‘ the flow of money to Slovakia ensures that even the nationalists in SNS appear to love the EU’. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. In addition, as discussed in chapter three, this approach has been suggested in studies discussing the contribution of the arrival of economically driven immigrants to West Europe to the electoral successes of radical right parties in elections held in the 1980s and 90s (e.g. Betz, 1993). More recent studies, however, do not support this approach, instead stressing the cultural differences between ethnic groups as the main factor helping radical right parties to increase their electoral support (e.g. Coffe et al, 2007; Schneider, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. This figure comes from the International Labor Organization’s dataset on unemployment. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. As an example of such criticism please see Szczerbiak and Hanley, 2004, ‘Introduction: Understanding the Politics of the Right in Contemporary East Central Europe’, *Journal of Communist and Transition Politics* 20: 3, 1-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. The EU’s decision to give the other three Visegrad countries candidate status in the 1997 Luxembourg Summit excluded Slovakia. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. It should be noted that the overwhelming support for EU membership, as Haughton and Rybar (2011: 141) underline, ‘is manifested not in enthusiastic advocacy, but mired in disinterested acceptance that Slovakia is better in than out.’ In other words, voters accepted that there was no better alternative to EU accession. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. The election, which Vachudova (2006: 2-3) terms a ‘watershed election’, was claimed to mark the beginning of a new transition in the country (Harris, 2002: 119). [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. After the completion of the Europeanization process in Poland and Slovenia, during which the importance of the anti-EU discourse gradually declined, electoral support for LPR and Slovene NS substantially decreased. LPR became an extra-parliamentary party in 2007, as did Slovene NS in 2011. LPR gained only 1 per cent of the vote in the 2007 elections and Slovene NS gained only 1.8 per cent in the 2011 elections. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. The post-QCA case study on the Slovak National Party’s electoral performance in the 2002 and 2006 elections concluded that the electoral success of the Slovak NS in 2006 was due in part to high levels of unemployment. The party received higher electoral support than its national average in industrial centres such as Zilina and Trencin, where over 95 per cent of the population is ethnically Slovaks. The establishment of a car factory by the South Korean firm KIA in the city of Zilina curbed the unemployment problem in the city and its neighbourhoods to a certain extent before the 2006 election. At the same time, the leader of Slovak NS, Jan Slota, was the mayor of Zilina. During his political career, he had enjoyed local popularity in the city. On account of these facts, this study could not say for sure that high levels of unemployment increased the electoral strength of the party, as the ethnic competition approach would predict; this theory suggests that radical right parties are supported by native citizens who do not want to compete with people, whose ethnicities are different over scarce economic resources. To answer this question, a study on radical right voters in Slovakia is needed. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. In fact, it is not a coincidence that the highest percentage of ‘yes’ votes in EU accession referenda held in the five of the countries included in this study occurred in Slovakia. Bulgaria and Romania, whose the membership processes were delayed largely due to illiberal practices, did not even hold referenda for EU membership. Instead, both countries approved the EU accession treaty with an overwhelming majority in parliamentary voting. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Remember that the second configuration (ephilm\*libm\*ethpop\*unemp) in the solution formula encompasses two deviant cases, including the electoral failure of the Slovak National Party in the 2002 election. In addition as explained in the main text, an internal party quarrel between two leading figures of the party (Anna Malikova and Jan Slota) was also partly responsible for the party’s electoral failure. The quarrel ultimately led to a split in the party, so there were two radical right parties (the True Slovak National Party led by Slota and the Slovak National Party led by Malikova) competing in the 2002 elections. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. It is important to note that numerous studies in the literature discuss the electoral performance of radical right parties by examining micro-level conditions in West European countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)