

Islamic Governmentality and Food Business Development: The Case of Brunei Halal Certification (2011- 2021)

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Declaration of authorship

I, Izni Azrein Noor Azalie, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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Abstract

This research delves into Brunei's halal certification program in the food industry through the lens of Foucault's (1991a) governmentality. Employing "Islamic governmentality", it explores the interplay of political rationalities and governing technologies used in halal governance, as seen through Dean's (2010) Analytics of Government (AOG), and the impact on Brunei's food businesses. Analysis of Halal Food Control Division's (HFCD) social media and governor interviews underscore the significant role of the monarchy in shaping political rationalities for halalisation and the use of diverse governing technologies, such as the Quran and the Hadith and industrial halal, as well as the digital space for socialisation, knowledge production, sharing, and creating halal behavioural standards. It also brings to light the existence of various governmentalities within halal certification governance. Insights from business surveys and interviews highlight the challenges in translating the idealised vision of Islamic governance into actual practices, including information asymmetries, ineffective knowledge-sharing, and personalised halal certification processes. Economically, businesses faced escalated production costs, limited market access, and imbalanced power dynamics with standard-setters, which impeded growth. These findings offer evidence of the impact of halal governance when Islamic governmentality, a concept that remains largely theoretical in contemporary Islamic ethics and governance fields, is put into action. Furthermore, assessing governmentality and its effects on the governed subject in this study provides extended linkages that Foucauldian governmentality scholars have yet to make clear, a novelty in its own terms. This is imperative as the world is in the middle of a transition, with more efforts being put into materialising the vision 2030 via the Sustainable Development Goals

(SDGs). Therefore, by proposing the integration of five components in Islamic governance for effective halal governmentality, the Integrated Islamic Halal Governmentality (IIHG) model is formulated to achieve fair and just halal governance whilst addressing some essential components relating to sustainability.

Impact Statement

This research offers profound insights into the dynamics of halal certification governance in Brunei and its subsequent impacts on the development of the halal food industry. While contemporary halal certification and standardisation are primarily focused on industrial fulfilment of requirements, halal science, and debates surrounding halal rulings concerning food production and consumption, there is a noticeable dearth of studies investigating the effects of halal standardisation towards food producers. When developing the halal economy as part of Brunei's economic diversification strategy, it is crucial to consider Islamic ethics, economy, and governance. This is a pivotal aspect of Brunei's Vision 2035 and the Brunei Economic Blueprint 2020, which aim to develop the economy and achieve a high quality of life and development among Bruneians.

Theoretically, the combination of the governmentality theory with the Islamic perspective on ethics and governance in this research offers novel insights into halal food development. It bridges the gap between European and Islamic views on halal governance, leading to a new emergence. With a country whose polity, economy and society are influenced by diverging historical experiences, from being a monarchy, a colony, to an independent Sultanate, this multitude of experiences significantly impacts how halal governing is carried out. It also provides an empirical case study on the actual effects of halal standardisation that utilises some degree of Islamic way of governing, which has been challenging to study due to the 'idealistic' or utopian ways in which halal governance is perceived. It also extended the application of Foucauldian governmentality by examining how the governors' governing affected the subject or the people being

governed. These interrelationships and their dynamics have never been made clear before; hence, the study focuses on this. Appropriate development policies can be constructed by assessing the effectiveness of halal governance and its effects on the food businesses. The proposed Integrated Islamic Halal Governmentality model acts as the starting point towards the establishment of sustainable halal governance, which incorporates the need to safeguard the welfare of communities, protect their mental health and well-being, support their ability to sustain themselves and create wealth for posterity purposes as well as for the protection of their rights to be self-determined and to live in dignity.

As a research methodological toolkit, the framework offers new ways of carrying out halal governing via digital spaces such as social media. Its use for information-sharing, knowledge creation, and co-creation, coupled with its potential to be used as an effective governance tool via public-private and people exchanges, makes it more beneficial. This study highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of this tool as part of the halal governing mechanisms while simultaneously providing the foundation for innovation based on the preceding experiences.

Its contribution to SDGs, mainly on zero poverty, decent job and economic growth, sustainable cities and communities, and responsible production and consumption, would be useful as the world explores ways to achieve sustainable development when the threat of climate change is real and present.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AGC	Attorney General Chambers
AI	Artificial Intelligence
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BCG	Brunei Certification Guidelines
BEDB	Brunei Economic Development Board
BDFA	Brunei Darussalam Food Authority
BIC	Bio-Innovation Corridor
BIRC	Brunei Islamic Religious Council
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DARe	Darussalam Enterprise
DO	District Office
DOF	Department of Fisheries
DOAA	Department of Agriculture and Agri-food
EUREP-GAP	European Good Agricultural Practices
FB	Facebook
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GAP	Good Agricultural Production
GLC	Government Linked Companies
GMP	Good Manufacturing Practices
G2G	Government to Government
G2C	Government to Citizen
G2B	Government to Business
HACCP	Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points
HCHLO	Halal Certificate And Halal Label Order
HFCD	Halal Food Control Divisions
IBTE	Institutes of Brunei Technical Educations
IDC	Islamic Da'wah Centre
IoT	Internet of Things
ISO	International Organisation for Standardisation

IMTS	International Merchandise Trade Systems
KIV	Keep in View
MABIMS	Ministers of Religious Affairs of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore
MCYS	Ministry of Culture, Youth And Sports
MNC	Multi-National Corporations
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MORA	Ministry of Religious Affairs
MPRT	Ministry of Primary Resources and Tourism
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PCSU	Police Crime Scene Unit
PBD	Piawaian Brunei Darussalam
RBAF	Royal Brunei Armed Forces
R2S	Royal to Subjects
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SIPA	Agriculture and Agri-food Incentives Scheme
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
UNISSA	University of Sultan Sharif Ali
1K1P	One Village One Product
3 Cs	Competencies, Capacities and Capabilities Development

