

**Violence and Forced Internal Migrants with Special
Reference to the Metropolitan Area of Bogotá,
Colombia (1990-2002)**

Chaowarit Chaowsangrat

**A Thesis Submitted as Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

University College London

2011

DECLARATION

I, Chaowarit Chaowsangrat, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own.

Where information has been derived from other sources,

I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Chaowarit Chaowsangrat

ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses topics of violence and forced internal migrants with special reference to the metropolitan area of Bogotá, Colombia between 1990 and 2002. While there is much scholarly debate by historians and political scientists about conflict between the state, guerrillas and paramilitaries in rural areas, urban violence has been relatively neglected. Violence caused many people to migrate from rural to urban areas, so that, Colombia had by 2002 more internally displaced persons than any country except Sudan. The main aims of the thesis are 1) to analyse trends in violent crime; 2) to discuss citizen security strategies that were pursued between 1990 and 2002; and 3) to examine the survival strategies of forced internal migrants in Bogotá comparing them to the strategies adopted by voluntary migrants and native residents.

Chapter 1 focuses on urban homicide and kidnapping. In Colombia, 40 percent of the 25,000 annual homicides were committed in the ten largest cities during the late 1990s. The problem of kidnapping is examined by analysing changes in Colombian anti-kidnapping legislation and its application and by focusing on the authors, the victims and the risk-zones involved. **Chapter 2** looks at the issue of perception and fear of violent crime. The concept of risk and the subjectivity of decision-making when facing insecurity are examined. **Chapter 3** investigates citizen security strategies during the administrations of Presidents César Gaviria (1990-1994), Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). **Chapter 4** develops an analysis of patterns of selectivity based on the notions of forced vis-à-vis voluntary migration and economic vis-à-vis non-economic migration. A research design collecting comparative data on households with diverse migration experiences residing in three locations within the metropolitan area of Bogotá is applied. **Chapter 5** explores the socioeconomic characteristics of forced migrants and compares them to voluntary migrants from outside and migrants who moved within Bogotá.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge my debt of gratitude for the institutional and individual support that I received in the various stages of this thesis. My greatest intellectual debts go to my academic mentor, Dr. Christopher Abel, for his invaluable guidance, kindness and time devotion throughout the period of study. I am also grateful to Dr. Julio Dávila for encouraging me throughout my graduate training at University College London. Dr. Alan Gilbert and Dr. Dirk Kruijt provided very favorable comments on my thesis during a viva examination.

It would have been impossible for me to complete this work without the advice, assistance and ultimately the friendship of a number of people in Bogotá, Colombia. My sincere thanks to Óscar Becerra, Milena Brito, Yelena Dectoa, Janeth Forero, Martha Franco, Juan Gabriel, Andrea González, Oliver Kaplan, Judy Pedroza, Julieta Rodriguez, Lina Rondon, Nicolás Suárez, Rodrigo Triana and Martha Vargas. I would also like to thank Jose López-Mayher for providing a warmest hospitality and friendship every time when I was in Madrid, Spain.

My sincere appreciation and gratitude goes to the staff of the Academia Colombiana de Historia, Archivo de Bogotá, Archivo General de la Nación, Biblioteca de Universidad de los Andes, Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango, Biblioteca Nacional, Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos, Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Fundación Pais Libre, Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, Oficina de Catastro, Red de Solidaridad Social, Secretaría de Gobierno de Bogotá and Secretaría Distrital de Planeación.

I wish particularly to thank the Royal Thai Government for granting me the scholarship for my study in London. Also, thanks to the Graduate School of University College London, the Hale Bellot Fund and the Royal Historical Society for financial assistance to conduct my research in Bogotá.

Above all, my greatest expression of gratitude goes to my mother, Yuwadee Chaowsangrat, who currently passed away. Without her love, care, understanding and great sacrifice throughout my life, I will not be able to stand on my feet. I LOVE YOU, MOM.

ABBREVIATIONS

AD/M-19	Alianza Democrática M-19
ANAPO	Alianza Nacional Popular
ANIF	Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras
AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
CAI	Centro de Atención Inmediata
CEDE	Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de los Andes
CEDLA	Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericanos, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
CEJ	Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia
CEPAL	Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe
CERAC	Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos
CIDSE	Centro de Investigaciones y Documentación Socioeconómica, Universidad del Valle
CIJUS	Centro de Investigaciones Sociojurídicas, Universidad de los Andes
CINEP	Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular
CNT	Corporación Nacional de Turismo
CODHES	Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento
CONASE	Consejo Nacional de Lucha contra el Secuestro y demás atentados contra la Libertad Personal
CONVIVIR	Cooperativas Comunitarias de Vigilancia Rural
CSRC	Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science
DADEP	Departamento Administrativo de Defensoría del Espacio Público
DANE	Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística
DAS	Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration of United States
DESEPAZ	Programa de Desarrollo, Seguridad y Paz
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey of United States
DIJIN	Dirección Central de Policía Judicial e Inteligencia
DNP	Departamento Nacional de Planeación
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación
ERG	Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista
ERP	Ejército Revolucionario Popular
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna of Spain
EU	European Union
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

Fedesarrollo	Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo
FONDELIBERTAD	Fondo Nacional para la Defensa de la Libertad Personal
GAULA	Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal y Antiextorción
GTD	Grupo Temático de Desplazamiento
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDB (BID)	Inter-American Development Bank (<i>Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo</i>)
IDPBS	Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IEPRI	Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INDUMIL	Industria Militar de Colombia
INPEC	Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario
IOM (OIM)	International Organisation for Migration (<i>Organización Internacional para las Migraciones</i>)
JBC	Jaime Bateman Cayón Group
JEGA	Movimiento Jorge Eliécer Gaitán
M-19	Movimiento 19 de Abril
MAS	Muerte a Secuestradores
OAS	Organisation of American States
PAHO	Pan American Health Organisation
PNUD	Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo
PRELAC	Proyecto Regional de Educación para América Latina y el Caribe
RSS	Red de Solidaridad Social
SISBEN	Sistema de Identificación y Clasificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios para los Programas Sociales
SISDES	Sistema de Información sobre Desplazamiento Forzado y Derechos Humanos en Colombia
UNASE	Unidad Anti-Secuestro
UNCICP	United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organisation
UP	Unión Patriótica
UPJ	Unidad Permanente de Justicia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCRI	United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants

CONTENTS

<i>Abstract</i>	3
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	4
<i>Abbreviations</i>	5
<i>Contents</i>	7
<i>Illustrations</i>	10
Introduction	15
Chapter 1 Urban Homicide and Kidnapping	32
Urban Homicide	32
Homicide in Colombia (1990-2002)	42
Homicide in Bogotá (1990-2002)	48
Kidnapping	58
Types of Kidnapping	72
Principal Victims of Kidnapping	77
Kidnapping in Bogotá and Cundinamarca	82
Chapter 2 Public Perception and Fear of Violent Crime	87
Theory and Concept on Perception of Violent Crime	90
Modelling Perception of Violent Crime and Assessing Behavioural Pattern	93
Perception of Violent Crime and the Colombian Crisis	104
Chapter 3 Citizen Security Policies from the Gaviria to the Pastrana Administrations	124
The Gaviria Administration (1990-1994)	127
A National Policy against Violence	128
‘Second Phase’ of the Policy: ‘More Security for the People’	133
The Samper Administration (1994-1998)	136
The Pastrana Administration (1998-2002)	139
Security Policies to Reduce Homicide	143
Security Policies to Reduce Kidnapping	146
Prison Policies	150
Problems of the Citizen Security Policies	153

Bogotá's Citizen Security Policies	158
The Castro Administration (1992-1994)	159
The Mockus Administrations (1995-1997 and 2001-2003)	160
The Peñalosa Administration (1998-2000)	161
Citizen Security Measures	163
Disarmament and Control of Alcohol Consumption	163
Regeneration Decaying Urban Environments	166
Misión Bogotá	167
Metropolitan Police	168
Judicial Consolidation	169
Chapter 4 Forced Internal Migrants, Gender and Household Composition Differentials	171
Forced Migration	175
Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia	176
Motives and Selection of Migration	188
Urbanisation and Internal Migration Pattern	192
Research Methodology in Internally Displaced Persons Survey	196
Experimental Census of Soacha, Cundinamarca	198
Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS)	204
Questionnaire Design	205
Sample Design	208
Interviewing	215
Data Entry and Processing	216
Migration Typology	217
Socio-Demographic Profile by Migrant Group	221
Gender, Conflict and Development	235
Gender and Conflict in Colombia	238
Household Composition Differentials and Labour Market	244
Demographic Structure and Socioeconomic Composition	245
Household Heads, Types of Households and Migration Experiences	253
Differential Performance in the Labour Market	258

Chapter 5	Socioeconomic Differentials among Migrant Groups and Labour Adaptation	268
	Socioeconomic Status and Migration	270
	Living Conditions of Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia	272
	Living Conditions of Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá	275
	Analysis of Socioeconomic Indicators	280
	Socioeconomic Conditions in the Place of Longest Residence	282
	Changes in Socioeconomic Conditions between the Place of Longest Residence and the Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002	293
	Socioeconomic Conditions in the Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002	297
	Migration Labour Adaptation	308
	Labour Adaptation of Forced Migrants	311
	Colombian Migrant Performance in the Labour Market	313
	Formal and Informal Urban Sectors	314
	Informal Sector and Employment in Colombia	315
	Migrations to Bogotá	317
	Methodological Approach	321
	Migration Typology	322
	Characteristics of the Migration Population in the Place of Origin	324
	Characteristics of the Migrant Population in Bogotá	327
	Migration and Labour Trajectories	333
	Conclusion	352
	<i>Appendices</i>	
	1 Reported Cases of Kidnapping by Departments and Municipalities in Colombia (2000)	371
	2 Reported Cases of Homicide in Urban Colombia (1990-2000)	373
	3 Non-Exhaustive List of Kidnappings of Well Known Public Figures in Colombia (1930-2002)	374
	4 Reported Cases of Kidnapping by Departments in Colombia (1996-2002)	377
	5 Risk Definitions for Cities as Defined by Control Risks Group (2002)	378
	6 Risk Definitions for Countries as Defined by Control Risks Group (2002)	379
	7 Interview Questionnaire	380
	8 The Detail of Research Design	382
	9 Oral Histories	390
	10 Colombian Government Policies towards the Internally Displaced Persons	402
	11 Self-criticisms	415
	<i>Bibliography</i>	436

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

A	Displaced Households and Violence in Colombia (1997-2001)	26
1.1	Reported Cases of Homicide in Colombia (1980-2002)	39
1.2	Map of Colombia	44
1.3	Reported Cases of Homicide in the 10 Largest Colombian Cities (2000)	46
1.4	Reported Cases of Homicide in Bogotá, Medellín and Cali (1988-2002)	47
1.5	Rates of Homicide per 100,000 Inhabitants in Colombia and Bogotá (1990-2002)	49
1.6	Rates of Homicide per 100,000 Inhabitants in Colombian Cities (2002)	50
1.7	Rates of Homicide per 100,000 Inhabitants Latin American Cities (2002)	51
1.8	Rates of Homicide per 100,000 Inhabitants in Bogotá by Localities (1994 and 2002)	52
1.9	Map of Bogotá by Localities	53
1.10	Rates of Homicide per 100,000 Inhabitants in Bogotá by Localities (1997-1999)	55
1.11	Perceived Risks of Kidnapping (1999)	61
1.12	Reported Cases of Kidnapping in Colombia (1990-2002)	63
1.13	People with Relatives, Friends or Colleagues That Were Kidnapped (1999)	65
1.14	Reported Cases of Kidnapping in Colombia by Motives (1996-2002)	71
1.15	Reported Cases of Kidnapping in Colombia by Perpetrators (1996-2002)	75
1.16	Reported Cases of Kidnapping in Colombia by Guerrillas (1996-2002)	75
1.17	Occupations of Victims of Ransom Kidnapping (2000)	78
1.18	Circumstances of Victims at the End of Each Year (1996-2002)	80
2.1	Relationship between Mass Media and Crime Perception	94
2.2	Victimology Model of Perceived Risk of Crime	99
2.3	Modelling Behaviours When Facing Extortion Risks	101
4.1	Displacement Patterns over Time in Colombia (1995-2002)	174
4.2	Spatial Distribution of Population in Colombia by Departments (1993)	180
4.3	Spatial Distribution of Population in Colombia by Departments (2002)	181
4.4	Spatial Distribution of Armed Actions Undertaken by the FARC (1995-2002)	182
4.5	Spatial Distribution of Armed Actions Undertaken by the ELN (1995-2002)	183
4.6	Spatial Distribution of Armed Actions Undertaken by Paramilitaries (1995-2002)	184

4.7	Geographical Distributions of Departments of Arrival of Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia (2002)	187
4.8	Causes of Migration at Origin and Motives of Migration at Destination	191
4.9	Relative Migrant Selectivity	191
4.10	Unemployment Rates in 6 Major Cities Compared to Bogotá (1990-2002)	194
4.11	Internally Displaced Persons by Years of Arrival at the Municipality of Soacha	200
4.12	Voluntary Migrants by Years of Arrival at the Municipality of Soacha	200
4.13	Map of the Department of Cundinamarca by Political Divisions	202
4.14	Map Locating the Municipality of Soacha, Department of Cundinamarca	203
4.15	Map of the Municipality of Soacha by Districts (<i>Comunas</i>)	204
4.16	Map of Bogotá by Socioeconomic Stratum, Mayor's Office Official Classification (2002)	210
4.17	Migrant Typology	218
4.18	Population Pyramid of the Non-Migrant Population Residing in Soacha	246
4.19	Population Pyramid of the Voluntary Migrant Population Residing in Soacha	247
4.20	Population Pyramid of the Forced Migrant Population Residing in Soacha	248
4.21	Sex Ratio of Population Residing in Soacha by Age Cohort	250
4.22	Predicted Probabilities of Employment for Males (Binary Logit)	264
4.23	Predicted Probabilities of Employment for Females (Binary Logit)	265
5.1	Illiteracy Rate for Bogotá, Urban and Rural Areas in Colombia (1985-2000)	321

Tables

A.	Average Annual Population Growth Rate in Bogotá by Localities (1973-2002)	25
1.1	Total Reported Cases of Homicide vs. Political Homicide in Colombia (1990-2002)	40
1.2	Categorisation of Homicide in Colombia by Losada and Vélez	41
1.3	Municipalities with Highest Number of Reported Homicides (1979-1986)	43
1.4	Reported Cases of Homicide in Bogotá by Localities (1997-1999)	54
1.5	Reported Cases of Kidnapping in Colombia (1930-2002)	66
4.1	Internally Displaced Persons by Departments of Origin and Destination (2002)	186
4.2	Numbers of Persons and Households by Migration Experiences and Districts	199
4.3	Absolute Frequency and Annual Growth Rate of Internally Displaced Persons and Voluntary Migrants by Years of Arrival at the Municipality of Soacha	201

4.4	Description of the Schedules of the Household Questionnaire for the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS)	206
4.5	Initial Place of Residence of the Internally Displaced Persons Who Arrived at Bogotá between May 1999 and August 2002 by Localities	211
4.6	Characteristics of the Neighbourhoods Included in the Sample	212
4.7	Basic Sampling Statistics of the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey	214
4.8	Missing Data of Individual, Household and Life History Experiences of Household Head and Spouse	217
4.9	Absolute and Percentage Frequency of Households by Migration Experiences of Household Head and Site of Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002	219
4.10	Percentage Distribution of Causes of Migration Reported by Household Head and Spouse	220
4.11	Age and Sex Composition of the Population in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Age Groups and Migration Experiences of Household Head	222
4.12	Relationship to Household Head Reported in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Age Groups and Migration Experiences of Household Head	224
4.13	Civil Status of the Population 15 Years Old and Over in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head	226
4.14	Level of Education of the Population between Ages 5 and 19 in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head	228
4.15	Level of Education of the Population 20 Years Old and Over in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head	229
4.16	Occupation of the Population 15 Years Old and Over in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head	231
4.17	Contribution to Household Expenditures of the Population 15 Years Old and Over in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head	233
4.18	Department of Birth of Population Residing in Voluntary and Forced Migrant Households in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá	234
4.19	Characteristics of Internally Displaced Households by Gender of Household Head (2002)	242

4.20	Age-Standardised Distribution of the Population Residing in Soacha by Migration Experiences and Socio-Demographic Characteristics	251
4.21	Age-Standardised Distribution of the Household Heads Residing in Soacha by Migration Experiences and Socio-Demographic Characteristics	254
4.22	Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Included in Binomial Logistic Regression Model	260
4.23	Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed One Week before Census Collection in Soacha (2003)	262
5.1	Percentage Distribution of Dwelling Characteristics before and after Displacement in the Metropolitan Area of Bogotá (1999 and 2002)	277
5.2	Percentage Distribution of Dwelling Characteristics and Access to Public Services in Bogotá by Localities (2002)	279
5.3	Aggregate Indicators of Poverty and Income Distribution for Households in Bogotá by Localities (2002)	280
5.4	Percentage Distribution of Selected Household Characteristics in the Place of Longest Residence by Migrant Groups	283
5.5	Variables Loading on Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 According to Rotated Factor Pattern, Four Factor Solution on Household Characteristics in Bogotá (2002)	286
5.6	Correlation Matrix of Factors and Migrant Classifications for the Place of Longest Residence	287
5.7	Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Included in Tobit Regression Models for the Place of Longest Residence	289
5.8	Coefficient Estimates of Tobit Regression on Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the Place of Longest Residence	291
5.9	Coefficient Estimates of Tobit Regression on Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the Place of Longest Residence: Controlling for Years Spent in Residence	292
5.10	T-Test for Pair Wise Differences in Household Characteristics between the Place of Longest Residence and the Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002	294
5.11	Percentage Distribution of Selected Household Characteristics in Bogotá at the End of 2002	299
5.12	Correlation Matrix of Factors and Migrant Classifications in Bogotá at the End of 2002	302
5.13	Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Included in Tobit Regression Models for the Place of Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002	303

5.14	Coefficient Estimates of Tobit Regression on Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the Place of Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002	306
5.15	Coefficient Estimates of Tobit Regression on Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the Place of Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002: Controlling for Years Spent in Residence	307
5.16	Number of Forced Migrants Hosted in Department Capitals (and Municipalities)	319
5.17	Characteristics of Household Head and Spouse One Year before the First Migration by Migration Experiences	326
5.18	Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in Agriculture or Outside the Labour Force One Year before the First Migration	327
5.19	Characteristics of Household Head and Spouse in Bogotá at the End of 2002 by Migration Experiences	328
5.20	Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being in the Labour Force, Employed in the Construction Sector or Employed in Personal Services in Bogotá at the End of 2002	331
5.21	Characteristics of Household Head and Spouse in Bogotá at the End of 2002 by Cohorts of Arrival at Bogotá	332
5.22	Descriptive Statistics of Household Head and Spouse for Years Living Outside Bogotá in a Given Year	335
5.23	Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in One of Nine Groups of Occupations for Household Head and Spouse Living Outside Bogotá in a Given Year	336
5.24	Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in the Informal Sector for Household Head and Spouse Living Outside Bogotá in a Given Year	341
5.25	Descriptive Statistics of Household Head and Spouse for Years Living in Bogotá in a Given Year	342
5.26	Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in One of Nine Groups of Occupations for Household Head and Spouse Living in Bogotá in a Given Year	344
5.27	Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in the Informal Sector for Household Head and Spouse Living in Bogotá in a Given Year	348

INTRODUCTION

During the 1990s, violent crime became a major concern in Latin America. Every year there were more than 140,000 reported homicides in the region. In addition, a great number of victims were assaulted, violently robbed and kidnapped.¹ Many of these crimes were unreported by the victims, and went unnoticed by the authorities. This complicated the implementation of criminal justice policies by local authorities and law enforcement agencies.

Violent crime also had important consequences for local communities. Because of the violence imposed upon the victims and their families, people who were related to them and shared similar experiences often identified with the victims, and subsequently feared the possibility of being victimised themselves. This was particularly the case of 'invisible crime', such as kidnapping and extortion, where the levels of psychological violence were often more detrimental for victims than the actual physical violence inflicted upon them. Few governments recognised that violent crime affected both the victims and their relatives who had to deal with ransom payments and psychological pressures from criminals, investigators and law enforcement authorities. In some cases, this pressure was also increased by harassment from the mass media.

Throughout Latin America, there was a common perception that violent crime increased during the 1990s, and that governments did not do enough to improve the situation. An international survey published in the *Barómetro Iberoamericano* in 2001 suggested that most citizens believed that their governments did not respond efficiently to the problem of crime and insecurity. Nearly 27 percent of the population thought that policies implemented by municipal government were *poor*, while another 18 percent described them as being *very poor*. Only 19 percent of the people in the survey found that crime has been fought *well* by their government.

¹ M. Rubio, 'Los costos de la violencia en América Latina: una crítica al enfoque económico en boga,' Paper presented at the Conference on 'Foro sobre convivencia y seguridad ciudadana en el Istmo Centroamericano, Haití y República Dominicana,' (San Salvador, 1998): p. 9 and M. Cohen and M. Rubio, 'Violence and crime in Latin America,' Paper prepared for Consulta de San José 2007 (San José, 2007): p. 2

Peru and Mexico had the highest percentages of people answering that the governmental strategy to improve public security had been good or very good: 45 and 41 percent respectively. In Colombia, only 19 percent found that the governmental security strategies were good. Brazil and Argentina had the lowest percentages, with only 4 and 8 percent of people considering the strategies to be good. Throughout Latin America, only 1 out of 5 people believed that their governments were doing a good job in the fight against crime.² This was especially true at the urban level. Surveys carried out in several countries in the region indicated that citizens living in the largest cities often felt more unsafe than those in small cities. These answers seemed to be common throughout Latin America where people often admitted that they adopted patterns of risk-avoiding behaviour to compensate for lack of security and to minimise the possible chances of victimisation.³

The implications of these social dynamics were immense. Violent crime became a cause, not only of more violence, but also of poverty, unemployment, displacement and the destruction of political, human, economic and social resources.⁴ The costs measured in losses of human lives, lost property, and even productivity, were immense and affected the social and economic development of the region.⁵ As a result, citizens increasingly requested that their governments prioritised the fight against violent crime.

² This survey was published in the *Barómetro Iberoamericano*, one of the few sources that undertook periodical reviews addressing the main issues of public concern on a comparative and regional basis. Although the *Barómetro* was useful to draw cross-regional comparisons on the main political issues, the figures presented there had to be handled with care. The number of people interviewed in each country was not always the same, and the illustrate number of respondents varied from city to city. In Peru and Mexico, people were interviewed only in the capital city. In Colombia and Argentina, much more extensive surveys were carried out in the major cities, and larger population samples were interviewed. See Consorcio Iberoamericano de Empresas de Investigación de Mercadeo y Asesoramiento (CIMA), *Barómetro Iberoamericano: informe de opinión de Latinoamérica y de la Península Ibérica 2001* (Bogotá, 2001): p. 7. Data on sampling found in pp. 52-53.

³ For example, 49 percent of Mexicans declared that they felt unsafe to walk out at night, and this figure reached 62 percent for Mexico City. See Inter-American Development Bank, 'Análisis de la magnitud y costos de la violencia en la Ciudad de México,' Working Paper No. 331 (Washington, DC, 1998): p. 6.

⁴ A. Solimano (ed.), *Colombia: essays on conflict, peace, and development* (Washington, DC, 2001); D. Lederman, N. Loayza, and P. Fajnzylber, *Crimen y violencia en América Latina* (Bogotá, 2001); and C.T. Call, 'Sustainable development in Central America: the challenges of violence, injustice, and insecurity,' CA 2020: Working Paper No. 8 (Hamburg, 2000): p. 1.

⁵ See J.L. Londoño, 'Violencia, psichis y capital social,' Paper presented at the Second Latin American Conference on Economic Development (Bogotá, 1996); C. Moser, 'Urban poverty and violence: consolidation or erosion of social capital?,' Paper presented at the Second Latin American Conference on Economic Development (Bogotá, 1996); R.L. Ayres, *Crime and violence as development issues in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington, DC, 1998); M. Buvinic, A. Morrison and M. Shifter, 'Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: a framework for action,' Inter-American Development Bank Technical Study (Washington, DC, 1999); and J.L. Londoño and R. Guerrero, 'Violencia en América Latina: epidemiología y costos,' Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper No. 375 (Washington, DC, 1999).

This topic often came to the forefront during local election campaigns: corruption and crime appeared among the top preoccupations of the population, together with education and unemployment. Opposition parties and pressure groups frequently referred to levels of crime as evidence of the inefficiency of the government in office.

Effective measures to reduce violent crime were often short-sighted, and did not solve many of the most urgent problems.⁶ Resources were frequently spent upon the implementation of new strategies rather than in the improvement of existing criminal justice policies. Prisons were usually overcrowded and installations were archaic.⁷ Existing legislative tools often aimed to keep inmates for longer periods of time in jails than to deter potential offenders. The punishment of criminals was usually perceived to be a useful measure to deter future crimes. Rehabilitation programmes for repeat offenders were almost non-existent. The judiciary faced enormous backlogs, and impunity was widespread. As a result, law enforcement agencies were often perceived to be inefficient and corrupt. To improve them, governments throughout the region tried to reform and modernise them. However, most members of the police and of the judiciary continued to be poorly trained and had too many responsibilities.⁸ In most cases, criminal justice policies were based on reactive rather than preventive approaches to crime, and most governments showed no interest in funding projects in the long term.

These multiple problems made difficult the implementation of effective solutions to curb violent crime, and did not alleviate the fears of the population. In most cases, citizens kept a sceptical and distrustful view of their authorities. Because law enforcement agencies were poorly regarded, they could rarely count on the support of the population. This scepticism was visible in the low perceptions that citizens had of their governments and their citizen security strategies. In some cases, like Venezuela,

⁶ M. Buvinic and A.R. Morrison, 'Controlling violence,' Social Development Division, Inter-American Development Bank Technical Note No. 6 (Washington, DC, 1999): p. 5.

⁷ For example, in Colombia the 167 existing prisons in 2000 sheltered approximately 40,000 inmates, but had the capacity for only 28,000. See E.M. Restrepo, *The Colombian criminal justice in crisis: fear and distrust* (Basingstoke, 2003): p. 44.

⁸ R. Neild, 'The role of the police in violence prevention,' Social Development Division, Inter-American Development Bank Technical Note No. 9 (Washington, DC, 1999): pp. 12-13.

The Woodrow Wilson International Centre's Latin American Programme has been engaged in study of citizen security for several years. In 2003, the Centre published *Crime and violence in Latin America: citizen security, democracy, and the state*, while in 2006 they produced *Toward a society under law: citizens and their police in Latin America*. Both offer a valuable study on the issue of police and judicial reform in Latin America; see H. Frühling and J.S. Tulchin (eds.) with H.A. Golding, *Crime and violence in Latin America: citizen security, democracy, and the state* (Washington, DC, 2003) and J.S. Tulchin and M. Ruthenburg (eds.), *Toward a society under law: citizens and their police in Latin America* (Washington, DC, 2006).

the authorities lost almost all the legitimacy to guarantee the rule of law among some sectors of the population.⁹

Although these aspects were visible throughout Latin America, the country where these problems were most pronounced was Colombia. Violence had been considered an endemic feature of Colombian history. Between the 1950s and 1970s, the estimated rate of homicide in Colombia was 30 per 100,000 inhabitants, the highest in Latin America. Early in the 1980s the homicide rates took off, and by the beginning the 1990s had tripled over the levels of 1950-1980. During the 1990s, violence spread to all levels of society, involving a conjunction of political violence perpetrated by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the state; drug-related violence steeped in terrorism, vendettas and mercenaries; and diverse kinds of so-called ordinary criminality. The annual number of homicides during the 1990s varied between 25,000 and 30,000, representing a national rate of 80 per 100,000 inhabitants, one of the highest rates in the world.¹⁰

An analysis of political conflict in Colombia is essential to understand why violence affected such a high proportion of the population and spread throughout the country.¹¹ Three historical developments were associated with cycles of violence in

⁹ M. Aguilera Peña, 'Guerra, insurgencia y prácticas judiciales,' in G. Sánchez and E. Lair (eds.), *Violencias y estrategias colectivas en la región andina: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú y Venezuela* (Bogotá, 2004): pp. 198-200.

¹⁰ F. Cubides, A.C. Olaya and C.M. Ortiz, *La violencia y el municipio colombiano: 1980-1997* (Bogotá, 1998): pp. 285-286.

¹¹ For general histories of Colombia, see D. Bushnell, *The making of modern Colombia: a nation in spite of itself* (Berkeley, CA, 1993); F. Safford and M. Palacios, *Colombia: fragmented land, divided society* (Oxford, 2002); M. Palacios, *Between legitimacy and violence: a history of Colombia, 1875-2002* (Durham, NC, 2006); M. Deas, 'Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, c. 1880-1930,' in L. Bethell (ed.), *The Cambridge history of Latin America*, volume 5 (Cambridge, England, 1986); and C. Abel and M. Palacios, 'Colombia, 1930-1958' and 'Colombia since 1958' both in *The Cambridge history of Latin America*, volume 8 (Cambridge, England, 1986). For a panoramic introduction of Colombian history, see J. Pearce, *Colombia: inside the labyrinth* (London, 1990).

Important works on crime and violence in Colombia include G. Guzmán, O. Fals Borda and E. Umaña, *La violencia en Colombia: estudio de un proceso social*, volumes 1 and 2 (Bogotá, 1962-1964); Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, *Colombia: violencia y democracia* (Bogotá, 1987); D. Pécaut, *Orden y violencia: Colombia 1930-1954*, 2 volumes (Bogotá, 1987); G. Sánchez, *Guerra y política en la sociedad Colombiana* (Bogotá, 1991); M. Jimeno and I. Roldán [et al.], *Las sombras arbitrarias: violencia y autoridad en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1996); E. Pizarro Leongómez, *Insurgencia sin revolución: la guerrilla en Colombia en una perspectiva comparada* (Bogotá, 1996); F. Cubides, A.C. Olaya and C.M. Ortiz, *La violencia y el municipio colombiano: 1980-1997* (Bogotá, 1998); A. Rangel, *Colombia: guerra en el fin de siglo* (Bogotá, 1998); M. Rubio, *Crimen e impunidad: precisiones sobre la violencia* (Bogotá, 1999); M.V. Llorente and M. Deas (eds.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz* (Bogotá, 1999); Á. Camacho and F. Leal Buitrago (eds.), *Armar la paz es desarmar la guerra* (Bogotá, 2000); D. Pécaut, *Guerra contra la sociedad* (Bogotá, 2001); D. Pécaut, *Crónica de cuatro décadas de política colombiana* (Bogotá, 2006); C. Echandía, *Dos décadas de escalamiento del conflicto armado en Colombia 1986-2006* (Bogotá, 2006); F. Leal Buitrago, *La inseguridad de la seguridad: Colombia 1958-2005* (Bogotá, 2006); F. Sánchez, *Las cuentas de la violencia: ensayos económicos sobre el conflicto y el crimen en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2007); I. Beltrán and E. Salcedo-Albarán, *El crimen como oficio: ensayos sobre economía del crimen en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2007); and G. Sánchez and R. Peñaranda (eds.), *Pasado y presente de la*

Colombia: conflicts for political power between the Liberals and the Conservatives, the emergence of guerrilla groups during the Cold War, and the rise of drug cartels and the domination of certain regions by coca cultivation and cocaine processing and trafficking. Frank Safford and Marco Palacios identified four periods of violence in the second half of the twentieth century.¹² The first was the violence of partisanship (1945-1953). This

violencia en Colombia, 3rd ed. (Medellín, 2007). In English see P. Oquist, *Violence, conflict, and politics in Colombia* (New York, 1980); C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda and G. Sánchez (eds.), *Violence in Colombia: the contemporary crisis in historical perspective* (Wilmington, DE, 1992); M. Deas, 'Violent exchanges: reflections on political violence in Colombia,' in D.E. Apter (ed.), *The legitimisation of violence* (New York, 1997); D. Pécaut, 'From the banality of violence to real terror: the case of Colombia,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Societies of fear: the legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America* (London, 1999); A. Solimano (ed.), *Colombia: essays on conflict, peace, and development* (Washington, DC, 2000); C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda and G. Sánchez (eds.), *Violence in Colombia: waging war and negotiating peace* (Wilmington, DE, 2001); G. Sánchez and D. Meertens, *Bandits, peasants, and politics: the case of 'La Violencia' in Colombia* (Austin, TX, 2001); N. Richani, *Systems of violence: the political economy of war and peace in Colombia* (Albany, NY, 2002); H. Braun, *Our guerrillas, our sidewalks: a journey into the violence of Colombia*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD, 2003); M. Baud and D. Meertens (eds.), *Colombia from the inside: perspectives on drugs, war and peace* (Amsterdam, 2004); S. Dudley, *Walking ghosts: murder and guerrilla politics in Colombia* (New York and London, 2004); C. Rojas and J. Meltzer (eds.), *Elusive peace: international, national, and local dimensions of conflict in Colombia* (New York and Basingstoke, England, 2005); W. Tate, *Counting the dead: the culture and politics of human rights activism in Colombia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2007); C. Welna and G. Gallón (eds.), *Peace, democracy, and human rights in Colombia* (Notre Dame, IN, 2007); and V.M. Bouvier (ed.), *Colombia: building peace in a time of war* (Washington, DC, 2009).

Some suggestive studies of urban protest and violence in Colombia are R. Janssen, 'Class practices of dwellers in barrios populares: the struggle for the right to the city,' *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 2 (1978): pp. 147-159; R.M. Melman, 'Populist mass mobilisation in Latin America: ANAPO,' Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (New York, 1978); J. Carrillo Bedoya, *Los paros cívicos en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1981); M. Medina, *La protesta urbana en Colombia en el siglo XX* (Bogotá, 1984); A. Cabrera [et al.], *Los movimientos cívicos* (Bogotá, 1986); E.A. Greco, 'Unionised professionals in Latin America: a Colombian case study,' Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Boston, MA, 1987); Á. Camacho and A. Guzmán, *Colombia: ciudad y violencia* (Bogotá, 1990); G. Segovia Mora, *La violencia en Santafé de Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1994); A.M. Jaramillo, *Milicias populares en Medellín: entre la guerra y la paz* (Medellín, 1994); A. Salcedo, *Violencia y miedo en el centro de la ciudad de Santafé de Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1995); F. Gutiérrez, *La ciudad representada: política y conflicto en Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1998); A.M. Jaramillo, R. Ceballos and M.I. Villa, *En la encrucijada: conflicto y cultura política en el Medellín de los noventa* (Medellín, 1998); G. Martin, 'Crime and violence in Cali (Colombia): a diagnosis and policy propositions,' mimeo (Washington, DC, 2000); C. Moser and C. McIlwaine, *Urban poor perceptions of violence and exclusion in Colombia* (Washington, DC, 2000); C. Moser and C. McIlwaine, *Encounters with violence in Latin America: urban poor perceptions from Colombia and Guatemala* (New York and London, 2004); G. Martin and M. Ceballos, *Bogotá: anatomía de una transformación: políticas de seguridad ciudadana, 1995-2003* (Bogotá, 2004); F. Gutiérrez and A.M. Jaramillo, 'Crime, (counter) insurgency and the privatisation of security: the case of Medellín, Colombia,' *Environment and Urbanisation*, vol. 16, no. 2 (2004): pp. 17-30; P. Casas Dupuy [et al.], *Seguridad urbana y policía en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2005); Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz, *Ciudadanía y conflicto: encuesta de percepciones desde la cotidianidad* (Bogotá, 2007); R. Rozema, 'Medellín,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Fractured cities: social exclusion, urban violence and contested spaces in Latin America* (London, 2007); T. Cordeweners, 'Violence in Bogotá, Colombia: a rich man's problem?,' Unpublished master thesis (Utrecht, 2008); Á.M. Robledo and P. Rodríguez, *Emergencia del sujeto excluido: aproximación genealógica a la no-ciudad en Bogotá* (Bogotá, 2008); and F. Gutiérrez [et al.], 'Politics and security in three Colombian cities,' Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, Working Paper No. 27 (London, 2009). See also the evocative testimonies contained in A. Salazar, *Born to die in Medellín* (London, 1990) and A. Salazar and A.M. Jaramillo, *Medellín: las subculturas del narcotráfico* (Bogotá, 1992).

¹² F. Safford and M. Palacios, *Colombia: fragmented land, divided society*, pp. 346-347.

period opened with the electoral campaign of 1945 and ended in 1953 when the military government of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla launched a programme of pacification.

The violence first erupted following the presidential election of 1946, which pitted the country's two traditional parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, against each other. The Liberals divided and ran two candidates; Gabriel Turbay (the official party nominee), and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán (the populist leader) which permitted the Conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Pérez, to win, ending a sixteen-year period of Liberal hegemony. A bogotano, Gaitán was selected as mayor of the city in June 1936 and later served in the Cabinet twice. Gaitán's populist movement was based on the urban growth and inflation of 1940s. He exploited the effects of urban inflation, condemned those who became wealthy by hoarding food in time of scarcity, and attacked the ostentatious consumption of the rich. He had a substantial following among the popular masses, urban and rural, as well as elements of the middle classes, but lacked significant support from industrialists.¹³ His populist movement, especially influential in Bogotá, was cut off by his assassination on 9 April 1948, which triggered one of the most destructive and bloody riots in Latin American history.¹⁴ An unsuccessful attempt to form a bipartisan government fuelled violence across the Colombian highlands, which caused Ospina to declare a state of siege in November 1949. During the violence which ensued probably more than 200,000 people were killed over a decade.¹⁵ Between 1950 and 1953 '*La Violencia*' intensified in the countryside, and left-wing guerrillas confronted partisan Conservative police in some regions. Rojas Pinilla seized power in 1953 and offered an amnesty to guerrillas, which ended the first stage of violence.

The second period went from 1954 to 1960 and was characterised by Safford and Palacios as a period of 'mafia' violence, when economic gain instead of political power played the predominant role. Violence was notable in the coffee region because increasing revenues in coffee and cattle ranching caused agrarian conflicts that alarmed

¹³ For more details on Gaitán's populist movement, see J. Green, *Gaitanismo, left liberalism, and popular mobilisation in Colombia* (Gainesville, FL, 2003).

¹⁴ Important studies of violence in Bogotá following the assassination of Gaitán include G. Sánchez, *Los días de la revolución: Gaitanismo y el 9 de abril en provincia* (Bogotá, 1983); A. Alape, *El Bogotazo: memorias del olvido* (Bogotá, 1983); and H. Braun, *The assassination of Gaitán: public life and urban violence in Colombia* (Madison, WI, 1985). See also R. Sánchez-Ángel, 'Gaitanismo y nueve de abril,' *Pap. Polít. Bogotá (Colombia)*, vol. 13, no. 1 (2008): pp. 13-49.

¹⁵ For recent analyses of *La Violencia* outside Bogotá, see G. Sánchez and D. Meertens, *Bandits, peasants, and politics: the case of 'La Violencia' in Colombia*, and M. Roldán, *Blood and fire: la violencia in Antioquia, 1946-1953* (Durham, NC, 2003).

city businessmen because they imperilled economic growth.¹⁶ Due to the fragility of property rights and partisan violence in a rural setting characterised by the absence of the rule of law, political bosses supported by local armed groups used various modes of extortion to manipulate farmers into selling their land and migrating to Bogotá.

Rojas' coup in 1953 received general support from the Liberals, the chief interest group associations as well as the Catholic Church. Inspired in part by Peronism, Rojas tried to organise his own populist political movement, the *Movimiento de Acción Nacional*, with its own urban union federation. Both traditional parties saw this development as a threat. During 1955 and 1956 economic and political elites began to turn against Rojas, in particular his gestures toward a populist movement in the Gaitán vein, which were encouraged by radical and socialist advisers from Bogotá. But these moves, which seldom went beyond propaganda, failed. Opposition from the Catholic Church and student demonstrations in Bogotá and in other major cities, which were dispersed with some violence, were accompanied by an economic crisis and a confrontation with the World Bank, which suspended credits to Colombia. Rojas resigned in 1957.¹⁷

In 1958 the two parties negotiated a power-sharing agreement known as the National Front (1958-1974), which effectively put an end to what some analysts considered a partisan civil war.¹⁸ Although the National Front coalition settled most of the disagreements between the Liberals and the Conservatives, it also sowed discontent among those excluded from political participation because they did not belong to the two main parties.

During the third period (1961-1989) revolutionary guerrillas appeared and armed conflict led by guerrilla organisations emerged. During the second period, violence had been confined to the local level, but the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC), the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN), the *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (EPL), the *Movimiento Armando Quintín Lame* and the *Movimiento 19 de Abril* (M-19) emerged with the aim of transforming the social order. The *Unión Patriótica* (UP) was created as a coalition of non-violent urban socialists, *agraristas* and former members of the FARC, aiming to achieve peace through political participation.

¹⁶ For violence in one coffee region, see C.M. Ortiz, *Estado y subversión en Colombia: la violencia en el Quindío años 50* (Bogotá, 1985).

¹⁷ See more details of an urban protest in Bogotá against Rojas in M. Medina, *La protesta urbana en Colombia en el siglo XX*, pp. 85-122.

¹⁸ For an analysis of the National Front, see J. Hartlyn, *The politics of coalition rule in Colombia* (Cambridge, England, 1988).

Many UP leaders and candidates were, however, assassinated, as narco-traffickers entered cattle ranching and acquired influence in frontier zones previously under FARC control.¹⁹ Confronted by drug-lords, paramilitaries, police and the military, the guerrilla groups retreated in 1987, leaving the rural civilian population exposed. By 1989 only the FARC and ELN remained as active guerrilla groups. All others had truced or reached agreements with the government.

Before its demobilisation and integration into the political process in 1990, the M-19 had been one of Colombian main guerrilla groups. It was formed in response to alleged electoral fraud in 1970, in which the opposition *Alianza Nacional Popular* (ANAPO) had its victory 'stolen'.²⁰ Unlike the other guerrilla groups, the roots of the M-19 were urban, and it was initially influenced by the urban focus of the Montoneros in Argentina and the Tupamaros in Uruguay. It committed many high-profile symbolic acts, like stealing Simón Bolívar's sword from a Bogotá museum in 1974, a successful raid on a weapons depot in 1979 and the seizure of the Dominican embassy in Bogotá in 1980. These incidents raised tensions with the armed forces, which demanded that President Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-1982) allowed military trials of civilians.²¹ The most infamous of the M-19 assaults was the seizure of the Palace of Justice in Bogotá in November 1985, when the entire Supreme Court was held hostage. Eventually, the building was stormed by the military, resulting in the deaths of most of the M-19 leadership and half of the judges. In 1989 the remaining M-19 leaders signed an agreement with President Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986-1990) to abandon the armed struggle and form a political party *Alianza Democrática M-19* (AD/M-19).

In the 1970s inflation exceeded 20 percent per annum, eroding the real wages, and prompting unionised urban workers and middle-class groups like doctors, school teachers and bank employees to participate actively in civic strikes (*paro cívico*) and protests in many cities including Bogotá.²² The numbers of civic strikes rose from 16 between 1958 and 1970 to 72 between 1971 and September 1977, and reached a peak of 50 in 8 months (September 1977 – May 1978).²³ In 1976, as a consequence of the

¹⁹ Steven Dudley chronicles the origins of the UP and its destruction by the early 1990s at the hands of paramilitary groups backed by elements of Colombia's official security forces. He narrates this political genocide through the lives of a few 'walking ghosts'-UP survivors who live fatalistically in anticipation of their violent deaths. See. S. Dudley, *Walking ghosts: murder and guerrilla politics in Colombia*.

²⁰ M. Palacios, *Between legitimacy and violence*, pp. 188-189.

²¹ F. Safford and M. Palacios, *Colombia: fragmented land, divided society*, pp. 359-360.

²² C. Abel and M. Palacios, 'Colombia since 1958,' pp. 638-639. For details of urban unrests outside Bogotá, see A. Cabrera [et al.], *Los movimientos cívicos*.

²³ J. Carrillo Bedoya, *Los paros cívicos en Colombia*, p. 14.

financial crisis of the Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales (ICSS) and the mismanaged efforts of the Afonso López Michelsen administration (1974-1978) to reform the Institute, there was a 52-day strike by doctors and medical workers in Bogotá.²⁴ López Michelsen declared the action illegal, which increasingly angered militant demonstrators.²⁵ In the 1980s, urban popular mobilisations declined as the economic position improved and oppressive state legislation was applied. The weakness of the urban working class and its isolation and lack of coordination reinforced this trend.²⁶

The final period from 1990 to 2002 was characterised by rising homicide and unemployment rates in the city and countryside. Increments in indicators of violence were attributed to drug trafficking and organised crime. Economic difficulties during these years were in part caused by fiscal imbalances and a declining manufacturing sector in Bogotá, Medellín and Cali. The increase in guerrilla members from 500 combatants in 1960 to 12,000 in the mid 1990s facilitated the geographic spread of the conflict to areas strategic to the economy and national security, including the most important urban centres, where at times the guerrillas were able to intimidate authorities in the 'localidades' and influence the use of official resources. The memory of the conflict and destruction caused by the bogotazo remained powerful in the 1990s. The main thrust of violence was usually rural, but it had significant ramifications in all the major and intermediate cities, including Bogotá. In particular, shortages of foodstuffs raised prices in Bogotá and contributed to labour strikes and urban protest. As the FARC and paramilitary groups were increasingly involved in the cultivation of illicit crops and export of narcotics, so government spending was diverted from social programmes in both urban and rural areas to the military and to campaigns of crop eradication. Meanwhile, the ELN destroyed oil pipelines and other infrastructure disrupting the urban economy. Since their illegal business was very lucrative the guerrillas and paramilitaries became 'prosperous military enterprises' peopled by paid combatants and invested part of their profit in real estate in the cities.²⁷

²⁴ See more details in E.A. Greco, 'Unionised professionals in Latin America: a Colombian case study'.

²⁵ C. Abel and M. Palacios, 'Colombia since 1958,' p. 664.

²⁶ J. Pearce, *Colombia: inside the labyrinth*, p. 120.

²⁷ See C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda and G. Sánchez (eds.), *Violence in Colombia: waging war and negotiating peace*; M. Baud and D. Meertens (eds.), *Colombia from the inside*; C. Echandía, *Dos décadas de escalamiento del conflicto armado en Colombia*; F. Leal Buitrago, *La inseguridad de la seguridad*; and F. Sánchez, *Las cuentas de la violencia*.

Bogotá was founded in 1538 by Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada and received its Royal Charter from Madrid in the following year. Originally called Bacatá by the indigenous Muisca inhabitants, it was successively renamed Nuestra Señora de la Esperanza, Santa Fe and, with the establishment of the 1991 Constitution, Santa Fe de Bogotá. Commonly known simply as Bogotá, this became its official name once more during the administration of Mayor Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000).²⁸ Bogotá is located 2,640 meters (8,500 feet) above sea level, in the highest plateau of the Colombian Andes. The city covers an area of 1,737 km² (173,000 ha). Its population had grown from 350,000 inhabitants in 1938 to an estimated 6,520,473 inhabitants at the end of 2002, accounted for 15.78 percent of the estimated total population in Colombia.²⁹ The population density of Bogotá increased from 930 inhabitants per km² in the 1950s to 3,717 inhabitants per km² in 2002.³⁰ Between 1993 and 2002, the localities of Bosa and Ciudad Bolívar, located in the southwestern area of the city, recorded the highest numbers of annual population growth rate, 8.90 percent and 3.64 percent respectively (see **Table A**). Both localities were among localities recorded a highest concentration of internally displaced persons in 2002 (see **Table 4.5**). The area of the city also expanded. The neighbouring municipalities started to register high rates of population growth, growing at a faster pace than Bogotá itself. For example, the municipality of Soacha registered an annual rate of growth of between 8 percent and 9 percent during 1973 and 1995.³¹ Lacking a serious agrarian reform in rural areas and regular outbreaks of rural violence caused the massive influx of rural immigrations to the cities, especially Bogotá.³²

²⁸ D. Bushnell, *The making of modern Colombia: a nation in spite of itself*, pp. 5-11.

²⁹ Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), *Colombia, proyecciones departamentales de población por sexo y edad, 1985-2020* (Bogotá, 2008). The estimated total population for Colombia in 2002 was 41,327,459.

³⁰ D. Hidalgo Guerrero, 'Contributions of TransMilenio to the development of bus rapid transit systems,' mimeo (Bogotá, 2003): p. 1.

³¹ F. Dureau and C.E. Flórez, 'Dinámicas demográficas colombianas: de lo nacional a lo local,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 96-01 (Bogotá, 1996): p. 17 and J.D. Dávila, 'La transformación de Bogotá,' in F. Cepeda Ulloa (ed.), *Fortalezas de Colombia* (Bogotá, 2005).

³² A. Gilbert and J.D. Dávila, 'Bogotá: progress within a hostile environment,' in D.J. Myers and H.A. Dietz (eds.), *Capital city politics in Latin America: democratisation and empowerment* (Boulder, CO, 2003): p. 29.

Table A: Average Annual Population Growth Rate in Bogotá by Localities (1973-2002)

Locality	1973-1985	1985-1993	1993-2002
Usaquén	9.23	5.97	2.35
Chapinero	1.66	1.37	1.00
Santafé	0.18	-1.50	1.63
San Cristóbal	5.56	2.99	1.05
Usme	27.08	2.47	2.30
Tunjuelito	-5.50	10.93	0.98
Bosa	13.64	7.05	8.90
Kennedy	8.78	3.76	1.69
Fontibón	5.12	2.40	3.44
Engativá	4.23	2.94	1.71
Suba	10.28	6.54	3.55
Barrios Unidos	-0.88	-1.54	0.12
Teusaquillo	0.34	-0.62	2.12
Los Mártires	-0.97	-2.18	0.63
Antonio Nariño	-0.37	-1.54	0.57
Puente Aranda	2.66	-0.96	0.22
La Candelaria	-1.04	-1.50	-0.21
Rafael Uribe	0.86	3.65	1.09
Ciudad Bolívar	18.49	3.12	3.64
Total City	4.46	3.05	2.32

Sources: DANE, *Censos nacionales de población 1985, 1993*, and *Encuesta de calidad de vida 2002* (Bogotá, 2003)


One of the most dramatic social consequences of the armed conflict among guerrillas, paramilitaries and the state during the 1990s was the forced internal migration of about two million people who fled, mostly in a scattered manner, from the countryside to urban areas: towns, cities, and, indeed, Bogotá.³³ Escalation of crimes against the civil population was a low-cost and effective strategy for clearing territories of their critics, which allowed illegal armed groups to strengthen their control, transport weapons and develop illegal activities with ease.³⁴ Violence and displacement were strongly linked. War strategies adopted by illegal armed groups like death threats, massacres, forced recruitments, brief seizures of towns and selected homicides compelled the civil population to flee from small towns and villages. Luis Alberto Restrepo argued that:

³³ Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, *Atención a desplazados: experiencias institucionales en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2001): p. 22. For scholarly discussion of rural-urban migration see B.R. Roberts, *Cities of peasants: the political economy urbanisation in Third World* (London, 1978) and B.R. Roberts, *The making of citizens: cities of peasants revisited* (1995).

³⁴ Red de Solidaridad Social, *Informe al Congreso de la República: Presidencia de la República Enero 2001- Febrero 2002* (Bogotá, 2002): pp. 16-18.

‘... the displaced persons arrive in the urban centres, which for them constitute unknown and hostile country. The cities, which are not prepared to receive so many new inhabitants, viewed them principally with distrust, as possible allies of one or another party in the conflict’.³⁵

Figure A: Displaced Households and Violence in Colombia (1997-2001)



Source: Red de Solidaridad Social, *Estadísticas para medios: cifras sobre desplazamiento forzado en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2003).

Figure A demonstrates a correlation between increments of political homicides and increases in the total number of displaced households between 1997 and 2001. In particular, the number of political homicides and displaced households soared significantly in 1999. Luis Eduardo Pérez found that nearly 80 percent of violations of human rights and 82 percent of armed confrontations occurred in expulsion sites.³⁶

³⁵ L.A. Restrepo, ‘Violence and fear in Colombia: fragmentation of space, contraction of time and forms of evasion,’ in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Armed actors: organised violence and state failure in Latin America* (London, 2004): p. 175.

³⁶ L.E. Pérez, ‘Desplazamiento forzado en Colombia 1995-1999: una aproximación empírica a las relaciones entre desplazamiento, conflicto armado y desarrollo,’ in Organización Internacional para las

The characteristics of displacement varied between and within departments, suggesting that regional characteristics partially determined the incidence of displacement: for example, illegal armed groups might want to control territories rich in natural resources. Particular characteristics of families would also trigger displacement as well. Some socio-demographic factors and the specific social context where the family resided might increase the likelihood of being victimised. On the other hand, some families were risk-averse and preferred to leave their towns in anticipation of violence. Social context dimensions such as risk and protective factors paired with victimisation were seemingly important determinants of displacement. The presence of illegal armed groups appeared to promote displacement. Violence, in particular death threats to family members, pushed households to seek refuge elsewhere. Indirect violence, such as massacres in nearby towns or the murder of a relative or friend were sources of displacement. Household characteristics could influence the likelihood of death threats, victimisation and displacement. Illegal armed groups were interested in appropriating land, so that small proprietors were especially inclined to flee their hometowns and villages. Families active in the community were more likely to be displaced than households that were not displaced. Illegal armed groups sought to destroy social cohesion in conflict zones by intimidating leaders and active members of the community.³⁷

The *Red de Solidaridad Social* argued that from the early 1990s mass displacements should be distinguished from individual and single-family displacements. After massacres in various towns, groups of households and families fled together in order to avoid victimisation by armed factions. Between January 2000 and December 2001, the number of individual and single-family displacements soared nationally by 414 percent, while mass displacements rose by 58 percent.³⁸

Migraciones (OIM) (ed.), *El desplazamiento forzado en Colombia: compromisos desde la universidad* (Bogotá, 2002).

³⁷ D. Meertens, 'Forced displacement in Colombia: public policy, gender and initiatives for reconstruction,' Paper prepared for Conference on 'African Migration in Comparative Perspective' on 4-7 June (Johannesburg, 2003): pp. 1-5.

³⁸ Red de Solidaridad Social, *Informe al Congreso de la República*, p. 24.

The causes of displacement in Colombia were difficult to identify. Immediate causes or triggers were often the last incident in a chain of events producing the final decision to flee. Nonetheless, the roots of displacement lay in the dynamics of the Colombian conflict.³⁹ Armed groups attacked the civil population to strengthen their territorial strongholds and expand from them, to weaken the support of their opponents, and to accumulate valuable assets especially fertile land. Consequently, illegal armed groups and their actions against civilians were mainly responsible for forced displacement. In 2001, paramilitaries instigated over one half of all forced migrations, while guerrillas and the simultaneous presence of two armed groups in one area were responsible for 20 and 22 percent of such migrations respectively.⁴⁰ Paramilitaries not only bore the bulk of the responsibility, they were also more effective in instigating displacement. During 2001, paramilitaries caused 599 displacement events, corresponding to 91,380 displaced persons, while guerrillas provoking similar number of events (570), forced 36,217 people to flee.⁴¹ The overwhelming majority, 97 percent of the victims of forced displacements in Bogotá interviewed by NGO and Catholic Church representatives in 1998, cited actual or feared violence as their reason for migration.⁴² What was clear from this survey was that the terror targeting population, which found its most visible expression in massacres and selective assassinations and other shocking human rights violations created a pervasive culture of fear that explained many cases of displacement.

Land conflicts and violent land appropriations were already in the late 1980s an underlying source of forced migration.⁴³ Displaced persons reported having lost 1.2 million hectares of land, twice the area of land distributed in agrarian reform programmes in Colombia between 1993 and 2002.⁴⁴ Programmes to eradicate illicit crops also produced displacement. The aerial fumigation of illicit crops destroyed farmers' assets, produced a temporary shock to their income, and, because it was

³⁹ Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana, *Derechos humanos: desplazados por violencia en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1995) and Arquidiócesis de Bogotá and CODHES, *Desplazados por violencia y conflicto social en Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1997).

⁴⁰ Red de Solidaridad Social, *Informe al Congreso de la República*, pp. 30-32.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁴² Arquidiócesis de Bogotá and CODHES, *Desplazados: huellas de nunca borrar, casos de Bogotá y Soacha* (Bogotá, 1999): p. 38.

⁴³ A. Reyes and A.M. Bejarano, 'Conflictos agrarios y luchas armadas en la Colombia contemporánea: una visión geográfica,' *Análisis Político*, no. 5 (1988): pp. 6-27.

⁴⁴ A.M. Ibáñez, A. Moya and A. Velásquez, 'Hacia una política proactiva para la población desplazada en Colombia,' mimeo (Washington, DC, 2006): p. 18.

generally applied in combat zones, exacerbated violence.⁴⁵ According to one academic 13,153 people were displaced from drug producing departments during 1999.⁴⁶ Families also migrated to avoid forced recruitment of their children by the illegal armed factions which recruited children as young as eight years.⁴⁷ After one engagement in October 2001, military forces found that 43 percent of dead and 41 percent of captured guerrillas were below 18 years old.⁴⁸

For most displaced people, return to their homes was not a realistic option, given the scale and intensity of conflict and the role of the civilian population as the main victim of armed actions. Not even the forced migrants themselves saw return as a viable life-project after displacement; in one survey only 13 percent indicated a preference to return. In 2001 there were some examples of return movements, accompanied by international monitoring. Nevertheless, official figures revealed the falling incidence of return migration: from 37 percent in 2000 of all forced migrants to a mere 11 percent (21,172 persons) in 2001. Rural settlement schemes seemed an even less viable option, since only 2,039 displaced persons opted for them.⁴⁹ Persistent violence, economic non-viability and poor selection of beneficiaries had frequently led to the dissolution of 'communal enterprises' for the resettled, and to a repetition of displacement, a very bitter experience for forced migrants who were left without the possibility of renewed government assistance. Thus integration into the cities constituted not only the dominant strategy for migrant households, but also the most realistic one.

Thesis Structure and Content

This thesis addresses topics of urban violence and forced internal migrants with special reference to the metropolitan area of Bogotá, Colombia between 1990 and 2002. While there is much scholarly debate by historians and political scientists about conflict between the state, guerrillas and paramilitaries in rural areas, and the problems of drug

⁴⁵ Programmes to eradicate illicit crops followed two strategies: (i) the aerial fumigation of illicit crops; (ii) manual and voluntary crop substitution. For further details of fumigation, see H. O'Shaughnessy and S. Branford, *Chemical warfare in Colombia: the costs of coca fumigation* (London, 2005).

⁴⁶ A.M. Puyana, 'Cultivos ilícitos, fumigación y desplazamiento en la Amazonía y la Orinoquía,' in F. Cubides and C. Domínguez (eds.), *Desplazados, migraciones internas y reestructuraciones territoriales* (Bogotá, 1999): p. 260.

⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, *You'll learn not to cry: child combatants in Colombia* (New York and London, 2003): p. 15.

⁴⁸ United States Committee for Refugees (USCR), *World refugee survey 2001* (Washington, DC, 2001).

⁴⁹ Grupo Temático de Desplazamiento (GTD), 'Estado de situación del desplazamiento: enero a diciembre de 2001,' mimeo (Bogotá, 2002): p. 52.

cartels and illegal drug production, urban violence has been relatively neglected. Violence caused many people to migrate from rural to urban areas, so that, Colombia had by 2002 more internally displaced persons than any country except Sudan. The main aims of the thesis are 1) to analyse trends in violent crime; 2) to discuss citizen security strategies that were pursued between 1990 and 2002; and 3) to examine the survival strategies of forced internal migrants in Bogotá comparing them to the strategies adopted by voluntary migrants and native residents.

Chapter 1 focuses on urban homicide and kidnapping. In Colombia, 40 percent of the 25,000 annual homicides were committed in the ten largest cities during the late 1990s. The cities of Bogotá, Medellín and Cali accounted for almost 30 percent of this total. Although the victims were mainly young men from the poorest socioeconomic levels, homicide did not necessarily occur in the areas where the poor lived. The probability of becoming involved in a homicide was significantly higher in locations where access to economic resources was greater. The problem of kidnapping is examined by analysing changes in Colombian anti-kidnapping legislation and its application by focusing on the authors, the victims and the risk-zones involved. Although these crimes affected mainly the rich and the middle class, kidnappers began in early 1990s to target victims from all social backgrounds. This practice created a climate of fear among citizens that allowed kidnappers to extort additional payments from people at risk.

Chapter 2 looks at the issue of perception and fear of violent crime. The concept of risk and the subjectivity of decision-making when facing insecurity are examined. If citizen security strategies had little impact during the years studied, low levels of co-operation and communication between victims, their families and neighbours were partly responsible. Thus an increasing perception of insecurity and distrust among citizens was evident.

Chapter 3 investigates citizen security strategies during the administrations of Presidents César Gaviria (1990-1994), Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). The reforms implemented since the 1991 Constitution was adopted had important impacts on security strategies by increasing discretionary powers for civilian authorities, especially at the municipal level. The city government of Bogotá implemented a series of successful programmes that reduced levels of violent crime, notably homicide. Other crimes, like kidnapping, did not decrease because government

agencies lacked a coherent strategy that combined peace negotiations with insurgent groups with an effective struggle against violent crime.

Chapter 4 develops an analysis of patterns of selectivity based on the notions of forced vis-à-vis voluntary migration and economic vis-à-vis non-economic migration. The importance of internal displacement worldwide and specifically in Colombia is investigated. Relative differentials in gender, socioeconomic conditions and occupational profiles are discussed. A research design collecting comparative data on households with diverse migration experiences residing in three locations within the metropolitan area is applied. The analysis of gender differentials and household composition reveals that, contrary to much of the literature, forced migrant households were more likely to have a male head and spouse than a female head. Similarly, contrary to scholarly orthodoxy, forced migrant females were less likely to find employment than males.

Chapter 5 explores the socioeconomic characteristics of forced migrants and compares them to voluntary migrants from outside and migrants who moved within Bogotá. The socioeconomic conditions of migrant groups, using five groups of variables: access to basic amenities, characteristics of housing and other dwellings, consumption of durable goods, access to and availability of health-care and education, and self-assessment of well-being are analysed. The data indicates that before migration, forced migrants were better off than voluntary migrants, and voluntary migrants had lower socioeconomic status between their places of origin and Bogotá. Comparing all four groups of migrants in Bogotá, forced migrants were the most vulnerable. Finally, differentials in occupation profiles between the places of origin, the places of transition and the final destinations of economic and forced migrants are evaluated. Much of the literature of reintegration and resettlement of forced migrants claimed that they had lower chances of success in Bogotá because of the low transferability of their agricultural skills and their lack of knowledge of the city. However, the labour trajectories of economic and forced migrants differed. These observed differences were not explained by their rural origins. Land tenure was a factor determining the probability of employment at origin. At destination, forced migrants were more likely to engage in income-generating activities related to their survival strategies. The observed relative differences in labour market performance indicated that forced migrants were more likely than economic migrants to be employed in the informal sector.

CHAPTER 1

Urban Homicide and Kidnapping

Urban Homicide

In the 1970s, one of the first hypotheses that tried to explain the increase of homicides stemmed from a structuralist approach. It suggested that homicide was a consequence of the poverty and the inequality that characterised Colombia. Violent crime was explained as a component of the struggle to redistribute resources and restructure social imbalances.¹ However, this idea was refuted when criminologists saw that the levels of violent crime were not necessarily correlated to poverty and underdevelopment. The most violent regions were often those within the highest potential for economic growth.² Gonzalo Sánchez demonstrated that areas rich in primary export goods became points of confrontation due to the importance of controlling these lucrative zones.³

At an international level, this conclusion was clear in countries like Chile or Argentina, where income gaps between rich and poor had rapidly increased without causing any significant changes in the levels of crime. Even cities like Santiago and Buenos Aires, renowned for their high levels of inequality, were not riddled by violent crime. There, criminality remained manageably low, even in periods of economic

¹ For a discussion of this issues, see C.C. LeGrand (2001), 'The Colombian crisis on historical perspective,' Online. Available HTTP: <http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu:7001/Events/conferences/Colombia/workingpapers/working_paper_legrand.doc>, accessed 31 January 2005 and G. Sánchez, 'The violence: an interpretative synthesis,' in C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda, and G. Sánchez (eds.), *Violence in Colombia: the contemporary crisis in historical perspective* (Wilmington, DE, 1992).

² For the debate about violence and poverty, see C. Moser, 'Urban poverty and violence: consolidation or erosion of social capital?,' Paper presented at the Second Latin American Conference on Economic Development (Bogotá, 1996); L. Thomas, 'Poverty and urban violence,' in Hamdi, N. and Handal, J. (eds.), *Urban futures: economic growth and poverty reduction* (London, 2005). For a relevant discussion of the debate as it pertains to Colombia, see J.F. Garrido, 'Guerra y pobreza en Colombia,' *Estudios Gerenciales*, no. 81 (2001): pp. 69-76.

For the debate about violence and inequality, see L. Sigelman and M. Simpson, 'Cross national test of linkage between economic inequality and political violence,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 21, no. 1 (1977): pp. 105-128; E. Muller, 'Income inequality, regime repressiveness, and political violence,' *American Sociological Review*, vol. 50, no. 1 (1985): pp. 47-61; E. Muller and M. Seligson, 'Inequality and insurgency,' *American Political Science Review*, vol. 81, no. 2 (1987): pp. 425-451; T. Boswell and W. Dixon, 'Dependency and rebellion: a cross-national analysis,' *American Sociology Review*, vol. 55, no. 4 (1990): pp. 540-559 and K. Schock, 'A conjunctural model of political conflict: the impact of political opportunities on the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflict,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 40, no. 1 (1996): pp. 98-133. For a relevant discussion of the debate as it applies to Colombia, see F. Gutiérrez, 'Crimen e impunidad: precisiones sobre la violencia,' *Revista de Estudios Sociales*, no. 3 (1999): pp. 133-136.

³ G. Sánchez, 'Colombia: violencias sin futuros,' *Foro Internacional*, vol. 38, no. 1 (1998): p. 39.

crisis.⁴ In urban Colombia, this lack of correlation was visible in cities like Cali and Medellín, and to a lesser extent Bogotá. The three cities, besides being the three urban centres with the largest industrial sectors and highest incomes per capita, were also among the most violent. In spite of the large number of possible hypotheses that tried to explain the levels of urban crime and violence, none of them could explain the problem at a global level. Among the causes that were most related to the increase of homicides in Latin America, and especially in Colombia, was the presence of armed groups such as guerrillas, paramilitaries, drug-cartels, and other organised criminal and delinquent groups.

The existence of such groups had a profound impact, especially in remote rural areas and frontier zones where the authorities could not provide a constant effective presence to consolidate their legitimacy. Rivalries over resource-rich areas of the territory caused an increase in violence, and homicides in particular. These were extremely detrimental for local communities, as they destabilised them, damaged social relations, and reduced the levels of trust among individuals.⁵

In Spanish, it was common to read about the damage that violence has caused *convivencia ciudadana*. Although these words were abstract and their exact meaning difficult to define, academics, civil servants, and journalists used them frequently to describe the normal state of human relationships inside communities. Government officials at a national level (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice or the Presidency) and at a municipal level (*alcaldías*) have created special offices to promote better levels of *convivencia*. This idea might be important for the restoration of tranquillity throughout the country, but its implementation has been difficult because of the abstract and subjective nature of this concept. References to the lack of *convivencia* could be linked to what has been referred as the ‘social capital’ of a community. Both terms

⁴ However, there was an exceptional situation during week-long food riots in Argentina, especially in Buenos Aires in December 2001. Thirty-four people were reported dead, and hundreds were injured. This uprising was a combination of an inept government and a dramatic economic crisis. For a full detail, see J. Auyero, *Routine politics and violence in Argentina: the grey zone of state power* (Cambridge, England, 2007).

⁵ **Chapter 2** below describes the relationships between crime, perception of crime and social trust. For social capital, see C. Moser, ‘Urban poverty and violence: consolidation or erosion of social capital?’, Paper presented at the Second Latin American Conference on Economic Development (Bogotá, 1996) and C. Moser and S. Lister (eds.), ‘Violence and social capital,’ LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 5 (Washington, DC, 1999).

related closely to a general idea of community participation that improved social conditions.⁶

In the early 1980s some Colombian academics, like Alfredo Molano and Gonzalo Sánchez, were already writing about the ‘alarming proportions’ that homicides were reaching in some areas of the country.⁷ At the time, this was perceived as a consequence of the establishment of drug-cartels in and around the largest cities of the country. The consolidation of highly organised and financially powerful drug-cartels also fostered the creation of smaller delinquent groups that controlled specific areas of the city where they distributed drugs, sold weapons and recruited young people for their business. These activities often caused violent rivalries between gangs. To this were added the presence of leftwing guerrillas who were involved in political activities, and at times, criminal and delinquent violence.⁸

While violence and delinquency became important factors affecting the political stability and economic development of Colombia, they also became extremely difficult to separate out and define. Because of this, during the mid-1980s scholars and policy-makers started to talk about a ‘multidimensionality of violence’, that required a multidisciplinary approach to recognise local determinants of crime. In 1987 the *Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia* was commissioned by the government of President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) with the purpose of integrating academics and researchers from different disciplines and political backgrounds to report on the complexities of violence and crime in Colombia. Among the main conclusions that this commission reached was the statement that the multiple expressions of violence did not exclude, but much exceeded those attributable to the political conflict. The report suggested that the homicide caused by the conflict between the state, the guerrillas and the paramilitaries was just a fraction of the total number of homicides committed in the country. The great majority of homicides, as they found, was committed in the streets. A sentence that made this point clear, and that later became one of the most quoted

⁶ For a debate on a meaning of ‘social capital’, see T. Schuller, S. Baron and J. Field, ‘Social capital: a review and critique,’ in S. Baron, J. Field and T. Schuller (eds.), *Social capital: critical perspectives* (Oxford, 2000). For the issue of social capital and community, see M. Warren, ‘Power and conflict in social capital: community organising and urban policy,’ in B. Edwards, M. Foley and M. Diani (eds.), *Beyond Tocqueville: civil society and the social capital debate in comparative perspective* (Hanover, HN, 2001).

⁷ R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia, 1979-1986* (Bogotá, 1988): p. 36.

⁸ M. Palacios, ‘Por una agenda de paz,’ Paper presented at DNP and IEPRI UNAL on ‘La Paz es Rentable’ (Mexico City and Bogotá, 1997): p. 3.

references was ‘*mucho más que las del monte, las violencias que nos están matando son las de la calle*’.⁹ [Violence in the street is killing us, much more than rural violence].¹⁰

Since then, there has been an increasing interest in describing the causes of violence from different disciplines and from different perspectives.¹¹ Most of the leading universities in the country have worked closely with the authorities, with non-governmental organisations, and with the private and philanthropic sectors to understand the complexities inherent in crime and violence.¹² Research centres like the Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI) at the Universidad Nacional, or the Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) and Centro de Investigaciones Sociojurídicas (CIJUS) both at the Universidad de los Andes, or the Centro de Investigaciones y Documentación Socioeconómica (CIDSE) at the Universidad del Valle have developed close relations with the government since the early 1990s.¹³ Academics took an active part in developing offices such as the presidential *Consejería de Paz, de Seguridad Nacional*, known today as *Consejería para la Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana*, and several dependencies in charge of policy-making and analysis within the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of

⁹ Although the main product of this *Comisión* was the publication of a report that was later published as a book, some members of the *Comisión* participated actively in policy-making for different governments during the 1990s. See Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, *Colombia: violencia y democracia* (Bogotá, 1987): pp. 17-30 and particularly p. 18.

¹⁰ All translations from Spanish to English are mine, except where otherwise indicated.

¹¹ In a similar context, the National University of Bogotá published two books in 1998 that had also been commissioned by the government to continue studying the correlation between crime and violence, and the correlation between violent municipalities and the existence of armed groups. To undertake this research, the *Consejería de Seguridad Nacional* of the government asked a group of academics to analyse the quality and quantity of available data that the government had at its disposal. See F. Cubides, M.C. Olaya and C.M. Ortiz, *La violencia y el municipio colombiano: 1980-1997* (Bogotá, 1998); and J. Arocha, F. Cubides and M. Jimeno (eds.), *Las violencias: inclusión creciente* (Bogotá, 1998).

The example works of other disciplines approach on violence in Colombia, see S. Franco Agudelo, ‘Violence and health in Colombia,’ *Pan American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 2, no. 3 (1997): pp. 170-180; R. Garfield and C.P. Llantén Morales, ‘The public health context of violence in Colombia,’ *Pan American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 16, no. 4 (2004): pp. 266-271. Nazih Richani investigated Colombian violence from a political economy perspective; see N. Richani, *Systems of violence: the political economy of war and peace in Colombia* (Albany, NY, 2002). See also the works of Michael Taussig on the anthropological approach; for example, M. Taussig, *Law in a lawless land: diary of a ‘limpieza’ in Colombia* (Chicago, IL and London, 2003).

¹² Colombia enjoyed a privileged position in terms of the number of research centres that worked closely with the government on the topics of crime and security. There also seemed to be more resources available in this field than in other countries.

¹³ Research centres outside Colombia also actively participated in investigating the Colombian conflict; for example, the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericanos (CEDLA), Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Justice. All these centres produced studies that tried to understand the origins and problems of crime in Colombia.¹⁴

While there have been many lines of explanation, none convincingly explained why Colombia was so violent in comparison to its neighbours. Experts on the topic preferred to speak about the country's violence as a plural phenomenon. Rather than one explanation, there was a combination of factors that have changed over time and place: the long tradition of guerrilla warfare, added to the drugs-industry and the remoteness and inaccessibility of frontier regions where armed groups have supplanted the authority of the state.¹⁵ Rural migrants, when settling in marginal areas and shantytowns where the presence of the state was limited, often re-created the conditions of frontier-zones.¹⁶ Apart from this, there was no theory that has actually answered why there were so many homicides in Colombia, and why such a large proportion was committed in urban areas. There was though a general agreement that violent crime was directly connected to a breakdown in community relations and that violence tended to perpetuate itself in the most affected zones.

Mauricio Rubio argued that recent progress in diagnosing Colombian violence has been oriented more towards challenging deeply-rooted concepts than proposing new theories.¹⁷ In an attempt to bring new ideas to his research, Rubio pointed to three main causes of violence:

1) The 'objective causes' that tried to explain crime by looking at structural socioeconomic factors such as economic inequality, rural migration added to urban unemployment, and lack of social opportunities and of social mobility.

2) The existence of armed groups, leftwing guerrillas, and paramilitaries. These groups perpetuated the conflict and were increasingly linked with transnational criminal groups that traded in illegal drugs and the armaments.

3) The lack of an effective judicial system and a coherent criminal justice policy. These elements perpetuated the high levels of impunity. For this reason, potential criminals were rarely deterred by the risk of facing the judiciary.

¹⁴ For example, CEDE publishes series of working papers 'Paz Pública' and IEPRI issues *Revista Análisis Político*.

¹⁵ W.M. LeoGrande and K.E. Sharpe, 'Two wars or one? Drug, guerrillas, and Colombia's new *Violencia*,' *World Policy Journal*, vol. 17, no. 3 (2000): pp. 1-11.

¹⁶ N.S. Escobar, 'Los desplazados en Colombia: violencia y exclusión,' in A. Gutiérrez (ed.), *Exclusión social y construcción de lo público en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2001): p. 168.

¹⁷ M. Rubio, *Crimen e impunidad: precisiones sobre la violencia* (Bogotá, 1999): p. 72.

Although the first studies on homicide in Colombia started to appear in the 1980s because of the increasing numbers of violent deaths throughout the country, it was only in the 1990s that these studies became a subject of meticulous attention in both local and international research.¹⁸ Most of the studies since the mid-1980s concentrated on the figures, and very few looked at the specific causality of homicides at a local level.

Rodrigo Losada and Eduardo Vélez were among the first researchers who looked at homicide in Colombia. Their study was published in 1988 just as homicides were beginning to increase at a rapid pace. One of their first findings was that homicide rose from being the eleventh cause of death in the early 1970s to the eighth place in 1977. By 1980-83, homicide was already in the sixth position and by 1985, it had reached the third place. In 1986, the last year for which they had data, homicide was the second single cause of mortality after cancer.¹⁹ From the late 1980s onwards, it became the main single cause of death for Colombians: during the 1990s more than 260,000 homicide cases were reported. The average number of homicides per day during the year 2000 was still around 71, and the national rate was 66 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002. Between 1996 and 2002, a homicide was committed in Colombia every twenty minutes.²⁰

Figure 1.1 represents the reported cases of homicide for the period 1980-2002 from DANE, the Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses and the national police. Even though, the numbers were different slightly among each organisation, the figure shows that homicides increased from 1980 and reached an unprecedented growth rate after the mid-1980s. This trend continued until the peak year of 1992 when the number of homicides approached 30,000 during the fights between the government and the drug cartels, especially in Medellín. Since then the official

¹⁸ Until the 1980s, the only reliable statistics covering violent deaths at a national level in Colombia were those of the *Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística* (DANE) and the national police. In 1987 DANE published the *Registro de defunciones en Colombia*, 1970-1978, vol. 1, and 1979-1984, vol. 2. These registers comprised a systematic list that also included all non-violent and non-criminal deaths. The national police have been publishing statistics in their annual *Criminalidad*. This publication provided only the data involving criminal deaths either reported by the public, or those involving investigations by the police. The only rigorous study of total mortality in Colombia, however, was the study conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Salud, *Mortalidad en Colombia*, which published its first study in 1982 using data from DANE and the national police. For more information on this, see R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1988): pp. 2-3.

¹⁹ R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia*, p. 18 and p. 53.

²⁰ L.A. Restrepo, 'Violence and fear in Colombia: fragmentation of space, contraction of time and forms of evasion,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Armed actors: organised violence and state failure in Latin America* (London, 2004): p. 173.


figures have been declining. However, in 2001 according to DANE the number of homicides exceeded 30,000. These statistics posed a series of questions:

- 1) Why did homicides increase so rapidly after the mid-1980s?
- 2) Why did the number of homicides remain so high?
- 3) How many of these homicides were a product of conflict between guerrillas, paramilitaries and the public forces?
- 4) How many were caused by organised criminals?
- 5) How reliable were these statistics?
- 6) Could there be serious underreporting in some (rural) areas?

Rubio claimed that there was a significant sub-registry of homicides in the country and especially in remote rural areas and frontier zones where corpses could be easily hidden. In such areas, armed group could impose high degrees of fear and coercion over the population to avoid any killing being reported. Under extreme circumstance, like a country at war, it could be argued that homicide was precisely the incident which the large number of agents, or indeed the most powerful one, were not interested in recording.²¹ In the cities this was not the case as the probability of discovery was greater, even long after the crime was committed.

²¹ While guerrillas and paramilitaries took care to hide the bodies of their members fallen in action, they were also keen in hiding the bodies of their enemies in common graves. This was also the case of drug cartels. See M. Rubio, *Crimen e impunidad*, pp. 33-42, and by the same author, 'Las bajas ocultas de la guerrilla' in *El Tiempo*, 10 March 1998.

Figure 1.1: Reported Cases of Homicide in Colombia (1980-2002)



Sources: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses and Revista de Criminalidad of the National Police

In Colombia, available data suggested that the majority of homicides were not committed during confrontations between the main armed groups in rural areas. Despite the common perception that ‘the country was living an ongoing civil war’, it was clear that only a small proportion of the victims of homicide was accounted for by direct conflicts between guerrillas, paramilitaries, soldiers and policemen. The percentage of political assassinations in the country had not surpassed 17 percent of the total number of homicides between 1990 and 2002, while the average was closer to 9.50 percent (see **Table 1.1**).²² Losada and Vélez reached this conclusion in the mid-1980s, and Camilo Echandía found similar results. Following their findings, between 1982 and 1986 the percentage of political homicides accounted for between 5 percent and 15 percent of the total number in the country. At the end of the 1990s, this percentage rose due to the

²² See R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia*, p. 56 and table 14, p. 57. See also Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, *Colombia: violencia y democracia*, p. 18.

reduction of homicides in the largest cities and the increase in the number of deaths in open confrontations between guerrillas and paramilitaries.²³

Echandía argued that of the total number of homicides committed each year in the country, around 10 percent were committed by the main agents of the conflict. This finding seemed confirmed by Rubio, who found the municipalities with an important presence of guerrillas or paramilitaries were not necessarily among the most violent.²⁴ On the contrary, the most violent zones were those that were not under the clear control of any particular groups. While most of the political assassinations were usually attributed to paramilitaries, Jesús Bejarano [et al.] estimated that assassinations of political leaders, civil servants, journalists, and social activists between 1992 and 1995, accounted for only 1 percent of the total number of cases.²⁵

Table 1.1: Total Reported Cases of Homicide vs. Political Homicide in Colombia (1990-2002)

Year	Total homicides committed	Numbers of political homicide*	% of political homicides/ total homicides
1990	24,225	2,274	9.39
1991	29,246	2,218	7.58
1992	30,017	2,843	9.47
1993	29,579	2,622	8.86
1994	27,655	1,911	6.91
1995	23,443	1,856	7.92
1996	24,848	1,746	7.03
1997	22,818	2,193	9.61
1998	24,874	1,471	5.91
1999	26,096	2,261	8.66
2000	29,209	4,772	16.34
2001	30,408	5,059	16.64
2002	32,092	2,923	9.11
Average	27,270	2,627	9.49

* Political homicides included all those that could be attributed to guerrillas, paramilitaries, and members of the public forces.

Sources: a) Homicides: DANE

b) Political homicides: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP)

²³ C. Echandía, 'El conflicto armado y las manifestaciones de violencia en las regiones de Colombia,' Observatorio de Violencia de la Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz (Bogotá, 1999): p. 232.

²⁴ M. Rubio, 'Crimen con misterio: lo que revelan las estadísticas de violencia y criminalidad en Colombia,' Working Paper (Bogotá, 1998): p. 10.

²⁵ J.A. Bejarano [et al.] (eds.), *Colombia: inseguridad, violencia y desempeño económico en las áreas rurales* (Bogotá, 1997): p. 15.

In their study, Losada and Vélez attempted the first classification of the different types of homicide in the country (see **Table 1.2**). This classification aimed to bring a broader understanding of the protagonists and causes of homicide.

Table 1.2: Categorisation of Homicide in Colombia by Losada and Vélez

1	Homicide caused by groups of people that are trying to create another sociopolitical order in the country.
2	Homicide caused by the action of the public forces in the accomplishment of the constitutional laws.
3	Homicide caused by groups of people that are trying to impede other groups from promoting and establishing ideologies that are against their own.
4	Homicide related to the production, processing and commercialisation of illegal drugs.
5	Homicide caused by groups that are trying to promote their own justice, or groups who undertake actions of 'social cleansing'.
6	Homicide caused by expressions of revenge.
7	Homicide caused by people who want to seize other people's possessions.
8	Homicide caused by 'passionate feelings', fights under the influence of alcohol, drugs and mental disorders.
9	Homicide related to pity like euthanasia.

Source: R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1988)

Losada and Vélez tried to classify homicide by separating causality and protagonist. Although this categorisation was innovative in the way that it differentiated distinct types of homicide, its application was rendered less useful because some homicides could be classified in two or more of the mentioned categories. As an example, homicide committed by guerrillas could be categorised as aiming to 'create another sociopolitical order in the country'. If the causes were unknown, it could be caused by 'expressions of revenge' or because it was committed by a group that implemented its 'own justice'. The same problem appeared when looking at homicide by protagonist. In the cities, most could not be classified because the authors remained unknown.

Fernando Cubides reviewed the model attempted by Losada and Vélez and concluded that, though interesting, this classification failed because of many linkages between political delinquency and organised crime. Classifications of crime protagonist were extremely difficult to make since the authors might be associated with many different agents of crime at the same time.²⁶

²⁶ Cubides also restated the argument from the *Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia* in which the authors emphasised that 'la violencia tiene múltiples expresiones que no excluyen, pero sí sobrepasan, la dimensión política'. See R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia, 1979-1986*, pp. 84-85; Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, *Colombia: violencia y democracia*, p. 17; and

It was extremely difficult to draw specific categorise of homicide in Colombia. Because of the large number of armed groups that were directly or indirectly related to guerrillas, paramilitaries and drug-cartels, the analysis of homicide and the search for determinants of crime varied considerably from one area to another. Generalisations at the national level were not helpful, as they oversimplified the specific details affecting crime at the local. The number of homicides differed within each department, and within each department and each urban centre; not all homicides were homogeneously spread. Unfortunately, recent studies have not developed this idea further. Even if most of the studies made reference to the difference between the large organisations committing homicide in the country, very few – and almost none of them – have developed the typology of homicide, even when focusing on the large urban centres. The problem was that without data regarding investigations, trials and sentencing, causes and motives could not be analysed.

Homicide in Colombia (1990-2002)

One interesting finding by Losada and Vélez is that the rates of homicide tended to be higher in rural zones, in localities that had less than 2,500 inhabitants; and in large urban agglomerations that had between 500,000 and 2,000,000 inhabitants. Rates of homicide did not seem to be so pronounced in intermediate cities with less than 500,000 people.²⁷ From the mid-1980s to 2002, this trend had not changed. Rates of homicide were persistently higher in remote rural municipalities and in the larger urban agglomerations. This was particularly significant since the number of cases had to be high to compensate for the number of inhabitants.²⁸

F. Cubides, 'La organización como factor diferencial,' in F. Cubides [et al.], *La violencia y el municipio colombiano*, p. 160.

²⁷ The exception was Bogotá, which had until the mid-1980s a low rate of homicide and fewer homicide cases in comparison to the other large cities. See R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia, 1979-1986*, p. 31.

²⁸ Most of the studies on homicide showed the rates of homicide per 100,000 inhabitants in a given town or city. Although the rates could be useful for comparing cities with the same population, they could also mislead when comparing small towns with large cities: small towns might appear as a being extremely violent, while larger cities might have overall low rates despite the existence of some extremely violent zones within them.

Table 1.3: Municipalities with Highest Number of Reported Homicides (1979-1986)

Municipality	Number of cases reported between 1979 and 1986	Annual average (8-year period)
Medellín	9,590	1,199
Bogotá	6,639	830
Cali	4,126	516
Barranquilla	2,366	296
Pereira	1,041	130
Cartago	997	125
Santa Marta	947	118
Bucaramanga	832	104
Buenaventura	742	93
Valledupar	719	90
Maicao	683	85
Tuluá	665	83
Manizales	651	81
Cúcuta	642	80
Villavicencio	632	79
Turbo*	596	74
Bello	563	70
Apartadó*	550	69
Palmira	522	65
Popayán	517	65
Bolívar (Cauca)*	495	62
Itagüí	475	59
Cartagena	462	58
San José del Guaviare*	417	52
Riohacha	414	52

Source: R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia*, table 12, p. 42 based on data from DANE. Municipalities marked with a (*) are those not included in the Directiva 006 15/07/1999.

Table 1.3 shows the list of the municipalities with the highest number of homicides during the early 1980s. Among the most violent were the three largest cities: Bogotá, Medellín and Cali, which had the highest increases in the number of homicides during the mid-1980s. The city of Pereira, an intermediate city in terms of population, revealed significant number of homicides from the mid-1980s. Cartago, Tuluá and Bello are small satellite towns near Cali and Medellín. Barranquilla, Santa Marta and Buenaventura are important ports and, together with Maicao, are renowned for their black markets of imported consumer goods. Valledupar, Cúcuta, and Riohacha are frontier municipalities (See **Figure 1.2**)

Figure 1.2: Map of Colombia



Base 802670AI (R00820) 6-01

Losada and Vélez suggested that in these cities the soaring levels of homicide were related to the illegal drug-market.²⁹ However, it was not possible to say that all the violence was directly caused by drug-trafficking organisations. The consolidation of drug cartels also fostered the establishment of other illegal parallel activities such as the arms trade, money laundering, and corruption that could also create violence among rival groups.

Among the list of violent municipalities appearing in **Table 1.3**, only 4 municipalities are rural. These are Turbo, Apartadó, Bolívar and San José del Guaviare. There, conflicts between guerrillas, paramilitaries and public forces were common and most homicides were caused by these armed groups.³⁰ The other 25 municipalities are urban agglomerations where the main armed groups might be present but where the levels of coercion and violence were not so clearly defined (see **Appendix 1**). This fact confirmed that a small fraction of the total homicides was caused during confrontations between guerrillas, paramilitaries and public forces. It also exhibited that in the mid-1980s most of the homicides were urban. During the last years of the 1990s, approximately 40 percent of the total number of homicides were committed in the 10 largest cities of the country.³¹


As seen in **Figure 1.3**, in 2000 almost the same municipalities had the highest number of homicides as in the early 1980s. The three largest cities were still in absolute numbers the most violent; Medellín being the most violent, followed by Bogotá and Cali. Together they accounted for almost 30 percent of all the reported cases. Cúcuta, after a significant increase in its number of homicides, overtook the other intermediate cities of Pereira and Barranquilla. That the three largest cities still figured far above the other cities in terms of the absolute number of homicides, ensured that violent crime remained a major issue despite the fact that the largest drug-cartels had been disbanded. This suggested that the homicide in the large cities was not necessarily linked to the presence of large drug-cartels. Rivalries between smaller delinquent organisations that were not necessarily linked to the existence of highly organised crime structures could perpetuate important levels of violence.

²⁹ R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia, 1979-1986*, p. 27.

³⁰ See also the classification of municipalities by degrees of violence in the statistical annexe in F. Cubides [et al.], *La violencia y el municipio colombiano*, pp. 253-261.

³¹ Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana* (Bogotá, 2000): p. 37. For a table of homicides in the largest cities of Colombia during the 1990s, see **Appendix 2**.

Figure 1.3: Reported Cases of Homicide in the 10 Largest Colombian Cities (2000)



Sources: Colombian National Police – DIJIN and Presidencia de la República


Most of the victims of homicide were young men in their early 20s, and most were killed with firearms. Figures for the 1980s showed that between 80 and 87 percent of the victims were men aged between 15-24 years, followed by men from 25 to 34 years.³² During the 1990s, this pattern remained relatively unchanged as the principal victim group remained youth aged 15 to 24.³³ Although data availability did not permit one to define more precisely the authors and locations, it was known that a large share of urban homicides occurred in public places, often in areas of gambling and prostitution. The press often argued that most homicides were committed accidentally, mainly as a result of violent behaviour excited by alcohol and aggravated by the carrying of weapons, notably at night when perpetrators and victims socialised, notions that seemed confirmed by the concentration of violence in specific zones of cities. Arguably, people might drink alcohol and carry weapons all around the city, so this fact would not explain why there was such a concentration of homicides in certain specific zones. A study by the Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, however, demonstrated that most victims of homicide during the late 1990s did not have high levels of alcohol in their blood when they were killed.³⁴

³² R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia, 1979-1986*, p. 29.

³³ Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, p. 56.

³⁴ For further details, see Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, Centro de Referencia Nacional sobre Violencia (CRNV), 'Muertes violentas y armas de fuego en Colombia 1996,' *Boletín Mensual*, vol. 2, no. 3 (1998): pp. 49-66; Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la*

Figure 1.4: Reported Cases of Homicide in Bogotá, Medellín and Cali (1988-2002)



Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE)

Figure 1.4 shows trends in homicides for the 3 largest cities of the country from 1988 to 2002. The graph presents similar trends for the three cities, although these for Medellín and Bogotá were more striking than that of Cali, except since 2001 when the number of homicides in Cali had exceeded Bogotá. The case of Medellín was especially striking because of the high levels of violence that were reached during the government’s prosecution of the main drug cartel.³⁵ The number of homicides in

convivencia y seguridad ciudadana, pp. 41-42 and p. 54; C. Echandía, ‘Geografía de la violencia homicida en Bogotá,’ p. 14. See also the papers published by CEDE – Paz Pública, Universidad de los Andes, notable by Camilo Echandía and Mauricio Rubio, for example, M. Rubio, ‘Crimen con misterio: lo que revelan las estadísticas de violencia y criminalidad en Colombia’; M. Rubio, *Crimen e impunidad*; and C. Echandía, ‘El conflicto armado y las manifestaciones de la violencia en las regiones de Colombia’.

³⁵ This represented the peak of the so-called ‘narco-terrorist’ violence of 1992. A wave of homicides committed against the police followed the arrest of several leaders of the cartel, notably Brances Muñoz Mosquera, aka ‘Tyson’. During the first week of November 1992, several policemen were shot in terrorist attacks. During the night of the 7 November 1992, several bombs exploded in the centre of Medellín and 6 others were de-activated. As a result, the government declared a ‘State of Commotion’ to take special security measures, and was allowed to adopt new security laws without having to ratify them by Congress. For the government’s report on the declaration of the national state of commotion, see ‘Informe motivado al Congreso de la República sobre las causas que determinaron la declaración de la Conmoción Interior,’

Medellín and Bogotá in 2002 was not significantly higher than in the late 1980s, but in Cali the number of homicides almost doubled.

Homicide in Bogotá (1990-2002)

Colombia's capital city, Bogotá, has always been the country's largest city. In 1990, it contained around 15 percent of the country's population and around a third of the industrial workforce.³⁶ The population had increased from 5,172,313 in 1991 to 6,698,420 in 2002.³⁷ Bogotá also had one of the greatest densities of population in Latin America, with a rate of 3,717 inhabitants per square kilometre.³⁸ It was a city with enormous disparities in income distribution and had a large share of the population, 13.6 percent, living in absolute poverty in 1990.³⁹ Despite such disparities, Bogotá did not show abnormal levels of violence before the 1980s.⁴⁰ Even thereafter, Bogotá for long did not attract the attention of criminologists, as the city was not known to have the problems of public order of Cali and Medellín with their prominent drug cartels, except for the Palace of Justice siege of 6-7 November 1985. The army stormed the Palace of Justice building, which the M-19 guerrilla group had taken over, killing 95 people who, apart from the guerrillas present, included twelve of the country's 25 Supreme Court

in Presidencia de la República, *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, vol. 1, pp. 179-187 (Bogotá, 1994).

³⁶ DANE, National Census 1993. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.dane.gov.co/Informacion_Estadistica/>, accessed 22 March 2006.

³⁷ Foro Internacional de Gobernabilidad Local, 'Violencia y delincuencia en contextos urbanos: la experiencia de Bogotá en la reducción de la criminalidad 1994-2002,' Documento elaborado para el PNUD (Bogotá, 2003), table 1, pp. 21-22.


³⁸ Rojas, C. (2003). 'Forging a culture of citizenship in Bogotá city,' Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.iadb.org/int/jpn/english/support_files/10colombia.pdf>, accessed 4 July 2006.

³⁹ For the backgrounds of Bogotá, see A. Gilbert, 'Bogotá: politics, planning, and the crisis of lost opportunities,' in W.A. Cornelius and R.V. Kemper (eds.), *Latin American urban research*, vol. 6 (Beverly Hills, CA and London, 1978): pp. 88-126; R. Mohan, *Understanding the developing metropolis: lessons from the city study of Bogotá and Cali, Colombia* (New York, 1994); A. Gilbert, 'Santa Fé de Bogotá: a Latin American special case?,' in A. Gilbert (ed.), *The mega-city in Latin America* (New York, 1996); J.D. Dávila, 'Bogotá, Colombia: restructuring with continued growth,' in N. Harris and I. Fabricius (eds.), *Cities and structural adjustment* (London, 1996); V. Gouëset, *Bogotá: el nacimiento de una metrópoli* (Bogotá, 1998); A. Gilbert and J.D. Dávila, 'Bogotá: progress within a hostile environment,' in D.J. Myers and H.A. Dietz (eds.), *Capital city politics in Latin America: democratisation and empowerment* (Boulder, CO, 2002); R. Skinner, 'City profile: Bogotá,' *Cities*, vol. 21, no. 1 (2004): pp. 73-81; J.D. Dávila, 'La transformación de Bogotá,' in F. Cepeda Ulloa (ed.), *Fortalezas de Colombia* (Bogotá, 2005) and Gouëset, V. [et al.] (coord.), *Hacer metrópoli: la región urbana de Bogotá de cara al siglo XXI* (Bogotá, 2005).

⁴⁰ R. Losada Lora and E. Vélez Bustillo, *Muertes violentas en Colombia*. See also C. Echandía, 'Geografía de la violencia homicida en Bogotá', p. 3. The studies on crime and violence in the capital have suggested that current levels of insecurity were not a new phenomenon, although in recent decades they have increased considerably. There has also been a decrease in politically motivated homicides and an increase in homicides that were related to economic crimes. See S. Niño Murcia [et al.], *Territorios del miedo en Santafé de Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1998): p. xiv and M.V. Uribe, 'Violencia difusa en Bogotá,' Working Paper (Bogotá, 1993): pp. 15-16.

judges and many members of the Palace staff.⁴¹ In 1988, the number of homicides in Bogotá was less than 2,000, significantly less than the cases reported for Medellín (3,627), though almost twice as many cases than in Cali (1,051).⁴²

Figure 1.5: Rates of Homicide per 100,000 Inhabitants in Colombia and Bogotá (1990-2002)



Source: Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses

During the 1990s, Bogotá accounted for 11 percent of total number of homicides, compared with 16 percent in Medellín and 7 percent in Cali.⁴³ Homicides in Bogotá increased until reaching a peak in 1993, when the authorities recorded more than 4,300 cases. This represented an increase of 136 percent in a period of 6 years. Since 1994, and especially after 1996, these figures fell. In 1999, the number of cases per year was practically the same as it was on the late 1980s: 2,419 reported homicides in 1989 compared to 2,409 in 1999. In 2002 the number of cases reached 1,896. This also represented a significant decrease in homicide rates by 66 percent, as they decreased from 80 at its peaks in 1993 to 28 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002 which was


⁴¹ See more details in A. Carrigan, *The Palace of Justice: a Colombian tragedy* (New York, 1993).

⁴² National Police – DIJIN and Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, based on table 10, p. 53.

⁴³ M.V. Llorente [et al.], ‘Violencia homicida y estructuras criminales en Bogotá,’ *Análisis Político*, no. 44 (2001): p. 17.


less than half of nation rate of 66 in the same year (see **Figure 1.5**). While Colombia continued to be one of the most violent countries in Latin America and its large cities had until recently homicide rates around or above 100 per 100,000 inhabitants (see **Figure 1.6**), its capital in 2002 had a rate below the Latin American average which placed it among the cities of the region with medium levels of violence (see **Figure 1.7**).

Figure 1.6: Rates of Homicide per 100,000 Inhabitants in Colombian Cities (2002)



Source: Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses


Figure 1.7: Rates of Homicide per 100,000 Inhabitants Latin American Cities (2002)



Source: Foro Internacional de Gobernabilidad Local, 'Violencia y delincuencia en contextos urbanos: la experiencia de Bogotá en la reducción de la criminalidad 1994-2002,' p. 24.

Figure 1.8 presents the homicide rates among localities in 1994 and 2002. The homicide rates in Santafé which were the highest decreased significantly from 497 in 1994 to 202 in 2002. In the localities of Fontibón, Usaquén, Engativá and Suba in the north and northwest of Bogotá, the rates of homicide stood at less than 20 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002. Between 1994 and 2002 the rates of homicide fell by 65 percent from 50 to 17 per 100,000 inhabitants in the localities of Kennedy, Engativá, Usaquén and Suba. While Santafé, La Candelaria, Los Mártires and Teusaquillo which had high rates of homicide, homicide rates fell by 61 percent from 180 to 69 per 100,000 inhabitants during the same period.

Figure 1.8: Rates of Homicide per 100,000 Inhabitants in Bogotá by Localities (1994 and 2002)



Sources: Policía Metropolitana de Bogotá and Policía Nacional

Most of Bogotá’s homicides were committed during weekend nights and within a few nuclei of violence. María Victoria Llorente [et al.] found that 30 percent of homicides in Bogotá between 1997 and 1999 were generally correlated to other crimes, mainly those involving property, violent robberies and muggings.⁴⁴ Although evidence was scarce, it was possible that homicide was also related to kidnapping and extortion. By using available data of homicide from the Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses, Camilo Echandía classified the number of homicides by localities to see which were the most affected zones. He found that the most affected localities were persistently violent across time, and that a few localities could define the rates for the entire city.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ M.V. Llorente [et al.], ‘Violencia homicida y estructuras criminales en Bogotá,’ p. 34.

⁴⁵ Bogotá’s capital district is divided into 19 different administrative localities (*localidades*) named as follows, in alphabetical order: Antonio Nariño, Barrios Unidos, Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, Chapinero, Engativá, Fontibón, Kennedy, La Candelaria, Los Mártires, Puente Aranda, Rafael Uribe, San Cristóbal, Santafé, Suba, Teusaquillo, Tunjuelito, Usaquén, and Usme (see **Figure 1.9**). These localities differ in size, and in the number and socioeconomic level of their inhabitants. Most of the studies on urban

Figure 1.9: Map of Bogotá by Localities



homicide did not include the locality of Sumapaz, a rural locality that had a long tradition of high levels of guerrilla activity.

Table 1.4: Reported Cases of Homicide in Bogotá by Localities (1997-1999)


Localities	Homicides	Percentage
Ciudad Bolívar	322	12.4
Kennedy	276	10.6
Santafé	273	10.5
Rafael Uribe	220	8.4
Puente Aranda	181	6.9
Sub-Total	1,272	48.8
Suba	197	7.6
San Cristóbal	162	6.2
Engativá	146	5.6
Bosa	122	4.7
Los Mártires	111	4.2
Sub-Total	738	28.3
Usme	108	4.1
Tunjuelito	89	3.4
Usaquén	81	3.1
Fontibón	62	2.4
Barrios Unidos	59	2.3
La Candelaria	57	2.2
Chapinero	54	2.1
Antonio Nariño	44	1.7
Teusaquillo	42	1.6
Sumapaz	n/a	n/a
Total City	2,606	100.0

Source: Based on findings by C. Echandía, 'Geografía de la violencia homicida en Bogotá'.

The data presented in **Table 1.4** demonstrate the average number of homicides in Bogotá for the period 1997-1999. For this period, Bogotá's rate of homicide was 43 per 100,000 inhabitants. A few localities had rates several times higher than the average rate of the city. The localities with the highest rates were Santafé and La Candelaria with rates of 255 and 207 respectively. Another eight localities had rates superior than the city average.⁴⁶ Only 5 localities (Ciudad Bolívar, Kennedy, Santafé, Rafael Uribe and Puente Aranda) accounted for almost 49 percent of the total number of homicides. The next 5 most violent localities (Suba, San Cristóbal, Engativá, Bosa, and Mártires) added another 28.3 percent of the total number of cases. This, in other words means that half of the localities in the city produced in that period about 80 percent of the total number of homicides (see **Figure 1.10**).

⁴⁶ These were Los Mártires (116), Puente Aranda (64), Ciudad Bolívar (62), Rafael Uribe (57), Usme (47), Antonio Nariño (45), Chapinero (44), and Tunjuelito (43). All rates are given in homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

Figure 1.10: Rates of Homicide per 100,000 Inhabitants in Bogotá by Localities (1997-1999)



Source: Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses

Echandía’s important finding was that the localities with the highest numbers of homicides were also among those with the highest rates of homicide: Santafé, Rafael Uribe, Ciudad Bolívar and Puente Aranda.⁴⁷ This was particularly significant as it proved that large and populated localities could be as violent as small and unpopulated ones. In spite of these important findings, some questions have remained unanswered. Why were some localities persistently more violent than others? What were the zones within each locality that tended to be more violent? What were the causes for this high number of homicides? Why were homicides concentrated in a few zones of the city?

⁴⁷ C. Echandía, ‘Geografía de la violencia homicida en Bogotá,’ p. 7.

If violence, and more specifically homicide seemed to be committed in the same zones of the city at different of times, this could suggest that violence was not purely accidental and was more complex than it was first suggested. A common argument to explain the number of homicides committed in Bogotá has tried to correlate these crimes with the consumption of alcohol and the use of weapons in public areas at night. This argument has been increasingly rejected.⁴⁸ Although most victims died in public places at night, few showed traces of alcohol in their blood. Drink and darkness did not explain why homicide was concentrated in these few localities, given that people went out at night and socialised in public places throughout the city.

A plausible explanation was that homicide was linked to other activities that were highly lucrative and competitive, such as the drugs and arms trafficking. Echandía also claimed that there was an increasing guerrilla presence in the cities, and notably in Bogotá where there was a high correlation between the existence of urban militias and the ‘high indices of indiscriminate and selective violence’.⁴⁹ Indiscriminate levels of violence comprised what seemed to be ‘random’ homicide in public places without known purposes, while selective homicide was more targeted against those who disagreed or did not comply with the rules of the guerrilla. These included homicides not only against petty delinquents and drug-dealers but also against members of opposing political groups and public authorities, policemen, politicians and civil servants.

However, there was no strong evidence of the importance of the militias’ activities in Bogotá. Guerrillas were present throughout the country, but there was no clear knowledge about their urban structure and organisation. There was, so far, no strong evidence of the existence of an urban guerrilla acting independently from rural guerrillas. Data used to sustain the existence of urban militias came from written media articles or from individual testimonies of policemen and guerrilla members who have been arrested. When made public, these claims affected the perception of security among the population and might have increased fears of victimisation.

⁴⁸ Llorente [et al.] found that in Bogotá during 1997-1999, murders resulting from scores settling and muggings accounted for a larger number of deaths than murders resulting from in-home aggressions and alcohol-nourished street fights. See M.V. Llorente [et al.], ‘Violencia homicida y estructuras criminales en Bogotá,’ pp. 35-36.

⁴⁹ C. Echandía, ‘Geografía de la violencia homicida en Bogotá,’ p. 15.

An important share of homicides in Bogotá was attributed to the presence of organised delinquent groups usually formed by numbers of youths. The activities of these groups included small street crime, assault robbery, kidnapping and extortion. Although the information available on specific gangs was scarce, it was also known that some also participated in 'social cleansing'.⁵⁰ Myriam Jimeno and Ismael Roldán [et al.] analysed the problem of violence in Ciudad Bolívar, a popular sector of Bogotá. They concluded that the organisation of youth bands, in some areas, could compensate for the lack of family structure of the children, where one and sometimes two of the parents were absent. Jimeno and Roldán [et al.] also established that violence was used as a risk-avoiding strategy against rival groups. Belonging to a group provided youth with the necessary protection in areas of risk where public security was not guaranteed and where those who chose not to participate became easy targets of crime and violence. In this situation, the street became the place for socialisation and gang membership which was often compulsory. They mentioned that some groups had more than two hundred members, although most of the time they were smaller in number, and the age of those involved varied from 7-8 years to 25-30 years. Committing crimes was not seen as a way of earning a living but as a means of demonstrating courage and power towards the peers.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Social cleansing was the systematic elimination and abuse of marginalised and/or impoverished sectors of a population, often defined as 'disposable' people by the perpetrators. Victims commonly included street children, the homeless, prostitutes, transvestites, petty criminals, drug addicts and garbage recyclers. The perpetrators often belonged to 'death squads' which received money and other backing to carry out the 'cleansing'. While the actual hitpeople were often off-duty and ex-police officers and off-duty private security guards, the chief instigators were civilians, including business people, members of civic groups called *Juntas de Acción Comunal*, and criminal elements. The first organised social cleansing operations were thought to have occurred in late 1979 in Pereira when 62 real or alleged thieves were shot dead in execution-style killings during a two-month period. Since 1979, the phenomenon has spread, and such killings have been carried out in most large urban areas in Colombia, particularly in Barranquilla, Bogotá, Bucaramanga, Cali, Medellín and Pereira. For more information see S.M. Guerrero, *Limpieza social: la guerra contra la indigencia* (Bogotá, 1995); C.E. Rojas, *La violencia llamada limpieza social*, 2nd ed. (Bogotá, 1996) and M. Taussig, *Law in a lawless land: diary of a 'limpieza' in Colombia* (Chicago, IL and London, 2003).

⁵¹ M. Jimeno and I. Roldán [et al.], *Las sombras arbitrarias: violencia y autoridad en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1996): pp. 75-79.

Kidnapping

After homicide, kidnapping was the most important crime affecting the Colombian population.⁵² Between 1996 and 2002, a kidnapping was committed every 3.2 hours.⁵³ The impact of kidnapping was so significant that Colombians usually referred to it as ‘small death’.⁵⁴ In some of his writings about the topic, Francisco Santos Calderón, a politician and journalist who was kidnapped by the Medellín cartel led by Pablo Escobar in 1990 to pressure the Colombian government to revert its support of drug lords’ extraditions to the United States, used the expression ‘*muertos en vida*’ to describe the victims of kidnapping.⁵⁵ The purpose of associating kidnapping with the image of death was not only to popularise the problem, but also to promote the diffusion of antiviolence feelings among the population by changing the perception of the population that considered extortion crime as ‘economic crime’ instead of ‘crime against the person’.