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

1.0 Research Statement, Problem and Context

Understanding scholarly development on studies relating to the halal industry runs in tandem with the major development in Islamic economics, which Islamic scholars see as a function of both growth and development, economically and socially different from conventional capitalistic economics. Issues in conventional capitalist economics relating to poverty, corruption, unequal distribution of income and wealth, unemployment, industrialisation, and the environment, among others, were often fine-tuned, Islamised and discussed from the lens of Islamic scholarship. References to Islamic primary sources such as the *Quran* and the *Hadith* have been made to provide ideal solutions to these problems to Islamically develop fairly and justly by safeguarding the welfare of the *Ummah* as envisioned in the *Maqasid Al-Sharia* (Ibn Khaldun 1406; Al-Mawardi, 1058). However, further scrutiny of these solutions found that such idealisation is void of successful, real-world case studies and Islamic implementation relating to humanity's economic problems (Khan, 2013; Research in Islamic Economics Centre, 2008), making it more of a romantic utopian Islamic narrative than a reality, as concepts rather than something that can be theoretically and empirically proven and tested. Hallaq (2012) and Khan (2013) argued that often when the *Quran* and *Hadith* were removed from the discussions, the problems identified were similar to those identified via conventional wisdom. Hence, rather than addressing the question of 'what Islamic economics can do', the question of 'what is currently being done or in effect (on or by Islamic economics)' shall be considered. It is only by studying current Muslim behaviour, juxtaposing the real

role of Islamic institutions in contrast to its role in the Islamic economics literature (Siddiqi, 2008; Khan, 2013) and collection of a dearth baseline Muslim societies' social and economic data that fruitful assessment and evaluation of the degree of success or failures of Islamic policies and economies can be measured (Chapra, 2008). It can also be used to evaluate whether the current Islamic economic development trajectory follows the principles of Islamic justice and ethics envisioned under the Islamic governance concept or vis-à-vis (Lewis, 2005). The idea of prosperity and misery in Islam, according to Khan (2013), also runs in parallel with one another, results of the mutually self-reinforcing dynamism between the factors of wealth production, its processes and economic outcomes resulting from normative change in human behaviour and their ethical and moral endeavours. This normative change in behaviour should not only be measured through the economic lens of labour efficiency and productivity or economic conventions. However, it should also be done by assessing the effects of embracing Islamic ethics and principles in daily living and operations.

The collapse of the post-war development consensus and the rise of neoliberal globalisation in the late 20th century catalysed a critical reassessment of the development project. As the promised outcomes of economic modernisation and nation-state-centered growth failed to materialise across much of the Global South, development came under increasing scrutiny for its Eurocentric, economistic, and depoliticising tendencies (Esteva, 1992; McMichael, 1996). The age of development, once legitimised through discourses of progress and modernisation—as exemplified in President Truman's 1949 inauguration of the development agenda—was increasingly perceived as a mode of governance that

reduced diverse societies to "underdeveloped" mirrors of the industrial North (Esteva, 1992). In response, critical development studies emerged as a field committed to interrogating the power-laden nature of development discourse and practice. Rather than proposing a singular alternative, this approach advocates for plural, ethically grounded understandings of development that attend to historical context, structural inequalities, and local agency (Slater, 1994; McMichael, 1996). In doing so, it challenges the presumed neutrality of development and emphasises a more reflexive, moral, and political engagement with questions of global inequality.

Arguments surrounding religion and their role in development studies are increasingly gaining centrality as the current Western capitalist system has failed to address the problems associated with its development. Development studies have historically marginalised the role of religion, often treating it as a residual cultural factor or barrier to modernisation. More recently, however, a body of scholarship has challenged the secular assumptions underlying dominant development paradigms (Clarke, 2011; Fountain, 2013; Mittermaier, 2019). Scholars such as Feener and Fountain (2012) have argued that religion should be analysed as a formative aspect of development itself, shaping institutional logics (vertically and horizontally), ethical frameworks, and visions of social progress.

Within this broader rethinking of religion and development, there has been growing interest in how Islamic values and institutions are mobilised for developmental ends. This includes work on Islamic finance, zakat, humanitarianism, and halal governance, all of

which reflect distinct moral economies and political rationalities (Clarke, 2011; Rudnyckyj, 2019). Such scholarship suggests that Islamic development is not a singular model but a contested and plural field, where competing interpretations of religiosity, governance, and modernity converge.

In this context, this research addresses the gaps between the Islamic governing system and its effects on business development and entrepreneurship, using Brunei's halal food industry as a case study. Before exploring the nuances of current halal industrial development and related scholarly works, it is important to define halal and halal food and their significance. This will be followed by a justification of why investigating its governmentality is crucial, as reflected in this research.

What is halal and halal food? Halal, an Arabic term meaning "permissible" or "lawful," refers to actions, behaviours, and consumables—including food—that align with Islamic principles as outlined in the Quran and Sunnah (Al-Teinaz, 2020). Halal food adheres to specific guidelines, such as the exclusion of pork, alcohol, and blood (Quran 5:3), as well as the humane slaughter of permissible animals with a dedicated invocation to Allah (dhabihah), as emphasised in the hadith: "Verily, Allah has prescribed excellence in all things. If you must kill, kill well; if you slaughter, slaughter well" (Muslim, 2007). For Muslims, consuming halal food is not merely a dietary preference but a profound act of worship and obedience to divine commandments. The Quran explicitly ties lawful consumption to piety, stating, "O mankind, eat from whatever is on earth [that is] lawful and good, and do not follow the footsteps of Satan. Indeed, he is to you a clear enemy"

(Quran 2:168). Islam emphasises that physical nourishment is intertwined with spiritual well-being, and hence, consuming halal sustains the body while honouring the sacred covenant between the Creator and creation. By consciously choosing halal, Muslims demonstrate 'taqwa' (God-consciousness), affirming their submission to Allah's will and purifying their intentions, as the Quran warns that consuming 'haram' (forbidden) substances "defiles the soul and corrupts the heart" (Al-Ghazali, n.d.). This practice reinforces piety, as impurities from 'haram' are believed to taint the soul, hinder prayers (Quran 5:90-91), and distance one from divine grace. Moreover, halal consumption fosters ethical awareness, promoting compassion in animal treatment, as the Prophet Muhammad taught, "Whoever is kind to the creatures of God, they are kind to him" (Ibn Majah, 2007, p. 317), and gratitude for lawful provision. In this way, halal food becomes a tangible expression of faith, linking daily sustenance to eternal accountability and the pursuit of righteousness in deed and devotion.

This thesis addresses how Brunei's halal certification regime functions as a form of governmentality that integrates Islamic authority, regulatory knowledge, and development rationalities in governing Muslim food producers. The analysis is structured around the three tiers of Dean's (2010) *Analytics of Government*: (i) political rationalities, (ii) governing technologies, and (iii) effects on the governed. These tiers guide the exploration of four key dimensions: the institutional rationalities of halal governing, the regulatory technologies deployed by the state, the impact of halal regimes on food business actors, and the alignment between halal standardisation and Brunei's

developmental aspirations. The details of these will be unravelled in the next few chapters to come.