In 2002, there were nearly 3,000 reported cases plus an unknown number of cases that were not reported to the authorities. This was due to the fact that the authorities lacked information about kidnapping. Families of victims and private businesses were frequently reluctant to disclose details regarding the abduction and the negotiation process with the kidnappers. Many Colombians preferred to settle an agreement in confidence with the kidnappers for fear of reprisal in case of notification to the authorities. The payment of ransoms, followed by regular extortion ‘fees’, was also

⁵² Kidnapping is defined as a situation where victims can be ‘abducted, retained or hidden’ to get something in exchange of their freedom. There have been numerous modifications of the laws dealing with kidnapping and extortion. The most important Colombian laws are Law 40 – 19 January 1993, known in Colombia as the ‘Law Against Kidnapping’; Law 282 – 6 June 1996; Law 599 – July 2000 [*Código de Procedimiento Penal*] especially Articles 169 and 170 and the modifications made in Law 733 – 29 January 2002. For more on this, see **Chapter 3**. Although kidnapping and hostage-taking situation are different and there are different laws to deal with these crimes, hostage-taking situation in Colombia is often treated as mass kidnapping because of the political or financial demands that are made in exchange of the liberation of victims. According to International Humanitarian Law, hostage takers seek to influence the behaviour of third parties in some way by threatening a hostage with physical harm; the definition relies on the hostage’s disempowerment in the hands of a party to the conflict and the possibility that the hostage will be exchanged for some concession made by a third party. Hostage-taking is prohibited by Article 1(b) of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions as well as Articles 4(2) (c) of Protocol II. See J. Pictet, ‘International humanitarian law: a definition,’ in United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), *International dimensions of humanitarian law* (Dordrecht, 1988). For a different perspective, see Human Rights Watch, *War without quarter: Colombia and international humanitarian law* (New York and London, 1998): p. 38.

⁵³ L.A. Restrepo, ‘Violence and fear in Colombia: fragmentation of space, contraction of time and forms of evasion,’ p. 173.

⁵⁴ M. Rubio, *Crimen e impunidad*, p. 11.

⁵⁵ F. Santos (n.d.), ‘Carta a un secuestrado,’ Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.paislibre.org/>>, accessed 28 July 2007.

common. This, in the eyes of many citizens, remained the best alternative to avoid further victimisation. It was understandable that many kidnappings were dealt with without the knowledge of the government, as many people preferred to pay a ransom rather than to put the victim at risk of being killed by calling the authorities.

To undertake negotiations with kidnappers, victims regularly used the mediation of experts who could help reducing the amount of the ransom demanded.⁵⁶ Because negotiators sometimes charged large sums of money by selling anti-kidnapping insurance policies and by asking a percentage of the money that was saved in the ransom, they were often accused of contributing to the ‘business of kidnapping’. This practice was considered illegal by the government, as it could not agree on the payment of ransoms.

Article 172 of Law 599 – July 2000 forbids the participation of negotiators and the issuing of anti-kidnapping insurance policies to business and individuals. Proponents of the Article said that this kind of activity should be banned since it fed and promoted the ‘business of kidnapping’. At the same time, negotiators de-legitimised the role of law enforcement authorities and made the fight against crime more difficult. Opponents of the Article argued that negotiators were essential since the authorities were too slow and inefficient in solving these crimes. Negotiators also helped bringing ransoms down and helped families of victims to solve the problem in a rational way. It was almost impossible to prevent people and firms from insuring themselves against kidnapping, since anti-kidnapping insurance policies and negotiators could always be contracted in other countries, outside the jurisdiction of the Colombian authorities. In 1993, the Congress voted the anti-kidnapping law which contained several articles aiming to penalise those who participated in any stage of the payment or the liberation of the victims. This included not only the relatives, but also the banks and all other entities or individuals who for some reasons might be involved in the process. Several articles and paragraphs were declared unconstitutional by the constitutional court as they affected individual liberties and they penalised the victims even more.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Some of the kidnapping negotiators that had been active and caused controversy in Colombia included Werner Mauss, Control Risks Group, Ackerman Group and Kroll. Members of the Catholic Church and representatives of the International Red Cross Committee had also been repeatedly involved in negotiations, but did not cause as much controversy because no financial compensation was charged for their services.

⁵⁷ For more on this, see **Chapter 3**.

Citizens who received kidnapping threats often had no other choice but to pay extortion 'fees'. By doing this, they preferred to avoid further victimisation by criminals who could retaliate and cause physical damage to close relatives, personal properties and businesses. In 2000, FARC's Law 002 dictated that every Colombian with a fortune in excess of US\$ 1 million had to pay a 'voluntary tax' to the FARC equivalent to 10 percent of their total fortune. Those who refused to pay were at risk of being 'retained' as a measure to enforce the payment. With of Law 002, the organisation also wanted to promote fear among citizens: by kidnapping some people who refused to pay, guerrillas could enforce the payment of many other ransoms from people who preferred to pay rather than being kidnapped. Because the extortion also focused on private firms and businesses, the FARC imposed extortion 'fees' on many different sectors of the population, as they were many medium sized companies with properties, estates, machinery and inventories worth over US\$ 1 million. *Revista Cambio* stated that in the first 6 months following the declaration of Law 002 by FARC more than 2,000 companies were asked to pay extortion money and from that number, 60 percent agreed to pay. There were no guarantees that payment of these 'fees' would exempt victims from future extortion.⁵⁸ Thus many citizens were repeatedly victimised. Surveys on the topic revealed that those who had been targeted had 50 percent chances of being victims again.⁵⁹ In some cases guerrillas kidnapped the same victim more than once. In other cases, they asked for a second payment once the first had been completed. These strategies had strong effects on the population because there was no possibility of knowing whether the extortion 'fees' would be a sufficient guarantee to regain the freedom or to avoid future kidnapping. Repeated targeting of the same victim, or victims from the same family, was especially common in the rural areas of northern Colombia where landowners and cattle-ranchers were kidnapped despite previous payments of extortion 'fees'.⁶⁰ Unless reported to the authorities, these crimes were rarely investigated or prosecuted.

Kidnapping and extortion caused long-term psychological damage to not only victims themselves but also their families and friends. This fact arguably caused distress to all citizens and increased the perception of insecurity among those starting to feel at risk. People who were victimised often had difficulties returning to their normal lives.


⁵⁸ See 'La ley del monte' in *Revista Cambio*, no. 417 (July 2001): pp. 18-25.

⁵⁹ C. Lemoine, *Nosotros los colombianos del milenio* (Bogotá, 2000): p. 48.

⁶⁰ *El Tiempo*, 3 September 2001. See also the security reports by the national cattle-rancher's association, Federación Nacional de Ganaderos (FEDEGAN).

This was a long and difficult task that involved strong emotional and psychological changes for the victims and for people around them.⁶¹ A survey carried out in 20 large cities throughout the country indicated that half the population perceived itself to be at risk of being kidnapped.⁶² While almost 30 percent of the people in the survey admitted that they or their relatives felt a ‘high’ or ‘very high’ risk of being kidnapped, another 20 percent said that they felt a ‘medium’ risk, 51 percent of respondents said that they felt to have a ‘low’ or ‘zero’ risk to be victimised . Since almost half of the people admitted that they feared the possibility of being kidnapped, this answer confirmed that the topic became a major issue for many citizens (see **Figure 1.11**).

Figure 1.11: Perceived Risks of Kidnapping (1999)



Source: Centro Nacional de Consultoría

⁶¹ The following testimony from a former M-19 kidnapper illustrated this point: ‘Some people had to be treated harshly to get a payment. We would take them for two or three days, and threaten their families. They were told that if they did not cooperate, we would kill the victims or do something similar’. See Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro* (Bogotá, 1994): p. 29. Other details on cases and strategies of kidnappers in the country can be found in H. Braun, *Our guerrillas, our sidewalks: a journey into the violence of Colombia*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD, 2003) and Pax Christi Netherlands, *The kidnap industry in Colombia: our business?* (Utrecht, 2001).

⁶² The survey was carried out by the Centro Nacional de Consultoría for a project commissioned by País Libre, ‘Expectativas y actitudes frente al secuestro’ (September 1999). The survey was done in the capital cities of 21 departments and 600 heads of household participated. The exact question was ‘*considerando la situación actual, ¿piensa que el riesgo de que usted o alguien de su círculo familiar cercano sea secuestrado es muy alto, mediano, bajo o ninguno?*’. See C. Lemoine, *Nosotros los colombianos del milenio*, figure 26, p. 49.

Although the main victims of kidnapping have been landowners, cattle-ranchers and businessmen, victims of kidnapping recently has come from every social group, rich and poor, urban and rural. There has been a ‘democratisation’ of kidnapping. The poorest sectors of the population were increasingly targeted, notably in rural areas where guerrilla activity was important and the payment of extortion ‘fees’ was considered as a necessary protection for survival. Although the payment of extortion ‘fees’ was common throughout the country, the victimisation of poor people was notably common in zones where paramilitary and guerrilla groups were present.⁶³ Because of their vulnerability, children were also targeted because they offered less resistance to kidnapers, rarely tried to escape and created more pressures on parents to pay ransoms.

Kidnapping began to appear more frequently in the 1970s as a political tool to put pressure on the authorities. However, the number of kidnappings saw an unprecedented increase in the early 1990s (see **Figure 1.12**). In an international comparison of kidnappings around the world, Rachel Briggs, a researcher at the Foreign Policy Centre in London, put Colombia on top of the list in 1999. The second country listed, Mexico, recorded 50 percent fewer cases than Colombia. The following countries, in order of importance for their numbers of cases were among the most affected: Brazil, the Philippines, Venezuela, Ecuador, the former Soviet Union, Nigeria, India and South Africa. It is significant to note that five out of ten countries in the list are in Latin America.⁶⁴


Although political kidnappings were still committed, about 90 percent of the cases were ransom kidnappings.⁶⁵ Guerrilla groups justified the commission of these crimes by referring to the Marxist argument which pictured the last stage of a revolution by a ‘combination of all forces’ aiming at redistributing the means of production. Ransom kidnapping was thus seen by guerrillas as an alternative way of promoting wealth redistribution in the country. With this theory, guerrillas vindicated the expropriation of lands and resources and accumulated large sums of capital to sustain their activities.

⁶³ The FARC was kidnapping and demanding extortion ‘fees’ to small farmers in their areas of stronghold, notably around the region of the Cagúan. There were also cases of kidnapping of poor people in the cities, but these cases were mainly attributed to common delinquents.

⁶⁴ See R. Briggs, *The kidnapping business* (London, 2001): p. 15.

⁶⁵ For a non-exhaustive list of well-publicised cases of kidnappings in the country, see **Appendix 3**.

Figure 1.12: Reported Cases of Kidnapping in Colombia (1990-2002)



Sources: 1) Policía Nacional – DIJIN (1990-2002) and
2) Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD (1996-2002)

To give more legitimacy to their argument, guerrillas of the FARC started to publish ‘Laws’, using the same terminology and style as constitutional authorities. This served as a mean of propagating fear among the population and of gaining additional resources by collecting extortion ‘fees’ from civilians. Kidnapping and extortion became a major source of income for guerrilla groups. However, the strategy of kidnapping and extorting citizens to collect ‘revolutionary taxes’ was not a new phenomenon. The strategy and terminology were already in use during the 1970s by the Basque separatist group, ETA. In their study on kidnapping and extortion, Mark Bles and Robert Low wrote:

‘Factions of the ETA resided in France but crossed the border ‘to carry out attacks, often of the civil guards and police: bombings, kidnappings and the other highly effective method of fund-raising which they had dreamed up – the ‘revolutionary tax’ as they termed it. Others simply call it extortion. It consists of demanding large sums from wealthy and prominent Basque individuals and businesses on pain of violent retribution if payment is not forthcoming. You might call it kidnapping without abduction. [...] Certainly, many of the best-known names in the Basque business

*community, including the big banks, arguing they could not afford to put their employees at risk, have capitulated to the extortion and have subsidised ETA over the years while publicly condemning its activities.'*⁶⁶

FARC's Law 002 seemed to be an exact replica of this strategy. This suggested that the FARC adopted and copied, with much success, the strategies of other insurgent groups to finance their revolutionary goals. The impact of this was enormous. Kidnapping had long-term effects on the population because it destabilised personal relations between the victims and their families, friends and colleagues. Emotions such as personal guilt, fear, anger, distress and general confusion seemed to be common in most of the victims once they were released.⁶⁷

Psychological studies on this matter argued that victims of kidnapping usually faced strong difficulties in returning to their normal lives for two reasons. First, because of the trauma to which they were submitted during the period of abduction, victims had psychological troubles in recovering over their experience and dealing with the fear of being victimised again. Secondly, because the people around victims learnt to live without them for a long period of time, they normally replaced the victim in professional and family responsibilities. Once the victim was liberated, this was a cause of personal aggression and frustration, as many victims tried to reintegrate their routines without realising that other individuals had much changed.

Carmen Elvira Navia and Marcela Ossa analysed different examples of families in which the head of the household was kidnapped. In most of the cases when victims owned a business or where they had independent sources of revenue, a relative replaced them in their professional activities to guarantee the family income. Once liberated, the majority of victims tried to assume the same responsibilities as they had before the abduction. In most cases, this was a major cause of conflict between family members as the persons who had taken over major responsibilities were not ready to give them back. For some other cases, victims accepted the new roles of their relatives and the transition was made without any conflict. There have also been cases where the victims did not want to resume their professional activities and left all personal and financial responsibilities to other members of the household.⁶⁸


⁶⁶ See M. Bles and R. Low, *The kidnap business* (London, 1987): pp. 200-201.

⁶⁷ País Libre, *Consejos para los familiares del secuestro* (Bogotá, 2002).

⁶⁸ For particular examples, see C.E. Navia and M. Ossa, *Sometimiento y libertad: manejo psicológico y familiar del secuestro* (Bogotá, 2001): p.16. Another example is given in Varios Autores, *Rostros del*

In a survey conducted by the Centro Nacional de Consultoría in 21 large cities throughout the country in September 1999, 85 percent of participants in the survey admitted that they had relatives, friends or colleagues who had been kidnapped in the past.⁶⁹ While only 4 percent of respondents admitted having close relatives that had been kidnapped, another 11 percent admitted to at least one distant relative who had been abducted. Nine percent of respondents said that a work colleague had been victimised and another 26 percent had a friend who had been targeted (see **Figure 1.13**). The study helped to discover that almost two thirds of the people fitted in more than one of the categories. This led Lemoine, who was in charge of conducting the survey, to conclude that: ‘for Colombians, any kidnapping was a threat against everyone’.⁷⁰

Figure 1.13: People with Relatives, Friends or Colleagues That Were Kidnapped (1999)



Source: Centro Nacional de Consultoría

secuestro, where a policeman related his return after a period of captivity of more than 3 months: ‘They were puzzled, assuming I was dead. This was a same idea I found, when I returned to my hometown, Cobaima. They could not believe it, they really thought I was dead. It seemed that I did not exist anymore’. See Varios Autores, *Rostro del secuestro*, p. 76.

⁶⁹ The survey was carried out by the Centro Nacional de Consultoría for a project commissioned by País Libre, *Expectativas y actitudes frente al secuestro* (Bogotá, 1999). The survey was conducted in the capital cities of 21 departments and 600 heads of household participated. See C. Lemoine, *Nosotros los colombianos del milenio*, figure 25, p. 49.

⁷⁰ C. Lemoine, *Nosotros los colombianos del milenio*, p. 48.

Kidnapping not only affected victims and their families, but also altered the entire society. Individuals became distrustful towards each other and the authorities lost their legitimacy among citizens. When victims did not report crimes, it became much harder for law enforcement authorities to find and arrest kidnappers. For criminal groups, this situation became ideal to continue committing crimes in impunity.

Although many people continued to deal with kidnapping and extortion in secrecy from the authorities, the denunciation of this crime has significantly increased. The Presidential Office estimated that 44,305 kidnappings took place between 1980 and 2002 along the country, of which 33,365 of these cases occurred between 1990 and 2002 (see **Table 1.5**).⁷¹ If close relatives of the victims were also taken into account, the total number of Colombians affected by the problem of kidnapping must have reached several hundred thousand. This was by far the highest national average in the world.⁷²

Table 1.5: Reported Cases of Kidnapping in Colombia (1930-2002)

Years	Reported Cases	Cumulative Total
1930 - 1939	5	5
1940 - 1949	20	25
1950 - 1959	389	414
1960 - 1969	805	1,219
1970 - 1979	566	1,785
1980 - 1989	10,940	12,725
1990 - 1999	23,598	36,323
2000 - 2002	9,767	46,090

Sources: 1) Archives of Eduardo Delgado Bravo (1933-1959)
2) Policía Nacional – DIJIN (1960-2002)

⁷¹ Presidencia de la República, 'Posición del gobierno nacional sobre el tema del secuestro y la extorsión en la mesa de diálogo y negociación,' mimeo (Bogotá, 2003): p. 1.

⁷² The statistical data presented in this section were the official figures collected by the Colombian government throughout its different agencies. Most of the data came from the archives of the Fondo Nacional para la Defensa de la Libertad Personal (FONDELIBERTAD) at the Ministry of Defence. This office replaced the *Consejería Presidencial para la Libertad Personal* in November 2000, and is no longer attached to the Presidential Office but to the Ministry of Defence. No statistical database covering kidnapping in Colombia would be complete without taking into account the figures provided by País Libre. It is also important to note here that there cannot be a database on kidnapping which is completely accurate. The statistics cannot be corroborated; and it is certain that a great number of cases go unnoticed by the authorities. However, this observation does not change the overall trends of this crime. The official database represents the minimum number of cases committed. See Pax Christi Netherlands, *The kidnap industry in Colombia*, pp. 28-29 for more details on statistical data of kidnapping in Colombia.

Guerrilla groups were the major kidnappers between 1990 and 2002. They were responsible for nearly 60 percent of all kidnappings committed in the country between 1996 and 2002. Paramilitaries were responsible for 5 percent of the total figure, mainly during the election years.⁷³ These cases of ‘mass kidnapping’ against the armed forces were particularly frequent between 1996 and 2002, when 750 members of the armed forces, notably from the national police, were kidnapped (see **Figure 1.14**).⁷⁴

Because of the progressive draining of wealthy hostages, from 1998 guerrillas started to commit large-scale mass kidnapping against civilians by abducting entire groups of people and then selecting from them the most valuable victims. In a mass kidnapping, large numbers of people were abducted on a random basis and then identified by the kidnappers. Once this process was carried out, kidnappers often released those who could not afford to pay a ransom, or who would not survive a period of captivity. There were numerous cases of kidnapping in which victims had health problems or were of advanced age. If these victims were considered important for their ransom value, they were kept regardless of their physical condition. There were many examples of kidnapping in which victims died in captivity due to poor health conditions, lack of medical treatment, or simply because of the physical efforts that were imposed on them. In other cases, the victims were swapped with other members of the same family who could better resist the conditions of captivity. The most heavily documented example of mass kidnapping was the hijacking of the Avianca Flight 9463, on 12 April 1999 by the ELN when all passengers and crew-members were seized.⁷⁵

⁷³ Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD, *Evolución del secuestro, 1996-2006* (Bogotá, 2008): p. 4.

⁷⁴ See for example, the articles on the kidnapping of soldiers and policemen after the attack to the town of Mitú, capital of the department of Vaupés, in *El Tiempo* and *El Espectador*, Bogotá, 1 November 1998 and following days.

⁷⁵ Other examples included the kidnapping by ELN of a group of people in the Ciénaga del Torno (Magdalena) on 6 June 1999, and the seizure in the Church of ‘La María’ in Cali on 30 May 1999, of more than one hundred people attending mass in an affluent sector of the city who were taken away in truckloads. Among the mass kidnappings committed in 2000 were the roadblocks of Rionegro and Playón (Santander), the roadblocks in the highway from Cali to Buenaventura and the roadblocks outside Bogotá in Machetá, la Calera and Sopó. In 2001, the ELN kidnapped more than a hundred employees of Occidental Petroleum, a U.S. oil company. Most of the people were released during the next day; see *El Tiempo*, 17 April 2001.

This type of kidnapping, especially when carried out at a roadblock, was typically popularised to by the mass media as *pescas milagrosas*, an ironic reference to a biblical parable.⁷⁶ However, the adoption of ironic expressions to describe violent crimes was deemed inappropriate because it trivialised crime. Some scholars, like Mauricio Rubio, maintained a strong position against the use of metaphors and synonyms to portray crimes, because they allowed for a politicisation, a justification and even an acceptance of criminal behaviour. On this, Eduardo Posada also argued that the language analysing the Colombian politics, both domestic and abroad, always emphasised the image of a state and a society lacking legitimacy and intellectual defence, confronting the violent attacks of illegal armed groups.⁷⁷ Posada concluded that the language used to describe crime should remain clear and concise, and should be based on strictly legal definitions. This would not only give authorities more legitimacy in their fight against crime, but would also provide them with better tools to foster democratic consolidation and provide effective governance.

For guerrillas, kidnapping and extortion remained major sources of funding for their activities. The Presidential Office calculated that ransom kidnapping accounted approximately for 40 percent of the total income of the FARC, and approximately 70 percent of the ELN.⁷⁸ Eduardo Pizarro compared the number of military actions carried out by guerrilla groups throughout the country and found that the numbers of municipalities with important guerrilla presence had grown from 437 in 1991 to 622 in 1995. Pizarro also argued that the financing of these operations came from illegal activities:

⁷⁶ The term *pescas milagrosa* means ‘miraculous catch’ and refers to the biblical passage (St. Luke 5:1-11) when Jesus helped a group of fishermen to catch ‘a multitude of fishes’. After the miracle, Jesus ordered his disciples to ‘fear not; from henceforth thou shalt catch men’.

⁷⁷ M. Rubio, *Crimen e impunidad*, pp. 220-230 and E. Posada Carbo (2001), ‘El lenguaje de la paz y sus errores,’ Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.ideaspaz.org/articulos/download/10lenguaje_de_paz_y_sus_errores.pdf>, accessed 10 January 2007. See also M. Rubio, *Del rapto a la pesca milagrosa: breve historia del secuestro en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2005).

⁷⁸ See Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana* (Bogotá, 2000): p. 61.

*'To sustain this strong guerrilla expansion, rebel groups look to diversify their financial resources, aided by the weak demarcation of borders between politics and crime. The traditional depredation of their "internal enemies" via kidnapping has been maintained, while the use of extortion against drug producers and traffickers as well as the petroleum, mining, and agricultural industries has multiplied'.*⁷⁹

Although the exact amount obtained from kidnapping and extorting civilians could not be calculated, these crimes could certainly be classified as one of the major sources of illegal income in Colombia, perhaps the most important after illegal-drug production and the arms trade. Estimates from official sources tended to vary greatly with those from private companies. Control Risks Group calculated that the average ransom paid in 1999 was approximately US\$ 127,672, and the company estimated that the revenues of kidnapping for the guerrillas were between US\$ 150 and US\$ 500 millions. The Colombian armed forces estimated that the average ransom was around US\$ 28,000 and that the annual revenues of these crimes were close to US\$ 72 millions. Differences for the total annual revenues of kidnapping demonstrated that it was extremely difficult to quantify exactly the income of these crimes since there were a large number of cases that were not reported. The significant differences between the estimates of Control Risks Group and the army suggested both that the army was aware of more cases of small ransoms than Control Risks Group, which brought the official figure down, and that the army was unaware of the payment of large sums of money, possibly by employees of multinationals or by wealthy people that preferred the services of private firms like Control Risks Group. Private companies had an interest in publishing large figures for ransoms because this increased the value of their services.⁸⁰

Guerrillas had been extorting large numbers of people and companies to finance the conflict against the state. By justifying their will to 'tax' the rich through kidnapping and extortion, they had institutionalised the use of kidnapping and extortion within the revolutionary struggle. They also encouraged a simultaneous opportunistic kidnapping led by organised delinquents. These groups frequently used the reputation and the name

⁷⁹ E. Pizarro Leongómez, 'Colombia: toward an institutional collapse?,' in S. Rotker (ed.), *Citizens of fear: urban violence in Latin America* (New Brunswick, NJ and London, 2002): p. 61.

⁸⁰ *Revista Semana*, no. 948, 11 July 2000. The figures calculated for Control Risks Group can be found in R. Briggs, *The kidnapping business*, p. 17; and the official figures of the army can be found in Ministerio de Defensa, *Revista del GAULA, 1999* (Bogotá, 2000): p. 21.

of the guerrillas to commit crimes and sometimes, but not always, sold their victims to them.

Extortion ‘fees’ were often referred to as ‘*vacunas*’ (vaccines against kidnapping). These ‘fees’ have been imposed on the middle-classes, but have been extended to all sectors of the population including the poor. As a way to maintain the terror and to keep levying ‘taxes’ from extortion, guerrillas also kidnapped people to convince those who would probably not agree to pay an extortion in the first instance. This not only increased the perception of insecurity among the population, but it also eroded further the reputation of the authorities which were inefficient.⁸¹ With this argument the guerrillas were able to justify their responsibilities as kidnapers by promoting what they called ‘political retentions’, even if these also involved the payment of economic ransoms. The ELN argued that it only ‘retained’ those who had ‘illicitly acquired fortunes’. In the ELN’s view these individual ‘detentions’ were not violations, since all the benefits of kidnapping were supposed to benefit the entire organisation, not only the kidnapers.⁸² Manuel Pérez, a former leader of the ELN, argued that the ELN kidnapped people who have become rich illicitly, demanded ransoms in exchange for their liberty. The victims were told that their ransoms would pass to the hands of the people in a just and noble cause, because it was a struggle for ideals.⁸³

Public opinion regularly criticised this discourse. Because the rationale for kidnapping transformed the goal of a political revolution into a ‘kidnapping business’, guerrillas lost much popular support in Colombia and abroad. By extorting money from the middle-classes, guerrillas also fostered the creation of organised delinquent groups that took advantage of insecurity to commit crimes in impunity.⁸⁴ This strategy of indiscriminate kidnapping was criticised on the evidence that guerrillas subcontracted delinquents to abduct victims. Some sceptical writers referred to the ‘franchises of the FARC’ whereby delinquents worked on an independent basis but used the name of the guerrilla to commit their crimes.

⁸¹ The same problem was seen in Southern Italy with the racketeering and kidnapping threats from the Mafia. Fighting the extortion was like fighting an ‘invisible enemy’. See I.F. Caramazza, *Phenomenology of kidnappings in Sardinia: towards an international perspective of a local crime problem* (Rome, 1984).


⁸² Human Rights Watch, *War without quarter*, p. 38.

⁸³ This was said by the leader of the ELN, Manuel Pérez Martínez, aka ‘Cura Pérez’. Quoted in M. Palacios, ‘Por una agenda de Paz,’ (Mexico City and Bogotá, 1997): p. 40.

⁸⁴ See G. Silva, ‘McFARC,’ in *El Tiempo*, 13 June 2000.

The problem became so important that even the poorest strata of the population turned into victims of kidnapping and extortion. A report published in 2000 by the GAULA, the anti-kidnapping unit of the armed forces, stated that extortion crime and low-ransom kidnapping had significantly increased during the last five years of the 1990s to include many cases which 100,000 pesos (or approximately US\$ 50) was paid. The report also mentioned that many small crimes of extortion were committed inside the prisons, where organised groups of inmates usually put pressure on other groups and individuals.⁸⁵

Figure 1.14: Reported Cases of Kidnapping in Colombia by Motives (1996-2002)



Source: Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD

Figure 1.14 shows a classification of different types of kidnapping in Colombia between 1996 and 2002. This graph distinguishes four main categories of kidnapping and follows the main definitions specified by the law and used by the Ministry of Defence and by País Libre. These four categories are a) ransom kidnapping, b) kidnapping made to demand political concessions, c) kidnapping of members of the armed forces, and d) the ‘simple’ kidnapping that did not have either the extortion of money or political concessions as their aims.

⁸⁵ See ‘Secuestros estrato uno’ in *El Tiempo*, 2 June 2000.

Types of Kidnapping

Although ransom kidnapping might sometimes be accompanied with political demands, most of the time main goal of these crimes was the extortion of money from families and businesses. This was the most common type of kidnapping being committed in Colombia, which figured increasing steadily during the 1990s. Between 1996 and 2002, 9,885 cases were recorded by the authorities.

The second type of kidnapping involved the demand of political concessions. The kidnapper's goal was primarily to exert pressure on the government and to demand a change of legislation, or the liberation of prisoners. The most common victims of these crimes were known public figures, like politicians, journalists, artists and even sportsmen. This type of kidnapping remained stable between 1996 and 2002.⁸⁶

Figure 1.14 distinguishes the kidnapping of members of the armed forces, although these were also considered as political kidnappings. This distinction was made by the Ministry of Defence and by País Libre to separate known cases of civilians and policemen or soldiers who were 'retained' and taken prisoner by guerrillas. The government kept separate data regarding the kidnapping of civilians from those of the armed forces, and responded differently when negotiating the liberation of the victims. This was of great importance during the Pastrana administration, because guerrilla groups were demanding the exchange of kidnapped policemen and soldiers for an equal number of convicted guerrilla members who were serving prison sentences.

⁸⁶ In 1996 only 2 political kidnappings were reported. This was certainly due to an inconsistency in the figures rather than a low number of cases. 1996 was also the year in which was created the Presidential Programme for the Defence of Personal Freedom (PPDLP), known in Colombia as the office of the anti-kidnappings Tsar. The GAULA (*Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal y Antiextorción*, the Unified Action Groups for Freedom) was to be the anti-kidnapping Tsar's operative arm. The most important objective of the anti-kidnapping Tsar, aided by the GAULA, was to improve the inter-organisation coordination between the various state institutions dealing with the fight against kidnapping. However, this did not really work out, also because of corruption in the GAULA, including asking ransom and organising kidnapping.

Because of these coordinating tasks, the anti-kidnapping Tsar earned itself a pivotal position as go-between in the inscrutable and obscure world of kidnapping in Colombia, with all its positive and adverse consequences. There have been continuous rumours that the anti-kidnapping Tsar was susceptible to blackmails, malpractices and giving preferential treatments to cases. President Pastrana announced on 28 June 1999 that within the framework of the state's restructuring promoted by his government, the duties of the anti-kidnapping Tsar were to be taken over by the Minister of Justice. It was clear that its autonomy and capacity of incidence had been seriously curtailed. From being an institution in which policies and decisions were coordinated directly with the President of the Republic, it became a ministerial agency with all the implications in terms of autonomy, budget and operational independence. Finally the anti-kidnapping Tsar was closing down in 2000.

Another governmental institute that was formed in 1996 was the *Consejo Nacional de Lucha contra el Secuestro y demás atentados contra la Libertad Personal* (CONASE). The CONASE created special groups in charge of actions against the perpetrators and accomplices of kidnapping and extortion, conferred special powers to the attorneys and the GAULA and regulated all other aspects of their work.

The third type of kidnapping included what the government defined as ‘simple kidnapping’.⁸⁷ Despite the name, this category was probably the most imprecise. The legislation defined simple kidnapping as being ‘all those considered different from extortion kidnapping’. Simple kidnapping included mainly cases of illegal child custody, but could also include short-term abductions carried out by delinquents on the streets, such as bank-robbers who took ‘human shields’ to escape but did not demand a ransom or concession. Simple kidnapping could also be confused with what was known in Colombia as ‘*paseos millonarios*’, a type of abduction in which victims were forced to give away their personal belongings, as well as credit cards and chequebooks that were used to raid bank accounts.⁸⁸ This category also covered the roadblocks imposed by guerrillas on the outskirts of cities and in rural zones when no victim was abducted for a long period. Roadblocks that were erected with the purpose of making demands from, or protesting against, the government, normally were used to steal money, personal belongings and vehicles from victims, but seldom involved long-term custody.⁸⁹

Every year, a large number of known kidnappings remained unclassified. This included many cases in which families had no contact with victims for several months and hence could not explain the reasons behind the abduction. This category also involved many cases of kidnapping that were not fully reported to the authorities. Law enforcement agencies might be aware of the crime because the relatives had reported it at an early stage, but because of fear of retaliation from kidnappers, they preferred to negotiate the freedom of the victim in complete secrecy. When this happened, these crimes remained unclassified because the authorities did not know the demands of the kidnappers.

Paramilitaries also started committing more kidnappings, but in these years did not consider it a key element in their military strategy, since they calculated it would reduce the support that they received from the rich and the middle-classes. While in 1996, no kidnapping was attributed to paramilitary organisations, in 2002 the number of cases

⁸⁷ See Law 733 of 2002 and other laws mentioned in **footnote 52** of this chapter.

⁸⁸ This kind of kidnapping was perhaps the most common in other Latin American countries, as it did not require a large amount of organisation and logistics from the kidnappers to keep the victims for a long period of time. In Mexico, this kind of kidnapping was referred to as ‘*secuestro express*’, or ‘*secuestro al paso*’ in Peru. Illegal child-custody should not be classified together with the ‘*paseos millonarios*’, with hostage taking situations and with roadblocks. The statistics of the government mixed up all these crimes. Even if in some database readers were warned of this fact, the data were still prone to cause confusion.

⁸⁹ The blockade in the Putumayo Region in November 2000 to protest against Plan Colombia was a good example. During this blockade, many peasants were protesting against the fumigation of thousands of hectares of lands where coca was being grown. Guerrillas often induced indigenous communities or settlers to resort to this form of protest, and to create roadblocks in remote regions of the country.

attributed to them rose to 183, but most did not involve the payment of ransoms. Usually victims were of high political importance, such as journalists, members of Congress and other politicians. These crimes usually had the purpose of protesting against the government's position in the peace process with the guerrillas. Paramilitaries were also accused of kidnapping relatives of senior guerrilla officers in order to force them to retreat from strategic areas of the country and to liberate prisoners and kidnap victims.⁹⁰ By contrast with the guerrillas, paramilitaries rarely kidnapped members of the armed forces. In 2000, there were only two such paramilitary kidnappings, as opposed to over 70 kidnapped by guerrillas.⁹¹

The number of cases attributed to 'delinquent groups' remained relatively stable between 1996 and 2002.⁹² It was important to note that until 1996 there were more cases attributed to 'delinquent groups' than to guerrillas (see **Figure 1.15**).⁹³ From 1997 onwards, the gap between guerrillas and 'delinquent groups' constantly increased, mainly because 'delinquent groups' lacked the necessary infrastructure to expand their kidnapping activities. Official reports frequently referred to 'delinquent organisations' that committed kidnapping and then sold the victims to the guerrillas.⁹⁴ This practice seemed to be especially common in big urban centres such as Bogotá, Medellín and Cali where the presence of guerrillas was not so strong and where the risks of investigation and capture by the authorities were greater.

⁹⁰ For a testimonial account of the strategies of kidnapping followed by paramilitaries, see C. Castaño, *Mi confesión: Carlos Castaño revela sus secretos* (Bogotá, 2001).

⁹¹ For the sources of funding for paramilitaries, see J. Hristov, *Blood and capital: the paramilitarisation of Colombia* (Toronto, 2009): pp. 74-82.


⁹² It should be emphasised that the definition of 'delinquent groups' is purely heuristic. It is dependent upon each authority's definition of 'delinquent groups' is. See C. Moser and C. McIlwaine, *Encounters with violence in Latin America: urban poor perceptions from Colombia and Guatemala* (New York and London, 2004): p. 139.

This did not mean that 'delinquents' in the cities did not commit increasing numbers of kidnapping. Once the victims were kidnapped, they were sold to the guerrillas who negotiated the ransom to liberate their victim. See J.A. Bejarano [et al.] (eds.), *Colombia: inseguridad, violencia y desempleo económico en las áreas rurales* (Bogotá, 1997): p. 50.

⁹³ A document published by País Libre showed that until 1996 more than 52 percent of kidnappings were committed by 'delinquent organisations'. Guerrillas followed with 48 percent. See País Libre, *Crónica de un atroz delio: breve reseña del secuestro* (Bogotá, 1998): p. 15.


⁹⁴ The authorities classified the authors of kidnappings when a ransom or political demand was made. However, it was impossible to know who was the 'intellectual author' of most kidnappings. When 'delinquent groups' sold their victims to the guerrillas before contacting the relatives of the victims, there were no possibilities of knowing who committed the abduction.

Figure 1.15: Reported Cases of Kidnapping in Colombia by Perpetrators (1996-2002)



Source: Ministerio de Defensa - FONDELIBERTAD

Figure 1.16: Reported Cases of Kidnapping in Colombia by Guerrillas (1996-2002)



Source: Ministerio de Defensa - FONDELIBERTAD

*Other guerrilla groups included the Ejército Revolucionario Popular (ERP), the Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista (ERG) and the Jaime Bateman Cayón Group (JBC).

Figure 1.16 reveals the rapid and constant growth in the number of kidnappings attributed to the FARC and the ELN. Between 1996 and 2002, these two groups had committed annually almost 90 percent of the reported numbers of kidnapping caused by all guerrillas throughout the country.⁹⁵ Of the two, the FARC was consistently the major group behind the nation's kidnapping because of its strategy to use kidnapping as a main element of their political conflict against the system. Because the FARC was the largest insurgent organisation, it had arguably the best strategies, logistics and infrastructure for conducting successful kidnapping and controlling victims while negotiations took place. Between 1998 and 2002, many people accused the FARC of using the 'demilitarised' zone of the Caguán in southern Colombia to keep abducted people, where the law enforcement authorities could not enter that zone. However, this was not the only reason behind the escalation of ransom kidnapping. The ELN, which did not possess such a 'demilitarised' zone, also increased its number of kidnappings during these years.

The ELN also used kidnapping to finance itself. For the late 1990s, recorded statistics showed that the ELN were as responsible as the FARC for fostering the 'kidnapping business' and went further in 2001. The ELN, however, was probably more dependent on kidnapping and extortion than the FARC, since it did not take an active role in other lucrative activities like the commerce of illegal drugs and the import of weapons for the black market.⁹⁶ By 2002, half of the ELN's victims were captured in mass kidnapping.⁹⁷

By achieving what Eduardo Pizarro described as an 'insurgency war without revolution', Colombian guerrillas were unable to win a military war: they were able to perpetuate a conflict, in which money rather than ideology became the pillar of the revolution.⁹⁸ Marco Palacios went even further when he resumed the situation as follows:

⁹⁵ Other small guerrilla groups like the Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista (ERG), the Jaime Bateman Cayón Group (JBC) and the Ejército Revolucionario Popular (ERP), did not participate so actively in kidnapping. The exception was the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), which was responsible for approximately 5 percent of the number of cases committed by the insurgency.

⁹⁶ The leader of the ELN, Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, publicly admitted in a television interview in 2000 that the ELN was generating revenues through extortion and kidnapping. See 'ELN tiene recursos en el exterior,' in *El Espectador*, 29 September 2000.

⁹⁷ M. Rubio, 'Kidnapping and armed conflict in Colombia,' Paper presented at the PRIO Workshop on 'Techniques of Violence in Civil War' on 20-21 August (Oslo, 2004): p.13.

⁹⁸ See E. Pizarro Leongómez, *Insurgencia sin revolución: la guerrilla en Colombia en una perspectiva comparada* (Bogotá, 1996).

*‘Although it is accepted that the roots of the social conflict lie deep in unequal and unfair contexts, other arguments are put forward in order to explain the persistence and degradation of the armed conflict, most of them related to the economic surpluses managed by the guerrillas’.*⁹⁹

While the ELN kidnapped people for their ransoms, it also committed a number of political kidnappings for publicity purposes. Among the most notorious mass kidnappings was the seizure of passengers and crews in an Avianca Flight 9463 on 12 April 1999, which was interpreted as a propaganda coup to attract the attention of the mass media, the government and the broader population, diverting them from the peace process with the FARC. A hostage-taking operation rapidly became a mass kidnapping with the purpose of extracting money from the passengers and crew members. While the oldest and most frail passengers were freed the day after the abduction, other passengers and crew members remained captives for over a year.¹⁰⁰

Principal Victims of Kidnapping


The authorities concluded that among the victims of ransom kidnapping, those who were most at risk were mainly businessmen, followed by company employees and cattle-ranchers (see **Figure 1.17**). For security reasons it was likely that some businessmen described themselves as ‘employees’ of the companies they owned because the general perception was that employees had a lower risk of being victimised than the owners. The statistics contained in **Figure 1.17** can be helpful in understanding the patterns of victimisation, but are extremely blurry and should be used with caution. Company employees can include any kind of employee from blue-collar workers to white-collar executives. Because of their vulnerability, sons and daughters of target victims were particularly at risk since they offered less resistance to kidnappers when abducted. When they seized children and teenagers, kidnappers usually found it easier to obtain political concessions from the government and large sums of money from their families. Bus drivers were also common victims of kidnapping, seized during roadblocks by guerrillas in remote regions. Because inter-municipal buses were often

⁹⁹ M. Palacios, ‘Por una agenda de paz,’ p. 37.

¹⁰⁰ The account of the kidnappings has been recorded by one of the passengers in a diary. Although the text does not present any significant analysis of the situation, it depicts the relation of the kidnappers with their victims while in captivity. See L. Kállı, *Kidnapped: a diary of my 373 days in captivity* (New York, 2006).

the only link between urban zones and remote rural regions, drivers could be kidnapped for a ransom and their buses burnt.

Figure 1.17: Occupations of Victims of Ransom Kidnapping (2000)



Source: Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD

Engineers also appeared as a separate category because the guerrillas, especially the ELN, targeted companies from the oil, mining and energy sectors. Because most of these were multinationals commanding substantial resources, their employees were often the targets of these crimes.¹⁰¹ The law enforcement agencies had difficulty in investigating and prosecuting these criminals because they often occurred in remote locations. For these companies, it was sometimes easier to pay the extortion ‘fees’ and include these in their operation costs. Since the profits of mining and energy companies were always important, they could afford to pay extortion ‘fees’ without suffering losses. Other firms in less profitable sectors of the economy could not afford these losses and had to close or relocate their operations.

¹⁰¹ To understand the history and strategy of the ELN, see the chapter by A. Peñate, ‘El sendero estratégico del ELN: del idealismo guevarista al clientelismo armado,’ in M.V. Llorente and M. Deas (eds.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz* (Bogotá, 1999): pp. 53-98.

Foreigners also tended to be important victims of kidnapping since the ransoms paid by them were much higher than those paid by Colombians. The principal perpetrators were the guerrilla groups FARC and ELN. The estimates ranged from 40 to 70 percent. According to the DAS, the guerrilla could be held responsible for 60 percent of the kidnapped foreigners over the period 1995-2000.¹⁰² The paramilitary accounted for one case during the same period. Although in the year 2000 only 22 cases of kidnappings of foreigners were reported to the authorities, it was probable that many others preferred to negotiate directly with kidnappers to pay ransoms and extortion 'fees'. Information derived from the statistics of País Libre indicated that approximately 50 percent of the kidnapped foreigners were Europeans (especially Italian, German and Spanish citizens).¹⁰³ Pax Christi, a non-governmental organisation, started a world campaign to report the hypocrisy of foreigners in this matter. This was because foreigners, and notably Europeans, paid important sums of money through ransoms and extortions. While European governments were active negotiators in the peace processes with guerrilla groups, according to Pax Christi, many European companies and individuals contributed to the 'kidnapping business' by paying large ransoms and extortion 'fees' to guerrillas and paramilitaries.¹⁰⁴ Pax Christi argued that the international community, and especially the countries of the European Union, should be more active in reporting these crimes and in preventing payments of money to criminal groups in Colombia.¹⁰⁵

In the cases of political kidnapping, where civilians were kidnapped and no monetary ransoms were paid, the occupation of the victims was easier to define. The main victims of political kidnappings were town mayors (*alcaldes municipales*) and members of local and national councils (*consejales* and *parlamentarios*). Members of Congress, especially those who represented constituencies where guerrilla groups were present, were often targeted. The risks of being kidnapped increased when victims held

¹⁰² Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), *Temática cuestionario Pax Christi* (Bogotá, 2000).

¹⁰³ País Libre, *Secuestro, extorsión y guerra en Colombia durante los años 1996-2002* (Boletín de Prensa), (Bogotá, various years).


¹⁰⁴ In October 2000, the EU announced the financing of €105 million in aid programme, corresponding to the entire allocation for Colombia during the period 2000-2006. This aid was invested in the following areas: projects in the sphere of social and economic development and combating poverty; supports for alternative and sustainable development; supports to administrative and judicial reform; actions to support the promotion and defence of human rights. Some financial aid was also sent to attend emergencies like mass displacements caused by the conflict. Several European countries also participated in the *Comisión Facilitadora* that mediated in the negotiations between guerrilla groups and the government. European members of the commission included Spain, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The other countries involved in the commission were Venezuela, Canada, Mexico and Cuba.

¹⁰⁵ Pax Christi Netherlands, *The kidnap industry in Colombia*, p. 9.

public office or were running for elections, and the aim of kidnapper was often to achieve a local or national political objective.¹⁰⁶

Figure 1.18 shows the reported circumstances of victims at the end of each year between 1996 and 2002. The most notable feature of this graph is that the number of liberations did not grow at the same pace as the number of kidnappings. This could mean that more people remained in captivity for more time, or that people did not report the fact that they were liberated. Law enforcement authorities were not always informed about the liberation of victims for three reasons: First, the victims were afraid of possible retaliations from kidnapers; secondly, victims did not want to think further about the crime after liberation; thirdly, they did not want to give details about the ransom and distrusted the authorities due to fear of involvement of authorities in kidnapping.

Figure 1.18: Circumstances of Victims at the End of Each Year (1996-2002)



Source: Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD

¹⁰⁶ Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD, *Evolución del secuestro, 1996-2006*, p. 4.

A *liberation*, as the Colombian government defined it, took place when the victim was freed after a period of negotiations. However, to say that someone was ‘liberated’ did not indicate that a ransom was paid, or a political concession was made, or a victim was freed for health grounds. Despite efforts from the government and from organisations like País Libre, most victims preferred not to talk about their experience after being released. Therefore, the authorities were unable to improve their data about releases of victims.

Figure 1.18 also includes some of the results obtained by the government in the struggle against this crime. It was impossible to know exactly what had been the level of governmental involvement in the number of releases that took place annually. Governmental involvement usually took the forms of rapid armed interventions that led to the rescue of victims, and of ‘pressure’ against the kidnappers, for example, capture or negotiation with guerrilla or paramilitary leaders.¹⁰⁷ This was perhaps the most tangible aspect of official involvement and could be seen in numerous rescue attempts by the authorities. Preventive policy-making to avoid kidnapping hardly existed, with the authorities reacting to crimes after they were committed.¹⁰⁸

In 1996, while more than 1,000 kidnapping cases were reported, 239 people were rescued and 162 remained captive. From 1997 onwards, the number of captive people increased and was significantly higher than the number of rescued people. During 2002, nearly 3,000 people were kidnapped and nearly one third of them were still captive by the end of the year. In that year, the authorities only succeeded in rescuing around 700 victims. The data available also indicated an increase in the number of deaths in captivity, suggesting that the risk of being killed while kidnapped had risen because the authorities adopted stronger strategies to rescue people. Kidnappers took hostages as guarantees of avoiding capture and killed some victims to avoid being identified if caught. The following testimony illustrates the argument from the kidnapper’s point of view:

¹⁰⁷ Usually the government negotiated only with guerrilla groups because they had the status of ‘belligerent group’. Since the paramilitaries did not hold such status, in theory the authorities should not negotiate with them. In practice, negotiations for the release of victims were frequent.

¹⁰⁸ For more on this, see **Chapter 3**.

*‘The cattle rancher stayed eight months in the same place, guarded by ten people. It was never necessary to move him to another place, which was good because not moving him was less risky. Anyway, the ‘slogan’ was that if something happened the guy should be used to save lives’.*¹⁰⁹

Another testimony, from a policeman ‘retained’ by the ELN, revealed the same argument from the victim’s point of view:

*‘The guerrilla who guarded me ran out and closed the door when he heard the helicopters. (...) I felt happy; I thought at that moment I was going to be rescued. But at the same time I thought maybe they would open the door, kill me and leave me lying there. Since I was tied up and blindfolded I would not be able to avoid it’.*¹¹⁰

The number of escapes was low. Assessing the right moment and the right place to escape was extremely difficult, but some former victims claimed that the likelihood of a successful escape was highest during the first hours of captivity.¹¹¹ Victims were kept in unknown places, often in remote and unpopulated areas of the country. If they were taken to a guerrilla or to a paramilitary controlled area, the probabilities of escaping were close to nil since it was too difficult to get help or to find a route to safety. By 2002, only 1 percent of the victims had managed a successful escape.

Kidnapping in Bogotá and Cundinamarca

Bogotá experienced a rise in the numbers of kidnappings. According to FONDELIBERTAD, the authorities reported 167 cases in 2000, an increase of 170 percent compared to 1996, before the number fell by half to 80 cases in 2002 (see **Appendix 4**).¹¹² Almost 80 percent of the victims admitted that a ransom was paid. A small proportion of other kidnappings was classified as being ‘simple kidnapping’ (5 percent), and political kidnapping was rare. Between 1998 and 2002, there was only one reported case of a political kidnapping in the city (in 2000 the FARC kidnapped one victim).

¹⁰⁹ Testimony of a former M-19 kidnapper, in Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro*, p. 33.

¹¹⁰ Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro*, p. 59.

¹¹¹ See H. Braun, *Our guerrillas, our sidewalks*, chapter 1.

¹¹² It is important to mention that many of the residents of Bogotá were kidnapped outside the limits of the city and therefore appeared as being kidnapped in the department of Cundinamarca.

The main perpetrators of kidnapping in Bogotá were ‘delinquent groups’ and the FARC. Between 1996 and 2002, 31.3 percent of reported kidnappings were made by ‘organised delinquents’ and 20.8 percent by the FARC. A large proportion of kidnappings seemed to be committed by ‘common’ delinquents ‘on request’ from the FARC. Many cases remained unclassified and the exact authors could not be determined until someone reported the crime (there were 43.6 percent of unclassified cases between 1996 and 2002). The Ministry of Defence held the FARC responsible, even if no proof were established, because ‘organised delinquents’ often committed crimes under its patronage. The ELN was sometimes responsible for kidnapping people in and near Bogotá (1.9 percent between 1996 and 2002), although their presence was not marked. Despite the ELN claim to have an urban front in Bogotá (the *Frente Urbano Oscar Fernando Serrano Rueda*), there was no strong evidence of a permanent ELN presence.

As in the rest of the country, the main victims of kidnapping in Bogotá were those with access to economic resources, like businessmen, engineers and foreigners. Students and children were also common victims. The geography of kidnapping in Bogotá remained unclear; and the authorities knew only that the areas where kidnapping was most common were the avenues and main roads connecting the capital with the outskirts, where kidnapping usually took place outside rush hours to avoid heavy traffic.¹¹³ These factors facilitated an easy escape for kidnappers.

Cundinamarca saw an important increase in the number of kidnappings during the late 1990s, when the number of reported cases jumped from 21 in 1996 to 225 in 2002, probably reflecting the relative prosperity of the Department. In 2000, 142 kidnappings out of 212 (almost 70 percent of the case) that were reported, involved the payment of ransoms. Only 6 cases, equivalent to 2.8 percent, had political motives.¹¹⁴ Simple kidnappings and kidnappings of members of the armed forces accounted for 11 and 1 cases (5.1 percent and 0.4 percent) respectively. In Cundinamarca, the FARC had a notable presence in most of the municipalities where kidnapping was common, and in some municipalities like La Calera and Anapoima where it was not strong, it was involved in kidnapping.¹¹⁵ During 2000, the FARC was the author of more than 150

¹¹³ Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD, *Evolución del secuestro 1996-2006*, p. 26.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹¹⁵ Guerrilla factions of the FARC had attacked and had made several roadblocks close to La Calera. Due to the proximity of this town with Bogotá, these attacks were purely strategic. They served as a political tool by the guerrillas to appear in the media and to put pressure on the government.

kidnappings, almost 70 percent of those reported. Because of several reported cases of victims being sold to the FARC, it was very difficult to calculate the exact number of kidnappings committed by 'delinquent groups'. In 2000, 'delinquent groups' working alone without the known support of the guerrillas, were responsible for almost 9 percent of the cases. Drug-traffickers, although present in Cundinamarca, did not commit any reported kidnappings like their counterparts in the Valle region.

Final Comments

I began this chapter by summarising some of the findings in the research on homicide in Colombia. It has described how the problem of violence was perceived as most acute in the larger cities where most of the country's homicides were committed. It also showed that homicide in Colombia was in terms of absolute numbers mainly a problem of large cities. Contrary to common belief, most of the homicides did not take place in confrontations between the guerrilla groups, the paramilitaries and the public forces. In 1987, the *Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia* argued that street violence was causing more deaths than the rural violence caused by guerrilla and paramilitary fighting. Despite the common perception that Colombians have of the intensity of the conflict, in 2002 the contention of the *Comisión* still applied.

In 2000, the ten largest cities in the country were responsible for 40 percent of the total number of reported cases. These accounted for almost 10,000 homicides. The three largest cities, Bogotá, Medellín and Cali were responsible for the largest share of this violence. An important share of these homicides stemmed from the existence of well-organised criminal groups and youth bands, linked with the larger criminal organisations such as drug-cartels and related organisations. A possible explanation for the intense degree of violence seen in some cities could be that gangs often competed for territories and for the economic prizes that were available in it.

Then I analysed the homicide in Bogotá between 1990 and 2002. Some conclusions can be derived from a finding. First, the problem of homicide has to be analysed on a local basis. Each locality contained specific and well defined sectors of violence. The study of homicide must analyse specifically each of the zones affected and take into account not only the population living there but also its social, political and economic characteristics. This finding also permits one to argue that despite the fact that a majority of homicides took place in zones defined as being medium or poor in

terms of the socioeconomic levels of their inhabitants, it was not possible to say that homicide was simply correlated with poverty. The number of homicides tended to be greater where the profits from other violent crimes were also greater. This may suggest that homicide tended to be concentrated where there was a larger number of parallel yet less visible crimes, such as violent robbery, kidnapping and extortion.

I moved on to analyse the problem of kidnapping in the country. Although this crime is far more difficult to detect and report than homicide, it is crucial to understand its importance within the context of recent Colombian politics because after homicide, kidnapping was undoubtedly the major problem affecting citizens' security.

Guerrillas had promoted the use of predatory, criminal activities to finance the increasing costs of arms and goods and of their operations generally. Guerrilla groups were the major kidnapers between 1990 and 2002, responsible for nearly 60 percent of all kidnappings committed nationally between 1996 and 2002. Because guerrilla organisations were large and controlled extensive areas of the territory, victims tended to spend more time in captivity than in other Latin American countries. The paramilitaries authored less than 10 percent of the country's kidnappings because this crime was not part of their main military strategy. Most kidnappings attributed to them had political purposes like a protest against the government's peace negotiations with guerrilla groups. By integrating into their discourse the need to 'tax' citizens and businesses through kidnapping and extortion, armed groups around the country had established a 'kidnapping industry' that affected most of the population and the citizens' security, notably around the areas of the country where economic activities tended to be concentrated. These areas were around the cities and in the rural areas where the productive sectors of the agriculture, cattle-ranching and mining were concentrated.

The consequences of kidnapping in the country had been enormous. Relations between people were affected at all levels of society; family relations had severely been destabilised and individuals became more self-reliant, distrustful towards each other and sceptical about the country's situation. This crime also had a negative impact on community relations creating a loss of trust among people and towards the authorities. This lack of trust was reflected by a lower capacity to implement effective security policies and to provide acceptable levels of governance by the authorities. Kidnapping and extortion crimes had serious economic consequences, since these crimes significantly increased the costs of firms to guarantee the security of their personnel and

their installations. Firms had to face significant losses of income, forcing many to close offices, fire employees and relocate operations.

The problem of kidnapping also affected foreigners, both in the country and abroad. While only a small minority of cases involved the kidnapping of foreigners, they had usually been primary targets since ransoms paid were much higher and they could often be paid in hard currencies abroad. Kidnapping foreigners caused much publicity and created distress among citizens, they also served as a way to extort many other citizens who preferred to pay than to be abducted. Many Colombians including those from the poorest sectors of the population had also been forced to pay. These cases, however, did not attract the attention of the authorities or the media.

For Colombia's economy this was reflected by a decrease in the levels of investment, both foreign and local. The impact on tourism had also been important, even in zones where kidnapping was not so frequent. While the economic crisis might reflect the global and regional economic slowdown, it was undeniable that the insecurity was among the main obstacles to achieve a rapid economic recovery and to promote further development of the country and its people.

However, the government's response to these crimes had been slow and incoherent since it was trying to negotiate peace with the illegal armed groups without demanding a complete stop of the 'kidnapping business'. Because a truce with the guerrillas would also mean a sharp decrease in their revenues, the difficulties to end with the 'kidnapping business' were evident. Guerrillas had always preferred to focus on the issue of wealth redistribution rather than wealth creation. By maintaining the strategy of 'taxing' citizens through kidnapping and extortion, they were causing great problems to the majority of Colombians. Increasing levels of violence, lost revenues, investments and opportunities had been evident consequences of this. Long-term consequences also included mass internal migration, unemployment and increased poverty which will be analysed in **Chapters 4 and 5**.

All these problems perpetuated the levels of fear among the population. The next chapter focuses on this issue; it looks at the concept of fear and perception of crime among the population. It also discusses the impact that these factors have had on the capacity of the authorities to reduce violent crimes and to promote the rule of law.

CHAPTER 2

Public Perception and Fear of Violent Crime

This chapter deals with the public perception and fear of violent crime in Colombia. The topic is essential to understand the consequences of violent crime in a society where citizens often have to rely on their own strategies to minimise potential victimisation risks. Public perceptions could be used to understand how people reacted to violent crime and how this could affect citizen security strategies.

As shown in **Chapter 1**, although most of the victims were poor, homicide was not necessarily committed in the poorest areas. It tended to be concentrated in the areas where economic resources were available and where other crimes like robberies were common. **Chapter 1** also revealed that kidnapping was spread around the country and most cases tended to concentrate near the large urban centres or in rural areas where illegal armed groups could impose the payment of illegal ‘taxes’ to citizens in exchange of their liberty. The general perception among the population was that violence significantly increased because of the daily amount of information on violent crime that people had to process. Citizens saw, heard and read about crimes, many of whose perpetrators were never brought to justice. This fact could have important consequences on the population, as many lived in fear and perceived increased victimisation risks. Colombians had learnt to live in a society of risk, where crime levels were high and where individual behaviour must adapt in order to deal with the insecurity. Violent crime like kidnapping worsened this situation by increasing the levels of fear among citizens.

Homicide risk could be minimised by avoiding risky locations where violence tended to concentrate. Extortion crime, however, could rarely be avoided nor minimised, because victims could not predict it and were usually targeted against selected victims. The victims included the individuals on whom the crime was inflicted and their close relatives who shared the experience. After this, many other people would potentially feel at risk. Public perceptions might consequently be useful to understand these risks.

The problem was that perceptions varied from one place and one individual to another. Perceptions depended on factors such as sources of information that the individual accessed, personal interests and ways of diffusing the information. Thus, the analysis of perceptions of crime and security risks was a difficult task because neither perceptions nor risks could be easily measured or quantified.¹

The most common topic in risk literature dealt with health risks: risks of smokers developing cancers, risks of environmental pollution or car accident risks. Risk literature, however, has not been able to quantify security risks due to the impossibility of modelling populations at risk. Arguably, it was possible to count the number of smokers that had developed cancers and the number of cigarettes smoked annually. The calculation of risk of developing cancer was consequently feasible. Victimization risks could not be calculated like that. We could find reliable data on crime and then tried to calculate victimisation trends but the quantification of security risks could not be known because crime varied depending on innumerable other variables such as the time of the day, its location, the number of people around possible victims as well as general factors like the conditions of governability and legitimacy of the authorities.²

Important questions occurred when studying perceptions of crime. How close to reality were these perceptions? To what extent could individuals rely on perceptions in order to minimise the risks of victimisation? How could citizens effectively measure these risks? In a few words, how could individuals know when being 'safe was safe enough'?

There seemed to be a certain degree of subjectivity in the decisions that individuals took to avoid victimisation risks. Possible alternatives might include the adoption of a constrained behaviour that limited the probability of being victimised. Examples of a constrained behaviour might include the refusal to go out at night, or to visit public places. It might also include the decision to migrate or the fact that someone accepted to be

¹ See K.F. Ferraro, *Fear of crime: interpreting victimisation risk* (Albany, NY, 1995): pp. 27-33.

² It is interesting to note that a review of risk literature between 1970s and 1990s, covering 26 chapters over 500 pages, deals with a vast array of topics from fatality risks when driving without belts, to developing cancers and living a nuclear tragedy. No single chapter though deals directly with security risks. In spite of this, the book provides an interesting source of concepts that refer to crime situations and that can be brought together in order to understand better the topic of crime risk. See P. Slovic, *The perception of risk* (London, 2000).

victimised.³ Alternatively, those who perceived the risks to be manageable might sometimes decide to adopt defensive or retaliatory behaviours. Examples of such behaviours abounded. While some people agreed to pay extortion ‘fees’, others were kidnapped because they refused to pay. Some of them would call the authorities while some others retaliated by contracting private security groups. Others simply avoided the risks and left the area where they felt insecure, which led to a mass internal displacement (see **Chapters 4 and 5**). These were essential consequences that must be kept in mind when analysing the effects of violent crime in the population.

To discuss this topic, the chapter is divided into two main parts. The first one defines concept of risk theory and perception, while the second part illustrates these arguments by presenting examples taken from Colombia. The main argument demonstrates how perceptions differed from one person to another and thus had strong consequences for the legitimacy of the authorities, and their effectiveness in bringing down levels of violent crime.

Perceptions could be created and modified at any time. By diffusing news on violent crime, the media had a singular role in creating perceptions on the subject among the population. However, different uses of language, phraseology and content led readers to have different perspectives on the same topics. Usually, the perception of violent crime would be closer to reality when individuals increased their knowledge on the subject. To improve public perception of violent crime, it was necessary to provide a better understanding of crime problems among the public, to improve the levels of communication between citizens and authorities and to increase the levels of citizen participation in security strategies. If these goals could be reached, citizens might have a better understanding of the problems of crime and violence. This provided the authorities the legitimacy to obtain better results in their citizen security strategies.

³ Other mentions of the adoption of a constrained behaviour can be found in T.P.R. Caldeira, *City of walls: crime, segregation, and the citizenship in São Paulo* (London, 2000): p. 28. See also Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), *Equidad, desarrollo y ciudadanía* (Santiago, 2000): p. 310.

Theory and Concept on Perception of Violent Crime

Perception of violent crime, according to Fredric DuBow [et al.] referred to people's assessments of crime rate and the probability of victimisation.⁴ The Oxford English dictionary defines the concept of perception as 'the ability of the mind to refer sensory information to an external object as its cause'.⁵ It is the ability that individuals have to give an interpretation of the situations they see, hear or feel. Perception of violent crime can be defined as an interpretation of past experiences in violent crime and victimisation risks existing in a community at a given time.

Perception of violent crime could be created and disseminated among the public by different actors that could or could not have similar opinions on the matter. Government officials and policy-makers, security consultants, private companies, the mass media and the international community were some of the actors that participated in the creation and diffusion of violent crime perceptions. Common citizens also engaged in this process by spreading their own views and telling past experiences. All citizens observed, heard and processed ideas that could affect other people's opinions, both at local, national and international levels.

The topic of perception had thus to be considered as a key concept in crime analysis. This was a difficult task because perceptions were not only based on the official crime statistics published by government authorities, but they also included personal views based on eavesdropping, life anecdotes and public imagination. Governments could have an influence on public opinion by publishing and explaining citizen security strategies and by reporting results of their fight against crime. Mass media representations of crime played an essential role in the diffusion of public opinion. The mass media could improve the views that citizens had of their governments, but could also counterbalance the efforts of the government by sensationalising news on crime and by criticising the government's lack of results. This could damage the public's opinion and created perceptions that were not necessarily in accordance with the reality.

⁴ F. DuBow [et al.], *Reactions to crime: a critical review of the literature* (Washington, DC, 1979): p. 3.

⁵ The Oxford English dictionary. Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.oed.com>>.

Not everyone necessarily shared and diffused the same perceptions. Different views were spread as a result of the differences in the quality of data used and different uses given to it. Personal opinions also depended on the individual's role inside the community as well as the available knowledge on the topic, age, class, race, gender, wealth and other individual or personal interests. Perceptions of violent crime could consequently change and evolve rapidly. They could evolve in a positive way if individuals felt that violent crime levels diminished or, on the contrary, they could worsen if citizens feared that victimisation risks increased. This might lead people to perceive the existence of high-risk zones that could have significant impacts on the local population and on foreigners. The existence of high-risk zones could erode social relations among individuals living in those zones and produce a de-legitimisation of the authorities and even a slowdown in commercial activities. In short, negative perceptions could also cause individuals to leave their cities or regions in order to minimise the risks of victimisation. Negative perceptions provoked unforeseen reactions among the public.

One of the most common consequences of the perception of violent crime was the general appearance of fear among individuals.⁶ This involved the adoption of constrained behaviours that might change social habits by forcing individuals to do certain things that they would not do otherwise, such as avoiding public places, not going out after dark or fearing strangers.⁷ This behaviour supposed that individuals were able to judge the risks

⁶ Fear of crime has been described as negative emotional reactions that people start to generate after having been victimised or after perceiving risks of crime. Most studies about fear of crime did not differentiate between perception of crime and fear of crime. Authors assumed the existence of fear to be a necessary element for the creation of perception of crime. Although the two concepts were no doubt related, they were nonetheless, distinct phenomena. A person could judge his or her risk of crime to be high but not necessary be afraid. See K.F. Ferraro and R.L. Grange, 'The measurement of fear of crime,' *Sociological Inquiry*, no. 57, issue 1 (1987): pp. 70-97. See also D. Kruijt and K. Koonings, 'Introduction: violence and fear in Latin America,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Societies of fear: the legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America* (London, 1999); C. Moser, A. Winton and A. Moser, 'Violence, fear, and insecurity among the urban poor in Latin America,' in M. Fay (ed.), *The urban poor in Latin America* (Washington, DC, 2005); C. McIlwaine and C. Moser, 'Living in fear: how the urban poor perceive violence, fear and insecurity,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Fractured cities: social exclusion, urban violence and contested spaces in Latin America* (London, 2007) and D. Howard, M. Hume and U. Oslender, 'Violence, fear and development in Latin America: a critical overview,' *Development in Practice*, vol. 17, no. 6 (2007): pp. 713-724 for the context of violence and fear applied to Latin America.

⁷ When people experienced real fear, the response depended on the individual; nonetheless, it was society that constructed the notions of risk, threat, and danger, and generated standardised modes of response, updating both – notions and modes of response – according to the historical period. See R. Reguillo, 'The social construction of fear: urban narratives and practices,' in S. Rotker (ed.), *Citizens of fear: urban violence in Latin America* (New Brunswick, NJ and London, 2002): pp. 190-193. In a context of Colombia, see L.A.

and prospect about the chances of avoiding crime. Public perceptions were essential variables in the generation of these judgements.

Researchers on the subject argued that perceptions of risk could decrease the levels of trust among individuals.⁸ A decrease in the levels of trust caused serious damage to the social relations of a community.⁹ A complete lack of trust promoted individualism and lack of co-operation among people de-stabilising social relations inside communities.¹⁰ This factor forced individuals to act individually when confronting situations of crime and eliminated the potential to co-operate with others when analysing potential risks of victimisation.

As a result, the concept of trust was essential to understand violent crime in the urban context: if citizens showed high levels of trust among each other, co-operative strategies aiming at reducing victimisation risks also emerged.¹¹ In other words, the consolidation of trust could reduce fears and ameliorate the perception of violent crime. The existence of trust could also improve the levels of communication and knowledge and therefore help to propagate perceptions that were closer to reality. The propagation of perceptions did not affect only one individual in the community: perceptions affected simultaneously individuals and groups. The creation and diffusion of perceptions had therefore reciprocal

Restrepo, 'Violence and fear in Colombia: fragmentation of space, contraction of time and forms of evasion,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Armed actors: organised violence and state failure in Latin America* (London, 2004): p. 179.

⁸ See J. Hraba [et al.], 'Perceived risk of crime in the Czech Republic,' *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, vol. 35, no. 2 (1998): pp. 225-242.

⁹ C. McIlwaine, 'Geography and development: violence and crime as development issues,' *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 23, no. 3 (1999): pp. 453-463 and N. Cárdua, 'The impact of exposure to violence in São Paulo: accepting violence or continuing horror?,' in S. Rotker (ed.), *Citizens of fear: urban violence in Latin America* (New Brunswick, NJ and London, 2002): p. 164.

¹⁰ L. Sjöberg, 'Perceived competence and motivation in industry and government as factors in risk perception,' in G. Cvetkovich and R.E. Löfstedt (eds.), *Social trust and the management of risk* (London, 1999): p. 89.

¹¹ The concept of trust can be defined as a situation where individuals are willing to relinquish some of the power and control they have over their actions, but without having the feeling that they have actually lost control or power. See G. Cvetkovich and R.E. Löfstedt (eds.), *Social trust and the management of risk*, pp. 4-5. According to Geoffrey Hosking, trust offers us a way of reducing uncertainty. It lies somewhere between hope and confidence, and involves an element of semi-calculated risk-taking. No society can survive, however, on a diet of total distrust. See G. Hosking, 'Trust and distrust: a suitable theme for historians?' *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, vol. 16 (2006): p. 96 and p. 106. For other important studies of trust are A. Giddens, *The consequences of modernity* (Cambridge, England, 1990); F. Fukuyama, *Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity* (New York, 1995); B. Mizralski, *Trust in modern society: the search for the bases of social order* (Cambridge, England, 1996) and P. Sztompka, *Trust: a sociological theory* (Cambridge, England, 1999).

effects on the community. Individuals who perceived different ideas from other people would probably change their own behaviour. Simultaneously, the way in which individuals decided to change their behaviour also affected other peoples' perceptions.¹²

Modelling Perception of Violent Crime and Assessing Behavioural Pattern

It was important to recall that the real volume of violent crime often remained unknown. Many violent crimes went either undetected by the authorities or unreported by the victims. Individuals sometimes chose not to report crimes because they thought the authorities could not be able to investigate and prosecute criminals. It was also possible that individuals were not willing to trust the authorities and hence preferred not to report a crime.

From the amount of crimes that were reported to the authorities, a certain number remained unclassified through lack of information and evidence. The crimes that could be classified and used generated what was known as the official crime database. This official database depended on definitions used, political interests and levels of accountability of data-gathering agencies and on the efficiency to provide accurate figures. Criminologists have often warned the public about the 'many pitfalls in interpreting the meaning of such statistics' because of the manipulation of the data in order to represent the real world of crime.¹³


From the official number of crimes committed per year, only a limited number of cases reached the public, and this, generally through the manipulation of mass media representations. Mass media companies were those who decided which crimes were

¹² This idea was developed in the 1960s and achieved major importance when described as the theory of 'symbolic interactionism'. This theory is helpful to provide an understanding of the role of perceptions of violent crime because it helps to illustrate how people gather and interpret information regarding victimisation risks and then how they choose appropriate courses of action. Herbert Blumer argued that the individual 'selects, checks, suspends, regroupes, and transforms the meanings in light of the situation in which he is placed and the direction of his action'. However, one of the first contemporary analyses of the perception of risk and its relation to crime was made in the mid-1970s, when Richard Henshel and Robert Silverman wrote about the 'growing recognition of the importance of perception in the field of criminology'. See H. Blumer, *Symbolic interactionism: perspective and methods* (Englewoods Cliffs, NJ, 1969): p. 5; R.L. Henshel and R.A. Silverman (eds.), *Perception in criminology* (London, 1975): p. xvi. For the application of the theory to perception and risk of crime, see K.F. Ferraro, *Fear of crime: interpreting victimisation risk* (Albany, NY, 1995): p. 8. See also R. Quinney, 'Public perceptions of crime,' in R.L. Henshel and R.A. Silverman (eds.), *Perception in criminology* (London, 1975).

¹³ M. Maguire, 'Crime data and statistics,' in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of criminology*, 4th ed. (Oxford, 2007): pp. 241-301. See also R. Reiner, 'The case of the missing crime,' in R. Levitas and W. Guy (eds.), *Interpreting official statistics* (London, 1996): pp. 185-205.

newsworthy and therefore of general interest to the public. It was important to note that markets for news companies varied greatly, and therefore, the use of data, phraseology, content and terminology could differ from one source to another (see **Figure 2.1**).

Figure 2.1: Relationship between Mass Media and Crime Perception



Source: S. Hall [et al.], 'Newsmaking and crime,' p. 2.

All these factors had a significant effect on the creation and modification of public perceptions. These depended on the manner in which the information was gathered and then presented to the public. Perceptions were therefore modelled depending on what individuals read, heard or watched.

Examples of crime as a topic for newsmaking abounded in all different media. This fact did not signify that all media representations were similar. On the contrary, systemic variations between news stories existed due to the differences in political contents and professional journalistic strategies. Differences in the patterns of media ownership, for example between private and public companies, might also address audiences with different perspectives. Robert Reiner argued that the interest of crime news stories derived from a variety of features that had nothing to do with the overt issue of crime. Instead they provided convenient vehicles for exploring common moral dilemmas.¹⁴ This had

¹⁴ R. Reiner, 'Media-made criminality: the representation of crime in the mass media,' in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of criminology*, 4th ed. (Oxford, 2007): pp. 302-337. See also J. Katz, 'What makes crime "news"?' *Media, Culture and Society*, vol. 9, no. 1 (1987): pp. 47-75 and P. Dahlgren, 'Crime news: the fascination of the mundane,' *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1988): pp. 189-206. For the Colombian case, see J. Martín-Barbero, 'The city: between fear and the media,' in S. Rotker (ed.), *Citizens of fear: urban violence in Latin America* (New Brunswick, NJ and London, 2002).

undoubtedly an effect on public perceptions and could sometimes create large opinion gaps. Mass media representations had consequently a great responsibility in the way they presented images of crime and violence. As such, the access to information was one of the main components in the modelling of public perceptions.

Reiner also asserted that crime coverage in newspapers, television and movies had a direct effect on the interpretations that everyone attached to crime. The mass media had been described as the most popular for diffusing preconceived ideas on crime and criminals in societies.¹⁵ Because access to information was strongly correlated to age, education and wealth of individuals, images of crime presented by different media should not be taken as being the same in different communities belonging to different socioeconomic levels.¹⁶ Sometimes, the mass media could also be used as a psychological tool against delinquents as they could speculate on the advances of the investigations made by the authorities.¹⁷

The proportion of crime stories was a function of medium, market and time. Broadcast news was known to give more prominence to stories of violence than print.¹⁸ At the same time, 'popular journalism' tended to describe more stories about violent crime than 'quality journalism'.¹⁹ Reiner found out that print journalism, especially 'quality'

¹⁵ This conclusion had already been reached in the early 1960s by J. Klapper, *The effects of mass communications* (New York, 1960). See R. Reiner, 'Media-made criminality,' pp. 303-315. See also Y. Jewkes, *Media and crime* (Los Angeles, CA and London, 2004) and the most recent and in-depth details three-volume books edited by the same author, Y. Jewkes (ed.), *Crime and media*, 3 vols. (Los Angeles, CA and London, 2008).

¹⁶ R. Reiner, 'Media-made criminality,' pp. 305-306.

¹⁷ A good example to illustrate this was given in the testimony of a former kidnapper who systematically refused to read newspapers, to watch television or to listen to radio because of the psychological impact that the news had on him and his colleagues. See Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro*, p. 48. Although the above idea could be true, it was also important to note that the diffusion of news might be extremely dangerous for the victims of kidnapping. Without knowing, the media could divulge information about the victim that the kidnappers did not know when committing the crime. This was the case, for example, of members of the public force who were kidnapped when not wearing their uniforms. This could also be the case of people abducted during a mass kidnapping, and who were 'given away' by the mass media when they divulged precise information about the victim that the kidnappers did not previously know. See R.L. Clutterbuck, *Kidnap and ransom: the response* (London, 1978) and by the same author, *Kidnapping, hijack and extortion: the response* (Basingstoke, 1987). For an example of a former policeman put at risk of being discovered because of a news report, see Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro*, p. 114 and pp. 276-277.

¹⁸ R. Ericson, P. Baranek and J. Chan, *Representing order: crime, law, and justice in the news media* (Milton Keynes, 1991): p. 244.

¹⁹ The concepts of 'popular journalism' and 'quality journalism' were used to define differences in the audience market. The terms were taken from R. Reiner, 'Media-made criminality,' p. 305. Empirical evidence about the use of violent crime in quality vs. popular journalism was found in R. Ericson, P. Baranek and J. Chan, *Representing order*, pp. 244-247.

newspapers and editorial pages, often had more analysis, with radio news having the least and television intermediate.²⁰

The transformation of crime news into sensationalist opinions had not been uncommon. As a result, the mass media had been accused of exaggerating the risks of crime as they had often presented ‘an image of the world which was scary and mean’.²¹ This was especially the case since media companies started facing increasing levels of competition when law and order topics became tradable goods.

Another problem was the politicisation of law and order, a topic that had increasingly attracted the attention of the population.²² Richard Ericson [et al.] concluded that the news media were as much an agency of policing as the law-enforcement agencies whose activities and classifications were reported on.²³ By stressing their views on what was right or wrong, crime topics were often amplified and modified before being transmitted to the population. The mass media tended thus to reproduce law and order instead of representing it.²⁴ To decide if the media should only represent the issues of crime and insecurity rather than judging and analysing whether the authorities were doing their job was a complicated matter. It was extremely difficult to draw the borderline between what comprised the liberty of press and what constituted the limits of influence and judgements of public security issues. The mass media had an important role to play in the definition and analysis of law and order, but it remained confusing whether they should take an active role in the judgement of criminal issues.

²⁰ R. Reiner, ‘Media-made criminality,’ p. 310; R. Ericson, P. Baranek and J. Chan, *Representing order*, pp. 244-247; G. Cumberbatch, S. Woods and A. Maguire, *Crime in the news: television, radio and newspapers: a report for BBC broadcasting research* (London, 1995): p. 7.

²¹ Reiner summarised this by arguing that when real-world violence was compared to real-world crime as measured by official statistics it appeared that the media images exaggerated the probability and severity of danger. This was said to ‘cultivate’ a misleading view of the world based on unnecessary anxiety about levels of risk from violent crime. The levels of influence that the media had on the population, remained equivocal. Academic studies so far had generally accepted that the media had an important role in shaping perceptions and even in promoting fears but the extent to which this had affected societies had not been sustained with strong empirical evidence. See R. Reiner, ‘Media-made criminality,’ pp. 321-323. See also G. Gerbner and L. Gross, ‘Living with television: the violence profile,’ *Journal of Communication*, vol. 26, issue 2 (1976): pp. 172-194 and J.M. Carlson, *Prime time law enforcement; crime show viewing and attitudes to the criminal justice system* (New York, 1985).

²² D. Downes and R. Morgan, ‘No turning back: the politics of law and order into the millennium,’ in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of criminology*, 4th ed. (Oxford, 2007): pp. 201-240.

²³ R. Ericson, P. Baranek and J. Chan, *Representing order*, p. 74.

²⁴ R. Reiner, ‘Media-made criminality,’ p. 326.

Data on crime were usually shared between the government, the mass media and the population with high degrees of precaution. Crime was a sensitive topic, and media companies often misused statistics to attract the attention of the public. Alternatively, by keeping sensitive data away from the public, government had a possibility to improve, or at least to maintain stable the perceptions of crime among citizens.²⁵ The aim of this strategy was indisputably to minimise the risks of misinterpretation and misuse of data by the population. Keeping information away from public opinion also generated misconceptions and deepened the gap between the authorities and the public.

Paul Slovic described what he called ‘the asymmetric principle of human psychology’.²⁶ This principle implied that trust was always more difficult to create than to destroy. When the levels of trust among the population were damaged, for example after an increase in violent crime, it could take a long time for the individuals to rebuild those levels of trust to their former state. In some cases, lost trust might never be regained. The idea behind this principle was that negative events had stronger impacts on the population than positive events.²⁷ Slovic’s conclusion was that in communities where citizens were concerned about low-probability high-consequence events, problematic events would increase people’s perceptions of risk to a much greater degree than favourable events would

²⁵ It was argued that one of the problems of mass media was that they only used the information that was of any interest for them in the business of newsmaking. An example of this happened when the Mayor of Bogotá published a 6-month report on crime in the city made by its Delinquency Observatory. The daily paper *El Tiempo* only took data of the last 4 weeks, biasing the meaning of the whole study. It was clear that if a trend showed a decrease in crime in the long-term, but an increase in the short term, it could be tempting to show only short term results, giving thus a feeling of insecurity.

²⁶ P. Slovic, ‘Perceived risk, trust, and democracy,’ in G. Cvetkovich and R.E. Löfstedt (eds.), *Social trust and the management of risk* (London, 1999): p. 46.

²⁷ An example of this was seen during the opening presentation of the United Nations World Congress on Crime, when researchers from the UN Centre for International Crime Prevention in Vienna presented a paper that summarised the situation of world crime and delinquency. In the presentation, they showed some issues dealing with transnational crime, corruption and victimisation in the world, using the statistics from 60 countries. One of their main conclusions was that crime and corruption were especially important in the Third World and notably in the Latin American countries. Colombia appeared as the country with the highest levels of organised crime and the second most corrupt country in the world after Bolivia. Following the presentation, representatives of the Colombian delegation protested against this classification because it lacked a strong methodology. In their view, Colombia was a country with high levels of organised crime but it was not the most corrupt. UN officers admitted that Colombians had a right to protest and declared the document unofficial. The Colombian delegation continued to protest because the presentation had given a wrong perception of the country to all the participants of the Congress. See United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention (UNCICP), ‘The state of crime and criminal justice worldwide,’ Paper presented at the 10th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime on 10-17 April (Vienna, 2000).

decrease them.²⁸ This was easily visible in mass media representations: negative news usually had stronger repercussions on the population's perceptions of insecurity than positive ones. A newspaper article relating to a kidnapping normally created more impact than the subsequent liberation of the same victim. Public impressions of the crime were manifest through letters of discontent in the print media or public manifestations in the streets, but the liberation of a victim or the arrest of the criminals did not cause such levels of public mobilisation. Examples that illustrated this argument abounded. Massacre, homicide, kidnapping and other crimes constantly filled the news. However, only 'spectacular' arrests, hostage liberations and escapes from the victims were reported. When it was the case, they rarely appeared on the front page like the negative news.

Violent crimes also tended to figure disproportionately in the news.²⁹ This fact was rarely counterbalanced with positive news showing improvements of the judicial system or police achievements in the fight against crime. People consequently were influenced by this imbalance and sometimes believed that insecurity had soared. Joseph Hrabá [et al.] presented a victimology model that correlated perceptions of crime and different social, political and economic variables.³⁰ The idea was to see if there was a relationship between individual parameters such as age, level of education, personal wealth, health and past victimisation experiences and other exogenous conditions such as economic crises and levels of trust in the government (see **Figure 2.2**). Their conclusion confirmed the importance of personal variables in defining local perceptions of crime. Path 'A' in the model, proved to be the most important link to define these perceptions. In overall terms, the conclusion argued that age, education, wealth and personal victimisation experiences were highly correlated to the creation and diffusion of crime perceptions among the population.


²⁸ P. Slovic, 'Perceived risk, trust, and democracy,' p. 49.

²⁹ This statement was based on studies of the British media between 1992 and 1994. One study indicated that over 40 percent of crime news dealt with death and murder on BBC Radio stations. On television, these topics accounted for more than 50 percent of all crime stories on Sky News, 42 percent on ITV and 38 percent on BBC1. See G. Cumberbatch, S. Woods and A. Maguire, *Crime in the news*, p. 25. Although this study focused on British media, similarities could certainly be found in other countries where mass media representations followed the same market strategies. See R. Reiner, 'Media-made criminality,' pp. 308-309.

³⁰ See J. Hrabá [et al.], 'Perceived risk of crime in the Czech Republic,' *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, vol. 35, no. 2 (1998): p. 232.

Trust in the government also proved to be highly correlated to individual perceptions of crime (path ‘CB’). Economic stress, however, was poorly related to perceived risk of crime (path ‘F’). The authors assessed that factors such as economic crises, increased unemployment levels and losses in income revenues did not affect the perceptions of crime. Economic stress only affected levels of public perceptions when trust in governmental institutions decreased simultaneously (path ‘E’).

Figure 2.2: Victimology Model of Perceived Risk of Crime



Source: J. Hrabá [et al.], ‘Perceived risk of crime in the Czech Republic,’ p. 232.

After the appearance of victimisation fears, an individual regularly adopted a different behaviour. This new behaviour should be more appropriate to face the individual’s perceptions of violent crime. Individuals might thus adopt either a risk-taking or a risk-averse behaviour. A risk-averse behaviour had deep consequences for the society as individuals started acting in ways that they would not consider otherwise. Such behaviours included decisions like avoiding concurrent public places or avoiding going out after dark. There were also other more radical risk-avoiding behaviours, like migration and displacement. The opposite alternative would be an acceptance ‘passive’ victimisation such as the voluntary payment of extortion ‘fees’ or the payment of crime insurance policies. These factors had strong consequences over the society as they forced individuals to

redefine all social, economic and political relationships within their communities. If individuals were aware that risks around them abounded and that unexpected outcomes might happen at anytime, a risk-averse behaviour was supposed to remind them that something could actually be done before any further risks were taken. Perceptions of violent crime would therefore help to define and model possible alternatives to risk. In this sense, it was possible to say that the diffusion of public perceptions was a key tool to understand individual risk management strategies.

Because of the subjectivity of risk taking, the results of risk management could not always be accurate and might sometimes lead to more unexpected outcomes. Risks could be minimised, but could not be eliminated. This idea could be illustrated by mentioning the example of someone who, feeling at risk, took what he or she believed to be appropriate security measures, only to become a victim later.


Individual behaviours usually depended on a set of possible alternatives that each individual faced when being confronted to victimisation risks. **Figure 2.3** demonstrates possible alternatives that people faced when facing extortion risks. In such situations, individuals had to choose two possible alternatives for their behaviours depending on their perception of the situation. One involved adopting a constrained behaviour that forced them to retire by migrating or by limiting their exposure to risks. The other possible alternative was to start paying an extortion ‘fee’, often referred to as a ‘vaccine’ against further victimisation risks.³¹

Sometimes, choosing not to get involved was the best way to reduce victimisation risks. Myriam Jimeno and Ismael Roldán [et al.] suggested that in Bogotá at times people chose not to intervene when being witnesses of crime. This non-interventionist behaviour, rather than a display of indifference towards the community, could be interpreted as a risk-avoiding strategy.³²

³¹ Extortion ‘fees’ in Colombia were generally paid in cash or in goods such as agricultural crops, consumer products and livestock. In remote areas where armed groups were highly active and authorities did not have the power to enforce the law, extortion ‘fees’ were almost never reported. See **Chapter 1** for more details.

³² M. Jimeno and I. Roldán [et al.], *Las sombras arbitrarias: violencia y autoridad en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1996). For more on the results of the research of Jimeno and Roldán [et al.] in Bogotá, see **Chapter 1**.

Figure 2.3: Modelling Behaviours When Facing Extortion Risks



Alistair Smith and Federico Varese analysed different models of behaviours that people could adopt when facing extortion threats.³³ Usually, individuals would start paying extortion ‘fees’ because of their fears of punishment if they disregarded the threats. However, the authors argued that the appearance of opportunistic criminals who used the reputation of established criminal organisations might change the perceptions and behaviours among the victims. Although Smith and Varese analysed different mafia organisations operation in Moscow, their study was comparable to the Colombian case: several armed organisations used violent tactics to obtain extortion ‘fees’ from civilians.

The main question that Smith and Varese tried to answer was how citizens distinguished ruthless and unregulated racketeering from serious criminal structures. To answer this question, the authors compared possible risks that people faced when confronting extortion threats. Because serious criminals could be confused with imposters, it was for the victim to decide whether it was worth risking a punishment from the serious criminals for disregarding their threats, or alternatively, if the perception of risk was important enough to start paying ‘fees’. Smith and Varese argued that personal access to

³³ A. Smith and F. Varese, ‘Payment, protection and punishment: the role of information and reputation in the mafia,’ *Sociology Working Papers* No. 2002-03 (Oxford, 2000). In a similar situation, Mark Bles and Robert Low found empirical evidence that fakers would use the reputation of the Basque Separatist group ETA to collect ‘revolutionary taxes’ from the population. See M. Bles and R. Low, *The kidnap business* (London, 1987): p. 201.

information was essential in decision-making processes when facing circumstances of threat: if the victim knew that the treat came from a serious criminal but also knew that the damage that criminals could inflict was not high enough, the victim would not pay. This could sometimes lead to sporadic levels of violence.³⁴ Secondly, victims could sometimes perceive retaliation risks to be extremely probable and therefore immediately started paying extortion ‘fees’. In this case, physical violence would be limited to a minimum but the number of unreported crimes would possibly rise. At this point, perception of violent crime also became increasingly negative. In their own words:

*‘When all is quiet, everything might be going wrong. A dynamic pattern emerges from this setting, where the mafia is in charge and the entrepreneurs always pay [...In] this region, fakers have an incentive to enter the market. This causes the entrepreneurs’ beliefs to change. As more fakers enter the protection market [...] we expect an increase in violence [...] As fakers drop out and entrepreneurs start to believe that there are only real Mafiosi, they again start to pay’.*³⁵

At this point, everything went back to the starting point where only serious criminals could increase the risks for violence. In Colombia, the guerrillas had established a reputation of being violent to those who did not co-operate and few people dared to challenge someone exercising guerrilla authority and demanding extortion ‘fees’. This situation had permitted, mainly in or around the cities where guerrilla groups were not as powerful, an increase in the number of independent criminal groups who acted as impostors.³⁶ In this case, the perception of insecurity was so high that potential victims did not have any alternatives but to pay.³⁷ In these cases, extortionists had the ability to sell ‘the

³⁴ A. Smith and F. Varese, ‘Payment, protection and punishment,’ p. 33.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 34.

³⁶ See **Chapter 1**, especially **Figure 1.15**. **Figure 1.15** presents the importance of ‘delinquent organisations’ that committed kidnappings in the country. ‘Delinquent organisations’ often committed kidnappings and then ‘sold’ their victims to the main guerrilla groups, notably the FARC. This was due to the fact that guerrillas had developed better organisations and logistics, to keep the victims until they were freed. Because victims were often kept for several months, most ‘common delinquents’ could not afford the risk of keeping them. Victims, usually, were much easier to hold in guerrilla controlled zones where neither the police nor the army were able to arrest kidnappers. When the authorities reported a kidnapping made by ‘common delinquents’ who worked for the guerrillas, the latter would have a strong interest to deny their relationship with ‘common delinquents’, except where the police could gather enough proof to substantiate the relationship. See *Revista Semana*, no. 948 (11 July 2000) and G. Silva, ‘McFARC’ in *El Tiempo*, 13 June 2000.

³⁷ M. Rubio, ‘Los criminales y la paz,’ *Revista Semana*, 11 July 2000.

right to security' against the violence that they themselves imposed to the public. Kidnapping was an extreme version of this: victims and their families bought the right not to be injured or killed by the captors. This was common in the countryside where large profits from mining, oil industry and cattle ranching acted as an incentive for companies and landowners to risk being victims.

The decisions taken by people who faced security risks could not be calculated in terms of gained or lost utilities, but rather in terms of gained or lost prospects. This idea emerged in the late 1970s when some researchers developed 'the prospect theory'. This theory stated that individuals were not always given the best choices when facing difficult situations. They often had to choose a second best alternative. With this idea, authors such as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky explained why similar people reacted differently when facing similar risks.³⁸ It was impossible for anyone to have a complete understanding and certainly about the events caused and about other decisions that people might take in a similar environment.³⁹ Sometimes individuals perceived themselves to be at risk when in fact there was no real danger. For example, the kidnapped victim could not know how probable it was to be abducted before the crime happened, as kidnappers generally never disclosed their plans before committing the crime. When the authorities or the potential victims discovered these plans, the crime was usually aborted. If the crime took place, a great number of people would feel at risk, mainly because they tended to compare and identify with the victim. However, from this group of individuals only a limited number would really be at risk.

Another example was given by the number of international migrants: many Colombians left the country during the second half of the 1990s.⁴⁰ The number of asylum-seekers increased abroad, especially in the countries of the European Union. In many cases, those who demanded asylum were not considered at risk and were not granted residence.

³⁸ D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, 'Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk,' *Econometrica*, vol. 47, no. 2 (1979): pp. 263-292.

³⁹ See J.S. Levy, 'Loss aversion, framing and bargaining: the implications of prospect theory for international conflict,' *International Political Science Review*, vol. 17, no. 2 (1996): pp. 179-195.

⁴⁰ Available data from the International Migration Office suggested that in 2000 there were about 3.3 million Colombians living abroad compared with 1.9 millions in 1992. In the last 8 years almost 1.5 million people left Colombia. These figures coincided with data from the *Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad* (DAS). See Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (ANIF), *Informe Semanal*, no. 565 (Bogotá, 2001): pp. 1-2.

The situation became so evident that most European governments introduced visa practices to prevent people from leaving Colombia and to select only those who were at imminent risk of being victimised for asylum.

Perception of Violent Crime and the Colombian Crisis

When violence was used in the commission of crimes such as homicide, kidnapping and racketeering, criminals could create deeper impacts among surviving victims, relatives and witnesses. This violence would later be reproduced and transmitted by individuals who recalled their past experiences and diffused their fears to other people. This had been most visible in Colombia with the ‘kidnapping business’ that increased tenfold during the 1990s. Individuals learned to minimise their victimisation risks by migrating, increasing their own private security, paying extortion ‘fees’ and distrusting other citizens. Surveys conducted by the Centro Nacional de Consultoría in September 1999 revealed that every time a kidnapping appeared in the news, most of the people responded that they felt that themselves or someone in their family could also become a victim of kidnapping.⁴¹

Victimisation risks also differed between geographical locations. The risk of being kidnapped in the city was lower than in rural areas. Perceptions therefore seemed to differ between different risk zones. The kidnapping in rural areas took more time to be solved and involved longer negotiations periods with higher ransoms. In the city, on the other hand, kidnapers tended to use faster strategies such as the ‘*paseos millonarios*’ or the ‘*secuestros express*’. These usually were shorter in time, involved lower ransom demands and did not need long periods of negotiations to free the victim. All these factors decreased the kidnapper’s risks of being arrested. For this same reason it was possible to argue that kidnapping in countries like Brazil and Mexico tended to be of shorter duration than in Colombia. Because the risk that kidnapers faced was greater in those countries, they had to proceed faster in order to minimise their risks. The average duration of a kidnapping in Colombia was longer than in Brazil and Mexico, because large swathes of territory were not controlled by the state.⁴²

⁴¹ C. Lemoine, *Nosotros los colombianos del milenio* (Bogotá, 2000): p. 48.

⁴² For an international comparison of ransom demands and periods of abduction, see R. Briggs, *The kidnapping business*, pp. 15-25. Kidnapping businessmen was a higher-risk, higher-return activity; usually businessmen lived in the cities, had irregular movement patterns and often had unpredictable timetables. For

The main problem with perceptions of violent crime and insecurity was that they tended to be worse than the actual possibilities of being a victim.⁴³ As mentioned in **Chapter 1**, during the years 1990-2002 there were 33,365 reported cases of kidnapping, which affected the entire population because they damaged consequences on the entire social and economic structures of the country. Entire networks of relatives and closed people had been destabilised by the psychological, physical or financial consequences of these crimes.⁴⁴ Because of this, public perceptions tended to classify kidnapping as one of the major security risks affecting Colombians.

Extortion crime had long-term consequences in the population because it destroyed all levels of trust among citizens. In Colombia, this affected social, political and economic structures within the country.⁴⁵ A group of researchers described the Colombian process of de-socialisation as a *modus vivendi* where the need for a sense of community was replaced by a sense of individualism. This caused a social mixture of individual rationality and collective irrationality.⁴⁶

It was precisely this disproportionate imbalance between collective irrationality and individual rationality that created and amplified social risks. Some hypotheses explained that by minimising their own risks, individuals could increase other people's risks. Although this idea could not be proven true, it had often been used by government officials to complain about the lack of civility among citizens, who reproduced their individualism in public areas around them. Concretely, this could be observed by the multiplication of confined spaces such as gated communities (*conjuntos*), closed streets and other zones of privileged access, including also property developers encroaching on parks, pavements and

these reasons, they were more difficult to kidnap and present high risks for kidnappers. A kidnapper once admitted that these kidnappings sometimes required a certain improvisation. The real incentive for kidnappers was the higher ransom that could be obtained in case of successful abduction. See Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro*, pp. 31-33.

⁴³ R. Quinney, 'Public perceptions of crime,' in R.L. Henshel and R.A. Silverman (eds.), *Perception in criminology* (London, 1975) and R. Sparks, *Television and the drama of crime* (Buckingham, 1992), especially chapter 1. For the same analysis in the Colombian context, see M. Rubio, *Crimen e impunidad*, pp. 11-17.

⁴⁴ See C.E. Navia and M. Ossa, *Sometimiento y libertad: manejo psicológico y familiar del secuestro* (Bogotá, 2001) and other articles available at País Libre's internet site, <http://www.paislibre.org/>. See also E. Meluk, *El secuestro: una muerte suspendida* (Bogotá, 1998) and F. Brito Ruiz, 'La estructura del delito de secuestro en Colombia,' Working Paper (Bogotá, 2000).

⁴⁵ It was common to read that Colombians were too individualistic and did not trust or co-operate with each other. High levels of crime and violence had been said to be the main cause of this. See H. Gómez Buendía (ed.), *¿Para dónde va Colombia?* (Bogotá, 1999).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

other public spaces such as schools, clubs and even shopping centres. All of these confined spaces grew at the detriment of public areas that should be accessible to all citizens.⁴⁷

This fact also created a lack of community belonging that allowed potential criminals to work in relative safety in areas where no one knew them, or at least no one preferred to get involved. In these conditions, both criminals and delinquents had a full potential to act in impunity where the authorities lacked popular support from the population to denounce them.⁴⁸ Thus, it was possible to argue that the perception of violent crime was greater where individuals had fewer social contacts and communicate less about local issues.

Extortion crime was also considered as a low-risk alternative for criminals. This was because this crime employed a division of labour that minimised the risks involved. In an average kidnapping, it was thought that at least 5 people participated. This was at least one leader who directed the operation, at least one but often more investigators, several kidnapers and then some invigilators and negotiators. The division of tasks was a necessity in order to guarantee the success of the criminals while reducing the levels of stress and risks of mistake. The leaders regularly were the intellectual authors and took the relevant decisions during the process. The investigators, although their task did not require high degrees of activity, had to undertake all the appropriate investigation about the victim. The kidnapers were those who took usually the greatest risks as they came into direct contact with the victim, the witnesses and sometimes, the authorities. Finally, there were guards who fed and were in charge of the victim while in captivity. These people were often, but not always, in charge of negotiating the price of the liberation.⁴⁹

Due to the large number of people involved in kidnapping, the risks for criminals were brought to a minimum. Within the larger kidnapping organisation, like the FARC or the ELN, kidnapers might not know each other. Sometimes, they were relegated from their duties and replaced by other guerrilla members to minimise any possibilities of

⁴⁷ This was described as a 'system of urban re-organisation' where public places were lost due to the progressive 'closure' of the city and due to the implementation of private housing units, small urbanisations which normally had their own shopping centres, social zones and even schools. See A.M. Téllez Ardila, *Las milicias populares: otra expresión de la violencia social en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1995): p. 36.

⁴⁸ This was one of the main arguments used by the police for the implementation of community policing programmes. The main idea was that by creating a rapprochement between the authorities and the population, criminals had more difficulties to commit their crimes. See Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, p. 30.

⁴⁹ See Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro*, p. 21.

socialisation between the victim and the captors, or between the captors and citizens living in the same area. This complicated further the tasks of the authorities, as it became more difficult to investigate, capture and prosecute those who were responsible for the crime.⁵⁰ Usually those who got arrested were not those who had the greater responsibility in the crime. The authorities might capture those in charge of abducting or hiding the victim, and also arrest those negotiated the victim's liberation. But the masterminds who planned the crime and those who identified potential victims and their wealth were rarely caught.⁵¹

Factors such as the announcement of the FARC's Law 002 worsened the possibilities of improving the situation of crime and perception of risk among the population.⁵² Those who did not pay faced a real possibility of being kidnapped or, in the worse scenario, to be killed.⁵³ When the FARC announced their Law 002, they wanted to create strong fears among the population and consolidate their levels of power. The FARC declared that, after a first notification of payment, those who refused to pay voluntarily were at risk of being kidnapped or even murdered.⁵⁴ An argument like this not only legitimised the use of violent crime in the political discourse of the guerrillas, but also institutionalised the promotion of fear and distress among civilians. Although the so-called 'taxation' of individuals by armed groups was not new in Colombia, the formal announcement of an 'illegitimate taxation law' through the mass media was a new phenomenon. By using the national media, guerrillas not only reached all the sectors of the population but they also multiplied the levels of fear in a way that they could not otherwise. This was an example of how mass media could actually reproduce the perceptions of risk of crime among the population.

⁵⁰ Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro*, pp. 29-32.

⁵¹ There was no data available on the effectiveness of the GAULA and on the number of kidnappers captured, accused and sentenced. For more on this, see **Chapter 3**.

⁵² FARC's Law 002 required profitable businesses and wealthy individuals to start contributing with the 'revolutionary cause'. While Article 1 of the Law stated that wealthy individuals were subject to pay a contribution to the FARC, Article 3 stated explicitly that those who refused to pay would be 'retained' until payments of the 'fees'. See FARC, 'LEY 002, Sobre la tributación,' Online. Available <http://www.farc-ep.org/Leyes/ley002.html>. For more on this see also **Chapter 1**.

⁵³ *Revista Semana*, no. 933, 13 March 2000.

⁵⁴ For deaths treat against those who did not pay the extortion, see 'Entrevista con Romaña,' in *Revista Semana*, no. 933; see also the interview with the FARC's leader, Manuel Marulanda Velez, in *El Tiempo*, 1 March 2001.

When a kidnapping took place and ended up with the liberation of the victim in exchange for a ransom, this victim was usually advised against seeing the authorities. With this attitude, criminals not only attempted to limit their risk of being arrested and prosecuted by the authorities, but they also managed to perpetuate the levels of fear among those who were in close contact with the victim. If someone had been the targeted victim of an extortion crime, it was possible that anyone else in close contact with this victim might also be at risk.⁵⁵ The use of direct violence against a victim, and the use of indirect violence against related people would facilitate the perpetuation of crimes where victims were unwilling to react or retaliate and authorities were not in a position to take effective solutions. Thus the use of violence in the commission of crimes could foster the levels of impunity and could also de-legitimise the authorities.

A survey carried out in Colombia in 1992 when urban homicides were at their highest illustrated that increased insecurity was closely related to significant decrease in levels of trust in the government.⁵⁶ In the cities where the perception of violent crime tended to be worse, the trust in the central government and local administrations was lower than in other cities. For example, on a scale from 1 to 10 in the cities of Bogotá, Medellín and Cali the average scores given to security were 3.7, 4.5 and 6.2 respectively. At the same time, trust in the President and his Ministers was only between 4.0 and 4.9. This was not a phenomenon unique to Colombia: academics elsewhere had argued that trust in government declined globally causing a decomposition of traditional values and an increased feeling of insecurity.⁵⁷

The Colombian government had emphasised that risk avoidance and constrained behaviour were one of the major obstacles to promoting further social and economic levels of development in the country.⁵⁸ Understandably, if minimum standards of certainty among the people could not be achieved there was no reason to believe that social trust would

⁵⁵ See Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro*, p. 35 and pp. 40-43.

⁵⁶ C. Lemoine, *Las fuerzas de la opinión* (Bogotá, 1993), table 14.1, p. 229 and table 16.3, p. 262.

⁵⁷ S.M. Lipset and W. Schneider, *The confidence gap: business, labour and government in the public mind*, rev. ed. (Baltimore, MD, 1987) and L. Weiss, *The myth of the powerless state: governing the economy in a global era* (Cambridge, England, 1998).

⁵⁸ Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, pp. 4-5. and Organisation of American States (OAS), Inter-American System of Legal Information, 'Document presented by the Interior Minister of Colombia, Néstor Humberto Martínez Neira,' at the special meeting of the committee on juridical and political affairs to prepare for the meeting of government experts on the prevention of war on crime (Washington, DC, 1999): p. 4.

reappear. A survey conducted by the newspaper, *El Tiempo*, in 2000 concluded that more than 85 percent of Colombian people in the cities never talk to strangers. Almost 72 percent reported that they went out less frequently at night, 70 percent did not go alone and almost 60 percent did not go out after dark because they had to stay at home to keep an eye on the house.⁵⁹ Jimeno and Roldán [et al.] also discovered that people in Bogotá would describe themselves as being distrustful of strangers, even at times without good reasons to do so.⁶⁰

In general, Colombians of the late 1990s became increasingly distrustful vis-à-vis other citizens. At a local level, this fact would confirm Andrés Salcedo's view that most of the citizens in Bogotá perceived that they would at some point be victimised.⁶¹ Colombian citizens were aware that victimisation risks existed. Most of the time, they would choose not to disregard those risks. Risk-averse behaviours caused by public fear would be adopted to minimise any chances of victimisation.

It was also possible to argue that negative changes in perceptions of violent crime could create increased levels of mobilisation and community activism. An example of this could be seen in the appearance of popular crowds and demonstrations denouncing violence and crime, such as the campaign called '*¡No más!*' and the '*Mandato Ciudadano por la Paz, la Vida y la Libertad*'. Nationally more than 3 million people demonstrated to against insecurity on 24 October 1999. The *Mandato Ciudadano por la Paz, la Vida y la Libertad* was described as the first national popular initiative to protest against violence, crimes and human rights abuses in the country. Although this popular movement was organised in the form of a referendum in the sense that every citizen had the opportunity to support or reject the initiative during the national elections of 26 October 1997, it did not carry any legal

⁵⁹ *El Tiempo*, 6 March 2000 and 26 August 2000.

⁶⁰ M. Jimeno and I. Roldán [et al.], *Las sombras arbitrarias*, p. 81.

⁶¹ A. Salcedo, *Violencia y miedo en el centro de la ciudad de Santafé de Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1995): p. 60. In the context of violence, fear and terror in Colombia, see D. Pécaut, 'From the banality of violence to real terror: the case of Colombia,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Societies of fear: the legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America* (London, 1999); C. Moser and C. McIlwaine, *Encounters with violence in Latin America: urban poor perceptions from Colombia and Guatemala* (New York and London, 2004) and L.A. Restrepo, 'Violence and fear in Colombia'. According to Restrepo, violence crimes seemed not to disturb the tranquillity of people in urban area. In his own words: '*Perhaps repetition of these types of crime over several decades has resulted in the desensitising Colombian, or has made them passive in the face of a phenomenon against which they feel important. The terrorist actions in city such as Bogotá certainly produce panic, but their impact is fleeting; people are obliged to continue their daily activity,*' see L.A. Restrepo, 'Violence and fear in Colombia,' p. 177. On the topic of fear in Bogotá, see also S. Niño Murcia [et al.], *Territorios del miedo en Santafé de Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1998), especially chapter 3, pp. 53-105 and G. Segovia Mora, *La violencia en Santafé de Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1994).

mandate. More than 10 million voters, out of 11 million, accepted the main thrust of the *Mandato*, requiring the authorities to take further measures to reduce the levels of violence. The *Mandato* was interpreted as both evidence of the legitimacy of democratic rule in the country and a statement of popular discontent against the main armed factions. However, it was only in the late 1990s that popular mobilisations against violent crime became common and by 2002, they had little impact on crime.⁶²

Another consequence that negative perceptions had over communities was that they promoted compensatory defensive actions aiming at reducing security risks. These were often made by public initiative and did not count upon the government's supervision. This factor sometimes induced individuals to adopt private security strategies, which included such expedients as placing security devices in private areas, contracting security companies for advice and protection, carrying weapons for protection and self-defence, and even, at times, contracting personnel to conduct illegal acts of revenge.⁶³

In these situations, individuals did not consider victimisation risks to be a direct threat against them: they adopted a behaviour that aimed at controlling these threats. Individuals judged the actual circumstances to be safe enough to disregard any possible risks or to take compensatory defensive measures. Jimeno and Roldán [et al.] found similar behaviour in Bogotá when analysing responses to fear. They argued that the existence of fear could provoke responses of increased violence caused by 'counter-phobia behaviour' (*comportamiento de contrafobia*).⁶⁴

⁶² Cases of popular mobilisation following massacres and assassinations of major figures had been important throughout the second half of the twentieth century. However, these marches were politically driven, often sectoral and regional.

⁶³ An example to illustrate this point included a significant number of private security companies that were doing business without a proper licence from the authorities. According to official sources, there were several hundred illegal companies, both in urban and rural areas, who offered security services. Although not all of them committed human rights abuses, none of them was legal, as they were not legally recorded in the books of the *Superintendencia de Vigilancia y Seguridad*, a watchdog office of the Ministry of Defence in charge of private security. Most of these companies were set up by retired members of the public force of low rank, lacked proper permits to use and carry arms and ammunition and did not train their guards in accordance to the law. See Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, chapter 7, p. 74.

⁶⁴ M. Jimeno and I. Roldán [et al.], *Las sombras arbitrarias*, p. 81.

As mentioned above, preventive actions against crime and insecurity had also pushed for a privatisation of the security market. Individuals tended to rely increasingly on their own means of protection to the detriment of the authorities' legitimacy, thus raising a reliance on private security companies and other private agents. This issue was important because it allowed the private sector to compete with the army and official police forces in matters of law and order, thus creating an ambiguous relationship between the private and public sectors and allowing individuals to cross the borderline between the legal right of protection and the illegal use of force against fellow citizens.

The Colombian state was extremely apprehensive about this kind of behaviour due to the long list of abuses which had increased levels of insecurity and human rights abuses. There was, in the view of government officials, much ignorance among the public regarding security matters, which distorted its views on how to solve the crime problem and created space for unlawful actions. The knowledge of crime and the perceptions that individuals had would have a definitive effect on public responses to crime.⁶⁵ Néstor Humberto Martínez Neira, a former Colombian Interior Minister, expressed his concern:

*'...public alarm and **fear of crime** are linked above all to the conventionally received stereotype of crime widely sustained by the media. This stereotype influences the research conducted in urban crime, and particularly the methods used in statistical information gathering. Research into the image of crime and the consequent public alarm has found it to be at odds with the **actual observation of crime** by the individuals interviewed. Beyond the immediate and highly selective visibility of certain criminal phenomena, the effects of media attention and image dissemination **add an imaginary perception of traditional crime to what is actually perceived**'.*⁶⁶

The integration of the mass media, the population and the authorities was a key aspect to improve security policy. Yet this aspect was often overlooked. Martínez Neira argued that:

⁶⁵ R. Quinney, 'Public perceptions of crime,' p. 176.

⁶⁶ Organisation of American States (OAS), Inter-American System of Legal Information, 'Document presented by the Interior Minister of Colombia, Néstor Humberto Martínez Neira,' p. 2 (bolds appear in the original text).

*'The community as a whole must be involved in analysing the problem [of crime] as a permanent phenomenon in order to gain a **real** perception... The community must undertake the social, institutional commitment to manage the problem. To the extent that the community assumes responsibility for the problem, and abandons its perceptions of crime as something alien to the community – a matter reserved for the state as a protector – civil society will begin to take an institutional role in determining the control and effectiveness of preventive measures'.⁶⁷*

The Colombian media frequently did not seem to take into consideration their influence on the topic of crime and violence. Their presentation of news and their phraseology often inflated events in order to attract the attention of the public and enlarge their audiences. Because of the political conflict and general levels of violence of the country, the mass media became increasingly sensationalist in order to keep the attention of the public. Even if homicide, massacre and kidnapping were common news, only the most striking news was presented to the public, sometimes to the detriment of the authorities.⁶⁸ It was very common to use in titles terms and phrases that were extremely sensationalist. Examples of this abounded in the main newspapers: *'Colombianos: criminales natos'*, *'Miedo en la calle'*, *'se disparó el secuestro'*, *'se disparó el paseo millonario'*, *'delito en continuo aumento'*, *'la paz secuestrada'* or even *'¡Corran! Que llegó el ejército'*. These titles were not limited to the Colombian media. Even international newspapers of large coverage and long-dating reputation repeatedly used sensationalist titles: a title of the *Financial Times* read *'Colombians queuing up to flee maelstrom'*.⁶⁹ In the urban centres of Colombia the perception of insecurity was evident: mass media investigations, company reports and official warnings reflected what the Colombian lived on a daily basis: articles

⁶⁷ Organisation of American States (OAS), Inter-American System of Legal Information, 'Document presented by the Interior Minister of Colombia, Néstor Humberto Martínez Neira,' p. 3.

⁶⁸ The regulation of Colombian media has not been studied yet. In theory, the freedom of the press should end where the interests of the state begin. This was often not the case: governmental strategies were published and criticised before being implemented and the media frequently used the topic of crime and insecurity to attract the attention of the public. With this, negative perceptions on violent crime were generalised and the authorities loosed confidence and legitimacy from the public.

⁶⁹ *The Financial Times* (London, 21 June 2000). See also *El Espectador* (Bogotá, 8 March 2000 and 29 November 2000); *El Tiempo* (Bogotá, 5 March 2000, 20 May 2000, 11 July 2000 and 1 June 2001); *Revista Semana*, no. 935 (Bogotá, 4 April 2001).

on homicide and kidnapping were printed almost on a daily basis in 2002. Indeed, this had strong effects on the population's views on crime and insecurity.

Perception could also be modified in a positive way. Titles such as '*Caen delincuentes gracias a colaboración ciudadana*', or '*Los bogotanos se matan menos*' not only created confidence among readers developing a sense of community belonging, but also improved the levels of legitimacy of the authorities.⁷⁰ However, the publication of positive news was not so common. The armed conflict between guerrillas, paramilitaries and the armed forces regularly involved a mixture of different economic, social, political and even psychological strategies.⁷¹ Affecting the perception of insecurity was indeed one of those strategies.

Perceptions also tended to vary enormously at an international level. Travel warnings published by foreign governments, mass media coverage, reports written by international organisations and analyses made by private enterprises could vary greatly and had immense effects on the population's perceptions. Negative perceptions abroad could repercuss and create internal instability, discouraging the tourism business and weakening the climate for foreign investment. Colombia was perceived as one of the most dangerous countries in the world. However, tourism was still considered as one of Colombia's main comparative advantages within the Andean and Caribbean regions. The following extracted from a guide edited by the Colombian Tourism Office presented the country in such a positive way that there was no single reference mentioned to the levels of insecurity:

*'Few countries possess a variety of natural and cultural resources like Colombia; white-sand beaches, mountains, snow-capped mountains, endless plains, jungles, exotic flora, archaeological sites, modern cities and quiet villages of colonial period. And, of course, people are friendly and welcoming... We invite you to visit our country, to explore our most beautiful folklore and people.'*⁷²

⁷⁰ *El Colombiano* (Medellín, 4 April 2000) and *El Tiempo* (Bogotá, 24 June 2001).

⁷¹ M. Palacios, 'Por una agenda de paz,' p. 3.

⁷² See Corporación Nacional de Turismo (CNT), *Guía del viajero* (Bogotá, 1997).

In 1998, the United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) calculated that Colombian growth rate in tourism industry decreased due to internal political instability.⁷³ The UNWTO also stated in its report that the image of insecurity projected by Colombia was the most important disincentive to international tourism, and posed the main obstacle to developing the sector further.⁷⁴ Even for countries like El Salvador, which ended their conflicts in 1992 the UNWTO reported that one of the major problems in attracting foreign tourists was the negative perception of war and crime of the country abroad. Some other countries such as Brazil and Mexico also have portrayed as increasingly insecure for tourism both at the urban and rural levels.⁷⁵

The US Department of State gave probably the most significant example of how foreigners would perceive Colombia. In its *Travel Warnings* of 2002, government officials constantly warned American citizens against travelling to Colombia. If visitors had a major reason to visit Colombia, they were urged to exercise a high degree of caution. This was because violence ‘by narcotraffickers, guerrillas, paramilitaries and other criminal elements continued to affect all parts of the country, both urban and rural... US citizens of all age groups and occupations, both tourist and residents, had been victimised... There was a greater risk of being kidnapped in Colombia than in any other country in the world’. The security situation in Colombia was, in the view of the US government, extremely ‘volatile’ and therefore made Colombia ‘one of the most dangerous countries in the world’.⁷⁶

Control Risks Group, a London-based company that helped ‘an international client base to access and manage risks around the world, particularly in difficult and complex business environments,’ specialised in the assessment of social and economic risks and advised on risk prevention strategies to both government officials and private companies.⁷⁷ One of their important areas of research was risk assessment and country classification. In these assessments, Colombia appeared as being a ‘medium risk country’ in terms of politics and tourism. In terms of citizens’ security, however, the country was classified as ‘high

⁷³ The United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), *Tourism market trends: Americas* (Madrid, 1998): p. 25.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, statistical data for Brazil, p. 85, for El Salvador, p. 108 and for Mexico, p. 120.

⁷⁶ US Department of State, ‘Colombia: Travel Warnings,’ Online. Available HTTP: <http://travel.state.gov/colombia_warning.html> and <<http://travel.state.gov/Colombia.html>>, accessed 28 December 2004.

⁷⁷ See Control Risks Group’s website, <http://www.controlrisks.com>.

risk'.⁷⁸ This classification was directed to advise the core of Control Risks Group's client base, which was mainly composed of wealthy individuals, foreigners and senior staffs working for large companies.

Because Colombia presented medium political and travel risks, the country had to be perceived, in the words of Control Risks Group, as a place where 'political and economic stability was secure in the short term but could not be guaranteed in the longer-term because political and state institutions lacked authority... Legal guarantees were weak. There was a latent threat or military or other illegal intervention'. Travel, in the company's view, was risky because there were 'high crime rates in certain areas or significant political unrest which could disrupt business travel at short notice. Terrorists attacks occasionally disrupted travel'. In terms of security, Colombia was perceived to be a country where 'there was a sustained campaign of terrorist or criminal violence specifically directed against companies' personnel and property...' Their conclusion was clear: in Colombia, 'there was a probability, not a possibility, of encountering security problems'.⁷⁹

At the same time, Colombian cities in 2002 in their view were also extremely risky in security terms: Bogotá was portrayed as 'one of the most violent cities in the world'. In Medellín, where crime levels were also among 'the highest in the world', they recommended that visitors took 'extreme caution' because the city had also 'one of the highest murder rates in the world'. This was interesting because they later stated that 'most murders occurred in low-income districts and it was extremely rare for foreigners to become victims'.⁸⁰ Bogotá, Medellín and Cali were all 'high risk' cities and were rated 6 on a scale from 1 to 7 where 7 was the most risky. This supposed that criminality in the main Colombian cities 'was common at all hours of the day and night throughout the city. There were sporadic car hijacks. Crime was a significant threat at airports. There were few areas that locals or visitors felt safe to walk around during the day'.⁸¹

⁷⁸ This classification was based on a 5 level-scale, ranging from *Insignificant, Low, Medium* to *High* and *Extreme* risk.

⁷⁹ Control Risks Group, 'Definitions of Risk,' (London, 2002). See **Appendices 5** and **6**.

⁸⁰ Control Risks Group, 'City briefs: Bogotá and Medellín,' Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.controlrisks.com>>, accessed 5 December 2004.

⁸¹ Cities like Freetown, Mogadishu, Kabul and Bagdad were ranked 7/7. Control Risks Group classified these cities as having extreme security risks because important levels of crime, terrorism and guerrilla violence demanded 'extraordinary security precautions'. In those cities, the government was unable to maintain law and order. For more on this, see **Appendix 5**.

Examples such as the travel warning of the US Department of State which clearly asked foreigners not to visit Colombia, or the travel analysis by the consulting company which recommended foreigners to take ‘extreme measures’ in a city where foreigners were seldom victimised were clear indications of the subjectivity of public perceptions. When analysing this, foreign readers indeed perceived Colombia as a highly dangerous country where crime and violence were common. However, very few intrepid visitors coming from abroad were victims of violent crime. Only a limited number of victims of homicide and kidnapping were foreign. Very few statistics indicated the number of foreigners killed per year in Colombia, but it was very rare that other countries denounced the death of their citizens in this country. One of the few exceptions was the murder of three US indigenous right activists killed by the FARC in March 1999. This case was highly publicised in Colombia and the United States. Another case included the death of another US citizen, member of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Bogotá, April 2000. This case did not receive a great deal of publicity due to the fact the victim was murdered during a fight in a late bar. Despite a few isolated cases, it was uncommon to hear about murders of foreigners in Colombia, the fact that would be opposed to the high perception of risk that foreigners had about the country.⁸²

When doing international risk comparisons, the reports usually had to simplify and generalise statements on local political and security issues. This allowed undertaking international analyses and helped inexpert readers to create broad perceptions of the topic. The terms used in classifications like the one above must be general enough to permit cross-country or inter-city comparisons.

⁸² The case of kidnapping was somewhat different because foreigners usually paid higher ransoms than Colombians and consequently were often targeted. A British citizen who once had been kidnapped by the guerrillas asked them the following question: ‘Why do you do this to me, a foreigner? Why not kidnap your own people? They laughed and said it was because foreigners were worth more money’. Even then, the number of foreigners kidnapped accounted only between 5 and 10 percent of the total number. The words of a kidnapping researcher were significant: ‘Although foreigners accounted for less than ten percent of hostages in the majority of hot-spot countries, their heightened market value meant they generated a disproportionate amount of revenue for kidnappers’. However, the risk of being caught was much higher because the abduction of a foreigner ‘might put more pressure on the host government to resolve the case, and would also bring the extra risk of having foreign intelligence and police forces in the case’. For the quote, see M. Weaver, ‘Engineer tells of 233-day ordeals at hands of Colombian guerrillas’ in *The Daily Telegraph*, 18 September 1996. See also R. Briggs, *The kidnapping business* (London, 2001): pp. 19-20. For data on kidnappings, see Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD, *Evolución del secuestro, 1996-2006* (Bogotá, 2008).

Degrees of subjectivity in risk classifications were significant because they had to represent particular interests from the governments and private businesses. The fact that the US advised all its citizens against travelling to Colombia did not mean that citizens of other countries received the same advice from their governments. The British Foreign Office did not advise UK citizens against travelling to Colombia. It asked them to take sensible precautions in Colombia. The only areas that the Foreign Office described as being potentially dangerous due to the violence were the provinces of Caquetá, Meta and Chocó, not in the urban areas like Bogotá, Medellín or Cali.⁸³ The Japanese embassy in Bogotá, even though reported kidnappings of foreigners in their website, but it only advised Japanese citizens to stay vigilant when visiting Colombia.⁸⁴

The case of Control Risks Group was similar: as they represented the interests of the business community and of wealthy individuals, they covered a large client-base that shared similar economic and political interests. While not all their clients around the world faced the same risks, the company annually classified risks in more than 200 cities using the same risk scale.⁸⁵ The company though had access to first class information because it had close contacts with victims, government officials, security agencies and journalists. This fact provided the company a broad vision on how to advise customers about their possibilities of victimisation. Their views, however, remained biased because their typical customer was not representative of the typical victim in Colombia.

⁸³ See the Foreign Office warnings at HTTP: <<http://www.fco.gov.uk/travel/countryadvice.asp?CO/>>, accessed 28 December 2004.

⁸⁴ See the Japanese embassy in Bogotá website at HTTP: <<http://www.colombia.emb-japan.go.jp/>>.

⁸⁵ Despite calculating similar risks in more than 200 cities in 160 countries around the world, the classification sometimes seemed very broad. As an example, the risk of foreigners being kidnapped in Colombia was far smaller than in Nigeria: in Colombia, it was known that less than 10 percent of the victims were foreigners, while in Nigeria the figure reached almost 70 percent. However, in the risk classification made by Control Risks Group both countries appeared as being 'high risk countries' where foreigners should take extreme precautions. Were most of foreigners kidnapped in rural or in urban areas? Were Nigeria's urban areas more dangerous for foreigners than Colombia's? Were Colombia's rural areas more dangerous than Nigeria's? These questions remained unanswered. The general perception, as a given by Control Risks Group, was that both countries were highly dangerous and that extreme levels of caution were required in case of visit. Different levels of risk and further details on geographical locations of the nuclei of crime and violence would indeed give better perceptions of insecurity. For a comparative table of kidnapping trends in the world, see R. Briggs, *The kidnapping business*, chart 2, p. 20.

Such generalisations did not seem to apply for people living in Colombia. Local residents were usually more informed about local risks and might have better and more precise perceptions of the crime situation. Extreme levels of caution were not required constantly. As an example, citizens might take extreme precautions in some sectors of the city, or in some areas of the country. Although there was a risk of victimisation in areas considered as safe, the chances of avoiding crimes were maximised when knowledge of local crime was put in practice. For local people perceptions of violent crime tended to be more precise and diverse. Foreigners and outsiders, on the other hand, had to over-generalise victimisation risks in order to spread the chances to remain safe. If extreme measures were taken in every circumstance, probabilities of encountering problems were thus minimised.

At a local level, for example, Bogotá's Chamber of Commerce has been publishing periodic surveys on the topic of victimisation and perception of violent crime. In a survey conducted in November 2001, it demonstrated how perceptions could vary over short periods of time. A survey disclosed that from the total number of respondents (1,080), 60 percent thought insecurity had risen, while only 3 percent answered that crime had decreased. Three months earlier, 49 percent of the people felt that insecurity was on the rise and 12 percent thought that it was diminishing. Among the crimes that the population perceived to be at risk were street robberies (57 percent), followed by homicides (13 percent) and residential burglaries (11 percent). From all the people interviewed, 65 percent answered that unemployment was the main cause for the rising insecurity. Those who replied lived either in the poorest or the richest sectors of the city. The respondents that thought unemployment was the main cause of insecurity came from either the poorest class (Estrato 1) or from the upper-middle class (Estratos 5 and 6). No mention was made about kidnappings by the interviewers. Because kidnappers tended to commit their crimes mainly in the municipalities outside Bogotá, where transport was easier and police duties were more difficult. This report had often been criticised by the city police because of the subjectivity of the Chamber's interests who represented the views of the business

community, which had been particularly affected by the insecurity and had been demanding guarantees.⁸⁶

Revista Dinero, a monthly magazine published in Bogotá, found similar yet somewhat different results: for the upper class, the most important problems to be solved were guerrilla warfare, insecurity, unemployment and corruption. For the lower class, the main issues to be solved were unemployment, guerrilla warfare, insecurity and corruption and poverty.⁸⁷ This survey revealed that unemployment, rather than violence, remained the main problem for the poor, while wealthy people felt more preoccupied by the high levels of guerrilla activity and the increase in crime and insecurity.

Although these problems had been going on since the early 1990s, the importance of these topics in terms of percentage had significantly increased. This was not difficult to understand as most of violent crimes with high social impacts like extortion and kidnapping had been targeted against them. Homicide, nevertheless, had especially affected the poorest strata of the population. Jimeno and Roldán [et al.] asserted that in some popular sectors of Bogotá, and notably in Ciudad Bolívar, ‘violence’ was only associated with political violence, and usually carried a historical connotation associated with membership of the two main political parties and *La Violencia* of the 1950s, while contemporary urban violence was associated only with street crime.⁸⁸

As mentioned, it was common for the mass media and the authorities to over-generalise the extent of violent crime. References about the ‘urbanisation of conflict’ and to the presence of urban militias in popular sectors were common. However, the extent of militia activity had not been sustained. The available information usually relied on testimonies and personal anecdotes rather than on sound factual evidence. The example of the police was striking. While high-ranking officials often gave the impression of possessing knowledge about armed militias and threats posed by them in popular sectors of the cities, low-ranking policemen who patrolled the streets and interacted with the population did not always perceive militias as a direct threat to security. This exemplified

⁸⁶ See Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, *Observatorio de la seguridad*, no. 22 (Bogotá, 2002): p. 21; ‘Los inversionistas piden más seguridad’ in *El Tiempo*, 10 September 2002 and ‘Policía de Bogotá cuestiona informe sobre seguridad’ in *El Tiempo*, 27 October 2002.

⁸⁷ *Revista Dinero* (Bogotá, 4 April 2002). See also C. Lemoine, *Nosotros los colombianos del milenio*, figure 22, p. 45.

⁸⁸ M. Jimeno and I. Roldán [et al.], *Las sombras arbitrarias*, p. 102.

how knowledge of the real situation could affect people's perceptions. In a country like Colombia where levels of insecurity were high, it could be in the interest of high-ranking officers to exaggerate the presence of illegal armed groups.

If the authorities said that a municipality or a sector of the city did not have a strong presence of armed groups or if they assumed that crime levels were low, there was a certain risk of being criticised if violence erupted. Individuals might then perceive increased fears of victimisation and felt that the authorities were not being efficient. At the same time, the authorities risked losing the trust of citizens who would start to feel unprotected. On the other hand, if the presence of criminal groups was exaggerated by the authorities, the public would remain cautious and therefore minimise victimisation risks. This was also in the interest of the authorities, as they might negotiate higher levels of funding and resources for their activities.⁸⁹

By overestimating risks the authorities were paradoxically helping armed groups to consolidate their presence in areas where they had a weak presence. If the authorities mentioned the presence of armed groups, the public would generally accept this opinion as being trustworthy. Armed groups would not contradict their view either. This fact might change the public's opinion concerning the security of the areas under question.

To correct these possible distortions, the government had to encourage further participation of local communities in local planning and urban management. The aim of this was to understand better about security risks and crime determinants inside communities where crime levels were high. The Colombian government had tried to address this issue by improving the levels of communication of local communities with the authorities, notably the police. Fostering the implementation of community-based security plans was an example of this new communication strategy. The *Frentes de Seguridad* and *Escuelas de Seguridad*, where community leaders participated together with the police in planning and organising preventive security strategies at a local level. The national police had promoted the creation of basic courses on crime prevention for community leaders and had helped to implement neighbourhood watch schemes at a local level. Although the police praised the positive results achieved by the *Frentes de Seguridad*, there was no evidence to confirm that the *Frentes* had brought insecurity down. At most, members of the

⁸⁹ M. Rubio, *Crimen e impunidad*, p. 69.

police had increased their legitimacy in the sectors where the *Frentes* had been established. Experiences were based on a case-to-case basis and generally only the cases with positive results were published. A priori it could be argued that the exchange of crime information between neighbours brought negative perceptions down because it raised levels of knowledge and trust among citizens.

General Jorge Linares, a former chief of Bogotá's police, often stated that urban security could only improve when citizens began to adopt co-operative strategies to find solutions to urban problems, including crime and insecurity. Until then, communities would continue with their passive approach of surviving crime by rewarding individualism and caution.⁹⁰ Insecurity, in his view, could not be tackled by improving the chances of individuals to recognise danger but rather by improving the chances of capturing and sentencing criminals.

Individuals had tried to solve the problem of insecurity alone. This had been highly controversial because of the massive privatisation of the security market to the detriment of the authorities and the police. General lack of trust in the authorities had been a major obstacle to improving police services in the community and therefore fostered negative perceptions of crime almost everywhere.⁹¹

The government's general effort to improve the perception of insecurity had been slow and divided. In a country where illegal armed groups took the lion's share of police resources, citizen security strategies often seemed unimportant. Police forces had to endure a long fight against illegal armed groups. It was only lately that the government started to promote new strategies of security based on the integration of civil authorities, police forces and communities. Their idea was to improve security levels by integrating more effective security strategies based on the understanding of community needs. With this, governments were aiming to reduce levels of crime and violence by improving the citizens' trust in local authorities as well as their real knowledge and perceptions of insecurity.

⁹⁰ See the interview with General Jorge Linares in *El Tiempo*, 2 April 2000. For the argument on risk-avoiding behaviour as a survival strategy, refer to M. Jimeno and I. Roldán [et al.], *Las sombras arbitrarias*, p. 62.

⁹¹ *El Tiempo*, 28 March 2000. One of the government's projects was precisely to stimulate the participation and co-operation in matters of security and peaceful coexistence (*convivencia*) between the state and the private companies. See also Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, p. 14 and V.G. Ricardo, 'El papel de los empresarios en la paz,' *El Espectador*, 8 March 2000.

Final Comments

In Colombia there was a significant disproportion in the levels of risk facing criminals and victims. More than 32,000 homicides and nearly 3,000 kidnappings that Colombia recorded in 2002 were the proof of this. There was also a significant yet unaccounted number of other extortion crimes. These had deep impacts not only on victims and their families, but also on a large number of other people who saw, heard or read about these cases. This uncertainty had strengthened the feeling of insecurity, while decreasing the levels of trust and increasing the seeming necessity for individual solutions. This strategy not only fostered a need to privatise security strategies but also damaged the capacity of the authorities to respond and react effectively to community needs. All this issue created a strong perception of risk and insecurity among the population.

For this reason, the topic of perception has to be considered as a key concept in crime analysis. This chapter has tried to build on this idea by developing an argument around the problems affecting the perception of insecurity in Colombia. This chapter firstly introduced the idea of perception of violent crime as seen in Colombia. It also explored the concept of risk and the subjectivity of decision-making processes when facing security risks. Finally, it examined why some people reacted in different ways when perceiving risks such as extortion risks.

The concept of risk was perceived differently by every person in every society and in every period of time. Today's perceptions of risk were not the same as tomorrow's. Cognitive experiences and qualitative variables such as information, knowledge and personal experiences made people perceived risk in different ways. This meant that individual reactions to security risks would depend not only on the personal qualities of the individual, but also on the outcomes of possible behaviours that this individual might take when facing victimisation risks. In this sense, individual analyses of security issues became essential factors that shaped public perceptions. When people shared views of crime and insecurity, this helped to strengthen the levels of trust and improved the co-operation in the community. In the end, this also helped to improve the levels of communication between citizens and authorities.

So far, violent crime increased the perception of insecurity among Colombians and foreigners alike; it established strong levels of fear among them, de-legitimised the roles of the authorities and fostered impunity among criminals due to the lack of support and co-operation between citizens and law enforcement agencies. While the risks of being victims increased for citizens, the risks for criminals of being arrested and prosecuted remained relatively limited.

The appearance of a security risk mentality had been a detrimental aspect that affected the cohesion of the Colombian society. The people living in or travelling to Colombia also tended to overestimate the risks of victimisation. This was considered as the most rational response to avoid the costs of damaging events like violent crimes. For common citizens, a pessimistic view of the crime situation and a risk-avoiding behaviour would minimise the possibilities of victimisation. If the security strategies of the government had little impact between 1990 and 2002, it was partly because of its poor levels of co-operation and communication with most citizens. This certainly helped to increase victimisation risks among people and to generalise negative perceptions of violent crime, both at national and international levels. Indeed, if the authorities wanted to improve the security of its citizens they had to raise levels of participation in order to get better results and improve public perceptions.

CHAPTER 3

Citizen Security Policies from the Gaviria to the Pastrana Administrations

During the 1970s, very few people used the term ‘citizen security’. Criminologists and policy-makers spoke about ‘national’ or ‘regional’ security and with this, they referred mainly to the threats against the state and its institutions, the references to the security and welfare of common citizens were taken for granted. This topic, it was thought, was included within the parameters of national security.¹ Security policies were generally drafted in the central headquarters of the police and the army and then applied throughout the country with little concern or particular knowledge about local security issues. This led to poor results in the fight against violent crime and widened the gap between the needs of the population and the responses to crime provided by the state.

With the increase in the number of violent crimes between 1986 and 1990, the subject of citizen security started to become a major priority for the Colombian government. However, this phenomenon was not unique to Colombia: it was common to many other Latin American countries.² Surveys usually depicted insecurity as being the main concern

¹ On the evolution of security policies in Latin America since the end of the Cold War and the impact of security policies in Colombia, see for example, R. Pardo Rueda, *Nueva seguridad para América Latina* (Bogotá, 1999). For the Colombian military and national security policies, see F. Leal Buitrago, ‘The military and the national security doctrine,’ in M. Baud and D. Meertens (eds.), *Colombia from the inside: perspectives on drugs, war and peace* (Amsterdam, 2004).

² For recent works on issues of citizen security in Latin America, see D. Lederman, N. Loayza and P. Fajnzylber, *Crimen y violencia en América Latina* (Bogotá, 2001); H. Frühling and J.S. Tulchin (eds.) with H.A. Golding, *Crime and violence in Latin America: citizen security, democracy, and the state* (Washington, DC, 2003), especially chapters 1 and 4; M. Buvinic, E. Alda and J. Lamas, ‘Emphasising prevention in citizen security: the Inter-American Development Bank’s contribution to reducing violence in Latin America and the Caribbean,’ Social Programmes Division, Inter-American Development Bank (Washington, DC, 2005); J.S. Tulchin and M. Ruthenburg (eds.), *Toward a society under law: citizens and their police in Latin America* (Washington, DC, 2006); and M.S. Bergman and L. Whitehead (eds.), *Criminality, public security, and the challenges to democracy in Latin America* (Notre Dame, IN, 2009). See also a review essay by M.S. Bergman, ‘Crime and citizen security in Latin America: the challenges for new scholarship,’ *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 41, no. 2 (2006): pp. 213-227. For the Colombian case, see F. Leal Buitrago [et al.], ‘Seguridad nacional y seguridad ciudadana: una aproximación hacia la paz,’ and A. Guzmán, ‘Violencia urbana: teorías y políticas de seguridad ciudadana,’ both are in Á. Camacho and F. Leal Buitrago (eds.), *Armar la paz es desarmar la guerra* (Bogotá, 2000); E.M. Restrepo, *The Colombian criminal justice in crisis: fear and distrust* (Basingstoke, 2003); and G. de Francisco Z., ‘Armed conflict and public security in Colombia,’ in J. Bailey and L. Dammert (eds.), *Public security and police reform in the Americas* (Pittsburgh, PA, 2006).

for citizens after unemployment. Violence, especially within the cities, had become ‘a cause, not only of more violence, but also of poverty, unemployment and the destruction of social, political, human and economic resources’.³ This problem was affecting social, political and economic aspects of development in the region.

In Colombia, this phenomenon was visible when the administration of President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) commissioned a group of leading academics and experts led by Gonzalo Sánchez of National University of Colombia to write a report on the new determinants of violence in the country. The result of the investigation confirmed what most citizens already perceived: in the country, the violence was not only a product of the rural conflict between guerrillas, paramilitaries and the state. The largest share of the violence came directly from the streets. Because of the variety of variables affecting crime and violence, the problem had to be analysed anew. The problem was so complex that government officials spoke about the need to understand the ‘Colombian violences’.

The investigation was later published as a book in 1987 containing two main parts.⁴ The first dealt with different categories of violence in the country. It comprised six chapters covering the problems of political violence, urban violence, organised and criminal violence, violence against ethnic minorities, violence against the mass media and intra-familial violence. The second part of the book drew an analysis of the effects of violence on local governance. It comprised five chapters dealing with criminal justice policy at the national level, the crisis of the judicial system and the role of the international community.

Although the chapters provided general recommendations on the topics, few of these could be put in place. The general tone of the *Comisión* was to recommend ideas promoting social development, reducing inequality and guaranteeing the rule of law. The position of the *Comisión* towards violent crime was that criminals and delinquents had to be punished and then released in society after completion of their prison sentences.⁵ Among the most significant recommendations that the *Comisión* suggested were:

³ A. Solimano (ed.), *Colombia: essays on conflict, peace, and development* (Washington, DC, 2000); C.T. Call, ‘Sustainable development in Central America: the challenges of violence, injustice and insecurity,’ CA 2020: Working Paper No. 8 (Hamburg, 2000): p. 1. See also S. González Ruiz, E. López Portillo and J.A. Yáñez, *Seguridad pública en México* (México, D.F., 1994): p. 16.

⁴ See Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, *Colombia: violencia y democracia* (Bogotá, 1987): pp. 17-30 and particularly p. 18. For more on this see **Chapter 1**.

⁵ Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, *Colombia: violencia y democracia*, p. 99.

- The creation of a national peace commission to discuss peace alternatives with insurgent armed groups;
- The struggle against illegal drugs from the production to the distribution, and the implementation of co-operation treaties with other countries involved in the commerce and consumption of illegal drugs;
- The reduction in the number of weapons in the streets, including those which had been granted special status by the authorities (*armas amparadas*);
- The adoption of strong laws to reduce the indiscriminate consumption of alcohol in public areas;
- The creation of ‘tribunals to investigate and take the appropriate measures’ to fight crime and impunity while maintaining a clear separation of ‘the functions of the police from those of the army’;
- The decentralisation of state institutions, the introduction of an effective agrarian reform, and strategies to reduce poverty and to increase the capacity of communities wishing to participate in local policy-making;
- The creation of an institute of criminal investigation attached to the Supreme Court. The main goal of this institute was to promote the ‘scientific follow-up of crime trends’ and to produce sound ‘criteria and recommendations’ to reduce the problem of crime, and alleviate the backlog of the judiciary.

The *Comisión*’s recommendations were useful to understand the structural problems behind crime and violence in modern Colombia. Because all the above measures played a part in improving security levels throughout the country, very few people opposed them. However, the exact implementation of projects remained theoretical. While most of the report explained *what* the problems of crime and violence were, little attention focused on *how* the authorities could implement these recommendations.

The Gaviria Administration (1990-1994)

When President César Gaviria Trujillo was elected in 1990, the levels of violence in Colombia were reaching proportions never seen before. Homicides were approaching 25,000 cases per year and numbers of kidnappings were increasing rapidly. The FARC and ELN, which had previously fought separately against the state, were trying to unite their efforts under a single strategy.⁶ At the same time, the Medellín drug-cartel was fighting its own war of terror against the authorities, who were discussing the possibilities of extraditing criminals to the United States.

The monetary power and the corruption capacity of both guerrillas and drug-traffickers led to the proliferation of large numbers of illegal armed groups that allowed the levels of crime to soar. The inability of the authorities to maintain the rule of law and secure some levels of security was the cause of fear and unprecedented levels of victimisation among the population. In 1993, the Colombian president argued that:

'The truth is that the scenario of violence in Colombia has changed dramatically in recent years. Perhaps the most significant aspect of what is happening is that the boundaries between drug trafficking, guerrillas, common criminals and vigilante groups, are increasingly tenuous. It happens in the urban centres where they are concentrating new forms of criminality'.⁷

Although the main guerrillas and drug-cartels played an important role in the increase of violence, government officials and academics pointed to other factors that permitted the erosion of the rule of law. These factors were also added to the low credibility of the authorities and the often inappropriate use and diffusion of crime news by the mass media. The growing presence of illegal armed groups and youth bands in deprived urban sectors

⁶ This refers to the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar, in which the FARC, the ELN, the M-19 and the EPL tried to follow a common strategy to fight the state using all available means. During this period, it was also decided that the conflict should be expanded to urban areas. See R. Pardo Rueda, *De primera mano. Colombia 1986-1994: entre conflictos y esperanzas* (Bogotá, 1996) and F. Leal Buitrago, 'Armed actors in the Colombian conflict,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Armed actors: organised violence and state failure in Latin America* (London, 2004): p. 91.

⁷ President Gaviria's speech pronounced during the opening session of the Congress (Bogotá, 20 July 1993), transcribed in Presidencia de la República, *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia* (Bogotá, 1994): p. 360.

and the uncontrolled consumption of alcoholic beverages and the easy access to weapons were also now recognised as among the main security problems.⁸

During its years in office, the Gaviria administration started one of the major programmes of institutional reform undertaken in recent times. Reforms included the promulgation of a new constitution, the modernisation and transformation of public institutions, the privatisation of public services and the decentralisation of power to local authorities. Within this extensive political agenda, there were several elements that influenced the way citizen security was approached.

A National Policy against Violence

In his inaugural speech, President Gaviria made clear that his political agenda included a long-term programme based on a ‘radical transformation’ of the society. He argued that:

*‘The President of the Republic will lead a process of education on the reform undertaken. It is not the exclusive modification of a skeleton of rules, but a radical transformation of public attitude’.*⁹

⁸ Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), *La paz: el desafío para el desarrollo* (Bogotá, 1998): p. 146. For the argument of the change in cultural values, see J.O. Melo, ‘Ciudadanía y violencia: algunas notas sobre la experiencia en Medellín,’ Documento de Trabajo, CIDSE-Universidad del Valle (Cali, 1995). For the access of firearms and ammunition see Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, ‘La violencia política,’ in *Colombia: violencia y democracia*, pp. 33-55. For alcohol in cases of violence and crime, see J.L. Londoño, ‘Violencia, psichis y capital social,’ Paper presented at the Second Latin American Conference on Economic Development (Bogotá, 1996). See also M. Jimeno and I. Roldán [et al.], *Las sombras arbitrarias: violencia y autoridad en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1996). For an analysis of violence and the role of the mass media see Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, ‘Violencia y medios de comunicación,’ in *Colombia: violencia y democracia*, pp. 134-149. On the topic of impunity, see ‘Gasto público y desempeño de la justicia,’ in Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia (CEJ), *Justicia y desarrollo: debates*, no. 1 (Bogotá, 1997); Partido Conservador Colombiano, *Inseguridad e impunidad en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1997); M. Rubio, *Crimen e impunidad: precisiones sobre la violencia* (Bogotá, 1999): p. 114; and Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia, ‘Criminalidad, impunidad y justicia,’ in *Colombia: violencia y democracia*, pp. 211-234. The analysis of the corruption of the police and the lack of credibility can be read in Colciencias – Policía Nacional – Universidad de los Andes, ‘Informe final: programa de lucha contra la corrupción en la Policía Nacional de Colombia,’ mimeo (Bogotá, 1998). See also N. Urueña Cortés, ‘La corrupción en la policía: modalidades, causas y control,’ *Cuadernos del CED*, no. 32 (1999); A. Goldsmith, ‘Police accountability reform in Colombia: the civilian oversight experiment,’ in A. Goldsmith and C. Lewis (eds.), *Civilian oversight of policing: governance, democracy and human rights* (Oxford, 2000); and G. de Francisco Z., ‘Armed conflict and public security in Colombia,’ and M.V. Llorente, ‘Demilitarisation in a war zone,’ in J. Bailey and L. Dammert (eds.), *Public security and police reform in the Americas* (Pittsburgh, PA, 2006).

⁹ President Gaviria’s inaugural speech (Bogotá, 7 August 1990), transcribed in Presidencia de la República, *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, vol. 1, p. 23.

In terms of security, these reforms were aimed at strengthening the rule of law thorough the modernisation of the police and the judicial systems. To achieve this, the government established a new office to advise different state agencies that were responsible for drafting and executing policies against violence.¹⁰ In practical terms, this involved the co-ordination of agencies responsible for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of crimes.

With the adoption of the new Constitution in 1991, security policies had to be decentralised and were now a matter of municipal planning. The role of the central government and its national institutions was to direct local authorities in different municipalities to put in place common policies against crime. National authorities would provide laws, guidelines and funding while local authorities would apply them following their own priorities. Security policies could be discussed in the Congress or in departmental and municipal councils before being put in place by the authorities.¹¹ The *Consejería Presidencial para la Seguridad y Defensa Nacional* was required to secure the adoption of guidelines and the application of local policies among all city mayors and departmental governors.¹²

This reform was also reflected by the appointment of a civilian as Minister of Defence, for the first time for almost half a century in Colombia. As a response to the politicisation of the national police and the reform of the armed forces during the early years of *La Violencia*, the military administration of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) subordinated the national police to the armed forces. Since then, the army was attached to the Ministry of Defence, and because the ministers were always army generals, the national police was subordinate to the army. In the eyes of the army, the national police was always as less prestigious and less influential. Civilians described the national police as being inefficient, unreliable and corrupt.¹³ The designation of Rafael Pardo Rueda as Minister of

¹⁰ This office refers to the *Consejería Presidencial para la Seguridad y Defensa Nacional*.

¹¹ Article 303 of the 1991 Constitution mentions that the departmental governors should act as 'direct representatives of the government as guarantors of the public order'. Article 315 is more explicit towards the role of the city mayors, defining them as 'first authorities of the police'. The article reads: '... El alcalde es la primera autoridad de policía del municipio. La Policía Nacional cumplirá con prontitud y diligencia las órdenes que le imparta el alcalde por conducto del respectivo comandante'.

¹² Presidencia de la República, *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, vol. 1, p. 33.

¹³ For a historical review of the national police, see M.V. Llorente, 'Perfil de la policía colombiana,' in M.V. Llorente and M. Deas (eds.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz* (Bogotá, 1999).

Defence in 1991 was therefore a key factor in the renewal and modernisation of the national police that break the hierarchical dependence of the police on the army.¹⁴

In spite of the fact that the 1991 Constitution promoted the decentralisation of security policies, and that *a priori* the city mayors and departmental governors were responsible to direct local police forces, the reality had been, *a fortiori*, very different. Since the 1950s, there had been a clear effort to de-politicise the armed forces, notably the police. That the *alcaldes* were constitutionally empowered to direct the actions of the police should not mean that they should advise the police officers about their jobs; it meant that *alcaldes* deserved a right to demand effective and accountable policing methods within their communities. The *alcaldes* could propose policies and could participate with the police in detecting risk-zones and pointing out problems in their communities.

Another major change in the theme of security brought with the 1991 Constitution was the creation of the *Fiscalía General de la Nación*, which was in charge of the prosecution of all crimes. The creation of this office redefined the role of the judiciary by introducing a partial accusatory component to the system. The *Fiscalía General* was an autonomous judicial entity with its own administration and budget. Its main function was to enforce the rule of law and guarantee access to justice. The tasks of the *Fiscalía General* were extensive and controversial: it had powers to investigate, prosecute and penalise crimes. Because of its legal autonomy, it could act on the demand of other authorities, of the public and on its own decisions. The *Fiscalía General* could prosecute any minister in the cabinet, the *Procurador* (procurator), the *Defensor del Pueblo* (ombudsman), members of the *Ministerio Público* and other senior public officials. The investigative powers of the *Fiscalía General* were only limited by the fundamental rights and liberties of the defendant. This fact had been the cause of many arguments in the country.¹⁵ While the *Fiscalía General* had been accused of abusing its powers by many of its opponents, many of its

¹⁴ In his memoirs, Pardo Rueda explained the relationships between the army, the police and his arrival as a Defence Minister. The book also provided an authoritative account of the strategies of peace-making and national security during the Barco and Gaviria administrations. See R. Pardo Rueda, *De primera mano, Colombia 1986-1994: entre conflictos y esperanzas* (Bogotá, 1996).

¹⁵ The two main sources of criticism had concerned the incorporation of the *Fiscalía General* into the judiciary, and the amount of power that this institution had been given without any controls. See C. Lleras de la Fuente [et al.] (eds.), *Interpretación y génesis de la constitución de Colombia* (Bogotá, 1992): p. 428 and R. Uprimny, 'Fiscal general o general fiscal?: nuevo procedimiento penal y derechos humanos en Colombia,' *Revista del Colegio de Abogados Penalistas del Valle*, nos. 29 and 30 (1993).

defendants argued that the *Fiscalía General* had filled a long-dating vacuum in the country's judicial system.¹⁶ The Constitution also reformed the Superior Courts and created the *Consejo Superior de Judicatura* in charge of administering the courts, rationalising the works and payloads of judges and legal staffs, combating corruption and nominating judges at a local level.

In May 1991, the government launched the *Estrategia Nacional contra la Violencia* (National Strategy against Violence), the first national policy against violence. Pardo Rueda argued that this was the first time that a government promoted the participation of civilians in matters of security, and concluded that citizens not only had to give their opinions for security projects to be effusive, but had also a right to participate in the implementation of state-led projects. As a civilian, Pardo Rueda was well placed to promote citizen participation and understanding. He commented that:

*'The innovative Estrategia was comprehensive. Overcoming violence was only possible by linking all state agencies as well as the participation of community organizations ... [the public security] was neither an exclusive responsibility of the military nor the state. It was a task of all Colombians.'*¹⁷

This language was repeated frequently in speeches of President Gaviria.¹⁸ Because the integration of the community in security policies against crime and violence was fundamental, summaries of projects were published and distributed in leading daily newspapers. The main ideals of this strategy were to guarantee the monopoly of the use of force by state institutions as stated in the Constitution, and to recover the state's capacity to facilitate justice for all citizens and to combat high levels of impunity.¹⁹

¹⁶ For functions of the *Fiscalía General*, see the *Fiscalía General*'s website at <http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/>. See also E.M. Restrepo, *The Colombian criminal justice in crisis*, pp. 63-70. An analysis of the functions of the *Fiscalía General* could also shed some light on its role in initiating one of the most serious corruption crisis in Colombia with the infamous *Proceso 8000*. *Proceso 8000* was the name given to the criminal proceedings, conducted by the *Fiscalía General* to establish the criminal liability of those responsible for the infiltration of drug money from the Cali cartel into the funding of Ernesto Samper's presidential campaign in 1994.

¹⁷ See the interview made to R. Pardo Pueda in *Revista Cromos*, no. 3827, 3 June 1991.

¹⁸ It continued even after his presidential term ended in 1994, see his speech delivered to the Conference of Gobernabilidad Democrática y el Pensamiento de Galán on 17 August 1999. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/discurso.asp?sCodigo=02-0134>, accessed 12 August 2007.

¹⁹ '*Estrategia Nacional Contra la Violencia*,' in Presidencia de la República, *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, vol. 1, p. 29.

The strategy had five main goals: first, it focused on the strengthening of local authorities by improving levels of communication and co-operation among all security institutions. This also meant an elaboration of security plans by civilian authorities at local levels to tackle the main priorities of each location. The government took an active role in promoting the new responsibilities for the city mayors and departmental governors established in the 1991 Constitution. Some of these assumed the new task and applied security programmes, but in general terms, the whole concept worked better in the largest cities. In Bogotá, Medellín and Cali, new security plans worked better than in most intermediate cities and small towns, especially in regions containing illegal armed factions, where co-operation between civilian authorities, the armed forces and the population seldom produced effective results. Usually, security policies in these areas remained the responsibility of the army.

Secondly, the strategy aimed at decreasing the levels of impunity permeating the judicial system. This involved the reorganisation of the judiciary to prioritise and alleviate the workload of the courts. The third goal was to separate the strategies dealing with the political conflict with guerrillas and paramilitaries from the strategies dealing with urban crime. This step was in connection with the fourth goal that called for the strengthening of security institutions. Issues like counter-insurgency, anti-narcotics, terrorism, kidnapping, extortion and other violent crimes had to be dealt with by stronger and more effective institutions. This meant an improvement of equipment and resources and an increase in budget allocations. The fifth step dealt with human rights. This was especially important when concerned non-governmental organisations were growing stronger in national and international politics. The army and the police had to also become more accountable for their actions if they wanted to be more credible at home and abroad.

The strategy aroused extremely high expectations and tried to tackle the problem of violence from a new institutional and social perspective. The strategy put into perspective the inherent problems that faced the majority of Colombians living in the cities during the early 1990s and was generally well accepted by the population. It was only with the strategy that the authorities recognised the multiplicity of variables affecting several types

of violence.²⁰ The main problem of the strategy was that it focused primarily on the rationalisation of crime prevention policies and on the co-operation between security institutions, and it overlooked the protection of citizens. This fact was reflected by the scale of violent crimes: in 1993, the number of homicides was roughly the same as in 1991, around 28,000 per year, and reported cases of kidnapping stood at around 1,700 cases.²¹ The main underlying problem was the underestimation of the amount of institutional reform and investments required to make this strategy effective. However, this strategy was useful because it changed the language of security institutions, popularising security discourse and democratising the need for a ‘citizen security’ approach that reached all sectors of the population. The strategy also promoted change among judiciary and policing institutions, fostering the accountability and transparency in the strategies used in the struggle against crime.

‘Second Phase’ of the Policy: ‘More Security for the People’

In November 1993, the Gaviria administration tried to fill this vacuum by publishing what was then described as a ‘second phase’ of the policy against violence.²² When the ‘second phase’ of the policy was launched, Gaviria said that:

*‘Why do we need to talk about a “second phase” of the national strategy against violence? For over three years the situation has changed, violence and crime in Colombia are dynamic phenomena that require constant adjustments to address them adequately. At the beginning of this decade, the threats were hovering over the institutions. Today, the narco-terrorist organizations, subversives and private justice are in action; and a certain danger bears heavily upon’.*²³

²⁰ This was the first strategy that put into practice what the *Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia* had published in 1987 in the book *Colombia: violencia y democracia*. With respect to the *Comisión* and their first study, see above **Chapter 1**.

²¹ See **Figure 1.1** for the reported numbers of homicide and **Figure 1.12** for the numbers of reported kidnapping, both are in **Chapter 1**.

²² Presidencia de la República, *Seguridad para la gente: segunda fase de la estrategia nacional contra la violencia* (Bogotá, 1993).

²³ Speech of President Gaviria read for the launching of the ‘second phrase’ of his national security policy. See Presidencia de la República, *Seguridad para la gente: segunda fase de la estrategia nacional contra la violencia*.

In this ‘second phase’, the aim was to promote a national citizen security policy to be implemented in conjunction with the first phase of institutional modernisation. The content of the ‘second phase’ centred on the reform of the national police and the strengthening of the judicial system, with an emphasis placed on the preventive rather than the reactive aspects of combating crime. The authors of the strategy noted that: ‘*Colombia must begin to design and to implement specific preventive strategies as fundamental elements to guarantee, in the long run, citizen security*’.²⁴

This ‘second phase’ was characterised by two factors: by publishing a ‘second phase’ of the national security policy, the government confirmed its willingness to maintain crime and insecurity as a top priority in its agenda. Secondly, the government recognised that the problems of violence could not be solved by fighting and persecuting all the illegal armed groups. Law-enforcement strategies needed to be complemented by crime-prevention programmes.

While all the key ideas of the *Estrategia Nacional contra la Violencia* were kept, the ‘second phase’ also recommended the improvement of information and investigation-gathering agencies, prosecutor’s offices and police-community relations. Following a series of corruption scandals in 1993, police-community relations were given a top priority after the Congress approved a law that required a substantial reform of the national police.²⁵ This reform was considered by scholars as ‘one of the most significant policies aiming at improving the citizen security during the decade’.²⁶

²⁴ Presidencia de la República, ‘Seguridad para la gente,’ in *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, p. 389.

²⁵ This refers to Law 62 of 1993. This law was passed following a scandal within the police caused by the murder of a teenage girl. Following this incident, the Minister of Defence ordered an investigation that led to a radical reform of the police. For an account of the political conditions during this time, see the ex-minister’s memoirs in R. Pardo Rueda, *De primera mano. Colombia 1986-1994*, p. 342. For an analysis of problems of corruption and citizen distrust towards the police, see A. Goldsmith, ‘Informe al Consejero Presidencial para la Defensa y Seguridad Nacional sobre la reforma en la Policía Nacional colombiana,’ mimeo (Bogotá, 1995); Colciencias – Policía Nacional – Universidad de los Andes, ‘Informe final: programa de lucha contra la corrupción en la Policía Nacional de Colombia,’ and N. Urueña Cortés, ‘La corrupción en la policía’.

²⁶ The relevant point to improve citizen security was passed with the Law 62 of 1993, when it directed the authorities to focus on the creation of a *Sistema Nacional de Participación Ciudadana en Asuntos de Policía* (National System of Citizen Participation in Police Matters), the regulation of the relation between local and regional authorities and the creation of a police commissioner. It is important to note that the establishment of a police commissioner was later withdrawn as it was considered expensive and redundant by the government taking office in 1994. The National System of Citizen Participation in Police Matters had also remained purely theoretical as it had never been organised and had never existed. See Á. Camacho and E. Camargo, ‘La seguridad ciudadana: una aproximación a la situación de Bogotá,’ in Y. Campos and I. Ortiz (eds.), *La ciudad observada: violencia, cultura y política* (Bogotá, 1998): p. 343; A. Goldsmith, ‘Police accountability reform

The changes introduced in 1993 had as a goal the specialisation of law-enforcement functions among different units of the police and the promotion of police affairs in local communities to foster transparency and accountability within the force. This was especially necessary in areas of intense violence like Medellín. The 1991 Constitution allowed national police of the decentralisation and more investment in judicial and criminal investigations. Thus, the importance of special investigation units that prosecuted crimes and prevented terrorist activities in the cities was stressed.²⁷

There were also important operational enhancements aimed at making the police more responsive to the urban public. These included the creation of *Centros Automáticos de Despacho* and the establishment of *Centros de Atención Inmediata* (CAIs). The CAIs were created near the end of the 1980s, first in Bogotá and then in almost all Colombian cities. The CAIs, inspired by the Japanese *kōban* (交番), were small police posts that decentralised basic police patrolling services to cover areas smaller than those served by a station, giving the police more direct contact with the residents of a jurisdiction. In 1987, 85 centres were created, most of them in Bogotá; in 1994, the national police calculated that there were 480, two-thirds of which were in urban areas. These centres, which deployed officers in posts at multiple points around a city, were the main initiative of the national police designed to improve community relations through decentralisation of basic police services. The CAIs were the first evidence in the operational arena of a shift to an emphasis on attending to the needs of the public, as the chief task of police work. This emphasis was one of the pivotal moments for the reform process of the 1990s.²⁸

in Colombia: the civilian oversight experiment,' p. 180 and M.V. Llorente, 'Demilitarisation in a war zone,' pp. 124-128.

²⁷ The metropolitan police departments were created at the beginning of the 1980s to offer law-enforcement services in Bogotá, Medellín and Cali. At the same time, automated dispatch systems were introduced in these and other large cities to modernise the handling of the emergency calls and speed up the dispatching of patrol cars. See F. Londoño and G. Diettes, 'Dependencias orgánicas mayores: surgimiento y evolución,' in Á. Valencia Tovar (ed.), *Historia de la policía nacional de Colombia* (Bogotá, 1993): pp. 341-342.

²⁸ See B. Camacho Leyva, 'Frente nacional y era contemporánea,' in Á. Valencia Tovar (ed.), *Historia de la policía nacional de Colombia* (Bogotá, 1993): p. 280.

Yet, the actual results of the ‘second phase’ concentrated on the modernisation of policing and judicial institutions more than on the protection of citizens in the streets. The tradition of implementing policies to guarantee ‘national security’ took precedence over the new idea of ‘citizen security’.²⁹

The Samper Administration (1994-1998)

During the administration of President Ernesto Samper Pizano (1994-1998) no new elements was added to the citizen security policies. Although the government published in 1995 another security policy, it contained the same ideas that the previous administration had been trying to implement.³⁰

The security policy of the Samper administration had four main objectives: first, the continuation of the modernisation process of all security institutions and the creation of the national police and citizen security council. This council included high profile figures, such as the President and the Ministers of the Interior and Defence, the director of the police, the police commissioner as well as city mayors and departmental governors.³¹ In 1995, the central government put in place, with the financial support of the Inter-American Development Bank, a US\$ 15.6 million project aiming to modernise the equipment the *Fiscalía General* and to improve its administrative capacity to implement criminal justice policies at the national level. The programme also included the training of staff and the use of new data processing tools to classify crimes. The main objectives of this project were to provide the *Fiscalía General* with ‘an adequate institutional basis’ aiming to: (a) improve its administrative, investigate, and technical efficiency by strengthening its staff’s management capacity; (b) provide the *Fiscalía General* with computers and other modern equipments; (c) formulate medium- and long-term policies to ensure the *Fiscalía General*’s effective participation in shaping a national criminal policy; and (d) establish methods to allocate resources. The Inter-American Development Bank gave its approval to finance two

²⁹ Á. Camacho, ‘Seguridad: ¿para la gente o para el Estado?’, *Análisis Político*, no. 21 (1994): pp. 81-96. See also Á. Camacho and E. Camargo, ‘La seguridad ciudadana,’ p. 343.

³⁰ See the *Programa Presidencial para la Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana* published by the presidential council for national security in September 1995.

³¹ This council had as its main objective the setting up of a security agenda for every locality, taking into account the necessities of the community and the requirements of local police forces. It also included a taskforce in charge of improving the use of statistics, the co-ordination of state entities and the improvement of mechanisms available to citizens to evaluate and denounce police irregularities.

thirds of the project, equivalent to US\$ 9.3 millions, while the country provided US\$ 6.3 millions. The results of these investments have unfortunately not been published, nor has their performance been appraised.³²

Samper's security policy promoted further decentralisation of security institutions, including the launching of a new programme called *Cooperativas Comunitarias de Vigilancia Rural* (CONVIVIR). This cooperative was supposed to create a new mechanism in which the population could organise itself to protect people and properties, especially in rural areas. Although the CONVIVIR was not supposed to participate in law-enforcement activities and had to call the authorities in case of need, it was strongly criticised and accused of favouring paramilitary activities and committing human rights abuses. This was the cause of a controversial public debate that ended with the dissolution of CONVIVIR.³³

The Samper policy also made several proposals to modify laws and legislative tools aimed at improving citizen security. The administration had proposed the modification of the code of police, the penal code, the family code, the code for minors and the anti-corruption law. The anti-corruption law was the only topic that received proper attention from the government, while the others received limited attention. Other security-related issues like drug trafficking, kidnapping and money laundering were absorbed more government time and energy.³⁴

During the Samper administration, most official programmes were based on the idea that public spending would promote social development. Arguing that public spending could alleviate the problems of crime and violence, Horacio Serpa, the Interior Minister, described the guerrillas as a 'cost to pay for the social injustice' of the country. Homicide,

³² A description of the project and costs is available at HTTP: <<http://www.iadb.org/exr/doc98/apr/co909e.htm>>, accessed 5 September 2005.

³³ Although much has been written about the CONVIVIR, very few academic papers have analysed objectively. Most studies have been based on individual examples rather than on methodical analyses. Human right groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have published several studies on the abuses of CONVIVIR based in interviews and individual case studies. Independent publications by academia, however, have been scarce. However, the studies of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were sceptical. A. Ballesteros [et al.] argued that both organisations had substantive problems in their handling of quantitative information on Colombian conflict, which included failure to specify sources, unclear definitions, an erratic reporting template and a distorted portrayal of conflict dynamics. Accounts of individual events were fairly representative and much more useful and accurate than the statistical information. There was some evidence of anti-government bias in both organisations' works. See A. Ballesteros [et al.], 'The work of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch: evidence from Colombia,' Documento de Centro de Recursos para Análisis de Conflictos (CERAC) No. 4 (Bogotá, 2007).

³⁴ E.M. Restrepo, *The Colombian criminal justice in crisis*, pp. 143-144.

kidnapping, extortion and other crimes could also be tackled by promoting social welfare and by investing in employment, housing, education and other such programmes. The main security changes introduced by central government were the establishment of a High Peace Commissioner, the creation of the anti-kidnapping advisory office and the promise of a national code of practice for the national police.³⁵ In December 1995, Néstor Humberto Martínez Neira, the Minister of Justice, presented to the Congress a new law aiming at penalising and processing of small crimes and infractions.³⁶ It had been argued that this measure caused further levels of congestion within the judicial system, as it significantly increased the number of cases in courts, the number of inmates in jails serving short sentences and created huge bureaucratic workloads.³⁷

The main problem regarding better implementation of security policies was the deep-rooted tradition of centralism within the judicial and policing institutions. This caused a certain contradiction between the determination to decentralise crime prevention policies and the lack of autonomy of local police and judicial officials. The judges depended on the *Consejo Superior de Judicatura*. This *Consejo* distributed judges in catchment areas (*circunscripciones*) that rarely matched the amount of work to be done at the local level. It was common for a judge in a small town to preside over a geographical area much larger than the town itself. A shortage of judges clogged the courts and distracted the judges from focusing on their local responsibilities.³⁸ Support from civil authorities at a local level was limited and the authorities were inefficient in drawing up strategies and applying policies aiming at improved citizen security. Camacho and Camargo summarised this situation by arguing that in Colombia: '*los alcaldes son jefes de policía, pero no jefes de la policía*'.³⁹ They contended that the law presupposed that civil authorities at a local level should have control over the police, but did not specify how or by whom this control should be

³⁵ Probably due to the vicissitudes of the impeachment process during the Samper administration, the law presenting the projects for the establishment of a code of practice for the national police was never voted in Congress. This project remained theoretical, as it never reached the commission in charge of security matters within the Congress. The anti-kidnapping co-ordination office was created by Samper under the name of *Consejería para la Libertad Personal*. This office remained attached to the Presidential Office until the year 2000 when it was transferred to FONDELIBERTAD, a dependence of the Ministry of Defence. Like the minister, the head of FONDELIBERTAD was a civilian.

³⁶ This refers to Law 228 of 1995.

³⁷ E.M. Restrepo, *The Colombian criminal justice in crisis*, p. 60.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-30.

³⁹ Á. Camacho and E. Camargo, 'La seguridad ciudadana,' p. 345.

exercised. There was no mention in the law of the faculties given to the civil authorities of controls the local police. To illustrate this, Camacho and Camargo referred to Bogotá, which had an *alcalde mayor*, but also over 20 local councils or *alcaldías menores* that seemed not to control local police forces. The same problem seemed to happen in every other major city. The main explanation for this, as given by Camacho and Camargo in their analysis of the Colombian police, was the inherently military character of the police hierarchy. Due to its historical composition, the institution seemed to reproduce a military scheme of hierarchy and subordination, which made it most unlikely that local forces would obey the civil authorities locally.⁴⁰

The Pastrana Administration (1998-2002)

The administration of President Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998-2002) continued with several of the security policies started earlier in the 1990s. This included a willingness to continue decentralising security policies at the urban level and a modernisation of security forces to combat drug-production and insurgency in rural areas. This had been implemented through *Plan Colombia*, a US\$ 7.5 billion aid initiative fostered by the United States. Yet two main factors had changed since the 1990s. First, levels of insecurity increased. Even if the number of homicides fell by 10 percent by 1998 compared with the early 1990s, other violent crimes such as kidnapping and extortion had tripled since 1998. This had a deep impact on the entire population of the country. Secondly, there were more people interested in the analysis of security policies than before. The authorities usually worked with the support of academics, members of international organisations, non-governmental organisations, private companies and others.

In 1998 the government contracted a new loan with the Inter-American Development Bank that provided funds to reinforce the government's policies for peace and security, by strengthening official funding in law-enforcement, crime prevention and alternative conflict resolution mechanisms in the largest Colombian cities. The total cost of this project was calculated at US\$ 95.6 millions and, under the terms of the contract, the IDB would give two-thirds of the capital, equivalent to US\$ 57.0 millions, while Colombia would contribute the remainder. Resources for this project would be spread over a 5-year period between

⁴⁰ Á. Camacho and E. Camargo, 'La seguridad ciudadana,' p. 345.

1998 and 2003. This was seen as innovation for the IDB, since the financing of citizen security programmes had never been attempted.⁴¹

The results of this project were mixed because only a small share of resources promised was disbursed. National institutions, including the Ministry of Finance and the *Departamento Nacional de Planeación* (DNP), which were in charge of monitoring the allocation of funds, were slow to respond, and had a poor capacity to understand the Bank's regulations and contract obligations.⁴² Only a small share of the approved budget was invested at the national and local levels. Due to a financial crisis, the city governments of Medellín and Cali had serious difficulties in complying with IDB's requirement that they provided matching funds. As the richest city Bogotá, invested some of the funds but did little to monitor spending. The main projects undertaken aimed at developing information systems about levels of crime and violence, funding alternative justice mechanisms, educating youth in risk-zones and modernising police forces.

One of the strategies of the government was to separate the peace process strategies with guerrilla groups from the policies aimed at reducing crime and violence in the main cities. The political conflict with guerrillas and paramilitaries was handled directly by the High Commissioner for Peace, and urban crime by the newly created *Programa Presidencial para la Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana*, an office that was active in the shaping and supervision of security policies in the main cities but not the countryside.⁴³

In 1999 the government launched a new national policy document, *Estrategia Nacional para la Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana*, to guide municipal authorities on the topic of crime. A major argument behind the policy was to demonstrate that increased fear among the population was caused by negative perceptions of security institutions and judiciary. In its introduction the government explained the links between citizen security

⁴¹ See 'Support for peaceful coexistence and citizen security'. The project details are available at the IDB database at HTTP: <<http://www.iadb.org/exr/doc98/apr/co909e.htm>>, accessed 25 January 2006.

⁴² One of then DNP's employees once said: 'El año 2000 fue una especie de año muerto en términos de ejecución, ya que el Programa [de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana] no tenía plan indicativo, ni líneas claras de proyecto; en fin, no había nada. Además, no se había hecho un trabajo serio de diagnóstico previo a la firma de los créditos, así que no había mucha claridad acerca de a qué apuntarle estratégicamente'. Mariana Escobar, she was an advisor of Programa de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana at DNP between 2000 and 2003, interviewed by author, Bogotá, 2 March 2006.

⁴³ Gonzalo de Francisco was appointed as the director of the *Programa* in 1998. His responsibilities had also included participating in the reform committee of the armed forces, directing and advising the government on the application of the US military aid through the Plan Colombia.

and the theme of citizen coexistence by attempting to define what it understood by negative perceptions that further aggregated insecurity. When the population lived with fear, intolerance between citizens became more apparent.⁴⁴

To reduce fear and raise levels of confidence in the authorities, these needed to improve their information strategies and to involve the population further, a goal already seen in the first *Estrategia Nacional* of the Gaviria administration, which had sought to strengthen the role of the civil authorities and the police. Arguably, in a country where levels of violence remained significantly high it was extremely difficult to change relationships between the authorities and the community. While the community suffered the consequences of crime and violence on a daily basis and therefore criticised the authorities for their many failings, the authorities could not improve their relations with the community. The policy of the Pastrana administration, like its predecessors, was too broad in scope to give useful precise advice at the local level. Furthermore, it offered general ideas on how municipalities should tackle crime and violence without supplying solutions to problems of financing.

One clear effect of the reform of the police in the 1990s was the consolidation of an institutional identity that was more appropriate to urban policing. The shift in identity first began to appear in the 1980s; but the urban-rural balance tipped in favour of urban security issues during the second half of the 1990s, when an unprecedented scale of guerrilla attacks upon rural police posts, combined with a lack of military support, caused the police to withdraw from many positions in guerrilla-dominated zones.⁴⁵ Llorente argued persuasively that community-policing initiatives that were also launched, with a pilot project in Bogotá in 1998, improved the public's image of policing in the city.⁴⁶

The very evident change in the public's perception of the police might also be associated with the 1990s reform. A Gallup poll carried out by the Ministry of Defence in July 2002 reported that 72 percent of Colombians approved of the national police. Only the

⁴⁴ Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, p. 5.

⁴⁵ Between 1996 and 2002, the police abandoned more than seventy rural posts as a consequence of guerrilla harassment. In contrast, during the ten previous years, slightly more than thirty posts were abandoned, which was troublesome enough. See *El Tiempo*, 1 December 2004.

⁴⁶ M.V. Llorente, 'La experiencia de la policía comunitaria de Bogotá: contexto y balance,' in H. Frühling (ed.), *Calles más seguras: estudios de policía comunitaria en América Latina* (Washington, DC, 2004): pp. 65-108.

Catholic Church, with 76 percent, and the armed forces, with 79 percent, did better.⁴⁷ Compared with other Colombian government institutions, the national police had the largest increase in public confidence for the past decade, with the armed forces coming in a distant second.⁴⁸ Paradoxically, citizens also identified the police as one of the most corrupt institutions in the country: thus, in a survey on corruption, conducted in 2002, 85 percent of the interviewees stated that the police were corrupt.⁴⁹

There were three possible interpretations of the increase in public confidence in the police. One was that the 1990s police reform process delivered its promised effect of restoring the institution's conventional crime-fighting image. In this view, the process of constructing a more civilian identity that responded to public demands, plus the internal cleanup and greater orientation towards urban policing, ultimately increased the effectiveness of the police force in its fight against common crime. A second possible interpretation was that the increase in public trust in the police had less to do with the reforms and their possible effects on urban crime, and more with the image of General Rosso José Serrano, an internationally renowned figure in the antinarcotics campaign, who headed the national police between 1995 and 2000, and the prestige garnered from capturing the Cali cartel *capos* in the mid-1990s. This interpretation was supported by the fact that General Serrano consistently had a public approval rating of almost 80 percent, which probably rebounded upon the public's perception of the institution that he commanded.⁵⁰ However, this interpretation had more salience to changes in perception in the short and medium term. It did not explain that a high level of institutional credibility for several years after the successes against the Cali cartel and the departure of General Serrano. A more solid reason for sustained change in public confidence in the national police was needed to explain why a major police corruption scandal in 2002 had no immediate effect upon public confidence in the institution.⁵¹ The third interpretation was that regard for the police was directly associated with the hard line that people were taking toward crime and violence, particularly with regard to guerrilla groups. This could also explain the increased

⁴⁷ See Ministerio de Defensa, 'Fuerzas armadas con el concepto mas favorable,' Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/fuerza/fpconcepto.html>>, accessed 1 October 2005.

⁴⁸ L. Carlos, 'El barómetro de la gobernabilidad,' in *El Tiempo*, 23 March 2003.

⁴⁹ 'Colombia enferma (I),' in *El Tiempo*, 26 October 2002.

⁵⁰ *Revista Semana*, 5 May 1997.

⁵¹ M.V. Llorente, 'La honda crisis de la policía,' *Revista Semana Especial Issue: Colombia y el Mundo en el 2003* (22 December 2003): pp. 84-86.

confidence levels for the armed forces and the widespread support for the incoming Uribe administration's proposals in 2002.

Security Policies to Reduce Homicide

During the 1990s, local security plans at the urban level had centred on the analysis of local crime issues. This had, to a certain extent, filled the vacuum created by the lack of a consistent national policy able to guide the cities in the search of homogenous approaches at the local level. The results varied depending on the resources available in each municipality and the priorities posed by local administrations. The main issues tackled by security policies had been the improvement of crime databases and knowledge of risk areas, the modernisation of the police and the improvement of the judiciary and the diffusion of civic programmes to re-educate citizens in areas that had been particularly affected by violence.

Both in Bogotá and outside the process of collecting and classifying data by public institutions had been disorganised and effort was often duplicated. It was common that different offices collected the same statistics from different sources and classified them by using different methodologies.⁵² However, there had been a consistent effort to direct data-gathering institutions to homogenise and simplify their methodologies and specific roles were defined for each institution. This also involved the introduction of better, more rational definitions for each crime to be used by all entities in order to avoid discrepancies. In this respect the government often repeated that the lack of co-ordination of crime

⁵² The example of homicide was striking: the police usually considered that a homicide took place when a person was found dead. If the person was taken to hospital alive, the police were informed of an 'aggravated assault'. If the victim died from internal wounds or from a heart attack, the cause of death might be classified as being something else than a homicide. It was only during the post-mortem analysis that the forensic office of the *Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses* might classify the main cause of death as being a homicide. Because of this, the statistics of the *Instituto* often were higher than the ones published by the police. These differences were even more evident when dealing with other violent and not-lethal crimes, such as kidnapping and extortion. These were actually being classified by several institutions that often presented important differences in their databases. The authorities who investigated these crimes might not have the same information as non-governmental organisations that provided assistance to the victims. These differences were found in most crime databases, and especially in less important and non-physical crimes, such as property crimes and burglaries. See M. Rubio, 'Crimen con misterio: lo que revelan las estadísticas de violencia y criminalidad en Colombia,' Working Paper (Bogotá, 1998).

databases was one of the main obstacles to devising effective policies for improving security, both at the national level and in the larger urban centres.⁵³

Despite having established specialised *Observatorios de la Violencia* in the larger urban agglomerations, the results were disappointing.⁵⁴ By 2002, these *Observatorios* remained precarious in their levels of analysis, and their use of technology was consistently low and labour intensive. The central government had tried since the mid-1990s to establish database centres with accurate information on crimes. The idea, as described by the government was to create a space in which the civil authority (*alcaldes* and *secretarios de gobierno*) could work together with the police, the *Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad* (DAS), the prosecutor general and others. They could see accurate computer-aided databases on crimes that facilitated policy-making. In many cities wallpaper maps with coloured pins were still used to follow trends in crime, although they had proved inefficient in implement effective preventive policies. The national observatory for crime and violence based at the executive branch had not been finished by 2002, despite having been announced several years before.⁵⁵ In spite of these problems, there was a general consensus on the need to promote better crime mapping techniques to understand variables of crime and define high-risk zones and populations.

One of the first measures attempted by local authorities to reduce the number of homicides was the control of weapons in the streets. Because most homicides were committed with firearms, it was decided to restrict the right to own and carry weapons in public areas.⁵⁶ In theory, the army had the monopoly of the production and commerce of weapons. In practice, there was also an important black market, and official calculations estimated that for every registered weapon there might be at least three illegal ones.⁵⁷ To solve this problem, the authorities led by the Ministry of Justice and by the *Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses*, put in place an initiative to create a

⁵³ Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, p. 17.

⁵⁴ The cities include Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Armenia, Bucaramanga, Buenaventura, Cúcuta, Ibagué, Manizales, Neiva, Pasto, Pereira, Valledupar and Villavicencio.

⁵⁵ See Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, pp. 20-24.

⁵⁶ More than 80 percent of the total number of homicides was committed with firearms and in some urban centres this percentage was even higher.

⁵⁷ Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, p. 51. See also Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, *Documento de la República de Colombia para el décimo Congreso de la Naciones Unidas sobre prevención del delito y tratamiento de delincuentes* (Bogotá, 2000): p. 15 and especially pp. 25-27.

ballistic fingerprinting database. However, until 2002 there was still no ballistic fingerprinting register, and the authorities could not identify which weapons were used in crimes.

The arms trade was closely linked to both drug trafficking and to the existence of illegal armed groups.⁵⁸ Legislation on the holding of private arms remained ambiguous and easy to evade.⁵⁹ In an effort to control illegal arms trafficking, the Colombian government promoted and signed several agreements with neighbouring states and international organisations. However, these agreements had few positive results. The scandals in Peru and Venezuela demonstrated that diplomacy was ineffective: both the Fujimori and the Chávez administrations were accused of illegally exporting and selling weapons to Colombia's insurgent organisations.⁶⁰

The most effective measure to reduce the number of illegal weapons in the streets had been to prohibit all weapons, including the legal ones. While most people owning guns were allowed to have the weapon at home, permits allowing citizens to carry their guns in public places were reduced. This measure was enforced on weekends and public holidays when most homicides took place. The issuing of new gun permits was also controlled, and there were several local programmes, notably in Bogotá, involving the exchange of weapons and ammunition for money and food-bonuses. Llorente [et al.] argued that policies of disarmament programmes and control on the consumption of alcohol had only a limited effect in reducing the number of homicides and that any fall in the annual number of these crimes could not be attributed to these measures.⁶¹ The authors also argued that because most homicides were concentrated in well-defined zones in the cities, a reduction in the number of weapons city-wide and the control of alcohol consumption in public places had little or no impact on the number of homicides.

⁵⁸ For more details, see K. Cragin and B. Hoffman, *Arms trafficking and Colombia* (Santa Monica, CA, 2003).

⁵⁹ Decree 2535 of 1993 defined the rules of private weapon use and the different gun permits that might be given to carry or to own a gun. The decree had a main flaw: Article 18 let the chance for people who only had a permit to own a gun at home, to transport it in public places if the gun was unloaded. As a result, the measures taken by municipalities to reduce the number of guns in the streets were not always effective, as many people carried their guns unloaded. This example demonstrated how easy it was to defy the law. Even if the weapon was unloaded, the owner could always load it and use it in a matter of seconds.

⁶⁰ Other countries like Panama, Ecuador and Nicaragua were also involved in illegal arms trafficking with the Colombian armed groups. A summary of scandals appeared in *El Tiempo*, 25 April 2002.

⁶¹ M.V. Llorente [et al.], 'Caracterización de la violencia homicida en Bogotá,' Working Paper No.5 (Bogotá, 2000): pp. 49-52. See also M.V. Llorente, J. Núñez and M. Rubio, 'Efecto de los controles al consumo de alcohol y al porte de armas de fuego sobre los homicidios en Bogotá,' Working Paper No.6 (Bogotá, 2000).

The question of how to reduce the number of homicides in the major cities of the country had been tackled from different angles. Although the topics were different and should not be confused, the number of homicides would perhaps only be reduced significantly when the state reached a solution to the conflict with the guerrillas and to the problem of drug-trafficking. Any progress in these areas could be a decisive factor in helping pursuing better policies to eliminate violent crime. A consistent policy of modernisation and strengthening of the army and the national police could also permit the consolidation of effective strategies based on the co-operation between the institutions charged with investigating, prosecuting and penalising crimes. While these were necessarily problems for the higher level of government, other specific questions had to be dealt by local institutions. A policy based on the combination of national policies and local projects was needed.

Security Policies to Reduce Kidnapping

During the 1980s, the government created specialised groups in charge of the investigation of kidnappings. These were rapid-development units especially trained for heavy combat and were attached to the DAS, the intelligence services of the police. Then in early 1990s, these groups were restructured and given more power.⁶²

The Gaviria government decided that a multi-institutional force, competent to investigate and prevent further crimes had to be established. In 1993, he announced the creation of special investigation and law enforcement units.⁶³ These anti-kidnapping units, called *Unidades Anti-Secuestro* (UNASE) were often criticised for radical methods and for poor results that frequently ended in the death of the victim. Their main role was to act as deterrents to kidnapers. In 1993 the Interior Minister declared that he was pleased with the results of these units since more than 120 victims had been released from their captors.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, the national police indicated that the number of kidnappings had surpassed

⁶² Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro* (Bogotá, 1996): p. 23.

⁶³ C. Gaviria Trujillo, 'Estamos construyendo un nuevo consenso nacional en contra de la violencia,' speech said on 18 November 1992. See transcript in Presidencia de la República, *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, vol. 1, pp. 139-140. See also 'Coordinación de información sobre inteligencia contra secuestro y extorsión,' Article 27, Law 40 – 19 January 1993.

⁶⁴ Speech by Fabio Villegas Ramirez, Interior Minister, 1993, in Presidencia de la República, *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, p. 223.

1,700 and that the number of rescues had reached 10 percent of the total number of reported cases. The authorities were criticised over this poor result, and their methods were questioned again because victims were constantly put at risk when the anti-kidnapping units attempted rescue operations. Demands from the public to change the strategies for rescuing victims intensified after Diana Turbay, a journalist and daughter of a former President, Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), was killed in a farm near Copacabana, Antioquia in a rescue operation after she had been kidnapped by the Medellín cartel. For several weeks her relatives asked the authorities not to attempt a rescue. Turbay's mother also sent letters to Gaviria urging him not to intervene, but her plea was ignored and Diana Turbay was murdered when the authorities attempted to liberate her.⁶⁵

The anti-kidnapping policy was based on the creation of special units that were active mainly in the rural areas and were under the command of the army.⁶⁶ In spite of these reforms, the efforts of the authorities to bring down the number of kidnap victims were not sufficient. While the number of kidnappings increased annually, rescue operations never involved more than 23 percent of victims. In 1996 the government created a national anti-kidnapping council composed of all the main figures in security affairs, which was designed to bring together the highest authorities responsible for drafting national and citizen security policies, as well as for investigating and prosecuting crimes.⁶⁷ Samper also created an advisory office in charge of leading the national policies against kidnapping and established several multi-institutional units from the police and the army with the support

⁶⁵ For a copy of the correspondence between Turbay's mother and the President, see Varios Autores, *Rostros del secuestro*, pp. 139-185. Her case was portrayed in a novel by Gabriel García Márquez, titled '*News of a Kidnapping*'.

⁶⁶ In 1992, there were 9 rural UNASE under the direction of the army in the following regions: Sogamoso, Barranquilla, Valledupar, Popayán, Bucaramanga, Villavicencio, Pereira, Neiva and Montería. The national police were only in charge of the urban UNASE in the cities of Bogotá, Medellín and Cali. This reflected the reactive approach of the authorities towards the problem of kidnapping. By 1993 the number of anti-kidnapping units had grown to 22, mainly to fix this imbalance between police and army units. See Presidencia de la República, *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, p. 282.

⁶⁷ This refers to the *Consejo Nacional de Lucha contra el Secuestro y demás atentados contra la Libertad Personal* (CONASE). In this council participated the Ministry of Defence, the general prosecutor, the commander of the *Fuerzas Militares*, the director of the national police, the director of the intelligence service and, until 2000, the director of the anti-kidnapping office. Directors, commanders of GAULA and other important civil servants working on related topics could also attend by invitation of the council. See Law 282 – 6 January 1996, Decree 1465 of 1995 and Decree 1512 of 2000.

of the prosecutor's office. The new units that replaced the UNASE were called *Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal y Antiextorción* (GAULA).⁶⁸

Following public demand in a referendum drawn up in 1993, the *Mandato Ciudadano* asked Congress to revise the legislation and try to step up official efforts to punish kidnappers and prevent the commission of new crimes. New anti-kidnapping legislation passed by Congress, imitated laws against organised crime that had been voted in Italy a few years before. These were meant to be highly punitive and deterrent and were based on a 'zero tolerance' approach to kidnappers, by which the state, through its investigative and law-enforcement authorities, was authorised to seize and control the assets of victims to avoid the payment of ransoms. The state could also take control of the assets of individuals and corporations that were suspected of helping the victims to find the capital to pay their ransoms. The purpose of this preventive seizure of goods was to act as a disincentive for kidnappers by limiting all access to financial resources by families of the victims. The laws also punished with prison sentences and imposed heavy fines upon all those who participated in the payment of ransoms or who contracted insurance policies and negotiators to mediate directly with kidnappers.⁶⁹

While the premises behind these laws were in theory correct because they required all victims to report crimes to the authorities and wait for them to investigate and capture the kidnappers, they caused much controversy because it was widely held that the authorities were not able or prepared to assume these tasks without putting the victim's life at risk. In the eyes of many, these laws caused 'further victimisation of the victims' since they made more difficult the liberation of kidnap victims in a country where the authorities were already immersed in the problems of combating drug-cartels, insurgents and other illegal armed groups. Several articles and paragraphs of the new legislation were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court because they affected individual liberties

⁶⁸ In December 2000 there were 27 working GAULA: 16 belonged to the army, 9 to the national police and 2 to the navy. While the GAULA of the national police were institutionally independent, the GAULA of the army and the navy needed to have personnel from the prosecutor's office and from the intelligence service (DAS) to undertake investigate and judicial actions. See Presidencia de la República, *Programa presidencial para la defensa de la libertad personal* (Bogotá, 1998): pp. 6-7.

⁶⁹ See E. Andrade Sánchez, *Instrumentos jurídicos contra el crimen organizado*, particularly chapter 5, 'La criminalidad organizada en Italia,' (México, D.F., 1997): pp. 113-115. See also U. Santino, 'Law enforcement in Italy and Europe against mafia and organised crime,' in W.F. McDonald (ed.), *Crime and law enforcement in global village* (Cincinnati, OH, 1997): pp. 151-166.

adversely.⁷⁰ Law 40 of 1993 stated that sentences against ransom kidnappers would rise to 40 years in jail, with the possibility of adding a further 20 years when victims included children, mentally or physically ill people or pregnant women. Law 40 stated too that if any kidnapping lasted more than 15 days, 20 years could be added to the sentence of the kidnapper.⁷¹

The national police was re-structured and another sub-direction in charge of combating kidnapping and extortion was created, placing the issue of kidnapping and extortion on a par with questions of counter-insurgency and anti-narcotics.⁷² The GAULA received more official resources and attention.⁷³

⁷⁰ Chapter 1, Article 7, Sentence No. 213 of the Constitutional Court, 28 April 1994. Other articles that were considered as inapplicable by the Constitutional Court include:

- The payment of anti-kidnapping insurance (Chapter 1, Article 12 and Chapter 4, Article 26, Sentence No. 542 of the Constitutional Court, 24 November 1993)
- The freezing of all assets belonging to the victims and their families (Chapter 2, Article 13 & Chapter 3, Article 18, Sentence No. 542 of the Constitutional Court, 24 November 1993)
- The participation of civil servants and public employees in the transactions leading to the liberation of victims (Chapter 2, Article 15, Sentence No. 542 of the Constitutional Court, 24 November 1993)
- The participation of financial institutions in any transaction related to the liberation of a victim (Chapter 3, Articles 20 & 21 and Chapter 4, Article 24, Sentence No. 542 of the Constitutional Court, 24 November 1993)
- The participation of foreigners in the liberation of victims (Chapter 4, Article 25, Sentence No. 542 of the Constitutional Court, 24 November 1993).

⁷¹ Chapter 1, Article 1 Law 40, 19 January 1993. In addition to the prison sentence, this article also stated that kidnappers could be fined between 100 and 500 minimum monthly wages. This article was changed with the adoption of a new penal code in 2001. Article 169 of the new code stated that kidnappers faced prison sentences between 18 and 28 years in jail and a fine between 2,000 and 4,000 minimum monthly wages. These sentences could be increased by up to 50 percent when kidnappers acted in groups or took the victim for more than 15 days. In January 2002, the law increased the minimum sentence to 20 to 28 years in jail and a maximum fine of 10,000 minimum monthly wages. This sentence could be increased to a jail sentence between 28 to 40 years in jail and a fine between 5,000 and 50,000 minimum monthly wages when there were aggravation circumstances, such as kidnapping a person for more than 15 days, kidnapping a minor or a disabled person, among others. There were no visible signs of any crime deterrence caused by these figures and there was no record available about kidnappers convicted and sentenced. Paradoxically, Pastrana reopened the debate to see whether the authorities should be given the right to freeze the assets of victims so as to avoid the payment of ransoms. Despite the fact that the measure was not popular as it 'victimised further the victims' and was deemed unconstitutional in 1994, projects to re-include it in the legislation were often discussed in Congress. Pastrana examined this in a televised statement on 30 June 2000. The statement could be obtained at <http://www.presidencia.gov.co/>. See also 'Cuestión de Honor' in *Revista Semana*, no. 948, 11 July 2000; Congreso de Colombia, *Código de Procedimiento Penal* (Bogotá, 2001), Articles 169 and 170 and Law 733 of 29 January 2002. For further details on the prohibition of ransom negotiation and anti-kidnapping policies, see **Chapter 1**.

⁷² For an analysis of the institutional reforms of the national police, see M.V. Llorente, 'Perfil de la policía colombiana,' pp. 389-474, and especially the organisational structure of the institution in p. 415. The existing sub-directions cover the following areas: operational, judicial police, special services, intelligence, anti-narcotics, anti-kidnapping and extortion, administrative and financial services, human resources, academic, social welfare and health. See also Decree 1512, 11 August 2000.

⁷³ Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, p. 63.

A sequence of reforms responded to daily necessities that had appeared over several years. A strategy evolved with regard to policing and also the judiciary and penal institutions. While the government had passed strong legislative measures to punish criminals it also began to build and refurbish penitentiaries. However, legislation to punish kidnappers was generally confusing, radical in its approach against innocent citizens, and extremely difficult to put into practice. Laws were often modified or replaced. For example, law 40 of 1993 was adopted to impose severe sentences upon kidnappers, but no one in government seemed to know exactly how many people had been sentenced for committing this type of crime, or about the payment of fines imposed upon kidnappers. Thus legislation was of little use in deterring criminals. Rather than actually penalising those who committed crimes of kidnapping, legislation merely sought immediate and superficial public approval.

Because of the growing number of kidnappings, the popularisation and sensationalism of the topic through the different media, the director of the anti-kidnapping office rapidly attracted public attention.⁷⁴ Few of the policies evolved during the 1990s included public participation through information or education. Public ignorance on the subject remained high, and poor co-operation with the authorities was a consequence.

Prison Policies

The country was already experiencing a crisis of its penitentiary system when the Gaviria administration announced that it was a ‘major priority’. In one of his speeches, Gaviria mentioned that his government would invest in rehabilitation and crime deterrence programmes. He also announced the establishment of a national prison code and a specialised body in charge of the surveillance inside jails.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ The director of the anti-kidnapping office was often referred to by the media as the *Tsar Anti-Secuestro* or anti-kidnapping tsar.

⁷⁵ Presidencia de la República, *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, pp. 393-394.

By the end of the 1990s, the problem remained the same, and the *Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario* (INPEC) was still in deep crisis. Colombia lacked a coherent penal policy, and in spite of a long tradition in establishing new law schools and producing lawyers. Malcolm Deas argued that a lack of consistency in criminal legislation was notorious. While legislation oscillated between severity and indulgence, increasing mandatory sentence was a common reaction to demands that ‘something be done’, but in Colombia the laws of evidence commonly favoured the defence. Sentences were also cumulatively scaled down by plea bargaining, undertakings by prisoners ‘to study’ and other allowances.⁷⁶

The prison system contained 55,000 inmates in 2000 while the country’s jails only had a capacity to maintain 34,000.⁷⁷ Statistics from the INPEC revealed an overcrowding of more than 38 percent at the national level. In 2000, the major prisons of Bogotá such as La Picota and Cártel Modelo were overcrowded by more than 73 percent and 45 percent respectively. The main prison of Medellín, which was conceived to have 1,800 inmates, had almost 5,500 inmates. Even the high-security prison of Itagüi had an overcrowding rate of 85 percent.⁷⁸ The general condition of prisons was poor, the equipment outdated and the guards underpaid. The conditions for inmates varied significantly depending on their background. Privileged inmates, including former guerrilla leaders, drug-traffickers and disgraced politicians often lived in larger cells with better facilities, had free access to the media and possessed mobile phones, computers and faxes.

⁷⁶ M. Deas, ‘Violence reduction in Colombia: lessons from government policies over the last decade,’ mimeo (Washington, DC, 1998): p. 12.

⁷⁷ Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario (INPEC), ‘Estadística población carcelaria, 1990-2000,’ mimeo (Bogotá, 2001). The media announced the inauguration of a high security jail for kidnappers and extortionists on 30 August 2001. It drew more public attention to announce the inauguration of a security jail for kidnappers than to announce the inauguration a new jail to relocate convicts that had already been sentenced. There had also been some improvements in the major penitentiary centres of the country, notably in Bogotá, Palmira, Cúcuta, Girardot, Apartadó, Manizales, Cali, Ipiales, Cartagena, Lórica, la Colonia Penal de Acacías, Montería and Tunja. New jails had been built in several other cities. See ‘Lista cárcel para secuestradores,’ in *El Tiempo*, 30 August 2001 and the speech pronounced by Pastrana, ‘Palabras del Presidente de la República: con ocasión de la inauguración del nuevo centro penitenciario del Oriente,’ Acacías (Meta), 30 August 2001.

⁷⁸ For data on the prison population, see the files of the INPEC at the Ministry of Justice’s internet site at HTTP: <<http://www.minjusticia.gov.co>>. These figures seemed to coincide with the analysis published in 1997 by the Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia. In one of their studies, the Corporación concluded that in the mid-1990s the overcrowding was already reaching close to 40 percent in jails that were generally old and poorly maintained. See Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia (CEJ), *Justicia y desarrollo: debates*, no. 1 (Bogotá, 1997): p. 9.

In spite of this, it was generally agreed that Colombia's prison population was low by international standards, especially when taking into account that many inmates were awaiting trial or had been sentenced for trivial offences.⁷⁹ Many of those who had been sentenced for serious crimes had only been the material authors of these crimes, and the intellectual authors had never been brought to justice. This applied especially to drug-cartels, paramilitaries and guerrillas.

Usually in Colombia trials were slow and expensive for most of the population. One of the state's planned solutions to the penal crisis and the backlog of the judiciary was the introduction of rapid, less expensive and hopefully more effective mechanisms of justice. To undertake this, the Gaviria administration announced in 1994 the creation of the *Casas de Justicia*. The first two *Casas de Justicia* were established in Ciudad Bolívar in Bogotá and in the Aguablanca district of Cali. These *Casas de Justicia* were intended facilitate for the poor to have access to the judicial system without travelling far and without delays. The main objective of these *Casas* was to restore the trust of the population in the legal system while reducing the backlogs of the system and offering citizens at the same time an accessible and non-violent way to resolve disputes.⁸⁰ The *Casas* were supposed to decrease the costs of the judiciary, especially in deprived and marginal areas by integrating, under one roof, members of several public offices. Among these were included representatives from the city council, the police, the prosecutor's office, the *Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses*, the *Defensoría del Pueblo*, the *Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar*, the *Personería Municipal* as well as several independent lawyers. Because of this congregation of legal and official institutions, the government perceived that the *Casas* would also improve levels of information of the population upon legal matters and judicial processes.

⁷⁹ In 1997, the number of prisons was 40,617; one prisoner for every 100,000 inhabitants. By contrast, a country like the United States had 426 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants. See Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario (INPEC), 'Número de internos años 1991 a 1997,' mimeo (Bogotá, 1997).

⁸⁰ Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, pp. 8-9. See also Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, *Documento de la República de Colombia para el décimo congreso de las Naciones Unidas sobre prevención del delito y tratamiento de delincuentes*, p. 42.

The establishment of other *Casas* throughout the country had been slow and difficult, despite the fact that the programme attracted the interest of larger foundations like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank and the Colombian *Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo* (Fedesarrollo). The central government had confirmed its commitment to continue to promote this programme, but there was no study of the efficiency and long-term impact of the *Casas de Justicia* in crime-ridden areas of the country.⁸¹ There was still very little information on the final outcomes of cases, on their impact upon local populations and on the effectiveness of inter-agency co-ordination inside the *Casas*. There were 15 *Casas de Justicia* operating, of which two were in Bogotá, two in Cali, and one each in Bucaramanga, Ibagué, Neiva, Pereira, Valledupar, Cartagena, Barranquilla, Mocoa, Pasto, Popayán and the Urabá zone. Although the *Casa* located in Ciudad Bolívar was often quoted as an example of success, there had been no monitoring of its performance. Critics of this programme usually argued that the *Casas* could not solve the problem of backlogs in the main courts, and that only minor crimes would be handled. There was a debate between proponents and opponents of the *Casas de Justicia* about the long-term sustainability of the project.⁸²

Problems of the Citizen Security Policies

During the Pastrana administration, citizen security was not included among the government's top priorities. Peace negotiations with guerrilla groups and the drugs trade occupied most of the attention of the central government. Consequently, the application of citizen security policies had not been effective and most of the projects remained theoretical.⁸³

⁸¹ By the end of the Pastrana administration, less than 15 of these offices had opened to the public, which limited results. It would be interesting to analyse how effective it had been to include so many different public offices under the roof. See Presidencia de la República, *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, p. 72.

⁸² See Presidencia de la República, *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, p. 394 and *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*, p. 47.

⁸³ The convenient introductory of collection of essays on Colombian peace process is V.M. Bouvier (ed.), *Colombia: building peace in a time of war* (Washington, DC, 2009). See also H.F. Kline, *Chronicle of a failure foretold: the peace process of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana* (Tuscaloosa, AL, 2007).

Several reasons explained this failure. First, there had not been a constant and regular criminal justice policy during the 1990s. Governments, both local and national, preferred to adopt new security programmes to continuing the implementation of those established by former administrations. Secondly, the authorities did not manage to incorporate a more consistent and democratic policy into their security programmes. Mainly because of the political conflict with guerrillas and paramilitaries, citizen security policies had been overshadowed by stronger counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics policies. The central government and its agencies, notably the police, had constantly implemented strong security programmes that did not allow for citizen participation.⁸⁴

Citizen security policies had sometimes been confusing and difficult to interpret. Deas argued that there was a great deal of understandable confusion about the structure, workings and results of the system, and despite the large sums spent over the last decade, not enough was done to make it comprehensible to the general public.⁸⁵ The result of this was a lack of consistent long-term policies to curb crime. Citizen security was considered a secondary matter, only approached with short-term projects aiming to bring rapid solutions to security problems that increased levels of public approval for a short period. Decisions were usually taken hurriedly, without proper planning and financing. This was described as the ‘immediatism’ of Colombian politics.⁸⁶

Impunity levels also remained extremely high.⁸⁷ This was an important matter, because the figures for impunity were often exaggerated and misused by the media and the population. The common perception was that impunity levels reached around 95 percent for most crimes and were close to 99 percent, in the case of homicide or kidnapping.⁸⁸ Rubio sustained that impunity levels were high, but not so high as many people believed.⁸⁹ The

⁸⁴ This was understandable because the national police had consistently been the main target for guerrillas and drug-traffickers during the 1990s. Until 2002, almost 10 percent of the municipalities did not have a police station and many others were frequently attacked and bombed by guerrillas. At the urban level, police forces had been targeted by drug-cartels or by armed groups who considered them as a ‘rival’ band.

⁸⁵ M. Deas, ‘Violence reduction in Colombia: lessons from government policies over the last decade,’ p. 12.

⁸⁶ Francisco Santos criticised the high degree of politicisation of criminal justice. See F. Santos, ‘Secuestro y voluntad política,’ in *El Tiempo*, 10 December 2000.

⁸⁷ A study conducted by the VII Commission of the Colombian Senate calculated that in 2000 there were 150,000 orders of capture in the country, some of them dating from the early 1990s. See ‘Vigentes, 150 mil órdenes de captura en el país,’ in *El Tiempo*, 16 June 2000.

⁸⁸ See ‘Gasto público y desempeño de la justicia,’ in Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia, *Justicia y desarrollo: debates*, no. 1; see also Partido Conservador Colombiano, *Inseguridad e impunidad en Colombia*.

⁸⁹ M. Rubio, *Crimen e impunidad*, p. 114.

main problem lay in the lack of data and information about criminals that had been captured, judged and sentenced. Deas mentioned that:

‘Ignorance about results so far obtained can be found in the most surprising quarters. In a seminar in April 1998 in Bogotá arranged by the President’s office on kidnapping, a senior official of that office confessed to the author that he had been unable to discover reliable figures on the number of kidnappers captured, tried and sentenced in Colombia, and that he had no idea what the figures were. It was not surprising that public confidence in the government’s anti-kidnapping strategies was low, and that there was no indication that they had much of a deterrent effect’.

Deas continued by concluding that:

*‘In general, the Colombian central government was often ignorant of the result of provincial experiments, even of municipal experiments in Bogotá itself. It was slow to learn about them, not good at evaluating them and slow to generalise successful practices. This was but one aspect of a lack of interest in preventive measures’.*⁹⁰

Another problem that could be added was the complete lack of transparency in the finances of security organisations. It was extremely difficult to define the exact budget allocated to the armed forces since the national budget attributed to the army and to the national police was often increased by foreign governments who donated resources to investigate, combat and prosecute transnational organised crime. The most significant example was the help received from the United States by the Colombian armed forces in their fight against illegal drugs. Although it was known that the Colombian army and especially the police periodically received weapons and financial support to improve their fight against drug-cartels, the exact figures of this help were rarely disclosed to the public.

One example was the *Industria Militar de Colombia* (INDUMIL), the military-owned company in charge of producing and providing weapons, ammunitions and industrial goods for the armed forces. INDUMIL was the only company that had the legal right to sell weapons and ammunitions to civilians across the country. Although it was thought that

⁹⁰ M. Deas, ‘Violence reduction in Colombia: lessons from government policies over the last decade,’ pp. 11-13.

INDUMIL was a very lucrative business for the armed forces, no figures related to the balance sheet of the company were released to the public. This lack of transparency was a major source of concern for civilian authorities, who often encountered difficulties from INDUMIL officials when trying to increase the accountability of the armed forces. INDUMIL had also been a source of (passive) resistance against civilian-led projects aiming to reduce the number of weapons in the streets.⁹¹

Government officials continued to argue that better levels of efficiency and transparency in security-related topics could be achieved by continuing the decentralisation process and by giving more power to regional authorities. These should receive national guidelines, promoting preventive rather than reactive policies.⁹² Issues like the financing of national security institutions and their accountability towards civilians had not been targeted yet.

In general, citizen security policies had nonetheless not received a great deal of attention from local authorities. These had traditionally given preference to other topics that brought more public attention and received larger resources from the nation, such as anti-insurgency and anti-narcotics policies. The judicial system lacked popular credibility and support because it was generally slow, corrupt and inefficient.⁹³ However, since the mid-1990s, this topic had attracted the attention of multilateral agencies and government abroad. Different agents of the international community started to play an important role in promoting and financing programmes of violence reduction, development of alternative methods of justice and modernisation of law-enforcement and crime prevention agencies. This interest had been reflected by the promotion and financing of projects in extremely diverse areas of research and policy-making. As mentioned above, multilateral agencies like the IDB, the World Bank and individual governments through specialised agencies like the USAID and the Council for External Relations of the European Union had taken an increasing role in the development of citizen security programmes aiming at improving security and providing peace among citizens. The European Union had been particularly concerned with issues related to the strengthening of democratic institutions, the protection

⁹¹ For more on INDUMIL's services, see HTTP: <<http://www.indumil.gov.co/>>.

⁹² Departamento Nacional de Planeación, *La paz: el desafío para el desarrollo*, p. 145.

⁹³ See Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia, *Políticas de seguridad y convivencia para el nuevo siglo* (Bogotá, 1998): p. 11.

of the rule of law and the respect of human rights. The then EU's Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, in a visit to Colombia repeated that the European Union was ready to increase its effort to 'tackle a number of structural problems in the country, and in particular to introduce the political, social and economic reforms'. To take this commitment to participate in the resolution of the Colombian conflict and the improvement of the rule of law, the long-term strategies of the European Union towards Colombia were supporting of on-going Colombian activities in the search for peace, targeting of the roots and cases of the conflict, and providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict.⁹⁴

In 1998 USAID established together with Georgetown University in Washington, DC, a programme on the study of crime and violence in Colombia. Its main aims were to provide further analysis and assistance to local authorities, including the *alcaldías*, in designing sound policies to curb violence and prevent the escalation of crime. In 2000, the above organisations formed the *Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence*, with the aim of supporting local efforts to curb problems of violence and security.⁹⁵ The areas that had been given more attention by members of the international community included projects aiming at 1) promoting the understanding of crime and victimisation in different risk-zones, especially among local leaders, academics and journalists; 2) supporting peace initiative in conflict-ridden zones and helping to implement violence-reduction and crime prevention programmes; 3) strengthening the rule of law and the judicial system, including alternative methods of conflict resolution; 4) modernising state institutions, training personnel and financing specialised units; and 5) helping with the economic apparatus, distributing resources among the poorest sectors and giving new incentives to promote employment.

⁹⁴ See the European Union's Council for External Relations website on Colombia, available at [HTTP: <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/Colombia/intro/index.htm/>](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/Colombia/intro/index.htm/). For the EU's strategy report on Colombia, available online at [HTTP: <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/colombia/csp/02_06en.pdf>](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/colombia/csp/02_06en.pdf), accessed 24 April 2006.

⁹⁵ The Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence was formed in 2000 and counted with the participation of the following organisations: the IDB, the World Bank, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), the Organisation of American States (OAS), and the United States Centres for Disease Control. Its mission, as described in the Coalition's charter, was to stimulate the analysis and dialogue across the region, promote the integration of sound policies linking the public and private sectors, rebuilding social capital within local communities, and establishing community participation programmes to incorporate the views and necessities of the sectors of the population, notably the poor, who had been the most vulnerable to crime and violence.

The country had benefited from this attention. Joint efforts between specialists in Colombia and abroad had permitted to progress further in this area than in other Latin American countries, at least in recognition of the problem, the analysis and re-definition of security concepts and policies and in the publication of data, books and reports. But most of the projects, both national and international, had lacked a proper system of monitoring and control. Projects like the 1995 IDB loan to modernise the *Fiscalía*, the 1998 IDB loan to support citizen security policies, the 2001 World Bank's project to support the *Consejo Superior de Judicatura*, and the USAID investment in the *Casas de Justicia*, had not been properly supervised. The completion of objectives was not properly monitored and reports were written without independent monitoring and verification. Reports on international projects were often not available to the public. Levels of accountability were limited, and there were very few means of measuring the impact that these projects had had on crime levels. Thus efforts made between 1990 and 2002 by local and national government to improve citizen security had been numerous, but had not achieved essential goals. There was in every topic a lack of knowledge that prevented policy makers from formulating sound policies and a consistent long-term citizen security policy.

Bogotá's Citizen Security Policies

The transformation of Bogotá's citizen security policies was related to the processes of change in the management of the city that took place during the 1990s. A critical starting point was the new set of norms established to govern the city and revive its finances, pushed by the administration of the city Mayor Jaime Castro (1992-1994).⁹⁶ Another watershed, specifically with regards to security issues, was the first administration of Antanas Mockus (1995-1997). For the first time the city government became involved in the planning and implementation of concrete actions on the subject of urban security, and the issue of violence in the capital was given priority in his plan of government, inspired by what was called *Cultura Ciudadana* (Citizenship Culture). The administration of Enrique

⁹⁶ Castro was well known by his advocacy in favour of decentralisation. In 1980, as a senator he presented to the Congress the legislation for elections of mayor but was defeated. In 1984 he was appointed interior minister with the task of making possible the elections of mayor, which he succeeded by introducing the legislative act of 1986. He was also a member of the national constitutional assembly charged with moving forward the reform of Bogotá. See A. Angell, P. Lowden and R. Thorp, *Decentralising development: the political economy of institutional change in Colombia and Chile* (Oxford, 2001): p. 25.

Peñalosa (1998-2000), although keeping in place certain aspects of the policies initiated in 1995, redirected the efforts on the matter of citizen security as part of his priority of construction of the city and, in particular, of recovering public spaces to create order. Later, in the second Mockus administration (2001-2003), the initiatives related to the *Cultura Ciudadana* and to the defence and ordering of public spaces taken by the Peñalosa administration were maintained.

The Castro Administration (1992-1994)

During the Castro administration an organic status was adopted that reorganised the city government in five fundamental aspects.⁹⁷ Firstly, relations between the council and the mayor's office were redefined to keep the council from continuing to take on administrative functions and focus on issues of planning, budgeting and control, compliance and oversight of the management of the city government. Secondly, anti-corruption tools were created, among which the city ombudsman stood out. Thirdly, administrative and procedural obstacles to city management were removed to speed up the process of decentralisation of the city. Fourthly, mechanisms to modernise administrative management were put in place. Lastly, the statute granted sufficient fiscal autonomy to the city to be able to reorganise its finances. Despite the fact that the financial reorganisation began in 1992 with a series of measures for actual control of public spending and of the budget, this process gained momentum from the passing of this norm. The organic statute permitted the redefinition of taxation instruments, the reorganisation of the budget, the planning of expenditure, the framing of the finance department's administrative reform and the reorientation of the local treasury.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ The Bogotá Organic Statute, contained in Decree 1421 of 1993.

⁹⁸ R. Velasquez, 'Agency, institutional constraints and law in the creation of Bogotá's new local governments and in the evolution of local government policies, 1991-1997,' Unpublished D.Phil. dissertation (University of Oxford, 2001): p. 28. For Bogotá city politics see A. Gilbert and J.D. Dávila, 'Bogotá: progress within a hostile environment,' in D.J. Myers and H.A. Dietz (eds.), *Capital city politics in Latin America: democratisation and empowerment* (Boulder, CO, 2002).

The Mockus Administrations (1995-1997 and 2001-2003)

The first Antanas Mockus administration in 1995 invented the concept of *Cultura Ciudadana*, understood as the set of minimum common rules regulating relations between citizens and their surroundings.⁹⁹ Through this attempt to harmonise the basic regulatory systems of individuals, society, law, morals and culture, a new political discourse was put into practice in the city, as well as an unfamiliar form of governance. The Mockus administration tried to change the behaviour of Bogotá's citizens, introducing forms of individual and collective regulation through education and communication.¹⁰⁰

The initiatives implemented during the two administrations of Mockus had pedagogical foundations, together with symbolic elements. One example was days of civil resistance against acts of terrorism, which rose in number in the city from 2000. Such initiatives, meant to modify residents' actions in relation to one another and to the city, were very different from the civic campaigns used generally by the authorities. With this conception of government, citizen security and, above all, 'coexistence initiatives' began to have priority on the agenda. The defence of citizen lives became a central aim of the Mockus administration, when the homicide rate in Bogotá remained very high. This priority was maintained during his second term under the motto 'Life is Sacred,' when the city's homicide indicators were considerably lower.

Two hypotheses about the causes of the violence that had proliferated in the country from the late 1980s were at the heart of the policies adopted since the first Mockus administration. The first began from the assumption that homicide violence was a generalised phenomenon that involved common citizens who, starting off from a culture of intolerance, became involved in trivial fights that ended in death due to the use of both alcohol and firearms. The second hypothesis stressed the fundamental role played by family

⁹⁹ Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, *Políticas saludables para la seguridad y la convivencia* (Bogotá, 1998): p. 12.

¹⁰⁰ Governmental initiatives in this field were meant to increase: 1) the respect for norms of coexistence; 2) the ability of certain citizens to make others respect the norms in a peaceful manner; 3) the citizens' capacity to negotiate and resolve conflicts peacefully; and 4) the citizens' capacity to communicate through art, culture, leisure and sport. See A. Mockus, 'Anfibios culturales y divorcio entre ley, moral y cultura,' *Análisis Político*, no. 21 (1994): pp. 37-48. See also A. Mockus, 'Cultura ciudadana: programa contra la violencia en Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, 1995-1997,' Online. Available: HTTP: < <http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/culturaciudadana.pdf>>, accessed 25 April 2006. For the concept of cultural citizenship, see N. Stevenson, 'Culture and citizenship: an introduction,' in N. Stevenson (ed.), *Culture and citizenship* (London, 2000).

violence and, above all, by the ill-treatment of children, in the reproduction of what had been called the ‘culture of violence’ in Colombia.¹⁰¹

On the basis of these hypotheses and with the clear aim of reducing violence in Bogotá, initiatives were taken that were inspired by the so-called ‘healthy policies,’ which fitted Mockus’ pedagogical approach because they were concentrated on interventions that attempted to prevent the factors that led to violent situations.¹⁰² The most widely publicised policies were those that tried to disarm Bogotá’s residents and that favoured responsible consumption of alcoholic beverages.¹⁰³ In this context, initiatives geared towards coexistence also gained momentum, in the form of the promotion of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms, both between citizens and in the family domain. Additionally, an epidemiological approach used in public health, was adopted in order to follow up violent deaths in the city, to check locations, times, days of week, and types of weapons, and to identify the main risk factors and define preventive measures. From these, an information system on violence and crime was built.¹⁰⁴

The Peñalosa Administration (1998-2000)

The Peñalosa administration introduced important changes in the management of the city. His platform was based on a ‘human scale’ model for the city, geared towards people rather than cars, in which access to quality urban environments became a priority, the

¹⁰¹ For the analysis of the ‘culture of violence’ in Colombia, see P. Waldmann, ‘Is there a culture of violence in Colombia?’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 19, no. 4 (2007): pp. 593-609.

¹⁰² Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, *Políticas saludables para la seguridad y la convivencia*, pp. 21-22.

¹⁰³ The experience of Cali, under the administration of Rodrigo Guerrero (1992-1994), affected significantly the adoption of this type of policy. The programme called DESEPAZ was based on the application of the epidemiological analysis of crime and violence in the city. For more details of the DESEPAZ programme, see R. Guerrero, ‘Programa desarrollo, seguridad y paz DESEPAZ de la ciudad de Cali,’ Online. Available HTTP: < <http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/2112spa.pdf>>, accessed 25 April 2007.