The research focuses on halal food certification by investigating governing halal practices and processes among halal governors and their effects on the development of halal food micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). By situating halal certification as a form of religious governance that operates within and contributes to Brunei's national development agenda, it aims to contribute towards the wider debates on the role of religion in development. It builds on critical insights from Islamic governmentality literature, as will be discussed in the next chapter, while engaging with development studies' broader concern with power, institutional practice, and the shaping of economic subjectivities. It attempts to empirically prove whether the current halal certifying and governing institution in Brunei follows the Islamic guidelines towards governing the Islamic collectives or Ummah morally and responsibly, while absolving problems associated with development economics concerning growth and development. There is an increase in work done on halal certification and halal industrial governance from the perspective of Islamic governance. However, most governance regimes and practices are often ill-equipped or not robust enough to deal with the nuances and complexities associated with industrial governing and sustainability (Frame & Brown, 2008). Most are constructed 'fit for their original purposes'. But the institutions that supposedly articulate these purposes found themselves wanting, faced with contemporary dilemmas (Russel & Frame, 2013) contextually unique to them, making it difficult to adapt, be adept and optimise their utility. One of the ways to overcome such issues is by studying the unfolding

processes or phenomena in situ and identifying the working mechanisms that make operationalisation possible based on the context in which it occurs. Research on halal governance, particularly on State-backed halal standards such as the Brunei Halal Standard, the dynamics between the State, the food industrialists, and the public, and the effects of such standard-setting exercises, is rarely touched. Hence, the study conducted used a modified version of Foucault's theory on Governmentality, primarily use to study the 'thinking' or driver that drives the government's way of operating combined with Mitchel Dean's Analytics of Government (AOG) to analyse governing processes and Ibn Khaldun's view on Islamic ethics and principles of governance leading to the coining of the term Islamic governmentality towards halal certification governing in Brunei.

Hence, this thesis examines Brunei's halal certification regime as a site of Islamic governmentality, with particular attention to how state institutions mediate religious norms and economic governance. While halal certification is often approached in policy and industry literature as a technical or regulatory instrument, this study conceptualises it as a moral and developmental apparatus, through which the Brunei state articulates a vision of Islamic modernity grounded in economic diversification and religious obligation. Situating this study within the interdisciplinary field of development studies, it seeks to contribute to critical debates on the intersections between governance, religion, and development. In contrast to secular framings of development as primarily technocratic or market-driven, this research draws from Feener and Fountain's (2012) call to reframe religion not as an external context but as constitutive of development processes. In this regard, halal certification is examined as a state technology that governs markets and

moralties, advancing a developmental narrative consistent with Brunei's national aspirations.

In light of all this recent development in Southeast Asia, where does Brunei position itself in the wider ASEAN halal food industry and certification landscape? The recent publication *The Halal Industry in Asia: Perspectives from Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Japan, Indonesia and China* (Idris et al., 2025) offers a comprehensive examination of the halal industry's evolution across diverse Asian contexts. This volume delves into the multifaceted nature of halal industries, encompassing sectors such as food, finance, pharmaceuticals, and tourism. It emphasises the interplay between certification processes, regulatory frameworks, and the broader socio-economic and cultural landscapes of both Muslim-majority and minority countries. The book underscores how halal practices are not merely religious obligations but are also deeply intertwined with national development strategies, economic diversification efforts, and global market integration. However, it lacks the analytical approaches towards halal governing that this research will try to address.

Southeast Asia's halal industry is characterised by a complex tapestry of standards and certifications, reflecting the region's diverse religious, cultural, and political landscapes. Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei have developed their halal certification bodies and standards, leading to a lack of uniformity that poses challenges for cross-border trade and mutual recognition (Sa'adan & Pauzi, 2017; Rahman & Razak, 2024), although efforts have been made by the Ministers of Religious Affairs of Brunei,

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (MABIMS) to harmonise it in 2017 (MABIMS, 2017). Similarly, other ASEAN member states with a sizeable Muslim community, such as Thailand and the Philippines, also managed to tap into the halal market by introducing their own halal certification and regulatory bodies for the halal food manufacturing sector (Bergeuad-Blackler et al., 2016). This fragmentation necessitates a nuanced understanding of how nations negotiate the balance between maintaining religious authenticity and engaging in global economic systems. Review of the work by scholars such as Fischer (2011) and Lever and Fischer (2018) highlighted the competitive nature of the halal food and halal certification as an industry, powered by the need for economic growth as ASEAN established itself as an economic community in 2015.

Integrating insights from *Islam, Standards, and Technoscience: In Global Halal Zones* by Fischer (2016), halal governmentality can be further explored. Fischer's work illustrates how halal standards are related to religious compliance and the governance of populations through technoscientific means. He discusses how halal certification processes involve scientific testing, bureaucratic procedures, and international standardisation, all of which contribute to the shaping of Muslim consumer behaviour and identity in a globalised world. Corporatisation of Islam and the Sharia as part of the new Islamic economy in contrast to conventional ones (Sloane, 1998) showed the interesting dynamics and nuances on the effects of Islamisation of work and businesses, leading to efficient resource mobilisation (Sloane-White, 2017) and refiguration of commerce and workplace (Sloane-White, 2018). These works, among others, not only highlighted the current development within the Islamic economy per se, but it also critically scrutinised

the problems associated with current values of capitalist mass production system by emphasising the need for a more flexible specialisation of production that incorporates Islamic ethics, values and principles in the name of inclusivity.

By situating Brunei's halal certification practices within this broader Southeast Asian and global context, one can analyse how the nation navigates the dual objectives of upholding Islamic principles and participating in the global halal market. Just as regional and global arenas have become frontiers where the national institutionalisation of resources and their market accessibility are contested (Lund, 2018), often leading to increased alienation and dispossession as nations and industries are integrated into global value chains (Rasmussen & Lund, 2025; Lund, 2018), Brunei's halal strategy reflects a governance model that attempts to harmonise religious values with economic imperatives. Halal certification is thus employed as a dual-purpose instrument—guiding spiritual practice while regulating market participation—though its impact on facilitating regional and global market access remains fully assessed. This dual role of halal certification exemplifies the intricate relationship between religion, governance, and development in contemporary Muslim societies. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, such a balancing act requires critical reflection, particularly if the current certification governing resulted in detrimental effects on the food businesses. The integration of these scholarly works provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the complexities of halal certification in Southeast Asia. They highlight the multifaceted nature of halal practices, encompassing religious, economic, scientific, and political dimensions. This holistic perspective is essential for analysing how halal certification functions as a mechanism of governance

that shapes national development strategies and the everyday lives of Muslim consumers, whilst situating Brunei's position within regional and globalised halal, cementing the need for further investigation.