¹⁰⁴ The epidemiology was defined by the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), as ‘the ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of outcome-specific data for use in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health practice’. See Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), *Guidelines for epidemiological surveillance systems on violence and injuries* (Washington, DC, 2001). See also J.L. Londoño and R. Guerrero, ‘Violencia en América Latina: epidemiología y costos,’ IDB Working Paper No. 375 (Washington, DC, 1999); A. Concha-Eastman [et al.], ‘La epidemiología de los homicidios en Cali, 1993-1998: seis años de un modelo poblacional,’ *Pan American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 12, no. 4 (2002): pp. 230-239; and J. Yunes and T. Zubarew, ‘Mortalidad por causas violentas en adolescentes y jóvenes: un desafío para la región de las Américas,’ *Revista Brasileira de Epidemiologia*, vol. 2, no. 3 (1999): pp. 102-171.

defence of public spaces and the regeneration of deteriorated urban environments, so as to create what was called 'spaces of order'.

The centrality of these issues for the administration was reflected in the creation of *Departamento Administrativo de Defensoría del Espacio Público* (DADEP) in 1999, as well as in the implementation of drastic measures that gave rise to many polemics, such as the installation of obstacles on the pavements of main roads to prevent cars from being parked and stalls from being set up by street vendors.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, actions were undertaken to make shopkeepers respect the norms of external advertising and take out their refuse regularly. According to the city authorities, these measures led to the recovery of over a million square metres of public space between 2000 and mid-2002.¹⁰⁶ Initiatives were taken to repair major public streets, revive decaying areas of the city, build cycle routes, line roads with trees, and construct the TransMilenio - a solution to the public transport problems that plagued Bogotá for decades.¹⁰⁷

In the realm of citizen security, the model pushed by Peñalosa was related to the 'broken windows' theory and to the principle of 'zero tolerance' adopted in New York during the 1990s.¹⁰⁸ Doubtless, this policy focus had much to do with the administration

¹⁰⁵ The objective of DADEP was contributing to improve the quality of life, by means of an effective defence of public spaces, of an adequate administration of the city's real estate and of the construction of a new culture of public spaces, meant to ensure their collective use and enjoyment and to stimulate community participation. See more at the DADEP website available online at HTTP: <<http://www.dadep.gov.co>>.

¹⁰⁶ Foro Internacional de Gobernabilidad Local, 'Violencia y delincuencia en contextos urbanos: la experiencia de Bogotá en la reducción de la criminalidad 1994-2002,' Documento elaborado para el PNUD (Bogotá, 2003): p. 95.

¹⁰⁷ *Empresa de Transporte del Tercer Milenio* (TransMilenio) is a public transportation system created in 1999 with the purpose of offering a mass-oriented, low-cost, public transportation service for passengers. For an analysis of TransMilenio, see J.C. Echeverry [et al.], 'The economics of TransMilenio: a mass transit system for Bogotá,' *Economía*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2005): pp. 151-188 and a chapter by A. Gilbert on 'Transmilenio: ¿una cura milagrosa?,' in A. Gilbert and M.T. Garcés, *Bogotá: progreso, gobernabilidad y pobreza* (Bogotá, 2008).

¹⁰⁸ The broken windows theory was developed in the United States in the early 1980s. This theory stated that poorly maintained urban areas, led to a physical and visual decomposition of the urban life. The existence of 'neighbourhood incivilities' such as abandoned storefronts, unkept lots, litter, bench sleepers or public drunks created fear among the population and might lead to the appearance of crime. Llorente [et al.] argued that the United States was the only country that evaluated the impact of these policies on the topic of crime and civility. Despite the lack of knowledge on the results of the theory, most of the security policies in Latin America adapted, with great enthusiasm, ideas stemming from this theory. See M.V. Llorente [et al.], 'Caracterización de la violencia homicida en Bogotá,' pp. 1-2. For references on perceived risk and appearance of crime, see R. LaGrange, K.F. Ferraro and M. Supancic, 'Perceived risk and fear of crime: role of social and physical incivilities,' *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, vol. 29, no. 3 (1992): pp. 311-334. There is an extensive literature on the broken windows theory. Some of the most quoted references include J. Wilson and G. Kelling, 'Broken windows: the police and neighbourhood safety,' *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 249, no. 3 (1982): pp. 29-38; G. Kelling and C. Coles, *Fixing broken windows: restoring order*

whose central aim was to regenerate public spaces by means of interventions in decaying urban environments. This was why the regeneration measures applied from 1998 in some areas of the city were emblematic: the areas chosen were in a critical state of deterioration, both physical and social. In this context, measures taken to strengthen the capacity to control crime and punish perpetrators were also important. Substantial increases in spending upon the equipment of the metropolitan police were made, as well as upon new detention spaces in the police stations and improvements to existing ones. Of all the interventions, however, it was ‘*Misión Bogotá*,’ which was Peñalosa’s main programme in the field of citizen security and coexistence.

Citizen Security Measures

Citizen disarmament, the regulation of the consumption of alcohol and interventions to regenerate public spaces in critical areas were the most representative measures of the Mockus and Peñalosa administrations to reduce crime and violence in Bogotá, as well as the measures to strengthen the capacity to control violent crime and punish perpetrators through support to the police and the judiciary.¹⁰⁹

Disarmament and Control of Alcohol Consumption

The preliminary diagnosis emerged in the early 1990s from the epidemiological analysis of violent deaths in city indicated to the authorities the pertinence of adopting measures to control firearms and alcohol consumption. Most violent deaths in Bogotá took place at night with a concentration at weekends; around half the fatal victims of traffic accidents had high alcohol levels in their blood, as well as a third of victims of murder by

and reducing crime in our communities (New York, 1996); and G. Costa, *La ventana rota y otras formas de lucha el crimen* (Lima, 2007). The principle of ‘zero tolerance’ was developed from the ‘broken windows’ theory and put in place by the city of New York during the 1990s. It was based on police action in response to minor offences, in order to prevent more serious ones.

¹⁰⁹ Fabio Sánchez, Silvia Espinosa and Ángela Rivas stated that Bogotá citizen security policies during this period could be categorised as: 1) *garrote* (stick) measures to punish offenders by strengthening the capacities of police and judiciary; 2) *ventanas rotas* (broken windows) theory based measures to recapture public spaces and involve citizens in security policies; and 3) *zanahoria* (carrot) measures to create the *Cultura Ciudadana* by controlling firearms and alcohol consumption. See F. Sánchez, S. Espinosa and Á. Rivas, ‘¿Garrote o zanahoria? Factores asociados a la disminución de la violencia homicida y el crimen en Bogotá, 1983-2002,’ in F. Sánchez, *Las cuentas de la violencia: ensayos económicos sobre el conflicto y el crimen en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2007): table 1, p. 318.

firearms; over 70 percent of homicides were committed with firearms.¹¹⁰ Hence, as a fundamental part of its citizen security strategy, from 1995 the Mockus administration pushed a disarmament plan meant to control both legal and illegal firearms in the city. One of the most discussed measures at the time was the restriction of firearms possession during weekends and public holidays.¹¹¹ In parallel, an alcohol consumption control policy was adopted, whose main measure, known as *Ley Zanahoria* (Carrot Law) or *Hora Zanahoria* (Carrot Hour), consisted of limiting the sale of alcoholic beverages until 1.00 a.m.¹¹²

These administrative measures were accompanied by education campaigns and police strategies. In the case of firearms, several voluntary disarmament campaigns were held during Mockus' two terms. The first one, named 'Gifts for Guns,' encouraged citizens to hand over their guns in return for gift vouchers and was held around Christmas 1996 with support from the Catholic Church and various private companies. By 2001 Bogotá's residents had handed in 6,368 firearms, which were melted down.¹¹³ In practice, the restriction of firearms possession during weekends and public holidays, used both by Mockus and Peñalosa in their efforts to prevent violence, was put into practice only intermittently, because its regulation depended on the national army, which regulated gun ownership and possession.¹¹⁴ Although mayors were legally entitled to request such control measures, the actual decision to apply them depended on the military. On several occasions both Mockus and Peñalosa had to deal with the refusal of the military to make the measure permanent, since military officers considered that it reduced the possibility of self-defence by 'good people'.

¹¹⁰ Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, *Políticas saludables para la seguridad y la convivencia*, pp. 37-40.

¹¹¹ Although the restriction of firearms possession had already been put in place in previous years, only in 1995 did it begin to be considered by the local administration as a fundamental element of the citizen security initiatives. For example, during 1994 firearms possession was restricted at weekends and on public holidays in Bogotá as a result of new control measures adopted at a national level in 1993 by the Ministry of Defence.

¹¹² This measure was preceded in the city by a curfew for minors and a ban on sales of alcohol on them, implemented in 1994 during the Castro administration. The norm forbade the presence of minors in public places after midnight, their admission to nightclubs and the purchase of alcohol.

¹¹³ Foro Internacional de Gobernabilidad Local, 'Violencia y delincuencia en contextos urbanos,' p. 77.

¹¹⁴ This restriction remained in force several times. Firstly, this was applied from April 1995 to April 1996, with a further complementary period of the voluntary disarmament campaign in December 1996. Later it lasted from January to June 1998 (six months), September to November 1999 (three months), and December 1999 to June 2000 (seven months).

Faced with this limitation, Mockus in his second term channelled his citizen disarmament proposal through the programme *La Vida es Sagrada* (Life is Sacred). In this, the aim of disarmament was linked to a reflection and awareness-raising exercise on the value of life, above all among the youth. With the programme as a starting point, several gatherings were held, and peace pledges and disarmament campaigns that involved several types of communities at local level took place.¹¹⁵

In the case of alcohol consumption control, major educational campaigns were held during the first Mockus administration. Between 1997 and 1998 the so-called *Cátedra del Alcohol* emphasised ‘knowing before drinking,’ and called on over 3,500 teenagers aged 10 and 11, to raise awareness of responsible drinking. At the same time, a media campaign was put in place with the theme ‘hand over the keys’. With the collaboration of the Ministries of Transport and Health, the city authorities attempted to convince citizens who consumed alcohol to hand over their car keys to someone sober, hence avoiding the risk of endangering their lives and those of others. This was accompanied by an additional administrative measure adopted in early 1997 that increased the sanctions for drunk driving: motorists could lose their licence for 6 months, be arrested for 24 hours and have their vehicle impounded.¹¹⁶

Although Peñalosa maintained the *Hora Zanahoria* among his citizen security policies, some officials questioned its pertinence, given the constant and significant reduction in the number of violent deaths in the capital. As a result, in early 1998, the administration allowed the sale of alcohol until 2.00 a.m., but a revival in numbers of violent deaths in the city led to the restoration of the *Hora Zanahoria* after two months. In mid-2002, with fewer violent deaths in the capital and believing that the people of Bogotá had learned to consume alcohol more responsibly, Mockus changed temporarily the *Hora Zanahoria* to the *Hora Optimista* (Optimistic Hour), e.g., the sale of alcoholic beverages was permitted until 3.00 a.m. After six months of experiment with the *Hora Optimista*, and having obtained positive results in terms of violent deaths, the city adopted the new time on a permanent basis for the sale of alcohol in Bogotá.

¹¹⁵ Foro Internacional de Gobernabilidad Local, ‘Violencia y delincuencia en contextos urbanos,’ pp. 74-75.

¹¹⁶ Another risk factor was the payment of wages. Mockus suggested that the payment of wages should be done on Mondays rather than on Fridays as traditionally had been the case. It was believed that this decision would reduce the incentives for people to go out and drink on pay-days, especially because the numbers of homicides were always higher on weekend nights.

Regeneration Decaying Urban Environments

Among the measures of the Peñalosa administration that were intended to develop a more citizen-friendly city, the aims of regenerating important public routes and decaying urban environments stood out. Examples included the reconstruction of Avenida 15, a commercial axis and one of the main avenues of the north of the city, as well as the reconstruction of the Avenida Jiménez, one of the main streets in the city's historical downtown area. In both cases, the space earmarked for pedestrians was expanded considerably, with a reduction in the space for vehicle lanes. On Avenida 15 the most important changes included the widening of sidewalks, a prohibition for parking cars on each sidewalk, as well as the elimination of kiosks and street vendors. Reconstruction of a major thoroughfare, the Avenida Jiménez, involved its redesign and reconstruction, as well as restrictions upon vehicle traffic. This policy constituted part of the broader strategy of reviving the historical downtown area of the city, one of the areas with highest pedestrian circulation that was often associated with high crime rates and high levels of insecurity. Avenida Caracas, one of the city's most important north-south routes, was rebuilt as one of the main TransMilenio routes.¹¹⁷ Among the changes made in decaying areas, those carried out from 1998 by the urban renewal programme in San Victorino and El Cartucho are worth highlighting.¹¹⁸ In San Victorino, an area with the largest concentration of street vendors in the city and where illegal commerce flourished, a square was built and neighbouring buildings were adapted for use by vendors.

El Cartucho was one of the city's most violent areas, with a large number of litter recyclers, homeless people, drug addicts and criminals involved in such activities as the sale of illicit drugs, guns and stolen merchandises.¹¹⁹ This problem was reflected in the physical deterioration of the neighbourhood: the poor condition of its buildings and large amounts of rubbish and other waste scattered in the streets. The intervention in El Cartucho which began towards the end of the Peñalosa administration and continued in Mockus' second term, involved the demolition of the entire area and the development of a park of

¹¹⁷ S. Niño Murcia [et al.], *Territorios del miedo en Santafé de Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1998): p. 48.

¹¹⁸ N. Rueda-García, 'The case of Bogotá, Colombia,' Working Paper for the United Nations Global Report on Human Settlements 2003 – The Challenge of Slums (London, 2003): p. 20.

¹¹⁹ This was Bogotá most critical area in terms of concentration of homicides. Between 1997 and 1999, it had an extremely high homicide rate of 40,000 per 100,000 inhabitants. See C. Echandía, 'Geografía de la violencia homicida en Bogotá,' p. 18.

some 20 hectares, together with urban renewal schemes in the adjacent areas. Strategies were implemented by various local institutions to respond to the local crisis. These included the transfer of the storage and sale points of recycled material and a social management plan, which led to the formulation and implementation of several inter-institutional projects assisting over 14,000 people.¹²⁰ Meanwhile, the police set out to break criminal structures in the area.¹²¹

Misión Bogotá

In its initial format, this programme sought to create public spaces for the promotion of coexistence and citizen security and to reduce the causes for high insecurity levels by connecting efforts between local institutions, the police and the community, especially programmes of policing and community vigilance, the creation of orderly spaces and programmes of *convivencia*.¹²²

During the first stage of Misión Bogotá, the programme relied on the support of local security councils. These local councils, which had been promoted by the metropolitan police since 1996, were community organisations whose members were integrated into civic-police support networks that watched over their immediate surroundings and reacted in unusual or suspicious circumstances in coordination with the police.¹²³ At the same time, ‘*guías cívicos*’ (civic guides) were hired temporarily by Misión Bogotá to regulate citizens on such matters as traffic congestion, security, citizen coexistence, community organisation and garbage recycling.¹²⁴ The second Mockus administration maintained these measures, expanding citizen ‘regulation’ functions to include the TransMilenio, the university neighbourhoods, artistic, recreational and sporting activities and areas designated for rapid regeneration.

¹²⁰ Foro Internacional de Gobernabilidad Local, ‘Violencia y delincuencia en contextos urbanos,’ p. 97.

¹²¹ For a description of El Cartucho and the social programmes to recover it, see Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá, *Habitantes de la calle: un estudio de El Cartucho* (Bogotá, 1999).

¹²² Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, *Misión Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1998): pp. 3-4.

¹²³ These councils’ work according to the guidelines of *Neighbourhood Watch* programmes, widely used in Britain and the United States.

¹²⁴ The ‘civic guide’ was considered the main social agent and educator of the programme. His tasks were to encourage citizens towards self-regulation and voluntary respect for basic coexistence norms, to improve the perception of security in the city. Moreover, he was a promoter of safe behaviour in public spaces.

A particular stress was placed upon supporting the population at risk. Between 1999 and 2000, job offers were made through the ‘civic guide’ to 3,995 people, among them were included teenagers, garbage collectors, prostitutes, the homeless, forced migrants and unemployed.¹²⁵ Decisions were also acted upon to help residents to reclaim their city, as with the *Tomas de Miedo*, held from 1999, measures aimed to persuade people to return to live and work in places once perceived as dangerous and unsafe. The city administration also organised concerts and spectacles to bring people together.

Metropolitan Police

The strengthening of the metropolitan police in the mid and late 1990s built upon the national police reform that began earlier in the decade. Spending upon the metropolitan police during the 1990s increased significantly from 12 million Colombian pesos during the Castro administration to over 116 million Colombian pesos at their peak during the Peñalosa administration.¹²⁶

Eighty-six percent of spending between 1995 and 2002 was aimed at improving the metropolitan office’s infrastructure and, in particular, at building and customising police stations and CAIs, at modernising the communications system to receive citizen calls and send out patrols and at renewing and expanding the police car pool. These measures covered the basic policing needs of the city and its capacity to respond to policing demands of citizen. For example, the average time for answering calls from the public fell from 20 to 5 minutes.¹²⁷ The rest of the budget was spent in acquiring equipment for intelligence gathering and criminal investigations, improving logistics and IT to link up police stations, mobile units and other local institutions more effectively, and providing housing for police officers with outstanding service records, and organising training programmes. From 1996 to 2002, some 13,000 police officers from several ranks took part in these training programmes, which dealt with issues of the law (police officer’s rights, human rights and international humanitarian law), concepts and strategies for citizen security and coexistence, community policing and community relations, judicial police (crime scene management and criminal investigations), sexual abuse of minors, adult education (pedagogy and

¹²⁵ Foro Internacional de Gobernabilidad Local, ‘Violencia y delincuencia en contextos urbanos,’ p. 98.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 55.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 56.

methodology) and measures to improve the administration of the force (management, standardisation of procedures, IT and English language teaching).¹²⁸

The community policing programme was launched in 1999 by the metropolitan police with the support of the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce. However, despite having involved the local security councils in its strategies, this programme was not fully developed owing to shortages of staff (about 1,000 full time officers) and lack of coordination with other police services. Nevertheless, according to a survey conducted by Instituto de Desarrollo Humano of Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, the community police enjoyed full acceptance by the community during its first year of operations, with 96.4 percent of respondents saying it was an effective way of reducing crime and improving coexistence.¹²⁹

Lastly, a safe zones programme was initiated in 2001 with support from the local administration and the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, that was put forward as a new model of management for the security of public spaces. The programme aimed at developing bonds of solidarity and trust between citizens and the authorities, as well as reviving a sense of security in parts of the city selected by virtue of their high level of activity (commerce, education and leisure) and constant circulation of people. Twelve safe zones were created; the presence of motorised police was increased; and a mobile unit was set up. To manage the programme, a local commission was organised in each zone made up of representatives of local government, the metropolitan police, the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce and civic and business associations in the area.

Judicial Consolidation

With the ‘zero tolerance’ conception adopted by Peñalosa, efforts were concentrated upon expanding considerably the city’s capacity to detain and keep in custody all prisoners, in respectable conditions. Bogotá, like the rest of the country, faced a critical situation in terms of prison accommodation. Both the district jail and temporary detention spaces in the city’s police stations were full. Furthermore, most prisoners were freed for lack of space, while those guilty of serious crimes often had to wait for several weeks for their position to

¹²⁸ M.V. Llorente, ‘La experiencia de la policía comunitaria de Bogotá: contexto y balance,’ pp. 65-108.

¹²⁹ Instituto de Desarrollo Humano, ‘Percepción y expectativas ciudadanas sobre la modalidad de Policía Comunitaria en Santa Fe de Bogotá,’ mimeo (Bogotá, 2002).

be resolved. This situation, which lasted several years, discouraged the police from capturing criminals, especially those guilty of minor offences.

Faced with this problem, the city government spent over US\$ 11 million between 1998 and 2002, upon refurbishing the district jail and building the *Unidad Permanente de Justicia* (UPJ). The district jail, intended for criminals receiving sentences of less than 24 months, was completely rebuilt, and its capacity increased more than doubled (from 450 to 1,028 places), thus meeting the demand caused by the police's rising efficiency in capturing those wanted by the justice system. The UPJ was set up in early 1999 as a transitional detention centre (36 hours, at most) for the offenders until their judicial situation was clarified. To achieve greater institutional coordination and more rapid implementation of justice, this unit was made up by local officials, public prosecutors, attorneys and police, and it operated around the clock. The procedure period decreased from several weeks to two days.¹³⁰ Between 1999 and 2001, nearly 142,000 people guilty of administrative misdemeanours, who could not have been punished previously for lack of space, were detained at the UPJ.¹³¹

The second Mockus administration also tried to strengthen the process of criminal investigation, one of the most critical aspects of the criminal justice and an important source of impunity. In 2002, the Mockus administration began training the personnel of the different institutions that carried out this task in Bogotá: the *Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad* (DAS), the prosecutor's office, the *Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses* and the metropolitan police's investigation bureau; with the aims of standardisation of procedures, efficient improvement and time reduction.

¹³⁰ Foro Internacional de Gobernabilidad Local, 'Violencia y delincuencia en contextos urbanos,' p. 110.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

CHAPTER 4

Forced Internal Migrants, Gender and Household Composition Differentials

Internal migration has been the major component influencing population redistribution within countries. However, additional studies are needed in order to further understand the reciprocal relations between population movement, socioeconomic change and conflict to increase our knowledge on the causes and consequences of migration.¹ It is well established that neo-liberal economic policies influenced patterns of labour demand and supply and population movements at the local levels, especially in Latin America during the 1990s.² However, market forces do not explain all migration patterns; there are other non-economic causes such as violent events, large development projects, famine and natural disasters that force people to move from their original places of residence. These also affect the timing and size of migration flows.

Among the diverse causes of migration, there are two dimensions of variation: economic vis-à-vis non-economic motivations and voluntary vis-à-vis forced causes. Along these two dimensions of migration, there is a continuum of circumstances in which migrant personal and household characteristics play a significant role in determining each migration decision. The motivation (economic vis-à-vis non-economic) or cause (voluntary vis-à-vis forced) of each move and the migration experience of a person have consequences for his/her integration at destination.

After the end of the Cold War, the prevalence of internal conflicts increased and this trend is likely to continue. During the 1990s many developing countries experienced structural adjustment policies or economic reforms that affected labour market conditions at the national and local levels. Some researchers suggested that globalisation and structural reforms have not led to shared growth and increments in social cohesion and political

¹ C.B. Nam, W.J. Serow and D. Sly, *International handbook on internal migration* (New York, 1990): p. 24.

² C.C. Fan, 'Economic opportunities and internal migration: a case study of Guangdong Province, China,' *Professional Geographer*, vol. 48, no. 1 (1996): pp. 28-45. For the effects of neo-liberal economic policy on employment trends in Bogotá, see A. Gilbert, 'Employment and poverty during economic restructuring: the case of Bogotá, Colombia,' *Urban Studies*, vol. 34, no. 7 (1997): pp. 1047-1070.

stability. On the contrary, they argued that there has been an increase in inequality, exclusion and violence.³ In addition, Thomas Homer-Dixon suggested that environmental scarcity provoked inter-state conflicts, induced group-identity and ethnic clashes, increased economic deprivation, and disrupted social institutions.⁴ These three phenomena - changing conditions in the labour markets, increasing inequality and scarcity, and increasing prevalence of violent confrontations - have led to large population movements. The number of internal forced migrants has been on the rise. As of December 2002, there were an estimated 32.8 million forced migrants worldwide. Of those 21.3 million were internally displaced persons and 11.5 million were refugees and asylum seekers. After Sudan, Colombia was the second country with the most internally displaced people.⁵ There were about 2.9 million internally displaced persons in Colombia, who accounted for 7 percent of the estimated population in 2002.⁶ It was estimated that in 2002 alone 75,730 families had to leave their homes because of the violence, and between 1996 and 2002, 939,155 people (an average of 368 persons per day) were displaced from their place of origin.⁷

³ C. Moser and C. McIlwaine, *Urban poor perceptions of violence and exclusion in Colombia* (Washington, DC, 2000): pp. 7-10. See also J. Stiglitz, *Globalisation and its discontents* (New York, 2002).

⁴ T. Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases,' *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1994): pp. 5-40.

⁵ United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), *World refugee survey 2003* (Washington, DC, 2003).

⁶ The estimated total population for Colombia in 2002 was 41,327,459. See Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), *Colombia, proyecciones departamentales de población por sexo y edad, 1985-2020* (Bogotá, 2008).

⁷ L.A. Restrepo, 'Violence and fear in Colombia: fragmentation of space, contraction of time and forms of evasion,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Armed actors: organised violence and state failure in Latin America* (London, 2004): p. 173.

Figure 4.1 presents the time trend of internal displacement in Colombia. According to the official statistics, after a static period between 1995 and 1998, internal displacement increased dramatically between 1999 and 2002.⁸ By 2000, 480 municipalities, which accounted for 44 percent of the total number of municipalities had been affected by the armed conflict nationwide, either as municipalities of expulsion or reception.

In concert with this surge in violence, Colombia also experienced the implementation of economic reforms, bringing about a subsequent economic recession with increased population mobility. Given the variety of circumstances that Colombia had experienced in the last decade and the magnitude of internal displacement, it is an appropriate case to study the links between economic and forced migration.


This chapter has six sections. The first section describes forced migration and within this category distinguishes internal displacement or forced internal migration.⁹ In the second section, a framework for the study of relations between economic motivations and causes of forced migration, and the role of positive self-selection are discussed. The third section describes trends in urbanisation and internal migration for Colombia in general and Bogotá, in particular.¹⁰ The research design is explained in the fourth section. Then I discuss the role of gender in conflict in general before looking at the case of Colombia in section five. Finally household composition differentials and labour market opportunities in the metropolitan area of Bogotá are investigated in the sixth section.

⁸ Time trends based on registration systems were problematic because they depended on the efficiency of the system and the timing of implementation. In Colombia, the system was implemented in 1997 but it began to work and reached out to the forced migrant population only in 1999. To appreciate the trend of population displacement, the punctuated line in **Figure 4.1** reveals data collected by an NGO between 1995 and 2002. Although, the tendency did not increase since 1999 as sharp as in the official data, from 2000 on both series were almost parallel. A household survey collected by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in six departments demonstrated that the period of highest forced migration was between 1999 and 2000.

⁹ Through out **Chapters 4** and **5**, I will use interchangeably the terms forced internal migration and internal displacement, as well as internally displaced persons and forced internal migrants.

¹⁰ Through out this chapter, the term of 'Bogotá' refers to the municipalities of Bogotá and Soacha.

Figure 4.1: Displacement Patterns over Time in Colombia (1995-2002)



Sources: 1) National Registration of Displaced Population (Registro Unico de Población Desplazada), *Red de Solidaridad Social*, 2003
 2) *Consultoría para el Desplazamiento Forzado y los Derechos Humanos*, 2003.

Forced Migration

Forced migration is not a contemporary phenomenon. The struggle for resources and power and resulting conflicts have been present throughout human history. However, it was only in 1951 that the vast number of forced migrants and the political conscience of the international community produced the first convention to protect persons with a well-founded fear of persecution who were living outside their countries.¹¹ This definition of a refugee meant that people who were persecuted within the borders of their own countries were excluded from international protection. Although this definition was framed to respect the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, it also assumed that people threatened with persecution would be able to leave their countries and that governments generally would protect their own citizens. Unfortunately, these assumptions were too optimistic and there were millions of internally displaced persons. Many governments in war-torn countries have used displacement as strategy against their adversaries, most of whom have been identified with a religious, ethnic, racial or marginalised group that somehow threatened people in power.

In the period studied the main causes of forced migration in Latin America were inequitable land distribution, exclusion, human rights violations, and additionally in the case of Colombia, drug trafficking.¹² Although in recent years there have been successful peace processes in Central America, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru, internal displacements still persist. Guatemala and Peru are in a stage of post-conflict and return to resettlement, while in Colombia a peace accord has not been reached and the civil population is continuously displaced by the actors in the conflict. One common

¹¹ As a result of prior events and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political option, was outside the country of his nationality and was unable, or owing to such fear, was unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, was unable or, owing to such fear, was unwilling to return to it. See the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 'Convention relating to the status of refugees,' mimeo (New York, 1950).

¹² R. Cohen and F.M. Deng, *Masses in flight: the global crisis of internal displacement* (Washington, DC, 1998): pp. 64-71 and C. Moser and C. McIlwaine, *Urban poor perceptions of violence and exclusion in Colombia* (Washington, DC, 2000): pp. 57-69.

characteristic of all three conflicts is that many internally displaced persons ended up living in shantytowns in the outskirts of the capital city.¹³

Until the 1980s the academic literature on forced migration focused on refugees and asylum seekers.¹⁴ Only recently, scientifically designed studies have been developed to test theories of forced migration to understand the complexity of its place in contemporary societies.¹⁵ Some non-academic studies on the effects of civil unrest or internal conflicts were based on biased data collected using unstructured interviews on an unknown number of cases without control groups, constituting a major methodological weakness.¹⁶

Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia

The two distinctive features of internal displacement are that movement is coerced or involuntary and that the populations affected remain within their national borders. The most widely used working definition of internally displaced persons (IDPs), presented in a 1992 report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, identifies them as ‘persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who are within the territory of their own country’.¹⁷ The definition includes the major causes of displacement, which are drawn in part from the broad refugee definitions used in Africa and Latin America. Persons fleeing armed conflict, internal strife, and systematic violations of human rights would, if they were to cross a border, qualify as refugees both under the Organisation of African Unity Convention and the Cartagena

¹³ See more details for the Colombian case in L. Obregón and M. Stavropoulou, ‘In search of hope: the plight of displaced Colombians,’ in R. Cohen and F.M. Deng (eds.), *The forsaken people: case studies of the internally displaced* (Washington, DC, 1998): pp. 399-453; while M. Stavropoulou, ‘Will Peru’s displaced return?’, in R. Cohen and F.M. Deng (eds.), *The forsaken people: case studies of the internally displaced* (Washington, DC, 1998): pp. 454-499 provides an evidence in Peru.

¹⁴ E. Mason, ‘Researching refugee and forced migration studies: an introduction to the field and the reference literature,’ *Behavioural and Social Sciences Librarian*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1999): pp. 1-20.

¹⁵ See A. Zolberg and P. Benda (eds.), *Global migrants, global refugees: problems and solutions* (Oxford, 2001) and M. Vincent and B.R. Sorenson (eds.), *Caught between borders: response strategies of the internally displaced* (London, 2001).

¹⁶ K. Jacobsen and L.M. Landau, ‘The dual imperative in refugee research: some methodological and ethical considerations in social science research on forced migration,’ *Disasters*, vol. 27, issue 3 (2003): pp. 185-206.

¹⁷ The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person who, ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted in his country of origin for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’.

Declaration, and, arguably in many cases, under the narrower definition of the Refugee Convention.¹⁸

The Colombian authorities passed in 1997 legislation to protect the rights of internally displaced people and to specify the duties of the Colombian state towards them.¹⁹ Colombian authorities distinguished between mass displacement and displacement of families. A mass displacement is defined by Decree 2569 (2000) as forced migration that affects at the same time, mode, and place more than 50 persons or 10 households. A displacement of families involves the movement of 10 or fewer households or less than 50 persons.²⁰ According to the registration system of displaced population by December 2002, there were 1,205,561 officially recognised internally displaced persons.²¹ Twenty five percent of this population migrated in mass displacements, while 75 percent moved individually or in what was called family displacement.²² The mass displacement was characterised by an exodus of peasants provoked by confrontations between the military and guerrilla groups. Usually these persons moved to the nearest city; and after the confrontation ended, many returned to their original places of residence.²³

Family displacement is characterised by the migration of paramilitary or guerrilla targeted families, or families fleeing their communities for fear of future confrontations. Usually these families move by stages to distant locations, and often choose cities as

¹⁸ Under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969), the term ‘refugee’ encompasses the definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention and ‘every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality’. The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984), which is pertinent in Latin America, defines as refugees persons forced to move ‘because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order’.

¹⁹ The Colombian Congress using the guiding principles on internal displacement as a reference developed and passed Law 387 (1997), which described in its 1st Article an internally displaced person as: ‘any person who is forced to migrate within the national territory abandoning their locality of residence or economic usual activities because his/her life, physical integrity, safety or freedom has been violated or are directly threatened because of internal armed conflict, internal disturbances and tensions, generalised violence, massive violations to human rights, violations to international humanitarian law or other circumstances related to the mentioned causes that could drastically alter public order’. See UNHCR and CODHES, *Compilación sobre desplazamiento forzado: normas doctrina y jurisprudencia nacional e internacional* (Bogotá, 2001): p. 22.

²⁰ UNHCR and CODHES, *Compilación sobre desplazamiento forzado*, p. 31.

²¹ However, CODHES estimated that there were 2,916,118 internally displaced persons in Colombia in 2002.

²² D. Otero Prada, *Las cifras del conflicto colombiano*, 2nd ed. (Bogotá, 2007): table 7.2, p. 130.

²³ Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana, *Derechos humanos: desplazados por violencia en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1995): p. 109.

destinations. In the first stage, displaced persons move to nearby villages where they have family ties. Lack of resources, employment opportunities, assistance and absorptive capacity at the local or municipal level then offer them incentives to move to the capital of the department and later to Bogotá. Big cities are the last stage of their itinerary.²⁴

Many studies suggested that the internally displaced population in Colombia was mainly of rural origins. Their education level was lower than the observed for the general population. Their labour skills in general were related to agriculture activities. I argue that what made internally displaced persons special was not their rural origin, but their lack of positive self-selection in the process of migration. Survey data have been useful to describe the profile of the internally displaced populations in the areas of destination.²⁵

To appreciate why these families and not others were displaced, profiles should be described relative to the population in areas of origin. Although collecting data in these areas was not possible, I argue that the displaced population was not a random sample of the population in areas of origin. Those that were displaced represented a threat to the guerrilla or the paramilitary groups because of their political power, their relative wealth or their links to other members of the community.²⁶

Researchers in Colombia have argued that the underlying determinant of forced displacement was not related to poverty. Crimes in Colombia were caused fundamentally because illegal armed groups used non-formal channels to 'expropriate' resources. Population displacement took place in regions with capital intensive projects where the value of land increases, in zones of cocaine production and trafficking, and territories rich

²⁴ Grupo Temático de Desplazamiento, 'Estado de situación del desplazamiento: enero a diciembre de 2001,' mimeo (Bogotá, 2002): p. 19.

²⁵ See Centro Nacional de Consultoría, 'Encuesta sobre condiciones demográficas, económicas y sociales de la población desplazada,' mimeo (Bogotá, 2004); Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES), *Sistema de información de hogares desplazados por la violencia* (Bogotá, 1995); Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana, *Derechos humanos: desplazados por violencia en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1995) and Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM), *Diagnostico sobre la población desplazada en seis departamentos de Colombia en 2001* (Bogotá, 2002).

²⁶ Eleven percent of the members of the municipal councils countrywide (*concejales municipales*) had received personal threats from the guerrillas or the paramilitaries, see *El Tiempo*, 5 December 2002, '122 concejos municipales en 13 departamentos están amenazados por las FARC'.

in mineral resources.²⁷ One of the characteristics of internal displacement in Colombia was that the very poor people residing in areas rich in resources were forced to leave.²⁸

Figure 4.2 reveals the population density by department in Colombia in 1993. The eastern departments (on the border with Venezuela and Brazil) were not densely populated. The Andean region and Atlantic coast was where the population was concentrated. **Figure 4.3** below reflects the population density in 2002. There were no striking differences in the spatial distribution of the population, although the relative density of the departments of Putumayo and Guanía was relatively greater than before.


Armed confrontations took place in regions rich in resources or in regions where the control of routes (particularly rivers) was important for drug trafficking. **Figures 4.4, 4.5** and **4.6** display the spatial distribution of armed actions taken from 1995 to 2002 by the FARC and ELN guerrillas and the paramilitaries, respectively. These data indicate a strong correlation between groups in their areas of operation, which suggests a competition for resources. From the spatial distribution of the armed actions four patterns are suggested:

- 1) A large proportion of the territory was experiencing unrest;
- 2) There was intense competition both along a route that from the southern department of Nariño to the Caribbean coast in the department of Antioquia, and between the department of Sucre and the department of Atlántico;
- 3) All three maps show numerous of confrontations in the coffee region, in the departments of Quindío, Risaralda, and Caldas, departments which had a history of political violence;
- 4) There was a movement from the more populated areas to the less populated Amazonian plains, particularly the departments of Meta and Casanare, where oil deposits were located.

²⁷ L. Sarmiento, 'Desarrollo social, conflicto y territorio,' Paper presented at the International Seminar on 'Desplazamiento, conflicto, paz y desarrollo,' on 30 May-2 June (Bogotá, 2000).


²⁸ L.E. Pérez, 'Población desplazada: entre la vulnerabilidad, la pobreza y la exclusión,' mimeo (Bogotá, 2002): p. 28.

Figure 4.2: Spatial Distribution of Population in Colombia by Departments (1993)




Source: Digital Atlas de Colombia, Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, 2005.

Figure 4.3: Spatial Distribution of Population in Colombia by Departments (2002)




Source: Digital Atlas de Colombia, Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, 2005.

Figure 4.4: Spatial Distribution of Armed Actions Undertaken by the FARC (1995-2002)




Source: UNDP Colombia Human Development Report, 2003

Figure 4.5: Spatial Distribution of Armed Actions Undertaken by the ELN (1995-2002)



Source: UNDP Colombia Human Development Report, 2003

Figure 4.6: Spatial Distribution of Armed Actions Undertaken by Paramilitaries (1995-2002)



Source: UNDP Colombia Human Development Report, 2003

Table 4.1 shows data on the departments of origin and destination for internally displaced persons. The department with the highest number expelled was Antioquia, followed by Bolívar, Sucre, Magdalena and Valle del Cauca, which together accounted for about 43 percent of all persons displaced. Although the absolute number of displaced persons from these departments was very high, the number of displaced persons relative to the total population of the departments was highest in Putumayo, Chocó, La Guajira, Caquetá and César. In Chocó, a large proportion of the displaced were of African descent, with some indigenous people.²⁹ In the departments of Putumayo, La Guajira and César indigenous populations were more numerous. In the department of Caquetá, displaced persons resided in areas close to the border of the department of Huila, where confrontations between FARC and paramilitaries were common.

There were departments with their own dynamic of displacement. Antioquia, Caldas, Cauca, Córdoba, Cundinamarca and Norte de Santander were departments where about 2 to 4 persons per 100 persons were forced to leave their places of origin, but the majority of these persons returned to their areas of origin or relocated within the same department.

The largest net departments of reception were Atlántico, Quindío, Risaralda, Santander, and the city of Bogotá.³⁰ **Figure 4.7** displays the spatial distribution of the internally displaced population by department of arrival using absolute number of persons received. Antioquia was the largest recipient, followed by the departments of the Atlantic coast, Santander, Valle del Cauca and Bogotá. The patterns of displacement for both dispersion and reception were closely related to areas of conflict.

²⁹ For details on forced displacement among African descent on Colombia's Pacific coast see U. Oslender, 'Spaces of terror and fear on Colombia's Pacific coast: the armed conflict and forced displacement among Black communities,' in D. Gregory and A. Pred (eds.), *Violent geographies: fear, terror, and political violence* (New York and London, 2007): pp. 111-132.

³⁰ Given the wide range of the absolute numbers and the rates, I divided the number of people received in the department by the number of people expelled. The first five were Bogotá which received 220 displaced persons per expelled person, Atlántico (40), Quindío (5), Risaralda (2.7), and Santander (1.6).

Table 4.1: Internally Displaced Persons by Departments of Origin and Destination (2002)


Department	Area of Origin		Area of Destination		Net Forced Immigration	
	Persons	Rate ^{a, b}	Persons	Rate ^{a, b}	Persons	Rate ^{a, b}
Amazonas	227	0.28	347	0.43	120	0.15
Antioquia	282,849	4.91	245,450	4.26	-37,399	-0.65
Arauca	16,817	5.98	9,232	3.28	-7,585	-2.70
Atlántico	1,499	0.06	59,894	2.53	58,395	2.46
Bogotá D.C.	407	0.01	89,666	1.25	89,259	1.24
Bolívar	165,086	7.40	115,647	5.18	-49,439	-2.22
Boyacá	5,575	0.39	7,006	0.50	1,431	0.10
Caldas	31,348	2.67	25,489	2.17	-5,859	-0.50
Caquetá	67,160	14.44	39,311	8.45	-27,849	-5.99
Casanare	15,955	4.90	12,136	3.73	-3,819	-1.17
Cauca	44,690	3.27	34,310	2.51	-10,380	-0.76
César	99,765	9.47	79,692	7.57	-20,073	-1.91
Chocó	78,037	18.74	50,349	12.09	-27,688	-6.65
Córdoba	60,116	4.30	66,626	4.77	6,510	0.47
Cundinamarca	32,498	1.39	35,708	1.53	3,210	0.14
Guainía	23,839	4.53	30,506	5.80	6,667	1.27
La Guajira	19,668	14.47	12,130	9.09	-7,538	-5.65
Guaviare	506	1.17	408	0.94	-98	-0.23
Huila	17,541	1.76	27,821	2.79	10,280	1.03
Magdalena	113,899	8.10	97,455	6.93	-16,444	-1.17
Meta	45,509	5.89	42,723	5.53	-2,786	-0.36
Nariño	31,550	1.78	44,638	2.51	13,088	0.74
Norte de Santander	56,124	3.76	47,801	3.20	-8,323	-0.56
Putumayo	72,081	19.02	36,491	9.63	-35,590	-9.40
Quindío	1,912	0.31	9,465	1.54	7,553	1.23
Risaralda	8,578	0.84	23,406	2.28	14,828	1.45
San Andrés	6	0.01	26	0.03	20	0.02
Santander	40,970	1.96	65,965	3.16	24,995	1.20
Sucre	69,830	8.02	104,420	12.00	34,590	3.95
Tolima	65,551	4.98	35,809	2.72	-29,742	-2.26
Valle	64,803	1.43	96,974	2.14	32,171	0.71
Vaupés	1,227	3.70	575	1.73	-652	-1.97
Vichada	2,589	2.69	1,354	1.41	-1,235	-1.28

a. Rates of intensity of expulsion or intensity of reception are estimates dividing the accumulated number of received or expelled persons by the population for 2002. I use the accumulated figure because the literature on forced on return, resettlement and reintegration offers a wide discussion on the criteria to define when displacement ends. Since Colombia was still in conflict and the displaced populations were remained vulnerable I included all of the registered IDPs for the estimations of the intensity of reception and expulsion.

b. Rate per 100 inhabitants.

Source: Red de Solidaridad Social, *Estadísticas para medios: cifras sobre desplazamiento forzado en Colombia* (2003)

Figure 4.7: Geographical Distributions of Departments of Arrival of Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia (2002)



Source: Red de Solidaridad Social, *Estadísticas para medios: cifras sobre desplazamiento forzado en Colombia* (2003)

Motives and Selection of Migration

There is a growing body of literature on the motives beyond migration that stresses that it can be fuelled by both economic incentives and threats of violence. Studies have found that for Salvadorans, Nicaraguans and Guatemalans, migration was closely correlated with periods of political unrest and was used as a defensive strategy.³¹

Although, migration can be caused by political unrest, Nora Hamilton and Norma Chinchilla argued that it was not necessarily the case that migration reflected purely political rather than economic factors.³² Political violence generally increased already existent migration flows. Forced migrants in Colombia often integrated into traditional migration streams that were linked with lines of communications to urban centres that offered anonymity and income-generating possibilities.³³

I argue that although political violence could be a push factor at origin, economic incentives were a pull factor at destination. In other words, the chances that forced migrants would stay at their places of origin were slim. None of their options were good: they might stay and face the conflict and try to cultivate their land, while ignoring personal threats, might join the military or the armed groups, or might flee, usually without planning the move beforehand.³⁴ When the threat was direct and credible, the person was most likely to move. Michael McGinnis provided a rational choice model where individuals chose to produce, to coerce, or to relocate depending on their endowments of productive capital and

³¹ For the El Salvador case see, R.C. Jones, 'Causes of Salvadoran migration to the United States,' *Geographical Review*, vol. 79, no. 2 (1989): pp. 183-194 and W.D. Stanley, 'Economic migrants or refugees from violence: a time-series analysis of Salvadoran migration to the United States,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 22, no. 1 (1987): pp. 132-154. J.H. Lundquist and D.S. Massey, 'Politics or economics?: international migration during the Nicaraguan Contra War,' *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 37, issue 1 (2005): pp. 29-53 examine the international migration in Nicaragua; while A.R. Morrison, 'Violence or economics: what drives internal migration in Guatemala,' *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 41, no. 4 (1993): pp. 817-831 investigates the Guatemalan case.

³² N. Hamilton and N.S. Chinchilla, 'Global economic restructuring and international migration: some observations based on the Mexican and Central American experience,' *International Migration*, vol. 34, no. 2 (1996): pp. 195-231.

³³ F.E. Osorio Pérez, 'Territorios, identidades y acción colectiva: pistas en la comprensión del desplazamiento,' in Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES), *Desplazamiento forzado interno en Colombia: conflicto, paz y desarrollo* (Bogotá, 2001): pp. 56-58.

³⁴ In Burundi and Kosovo forced migrants based on previous experience were aware of the probability of displacement and they used strategies to migrate early, sent some family members in advance and prepared for the move, in case needed. See G. Boutin and S. Nkurunziza, 'Burundi: developing strategies for self-reliance, a study of displacement in four provinces,' and V. Ilic, 'Yugoslavia: displacement from Kosovo, from patronage to self-help,' both are in M. Vincent and B.R. Sorenson (eds.), *Caught between borders: response strategies of the internally displaced* (London, 2001).

coercive capital. He argued that those individuals whose land was under dispute underwent an effective drop in their level of productive capital. As the level of productive capital decreased, the number of forced migrants increased and the number of producers also dropped. He also discussed that as a risk diversifying strategy households could select a mixture of becoming refugees, coercers and producers.³⁵

A second choice, independent of their decision to leave their usual place of residence, was where to go. There were several considerations in this regard. First, migration was a family decision and the place(s) of destination would depend on the characteristics and abilities of all members.³⁶ Second, migrants were expected to make good use of all their forms of capital: human, social and financial. Finally, migrants would also evaluate the possibilities for return in the short run – then they would either move short distance; or resettle in other more distant areas.

The characteristics of forced migrants were related to the infeasibility of staying at places of origin. While economic migrants tended to be favourably ‘self-selected’ to integrate in the labour market at destination and to be successful, forced migrants were not.³⁷ In Colombia, forced migrants consisted of poor populations from areas rich in resources who would not otherwise migrate. Studies have shown that economic migrants tended to be more risk-inclined, to have more schooling, and, to be more efficient in the labour market compared with non-economic migrants like refugees who tended to be less successful in the labour market at destination.³⁸

³⁵ Coercers refer to the military, guerrillas and paramilitaries. M.D. McGinnis, ‘Policy substitutability in complex humanitarian emergencies: a model of individual choice and international response,’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 44, no. 1 (2000): pp. 62-89.

³⁶ O. Stark, *The migration of labour* (Oxford, 1991): p. 97.

³⁷ H.L. Browning and W. Feindt, ‘Selectivity of migrants to a metropolis in a developing country: a Mexican case study,’ *Demography*, vol. 6, no. 4 (1969): pp. 347-357; B.R. Chiswick, ‘Are immigrants favourably self-selected?’, *American Economic Review*, vol. 89, no. 2 (1999): pp. 181-185; and C.H. Mulder and M.V. Ham, ‘Migration histories and occupational achievement,’ *Population, Space and Place*, vol. 11 (2005): pp. 173-186.

³⁸ There is debate in the literature about the long-term effects of migrant positive selection. Studies comparing tied movers and forced migrants with economic migrants have shown that the earning disadvantages of tied movers and refugees are greater initially and although they diminish over time they do not disappear; see B.R. Chiswick, ‘Occupational change among United States immigrants,’ *Monthly Labour Review*, vol. 101, no. 3 (1978): pp. 29-30 and J. Mincer, ‘Family migration decisions,’ *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 86, no. 5 (1978): pp. 749-773. However, analyses in Australia and the United States have shown that with duration of residence in the place of destination differences in labour market performance lessens or are even inverted between migrant groups. Given that refugees are less likely to have the choice of return than economic migrants they will invest more in destination-specific human capital. After residing a certain period of time at destination, refugees are expected to have similar or even higher performance in the labour market; see B.R.

As mentioned before it was very difficult to classify types of migration and to separate economic from political migration. First, even if persons were forced to leave their usual places of residence, they could choose their place of destination on the bases of expected improvements in their well-being. Second, there were different motivations to move along depending on age, stage of family life cycle, economic or job related motivations, and non-economic factors. Even if I recognise that an individual migrated many times and could be motivated by a variety of different factors I argue that those who were forced to migrate were generally not ready to do so and therefore were not selected as positively as voluntary migrants were. A relative lack of entrepreneurial skills had negative consequences for their economic and social integration in the city.

The self-selection process should not be considered as a dichotomy: positively selected economic migrants and adversely selected forced migrants. Several scholars have argued that the degree of positive selection depended on factors at origin. Migrants with strong overall pushes were less selective.³⁹ Given that forced internal migrants that arrived in large cities did it in stages, where each stage offered a chance to resettle or move again in search of better options, I speculate that those that arrived after several stages at Bogotá were more positively selected than those who stayed in areas near their places of origin.

Chiswick, Y.L. Lee and P.W. Miller, 'Patterns of immigrant occupational attainment in a longitudinal survey,' *International Migration*, vol. 41, no. 4 (2003): pp. 47-69 and K.E. Cortes, 'Are refugees different from economic immigrants?: some empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of immigrant groups in the United States,' *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 86, no. 2 (2004): pp. 465-480.


³⁹ J. Balán, 'Migrant-native socioeconomic differences in Latin American cities: a structural analysis,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1969): pp. 3-29; A.B. Simmons and R. Cardona, 'Rural-urban migration: who comes, who stays, who returns? The case of Bogotá, Colombia, 1929-1968,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 6, no. 2 (1972): pp. 166-181; and D.W. Wimberly, E.H. Berry and W.L. Flinn, 'Structural influences on outmigrant selectivity: a panel study of three rural Colombian communities,' *Rural Sociology*, vol. 54, no. 3 (1989): pp. 339-364.

The diagrams in **Figures 4.8** and **4.9** are based on the foregoing discussion. The first diagram demonstrates that at the place of origin migrants can be classified as voluntary or forced, and that depending on their perceptions about the place of origin and their different forms of capital they possess, they will choose a destination based on economic or social motivations. To describe a continuum of migrant self-selection, I suggest that voluntary-economic migrants are the most positive selected group, followed by forced economic migrants. In contrast, forced migrants that choose a location because of social motivations are the most adversely selected group, and that voluntary migrants who choose a destination for social reasons are more positively selected but not as much as forced economic migrants.

Figure 4.8: Causes of Migration at Origin and Motives of Migration at Destination

		Cause at Origin	
		Voluntary	Forced
Motive at Destination	Economic	I	II
	Social	III	IV

Figure 4.9: Relative Migrant Selectivity



Urbanisation and Internal Migration Pattern

The urbanisation process of Latin American cities was characterised by rural-urban flows originating in the mechanisation of agriculture in rural areas and the introduction of an industrial sector in urban centres.⁴⁰ The differential evolution of agriculture and manufacturing provoked a population re-distribution, and for a sustained period of time the growth of urban population was higher than the growth of the total population, and Colombia was no exception.⁴¹ In 1938 Colombia began a rapid process of urbanisation.⁴² In this year the percentage of urban population was 30.9, but in 1990 it had reached 68.7 percent before arriving at 74.9 percent by the end of 2000.⁴³ The period from late 1950s to early 1970s was thus characterised by rapid urbanisation. The highest urban growth rate (5.23 percent on average per year) was recorded between 1951 and 1964. After 1973 flows from rural to urban locations began to diminish.⁴⁴

The determinants of rural-urban migration from 1950 to early 1973 were the comparative economic advantages of living in the city: access to public services and infrastructure; increasing public expending in education and health care; increasing manufacturing and construction sectors in urban areas; and land concentration in rural areas.⁴⁵ Political violence at the time was not a major determinant of internal migration. The profile of the migrant population during this period demonstrated a pattern of selectivity. Migrants were composed of working age persons and higher percentages of women than men. The mechanisation of agriculture displaced more females than males from rural areas. Females, owing to their traditional roles, were not assimilated in the mechanisation of agriculture.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ For more details on Latin American urbanisation see B.R. Roberts, *The making of citizens: cities of peasants revisited* (London, 1995); A. Gilbert, *The Latin American city*, rev. ed. (London, 1998) and A. Gilbert, 'El proceso de urbanización,' in M. Palacios (ed.), *Historia general de América Latina*, volume 8 (Paris, 2008).

⁴¹ E.E. Arriaga, 'Components of city growth in selected Latin American countries,' *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 2, part 1 (1968): p. 243.

⁴² The national census was also collected in this year.

⁴³ United Nations (UN), *World urbanisation prospects: the 2003 revision* (New York, 2004): pp. 174-175.

⁴⁴ C.E. Flórez, *Las transformaciones sociodemográficas en Colombia durante el siglo XX* (Bogotá, 2000): table 4.1, p. 64.

⁴⁵ S. Jaramillo and L.M. Cuervo, *La configuración del espacio regional en Colombia: tres ensayos* (Bogotá, 1987): pp. 289-291.

⁴⁶ E. Boserup, *Woman's role in economic development*, reprinted with new introduction by Nazneen Kanji, Su Fei Tan and Camilla Toulmin (London, 2007): pp. 171-173.

During the process of urbanisation, Bogotá, Medellín and Cali emerged as entrepôts in the Andean mountains, and Barranquilla on the Atlantic coast. By 1973 these four cities contained 25 percent of the total population. The migration flows that produced the urbanisation of the country were thus geographically dispersed. Although Bogotá was an important centre, all other three cities were growing at a similar rate. After 1973, rates of urban growth diminished in general, but for Bogotá the decline was smaller.⁴⁷

In 1993, 21.8 percent of the population in Colombia was living in a department different from the department they were born. About 5 percent of this population lived in the departments of Atlántico, Valle del Cauca, Cundinamarca and the city of Bogotá. Using information about place of residence between 1988 and 1993, Ciro Martínez and Manuel Rincón found that 8 percent of the population changed their place of residence and that Bogotá received on average 12 persons per 1,000 inhabitants every year. By 1993 Bogotá held 17 percent of the population of Colombia.⁴⁸

One plausible explanation for the increasing movement of internal migrants to Bogotá was relative opportunities for employment it offered, compared to other cities. If Bogotá had lower unemployment rates than the other urban centres then the flow of internal economic migrants, would be directed to it. In the literature on economic migration not only the effects at the origin were important to explain a migration flow but also the conditions at destination.⁴⁹ **Figure 4.10** illustrates the trajectories of the unemployment for six major cities: Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Manizales and Pasto, relative to Bogotá from 1990 to 2002.⁵⁰ From 1990 to 2000 the unemployment rate of Bogotá was consistently below the unemployment rate for all other major cities in the country. However, from 2000 to 2002, which coincided with the highest period of forced internal displacement, unemployment rates in Bogotá were very similar or even higher than for other major cities.


⁴⁷ F. Dureau and C.E. Flórez, 'Dinámicas demográficas colombianas: de lo nacional a lo local,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 96-01 (Bogotá, 1996): pp. 22-24.

⁴⁸ C. Martínez and M. Rincón, 'Tendencias recientes de las migraciones internas en Colombia,' *Desarrollo Urbano en Cifras*, no. 2 (1997): pp. 78-81.

⁴⁹ D.S. Massey, 'The social and economic origins of immigration,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 510 (1990): p. 70.

⁵⁰ In Colombia, employment was measured using the *Encuesta Continua de Hogares*. The estimations for rural employment were scarce. This survey was designed to measure the economic activity of 7 major urban areas before 2000, and 13 areas after 2000. Because change in the levels of data and for the purpose of this analysis, I used a relative measure to Bogotá to eliminate the problem with changes in levels. I divided the unemployment rate of each major city by the unemployment rate in Bogotá.

Figure 4.10: Unemployment Rates in 6 Major Cities Compared to Bogotá (1990-2002)



Source: DANE, *Encuesta Continua de Hogares* (own calculations)

Some writings on migrant characteristics and adaptation to urban life stressed that selective migration patterns explained the characteristics of the migrant population.⁵¹ Alan Simmons and Ramiro Cardona argued that male migrants who arrived at Bogotá between 1929 and 1968 were positively selected from the middle and upper strata of their towns. This positive selection minimised occupational and educational differences, and therefore,

⁵¹ J. Balán, 'Migrant-native socioeconomic differences in Latin American cities: a structural analysis,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1969): pp. 3-29 and F. Dureau and C.E. Flórez, 'Dinámicas demográficas colombianas: de lo nacional a lo local,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 96-01 (Bogotá, 1996).

well-being differentials between migrants and natives. In the late 1960s they also observed that the degree of positive self-selection among migrants diminished.⁵²

About 75 percent of domestic immigrants in Bogotá in the period 1973-1990 came from the departments of Cundinamarca, Boyacá, Tolima and Santander. Thus there was a bimodal profile of the immigration flow. Those arriving from rural areas were coming from the departments closest to the city, particularly Boyacá and Cundinamarca; but those of urban origins often came from more distant departments. About 1990, the patterns of circular and temporal migration rose in Colombia and the permanent residence pattern was slowly modified. Labour diversification strategies were adopted to generate enough income to cover family needs.⁵³

The geographic dispersion of migrants in the city was not homogenous. Since the 1970s, migrants have tended to arrive at the periphery of Bogotá, a pattern observed in other large cities as well. Françoise Dureau and Carmen Elisa Flórez studied the municipality of Soacha and revealed the prevalence of illegal occupation of plots in the periphery of the city.⁵⁴ According to Alejandro Portes, these patterns of settlement were related to the physical separation of social classes.⁵⁵ Portes described Bogotá as 'the prototypical example of Third World urban polarisation' and suggested three patterns of internal mobility within the city during the 1980s. First, due to the increase in the price of the land in central Bogotá, middle income groups moved to the west and southwest.⁵⁶ Second, working class settlements expanded in the north of the city. The location of the new settlements increased their job opportunities in services required by people of a higher socioeconomic level. Third, a final element that affected the patterns of mobility within the

⁵² A.B. Simmons and R. Cardona, 'Rural-urban migration: who comes, who stays, who returns? The case of Bogotá, Colombia, 1929-1968,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 6, no. 2 (1972): pp. 166-181.

⁵³ A. Gilbert and P. Ward, 'Latin American migrants: a tale of three cities,' in F. Slater (ed.), *People and environments: issues and enquiries* (London, 1986): pp. 24-42 and A. González, 'Patrones de migración en Colombia,' Paper presented at the 25th International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) on 6-8 October (Las Vegas, NV, 2004): p. 4.

⁵⁴ F. Dureau and C.E. Flórez, 'Dinámicas demográficas colombianas: de lo nacional a lo local,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 96-01 (Bogotá, 1996): p. 19.

⁵⁵ A. Portes, 'Latin American urbanisation during the years of crisis,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 24, no. 3 (1989): pp. 17-19.

⁵⁶ See also A. Gilbert and P. Ward, *Housing, the state and the poor: policy and practice in three Latin American cities* (Cambridge, England, 1985): p. 116.

city was changing policy regarding legalisation of pirate subdivision.⁵⁷ Before 1960, the city's administration refrained from legalising the property rights of irregular settlers, but from 1963 the administration changed its requirements, and allowing for ex post facto legalisation of plots, and went on to provide public services. These changing policies fuelled the permanence of an illegal and semi-legal land market in the poor areas of the city, which was particularly important for the displaced population and influenced their settlement patterns.

Research Methodology in Internally Displaced Persons Survey

Many studies on forced migration, refugees and internally displaced persons, are available that use macro-level data on migration and related rates of migration as indicators of violence and conflict.⁵⁸ Some studies based on micro-level data classify respondents as voluntary or forced migrants according to their place of birth or country of origin.⁵⁹ But studies on forced migration based on primary data are rare both because of the difficulties of collecting information and the risk of exhaustion. Forced migrants, when available, are often interviewed many times by different research teams or institutions. There are a number of studies on health outcomes and needs of the internally displaced persons in aid camps, but, these studies do not allow comparisons among migrants with different experiences and motivations for moving.

⁵⁷ For more details on 'pirate' urbanisation in Bogotá see A. Gilbert, 'Pirates and invaders: land acquisition in urban Colombia and Venezuela,' *World Development*, vol. 9, issue 7 (1981): pp. 657-678.

⁵⁸ Examples include A.R. Morrison and R.A. May, 'Escape from terror: violence and migration in post-revolutionary Guatemala,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 29, no. 2 (1994): pp. 111-132 and W.D. Stanley, 'Economic migrants or refugees from violence? A time-series of Salvadoran migration to the United States,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 22, no. 1 (1987): pp. 132-154.

⁵⁹ B.R. Chiswick, 'Are immigrants favourably self-selected?,' *American Economic Review*, vol. 89, no. 2 (1999): pp. 181-185; B.R. Chiswick, Y. Cohen and T. Zach, 'The labour market status of immigrants: effects of the unemployment rate at arrival and duration of residences,' *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, vol. 50, no. 2 (1997): pp. 289-303 and K.E. Cortes, 'Are refugees different from economic immigrants?: some empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of immigrant groups in the United States,' *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 86, no. 2 (2004): pp. 465-480.

There are few studies on forced migrants in urban settings.⁶⁰ Reaching forced migrants in urban setting is complex, because registration systems seldom exist and are often unavailable for safety reasons. Additionally, refugees and internally displaced persons in urban areas are highly mobile. They are dispersed, hard to find, and usually do not want to be recognised as refugees, asylum seekers or internally displaced persons owing to fears of persecution, discrimination or the stigma attached to being persecuted during an armed conflict.⁶¹ However, despite these obstacles it is important to understand the process of integration among internally displaced persons in urban sites because once they are uprooted and reach the city, they are very likely to stay.

Colombia is an example of a country with a large internally displaced persons. After 1997, a National System for the Integral Attention to the Displaced Population has functioned. In order to comply with its responsibilities an Information Network for the Attention of the Internally Displaced was created. This Information Network used data gathering systems to provide information on the growth and level of internal displacement and its geographic patterns. The two components of this Information Network are the *Registro Único de Población Desplazada* (Registration of Internally Displaced Population) and the *Sistema de Estimación del Desplazamiento Forzado por Fuentes Contrastadas* (Forced Displacement Estimation System by Contrasting Sources).⁶²

The objective of this study is to analyse the experience of the internally displaced people who arrived at Bogotá between 1990 and 2002 and compare it to the experience of other migrant groups. The study focuses on people living in similar underdeveloped sites within the metropolitan area of Bogotá using two sources of primary data: the Experimental Census for the Municipality of Soacha and the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS). The first data set was collected by the *Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística* (National Administrative Department of Statistics, DANE) and the second data set was designed for the specific purpose of this study.

⁶⁰ K. Jacobsen and L.B. Landau, 'The dual imperative in refugee research: some methodological and ethical considerations in social science researches on forced migration,' *Disasters*, vol. 27, issue 3 (2003): pp. 185-206.

⁶¹ D. Buscher, 'Case identification: challenges posed by urban refugees,' Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f41f4e34.html>>, accessed 29 July 2008.

⁶² Red de Solidaridad Social, *Guía de atención integral a la población desplazada por la violencia* (Bogotá, 2001).

Experimental Census of Soacha, Cundinamarca

In preparation for the 2005 Colombian National Population Census, there were three pilot censuses in the municipality of Yopal in the department of Casanare, the island of San Andrés, and the municipality of Soacha, Cundinamarca. The pilot censuses targeted areas with apparently high population growth since 1993, the date the last population census was taken.

Soacha was of interest for testing the census questionnaire because it is the most populated municipality adjacent to Bogotá and part of its metropolitan area. Additionally, it has received a large in-flow of voluntary and forced migrants. Soacha was the 27th largest municipality for the reception of internally displaced people country-wide and, according to the figures of the National Registration of Internally Displaced Persons, there were about 13,083 internally displaced people registered in this municipality in 2002, a figure that represented roughly 12 percent of the internally displaced population within metropolitan Bogotá.⁶³

The census was collected on Sunday 25 May 2003. On that day the population of the municipality was asked to remain at home while face-to-face interviews were carried out by community enumerators trained by DANE. The pilot census questionnaire had 60 questions, among which nine were on migration. One of these specifically addressing forced migration was phrased as follows:

Have you ever had to abandon your place of residence because of the internal armed conflict?

When?

From where did you leave (Municipality and Department)?

Table 4.2 displays frequencies of persons and households by migration experience and district of residence. A household was considered to be a forced migrant household if any of its members were forced to leave their usual place of residence because of the armed conflict at any point before 25 May 2003. The internally displaced population in Soacha was concentrated in the fourth district, about 43.48 percent of forced migrants lived in this

⁶³ Red de Solidaridad Social, *Estadísticas para medios: cifras sobre desplazamiento forzado en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2003).

area. Forced migrants accounted for 4.89 percent of the total population of the municipality and for about 23.35 percent of total migrants.

Table 4.2: Numbers of Persons and Households by Migration Experiences and Districts

	Non Migrant ^a	Voluntary Migrant ^b	Forced Migrant ^c	Total
Persons	286,993	58,275	17,751	363,019
4 th District	44,943	10,585	7,718	63,246
All other districts	242,050	47,690	10,033	299,773
Households ^d	68,002	15,676	5,355	89,033
4 th District	9,791	2,452	2,231	14,474
All other districts	58,211	13,224	3,124	74,559

^a. Persons who were never forced to leave their usual place of residence and were living in the municipality in May 1998.

^b. Persons who were never forced to leave their usual place of residence and were not living in the municipality in May 1998.


^c. Persons who were forced to leave their usual place of residence before arriving at the municipality of Soacha.

^d. Households were classified according to the migration experience of the household head.

Source: Micro-data from the experimental census of Soacha, Cundinamarca, 2003 (own calculations)


Figures 4.11 and **4.12** reveal the timing of arrival of internally displaced and voluntary migrant population at Soacha. As observed, the rate of growth of the internally displaced population in the municipality was very high from 1997 to the date of the Census. The time trends of the voluntary migration to the municipality registered more fluctuations but the general trend was upward. **Table 4.3** shows the frequency and the rate of growth of the internally displaced and the voluntary migrant population by year of arrival. Only 34.46 percent of the internally displaced persons arrived in or before 1996, whereas 65.54 percent arrived in or after 1997. The year with the highest rate of growth for the internally displaced population was 2002, as will be explained later. The year of highest reception number of voluntary migrants in the municipality was 2002. Between 1999 and 2001 although there was a positive influx of voluntary migrants to the municipality the flow was lower. The temporal pattern was likely related to the years of economic recession in Colombia.

Figure 4.11: Internally Displaced Persons by Years of Arrival at the Municipality of Soacha



Source: Micro-data from the experimental census of Soacha, Cundinamarca, 2003 (own calculations)

Figure 4.12: Voluntary Migrants by Years of Arrival at the Municipality of Soacha



Source: Micro-data from the experimental census of Soacha, Cundinamarca, 2003 (own calculations)

Table 4.3: Absolute Frequency and Annual Growth Rate of Internally Displaced Persons and Voluntary Migrants by Years of Arrival at the Municipality of Soacha


Year of Arrival	Forced Migrant		Voluntary Migrant	
	Arrival	Growth Rate (%)	Arrival	Growth Rate (%)
Before 1985	1,242	—	25,555	—
1985	150	12.08	8,935	34.96
1986	138	9.91	6,356	18.43
1987	172	11.24	6,345	15.53
1988	160	9.40	6,429	13.62
1989	203	10.90	6,121	11.42
1990	247	11.96	8,005	13.40
1991	282	12.20	6,886	10.16
1992	348	13.42	8,390	11.24
1993	384	13.05	11,535	13.89
1994	375	11.27	9,495	10.04
1995	475	12.83	12,472	11.99
1996	524	12.55	12,739	10.93
1997	661	14.06	16,548	12.80
1998	985	18.37	17,692	12.13
1999	1,017	16.03	15,873	9.71
2000	1,272	17.28	15,159	8.45
2001	1,927	22.32	14,233	7.32
2002	3,071	29.08	23,658	11.33

Source: Micro-data from the experimental census of Soacha, Cundinamarca, 2003 (own calculations)

Figures 4.13 and **4.14** exhibit a map of the department of Cundinamarca which surrounds Bogotá and includes the municipality of Soacha. The municipality of Soacha is divided in six districts (or *comunas*) as shown in **Figure 4.15** where the internally displaced population is concentrated in the fourth district, particularly in a section called Altos de Cazuca and Ciudadela Sucre. This sector is adjacent to Bogotá, and therefore has the highest degree of urbanisation, but its poor infrastructure has held back its development. Migrant settlements started in the 1980s. The illegal occupation of plots is done in the only spaces available. There is an ‘informal land market’. Persons called ‘*terreros*’ arrange plots of land with difficult topography and sell them to newly arrived migrants.⁶⁴


⁶⁴ M.E. Pérez Martínez, *Territorio y desplazamiento: el caso de Altos de Cazucá, municipio de Soacha* (Bogotá, 2004): p. 45.

Figure 4.13: Map of the Department of Cundinamarca by Political Divisions




Source: Gobierno del departamento de Cundinamarca, 2005.

Figure 4.14: Map Locating the Municipality of Soacha, Department of Cundinamarca



Source: Secretaría de Planeación de Cundinamarca, 2003

Figure 4.15: Map of the Municipality of Soacha by Districts (Comunas)



Source: Alcaldía Municipal de Soacha, 2003

Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS)

Although the ideal settings to analyse the determinants of economic and forced migration are the places of origin of the migrant population, it is not advisable for methodological and security reasons to collect data in villages or towns where confrontations between guerrilla, paramilitary and military groups are taking place. If collecting information in the place of origin is not possible, then the place of destination is the only real alternative. Internally displaced persons tended to move to nearby villages, then to a town, and finally to major urban centres.⁶⁵ To observe the completed paths of migration, the intentions to return and the degree of integration of the internally displaced persons, data collection at destination is the appropriate strategy.

⁶⁵ IDP project, 'Patterns of displacement in Colombia,' Global IDP Database, 2008.

Under these circumstances I concentrated resources and effort in collecting comparable data on migrant groups in settings where fieldwork could be completed and high quality data could be collected without risking the integrity of the research team or the confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewees. I thus gathered data in urban neighbourhoods in the metropolitan area of Bogotá.

The Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS) was designed in 2008 to study migration patterns of internally displaced persons who had arrived at Bogotá between 1990 and 2002, from areas of origin to urban destinations, and to compare the experiences of internally displaced persons with different groups of non-forced migrants. The data collection process was divided in four stages: questionnaire design, sample design, interviewing, and data entry and processing.

Questionnaire Design

I designed the survey instrument using an ethnosurvey approach, which combines techniques of ethnographic fieldwork and representative survey sampling together with qualitative as well as quantitative data.⁶⁶ The survey instrument was based on a series of the household questionnaires that followed a semi-structured format to provide the interviewers with the flexibility to build rapport and conduct an unobtrusive and non-threatening interview, which was essential to collecting sensitive information from forced migrants. The questionnaire was designed to obtain identical and comparable information for each person in a selected household. However, the wording and the timing of the questions were not fixed.

Although it was very difficult to separate economic migration from migration due to political violence, the survey instrument was designed to gather data that could be used to differentiate movements by those who never faced a violent event from those who did. Specifically I collected detailed data on the reasons for migration to distinguish forced migrants from non-forced migrants and asked about exposure to violent events.

⁶⁶ D.S. Massey [et al.], *Return to Aztlan: the social process of international migration from Western Mexico* (Berkeley, CA, 1987): p. 38. For more details of the ethnosurvey see D.S. Massey, 'The ethnosurvey in theory and practice,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 21, no. 4 (1987): pp. 1498-1522.

Table 4.4: Description of the Schedules of the Household Questionnaire for the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS)

Schedule	Description	Unit of Observation
Introduction	<i>The ethical protocol on confidentiality and anonymity of the information provided.</i>	
Schedule A	<i>Household roster.</i> Inquires about persons living in the dwelling and the living children of the household head who did not live in it by 2002. The relevant variables in this schedule are: relation to the head, sex, age, place of birth, civil status, education, occupation and participation in household expenditures	Household members and non-member children
Schedule B	<i>Head's union, marriage and birth retrospective history.</i> This schedule is divided in two. Schedule B-1 contains information on unions, marriages and the number of children ever born per union or marriage of the household head. Schedule B-2 asks details about reported death children.	Unions or marriages and death children
Schedule C	<i>Migratory experience of the family of origin of the household head.</i> This schedule inquires about the migratory experience of parents and siblings of the household head. If any member of the family of origin had died, the schedule collects information on age at death, year deceased and, in broad categories, cause of death.	Household head's parents and siblings
Schedule D	<i>Retrospective labour and migration histories of household head and spouse.</i> The labour and migration histories began with the year of birth and finished at the end of 2002. This schedule contains the open questions on the causes of migration and family members left behind in each experience.	Migration or/and labour experiences
Schedule E	<i>Retrospective history of forced migration.</i> This schedule contains information about violent events associated with each of the places of residence. Questions about violent events associated with the head, his/her properties, his/her family, his/her neighbours, and if the perpetrators were actors of the Colombian armed conflict or delinquents.	Migration or/and labour experiences
Schedule F	<i>Household head's retrospective land ownership history.</i> This schedule contains information about year and sources for the acquisition, year and cause for selling, size and location.	Plots

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008)

Table 4.4: Description of the Schedules of the Household Questionnaire for the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS) (continued)

Schedule	Description	Unit of Observation
Schedule G	<i>Household head's retrospective real estate ownership history.</i> This schedule contains information about the year and sources for the acquisition, year and cause of selling, its size, location and type of property.	Real estate
Schedule H	<i>Dwelling characteristics.</i> This schedule contains information on the residence in Bogotá, the residence they inhabited the longest after leaving the parental home and, if applicable, the residence from where they were forced to migrate. Information about construction materials and size of the dwelling are included.	Household
Schedule I	<i>Access to public infrastructure and consumption of durable goods.</i> As in Schedule H, this schedule contains information of the places of residence at three points in time. It contains questions about access and availability of sewerage, running water and electricity, type of household tenancy and consumption of 11 durable goods.	Household
Schedule J	<i>Access to public services and household head's perceptions.</i> As in Schedules H and I, this schedule contains information about the places of residence at three points in time. Its purpose is to observe availability and access of education and health care public services of the selected population. In addition, questions about household head self-assessment of his/her well-being, health and economic situation were asked.	Household and household head
Schedule K	<i>Earnings and other income.</i> This schedule collects information about earnings, working hours and other income (cash or in-kind) received.	Household head
Schedule L	<i>Return intentions.</i> This schedule contains questions about household heads' intentions to return, where he/she would like to go and when.	Household head

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008)

As shown in **Table 4.4** the survey instrument contains 12 schedules. The purpose of Schedule D was to collect migration histories from the household head and spouse. In this schedule an open-ended question on causes of migration was included. Schedule E sought to link the migration histories reported in Schedule D to violent events experienced in each place of residence. The phrasing of this schedule was designed according to the definition of internally displaced persons given by the United Nations.⁶⁷ It also considered different levels of exposure to violence due to armed conflict: the self, the family and the extended social group. I linked information from Schedules D and E to analyse the reported causes of migration with their exposure to violence. Out of 603 households, 15 percent consisted of forced migrants according to criteria derived from Schedule E, and only 17 percent of displaced households said in Schedule D that they migrated for causes other than violence due to armed conflict.

The instrument also requested information at the personal and household level. Household data and marital histories were reported by the head of household. Basic socio-demographic information was asked about each household member and about the non-resident children of the head of household. In addition, to the questionnaire, other instruments were required to complete the data collection process. These instruments included the interviewer's manual, training guides, and letters to the representatives of the local administrative organisations, diagrams for organisation of fieldwork daily activities, daily report forms, and an interviewer's questionnaire to evaluate potential problems during the fieldwork that could affect data quality. Finally, following the World Bank guidelines for designing household survey questionnaires for developing countries, it was advisable to collect community level data while in the field. For this purpose a neighbourhood questionnaire was added to the measurements instruments for this study.

Sample Design

The goal of the study was to collect comparable data that described how the experience of internally displaced persons differed from the experience of urban non-migrants and non-forced migrants during 1990-2002. The total sample includes 603 households from three sites located in southeast Bogotá, northeast Bogotá and southwest

⁶⁷ See p. 176 for the definition of IDPs.


neighbourhoods in the metropolitan periphery in the 4th district of the municipality of Soacha. These three sites were defined according to four criteria. First, I sought a relatively high concentration of internally displaced persons to ensure an adequate number of forced migrants. Second, I looked for a site in which the community leaders were willing to participate in the study by allowing the interviewers perform their duties in the neighbourhood. Third, I attempted to locate sites in diverse parts of the city, as Bogotá is highly stratified by socioeconomic status. Fourth, even if sites were very distant from downtown Bogotá I required easy access to public transportation to ensure the safety of interviewers and to facilitate fieldwork logistics. In addition, all data collection activities were carried out between 9 am and 4 pm to minimise risks for both interviewers and interviewees.

The sample represents 2,413 households included in the sample frame. **Figure 4.16** demonstrates the socioeconomic stratification of legal settlements by block in Bogotá in 2002. The areas in red represent the lowest socioeconomic status and the areas in yellow represent the next to the lowest level. All neighbourhoods included in the study were classified in either of these two categories or an illegal settlement. The data generally reflected living conditions for residents living in lower status neighbourhoods within the metropolitan area.

To collect information on the residential patterns of internally displaced persons in the city I visited the Bogotá branch of the *Red de Solidaridad Social*. The office provided data on the concentration of internally displaced persons by localities. As specified by the internally displaced persons in his/her official declaration.⁶⁸ **Table 4.5** shows numbers of internally displaced persons by localities. The three localities with a highest concentration of internally displaced persons were Ciudad Bolívar, Kennedy and Bosa, all of which were densely populated.

⁶⁸ Internally displaced persons in Colombia can access humanitarian aid, health care and school enrolment if they have a certificate from the government. To request this certificate they need to declare to the corresponding authorities why and how they fled from their previous place of residence and what their current place of residence and address are.

Figure 4.16: Map of Bogotá by Socioeconomic Stratum, Mayor's Office Official Classification (2002)



Source: Oficina de Catastro Distrital, Bogotá

Table 4.5: Initial Place of Residence of the Internally Displaced Persons Who Arrived at Bogotá between May 1999 and August 2002 by Localities

Locality or District	Household	Percentage Distribution
Ciudad Bolívar	2,190	26.2
Kennedy	958	11.5
Bosa	863	10.3
Usme	704	8.4
Rafael Uribe	452	5.4
San Cristóbal	447	5.3
Suba	384	4.6
Engativá	384	4.6
Tunjuelito	281	3.4
Santa Fe	276	3.3
Fontibón	181	2.2
Puente Aranda	150	1.8
Usaquén	138	1.7
Chapinero	109	1.3
Antonio Nariño	97	1.2
Los Mártires	82	1.0
Barrios Unidos	57	0.9
Teusaquillo	53	0.6
La Candelaria	38	0.5
Sumapaz	3	0.0
Other location within the metropolitan area	97	1.2
Without information	440	5.3
Total	8,362	100.0

Source: Red de Solidaridad Social cited in UNHCR publication, *La población desplazada por la violencia en Bogotá: una responsabilidad de todos*, 2003.

Site I: Southeastern Bogotá's periphery

I visited the neighbourhood areas on Bogotá's southeastern periphery and decided that it provided not only a number of internally displaced families, but also the possibility of defining a study area composed of three neighbourhoods with different levels of urban consolidation. This site was located in the localities Usme and San Cristóbal in southeastern area of the city. Neighbourhood A had urban public services and other facilities such as school, parks, small grocery stores and bakeries. Neighbourhood B was a government sponsored housing complex that was built to relocate poor families living in high risk areas near the Tunjuelito River in southern Bogotá. Neighbourhood C was an

informal (illegal) settlement. There were neither paved streets nor sewerage. There were electric lines installed by the electric company and the settlers themselves. The provision of water was organised by the settlers who bought the materials to connect a tube to the main water line. **Table 4.6** presents data on the age and basic amenities available in each neighbourhood.

Table 4.6: Characteristics of the Neighbourhoods Included in the Sample

Site	Date streets were traced	Date streets were paved	Date electric power was installed	Sewerage availability (2002)
Southeastern				
Neighbourhood A	1987	1993	1987	Yes
Neighbourhood B	1996	1996	1996	Yes
Neighbourhood C	1995	Not paved	1999	No
Northeastern				
Neighbourhood D	1972	2000	1974	Yes
Neighbourhood E	1987	1998	1999	Yes
Neighbourhood F	1993	Not paved	1999	No
Southwestern				
Neighbourhood G	1999	Not paved	2001	No
Neighbourhood H	1999	Not paved	1999	No
Neighbourhood I	1995	Not paved	1999	No

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008)

Site II: Northeastern Bogotá's periphery

I explored several neighbourhoods in northern Bogotá, particularly in the localities of Suba and Usaquén before choosing the second site. After evaluating the characteristics of the potential sites, I decided to collect data in three neighbourhoods within the locality of Usaquén. This locality hosted a large proportion of the richest population in the city. As in the cases of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, however, poor neighbourhoods were located near to high income areas because of demand for domestic, gardening and maintenance services provided informally by poor people living nearby.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ A. Portes. 'Latin American urbanisation during the years of the crisis,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 24, no. 3 (1989): pp. 7-44.

Neighbourhood D was a relatively old settlement. Land tenure was legal, streets were paved, the majority of dwellings were built of brick, and all had running water, sewerage and electric power. Neighbourhood E was younger than neighbourhood D. It had paved streets and concrete public stairs, and all public services were provided. Dwellings in neighbourhood E were less frequently built of brick than in neighbourhood D. Neighbourhood F was an informal (illegal) settlement in a high risk area. Dwellings were built more frequently of wood and other materials. There was no municipal provision of sewerage, but the settlers paid for electric power and running water.

Site III: Southwestern metropolitan area

I investigated an area which bordered the locality of Ciudad Bolívar, which had the highest concentration of internally displaced people in Bogotá. The area was located in the 4th district of the municipality of Soacha, and recorded the highest concentration of internally displaced people in the municipality. The characteristics of the three neighbourhoods selected near Ciudad Bolívar were different from the first two sites surveyed in Bogotá. None of the neighbourhoods had paved streets, sewerage or running water, though dwellings had access to electric power. The settlers themselves built a temporary sewerage system and the organisation, *Médecins Sans Frontières*, was sponsoring the installation of water tanks for a number of dwellings.

Independent samples were collected in each defined area. In order to create a sample frame I enumerated all dwellings and inhabitable constructions in the defined area. In order to be able to locate the selected households for interview I went to the urban registration office (Oficina de Catastro) and asked for the registered maps of the selected neighbourhoods. In addition to the maps, I prepared formats for the enumerators to collect comparable information and to establish the particular characteristics of dwellings. In some cases addresses were non-existent or hard to verify, and for this reason, I used a system of enumeration that allowed me to identify each dwelling within defined sites.

After enumerating all dwellings, between 239 and 260 households were randomly selected in each site. I expected to collect data on 200 households in each site, but I added an additional sample of 25 percent in case the initial selected household were not reached or rejected the interview.⁷⁰ **Table 4.7** contains basic sampling statistics. I counted a total of 2,413 households and interviewed 603 households.

Table 4.7: Basic Sampling Statistics of the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey

Site	I	II	III	Total
Total households in the sample frame	702	832	879	2,413
Visited households	239	251	260	750
Not reached	44	27	35	106
Rejected	13	10	18	41
Interviewed households	182	214	207	603

Source: Primary data collected (own calculation)

The team of interviewers was composed of 5 members: two economists who were my colleagues when I was a visiting scholar at *Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos* (CERAC), a community child care provider familiar with these neighbourhoods, an experienced household interviewer and myself. The fieldwork team composed by persons of diverse backgrounds and points of view enhanced the quality of the data collected.

Accurate application of the measurement instrument required a very good understanding of the objectives of the study, the logic behind each schedule, and the way the schedules were linked. Since the interviewers were given the flexibility of changing question wording and interview order, a good management of the instrument was necessary in order to minimise inconsistent or missing data that would require a second visit to a household. Given the focus of the study, forced migration in a country with a long history of civil unrest, and its location in poor areas of the city, it was very important for the interviewer to build rapport with respondents in order to obtain reliable information on

⁷⁰ The households who rejected the interview include both families that did not want to participate and families that could not recount their memories.

traumatic or disturbing episodes that were difficult and stressful to remember and which therefore tended to be hidden.

Interviewing

I spent about 21 consecutive working days at each site, starting with the enumeration of the dwellings. The enumeration process and the sample selection took about 3-4 days. During this time the interviewers and I talked to the people in the community and informed them of a possible visit to their house to ask about their memories of displacement during 1990-2002. On the fifth day we started organising teams and rounds. In order to minimise insecurity, the interviewers did their rounds in teams of two, and while conducting independent interviews they worked in close proximity. I was always waiting in a visible and fixed location so that the reports of the interviewers and the completed questionnaires could be immediately reviewed for inconsistencies. When necessary, the interviewer was asked to clarify information or to go back to the selected household.

The interview took between 45 and 90 minutes depending on the number of household members and the migration experience of the head of household and spouse. There were few extreme cases in which the interviewees liked to talk about their experiences where the interviews lasted for 120 minutes. We worked from about 10 am to 4 pm, when public transportation was still available and before sunset. For each site we organised a team that stayed for an additional two days later in the afternoon to try to contact unreachable households. We collected data on weekends and holidays, interviewing families who were away working on weekdays.

For those households that could not be reached on the first visit, the interviewers were told to attempt at least three times to reach the head of household or spouse. If the respondent appeared very tired or busy, interviewers were instructed to ask if it was more appropriate to continue the interview later. This practice worked well, particularly when the interviews were carried out at lunch time. When the interviewers returned later, the respondent was more involved in his/her life histories. This practice improved data quality.

Given that the questionnaire was mainly based on the experience of the head of household, the interviewers asked first to interview the head of household. If it was impossible, then they were asked to interview the spouse and, finally, any member of the

family who was older than 15 years by 2002 and who could answer detailed questions about the migration and working experiences of the head of household and spouse. Interviewers did in many cases make more than one visit in order to interview the head of household or spouse and to avoid encountering a proxy respondent.

Data Entry and Processing

I used Microsoft Access platform to design the entry programme. The design was done during the interviewing process so that we could start entering the data as soon as the activities in the field were finished. I tried out several versions of the data entry programme and made necessary corrections and adjustments to make sure that identifiers, and consistency checks and warning for the data entry personnel functioned properly. The participation of the interviewers in data entry enhanced the quality data. Since they knew the structure of the data and had been in the field, they could often correct any mistakes due to illegible handwriting and other minor problems. The data entry started two days after interviewing finished, and it lasted about three weeks. I processed all data using Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software.

Missing Data

As researchers we sought to minimise missing or inconsistent data. However, we could never eliminate it completely even with the most sophisticated controls. During the data production process the quality of the overall data production could be assessed by analysing missing data. **Table 4.8** shows the percentage of observations with complete data for all variables and with missing data in one to three variables. The data set for the study was composed by data at three levels: individuals, households and life histories.

For individuals or household members, 98.47 percent of the cases had values for all eight principal variables. For households, there were 32 variables that measured dwelling characteristics and access to public amenities and services. Only 2.32 percent of the cases had no values for all variables. Finally, the last piece of data was the migration and labour histories of the head of household and spouse. For this analysis instead of using person-years, I used life experiences. There were 6,090 reported experiences in the migration and labour histories of 603 heads of household and 453 spouses, and 4.88 percent of them had a

missing value in one of the five basic variables included in the analysis. I concluded that the completeness of the data collected was high and therefore its use in the following analysis was adequate.

Table 4.8: Missing Data of Individual, Household and Life History Experiences of Household Head and Spouse

Level of Analysis	Complete data for all variables		Missing data for one to three variables		Total Observations	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Household members <i>Variables=8</i>	2,703	98.47	42	1.53	2,745	100
Households <i>Variables=32</i>	589	97.68	14	2.32	603	100
Experiences in the migration and labour histories of household head and spouse <i>Variables=5</i>	5,793	95.12	297	4.88	6,090	100


Source: Primary data collected (own calculation)

Migration Typology

Given the vast array of reasons for migrating and migration trajectories over time, I distinguished groups of migrant households by the migration experience of the household head. **Figure 4.17** contains a diagram to explain this typology. First, I divided migrants according to their migration experience starting in the year they left the parental home, either because they got their first job and moved out, married or began cohabiting, or, as they frequently answered, wanted 'to be independent'. The first classification was according to the geographical pattern of their migration experience. If they migrated from any department to Bogotá after leaving the parental home they were classified as internal migrants. If they were living in Bogotá and had been moving within the city after they left the parental home, then they were considered as non-internal migrants. Their places of birth were not considered in this classification.

The group without internal migration experience was further divided in two according to the place of residence they had lived the longest. If the place they had lived the longest was the same place in Bogotá at the end of 2002, then they were classified as non-migrants. If the longest place of residence differed from the place of residence in Bogotá at end of 2002 then they were catalogued as intra-urban migrants.

Figure 4.17: Migrant Typology



Internal migrant households were further distinguished by the migration experience of the household head in two groups: voluntary migrants and forced migrants. A household was considered to be a forced migrant household if at any point after leaving his/her parental home, the household head left his/her usual place of residence because his/her life, physical integrity or freedom was threatened by an actor in the armed conflict. In this second level classification I considered both geography of migration and the causal mechanism. According to this typology households were classified in four main categories: non-migrants, intra-urban migrants, forced migrants and voluntary migrants.

Table 4.9 demonstrates the distribution of migrant groups in the selected sites. The distribution of the four groups was uneven. There were 51.41 percent of intra-urban migrants, 22.39 percent of voluntary migrants, 15.26 percent of forced migrants and 10.94 percent of non-migrants. There was a relative concentration of non-migrants in the northeastern site, the oldest of the three, as well as a relative concentration of forced migrants in the southwestern site. The intra-urban and voluntary migrants were similarly distributed across the sites.

Table 4.9: Absolute and Percentage Frequency of Households by Migration Experiences of Household Head and Site of Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002

Site	Non-Migrant	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Southeast	10	113	37	22
	1.66%	18.74%	6.14%	3.65%
Northeast	54	107	46	7
	8.95%	17.74%	7.63%	1.16%
Southwest	2	90	52	63
	0.33%	14.93%	8.62%	10.45%
Total	66	310	135	92
	10.94%	51.41%	22.39%	15.26%

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Given the variety of migration causes, I classified the reported main causes of each migration experience in three categories: economic causes, personal causes and safety causes. This classification was useful to describe migration trajectories for the intra-urban migrants, voluntary migrants and forced migrants. The bottom of **Figure 4.17** contains a more detailed classification of the reported causes of migration. The units of analysis for this classification were migration histories reported by the household heads and spouses (Schedule D in the questionnaire). The data set contained data on 4,400 migration histories reported by 603 household heads and 453 spouses.

Table 4.10 demonstrates frequency distribution of causes of migration. As expected, economic causes were more frequently reported than personal or safety causes. The distribution by household head and spouse was very similar, in both cases the majority of their moves were motivated by economic reasons. Only 5.27 percent of the causes reported were due to safety reasons, and among those only 2.79 percent for violence related to the armed conflict.

Table 4.10: Percentage Distribution of Causes of Migration Reported by Household Head and Spouse^a

Cause of Migration	Household Head	Spouse	Total
Economic	36.60	20.22	56.82
Economic or labour market opportunities	16.43	9.66	26.09
Education and training	1.99	0.44	2.43
Housing	18.18	10.12	28.30
Personal	21.04	16.87	37.91
Family of origin and marriage	15.38	14.13	29.51
Other personal causes	5.66	2.74	8.40
Safety	3.42	1.85	5.27
Violence due to armed conflicts	1.96	0.83	2.79
Urban violence (delinquency)	1.14	0.68	1.82
Sexual or physical abuse	0.32	0.34	0.66
All causes	61.06	38.94	100.00

^a The unit of analysis is the migration history.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Socio-Demographic Profile by Migrant Group

The primary sampling unit was the household, and for this reason I started the description of the data at the household level. The questionnaire was designed to collect data at 3 levels: household (n = 603), persons (n = 3,127) and person-year (n = 43,335).

In order to introduce the profile of the population included in this analysis, this section presents the characteristics of the persons living in low income households in the three sites studies in the peri-urban area of Bogotá. I argue that the experience of the household head, usually the father or the mother or the person who was in charge of the household, determined the circumstances and environment in which the other members of the household lived. For this reason, I classified the household into four categories: non-migrants, intra-urban migrants, voluntary migrants and forced migrants (also called internally displaced persons) based on the experience of the household head. All members belonged to a migration category not depending on their personal migration experience, but the migration experience of the household head.

Table 4.11 reveals the percentage distribution of household members (n = 2,745) by age group, sex and migrant status group.⁷¹ The distribution of the forced migrants showed that 56.86 percent of the population were young and 3.92 percent were over age 65. Only 39.22 percent lay between ages 15 and 64, and the majority on this group were males (61.38 percent). For all other migrant groups the percentages of people in working ages were higher, between 55.62 percent and 56.15 percent, and the sex distributions by age group were more evenly distributed than in the case of the forced migrants. Considering as a reference category the non-migrant group and performing Chi Square tests for differences in the relative distributions of age groups by migrant group for males and females, I found that male age distribution of voluntary migrants and forced migrants both differed from non-migrant distribution. For females, however, the distributions of all four groups revealed statistically significant differences at 95 percent confidence level. The data by age and sex suggested that the forced migrant population was less positively selected for migration because the flow was mainly composed by people under age 15 and over 65.

⁷¹ The questionnaire asked for information of the household members and all the live children of the household head whether they were household members or living separated. For the purpose of this analysis I only considered the household members (n = 2,745) and not all persons (n = 3,127).

Table 4.11: Age and Sex Composition of the Population in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Age Groups and Migration Experiences of Household Head

Age group and Sex	Non-Migrant (Ref)	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Less than 15 years old	43.44%	42.15%	39.97%	56.86%
Males	24.69%	22.14%	18.79%	29.56%
Females	18.75%	20.01%	21.18%	27.30%
Between 15 and 40 years old	41.56%	39.53%	39.29%	24.03%
Males	18.12%	19.51%	17.94%	19.89%
Females	23.44%	20.02%	21.35%	4.14%
Between 40 and 65 years old	14.06%	16.62%	16.66%	15.19%
Males	7.18%	7.64%	8.74%	8.84%
Females	6.88%	8.98%	7.92%	6.35%
More than 65 years old	0.94%	1.70%	4.08%	3.92%
Males	0.63%	0.64%	2.27%	3.09%
Females	0.31%	1.06%	1.81%	0.83%
<hr/>				
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Males	50.62%	49.93%	47.74%	61.38%
Females	49.38%	50.07%	52.26%	38.62%
Mean Age				
Males	19.91	21.50	25.34	22.11
Females	21.99	23.95	24.37	20.71
<hr/>				
Chi Square Test ^a				
Males				
Chi Square	—	5.60	30.04	25.77
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.13	0.00	0.00
N	162	706	275	267
Females				
Chi Square	—	42.25	61.36	9.30
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00	0.00	0.03
N	158	708	301	168

^a Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of age groups by age and sex taking as a reference category the distribution of the non-migrant population.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Since families who were forced suddenly to abandon their usual place of residence were at risk of being separated, the household composition of the forced migrants was expected to be different to the other migrant groups. **Table 4.12** presents the percentage distribution of household members by their relationship to the household head, migrant group and sex as well as the mean number of household members by migrant group. The voluntary migrants reported the smaller households while the non-migrants reported the largest households. T-tests for the difference of means suggested that the only group different in household size compared to the forced migrants was the voluntary migrants.

These patterns suggested that voluntary migrants lived in households with a lower number of members because their fertility was lower (as suggested by the proportion of children in residence) and because they followed a strategy of maximising the expected gains from migration. Therefore they were more likely to live with other non-family members that contributed to the household expenditures and that promoted the migration of other family members from the areas of origin. The number of household members in all the other migration groups was similar. Non-migrants and forced migrants had 4.85 and 4.73 household members on average. The distribution by the relation to the household head was also similar, both reported high proportion of children in residence and low proportion of other non-family related household members.

Table 4.12: Relationship to Household Head Reported in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Age Groups and Migration Experiences of Household Head

Age group and Sex	Non-Migrant (Ref)	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Household Head	20.63%	21.85%	23.26%	21.15%
Males	12.50%	14.50%	15.97%	15.86%
Females	8.13%	7.35%	7.29%	5.29%
Spouse	16.56%	17.04%	16.32%	15.86%
Males	5.00%	3.04%	2.60%	2.07%
Females	11.56%	14.00%	13.72%	13.79%
Children in residence	54.69%	51.70%	48.09%	52.88%
All other members	8.12%	9.41%	12.33%	10.11%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Number of members in the household				
Mean	4.85	4.56	4.27	4.73 ^b
Standard Deviation	1.99	1.79	2.07	1.90
N	66	310	135	92
Chi Square Test ^a				
Chi Square	—	6.37	19.02	2.56
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.09	0.00	0.47
N	320	1,414	576	435

^a Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of migration groups by relationship to the household head taking as a reference category the distribution of the non-migrant population.

^b The t-test for the difference of means between the average number of household members for the voluntary migrants and the forced migrants was significant at 90% confidence level.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Gloria Amparo Camilo argued that displaced families were usually dispersed after departure.⁷² Family members moved into different situations according to their circumstances. Some hid in areas nearby, whereas others relied on the assistance of family or friends during the first stage of displacements; and in some cases all family members moved together. Probably there was a selection process as the stages of displacement progressed. Those families with relatively more economic and non-monetary resources would arrive at Bogotá while other less advantaged families remained in nearby villages, towns or middle size cities. The data collected for this study are consistent with this explanation. As one would expect, forced migrants, like non-migrants were not selected with respect to labour force status and were not disproportionately concentrated in the labour force age cohorts.

Another variable that was useful for looking at household composition was civil status. **Table 4.13** reveals the relative distribution of the population in the selected areas by civil status, migration group, and sex for the population aged 15 and over by 2002. The first difference was the gender composition of the population. There was a higher percentage of females in the non-migrant group, almost 1 extra female for every 10 males. For all the other groups the percentage of males and females was similar.

The relationship distributions for males differed by migration group. Male forced migrants and intra-urban migrants were more likely to be in consensual unions than voluntary migrants. In contrast, women were more likely to be widowed than men on all migration groups. The percentage of widowed females reported by the voluntary and forced migrants was higher than that reported by non-migrants and intra-urban migrants. The only group that differed from the non-migrant distribution for females was the intra-urban migrant group. Women in this group were less likely to marry and more likely to engage in consensual unions.

⁷² G.A. Camilo, '*Impacto psicológico del desplazamiento forzoso: estrategia de intervención*,' in M.N. Bello, E.M. Cardinal and F.J. Arias (eds.), *Efectos psicosociales y culturales del desplazamiento* (Bogotá, 2000): pp. 27-40.

Table 4.13: Civil Status of the Population 15 Years Old and Over in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head

Age group and Sex	Non-Migrant (Ref)	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Never married	28.73%	26.77%	29.62%	27.08%
Males	11.05%	14.91%	15.54%	15.29%
Females	17.68%	11.86%	14.08%	11.79%
Married	28.18%	21.76%	27.27%	23.14%
Males	13.81%	10.64%	13.78%	11.35%
Females	14.37%	11.12%	13.49%	11.79%
Consensual union	38.12%	43.16%	34.60%	42.79%
Males	19.89%	21.52%	17.01%	20.96%
Females	18.23%	21.64%	17.59%	21.83%
Widowed	1.66%	3.91%	2.35%	1.31%
Males	0.56%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Females	1.10%	3.91%	2.35%	1.31%
Divorced or Separated	3.31%	4.40%	6.16%	5.68%
Males	0.55%	0.98%	2.35%	2.62%
Females	2.76%	3.42%	3.81%	3.06%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Males	45.86%	48.05%	48.68%	50.22%
Females	54.14%	51.95%	51.32%	49.78%
Chi Square Test ^a				
Males				
Chi Square	—	16.57	11.19	7.94
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00	0.01	0.05
N	83	393	166	115
Females				
Chi Square	—	89.42	8.08	7.11
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00	0.09	0.13
N	98	425	174	114

^a Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of migration groups by civil status taking as the reference category the distribution of non-migrant population.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Education was a fundamental variable in understanding migrant selectivity and the assimilation of persons with different migration experiences in the labour market in the place of destination, in this case the labour market of Bogotá. The analysis of education is divided in two parts, first the population of school age (ages 5 to 19) and second the population 20 years old and over. **Table 4.14** shows the percentage distribution of the population aged 5-19 by level of education, migrant status group and sex. The data revealed no differences in the level of education for males among non-migrants, intra-urban migrants and the voluntary migrants. However, for females, those belonging to voluntary migrant households had less education than those in non-migrant households, and those residing in internally displaced household showed the lowest levels of education of all. Thus the young population did not show any difference by migrant category, but it did by gender. Given the exposure of young people to the education system in Bogotá, and policies promoting education coverage for the poor and particularly for IDPs, there were no evident differences in the distribution of education by migrant status among males. The fact that there were some differences for females might reveal cultural preference for males, particularly in the internal migrant groups.

I argue that the internally displaced population was less educated than the non-migrant population because they came from places where higher education had seldom been available and secondary education was rare and of poor quality. **Table 4.15** indicates the percentage distribution by level of education, migration group and sex for the population aged 20 and over by 2002. In general the level of education of the people living in poor peri-urban areas was below the average education for the city's population. Among the adult population in the sample the mean observation of education stood at 3.17 years, ranging from 2.51 for female forced migrants to 4.26 for female non-migrants. The level of education was different if I considered only the distribution by migrant groups. Forced internal migrants seemed to be the most disadvantaged. However, when gender was included the differences in the distributions were seen to arise from the relatively higher levels of education achieved by non-migrant females in comparison to the other migrant groups. According to the figures, forced internal female migrants were the least educated group.

Table 4.14: Level of Education of the Population between Ages 5 and 19 in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head

Age group and Sex	Non-Migrant (Ref)	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Less than completed primary	57.55%	56.41%	59.65%	69.68%
Males	27.33%	29.49%	30.26%	36.70%
Females	30.22%	26.92%	29.39%	32.98%
Less than completed high school	36.69%	38.46%	37.72%	28.19%
Males	17.99%	19.96%	18.42%	14.89%
Females	18.70%	18.50%	19.30%	13.30%
More than completed high school	5.76%	5.13%	2.63%	2.13%
Males	1.44%	2.20%	1.32%	1.07%
Females	4.32%	2.93%	1.31%	1.06%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Males	46.76%	51.65%	50.00%	52.66%
Females	53.24%	48.35%	50.00%	47.34%
Chi Square Test ^a				
Males				
Chi Square	—	1.36	0.24	5.17
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.51	0.89	0.08
N	65	282	114	99
Females				
Chi Square	—	2.15	4.69	7.64
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.34	0.10	0.02
N	74	264	114	89

^a Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of migration groups by education level taking as the reference category the distribution of non-migrant population.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 4.15: Level of Education of the Population 20 Years Old and Over in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head

Age group and Sex	Non-Migrant (Ref)	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Less than completed primary	63.64%	65.03%	66.33%	76.10%
Males	35.83%	35.10%	31.65%	40.24%
Females	27.81%	29.93%	34.68%	35.86%
Less than completed high school	29.94%	30.07%	31.31%	21.91%
Males	14.97%	15.50%	14.81%	11.55%
Females	14.97%	14.57%	16.50%	10.36%
More than completed high school	6.42%	4.90%	2.36%	1.99%
Males	1.61%	2.65%	1.01%	1.20%
Females	4.81%	2.25%	1.35%	0.79%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Males	52.41%	53.25%	47.47%	52.99%
Females	47.59%	46.75%	52.53%	47.01%
Chi Square Test ^a				
Males				
Chi Square	—	5.21	0.80	3.53
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.07	0.67	0.17
N	98	402	141	133
Females				
Chi Square	—	11.69	10.33	18.03
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00	0.01	0.00
N	89	353	156	118

^a Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of migration groups by education level taking as the reference category the distribution of non-migrant population.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

By comparing the distribution of voluntary migrants and forced migrants it was appreciated that forced migrants were less educated than voluntary migrants. A statistical test at 95 percent confidence level confirmed significant differences in the distribution of education level among both males and females between voluntary and forced migrant households, suggesting a positive selection among voluntary migrants but not among the internally displaced population.

Apart from education, one further relevant variable for evaluate the characteristics of different migration groups and their relative success in the urban labour market was their employment status and occupation. **Table 4.16** reports the occupation of household members of 15 years and over by 2002 by migration group and sex. The percentages of homemaker and personal services employees were the highest for the forced migrants and the percentage of professional was the lowest for this group. The percentage of unemployed for forced migrants was the highest compared to other groups. Non-migrants reported the highest employment in occupations that were likely to be in the formal labour market.

Voluntary migrants were less likely to be unemployed, with only 3 percent reported being in this status. The percentage distribution of male internal voluntary migrants was more similar to the non-migrants and to the intra-urban migrants than the distribution by occupation of the forced internal migrants. The largest difference for the internal voluntary migrants in relation to the other non-migrant group was that there were more likely to be employed in the informal sector, e.g., personal services, and less in occupations linked to the formal market, e.g., professionals or workers other than construction workers.

If we compared the occupation distribution of the internal voluntary and forced migrants, we noticed that forced migrants were more likely to be unemployed and more likely to be employed in the informal sector. Although I did not have any specific indicator on informality in the labour market, the occupations reported and the classification I used provided some information about the formality or informality in the employments of the population living in poor areas by migration experience.

Table 4.16: Occupation of the Population 15 Years Old and Over in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head

Age group and Sex	Non-Migrant (Ref)	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Homemaker	18.18%	20.02%	22.39%	30.40%
Males	0.57%	0.74%	0.60%	4.41%
Females	17.61%	19.28%	21.79%	25.99%
Out of Labour Force	13.63%	11.74%	13.43%	9.69%
Males	5.68%	6.55%	6.56%	4.84%
Females	7.95%	5.19%	6.87%	4.85%
Professional	3.41%	1.85%	1.49%	1.32%
Males	0.57%	0.74%	0.90%	0.44%
Females	2.84%	1.11%	0.59%	0.88%
Worker	17.05%	17.80%	15.23%	11.45%
Males	13.64%	13.23%	10.75%	10.57%
Females	3.41%	4.57%	4.48%	0.88%
Construction Worker	10.80%	8.90%	11.04%	5.29%
Males	10.80%	8.90%	11.04%	5.29%
Administrative and Commercial Employee	9.66%	5.70%	7.46%	3.96%
Males	5.11%	2.48%	4.18%	2.20%
Females	4.55%	3.22%	3.28%	1.76%
Personal Services Employee	13.07%	22.25%	19.41%	17.62%
Males	5.11%	12.48%	12.84%	13.22%
Females	7.96%	9.77%	6.57%	4.40%
Domestic Servants	8.52%	6.80%	6.57%	6.17%
Females	8.52%	6.80%	6.57%	6.17%
Unemployed	5.68%	4.94%	2.98%	14.10%
Males	5.11%	3.21%	1.79%	8.81%
Females	0.57%	1.73%	1.19%	5.29%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Males	46.59%	48.33%	48.66%	49.78%
Females	53.41%	51.67%	51.34%	50.22%
Chi Square Test ^a				
Males				
Chi Square	—	102.99	47.60	98.79
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	82	391	163	113
Females				
Chi Square	—	50.66	17.09	124.39
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00	0.02	0.00
N	94	418	172	114

^a Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of migration groups by occupation taking as the reference category the distribution of non-migrant population.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Another indicator related to the level of well-being of the household was the number of people contributing to the household expenditures by migration type. **Table 4.17** presents the percentage of household members 15 years old and older by 2002 that contributed to household expenditures. The forced migrants were the group with the lowest number of contributors to household expenditures. As in all the other groups, males were the ones that contribute the most.

Colombia is a nation of regions and given its topography, the regions are not only different culturally but there are large differences in their levels of development and presence of the state. Although the guerrillas and paramilitaries are dispersed all over the territory, confrontations are more frequently reported in areas where the presence of the state is weak. **Table 4.18** shows the department of birth of the population residing in voluntary and forced migrant households. The majority of the internal migrants arrived at Bogotá from Cundinamarca, Boyacá and Tolima. The departments of Cundinamarca and Boyacá are located in the Andean highlands or what is called *Altiplano Cundiboyacense*. A high proportion of the voluntary or economic migrants to Bogotá came from this area.⁷³ The majority of the internally displaced population also came from the departments of Cundinamarca and Tolima, followed by the departments of the coffee-growing region.

⁷³ C.E. Flórez and E. Bonilla, 'The demographic transition in Colombia,' in E. Masini and S. Stratigos (eds.), *Women, households and change* (Tokyo, 1991): p. 60.

Table 4.17: Contribution to Household Expenditures of the Population 15 Years Old and Over in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head

Age group and Sex	Non-Migrant (Ref)	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Persons contributing to household expenditures	59.67%	62.35%	61.88%	50.22%
Males	33.70%	36.31%	39.00%	32.32%
Females	25.97%	26.04%	22.88%	17.90%
Persons not contributing to household expenditures	40.33%	37.65%	38.12%	49.78%
Males	12.15%	11.73%	9.68%	17.90%
Females	28.18%	25.92%	28.44%	31.88%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Males	45.85%	48.04%	48.68%	50.22%
Females	54.15%	51.96%	51.32%	49.78%
Chi Square Test ^a				
Males				
Chi Square	—	485.57	244.89	84.51
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	83	393	166	115
Females				
Chi Square	—	0.63	3.91	11.80
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.43	0.05	0.00
N	98	425	175	114

^a Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of migration groups by contribution to household expenditures taking as the reference category the distribution of non-migrant population.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 4.18: Department of Birth of Population Residing in Voluntary and Forced Migrant Households in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá

Department of Birth	Voluntary Migrant (Ref)	Forced Migrant
Boyacá	16.10%	4.98%
Chocó	0.28%	10.63%
Cundinamarca	28.43%	22.26%
Meta	1.41%	2.99%
Nariño	3.11%	1.00%
Santander	6.78%	11.96%
Tolima	20.16%	14.62%
Eje Cafetero ^a	13.28%	14.95%
All others	10.45%	16.61%
Total	100.00%	100.00%
Chi Square Test ^b		
Chi Square	—	316.28
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00
N	354	301

^a Includes the departments of Valle del Cauca, Risaralda, Caldas, Quindío and Antioquia

^b Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of migration groups by department of birth. The distribution of reference is for voluntary migrants.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Gender, Conflict and Development

One of the main characteristics of contemporary conflicts is that they are no longer held on battlefields separated from people's homes. As a consequence, the main casualties are civilians.⁷⁴ Previously during wars and armed confrontations men were active in the armed forces and at the battlefields while women were in charge of safeguarding the home and the children. However, the participation of women in the armed forces has increased recently.⁷⁵ In Colombia, women were also increasingly recruited into the guerrilla groups and their participation in delinquency increased by 10.3 percent in 2002.⁷⁶ Given the ways in which war and civil conflict have evolved over time, gender relations during and after conflict have also been modified. The ways in which these changes have affected gender roles vary considerably according to ethnic, cultural, political and economic circumstances.

Although the roles played by women in conflict situations and in the military have been increasing, male participation is still predominant. In Colombia, age-specific mortality patterns illustrate the effects of a long-term armed conflict on population composition. Between 1990 and 1995 deaths caused by intentional injuries caused an estimated loss of 950,000 person-years of healthy life, and 90 percent of these years corresponded to males. As a result, the ratio of male to female age-specific mortality rates during the period 1990-1995 was the highest since 1900. The decline in the growth of life expectancy for males was attributed to violent deaths, principally homicides, which were linked to violence, drug trafficking and insecurity.⁷⁷

In any country that has suffered a period of military intervention or civil unrest certain images are increasingly common: women refugees gazing out hopelessly after witnessing the death of a child, women with a rifle over the shoulder and a baby on her back, mothers and daughters protesting to prevent relief trucks from reaching zones belonging to the enemy, and women surrounded by a children in refugee or IDP camps.

⁷⁴ W. Giles and J. Hyndman, 'Introduction: gender and conflict in a global context,' in W. Giles and J. Hyndman (eds.), *Sites of violence: gender and conflict zones* (Berkeley, CA, 2004): p. 3.

⁷⁵ C.H. Enloe, *Manoeuvres: the international politics of militarising women's lives* (Berkeley, CA, 2000): p. 23.

⁷⁶ C. Moser and C. Fiona, 'Gender, conflict and building sustainable peace: recent lessons from Latin America,' *Gender and Development*, vol. 9, no. 3 (2001): pp. 29-39 and C.E. Flórez, 'Migration and the urban informal sector in Colombia,' Paper presented at the Conference on 'African Migration in Comparative Perspective' on 4-7 June (Johannesburg, 2003): p. 16.

⁷⁷ C.E. Flórez, with the collaboration of R. Echeverri, and E. Bonilla, *La transición demográfica en Colombia: efectos en la formación de la familia* (Tokyo, 1990): pp. 46-47.

Recent writing on refugees and internally displaced persons outlined that civil wars displaced substantial numbers of people and that, women and children generally constituted a majority of refugee and internally displaced populations.⁷⁸ In Africa, Asia and Europe, collective centres for displaced were overwhelmingly populated by women, children, the infirm and the elderly, since men were fighting, had chosen to stay behind to protect their land, were hiding to avoid recruitment and personal threats, or had been killed.⁷⁹

According to Cynthia Cockburn, there were three manifestly gendered elements of war: mobilisation into the armed forces, the catastrophic disruption of everyday life and brutalisation of the body.⁸⁰ Colombian women in conflict zones faced rape, sexual abuse, prostitution, early pregnancies and lack of access to maternal care. These gender-specific types of violence and consequences of conflict demanded special attention.

To understand the role of internally displaced women and men as agents in the process of resettlement and reintegration, and therefore in the development of new communities, it is necessary to look at the contrasting roles that men and women play in development. Ester Boserup demonstrated the extent of women's participation in agriculture and the need to include them as agents in national development in agriculture and the need to include them as agents in national development plans.⁸¹ Later Amartya Sen argued that instead of looking at families as units of analysis for research on poverty and given the inferior position of women, researchers should consider a gendered perspective.⁸² As in studies of poverty, research on development in post-conflict situations or resettlement during conflict must also be gendered. This analysis aims to achieve that goal.

⁷⁸ K. Kumar, 'The nature and focus of international assistance for rebuilding war-torn societies,' in K. Kumar (ed.), *Rebuilding societies after civil war: critical roles for international assistance* (Boulder, CO, 1996): pp.16-19 and pp. 22-24.

⁷⁹ R. Cohen and F.M. Deng, *Masses in flight: the global crisis of internal displacement* (Washington, DC, 1998): p. 71.

⁸⁰ C. Cockburn, 'The continuum of violence: a gender perspective on war and peace,' in W. Giles and J. Hyndman (eds.), *Sites of violence: gender and conflict zones* (Berkeley, CA, 2004): pp. 34-36.

⁸¹ E. Boserup, *Woman's role in economic development*, reprinted with new introduction by Nazneen Kanji, Su Fei Tan and Camilla Toulmin (London, 2007): p. 36.

⁸² A. Sen, 'Gender and cooperative conflicts,' in I. Tinker (ed.), *Persistent inequalities: women and world development* (Oxford, 1990): pp. 123-149.

Forced displacement represents a traumatic rupture in the time and space of domestic and social reproduction across all dimensions.⁸³ Displacement disrupts social and community relations, alters the structure and size of households and changes family patterns and gender roles. During displacement families and households are often torn apart or fragmented. Although for women the process of displacement is more traumatic, they also seem to display greater flexibility in their adaptation to new environments and conditions as a survival strategy.⁸⁴ In some cases, displacement offers an opportunity for renegotiation of gender relations. Women tend to take on more and different roles as providers and protectors of families when productive older males become separated from households when they leave for work, security or recruitment into the military. Displacement and resettlement generally yield a higher proportion of single female-headed households, and often these women develop a new sense of political consciousness and agency. In sum, women in displacement are forced to fulfil new roles that change gender power relations, whereas men find themselves cut loose and unable to re-establish their position as bread winners and decision makers.⁸⁵

Tsjeard Bouta and Georg Frerks suggested seven roles in which women were found during time of conflict: as victims of sexual violence, combatants, peace workers in NGOs, workers in formal peace politics, coping and surviving actors, household heads, and occupying informal and formal employment opportunities.⁸⁶ In the literature, I found a vast number of frameworks and case studies focusing on the effects of war on women and girls, but unfortunately I only found few references about the effects of war on men and boys.⁸⁷ The literature on gender and development saw the behaviour of men and women as conditioned by social and cultural explanations, rather than by innate or natural differences

⁸³ K. Kumar, 'The nature and focus of international assistance for rebuilding war-torn societies,' in K. Kumar (ed.) *Rebuilding societies after civil war: critical roles for international assistance* (Boulder, CO, 1996): p. 2 and D. Meertens and N. Segura-Escobar, 'Uprooted lives: gender, violence and displacement in Colombia,' *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, vol. 17, no. 2 (1996): pp. 165-178.

⁸⁴ C. Moser and F. Clark, 'Gender, conflict and building sustainable peace: recent lessons from Latin America,' *Gender and Development*, vol. 9, no. 3 (2001): pp. 29-39.

⁸⁵ R. Cohen and F.M. Deng, *Masses in flight: the global crisis of internal displacement*, p. 26; T. Bouta, G. Frerks, and I. Bannon, *Gender, conflict, and development* (Washington, DC, 2005): pp. 89-109; and S. Gururaja, 'Gender dimensions of displacement,' *Forced Migration Review*, issue 9 (2000): pp. 13-16.

⁸⁶ T. Bouta and G. Frerks, 'Women's roles in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction: literature review and institutional analysis,' Working Paper (The Hague, 2002): p. 29.

⁸⁷ S. Gururaja, 'Gender dimensions of displacement,' *Forced Migration Review*, issue 9 (2000): pp. 13-16 and C. Moser and F. Clark, 'Gender, conflict and building sustainable peace: recent lessons from Latin America,' *Gender and Development*, vol. 9, no. 3 (2001): pp. 29-39.

between the sexes.⁸⁸ Assuming the underlying equality of men and women in this section, I will analyse not only the characteristics of internally displaced women, but also those of internally displaced men.

Gender and Conflict in Colombia

Donny Meertens has documented changes in the roles played by internally displaced women in Colombia.⁸⁹ She argued that women were victims and survivors of displacement as widows, spouses and leaders. The majority of displaced peasant women were raised in a patriarchal tradition of subjection to male authority characterised by a rigid feminine role centred on domesticity and agricultural activities that occurred close to the home. In a case study on displaced women from the department of Córdoba, Meertens observed that displaced women went to Montería (the capital city of the department) for three main reasons: because they had family there, because they could achieve anonymity, and because they expected to find jobs more easily than in a small town. She identified three key factors in successfully becoming established in the city and in the labour market: specific conditions before displacement; duration since displacement, which was conceptualised as a traumatic psychological event; and stage in family life cycle. She also found that the increase in unemployment for males was more than fivefold the increase for women, a differential partially explained by the agricultural background of males and the difficulties they faced in adapting skills to urban labour markets.

The fact that women were more likely to be employed after displacement than men did not mean that their jobs were stable and well remunerated. Internally displaced women were more likely to be employed as domestic servants or in the informal labour market, usually in personal services.⁹⁰ In Bogotá, the increases in labour force attachment of mothers of young children raised the demand for child care and domestic servants, which were offered more in the informal than in the formal sector. Among women, research

⁸⁸ D. Indra, 'Not a "room of one's own": engendering forced migration knowledge and practice,' in D. Indra (ed.), *Engendering forced migration: theory and practice* (New York, 1999): pp. 9-16.

⁸⁹ D. Meertens and N. Segura-Escobar, 'Uprooted lives: gender, violence and displacement in Colombia,' *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, vol. 17, no. 2 (1996): pp. 165-178 and D. Meertens, 'Facing destruction, rebuilding life: gender and the internally displaced in Colombia,' translated by Richard Stoller, *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 28, no. 1 (2001): pp. 132-148.

⁹⁰ T. Bouta, G. Frerks and I. Bannon, *Gender, conflict, and development* (Washington, DC, 2005): pp. 94-95.

suggested that the presence of children increased the probability of being employed in the informal sector, thus allowing more flexibility for family care.⁹¹

The possibilities of return for males and females were distinct. In general, most people reaching regional urban centres were less willing to return to their rural areas of origin.⁹² According to a survey implemented by the *Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento* (the Centre for Human Rights and the Displaced, CODHES), only 12 percent of female heads of household wanted to return.⁹³ Displaced women in urban areas were more likely to be employed than men after displacement generally experienced greater power and autonomy. The incentives to return were less attractive than the incentives to integrate themselves in the cities. Since they were more likely to stay, their motivation to integrate themselves in the urban space and achieve an improved standard of living was likely higher than for males.

Flor Edilma Osorio Pérez using data from the *Sistema de Información sobre Desplazamiento Forzado y Derechos Humanos en Colombia* (SISDES) that was collected by CODHES from 1993 to 1995, found that the number of members per household was larger in displaced female-headed households than in male-headed households.⁹⁴ Regarding education she found that internally displaced women were generally less educated than males because of their restricted access to technical and higher education.

She also found important gender differences regarding the source of aid or help. Women tended to find more support through in their family networks, NGOs, community organisations and the Catholic Church. Males were more likely to contact unions, political parties and cooperatives. These differences in the source of social capital might be explained by two factors: traditional male and female roles in the Colombian society, and the need to implement a strategy with as many sources of aid as possible in order to insure survival.

⁹¹ A.M. Ibáñez and P. Querubín, 'Acceso a tierras y desplazamiento forzado en Colombia,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2004-23 (Bogotá, 2004): pp. 46-48 and R. Ribero, 'Gender dimensions of non-formal employment in Colombia,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2003-04 (Bogotá, 2003): pp. 34-35.

⁹² Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana, *Derechos humanos: desplazados por violencia en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1995): pp. 56-58 and M. Ibáñez and P. Querubín, 'Acceso a tierras y desplazamiento forzado en Colombia,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2004-23 (Bogotá, 2004): pp. 73-92.

⁹³ CODHES, *Sistema de información de hogares desplazados por la violencia* (Bogotá, 1995): p. 26.

⁹⁴ F.L. Osorio Pérez, 'Mujer desplazada: violencia y discriminación,' in J.E. Rojas Rodríguez (ed.), *Un país que huye: desplazamiento y violencia en una nación fragmentada* (Bogotá, 1999): pp. 129-157.

Regarding to the intention of return, Osorio Pérez noted that access to land for women was more restricted than for men. Sixty nine percent of female-headed households abandoned their land in rural areas and those arriving from the Departments of Córdoba, Antioquia and Cundinamarca recorded the highest levels. This pattern implied that families expelled from other departments found strategies to keep their land, such as renting it or asking family or friends to look temporarily after it.

Comparing the occupation profiles of internally displaced women before and after displacement, Osorio Pérez observed an increase of employment in domestic servants, a decrease in the frequency of homemakers, an increase in petty cash and vendor activities (for both men and women but at lower levels for women), and a decreasing role of women as teachers or educators. For men the most salient trend was increasing unemployment linked to the lower demand for agricultural workers in urban areas and the difficulty of transferring their skills to urban labour markets.

The *Red de Solidaridad Social* (RSS), which collected official information on the characteristics of the internally displaced persons, provided data of female-headed households with or without partners at the place of reception. **Table 4.19** shows figures at the department level, revealing that in about half of all departments (53 percent) the size of female-headed households was larger than those headed by males. The numbers of members per household among female-headed households were between 3.24 and 5.63 members, whereas in males-headed households they were between 3.83 and 5.18 members.

On average, 38.75 percent of internally displaced households were headed by women. The department in which this figure was the highest was Atlántico with 50.78 percent. According to data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) collected in 2000 in Colombia, 28 percent of households were headed by females and the percentage of female-headed households with or without a partner has been growing over time. In 1995 the percentage of female-headed households was only 24 percent. There were considerable rural-urban differences. However, the percentage of male-headed households in rural areas was 19 percent and in urban areas was 31.3 percent.⁹⁵ Comparing DHS data with those

⁹⁵ PROFAMILIA, *Salud sexual y reproductiva: resultados de la encuesta nacional de demografía y salud 2000* (Bogotá, 2000): pp. 16-17.

reported by the *Red de Solidaridad Social*, it was apparent that the prevalence of female-headed households among the internally displaced was higher than in the total population.

To analyse regional patterns and correlations between the patterns of forced migration and the prevalence of female-headed households, I used two measures. Intensity of reception was measured by taking the ratio of the accumulated number of internally displaced arrived by department from 1995 to 2002 over the department population in 2002.⁹⁶ A department's ranking as a place of reception was measured as the percentile in the distribution of internally displaced persons received by department. The correlation, however, did not reveal any regional patterns or relationships between the prevalence or size of female-headed households and either the intensity of reception or the department's ranking as a place of reception. The Pearson correlation coefficients, although positive, were weak and non-significant.

⁹⁶ DANE, 'Colombia: estimaciones 1985-2005 y proyecciones 2006-2020 anualizadas por sexo y edad,' Online. Available HTTP:<http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/poblacion/seriesp85_20/EstimacionesProyecciones1985__020.xls>, accessed 25 July 2008.

Table 4.19: Characteristics of Internally Displaced Households by Gender of Household Head (2002)

Region and Department	Number of members per female-headed household	Number of members per male-headed household	Percentage of female-headed households of total households	Intensity of reception (received IDPs/Tot Pop)	Distribution of IDPs
Capital					
Bogotá	4.07	3.88	43.16	1.31%	5.86%
Atlantic					
Atlántico	4.58	4.21	50.78	2.56%	3.97%
Bolívar	4.50	4.36	35.68	5.29%	7.54%
César	5.36	5.02	41.26	7.76%	5.28%
Córdoba	4.76	4.59	43.45	4.87%	4.43%
La Guajira	4.44	4.81	37.31	5.97%	1.95%
Magdalena	4.66	4.68	35.21	7.02%	6.33%
Sucre	5.02	4.83	50.64	12.23%	6.82%
Central					
Antioquia	4.41	4.52	32.24	4.34%	15.79%
Caldas	3.99	4.39	17.04	2.15%	1.56%
Caquetá	4.87	4.62	45.92	8.67%	2.71%
Huila	4.57	4.33	45.40	2.92%	1.81%
Quindío	3.78	3.90	46.75	1.66%	0.63%
Risaralda	4.37	4.50	37.82	2.42%	1.54%
Tolima	4.23	4.31	57.35	2.78%	2.28%
Pacific					
Cauca	4.49	4.76	36.73	2.58%	2.39%
Chocó	4.67	4.39	18.08	12.68%	3.48%
Nariño	4.13	3.83	46.31	2.59%	3.06%
Valle del Cauca	4.52	4.64	14.92	2.19%	3.97%
North Eastern					
Boyacá	4.01	3.87	37.88	0.52%	0.45%
Cundinamarca	4.47	3.84	37.79	1.59%	2.51%
Meta	4.28	3.94	42.61	5.73%	2.95%
Norte de Santander	5.17	4.94	36.54	3.32%	3.28%
Santander	4.78	4.27	41.73	3.25%	4.41%
Eastern					
Amazonas	5.63	3.96	18.39	0.46%	0.02%
Arauca	3.90	4.30	35.37	3.41%	0.60%
Casanare	4.25	4.31	33.60	3.82%	0.77%
Guainía	4.22	5.18	26.32	2.17%	0.06%
Guaviare	3.65	4.18	32.10	10.07%	0.84%
Putumayo	4.74	4.53	46.99	10.10%	2.58%
Vaupés	3.24	4.72	31.76	2.18%	0.04%
Vichada	3.89	4.33	35.14	1.45%	0.09%
Total	4.56	4.44	38.75	3.49%	100.00%

Source: *Red de Solidaridad Social* - DANE (own calculations)

As discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, much of the literature on gender and conflict centred on the position of women as household heads and the burden it implied for them. However, defining who the household head was in the presence of two adult authority figures (usually a husband and a wife) depended on traditional gender roles and power relations within the couple. In Colombia, as in many countries in Latin America, males were normally the household heads. This role was changing due to the increasing female education, and labour force participation, which has empowered women. Particularly for internally displaced women it was relevant to explore their role as household heads after displacement, when they were more active in the labour market and more familiar with activities outside the home, such as political and community organisations.

Osorio Pérez argued that the definition of women as household heads, even when they were breadwinners, was diminished by a lack of recognition by the family and society, which only made quantification more difficult.⁹⁷ She distinguished a non-evident female household headship. Examples of this type of household were those in which the female was working and the male was not and not looking for a job, when the husband was not permanently present but still recognised as the household head, and when female widows lived with their sons. Although women could have responsibility for mobilising resources and the care of household members, males were still recognised as household heads. In this sense Debbie Budlender argued that the classification of the household head should be based on observed characteristics and not on perceptions of household members.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ F.L. Osorio Pérez, 'Mujer desplazada: violencia y discriminación,'.

⁹⁸ D. Budlender, 'The debate about household headship,' *Social Dynamics*, vol. 29, no. 2 (2003): pp. 48-72.

Household Composition Differentials and Labour Market

The literature on forced migration illustrates that violent events such as internal armed conflict or civil wars affect the gender and household composition of populations exposed to armed conflict. Households that are forced to leave their usual place of residence face the prospect of family disintegration. Such a phenomenon is expected when members must take refuge for survival strategy or when young and adult males are killed or recruited, either by the military or insurgent groups. In this section I describe differences in household composition, household headship, occupation profiles and employment among different migration groups living in Soacha, Cundinamarca. Soacha is a municipality with a high concentration of internally displaced persons in the metropolitan area of Bogotá. I divided respondents into three groups: non-migrants, voluntary migrants and forced migrants. From the literature I expect to find noticeable differences in gender, household composition, and employment patterns between the groups. Forced migrants are anticipated to show a larger degree of family disintegration, a higher frequency of female household headship, and lower employment rates. In addition, given the changing roles of forced migrant women in urban areas, I expect to find gender differences in the labour patterns of this population.

The literature just reviewed emphasised the burden of armed conflict on women and their relative advantage in the urban labour markets. In the next paragraphs I focus on the labour market experiences of internally displaced men and women, using micro-data from the Experimental Census of Soacha, Cundinamarca. I classify the population of Soacha in three groups according to their migration experience: forced migrants, voluntary migrants and non-migrants. Forced migrants include all those who have been forced to leave their usual place of residence as a consequence of armed conflict, e.g., confrontations, personal attacks, family threats and general insecurity. Voluntary migrants are those who were not living in the municipality in 1998 (5 years before the census was collected) but were never forced to leave their usual place of residence. Non-migrants are those who were living in Soacha before 1998 and had never been forced to leave their usual place of residence.

To describe gender and household composition differentials among groups I undertake the analysis in three steps. First, I describe the age and sex composition of the population according to their individual migration experience. Second, I analyse differences between the three migration groups with respect to education, civil status, employment

status and occupation, standardising for the population structure of the non-migrant group and restricting attention to household heads. Household heads are normally those who care and provide for other members, and therefore their characteristics and behaviour are thus critical to understand the conditions of other household members. I classify the households into four groups: those with head and spouse headed by males, those with head and spouse headed by females, single male-headed households, and single female-headed households. I use this classification to compare the experiences of the persons in the three migration groups.

Finally, I estimate the probability of being employed for household heads. The relevant independent variables in this models are whether the household is mono-parental or bi-parental, and in the case of bi-parental if the spouse is employed, duration since arrive in the municipality, type of migration experience, and gender of the household head.

Demographic Structure and Socioeconomic Composition


Figures 4.18, 4.19 and 4.20 present population pyramids for the three migration groups: non-migrants, voluntary migrants and forced migrants to reveal two salient differences: the voluntary migrant population was concentrated in the working ages and the forced migrant population had more people at older ages and fewer at younger ages than the non-migrant population.⁹⁹ The mean age for the voluntary migrant population was 25.51 years, compared with 29.45 years for the forced migrant population and 27.16 for the non-migrant population.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ **Figure 4.11** contains a graph of the forced migrant population by year of arrival. Seventy three percent of the migrant population arrived at Soacha after 1998. Given the time of arrival at Soacha it is possible to compare them with the voluntary migrant population that is defined for this section of the analysis as the population that arrived at Soacha since 1998 (5 years before the data were collected) and who were not forced to leave their usual place of residence because of the armed conflict.

¹⁰⁰ The dependency ration by migration group and sex was estimated. Non-migrants (males=0.67, females=0.42), voluntary migrants (males=0.52, females=0.61) and forced migrants (males=0.39, females=0.50). I found problems with these estimates. First by definition there was no population in the age group 0 to 4 for voluntary migrants; second, although the proportion of population over 65 was larger for forced migration population than for other groups, the dependency ratio was affected by the low proportion of population in the first age group. In this analysis I referred to individual migration experiences. In migrant households (according to the migration experience of the household head) there were young children who were born in Soacha and therefore they were, for the purpose of this analysis, non-migrants although they were living in forced migrants or voluntary migrant households.

To address this caveat I constructed the population pyramids for all groups classifying the migration experience for all the members of the household as the migration experience of the household head. The population pyramids were similar. The dependency ratios using this classification were 0.71 for male non-


Figure 4.18: Population Pyramid of the Non-Migrant Population Residing in Soacha



Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)


migrants, 0.71 for female non-migrants, 0.71 for male voluntary migrants, 0.65 for female voluntary migrants, 0.64 for male forced migrants and 0.62 for female forced migrants. The dependency ratio for the forced migrant population was the lowest, meaning that there were more working age people in this group per children under age 14 or people over age 65.

Figure 4.19: Population Pyramid of the Voluntary Migrant Population Residing in Soacha



Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

Figure 4.20: Population Pyramid of the Forced Migrant Population Residing in Soacha



Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

To better describe the sex composition of the three populations by migrant group, **Figure 4.21** shows sex ratios by age cohort. The graph suggests three age ranges where differences in sex ratios among the groups are relevant. Between ages 10 and 25 the sex ratio among voluntary migrants was lower than among non-migrants and forced migrants. Between ages 25 and 55 the sex ratio was high for both the voluntary and forced migrants. Finally, for the population 55 years and older, there were fewer males per 100 females in the voluntary migrant group than in the non-migrant group, but more males per 100 females in the forced migrant group. This age and sex pattern suggests that the forced migrant population was not positively selected by age, since was not concentrated in the working age groups, or by sex, since for the age group 80-84 the sex ratio was close to one.


Civil status, education, labour force status and occupation are variables that allow us to detect differences in household stability and socioeconomic status. It is well known in the literature that any rupture in a conjugal relationship due to separation, divorce or widowhood has negative consequences for well-being.¹⁰¹ **Table 4.20** presents the distribution of the population by civil status, education level, labour force status and occupation in six groups defined by migration experience and sex.¹⁰² The distribution of the population by civil status indicated that female forced migrants were more exposed to widowhood than women in non-migrant or voluntary migrant populations. The forced migrant population was more likely to be in a consensual union than married and less likely to be single than other groups. The proportion separated or divorced was higher for voluntary migrants than for non-migrant population.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ D.G. Blanchflower and A.J. Oswald, 'Well-being over time in Britain and the USA,' *Journal of Public Economics*, vol. 88, issues 7-8 (2004): pp. 1359-1386; K. Bradbury and J. Katz, 'Women's labour market involvement and family income mobility when marriages end,' *New England Economic Review*, issue 2002, fourth quarter (2002): pp. 41-74 and D.T. Lichter, D.R. Graefe and J.B. Brown, 'Is marriage a panacea? Union formation among economically disadvantaged unwed mothers,' *Social Problems*, vol. 50, no. 1 (2003): pp. 60-86.

¹⁰² Due to the observed differences in the age distribution of the population, the distributions presented in **Table 4.20** are standardised by the age pattern of the non-migrant population. Each group by sex and migrant experience totals 1.

¹⁰³ In 1991 the Colombian constitution allowed divorce. The proportion of persons divorced was very low. For this reason I reported a combined category with persons separated or divorced.

Figure 4.21: Sex Ratio of Population Residing in Soacha by Age Cohort



Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

Table 4.20: Age-Standardised Distribution of the Population Residing in Soacha by Migration Experiences and Socio-Demographic Characteristics^d

Socio-demographic Characteristic	Non-Migrant		Voluntary Migrant		Forced Migrant	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
N	139,033	147,960	28,038	30,237	8,753	8,998
Civil Status ^a						
Consensual union	0.27	0.25	0.32	0.30	0.36	0.32
Separated or divorced	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.10
Widowed	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.07
Married	0.25	0.23	0.21	0.19	0.17	0.17
Single	0.44	0.39	0.41	0.36	0.41	0.34
Education Level ^b						
None	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.12	0.12
Some primary	0.26	0.24	0.26	0.25	0.36	0.35
Completed primary	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.19
Some middle school	0.19	0.18	0.20	0.20	0.16	0.17
Completed middle school	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.04
Some or completed high school or other technical	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.11	0.12
Some or completed professional	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.01
Labour Force Status ^a						
Employed - active	0.53	0.34	0.56	0.35	0.47	0.28
Employed - inactive	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.03
Unemployed	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.17	0.11
Students	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.14
Homemakers	0.03	0.29	0.04	0.30	0.05	0.33
Retired	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Other	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.10
Occupation Level ^{a,c}						
Employee in private sector	0.68	0.66	0.68	0.69	0.66	0.61
Employee in public sector	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.05
<i>Jornalero o peón</i> (blue collar worker)	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.01
Worker in domestic services	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.09
Self-employed	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.15	0.21	0.17
Employer	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02
Unpaid family worker	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.05

^a For the population 10 years old and older.

^b For the population 3 years old and older.

^c For the population in the labour force.

^d Non-migrant population used as standard.

Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

The distribution by education level demonstrated that voluntary migrants were on average more educated, followed by non-migrants.¹⁰⁴ Forced migrants were the least educated group. The lower level of education among forced migrants might reflect their rural background and restricted access to education in areas of origin.¹⁰⁵ For all groups, women generally reported slightly higher education than men; but men reported more frequently labour force participation than women. Forced migrants were less likely to be employed and more likely to be looking for a job (unemployed) or in some 'other situation'. The pattern was similar for forced migrant men and women.

Among those who were employed, the distribution by level of occupation was similar for non-migrants and voluntary migrants. Voluntary migrants reported more employment in the private than in the public sector. Although occupational distributions were similar for all groups, at the margin forced migrants were more likely to be employed as blue collar workers, in domestic services or self-employed. These occupations were usually linked to activities in the informal labour market. Among blue collar workers, males were predominant and females were about 10 times more likely to be employed in domestic workers than males.

In conclusion, forced migrants were not completely different from non-migrants and voluntary migrants in their marriage, education and labour patterns. However, I identified three different contrasting characteristics between the groups: forced migrants were more likely to be in consensual unions or widows; they were more frequently unemployed or not participating in the labour force; and among those who were in the labour force, they were more likely to be employed as blue collar workers in the informal sector or in domestic services.

¹⁰⁴ Level of education was available. Years of education were not reported.

¹⁰⁵ Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana, *Derechos humanos: desplazados por violencia en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1995): p. 85.

Household Heads, Types of Households and Migration Experiences

The second step of the analysis examined the characteristics of household heads (sex, civil status, education level, status in the labour force and occupation level) by type of household and migration group. I classified households into two types: those with a single head and those households with spouse present. The second row in **Table 4.21** presents proportions of male and female household heads by type of household and migration group standardised using the age distribution of non-migrant household heads.

The prevalence of single female-headed household was not the highest for the forced migrant group (20.53 percent), although it was higher than for the voluntary migrant population (18.53 percent), it was lower than for non-migrants (22.51 percent). As the literature suggested, the prevalence of single female-headed households was larger among forced migrants than for migrants in general; however, it was not higher than the prevalence of the non-migrants.

Although single female-headed households were not more frequent among forced migrants than among non-migrants, the percentage of households with spouses headed by females was larger for forced migrants than for other migrant groups. According to the literature, this higher prevalence was explained by the relatively easy engagement of women in urban labour market activities, especially in the informal sector, and the consequential shift in the power relations among couples. These patterns suggested that the forced migrant families arriving at Soacha, or the metropolitan area of Bogotá generally, were a selected group in which the spouse was present. Forced migrant households that arrived at other smaller cities or towns might be less selective, yielding a higher prevalence of single-headed.

A point of contention, as mentioned before, is the recognition and definition of who is the household head. A household head is defined as ‘resident household member who is recognised as the head by other members of the household, usually is the father, the mother or the principal provider’.¹⁰⁶ There are no clear and objective criteria to define who is the head, The definition of household head used by the *Red de Solidaridad Social* and the Department of Statistics in Colombia is subjective and depends on where, when, and who is answering the declaration of displacement or the census questionnaire. This lack of

¹⁰⁶ DANE, ‘Manual de recolección: Censo Experimental de Soacha,’ (Bogotá, 2003): p. 23.

objective definition might be responsible for the observed differences between the data reported in **Tables 4.19** and **4.21**.

Table 4.21: Age-Standardised Distribution of the Household Heads Residing in Soacha by Migration Experiences and Socio-Demographic Characteristics ^a

Socio-demographic Characteristic	Non-Migrant			
	Single-Headed		Head and Spouse	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
N	5,981	15,990	45,609	3,446
%	8.42	22.51	64.22	4.85
Average Number of Members	4.13	4.13	4.20	4.12
Civil Status				
Consensual union	0.15	0.07	0.49	0.67
Separated or divorced	0.29	0.41	0.00	0.00
Widowed	0.11	0.21	0.00	0.00
Married	0.11	0.05	0.51	0.33
Single	0.34	0.26	0.00	0.00
Education Level				
None	0.09	0.07	0.03	0.05
Some primary	0.18	0.16	0.15	0.20
Completed primary	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.23
Some middle school	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.18
Completed middle school	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.07
Some or completed high school or other technical	0.22	0.23	0.26	0.22
Some or completed professional	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05
Labour Force Status				
Employed - active	0.66	0.53	0.76	0.57
Employed - inactive	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03
Unemployed	0.11	0.08	0.09	0.08
Students	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Homemakers	0.05	0.24	0.03	0.24
Retired	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.02
Other	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.05
Occupation Level				
Employee in private sector	0.63	0.65	0.66	0.63
Employee in public sector	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.10
<i>Jornalero o peón</i> (blue collar worker)	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00
Worker in domestic services	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.04
Self-employed	0.24	0.17	0.20	0.18
Employer	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03
Unpaid family worker	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02

^a Non-migrant population used as standard.

Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

Table 4.21: Age-Standardised Distribution of the Household Heads Residing in Soacha by Migration Experiences and Socio-Demographic Characteristics ^a (continued)

Socio-demographic Characteristic	Voluntary Migrant			
	Single-Headed		Head and Spouse	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
N	1,697	3,883	14,260	1,119
%	8.10	18.53	68.03	5.34
Average Number of Members	3.95	3.90	3.87	3.90
Civil Status				
Consensual union	0.12	0.07	0.59	0.74
Separated or divorced	0.35	0.41	0.00	0.00
Widowed	0.08	0.18	0.00	0.00
Married	0.09	0.04	0.41	0.26
Single	0.36	0.30	0.00	0.00
Education Level				
None	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.04
Some primary	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.21
Completed primary	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.23
Some middle school	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.19
Completed middle school	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07
Some or completed high school or other technical	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.22
Some or completed professional	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.04
Labour Force Status				
Employed - active	0.67	0.53	0.75	0.57
Employed - inactive	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
Unemployed	0.12	0.09	0.11	0.09
Students	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Homemakers	0.05	0.25	0.03	0.24
Retired	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01
Other	0.09	0.06	0.05	0.05
Occupation Level				
Employee in private sector	0.63	0.69	0.66	0.66
Employee in public sector	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.05
<i>Jornalero o peón</i> (blue collar worker)	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
Worker in domestic services	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.04
Self-employed	0.25	0.15	0.21	0.19
Employer	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03
Unpaid family worker	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02

^a Non-migrant population used as standard.

Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

Table 4.21: Age-Standardised Distribution of the Household Heads Residing in Soacha by Migration Experiences and Socio-Demographic Characteristics ^a (continued)

Socio-demographic Characteristic	Forced Migrant			
	Single-Headed		Head and Spouse	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
N	564	1,275	3,989	382
%	9.08	20.53	64.24	6.15
Average Number of Members	3.89	3.99	4.03	3.95
Civil Status				
Consensual union	0.18	0.09	0.63	0.74
Separated or divorced	0.32	0.40	0.00	0.00
Widowed	0.11	0.28	0.00	0.00
Married	0.06	0.04	0.37	0.26
Single	0.33	0.19	0.00	0.00
Education Level				
None	0.13	0.11	0.06	0.07
Some primary	0.27	0.28	0.30	0.33
Completed primary	0.23	0.25	0.26	0.26
Some middle school	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.15
Completed middle school	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.06
Some or completed high school or other technical	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.12
Some or completed professional	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.01
Labour Force Status				
Employed - active	0.56	0.41	0.64	0.40
Employed - inactive	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04
Unemployed	0.21	0.14	0.17	0.14
Students	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Homemakers	0.05	0.29	0.04	0.30
Retired	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
Other	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.10
Occupation Level				
Employee in private sector	0.54	0.60	0.66	0.62
Employee in public sector	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04
<i>Jornalero o peón</i> (blue collar worker)	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.00
Worker in domestic services	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.07
Self-employed	0.30	0.19	0.21	0.23
Employer	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01
Unpaid family worker	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.03

^a Non-migrant population used as standard.

Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

Non-migrant households had on average larger households than forced migrant households and voluntary households. Voluntary households had the smaller households on average. Differences in household size might be explained by differential fertility patterns among the groups, or be differential family disintegration suffered in the process of forced migration. Unfortunately there were no data available to explore if forced migrant households were complete or there were other members in hiding at places of origin looking after the family patrimony.

In **Table 4.21**, the consensual unions were more common among the forced migrant population. Among households with the spouse present, forced migrant women were more likely to be in consensual unions than forced migrant men. A large difference was observed among females who were single in single-headed households. There were only 19 percent of forced migrants in this group relative to 26 percent for non-migrants and 30 percent for voluntary migrants. The data indicated that forced migrant women were more likely to be living in households with spouse present than in single-headed households.

Patterns of education for household heads were similar to those for the whole population. Among single-headed households, female heads seemed to be advantaged, on average. In households with spouse present, men seemed to have more education. For the highest level of education, some or completed professional, men in all cases showed advantage. In particular, the data revealed large differences in professional education between forced migrant men and women in single-headed households. Only 1 percent of forced migrant women reported having some or completed professional education while 5 percent of forced migration men in this household category did. Among forced migrant males, those in single-headed households demonstrated the highest education level although slightly lower than the level observed for non-migrant males living in single-headed households. In conclusion, forced migrant household heads generally were at a disadvantage because their education level was the lowest, and forced migrant women were the least educated. Therefore, the economic performance of forced migrant households headed by women was expected to be poor relative to the other groups.

The labour force status of forced migrant household heads resembled that of the general population, with a large percentage employed followed by a smaller share of the unemployed. Nevertheless, the data revealed that forced migrant heads were more likely to

be unemployed than heads of other groups; and forced migrant female household heads were even less likely to be employed than forced migrant male heads. The literature indicated that forced displaced men of rural origin were less likely than women to be employed in the urban labour market. The data on **Table 4.21** demonstrated that the employment patterns by sex were similar for all groups and that forced migrant males more frequently engaged in labour force activities than forced migrant women. The distributions by occupational level indicated that, in general, forced migrants were more likely to be *jornaleros o peones* (blue collar workers) or in domestic services than any other groups. In general, forced migrants reported less frequently employment in the private or public sectors.

Differential Performance in the Labour Market

Successful integration of forced migrants into host cities depends in large part on performance in the urban labour market. In this part I explore the differential labour market participation of men and women and compare it across the different migrant groups. In order to include the positive cumulative effects of time since arrival at the municipality, the definition of migration experience is changes. Non-migrants are those who were born in Soacha and have always lived there. Forced migrants are those who were forced to abandon their usual place of residence at any point in their lives and were living in Soacha on 23 May 2003. Voluntary migrants are persons who arrived to Soacha at any points in their lives. To explore the probability of employment I estimate the following basic model:

$$\log\left(\frac{p_i}{1-p_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1 M_i + \beta_2 X_{iP} + \beta_3 X_{iH}$$

where:

p_i = The probability of being employed

M_i = Type of migration experience

X_{iP} = A vector of individual characteristics

X_{iH} = A vector of household characteristics

Table 4.22 contains basic descriptive statistics for the variables included in the model. The variables at the personal level are: sex, age, civil status and education level.¹⁰⁷ This set of variables as well as the dependent variables has been discussed at length in previous paragraphs. The vector of variables at the household level has two independent variables and a set of controls. The first independent variable is the type of household, single-headed household or household with spouse present. The second variable is whether the spouse was employed, conditional on household type. In 42 percent of the households with spouse present, the spouse was employed. The control variables are employment status of other household members, socioeconomic index, and presence of minors under age 14.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ The specification of the model requires that all heads in households with spouse present were married or in consensual union, for a correct specification of the model this variable is modelled as an interaction with type of household.

¹⁰⁸ The socioeconomic index was created by regressing the log-odds of employment on 9 items of durable goods and access to infrastructure and services. The index was estimated using the following model: $ses = 0.56 + (fridge*0.19) + (washer*0.19) + (boiler*0.11) + (oven*0.22) + (TV*0.52) + (cable*0.12) + (internet*0.21) + (sewerage*-0.08) + (gas*-0.13) + (phone*-0.01) + (running\ water\ 7\ days*0.06) + (rubbish\ pickup*0.04) + (dwelling\ ownership*-0.38)$ / Likelihood Ratio : 2,209.86, Pr < 0.0001.

Table 4.22: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Included in Binomial Logistic Regression Model

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variables			
Unemployed	84,288	0.28	0.45
Employed	84,288	0.72	0.45
Employed in the formal sector	60,467	0.79	0.41
Employed in the informal sector	60,467	0.21	0.41
Independent Variables			
Personal Characteristics			
Male	84,288	0.72	0.45
Female	84,288	0.28	0.45
Age	84,288	42.91	12.67
Civil Status			
Single	84,288	0.09	0.29
Separated or divorced	84,288	0.12	0.32
Married or in consensual union	84,288	0.73	0.44
Widowed	84,288	0.06	0.23
Education			
None or less than primary	84,288	0.21	0.41
Completed primary	84,288	0.41	0.49
Completed middle school	84,288	0.07	0.26
More than completed middle school	84,288	0.31	0.46
Migration Experience			
Non-Migrant	84,288	0.08	0.27
Forced Migrant	84,288	0.06	0.24
Years since arrival at Soacha	4,707	7.62	8.45
Voluntary Migrant	84,288	0.86	0.34
Years since arrival at Soacha	66,324	10.95	9.02
Household Characteristics			
Single-headed household	84,288	0.32	0.47
Household with spouse present	84,288	0.68	0.47
Spouse employed	57,401	0.42	0.49
Spouse unemployed	57,401	0.58	0.49
Other household member(s) employed	84,288	0.21	0.41
Other household member(s) unemployed	84,288	0.79	0.41
Presence of minors under age 14	84,288	0.59	0.49

Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

Table 4.22: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Included in Binomial Logistic Regression Model (continued)

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Independent Variables			
Socioeconomic Indicators			
Socioeconomic Index	84,288	0.96	0.36
Owns a refrigerator	84,288	0.66	0.47
Owns a washer	84,288	0.26	0.44
Owns a boiler	84,288	0.25	0.43
Owns an oven	84,288	0.18	0.39
Owns a TV	84,288	0.82	0.38
Has cable TV service	84,288	0.30	0.46
Has internet service	84,288	0.03	0.18
Has access to sewerage	84,288	0.86	0.34
Has access to a gas connection	84,288	0.62	0.49
Has telephone service	84,288	0.77	0.42
Received running water 7 days a week	84,288	0.73	0.44
Has rubbish collection services	84,288	0.99	0.12
Owns his/her dwelling	84,288	0.62	0.48

Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

Table 4.23 shows coefficient estimates of the first model. The estimate for the forced migrant dummy indicated that *ceteris paribus* on average the probability of employment for a forced migrant was less than the probability of employment for a voluntary or a non-migrant.¹⁰⁹ In contrast, the average probability of employment for a voluntary migrant was higher than for a non-migrant. Single household heads were more likely to be employed than married heads, those in consensual unions or the windowed. The coefficients for education suggested a positive and increasing relation of employment with level of education.

¹⁰⁹ $\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial x_i} = \beta p_i(1 - p_i)$, where p_i is on average the proportion of persons employed.

Table 4.23: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed One Week before Census Collection in Soacha (2003)

Variable	Model I			Model II		
	Estimate		Std. Error	Estimate		Std. Error
N	84,288			77,557		
Personal Characteristics						
Male	0.95	***	0.06	0.98	***	0.07
Age	0.09	***	0.01	0.08	***	0.00
Age squared	0.00	***	0.00	0.00	***	0.00
Civil Status						
Single, separated or divorced (Ref)						
Widowed	-0.29	***	0.03	-0.31	***	0.03
Married or in consensual union	-0.37	***	0.03	-0.41	***	0.03
Education						
None or less than primary (Ref)						
Completed primary	0.17	***	0.03	0.12	***	0.03
Completed middle school	0.22	***	0.05	0.17	***	0.05
More than completed middle school	0.47	***	0.04	0.41	***	0.04
Household Characteristics						
Single-headed household (Ref)						
Household with spouse present	0.19	***	0.05	0.19	***	0.05
Spouse employed	0.37	***	0.03	0.37	***	0.03
Other household member(s) employed	0.17	***	0.03	0.14	***	0.03
Socioeconomic index	0.58	***	0.04	0.59	***	0.05
Presence of minors under age 14	0.18	***	0.02	0.15	***	0.02
Migration Experience						
Non-migrant	-0.20	***	0.03			
Forced migrant	-0.49	***	0.02	-0.81	***	0.03
Voluntary migrant (Ref)	—		—	—		—
Duration since arrival at Soacha						
Years				0.00	+	0.00
Squared years				0.00	***	0.00
Duration* Forced Migrant						
Years				0.05	***	0.01
Squared years				-0.01	**	0.00
Goodness of fit statistics						
LR $\hat{\sigma}^2(15)$			15,576.40			14,336.90

Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

Looking at the second set of variables for household characteristics the data indicated that heads in households with a spouse present had a small but higher probability of being employed than heads in single-headed households. Employment status of other household members was also positively related to the probability of employment of the household heads, as were socioeconomic index and presence of minors under age 14.

The second step in the analysis is to look for the cumulative effects of time. If forced migrants had arrived at the city just before the time of census collecting, then their disadvantage in the labour market might be explained by the lack of time to adapt to the new conditions. The second model takes into account the time-period since arrival at Soacha of forced migrants and voluntary migrants. This variable is estimated subtracting from the year of the census (2003) the reported year of arrival to the municipality. The model is as follow¹¹⁰:

$$\log\left(\frac{P_i}{1-P_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{iP} + \beta_2 X_{iH} + \beta_3 M_i * T_i$$

where:

T_i = Vector of variables measuring time since arrival at the municipality of Soacha


The coefficient estimates for this model are presented in the last columns of **Table 4.23**. The coefficients for years since arrival for the forced migrant population and the voluntary migrant population suggested diverging trajectories over time.¹¹¹ **Figure 4.22** shows the estimated probabilities of employment for hypothetical non-migrant, voluntary migrant and forced migrant males who are aged 20 at the beginning of the period that will

¹¹⁰ The specification of the model was reviewed several times. I estimated the model using each year for a total of 20 years as a dichotomous variable to see if there were any nonlinearities. In this model I appreciated that the effect of time was in general uniform; however the estimated coefficients were not very robust given the number of observations per year for the forced migration population. In a second step I grouped time in 5 year periods. The resulting model was not robust. Finally I tried to include time since arrival as a continuous variable and the specification with the best measures of goodness of fit are presented in **Table 4.23**.

¹¹¹ In the regression I included only those who had migration experience. The coefficients for the variables measuring duration are the coefficients for the reference category: voluntary migration household heads. The coefficients for the interaction terms for the forced migrants provided the magnitude of the difference in the probability of employment at different lengths of stay in the city.

live until age 40 and will experience changing probabilities based on the experiences of the people living in Soacha.¹¹² The probability of employment increases over time slightly more for voluntary migrants and for non-migrants, but in both cases is positively related with time. The probability of employment for forced migrants decreases over time almost constantly. Although the Colombian armed conflict has caused the displacement of much of population since the mid-1940s, displacement caused by the armed conflict was not as frequent and generalised throughout the country until 1990-2002. Therefore, the estimations presented here are based on the experiences of the forced migrant population in Soacha.¹¹³

Figure 4.22: Predicted Probabilities of Employment for Males (Binary Logit)




Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

¹¹² The hypothetical male was aged 20 at the beginning of the trajectory, married, living with an unemployed spouse, with completed middle school, other household members were unemployed, socioeconomic index of one (near to mean).

¹¹³ As shown in the research design section, almost two-thirds of the forced migrant population arrived after 1997.

If employment prospects for forced migrant males were poor, forced migrant women should be a greater concern to the Colombian authorities. **Figure 4.23** presents the probability of employment over time for females.¹¹⁴ As discussed previously the probability of employment was lower for females than for males regardless of duration of residence in Soacha or migration experience. The main difference was that the probability of employment decreased faster with time for forced migrant females than for forced migrant males.

Figure 4.23: Predicted Probabilities of Employment for Females (Binary Logit)



Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

¹¹⁴ I used the same values for all variables than for the estimation of employment for males shown in **Figure 4.22**.

Final Comments

Due to the effects of a globalising economy, scarcity and conflict are likely to increase and the number of forced internal migrants will rise. There is contention in the field of migration about the legitimacy of forced migrants, particularly since international frontiers are being virtually closed to refugees and asylum seekers. I argue that the difficult conditions faced by internally displaced persons and their relative lack of success in improving their living standards is not due to a lack of agency, but to adverse selection. Internally displaced persons would not have left their places of origin for reasons other than a credible threat to their life, physical integrity or freedom.

This chapter has six sections. First, I sought to present a description of internally displaced persons and to broaden our knowledge using scientific methods to study its causes and consequences. Secondly, internally displaced persons need to be compared with economic migrants and non-migrants in order to analyse how the nature of their migration affects patterns on integration. I sought to provide convincing arguments about adverse migrant selectivity to explain the slow pattern of integration among internally displaced persons in the urban labour markets.

Then I attempted to present Bogotá, as an appropriate case study for forced internal migration and its relation to changing circumstances in the labour market in section three. In the fourth section, I described the sampling strategy and the criteria I followed to collect data in poor neighbourhoods in the periphery of Bogotá where the forced migrants were concentrated. I randomly selected households in three geographically independent and diverse areas. The final sample contains data from 603 households and 2,745 household members. According to the migration experience of the household heads, I defined four groups of migrants: forced migrants, voluntary migrants, intra-urban migrants and non-migrants. The descriptive analysis of the household members by migration status revealed that internally displaced persons were similar to non-migrants. This similarity suggested that forced migrants were not self-selected to migrate. By contrast, the age and sex composition and occupations of voluntary migrants demonstrated that they migrated for economic reasons.

Views from the literature on gender and conflict that repeatedly cited the advantages experienced by female forced migrants who resettled in urban areas were not supported by the findings in Soacha, Cundinamarca. In sections five and six, I found that the probability of employment for male forced migrants was always higher than females; as was the case between male and female non-migrants and voluntary migrants. Another characteristic of female forced migrants that did not follow what has been described in the literature concerned the prevalence of single female-headed households. Among the forced migrants observed here, it was not higher relative to female voluntary migrants. I did, however, observe a high prevalence of female heads in households with spouse present. This pattern may imply a selection process within the forced migrant population. On average, the likelihood that couples with children reached large cities might be higher than for single-headed households. The conditions of single-headed households may only allow them to reach small towns or intermediate cities near their places of origin. Although, travelling greater distances with fewer people can be easier, the help provided by a male spouse in the migration process might increase the likelihood of reaching Bogotá.

The problem facing forced migrants was the low probabilities of formal employment they registered and their inability to catch up with the voluntary and non-migrant groups. Their relative disadvantage in the labour market was partially explained by their low levels of education. However, other factors were playing an important role in restricting the access of forced migrants to the urban labour markets. I argue that lack of credentials, difficulties in transferring their skills and unmeasured motivations could explain their relative disadvantage. Voluntary migrants were more likely to be selected for ambition and drive.

CHAPTER 5

Socioeconomic Differentials among Migrant Groups and Labour Adaptation

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part I, I analyse changes in socioeconomic well-being associated with voluntary, forced and intra-urban migrations. Most people migrated as a strategy to improve their lives and the lives of their family members. However, forced migrants faced poor living conditions at destination relative to non-migrants, intra-urban migrants and voluntary migrants in host areas. A potential explanation for the poor living conditions of the forced migrants was their adverse selection into the migration stream to Bogotá.¹ To explore the relative socioeconomic well-being of forced migrants and explain their potential adverse self-selection for migration to Bogotá, this analysis offers three descriptions of the relative situation of forced migrants. First, I describe the circumstances of intra-urban, voluntary and forced migrants in the place that they inhabited the longest before the place they lived in Bogotá at the end of 2002. Second, I evaluate gains or losses in socioeconomic well-being between voluntary and forced migrants comparing their living conditions in the place of longest residence and the place in Bogotá at the end of 2002. Third, I compare the living conditions in Bogotá at the end of 2002 of non-migrants, intra-urban migrants, voluntary migrants and forced migrants. As shown in the analysis voluntary migrants were poorer than forced migrants at the place of longest residence. At the end of 2002 forced migrants lost relative well-being in living conditions and consumption of durable goods in Bogotá relative to the place of longest residence. Finally, forced migrants were poorest group among people living in impoverished areas on the periphery of Bogotá.

¹ As in **Chapter 4**, the term of ‘Bogotá’ refers to the municipalities of Bogotá and Soacha. This phenomenon applies throughout this chapter.

In part II, I investigate the labour market performance of internally displaced persons in urban labour markets relative to voluntary migrants and non-migrants. The analysis is based on retrospective labour and migration histories of economic, tied and forced migrants and non-migrants in Bogotá.² Economic migrants are considered positively self-selected. Therefore, their participation in the urban labour market is expected to be higher than tied or forced migrants. Forced migrants are expected to show low probabilities of employment after displacement. The experience of internally displaced population in other countries suggested that the participation of forced migrants in informal activities was very high due to the low rates of formal employment and their need to generate income for family support. The data set used in this analysis allows descriptions of labour patterns at different points in migration histories. The analysis is divided in three sections. First, a description of the occupational and land tenure profiles of forced, tied and voluntary migrant population in the place of origin. Second, a cross-sectional descriptive analysis of unemployment and occupation profiles in Bogotá at the end of 2002. Third, an estimation of the probability of being employed in different occupations at any point in time controlling for personal characteristics, time-specific migration experience and area of residence-rural/urban in the department where migrants resided in a given year. The results reveal that employment probabilities of economic and forced migrants were different in Bogotá and in other places.

² Tied migrants are those who were never forced to migrate, did not pursue economic incentives in any of their moves before arriving at Bogotá and left their place of origin because they were following their families or husbands, or because they had been separated from their families or husbands.

Socioeconomic Status and Migration

Migration was used by households as a livelihood strategy, and it was most common when survival was at stake.³ The sustainable livelihood framework emphasised that migration occurred in response to crisis and it was central to livelihood strategy for people facing physical, economic, social and political adversity.⁴ There was also a difference in the outcome of migration when the decision to migrate was out of choice rather than when it was out of necessity. Frank Ellis argued that when migrations took place out of necessity, as with forced internal migrants, the process of migration was likely to exacerbate poverty and vulnerability.⁵ Economically disadvantaged people who fled usually made decisions, like borrowing at high interest rates to fund the cost of moving or living expenses that aggravated their vulnerability. To address the impacts of migration on voluntary migrants and forced migrants in this chapter, I evaluate changing livelihoods of those who migrated for diverse reasons and their relative well-being at origin and destination.

Robert Chambers described differences between poverty and vulnerability.⁶ Vulnerability means ‘defencelessness, insecurity and exposure to risk, shocks and stress’; in other words, vulnerability is the opposite of security. I argue that given the nature of their migration, forced migrants were vulnerable, compared to others in host areas. Chambers argued that vulnerability had two sides: internal and external. Internal vulnerability was the lack of means to cope without damaging loss; therefore, it was linked to the accumulated wealth of the household rather than on income. External vulnerability was understood as the shocks and stress to which the household was subject. Caroline Moser went beyond the description of vulnerability and offered a typology of assets related to different kinds of vulnerabilities: labour, human capital, housing and infrastructure, household relations and social capital.⁷ In this analysis I only address housing and infrastructure. The neighbourhoods I visited in Bogotá were

³ N. Nyberg-Sørensen, N.V. Hear and P. Engberg-Pedersen, ‘The migration-development nexus evidence and policy options,’ IOM Migration Research Series No. 8 (Geneva, 2002): p. 28.

⁴ A. de Haan and B. Rogaly, ‘Introduction: migrant workers and their role in rural change,’ *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 38, issue 5 (2002): p. 1.

⁵ F. Ellis, ‘Household strategies and rural livelihood diversification,’ *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 35, issue 1 (1998): p. 14.

⁶ R. Chambers, ‘Vulnerability, coping and policy (editorial introduction),’ *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 37, no. 4 (2006): p. 33.

⁷ C. Moser, ‘The asset vulnerability framework: reassessing urban poverty reduction strategies,’ *World Development*, vol. 26, no. 1 (1998): p. 4.

locations in which domestic violence, inadequate care for the elderly, and high rates of crime and homicide were prevalent.⁸

In the literature on livelihoods and migration it was argued that there were two types of strategies of migration: coping strategies and accumulative strategies.⁹ Economically disadvantaged voluntary or forced migrants were typically precluded from the accumulative strategies that involved increases in well-being over time and focused instead on a coping strategy that guaranteed survival, but not accumulation of wealth. The result over time was increasing inequality at destination between those who implemented an accumulative strategy and those who survived under a coping strategy.

Migration was a process that involved change, negotiation and resistance.¹⁰ When comparing voluntary and forced migrants, their agency and negotiation abilities were likely to differ. These differences in behaviour at the place of destination translated into a differential change of socioeconomic status for both groups. While voluntary migrants were more successful in the labour market as discussed in **Chapter 4**, forced migrants might be more successful in negotiating provisions with NGOs, international agencies and governmental agencies. Forced migrants were entitled to benefits and provisions to which other migrants or non-migrants did not have access. Under Law 387 of 1997, which was widely debated in Colombia, the authorities were required to provide internally displaced persons with humanitarian assistance, access to schools and health care services, and resettlement assistance. Although assistance programmes were available for the forced migrants, however, these did not provide a sustained source of income or provision over time.

In part I, I focus on the differentials in living conditions among those with different migration experiences. The arguments discussed in **Chapter 4** about the positive self-selection of voluntary migrants and the adverse selectivity of forced migrants suggested that voluntary migrants were likely to improve their livelihoods after migrating relative to the livelihoods of forced migrants. In addition, given the arguments discussed above, forced migrants were hypothesised to be more likely to remain in poverty because they were vulnerable to external shocks and were more likely to develop coping strategies rather than accumulating strategies.

⁸ C. Moser and C. McIlwaine, *Urban poor perceptions of violence and exclusion in Colombia* (Washington, DC, 2000): pp. 20-30.

⁹ P. Deshingkar and D. Start, 'Seasonal migration for livelihoods in India: coping, accumulation and exclusion,' Working Paper No. 220 (London, 2003): pp. 17-28.

¹⁰ C. Waddington, 'Livelihood outcomes of migration for poor people,' Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty Working Paper No. T1 (Brighton, 2003): p. 7.

Living Conditions of Internally Displaced Persons in Colombia

In Colombia there is a vast literature on the living conditions of the internally displaced.¹¹ All sources of information indicate that the internally displaced population moved mostly from rural to urban areas. Although the conditions of their dwellings might improve, their socioeconomic conditions were not better than in their places of origin.¹² Their relative inability to adapt to the urban labour market explained their loss of income and therefore the deterioration of living conditions at destination.

Data from the first survey on the internally displaced population, collected by the *Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana* in 1993 and completed in 1994, suggested that forced migrants were living in poorer conditions after displacement relative to the places of origin.¹³ Before displacement 70 percent owned their house, while only 30 owned their dwelling after displacement. Before displacement only 4 percent were living in squatter settlements (*tugurios*), while 16 percent were living in these conditions after displacement.

CODHES argued that living conditions of the internally displaced were worse in areas of destination than in areas of origin.¹⁴ These arguments were based on data collected by SISDES.¹⁵ In 1996, when there were relatively few internally displaced persons in urban centres, their living conditions based on indicators of access to public services, education and health care, were worse than in their rural places of origin. In 1997, only 54 percent of the displaced population received some assistance, mainly from the Catholic Church, family members and community organisations (*cooperativas*), and less than 10 percent from the government.¹⁶

¹¹ A brief summary is provided in previous chapter and this chapter.

¹² In urban areas there was a greater availability of construction materials like bricks and concrete.

¹³ Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana, *Derechos humanos: desplazados por violencia en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1995).

¹⁴ Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES), *Sistema de información de hogares desplazados por la violencia* (Bogotá, 1995).

¹⁵ Information system continuously collected and briefly described in **Chapter 4**.

¹⁶ United Nations Economic and Social Council, 'Profiles in displacement: follow-up mission to Colombia,' mimeo (New York, 2000): p. 21.

The International Organisation for Migration collected a survey in six departments affected by the armed conflict (Norte de Santander, Santander, Valle del Cauca, Nariño, Caquetá and Putumayo).¹⁷ Comparing the displaced population with their hosts in department capitals and municipal seats and to the general population in Colombia, the IOM found that only 25 percent of the dwellings inhabited by the internally displaced had access to sewerage while for the general population it was 70 percent. Their access to running water was similar to the rest of the population. The IOM observed that the percentage of internally displaced households living in inadequate housing (40 percent & 7 percent) and crowding conditions (60 percent & 10 percent) was very high relative to the host populations. They estimated the unsatisfied basic needs index and contended that on average 50 percent of the interviewed internally displaced persons were in extreme poverty, 28 percent with two needs unsatisfied, and 22 percent in relative poverty.¹⁸

Luis Eduardo Pérez Murcia used data from SISBEN (*Sistema de Identificación y Clasificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios para los Programas Sociales*, Colombia Welfare System), which was only collected in neighbourhoods in socioeconomic strata 1 (very poor), 2 (poor) and 3 (low to middle income), to analyse the situation of the internally displaced.¹⁹ He chose the cities of Medellín, Bogotá, Villavicencio, Cartagena and Cali to compare the internally displaced population to the host population. The evaluation measures in the SISBEN, included living conditions, public services availability, income, human capital, social security and property ownership. Based on these indicators the author showed that internally displaced persons were more frequently exposed to poverty. Their scores in the SISBEN system were systematically lower than those of the host populations.

¹⁷ International Organisation for Migration (IOM), *Anuario 2003: movimientos migratorios internacionales de Colombia* (Bogotá, 2004).

¹⁸ The unsatisfied basic needs method entailed the specification of those basic needs where lack of satisfaction was considered to be an indicator of deprivation or poor living conditions. The published indicators did not contain methodological notes on how the index was constructed and how the thresholds were defined.

¹⁹ L.E. Pérez, 'Población desplazada: entre la vulnerabilidad, la pobreza y la exclusión,' mimeo (Bogotá, 2002).

Stefanie Kirchhoff and Ana Maria Ibáñez collected household data on places of origin and destination in Colombia.²⁰ Comparing the displaced population with the non-displaced, they found that the vast majority of the displaced population had lived in their areas of origin for a long time. Loss of agricultural land and of a rural way of life meant that internally displaced persons in urban centres were unemployed for long periods. Regarding measures of home ownership and access to public services, their results demonstrated that internally displaced persons were less likely to own their homes in the place of destination relative to their places of origin. They had on average better access to public services in the places of destination because they were in urban environments. They also found that the access to education and health care services varied depending on the city. In Bogotá, they discovered that overall, internally displaced persons lost access to services, but for those who did have services the scale of coverage improved. Regarding education, 68 percent had access to schools before displacement, and only 53 percent reported having access in Bogotá.²¹

Ana Maria Ibáñez and Carlos Eduardo Vélez developed a model of compensating variation to measure the expected maximum utility before and after displacement.²² Using the same data as Kirchhoff and Ibáñez, they found that the economic cost of displacement was on average 25 percent of the net present value of aggregated rural consumption. Therefore, families experienced large welfare losses when they were displaced. In a reviewed version of the described paper Ibáñez and Vélez estimated that the economic cost of displacement was on average 37 percent of the net present value of aggregated rural consumption.²³ Additionally, they estimated welfare losses by rural consumption quartile and found that the welfare losses for those in the first consumption quartile were around 72 percent.²⁴

²⁰ S. Kirchhoff and A.M. Ibáñez, 'Displacement due to violence in Colombia: determinants and consequences at the household level,' ZEF – Discussion Papers on Development Policy No. 41 (Bonn, 2001).

²¹ The sample size was very small (around $n = 66$). The authors did not comment on the statistical significance of their indicators.

²² A.M. Ibáñez and C.E. Vélez, 'Forced displacement in Colombia: causality and welfare losses,' mimeo (Washington, DC, 2003).

²³ A.M. Ibáñez and C.E. Vélez, 'Civil conflict and forced migration: the micro determinants and the welfare losses of displacement in Colombia,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2005-35 (Bogotá, 2005): p. 4.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Living Conditions of Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá

Up to this point I have provided some indicators about the conditions of the internally displaced persons in urban areas in Colombia. In this section I analyse the conditions of the population of Bogotá and investigate living conditions and relative poverty measures by locality.²⁵

Using data periodically collected in parishes the *Arquidiócesis de Bogotá* and CODHES described the characteristics of the internally displaced persons in the Metropolitan Area of Bogotá.²⁶ In the 1997 report, they found that before displacement 73 percent of the displaced population arriving in Bogotá lived in houses, while only 26 percent did after displacement; 48 percent owned their dwelling before displacement and only 8 percent did after the event. A further relevant figure was that 72 percent of the interviewed persons were planning to stay in the city.

In the 1999 volume they included Soacha in the analysis given the rapid growth of the internally displaced population in the municipality. They reported that 91 percent of the displaced population had arrived from rural zones, and 57 percent was planning to stay in the city. Ninety percent of the interviewees answered that their principal need was the purchase of the dwelling. Regarding the availability and access to education, 77 percent of displaced children and youth in school age were not attending school. Moreover, of those attending school during that academic year, 30 percent were expecting to drop-out due to economic difficulties. The reported living conditions shown in **Table 5.1** reveal that although the access to public services increased, which was expected because they were arriving from rural communities, housing conditions and homeownership declined.

In the 2001 report the needs and living conditions of the internally displaced were similar to those outlined in previous reports. But there were some differences worth mentioning. For example, the need for purchase of dwellings had declined, but the need for dwelling improvements rose. In addition, the reported need for health care services increased from 53 percent in the 1999 report to 84 percent in 2001.

²⁵ A locality is an administrative unit within the city of Bogotá. There are 19 localities in the city. See **Chapter 1** for more details.

²⁶ Arquidiócesis de Bogotá and CODHES, *Desplazados por violencia y conflicto social en Bogotá* (Bogotá, 1997); Arquidiócesis de Bogotá and CODHES, *Desplazados: huellas de nunca borrar, casos de Bogotá y Soacha* (Bogotá, 1999) and Arquidiócesis de Bogotá and CODHES, *Senderos: rostros invisibles del desplazamiento en Bogotá* (Bogotá, 2001).

Using data from the official declarations of the internally displaced persons from May 1999 to August 2002, the UNHCR Office in Colombia found that 63 percent of people owned farms (*fincas*) before displacement and 29 percent owned their house.²⁷ Only the remaining 8 percent had some other form of housing at origin. In contrast, in Bogotá only 1 percent owned their dwelling, 22 percent lived in rented houses, 40 percent in rented rooms, 20 percent in rented apartments and the remaining 18 percent reported some other type of housing arrangement.²⁸

The *Centro Nacional de Consultoría*, a private marketing research company in Bogotá, found that 86 percent of the displaced residing in Bogotá in 2002 owned real estate in their places of origin. Regarding home ownership in Bogotá the results indicated that only 5 percent of the displaced population were home owners, 71 percent were renters, 21 percent were living with a family member or a friend and 24 percent were illegally occupying a lot (*ocupantes de hecho*). The bottom part of **Table 5.1** contains information about access to public services before and after displacement. As in the other studies mentioned, living conditions of the internally displaced were generally better after displacement than in the areas of origin.

²⁷ UNHCR, *La población desplazada en Bogotá: una responsabilidad de todos* (Bogotá, 2003): p. 31.

²⁸ Renting rooms was a common practice in urban areas in Colombia. These were not considered apartments, but were rooms rented in dwellings inhabited by various households. For housing in Colombia and for comparative purposes, see A. Gilbert and A. Varley, *Landlord and tenant: housing the poor in urban Mexico* (London, 1991); A. Gilbert, 'Colombian housing policy during the 1990s,' in E. Posada-Carbó (ed.), *Colombia: the politics of reforming the state* (New York, 1998); A. Gilbert, 'A home is for ever?: residential mobility and homeownership in self-help settlements,' *Environment and Planning A*, vol. 31, no. 6 (1999): pp. 1073-1091; A. Gilbert, 'Financing self-help housing: evidence from Bogotá, Colombia,' *International Planning Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2000): pp. 165-190 and A. Gilbert, 'Housing policy and legal entitlements: survival strategies of the urban poor,' in C. Abel and C. Lewis (eds.), *Exclusion and engagement: social policy in Latin America* (London, 2002).

The data for this study was not based in a random sampling of the internally displaced. Probably those who went to the registration offices were the more informed and had incentives to declare their situation. They also had an incentive to underreport their properties, because they were entitled to financial assistance for resettlement.

Table 5.1: Percentage Distribution of Dwelling Characteristics before and after Displacement in the Metropolitan Area of Bogotá (1999 and 2002)

Variable	Before	After
<i>CODHES (1999)</i>		
Home ownership		
Owned	81	3
Rented	9	66
Other	10	31
Type of dwelling		
House	90	3
Apartments (rooms)	5	68
Other	5	29
Public services		
Electric power	70	9
Sewerage	72	96
Running water	24	92
<i>Centro Nacional de Consultoría (2002)</i>		
Public services		
Electric power	69	95
Sewerage	30	77
Running water	50	76
Gas connection	6	46
Rubbish collection	22	95
Telephone connection	14	57

Source: Arquidiócesis de Bogotá and CODHES, *Desplazados: huellas de nunca borrar, casos de Bogotá y Soacha* (Bogotá, 1999) and Centro Nacional de Consultoría, 'Encuesta sobre condiciones demográficas, económicas y sociales de población desplazada,' mimeo (Bogotá, 2002).

Finally, Manuel Enrique Pérez Martínez described irregular settlements in Soacha.²⁹ He distinguished sectors with different types of housing: state planned housing in apartment complexes (*unidades multifamiliares*), individual housing (*unidades unifamiliares*), regularised settlements, and irregular or illegal settlements.³⁰ In interviews with 30 families in March 2002, he estimated that the value of property left behind in areas of origin was between 10 and 40 million Colombian pesos, or between US\$ 4,500 and US\$ 28,000 per family. The assets mentioned by interviewees were farms (accounting for 52 percent of the value on average), crops (9 percent), houses (19 percent), animals (19 percent) and appliances (1 percent).

²⁹ M.E. Pérez Martínez, *Territorio y desplazamiento: el caso de Altos de Cazucá, municipio de Soacha* (Bogotá, 2004): table 7 and figure 2, p. 71.

³⁰ There was a market for permits in illegal settlement. Forced migrants bought non-regularised lots of about 80 squared meters for about 3 million Colombian pesos, or about US\$ 1,400 (at 2002 price).

To evaluate living conditions of the internally displaced, it was necessary to compare them with the host population in Bogotá. **Table 5.2** shows indicators of living conditions, by locality.³¹ I collected the survey data described in **Chapter 4** in the localities of Usaquén, San Cristobál and Usme. The locality of Ciudad Bolívar was relevant for two reasons, first because the concentration of forced migrants was high, and secondly because it is the locality that neighbours the municipality of Soacha and to third site visited for my survey. The data suggested that access to public services in Bogotá was relatively high. In every locality, more than 95 percent of the population had access to sewerage, running water, rubbish collection, and electric power.³² There were, however, important differences among localities in the average number of persons per room, particularly in those selected for the survey. The locality of Usaquén was characterised by a high standard of living due to the concentration of wealthy households. Therefore, the percentage of households with less than two persons per room on average was very high. All other three localities had lower percentages. The predominant materials of construction of walls and floors also gave us an indication that the localities selected for the study were among the poorest in the city.

Table 5.3 demonstrates indicators of poverty and income distribution using three measures: 1) the percentage of households with unsatisfied basic needs; 2) the percentage of households considered in extreme poverty because they had a number of unsatisfied basic needs; and 3) the percentage of households below poverty line, below extreme poverty line and the Gini Coefficient.³³ Consistent with the figures in **Table 5.2**, San Cristóbal, Usme and Ciudad Bolívar were the localities with the highest percentage of households in poverty defined either by the unsatisfied basic needs index or the poverty line criteria. The Gini Coefficients for San Cristóbal, Usme and Ciudad Bolívar were low relative to the other localities. This was an indication that the income level of the population living in these areas was smaller than relative to the city as a whole,

³¹ The data came from the Survey of Quality of Life which had a representative sample by locality of Bogotá. Estimations of the index were taken from Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 'Encuesta calidad de vida 2002 para Bogotá y localidades urbanas,' mimeo (Bogotá, 2004).

³² According to the Mayor's Office of Planning information, access to electric energy was 'universal' in regular settlements and it was almost complete in irregular settlements. For this reason it was not mentioned in the table.

³³ All these calculation were made by the Mayor's Office of Planning. The results were based on the National Quality of Life Survey, 2002. I looked for the methodology applied in the calculations of poverty lines but I did not find the criteria (caloric consumption, minimum consumption or income) they used.

probably because economically disadvantaged people were clustered in these neighbourhoods and not evenly dispersed within the metropolitan area.

Table 5.2: Percentage Distribution of Dwelling Characteristics and Access to Public Services in Bogotá by Localities (2002)

Locality	Sewerage	Running water	Rubbish collection	Room density ^a	Main materials of construction	
					Walls ^b	Floors ^c
Bogotá	98.74	99.38	99.79	82.63	98.94	81.95
Usaquén	100.00	99.27	100.00	92.65	98.57	88.79
Chapinero	96.96	97.80	100.00	97.45	99.70	94.92
Santa Fe	97.56	98.95	100.00	76.99	95.25	72.75
San Cristóbal	96.33	99.09	99.47	67.47	96.27	66.05
Usme	98.07	99.53	100.00	62.61	98.40	55.74
Tunjuelito	99.87	99.87	99.87	71.53	99.58	83.85
Bosa	96.37	100.00	98.43	75.25	98.79	68.98
Kennedy	100.00	99.75	100.00	82.23	99.73	87.31
Fontibón	100.00	99.86	100.00	84.35	98.43	85.54
Engativá	100.00	99.87	100.00	90.81	99.84	93.23
Suba	96.57	98.55	99.74	90.10	99.53	90.83
Barrios Unidos	100.00	98.44	100.00	88.83	99.87	88.67
Teusaquillo	100.00	98.78	100.00	96.32	99.86	94.50
Los Mártires	99.73	99.54	99.86	86.60	99.48	76.03
Antonio Nariño	100.00	99.87	100.00	88.66	99.70	89.12
Puente Aranda	99.52	99.86	100.00	89.85	100.00	91.32
La Candelaria	99.41	98.87	100.00	76.98	94.32	76.16
Rafael Uribe	99.07	99.39	100.00	78.13	98.79	85.33
Ciudad Bolívar	99.44	99.50	99.69	69.27	98.04	54.51

^a Dwellings with rooms with less than 2 persons on average.

^b Bricks, concrete cubes or other similar materials of construction.

^c Bricks, tiles or polished wood.

Source: Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 'Encuesta calidad de vida 2002 para Bogotá y localidades urbanas' (Bogotá, 2004).

From the data presented in this section I conclude that internally displaced persons living in urban areas had better living conditions than in their places of origin given the available amenities in an urban environment. However, they were more vulnerable than in their places of origin. Given the concentration of internally displaced persons in poor localities in Bogotá, they were a disadvantaged population among already less disadvantaged urban hosts.

Table 5.3: Aggregate Indicators of Poverty and Income Distribution for Households in Bogotá by Localities (2002)

Locality	% Poor by unsatisfied basic needs index	% Extreme poor by unsatisfied basic needs index	% Below poverty line	% Below extreme poverty line	Gini Coefficient
Bogotá	5.6	0.7	40.8	11.2	0.56
Usaquén	2.5	0.0	18.0	5.1	0.57
Chapinero	0.8	0.0	11.7	4.2	0.54
Santa Fe	7.1	0.8	45.6	15.0	0.59
San Cristóbal	11.4	2.0	64.4	21.6	0.43
Usme	11.3	1.6	73.2	23.4	0.35
Tunjuelito	7.2	0.7	49.8	13.3	0.44
Bosa	7.8	0.7	60.4	17.3	0.43
Kennedy	6.4	0.8	40.3	10.0	0.43
Fontibón	5.2	0.0	35.6	8.2	0.50
Engativá	2.8	0.1	30.7	7.7	0.46
Suba	2.2	0.4	27.4	5.3	0.58
Barrios Unidos	2.7	0.1	26.5	7.5	0.53
Teusaquillo	0.1	0.0	12.6	4.3	0.48
Los Mártires	3.4	0.1	43.9	12.9	0.51
Antonio Nariño	2.2	0.0	35.9	10.9	0.43
Puente Aranda	2.4	0.1	29.0	6.3	0.40
La Candelaria	5.6	0.6	42.6	14.1	0.56
Rafael Uribe	6.8	0.6	57.1	15.6	0.44
Ciudad Bolívar	12.8	2.1	63.8	18.6	0.40

Source: Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá.

Analysis of Socioeconomic Indicators

In order to perform a comparative analysis of socioeconomic conditions at different points in the life histories of the different migrant groups interviewed in Bogotá this section provides three different comparisons. The first provides a comparison of the socioeconomic conditions in the place of longest residence among intra-urban, voluntary and forced migrants.³⁴ The second part provides paired comparisons of all variables in the place of longest residence before migrating to Bogotá and the place in Bogotá at the end of 2002. The third part of the analysis describes the relative socioeconomic conditions among four migrant groups in the place of residence by the end of 2002.

³⁴ The classification of the migrant groups that analyses in the next section is as defined in **Chapter 4**. It is based on the migration experience after leaving the parental home regardless of their department or municipality of origin.

Schedules H, I and J in the questionnaire of the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS) provide information to assess the socioeconomic conditions of the household. These variables can be grouped in: access to public services, characteristics of the dwelling, home ownership, consumption of durable goods, availability and access to education and health care services and self-assessment of general conditions, economic status and health status.

After analysing the distributions of categories in the variables measuring dwelling characteristics, I defined six variables that show variation among households. The variables are: walls made of brick, roofs of *teja* (tile), cement floors, dwellings with more than three rooms, dwellings with separate bathroom or/and kitchen, and access to electric power, running water and sewerage. Homeownership was described in a single variable that had three categories: whether the household head was the owner, renting or had other arrangements.³⁵ Consumption of durable goods was used as a proxy for the level of income of the family. The questionnaire asked if the household owned the following durable goods: radio, stove, oven, refrigerator, bicycle, telephone, washing machine, television and sewing machine.³⁶

The variables that measured availability and access to education are: whether a school was near the place of residence and whether school age persons (ages 5 to 19) attended school. For health care services I asked if there was a nearby health care centre, and if any of the household members received health care services. Finally, in order to compare self-perceptions about general well-being (happiness), health status and economic status the questionnaire included three questions:

- 1) How did you feel in general between 1990 and 2002? (very happy, happy, sad, very sad);
- 2) Did you feel that your health was: excellent, good, fair, bad?;
- 3) How did you classify your economic situation? (excellent, good, fair, bad).³⁷

³⁵ For irregular (or illegal) settlers that paid for their lot even if they did not have the titles of their properties they were considered owners. Examples of other arrangements were: occupants with permission of the owners without paying any rent. This was a common practice in Colombia and was called '*comodato*'.

³⁶ Motorcycle and automobile were also included in the questionnaire, but since their variance was very small I left them out of the analysis. Although I included a question on income in the questionnaire I preferred to use consumption of durable goods as a proxy for income than the income variable. I had few observations with exact values, and although I also asked income in brackets relative to the minimum wage the information was not as complete as the information collected for durable goods.

³⁷ These are examples on how the questions were asked. The questionnaire followed an ethnosurvey approach, as explained in **Chapter 4**.

Socioeconomic Conditions in the Place of Longest Residence

Table 5.4 contains descriptive statistics of all these variables in the place of longest residence for intra-urban, voluntary and forced migrants. In order to compare differences in socioeconomic status in the place of longest residence among intra-urban, voluntary and forced migrants, intra-urban migrants were chosen as the reference category. There were three reasons for expecting that forced migrants in the origin were doing better than voluntary migrants. First, if they were prosperous relative to their community members they would not have incentives to leave voluntarily. Second, if they were risk adverse then they would stay in their place of origin. Third, they fled because they were threatened or perceived a higher risk of being targeted by an actor of the armed conflict because they enjoyed some political or economic power in their community of origin. Intra-urban migrants were included in the analysis because information on retrospective socioeconomic characteristics in diverse areas of the city was useful to observe the differences between people living in Bogotá and other areas of Colombia.

The dwelling characteristics of forced and voluntary migrants in the place of longest residence were different. The hypothesis test indicated that brick walls, separate kitchen or/and bathrooms, and access to public services were more frequent for forced migrants than for voluntary migrants. This suggested relative better living conditions for forced migrants than for voluntary migrants in the place of origin. Intra-urban migrants in general were better off than voluntary migrants in the place of longest residence, except for the roofs' materials.

Data on homeownership did not reveal significantly differences between forced and voluntary migrants in the place of longest residence. I expected that homeownership would be more likely among forced migrants than among voluntary migrants. However, the data did not confirm my expectations. Voluntary migrants might not be among the poorest in their places of origin. Even if the living conditions of the voluntary migrants were worse than for forced migrants they were as likely to own their house. Intra-urban migrants were more likely to rent a house in their place of longest residence than voluntary and forced migrants.

Table 5.4: Percentage Distribution of Selected Household Characteristics in the Place of Longest Residence by Migrant Groups

Variable	Intra-urban Migrant (Ref) %	Voluntary Migrant %		Forced Migrant %	
N	(Chi Square)	(Chi Square)		(Chi Square)	
Dwelling characteristics					
Brick or concrete walls	78.32	40.15	*	50.00	*
	—	(87.32)		(3.88)	
Roofs of <i>teja</i>	37.54	49.24	*	51.04	
	—	(6.92)		(0.72)	
Cement or other materials in floors	49.84	42.42	*	42.71	
	—	(6.96)		(0.00)	
More than 3 rooms ^a	33.01	32.58		26.04	
	—	(2.03)		(1.87)	
With separate kitchen or/and bathroom	85.44	68.18	*	84.38	*
	—	(22.42)		(11.61)	
With access to electric power, sewerage and running water	76.70	39.39	*	52.08	*
	—	(10.16)		(6.48)	
Housing arrangement					
Owned	25.57	46.21	*	52.08	
Rented	57.28	31.06	*	32.29	
Other	17.15	22.73	*	15.63	
	—	(11.13)		(2.90)	
Consumption of durable goods					
Radio	83.82	77.27	*	83.33	
	—	(4.55)		(2.01)	
Stove	89.32	65.15	*	64.58	
	—	(9.51)		(0.01)	
Oven	17.48	16.67		12.50	
	—	(1.14)		(1.20)	
Refrigerator	29.13	19.70	*	28.13	*
	—	(1.36)		(4.31)	
Bicycle	31.39	19.70		26.04	
	—	(6.70)		(2.44)	
Telephone	47.57	12.88	*	20.83	*
	—	(4.12)		(5.41)	
Washing machine	9.39	3.03	*	8.33	*
	—	(2.47)		(9.19)	
Television	71.20	38.64	*	52.08	*
	—	(8.15)		(7.32)	
Sewing machine	15.21	17.42		14.58	
	—	(1.05)		(0.54)	

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.4: Percentage Distribution of Selected Household Characteristics in the Place of Longest Residence by Migrant Groups (continued)

Variable	Intra-urban Migrant (Ref) %	Voluntary Migrant %		Forced Migrant %	
	(Chi Square)	(Chi Square)		(Chi Square)	
Availability and access to education and health care					
Education					
School nearby	83.50	70.45	*	85.42	*
	—	(15.26)		(10.33)	
Persons attending school	58.25	69.70		69.79	
	—	(9.17)		(0.00)	
Health care services					
Health care centres nearby	69.58	52.27	*	69.79	*
	—	(17.11)		(11.81)	
Persons going to health care centres	55.99	55.30		70.83	*
	—	(5.06)		(9.37)	
Household head self-assessment					
General well-being status	78.64	81.06		72.92	*
	—	(4.18)		(4.15)	
Economic status	50.16	46.21		57.29	*
	—	(2.94)		(4.74)	
Health status	86.41	84.85		83.33	
	—	(0.58)		(0.17)	

^a Rooms considered were: living and dining rooms, bedrooms and other similar rooms. Garages, kitchens and bathrooms were excluded.

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

The comparison of consumption of durable goods indicated that forced and intra-urban migrants had higher income, or a higher consumption of durable goods, than voluntary migrants. Forced migrants and intra-urban migrants exhibited similar consumption of durable goods except for telephone and television, which was related to the restricted availability of communication stations in rural areas.

Access to education and health care services of forced migrants and intra-urban migrants in the places of longest residence was higher than for voluntary migrants, but there were no differences in coverage, except for forced migrants who were more likely to receive health care services.

The retrospective self-assessment of well-being was a controversial measure.³⁸ However the comparison across groups revealed that forced migrants were less happy than voluntary migrants in the place of origin, potentially because they associated the events that led them to leave the community. Their self-assessed economic status was higher than the self-assessment of voluntary migrants and consistent with their relative higher consumption of durable goods. There were no apparent differences between forced and intra-urban migrants. The self-assessed health status of the three groups was similar.

In order to summarise the information on **Table 5.4** I performed an exploratory factor analysis on the variables listed in **Table 5.5**. Although there were a number of methods and techniques to summarise and evaluate data on living conditions and socioeconomic status, I performed an exploratory factor analysis to investigate the nature of the underlying factors in the different dimensions of socioeconomic status among migrant groups.³⁹ To estimate the factors I used the values for these variables at the place in Bogotá at the end of 2002. The purpose of using the values at the destination rather than at the origin was to produce a consistent measure to compare living conditions before and after displacement. The rotated factor pattern resulting from an oblique rotation indicated that the principal variables loading in the four factors retained in the analysis were grouped as shown in **Table 5.5**. The groups of variables loading on each factor seemed to be related to four dimensions: access to public services (factor 1), consumption of durable goods (factor 2), dwelling characteristics (factor 3) and self-assessment of the household head (factor 4).

After performing the exploratory factor analysis on the factor of the destination place, I estimated using the regression coefficients for each factor loading four factors scores for each observation in the sample based on the values of the variables for the longest place of residence.

³⁸ R. Biswas-Diener, E. Diener and M. Tamir, 'The psychology of subjective well-being,' *Daedalus*, vol. 133, issue 2 (2004): pp. 18-25; R.A. Easterlin, 'The economics of happiness,' *Daedalus*, vol. 133, issue 2 (2004): pp. 26-33 and M. Ravallion and M. Lokshin, 'Subjective economic welfare,' Policy Research Working Paper No. 2106 (Washington, DC, 1999).

³⁹ I tried various assumptions for the correlation among the factors, after a careful verification of the orthogonal and oblique methods I used an oblique rotated factor pattern for this analysis. Since all the variables included were related to the socioeconomic status of the household in various dimensions, it was expected that the resulting factors were correlated. Correlations in **Table 5.6** shows factors 1, 2 and 3 were positively correlated among them. After an evaluation of initial Eigenvalues (12.31 for factor 1, 2.66 for factor 2, 1.34 for factor 3 and 0.89 for factor 4), scree test and rotated factor patterns I chose to retain 4 factors that had a meaningful interpretation.

Table 5.5: Variables Loading on Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 According to Rotated Factor Pattern, Four Factor Solution on Household Characteristics in Bogotá (2002)

Variables Loading on:
<i>Factor 1</i>
Dwelling with more than 3 rooms
Connected to running water
Connected to sewerage
<i>Factor 2</i>
Connected to electric power
Home ownership
Radio
Stove
Oven
Refrigerator
Bicycle
Telephone
Washing machine
Television
Sewing machine
<i>Factor 3</i>
Roofs of <i>teja</i>
Separate kitchen
Separate bathroom
Living in a house
Walls made of bricks or concrete
Cement floors
<i>Factor 4</i>
Self assessment of general well-being
Self assessment of health condition
Self assessment of economic condition

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008)

Table 5.6 presents a correlation matrix between migrant groups and factors. As expected there was a positive and significant correlation between intra-urban migrant and factors 1, 2 and 3. This pattern suggested that for intra-urban migrant households a high frequency of factor scores was larger than zero.⁴⁰ For voluntary migrants correlations for the first three factors were negative. For forced migrants only the correlation with factor 1 was significant and slightly negative. The correlations between factor 4 and migrant group were not significant.⁴¹

⁴⁰ The resulting factors were normally distributed with a mean of zero; and a standard deviation closed to one.

⁴¹ The scatter plots resulting from graphing the factors by migrant group were not clear. The clustering of observations did not provide any description of the pattern. Instead of showing scatter plots I showed a correlation matrix which conveyed the same information more clearly.

Table 5.6: Correlation Matrix of Factors and Migrant Classifications for the Place of Longest Residence

	Intra-urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Intra-urban Migrant	1.00						
Voluntary Migrant	-0.66 0.00	1.00					
Forced Migrant	-0.54 0.00	-0.27 0.00	1.00				
Factor 1	0.35 0.00	-0.30 0.00	-0.12 0.01	1.00			
Factor 2	0.26 0.00	-0.21 0.00	-0.09 0.03	0.59 0.00	1.00		
Factor 3	0.17 0.00	-0.14 0.00	-0.06 0.16	0.43 0.00	0.14 0.00	1.00	
Factor 4	0.02 0.69	0.00 0.96	-0.02 0.64	0.03 0.45	0.15 0.00	0.10 0.03	1.00

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

From the descriptive statistics presented in **Table 5.4** and the correlations in **Table 5.6** I concluded that forced migrants in the place of longest residence had a higher socioeconomic status, measured by living conditions and consumption of durable goods, than voluntary migrants. Intra-urban migrants were the group with the highest socioeconomic level among the three migrant groups in the place of longest residence.

The next step in the analysis is to explain which personal characteristics of the household head were useful to explain the variation in the estimated factor scores. Since each factor was a continuous dependent variable with an upper and lower bound I estimated a series of Tobit regression models.⁴² The specification of the general model is:

⁴² I tried OLS and Tobit regression. The coefficient estimates for the first set of models were equivalent. However, when I controlled for duration (explained in the next section) the coefficient estimates changed and the standard errors of the OLS regression were underestimated.

$$E(y_i|x_i) = P(a < y_i > b|x_i)E(y_i|a < y_i > b, x_i) + [1 - P(a < y_i > b|x_i)]E(y_i|a \geq y_i \leq b, x_i)$$

where:

y_i = estimated factor score

a = lower bound of factor y

b = upper bound of factor y

x_i = vector of variables with the characteristics of the household head

The personal characteristics of the household head included in the regression models were sex, age on the last year he/she lived in the residence they lived the longest before arriving at the place they were living at the end of 2002, years of education and type of migration experience. Years of education were considered as fixed because the migration experience was measured after they left the parental home and usually at this time in the life cycle education was completed unless they left the parental home to attend institutions of higher education.⁴³ Given the mean ages by migrant group reported in **Table 5.7** assuming time-fixed education was reasonable.

⁴³ The number of persons who migrated in order to pursue higher education in the sample was relatively small.

Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Included in Tobit Regression Models for the Place of Longest Residence

Variable	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
ALL MIGRANTS					
Characteristics of the household head					
Male	537	0.69	0.46	0	1
Age at the last year of residence	537	29.63	11.35	12	88
Years of education	537	5.15	3.08	0	16
Migration experience					
Intra-urban migrant	537	0.57	0.49	0	1
Voluntary migrant	537	0.25	0.43	0	1
Forced migrant	537	0.18	0.38	0	1
Duration					
Years spent in the place of residence	537	11.02	8.23	0	54
Dependent variables					
Factor 1	537	1.93	1.25	-0.16	3.79
Factor 2	537	1.21	0.93	-0.61	4.32
Factor 3	537	1.34	0.59	0.06	2.35
Factor 4	537	1.16	0.49	-0.23	1.99
INTRA-URBAN MIGRANTS					
Male	310	0.67	0.47	0	1
Age at the last year of residence	310	29.80	10.21	12	62
Years of education	310	5.48	2.97	0	16
Years spent in the place of residence	310	5.54	3.23	0	54
Factor 1	310	2.31	1.13	-0.16	3.79
Factor 2	310	1.41	0.88	-0.61	3.94
Factor 3	310	1.43	0.56	0.60	2.28
Factor 4	310	1.17	0.48	-0.19	1.99
VOLUNTARY MIGRANTS					
Male	135	0.69	0.46	0	1
Age at the last year of residence	135	28.11	12.49	12	62
Years of education	135	4.48	3.25	0	16
Years spent in the place of residence	135	4.59	2.46	0	49
Factor 1	135	1.29	1.23	-0.16	3.73
Factor 2	135	0.87	0.90	-0.60	4.32
Factor 3	135	1.20	0.63	-0.06	2.35
Factor 4	135	1.16	0.46	-0.11	1.90
FORCED MIGRANTS					
Male	92	0.74	0.44	0	1
Age at the last year of residence	92	31.21	12.94	12	88
Years of education	92	5.01	3.06	0	14
Years spent in the place of residence	92	11.82	9.06	0	42
Factor 1	92	1.62	1.20	-0.10	3.75
Factor 2	92	1.03	0.94	-0.54	3.97
Factor 3	92	1.27	0.60	0.06	2.20
Factor 4	92	1.14	0.54	0.23	1.89

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.8 shows the coefficient estimates for Tobit regression on four estimated factors. The coefficient estimates for education in all factors were significant and positive, meaning that education had a positive effect on dwelling characteristics: e.g., quality materials of construction, size and access to public services; consumption of durable goods, and self assessment of well-being. The estimated coefficients for the dummy variables for migration experiences of voluntary and forced migrants were negative, as expected. Voluntary migrants had lower socioeconomic status than intra-urban migrants in the place of longest residence in the three factors measuring living conditions and consumption of durable goods. Forced migrants were in disadvantage relative to intra-urban migrants but were better than voluntary migrants in the place of longest residence.

Differences in the duration of the time spent in the place of longest residence might explain differentials in living conditions. **Table 5.7** contains the average numbers of years spent in the place of longest residence by migrant group. Voluntary migrants had the lowest duration (4.59 years), followed by intra-urban migrants (5.54 years) and forced migrants (11.82 years). The time spent in the place of longest residence was on average more than double for forced migrants than for voluntary migrants.

Table 5.9 shows coefficient estimates of a second set of Tobit regression models on factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 controlling for the years spent in the place of longest residence. It was not clear from the estimated coefficients for the years spent in the place of longest residence had a substantial effect on socioeconomic status because the coefficients for the duration variable were small.

Table 5.8: Coefficient Estimates of Tobit Regression on Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the Place of Longest Residence

Variable	Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
	β		β		β		β	
	(S.E.)		(S.E.)		(S.E.)		(S.E.)	
Intercept	1.82	***	1.15	***	1.11	***	1.18	***
	(0.38)		(0.26)		(0.18)		(0.15)	
Characteristics of the household head								
Sex (Male=1)	0.03		-0.01		0.12	**	0.04	
	(0.12)		(0.08)		(0.06)		(0.05)	
Age at the last year of residence	0.02		-0.01		0.01		-0.01	
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Age squared	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Years of education	0.06	***	0.08	***	0.02	+	0.03	***
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Migration experience of the household head								
Intra-urban migrant (Ref)	—		—		—		—	
Voluntary migrant	-1.09	***	-0.51	***	-0.21	***	0.00	
	(0.14)		(0.09)		(0.06)		(0.05)	
Forced migrant	-0.68	***	-0.37	***	-0.17	*	-0.02	
	(0.15)		(0.10)		(0.07)		(0.06)	
Sigma	1.27	***	0.88	***	0.60	***	0.50	***
	(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
N								
	537		537		537		537	
Log Likelihood								
	852.99		-687.67		-494.77		-415.32	
AIC								
	1,722		1,391		1,006		846	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.9: Coefficient Estimates of Tobit Regression on Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the Place of Longest Residence: Controlling for Years Spent in Residence

Variable	Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
	β		β		β		β	
	(S.E.)		(S.E.)		(S.E.)		(S.E.)	
Intercept	1.76	***	1.04	***	1.13	***	1.16	***
	(0.39)		(0.26)		(0.18)		(0.15)	
Characteristics of the household head								
Sex (Male=1)	0.04		-0.01		0.13	*	0.04	
	(0.12)		(0.08)		(0.06)		(0.05)	
Age at the last year of residence	0.01		-0.01		0.01		-0.01	+
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Age squared	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Years of education	0.06	**	0.08	***	0.02	+	0.03	***
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Migration experience of the household head								
Intra-urban migrant (Ref)	—		—		—		—	
Voluntary migrant	-0.87	***	-0.22		-0.33	**	0.04	
	(0.24)		(0.16)		(0.11)		(0.09)	
Forced migrant	-0.24		-0.18		-0.24	*	0.01	
	(0.25)		(0.17)		(0.12)		(0.10)	
Duration								
Years spent in residence	0.02		0.01		0.00		0.01	*
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Years spent in residence squared	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	*
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Voluntary migrant * years spent in residence	-0.02		-0.03	**	0.01		0.00	
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Forced migrant * years spent in residence	-0.04	*	-0.02		0.01		0.00	
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Sigma	1.27	***	0.87	***	0.60	***	0.50	***
	(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
N								
	537		537		537		537	
Log Likelihood								
	850.09		-683.24		-493.77		-412.87	
AIC								
	1,776		1,390		1,012		849	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

I added interaction terms between migrant experience and duration in the place of residence to evaluate differential socioeconomic progress by migration experience in the place of longest residence. The negative and significant coefficient for the interaction term between duration in the place of longest residence and forced migrants indicated that over time there was increasing inequality between intra-urban migrants or people that were living in the city and the people living in areas at risk of being displaced. For factor 2 (consumption of durable goods) there was a negative and significant effect between duration in the place of residence and consumption of durable goods for voluntary migrants which might be related to declining income generating opportunities in other areas of the country, particularly rural areas or small cities during the economic recession.⁴⁴ The interaction terms for factors 3 and 4 were non-significant.⁴⁵

Changes in Socioeconomic Conditions between the Place of Longest Residence and the Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002

The second part of the analysis consists in evaluating differences in the socioeconomic status of intra-urban, voluntary and forced migrants between the place of longest residence and the residence in Bogotá at the end of 2002. **Table 5.10** shows mean and standard errors for the distribution of paired differences between the characteristics in the place of longest residence and the residence in Bogotá at the end of 2002. Negative signs indicate that the conditions in the residence in Bogotá were better than in the place of longest residence.

⁴⁴ In general the number of truncated observations was not higher than 25 percent in any of the eight models shown.

⁴⁵ In this analysis I did not show estimations for the marginal effects of the independent variables in the model because the factor scores did not have any tangible meaning. It is in my opinion the direction of the effect and the relative magnitude of the coefficients for the dummy variables for migration experience what is relevant in this case. To estimate the marginal effects of the estimated coefficients I would use the following formula:

$$\frac{\partial E(y)}{\partial x_j} = \Phi(z) \beta_j$$

where $z = \beta x / \sigma$

Table 5.10: T-Test for Pair Wise Differences in Household Characteristics between the Place of Longest Residence and the Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002

Variable	Intra-urban Migrant Mean (S.E.)		Voluntary Migrant Mean (S.E.)		Forced Migrant Mean (S.E.)	
Dwelling characteristics						
Brick or concrete walls	0.06 (0.03)		-0.30 (0.06)	***	-0.13 (0.07)	+
Roofs of <i>teja</i>	-0.08 (0.04)	*	-0.05 (0.05)		0.07 (0.06)	
Cement floors	-0.13 (0.03)	***	-0.24 (0.06)	***	-0.17 (0.06)	*
More than three rooms	-0.15 (0.03)	***	-0.10 (0.06)	+	0.02 (0.05)	
Separate kitchen	-0.06 (0.02)	*	-0.04 (0.03)		0.03 (0.04)	
Separate bathroom	-0.07 (0.02)	***	-0.26 (0.04)	***	-0.13 (0.04)	**
Independent house	-0.11 (0.03)	***	-0.07 (0.03)	*	-0.07 (0.04)	+
Access to public services						
Running water	0.13 (0.04)	***	-0.08 (0.06)		0.33 (0.06)	***
Sewerage	0.13 (0.04)	***	-0.07 (0.06)		0.39 (0.07)	***
Electric power	-0.06 (0.02)	***	-0.32 (0.04)	***	-0.18 (0.05)	***
Home ownership	-0.77 (0.02)	***	-0.31 (0.06)	***	-0.07 (0.07)	
Consumption of durable goods						
Radio	-0.09 (0.02)	***	-0.12 (0.04)	**	0.03 (0.05)	
Stove	-0.09 (0.02)	***	-0.33 (0.04)	***	-0.29 (0.05)	***
Oven	0.00 (0.03)		0.02 (0.04)		0.00 (0.04)	
Refrigerator	-0.20 (0.03)	***	-0.20 (0.05)	***	-0.07 (0.06)	
Bicycle	-0.08 (0.03)	*	-0.09 (0.05)	+	0.07 (0.05)	
Telephone	-0.04 (0.04)		-0.22 (0.05)	***	0.06 (0.05)	
Washing machine	0.00 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.03)		0.04 (0.03)	
Television	-0.16 (0.03)	***	-0.42 (0.05)	***	-0.26 (0.06)	***
Sewing machine	0.03 (0.02)		-0.03 (0.04)		0.08 (0.04)	*

Table 5.10: T-Test for Pair Wise Differences in Household Characteristics between the Place of Longest Residence and the Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002 (continued)

Variable	Intra-urban Migrant Mean (S.E.)		Voluntary Migrant Mean (S.E.)		Forced Migrant Mean (S.E.)	
Household head self-assessment						
General well-being	0.10 (0.03)	**	0.13 (0.05)	*	0.19 (0.07)	*
Health status	0.23 (0.03)	***	0.27 (0.05)	***	0.27 (0.06)	***
Economic status	0.21 (0.04)	***	0.23 (0.05)	***	0.48 (0.06)	***
Availability and access to:						
Education						
School nearby	-0.09 (0.03)	**	-0.24 (0.04)	***	-0.03 (0.05)	
Persons attending school	0.08 (0.04)	*	0.14 (0.06)	*	0.17 (0.07)	*
Health care						
Health care centres nearby	-0.09 (0.04)	*	-0.38 (0.05)	***	-0.08 (0.06)	
Persons getting health care services	0.11 (0.04)	**	-0.01 (0.05)		0.07 (0.07)	
Duration in residence						
Years	3.35 (0.54)	***	5.42 (1.00)	***	7.44 (1.01)	***

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Voluntary migrants were enjoying relatively better living conditions in Bogotá than in the place of longest residence, better housing and more access to public services. For forced migrants the differences did not show a consistent pattern. A large number of displaced persons had brick walls, cement floors and separate bathrooms in Bogotá but less access to running water and sewerage. This was explained by the resettlement patterns in Bogotá. As mentioned in the previous section, forced migrants were likely to arrive to the city and settle in irregular areas in the periphery where the provision of public services was not available.

Differences in living conditions between the place of longest residence and the place in Bogotá in 2002 for intra-urban migrants were not conclusive regarding improving or declining living conditions. In the place of longest residence they enjoyed more frequently access to sewerage and running water. As forced migrants, intra-urban migrants settled on the periphery of Bogotá because they bought a lot in an underdeveloped area where the provision of public services was scarce.

The informal (and sometimes illegal) market for urban lots was very active in the periphery of Bogotá. Since the provision of services was scarce the price of the lots was affordable for low income families. For intra-urban and voluntary migrants the frequency of homeownership increased in the Bogotá residence relative to the place of longest residence. The effect was smaller and non-significant for forced migrants revealing a relative disadvantage in homeownership opportunities in impoverished areas in urban centres relative to the other migrant groups, but not relative to homeownership in the place of origin. The differences for the consumption of durable goods between the place of longest residence and the place in Bogotá revealed that voluntary migrants had more appliances in 2002 than before. Intra-urban migrants also reported a higher consumption of durable goods. Voluntary migrants seemed to be the group with the largest increment in income over time.

As expected in general the differences indicated that forced migrants were not doing better at Bogotá in 2002 than in the place they lived longest. However, there were three items with different consumption frequency: stove, television and sewing machine. Stove and television were articles which increased over time for three groups which could be explained by better access to electric energy, but in both items differences over time were lower for forced migrants compared to voluntary migrants. Forced migrants were more likely to own sewing machines in the places of longest residence. As an appliance related to informal job opportunities, this was an indication of loss of productive assets due to unexpected departure.

Differences in the self-assessment revealed that, with respect to economic and health status all groups were doing better in the place of longest residence than in Bogotá at the end of 2002. The magnitude of the coefficients was in general similar. However, the large difference of means for the self-assessed economic situation of forced migrants suggested a sense of loss in their income and wealth between the place of longest residence and in Bogotá by 2002.

Availability and access to education and health care were important for all migrant groups, particularly if one of the objectives of the migration was to seek educational opportunities for school age members of the household. Voluntary and intra-urban migrants reported increased availability of schools in Bogotá by 2002 than in the place of longest residence. However, the coverage of education could have decreased because of the overloading of educational facilities. In many of the interviews a recurring claim of the respondents was the lack of quotas available in the schools and the problematic process of enrolment of colloquial children.

Health care facilities were more available in Bogotá than in the place of longest residence for voluntary and intra-urban migrants. The coefficient for forced migrants was small and non-significant suggesting similar access in both locations. The coverage for voluntary and forced migrants did not show any difference, but it decreased for intra-urban migrants.

The last variable in **Table 5.10** is the difference in years spent in the longest place of residence and in Bogotá by 2002. As expected, all groups lived more years in the longest place of residence than in Bogotá.

Socioeconomic Conditions in the Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002

The last part of the analysis compares socioeconomic status among migrant groups in Bogotá at the end of 2002. In this section non-migrant households were added to the analysis. I described the characteristics of the household by migrant group taking non-migrants as the reference category, performed an exploratory factor analysis and presented regression models on the estimated factor scores.

Table 5.11 contains the percentage distribution of the five groups of variables mentioned earlier. The reported percentage distribution of dwellings with brick walls, more than three rooms and access to public services suggested that non-migrants were the group with the best living conditions, followed by intra-urban migrants. Voluntary migrants had worse living conditions than non-migrants, but better living conditions than forced migrants. Forced migrants were the least advantaged group.

The data suggested that the housing arrangement and homeownership patterns of voluntary, intra-urban and non-migrants were similar. Forced migrants showed different patterns. Forced migrants were less likely to be owners and more likely to be renters or to have other types of housing arrangements than voluntary migrants. Regarding consumption of durable goods the data suggested the same pattern as for living conditions. Non-migrants were the group with the highest consumption of durable goods. The second group was intra-urban migrants and their consumption levels were higher than for voluntary migrants. Forced migrants were the least advantaged group.

Availability of schools for forced migrants was lower than for voluntary migrants, but those forced migrants who had schools nearby were more likely to attend than non-migrants and intra-urban migrants. The availability of schools for non-migrants and intra-urban migrants were 96.97 percent and 92.23 percent respectively but access to education seemed limited for these groups.⁴⁶ Access to education was lower for non-migrants and intra-urban migrants than for voluntary migrants.

Measures of self-assessment of well-being, economic status and health status revealed that forced migrants' evaluation of their economic status was low in 2002 relative to voluntary migrants. Voluntary migrant perceptions on their economic status were similar to non-migrants' perceptions. The data suggested that intra-urban migrants were more optimistic about their economic situation. Non-migrants and intra-urban migrants claimed that their health status was very good more frequently than voluntary and forced migrants.

⁴⁶ These figures were adjusted for the presence of school age persons in the interviewed household.