The general discourse on halal certification and standardisation, particularly that of the Brunei government, emphasises primarily the need to utilise halal ingredients in food processing as well as the need to maintain halal integrity for the benefit of consumers (*halalan tayyiban*), i.e., as part of their religious dietary practices, as well as the social and economic benefits it creates towards businesses (Al-Haadi, 2010; Too & Shahminan, 2014). However, as will be seen in the brief review of halal-related research in Brunei, there is a limited study to date that seeks to investigate further into some of these benefit claims apart from those that Malaysian scholars make with regard to Brunei's halal auditing process (Othman et al., 2015). Studies on halal governance and how it affects Brunei's producers and agri-food business owners have yet to be conducted.

An overview of research publications relating to Brunei halal studies showed rich and abundant sources of information. Whilst research on halal in other parts of the world has gained momentum as early as the late 1990s, the proliferation of writings on Brunei's halal industry only showed in-depth interest among scholars after it was earmarked as the next potential driver of Brunei's economic diversification strategies, particularly after the first decade of the 21st century. Concerning some of the research carried out between 2017 and 2022, most of it was focused on five major recurring themes. One of the themes widely researched relates to the Brunei halal certification quality assurances relating to

the level of halalness, safety and hygiene. In the exploratory study by Raffi, Hasan and Sumimura (2019), for instance, the researchers studied the potential of applying the principles of *halalan tayyiban* combined with Japanese experiences in food quality and safety. In other studies on halal assurances by Sulaiman (2019a), Rahim, Sulaiman and Hashim (2021), the focus was more technical, particularly on the need to develop quality halal animal feed as well as experimentation on developing synergistic halal management systems for poultry farming in Brunei.

Apart from the latter studies, which were concerned mainly with the effects of COVID-19 on Brunei's national food industry, halal production and consumption, as highlighted by Sulaiman and Hasim (2022) on the pandemic's halal food handling and COVID-19 and Brunei's food security in general (Sulaiman et al., 2021), there were also studies which tries to approach halal industrial development from the sustainability perspectives (see Sulaiman, 2019b; Wahab et al., 2020; Pratikto et al, 2021). Studies on halal certification (Kifli, 2019; Khalid et al, 2018), halal certification and value chains (Sulaiman & Hashim, 2021) as well as on halal supply chains and logistics (Ab Talib, 2019, 2020; Mahalle et al., 2020; Ab Talib & Wahab, 2021) helped further enriched the national knowledge-based in hope of encouraging the growth of Brunei's halal industry. These writings highlight the inherent potential of Brunei's halal food industry. However, issues surrounding the sustainability of firms, the lack of real industry-based case studies to support claims made and the failure to understand the dynamics of the structural regulatory and institutional framework with both economic and non-economic agents alike resulted in ungrounded superficial findings. At best, the kind of knowledge created was general or planar since it

was approached from a bird's eye visionary field with little understanding of the vertical dynamics between structure and agents. This highlights the need for an applied, empirically based, and in-depth study beyond the current normative, 'check listing' or consultancy-like overview type of studies.

Research on halal consumers and their behaviours, such as those aimed at assessing the level of halal awareness among the public and university students (Hashim, 2021; Sulaiman et al., 2021), consumer reception to Brunei halal food, logo and meat products (Muhamad et al., 2017; Khalid et al, 2018) and the emerging food crimes resulting from Covid-19 border closures (Sulaiman & Hashim, 2021) were also increasingly gaining interest locally. Themes on halal science, halal law, and sustainable development were among those with the lowest focus or interest among local halal scholars. Studies on halal science, for instance, were mainly focused on plant chemical analysis and halal (Sulaiman et al., 2021), apart from studies on the employability of halal science graduates in Brunei's labour market (Deuraseh et al., 2021). While the findings from some of this research allowed for deeper insights into the behaviour, psyche, and perception of the consumption rate of locally made halal products, it does little to explain whether halal awareness is significantly impacted. The enforcement of halal monitoring and surveillance along the national border, despite successes in nabbing smugglers and their smuggling activities of raw materials, meat, and other food products, does not explain some of the issues and effects that such strict enforcements had on already halal-certified products. This includes products labelled dubious despite being certified halal by other foreign regional and global halal governing bodies. Though beneficial for co-creating new food

technologies and ingredients, studies investigating the role of government in proliferating or shaping halal awareness, behaviour, communal knowledge and their halal industrial code of conduct have never been made clear. This is where this research comes in.

Industrial organisation- and business performance-related research was also conducted within the same period, with six papers published. Two of the papers were focused on benchmarking business excellence practices of firms involved in both local and regional halal food industry in general (see Wahab et al., 2019 and Sulaiman et al., 2019), with one assessing the use of the benchmark on a Malaysian firm called *Perniagaan Sri Samudera Desa* (PSSD) as their case study research (Sulaiman et al., 2020). The commonalities between these halal papers and the previous themes revolve around using derivative criteria extracted from existing literature and case studies to situate, assess, and reflect on Brunei's experiences. Similar to commentaries made on the previous theme on halal industry and sustainability, using such criteria to measure the performances of Brunei's businesses was, at best, unidirectional, resulting in oversimplification of the entire business and overall industrial landscapes. The use of business reports, check listings and indices to measure business performance, such as firms' decision-making, leadership, adaptive strategies, market perception and self-reflection, for instance, failed to capture businesses and their industrial performances based on returns of investments (ROI), labour and sales turnovers, worker and labourers' productivity, size, and volume of deliverables or even market accessibilities. The dynamic effects of market exposure, the resulting processes, and the disruptive effects of industrial politics and policies were never touched, addressed, or used as part of the benchmarking

exercises. Whilst comparisons between Bruneian and Malaysian firms were made to gauge the current position of local firms against their peers in adopting the industry's best practices, it only provides researchers snippets of their entire experiences. It is imperative for these writings not only to contextualise but also assess their study by considering the influence of national economic, socio-cultural, and political settings on halal food development in Brunei. Only by doing so can highly relevant and grounded research be generated, reflective of the emerging or current realities the industry is operationalising based on the case studies used.