Table 5.11: Percentage Distribution of Selected Household Characteristics in Bogotá at the End of 2002

Variable	Non-Migrant (Ref) % (Chi Square)	Intra-urban Migrant % (Chi Square)		Voluntary Migrant % (Chi Square)		Forced Migrant % (Chi Square)	
N	66	310		135		92	
Dwelling characteristics							
Brick or concrete walls	87.88 —	72.82 (0.83)	*	70.45 (5.63)	*	62.50 (2.91)	+
Roofs of <i>teja</i>	54.55 —	45.95 (7.63)	*	53.79 (3.02)		43.75 (3.89)	*
Cement floors	65.15 —	62.46 (2.47)		66.67 (2.07)		59.38 (2.30)	
More than three rooms	75.76 —	48.22 (3.20)	+	43.18 (12.55)	*	23.96 (14.46)	*
With separate kitchen or/and bathroom	93.94 —	91.91 (1.08)		90.15 (1.07)		89.58 (0.03)	
With access to electric power, sewerage and running water	95.45 —	64.40 (31.36)	*	48.48 (33.38)	*	17.71 (36.39)	
Housing arrangement							
Owned	69.70	77.02		77.28		59.38	*
Rented	15.15	14.89		14.39		28.12	*
Other	15.15 —	8.09 (0.08)		8.33 (4.20)		12.50 (18.57)	*
Consumption of durable goods							
Radio	96.97 —	92.56 (3.27)	+	89.39 (3.99)	*	80.21 (8.53)	*
Stove	96.97 —	98.71 (1.33)		97.73 (0.17)		93.75 (6.85)	*
Oven	27.27 —	17.80 (1.69)		15.15 (1.55)	*	12.50 (0.52)	
Refrigerator	57.58 —	49.51 (13.27)	*	39.39 (7.14)	*	35.42 (0.63)	
Bicycle	36.36 —	39.16 (16.20)	*	28.79 (1.85)		18.75 (4.72)	*
Telephone	78.79 —	51.78 (39.01)	*	34.85 (26.19)	*	14.58 (17.37)	*
Washing machine	21.21 —	9.71 (11.97)	*	5.30 (3.29)	*	4.17 (0.25)	
Television	92.42 —	86.73 (6.47)	*	81.06 (5.55)	*	78.13 (0.54)	
Sewing machine	15.15 —	11.97 (13.65)	*	20.45 (12.14)		6.25 (11.90)	*

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.11: Percentage Distribution of Selected Household Characteristics in Bogotá at the End of 2002 (continued)

Variable	Non-Migrant (Ref) % (Chi Square)	Intra-urban Migrant % (Chi Square)	Voluntary Migrant % (Chi Square)	Forced Migrant % (Chi Square)	
N	66	310	135	92	
Availability and access to education and health care					
Education					
School nearby	96.97 —	92.23 (1.58)	93.94 (1.06)	88.54 (4.91)	*
Persons attending school	50.85 —	55.64 (17.03)	* 67.68 (7.64)	* 60.24 (2.10)	
Health care services					
Health care centres nearby	93.94 —	78.64 (46.09)	* 90.15 (22.06)	78.13 (15.63)	*
Persons going to health care centres	42.42 —	44.98 (15.39)	56.06 (4.98)	63.54 (2.18)	
Household head self-assessment					
General well-being status	69.70 —	68.61 (0.03)	68.18 (0.07)	54.17 (8.69)	*
Economic status	24.24 —	28.80 (4.87)	* 23.48 (0.02)	9.38 (10.63)	*
Health status	71.21 —	63.75 (4.82)	* 57.58 (5.02)	* 56.25 (0.07)	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Adopting the same methods I used to analyse the differences in living conditions among the migrant groups in the place of longest residence, I estimated four factor scores that measured four dimensions of well-being: living conditions, consumption of durable goods, dwelling characteristics and self-assessment of well-being. The factor loadings were grouped as mentioned in **Table 5.5**.

Table 5.12 shows correlations between migrant groups and estimated factor scores in Bogotá at the end of 2002. The correlation coefficients for factor 1 and migrant groups revealed that the most advantage groups in terms of access to basic amenities and larger dwellings were non-migrants followed by intra-urban migrants, which demonstrated positive and significant correlations. Voluntary and forced migrants were less advantaged. The correlations with factor 1 and these two groups were negative. The correlation for voluntary migrants was weak (-0.08), but the correlation coefficient for forced migrants was negative and larger (-0.34).

The seventh row in the correlation matrix demonstrated the correlation coefficients between factor 2 (consumption of durable goods) and migrant groups. The pattern was similar to the pattern observed in factor 1. Non-migrants reported higher frequency in the consumption of durable goods, followed by intra-urban migrants, voluntary migrants and forced migrants in this order. The correlation between access to electric power, homeownership and consumption of durable goods was negative and significant for forced migrants.

The correlations between factor 3 and migrant groups were weak and non-significant. The correlations between the fourth factor and migrant groups were significant and positive for intra-urban migrants, and significant and negative for forced migrants. The results for non-migrants and voluntary migrants in the self-assessed measures showed no differences.

The last part of the analysis consists in a series of regression models to analyse which of the characteristics of the household head were responsible for the variations in the estimated four factor scores. **Table 5.13** includes descriptive statistics by migration group of the variables included in the analysis. Additional to the variables for the models of the longest place of residence, I included whether or not the spouse was present.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ I tried various model specifications including the education of the spouse and the presence of minors in the household. I dropped them out of the regression models because they did not help to explain the variation in the estimated factor scores.

Table 5.12: Correlation Matrix of Factors and Migrant Classifications in Bogotá at the End of 2002

	Non-Migrant	Intra-urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Non-Migrant	1.00							
Intra-urban Migrant	-0.36 0.00	1.00						
Voluntary Migrant	-0.19 0.00	-0.54 0.00	1.00					
Forced Migrant	-0.15 0.00	-0.45 0.00	-0.23 0.00	1.00				
Factor 1	0.28 0.00	0.14 0.00	-0.08 0.04	-0.34 0.00	1.00			
Factor 2	0.17 0.00	0.11 0.01	-0.07 0.08	-0.22 0.00	0.48 0.00	1.00		
Factor 3	0.06 0.15	-0.01 0.84	0.02 0.56	-0.06 0.12	0.25 0.00	0.43 0.00	1.00	
Factor 4	0.04 0.34	0.11 0.01	-0.02 0.55	-0.15 0.00	-0.02 0.57	0.43 0.00	0.15 0.00	1.00

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.13: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Included in Tobit Regression Models for the Place of Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002

Variable	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
ALL MIGRANTS					
Characteristics of the household head					
Male	603	0.68	0.47	0	1
Age at the last year of residence	603	41.13	12.71	18	90
Years of education	603	5.22	3.11	0	16
Spouse present	603	0.76	0.43	0	1
Migration experience					
Intra-urban migrant	603	0.51	0.50	0	1
Voluntary migrant	603	0.22	0.41	0	1
Forced migrant	603	0.16	0.37	0	1
Duration					
Years spent in Bogotá place at the end of 2002	603	7.49	7.09	0	42
Dependent variables					
Factor 1	603	0.00	0.98	-1.46	1.07
Factor 2	603	0.00	0.84	-2.60	2.22
Factor 3	603	0.00	0.83	-2.20	1.04
Factor 4	603	0.00	0.77	-1.75	1.60
NON-MIGRANTS					
Male	66	0.61	0.49	0	1
Age at the last year of residence	66	37.41	11.55	18	73
Years of education	66	5.79	3.36	0	14
Spouse present	66	0.80	0.40	0	1
Years spent in Bogotá place at the end of 2002	66	16.08	8.92	3	42
Factor 1	66	0.78	0.40	-1.24	1.07
Factor 2	66	0.41	0.81	-1.60	2.22
Factor 3	66	0.14	0.68	-1.76	0.90
Factor 4	66	0.09	0.78	-1.45	1.29
INTRA-URBAN MIGRANTS					
Male	310	0.67	0.47	0	1
Age at the last year of residence	310	39.96	11.38	18	75
Years of education	310	5.48	2.97	0	16
Spouse present	310	0.78	0.41	0	1
Years spent in Bogotá place at the end of 2002	310	6.59	5.78	0	28
Factor 1	310	0.14	0.96	-1.41	1.06
Factor 2	310	0.09	0.83	-1.97	2.09
Factor 3	310	-0.01	0.82	-2.08	1.04
Factor 4	310	0.08	0.76	-1.75	1.60

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.13: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Included in Tobit Regression Models for the Place of Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002 (continued)

Variable	N	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
VOLUNTARY MIGRANTS					
Male	135	0.69	0.46	0	1
Age at the last year of residence	135	45.49	14.67	19	86
Years of education	135	4.48	3.25	0	16
Spouse present	135	0.70	0.46	0	1
Years spent in Bogotá place at the end of 2002	135	7.58	7.45	0	37
Factor 1	135	-0.15	0.97	-1.46	1.05
Factor 2	135	-0.11	0.76	-2.60	2.01
Factor 3	135	0.03	0.83	-2.20	0.92
Factor 4	135	-0.04	0.77	-1.53	1.44
FORCED MIGRANTS					
Male	92	0.74	0.44	0	1
Age at the last year of residence	92	41.47	13.23	21	90
Years of education	92	5.01	3.06	0	14
Spouse present	92	0.74	0.44	0	1
Years spent in Bogotá place at the end of 2002	92	4.34	3.93	0	25
Factor 1	92	-0.77	0.79	-1.43	1.02
Factor 2	92	-0.41	0.78	-2.38	1.58
Factor 3	92	-0.12	0.91	-1.87	0.95
Factor 4	92	-0.26	0.71	-1.65	1.12

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

The coefficient estimates for the first set of Tobit regression models are displayed in **Table 5.14**. The results suggested a positive relation between years of education and socioeconomic status. Spouse presence also had a positive relation with socioeconomic status for non-migrants, intra-urban and voluntary migrants. The coefficient estimate for spouse presence was not significant for forced migrants, suggesting that the socioeconomic conditions neither improved nor declined if the household had two heads or just one.

The coefficient estimates for the dummy variables for migrant groups confirmed what I discussed earlier. There was a gradient in the estimated coefficients for the models on estimated factor scores 1 and 2. Non-migrants were consistently the group enjoying the relative highest socioeconomic status among the four groups. The next group was intra-urban migrants, which were not doing as well as non-migrants, but their living conditions and consumption of durable goods were higher than for voluntary migrants and forced migrants. Voluntary migrants were doing better than forced migrants.

Finally, the regression estimated coefficients for forced migrants for the four models demonstrated that forced migrants were the group with the worst access to basic amenities, the lowest levels of consumption of durable goods, the poorest living conditions and also the lowest assessment of well-being.

One potential explanation of the poor conditions of the internally displaced was that they did not spend enough time in the city to adapt to the new urban environment. To test if time had any effects in the estimated factor scores I estimated the same set of regression adding years spent in Bogotá until the end of 2002 and interaction terms for voluntary and forced migrants.⁴⁸

The estimated coefficients for the duration variable and changes in the magnitude of the coefficients for the dummy variables for migrant group in **Table 5.15** indeed indicated that the time played a role in the likelihood of access to basic amenities, consumption of durable goods, improving dwelling characteristics and self-assessment of well-being. Estimated coefficients for years spent in Bogotá at the end of 2002 were positive and significant for all factor scores. Comparing the regression coefficients for migrant groups in **Table 5.14**, with those in **Table 5.15**, I noticed that the marginal effect of the migrant experience of the household head decreased when duration in the place of residence was fixed, particularly for factors one and two.

The interaction terms for duration and voluntary migration suggested that for voluntary migrants each additional year in the city had an additional positive effect upon their access to basic amenities in comparison to non-migrants and intra-urban migrants. Duration did not have any additional affects for forced migrants.

⁴⁸ I estimated the regression with an interaction term for duration and intra-urban migration. In any of the models the coefficient was significant and the fitness of the model did not improved.

Table 5.14: Coefficient Estimates of Tobit Regression on Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the Place of Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002

Variables	Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4		
	β		β		β		β		
	(S.E.)		(S.E.)		(S.E.)		(S.E.)		
Intercept	-1.37	***	-1.67	***	-0.53		0.07		
	(0.35)		(0.32)		(0.34)		(0.31)		
Characteristics of the household head									
Sex (Male=1)	-0.15	+	0.02		0.02		0.18	*	
	(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		
Age	0.06	***	0.06	***	0.01		-0.01		
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		
Age squared	0.00	**	0.00	***	0.00		0.00		
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		
Years of education	0.05	***	0.06	***	0.03	*	0.03	**	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		
Spouse present	0.31	**	0.35	***	0.24	**	0.10		
	(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.08)		
Migration experience of the household head									
Non-migrant (Ref)	—		—		—		—		
Intra-urban migrant	-0.69	***	-0.34	***	-0.15		0.01		
	(0.11)		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.10)		
Voluntary migrant	-1.04	***	-0.52	***	-0.12		-0.04		
	(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.11)		
Forced migrant	-1.58	***	-0.82	***	-0.26	*	-0.32	**	
	(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.12)		
Sigma	0.83	***	0.76	***	0.81	***	0.74	***	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		

N	603		603		603		603		
Log Likelihood	-745.94		688.60		728.26		670.24		
AIC	1,512		1,397		1,477		1,360		

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.15: Coefficient Estimates of Tobit Regression on Factors 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the Place of Residence in Bogotá at the End of 2002: Controlling for Years Spent in Residence

Variables	Factor 1		Factor 2		Factor 3		Factor 4	
	β		β		β		β	
	(S.E.)		(S.E.)		(S.E.)		(S.E.)	
Intercept	-1.65	***	-1.86	***	-0.54		0.03	
	(0.34)		(0.31)		(0.34)		(0.31)	
Characteristics of the household head								
Sex (Male=1)	-0.13		0.03		0.03		0.18	*
	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Age	0.06	***	0.05	***	0.00		-0.02	+
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Age squared	0.00	**	0.00	***	0.00		0.00	
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Years of education	0.04	**	0.06	***	0.03	*	0.03	**
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Spouse present	0.24	**	0.31	***	0.23	*	0.08	
	(0.09)		(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.08)	
Migration experience of the household head								
Non-migrant (Ref)	—		—		—		—	
Intra-urban migrant	-0.40	**	-0.08		-0.05		0.19	+
	(0.13)		(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.12)	
Voluntary migrant	-0.94	***	-0.24		0.00		0.32	*
	0.18		0.17		0.18		0.17	
Forced migrant	-1.28	***	-0.55	**	-0.10		-0.14	
	(0.19)		(0.18)		(0.20)		(0.18)	
Duration								
Years spent in Bogotá residence in 2002	0.07	***	0.05	***	0.04	**	0.02	+
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.01)	
Years spent in Bogotá residence in 2002 squared	0.00	**	0.00		0.00	*	0.00	
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Voluntary migrant * years spent in 2002 residence	0.03	*	0.00		0.00		-0.03	*
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Forced migrant * years spent in 2002 residence	0.02		0.02		0.00		0.01	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Sigma	0.79	***	0.74	***	0.80	***	0.73	***
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
N								
	603		603		603		603	
Log Likelihood								
	-717.01		-672.88		-723.46		-665.41	
AIC								
	1,462		1,374		1,475		1,357	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Migration Labour Adaptation

Patterns of migrant labour adaptation have been widely studied. Researchers have shown that immigrants tended to experience downward occupational mobility relative to their position at origin.⁴⁹ A variety of factors explained this pattern. Immigrant skills might not be perfectly transferable between origin and destination. Immigrants usually lacked labour market information. They could face entry barriers in employment that required credentials or certifications, particularly in urban labour market and specialised occupations. Immigrants might have lower levels of human capital compared to the native population. In addition, the process of migration could be considered as disruptive event in a working career. Other factors to consider were the role of asymmetric information and immigrant discrimination. Moreover, initial low labour market performance could be explained by distance moved and economic conditions at destination labour market for internal migrants.⁵⁰

These studies have also explored that the initial relative labour migrant disadvantage was overcome over time. The patterns of labour adaptation (measured in earning or occupational mobility) showed a U shape: starting at the origin, there was a decline in the probability of employment or occupational mobility associated with migration, but as immigrants spent time at destination they improved their performance in the labour market. This pattern was steep for high-skilled immigrants and shallow for low-skilled immigrants.⁵¹

⁴⁹ G.J. Borjas, S.G. Bronars and S.J. Trejo, 'Assimilation and the earnings of young internal migrants,' *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 74, no. 1 (1992): pp. 170-175; G.J. Borjas and M. Tienda, 'The employment and wages of legalised immigrants,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 27, no. 4 (1993): pp. 712-747; B.R. Chiswick, 'Occupational change among United-States immigrants,' *Monthly Labour Review*, vol. 101, no. 3 (1978): pp. 29-30; B.R. Chiswick, 'Are immigrants favourably self-selected?,' *American Economic Review*, vol. 89, no. 2 (1999): pp. 181-185; B.R. Chiswick, Y. Cohen and T. Zach, 'The labour market status of immigrants: effects of the unemployment rate at arrival and duration of residence,' *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, vol. 50, no. 2 (1997): pp. 289-303; I. McAllister, 'Occupational mobility among immigrants: the impact of migration on economic success in Australia,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 29, no. 2: pp. 441-468 and F. Yamauchi, 'Are experience and schooling complementary?: evidence from migrants' assimilation in the Bangkok labour market,' *Journal of Development Economics*, vol. 74, no. 2 (2004): pp. 489-513.

⁵⁰ G.J. Borjas, S.G. Bronars and S.J. Trejo, 'Assimilation and the earnings of young internal migrants,' *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 74, no. 1 (1992): pp. 170-175.

⁵¹ B.R. Chiswick, Y.L. Lee and P.W. Miller, 'Patterns of immigrant occupational attainment in a longitudinal survey,' *International Migration*, vol. 41, no. 4 (2003): pp. 47-69 and J. Long, 'Rural-urban migration and socioeconomic mobility in Victorian Britain,' *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 65, no. 1 (2005): pp. 1-35.

Although, this pattern was similar for all migrant groups (economic, tied or forced) there was contention in the literature about how different migrant groups adapted to the labour markets at destination. It was argued that forced migrants and tied migrants demonstrated greater disadvantages when arriving at their destinations and although their labour market performance improved over time, their disadvantages did not disappear.⁵² However, Katena Cortes found that there are different time horizons between refugees and economic migrants.⁵³ Refugees who are unwilling or unable to return home, have more incentives to invest in destination-specific human capital and over time would exhibit higher rates of human accumulation that would improve their labour market performance.

Jorge Balán argued that factors influencing relative occupational success of migrants when compared to natives are the rate of creation of new jobs in sectors of high productivity and the degree to which formal requirements are built into the city's occupational structure.⁵⁴ Using data from Latin American countries, Balán found that migrants from rural areas who lacked credentials were disadvantaged with regard to occupational mobility. For forced migrants, not only their lack of credentials could be a barrier, but in addition, sometimes they lacked identification documents.⁵⁵

Education and performance in the labour market were closely related. Using data from the 1995 Population Census in Israel, Shira Offer found that education was an important factor for explaining differences in the probabilities of employment between Israelis of Ethiopian origin and other Israelis.⁵⁶ Although education was suggested to be the avenue for upward mobility for the Ethiopian community in Israel, their low levels of education might have some deteriorating effects in the occupational mobility of the group in the long run. If they did not go to school because they did not have enough resources, consequently they would not have enough education to generate resources in

⁵² B.R. Chiswick, Y.L. Lee and P.W. Miller, 'Patterns of immigrant occupational attainment in a longitudinal survey,' *International Migration*, vol. 41, no. 4 (2003): pp. 47-69.

⁵³ K.E. Cortes, 'Are refugees different from economic immigrants?: some empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of immigrant groups in the United States,' *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 86, no. 2 (2004): pp. 465-480.

⁵⁴ J. Balán, 'Migrant-native socioeconomic differences in Latin American cities: a structural analysis,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1969): pp. 3-29.

⁵⁵ E. Mooney and B. Jarrah, 'Safeguarding IDP voting rights,' *Forced Migration Review*, issue 23 (2005): p. 55. During data collection, I noticed that IDPs frequently complained about the high cost of transportation and the lack of identification documents. The *Red de Solidaridad Social* implemented a special programme for issuing basic identifications (birth certificated and citizenship cards – *cedulas de ciudadanía*) to the IDPs.

⁵⁶ S. Offer, 'The socio-economic integration of the Ethiopian community in Israel,' *International Migration*, vol. 42, issue 3 (2004): pp. 29-55.

the future. Therefore, they were at risk of enter in a vicious circle. This same argument might be applied to the internally displaced persons. Their low performance in the labour market, or their lower probabilities of employment in the formal labour market might be explained by differences in the educational attainment, rather than on skill transferability. Internally displaced persons came mainly from rural areas. If the differences in the educational attainment of the rural and the urban population were considerable, then the poor adaptation of the internally displaced persons into urban labour markets was explained by structural differences in the provision of education, rather than by lack of experience in the urban labour market as it has been suggested.

As mentioned in **Chapter 4**, self-positive selection of economic migrants explained their relative advantage in the labour market. Using data collected in Monterrey, Mexico, Harley Browning and Waltraut Feindt found that the positive selection of migrants decreased by migrant cohort.⁵⁷ They suggested that those less positive self-selected newer cohorts, in which married males with families were migrating into the city, had more difficulties in adapting to the labour market than the older positively self-selected cohorts. Their findings might imply that as the degree of positive self-selection declined the adaptation to the labour market in the urban destination was less successful within a given period of time.

In this part I explore labour patterns of internally displaced, economic and tied migrants to Bogotá. The questions driving the analysis are:

- 1) Did occupation profiles in the areas of origin differ for internally displaced and voluntary migrants?
- 2) Did the probability of employment at destination differ by migration experience?
- 3) Which were the variables related to the probability of being employed in a specific occupation in a certain location at a given point in time?

⁵⁷ H.L Browning and W. Feindt, 'Selectivity of migrants to a metropolis in a developing country: a Mexican case study,' *Demography*, vol. 6, no. 4 (1969): pp. 347-357.

Labour Adaptation of Forced Migrants

The labour adaptation of refugees has been more widely studied than the labour adaptation of the internally displaced persons for two reasons. First, because internal displacement is a more recent phenomenon due to increasing numbers of internal conflicts. Second, because comparable data on internally displaced persons is scarce.

The literature on refugee resettlement suggested that self-identification of refugees, attitudes towards displacement, ideological orientation in exile, cultural compatibility, social receptiveness and population policies of the host community helped explain refugee outcomes in areas of reception. Those who chose to stay in host areas receptive to the needs of the newcomers would be more successful in their adaptation and integration to the new community than those who were expecting to return or were not welcomed by the host community.⁵⁸ In-depth interviews of Vietnamese refugees, Christine Finnan found that downward occupational mobility of immigrants was associated with the image they shaped on themselves during resettlement.⁵⁹

The literature on the experience of forced migrants in urban settings indicated that forced migration had pervasive effects on the productivity of forced migrants.⁶⁰ It has been suggested that forced migrants lowered their productivity in urban settings because of their rural origin. Internally displaced persons who arrived to urban areas had not developed skills in areas different than agriculture.⁶¹ In addition to their lack of skills to participate in the urban labour markets, the timing of their displacement might be correlated with times of economic difficulties at the macro level that increased competition in the labour market and made their adaptation more difficult.⁶²

⁵⁸ E.F. Kunz, 'Exile and resettlement: refugee theory,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1981): pp. 42-51.

⁵⁹ C.R. Finnan, 'Occupational assimilation of refugees,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1981): pp. 292-309.

⁶⁰ C. Davenport, W. Moore and S. Poe, 'Sometimes you just have to leave: domestic threats and forced migration, 1964-1989,' *International Interactions*, vol. 29, issue 1 (2003): pp. 27-55.

⁶¹ U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), *The wall of denial: internal displacement in Turkey* (Washington, DC, 2003).

⁶² P. Collier [et al.], *Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy* (Washington, DC, 2003): pp. 13-19 and K. Kumar, 'The nature and focus of international assistance for rebuilding war-torn societies,' in K. Kumar (ed.) *Rebuilding societies after civil war: critical roles for international assistance* (Boulder, CO, 1996): pp. 1-38.

The internally displaced in urban areas of Khartoum (Sudan),⁶³ Huambo (Angola)⁶⁴ and Lima⁶⁵ were often facing long periods of unemployment. Since income generating activities in the formal labour market were not accessible, they adopted strategies using their labour force and social networks. The following activities were common among the internally displaced: trading fruits and vegetables, working in small businesses, washing clothes, household chores, and participation in food for work programmes. Among the displaced household income generating strategies included child labour, inter- and intra-city migration and labour migration of household members. Similar income generating activities were observed in Indonesia among households as a response to the 1997 economic recession.⁶⁶ In conclusion, the participation of internally displaced persons in the informal labour markets already existent in the host areas was prevalent.

Internally displaced persons also used their social networks to generate coping strategies. They might marry off their daughters early and borrow from kin. Jeremy Hein argued that like immigrants, refugees organised migration through social networks, but the composition of the networks and the effects of migration on social identity differed. Forced migrants had a closer relation with the state as provider of support and opportunities.⁶⁷

⁶³ K. Jacobsen, S. Lautze and A.M.K. Osman, 'The Sudan: the unique challenges of displacement in Khartoum,' in M. Vincent and B.R. Sorensen (eds.), *Caught between borders: response strategies of the internally displaced* (London, 2001): pp. 78-98.

⁶⁴ N.M. Birkeland and A.U. Gomes, 'Angola: deslocados in the province of Huambo,' in M. Vincent and B.R. Sorensen (eds.), *Caught between borders: response strategies of the internally displaced* (London, 2001): pp. 17-47.

⁶⁵ M. Stavropoulou, 'Will Peru's displaced return?,' in R. Cohen and F.M. Deng (eds.), *The forsaken people: case studies of the internally displaced* (Washington, DC, 1998): pp. 454-499.

⁶⁶ M. González de la Rocha, 'Private adjustments: household responses to the erosion of work,' Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.hdr.undp.org/docs/events/global_forum/2000/rocha.pdf>, pp. 19-20, accessed 1 March 2009.

⁶⁷ J. Hein, 'Refugees, immigrants and the State,' *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 19 (1993): pp. 43-59.

In addition to all the reasons mentioned, there could be a certain degree of discrimination towards internally displaced persons which explained in part their lack of employment opportunities in the labour market. This form of discrimination was probably related to the fact that forced migrants brought security problems to the host area.⁶⁸ There was evidence that forced migrants carried security problems of the regions they fled to their host areas.⁶⁹ The perceptions of employers about the political and criminal environment led them to be less willing to hire an internally displaced person than a voluntary migrant or a native, both in order to avoid difficulties in the future and avoid the costs of training personal.

In conclusion, internally displaced persons appeared to be less likely to be employed in the urban labour markets for various reasons: lack of education, lack of urban labour force experience, lack of credentials and potential discrimination based on their migration condition. In addition, internally displaced persons during arrival and resettlement period were embedded in a process of reconstruction of self-identification. Given their disadvantaged condition, this might be a process of acceptance of downward socioeconomic and occupational mobility. Internally displaced persons were likely to be engaged in seasonal and informal labour market activities as coping and surviving strategy.

Colombian Migrant Performance in the Labour Market

In **Chapter 4** I presented a description of internal migration patterns in Colombia and discussed migrant selectivity in this context. In this chapter I present a description of migrant adaptation in the urban labour markets. In order to explain migrant adaptation is necessary to describe the labour market structure in Bogotá.

As in any other Latin American country, Colombia suffered structural reforms in the 1990s that affected the composition of the labour market. This section is divided into three parts. The first part describes formal and informal labour markets and changes in the Colombian social security legislation. The second part discusses research about informal sector and migration in Colombia. The third part reviews contemporary migrant profiles and internally displaced persons resettlement and integration in Bogotá.

⁶⁸ In the third site the presence of paramilitary urban guerrillas was evident in 2002. There were written threatens to the population, particularly those located in visible places in the main street of the neighbourhood.

⁶⁹ K. Jacobsen, 'Local integration: the forgotten solution,' Migration Policy Institute Working Paper (Washington, DC, 2003).

Formal and Informal Urban Sectors

The ability of million of rural migrants to adapt to the urban environment and survive in rapidly growing shantytowns has been a subject of study during the last 40 years, when rapid urbanisation process took place in developing countries. Keith Hart described the concept of formal and informal income opportunities.⁷⁰ Later *El Proyecto Regional de Educación para América Latina y el Caribe* (the Regional Education Project for Latin America and the Caribbean, PRELAC) conceptualised the informal urban sector as ‘a way to establish an employment that constitutes an individual survival strategy more than a stable and permanent opportunity of income generation to support the family’.⁷¹ The literature on vulnerability and socioeconomic conditions of the internally displaced and the labour patterns presented in **Chapter 4**, indicated that the PRELAC conceptualisation in the urbanisation period could serve to describe the coping strategies of the internally displaced populations arriving to urban areas.

The study of informal labour markets has evolved since the International Labour Organisation (ILO) provided the first definitions in the early 1970s.⁷² There were at least three approaches for the study of informal markets: dualistic, excessive regulated and structural articulation. The dualistic approach sustained that the informal sector was independent from the formal sector and characterised the informal sector as a collection of marginal enterprises. The excessive regulated approach attributed the origins of informality to excess regulation of the economy. Hernando de Soto argued controversially that informal economic activity gradually expanded in response to rigidities and the limitations of the ‘mercantilist state’.⁷³ The third approach was developed by Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes.⁷⁴ They claimed that the informal

⁷⁰ K. Hart, ‘Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana,’ *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1973): pp. 61-89. In his paper, Hart emphasised on the individual and the distinction between the formal and informal sectors hinged upon whether the person was wage earning (formal sector) or self-employed (informal sector). He outlined a series of activities that were classified in terms of ‘formal income opportunities’ and ‘informal income opportunities’. The formal consisted of public sector and private sector wages and transfer payments (pensions and unemployment benefits), while the latter was sub-divided into legitimate and illegitimate income opportunities.

⁷¹ A.N. Vergara, *Urbanización y sector informal en América Latina* (Santiago, Chile, 1990).

⁷² The 1972 report of the ILO mission to Kenya contained the first explicit discussion of the informal urban sector. See ILO, *Employment, incomes and inequality: a strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya* (Geneva, 1972): p. 6. See also J.J. Thomas, *Surviving in the city: the urban informal sector in Latin America* (London, 1995): p. 20 and D. Kruijt, C. Sojo and R. Grynspan, *Informal citizens: poverty, informality and social exclusion in Latin America* (Amsterdam, 2002): p. 4.

⁷³ H. de Soto, *The other path: the invisible revolution in the Third World* (London, 1989): pp. 201-229.

⁷⁴ M. Castells and A. Portes, ‘World underneath: the origins, dynamics, and effects of the informal economy,’ in A. Portes, M. Castells and L.A. Benton (eds.), *The informal economy: studies in advanced and less developed countries* (Baltimore, MD, 1989): pp. 11-37.

economy was characterised by unregulated income-generating activities closely related to the formal sector. The informal sector supplied low-cost goods and services for workers in formal enterprises. Given the heterogeneity of the informal sector they offered a typology of informal activities: direct subsistence activities; informal activities subordinated to production and marketing in the formal sector and autonomous informal enterprises with modern technology and captivity for capital accumulation. Studies using this approach have relied on the proportion of the economically active population that was not covered by the social security system.⁷⁵

In 1993 the pension and health care systems in Colombia were reformed. The three major changes were: 1) a significant increase in contribution rates paid by all active workers; 2) reduction of pension benefits for younger workers; and, 3) the introduction of a mixed defined benefit and defined contribution pension system. As a result the percentage of wage paid by the worker for social security went from 2.2 in 1990 to 3.4 percent in 1996; and for health care services from 2.3 to 4 percent over the same years. The contributions for the employers were most affected. An employer paying 4.3 percent of wages in 1990 to the social security was paying 10.1 percent in 1993. The share of health care services provided by the employer also increased from 4.7 to 8 percent between 1990 and 1996. Therefore, it was expected that as the hiring costs increased the number of formal workers decreased according to the excess regulated approach.⁷⁶

Informal Sector and Employment in Colombia

Using data from the National Household Survey in Colombia, Carmen Elisa Flórez explored the characteristics of the informal and the formal sectors from 1984 to 2000.⁷⁷ She used a variety of measures to test if the dualistic, the excessive regulation or the structural articulation approaches explained changes in the composition of the Colombian urban labour markets. She suggested that the informal sector was a heterogeneous sector that could be divided in three sub-sectors: subsistence workers,

⁷⁵ In the initial version of the questionnaire this question was included. In a review of the questionnaire I decided to eliminate it given divergences in the coverage of social security and health services. Given the location and characteristics of the neighbourhoods and what I investigated in the field, more than half of the population living in the visited areas could be considered as workers in the informal sector.

⁷⁶ H. Von Gersdorff, 'Pension reform,' in M.M. Giugale, O. Lafourcade and C. Luff (eds.), *Colombia: the economic foundation of peace* (Washington, DC, 2003): p. 284.

⁷⁷ C.E. Flórez, 'The function of the urban informal sector in employment: evidence from Colombia, 1984-2000,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2002-04 (Bogotá, 2002).

salaried workers and entrepreneurs. The sub-sector of subsistence workers behaved as predicted by the dualistic approach; it expanded in periods of economic crisis and shrank in upturn years. The other two sub-sectors were pro-cyclical and followed the patterns of the formal sector. She identified seven trends that were important for the purpose of this analysis. First, increasing feminisation of the labour force. Second, an employment life cycle that started in the informal labour market, progressed to the formal labour market and finished in the informal labour market. Third, the structural reform increased the sensitivity of health coverage to changes in the economic cycle. Fourth, informal sector absorbed most of the employed recent migrants (60 to 70 percent). In this regard she also observed that the proportion of recent migrants in the formal sector was sensitive to the economic cycle: 42.2 percent in 1998 and 33 percent in 2000 when the unemployment rate reached 20.4 percent. Fifth, an increasing more educated labour force and stable education differences between the sectors. There were more educated people in the formal sector and fewer educated people in the informal sector. Sixth, low employment stability for salaried informal workers. Therefore, this was the most affected group during the economic crisis. Seventh, informal salaried workers were over-represented in construction and manufactured goods industries.

In the analysis Flórez offered a socioeconomic characterisation of the population in each of the three sub-sectors in the informal labour market. She noticed that the sub-sector of subsistence workers accounted for 52 to 63 percent of the informal sector. This sub-sector was composed of self-employed, unpaid family workers and domestic servants working in commerce and personal services with low wages and no previous labour experience. It had a high proportion of women, recent migrants and persons with low education. She argued that given the large proportion of persons without previous experience in the labour market in this sub-sector, it served as the open door to the labour market for young, less-educated and incoming workers. Internally displaced persons were expected that if their education levels were low relative to the natives and they did not have previous experience in the urban labour market, they would be more frequently employed in the sub-sector of subsistence workers.

The sub-sector of the informal salaried workers in large and small firms accounted for 30 to 40 percent of the informal sector. People in this group were young men, established migrants, working in construction or manufacturing goods. Labour conditions were defined as unstable with wages higher than for the subsistence sub-sector. Employees in this sub-sector had previous labour force experience.

The third sub-sector of informal entrepreneurs accounted for 5 to 9 percent of the informal sector. Persons in this sub-sector were usually in the late phase of their life cycle mainly natives or non-recent migrants, persons with middle to high education. The activities they performed were related to small commerce, manufactured goods. Labour stability and earnings were high.

In a second analysis Carmen Elisa Flórez focused on the possible impacts of the internal conflict on the migration flows and the integration of recent migrations to the urban labour markets.⁷⁸ From the analysis she concluded that there was an increasing participation of males in the migration flows and an increasing rural-urban flow. Migrants in urban areas showed high labour force participation, low unemployment and high participation in informal sector. Labour instability in the informal sector provoked that recent migrants were among the most affected groups during the economic crisis. However, with time there was a process of assimilation of recent migrants to the urban labour market. She did not reach conclusions about the impact of the conflict because the official household surveys did not include geographical areas in the cities where displaced people were concentrated and questions about causes of migration were not considered. Therefore the lack of complete coverage and information on IDPs impeded the analysis of presumably different trends.

Migrations to Bogotá

The importance of the rural-urban flows has decreased continually as a factor explaining urban population growth. There were studies arguing that urban-urban migration patterns have increased, which was related to the degree of urbanisation of the country.⁷⁹ An emergent pattern of migration was circular migration, which did not involve a change in the permanent place of residence and was more related to temporary and self-employment. Other studies revealed that the profile of the migrant population has changed recently. There was a higher participation of internally displaced persons from rural origin who had low educational level.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ C.E. Flórez, 'Migration and the urban informal sector in Colombia,' Paper presented at the Conference on 'African Migration in Comparative Perspective' on 4-7 June (Johannesburg, 2003).

⁷⁹ C.E. Flórez, *Las transformaciones sociodemográficas en Colombia durante el siglo XX* (Bogotá, 2000): pp. 129-130 and C. Martínez and M. Rincón, 'Tendencias recientes de las migraciones internas en Colombia,' *Desarrollo Urbano en Cifras*, no. 2 (1997): pp. 60-85.

⁸⁰ C.E. Flórez, 'Migration and the urban informal sector in Colombia,' Paper presented at the Conference on 'African Migration in Comparative Perspective' on 4-7 June (Johannesburg, 2003): p. 4.

Using data from the National Household Survey, Javier Gutiérrez, Carolina Guzmán and Ulpiano Jiménez analysed the profile of migrants to Bogotá from 1995 to 1999.⁸¹ They claimed that the majority of migrants to Bogotá arrived from other urban centres and not from rural areas, as was the case during the 1960s. Their estimates indicated that about 40 percent of the migrant population arrived from the departments of Cundinamarca, Boyacá and Tolima. The migrant population during their period of study was clustered in the working age group. Sixty percent were between 20 and 39 years old. Two-thirds of the migrants were women, the same proportion observed by Gary Fields using the 1973 population census.⁸²

Using additional sources of data, Gutiérrez [et al.] compared the recent migrants, with the non-recent migrants and the natives.⁸³ They found that recent migrants were more educated than natives and non-recent migrants. Sixty four percent of the recent migrants had more than middle school education. The labour market participation rate for recent migrants was 75.1 percent, 63.4 percent for natives and 66.5 percent for non-recent migrants.⁸⁴ In conclusion, migrants who arrived at Bogotá between 1995 and 1999 were more educated and more active in the labour market than migrants who arrived between 1988 and 1993 or natives. These findings might suggest that although there was an apparent increment in rural-urban migration related to the armed conflict, the impact of these changing migrant profiles was not noticed in the flow to Bogotá. The population of Bogotá and the migration flow to Bogotá were so numerous that the presence of the internally displaced persons although considerable was lost in an aggregate analysis of the recent migrant population to the city, at least until 1999.

As explained in **Chapter 4**, the expansion of the Colombian armed conflict had provoked a rural-urban migration flow to the main cities which were hosting large proportions of the internally displaced persons. **Table 5.16** shows the number of forced migrants hosted and the percentage distribution of the total registered internally displaced persons by department capital (and municipality). Sixty five percent of the internally displaced persons was hosted in the capital cities of the departments, and

⁸¹ J.A. Gutiérrez, C. Guzmán and U.J. Jiménez, 'Algunas consideraciones socioeconómicas en torno a las migraciones en Bogotá, 1995-1999,' Oficina de Estudios Económicos Documento N° 16 (Bogotá, 2000).

⁸² G.S. Fields, 'Lifetime migration in Colombia: test of the expected income hypothesis,' *Population and Development Review*, vol. 5, no. 2 (1979): pp. 247-265.

⁸³ They defined the natives as those who were living in Bogotá before 1988.

⁸⁴ The labour market participation rate was defined as the number of persons working or looking for a job per 100 persons aged 15 to 65.

among them Bogotá, Medellín, Santa Marta, Sincelejo and Valledupar received 30.52 percent of forced migrants.

Table 5.16: Number of Forced Migrants Hosted in Department Capitals (and Municipalities)

Municipality	Department	Number of IDPs hosted	% of the total IDPs
Bogotá D.C.	Bogotá D.C.	97,642	8.10
Medellín	Antioquia	78,511	6.51
Santa Marta	Magdalena	72,383	6.00
Sincelejo	Sucre	67,888	5.63
Valledupar	César	51,645	4.28
Cartagena	Bolívar	36,803	3.05
Florencia	Caquetá	32,510	2.70
Cali	Valle del Cauca	31,627	2.62
Barranquilla	Atlántico	31,572	2.62
Villavicencio	Meta	30,715	2.58
Cúcuta	Norte Santander	28,823	2.39
Quibdó	Chocó	28,421	2.36
Bucaramanga	Santander	23,490	1.95
Barrancabermeja*	Santander	20,919	1.74
Montería	Córdoba	20,025	1.66
Ibagué	Tolima	19,027	1.58
Pasto	Nariño	18,321	1.52
Popayán	Cauca	17,634	1.46
Neiva	Huila	15,649	1.30
Pereira	Risaralda	14,856	1.23
Riohacha	La Guajira	13,404	1.11
San José del Guaviare	Guaviare	13,261	1.10
Soacha*	Cundinamarca	13,239	1.10
Mocoa	Putumayo	12,953	1.07
Apartadó*	Antioquia	8,131	0.67
Yopal	Casanare	7,329	0.61
Manizales	Caldas	5,590	0.46
Armenia	Quindío	5,451	0.45
Arauca	Arauca	4,060	0.34
Puerto Carreño	Vichada	992	0.08
Mitú	Vaupés	709	0.06
Leticia	Amazonas	353	0.03
Total		1,205,561**	64.85 (68.36***)

* Barrancabermeja, Soacha and Apartadó are not departmental capitals.

** 1,205,561 were the officially recognised number of internally displaced persons in 2002.

*** 68.36% included IDPs of Barrancabermeja, Soacha and Apartadó.

Source: Red de Solidaridad Social, *Estadísticas para medios: cifras sobre desplazamiento forzado en Colombia (2003)*

Deborah Hines and Raoul Balleto used a vulnerability analysis and mapping standard analytical framework covering three components: comprehensive vulnerability assessment, periodic vulnerability monitoring and emergency vulnerability analysis and mapping to assess the conditions of the Colombian forced migrants in June 2001.⁸⁵ Their assessment was based on data from the official registration of internally displaced persons mentioned in **Chapter 4**. They found that emergency humanitarian aid was not reaching the internally displaced persons in the first three months after displacement.⁸⁶ They observed that the two most important factors leading to assistance dependency were the lack of security and lack of consistent access to all vulnerable groups in need. Their restricted movement and loss of access to their productive assets partially explained why the internally displaced were unable to restore their livelihoods.

As mentioned earlier land tenure was one of the most important factors for explaining the origins and progression of the internal conflict on Colombia. One of the principal causes of displacement was the illegal practice of land confiscation by guerrillas and paramilitaries. Therefore, it was predicted that land tenure for internally displaced persons would be more frequent before displacement than for any other migrant groups. Moreover, I expect that their agricultural activities were related to patterns of land tenure before displacement.

Various studies on internally displaced persons in Colombia suggested that internally displaced persons experienced long terms of unemployment in urban areas due to the lack of transferability of agricultural skills to the urban labour market.⁸⁷ I argue that although the transferability of skills might explain why they did not find jobs in Bogotá, the main cause of their lack of success in the urban labour market was their low levels of education relative to the levels of education of people living in urban areas. **Figure 5.1** reviews time trends for urban and rural areas in Colombia and in Bogotá for the period 1985-2000, and shows that the gap in basic education between rural and urban areas had remained almost constant, although since 1998 there was a decline of


⁸⁵ D. Hines and R. Balleto, 'Assessment of needs of internally displaced persons in Colombia,' Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper No. 189 (London, 2002).

⁸⁶ Colombian legislation states that internally displaced persons are entitled to three months of humanitarian emergency aid that includes monthly provisions of food and other personal care and hygiene products. This is the time assumed to be of worst distress after displacement. After three months they should have passed the worst part of the emergency situation and be able to resume their normal lives.

⁸⁷ Arquidiócesis de Bogotá and CODHES, *Desplazados: huellas de nunca borrar, casos de Bogotá y Soacha* (Bogotá, 1999); J.E. Rojas Rodríguez (ed.), *Un país que huye: desplazamiento y violencia en una nación fragmentada* (Bogotá, 1999) and Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM), *Diagnostico sobre la población desplazada en seis departamentos de Colombia en 2001* (Bogotá, 2002).

the illiteracy rate in rural areas but a slight increase in Bogotá. The gap in the literacy rate between Bogotá and rural areas was on average 17.7 percent higher in rural areas for the period 1985-2000.

Figure 5.1: Illiteracy Rate for Bogotá, Urban and Rural Areas in Colombia (1985-2000)



Source: National Department of Planning, SISD 2.0

The pattern of migration to Bogotá and the characteristics of internally displaced persons in urban areas suggested that the occupation profiles of voluntary migrants should differ. These differences in occupation profiles along their migration histories should not only be related to their migration condition, but to education level, land tenure, place of residence (rural or urban), and experience in urban or rural occupations.

Methodological Approach

In this section I present a comparative analysis of labour conditions of forced, economic and tied migrants. The analysis is divided into three parts. First, I describe migration typology. Second, I present characteristics of household heads and spouses in the place of origin before the first migration stage. Finally, I explain their characteristics in Bogotá.

Migration Typology

For the purpose of this analysis I used labour and migration histories of household heads and spouses described in **Chapter 4** and used the migration histories starting at age 15 until the end of 2002.⁸⁸ I classified this population based on their reported causes of migration in their migration histories in four groups: forced migrants, economic migrants, tied migrants and natives.

Forced migrants were those who at any point in their lives between age 15 and their arrival at Bogotá reported as a cause of migration the armed conflict (either because they felt insecure in the place of origin or because they were directly threatened). I asked about violent causes of migration in two schedules of the questionnaire. The first question referred to the motivation for leaving a specific location. The second question asked specific about any violence event at the personal, family and extended social circle in each of the locations the person had resided. Taking information from both schedules I defined the number of forced migrants. Even if a person reported as a cause of migration economic reasons after being displaced, I classified this person as a forced migrant. Research on internally displaced persons in Colombia suggested that once persons were displaced they moved to other locations.⁸⁹ The first move was from the usual place of residence to the next town or city. Afterwards they continued moving based on their perceptions about security in their places of origin or on their evaluation of labour prospects elsewhere. There was no consensus in the literature on forced displacement about when displacement ended. Researchers have argued that it might end with resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction or restitution.⁹⁰

Economic migrants were those who reported that they migrated to look for jobs, better opportunities, income, or because they had a job offer in the place of destination at any point before arriving at Bogotá. The main difference between forced and economic migrants was that forced migrants were not planning to move from the original place of residence and economic migrants had incentives to leave it.

⁸⁸ I did not use the information during the first 15 years in the life histories because the migration experience of those under 15 were more related to the migration of children as companions.

⁸⁹ One of reasons that the IDPs moved to other place was 'seeking anonymity'. In regions where fighting was intense, identifying oneself as a displaced person left one vulnerable to attack by one or several armed groups. Fear, then, drove the displaced to search for places in which they could hide their status as displaced persons, usually in medium to large towns and cities.

⁹⁰ B. Lippman and S. Malik, 'The 4Rs: the way ahead?,' *Forced Migration Review*, issue 21 (2004): pp. 9-11.

The literature on migrant selectivity compared tied and forced migrants with the economic migrants and suggested that tied and forced migrants were not as positive self-selected as economic migrants. Therefore, I included in this analysis tied migrants as those who were never forced to migrate, did not pursue economic incentives in any of their moves before arriving at Bogotá and left their place of origin because they were following their families or husbands, or because they got separated from their families or husbands.

The total sample includes 1,056 persons, 603 household heads and 453 spouses. According to the migrant classification, there are 116 forced migrants, 187 economic migrants, 118 tied migrants and 635 natives.⁹¹ The person-years data set includes 27,454 observations.

The groups of variables considered for the analysis are: personal characteristics of household heads and spouses at a certain point in time, occupations, indicators of accumulated wealth (land and dwelling ownership), characteristics of the place of residence, migration experience (years of first trip, year of arrival at Bogotá and accumulated migration experiences in urban and rural areas) and labour market indicators (unemployment rate).

The data on occupations is central to this analysis. After analysing the structure of the occupations in the studied areas I grouped the occupations in nine groups according to their relative frequency, economic sector and predominant activity. The nine groups are: agriculture, skilled occupations, non-skilled occupations, construction workers, provision of security services, employed in the service and commerce sectors, petty commerce (most of them are street vendors), providers of personal services and domestic servants.⁹²

According to the findings of Carmen Elisa Flórez described earlier in this chapter I further classified informal and formal sectors according to occupational category. Those who were employed as construction workers, small merchants, providers of personal service and domestic servants were considered members of the informal sector. Those in skilled and non-skilled occupations, providers of security services, employed in the service and commerce sector were considered in the formal sector. The division between formal and informal sectors was related to the labour composition in urban

⁹¹ The natives included intra-urban and non-migrants described in **Chapter 4**.

⁹² The proportion of persons who reported being unemployed was very small, therefore I considered them among the population out of labour force.

areas. Agricultural activities were usually not considered in this classification. Yet agricultural employment included production of roses that was concentrated near Bogotá by workers resident in the city. Persons living in Bogotá and working in agriculture-related activities were classified as agricultural workers. Because their employment conditions and the seasonality of their jobs, corresponded those in the urban informal sector, all workers employed in agriculture near Bogotá and resident in it were considered as workers in the informal sector.

Characteristics of the Migration Population in the Place of Origin

Table 5.17 contains the main characteristics of the migrant population by migrant group one year before the first migration journey.⁹³ The data suggest that forced migrants and economic migrants did not have different levels of education or different occupations in the place of origin; particularly there were no observed differences in the proportion of persons working in agriculture before the first migration.⁹⁴ Patterns of land tenure differed between forced and economic migrants. Sixteen percent of forced migrants reported ownership of land in the place of origin, and only 7 percent of the economic migrants. The distribution of forced and economic migrants in urban areas was not different.⁹⁵ Departments of origin were also different for forced and economic migrants. Forced migrants were more likely than economic migrants to arrive from those departments where armed confrontations were more frequent like Antioquia and Caquetá, and less likely to arrive from the traditional departments of origin of economic migrants to Bogotá like Boyacá. Economic migrants were as likely as forced migrants to arrive from the department of Tolima. Regarding the year of the first migration, economic migrants were spread almost equally along the different intervals. Forced migrants were less likely to leave their usual place of residence before 1980 than economic migrants, and more likely to make the first stage after 1997 relative to economic migrants.

⁹³ I performed t-test for the difference of means at 90% confidence level.

⁹⁴ The coefficient for domestic servants was significant because if the economic migration of girls started before age 15, then their occupation was taken at age 15 to reflect not the occupation at origin, but the occupation during the first migration or at the youngest age considered in the analysis.

⁹⁵ The Colombian statistics did not distinguish between rural/urban, but between municipal seat or other location within the municipality (*resto*). Following this notion and based on the perception of the interviewees they were asked if the place they lived was in a rural area (*campo*) or in a town (*pueblo*). Another problem I faced with the distinction between rural and urban areas was that interviewees would know the name of the *vereda* or place they lived but often were not familiar with the name of the municipality.

In general, tied migrants were similar to economic migrants. However, there were some differences. As expected, economic migrants were more likely to be males, and household heads than tied migrants. Tied migrants were more likely to be outside the labour force.

From the comparison of the characteristics in the place of origin the data demonstrate that: 1) there were no differences in education between forced and economic or tied migrants; 2) there were no differences in their participation in agricultural activities; and, 3) forced migrants were more likely to own land in the place of origin than the other voluntary migrant groups. The similarities between forced and economic migrants in terms of level of education might be explained by their similar access to education in the places of origin.

In order to explore the participation of forced and economic migrants in agricultural activities I estimated a logistic regression model predicting the probability of working in agricultural activities before the first migration. Coefficient estimates, shown in second column of **Table 5.18**, indicate that forced migrants were not more likely to be working in agriculture than economic migrants. In **Table 5.17** it is observed that the percentage of tied migrants outside the labour force was considerable. To verify which variables might be correlated with this observation I estimated a second model on the probability of being outside the labour force for tied migrants. My results suggest that less educated tied migrants were more likely to be outside the labour market in the original place of residence than economic migrants.⁹⁶

From these data I could not conclude that in the places of origin forced migrants were more likely to work in agriculture than economic migrants or that they were less educated than economic migrants. The data indicate that the levels of education and probability of being employed in agriculture were similar for both groups in the place of origin before the first migration.⁹⁷ The main characteristic of forced migrants in the place of origin was that they were more likely to own land than economic migrants.

⁹⁶ I checked the different categories for those outside the labour force and found that 8 forced migrants were students the year before the first migration stage but only 4 economic migrants were students. Probably a larger sample would allow further exploration of forced and economic migrant conditions in various occupation categories in the places of origin.

⁹⁷ I also estimated the characteristics of migrants one year before an economic migration, one year before a forced migration and one year before a tied migration. The results were similar because forced migrants did not have many stages before their displacement.

Table 5.17: Characteristics of Household Head and Spouse One Year before the First Migration by Migration Experiences

Variable	Forced Migrant		Voluntary Migrant			
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Economic Migrant		Tied Migrant	
N	116		187		118	
Head ^a	0.82*	0.39	0.70	0.46	0.58*	0.50
Sex	0.66*	0.47	0.57	0.50	0.40*	0.49
Mean Age	26.41*	9.97	23.44	7.26	25.67*	10.89
Mean Years of Education	4.99	3.03	4.53	3.03	4.47	3.47
Married	0.53*	0.50	0.34	0.47	0.48*	0.50
Owned Dwelling	0.10	0.31	0.05	0.23	0.02	0.13
Owned Land	0.16	0.37	0.07	0.26	0.05	0.22
Main Occupations						
Outside the labour force	0.23	0.42	0.17	0.38	0.31*	0.47
Agriculture	0.37	0.49	0.39	0.49	0.31	0.46
Skilled	0.06	0.24	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.25
Non-skilled	0.09	0.29	0.05	0.23	0.03	0.18
Construction workers	0.06	0.24	0.03	0.18	0.03	0.18
Security services	0.01	0.09	0.03	0.16	0.02	0.13
Services and commerce	0.03	0.16	0.01	0.10	0.04	0.20
Petty commerce	0.03	0.18	0.02	0.15	0.00*	0.00
Personal services	0.04	0.20	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.24
Domestic servants	0.04*	0.20	0.12	0.33	0.09	0.29
Urban Area	0.49	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.53	0.50
State of Origin						
Antioquia	0.09*	0.28	0.04	0.19	0.03	0.18
Boyacá	0.05*	0.22	0.14	0.35	0.11	0.31
Caldas	0.03	0.18	0.06	0.25	0.06	0.24
Caquetá	0.07*	0.25	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.09
Cundinamarca	0.16	0.36	0.23	0.42	0.35*	0.48
Meta	0.06	0.24	0.05	0.23	0.03	0.18
Nariño	0.02	0.13	0.03	0.16	0.01	0.09
Santander	0.09	0.29	0.06	0.25	0.05	0.22
Tolima	0.21	0.41	0.13	0.34	0.17*	0.38
Valle	0.01	0.09	0.02	0.13	0.03	0.18
Year of First Migration Stage						
Before 1969	0.10*	0.31	0.17	0.38	0.05*	0.22
1970-1979	0.05*	0.22	0.23	0.42	0.14*	0.34
1980-1989	0.31	0.46	0.31	0.46	0.42	0.50
1990-1996	0.27	0.44	0.23	0.42	0.26	0.44
1997-2002	0.27*	0.44	0.06	0.24	0.13*	0.33

* T-test for the difference of means; $p < 0.1$

^a Time constant variable fixed at 2002

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.18: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in Agriculture or Outside the Labour Force One Year before the First Migration

Variable	Agriculture		Outside the Labour Force	
	β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)	
Intercept	-0.04 (0.57)		-0.91 (0.51)	*
Personal Characteristics				
Male	1.24 (0.34)	***	-3.04 (0.37)	**
Age	0.03 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)	
Years of education	-0.04 (0.05)		-0.11 (0.04)	**
Owned land	1.34 (0.60)	**	-0.23 (0.49)	
Living in urban area	-2.89 (0.31)		-0.27 (0.29)	
Migrant experience				
Economic migrants (Ref)	—		—	
Forced migrants	-0.47 (0.37)	**	0.85 (0.36)	
Tied migrants	-0.20 (0.37)		0.58 (0.32)	
N	421		421	
Log Likelihood Ratio	161.77		120.46	
Percent Concordant	86.90		83.70	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Characteristics of the Migrant Population in Bogotá

Following the analysis of the migrant population in their place of origin, I present a comparison of the occupation profiles, cohorts of arrival and personal characteristics of natives, forced, economic and tied migrants in Bogotá at the end of 2002.

Table 5.19 reviews the distribution of the characteristics for all groups. The data suggest that forced migrants were more likely to be household heads, males and were on average younger than economic migrants because they arrived more recently at Bogotá. The distribution and t-test differences for the year of arrival indicate that economic migrants arrived almost in similar proportions during the periods of time considered. In contrast, forced migrants arrived more recently at the city; the difference of means is the largest for the period of 1997-2002, which was consistent with the patterns of displacement in Colombia and to Soacha described in **Chapter 4**.

The distribution of occupations in **Table 5.19** shows that forced migrants reported more frequently being employed as the provider of personal services than economic migrants. The t-test for the distribution of occupations was not significant for any other occupation. From the table I observed that although the t-test for the difference of means was not significant there were three groups where the differences in proportions were considerable. To explore further if the same differences could be observed after controlling for personal characteristics and migration experience I estimated three logistic regression models on the probability of being in of the labour force, the probability of being employed as construction worker, and the probability of being employed as the provider of personal services.

Table 5.19: Characteristics of Household Head and Spouse in Bogotá at the End of 2002 by Migration Experiences

Variable	Native		Forced Migrant	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
N	635		116	
Personal Characteristics				
Head	0.49*	0.50	0.82*	0.39
Male	0.41*	0.49	0.66*	0.47
Mean age	37.62*	10.73	41.50*	12.87
Mean years of education	5.82*	2.99	4.99	3.03
Married	0.80	0.40	0.66	0.47
Owned dwelling	0.52	0.50	0.45*	0.50
Owned land	0.03	0.17	0.06	0.24
Main Occupations				
Outside the labour force	0.30*	0.46	0.32	0.47
Agriculture	0.02	0.14	0.02	0.13
Skilled	0.03	0.17	0.03	0.16
Non-skilled	0.15	0.35	0.10	0.31
Construction workers	0.13	0.34	0.11	0.32
Security services	0.04*	0.20	0.09	0.29
Services and commerce	0.06	0.23	0.08	0.27
Petty commerce	0.06	0.24	0.07	0.25
Personal services	0.09	0.29	0.12*	0.33
Domestic servants	0.10	0.30	0.05	0.22
Migration Experience				
Number of previous stages	0.00	0.00	2.24	1.60
Year of Arrival				
Before 1969	—	—	0.04*	0.20
1970-1979	—	—	0.06*	0.24
1980-1989	—	—	0.22	0.42
1990-1996	—	—	0.33	0.47
1997-2002	—	—	0.34*	0.48

* T-test for the difference of means; $p < 0.1$. Economic migrant is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.19: Characteristics of Household Head and Spouse in Bogotá at the End of 2002 by Migration Experiences (continued)

Variable	Voluntary Migrant			
	Economic Migrant		Tied Migrant	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
N	187		118	
Personal Characteristics				
Head	0.70	0.46	0.58*	0.50
Male	0.57	0.50	0.40*	0.49
Mean age	44.91	12.71	42.10*	13.82
Mean years of education	4.53	3.03	4.47	3.47
Married	0.74	0.44	0.75	0.44
Owned dwelling	0.58	0.50	0.49	0.50
Owned land	0.06	0.24	0.03	0.16
Main Occupations				
Outside the labour force	0.24	0.43	0.30	0.46
Agriculture	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.13
Skilled	0.05	0.23	0.03	0.18
Non-skilled	0.11	0.32	0.15	0.36
Construction workers	0.16	0.37	0.08*	0.28
Security services	0.09	0.28	0.04	0.20
Services and commerce	0.06	0.25	0.08	0.28
Petty commerce	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.31
Personal services	0.07	0.26	0.06	0.24
Domestic servants	0.09	0.28	0.08	0.28
Migration Experience				
Number of previous stages	2.47	1.56	1.91*	1.07
Year of Arrival				
Before 1969	0.13	0.34	0.07*	0.25
1970-1979	0.21	0.41	0.18	0.38
1980-1989	0.27	0.44	0.32	0.47
1990-1996	0.29	0.45	0.34	0.48
1997-2002	0.10	0.30	0.09	0.29

* T-test for the difference of means; $p < 0.1$. Economic migrant is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.20 shows coefficient estimates for each model. The results indicate that education and time spent in Bogotá were positively correlated with the probability of being in the labour force. Natives and forced migrants were less likely to be in the labour force than economic and tied migrants. Economic migrants and natives were more likely to be employed as construction workers than forced migrants. The last column reviews the coefficients for the regression model of the probability of being employed as the provider of personal services. The sign of the coefficients indicates that forced migrants were more likely than economic migrants to work as providers of

personal services. Those who owned their dwelling were less likely to work in these occupations. This might be an indication that employment as the provider of personal services was more related to coping strategies than to accumulative strategies.⁹⁸

To appreciate changes in the characteristics of migrants by cohorts of arrival at Bogotá, I estimate the distribution of variables related to personal characteristics, migration experience and occupation (see **Table 5.21**). The data shows that older cohorts were less educated than more recent cohorts, thus indicating improved access to education for migrant populations in their places of origin.⁹⁹

By comparing the characteristics of migrant groups in the place of origin one year before the first migration and the characteristics of the same population in Bogotá at the end of 2002 I observed the following trends. First, there were no differences in years of education between economic migrants and forced migrants either in the areas of origin or in their place of residence in Bogotá. Therefore, the data could not support the hypothesis of positive self-selection of the migrant population in terms of education.¹⁰⁰

A comparison of the characteristics of the place of residence in the place of origin and the occupation one year before the first migration stage indicated that forced migrants were not more likely to arrive from rural areas than economic migrants. In terms of occupation, forced migrants were more likely than economic migrants to work in agricultural activities in their place of origin. The claim that forced migrants were less successful in the urban labour market might not be explained by their rural origin, or their lack of skills appropriate to the urban labour market. Economic and forced migrants had similar backgrounds in these two variables.

The variable that determined differences between economic and forced migrants was land tenure. Forced migrants were more likely than economic migrants to own land in their original place of residence. In Bogotá the reported land tenure for both groups was similar. However, economic migrants were more likely to own their dwellings in Bogotá than forced migrants, which might indicate their relative success in the urban labour market.

⁹⁸ I included in a preliminary set of regression models an interaction term of forced migrants and number of years spent in Bogotá. The resulting coefficients were small and non-statistically significant, so I dropped them from the analysis.

⁹⁹ Given the low levels of education overall (the average years of education was about 5) I argue that the increasing levels of education were related to increasing provision of education in the places of origin.

¹⁰⁰ In **Chapter 4** the data indicated that forced migrants were less educated than natives. Here I compared forced and economic migrants and I just considered household heads and spouses.

Table 5.20: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being in the Labour Force, Employed in the Construction Sector or Employed in Personal Services in Bogotá at the End of 2002

Variable	In Labour Force		Construction		Personal Services	
	β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)	
Intercept	0.86 (0.48)	+	-5.03 (0.87)	***	-1.46 (0.73)	*
Personal Characteristics						
Head	0.77 (0.19)	***	0.60 (0.31)	*	0.35 (0.27)	
Male	1.95 (0.21)	***	4.07 (0.60)	***	-0.86 (0.27)	**
Age	-0.03 (0.01)	***	0.00 (0.01)		-0.03 (0.02)	+
Years of education	0.08 (0.03)	**	-0.09 (0.04)	*	0.03 (0.04)	
Married	-0.26 (0.20)		0.16 (0.28)		-0.09 (0.27)	
Accumulated Wealth						
Owned dwelling	-0.21 (0.16)		-0.27 (0.21)		-0.53 (0.22)	*
Migration Experience						
Economic migrants (Ref)	—		—		—	
Natives	-0.43 (0.24)	+	0.40 (0.29)		-0.17 (0.35)	
Tied migrants	0.03 (0.30)		-0.33 (0.42)		-0.41 (0.49)	
Forced migrants	-0.92 (0.31)	**	-0.72 (0.39)	+	0.63 (0.42)	+
Years of Accumulated Experience of Bogotá	0.03 (0.01)	**	-0.01 (0.01)		0.04 (0.02)	*
<hr/>						
N	1,046		1,046		1,046	
Log Likelihood Ratio	245.47		216.68		28.66	
Percent Concordant	78.70		84.40		65.10	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.21: Characteristics of Household Head and Spouse in Bogotá at the End of 2002 by Cohorts of Arrival at Bogotá

Variable	Before 1969		1970-1979		1980-1989	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
N	37		68		114	
Personal Characteristics						
Head	0.76	0.44	0.72	0.45	0.70	0.46
Male	0.62	0.49	0.56	0.50	0.48	0.50
Mean age	63.65*	9.57	48.50*	8.56	42.31*	10.43
Mean years of education	2.86*	3.65	4.00*	2.96	5.05	3.34
Married	0.76	0.44	0.72	0.45	0.68*	0.47
Accumulated Wealth						
Owned dwelling	0.51	0.51	0.59	0.50	0.53	0.50
Migration Experience						
Number of previous stages	2.27	1.26	2.79*	1.80	2.16	1.51
Main Occupations						
Outside the labour force	0.49*	0.51	0.16*	0.37	0.23	0.42
Agriculture	0.05	0.23	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.16
Skilled	0.00*	0.00	0.07	0.26	0.04	0.21
Non-skilled	0.00*	0.00	0.22	0.42	0.08	0.27
Construction workers	0.19	0.40	0.16	0.37	0.15	0.36
Security services	0.03*	0.16	0.04	0.21	0.07	0.26
Services and commerce	0.08	0.28	0.09	0.29	0.09	0.28
Petty commerce	0.05	0.23	0.09	0.29	0.09	0.28
Personal services	0.05	0.23	0.07	0.26	0.11	0.32
Domestic servants	0.05	0.23	0.09	0.29	0.11	0.31

* T-test for the difference of means; $p < 0.1$.
The cohort arriving between 1990 and 1996 is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.21: Characteristics of Household Head and Spouse in Bogotá by the End of 2002 by Cohorts of Arrival at Bogotá (continued)

Variable	1990-1996		1997-2002	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
N	132		70	
Personal Characteristics				
Head	0.66	0.48	0.71	0.46
Male	0.55	0.45	0.59	0.50
Mean age	37.86	11.73	38.69	12.76
Mean years of education	5.11	3.06	4.67	2.52
Married	0.77	0.42	0.69	0.47
Accumulated Wealth				
Owned dwelling	0.52	0.50	0.44	0.50
Migration Experience				
Number of previous stages	2.01	1.19	2.30	1.52
Main Occupations				
Outside the labour force	0.27	0.44	0.37	0.49
Agriculture	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.12
Skilled	0.05	0.21	0.01	0.12
Non-skilled	0.13	0.34	0.14	0.35
Construction workers	0.11	0.31	0.06	0.23
Security services	0.10	0.23	0.10	0.30
Services and commerce	0.05	0.21	0.09	0.28
Petty commerce	0.11	0.31	0.09	0.28
Personal services	0.07	0.25	0.09	0.28
Domestic servants	0.08	0.27	0.03	0.17

* T-test for the difference of means; $p < 0.1$.
The cohort arriving between 1990 and 1996 is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Migration and Labour Trajectories

In this section I describe labour trajectories based on the migration experience of the observed population. I analyse the population during the years they lived outside Bogotá, and during their years of residence in the city. The objective of this section is to describe the different patterns of occupation given the migration experience of the observed population.

I applied event history analysis models to predict the probability of being employed in any of the nine occupation groups and in the informal sector. I used person-years spent by migrant population outside Bogotá. To evaluate if the experience in rural or urban areas determined the probability of employment in certain occupations I accumulated years of migration experience since first migration and divided them in years spent in rural or urban areas. In addition, I also included accumulated labour force experience in rural and urban areas.¹⁰¹

Table 5.22 contains descriptive statistics of person-years lived by the population older than 15 years old in 2002, who was not living in Bogotá and participating in the labour market. **Table 5.23** includes estimation coefficients of the regression models by group of occupations.

The second column in **Table 5.23** shows coefficient estimates for the probability of being employed in agriculture in any person-year if the person was living outside Bogotá. The coefficient for land tenure suggests that the probability of being employed in agriculture was higher for those who owned land in a given year. Years of labour force experience in rural areas were positively associated with the probability of being employed in agriculture. The negative coefficients for the accumulated years spent in areas outside Bogotá suggest that the probability of being employed in agriculture declined with time among economic migrants. This pattern could be caused by potential reductions in the agriculture sector related to the increasing number of violent events in the areas of displacement. The total effects for forced migrants was almost zero since the coefficient for the interaction term between migration experience and force migrant was positive.

The probability of being employed as skilled worker in a given year outside Bogotá was positively related with education, land tenure and residing in an urban area. Tied migrants were more likely than economic migrants and forced migrants to be employed as skilled workers.

¹⁰¹ I tried to include variables to control for location specific indicators of political violence and economic activity. I had a time series of internally displaced expulsion rates, homicide rates and unemployment rates by department from 1996 to 2002. When I included the variables the number of observations was drastically reduced because the majority of the experience in Bogotá was after 1996. Second I analysed if the variables had some relation with the probability of employment. All coefficient estimates were non-significant.

Table 5.22: Descriptive Statistics of Household Head and Spouse for Years Living Outside Bogotá in a Given Year

Intercept	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Occupation					
Employed in agriculture	4,173	0.61	0.49	0	1
Employed as skilled employee	4,173	0.04	0.20	0	1
Employed as non-skilled worker	4,173	0.07	0.25	0	1
Employed in construction sector	4,173	0.05	0.21	0	1
Employed in the provision of security service	4,173	0.02	0.14	0	1
Employed in service and commerce sectors	4,173	0.03	0.18	0	1
Petty commerce	4,173	0.02	0.15	0	1
Employed as the provider of personal service	4,173	0.07	0.25	0	1
Employed as domestic servant	4,173	0.09	0.29	0	1
Employed in the informal sector	1,621	0.59	0.49	0	1
Personal Characteristics					
Head ^a	4,173	0.81	0.39	0	1
Male	4,173	0.70	0.46	0	1
Age	4,173	26.69	10.11	15	69
Years of education	4,173	3.79	3.03	0	16
Indicators of Accumulated Wealth					
Owned dwelling	4,173	0.02	0.16	0	1
Owned land	4,173	0.13	0.34	0	1
Characteristic of the Place of Residence					
Living in urban area	4,173	0.41	0.49	0	1
Labour Force Experience					
Years of labour force experience in rural areas	4,173	7.68	9.55	0	55
Years of labour force experience in urban areas	4,173	4.28	7.06	0	49
Migration Experience					
Economic migrant ^a	4,173	0.20	0.40	0	1
Forced migrant ^a	4,173	0.36	0.48	0	1
Tied migrant ^a	4,173	0.44	0.50	0	1
Accumulated migration experience	4,173	3.84	6.15	0	44
Accumulated years spent in urban areas outside Bogotá	4,173	8.06	9.80	0	55
Accumulated years spent in rural areas outside Bogotá	4,173	3.59	6.90	0	50

^aTime constant

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.23: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in One of Nine Groups of Occupations for Household Head and Spouse Living Outside Bogotá in a Given Year

Variable	Agriculture		Skilled		Non-Skilled	
	β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)	
Intercept	-1.72 (0.65)	**	-8.00 (0.97)	***	-10.34 (0.98)	***
Personal Characteristics						
Head	0.10 (0.17)		-1.13 (0.23)	***	0.98 (0.28)	***
Male	0.49 (0.16)	**	1.44 (0.25)	***	1.60 (0.23)	***
Age	0.25 (0.05)	***	0.20 (0.07)	**	0.40 (0.07)	***
Age square	0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)	*	-0.01 (0.00)	***
Years of education	-0.09 (0.02)	***	0.22 (0.03)	***	-0.05 (0.02)	*
Indicators of Accumulated Wealth						
Owned dwelling	-0.16 (0.40)		-0.94 (0.77)		0.06 (0.46)	
Owned land	1.50 (0.21)	***	1.36 (0.26)	***	1.91 (0.48)	***
Characteristics of the Place of Residence						
Living in urban area	-3.24 (0.14)	***	1.34 (0.26)	***	0.95 (0.19)	***
Labour Force Experience						
Years of labour force experience in rural areas	0.39 (0.03)	***	-0.37 (0.05)	***	0.24 (0.03)	***
Years of labour force experience in urban areas	-0.24 (0.03)	***	-0.06 (0.03)	+	-0.08 (0.03)	*
Migration Experience outside Bogotá						
Accumulated years spent in urban areas	-0.23 (0.02)	***	-0.05 (0.03)	+	-0.01 (0.02)	
Accumulated years spent in rural areas	-0.50 (0.03)	***	0.09 (0.03)	***	0.07 (0.02)	**
Forced migrant	-0.15 (0.15)		-0.11 (0.25)		0.31 (0.16)	*
Tied migrant	-0.26 (0.17)		1.06 (0.24)	***	0.53 (0.19)	**
Forced migrant*Accumulated migration experience	0.05 (0.02)	*	0.01 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.02)	
Tied migrant*Accumulated migration experience	-0.06 (0.04)		-0.39 (0.17)	*	-0.26 (0.13)	*
N	4,173		4,173		4,173	
Likelihood Ratio	3,466.01		472.30		339.83	
Percent Concordant	95.80		88.30		81.60	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001. Economic migrant is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.23: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in One of Nine Groups of Occupations for Household Head and Spouse Living Outside Bogotá in a Given Year (continued)

Variable	Construction		Security		Service and Commerce	
	β		β		β	
	(S.E.)		(S.E.)		(S.E.)	
Intercept	-6.00	***	-7.04	***	-7.48	***
	(1.22)		(1.52)		(1.97)	
Personal Characteristics						
Head	2.91	***			-1.21	***
	(0.49)				(0.25)	
Male					0.21	
					(0.27)	
Age	-0.08		0.12		0.36	*
	(0.08)		(0.11)		(0.15)	
Age square	0.00	**	0.00	*	-0.01	***
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Years of education	0.12	***	0.23	***	0.16	***
	(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.03)	
Indicators of Accumulated Wealth						
Owned dwelling	-0.35		2.95	***	0.96	+
	(0.55)		(0.41)		(0.55)	
Owned land	-2.12	***	-1.91	**	1.27	***
	(0.55)		(0.62)		(0.27)	
Characteristics of the Place of Residence						
Living in urban area	1.58	***			1.38	***
	(0.24)				(0.36)	
Labour Force Experience						
Years of labour force experience in rural areas	0.03		-0.06		-0.42	***
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.08)	
Years of labour force experience in urban areas	0.27	***	0.05		0.02	
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Migration Experience outside Bogotá						
Accumulated years spent in urban areas	-0.02		0.14	***	0.27	***
	(0.02)		(0.04)		(0.08)	
Accumulated years spent in rural areas	0.13	***	0.09	*	0.31	***
	(0.02)		(0.04)		(0.08)	
Forced migrant	0.73	***	-1.06	**	-0.18	
	(0.19)		(0.36)		(0.29)	
Tied migrant	0.62	**	-3.59	**	-0.27	
	(0.23)		(1.09)		(0.35)	
Forced migrant*Accumulated migration experience	-0.14	***	0.01		0.18	***
	(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Tied migrant*Accumulated migration experience	-0.07		0.03		-0.20	
	(0.07)		(0.36)		(0.19)	
N	4,173		4,173		4,173	
Likelihood Ratio	410.35		211.45		390.35	
Percent Concordant	86.00		87.80		89.50	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001. Economic migrant is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.23: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in One of Nine Groups of Occupations for Household Head and Spouse Living Outside Bogotá in a Given Year (continued)

Variable	Petty Commerce		Personal Service		Domestic Servant	
	β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)	
Intercept	-6.42 (1.45)	***	-1.59 (0.81)	*	1.73 (0.76)	*
Personal Characteristics						
Head	-1.60 (0.31)	***	0.58 (0.19)	**	-1.25 (0.13)	***
Male	1.41 (0.31)	***	-0.48 (0.17)	**		
Age	0.27 (0.11)	*	-0.16 (0.06)	**	-0.18 (0.05)	***
Age square	0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)	*	0.00 (0.00)	*
Years of education	-0.06 (0.04)		-0.13 (0.02)	***	-0.18 (0.02)	***
Indicators of Accumulated Wealth						
Owned dwelling	-0.53 (0.83)		-2.12 (1.03)	*	-1.49 (0.77)	*
Owned land			-0.95 (0.31)	**	0.56 (0.19)	**
Characteristics of the Place of Residence						
Living in urban area	1.22 (0.54)	*	2.50 (0.23)	***	1.27 (0.17)	***
Labour Force Experience						
Years of labour force experience in rural areas	-0.32 (0.09)	***	-0.15 (0.03)	***	-0.23 (0.03)	***
Years of labour force experience in urban areas	-0.10 (0.05)	*	0.05 (0.03)		0.03 (0.03)	
Migration Experience outside Bogotá						
Accumulated years spent in urban areas	-0.04 (0.03)		0.05 (0.02)	*	0.08 (0.03)	**
Accumulated years spent in rural areas	-0.49 (0.13)	***	0.14 (0.02)	***	0.16 (0.03)	***
Forced migrant	-1.29 (0.40)	**	0.49 (0.18)	**	-1.09 (0.22)	***
Tied migrant	-2.36 (0.53)	***	0.13 (0.19)		-0.51 (0.17)	**
Forced migrant*Accumulated migration experience	0.07 (0.05)		-0.25 (0.06)	***	0.10 (0.02)	***
Tied migrant*Accumulated migration experience	0.21 (0.09)	*	0.12 (0.04)	**	0.20 (0.04)	***
N	4,173		4,173		4,173	
Likelihood Ratio	313.22		551.08		774.58	
Percent Concordant	90.50		85.70		87.50	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001. Economic migrant is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

The fourth column in **Table 5.23** shows the model predicting the probability of being employed as a non-skilled worker. The estimates indicate that the probability of employment in non-skilled occupations was negatively related to education, as was the case for agricultural workers. Non-skilled workers were more common among those living in urban areas and with rural experience.¹⁰² Forced migrants and tied migrants were more likely to be employed as non-skilled workers than economic migrants outside Bogotá.

The second page of **Table 5.23** contains coefficient estimates for the models predicting the probability of being employed as a construction worker, in security services and in the service and commerce sector. The probability of having a job as a construction worker in a given year was associated with years of education and labour force experience in urban areas but rural origins. Forced migrants living outside Bogotá were more likely to be employed in the construction sector than economic migrants, but their probabilities declined over time.

Employees in security services were male household heads living in urban areas in all cases. The probability of employment in security services was associated with education and owned dwelling. Forced migrants and tied migrants were less likely than economic migrants to be employed in the provision of security services. Employment in service and commerce sector was associated with years of education and owned land. Labour force experience in rural areas decreased the probability of employment in this sector. The accumulated experience as forced migrant increased the probability of being employed in service and commerce in areas outside Bogotá.¹⁰³

The third page of **Table 5.23** includes models for the probability of employment in petty commerce (mainly street vendors), the provider of personal services and as domestic servants. Education and labour force experience in rural areas were negatively associated with employment in these occupations. Living in an urban area was positive correlated with being employed in any of these occupations. Persons with rural origins were likely to be employed in personal services and as domestic servants. The models indicate that employment in personal services and domestic servants was initial opportunities for young persons entering the labour market.

¹⁰² In general, rural experience preceded urban experience. This was why I suggested that the coefficients for the years of labour force experience in rural areas referred to the rural experience before migrating, which implied rural origin.

¹⁰³ The principal occupations in this group were activities related to services such as messengers, self-employed persons in commerce and shop workers.

Forced migrants and tied migrants were less likely to be self-employed in petty commerce and employed as domestic servants than economic migrants. As migration experience increased for forced and tied migrants their probability of employment in these occupations also increased significantly. Forced migrants were more likely to be employed in personal services than economic migrants, but as their migration experience increased in areas outside Bogotá their probability of employment in personal services decreased.

Table 5.24 presents coefficient estimates on the probability of being employed in the informal sector. I estimated this regression as a summary model for the estimations presented in **Table 5.23**. As I expected, years of education were negatively associated with being employed in the informal sector. Both measures of accumulated wealth were negatively associated with the likelihood of employment in the informal sector. Living in urban areas and additional labour force experience increased the probability of being employed in the informal sector. The effect of each additional year of labour force experience in urban areas had a larger impact than the years of labour force experience in rural areas. Forced migrants were as likely as economic migrants to be employed in the informal sector; however, tied migrants were less likely than economic migrants to be employed in the informal sector. The results suggested that over time the trajectories were opposite. Tied migrants were more likely to be employed in the informal sector as their migration experience increased and the opposite happened to forced migrants during the years residing outside Bogotá.

The second part of this section refers to labour trajectories in Bogotá.¹⁰⁴ In this part person-years lived by natives were included in the analysis and natives were considered as the reference category. **Table 5.25** shows descriptive statistics for the variables included in the models for person-years lived in Bogotá. On average 61 percent of person-years lived in Bogotá were being employed in the informal sector.

¹⁰⁴ I tried various model specifications including homicide rate for the period 1996-2002 and unemployment rates for the period 1990-2002 which covered the period of economic recession in Colombia starting in 1998. Unemployment rates were significant only for construction workers and petty commerce.

Table 5.24: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in the Informal Sector for Household Head and Spouse Living Outside Bogotá in a Given Year

Variables	Informal β (S.E.)	
Intercept	5.55 (0.76)	***
Personal Characteristics		
Head	0.81 (0.18)	***
Male	-2.02 (0.18)	***
Age	-0.30 (0.05)	***
Age square	0.00 (0.00)	***
Years of education	-0.15 (0.02)	***
Indicators of Accumulated Wealth		
Owned dwelling	-1.61 (0.46)	***
Owned land	-1.34 (0.22)	***
Characteristics of the Place of Residence		
Living in urban area	0.68 (0.19)	***
Labour Force Experience		
Years of labour force experience in rural areas	0.06 (0.03)	*
Years of labour force experience in urban areas	0.13 (0.03)	***
Migration Experience outside Bogotá		
Accumulated years spent in urban areas	0.02 (0.02)	
Accumulated years spent in rural areas	0.03 (0.02)	
Forced migrant	0.14 (0.16)	
Tied migrant	-0.75 (0.18)	***
Forced migrant*Accumulated migration experience	-0.07 (0.02)	***
Tied migrant*Accumulated migration experience	0.56 (0.11)	***
N	1,621	
Likelihood Ratio	417.43	
Percent Concordant	78.10	

+ = $p < 0.1$; * = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$; *** = $p < 0.001$. Economic migrant is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.25: Descriptive Statistics of Household Head and Spouse for Years Living in Bogotá in a Given Year

Intercept	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Occupation					
Employed in agriculture	14,660	0.03	0.17	0	1
Employed as skilled employee	14,660	0.04	0.20	0	1
Employed as non-skilled worker	14,660	0.20	0.40	0	1
Employed in construction sector	14,660	0.20	0.40	0	1
Employed in the provision of security service	14,660	0.07	0.26	0	1
Employed in service and commerce sectors	14,660	0.08	0.26	0	1
Petty commerce	14,660	0.07	0.26	0	1
Employed as the provider of personal service	14,660	0.13	0.34	0	1
Employed as domestic servant	14,660	0.17	0.38	0	1
Employed in the informal sector	14,596	0.61	0.49	0	1
Characteristics of the Household Head					
Head	14,660	0.67	0.47	0	1
Male	14,585	0.56	0.50	0	1
Age	14,660	31.66	10.97	15	81
Years of education	14,502	5.01	3.07	0	16
Indicators of Accumulated Wealth					
Owned dwelling	14,660	0.25	0.43	0	1
Labour Force Experience					
Years of labour force experience in rural areas	14,660	2.83	6.43	0	55
Years of labour force experience in urban areas	14,660	13.05	9.50	0	58
Migration Experience					
Accumulated years spent in Bogotá	14,660	12.74	9.21	1	64
Native	14,660	0.65	0.48	0	1
Economic migrant	14,660	0.20	0.40	0	1
Forced migrant	14,660	0.07	0.25	0	1
Tied migrant	14,660	0.09	0.28	0	1
Accumulated migration experience	14,660	4.45	8.63	0	64

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

The second column in **Table 5.26** contains coefficient estimates for the probability of working in agriculture during the years residing in Bogotá. Homeownership was positive associated with the probability of being employed in agriculture.¹⁰⁵ There were no differences among natives and all migrant groups in the probability of employment in agriculture near Bogotá. Moreover, the probability of being employed in agriculture increased over time for forced and tied migrants, and was positively related with labour force experience in rural areas.

Estimated coefficients of the probability of the employment in skilled occupations, while living in Bogotá, suggested that each additional year of education was positively related with the probability of being employed as a skilled worker. Economic and tied migrants were more likely to be employed as skilled workers than natives. There were no differences in the probability of employment in skilled occupations between forced migrants and natives.

For non-skilled occupations education was positive correlated, but the coefficient was smaller than for skilled occupations. Years of labour force experience were negatively correlated with the probability of being employed as non-skilled workers indicating that these were occupations where relatively inexperienced persons were employed. Forced migrants were less likely than natives to be employed as non-skilled workers; but, as time since displacement passed their probability of employment in non-skilled occupations increased.

The probability of employment as construction workers for forced migrants decreased with time since displacement. The probability of working in construction was not positively related to education. Indeed, as education increased a person was more likely to be employed in other occupations other than construction in a given year. Finally as the number of years spent in Bogotá increased the probability of employment in construction declined.

¹⁰⁵ The coefficient estimates for the models were not implying a causal relation. They were implying associations between the variables in a given point in time. Although homeownership was associated with wealth the conditions of the dwelling might help explain the relation behind this correlation.

Table 5.26: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in One of Nine Groups of Occupations for Household Head and Spouse Living in Bogotá in a Given Year

Variable	Agriculture		Skilled		Non-Skilled	
	β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)	
Intercept	-1.93 (0.55)	***	-5.26 (0.43)	***	-2.99 (0.21)	***
Personal Characteristics						
Head	-0.56 (0.15)	***	0.01 (0.11)		0.07 (0.06)	
Male	-0.12 (0.15)		0.11 (0.10)		1.21 (0.05)	***
Age	-0.08 (0.03)	*	0.02 (0.03)		0.04 (0.01)	***
Age square	0.00 (0.00)	***	0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)	***
Years of education	0.01 (0.02)		0.19 (0.01)	***	0.08 (0.01)	***
Indicators of Accumulated Wealth						
Owned dwelling	0.68 (0.15)	***	0.22 (0.10)	*	0.06 (0.05)	
Labour Force Experience						
Years of labour force experience in rural areas	0.29 (0.02)	***	-0.02 (0.02)		-0.06 (0.01)	***
Years of labour force experience in urban areas	-0.14 (0.02)	***	0.01 (0.01)		-0.02 (0.01)	*
Migration Experience						
Accumulated years spent in Bogotá	0.24 (0.01)	***	0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	
Economic migrant	0.32 (0.25)		0.64 (0.18)	***	-0.04 (0.10)	
Forced migrant	-0.53 (0.34)		0.22 (0.22)		-0.34 (0.11)	**
Tied migrant	-0.50 (0.43)		1.18 (0.23)	***	-0.24 (0.13)	+
Economic migrant*Accumulated migration experience	-0.01 (0.02)		0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)	
Forced migrant*Accumulated migration experience	0.06 (0.01)	***	0.02 (0.01)		0.05 (0.01)	***
Tied migrant*Accumulated migration experience	0.10 (0.03)	**	-0.09 (0.02)	***	0.05 (0.01)	***
N	14,502		14,502		14,502	
Likelihood Ratio	1,208.06		324.10		1,159.60	
Percent Concordant	84.40		66.70		69.60	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001. Native is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.26: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in One of Nine Groups of Occupations for Household Head and Spouse Living in Bogotá in a Given Year (continued)

Variable	Construction		Security		Service and Commerce	
	β		β		β	
	(S.E.)		(S.E.)		(S.E.)	
Intercept	-0.17		-6.50	***	-3.51	***
	(0.24)		(0.40)		(0.26)	
Personal Characteristics						
Head	1.44	***	0.29	**	-0.02	
	(0.06)		(0.11)		(0.07)	
Male			2.06	***	-1.01	***
			(0.13)		(0.08)	
Age	-0.14	***	0.08	***	0.05	**
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Age square	0.00		0.00	***	0.00	+
	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Years of education	-0.04	***	0.03	*	0.10	***
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Indicators of Accumulated Wealth						
Owned dwelling	-0.11	*	0.21	**	0.19	*
	(0.06)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Labour Force Experience						
Years of labour force experience in rural areas	0.20	***	0.04	**	-0.01	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Years of labour force experience in urban areas	0.19	***	0.04	**	-0.08	***
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Migration Experience						
Accumulated years spent in Bogotá	-0.05	***	0.00		0.00	
	(0.00)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Economic migrant	-0.32	***	0.76	***	-0.44	**
	(0.10)		(0.13)		(0.17)	
Forced migrant	-0.46	***	0.77	***	0.07	
	(0.11)		(0.14)		(0.17)	
Tied migrant	-0.88	***	1.32	***	-0.37	+
	(0.14)		(0.18)		(0.20)	
Economic migrant*Accumulated migration experience	-0.01		-0.01		0.01	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Forced migrant*Accumulated migration experience	-0.03	***	-0.03	**	-0.02	*
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Tied migrant*Accumulated migration experience	0.03	**	-0.06	***	0.02	+
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
N	14,502		14,502		14,502	
Likelihood Ratio	1,555.95		995.13		559.41	
Percent Concordant	72.60		77.00		70.00	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001. Native is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table 5.26: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in One of Nine Groups of Occupations for Household Head and Spouse Living in Bogotá in a Given Year (continued)

Variable	Petty Commerce		Personal Service		Domestic Servant	
	β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)		β (S.E.)	
Intercept	-3.82 (0.30)	***	-1.68 (0.24)	***	1.34 (0.21)	***
Personal Characteristics						
Head	0.34 (0.08)	***	-0.15 (0.06)	*	-1.34 (0.05)	***
Male	-0.48 (0.08)	***	-0.98 (0.06)	***		
Age	0.08 (0.02)	***	0.03 (0.01)	+	-0.06 (0.01)	***
Age square	0.00 (0.00)	**	0.00 (0.00)	*	0.00 (0.00)	***
Years of education	-0.02 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)		-0.20 (0.01)	***
Indicators of Accumulated Wealth						
Owned dwelling	0.00 (0.08)		-0.50 (0.07)	***	-0.08 (0.06)	
Labour Force Experience						
Years of labour force experience in rural areas	-0.08 (0.01)	***	-0.04 (0.01)	***	-0.11 (0.01)	***
Years of labour force experience in urban areas	-0.02 (0.01)	**	0.01 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)	
Migration Experience						
Accumulated years spent in Bogotá	-0.01 (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)	
Economic migrant	-0.63 (0.17)	***	-0.24 (0.12)	+	0.48 (0.10)	***
Forced migrant	0.45 (0.16)	**	0.62 (0.13)	***	-0.18 (0.15)	
Tied migrant	0.29 (0.17)	+	-0.64 (0.17)	***	0.75 (0.13)	***
Economic migrant*Accumulated migration experience	0.04 (0.01)	***	0.01 (0.01)		-0.03 (0.01)	***
Forced migrant*Accumulated migration experience	-0.07 (0.02)	**	-0.06 (0.02)	***	0.01 (0.01)	
Tied migrant*Accumulated migration experience	0.01 (0.01)		0.02 (0.01)		-0.09 (0.01)	***
N	14,502		14,502		14,502	
Likelihood Ratio	232.12		721.22		1873.71	
Percent Concordant	62.70		67.80		76.20	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001. Native is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Persons that were employed in security services were more likely to have migration experience. As their migration experience increased the probability of being employed in security services decreased for forced and tied migrants.¹⁰⁶ The probability of employment in services and commerce was also sensitive to the migration experience of the person in a given year but in the opposite direction; and economic and tied migrants were less likely to be employed in these activities than natives. As time since displacement increased for forced migrants, the probability of employment in the services and commerce sector decreased. As in the case on non-skilled workers, the probability of employment in this sector was negatively related to experience in the labour market.

Self-employment in petty commerce was also sensitive to migration experience. Economic migrants were less likely to be employed as street vendors or in petty commerce than natives. Forced and tied migrants were more likely to be working in petty commerce than natives. The likelihood of self-employment as street vendor for forced migrants decreased with time. Employment patterns of forced migrants that supplied personal services were similar to those of forced migrants engaged in petty commerce. They were more likely to be employed in personal services than natives or voluntary migrants (economic and tied), but less so over time. In contrast, forced migrants were less likely to be employed as domestic servants than economic and tied migrants. A possible explanation was that forced migrants were less likely than others to have the network connections to be employed as domestic servants.

Finally, the summary model indicates that the probability of being employed in the informal sector was negatively related with age, education and accumulated wealth (homeownership) and positively associated with experience in the labour force (see **Table 5.27**). Time spent in Bogotá reduced the chances of employment in the informal sector. Forced migrants were as likely as natives to be employed in occupations in the informal sector. However, economic and tied migrants were more likely to be employed in the formal sector.

¹⁰⁶ Security services referred mostly to doormen and watchmen.

Table 5.27: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed in the Informal Sector for Household Head and Spouse Living in Bogotá in a Given Year

Variable	Informal β (S.E.)	
Intercept	2.99 (0.17)	***
Personal Characteristics		
Head	-0.07 (0.05)	
Male	-1.03 (0.04)	***
Age	-0.07 (0.01)	***
Age square	0.00 (0.00)	***
Years of education	-0.14 (0.01)	***
Indicators of Accumulated Wealth		
Owned dwelling	-0.22 (0.04)	***
Labour Force Experience		
Years of labour force experience in rural areas	0.05 (0.01)	***
Years of labour force experience in urban areas	0.05 (0.01)	***
Migration Experience		
Accumulated years spent in Bogotá	-0.01 (0.00)	*
Economic migrant	-0.14 (0.08)	+
Forced migrant	0.10 (0.09)	*
Tied migrant	-0.30 (0.11)	**
Economic migrant*Accumulated migration experience	0.00 (0.00)	
Forced migrant*Accumulated migration experience	-0.02 (0.01)	**
Tied migrant*Accumulated migration experience	-0.01 (0.01)	
<hr/>		
N	14,502	
Likelihood Ratio	1,507.90	
Percent Concordant	68.10	

+ = p<0.1; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01; *** = p<0.001. Native is the reference category.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

From the models presented in this section I conclude that there were differences in the labour trajectories of the different migrant groups. However, these differences were not explained by differences in education or previous labour force experience. I noticed that the probabilities of employment in Bogotá and outside the city for forced migrants relative to economic migrants did not show similar patterns.

Economic migrants were as likely as forced migrants to be employed in agriculture and as the provider of personal services in Bogotá and in other locations. When forced migrants were in Bogotá they were more likely to be employed in petty commerce than in other areas. Forced migrants had more opportunities to be employed in the construction sector and in non-skilled occupations in areas outside Bogotá than in the city. Access to skilled occupations was also more restricted for forced migrants than for economic migrants. Forced migrants were at a disadvantage as the provider of domestic servants in both settings.

In the summary models there were no differences in the probability of employment for forced and economic migrants in the informal sector either in Bogotá or in other areas outside the city.

Final Comments

In part I of this chapter, I presented evidence and explanations of the negative and long-term impact of forced migration in the socioeconomic status of forced migrants relative to the migration experiences of voluntary migrants and the conditions of the host populations. According to the data from the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey, forced migrants in the places of longest residence were doing better than voluntary migrants. A comparison between the socioeconomic indicators in the place of longest residence (origin) and in Bogotá at the end of 2002 (destination) indicated that voluntary migrants were enjoying basic amenities, reported a higher consumption of durable goods, and higher levels of homeownership. Forced migrants were living in worse conditions than in the place of longest residence and consumed fewer appliances than in the places of origin. When compared to non-migrants, intra-urban migrants and voluntary migrants in the poor areas in the periphery of Bogotá, the indicators for forced migrants in four of the five groups of variables in this analysis suggested that they were the least advantaged group. They had lower access to basic amenities, smaller dwellings

and inadequate housing, lower consumption of durable goods and lower self-assessment of their economic situation.

There were potential explanations for the patterns observed. Following the reasoning of Robert Chambers forced migrants became vulnerable after displacement because they were impoverished and did not have the means in the place of destination to cope with the costs of adaptation.¹⁰⁷ By contrast, voluntary migrants experienced improvements in their living conditions between the place of origin and the place of destination. In the place of origin their socioeconomic status was lower than that of forced migrants; but at the place of destination the pattern was reversed. Voluntary migrants were doing better than forced migrants, even after controlling for time spent residing in Bogotá. One possible explanation of these different patterns was that forced migrants were using coping strategies, while voluntary migrants were using cumulative strategies.

Even given the poor living conditions in the urban places of destination for forced migrants, they were very likely to stay in the city. Forced migrants that were not the subject of a public policy providing both humanitarian assistance and resettlement assistance, as well as promoting participation in the urban labour market, were likely to remain in poverty. In sum, forced migrants were among the most vulnerable populations in Colombia and their conditions seldom improved during the period of study.

My analysis in part II did not support the findings of other studies that relied only on internally displaced persons. The comparison of migrants and labour trajectories indicated that although the labour patterns of forced migrants and economic migrants differed, these differences were not explained by their rural background or their lack of education. Forced migrants in this analysis demonstrated that they had access to land as a productive asset in the place of destination and that it was an important determinant in the probability of being employed in agriculture. After controlling for land tenure and location characteristics (urban or rural) tenure the differences in the probability of employment in agriculture were not different for economic and forced migrants.

I introduced the discussion on the informal sector by estimating models for predicting the probabilities of employment in each group of occupations to explore the following questions:

¹⁰⁷ R. Chambers, 'Vulnerability, coping and policy (editorial introduction),' *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 37, no. 4 (2006): pp. 33-40.

1) Were forced migrants employed more frequently than economic migrants in activities related to coping strategies or cumulative strategies?

2) Were the occupations of forced migrants more compatible with the dualistic approach or more linked to activities in the formal market?

The data revealed that forced migrants tended to be employed in activities related more frequently to coping strategies than to cumulative strategies, particularly with regard to skilled employment. Second, coping strategies were more related to the dualistic approach. Thus the labour patterns of forced migrants, though not drastically different from those of economic migrants, were not likely to help the forced migrants to integrate fully with the labour market and improve their living conditions later.

CONCLUSION

In February 2002 the Colombian government decided to end the peace negotiations with the guerrillas of the FARC after it hijacked a plane, landed it in an uninhabited area and then kidnapped one of its passengers, a senator. During the same week, a presidential candidate was also abducted and another senator was shot dead. Following the government's decision, the FARC undertook a terrorist campaign aimed at creating fear among the population and damaging the country's infrastructure. For most Colombians, their security had then become a major priority. The new policies were required to improve the situation and prevent the escalation of violent crime. As a direct consequence of the violence, the civilian population was a primary objective in the war. Civilian inhabitants of conflict zones found themselves converted into targets for coercion and violence by different armed factions. Practices such as attacks against civilian targets, hostage taking, public killings, torture and massacres, and other forms of violence or specific threats against the population were part of this process and directly responsible for the forced internal migration of more two million people by 2002.

This thesis has analysed findings in research on violent crime, notably homicide and kidnapping in Bogotá, Colombia between 1990 and 2002. It has described how the problem of violence was affecting the majority of people living in Bogotá and how their negative perceptions of the situation affected the stability of their communities. Negative perceptions had also affected the legitimacy of the authorities at the local, national and international levels. The thesis also contributes to the study of forced internal migrants by providing a research design that compared the experience of various groups of migrants over time, and by using the concepts of migrant positive self-selection and vulnerability to explain differences among migrant groups in their adaptation at destination.

During the 1990s, every government put forward its own security policies, modifying, adding and deleting earlier programmes. Untimely, most of the results tended to be similar. While most of the changes had been done at the level of legislation, some institutions - the national police, the army and the *Fiscalía General* - benefited from increased resources from the national government and from overseas governments and international agencies. While the result of this increased investment was visible in

the creation of new and specialised crime-prevention and crime-reaction units throughout the country, their results were often less than was hoped for. Most of the Colombian security institutions, notably the army and the national police, still had a poor capacity to evaluate themselves. Anti-kidnapping units, for example, did not have a common policy, did not promote crime prevention and often preferred not to intervene to avoid risking the victim's life by engaging in an open confrontation with armed groups. In a country where state institutions were a constant target for illegal armed groups, low levels of accountability and trust towards non-members of the force were understandable.

Although the central government and local agencies throughout the country approached the problem by implementing different projects aimed at modernising state institutions and providing better methods of justice, the outcomes of these projects were not always been visible. Projects like the modernisation of the *Fiscalía General* in 1994, the investment in *Casas de Justicia* since the mid-1990s, and the adoption of a 5-year plan in 1998 to finance projects related to citizen security and peaceful coexistence did not achieve the expected results. These programmes did not receive much attention from the public: their levels of accountability remained low, and project follow-ups were scarce. In many cases, there was a total lack of knowledge about the social impact of these projects.

International efforts to promote the understanding of violent crime increased during the 1990s. The results of international conferences held in Europe and the United States during the late 1980s and the publications by multilateral agencies like the United Nations and the Organisation of American States raised general awareness of the topic throughout the region. Colombia's citizen security policies had been directly influenced by international programmes like *Safer Cities*, a strategy of crime reduction and violence prevention led by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). This, added to the funding possibilities offered by institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank or by individual foreign governments, had shown a growing interest to provide solutions to improve the security situation. Because crime was frequently seen as a primarily consequence of inequality, long-term structural unemployment and general lack of opportunities for most of the people in the poorest sectors of the population, much of international community focused on social development and poverty-reduction programmes. There had also been

a clear and constant effort to improve and modernise institutions in charge of investigating, prosecuting and penalising crime.

In 1987 the *Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia* produced its pioneer analysis of the problem of violence in the country. This example, which led a group of academics to participate actively in the drafting and implementation of security policies during the early 1990s, has not been repeated, despite the importance of the study in delineating new lines for research into Colombian crime, violence and the application of justice. The national government failed to repeat the promotion of study groups like the *Comisión*. Commissions that promoted further understanding of crime problems at the local level had also been rare. Only the largest cities undertook such exercises, and even then government involvement was scarce. Comparative studies at the national level were few, and this in spite of repeated statements committing successive governments to invest resources in this area. There was little sound knowledge of the crime situation in the intermediate cities and small towns of the country. Only the largest cities, where were also located the major universities and research centres, made significant progresses in the study of crime during the 1990s, but their capacity to fund projects in this area was usually weak.

In spite of this, there had been clear efforts to understand, implement and improve citizen security policies in the country. The most visible results in citizen security policies were the reforms of the national police, the creation of several new law enforcement agencies and the introduction of a partial accusatory system led by the *Fiscalía General* and its dependencies. While the police and the *Fiscalía General* had probably been the best financed and enjoyed widespread popular support, many less visible changes had taken place in other institutions, like the *alcaldías* which played an essential role in drafting local security policies. Local councils, notably through their *Secretarías de Gobierno*, had been promoting improved public areas, educating local communities in the respect for civil rules and establishing methods of citizen participation and conflict resolution as a method of crime prevention.

Most of the population, although being more informed and involved in citizen security issues than before, had nonetheless remained distant from the authorities in their fight against violent crime. Although the image of the police had improved, many citizens were still distrustful towards the institution. Alternative methods of conflict resolution like the *Casas de Justicia*, were not always successful, partly because of a lack of understanding among the population. In all too many cases, crimes remained

unreported, uninvestigated and criminals were immune from prosecution. This increased popular fears of violent crime and posed a serious threat to the stability of communities. Because citizens were so distrustful towards each other, social and economic relations within communities were adversely affected. Economic incentives were lost and levels of investment shrank. This increased unemployment, migration and inequality, creating serious obstacles for long-term economic development and improvements in the quality of life of the population.

In most of the smaller towns and intermediate cities, the *alcaldías* had to apply short-term policies, without consistent support from national institutions like the central government and the national police. The implementation of co-ordinated medium or long-term policies between the police and the local *alcaldes* had proven difficult. The *alcaldes* were not supposed to direct the police: they were supposed to demand from the police a proper investigation and prosecution of crimes. They were also supposed to share the knowledge to implement crime-prevention policies by detecting communities at risk, implementing educational programmes and improving public areas where citizens felt unsafe and where the relations between the police and the community had been damaged by violence and crime. This had especially been the case in sectors where the authorities were the targets of homicide and kidnapping by illegal armed groups.

Colombia's largest share of violent crimes, notably homicide and kidnapping, took place in or near the cities where the majority of the population lived. The ten largest cities in the country represented some 40 percent of the total number of reported cases. In 1999, this meant almost 10,000 homicides. The three largest cities, Bogotá, Medellín and Cali accounted for more than 30 percent of the total number of homicides committed annually in the country.

While the major drug-cartels of the early 1990s had been disbanded, the drug-business was still flourishing. This was certainly one of the root causes of violence and competition between illegal armed groups, both in rural and urban areas. It was also a major cause of corruption in central and local government, among the judiciary and among law-enforcement authorities. The implementation of citizen security policies had been directly and adversely affected.

Well-organised groups were responsible for an important share of violent crime. These criminal groups were often associated with larger criminal organisations, drug-cartels, and paramilitary and guerrilla groups. A possible explanation for the intense degree of violence seen in some localities of the cities was the fact that bands often

competed for their share of urban territory and for the economic gains that could be obtained in their zone. In each city there were specific and well defined sectors of violence.

The main problem was that such a large proportion of violent crimes were never reported, investigated and prosecuted. Only a small share of the cases ended with the prosecution and sentencing of criminals. Statistical records of crime had somewhat improved in recent years; yet while homicide data, especially at the urban level, seemed to be fairly accurate, databases covering other violent crimes were much less reliable. This was especially the case with kidnapping and extortion, and these crimes remained 'invisible' when the victims did not report them. Families of victims and private businesses were often reluctant to disclose details regarding abductions and the negotiation process with the kidnappers, or with extortionists.

Kidnapping and extortion were the major problem affecting the security of the population, after homicide. These crimes had significant impacts on all citizens since they not only victimised the abducted and threatened persons but also their friends and families who handled the pressures of negotiating with kidnappers and paying ransoms. These crimes had become an all-class problem in Colombia, since many victims came from modest strata of the population. Ransoms and extortion 'fees' could vary from US\$ 50 dollars to several millions. In rural areas, farmers were often obliged to pay their extortion 'fees' in goods and livestock.

Many Colombians and foreigners preferred to reach special agreements with criminals. The payment of ransoms, followed by regular extortion 'fees', was common. This, in the eyes of many citizens, remained the best strategy to avoid further victimisation. Between 1998 and 2001, the authorities recorded between 3,000 and 3,800 cases of kidnapping per year. Real figures might be higher. Most of the cases of kidnapping had been attributed to guerrillas who, since the early 1990s, had justified the use of this crime in terms of the increasing costs of their military operations throughout the country. After the production of narcotic drugs and the 'taxation' of drug-related activities, the 'business of kidnapping' became the major source of income for illegal armed groups and notably for guerrillas. However, to commit these crimes, guerrillas and paramilitaries often subcontracted common delinquents. This perverse strategy created a general climate of insecurity in the country that had led to a loss of legitimacy and credibility in the authorities that could not prosecute these crimes.

The levels of insecurity had an obvious negative influence on the country's governability. The lack of results in the fight against kidnapping and the limited results of homicide-reduction programmes had been reflected in the feelings of the majority of the population. It decreased the levels of trust among individuals and towards the authorities. People constantly saw, heard and read about crime. This had serious consequences for the levels of social trust in the society and led to the appearance of a 'security risk mentality' that was detrimental to the entire society. This policy had also promoted the privatisation of security by recourse to methods both legal and illegal, and had simultaneously distanced the authorities from the needs of the local population.

Violent crime increased the perception of insecurity among Colombians and foreigners; it established strong levels of fear among them, de-legitimising the role of the government and fostering impunity among criminals, due to the lack of support and co-operation between citizens and the authorities. The security policies of the government had little impact during the 1990s partly because of poor levels of participation and communication with citizens. The effectiveness of citizen security policies was closely linked to public opinion, and could be influenced by mass media reports. Media coverage of crime could serve to diffuse governmental policies, but it could also destroy the efforts of the authorities by sensationalising crime. These factors had certainly helped to increase victimisation fears among citizens and to generalise negative perceptions of the levels of crime, at both national and international levels. An improvement in citizen security policies could be achieved by facilitating communication channels between government and citizens.

The mass media had thus a major role to play. The government had the obligation to guarantee the independence and freedom of the media, and the media had the right to remain critical. Yet, it had to learn to analyse and publicise violent crime in a more professional and socially constructive manner. The government was not sufficiently aware of the influence of the media upon the population, and, at both local and national levels, failed to put programmes in place to work with the mass media. Government did too little to improve the quality of crime data and promote the coverage of its policies in the fight against violent crime.

There were still important gaps in the citizen security policies that had not been addressed properly and that had not attracted interest from the authorities. There remained a notorious judicial backlog; the levels of impunity remained high; and most prisons were outdated, overcrowded and faced endemic personnel crises. This last

problem, visible throughout Latin America, was especially visible in Colombia where the security problems arising from political violence and the highly lucrative and corrupting drug-business were the cause of frequent crises in the penitentiaries. In this sense, Colombia had a significant disadvantage in comparison to the other countries: it had to attempt to negotiate peace with guerrilla groups while combating those who trafficked with illegal drugs, kidnapped people and promoted delinquency. Because the groups that were involved in these activities were often inter-linked, there had been a major problem in defining a clear and consistent security policy.

The complexity of the problem and its important impacts on the population made the solution arduous and long-term. With approximately 25,000 homicides a year, 2,500 kidnappings and another large number of non-declared extortion crimes during the 1990s, the authorities could not hope for the success of short-term policies. It was not only a problem for the security forces and the prosecutor's office. Since the population had been living in fear, the entire society had to be taken into account in facing this violence. The topic of violent crime could not be dealt with only by the implementation of conventional security policies by the central government and local authorities. The issue had to be considered as a national development project involving both crime deterrence and prevention programmes, especially in zones where levels of crime were highest.

Without the efforts made and initiations taken, the position could be worse. Some crimes, like homicide, have decreased somewhat in recent years, while falling too in many other countries besides Colombia. Other crimes, like kidnapping and extortion, increased more rapidly than in other countries, despite official efforts, indicating that more remained to be done in the areas of citizen security and criminal justice. There was room for some optimism. It was clear by 2002 that government, both national and local, needed to learn from past errors and to prioritise sound policies that brought criminals to justice and deterred potential offenders. This could be achieved by de-politicising security issues and devising long-term policies that combined all sectors of the population with politicians and technocrats, academics, foreign governments, officials from multilateral agencies, members of non-governmental organisations and local community leaders. While this was not an easy task, it was the best way to provide long-term involvement, improve accountability and monitor the financing of citizen security projects.

Although the determinants of crime and violence seen in this country were not unique to Colombia, it was the Latin American country that presented the most varied and numerous problems simultaneously. Guerrilla and paramilitary groups with different political and military strategies, drug-cartels with a decade of violence and a strong presence in the main urban centres and youth bands that were highly territorial were the main groups that perpetuated crime and violence. Other factors also included armed forces that were constantly threatened by attacks from armed opposition groups, a public sector which sometimes lacked legitimacy and was often subject to corruption and underfunding, plus a slow modernisation process of the institutions which adapted poorly to changing environments.

Until recently, the country also suffered from low levels of attention and involvement from foreign governments and from the international community. The United States was involved mainly in funding the state in its fight against drug cartels; the European presence, however, was shallow, although EU involvement had gradually increased during the 1990s. This was most evident during peace negotiations with the largest guerrilla groups and in the EU's concern for funding social projects in education, health and democratic development.

The Colombian security crisis gradually expanded and affected most of the population. The common statement of the late 1980s and early 1990s of '*el país va mal pero la economía va bien*' was outdated. The economic slowdown of the late 1990s increased levels of unemployment, caused further rural-urban and rural-rural migrations and decreased the potential for investment. Economic crisis contributed, or so it was argued, to an increase in economic crimes, notably ransom kidnapping, extortion crime and street robbery. Insecurity, besides hindering the chances of a prompt economic recovery, caused a general malaise through all levels of society. In this respect, there had been a democratisation of victimisation.

In spite of this citizen security was not a 'fashionable' topic in Colombian politics. The topic did not attract the attention of academics, politicians and citizens in general to the extent of as other themes like the control of illegal drugs and negotiations with insurgent groups. Citizen security was still seen as a secondary problem; it was perceived as a consequence of other problems. Although the efforts of the authorities to curb crime were overshadowed by their efforts to find a solution to the conflict with guerrillas or by their struggles against drug-cartels, some progress was made. Citizens were aware that their security was not independent from the revolutionary programmes

of guerrillas. However, kidnapping and extortion crime ceased to be considered as instruments for political pressure and became a lucrative industry with little or no revolutionary purpose. The problem of homicide had also taken a new dimension since available data suggested that most Colombians died in urban areas, distant from combat zones. Security institutions had responded to these problems; homicide had decreased and there had been some improvement in the capacity of the authorities, notably the police and the *Fiscalía General*, to investigate and prosecute criminals. Yet, there was vast space for improvement: other violent crimes remained rife.

Citizen security policies were still at an early stage of development. It was a new concept where law-enforcement policies blended with crime-prevention programmes. To achieve this local authorities and community members co-operated and shared information. A consensus was reached that different communities required different security programmes based upon local analyses. Because there was no such thing as an 'established citizen security policy', Colombian policy makers had to adapt security policies diffused from abroad to local circumstances. The experiences of Cali with DESEPAZ and Bogotá with the *Educación Ciudadana* were examples of successful experiments. However, much more remained to be done: 25,000 homicides per year, 2,500 declared kidnappings and many other cases of violent crimes were proof of this.

There was an urgent need to create better and more reliable crime databases. This would improve the knowledge of crime, its trends, locations and criminals; databases were needed to classify prison populations, convicts and sentences. For the majority of the population, databases also helped to measure the impact of public policies in the fight against crime. Central governments had to call for an increased participation and co-operation between the academia, the private sector, the mass media, community leaders, non-governmental organisations and minority sectors and the international community. Together, all these groups could work hand in hand to improve the knowledge of crime while encouraging better levels of accountability and transparency from the authorities. This would help to provide better levels of security, improve public perceptions and in general, work towards an increased respect of the rule of law. All these factors would help to defend the rights of citizens and to provide a serious and consistent long-term criminal justice policy within a democratic and constitutional framework.

Research on forced internal migrants based on empirical data was scarce because of the difficulties of collecting information. Moreover, most studies were based on information collected at aid camps or other locations where internally displaced persons were concentrated. These studies generally had two methodological flaws. They were based on biased samples and lacked control groups such as voluntary migrants or natives. It was necessary to compare the experience of the internally displaced persons and other migrant populations in order to appreciate if displacements had deleterious effects for the population forced to leave from its place of origin. This thesis addresses these methodological problems providing a research design that considered persons with various migration experiences in large urban areas of settlement where the internally displaced persons were dispersed throughout the city.

In order to understand the effects of displacement, it was crucial to recognise the effects of voluntary migration as well. First, because internally displaced persons usually followed the directions of the voluntary migration streams; and second, because differences between the characteristics of forced and voluntary migrants explained why after displacement the household compositions, socioeconomic conditions and labour trajectories of these two migration group differed.

The internally displaced persons differed from voluntary migrants. In general, voluntary migrants were less advantaged at the origin than forced migrants, and more advantage at destination than forced migrants. A potential explanation for these differences was the positive self-selection of voluntary migrants and the adverse selection of forced migrants into the migration stream to urban areas. Voluntary migrants had the incentives to move in search for better opportunities or as tied migrants. Those who decided to move in search of jobs or higher earnings were expected on average to succeed at destination and progressively improve their living conditions.

Two key factors that explained the differences between forced and voluntary migrants were the types of strategies they implemented at destination and their different degrees of vulnerability. Voluntary migrants might plan their move, gather information about the labour market at destination and use their social capital. The results suggested that at destination they were more likely to use cumulative strategies; that is to say, their higher social network and probability of finding jobs allowed them to save more than forced migrants and accumulate capital for increasing their well-being or facing an external shock in the future. In contrast forced migrants did not have their incentive to

move and usually left their original place of residence at short notice, abandoning their productive capital and using their accumulated resources to move. Their social networks were often weak, and they often had insufficient information about conditions at their destinations to obtain jobs. The analysis of the access of forced and voluntary migrants to occupations such as domestic servants indicated that forced migrants did not have the networks to be recommended as workers in domestic servants, and that forced migrants were discriminated against in this occupation. Forced migrants were more likely to work in the informal than in the formal sector and their probability of employment decreased over time. Due to restricted access to the labour market and their low social capital forced migrants were more likely to implement coping strategies at destination that meant that their standard of living deteriorated over time. In other words, given their low incomes they were unable to save, and were spending all their income upon daily survival needs. Moreover, forced migrants were more likely to be vulnerable than voluntary migrants. Forced migrants used their cumulative capital to face the shock of displacement, and, after displacement, were vulnerable because they did not have the resources to face a second shock like sickness, unemployment and natural disaster. They were compelled to adopt coping rather than cumulative strategies.

A case study of internally displaced persons in Bogotá, Colombia was presented using two sources of primary data: the Experimental Census of Soacha, Cundinamarca, and the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey collected specifically for this investigation. The main findings of the study suggested that one of the main causes of displacement was the use of force to obtain land. The prevalence of land tenure before displacement was larger for internally displaced persons than for voluntary migrants. The socioeconomic conditions of voluntary migrants were different at destination than at origin. Forced migrants used to be better off than voluntary migrants at origin. At destination it was the opposite, voluntary migrants were better than forced migrants controlling for time since arrival at Bogotá. Among the four migrant groups, forced migrants were the most vulnerable of all.

Gender roles of forced and voluntary migrants also differed. The prevalence of female heads in households with spouse present was higher in the forced migrant group than in the other groups. This indicated two different processes. One was the positive selection of complete families of forced migrants in urban settings. Households headed by single women might not have the resources needed to migrate to Bogotá, and they might stop in towns nearby their original homes or in medium size cities. Second, the

literature suggested that forced migration altered the production structure of household members and therefore the power relations within the household. The estimated probability of employment for forced migrant females was higher at origin than at destination, and the opposite for men. Therefore in urban areas women were likely to gain power in the household after displacement. The participation in the labour force was always higher for males than for females in all migrant groups. Job opportunities in the formal sector were lower for forced migrants and for natives than for voluntary migrants. In addition, the probabilities of formal employment for forced migrants decreased over time indicating poor adaptation to the urban labour market. Forced migrants might need longer periods of adaptation than voluntary migrants in urban labour markets.

In a further examination of labour and migration histories of people living in poor areas on the periphery of Bogotá, the occupation profiles of forced migrants in Bogotá and in other areas of the country were different. In the models predicting the probabilities of employment by occupation for person-years spent outside Bogotá forced migrants were more likely to be employed in non-skilled occupations, as construction workers or as providers of personal services than economic migrants. In the models for the person-years spent in Bogotá results suggested that forced migrants were more likely to be employed in petty commerce and as providers of personal services than economic migrants or natives. The predicted probabilities of employment in the informal sector indicated that during the person-years spent outside Bogotá forced migrants were as likely as economic migrants to work in the informal sector. The results of the models including person-years spent in Bogotá revealed that forced migrants were as likely as natives to work in the informal sector, while the predicted probabilities for employment in the formal sector were higher for economic migrants. The results showed that forced migrant households arriving into urban areas adopted survival strategies, which at times provoked a deterioration of their living conditions or the inability to improve their standards of living, arising in part from an absence of integration policies that improved the chances of employment for forced migrants in the formal sector.

Internally displaced persons were held in disdain and stigmatised. Because they were unwelcome, they were not treated as full citizens of the places where they resided, even if they had resided there for some time. Unable to find work, obliged to take possession of property illegally, many eventually conformed to the negative images

with which society viewed them. Their precarious living conditions often led them to treat public authorities with distrust and hostility, and their need to survive drove some to illegal acts and criminal activities.

The place of arrival was typically either 1) existing neighbourhoods where forced migrants blended in with the ‘historically displaced’—more traditional rural-urban migrants—and ‘socially displaced’—poor people who had been squeezed out of the inner cities by the processes of ‘gentrification’; or 2) new settlements on illegally occupied land. The process of urbanisation in these areas took place, by and large, beyond the control of local communities. The newcomers were exploited from the start. Often groups of middlemen, called ‘urbanisation pirates’, sold the right to build houses on the land, and the buyers received receipts with no legal value. In Bosa, Bogotá an estimated 50 percent of residents lived on properties that had not been titled. On the employment side, *tinteros*, who controlled the ambulant preparation and sale of hot coffee, engaged in another form of exploitation. They rented equipment to street vendors, or made them work in exchange for food or rent on land the former owned or controlled.

Urban accommodation was usually very insecure and substandard with little developed physical or social infrastructure. The authorities had difficulties in communicating with the newcomers, because of the lack of trust and confidence on both sides, and the fact that land invasion had been criminalised. Thus, the displaced persons could not participate in the basic entities of local governance, the *Juntas de Acción Comunal*. Nor did they receive services, at least not without special and costly arrangements in their areas of residence. Furthermore, if internally displaced persons were not legally entitled to their houses, they were not entitled to economic support for rent through emergency municipal programmes. To legalise and gain title to their land and homes, the newcomers to metropolitan areas should benefit from actions of the Urban Housing Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Vivienda de Interés y Reforma Urbana*, INURBE). In practice, gaining access to INURBE assistance or other mechanisms was complicated, time-consuming, and put large economic and organisational demands on forced migrants. A major obstacle to legalising property was the fact that forced migrants were unlikely to know others with property who could serve as guarantors in a title transaction. In the best of circumstances—that was, without obstructions from ‘urbanisation pirates’—such procedures were uncharted territory for many internally displaced persons. Some candidates for political officers used the promise of land in

their campaigns in marginal urban areas. While such action might buy squatters more time, the legal issues remained unsolved, and the forced migrants still lived in instability, insecurity and without access to services.

To enter the governmental system of humanitarian aid the forced migrants had to register with the *Red de Solidaridad Social* (RSS) within a year following displacement, and had to establish that they had been displaced by political violence.¹ This was done directly at offices of the *Red de Solidaridad Social*, at the office of the *Defensoría del Pueblo* at the departmental or municipal level, or at the Assistance and Orientation Units (UAOs). A large number of forced migrants never registered because they could not meet the time requirements or chose not to register for other compelling reasons:

First, given the stigmatisation inherent in the label of *desplazado*, forced migrants often did not register if they were able to manage life in the city through their own networks and capabilities. Second, in addition to the general suspicion towards governmental agencies, forced migrants were afraid that if it became known that they were living illegally on a property, or were part of an illegal land invasion, the authorities would forcibly remove them from the places they occupied. Third, the *Red de Solidaridad Social* determined eligibility on the basis of a long and intrusive questionnaire that included questions relating to the reasons for displacement. Many forced internal migrants feared that their statements would not be confidential and they would be identified to their pursuers. Rumours abounded that the information was passed on to the paramilitaries. Many internally displaced persons viewed the risks of giving up anonymity and invisibility as too high, especially in view of the small benefits provided by the humanitarian system. Fourth, a large percentage of forced migrants did not have personal documents. To remedy this deficiency, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) supported a mobile registration unit that could issue birth certificates. Finally, it seemed that many forced migrants did not know about the possibility of receiving assistance or did not know where to go and what to do. Therefore, several agencies including the *Defensoría del Pueblo*, UNHCR and the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) produced and distributed information on the definition, the rights and the possibilities for forced migrants.

¹ Since October 2002, thanks to a legal ruling in their favour, fumigation migrations had been eligible for registration by the *Red de Solidaridad Social*. This change reflected the situation of forced migrants, especially indigenous groups around Putumayo where was a major site of coca fumigation supported by US funds.

By permitting registration only within the first year after displacement, the system excluded several categories of persons who might otherwise register: First, persons who became forced migrants prior to Law 387 of 1997; second, anyone who was displaced more than a year previously, whether or not that person received emergency assistance from the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC); third, the increasingly large number of people who were victims of multiple forced displacements. The detailed registration form was passed on to the local technical unit of the *Red de Solidaridad Social* where screening was undertaken. In principle registrations were accepted on the basis of good faith since the *Red de Solidaridad Social* did not have investigative capacity. In practice, it appeared that only a small percentage was actually rejected. A new single registration system was in effect in 2002 that permitted the *Red de Solidaridad Social* to detect if a person had received assistance in other places before.

Within 25 days of acceptance, the forced migrants were supposed to receive a home visit by personnel of the UAO contracted by the *Red de Solidaridad Social* in that locality. In practice, the home visit might occur months after submission of the application. Because many forced migrants moved frequently, it was common for the RSS agency to be unable to locate the would-be beneficiaries, hence unable to deliver the assistance. At times, agency personnel, who were responsible for extremely large caseloads, ceased trying after a first unsuccessful attempt to find anyone at home. The rationale of the home visit was to verify the needs of the family in order to reduce the assistance obligations of the government or, putting a positive face on it, to assure that the forced migrants received what they needed. According to the Colombian Red Cross that implemented the programmes in Bogotá, the home visits was also intended to help the forced migrants adjust to life in the city for which they were poorly prepared. Forced internal migrants acknowledged that it was difficult for them to grow accustomed to purchasing food and many of the other items they were once able to obtain by cultivation, home manufacture and barter in rural areas. Forced migrants whom I interviewed, spoke nostalgically of the difference between the ‘happy poor’ in the countryside and the ‘sad poor’ in the city where they ‘ate only with half of their mouth’.

The three months of emergency assistance might pass before forced migrants received goods to which they were entitled. The goods they received were given in kind or as *bonos* for purchase in specified markets, often at considerable distance from their neighbourhoods. Internally displaced persons received attention only on specific days of the week, and queues were so long that not all those waiting were attended on the day

they arrived. Moreover, the agencies sometimes ran out of provisions, because their contracts specified a number of IDPs to be assisted during three months. If there were more than was estimated, provisions could not be augmented until the contracts had been renegotiated to take the added number of forced migrants into account. Forced migrants might be without provisions for as long as two months unless supplementary funds could be found.

After three monthly packages, only the most vulnerable IDPs could have the assistance extended for another three months.² Yet, nearly all families were vulnerable and three months was woefully inadequate. The arbitrariness and inadequacies of the system were exacerbated by the fact that there was little or no follow-up action. In theory, following the period of emergency assistance forced migrants should continue to benefit from programmes aimed at stabilisation, resettlement and return. Health services should be available at low cost; and if their children were accepted in a school, they were to receive a free uniform and some expenses. The practice was quite different. The majority of forced migrants interviewed maintained that the hospitals and clinics would turn them away, and schools would tell them that there was no space for their children or obliged them to pay for supplies and uniforms. The opening of new schools in migrant areas fell far behind needs. Where forced migrants could reach a health facility and there were schools nearby, they usually paid both for health and education, albeit at a reduced tariff.

Solving the problems of housing, income and services during the stabilisation phase was very much dependent on the attitude and actions of local authorities, in particular the Mayors and the departmental governors. The *Red de Solidaridad Social* itself had minimal funding of its own for stabilisation projects. The responsibility for formulating and designing projects designed for IDPs lay with local committees that were meant to incorporate representatives of the public sectors, including the *defensoría*, the *Red de Solidaridad Social*, as well as the Catholic Church and NGOs working in the area, and representation of forced migrants. As I have described, few municipalities and departments were keen on helping IDPs to establish themselves permanently within their jurisdiction. Several municipalities had actively deterred access. At best the forced migrants were ignored.

² They included single mothers, old people and the disabled.

Projects for income-generation and training were few. I was able to visit one of the better operations, located in Soacha. The project, *Actuar Famiempresa* offered a comprehensive programme of training, credit and continuing support to people who would eventually establish small enterprises. It was targeted primarily at forced migrants who were best adapted to the metropolitan area, but lacked prospects for exploring new opportunities. The programme was well funded, professionally organised and had strong links with business community. While it would be difficult to replicate a project such as *Actuar* on a scale that would respond to the needs of the majority of IDPs, the economic opportunities it offered to those who did participate were unquestionably valuable. The most attractive feature of this programme was its underlying philosophy of incorporating the newcomers into the economic and social fabric of the city, and the assumption that IDPs had positive contributions to make to Soacha.

This approach was all too rare.³ Most income generating projects were short-term and not sustainable. Many NGOs preferred to fund psychosocial projects. Psychosocial support was doubtless badly needed among all segments of forced migrants. Yet, when introduced as a stand-alone project, it was not always appreciated by forced migrants whose priority was remunerated labour. ‘They bring us psychologists, who tell us we are traumatised, but we are peasants and we need to work.’⁴

The tragedy of displacement was obviously part of the tragedy of conflict in Colombia, along with homicides, kidnappings, destruction of social and productive infrastructure and persistent fear. National and international efforts to humanise the war, e.g., to persuade all sides to comply with international humanitarian law and to end the widely practiced atrocities on all sides, had not produced results. Still, the nation-wide incidence of displacement had been all but invisible in political discourse. Neither access to, nor treatment of, IDPs were burning issues at the peace table before the negotiations ended in February 2002. As the government’s policies had turned from vain efforts to negotiate the end of conflict to actions aimed at military victory, it had to take stronger steps to protect civilian population. Continuing murder, displacement and expropriation of peasant land and resources were inevitable unless expanding security forces were made accountable not just for fighting the illegal armed groups, but also for

³ The funding for the *Actuar Famiempresa* project came through a USAID grant to the Pan American Development Foundation.

⁴ For more Colombian government policies towards the internally displaced persons, see **Appendix 10**.

assuring the security of Colombian citizens. This implied taking more serious measures to curb the illegal armed groups engaged in repression and criminal activities.

Despite evidence to the contrary, Colombians and their international supporters continued to treat displacement solely as a derivative of war, which was to say, a temporary problem that would go away when the war was over, and about which little could be done beyond palliative emergency assistance till then. The Pastrana government promised to address displacement with stronger actions to prevent it and more ambitious programmes to bring the displaced back to their homes. But these compelling options were buttressed neither with funding needed for economic revitalisation and recovery, nor with essential security and protection mechanisms for the affected population

Nevertheless, neither the government nor the humanitarian agencies wanted to acknowledge the extent to which displacement was irreversible, and how its effects had changed the face of Colombia. The forced exodus of so large a number among the rural poor had brought about an accelerated and almost certainly permanent concentration of the rural land holdings once used for subsistence agriculture. And, on the other side, it had led to an unprecedented acceleration of urbanising trends. Assuming that a majority of forced migrants and their children ultimately would be unable and often uninterested in returning to the rural areas from which they originated, their presence would change the class and ethnic demographics, as well as the size of many Colombian cities.

The internally displaced persons originated in large part from regions once considered marginal to national interests, where they received few benefits from the state. The government and some international agencies advocated investing in the economic development of these marginal areas in order to prevent displacement. The moment to do so had probably passed. Many, perhaps most IDPs were living in urban settings, and depended largely, if not wholly on state and/or outside benefactors to provide for them. The palliative emergency assistance was barely adequate for short-term survival and, as such, did not allow forced migrants to establish the bases for self-sufficiency in the future. As the number of internally displaced persons increased, and prospects of finding gainful employment in the Colombian economy remained small, emergency assistance resources would be even more strained. The result could only be an ever expanding, marginal, disaffected population that continued to drain the social and economic resources of the country.

The failure to establish serious programmes to keep IDPs in rural settings or resettle and help integrate them into the towns and cities were major gaps. The UN Humanitarian Plan of Action of 2002 recognised the gaps, but lacked sufficient presence and resources to make serious progress toward filling them, despite its pledge to devote more attention to needs during the transition. It was essential to design and implement a comprehensive set of policies, backed by competent organisations and funding, and based on the premise that neither displacement nor the reasons for displacement would disappear when the conflict had been brought to a close.

Colombia was usually compliant with international humanitarian law, including norms for protecting and assisting forced migrants. The government had sought international involvement, had invited the United Nations to establish its agencies and mount its programmes in the country, and had incorporated the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into its National Law 387. Along with a legal framework that codified IDPs rights, the government had established structures at the national, regional and municipal levels which, in principle, should assure full access of rights and services for IDPs. Yet, various international missions had passed through Colombia to assess the massive and growing problem of displacement and almost invariably criticised the inadequacy of Colombian government responses. They cited the failure of the state to adequately assume its obligations to assist and protect IDPs and other victims. While the Colombian government fulfilled its obligations through legislation, legal recourse, and institutional venues for services, it denied its obligations at the same time by narrowly defining the eligible beneficiary group, limiting the attention available, and placing obstacles in the way of claiming rights and services. The result had been a highly developed but ineffective response to displacement.

Between the late 1990s and 2002 the government had taken steps to reinforce the legislative measures and to rectify many bureaucratic practices that had impeded the implementation of Law 387. It had accepted judicial rulings demanding policy changes and had collaborated with international agencies through the Joint Technical Unit and Thematic Group on Displacement. Humanitarian assistance was in no way a solution, however. The government had been unwilling—and partially unable—to protect this quintessentially vulnerable population, to employ its members productively and, most important, to end or even to reduce the rate of displacement.

APPENDIX 1

Reported Cases of Kidnapping by Departments and Municipalities in Colombia (2000)

Departments with higher numbers of kidnapping, Colombia 2000			
Department/ Municipality	Cases	Percentage within Department	Presence of armed groups and delinquents
Antioquia			
Medellín	133	18.40	Paramilitaries, Drug dealers, Delinquency, Militias
La Unión	56	7.75	ELN
Corcoraná	34	4.70	ELN, FARC, EPL
Guatapé	29	4.01	FARC, Drug dealers
Barbosa	23	3.18	EPL
Caldas	16	2.21	
Carmen de Viboral	15	2.07	EPL
Marinilla	13	1.80	FARC
Abejorral	11	1.52	
Cañasgordas	11	1.52	Drug dealers
Other municipalities	382	52.84	
Total Antioquia	723	100.00	
Santander			
Bucaramanga	62	20.53	Delinquency, Militias
Barrancabermeja	44	14.57	ELN, FARC, EPL, Paramilitaries
Rionegro	41	13.58	ELN, FARC, Paramilitaries
El Playón	31	10.26	ELN
Sabana de Torres	21	6.95	ELN, FARC, Paramilitaries
Betania	10	3.31	
Matanza	10	3.31	ELN
Piedecuesta	9	2.98	ELN, FARC
Lebrija	7	2.32	ELN, FARC, Paramilitaries
Velez	7	2.32	ELN, FARC
Other municipalities	60	19.87	
Total Santander	302	100.00	
Valle del Cauca			
Cali	155	54.39	Delinquency, Drug dealers
Buenaventura	37	12.98	FARC, Paramilitaries, Drug dealers
Jamundí	11	3.86	FARC, Paramilitaries, Drug dealers
Tuluá	11	3.86	FARC, Paramilitaries, Drug dealers
Candelaria	10	3.51	FARC
Florida	10	3.51	FARC
Caicedonia	8	2.81	FARC
Buga	7	2.46	FARC, Drug dealers
Ginebra	6	2.10	FARC, Drug dealers
El Cerrito	5	1.75	FARC, Paramilitaries, Drug dealers
Other municipalities	25	8.77	
Total Valle del Cauca	285	100.00	

APPENDIX 1

Reported Cases of Kidnapping by Departments and Municipalities in Colombia (2000) (continued)

Departments with higher numbers of kidnapping, Colombia 2000			
Department/ Municipality	Cases	Percentage within Department	Presence of armed groups and delinquents
Cesar			
Aguachica	67	23.59	ELN, FARC, EPL, Paramilitaries
Valledupar	44	15.49	ELN, FARC, Paramilitaries, Drug dealers
Río de Oro	25	8.80	
Agustín Codazzi	22	7.75	ELN, FARC, Paramilitaries, Drug dealers
Bosconia	17	5.99	ELN, FARC
La Jágua de Ibirico	15	5.28	ELN, FARC, Paramilitaries
Chiriguaná	14	4.93	ELN, Paramilitaries, Drug dealers, Illegal Crops
Curumaní	11	3.87	ELN, Paramilitaries
La Gloria	9	3.17	ELN, Paramilitaries
Pelaya	9	3.17	ELN, Paramilitaries
Other municipalities	51	17.96	
Total Cesar	284	100.00	
Bolívar			
El Carmen de Bolívar	73	27.97	ELN, Drug dealers
San Juan de Nepomuceno	26	9.96	
Cartagena	21	8.05	FARC
María La Baja	21	8.05	
Achí	19	7.28	ELN, FARC, Drug dealers
San Jacinto	19	7.28	ELN, Illegal Crops
Magangué	13	4.98	ELN
San Pablo	9	3.45	ELN, FARC, Paramilitaries, Drug dealers
Arjona	6	2.30	
Calamar	5	1.91	
Other municipalities	49	18.77	
Total Bolívar	261	100.00	
Cundinamarca			
Fusagasugá	28	13.21	FARC
Machetá	23	10.85	
La Calera	15	7.07	
Silvania	13	6.13	
Guayabetal	10	4.72	FARC, Illegal Crops
Fómeque	6	2.83	FARC
Granada	6	2.83	
Medina	6	2.83	FARC, Illegal Crops
Anapoima	5	2.36	FARC
Caparrapí	5	2.36	FARC, Paramilitaries, Drug dealers
Girardot	5	2.36	
Other municipalities	90	42.45	
Total Cundinamarca	212	100.00	
Bogotá DC	167	100.00	
TOTAL COUNTRY	3,706	100.00	

Sources: a) Kidnappings: Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD;

b) Presence of armed groups: F. Cubides, A.C. Olaya and C.M. Ortiz, *La violencia y el municipio colombiano 1980-1997*, tables 1 and 2, pp. 253-283.

APPENDIX 2

Reported Cases of Homicide in Urban Colombia (1990-2000)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	TOTAL
Medellín	3,924	4,585	4,120	2,852	2,932	3,711	3,824	3,169	2,950	3,258	3,151	38,476
Bogotá	2,258	2,698	3,231	4,378	3,664	3,385	3,296	2,810	2,483	2,409	2,252	32,864
Cali	1,102	1,420	1,654	1,702	2,226	2,076	2,000	1,627	1,847	2,004	1,969	19,627
Cúcuta	242	287	377	443	415	402	572	448	454	564	664	4,868
Pereira	393	425	418	395	370	338	432	462	466	502	463	4,664
Barranquilla	274	291	261	338	380	361	546	448	469	445	312	4,125
Bucaramanga	376	459	439	621	322	342	254	336	376	130	141	3,796
Manizales	176	259	213	223	303	233	224	207	252	282	261	2,633
Santa Marta	185	193	255	263	247	201	230	241	183	226	266	2,490
Cartagena	105	117	152	157	177	210	197	232	181	176	197	1,901
Valledupar	123	117	114	135	143	152	197	229	113	124	189	1,636
Armenia	117	116	149	144	169	158	169	159	141	139	172	1,633
Montería	196	133	145	139	106	139	130	91	75	99	177	1,430
Villavicencio	103	105	108	170	179	135	113	110	121	131	129	1,404
Pasto	130	125	129	124	133	119	102	112	99	102	159	1,334
Ibagué	85	110	126	138	101	124	128	108	114	116	125	1,275
Riohacha	95	112	108	135	122	96	94	87	96	66	97	1,108
Popayán	106	100	79	83	98	104	81	75	90	107	101	1,024
Neiva	62	80	73	76	53	60	62	73	83	57	79	758
Quibdó	45	48	42	46	40	31	50	86	87	31	65	571
Sincelejo	35	39	35	33	45	54	63	52	43	21	49	469
TOTAL	10,132	11,819	12,228	12,595	12,225	12,431	12,764	11,162	10,723	10,989	11,018	128,086

Source: Policía Nacional - DIJIN

APPENDIX 3

Non-Exhaustive List of Kidnappings of Well Known Public Figures in Colombia (1930-2002)

Date	Victim(s)	Occupation at the time	Kidnapper(s)/Comments
Before 1980			
31/01/1933	Elisa Eder	Daughter of H. Eder, Industrialist	Common delinquents
1950s	Carlos Navarro	Industrialist	
20/03/1965	Harold Eder	Industrialist	Died in captivity
1970	Germán Buss Werner José Straessle	Swiss Consulate, Cali	Drug-related
09/07/1970	Fernando Londoño	Former Minister	ELN
15/02/1976	José Raquel Mercado	Leader of the Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC)	M-19 Died in captivity
28/09/1976	George Curtis	Vice President of Beatrice Foods	
1977	Charles R. Starr	US Engineer	FARC
19/08/1977	Hugo Ferrerira Neira	Manager, Indupalma	M-19
29/05/1978	Nicolás Escobar Soto	President, TEXACO and member of the managing committee of the Central Bank	M-19 Died in captivity
1980s			
27/02/1980	Embassy of the Dominican Republic	Thirty Diplomats	M-19
23/06/1982	Gloria Lara de Echeverri		
1985	Camila Michelsen N.	Daughter of Jaime Michelsen, Banker	M-19
18/01/1988	Andrés Pastrana Arango	Son of former President Pastrana and Politician	
25/01/1988	Carlos Mauro Hoyos	Attorney General	Died in captivity
04/05/1988	Gloria Cecilia Gomez	Kidnapped with a group of journalists and diplomats	ELN
29/05/1988	Alvaro Gómez Hurtado	Son of former President Gómez and Politician	M-19
29/05/1989	Gustavo Montoya E.	Son of Germán Montoya Vélez, Industrialist and advisor to President Barco	Drug cartels
1989	Jaime Betancur Cuartas	Brother of former President Betancur	ELN
16/12/1989	Patricia Echavarría and daughter Diana	Relatives of President Barco	Drug cartels
1990s			
30/08/1990	Diana Turbay and other journalists	Daughter of former President Turbay and Journalist	Drug cartels
09/09/1990	Francisco Santos	Sub-editor of newspaper 'El Tiempo'	Drug cartels
19/09/1990	Marina Montoya P.	Sister of Germán Montoya Vélez (see above)	Drug cartels Died in captivity
07/11/1990	Maruja Pachón	Sister-in-law of Senator Galán	Drug cartels
09/1991	Nakagama Akeyoshi Toshikiro Coniche	Japanese Engineers	FARC
13/02/1991	Fortunato Gaviria Trujillo	Cousin of President Gaviria	Drug cartels Died in captivity
01/1992	Argelino Durán Quintero	Former Minister	EPL Died in captivity
05/02/1992	Lorenzo Kling Mazuera	Businessman	
31/01/1993	David Mankins Mark Rich Rick Tenenoff	US Missionaries	FARC

APPENDIX 3

Non-Exhaustive List of Kidnappings of Well Known Public Figures in Colombia (1930-2002) (continued)

Date	Victim(s)	Occupation at the time	Kidnapper(s)/Comments
31/03/1994	Ramón Rising	US Missionary	FARC
23/09/1994	Tom Hargrove	US Engineer, CIAT	FARC
15/10/1994	Regina Betancourt de Liska	Politician and Presidential Candidate	Colombia Viva (Dissidence of M-19)
11/1994	José C. Arias Arias	Former Mayor of Florencia	FARC
13/11/1994	Alfonso Lizarazo	Comedian (and later Politician)	FARC
15/06/1995	Rodrigo Turbay Cote	Former President of the House of Representatives	FARC
05/07/1995	Julio César Sánchez	Member of Congress, former Minister	FARC
22/08/1995	Julio César Patiño P.		ELN
03/08/1995	Guillermo Alvarez		ELN
27/06/1995	Antonio Martelo	Former Governor of Sucre; President of FEDEGAN in Sucre	ELN
20/11/1995	Alfonso Manrique Van Damme	Member of the managing committee of Ecopetrol	
21/11/1995	Giovanni Pizarro Ruiz	Director of Carbones del Caribe (Cerrejón)	
07/12/1995	Gustavo Murillo Arias	Uncle of Manuel Patarroyo (Scientist)	Delinquency
14/12/1995	Javier M. Restrepo	High Peace Commissioner in Cali	ELN
02/04/1996	Juan Carlos Gaviria	Brother of former President Gaviria	JEGA
07/1996	Brigitte Schonne	Wife of former President of BASF in Colombia	ELN
01/1997	Carlos Jaimes Castro	Son of Adalberto Jaimes, Member of Congress	FARC
08/02/1997	Julio Bahamón	Member of Congress	FARC
13/03/1997	Ezequiel Bello	Director of IDEMA	ELN
17/04/1997	One bus in Bogotá	Random (thirty people)	Delinquency
15/05/1997	Elías George González	Brother of Edgard George González, Mayor of Barranquilla	
24/08/1997	Javier Gómez	Former CEO of the Banco Industrial Colombiano	
24/10/1997	Two Diplomats	Organisation of American States	ELN
27/11/1997 & 17/08/1999	José de Jesús Quintero	Bishop of Tibú	ELN
08/12/1997	Emiro Sosa Pacheco	Former Governor of Casanare & Former Mayor of Yopal	FARC
02/03/1998	José Lorenzo Escandón	Mayor of Neiva	FARC
23/03/1998	Elías Ochoa Daza	Former Mayor of Valledupar	FARC
30/10/1998	Benjamín Khoudari	Businessman	Died in captivity
23/01/1999	Gregorio González G.	Former Congressman (House of Representative – Atlántico)	
02/1999	Ingrid Washinawatok Larry Gay Lahe'ena'e Terence Freitas	US indigenous rights activists	FARC Died in captivity
25/02/1999	Humberto Arias	Director of Cali Football Club	
26/03/1999	Wilmar Gómez Pineda	Son of Darío Gomez, Folk Singer	
12/04/1999	Fokker Avianca, Forty-one passengers + five crews	Random kidnapping	ELN
05/1999	Jesús Antonio Pimiento	Father of Mauricio Pimiento, former Governor of Cesar	ELN

APPENDIX 3

Non-Exhaustive List of Kidnappings of Well Known Public Figures in Colombia (1930-2002) (continued)

Date	Victim(s)	Occupation at the time	Kidnapper(s)/Comments
16/05/1999	Diomedes Dionisio Díaz Rolando Ochoa	Folk Singers	ELN
09/11/1999	Carlos Ramos M.	Member of Congress (House of Representative – Atlántico)	ELN
14/12/1999	Efraín Valencia	Brother of Adolfo ‘Tren’ Valencia, Football Player	
21/05/1999	Piedad Córdoba	Member of Congress (Senate)	Paramilitaries
30/05/1999	La Maria Church, One hundred and thirty people approximately	Random kidnapping	ELN
06/06/1999	Fishing Club, Barranquilla Nine people	Random kidnapping	ELN
25/09/1999	Jorge Velosa	Folk Singer (Carranguero)	EPL
2000-2002			
20/01/2000 & 29/03/2000	Oliverio Rincón	Cyclist	ELN & FARC
22/01/2000	Guillermo ‘La Chiva’ Cortés	Journalist	FARC
07/02/2000	Ernesto Mesa Arango	Member of Congress (House of Representative – Antioquia)	
04/03/2000	Lucho Herrera	Cyclist Champion	FARC
23/04/2000	Andres ‘Pinta’ Estrada	Football Player	ELN
27/04/2000	Dagoberto Ospina (Nine years old)	Spokesman for a children’s peace group	FARC
05/2000	Ernesto Michelsen Caballero	Relative of former President Alfonso López	ELN
21/06/2000	Hernando Martínez A.	Mayor of Villavicencio	FARC
28/11/2000	Juliana Villegas	Daughter of Luis C. Villegas, President of ANDI	FARC
15/07/2001	Alan Jara Urzola	Former Governor of Meta	FARC
29/09/2001	Consuelo Araújooguera and thirty people	Community leader and wife of Attorney General	FARC Died in captivity
12/11/2001	Alfredo Gutierrez	Folk Singer (Vallenatero)	ELN
23/02/2002	Ingrid Betancourt	Politician and Presidential Candidate	FARC

Source: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP)

APPENDIX 4

Reported Cases of Kidnapping by Departments in Colombia (1996-2002)

Department	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Antioquia	303	337	571	609	723	600	525
Cesar	93	145	333	207	284	418	304
Valle del Cauca	63	85	158	334	285	187	161
Bogotá	62	61	103	151	167	49	80
Norte de Santander	49	84	177	217	148	113	43
Santander	48	132	114	252	302	129	132
Sucre	37	66	31	113	63	100	107
Meta	36	81	188	171	113	108	120
Magdalena	33	50	144	127	138	100	173
Bolívar	30	122	126	137	261	136	119
Atlántico	27	24	29	25	43	17	83
Guajira	27	45	70	53	51	120	83
Huila	27	29	63	63	53	59	83
Chocó	23	26	23	30	53	49	80
Cundinamarca	21	32	125	127	212	182	225
Nariño	21	77	39	19	89	35	51
Risaralda	20	17	21	71	50	37	45
Tolima	19	43	84	90	130	153	133
Arauca	18	19	24	21	35	41	44
Caquetá	18	34	123	82	59	28	59
Casanare	13	47	93	110	116	142	82
Caldas	10	14	25	55	88	38	94
Cauca	16	70	61	71	99	72	52
Córdoba	10	19	8	30	61	33	8
Boyacá	5	7	51	122	55	76	60
Guanía	3	1	—	5	1	—	—
Putumayo	3	—	—	20	18	2	11
Quindío	3	—	—	8	4	15	15
San Andrés	1	1	2	—	—	—	—
Vichada	—	—	25	10	1	—	9
Vaupés	—	—	70	—	—	—	—
Guaviare	—	4	133	—	4	2	5
Amazonas	—	3	—	4	—	—	—
Total	1,039	1,675	3,014	3,334	3,706	3,041	2,986

Source: Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD

APPENDIX 5

Risk Definitions for Cities as Defined by Control Risks Group (2002)

Rating: the rating reflect the most realistic threats to business visitors, which in most cases stem from crime. However, they also take into account, where appropriate, the threat to visitors from terrorism and political violence.

1. Crime rates are low. Petty crime occasionally involves foreigners, but violence is very rare. There is no area of the city that visitors should avoid. Examples: Singapore, Dubai.
2. There is some petty crime, but the use of violence is rare. It is generally safe to walk on the streets in main business, hotel and residential districts at all times of the day and usually after dark. There are few city districts that visitors should avoid if alone during the hours of darkness. There are no 'no-go' areas. Examples: Geneva, Brussels, Calgary.
3. Crime rates are low in the main business, hotel and residential areas. It is usually safe to walk the streets by day, though there is some risk of petty crime and – rarely – mugging. Some caution is required when walking in city centres after dark, when crime rates rise. There are few poorer residential areas, which higher crime rates, that locals would feel uncomfortable visiting during the day and that they avoid during the night. Examples: London, San Francisco, Istanbul.
4. Walking the streets in the main business and hotel district is generally safe during the day, though there is always a risk of petty crime and isolated muggings. It is safe to walk in well-lit business, hotel and some residential districts during the night, though there are many areas that locals would avoid during the hours of darkness. There also may be many areas that locals feel uncomfortable visiting by day, and avoid completely after dark. There are a few well-recognised 'no-go' areas. Examples: New York City, Washington DC, Miami.
Alternatively: there are generally low crime rates in the main business, hotel and residential areas, but there are periodic episodes of political or social unrest, or terrorist attacks. Example: Colombo.
5. It is usually safe to walk in the main business and hotel districts in daytime, but night-time journeys should usually be by car because of the risk of violent crime. Crime is a constant threat throughout the city. There are many districts considered as 'no-go' areas that should be avoided at all times. There are occasional car hijacks. Examples: New Orleans, Lima, Mexico City.
Alternatively: crime is a concern in the main business and hotel districts though the risk rating more reflects frequent terrorist attacks and/or political violence. Examples: Algiers, Jakarta.
6. Street crime is common at all hours of the day and night throughout the city. There are sporadic car hijacks. Crime is a significant threat at airports. There are few areas that locals or visitors feel safe to walk around during the day. Examples: Johannesburg, Bogotá, Karachi.
Alternatively: crime can be a significant concern throughout the city, but the risk rating more reflects such factors as relatively high levels of politically-motivated terrorism or violent unrest. Example: Brazzaville.
7. High crime levels and/or terrorism and guerrilla violence demand extraordinary security precautions. The government is unable to maintain law and order. Criminal gangs carry more authority than the government. Example: Freetown.
Alternatively: the city is experiencing civil war or is the target of military action by foreign powers.

APPENDIX 6

Risk Definitions for Countries as Defined by Control Risks Group (2002)

<u>Political Risk</u>	
Insignificant:	The government is stable and there is a high degree of political continuity. There are no significant extra-constitutional threats to the authority of the government AND there is no arbitrary treatment of business by government or in the courts.
Low:	Political and commercial institutions are strong. Any changes of government are likely to take place through constitutional process. Political and economic stability is secure enough to withstand occasional internal disputes or outbreaks of unrest AND courts and other government authorities respect business rights.
Medium:	Political and economic stability is secure in the short term but cannot be guaranteed in the longer-term because political and state institutions lack authority or are evolving OR the economy is weak. Legal guarantees are weak. In some Medium risk countries there is a latent threat of military or other illegal intervention.
High:	Political, economic and legal institutions are highly vulnerable or have ceased to function effectively. The government could be ousted by non-constitutional means OR the government is only maintained in office by the presence of international peace-keeping force.
Extreme:	Law and order has broken down and government has ceased to function outside narrow circles. The economy is in ruins. There are no protections for foreign business except possible political patronage.
<u>Security Risk</u>	
Insignificant:	Virtually no politically-motivated violence, and a low level of violent crime. However, extremely isolated attacks by foreign terrorists may occur.
Low:	Occasional violence perpetrated by terrorist or criminals. This affects companies or individual members of their staff only infrequently.
Medium:	Internal unrest or violence frequently perpetrated by terrorist or criminals, though there are no areas completely outside the state's control. Violence occasionally affects companies or individual members of their staff, but there is no sustained threat directed specifically against foreign companies.
High:	There is a sustained campaign of terrorist or criminal violence specifically directed against companies' personnel and property OR there is a high risk of collateral damage from attacks on nearby targets. There is a probability – not a possibility – of encountering security problems.
Extreme:	The government is unable to maintain law and order. In extreme cases conditions verge on war or civil war. Business operations become untenable or are set to become so. Foreign companies must strongly consider withdrawal.
<u>Travel Risk</u>	
Insignificant:	The crime risk is very low. No terrorist groups are active and, although isolated incidents are possible, the security threat to travellers is minimal.
Low:	There are occasional demonstrations or terrorist incidents, but these provide no more than incidental threats to business travellers. There is a limited amount of criminal activity but this provides little risk to travellers provided they exercise common sense discretion.
Medium:	There is a high crime rate in certain areas or significant political unrest which could disrupt business travel at short notice. Terrorist attacks occasionally disrupt travel.
High:	A terrorist campaign or high levels of violent crime directly affect business travellers. Business travel is possible, but only after careful planning.
Extreme:	Conditions of war or civil war exist or are about to: law and order are in imminent danger or breaking down. It is strongly advisable that travel should be avoided.

APPENDIX 7

Interview Questionnaire

The following is an example of an open-ended interview questionnaire composed by the author looking at the problem of internally displaced persons in Bogotá (Soacha). The interviewers selected questions according to the willingness and suitability of respondents. For examples of the practical use of the questionnaire, please consult pages 280-307.

1. Percepción general del impacto del desplazamiento en la ciudad

- 1.1 ¿Cómo sintió o percibió en su ámbito (espacio) la llegada de desplazados por la violencia a la ciudad?
- 1.2 ¿Cuáles cree usted que eran los problemas de la ciudad que se incrementaron a causa de la llegada de personas desplazadas?
- 1.3 ¿La llegada de personas desplazadas sólo le trajo problemas a la ciudad o también pudo traerle cosas buenas? ¿Cuáles por ejemplo?
- 1.4 ¿Cómo sentía usted, en su campo visual y de acción diaria, el problema del desplazamiento forzado por la violencia?
- 1.5 ¿Cuáles eran los principales problemas derivados de este fenómeno en su localidad o en su vecindad?

2. Empleo y desplazamiento

- 2.1 ¿Cómo cree usted que influyó el desplazamiento forzado en la situación de desempleo y subempleo que padeció Bogotá (Soacha)?
- 2.2 ¿Qué conoce sobre las formas en que se ganaban la vida los desplazados en la ciudad?
- 2.3 ¿Cómo ve la participación de los miembros de la familia: Intervienen todos por igual o lo hacen más los niños y las mujeres?
- 2.4 ¿Cuáles eran las principales formas en que intervenían los desplazados en las ventas o actividades informales?
- 2.5 ¿Cree usted que se incrementó la competencia en las calles y los mercados con motivo de la vinculación a las ventas de los desplazados por la violencia? ¿En qué medida?

3. La vivienda

- 3.1 ¿Qué tan grave ve usted la necesidad de vivienda entre la población en general y los desplazados más específicos?
- 3.2 ¿Cómo cree que resolvieron los desplazados su necesidad de vivienda?
- 3.3 ¿Qué alcances tuvo la ayuda que les brindaron en este campo las entidades oficiales y privadas o la iglesia o las ONGs?

4. La seguridad

- 4.1 ¿Cree usted que la llegada de desplazados a la ciudad tuvo alguna influencia en la tema de seguridad ciudadana y, en general, en el tema de seguridad?
¿En qué situaciones se podía ver esta influencia?
- 4.2 ¿Cuáles podrían ser algunas señales de que la llegada de personas desplazadas influyó en la seguridad de la ciudad?
- 4.3 ¿Los datos que poseía usted sobre la inseguridad en la ciudad pueden mostrar algún nivel de participación cuantitativa o porcentual de los desplazados como agentes de inseguridad?
- 4.4 ¿Cuáles cree usted que podrían ser medidas preventivas apropiadas para impedir la vinculación eventual de los desplazados que llegaran a la ciudad con los circuitos delictivos existentes en ella?

5. Los servicios sociales: salud, educación

- 5.1 ¿Cómo hicieron los desplazados para acceder a servicios de salud?
- 5.2 ¿Cómo hicieron para acceder a servicios de educación?
- 5.3 ¿Se recibieron bastantes solicitudes de parte de los desplazados? ¿Cómo fueron atendidas?
- 5.4 ¿Se recibieron quejas por no atención en estos servicios por parte de la población desplazada?
- 5.5 ¿Cómo cree que podría mejorarse la atención a la población desplazada en salud y educación?

6. Las representaciones e imaginarios

- 6.1 ¿Cuál era la imagen que se tenía en la localidad y entre sus vecinos sobre los desplazados?
- 6.2 ¿Con cuál de estas imágenes se asociaba al desplazado entre la gente que trabajaba o vivía con usted: pobreza, inseguridad, muerte, desquiciamiento, oscuridad, mendicidad, necesidad, locura, desesperación, compasión, luz, esperanza, progreso, dignidad?

APPENDIX 8

The Detail of Research Design

Many studies on forced migration, refugees and internally displaced persons, are available that use macro-level data on migration and related rates of migration as indicators of violence and conflict.¹ Some studies based on micro-level data classify respondents as voluntary or forced migrants according to their place of birth or country of origin.² But studies on forced migration based on primary data are rare both because of the difficulties of collecting information and the risk of exhaustion. Forced migrants, when available, are often interviewed many times by different research teams or institutions. There are a number of studies on health outcomes and needs of the internally displaced persons in aid camps, but, these studies do not allow comparisons among migrants with different experiences and motivations for moving.

There are few studies on forced migrants in urban settings.³ Reaching forced migrants in urban setting is complex, because registration systems seldom exist and are often unavailable for safety reasons. Additionally, refugees and internally displaced persons in urban areas are highly mobile. They are dispersed, hard to find, and usually do not want to be recognised as refugees, asylum seekers or internally displaced persons owing to fears of persecution, discrimination or the stigma attached to being persecuted during an armed conflict.⁴ However, despite these obstacles it is important to understand the process of integration among internally displaced persons in urban sites because once they are uprooted and reach the city, they are very likely to stay.

¹ Examples include A.R. Morrison and R.A. May, 'Escape from terror: violence and migration in post-revolutionary Guatemala,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 29, no. 2 (1994): pp. 111-132 and W.D. Stanley, 'Economic migrants or refugees from violence? A time-series of Salvadoran migration to the United States,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 22, no. 1 (1987): pp. 132-154.

² B.R. Chiswick, 'Are immigrants favourably self-selected?,' *American Economic Review*, vol. 89, no. 2 (1999): pp. 181-185; B.R. Chiswick, Y. Cohen and T. Zach, 'The labour market status of immigrants: effects of the unemployment rate at arrival and duration of residences,' *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, vol. 50, no. 2 (1997): pp. 289-303 and K.E. Cortes, 'Are refugees different from economic immigrants?: some empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of immigrant groups in the United States,' *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 86, no. 2 (2004): pp. 465-480.

³ K. Jacobsen and L.B. Landau, 'The dual imperative in refugee research: some methodological and ethical considerations in social science researches on forced migration,' *Disasters*, vol. 27, issue 3 (2003): pp. 185-206.

⁴ D. Buscher, 'Case identification: challenges posed by urban refugees,' Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f41f4e34.html>>, accessed 29 July 2008.

The objective of this study is to analyse the experience of the internally displaced people who arrived at Bogotá between 1990 and 2002 and compare it to the experience of other migrant groups. The study focuses on people living in similar underdeveloped sites within the metropolitan area of Bogotá using two sources of primary data: the Experimental Census for the Municipality of Soacha and the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS). The first data set was collected by the *Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística* (National Administrative Department of Statistics, DANE) and the second data set was designed for the specific purpose of this study.

Experimental Census of Soacha, Cundinamarca

In preparation for the 2005 Colombian National Population Census, there were three pilot censuses in the municipality of Yopal in the department of Casanare, the island of San Andrés, and the municipality of Soacha, Cundinamarca. The pilot censuses targeted areas with apparently high population growth since 1993, the date the last population census was taken.

Soacha was of interest for testing the census questionnaire because it is the most populated municipality adjacent to Bogotá and part of its metropolitan area. Additionally, it has received a large in-flow of voluntary and forced migrants. Soacha was the 27th largest municipality for the reception of internally displaced people country-wide and, according to the figures of the National Registration of Internally Displaced Persons, there were about 13,083 internally displaced people registered in this municipality in 2002, a figure that represented roughly 12 percent of the internally displaced population within metropolitan Bogotá.⁵

The census was collected on Sunday 25 May 2003. On that day the population of the municipality was asked to remain at home while face-to-face interviews were carried out by community enumerators trained by DANE. The pilot census questionnaire had 60 questions, among which nine were on migration. One of these specifically addressing forced migration was phrased as follows:

⁵ Red de Solidaridad Social, *Estadísticas para medios: cifras sobre desplazamiento forzado en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2003).

Have you ever had to abandon your place of residence because of the internal armed conflict?

When?

From where did you leave (Municipality and Department)?

Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS)

Although the ideal settings to analyse the determinants of economic and forced migration are the places of origin of the migrant population, it is not advisable for methodological and security reasons to collect data in villages or towns where confrontations between guerrilla, paramilitary and military groups are taking place. If collecting information in the place of origin is not possible, then the place of destination is the only real alternative. Internally displaced persons tended to move to nearby villages, then to a town, and finally to major urban centres.⁶ To observe the completed paths of migration, the intentions to return and the degree of integration of the internally displaced persons, data collection at destination is the appropriate strategy.

Under these circumstances I concentrated resources and effort in collecting comparable data on migrant groups in settings where fieldwork could be completed and high quality data could be collected without risking the integrity of the research team or the confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewees. I thus gathered data in urban neighbourhoods in the metropolitan area of Bogotá.

The Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS) was designed in 2008 to study migration patterns of internally displaced persons who had arrived at Bogotá between 1990 and 2002, from areas of origin to urban destinations, and to compare the experiences of internally displaced persons with different groups of non-forced migrants.

I designed the survey instrument using an ethnosurvey approach, which combines techniques of ethnographic fieldwork and representative survey sampling together with qualitative as well as quantitative data.⁷ The survey instrument was based on a series of the household questionnaires that followed a semi-structured format to provide the interviewers with the flexibility to built rapport and conduct an unobtrusive and non-

⁶ IDP project, 'Patterns of displacement in Colombia,' Global IDP Database, 2008.

⁷ D.S. Massey [et al.], *Return to Aztlan: the social process of international migration from Western Mexico* (Berkeley, CA, 1987): p. 38. For more details of the ethnosurvey see D.S. Massey, 'The ethnosurvey in theory and practice,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 21, no. 4 (1987): pp. 1498-1522.

threatening interview, which was essential to collecting sensitive information from forced migrants. The questionnaire was designed to obtain identical and comparable information for each person in a selected household. However, the wording and the timing of the questions were not fixed.

Although it was very difficult to separate economic migration from migration due to political violence, the survey instrument was designed to gather data that could be used to differentiate movements by those who never faced a violent event from those who did. Specifically I collected detailed data on the reasons for migration to distinguish forced migrants from non-forced migrants and asked about exposure to violent events.

The instrument also requested information at the personal and household level.⁸ Household data and marital histories were reported by the head of household. Basic socio-demographic information was asked about each household member and about the non-resident children of the head of household. In addition, to the questionnaire, other instruments were required to complete the data collection process. These instruments included the interviewer's manual, training guides, and letters to the representatives of the local administrative organisations, diagrams for organisation of fieldwork daily activities, daily report forms, and an interviewer's questionnaire to evaluate potential problems during the fieldwork that could affect data quality. Finally, following the World Bank guidelines for designing household survey questionnaires for developing countries, it was advisable to collect community level data while in the field. For this purpose a neighbourhood questionnaire was added to the measurements instruments for this study.

⁸ I was also aware of the difference between the terms house and household. A house or apartment could consist of several households. House, apartment or rented room was a location where one or more people lived; however, the household was a group of people who were tied together through a common bond.

Renting rooms was a common practice in urban areas in Colombia. These were not considered apartments, but were rooms rented in dwellings inhabited by various households. For housing in Colombia and for comparative purposes, see A. Gilbert and A. Varley, *Landlord and tenant: housing the poor in urban Mexico* (London, 1991); A. Gilbert, 'Colombian housing policy during the 1990s,' in E. Posada-Carbó (ed.), *Colombia: the politics of reforming the state* (New York, 1998); A. Gilbert, 'A home is for ever?: residential mobility and homeownership in self-help settlements,' *Environment and Planning A*, vol. 31, no. 6 (1999): pp. 1073-1091; A. Gilbert, 'Financing self-help housing: evidence from Bogotá, Colombia,' *International Planning Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2000): pp. 165-190 and A. Gilbert, 'Housing policy and legal entitlements: survival strategies of the urban poor,' in C. Abel and C. Lewis (eds.), *Exclusion and engagement: social policy in Latin America* (London, 2002).

The goal of the study was to collect comparable data that described how the experience of internally displaced persons differed from the experience of urban non-migrants and non-forced migrants during 1990-2002. The total sample includes 603 households from three sites located in southeast Bogotá (Barrio La Gloria, Barrio Alfonso López and Barrio Los Puentes), northeast Bogotá (Barrio Buena Vista, Barrio Chaparral and Barrio La Estrellita) and southwest neighbourhoods in the metropolitan periphery in the 4th district of the municipality of Soacha (Barrio Luis Carlos Galán I, Barrio Santo Domingo and Barrio Luis Carlos Galán II). These three sites were defined according to four criteria. First, I sought a relatively high concentration of internally displaced persons to ensure an adequate number of forced migrants. Second, I looked for a site in which the community leaders were willing to participate in the study by allowing the interviewers perform their duties in the neighbourhood. Third, I attempted to locate sites in diverse parts of the city, as Bogotá is highly stratified by socioeconomic status. Fourth, even if sites were very distant from downtown Bogotá I required easy access to public transportation to ensure the safety of interviewers and to facilitate fieldwork logistics. In addition, all data collection activities were carried out between 9 am and 4 pm to minimise risks for both interviewers and interviewees.

The locality of Usaquén hosted a large proportion of the richest population in the city. As in the cases of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, however, poor neighbourhoods were located near to high income areas because of demand for domestic, gardening and maintenance services provided informally by poor people living nearby. Since the goal of my research was to collect comparable data that described how the experience of internally displaced persons differed from the experience of urban non-migrants and non-forced migrants during 1990-2002, and the three localities of Barrio Buena Vista, Barrio Chaparral and Barrio La Estrellita not only provided non-migrants and non-forced migrants but also contained a number of forced displacements, I decided to choose Usaquén for my research.

Independent samples were collected in each defined area. In order to create a sample frame I enumerated all dwellings and inhabitable constructions in the defined area. In order to be able to locate the selected households for interview I went to the urban registration office (Oficina de Catastro) and asked for the registered maps of the selected neighbourhoods. In addition to the maps, I prepared formats for the enumerators to collect comparable information and to establish the particular characteristics of dwellings. In some cases addresses were non-existent or hard to

verify, and for this reason, I used a system of enumeration that allowed me to identify each dwelling within defined sites.

After enumerating all dwellings, between 239 and 260 households were randomly selected in each site. I expected to collect data on 200 households in each site, but I added an additional sample of 25 percent in case the initial selected household was not reached or rejected the interview.⁹ **Table A** contains basic sampling statistics. I counted a total of 2,413 households and interviewed 603 households.

Table A: Basic Sampling Statistics of the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey

Site	I	II	III	Total
Total households in the sample frame	702	832	879	2,413
Visited households	239	251	260	750
Not reached	44	27	35	106
Rejected	13	10	18	41
Interviewed households	182	214	207	603

Source: Primary data collected (own calculation)

I spent about 21 consecutive working days at each site, starting with the enumeration of the dwellings. The enumeration process and the sample selection took about 3-4 days. During this time the interviewers and I talked to the people in the community and informed them of a possible visit to their house to ask about their memories of displacement during 1990-2002. On the fifth day we started organising teams and rounds. In order to minimise insecurity, the interviewers did their rounds in teams of two, and while conducting independent interviews they worked in close proximity. I was always waiting in a visible and fixed location so that the reports of the interviewers and the completed questionnaires could be immediately reviewed for inconsistencies. When necessary, the interviewer was asked to clarify information or to go back to the selected household.

The interview took between 45 and 90 minutes depending on the number of household members and the migration experience of the head of household and spouse. There were few extreme cases in which the interviewees liked to talk about their experiences where the interviews lasted for 120 minutes. We worked from about 10 am

⁹ The households who rejected the interview include both families that did not want to participate and families that could not recount their memories. The interviewees were very kind to participate as they were informed in advanced by the leaders of communities.

to 4 pm, when public transportation was still available and before sunset. For each site we organised a team that stayed for an additional two days later in the afternoon to try to contact unreachable households. We collected data on weekends and holidays, interviewing families who were away working on weekdays.

For those households that could not be reached on the first visit, the interviewers were told to attempt at least three times to reach the head of household or spouse. If the respondent appeared very tired or busy, interviewers were instructed to ask if it was more appropriate to continue the interview later. This practice worked well, particularly when the interviews were carried out at lunch time. When the interviewers returned later, the respondent was more involved in his/her life histories. This practice improved data quality.

Given that the questionnaire was mainly based on the experience of the head of household, the interviewers asked first to interview the head of household. If it was impossible, then they were asked to interview the spouse and, finally, any member of the family who was older than 15 years by 2002 that could answer detailed questions about the migration and working experiences of the head of household and spouse. Interviewers did in many cases make more than one visit in order to interview the head of household or spouse and avoid a proxy respondent.

I used Microsoft Access platform to design the entry programme. The design was done during the interviewing process so that we could start entering the data as soon as the activities in the field were finished. I tried out several versions of the data entry programme and made necessary corrections and adjustments to make sure that identifiers, and consistency checks and warning for the data entry personnel functioned properly. The participation of the interviewers in data entry enhanced the quality data. Since they knew the structure of the data and had been in the field, they could often correct any mistakes due to illegible handwriting and other minor problems. The data entry started two days after interviewing finished, and it lasted about three weeks. I processed all data using Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software.

As researchers we sought to minimise missing or inconsistent data. However, we could never eliminate it completely even with the most sophisticated controls. During the data production process the quality of the overall data production could be assessed by analysing missing data. **Table B** shows the percentage of observations with complete data for all variables and with missing data in one to three variables. The data set for the study was composed by data at three levels: individuals, households and life histories.

For individuals or household members, 98.47 percent of the cases had values for all eight principal variables. For households, there were 32 variables that measured dwelling characteristics and access to public amenities and services. Only 2.32 percent of the cases had no values for all variables. Finally, the last piece of data was the migration and labour histories of the head of household and spouse. For this analysis instead of using person-years, I used life experiences. There were 6,090 reported experiences in the migration and labour histories of 603 heads of household and 453 spouses, and 4.88 percent of them had a missing value in one of the five basic variables included in the analysis. I concluded that the completeness of the data collected was high and therefore its use in the following analysis was adequate.

Table B: Missing Data of Individual, Household and Life History Experiences of Head of Household and Spouse

Level of Analysis	Complete data for all variables		Missing data for one to three variables		Total Observations	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Household members <i>Variables=8</i>	2,703	98.47	42	1.53	2,745	100
Households <i>Variables=32</i>	589	97.68	14	2.32	603	100
Experiences in the migration and labour histories of head of household and spouse <i>Variables=5</i>	5,793	95.12	297	4.88	6,090	100

Source: Primary data collected (own calculation)

APPENDIX 9

Oral Histories

Testimonies 1-3 illustrate the experiences of voluntary migrants, while testimonies 4-7 illustrate those of forced migrants. Non-migrants are reviewed in testimonies 8-9.

Testimony 1

'...Nací en Medina, Cundinamarca. Mis padres fueron campesinos, ellos tenían su finquita y allí nos criamos nosotros. Somos nueve hermanos, seis varones y tres mujeres. Mis padres fallecieron cuando yo tenía 16 años, quedamos muy jóvenes. Yo me escapé de mi casa después de eso y me vine para Bogotá. Me vine sola porque uno de mis hermanos me maltrataba mucho, demasiado. Un amigo me regaló \$5.000, otro hermano me dio otros \$5.000 y yo tenía algo también.

Yo conocía Bogotá porque cuando mi mamá estuvo enferma yo había estado con ella acá. Mi mamá tenía un primo en la Ciudad Bolívar y allí llegué. También yo había trabajado antes en una casa de familia cuando mi mamá estaba enferma. Cuando volví me puse de nuevo a trabajar con esa de familia y viví con ellos por seis años. Pero ellos no me ayudaron nunca a que yo me superara, creo que abusaron de mi trabajo porque no me pagaban mucho tampoco. Así me enfrenté a la vida hasta los 22 años. Después de eso una señora amiga que era del Chocó me sacó de ahí y me llevó a trabajar a un restaurante donde conocí al papá de mis hijos, él era el administrador...'

Testimony 2

'...Yo soy de Chibor, Boyacá. Mi papá murió cuando yo estaba pequeñita, somos cuatro hermanos, dos hombres y dos mujeres. Mis papas eran agricultores y vivíamos en el campo. Cuando murió mi papá mi mamá quedó sola, la vida era más difícil y tuvo que dejarnos con unos tíos a mí y a mi hermano. Con ellos la vida era muy dura. Nos tocaba trabajar desde los ocho años para ganarnos la comida. Yo les cocinaba a los obreros, hacía el aseo, etc. A mi hermano sí le daban escuelita pero lo trataban mal. A veces le echaban en cara la comida. A los dos años de estar con ellos nos trajeron para Bogotá. A mi hermano se lo llevó otro tío y quedamos separados.

Les seguía trabajando y me pagaban poquito. Estudié como un año en la nocturna estando acá. Estuve como un año así pero me cansé de tanto trabajo y tanto maltrato por parte del tío. De ahí me fui para donde una familia donde me trató muy mal también, y lo peor era que mi mamá no podía hacer nada. Luego de ahí me fui para donde una familia en el norte porque me escapé de donde estaba. Cuando llegué donde ellos sentí que había salido como de una cárcel. Antes me tenían era como encerrada, no me dejaban tener amistades, me tenían en una azotea, en un cuarto muy frío y allá arriba me tenía que bañar...eso era horrible.

Con la otra familia me fue muy bien porque me dieron mucha confianza. La familia se iba para el Ecuador y me iban a llevar con ellos. Antes de irme yo fui a donde mi mamá a despedirme y llevarle mercadito, pero pasaron las semanas y me quedé con ella. Mi mamá estaba muy pobre y me lloraba que no me fuera tan lejos.

Me quedé para ayudarle y en ese tiempo fue que conocí a mi marido. Me enamoré, me quedé y me casé.

Formamos una familia. Tengo diez hijos. Fueron demasiados pero en este momento no estoy arrepentida porque cuando no me ayuda uno, me ayudan los otros. Cuando tenía cuatro hijos mi mamá se fue para otro lado porque le salió un trabajo. Ella me mandaba mercado. Mi esposo se dedicaba a la mina y compramos una finca cerca al pueblo. Como al sexto hijo mi esposo se iba para la mina y me empezó a dejar sola. Yo conseguí un trabajo con el Bienestar Familiar y tuve un hogar comunitario en mi casa. Los hijos siempre estudiaron y ese era mi mayor empeño porque mi esposo decía que mejor les enseñara a trabajar. Me tocaba muy duro porque tenía cuatro en el bachillerato y mi esposo no aportaba nada porque la vida por allá era muy difícil...'

Testimony 3

'...Tengo 43 años. Nací en Guamo, Tolima. Me criaron mis abuelos porque mi mamá me abandonó como al mes de nacido para casarse. A mi papá no lo conocí sino hasta los 30 años de edad. Mi infancia fue especial porque era el único nieto. Fui muy querido, muy consentido, nunca me pegaron, fue muy chévere. Hice la primaria. Mis tíos todos me apoyaban. Son tres tíos, una tía y dos tíos. Mis abuelos tenían una finca grandísima en el campo. Producía de todo, pescado, leche, quesos... de todo. La infancia llegó hasta el término en que murieron mis abuelos. Primero se murió mi abuelita y se acabó todo. Yo tenía 14 años y quedamos mi abuelo y mi tío solos en la casa. Mi abuelo nunca cocinaba entonces era tremendo.

De los 14 años a los 20 fue cuando me tocó venirme. Ya fue entonces la muerte de mi tío. Lo mataron allá en el medio de nosotros. Estábamos todos en la casa y llegó un vecino a pedir una recomendación para sacar un crédito en la caja agraria. Llegaron y mataron a bala a mi tío y al vecino. A mí también casi me matan ese día.

Me dijeron que yo era un peligro porque iba a seguir los pasos de él. Me llevaron por allá al monte con un primo que había llegado a ver qué era lo que había sucedido después de que mataron a mi tío. Estábamos de 14-15 años y no me mataron pero empezó la persecución a nosotros. Al año siguiente me tocó venirme yo sabía que me estaban siguiendo.

Un tío que estaba en el ejército me dijo que me fuera con él para Boyacá donde estaba trabajando y me alojé en el cuartel. De ahí estuve hasta los 18 años cuando salí a prestar el servicio. Allá trabajaba como sardino en lo que me rebuscaba. Cuando estaba presentado el servicio en la Fuerza Aérea fue que murió mi abuelo. Él le había tocado quedarse solito-solito en la finca y se murió de pena moral. Me quedé solo-solo. Mi abuelo dejó la tierra en el Tolima botada. Allá no hay nadie.

En el Fuerza Aérea me fue muy bien, me decían que me quedara pero a mí no me gustaba la vida militar. Terminé el servicio y me fui para el pueblo pero allá me aburrí porque no había nada que hacer. Un primo me dijo que nos fuéramos para Bogotá a aventurar porque no teníamos a nadie acá. Me vine con una maletica y cuatro mudas de ropa. ¡Imagínese! eso llegar a la ciudad sin conocer a nadie ni nada.

A mí me tocó dormir debajo de un puente. Solo tuvimos plata para comer uno o dos días y después a pedir porque qué más se puede hacer. Un día mi primo y yo llegamos a la Frutería Paty y estaba el dueño y le pedimos trabajo. El tipo estaba comenzando y nos pusimos a trabajar. Hoy en día eso es grandísimo...'

Testimony 4

'...Yo era ama de casa. Mi esposo trabajaba en una finca de tractorista. Vivíamos en el pueblo de Popente en el departamento del Cesar. Popente queda metió, nadie lo conoce, casi ni está en el mapa, es un pueblo de tres calles largas. Tengo tres niñas y un varón. Mis hijos estudiaban también allá. Toda mi familia es y están allá. Mi esposo se salió de la finca y se metió a trabajar a un colegio.

La guerrilla era antes como la ley del pueblo. Todo empezó a dañarse cuando se metieron los paramilitares. Cuando se metieron empezaron a amenazar. Allá no había policía y si llegaban los sacaban. Los campesinos empezaron a bajar, empezó el pueblo a sufrir, porque si ellos se bajan no hay cultivos, no hay comida. Entonces toda la gente comenzó a irse y a sufrir.

Mi esposo tenía un hermano acá en Bogotá que vivía acá hace años, lo llamó y le dijo que se viniera porque un sobrino de se había metido a los paramilitares y mi esposo tampoco ya tenía trabajo. En esa época los pelaos veían que esos muchachos tenían una vida sabrosa, ganando plata ahí sentados, con el arma ahí nada más y muchos se metieron a eso. El sobrino se metió y luego llegó una carta avisando a toda la familia que nos iban a matar.

Mi esposo se vino adelante primero que yo a ver cómo era la ciudad mientras yo hacia los trámites para salir del trabajo, dure dos meses más allá. Pero esos dos meses los pasé...mejor dicho...terror y de todo porque eso a cada rato había enfrentamientos. Se mataban hasta entre ellos mismos.

A los dos meses me vine yo con los niños. Renuncié, vendí un televisor que tenía, y él me mandó para los pasajes con lo que había recogido de los primos que le habían dado. Así me vine para acá, pero me dio muy duro la llegada. Yo lloraba todos los días, el frío... Yo viaje con todos los niños excepto con una que mi mamá la cogió porque ella la había criado, estaba apegada a mi mamá.

Nosotros llegamos a donde mi cuñado por aquí cerquita. Desde que llegamos hemos estado aquí en el barrio. Aquí mi esposo consiguió trabajo. Para el apartamento casi que no nos recibían por tanto niño y nos mudamos cinco veces desde que llegamos. Fue muy duro porque el cambio fue tenaz. Vivíamos encerrados en cambio allá uno vive como el pájaro, libre. Mis hijos lloraban para que los mandara de regreso. Así pasó el primer mes y mi esposo comenzó a trabajar más fijo, y le empezamos a ayudar a su hermano.

Yo no sabía nada de eso de declarar y una señora que el marido es abogado me dijo que declarara que nosotros podíamos porque veníamos huyendo de la violencia.

Nosotros declaramos a los dos meses. Al comienzo yo no sabía que al desplazado lo iban a tratar tan mal cuando uno declaraba, ya la gente lo miraba a uno como desplazado, como no sé qué...se siente uno como humillado, como mal...En el colegio los niños se sentían mal por eso también. Ir a declarar me ayudó porque me dieron para los mercados, para los arriendos, colchonetas, un kit de cocina, y cosas de baño.

Esa ayuda duró tres meses. En esos tres meses no compré ni una libra de arroz ni aceite porque todo nos lo daban.

Al principio mi esposo le ayudaba a mi cuñado, luego a los dos meses después de que yo llegué él trabajaba en San Cristóbal, y ahora está de vigilante en otra parte. Cuando estaba en San Cristóbal se puso flaquito y yo le decía ‘no papi usted está bien bonito ¡se ve más elegante!’. Pero a él ese trabajo allá le dio duro. El permanecía ocupado y a mi todo me afectaba porque yo mantenía en la casa, y me ponía a pensar en todas esas cosas que pasaron.

Pero nos adaptamos como rápido. Además teníamos la familia de él acá y eso ayudó un poco. Yo no tenía amigas, solamente la cuñada que me sacaba a conocer. En eso yo era evangélica y me relacioné con la iglesia acá. Eso me ayudó mucho también. Me fui sintiendo como en casa pero a pesar de eso todavía recuerdo y me da duro, quisiera devolverme por allá otra vez. Acá la vida estresa, todo es plata y cansa. Así uno esté trabajando tiene que pasar necesidades y toca estar echando parlante a toda hora. Los niños siempre están necesitando que les de dinero para una cosa y para otra, y eso me estresa...’

Testimony 5

‘...Yo nací en Mesetas, Meta. Mis papás tenían una finca allá, hice la primaria allá en la vereda y el bachillerato en otro pueblito. Trabajé en el campo como docente y de ahí me trasladaron al casco urbano que también era una vereda. Trabajé en un internado, era como la directora de eso, estaba pendiente de las chicas, hacíamos actividades recreativas, manualidades y cosas para su desarrollo. Ahí conocí a mi compañero. De ahí regresé a la escuela rural y nos juntamos a vivir.

Ya juntos tuvimos el primer hijo y decidimos buscar otros rumbos, otras aventuras. Nos fuimos para Boyacá y allá trabajé como docente. Yo no me amañé por allá y regresamos a Mesetas y seguí trabajando en un colegio privado como docente. Llegó el otro niño y en total ahora son tres niños. Y nos ubicamos ahí, a él le salió buen trabajo en construcción por parte de la alcaldía y allí nos asentamos a trabajar. Nos salió la oportunidad de un subsidio y nos hicimos a la casita. Teníamos una casita bien bonita y él seguía trabajando con la alcaldía.

Esa era zona de distensión, fue como cinco años así. El pueblo se veía desolado, la gente del campo los domingos no salía, uno tenía que estar pendiente de que los niños no salieran por ahí. En ese tiempo hubo mucha deserción de los colegios porque se iban o se los llevaban para la guerrilla desde los 11-12 años.

Tocó cerrar el colegio y por eso yo me quedé sin trabajo. Busqué trabajo en una droguería donde trabajé año y medio, y luego me independicé. En la casa pusimos una miscelánea que poco fui surtiendo. Vivía en la casa, trabajaba en la miscelánea y estaba pendiente de los niños. Él seguía trabajando. Yo me sentía contenta porque me podía quedar en la casa y estar tranquila para atender los muchachos allí también.

Después de eso terminó la zona de distensión y entró el ejército. Igual nosotros seguíamos tranquilos porque igual no pertenecíamos a ningún grupo. Cuando ellos entraron, detracito entraron los paramilitares y empezaron a haber muchas muertes, y todos los días uno escuchaba que a fulano lo encontraron por allá, y que se llevaban a gente en plena calle y no volvían. Muchos conocidos que uno sabía que no se meten en nada se los llevaron. Antes de eso también hubo mucha gente que se salió de allá, gente que quizás sí tenía algo que ver, que apenas sintieron que la guerrilla se fue, se fueron...

...Entonces cuando pasó eso, fue un golpe terrible. Nosotros no pensábamos salirnos porque no teníamos ningún problema, pero entonces con eso a uno le empieza a dar como miedo porque esa gente llegó y decía que todos los del pueblo éramos informantes o éramos ayudantes de la guerrilla...

...Cuando llegamos a la casa había un señor esperándolo y le dijo que aquella gente nos andaba buscando. Él como no tenía nada que ver con nada dijo 'Se me hace raro si ellos saben donde vivo y todo'. Él pensó irlos a buscar y preguntarles para qué lo necesitaban, sabiendo que cuando ellos preguntaban a alguien no era para nada bueno porque ellos no investigaban sino que de una vez iban matando. El señor que le avisó no le dijo más, pero una señora vecina si no se aguantó y nos dijo que era que lo querían era matar, que se lo iban a llevar.

A raíz de eso se acabó la tranquilidad y a le tocó salirse. Esa misma noche se salió. Contamos con la ayuda del médico del hospital para sacarlo del pueblo sin que se dieran cuenta. Como mi hermana es enfermera le comentamos y ella también nos dijo que él se tenía que ir. Nos ayudaron y esa misma noche se fue para Villavicencio donde un hermano mío. Echamos dos muditas de ropa a una maleta y arrancó. Él pensó las cosas y decidió venirse para acá para Bogotá.

Yo me quedé y trabajaba en un restaurante escolar. Seguí como un y corriente. Hicimos de cuenta que nada había pasado. Yo iba al restaurante y así. Iba donde mi mamá y eso. Yo me hacía la que no sabía nada. En el mes que me estuve allá sola nunca me dijeron nada. Yo salía y escuchaba la moto y sabía que eran ellos, las autodefensas...

...Cuando yo me fui yo no le dije a nadie porque uno en esa situación no confía en nadie. Cuando me vine nos encontramos con él en Villavicencio. En Villavicencio nos quedamos poquito tiempo porque allá hay mucha gente de Mesetas. Y nos vinimos para acá a Bogotá donde una hermana de él.

Había un señor que tenía un local que era un solo salón y allí nos fuimos. Estuvimos un mes y al mes un muchacho de por allá de la región de donde es mi esposo, nos ofreció una casa que estaba llena de material y nos la dio. Ese señor siempre nos ayudó mucho y no nos cobraba arriendo siempre porque no teníamos de donde sacar para eso. En la misma semana de haber llegado ya declaramos en la Red y empezamos a buscar lo de las ayudas. En comienzo íbamos a abastos a recoger para la comida y con lo de las primeras ayudas de la Red y de la Cruz Roja, nos fuimos acomodando. Él no se quedaba quieto, siempre buscaba que hacer. Estuvo vendiendo huevos pero eso no funcionó, luego vendía plátanos y así nos fuimos ubicando.

A mí al principio me dio muy duro. Yo dejé toda mi familia allá. A la familia de él también le tocó salir, a los hermanos, hermanas, lo papas, todos lo que vivían allá, porque como ellos si vivían en el campo y allá había mayor dificultad los empezaban a señalar y todo eso. Como nosotros fuimos los primeros que llegamos los íbamos acogiendo, y los acompañábamos a que hicieron las declaraciones y a buscar más acomodo. Poco a poco y gracias a Dios contamos con las ayudas a tiempo y pues donde quiera que iba a pedir ayuda nos tendían la mano...'

Testimony 6

'...Llegué a una región de mucha violencia cuando tenía como casi 8 años. Somos nativos de Planada, Tolima. Mi papá trabajaba en el campo, él abastecía la región pero debido a las envidias vinimos a parar a Dolores, Tolima. Llegamos allá en el 68. Allá por el lado de la Estrella los conflictos eran horribles-horribles. Todos los días veíamos pasar al ejército y por las tardes veíamos pasar todos esos muertos atravesados en esas mulas.

Todo eso eran cosas que se nos iban quedando grabadas. Doce o quince soldados los pasaban muertos. A nosotros siempre se nos quedó que la guerrilla siempre ha estado por ahí. Siempre hemos estado en medio del conflicto, de las balas.

Ahí duramos un año y luego nos fuimos a otro lado por ahí cerca donde terminamos de crecer, y de nuevo empezaron las cosas. Nos encontrábamos gente encapuchada y armada hasta los dientes pero nunca nos dijeron nada, pero siempre cargábamos la idea que esa era gente mala. En el 75 terminé la primaria y me fui para Neiva, allá duré cinco años y regresé. En el tiempo que no estuve comenzaron a matar a las familias que eran muy allegadas a la familia.

Luego me conocí con mi ex-esposo, me casé y me erradiqué por allá por un tiempo. Empezaron los problemas porque donde vivíamos vivía la comandante de ellos. Ella preparaba a sus hijos para que le recibieran el mando cuando falleciera. Allá persiguen mucho a los liberales y mis suegros eran liberales. Pero la guerrilla era la que mandaba en ese pueblo y quien no quería trabajar con ellos se tenía que ir o se moría, lo empiezan a boletear. Mi esposo siempre estuvo aislado de eso, pero a veces es difícil porque uno tiene sus mejores amigos y sus familias que son muy allegadas y uno a veces tenían que irlos a recoger y acompañarlos en los entierros.

Y siempre miraban con quien uno hablaba y todo eso.

Mi esposo y yo trabajábamos en la finca de los suegros tecnificándola con la Federación de Cafeteros. En el 92 sacaron a los suegros porque ellos eran muy conocidos y a la casa iba mucha gente importante. Les tenían mucha envidia por todo eso y la comandante juró que de ellos no iba a dejar nada. Nosotros dormíamos custodiados por la guerrilla todo el tiempo y no podíamos decir nada. Si alguien en el pueblo trataba de surgir o hacer algo bonito ellos lo iban matando.

La ley allá es que uno tiene que trabajarles a ellos o irse en las filas con ellos, o trabajarles como informantes en el pueblo. Y si usted no acepta eso no le sirve a ellos y lo boletean. Nosotros pudimos sacar al suegro. Los camuflamos como si fuera ir a sacar café con nosotros. Lo metimos al cafetal y el salió de allí. Cuando uno sale volado, ellos minan todo, cierran carreteras y avisan por todos lados donde uno vaya a salir. Nosotros lo sacamos por los caños, por la loma. Ellos mataron a una persona que lo ayudó a salir. Le cobraron por ayudar a sacar al suegro. El suegro durmió tres noches en el atrio de la Iglesia del pueblo de donde salió.

Mi suegro trabajaba con el gobierno y nosotros éramos líderes comunitarios también. Trabajamos en la junta local de allá y nos amenazaron de nuevo y vimos morir mucha gente amiga de nosotros. El ejército había estado por allá y mataron a la comandante y mucha de su familia. Cuando el ejército se fue culparon a mucha gente de haberlos ayudado.

Uno vivía vigilado por esa gente y en una zozobra muy grande. A nosotros nos boletearon al año de que salió el suegro. Nos daban 24 horas para salir. Nos culparon de haber ayudado al ejército. Nosotros nos fuimos de allá a otro pueblo más grande.

Cuando llegamos a otro pueblo a los pocos días nos separamos con mi esposo por eso mismo. Nos habían jurado que nos iban a matar a todos y él decía que no quería cargar el riesgo de que les pasara algo a los muchachos y por eso se abrió. Luego se consiguió otra señora y se fue. A mis hijos se los querían llevar para las filas. Por eso nos volamos al final porque le habían dicho a uno de ellos que lo iban a mandar a estudiar Estados Unidos para que fuera comandante. Mis hijos en eso se habían graduado de bachiller. Ellos se aburrieron donde estábamos por todo eso y porque se los querían llevar decidimos que se vinieran para Bogotá donde mis hermanos. Yo me quedé trabajando. Mis hijos me dijeron luego que me viniera para Bogotá.

Ellos empezaron a trabajar en una fábrica de muebles. Cuando yo llegué, llegué con las manos vacías porque habíamos perdido todo. Nos sosteníamos con la ayuda de mi hermana y con lo que ellos trabajaban. Luego nos fuimos donde un sobrino que nos ayudó a surgir. Él pertenecía a la policía del barrio. Él me fue ayudando a hacer amistades y me daban algunas horas de trabajo. Él no nos cobraba arriendo. Allí estaba hasta que nos vinimos aquí al barrio y ahora pagamos arriendo. Estaba yo ya acá en el barrio con mis tres hijos cuando un día me fui a acompañar a un primo que trabajaba con un programa de infancia y desarrollo. Y allá necesitaban gente que ayudara a empacar unos mercados y me puse a ayudar. Allá la cosa empezó a cambiar porque allá me daban mucha comida. Yo quiero mucho esa corporación y a los niños que están allá también. Fui dejando atrás todo lo que me pasó.

Un día venía de la corporación y pasé por acá por el Ecoparque. Vi los letreros de los cursos afuera y me llamaron la atención. Pero cuando los leí sentí como una contradicción porque decía que eran cursos de cultivos urbanos para desplazados y pensé que era como regresar al mundo de donde salir. Nosotros teníamos muchas hortalizas, y habíamos perdido eso cuando nos fuimos. Me daba como tristeza recordar

los cultivos que teníamos listos para cosechar cuando nos fuimos. Y cuando empecé a participar en los cursos poco a poco se me fue quitando eso. Luego de que me inscribí y comenzamos las clases me di cuenta que la agrónoma venía del Tolima también y me dio mucha felicidad. Entonces mis hermanos, hermana y otros familiares nos inscribimos y jalamos a otras personas del Tolima que se quisieran inscribir. Nos reunimos la colonia de allá a través de los cursos. La agrónoma era muy echada para adelante y ¡nosotros también!...

Testimony 7

'...Soy nacida en el Valle del Cauca. Mi padre es Tolimense y mi madre es de Pereira. Ellos han vivido en el Valle y en Tolima. Mi madre cuenta que alrededor de los años 52-53 estaba lo más grueso de la Violencia de colores, el rojo y el azul. Ella en esa época estaba embarazada de mí de seis meses y había problemas porque sacaban a los hombres de las casas, quemaban casas y los guerrilleros se llamaban bandoleros.

Yo recuerdo que en esa época avisaban que ellos venían con un cacho que hacía un ruido como de temor. Mi mamá y mi papá iban caminando saliendo para el Valle cuando escucharon un tiroteo y la quema de casas y mi madre recuerda que ellos se echaron a correr estando ella embarazada de mí. Dios no permitió que me viniera antes de tiempo a pesar de que ella rodó por el camino. Él ya tenía un propósito para mí.

Me crié en el Valle con mi abuela. Mi mamá volvía cada vez que iba a tener otro bebé. Ella tuvo 15 hijos en total. A los 12 años mi abuela me entregó a mis papas porque ya estaba entrando en la adolescencia y para que les cogiera cariño. Me fui para el Tolima y allá estaba trabajando con la empresa de Telecom. Me casé y tuve cinco hijos. Apenas tengo vivos tres porque dos se murieron pequeños. Trabajaba en una agencia indirecta de teléfonos, una sucursal. Allá hacía de todo, recibía llamadas, correo, servía tintos, mandaba mensajes, etc. Esa época fue linda. Fui siempre muy independiente y no me gustaba el machismo. Allá duré harto tiempo hasta que me tocóirme por el conflicto armado. Y no era la Violencia pero era lo mismo porque desde que le violenlos derechos a uno y lo maten eso es lo mismo.

Estando en mi trabajo de operadora a mi trabajo llegaban los unos y los otros de cualquiera de los bandos. Yo no le ayudaba a nadie sino estrictamente en lo que mi trabajo requería. Para mí lo primero era la neutralidad, la imparcialidad. Pero me decían que yo tenía los teléfonos interceptados. Una vez el ejército llegó y me dijeron dizque me iban a colgar y que les tenía que entregar uno por uno a los guerrilleros. Era

grave porque yo era neutral y ellos me acosaban de un lado y otro. Eso duró muchísimo.

Luego aparecí en un listado y yo les pregunté que qué era lo que había en contra mía y siempre me decían que conmigo no había problema. Yo en el único que confié es en Dios. Los de la guerrilla me decían que no me fuera que mientras que no iba a pasar nada, pero al mismo tiempo me mostraban la lista de personas que iban a matar en la que estaban mi esposo, mis hijos y yo.

Un día le dijeron a un familiar de mi esposo que estaba en un pueblito cercano que me avisara que la semana que entraba estuviera pendiente que uno de esos capitanes necesitaba hacer sus llamadas. Y todo por malos entendidos. Entonces al otro día le tocó salir a mi esposo primero y luego a los seis meses salí yo con los dos niños y yo iba embarazada. En la lista estaba primero mi esposo, yo no me fui antes porque en la oficina me tocó entrenar a alguien.

El desarraigo es muy duro, estuvimos en Lérida un tiempo pero allá pasó exactamente lo mismo y me vine a tener la hija de la que estaba embarazada acá en Bogotá. Esta es la hora que yo no he podido volver. Estando acá en Usme me empecé a unir con unas líderes buscando colegio para mis hijos. En ese tiempo no había la ley 387, yo soy compañera de la ley...'

Testimony 8

'...Yo vivía en Usme, yo soy nacida y criada allá. Allá, nací, me crié, tuve mis hijos. Vivía con mis cinco hijos, mi nieto y el papá de mis hijos; además mi papá, mi mamá y mis hermanos eran de allá. La relación con mi esposo y mis hijos era una relación feliz. Con los vecinos era intachable, porque compartíamos todos, menos los maridos. Todo era como una unión, para las fiestas eso era inconfundible.

Yo tenía mi tienda, y él trabajaba en una institución educativa en oficios varios, y tenía como 23 años de estar trabajando en esa institución. Tenía mi casa, asistíamos a la iglesia católica. En la política participaba, cuando llegaba el político decía: 'yo quiero que ustedes me colaboren para las elecciones', y eso lo hacía yo.

Allá había compañías, eran empresas grandes. Trabajábamos mujeres y hombres, no solamente trabajaban hombres, sino hombres y mujeres en esas empresas, había empresas pequeñas también, pero todo lo que hacían se lo llevaban a las empresas grandes...'

Testimony 9

'...Yo soy de Usaquéen. Tuve una infancia muy bonita, sufrida como pobre pero muy bonita. Mi relación con mis padres fue muy bonita, con mi papá nunca hemos tenido problemas, somos pobres pero tenemos buenas relaciones, jugábamos con él, jugábamos fútbol, recechábamos... Mi mamá era un poquito más seria, pero también tuvimos buenas relaciones.

En la infancia fuimos 11 hermanos, pero murieron dos y quedamos 9. Las celebraciones eran las de navidad, año nuevo, nosotros siempre hemos sido creyentes. Yo me levanté en el evangelio porque cuando yo tenía 5 años, mi mamá se entregó y de ahí parlante crecimos en el evangelio. Mi papá era creyente, un hermano de él también. Nos íbamos a reunir todos los domingos y los miércoles a la iglesia, y en diciembre hacíamos las fiestas navideñas allá. Uno de joven piensa muy feliz, vive encantado de la vida.

Luego mi mamá se enfermó. Duró un año y ahí dejé de estudiar, entonces mi papá dijo: 'no hay para que sigan estudiando, y para pagar una mujer que atienda acá, entonces saquemos a Delia, que es la más grande, y que ella venga atender la casa'. Duró un año hospitalizada y yo me hice cargo de la casa, cuando mi mamá regresó, regresó con estrictas condiciones del médico: que no podía sofocarse, que viniera hacer un reposo a la casa, porque el problema era de los pulmones. Ella debía estar comiendo a cada rato, y siguió en tratamiento como 6 años, ella iba cada mes al hospital a recibir el tratamiento, yo seguí, como en la casa mi mamá era modista, prácticamente se dedicó a la máquina, y yo hacía los oficios, mis hermanos siguieron estudiando...'

APPENDIX 10

Colombian Government Policies towards the Internally Displaced Persons

Colombians were being forcibly displaced at least two decades before international recognition of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a vulnerable category of persons in need of protection and assistance. The international attention to displacement, when it did come about, significantly helped to mobilise action on behalf of internally displaced persons among Colombian human rights lawyers and political leaders. The conflicts in Central America during the 1980s gave rise to new regional formulations of state responsibilities towards refugees and internally displaced persons. The Cartagena Declaration of 1984 broadened the definition of refugees and expressed a regional concern for the phenomenon of internal displacement. The resulting International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) launched a Plan of Action that called for combined attention to refugees, internally displaced and returning populations. The international funding for programmes that supported the CIREFCA Plan of Action was essential, especially for helping the internally displaced who far outnumbered the other two categories and were not formally within international agency mandates.

Following CIREFCA, regional attention to internally displaced persons beyond Central America led to the creation of the Permanent Consultation on Internal Displacement in the Americas (CPDIA), under the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights in Costa Rica in 1992.¹ Colombia and Peru were the countries of greatest concern. Following its visit to Colombia in the early 1990s, the CPDIA recommended several measures that the Colombian government should take to assist and protect internally displaced persons.

¹ See R. Cohen, 'The response of regional organisations to internal displacement in the Americas,' Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cohene.html>>, accessed 12 August 2010.

At the international level, the works of Francis Deng brought the problem of internally displaced persons to the centre of human rights concerns.² In 1992 Deng was named UN Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, indicating international recognition of the magnitude of the phenomenon and the urgent need of strategies for prevention, protection and assistance. Deng visited Colombia in 1994 at the invitation of a large group of NGOs and the Colombian government. At that time the first serious studies of internal displacement were being produced, most influential of which was the work of the Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church.³

Development of Mechanisms for Responding to the Crisis of Displacement

Prior to the Ernesto Samper presidency (1994-1998), few benefits were available to help the internally displaced. Samper, however, made this issue part of a broader state policy emphasising social responsibility.⁴ The Development Plan for 1995-1999 included the creation of a National System for the Integral Attention to the Displaced Population. It was initially incorporated into the existing National System for Disaster Response and the Presidential Council on Human Rights. The National Planning Department instrument *Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social* (CONPES) acknowledged the responsibility of the state to respond to the crisis of displacement.⁵ However, there were narrow limits placed on conditions for emergency response, and the initiatives lacked budgetary support for the activities contemplated.

In July 1997, the Colombian Congress passed Law 387, which established the basis for a new National System for the Integral Attention to the Displaced Population and a special fund. In order to comply with its responsibilities an Information Network for the Attention of the Internally Displaced was created. This Information Network used data gathering systems to provide information on the growth and level of internal displacement and its geographic patterns. The two components of this Information Network were the *Registro Único de Población Desplazada* (Registration of Internally

² The works of Francis Deng which related to the problems of internally displaced persons are R. Cohen and F.M. Deng (eds.), *The forsaken people: case studies of the internally displaced* (Washington, DC, 1998) and R. Cohen and F.M. Deng, *Masses in flight: the global crisis of internal displacement* (Washington, DC, 1998).

³ S. Cervellin and F. Uribe, *Desplazados, aproximación psicosocial y abordaje terapéutico* (Bogotá, 1994). The Catholic Church estimated that some 600,000 persons had been displaced between 1985 and 1994.

⁴ He was motivated both by wishing to counter the neoliberal policies of his predecessor and to court greater legitimacy in international circles, especially in the United States, where he was criticised for having ties to the drug lords. See above **Chapter 3**.

⁵ Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social, contained in Decree 2804 of 1995.

Displaced Population) and the *Sistema de Estimación del Desplazamiento Forzado por Fuentes Contrastadas* (Forced Displacement Estimation System by Contrasting Sources).⁶ The *Red de Solidaridad Social* (RSS), created in 1994 for programmes that addressed poverty and helped the most vulnerable sectors, was given broad responsibilities for helping displaced persons.

The formulation and passage of Law 387 gave a juridical basis to subsequent national action on behalf of internal displacement. The legislation came about thanks to advocacy from an impressive coalition of Colombian legal experts, academics, the Episcopal Conference, government agencies, the Colombian Senate, and international organisations—primarily the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The law anticipated many of the measures in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, promulgated the following year by the UN Special Representative, Francis Deng.⁷ It was expected, as in the case of CIREFCA, that the international community would provide financial assistance and expertise. The same year, 1997, the Colombian government issued an invitation to UNHCR to establish an office in Bogotá for IDP protection. UNHCR did so in 1998. Thereafter UNHCR officially determined the persons in the government's RSS registry to be of concern. In the following years, measures were adopted to improve the legal instruments supporting application of Law 387, and to strengthen the community and NGO implementing agencies.

⁶ Red de Solidaridad Social, *Guía de atención integral a la población desplazada por la violencia* (Bogotá, 2001).

⁷ The Guiding Principles provided a broader definition of an internally displaced person and, contrary to Law 387, asked governments to provide for the safety of returned to dangerous areas.

Institutionalising Protection and Attention

In January 1999, the government of Andrés Pastrana adopted another National Plan for the Integral Attention to the Displaced Population by Violence, which thereafter would be coordinated by the *Red de Solidaridad Social*.⁸ Under the National Plan, the *Red de Solidaridad Social* was assigned a broad range of tasks:

*[To] articulate governmental actions nationally and territorially; in accordance with the principles and objectives defined in Law 387, formulate the actions to be undertaken by the national government in matters of prevention of displacement, emergency humanitarian attention; and socio-economic consolidation and stabilisation for the prospect of voluntary return or resettlement of the population displaced by violence.*⁹

The programmes under the jurisdiction of the *Red de Solidaridad Social* were based on the rights affirmed in the basic law on displacement, Law 387, and the subsequent international Guiding Principles on Displacement. The Components foreseen in Law 387 were:

- *Prevention*: The *Red de Solidaridad Social* supported productive projects, conflict resolution and human rights seminars and workshops, and had created early warning mechanisms in places where the threat of displacement was high. The *Defensoría del Pueblo* coordinated early warning responses.¹⁰ Projects might be executed by international agencies, international or local NGOs. The Prevention component also included psychosocial counselling to assist persons traumatised by displacement.

- *Emergency Humanitarian Assistance*: Families and individuals registered with the *Red de Solidaridad Social* received emergency assistance for three months. The assistance packages varied, but included food and non-food items, presumably tailored to individual needs. Each departmental office of the *Red de Solidaridad Social* selected local implementing agencies, Assistance and Orientation Units (UAOs), to deliver the assistance.¹¹ When large groups were displaced in areas where the RSS was not present,

⁸ Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social, contained in Decree 3057 of 1999.

⁹ Decree 173 of 1999.

¹⁰ A government office created to defend citizens' rights.

¹¹ For example, the Colombian Red Cross was the implementing agency in Bogotá; *Corporación Minuto de Dios* was a partner around Medellín; the *Red de Apoyo Social* executed projects in the Cartagena area.

the International Committee of the Red Cross would generally respond, using its own funding.

- *Stabilisation Component*: The government and its institutions, especially the Land Reform Institute (*Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria*, INCORA) and the Urban Housing Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Vivienda de Interés y Reforma Urbana*, INURBE) were charged to identify solutions for the internally displaced population. As the population was overwhelmingly rural in origin, finding available land for resettlement was a priority. In this sector, the *Red de Solidaridad Social* acted in a coordinating capacity to bring together resources from government, private, and international sources that supported, in turn, various kinds of productive projects and training.

- *Social Services*: Law 387 gave the internally displaced persons rights to health, education and basic services that spanned the emergency and stabilisation phases. The *Red de Solidaridad Social* coordinated the activities of the various ministries and state corporations whose services were related to displacement, for example, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Interior, INCORA, INURBE and the Agrarian Bank. The internally displaced persons should receive health and education free of charge during the three months they were receiving emergency assistance and therefore be obliged to pay a small amount. In the RSS budget, the social service component existed in both the emergency assistance and stabilisation categories.

- *Support for Return to Places of Origin*: This activity was seen as the outcome of stabilisation. The RSS documentation emphasised return as the preferred solution and implied that there would be security in place to make it possible for the internally displaced persons to return. International assistance was sought for this purpose.

Thus, since 1999, the Colombian government theoretically had had in place a system that operated on the state, departmental and local levels to meet the challenges of displacement on all its phases. Comprehensive legislation had specified the rights of the displaced and the responsibilities of government organisations at all levels. The system was coordinated by a single organisation, the *Red de Solidaridad Social*, mandated to oversee local, departmental and national governmental responses to displacement. Between 1995 and 2000, the government devoted around US\$ 60 million.

In 2001, it spent some US\$ 63 million and in 2002, the budget for assistance to the displaced population had risen to US\$ 70 million.¹²

Although Colombia had in place the most comprehensive structures in the world for the internally displaced persons, a closer look uncovered a system that was grossly under-financed and understaffed, in which responsibilities were ill-defined and officials were rarely if ever held accountable.

Virtually every national and international analysis identified an enormous gap in the Colombian mechanisms on displacement between stated purposes and implementations. As seen the problems below:

- *Prevention*: The support for early warning systems was rendered nearly ineffectively because the security forces were rarely prepared to intervene to prevent threatened displacements. Knowing that the likelihood of response was small, the potential victims were all the more fearful of reprisals for speaking out in the first place. The seminars on humanitarian law and conflict resolution and human rights accompaniment produced only isolated successes in preventing displacements from occurring. Despite the fact that human rights protection mechanisms were constitutionally incorporated into the mandates of all state agencies, the state was incapable of protecting its citizens from violence and displacement even when the state itself was aware of and condemned the violations.

- *Emergency Humanitarian Assistance*: The emergency assistance made available through government and non-government sources failed far short of meeting the humanitarian challenges posed by so large a number of uprooted people. Although the system was improving over time, it was still common for assistance to reach beneficiaries months after their displacement. The most important weaknesses in Colombia's emergency assistance programme were, first, that it was unavailable to large numbers of the internally displaced who, for reasons related to security, timing, difficult access and other causes, were not registered; second that three months of assistance was entirely too short.

¹² Online. Available at HTTP: <<http://terra.com.co/actualidad/nacional/19-10-2002/nota70433.html>>, accessed 12 August 2010. The amounts in Colombian peso were 139 billion, 146 billion and 162 billion, respectively.

- *Stabilisation Component*: Internally displaced persons, for the most part, lost whatever health and education benefits they had in their communities of origin. In their new places of residence, there were numerous bureaucratic obstacles to recovering these services even though they were mandated by law. This problem was addressed in the 1999, 2001 and 2002 planning documents of the *Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social*, each time with more specific instructions for including services to the internally displaced persons in ministerial budgets.

- *Durable Solutions*: Neither international nor national programmes had been able to contribute in a meaningful way to creating durable solutions for the victims of displacement. Resettlement projects were few in number and rarely successful. No government guaranteed their security of returning groups, there was no regular monitoring of conditions in places of return, and very few programmes were in place to facilitate economic reintegration.

The system overall was weakened by the tension between its centralised management and decentralised operation. While the *Red de Solidaridad Social* operated with a centralised decision making apparatus from Bogotá, the actual execution of the programmes was decentralised at the municipal and departmental levels. Services were made available to the internally displaced persons by actions taken within the several ministries and state corporations, which the *Red de Solidaridad Social* merely coordinated. The latter did not have authority over ministries or corporations, and could not require actions on their part. Programmes for the internally displaced persons came about through the actions of municipal and departmental technical committees and working groups that included all relevant participants of government, civil society and representatives of the displaced; but the *Red de Solidaridad Social* could neither oblige these administrations to meet nor direct their actions.

A Defective System

The Colombian mechanisms for assisting and protecting the internally displaced persons did not work as intended, and the respective parts of the system did not fulfil the roles and responsibilities they were assigned. The obstacles were largely institutional and financial, but the problems were exacerbated by a lack of political will among the key policy actors and the failure to obtain concessions from the armed groups regarding humanising their methods of warfare.

When asked about the poor performance of the system for assisting and protecting the internally displaced persons, each respondent knew where to place the blame. The IDP leaders blamed the government and all its institutions for failing to meet their needs. Officials in the *Red de Solidaridad Social* blamed municipal and departmental authorities for refusing to create projects on behalf of the internally displaced persons living in their areas. Municipal authorities blamed government ministries and corporations for failing to make available the funds needed to provide education and health care and to resolve housing problems. International agencies complained that the government was weak. The government complained that the international community should have a stronger presence, implement a more coherent programme, and contribute more to assistance. The advocacy community acknowledged all the above but cited an absence of political will as the major obstacle to achieving more.

The institutional and financial issues were closely related. The rights guaranteed to internally displaced persons in Law 387 depended on the ability of hospitals to afford medical attention, schools to accept significantly more students, urban services to be extended to encompass areas previously marginal to the cities involved, and so on. A key problem lay in the bottlenecks and tensions in Colombian system of resource allocation generally and particularly in relation to the displaced population.

The fact that the national ministries and corporations had policy mandates to provide funding for the internally displaced persons, and that the law and the National Planning Department affirmed the IDPs' rights to services, did not mean that the internally displaced persons actually received services. The national government determined the overall budget, which was allocated to departments, and from departments to municipalities, on the bases of availability and population. Delivery of social services in Colombia was decentralised, so each department and/or municipality paid for services from these previously budgeted resources. A departmental or municipal budget might be increased if the population grew, but the additional resources could be allocated only if the municipal and departmental governments included the new population in the planning figures they submitted. In fact, local planners rarely tried to accommodate newly arriving migrants. More often than not, the internally displaced persons were not counted in planning figures. Even when municipalities did calculate IDPs in their population for budgetary purposes and ask for additional resources, the funds were allocated, if at all, for the following year, by which time the population was likely to have grown even more.

Of particular concerns were the problems of health care and education, both of which should be free and available to the internally displaced persons. There was a national emergency health care fund (*Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía*, FOSYGA), which was earmarked for the victims of disasters (the internally displaced persons were included in that category). Municipal authorities might tap this fund, and a few did so. For the most part the poor in Colombia had access to state subsidised health care under the System of Beneficiary Selection (*Sistema de Identificación y Clasificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios para los Programas Sociales*, SISBEN) which was managed at the municipal level. The internally displaced persons in principle should have access to SISBEN, but in practice, a very sizable majority did not. To enter SISBEN required that the IDP beneficiaries were already registered and recognised as such in the RSS National Registry in Bogotá and that they remained in their place of registration. Thus, IDPs who were not registered, not yet registered, still in the process of registration (this could be a long period), whose names did not appear on local computer print-outs, who moved from place to place, or who for some reason could not register, had to pay for health care. Only in 2002 did the *Ministerio de la Protección Social* finally begin to allocate resources directly to departments and districts to pay for health services to IDPs lacking coverage. Further complicating the SISBEN mechanism, however, was the fact that it was not applied uniformly throughout the country, and each municipality could impose somewhat different regulations.¹³

Similarly, the internally displaced persons had the right to primary education free of charge. In practice, the IDP informants nearly all denied that their children were receiving it, a fact confirmed in numerous national and international organisational reports.¹⁴ Although the local schools were not charging for tuition, parents had to purchase uniforms, buy school supplies and pay other bureaucratic costs that proved prohibitive for many. Nor were there sufficient schools or teachers in rapidly growing urban settlements.

¹³ A.F. Juan, 'Salud, poblaciones involucradas en procesos de desplazamiento y políticas sociales,' in R. Vidal López [et al.], *Atención a los desplazados: experiencias institucionales en Colombia* (Bogotá, 2001): pp. 121-138.

¹⁴ For example, the UN World Food Programme recognised that its school lunch programme was missing the majority of the most needy children who did not attend school. Hence, the agency had to find other ways of reaching them.

As mentioned above, the *Red de Solidaridad Social* was mandated to coordinate the programmes and projects on behalf of the IDPs, for instance, housing, micro credits, agricultural projects, but had no authority to require either national or local agencies to create programmes and projects. With a minimum budget of its own, the RSS channelled funding for such purposes from the ministries and corporations only if a municipality presented a project request. If the municipal and departmental leaders did not submit requests, they received no funding, and could accurately claim that they could not pay for the additional services that IDPs required. As for the national ministries and corporations, not until 2002, the government committed specific funds for IDP housing through INURBE, land through INCORA and for employment through the Social Support Network.

The *Red de Solidaridad Social* was supposed to work with multi-sector local committees and working groups to design projects that incorporated the internally displaced persons and addressed their problems. The projects then were to be combined into a department-wide integration plan. There was some justification to the RSS assertion that its poor record in achieving stabilisation for the internally displaced was due to the lack of cooperation from the local governments that were supposed to request and implement the projects. But, it was not the only reason. Another cause of its poor performance was that the RSS was minimally staffed. In one RSS facility an officer, charged with oversight for the stabilisation components of RSS programmes, confessed that he spent nearly all his time reading hundreds of applications for emergency assistance and barely had time to think about projects of longer duration. He had been involved in establishing two productive projects, but had never visited either of them. He was one of only ten employees for a large urban area.¹⁵ A third reason was the centralisation and consequent inflexibility of the *Red de Solidaridad Social*. All resources and nearly all decision were made at the national level, while the actual work and the RSS partners were all at the local level. Local level activities and many well-intentioned RSS employees cynically concluded that any initiative on their part would be negatively rewarded with lengthy systemic bureaucratic hurdles.

¹⁵ .F. Juan, 'Salud, poblaciones involucradas en procesos de desplazamiento y políticas sociales,' p. 130.

Municipal and departmental authorities lacked motivation to productively incorporate the IDPs under their jurisdiction. They feared that any determination to incorporate IDPs in the social and economic fabric of a community would attract even more arrivals. A second important impediment was the weaknesses of municipal institutions. Finance, health, education, and planning officials often lacked the technical experience needed to work their respective national bureaucracies and obtain needed resources. A third problem lay in the persistent notion that the problems faced by IDPs could be solved with the mechanisms and institutional vehicles in place for assisting Colombian poor. However, since the IDPs were so numerous and often lacked fixed addresses, property, identity documents, and even minimum sources of income, they were unable to meet the requirements that a non-forced migrants but poor would have an access to the services they required, for example, social services, credit lines, health and housing subsidies.