Whilst there is considerable growth in local research looking into Brunei's halal certification governing, only a few managed to capture the industry and government dynamics, albeit at a broader dimension. According to Muhamad et al. (2019), their findings on the concerted effort made by the Bruneian government towards globalising the Brunei halal logo increased the amount of trust other regional and global players have in it. It was hoped that such a rise in the trust would eventually lead to international market penetration and expansion. Ab Talib and Wahab (2021), in their observation of halal logistics in a rentier state such as Brunei, argued that SWOT analysis on Brunei halal logistics uncovered the existence of substantial government support both in terms of policy and surveillance mechanisms. However, there is a vacuum in terms of halal logistic experts. This stifles further expansion of these activities as projected in their previous study (see Ab Talib, 2020) with similar recommendations proposed in some of their earlier writings (see Ab Talib et al., 2020). Raffi (2019) provided a summary of halal governing agencies in Brunei with descriptions of their role and responsibilities, supported by a study

by Ibrahim (2022) on halal policy in Brunei. In both studies, though helpful information on the scope of work of the involved parties, the information provided was, at best, descriptive and general, with few misconceptions that will be discussed in the latter paragraphs. Writings on halal beyond the national borders show a similar trend of focus, which will be discussed next.

The concerns over the halalness of food, the operations of Brunei's halal certification governing and its overall effects towards the local halal industries stem from the changes in the dynamics of the Muslim consumer market. The contemporary approach to halal food production follows the principle of *halalan tayyiban* that emphasises on the need to maintain hygiene, cleanliness, and sanitation in production beyond safeguarding it against impurities. This industrial approach looks beyond the traditional definition of halal, which incorporates Sharia-compliance elements of the religion. This contrasts with the Sharia-based principles and the definition of halal food production and consumption mentioned in the Holy Quran, which is as follows:

“Prohibited to you are dead animals, blood, the flesh of swine and that which has been dedicated to other than Allah; any animal strangled, or victim of fall, or gored or savaged by a beast of prey unless you still slaughter it [in the correct manner] or anything sacrificed on idolatrous altars” (Al-Maidah, 5:3).

“O you who have believed! Eat from the good things that We have provided for you and be grateful to Allah if it is [indeed] Him that you worship” (Al-Baqarah 2:172)

These verses lay the foundation for the basic knowledge of animal slaughtering and handling, which later led to the rise of halal standards for food industries. Halal food production not only provides Muslim consumers with their basic dietary requirements but is also a responsibility, an act of worship, to protect religious sanctity for the collective benefit of the public (*Umma*). Between 2004 and 2009, there was a rapid expansion in the global halal food industry, increasing by 8.1 % from 2004 to 2009 with an approximate value of USD 634.5 billion, i.e., 15.9% of the total global food market size (Omar et al., 2011). The increase in the number of non-Muslim producing countries led to increasing concerns on the level of halalness, doubt and fear of contamination throughout the whole supply chain, as well as ethical concerns surrounding the methods of slaughtering and handling, put the need for certification and standardisation to the forefront. The concern over doubt is not to be taken lightly, as it has also been mentioned in the prophetic traditions. The Prophet mentioned:

“What is halal is clear. And what is haram is also clear. And in between those two is a dubious area which many people do not know about. So, whoever distanced himself from it he has acquitted himself. And those which fall into it, has fallen into a state of haram.”

(Muslim, 2007)

Due to this ruling, the halal supply chain has become a critical control point that must be audited and monitored to maintain halal integrity. The controls are developed due to the vulnerability of halal industrial production to increasingly globalised productions (Ayan,

2013; Tieman et al., 2012; Temporal, 2011). Being the global leader in halal industrial development, Malaysia managed to develop the technical halal expertise overseeing the halal auditing, certification, and standardisation processes. Transparency and business accountability through corporate reporting on top of authorities' regular audits are fundamental to maintaining halal quality. Within the halal supply chain management literature, works by Tieman et al. (2012), Iberahim et al. (2012), Nazirah and Backhouse (2014) and Riaz and Chaudry (2004) highlighted the emerging halal monitoring and auditing system adopted and modified from established industrial standards such as ISO, GMP and HACCP to maintain halal credence, quality, and trustworthiness of food products. Some of the critical aspects of the scrutiny are sanitary and cleanliness of the production site, source of animal feed, animal slaughter and handling, the origin of labels and packaging materials, animal welfare, the extent of individuals handling the different sites of production, other than emphasis on ingredients used in production per se (Riaz & Chaudry, 2004; Bonne & Verneke, 2008; Havinga, 2010; Ab Talib et al., 2010; Shafii & Zain, 2015). This led to the introduction the Halal Compliance Critical Control Points (HCCCP) system.

In most cases, intermediate producers' halal certifications are needed on the origin of ingredients, should it be outsourced from both local and international markets. In Malaysia's case, a halal traceability and halal tracking system are currently in place to monitor the origins of food products, i.e. both final and intermediate products, as well as monitoring of critical 'value' chains to mitigate levels of risk from cross contamination (Zailani et al., 2010). Studies on halal logistics are also gaining attention, and simulation

supply chain model innovation is constantly created to improve the existing system (Lam & Saadat, 2008; Jaafar et al., 2011). In terms of halal logistics, for example, scrutiny on the transportation, i.e., vehicle use, shipping container content among others and distribution networks, i.e., conditions of retail space, final display cabinets and products around it, to name a few, are now part of the halal audits. All these are done to fulfil not only the commercial or industrial requirements. Nevertheless, it maintains halalness and fulfils religious requirements for Muslims and the public.