Government Efforts to Improve the System

The impressive networks of Colombian human rights and legal institutions had repeatedly sanctioned the state for failing to fulfil its obligations toward displaced persons. The combined judicial actions and the multiple decisions of the court promoted a government review of procedures and some important steps towards improving them. The presidential statements and planning documents issued during the last years of the Pastrana administration, especially Presidential Directive Number 6 of 2001, were in many ways the direct outcome of literally hundreds of IDP-related judicial actions. There was a stream of presidential decrees and legislation aimed at the government agencies responsible for health, land, personal identity documents, education and housing.

- In the area of international cooperation, the *Red de Solidaridad Social* and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees established a Joint Technical Unit (*Unidad Técnica Conjunta*, UTC) in 1999 intended to give technical support to the design and execution of RSS operations. This support covered emergency humanitarian assistance, juridical developments, monitoring and evaluation. The UTC advised with regard to return movements, resettlement projects and the channelling of international assistance.

The UNHCR and the RSS also signed agreements of cooperation with Venezuela, Panama and Ecuador regarding displacement and fights across the borders.¹⁶

- In August 2000, the Constitutional Court issued an important sentence on forced displacement.¹⁷ The sentence brought together the twenty decisions related to displacement that the Court had issued since 1994. The Court declared forced displacement to be a social phenomenon which resulted in multiple, massive and continued infringement on the fundamental rights of those Colombians who were obliged to migrate internally. Noting the weakness of the state in confronting internal displacement, the government was urged to promote greater international assistance and to follow international recommendations with regard to internal displacement. In particular, the Court asked that the Guiding Principles be taken into account in the state's rules and regulations on displacement. The Court declared that any type of discrimination based on a person's status as an internally displaced person was in violation of constitutional rights. The sentence concluded that the President should develop whatever activities might be required in order to determine, according to the existing resources and possibilities, the rights of persons displaced by violence and to ensure that the various public agencies assume their obligations and responsibilities towards displaced persons.

- In December 2000, the government issued Decree 2569, the purpose of which was to fully review the implementation of Law 387 of 1997 and the functioning of the *Red de Solidaridad Social*. The result of the Decree was to curtail somewhat the parameters of attention to displaced persons while, at the same time, bringing about a more focused and effective operational system.

- In April 2001, in order to raise Colombian public awareness on the problems of internally forced migrants, a Constitutional Court decision placed the Guiding Principles on the same level as the Colombian Constitution.

- In May 2001, as a result of the Constitutional Court Sentence of August 2000, CONPES issued a document that defined the responsibilities of the state sectors to allocate resources for internally displaced persons so as to comply with the prior 1999 National Plan for the Integral Attention to the Displaced Population by Violence.

¹⁶ Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social, contained in Decree 3057 of 1999.

¹⁷ Sentencia: SU-1150 of August 2000

- In November 2001, Presidential Directive Number 6, reiterated the previous decisions, ordering compliance by the mandated authorities of the state. The Ministry of Interior was to act to prevent displacement; the Ministry of Health to provide prompt and adequate care; the Ministry of Education to deliver special educational programmes to the forced migrants; the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, through the Land Reform Institute, to register the abandoned properties of the IDPs and to establish micro-credits and programmes for their economic stability; and the Ministry of Development to take the lead in projects and programmes for resettlement. The Armed Forces were ordered to assist IDPs in all the above fields, to guarantee their safety, security and protection, and to adopt measures to protect those who assisted and cared for the forced migrants.

APPENDIX 11

Self-criticisms

According to the questions that the examiners have raised during the viva examination, I would like to clarify what I have done and learnt from my research process and if I were to begin the thesis again, what I should do.

1. How I distinguished between forced and voluntary migrants in my survey?

Although it was very difficult to separate economic migration from migration due to political violence, the survey instrument was designed to gather data that could be used to differentiate movements by those who never faced a violent event from those who did. Specifically I collected detailed data on the reasons for migration to distinguish forced migrants from non-forced migrants and asked about exposure to violent events.

The Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS) contains 12 schedules (see **Table A**). The purpose of Schedule D was to collect migration histories from the household head and spouse. In this schedule an open-ended question on causes of migration was included. Schedule E sought to link the migration histories reported in Schedule D to violent events experienced in each place of residence. The phrasing of this schedule was designed according to the definition of internally displaced persons given by the United Nations. It also considered different levels of exposure to violence due to armed conflict: the self, the family and the extended social group. I linked information from Schedules D and E to analyse the reported causes of migration with their exposure to violence. Out of 603 households, 15 percent consisted of forced migrants according to criteria derived from Schedule E, and only 17 percent of displaced households said in Schedule D that they migrated for causes other than violence due to armed conflict.

Table A: Description of the Schedules of the Household Questionnaire for the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS)

Schedule	Description	Unit of Observation
Introduction	<i>The ethical protocol on confidentiality and anonymity of the information provided.</i>	
Schedule A	<i>Household roster.</i> Inquires about persons living in the dwelling and the living children of the household head who did not live in it by 2002. The relevant variables in this schedule are: relation to the head, sex, age, place of birth, civil status, education, occupation and participation in household expenditures	Household members and non-member children
Schedule B	<i>Head's union, marriage and birth retrospective history.</i> This schedule is divided in two. Schedule B-1 contains information on unions, marriages and the number of children ever born per union or marriage of the household head. Schedule B-2 asks details about reported death children.	Unions or marriages and death children
Schedule C	<i>Migratory experience of the family of origin of the household head.</i> This schedule inquires about the migratory experience of parents and siblings of the household head. If any member of the family of origin had died, the schedule collects information on age at death, year deceased and, in broad categories, cause of death.	Household head's parents and siblings
Schedule D	<i>Retrospective labour and migration histories of household head and spouse.</i> The labour and migration histories began with the year of birth and finished at the end of 2002. This schedule contains the open questions on the causes of migration and family members left behind in each experience.	Migration or/and labour experiences
Schedule E	<i>Retrospective history of forced migration.</i> This schedule contains information about violent events associated with each of the places of residence. Questions about violent events associated with the head, his/her properties, his/her family, his/her neighbours, and if the perpetrators were actors of the Colombian armed conflict or delinquents.	Migration or/and labour experiences
Schedule F	<i>Household head's retrospective land ownership history.</i> This schedule contains information about year and sources for the acquisition, year and cause for selling, size and location.	Plots

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008)

Table A: Description of the Schedules of the Household Questionnaire for the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS) (continued)

Schedule	Description	Unit of Observation
Schedule G	<i>Household head's retrospective real estate ownership history.</i> This schedule contains information about the year and sources for the acquisition, year and cause of selling, its size, location and type of property.	Real estate
Schedule H	<i>Dwelling characteristics.</i> This schedule contains information on the residence in Bogotá, the residence they inhabited the longest after leaving the parental home and, if applicable, the residence from where they were forced to migrate. Information about construction materials and size of the dwelling are included.	Household
Schedule I	<i>Access to public infrastructure and consumption of durable goods.</i> As in Schedule H, this schedule contains information of the places of residence at three points in time. It contains questions about access and availability of sewerage, running water and electricity, type of household tenancy and consumption of 11 durable goods.	Household
Schedule J	<i>Access to public services and household head's perceptions.</i> As in Schedules H and I, this schedule contains information about the places of residence at three points in time. Its purpose is to observe availability and access of education and health care public services of the selected population. In addition, questions about household head self-assessment of his/her well-being, health and economic situation were asked.	Household and household head
Schedule K	<i>Earnings and other income.</i> This schedule collects information about earnings, working hours and other income (cash or in-kind) received.	Household head
Schedule L	<i>Return intentions.</i> This schedule contains questions about household heads' intentions to return, where he/she would like to go and when.	Household head


Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008)

Given the vast array of reasons for migrating and migration trajectories over time, I distinguished groups of migrant households by the migration experience of the household head. **Figure A** below contains a diagram to explain this typology. First, I divided migrants according to their migration experience starting in the year they left the parental home, either because they got their first job and moved out, married or began cohabiting, or, as they frequently answered, wanted 'to be independent'. The first classification was according to the geographical pattern of their migration experience. If they migrated from any department to Bogotá after leaving the parental home they were classified as internal migrants. If they were living in Bogotá and had been moving within the city after they left the parental home, then they were considered as non-internal migrants. Their places of birth were not considered in this classification.

The group without internal migration experience was further divided in two according to the place of residence they had lived the longest. If the place they had lived the longest was the same place in Bogotá at the end of 2002, then they were classified as non-migrants. If the longest place of residence differed from the place of residence in Bogotá at end of 2002 then they were catalogued as intra-urban migrants.

Internal migrant households were further distinguished by the migration experience of the household head in two groups: voluntary migrants and forced migrants. A household was considered to be a forced migrant household if at any point after leaving his/her parental home, the household head left his/her usual place of residence because his/her life, physical integrity or freedom was threatened by an actor in the armed conflict. In this second level classification I considered both geography of migration and the causal mechanism. According to this typology households were classified in four main categories: non-migrants, intra-urban migrants, forced migrants and voluntary migrants.

Figure A: Migrant Typology



2. How time in the city affected the ways in which migrants adapted and whether time healed?

The issue of the cumulative effects of time in the city was another point that had to be considered when analysed how forced migrants adapted themselves into the city. If forced migrants had arrived at the city just before the time of data collecting, then their disadvantage in the labour market might be explained by the lack of time to adapt to new conditions.

I conducted the model which took into account the time-period since arrival at Soacha of forced migrants and voluntary migrants, using micro-data from the Experimental Census of Soacha, Cundinamarca. I classified the population of Soacha in three groups according to their migration experience: forced migrants, voluntary migrants and non-migrants. Forced migrants included all those who had been forced to leave their usual place of residence as a consequence of armed conflict, e.g., confrontations, personal attacks, family threats and general insecurity. Voluntary migrants were those who were not living in the municipality in 1998 (5 years before the census was collected) but were never forced to leave their usual place of residence. Non-migrants were those who were living in Soacha before 1998 and had never been forced to leave their usual place of residence.

This variable was estimated subtracting from the year of the census (2003) the reported year of arrival to the municipality. The model is as follow¹:

$$\log\left(\frac{P_i}{1-P_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{iP} + \beta_2 X_{iH} + \beta_3 M_i * T_i$$

where:

T_i = Vector of variables measuring time since arrival at the municipality of Soacha

¹ The specification of the model was reviewed several times. I estimated the model using each year for a total of 20 years as a dichotomous variable to see if there were any nonlinearities. In this model I appreciated that the effect of time was in general uniform; however the estimated coefficients were not very robust given the number of observations per year for the forced migration population. In a second step I grouped time in 5 year periods. The resulting model was not robust. Finally I tried to include time since arrival as a continuous variable and the specification with the best measures of goodness of fit are presented in **Table B**.

Table B: Binary Logistic Regression Estimates of the Probability of Being Employed One Week before Census Collection in Soacha (2003)

Variable	Model I		Model II			
	Estimate	Std. Error	Estimate	Std. Error		
N	84,288		77,557			
Personal Characteristics						
Male	0.95	***	0.06	0.98	***	0.07
Age	0.09	***	0.01	0.08	***	0.00
Age squared	0.00	***	0.00	0.00	***	0.00
Civil Status						
Single, separated or divorced (Ref)						
Widowed	-0.29	***	0.03	-0.31	***	0.03
Married or in consensual union	-0.37	***	0.03	-0.41	***	0.03
Education						
None or less than primary (Ref)						
Completed primary	0.17	***	0.03	0.12	***	0.03
Completed middle school	0.22	***	0.05	0.17	***	0.05
More than completed middle school	0.47	***	0.04	0.41	***	0.04
Household Characteristics						
Single-headed household (Ref)						
Household with spouse present	0.19	***	0.05	0.19	***	0.05
Spouse employed	0.37	***	0.03	0.37	***	0.03
Other household member(s) employed	0.17	***	0.03	0.14	***	0.03
Socioeconomic index	0.58	***	0.04	0.59	***	0.05
Presence of minors under age 14	0.18	***	0.02	0.15	***	0.02
Migration Experience						
Non-migrant	-0.20	***	0.03			
Forced migrant	-0.49	***	0.02	-0.81	***	0.03
Voluntary migrant (Ref)	—		—	—		—
Duration since arrival at Soacha						
Years				0.00	+	0.00
Squared years				0.00	***	0.00
Duration* Forced Migrant						
Years				0.05	***	0.01
Squared years				-0.01	**	0.00
Goodness of fit statistics						
LR $\hat{\sigma}^2(15)$			15,576.40			14,336.90

Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)


The coefficient estimates for this model are presented in the last columns of **Table B**. The coefficients for years since arrival for the forced migrant population and the voluntary migrant population suggested diverging trajectories over time.² **Figure B** below shows the estimated probabilities of employment for hypothetical non-migrant, voluntary migrant and forced migrant males who are aged 20 at the beginning of the period, who will live until age 40, and will experience changing probabilities based on the experiences of the people living in Soacha.³ The probability of employment increased over time slightly more for voluntary migrants and for non-migrants, but in both cases was positively related with time. The probability of employment for forced migrants decreased over time almost constantly. Although the Colombian armed conflict had caused the displacement of much of population since the mid-1940s, displacement caused by the armed conflict was not as frequent and generalised throughout the country until 1990-2002. Therefore, the estimations presented here were based on the experiences of the forced migrant population in Soacha.⁴

² In the regression I included only those who had migration experience. The coefficients for the variables measuring duration are the coefficients for the reference category: voluntary migration household heads. The coefficients for the interaction terms for the forced migrants provided the magnitude of the difference in the probability of employment at different lengths of stay in the city.

³ The hypothetical male was aged 20 at the beginning of the trajectory, married, living with an unemployed spouse, with completed middle school, other household members were unemployed, socioeconomic index of one (near to mean).

⁴ As shown in **Chapter 4**, almost two-thirds of the forced migrant population arrived after 1997.


Figure B: Predicted Probabilities of Employment for Males (Binary Logit)



Source: DANE, *Experimental Census of Soacha*, 2003 (own calculations)

The assumption of that forced migrants were disadvantaged in the labour market could be explained by lack of time to adapt to new conditions, was not supported by my findings in Soacha. The problem facing forced migrants was the low probabilities of formal employment they registered and their inability to catch up with the voluntary and non-migrant groups. Their relative disadvantage in the labour market was partially explained by their low levels of education relative to the levels of education of non-migrants. **Figure C** below reviews time trends for urban and rural areas in Colombia and in Bogotá for the period 1985-2000, and shows that the gap in basic education between rural and urban areas had remained almost constant, although since 1998 there was a decline of the illiteracy rate in rural areas but a slight increase in Bogotá. The gap in the literacy rate between Bogotá and rural areas was on average 17.7 percent higher in rural areas for the period 1985-2000.

Figure C: Illiteracy Rate for Bogotá, Urban and Rural Areas in Colombia (1985-2000)



Source: National Department of Planning, SISD 2.0

However, other factors were playing an important role in restricting the access of forced migrants to the urban labour markets. I argue that lack of credentials, difficulties in transferring their skills in areas different than agriculture and unmeasured motivations could explain their relative disadvantage. Voluntary migrants were more likely to be selected for ambition and drive. Moreover, the timing of forced migrants' displacement might be correlated with times of economic difficulties at the macro level that increased competition in the labour market and made their adaptation more difficult.⁵ The Colombian economic slowdown of the late 1990s increased levels of unemployment and decreased the opportunity of the forced migrants to enter the labour market.

In addition to all the reasons mentioned, there could be a certain degree of discrimination towards internally displaced persons which explained in part their lack of employment opportunities in the labour market. This form of discrimination was probably related to the fact that forced migrants brought security problems to the host

⁵ P. Collier [et al.], *Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy* (Washington, DC, 2003): pp. 13-19 and K. Kumar, 'The nature and focus of international assistance for rebuilding war-torn societies,' in K. Kumar (ed.) *Rebuilding societies after civil war: critical roles for international assistance* (Boulder, CO, 1996): pp. 1-38.

area from the regions they fled.⁶ The perceptions of employers about the political and criminal environment led them to be less willing to hire an internally displaced person than a voluntary migrant or a native, both in order to avoid difficulties in the future and avoid the costs of training personal.

There were two types of strategies of migration: coping strategies and accumulative strategies.⁷ I argue that forced migrants were typically precluded from the accumulative strategies that involved increases in well-being over time and focused instead on a coping strategy that guaranteed survival, but not accumulation of wealth. The result over time was increasing inequality and decreasing access to a labour market at destination between those who implemented an accumulative strategy and those who survived under a coping strategy. The forced migrants were to be more likely to remain in poverty because they were vulnerable to external shocks.

Migration was a process that involved change, negotiation and resistance.⁸ When comparing voluntary and forced migrants, their agency and negotiation abilities were likely to differ. These differences in behaviour at the place of destination translated into a differential change of socioeconomic status for both groups. While voluntary migrants were more successful in the labour market, forced migrants might be more successful in negotiating provisions with NGOs, international agencies and governmental agencies. Forced migrants were entitled to benefits and provisions to which other migrants or non-migrants did not have access. Under Law 387 of 1997, which was widely debated in Colombia, the authorities were required to provide internally displaced persons with humanitarian assistance, access to schools and health care services, and resettlement assistance. Although assistance programmes were available for the forced migrants, however, these did not provide a sustained source of income or provision over time. Thus time in the city had some healing consequences for migrants successfully implementing an accumulative strategy, but a process of healing was observed less frequently among those who could not move beyond a coping strategy.

⁶ K. Jacobsen, 'Local integration: the forgotten solution,' Migration Policy Institute Working Paper (Washington, DC, 2003).

⁷ P. Deshingkar and D. Start, 'Seasonal migration for livelihoods in India: coping, accumulation and exclusion,' Working Paper No. 220 (London, 2003): pp. 17-28.

⁸ C. Waddington, 'Livelihood outcomes of migration for poor people,' Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty Working Paper No. T1 (Brighton, 2003): p. 7.

3. Why did I ask interviewees only about their experiences between 1990 and 2002? Did interviewees have difficulty remembering their circumstances such a relatively long time ago? Did I have to eliminate many migrant households who arrived after 2002? Did I lose unnecessarily potentially interesting data for the period of 2002-2008?

I asked interviewees only about their experiences between 1990 and 2002 because I wanted my research to focus on the years 1990 and 2002 so as to match the time frame of my research on urban violence in Bogotá which I had already finished. If I conducted the research asking them their experiences after 2002, I also had to expand my research on urban violence to match the new time frame, which I could not do at that time (in 2008) because of the schedule of study which I had to submit the thesis in 2009 and resource limitations (in 2008 I had no longer receive the scholarship from the Royal Thai government). If I were to begin my thesis again now (in 2011) and had time permission and financial support to conduct the research again, I, of course, would like to extend the period of study of both internally forced migrants and urban violence to 2010. The dimensions of Colombian violence changed dramatically often in positive ways during the two-terms of office of President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), when the conditions of urban violence and internally forced migrants improved considerably. It would be interesting and useful to investigate and compare the situations of 1990-2002 and 2002-2010.

The interviewees did not have serious difficulty in remembering their circumstances in 1990-2002 when I conducted my research in 2008. The rejection rate which included the families that did not want to participate and families that could not recount their memories was only 5.47 percent (41 of 750 households). Moreover, given that the questionnaire was mainly based on the experience of the household head, the interviewers asked first to interview the household head. If it was impossible, then they were asked to interview the spouse and, finally, any member of the family who was older than 15 years by 2002 and who could answer detailed questions about the migration and working experience of the household head and spouse. Interviewers did in many cases make more than one visit in order to interview the household head or the spouse and to avoid encountering a proxy respondent.

I did not record the exact numbers of households who arrived after 2002 because interviewers were asked to interview only the households that occupying the sites before that year. The questionnaires that I received back had only few reports that indicated their arrival after 2002.

4. What was the process of interviewing by the team of Colombian interviewers?

The team of interviewers was composed of 5 members: two economists who were my colleagues when I was a visiting scholar at *Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos* (CERAC), a community child care provider familiar with these neighbourhoods, an experienced household interviewer and myself. The fieldwork team composed by persons of diverse backgrounds and points of view enhanced the quality of the data collected.

Accurate application of the measurement instrument required a very good understanding of the objectives of the study, the logic behind each schedule, and the way the schedules were linked. Since the interviewers were given the flexibility of changing question wording and interview order, a good management of the instrument was necessary in order to minimise inconsistent or missing data that would require a second visit to a household. Given the focus of the study, forced migration in a country with a long history of civil unrest, and its location in poor areas of the city, it was very important for the interviewers to build rapport with respondents in order to obtain reliable information on traumatic or disturbing episodes that were difficult and stressful to remember and which therefore tended to be hidden.

Given the diverse backgrounds of the interviewers, I prepared training sessions in five parts. The first part covered the objective of the study, its importance and the outcomes expected from the data collected. The second part covered the interviewer's manual and explained each of the tables and variables on the questionnaire, giving examples of how to ask the questions. At the end of this session the interviewers were given a hypothetical respondent and asked to fill out the questionnaire. They were also asked to practice by interviewing persons in their social networks before their first visit to the field.

The third and fourth parts of training were covered in a second session. The third part explained the design of the sample frame and the sampling strategy and the fourth part outlined how the fieldwork was going to be organised, describing the responsibilities of the supervisor and the interviewers and explaining how to fill daily and final reports requested for each site. During the third day we visited the first selected site to pre-test the measurement instrument with three families. After evaluating the interviews, I made corrections to the questionnaire, mostly replacing terms that were part of Colombian slang and local variations of Spanish language.

During the days of interviewing, I was always waiting in a visible and fixed location so that the reports of the interviewers and the completed questionnaires could be immediately reviewed for inconsistencies. When necessary, the interviewer was asked to clarify information or to go back to the selected household.

The process of interviewing by the team of Colombian interviewers ran effectively without any significant complexity. I concluded that the completeness of the data collected was high and therefore its use in the analysis was adequate.

5. Why did I analyse the statistical data for the whole household rather than breaking down the results into sub-groups according to the issue concerned? For example, should I have considered employment in the city only for those who had migrated rather than recording the employment for everyone in the migrant household? For education, should I not have analysed the results only for the children, not for the whole household?

The primary sampling unit was the household, and for this reason I started the description of the data at the household level. The questionnaire was designed to collect data at 3 levels: household ($n = 603$), persons ($n = 3,127$) and person-year ($n = 43,335$).⁹

I argue that the experience of the household head, usually the father or the mother or the person who was in charge of the household, determined the circumstances and environment in which the other members of the household lived. For this reason, I classified the household into four categories: non-migrants, intra-urban migrants, voluntary migrants and forced migrants (also called internally displaced persons) based on the experience of the household head. All members belonged to a migration category not depending on their personal migration experience, but the migration experience of

⁹ The questionnaire asked for information of the household members and all the live children of the household head whether they were household members or living separated. When I analysed I only considered the household members ($n = 2,745$) and not all persons ($n = 3,127$).

the household head. However, the information on socio-demographic was divided into sub-groups according to the issue concerned. I used individual information of household members, not only of household heads, to analyse while classifying them into a migration category that depended on the migration experience of the household head.

The analysis of education is divided in two parts, first the population of school age (ages 5 to 19) and second the population 20 years old and over. **Table C** shows the percentage distribution of the population aged 5-19 by level of education, migrant status group and sex. The data revealed no differences in the level of education for males among non-migrants, intra-urban migrants and the voluntary migrants. However, for females, those belonging to voluntary migrant households had less education than those in non-migrant households, and those residing in internally displaced household showed the lowest levels of education of all. Thus the young population did not show any difference by migrant category, but it did by gender. Given the exposure of young people to the education system in Bogotá, and policies promoting education coverage for the poor and particularly for IDPs, there were no evident differences in the distribution of education by migrant status among males. The fact that there were some differences for females might reveal cultural preference for males, particularly in the internal migrant groups.

I argue that the internally displaced population was less educated than the non-migrant population because they came from places where higher education had seldom been available and secondary education was rare and of poor quality. **Table D** indicates the percentage distribution by level of education, migration group and sex for the population aged 20 and over by 2002. In general the level of education of the people living in poor peri-urban areas was below the average education for the city's population. Among the adult population in the sample the mean observation of education stood at 3.17 years, ranging from 2.51 for female forced migrants to 4.26 for female non-migrants. The level of education was different if I considered only the distribution by migrant groups. Forced internal migrants seemed to be the most disadvantaged. However, when gender was included the differences in the distributions were seen to arise from the relatively higher levels of education achieved by non-migrant females in comparison to the other migrant groups. According to the figures, forced internal female migrants were the least educated group.

By comparing the distribution of voluntary migrants and forced migrants it was appreciated that forced migrants were less educated than voluntary migrants. A statistical test at 95 percent confidence level confirmed significant differences in the distribution of education level among both males and females between voluntary and forced migrant households, suggesting a positive selection among voluntary migrants but not among the internally displaced population.

Table C: Level of Education of the Population between Ages 5 and 19 in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head

Age group and Sex	Non-Migrant (Ref)	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Less than completed primary	57.55%	56.41%	59.65%	69.68%
Males	27.33%	29.49%	30.26%	36.70%
Females	30.22%	26.92%	29.39%	32.98%
Less than completed high school	36.69%	38.46%	37.72%	28.19%
Males	17.99%	19.96%	18.42%	14.89%
Females	18.70%	18.50%	19.30%	13.30%
More than completed high school	5.76%	5.13%	2.63%	2.13%
Males	1.44%	2.20%	1.32%	1.07%
Females	4.32%	2.93%	1.31%	1.06%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Males	46.76%	51.65%	50.00%	52.66%
Females	53.24%	48.35%	50.00%	47.34%
Chi Square Test ^a				
Males				
Chi Square	—	1.36	0.24	5.17
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.51	0.89	0.08
N	65	282	114	99
Females				
Chi Square	—	2.15	4.69	7.64
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.34	0.10	0.02
N	74	264	114	89

^a Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of migration groups by education level taking as the reference category the distribution of non-migrant population.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Table D: Level of Education of the Population 20 Years Old and Over in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head

Age group and Sex	Non-Migrant (Ref)	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Less than completed primary	63.64%	65.03%	66.33%	76.10%
Males	35.83%	35.10%	31.65%	40.24%
Females	27.81%	29.93%	34.68%	35.86%
Less than completed high school	29.94%	30.07%	31.31%	21.91%
Males	14.97%	15.50%	14.81%	11.55%
Females	14.97%	14.57%	16.50%	10.36%
More than completed high school	6.42%	4.90%	2.36%	1.99%
Males	1.61%	2.65%	1.01%	1.20%
Females	4.81%	2.25%	1.35%	0.79%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Males	52.41%	53.25%	47.47%	52.99%
Females	47.59%	46.75%	52.53%	47.01%
Chi Square Test ^a				
Males				
Chi Square	—	5.21	0.80	3.53
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.07	0.67	0.17
N	98	402	141	133
Females				
Chi Square	—	11.69	10.33	18.03
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00	0.01	0.00
N	89	353	156	118

^a Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of migration groups by education level taking as the reference category the distribution of non-migrant population.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

Apart from education, one further relevant variable for evaluate the characteristics of different migration groups and their relative success in the urban labour market was their employment status and occupation. **Table E** below reports the occupation of household members of 15 years and over by 2002 by migration group and sex. The percentages of homemaker and personal services employees were the highest for the forced migrants and the percentage of professional was the lowest for this group. The percentage of unemployed for forced migrants was the highest compared to other groups. Non-migrants reported the highest employment in occupations that were likely to be in the formal labour market.

Voluntary migrants were less likely to be unemployed, with only 3 percent reported being in this status. The percentage distribution of male internal voluntary migrants was more similar to the non-migrants and to the intra-urban migrants than the distribution by occupation of the forced internal migrants. The largest difference for the internal voluntary migrants in relation to the other non-migrant group was that there were more likely to be employed in the informal sector, e.g., personal services, and less in occupations linked to the formal market, e.g., professionals or workers other than construction workers.

If we compared the occupation distribution of the internal voluntary and forced migrants, we noticed that forced migrants were more likely to be unemployed and more likely to be employed in the informal sector. Although I did not have any specific indicator on informality in the labour market, the occupations reported and the classification I used provided some information about the formality or informality in the employments of the population living in poor areas by migration experience.

Table E: Occupation of the Population 15 Years Old and Over in Selected Areas in the Peri-Urban Area of Bogotá by Migration Experiences of Household Head

Age group and Sex	Non-Migrant (Ref)	Intra-Urban Migrant	Voluntary Migrant	Forced Migrant
Homemaker	18.18%	20.02%	22.39%	30.40%
Males	0.57%	0.74%	0.60%	4.41%
Females	17.61%	19.28%	21.79%	25.99%
Out of Labour Force	13.63%	11.74%	13.43%	9.69%
Males	5.68%	6.55%	6.56%	4.84%
Females	7.95%	5.19%	6.87%	4.85%
Professional	3.41%	1.85%	1.49%	1.32%
Males	0.57%	0.74%	0.90%	0.44%
Females	2.84%	1.11%	0.59%	0.88%
Worker	17.05%	17.80%	15.23%	11.45%
Males	13.64%	13.23%	10.75%	10.57%
Females	3.41%	4.57%	4.48%	0.88%
Construction Worker	10.80%	8.90%	11.04%	5.29%
Males	10.80%	8.90%	11.04%	5.29%
Administrative and Commercial Employee	9.66%	5.70%	7.46%	3.96%
Males	5.11%	2.48%	4.18%	2.20%
Females	4.55%	3.22%	3.28%	1.76%
Personal Services Employee	13.07%	22.25%	19.41%	17.62%
Males	5.11%	12.48%	12.84%	13.22%
Females	7.96%	9.77%	6.57%	4.40%
Domestic Servants	8.52%	6.80%	6.57%	6.17%
Females	8.52%	6.80%	6.57%	6.17%
Unemployed	5.68%	4.94%	2.98%	14.10%
Males	5.11%	3.21%	1.79%	8.81%
Females	0.57%	1.73%	1.19%	5.29%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Males	46.59%	48.33%	48.66%	49.78%
Females	53.41%	51.67%	51.34%	50.22%
Chi Square Test ^a				
Males				
Chi Square	—	102.99	47.60	98.79
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	82	391	163	113
Females				
Chi Square	—	50.66	17.09	124.39
Pr < Chi Square	—	0.00	0.02	0.00
N	94	418	172	114

^a Chi Square test for the difference in distributions of migration groups by occupation taking as the reference category the distribution of non-migrant population.

Source: Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (2008) (own calculations)

6. Why did I not use CODHES figures? How are CODHES figures different from official figures?

The question of how many Colombians had been forcibly displaced was much debated. The fact that agencies tracking displacement failed to agree was not a reflection upon the demographic professionalism of the various researchers. It was due to the differing bases on which the calculations were being made. The state, the Catholic Church, the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the international agencies, had different definitions of who was an internally displaced person. The Colombian government's *Red de Solidaridad Social* (RSS) recorded only those displaced by violence who had been officially registered. The Catholic Church's Human Mobility Section of the Colombian Episcopal Conference counted persons who came to the attention of the parishes; The Consultancy on Human Rights and Displacement (Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento: CODHES), an NGO devoted to tracking displacement and documenting human rights associated with displacement made estimate based on the Catholic Church and NGO sources. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) made its own estimates also based on these same sources. International agencies especially the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) used at times government figures, but more likely relied on CODHES.

These definitions varied according to whether only those whose flight was due to violence were counted, whether only those formally registered with the government were counted, how long ago the migration took place and whether the internally displaced persons chose to identify themselves. Since the government counted only registered internally displaced persons, and only internally displaced persons who could establish that they were fleeing political violence could register, government numbers were always the lowest.

Colombian authorities distinguished between mass displacement and displacement of families. A mass displacement was defined by Decree 2569 (2000) as forced migration that affected at the same time, mode, and place more than 50 persons or 10 households. A displacement of families involved the movement of 10 or fewer households or less than 50 persons.¹⁰ According to the registration system of displaced population by December 2002, there were 1,205,561 officially recognised internally

¹⁰ UNHCR and CODHES, *Compilación sobre desplazamiento forzado: normas doctrina y jurisprudencia nacional e internacional* (Bogotá, 2001): p. 31.

displaced persons.¹¹ Twenty five percent of this population migrated in mass displacements, while 75 percent moved individually or in what was called family displacement.¹² The mass displacement was characterised by an exodus of peasants provoked by confrontations between the military and guerrilla groups. Usually these persons moved to the nearest city; and after the confrontation ended, many returned to their original places of residence.¹³

Family displacement was characterised by the migration of paramilitary or guerrilla targeted families, or families fleeing their communities for fear of future confrontations. Usually these families moved by stages to distant locations, and often chose cities as destinations. In the first stage, displaced persons moved to nearby villages where they had family ties. Lack of resources, employment opportunities, assistance and absorptive capacity at the local or municipal level then offered them incentives to move to the capital of the department and later to Bogotá. Big cities were the last stage of their itinerary.¹⁴

The goal of my research was to collect comparable data that described how the experience of internally displaced persons differed from the experience of urban non-migrants and non-forced migrants during 1990-2002. The Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey (IDPBS) was based on a series of household questionnaires that followed a semi-structured format to provide the interviewers with the flexibility to build rapport and conduct an unobtrusive and non-threatening interview, which was essential to collecting sensitive information from forced migrants. The questionnaire was designed to obtain identical and comparable information for each person in a selected household. However, the wording and the timing of the questions were not fixed. I did not use the CODHES figures because they did not provide information on non-migrants and non-forced migrants. Therefore, the Internally Displaced Persons in Bogotá Survey, which combined techniques of ethnographic fieldwork and representative survey sampling together with qualitative as well as quantitative data was suitable for my research.

¹¹ However, CODHES estimated that there were 2,916,118 internally displaced persons in Colombia in 2002.

¹² D. Otero Prada, *Las cifras del conflicto colombiano*, 2nd ed. (Bogotá, 2007): table 7.2, p. 130.

¹³ Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana, *Derechos humanos: desplazados por violencia en Colombia* (Bogotá, 1995): p. 109.

¹⁴ Grupo Temático de Desplazamiento, 'Estado de situación del desplazamiento: enero a diciembre de 2001,' mimeo (Bogotá, 2002): p. 19.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives

Academia Colombiana de Historia, Bogotá

Archivo de Bogotá

Archivo General de la Nación, Bogotá

Newspapers and Magazines

El Colombiano. Medellín: Several Issues.

El Espectador. Bogotá: Several Issues.

El Tiempo. Bogotá: Several Issues.

Revista Cambio. Bogotá: Several Issues.

Revista Cromos. Bogotá: 3 June 1991.

Revista del GAULA. Bogotá: Several Issues.

Revista Dinero. Bogotá: Several Issues.

Revista Foro. Bogotá: Several Issues.

Revista Milenio. México, D.F.: Several Issues.

Revista Semana. Bogotá: Several Issues.

The Daily Telegraph. London: 18 September 1996.

The Financial Times. London: Several Issues.

Official Publications of Governments and Multilateral Agencies

Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá (1998a). *Misión Bogotá*. Bogotá: Imprenta Distrital.

_____ (1998b). *Políticas saludables para la seguridad y la convivencia*. Bogotá: Imprenta Distrital.

Ayres, R.L. (1998). *Crime and violence as development issues in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Bouta, T., Frerks, G. and Bannon, I. (2005). *Gender, conflict, and development*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Buvinic, M., Alda, E. and Lamas, J. (2005). 'Emphasising prevention in citizen security: the Inter-American Development Bank's contribution to reducing violence in Latin America and the Caribbean,' Social Programmes Division, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Washington, DC: IDB.

- Buvinic, M and Morrison, A.R. (1999). 'Controlling violence,' Social Development Division, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Technical Note No. 6. Washington, DC: IDB.
- Buvinic, M., Morrison, A.R., and Shifter, M. (1999). 'Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: a framework for action,' Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Technical Study. Washington, DC: IDB.
- Caramazza, I.F. (1984). *Phenomenology of kidnappings in Sardinia: towards an international perspective of a local crime problem*. Rome: United Nations Social Defence Institute (UNSDI).
- Centro Nacional de Consultoría (2002). 'Encuesta sobre condiciones demográficas, económicas y sociales de la población desplazada,' mimeo. Bogotá: Centro Nacional de Consultoría.
- Colciencias – Policía Nacional – Universidad de los Andes (1998). 'Informe final: programa de lucha contra la corrupción en la Policía Nacional de Colombia,' mimeo. Bogotá: Colciencias.
- Collier, P. [et al.] (2003). *Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Comisión de Estudios sobre la Violencia (1987). *Colombia: violencia y democracia*. Bogotá: Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI) - Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) (2000). *Equidad, desarrollo y ciudadanía*. Santiago: CEPAL.
- Conferencia Episcopal Colombiana (1995). *Derechos humanos: desplazados por violencia en Colombia*. Bogotá: Editorial Kimpres.
- Congreso de Colombia (2001). *Código de Procedimiento Penal*. Bogotá: Congreso de Colombia.
- Corporación Nacional de Turismo (CNT) (1987). *Guía del viajero*. Bogotá: CNT.
- Deas, M. (1998). 'Violence reduction in Colombia: lessons from government policies over the last decade,' mimeo. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá (2004). 'Encuesta calidad de vida 2002 para Bogotá y localidades urbanas,' mimeo. Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá.
- Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) (2000). *Temática cuestionario Pax Christi*. Bogotá: DAS.

- Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) (2003a). *Encuesta de calidad de vida 2002*. Bogotá: DANE.
- _____ (2003b). 'Manual de recolección: Censo Experimental de Soacha,' mimeo. Bogotá: DANE.
- _____ (2008). *Colombia, proyecciones departamentales de población por sexo y edad, 1985-2020*. Bogotá: DANE.
- Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP) (1998). *La paz: el desafío para el desarrollo*. Bogotá: DNP and Tercer Mundo Editores.
- DuBow, F. [et al.] (1979). *Reactions to crime: a critical review of the literature*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.
- Echandía, C. (1999). 'El conflicto armado y las manifestaciones de la violencia en las regiones de Colombia,' Observatorio de Violencia de la Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.
- Fay, M. (ed.) (2005). *The urban poor in Latin America*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Foro Internacional de Gobernabilidad Local (2003). 'Violencia y delincuencia en contextos urbanos: la experiencia de Bogotá en la reducción de la criminalidad 1994-2002,' Documento elaborado para el PNUD. Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor, Secretaría de Gobierno, Subsecretaría para Asuntos de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana.
- Giugale, M.M., Lafourcade, O. and Luff, C. (eds.) (2003). *Colombia: the economic foundation of peace*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Goldsmith, A. (1995). 'Informe al Consejero Presidencial para la Defensa y Seguridad Nacional sobre la reforma en la Policía Nacional colombiana,' mimeo. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.
- Grupo Temático de Desplazamiento (GTD) (2002). 'Estado de situación del desplazamiento: enero a diciembre de 2001,' mimeo. Bogotá: Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados.
- Gutiérrez, J.A., Guzmán, C. and Jiménez, U.J. (2000). 'Algunas consideraciones socioeconómicas en torno a las migraciones en Bogotá, 1995-1999,' Oficina de Estudios Económicos Documento N° 16. Bogotá: Secretaría de Hacienda Distrital.
- Ibáñez, A.M., Moya, A. and Velásquez, A. (2006). 'Hacia una política proactiva para la población desplazada en Colombia,' mimeo. Washington, DC: The United States Agency for International Development.
- Ibáñez, A.M. and Vélez, C.E. (2003). 'Forced displacement in Colombia: causality and welfare losses,' mimeo. Washington, DC: World Bank.

- Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario (INPEC) (1997). 'Número de internos años 1991 a 1997,' mimeo. Bogotá: INPEC.
- _____ (2001). 'Estadística población carcelaria, 1990-2000,' mimeo. Bogotá: INPEC.
- Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (1998). 'Análisis de la magnitud y costos de la violencia en la Ciudad de México,' Working Paper No. 331. Washington, DC: IDB.
- International Labour Organisation (ILO) (1972). *Employment, incomes and inequality: a strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya*. Geneva: ILO.
- International Organisation for Migration (IOM). *Anuario 2003: movimientos migratorios internacionales de Colombia*. Bogotá: IOM.
- Lederman, D., Loayza, N. and Fajnzylber, P. (2001). *Crimen y violencia en América Latina*. Bogotá: Alfaomega S.A. and World Bank.
- Londoño, J.L. and Guerrero, R. (1999). 'Violencia en América Latina: epidemiología y costos,' Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Working Paper No. 375. Washington, DC: IDB.
- Martin, G. (2000). 'Crime and violence in Cali (Colombia): a diagnosis and policy propositions,' mimeo. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Ministerio de Defensa (2000). *Los grupos ilegales de autodefensa en Colombia*. Bogotá: Ministerio de Defensa.
- Ministerio de Defensa – FONDELIBERTAD (2008). *Evolución del secuestro, 1996-2006*. Bogotá: FONDELIBERTAD.
- Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho (2000). *Documento de la República de Colombia para el décimo Congreso de la Naciones Unidas sobre prevención del delito y tratamiento de delincuentes*. Bogotá: Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho.
- Mohan, R. (1994). *Understanding the developing metropolis: lessons from the city study of Bogotá and Cali, Colombia*. New York: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press.
- Moser, C. and Lister, S. (eds.) (1999). 'Violence and social capital,' Proceedings of the LCSES seminar series 1997-1999, LCR Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 5, Urban Peace Programme Series. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Moser, C. and McIlwaine, C. (2000). *Urban poor perceptions of violence and exclusion in Colombia*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

- Moser, C., Winton, A. and Moser, A. (2005). 'Violence, fear, and insecurity among the urban poor in Latin America,' in M. Fay (ed.), *The urban poor in Latin America*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Neild, R. (1999). 'The role of the police in violence prevention,' Social Development Division, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Technical Note No. 9. Washington, DC: IDB.
- Nyberg-Sørensen, N., Hear, N.V. and Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2002). 'The migration-development nexus: evidence and policy options,' IOM Migration Research Series No. 8. Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM).
- Organisation of American States (OAS), Inter-American System of Legal Information (1999). 'Document presented by the Interior Minister of Colombia, Néstor Humberto Martínez Neira,' at the special meeting of the committee on juridical and political affairs to prepare for the meeting of government experts on the prevention of war on crime, mimeo. Washington, DC: OAS.
- Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) (2002). *Diagnostico sobre la población desplazada en seis departamentos de Colombia en 2001*. Bogotá: Nuevas Ediciones.
- Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) (2001). *Guidelines for epidemiological surveillance systems on violence and injuries*. Washington, DC: PAHO.
- Pérez, L.E. (2002a). 'Desplazamiento forzado en Colombia 1995-1999: una aproximación empírica a las relaciones entre desplazamiento, conflicto armado y desarrollo,' in Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) (ed.), *El desplazamiento forzado en Colombia: compromisos desde la universidad*. Bogotá: OIM.
- _____ (2002b). 'Población desplazada: entre la vulnerabilidad, la pobreza y la exclusión,' mimeo. Bogotá: Red de Solidaridad Social.
- Pictet, J. (1988). 'International humanitarian law: a definition,' in United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), *International dimensions of humanitarian law*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Presidencia de la República (Colombia) (1991). *Estrategia nacional contra la violencia*. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.
- _____ (1993). *Seguridad para la gente: segunda fase de la estrategia nacional contra la violencia*. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.
- _____ (1994). *Una política de seguridad para la convivencia*, vols. 1 & 2. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.

- _____ (1998). *Programa presidencial para la defensa de la libertad personal*. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.
- _____ (2000). *Estrategia nacional para la convivencia y seguridad ciudadana*. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.
- _____ (2003). 'Posición del gobierno nacional sobre el tema del secuestro y la extorsión en la mesa de diálogo y negociación,' mimeo. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.
- Ravallion, M. and Lokshin, M. (1999). 'Subjective economic welfare,' Policy Research Working Paper No. 2106. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Red de Solidaridad Social (2001). *Guía de atención integral a la población desplazada por la violencia*. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.
- _____ (2002). *Informe al Congreso de la República: Presidencia de la República Enero 2001- Febrero 2002*. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.
- _____ (2003). *Estadísticas para medios: cifras sobre desplazamiento forzado en Colombia*. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República.
- Solimano, A. (ed.) (2000). *Colombia: essays on conflict, peace, and development*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- United Nations (UN) (2004). *World urbanisation prospects: the 2003 revision*. New York: UN.
- United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention (UNCICP) (2000). 'The state of crime and criminal justice worldwide,' Paper presented at the 10th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime on 10-17 April. Vienna: UNCICP.
- United Nations Economic and Social Council (2000). 'Profiles in displacement: follow-up mission to Colombia,' mimeo. New York: UN.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (1950). 'Convention relating to the status of refugees,' mimeo. New York: UNHCR.
- _____ (2003). *La población desplazada por la violencia en Bogotá: una responsabilidad de todos*. Bogotá: LitoCamargo.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and CODHES (2001). *Compilación sobre desplazamiento forzado: normas doctrina y jurisprudencia nacional e internacional*. Bogotá: UNHCR and CODHES.
- United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) (1998). *Tourism market trends: Americas*. Madrid: UNWTO.
- United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) (2001). *World refugee survey 2001*. Washington, DC: USCR.

- United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) (2003a). *The wall of denial: internal displacement in Turkey*. Washington, DC: USCRI.
- _____ (2003b). *World refugee survey 2003*. Washington, DC: USCRI.
- Vergara, A.N. (1990). *Urbanización y sector informal en América Latina*. Santiago, Chile: El Proyecto Regional de Educación para América Latina y el Caribe (PRELAC).
- Von Gersdorff, H. (2003). 'Pension reform,' in M.M. Giugale, O. Lafourcade and C. Luff (eds.), *Colombia: the economic foundation of peace*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Books

- Alape, A. (1983). *El Bogotazo: memorias del olvido*. Bogotá: Editorial Pluma.
- _____ (1985). *La paz, la violencia: testigos de excepción*. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta.
- Andrade Sánchez, E. (1997). *Instrumentos jurídicos contra el crimen organizado*. México, D.F.: UNAM.
- Angell, A., Lowden, P. and Thorp, R. (2001). *Decentralising development: the political economy of institutional change in Colombia and Chile*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Arocha, J., Cubides, F. and Jimeno, M. (eds.) (1998). *Las violencias: inclusión creciente*. Bogotá: CES and Universidad Nacional Ed.
- Auyero, J. (2007). *Routine politics and violence in Argentina: the grey zone of state power*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Baud, M. and Meertens, D. (eds.) (2004). *Colombia from the inside: perspectives on drugs, war and peace*. Amsterdam: Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation.
- Behar, O. (1985). *Las guerras de la paz*. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta.
- Bejarano, J.A. [et al.] (eds.) (1997). *Colombia: inseguridad, violencia y desempeño económico en las áreas rurales*. Bogotá: Fondo Financiero de Proyectos de Desarrollo, Universidad Externado de Colombia.
- Beltrán, I. and Salcedo-Albarán, E. (2007). *El crimen como oficio: ensayos sobre economía del crimen en Colombia*. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia.
- Bergman, M.S. and Whitehead, L. (eds.) (2009). *Criminality, public security, and the challenges to democracy in Latin America*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

- Bergquist, C., Peñaranda, R. and Sánchez, G. (eds.) (1992). *Violence in Colombia: the contemporary crisis in historical perspective*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- _____ (2001). *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: waging war and negotiating peace*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- Bles, M. and Low, R. (1987). *The kidnapping business*. London: Pelham Books.
- Blumer, H. (1969). *Symbolic interactionism: perspective and methods*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Boserup, E. (2007). *Woman's role in economic development*. Reprinted with new introduction by Nazneen Kanji, Su Fei Tan and Camilla Toulmin. London: Earthscan.
- Bouvier, V.M. (ed.) (2009). *Colombia: building peace in a time of war*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Braun, H. (1985). *The assassination of Gaitán: public life and urban violence in Colombia*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- _____ (2003). *Our guerrillas, our sidewalks: a journey into the violence of Colombia*, 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Briggs, R. (2001). *The kidnapping business*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.
- Bushnell, D. (1993). *The making of modern Colombia: a nation in spite of itself*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Cabrera, A. [et al.] (1986). *Los movimientos cívicos*. Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP).
- Caldeira, T.P.R. (2000). *City of walls: crime, segregation, and citizenship in São Paulo*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Camacho, Á. and Guzmán, A. (1990). *Colombia: ciudad y violencia*. Bogotá: Ediciones Foro Nacional.
- Camacho, Á and Leal Buitrago, F. (eds.) (2000). *Armar la paz es desarmar la guerra*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Colombiana (CEREC).
- Carlson, J.M. (1985). *Prime time law enforcement; crime show viewing and attitudes to the criminal justice system*. New York: Praeger.
- Carrigan, A. (1993). *The Palace of Justice: a Colombian tragedy*. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows.
- Carrillo Bedoya, J. (1981). *Los paros cívicos en Colombia*. Bogotá: Editorial La Oveja Negra.

- Casas Dupuy, P. [et al.] (2005). *Seguridad urbana y policía en Colombia*. Bogotá: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia.
- Castaño, C. (2001). *Mi confesión: Carlos Castaño revela sus secretos*. Interviewed by Mauricio Aranguren. Bogotá: Editorial La Oveja Negra.
- Clutterbuck, R.L. (1978). *Kidnap and ransom: the response*. London: Faber and Faber.
- _____ (1987). *Kidnapping, hijack and extortion: the response*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Cohen, R. and Deng, F.M. (1998a). *Masses in flight: the global crisis of internal displacement*. Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press.
- _____ (eds.) (1998b). *The forsaken people: case studies of the internally displaced*. Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press.
- Costa, G. (2007). *La ventana rota y otras formas de lucha el crimen*. Lima: Instituto de Defensa Legal.
- Cragin, K. and Hoffman, B. (2003). *Arms trafficking and Colombia*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Cubides, F., Olaya, A.C. and Ortiz, C.M. (1998). *La violencia y el municipio colombiano: 1980-1997*. Bogotá: CES and Universidad Nacional Ed.
- Cumberbatch, G., Woods, S. and Maguire, A. (1995). *Crime in the news: television, radio and newspapers: a report for BBC broadcasting research*. London: Communications Research Group, Aston University.
- Cvetkovich, G. and Löfstedt, R.E. (eds.) (1999). *Social trust and the management of risk*. London: Earthscan.
- De Soto, H. (1989). *The other path: the invisible revolution in the Third World*. London: Tauris.
- Dudley, S. (2004). *Walking ghosts: murder and guerrilla politics in Colombia*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Duncan, G. (2007). *Los señores de la guerra: de paramilitares, mafiosos y autodefensas en Colombia*, 3rd ed. Bogotá: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia and Editorial Planeta.
- Echandía, C. (2006). *Dos décadas de escalamiento del conflicto armado en Colombia 1986-2006*. Bogotá: Universidad Externando de Colombia.
- Enloe, C.H. (2000). *Manoeuvres: the international politics of militarising women's lives*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ericson, R., Baranek, P. and Chan, J. (1991). *Representing order: crime, law, and justice in the news media*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

- Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (2001). *Atención a desplazados: experiencias institucionales en Colombia*. Bogotá: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Ferraro, K.F. (1995). *Fear of crime: interpreting victimisation risk*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Flórez, C.E. (2000). *Las transformaciones sociodemográficas en Colombia durante el siglo XX*. Bogotá: Banco de la República and Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Flórez, C.E., with the collaboration of Echeverri, R. and Bonilla, E. (1990). *La transición demográfica en Colombia: efectos en la formación de la familia*. Tokyo: Universidad de la Naciones Unidas and Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes.
- Frühling, H. and Tulchin, J.S. (eds.) with Golding, H.A. (2003). *Crime and violence in Latin America: citizen security, democracy, and the state*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995). *Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York: The Free Press.
- García Márquez, G. (1997). *News of a kidnapping*. Translated by Edith Grossman. New York: Knopf.
- Giddens, A. (1990). *The consequences of modernity*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
- Gilbert, A. (1998). *The Latin American city*, rev. ed. London: Latin American Bureau.
- Gilbert, A. and Garcés, M.T. (2008). *Bogotá: progreso, gobernabilidad y pobreza*. Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario.
- Gilbert, A. and Varley, A. (1991). *Landlord and tenant: housing the poor in urban Mexico*. London: Routledge.
- Gilbert, A. and Ward, P. (1985). *Housing, the state and the poor: policy and practice in three Latin American cities*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Gómez Buendía, H. (ed.) (1999). *¿Para dónde va Colombia?*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- González Ruiz, S., López Portillo, E. and Yáñez, J.A. (1994). *Seguridad pública en México*. México, DF: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- Gouëset, V. (1998). *Bogotá: el nacimiento de una metrópoli*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Gouëset, V. [et al.] (coord.) (2005). *Hacer metrópoli: la región urbana de Bogotá de cara al siglo XXI*. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia.
- Green, J. (2003). *Gaitanismo, left liberalism, and popular mobilisation in Colombia*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.

- Guerrero, S.M. (1995). *Limpieza social: la guerra contra la indigencia*. Bogotá: Ediciones Temas de Hoy.
- Gutiérrez, F. (1998). *La ciudad representada: política y conflicto en Bogotá*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores-IEPRI.
- Guzmán, G., Fals Borda, O. and Umaña, E. (1962). *La violencia en Colombia: estudio de un proceso social*, volumen 1. Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo.
- _____ (1964). *La violencia en Colombia: estudio de un proceso social*, volumen 2. Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo.
- Hartlyn, J. (1988). *The politics of coalition rule in Colombia*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Henshel, R.L. and Silverman, R.A. (eds.) (1975). *Perception in criminology*. London: Columbia University Press.
- Hristov, J. (2009). *Blood and capital: the paramilitarisation of Colombia*. Toronto: Between the Lines.
- Jaramillo, A.M. (1994). *Milicias populares en Medellín: entre la guerra y la paz*. Medellín: Corporación Región.
- Jaramillo, A.M., Ceballos, R. and Villa, M.I. (1998). *En la encrucijada: conflicto y cultura política en el Medellín de los noventa*. Medellín: Corporación Región.
- Jaramillo, S. and Cuervo, L.M. (1987). *La configuración del espacio regional en Colombia: tres ensayos*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE).
- Jewkes, Y. (2004). *Media and crime*. Los Angeles, CA and London: SAGE Publications.
- Jewkes, Y. (ed.) (2008). *Crime and media*, 3 vols. Los Angeles, CA and London: SAGE Publications.
- Jimeno, M. and Roldán, I. [et al.] (1996). *Las sombras arbitrarias: violencia y autoridad en Colombia*. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional Ed.
- Kállí, L. (2006). *Kidnapped: a diary of my 373 days in captivity*. Translated by Kristina Cordero. New York: Atria.
- Kelling, G. and Coles, C. (1996). *Fixing broken windows: restoring order and reducing crime in our communities*. New York: Martin Keiser Books.
- Klapper, J. (1960). *The effects of mass communications*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Kline, H.F. (2007). *Chronicle of a failure foretold: the peace process of Colombian President Andrés Pastrana*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.

- Koonings K. and Kruijt, D. (eds.) (1999). *Societies of fear: the legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.
- _____ (eds.) (2004). *Armed actors: organised violence and state failure in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.
- _____ (eds.) (2007). *Fractured cities: social exclusion, urban violence and contested spaces in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.
- Kruijt, D., Sojo, C. and Grynspan, R. (2002). *Informal citizens: poverty, informality and social exclusion in Latin America*. Amsterdam: Rozenberg.
- Leal Buitrago, F. (2006). *La inseguridad de la seguridad: Colombia 1958-2005*. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta.
- Lemoine, C. (1993). *Las fuerzas de la opinión*. Bogotá: Centro Nacional de Consultoría.
- _____ (2000). *Nosotros los colombianos del milenio*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Lipset, S.M. and Schneider, W. (1987). *The confidence gap: business, labour and government in the public mind*, rev. ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Llorente, M.V. and Deas, M. (eds.) (1999). *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*. Bogotá: CEREC, Ediciones Uniandes and Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Losada Lora, R. and Vélez Bustillo, E. (1988). *Muertes violentas en Colombia, 1979-1986*. Bogotá: Instituto SER.
- Maguire, M., Morgan, R. and Reiner, R. (eds.) (2007). *The Oxford handbook of criminology*, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Martin, G. and Ceballos, M. (2004). *Bogotá: anatomía de una transformación: políticas de seguridad ciudadana, 1995-2003*. Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Massey, D.S. [et al.] (1987). *Return to Aztlan: the social process of international migration from Western Mexico*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Maullin, R. (1973). *Soldiers, guerrillas, and politics in Colombia*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Medina, M. (1984). *La protesta urbana en Colombia en el siglo XX*. Bogotá: Ediciones Aurora.
- Meluk, E. (1998). *El secuestro: una muerte suspendida*. Bogotá: Uniandes.
- Misztal, B. (1996). *Trust in modern society: the search for the bases of social order*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

- Moser, C. and McIlwaine, C. (2004). *Encounters with violence in Latin America: urban poor perceptions from Colombia and Guatemala*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Nam, C.B., Serow, W.J. and Sly, D. (1990). *International handbook on internal migration*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Niño Murcia, S. [et al.] (1998). *Territorios del miedo en Santafé de Bogotá*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Oquist, P. (1980). *Violence, conflict, and politics in Colombia*. New York: Academic Press.
- Ortiz, C.M. (1985). *Estado y subversión en Colombia: la violencia en el Quindío años 50*. Bogotá: CEREC and CIDER.
- O'Shaughnessy, H. and Branford, S. (2005). *Chemical warfare in Colombia: the costs of coca fumigation*. London: Latin American Bureau.
- Osterling, J.P. (1989). *Democracy in Colombia: clientelist politics and guerrilla warfare*. New Brunswick, NJ and Oxford: Transaction Publishers.
- Otero Prada, D. (2007). *Las cifras del conflicto colombiano*, 2nd ed. Bogotá: Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (INDEPAZ).
- Palacios, M. (2006). *Between legitimacy and violence: a history of Colombia, 1875-2002*. Translated by Richard Stoller. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Pardo Rueda, R. (1996). *De primera mano. Colombia 1986-1994: entre conflictos y esperanzas*. Bogotá: CEREC and Grupo Editorial Norma.
- _____ (1999). *Nueva seguridad para América Latina*. Bogotá: FESCOL and CEREC.
- Partido Conservador Colombiano (1997). *Inseguridad e impunidad en Colombia*. Bogotá: Partido Conservador Colombiano.
- Pearce, J. (1990). *Colombia: inside the labyrinth*. London: Latin American Bureau.
- Pécaut, D. (1987). *Orden y violencia: Colombia 1930-1954*, 2 volumes. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Colombiana (CEREC) and Siglo XXI.
- _____ (2001). *Guerra contra la sociedad*. Bogotá: El Áncora Editores.
- _____ (2006). *Crónica de cuatro décadas de política colombiana*. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Pérez Martínez, M.E. (2004). *Territorio y desplazamiento: el caso de Altos de Cazucá, municipio de Soacha*. Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.

- Pizarro Leongómez, E. (1991). *Las FARC 1946-1966: De la autodefensa a la combinación de todas las formas de lucha*. Bogotá: Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI) and Tercer Mundo Editores.
- _____ (1996). *Insurgencia sin revolución: la guerrilla en Colombia en una perspectiva comparada*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- PROFAMILIA (2000). *Salud sexual y reproductiva: resultados de la encuesta nacional de demografía y salud 2000*. Bogotá: Macro International Inc.
- Rangel, A. (1998). *Colombia: guerra en el fin de siglo*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Restrepo, E.M. (2003). *The Colombian criminal justice in crisis: fear and distrust*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford.
- Richani, N. (2002). *Systems of violence: the political economy of war and peace in Colombia*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Roberts, B.R. (1978). *Cities of peasants: the political economy urbanisation in Third World*. London: Edward Arnold.
- _____ (1995). *The making of citizens: cities of peasants revisited*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Robledo, Á.M. and Rodríguez, P. (2008). *Emergencia del sujeto excluído: aproximación genealógica a la no-ciudad en Bogotá*. Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Rochlin, J.F. (2003). *Vanguard revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Rojas, C.E. (1996). *La violencia llamada limpieza social*, 2nd ed. Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP).
- Rojas, C. and Meltzer, J. (eds.) (2005). *Elusive peace: international, national, and local dimensions of conflict in Colombia*. New York and Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Roldán, M. (2002). *Blood and fire: la violencia in Antioquia, 1946-1953*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Romero, M. (2003). *Paramilitares y autodefensas 1982-2003*. Bogotá: Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI) and Editorial Planeta.
- Rotker, S. (ed.) (2002). *Citizens of fear: urban violence in Latin America*. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press.
- Rubio, M. (1999). *Crimen e impunidad: precisiones sobre la violencia*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) and Tercer Mundo Editores.

- _____ (2005). *Del rapto a la pesca milagrosa: breve historia del secuestro en Colombia*, Estudios de Caso en Políticas Públicas No. 9. Bogotá: Universidad Externando de Colombia.
- Safford, F. and Palacios, M. (2002). *Colombia: fragmented land, divided society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Salazar, A. (1990). *Born to die in Medellín*. Translated by Nick Caistor. London: Latin American Bureau.
- Salazar, A. and Jaramillo, A.M. (1992). *Medellín: las subculturas del narcotráfico*. Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP).
- Salcedo, A. (1995). *Violencia y miedo en el centro de la ciudad de Santafé de Bogotá*. Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP).
- Sánchez, F. (2007). *Las cuentas de la violencia: ensayos económicos sobre el conflicto y el crimen en Colombia*. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Sánchez, G. (1983). *Los días de la revolución: Gaitanismo y el 9 de abril en provincia*. Bogotá: Centro Cultural Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.
- _____ (1991). *Guerra y política en la sociedad Colombiana*. Bogotá: El Áncora Editores.
- Sánchez, G. and Meertens, D. (2001). *Bandits, peasants, and politics: the case of 'La Violencia' in Colombia*. Translated by Alan Hynds. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Sánchez, G. and Peñaranda, R. (eds.) (2007). *Pasado y presente de la violencia en Colombia*, 3rd ed. Medellín: La Carreta Editores and Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI)-Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Segovia Mora, G. (1994). *La violencia en Santafé de Bogotá*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Slovic, P. (2000). *The perception of risk*. London: Earthscan.
- Sparks, R. (1992). *Television and the drama of crime*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Stark, O. (1991). *The migration of labour*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Stiglitz, J. (2002). *Globalisation and its discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Sztompka, P. (1999). *Trust: a sociological theory*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Tate, W. (2007). *Counting the dead: the culture and politics of human rights activism in Colombia*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.

- Taussig, M. (2003). *Law in a lawless land: a diary of a 'limpieza' in Colombia*. Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Téllez Ardila, A.M. (1995). *Las milicias populares: otra expresión de la violencia social en Colombia*. Bogotá: Rodríguez Quito.
- Thomas, J.J. (1995). *Surviving in the city: the urban informal sector in Latin America*. London: Pluto Press.
- Tulchin, J.S. and Ruthenburg, M. (eds.) (2006). *Toward a society under law: citizens and their police in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.
- Varios Autores (1994). *Rostros del secuestro*. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta.
- Vincent, M. and Sorensen, B.R. (eds.) (2001). *Caught between borders: response strategies of the internally displaced*. London: Pluto Press.
- Weiss, L. (1998). *The myth of the powerless state: governing the economy in a global era*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
- Welna, C. and Gallón, G. (eds.) (2007). *Peace, democracy, and human rights in Colombia*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Zolberg, A. and Benda, P. (eds.) (2001). *Global migrants, global refugees: problems and solutions*. Oxford: Berghahn.

Scholarly Articles

- Arriaga, E.E. (1968). 'Components of city growth in selected Latin American countries,' *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 2, part 1: pp. 237-252.
- Balán, J. (1969). 'Migrant-native socioeconomic differences in Latin American cities: a structural analysis,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 4, no. 1: pp. 3-29.
- Bergman, M.S. (2006). 'Crime and citizen security in Latin America: the challenges for new scholarship,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 41, no. 2: pp. 213-227.
- Biswas-Diener, R., Diener, E. and Tamir, M. (2004). 'The psychology of subjective well-being,' *Daedalus*, vol. 133, issue 2: pp. 18-25.
- Blanchflower, D.G. and Oswald, A.J. (2004). 'Well-being over time in Britain and the USA,' *Journal of Public Economics*, vol. 88, issues 7-8: pp. 1359-1386.
- Borjas, G.J., Bronars, S.G. and Trejo, S.J. (1992). 'Assimilation and the earnings of young internal migrants,' *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 74, no. 1: pp. 170-175.

- Borjas, G.J. and Tienda, M. (1993). 'The employment and wages of legalised immigrants,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 27, no. 4: pp. 712-747.
- Boswell, T. and Dixon, W. (1990). 'Dependency and rebellion: a cross-national analysis,' *American Sociology Review*, vol. 55, no. 4: pp. 540-559.
- Bradbury, K. and Katz, J. (2002). 'Women's labour market involvement and family income mobility when marriages end,' *New England Economic Review*, issue 2002, fourth quarter: pp. 41-74.
- Browning, H.L. and Feindt, W. (1969). 'Selectivity of migrants to a metropolis in a developing country: a Mexican case study,' *Demography*, vol. 6, no. 4: pp. 347-357.
- Budlender, D. (2003). 'The debate about household headship,' *Social Dynamics*, vol. 29, no. 2: pp. 48-72
- Camacho, Á. (1994). 'Seguridad: ¿para la gente o para el Estado?,' *Análisis Político*, no. 21: pp. 81-96.
- Chambers, R. (2006). 'Vulnerability, coping and policy (editorial introduction),' *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 37, no. 4: pp. 33-40.
- Chernick, M. (1988). 'Negotiated settlement to armed conflict: lessons from the Colombian peace process,' *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, vol. 30, no. 4: pp. 53-88.
- Chiswick, B.R. (1978). 'Occupational change among United-States immigrants,' *Monthly Labour Review*, vol. 101, no. 3: pp. 29-30.
- _____ (1999). 'Are immigrants favourably self-selected?,' *American Economic Review*, vol. 89, no. 2: pp. 181-185.
- Chiswick, B.R., Cohen, Y. and Zach, T. (1997). 'The labour market status of immigrants: effects of the unemployment rate at arrival and duration of residence,' *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, vol. 50, no. 2: pp. 289-303.
- Chiswick, B.R., Lee, Y.L. and Miller, P.W. (2003). 'Patterns of immigrant occupational attainment in a longitudinal survey,' *International Migration*, vol. 41, no. 4: pp. 47-69.
- Concha-Eastman, A. [et al.] (2002). 'La epidemiología de los homicidios en Cali, 1993-1998: seis años de un modelo poblacional,' *Pan American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 12, no. 4: pp. 230-239.
- Cortes, K.E. (2004). 'Are refugees different from economic immigrants?: some empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of immigrant groups in the United States,' *Review of Economics and Statistics*, vol. 86, no. 2: pp. 465-480.

- Dahlgren, P. (1988). 'Crime news: the fascination of the mundane,' *European Journal of Communication*, vol. 3, no. 2: pp. 189-206.
- Davenport, C., Moore, W. and Poe, S. (2003). 'Sometimes you just have to leave: domestic threats and forced migration, 1964-1989,' *International Interactions*, vol. 29, issue 1: pp. 27-55.
- De Haan, A. and Rogaly, B. (2002). 'Introduction: migrant workers and their role in rural change,' *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 38, issue 5: pp. 1-14.
- De la Torre, C. (1980). 'Nacimiento del ELN: revelaciones de Ricardo Lara Parada,' *Trópicos*, no. 3 and 4.
- Easterlin, R.A. (2004). 'The economics of happiness,' *Daedalus*, vol. 133, issue 2: pp. 26-33.
- Echeverry, J.C. [et al.] (2005). 'The economics of TransMilenio: a mass transit system for Bogotá,' *Economía*, vol. 5, no. 2: pp. 151-188.
- Ellis, F. (1998). 'Household strategies and rural livelihood diversification,' *Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 35, issue 1: pp. 1-38.
- Fan, C.C. (1996). 'Economic opportunities and internal migration: a case study of Guangdong Province, China,' *Professional Geographer*, vol. 48, no. 1: pp. 28-45.
- Ferraro, K.F. and Grange, R.L. (1987). 'The measurement of fear of crime,' *Sociological Inquiry*, no. 57, issue 1: pp. 70-97.
- Fields, G.S. (1979). 'Lifetime migration in Colombia: test of the expected income hypothesis,' *Population and Development Review*, vol. 5, no. 2: pp. 247-265.
- Finnan, C.R. (1981). 'Occupational assimilation of refugees,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 15, no. 1: pp. 292-309.
- Franco Agudelo, S. (1997). 'Violence and health in Colombia,' *Pan American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 2, no. 3: pp. 170-180.
- Garfield, R. and Llantén Morales, C.P. (2004). 'The public health context of violence in Colombia,' *Pan American Journal of Public Health*, vol. 16, no. 4: pp. 266-271.
- Garrido, J.F. (2001). 'Guerra y pobreza en Colombia,' *Estudios Gerenciales*, no. 81: pp. 69-76.
- Gerbner, G and Gross, L. (1976). 'Living with television: the violence profile,' *Journal of Communication*, vol. 26, issue 2: pp. 172-194.
- Gilbert, A. (1981). 'Pirates and invaders: land acquisition in urban Colombia and Venezuela,' *World Development*, vol. 9, issue 7: pp. 657-678.
- _____ (1997). 'Employment and poverty during economic restructuring: the case of Bogotá, Colombia,' *Urban Studies*, vol. 34, no. 7: pp. 1047-1070.

- _____ (1999). 'A home is for ever?: residential mobility and homeownership in self-help settlements,' *Environment and Planning A*, vol. 31, no. 6: pp. 1073-1091.
- _____ (2000). 'Financing self-help housing: evidence from Bogotá, Colombia,' *International Planning Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2: pp. 165-190.
- Gururaja, S. (2000). 'Gender dimensions of displacement,' *Forced Migration Review*, issue 9: pp. 13-16.
- Gutiérrez, F. (1999). 'Crimen e impunidad: precisiones sobre la violencia,' *Revista de Estudios Sociales*, no. 3: pp. 133-136.
- Gutiérrez, F. and Jaramillo, A.M. (2004). 'Crime, (counter) insurgency and the privatisation of security: the case of Medellín, Colombia,' *Environment and Urbanisation*, vol. 16, no. 2: pp. 17-30.
- Hamilton, N. and Chinchilla, N.S. (1996). 'Global economic restructuring and international migration: some observations based on the Mexican and Central American experience,' *International Migration*, vol. 34, no. 2: pp. 195-231.
- Hart, K. (1973). 'Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana,' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1: pp. 61-89.
- Hein, J. (1993). 'Refugees, immigrants and the State,' *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 19: pp. 43-59.
- Homer-Dixon, T. (1994). 'Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: evidence from cases,' *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1: pp. 5-40.
- Hosking, G. (2006). 'Trust and distrust: a suitable theme for historians?,' *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, vol. 16: pp. 95-115.
- Howard, D, Hume, M. and Oslender, U. (2007). 'Violence, fear and development in Latin America: a critical overview,' *Development in Practice*, vol. 17, no. 6: pp. 713-724.
- Hraba, J. [et al.] (1998). 'Perceived risk of crime in the Czech Republic,' *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, vol. 35, no. 2: pp. 225-242.
- Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses – Centro de Referencia Nacional sobre Violencia (CRNV) (1998). 'Muertes violentas y armas de fuego en Colombia 1996,' *Boletín Mensual*, vol. 2, no. 3: pp. 49-66.
- Jacobsen, K. and Landau, L.B. (2003). 'The dual imperative in refugee research: some methodological and ethical considerations in social science research on forced migration,' *Disasters*, vol. 27, issue 3: pp. 185-206.

- Janssen, R. (1978). 'Class practices of dwellers in barrios populares: the struggle for the right to the city,' *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 2: pp. 147-159.
- Jones, R.C. (1989). 'Causes of Salvadoran migration to the United States,' *Geographical Review*, vol. 79, no. 2: pp. 183-194.
- Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). 'Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk,' *Econometrica*, vol. 47, no. 2: pp. 263-292.
- Katz, J. (1987). 'What makes crime "news"?,' *Media, Culture and Society*, vol. 9, no. 1: pp. 47-75.
- Kunz, E.F. (1981). 'Exile and resettlement: refugee theory,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 15, no. 1: pp. 42-51.
- LaGrange, R., Ferraro, K.F. and Supancic, M. (1992). 'Perceived risk and fear of crime: role of social and physical incivilities,' *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, vol. 29, no. 3: pp. 311-334.
- LeoGrande, W.M. and Sharpe, K.E. (2000). 'Two wars or one? Drug, guerrillas, and Colombia's new *Violencia*,' *World Policy Journal*, vol. 17, no. 3: pp. 1-11.
- Levy, J.S. (1996). 'Loss aversion, framing and bargaining: the implications of prospect theory for international conflict,' *International Political Science Review*, vol. 17, no. 2: pp. 179-195.
- Lichter, D.T., Graefe, D.R. and Brown, J.B. (2003). 'Is marriage a panacea? Union formation among economically disadvantaged unwed mothers,' *Social Problems*, vol. 50, no. 1: pp. 60-86.
- Lippman, B. and Malik, S. (2004). 'The 4Rs: the way ahead?,' *Forced Migration Review*, issue 21: pp. 9-11.
- Llorente, M.V. (2003). 'La honda crisis de la policía,' *Revista Semana Especial Issue: Colombia y el Mundo en el 2003* (22 December): pp. 84-86.
- Llorente, M.V. [et al.] (2001). 'Violencia homicida y estructuras criminales en Bogotá,' *Análisis Político*, no. 44: pp. 17-38.
- Long, J. (2005). 'Rural-urban migration and socioeconomic mobility in Victorian Britain,' *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 65, no. 1: pp. 1-35.
- Lundquist, J.H. and Massey, D.S. (2005). 'Politics or economics?: international migration during the Nicaraguan Contra War,' *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 37, issue 1: pp. 29-53.
- Martínez, C. and Rincón, M. (1997). 'Tendencias recientes de las migraciones internas en Colombia,' *Desarrollo Urbano en Cifras*, no. 2: pp. 60-85.

- Mason, E. (1999). 'Researching refugee and forced migration studies: an introduction to the field and the reference literature,' *Behavioural and Social Sciences Librarian*, vol. 18, no. 1: pp. 1-20.
- Massey, D.S. (1987). 'The ethnosurvey in theory and practice,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 21, no. 4: pp. 1498-1522.
- _____ (1990). 'The social and economic origins of immigration,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 510: pp. 60-72.
- McAllister, I. (1995). 'Occupational mobility among immigrants: the impact of migration on economic success in Australia,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 29, no. 2: pp. 441-468.
- McGinnis, M.D. (2000), 'Policy substitutability in complex humanitarian emergencies: a model of individual choice and international response,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 44, no. 1: pp. 62-89.
- McIlwaine, C. (1999). 'Geography and development: violence and crime as development issues,' *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 23, no. 3: pp. 453-463.
- Meertens, D. (2001). 'Facing destruction, rebuilding life: gender and the internally in Colombia,' translated by Richard Stoller, *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 28, no. 1: pp. 132-148.
- Meertens, D. and Segura-Escobar, N. (1996). 'Uprooted lives: gender, violence and displacement in Colombia,' *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, vol. 17, no. 2: pp. 165-178.
- Mincer, J. (1978). 'Family migration decisions,' *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 86, no. 5: pp. 749-773.
- Mockus, A. (1994). 'Anfibios culturales y divorcio entre ley, moral y cultura,' *Análisis Político*, no. 21: pp. 37-48.
- Mooney, E. and Jarrah, B. (2005). 'Safeguarding IDP voting rights,' *Forced Migration Review*, issue 23: p. 55.
- Morrison, A.R. (1993). 'Violence or economics: what drives internal migration in Guatemala,' *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, vol. 41, no. 4: pp. 817-831.
- Morrison, A.R. and May, R.A. (1994). 'Escape from terror: violence and migration in post-revolutionary Guatemala,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 29, no. 2: pp. 111-132.
- Moser, C. (1998). 'The asset vulnerability framework: reassessing urban poverty reduction strategies,' *World Development*, vol. 26, no. 1: pp. 1-19.

- _____ (2004). 'Urban violence and insecurity: an introductory roadmap,' *Environment and Urbanisation*, vol. 16, no. 2: pp. 3-16.
- Moser, C. and Clark, F. (2001). 'Gender, conflict and building sustainable peace: recent lessons from Latin America,' *Gender and Development*, vol. 9, no. 3: pp. 29-39.
- Moser, C. and McIlwaine, C. (2006). 'Latin American urban violence as a development concern: towards a framework for violence reduction,' *World Development*, vol. 34, no. 1: pp. 89-112.
- Mulder, C.H. and Ham, M.V. (2005). 'Migration histories and occupational achievement,' *Population, Space and Place*, vol. 11: pp. 173-186.
- Muller, E. and Seligson, M. (1987). 'Inequality and insurgency,' *American Political Science Review*, vol. 81, no. 2: pp. 425-451.
- Offer, S. (2004). 'The socio-economic integration of the Ethiopian community in Israel,' *International Migration*, vol. 42, no. 3: pp. 29-55.
- Pécaut, D. (1997). 'Presente, pasado y futuro de la violencia en Colombia,' *Análisis Político*, no. 30: pp. 3-36.
- Pérez, M. (1999). 'El desplazamiento por violencia y los procesos de reconstrucción vital en Colombia,' *Revista Javeriana*, no. 67: pp. 663-676.
- Petras, J. (2000). 'The FARC faces the empire,' *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 27, no. 5: pp. 134-143.
- Portes, A. (1989). 'Latin American urbanisation during the years of crisis,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 24, no. 3: pp. 7-44.
- Reyes, A. and Bejarano, A.M. (1988). 'Conflictos agrarios y luchas armadas en la Colombia contemporánea: una visión geográfica,' *Análisis Político*, no. 5: pp. 6-27.
- Sánchez, G. (1998). 'Colombia: violencias sin futuros,' *Foro Internacional*, vol. 38, no. 1: pp. 37-58.
- Sánchez-Ángel, R. (2008). 'Gaitanismo y nueve de abril,' *Pap. Polít. Bogotá (Colombia)*, vol. 13, no. 1: pp. 13-49.
- Schock, K. (1996). 'A conjunctural model of political conflict: the impact of political opportunities on the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflict,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 40, no. 1: pp. 98-133.
- Sigelman, L. and Simpson, M. (1977). 'Cross national test of linkage between economic inequality and political violence,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 21, no. 1: pp. 105-128.

- Simmons, A.B. and Cardona, R. (1972). 'Rural-urban migration: who comes, who stays, who returns? The case of Bogotá, Colombia, 1929-1968,' *International Migration Review*, vol. 6, no. 2: pp. 166-181.
- Skinner, R. (2004). 'City profile: Bogotá,' *Cities*, vol. 21, no. 1: pp. 73-81.
- Stanley, W.D. (1987). 'Economic migrants or refugees from violence: a time-series analysis of Salvadoran migration to the United States,' *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 22, no. 1: pp. 132-154.
- Uprimny, R. (1993). 'Fiscal general o general fiscal?: nuevo procedimiento penal y derechos humanos en Colombia,' *Revista del Colegio de Abogados Penalistas del Valle*, no. 29 and 30.
- Urueña Cortés, N. (1999). 'La corrupción en la policía: modalidades, causas y control,' *Cuadernos del CED*, no. 32.
- Vélez, M.A. (2001). 'FARC-ELN: evolución y expansión territorial,' *Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad*, no. 47: pp. 151-225.
- Waldmann, P. (2007). 'Is there a culture of violence in Colombia?,' *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 19, no. 4: pp. 593-609.
- Wilson, J. and Kelling, G. (1982). 'Broken windows: the police and neighbourhood safety,' *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 249, no. 3: pp. 29-38.
- Wimberly, D.W., Berry, E.H. and Flinn, W.L. (1989). 'Structural influences on outmigrant selectivity: a panel study of three rural Colombian communities,' *Rural Sociology*, vol. 54, no. 3: pp. 339-364.
- Yamauchi, F. (2004). 'Are experience and schooling complementary?: evidence from migrants' assimilation in the Bangkok labour market,' *Journal of Development Economics*, vol. 74, no. 2: pp. 489-513.
- Yunes, J. and Zubarew, T. (1999). 'Mortalidad por causas violentas en adolescentes y jóvenes: un desafío para la región de las Américas,' *Revista Brasileira de Epidemiología*, vol. 2, no. 3: pp. 102-171.

Chapters in Collected Volumes

- Abel, C. and Palacios, M. (1991a). 'Colombia, 1930-1958,' in L. Bethell (ed.), *The Cambridge history of Latin America*, volume 8. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- _____ (1991b). 'Colombia since 1958,' in L. Bethell (ed.), *The Cambridge history of Latin America*, volume 8. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

- Aguilera Peña, M. (2004). 'Guerra, insurgencia y prácticas judiciales,' in G. Sánchez and E. Lair (eds.), *Violencias y estrategias colectivas en la región andina: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú y Venezuela*. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Birkeland, N.M. and Gomes, A.U. (2001). 'Angola: deslocalados in the province of Huambo,' in M. Vincent and B.R. Sorensen (eds.), *Caught between borders: response strategies of the internally displaced*. London: Pluto Press.
- Boutin, G and Nkurunziza, S. (2001). 'Burundi: developing strategies for self-reliance, a study of displacement in four provinces,' in M. Vincent and B.R. Sorensen (eds.), *Caught between borders: response strategies of the internally displaced*. London: Pluto Press.
- Camacho, Á. and Camargo, E. (1998). 'La seguridad ciudadana: una aproximación a la situación de Bogotá,' in Y. Campos and I. Ortiz (eds.), *La ciudad observada: violencia, cultura y política*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Camacho Leyva, B. (1993). 'Frente nacional y era contemporánea,' in Á. Valencia Tovar (ed.), *Historia de la policía nacional de Colombia*. Bogotá: Planeta.
- Camilo, G.A. (2000). 'Impacto psicológico del desplazamiento forzoso: estrategia de intervención,' in M.N. Bello, E.M. Cardinal and F.J. Arias (eds.), *Efectos psicosociales y culturales del desplazamiento*. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Cárdia, N. (2002). 'The impact of exposure to violence in São Paulo: accepting violence or continuing horror?,' in S. Rotker (ed.), *Citizens of fear: urban violence in Latin America*. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press.
- Castells, M and Portes, A. (1989). 'World underneath: the origins, dynamics, and effects of the informal economy,' in A. Portes, M. Castells and L.A. Benton (eds.), *The informal economy: studies in advanced and less developed countries*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
- Centeno, M.A. and Portes, A. (2006). 'The informal economy in the shadow of the state,' in P. Fernández-Kelly and J. Shefner (eds.), *Out of the shadows: political action and the informal economy in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Cockburn, C. (2004). 'The continuum of violence: a gender perspective on war and peace,' in W. Giles and J. Hyndman (eds.), *Sites of violence: gender and conflict zones*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Cubides, F. (1998). 'La organización como factor diferencial,' in F. Cubides, A.C. Olaya and C.M. Ortiz, *La violencia y el municipio colombiano: 1980-1997*. Bogotá: CES and Universidad Nacional Ed.
- _____ (2001). 'From private to public violence: the paramilitaries,' in C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda and G. Sánchez (eds.), *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: waging war and negotiating peace*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- _____ (2004). 'Narcotráfico y guerra en Colombia: los paramilitares,' in G. Sánchez and E. Lair (eds.), *Violencias y estrategias colectivas en la región andina: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú y Venezuela*. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Dávila, J.D. (1996). 'Bogotá, Colombia: restructuring with continued growth,' in N. Harris and I. Fabricius (eds.), *Cities and structural adjustment*. London: UCL Press.
- _____ (2005). 'La transformación de Bogotá,' in F. Cepeda Ulloa (ed.), *Fortalezas de Colombia*. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta.
- De Francisco Z., G. (2006). 'Armed conflict and public security in Colombia,' in J. Bailey and L. Dammert (eds.), *Public security and police reform in the Americas*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Deas, M. (1986). 'Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, c. 1880-1930,' in L. Bethell (ed.), *The Cambridge history of Latin America*, volume 5. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- _____ (1997). 'Violent exchanges: reflections on political violence in Colombia,' in D.E. Apter (ed.), *The legitimisation of violence*. New York: New York University Press.
- Downes, D. and Morgan, R. (2007). 'No turning back: the politics of law and order into the millennium,' in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of criminology*, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Duce, M. and Pérez Perdomo, R. (2003). 'Citizen security and reform of the criminal justice system in Latin America,' in H. Frühling and J.S. Tulchin, (eds.) with H.A. Golding, *Crime and violence in Latin America: citizen security, democracy, and the state*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.
- Escobar, N.S. (2001). 'Los desplazados en Colombia: violencia y exclusión,' in A. Gutiérrez (ed.), *Exclusión social y construcción de lo público en Colombia*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Colombiana (CEREC) and CIDSE-Universidad del Valle.

- Flórez, C.E. and Bonilla, E. (1991). 'The demographic transition in Colombia,' in E. Masini and S. Stratigos (eds.), *Women, households and change*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Gilbert, A. (1978). 'Bogotá: politics, planning, and the crisis of lost opportunities,' in W.A. Cornelius and R.V. Kemper (eds.), *Latin American urban research*, vol. 6. Beverly Hills, CA and London: Sage Publications.
- _____ (1996). 'Santa Fé de Bogotá: a Latin American special case?,' in A. Gilbert (ed.), *The mega-city in Latin America*. New York: United Nations University Press.
- _____ (1998). 'Colombian housing policy during the 1990s,' in E. Posada-Carbó (ed.), *Colombia: the politics of reforming the state*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- _____ (2002). 'Housing policy and legal entitlements: survival strategies of the urban poor,' in C. Abel and C. Lewis (eds.), *Exclusion and engagement: social policy in Latin America*. London: Institute of Latin American Studies.
- _____ (2008). 'El proceso de urbanización,' in M. Palacios (ed.), *Historia general de América Latina*, volume 8. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).
- Gilbert, A and Dávila, J.D. (2002). 'Bogotá: progress within a hostile environment,' in D.J. Myers and H.A. Dietz (eds.), *Capital city politics in Latin America: democratisation and empowerment*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Gilbert, A. and Ward, P. (1986). 'Latin American migrants: a tale of three cities,' in F. Slater (ed.), *People and environments: issues and enquiries*. London: Collins Educational.
- Giles, W. and Hyndman, J. (2004). 'Introduction: gender and conflict in a global context,' in W. Giles and J. Hyndman (eds.), *Sites of violence: gender and conflict zones*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Goldsmith, A. (2000). 'Police accountability reform in Colombia: the civilian oversight experiment,' in A. Goldsmith and C. Lewis (eds.), *Civilian oversight of policing: governance, democracy and human rights*. Oxford: Hart.
- González de la Rocha, M. (2006). 'Vanishing assets: cumulative disadvantages among the urban poor,' in P. Fernández-Kelly and J. Shefner (eds.), *Out of the shadows: political action and the informal economy in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

- Guzmán, A. (2000). 'Violencia urbana: teorías y políticas de seguridad ciudadana,' in Á. Camacho and F. Leal Buitrago (eds.), *Armar la paz es desarmar la guerra*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Colombiana (CEREC).
- Ilic, V. (2001). 'Yugoslavia: displacement from Kosovo, from patronage to self-help,' in M. Vincent and B.R. Sorenson (eds.), *Caught between borders: response strategies of the internally displaced*. London: Pluto Press.
- Indra, D. (1999). 'Not a "room of one's own": engendering forced migration knowledge and practice,' in D. Indra (ed.), *Engendering forced migration: theory and practice*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Jacobsen, K., Lautze, S. and Osman, A.M.K. (2001). 'The Sudan: the unique challenges of displacement in Khartoum,' in M. Vincent and B.R. Sorensen (eds.), *Caught between borders: response strategies of the internally displaced*. London: Pluto Press.
- Kruijt, D. and Koonings, K. (1999). 'Introduction: violence and fear in Latin America,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Societies of fear: the legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.
- Kumar, K. (1996). 'The nature and focus of international assistance for rebuilding war-torn societies,' in K. Kumar (ed.), *Rebuilding societies after civil war: critical roles for international assistance*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Leal Buitrago, F. (2004a). 'Armed actors in the Colombian conflict,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Armed actors: organised violence and state failure in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.
- _____ (2004b). 'The military and the national security doctrine,' in M. Baud and D. Meertens (eds.), *Colombia from the inside: perspectives on drugs, war and peace*. Amsterdam: Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation.
- Leal Buitrago, F. [et al] (2000). 'Seguridad nacional y seguridad ciudadana: una aproximación hacia la paz,' in Á. Camacho and F. Leal Buitrago (eds.), *Armar la paz es desarmar la guerra*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Colombiana (CEREC).
- Levitt, S. and Rubio, M. (2005). 'Understanding crime in Colombia and what can be done about it,' in A. Alesina (ed.), *Institutional reform: the case of Colombia*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Llorente, M.V. (1999). 'Perfil de la policía colombiana,' in M.V. Llorente and M. Deas (eds.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*. Bogotá: CEREC, Ediciones Uniandes and Grupo Editorial Norma.

- _____ (2004). 'La experiencia de la policía comunitaria de Bogotá: contexto y balance,' in H. Frühling (ed.), *Calles más seguras: estudios de policía comunitaria en América Latina*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- _____ (2006). 'Demilitarisation in a war zone,' in J. Bailey and L. Dammert (eds.), *Public security and police reform in the Americas*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Londoño, F. and Diettes, G. (1993). 'Dependencias orgánicas mayores: surgimiento y evolución,' in Á. Valencia Tovar (ed.), *Historia de la policía nacional de Colombia*. Bogotá: Planeta.
- Maguire, M. (2007). 'Crime data and statistics,' in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of criminology*, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Martín-Barbero, J. (2002). 'The city: between fear and the media,' in S. Rotker (ed.), *Citizens of fear: urban violence in Latin America*. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press.
- McIlwaine, C. and Moser, C. (2007). 'Living in fear: how the urban poor perceive violence, fear and insecurity,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Fractured cities: social exclusion, urban violence and contested spaces in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.
- Obregón, L. and Stavropoulou, M. (1998). 'In search of hope: the plight of displaced Colombians,' in R. Cohen and F.M. Deng (eds.), *The forsaken people: case studies of the internally displaced*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Oslender, U. (2007). 'Spaces of terror and fear on Colombia's Pacific coast: the armed conflict and forced displacement among Black communities,' in D. Gregory and A. Pred (eds.), *Violent geographies: fear, terror, and political violence*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Pécaut, D. (1992). 'Guerrillas and violence,' in C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda and G. Sánchez (eds.), *Violence in Colombia: the contemporary crisis in historical perspective*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- _____ (1999). 'From the banality of violence to real terror: the case of Colombia,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Societies of fear: the legacy of civil war, violence and terror in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.

- Peñate, A. (1999). 'El sendero estratégico del ELN: del idealismo guevarista al clientelismo armado,' in M.V. Llorente and M. Deas (eds.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*. Bogotá: CEREC, Ediciones Uniandes and Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Pizarro Leongómez, E. (1992). 'Revolutionary guerrilla groups in Colombia,' in C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda and G. Sánchez (eds.), *Violence in Colombia: the contemporary crisis in historical perspective*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- _____ (2002). 'Colombia: toward an institutional collapse?,' in S. Rotker (ed.), *Citizens of fear: urban violence in Latin America*. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press.
- Puyana, A.M. (1999). 'Cultivos ilícitos, fumigación y desplazamiento en la Amazonía y la Orinoquía,' in F. Cubides and C. Domínguez (eds.), *Desplazados, migraciones internas y reestructuraciones territoriales*. Bogotá: Centro de Estudios Sociales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Quinney, R. (1975). 'Public perceptions of crime,' in R.L. Henshel and R.A. Silverman (eds.), *Perception in criminology*. London: Columbia University Press.
- Rangel, A. (1999). 'Las FARC-EP: una mirada actual,' in M.V. Llorente and M. Deas (eds.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*. Bogotá: CEREC, Ediciones Uniandes and Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Reguillo, R. (2002). 'The social construction of fear: urban narratives and practices,' in S. Rotker (ed.), *Citizens of fear: urban violence in Latin America*. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press.
- Reiner, R. (1996). 'The case of the missing crime,' in R. Levitas and W. Guy (eds.), *Interpreting official statistics*. London: Routledge.
- _____ (2007). 'Media-made criminality: the representation of crime in the mass media,' in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of criminology*, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Restrepo, L.A. (2004). 'Violence and fear in Colombia: fragmentation of space, contraction of time and forms of evasion,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Armed actors: organised violence and state failure in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.
- Rozema, R. (2007). 'Medellín,' in K. Koonings and D. Kruijt (eds.), *Fractured cities: social exclusion, urban violence and contested spaces in Latin America*. London: Zed Books.

- Rubio, M. (1999a). 'Criminalidad urbana en Colombia,' in M.V. Llorente and M. Deas (eds.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*. Bogotá: CEREC, Ediciones Uniandes and Grupo Editorial Norma.
- _____ (1999b). 'La justicia en una sociedad violenta,' in M.V. Llorente and M. Deas (eds.), *Reconocer la guerra para construir la paz*. Bogotá: CEREC, Ediciones Uniandes and Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Sánchez, F., Díaz, A.M. and Formisano, M. (2007). 'Conflicto, crimen violento y actividad en Colombia: un análisis espacial,' in F. Sánchez, *Las cuentas de la violencia: ensayos económicos sobre el conflicto y el crimen en Colombia*. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Sánchez, F., Espinosa, S. and Rivas, Á. (2007). '¿Garrote o zanahoria? Factores asociados a la disminución de la violencia homicida y el crimen en Bogotá, 1983-2002,' in F. Sánchez, *Las cuentas de la violencia: ensayos económicos sobre el conflicto y el crimen en Colombia*. Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Sánchez, G. (1992). 'The violence: an interpretative synthesis,' in C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda and G. Sánchez (eds.), *Violence in Colombia: the contemporary crisis in historical perspective*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.
- Santino, U. (1997). 'Law enforcement in Italy and Europe against mafia and organised crime,' in W.F. McDonald (ed.), *Crime and law enforcement in the global village*. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing.
- Schuller, T., Baron, S. and Field, J. (2000). 'Social capital: a review and critique,' in S. Baron, J. Field and T. Schuller (eds.), *Social capital: critical perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sen, A. (1990). 'Gender and cooperative conflicts,' in I. Tinker (ed.), *Persistent inequalities: women and world development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sjöberg, L. (1999). 'Perceived competence and motivation in industry and government as factors in risk perception,' in G. Cvetkovich and R.E. Löfstedt (eds.), *Social trust and the management of risk*. London: Earthscan.
- Slovic, P. (1999). 'Perceived risk, trust, and democracy,' in G. Cvetkovich and R.E. Löfstedt (eds.), *Social trust and the management of risk*. London: Earthscan.
- Stavropoulou, M. (1998). 'Will Peru's displaced return?,' in R. Cohen and F.M. Deng (eds.), *The forsaken people: case studies of the internally displaced*. Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press.
- Stevenson, N. (2000). 'Culture and citizenship: an introduction,' in N. Stevenson (ed.), *Culture and citizenship*. London: SAGE.

- Thomas, L. (2005). 'Poverty and urban violence,' in N. Hamdi and J. Handal (eds.), *Urban futures: economic growth and poverty reduction*. London: ITDG Publishing.
- Tulchin, J.S. and Golding, H.A. (2003). 'Introduction, citizen security in regional perspective,' in H. Frühling and J.S. Tulchin, (eds.) with H.A. Golding, *Crime and violence in Latin America: citizen security, democracy, and the state*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.
- Warren, M. (2001). 'Power and conflicts in social capital: community organising and urban policy,' in B. Edwards, M. Foley and M. Diani (eds.), *Beyond Tocqueville: civil society and the social capital debate in comparative perspective*. Hanover, HN: University Press of New England.

Research and Working Papers

- Ballesteros, A. [et al.] (2007). 'The work of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch: evidence from Colombia,' Documento de Centro de Recursos para Análisis de Conflictos (CERAC) No. 4. Bogotá: CERAC.
- Brito Ruiz, F. (2000). 'La estructura del delito de secuestro en Colombia,' Working Paper. Bogotá: Instituto de Estudios por la Democracia y la Paz y la Convivencia en Colombia (DEPAZ).
- Call, C.T. (2000). 'Sustainable development in Central America: the challenges of violence, injustice and insecurity,' CA 2020: Working Paper No. 8. Hamburg: Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde.
- Deshingkar, P. and Start, D. (2003). 'Seasonal migration for livelihoods in India: coping, accumulation and exclusion,' Working Paper No. 220. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Dureau, F. and Flórez, C.E. (1996). 'Dinámicas demográficas colombianas: de lo nacional a lo local,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 96-01. Bogotá: CEDE, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de los Andes.
- Echandía, C. (1999). 'Geografía de la violencia homicida en Bogotá,' mimeo. Bogotá: Paz Pública-CEDE-Uniandes.
- Flórez, C.E. (2002). 'The function of the urban informal sector in employment: evidence from Colombia, 1984-2000,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2002-04. Bogotá: CEDE, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de los Andes.

- Gutiérrez, F. [et al.] (2009). 'Politics and security in three Colombian cities,' Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, Working Paper No. 27. London: Development Studies Institute, LSE.
- Hidalgo Guerrero, D. (2003). 'Contributions of TransMilenio to the development of bus rapid transit systems,' mimeo. Bogotá.
- Hines, D. and Balleto, R. (2002). 'Assessment of needs of internally displaced persons in Colombia,' Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Working Paper No. 189. London: ODI.
- Ibáñez, A.M. and Querubín, P. (2004). 'Acceso a tierras y desplazamiento forzado en Colombia,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2004-23. Bogotá: CEDE, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de los Andes.
- Ibáñez, A.M. and Vélez, C.E. (2005). 'Civil conflict and forced migration: the micro determinants and the welfare losses of displacement in Colombia,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2005-35. Bogotá: CEDE, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de los Andes.
- Instituto de Desarrollo Humano (2002). 'Percepción y expectativas ciudadanas sobre la modalidad de Policía Comunitaria en Santa Fe de Bogotá,' mimeo. Bogotá: Instituto de Desarrollo Humano, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.
- Jacobsen, K. (2003). 'Local integration: the forgotten solution,' Migration Policy Institute Working Paper. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Kirchhoff, S. and Ibáñez, A.M. (2001). 'Displacement due to violence in Colombia: determinants and consequences at the household level,' ZEF – Discussion Papers on Development Policy No. 41. Bonn: Centre for Development Research.
- Llorente, M.V., Núñez, J. and Rubio, M. (2000). 'Efecto de los controles al consumo de alcohol y al porte de armas de fuego sobre los homicidios en Bogotá,' Working Paper No.6 Bogotá: Paz Pública-CEDE-Uniandes and Alcaldía de Bogotá.
- Llorente, M.V. [et al.] (2000). 'Caracterización de la violencia homicida en Bogotá,' Working Paper No. 5. Bogotá: Paz Pública-CEDE-Uniandes and Alcaldía de Bogotá.
- Melo, J.O. (1995). 'Ciudadanía y violencia: algunas notas sobre la experiencia en Medellín,' Documento de Trabajo, CIDSE-Universidad del Valle. Cali: CIDSE.
- Offstein, N. (2002). 'An extortionary guerrilla movement,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2002-09. Bogotá: CEDE, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de los Andes.

- _____ (2003). 'An historical review and analysis of Colombian guerrilla movements,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2003-21. Bogotá: CEDE, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de los Andes.
- Ribero, R. (2003). 'Gender dimensions of non-formal employment in Colombia,' Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE) Document No. 2003-04. Bogotá: CEDE, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de los Andes.
- Rubio, M. (1998). 'Crimen con misterio: lo que revelan las estadísticas de violencia y criminalidad en Colombia,' Working Paper. Bogotá: Paz Pública-CEDE-Uniandes.
- Rueda-García, N. (2003). 'The case of Bogotá, Colombia,' Working Paper for the United Nations Global Report on Human Settlements 2003 – The Challenge of Slums. London: Development Planning Unit (DPU), University College London (UCL).
- Smith, A. and Varese, F. (2000). 'Payment, protection and punishment: the role of information and reputation in the mafia,' Sociology Working Papers No. 2002-03 Oxford: Department of Sociology, University of Oxford.
- Uribe, M.V. (1993). 'Violencia difusa en Bogotá,' Working Paper. Bogotá: Fundación Alejandro Ángel Escobar.
- Waddington, C. (2003). 'Livelihood outcomes of migration for poor people,' Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty Working Paper No. T1. Brighton: Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, University of Sussex.

Unpublished Conference Papers

- Cohen, M. and Rubio, M. (2007). 'Violence and crime in Latin America,' Paper prepared for Consulta de San José 2007 on 22-26 October. San José: The Inter-American Development Bank.
- Flórez, C.E. (2003). 'Migration and the urban informal sector in Colombia,' Paper presented at the Conference on 'African Migration in Comparative Perspective' on 4-7 June. Johannesburg, South Africa.
- Hall, S. [et al.] (n.d.). 'Newsmaking and crime,' Paper presented at the NARCO Conference on Crime and Media. Birmingham: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham.
- González, A. (2004). 'Patrones de migración en Colombia,' Paper presented at the 25th International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) on 6-8 October. Las Vegas, NV: LASA.

- Londoño, J.L. (1996). 'Violencia, psichis y capital social,' Paper presented at the Second Latin American Conference on Economic Development. Bogotá: World Bank and Universidad de Los Andes.
- Meertens, D. (2003). 'Forced displacement in Colombia: public policy, gender and initiatives for reconstruction,' Paper prepared for Conference on 'African Migration in Comparative Perspective' on 4-7 June. Johannesburg.
- Moser, C. (1996). 'Urban poverty and violence: consolidation or erosion of social capital?,' Paper presented at the Second Latin American Conference on Economic Development. Bogotá: World Bank and Universidad de Los Andes.
- Palacios, M. (1997). 'Por una agenda de paz,' Paper presented at DNP and IEPRI, Universidad Nacional de Colombia on 'La Paz es Rentable'. México, D.F. and Bogotá: IEPRI, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Rubio, M. (1998). 'Los costos de la violencia en América Latina: una crítica al enfoque económico en boga,' Paper presented at the Conference on 'Foro sobre convivencia y seguridad ciudadana en el Istmo Centroamericano, Haití y República Dominicana' on 2-4 June. San Salvador.
- _____ (2004). 'Kidnapping and armed conflict in Colombia,' Paper presented at the PRIO Workshop on 'Techniques of Violence in Civil War' on 20-21 August. Oslo: PRIO.
- Sarmiento, L. (2000). 'Desarrollo social, conflicto y territorio,' Paper presented at the International Seminar on 'Desplazamiento, conflicto, paz y desarrollo,' on 30 May-2 June. Bogotá.

Non-Governmental Organisations' Publications

- Arquidiócesis de Bogotá and CODHES (1997). *Desplazados por violencia y conflicto social en Bogotá*. Bogotá: Editorial Kimpres.
- _____ (1999). *Desplazados: huellas de nunca borrar, casos de Bogotá y Soacha*. Bogotá: Editorial Kimpres.
- _____ (2001). *Senderos: rostros invisibles del desplazamiento en Bogotá*. Bogotá: Editorial Kimpres.
- Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (ANIF) (2001). *Informe Semanal*, no. 565. Bogotá: ANIF.
- Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (1999). *Habitantes de la calle: un estudio de El Cartucho*. Bogotá: Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá.

- _____ (2002). *Observatorio de la seguridad*, no. 22. Bogotá: Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá.
- Consortio Iberoamericano de Empresas de Investigación de Mercadeo y Asesoramiento (CIMA) (2001). *Barómetro Iberoamericano: informe de opinión de Latinoamérica y de la Península Ibérica 2001*. Bogotá: CIMA.
- Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES) (1995). *Sistema de información de hogares desplazados por la violencia*. Bogotá: CODHES.
- Corporación Excelencia en la Justicia (CEJ) (1997). *Justicia y desarrollo: debates*, no. 1. Bogotá: CEJ.
- _____ (1998). *Políticas de seguridad y convivencia para el nuevo siglo*. Bogotá: CEJ.
- Human Rights Watch (1993). *State of war: political violence and counterinsurgency in Colombia*. New York and London: Human Rights Watch.
- _____ (1998). *War without quarter: Colombia and international humanitarian law*. New York and London: Human Rights Watch.
- _____ (2000). *The ties that bind: Colombia and military-paramilitary links*. New York and London: Human Rights Watch.
- _____ (2001). *The 'Sixth Division': military-paramilitary ties and U.S. policy in Colombia*. New York and London: Human Rights Watch.
- _____ (2003). *You'll learn not to cry: child combatants in Colombia*. New York and London: Human Rights Watch.
- _____ (2005). *Colombia: displaced and discarded. The plight of internally displaced persons in Bogotá and Cartagena*. New York and London: Human Rights Watch.
- Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (INDEPAZ) (2007). *Ciudadanía y conflicto: encuesta de percepciones desde la cotidianidad*. Bogotá: INDEPAZ.
- Lleras de la Fuente, C. [et al.] (eds.) (1992). *Interpretación y génesis de la constitución de Colombia*. Bogotá: Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá.
- Navia, C.E. and Ossa, M. (2001). *Sometimiento y libertad: manejo psicológico y familiar del secuestro*. Bogotá: País Libre.
- Osorio Pérez, F.E. (1999). 'Mujer desplazada: violencia y discriminación,' in J.E. Rojas Rodríguez (ed.), *Un país que huye: desplazamiento y violencia en una nación fragmentada*. Bogotá: CODHES and UNICEF.

_____ (2001). 'Territorios, identidades y acción colectiva: pistas en la comprensión del desplazamiento,' in Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES), *Desplazamiento forzado interno en Colombia: conflicto, paz y desarrollo*. Bogotá: CODHES.

País Libre (1998). *Crónica de untaros delio: breve reseña del secuestro*. Bogotá: País Libre.

_____ (1999). *Expectativas y actitudes frente al secuestro*. Bogotá: País Libre.

_____ (2002.). *Consejos para los familiares del secuestrado*. Bogotá: País Libre.

_____ (various years). *Secuestro, extorsión y guerra en Colombia durante los años 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002* (Boletín de Prensa). Bogotá: País Libre.

Pax Christi Netherlands (2001). *The kidnap industry in Colombia: our business?*. Utrecht: Pax Christi Netherlands.

Rojas Rodríguez, J.E. (ed.) (1999). *Un país que huye: desplazamiento y violencia en una nación fragmentada*. Bogotá: CODHES and UNICEF.

Unpublished Theses

Cordeweners, T. (2008). 'Violence in Bogotá, Colombia: a rich man's problem?,' Unpublished master's thesis. Utrecht University.

Greco, E.A. (1987). 'Unionised professionals in Latin America: a Colombian case study,' Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Boston University.

Melman, R.M. (1978). 'Populist mass mobilisation in Latin America: ANAPO,' Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Columbia University.

Velásquez, R. (2001). 'Agency, institutional constraints and law in the creation of Bogotá's new local governments and in the evolution of local government policies, 1991-1997,' Unpublished D.Phil. dissertation. University of Oxford.

Electronic Resources

Buscher, D. (n.d.). 'Case identification: challenges posed by urban refugees,' Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f41f4e34.html>>, accessed 29 July 2008.

Control Risks Group (2002). 'City briefs: Bogotá and Medellín,' Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.controlrisks.com>>, accessed 5 December 2004.

- DANE (2006). 'Colombia: estimaciones 1985-2005 y proyecciones 2006-2020 anualizadas por sexo y edad,' Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/poblacion/seriesp85_20/EstimacionesProyecciones1985__020.xls>, accessed 25 July 2008.
- González de la Rocha, M. (2000). 'Private adjustments: household responses to the erosion of work,' Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.hdr.undp.org/docs/events/global_forum/2000/rocha.pdf>, accessed 1 March 2009.
- Guerrero, R. (1999). 'Programa desarrollo, seguridad y paz DESEPAZ de la ciudad de Cali,' Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/2112spa.pdf>>, accessed 25 April 2007.
- LeGrand, C.C. (2001). 'The Colombian crisis in historical perspective,' Online. Available HTTP: <http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu:7001/Events/conferences/Colombia/workingpapers/working_paper_legrand.doc>, accessed 31 January 2005.
- Ministerio de Defensa (2002). 'Fuerzas armadas con el concepto mas favorable,' Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/fuerza/fpconcepto.html>>, accessed 1 October 2005.
- Mockus, A. (2001). 'Cultura ciudadana: programa contra la violencia en Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, 1995-1997,' Online. Available: HTTP: <<http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/culturaciudadana.pdf>>, accessed 25 April 2006.
- Posada Carbó, E. (2001), 'El lenguaje de la paz y sus errores,' Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.ideaspaz.org/articulos/download/10lenguaje_de_paz_y_sus_errors.pdf>, accessed 10 January 2007.
- Rojas, C. (2003). 'Forging a culture of citizenship in Bogotá city,' Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.iadb.org/int/jpn/english/support_files/10colombia.pdf>, accessed 4 July 2006.
- Santos, F. (n.d.). 'Carta a un secuestrado,' Online. Available HTTP: <<http://www.paislibre.org/>>, accessed 28 July 2007.
- US Department of State (2002). 'Colombia: Travel Warnings,' Online. Available HTTP: <http://travel.state.gov/colombia_warning.html> and <<http://travel.state.gov/Colombia.html>>, accessed 28 December 2004.