The commonality of all these recent writings is that the approach to the dynamics between the government structure and the agents is seen from a mechanistic, unilinear linkage with an attempt to generalise the case study based on grand theory or framework. This needs to be reviewed as such an approach, i.e., blanket or universal application of a grand narrative or theoretical framework, may not be enough or suitable for describing and explaining the context in which halal governing shall be approached. The works by Muhamad et al. (2019), for instance, approached halal certification from the consumer, branding and marketing perspectives, but this does not explain the dynamics relating to the halal certification processes, the biopolitics of certification, the power relations between those who governed and the governed, subsequently, how these have some impetus over halal production, consumerism and market access to name a few. As mentioned, the studies by Ab Talib and Wahab (2021) and his other related works (see Ab Talib et al., 2020; Ab Talib, 2020; Mahalle et al., 2020) are too general and simplistic. While SWOT analysis, bibliometric review and learning from the experiences of others to solve emerging issues relating to halal logistics are helpful, they only highlighted the

macro-economic conditions that dictate and plague the industry. More insights into the complexity, multidimensionality, and multifaceted aspects of halal governing, particularly ones that governors experientially face and those at the receiving end of the governing prism, the business communities, need to be made. This is one of the crucial elements that will be mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis, particularly in justifying why a mid-level theory that looks beyond the Structure-Agency binaries is used in studying the processes of governing. The limitations of these studies also stem from the theoretical positions or underpinnings that these researchers used to define the realities they studied, which is very Cartesian and positivistic in the social sciences sense. Due to this, the third chapter of this thesis is purportedly designed to understand the epistemological and ontological positions that the researcher took and justify why such positioning matters in studying the processes of halal governing.

Furthermore, the approach to Islamic economics has been very theoretical, abstract, and normative at best. Hence, this research aims to provide empirical evidence on Islamic governing, using the implementation of halal standards as an entry point to explore the components of halal governing, its practicality and application as well as its effects towards the governed, in this case, the food producers. As discussed in the next chapter, the mechanisms of Islamic governing are often the results of innovation and State ingenuity as the Muslim civilisation expanded. Corpuses have been written regarding a globalised industry such as Islamic Finance and Banking, with details on its operationalisation, practicality of Islamic creed and ethics in its development as well as its current trajectory and progress about Industrial Revolution 4.0 (IR4) and blockchain

technological development. However, concerning the global halal food industry, the research focused thus far has been more on the consumption and market aspects of the industry coupled with studies on its certification and quality assurance aspects. This is more so if it is approached from the political economy and institutional perspectives.

Questions surrounding how the government strategise itself, details on the type of policies and mechanisms to introduce to spur the growth of the halal industry, as well as the decisions on the directions or pathways of which the State embarked have been sparsely studied. Apart from these dimensions, studies on the State's ability to reconcile or negotiate any differences and realign governing strategies to maintain the relevancy of any given development programme, the tools necessary in meeting their vision and linking it to Islamic principles of fairness and justice as well as the question over sustainability have yet to be understood. Hypothetically, including Islamic principles and ethics in governing would result in morally fair, just, and inclusive governing. Its inclusion should not be problematic as any approaches used in Islamic governing follow the teachings found in the Holy Quran and the Prophetic sayings, i.e. the *hadith*, which acts as the absolute constitution and, thus, is essential towards creating a particular halal industrial code of conduct. The practice of consultation and coordination between the government and those governed throughout the certification processes should also support this goal. Hence, an investigation is needed into whether embracing religious halal food standards and its moral and ethical propositions protects the welfare of producers and the community. Studies on whether growth can be achieved are also essential. Evaluating how the government governs and understanding the technologies it

uses is needed to ensure a holistic understanding of the after-effects it made towards the industry. Business growth provides empirical evidence not only on the inner workings of the Islamic economy in general but also on an alternative to the contemporary market economy. Contextualising it from the experiences of a small national economy like Brunei also justifies why research on halal governing and the dynamics surrounding certification matters. This is the gap that the research tries to fill in. This research will focus more on the national agri-food businesses/ enterprises operating both in the formal and informal sectors. In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on the importance of the informal sector towards the urban economy. Hence, investigating the effects of halal standardisation on the agri-food business is worth studying.

1.1 Research goals and motives

The main goal and motivation of this research is to explore and understand the strategies employed by the Brunei Government, particularly Brunei's Halal Food Control Division, in implementing and maintaining a high degree of halal standard compliance among agri-food businesses. This is followed by an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of current halal standardisation and certification governing by studying its receptions or how it affects the growth and expansion of agri-food enterprises, particularly start-ups or aspiring entrepreneur's vis-à-vis. It also explores the practical application of moral and Islamic ethics in governing as part of responsible halal industrial production and governance. The final goal is to make a new contribution towards academia by combining both Euro-American and Islamic perspectives into the literature or corpora on Foucault's 'Governmentality' whilst at the same time providing empirical evidence on its

operationalisation over a specific governing sphere, in this case, halal standard settings and governing.

Since the early 20th century, the newfound wealth generated from Brunei's oil and gas industry created a new market for employment, particularly in public services, resulting in the expansion of government services. Whilst other sectors experienced boom years because of the growing middle class, the agricultural sector experienced a further decline, with younger generations from the 1960s onwards opting for stable government jobs (Bakar, 2018). The wealth generated from oil and gas provided a lifeline for the nation to acquire its food through cheap imports from neighbouring ASEAN neighbours, with further subsidies given to essential commodities such as rice, flour and sugar, daily staples of the country. However, the concern over food security in 2008, marked by global food insecurity and climate challenges affecting food production, unstable regional politics, experienced by Brunei's major rice-supplying country, Thailand, i.e., with the overthrow of the then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 as well as rising global food prices prompted His Majesty the Sultan of Brunei to declare on the need to reinvent and redevelop its agriculture and food processing industries (Mahmud, 2008). Rice and halal food production were two of the critical sectors that needed to be developed further, and this marked the beginning of the agricultural and agri-food development in Brunei. The implementation of the new halal regulatory framework in 2005 opened new opportunities for Brunei agri-food entrepreneurs in their attempt to gain access to the growing halal niche market locally and internationally.

The focus on developing agriculture and the agri-food industry has been ongoing since the 1970s, with the opening of Brunei's first state-owned livestock farm called Brunei McFarm in its attempt to cater for increasing national beef demand. Before this, the period between 1965 and 1974 saw the development of four smallholdings model farm units, an experiment between the then Brunei Government Department of Agriculture and Brunei Shell Petroleum to assess the potential of developing monoculture farms as well as identifying farm management systems suitable in the Bruneian context of development (Groome, 1980). In the late 90s and early 2000, the country managed to improve its poultry industry, which resulted in the self-sufficiency of production by the first decade of the 21st century. Based on data published by the Department of Agriculture and Agri-food in the government's centralised data website www.gov.bn, the production of local broilers between 1992 and 2020 and beef slaughterhouses between 1995 and 2020 showed a mixed pattern. Whilst local broilers have managed to overcome import dependencies and become self-sufficient, beef slaughterhouse production fluctuates with a decrease in local production as opposed to the importation of live ruminants and chilled or frozen meat. Such disparity in production increases the potential of halal scrutiny and surveillance of the beef production-related industry using the Brunei halal standard, which is known widely as one of the most stringent standardisations compared to other standards. The importation of live animals, particularly cattle and lamb, is made possible due to Brunei's limited geographical area, resulting in over-reliance on food importation. Most live cattle came from Australia, supplied by previously Brunei-owned Willeroo Ranch, sold to an Indonesian private company in 2014, and Opium Creek, owned and managed by Brunei's

GLC Darussalam Asset (DA). The chart below clearly shows the contrast between the two agricultural sectors:




Figure 1. Amounts of production of local broilers and beef sector against imports for the period between 1992-2020 (Source: www.gov.bn)

Whilst studies on halal in Brunei have thus far focused more on the halal consumption and maintenance aspects of the food industry, more studies have yet to be done concerning halal food industrial governing and the subsequent effects of halal standardisation on these two sectors. It is time to reconsider the importance of halal governing as the country embarked on a mission of developing its halal food industry as part of the Brunei Vision of 2035 and as part of the national food security goals. This goal is also stated clearly under the 11th Brunei Darussalam National Development Plan (2018-2023) aimed at “developing the non-oil and gas sector as the catalyst for economic

growth”, of which one out of the seven significant clusters identified comprised of development of halal products and services (DEPS, 2020). These products and services include pharmaceutical and health supplements, aquaculture, agriculture, food processing, manufacturing, distribution, and cosmetics.

As the Ministry in charge of developing the agriculture and agri-food industry, the Ministry of Primary Resources and Tourism (henceforth MPRT) published two short-to-medium strategic plans for 2007-2013 and 2016-2020 to facilitate industrial development further by focusing on the following aspects. Under the Department of Agriculture and Agri-food (DAA) short-medium strategic plan of 2007-2013, the plan's aims revolved around establishing the Brunei Halal Brand (BHB) products. It calls for the collaboration between the then MIPR and the Ministry of Finance (MOF, presently known as the Ministry of Finance and Economy) towards the BHB's establishment. It also focused on developing the national competency and capabilities that support BHB development and halal food production. These include establishing a Halal Science Centre, attracting investors to invest in the new Halal agro-tech park, and establishing a Halal product academy through intergovernmental agency cooperation with the State Mufti's Office. Regarding BHB, the strategic plan also aimed at establishing a special vehicle company that would be responsible for managing the royalty of BHB apart from providing support in marketing, launching, and promoting BHB products locally, regionally, and internationally. There is also a plan to register the BHB trademark and halal logo internationally in Geneva, Austria. At the national level, DAA also identified the need to publish halal handbooks on additives and halal manuals for food processors, restaurants, and catering services with

the assistance of other agencies, particularly the Brunei Halal Food Control Division (HFCD henceforth). Developing capabilities in halal screening and detection kits through joint research and consultancy-based projects were also mooted under the strategic plan. Apart from establishing a halal academy and investing in the halal agro-tech park, all other aims have been achieved.

Under the second DAA's strategic plan for 2016-2020, the aims were much more general and holistic in contrast to the previous plan, whereby the DAA envisions increasing the industrial output of industries based on agriculture and agri-food by raising productivity and increasing capabilities using highly advanced technology whilst orienting production towards the export market. It is in this short-medium-term plan that the DAA acknowledges the need to develop the ecosystem and value chains of the various agricultural and agri-food sectors to push for exponential growth in the industry, with a target of GDP projected at B\$ 1080 million as of 2020 from the B\$ 366.15 million of GDP in 2015 (Department of Agriculture and Agri-food, 2016). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide detailed insights into the plans for the various sectors under the DAA's purview. However, regarding livestock, poultry and agri-food sectors linked to halal food, the plan focuses on creating an enabling environment whilst developing spin-off industries simultaneously. The measures identified were to prepare entrepreneurs and investors with the necessary facilities, infrastructures, and industrial requirements such as industry certifications and product branding, marketing, and establishment of International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO 17025) laboratory services. Improvement in support services such as cold storage expansions, health and safety monitoring and

auditing programmes, as well as the role of distributors to network and market Brunei-made products abroad, were some of the identified links required in strengthening the value chain of these sectoral activities. Identifying newer industries, such as local halal packaging and logistic services, was also mentioned as part of spin-offs that could benefit Brunei's economic diversification efforts. Despite the development of such plans and strategic measures that the government plans to undertake towards boosting local food production activities, the effects of these changes on Brunei's food processing and premise operators categorised as Micro-Small Medium Enterprises (MSME) and informal businesses are yet to be studied or are unknown at best. This is crucial as MSMEs, and informal operators are important sources of employment and a component of economic growth in a city economy. The heterogeneity of the firms involved within the city, particularly industries, goes beyond the formal-informal binaries (Williams et al., 2007). The territorial linkages and embeddedness of these informal sectors with formal enterprises and regulatory regimes (Chen, 2007) also require a new inclusive approach to understanding this dynamism's multidimensionality and multifaceted aspect (Lawson, 2010) towards city economy development. In the case of Brunei, they are important players in Brunei's halal food industry, which can be considered still in its infancy. Research on Brunei's industrial governing, particularly on halal, has thus far been superficial, with no in-depth studies or analyses of how it takes place or the processes involved in its governing. The scope of this research has been mentioned previously (see p. 4 – 7 of this chapter).

Brunei's effort in developing its food industry as part of its national food security agenda should be applauded despite the contribution of Brunei's Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sectors from 1974 to 2021 towards the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on average at 1%. This is shown clearly in the graph below with data tabulated from the World Bank databases:




Figure 2. Contribution of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Sectors towards national GDP between 1974 and 2021 (Source: World Bank, 2022)

Apart from such development, the local agri-food sector also experienced some growth even though its total contribution to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is considered minute, approximately B\$ 150.23 million (approximately GBP85.28 million. The growth patterns of agriculture and agri-food, in general, showed an increase in total value from B\$ 240 million in 2011 to B\$ 290 million (US\$ 203.6 million) in 2013, with livestock production (meat, eggs and poultry) market share at B\$ 156.97 million (US\$109.6 million) domestically (Koo, 2014). Livestock-based processing contributed

about B\$ 44 million in 2013, a substantial increase from B\$ 7 million in 2007 (Koo, 2014; Haji Anjah, 2007). 2011, the agri-food processing value estimate was B\$ 57.21 million; in 2013, it increased to B\$ 86 million (Koo, 2014; Radzi, 2012). Several halal livestock and plant-based processing industry firms have also tried to penetrate the international market. Companies such as BMC Food Industry, Hussyn Rahman Ltd, Sabli Group Food Industry, Sahamada Corporation, PDS Group and Ideal Food Industry are the major players. Parallel to this development, there has also been an increase in the number of micro-small and medium firms/ enterprises (MSMEs) operating domestically in both formal and informal sectors. The figures (Fig. 3 and 4) below show the development trends in the local agri-food sector regarding its retail value and the breakdown of agri-food by category and market share for the second decade of the 21st century. The average annual growth rate of the Agri-food sector between 2003 and 2021 can be seen in Figure 5. The growth rate was calculated based on the data from Figure 3.

Interestingly, the rapid growth in livestock processing from 2013 onwards signalled demand for local products. However, it might be only limited to a particular segment, such as poultry. The processed poultry products are sold directly as domestic brand products for the public or as raw materials for others involved in other sectors, such as the fast-food businesses. A detailed breakdown of the market share of this sector is not available apart from those shared in Figure 4. Considering the period when Brunei aimed to develop its halal industry in 2005, it has been 16 years since, and the growth in agrifood is relatively stable. However, no specific evidence suggests that the halal sector also

experienced the same growth rate apart from the halal application data mentioned in the upcoming Table 2 and Figure 7.




Figure 3. Local agri-food sector development between 2003 and 2021 (Source: Department of Agriculture and Agri-food, 2021)




Figure 4. Diverse agri-food sectors market share value (Source: Brunei’s Department of Agriculture and Agri-Food, 2021)

The pie chart above shows the market share of diverse categories of products within Brunei's agrifood sector for 2020 and their retail value (in B\$ millions). There are thirteen categories, and out of the thirteen, Fast Food products were valued at B\$ 78.06 million at retail (52% of the market), followed by Meat products at B\$ 28.74 million, capturing 19.1% of the local domestic market. Biscuits and Bakery were valued at B\$ 19.99 million with 13.3% market coverage, followed by Soft Drinks and Mineral Water, valued at B\$ 11.15 million with a 7.4% market share. Ice cream and Noodles were valued at B\$ 3.18 million and B\$ 1.92 million, respectively, with 2% and 1% market shares. The other seven food categories have market shares of 1% each, with a total value of B\$ 7.17 million. Although statistical data and information were made readily available online, particularly from 2015 onwards, analysis about sectoral competitiveness linking to the general cost of productions covering operations, labour, research and development, as well as entry into the market of each sector remained absent. This will be of interest and increasing importance as the industry embarks on halalisation.




Figure 5. Average annual growth rate (AAGR) of the agri-food sector

The Average Annual Growth Rate (AAGR) chart of the agri-food sector's retail value shows an interesting trend. The data measurement for this sector only began in 2004 when the country started to see the importance of crop processing output as part of the country's growing food security needs. The general trend shows an uneven growth pattern, with specific years showing rapid growth, particularly between 2006 and 2008, with growth rates of 16.7%, 33.6% and 30.6%, respectively. The growth for 2013 was also high at 37.2% compared to the previous year. In some remaining years, the average growth was less than 10%. The latter years showed an increase of more than 10%, with 2020 at 13.4% and 2021 at 11%, respectively, from the previous years. This is because of the COVID-19 pandemic, which closed national borders, forcing domestic producers to raise their productivity to unprecedented levels as fear of food scarcity became more real and apparent.

1.2 General overview of Brunei Darussalam's politics and government

The role of the Sultan within the Brunei Constitution encompasses not only the position of Head of State but also that of the nation-state's religious leader. With a legacy of 700 years of monarchical rule and 50 years of governance as a Constitutional Monarch, the Sultan's authority became centralised because of the emergency law that has been in effect since the 1962 rebellion. The Sultan holds significant decision-making power, serving concurrently as both the Sultan and Prime Minister, as well as occupying key ministerial positions including First Ministers of Finance, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Trade. This distinctive governance structure sets Brunei apart from other modern polities

in the Malay world, where countries like Malaysia and Indonesia have established political systems rooted in democratic principles, one as a Federation of Malay States with Constitutional Monarchs and the other as a Republic. Conversely, Brunei practices a form of limited Constitutional Monarchy, with the Sultan assuming pivotal roles in the ministerial offices.

Brunei's system of government is a hybrid resulting from the assimilation of British, Islamic, and Traditional Malay Sultanate politico-cultural elements. This complexity reflects the multifaceted nature of Brunei's governance. The hybridity arises from the distinctive attributes of each system: a Sultanate with entrenched hierarchical structures and customs, a governmental system influenced by Britain's Constitutional Monarchy, and an administration based on Islamic principles embedded within both traditional and constitutional monarchical systems. The current 'Constitutional Monarchy' element is applied selectively, a consequence of the Emergency Order Act of 1962 following the 1961 Brunei rebellion, which mandated the centralisation of the Prime Minister's role – occupied by the Sultan – in overseeing critical aspects of governance such as the Military, Police, Law, Legislature, and Finance. Originally intended as a two-year measure subject to review, the Emergency Order remains in force to safeguard the peace and stability achieved post-independence in 1984. In a positive development, the Brunei Legislative Council was reinstated in the early 2000s to address contemporary political challenges and incorporate public concerns and grievances into parliamentary deliberations. The profound influence of the government's hybrid political system within the monarchy – from decision-making to top-down governance of ministries – significantly shapes public

perceptions and responses to policy adjustments. This influence is postulated to impact the implementation of halal standards and the dynamics between the governing and the governed, including the scrutiny of the relative powers vested in councils and their advisories.

Despite the central role of the monarchy, the Brunei Constitution of 1959 (revised 2011) established five advisors' councils, each entrusted with specific advisory functions for His Majesty the Sultan on diverse governance matters. These councils include the Traditional Malay Customary Council (*Majlis Adat Istiadat*), responsible for overseeing Malay customs, the Council of Regency, dedicated to matters of reigning and succession, the Council of Ministers, comprising government ministers, the Brunei Islamic Religious Council, which advises on religious matters, and the revived Legislative Council, tasked with passing bills and scrutinising fiscal and other governance-related issues, among other responsibilities (Brunei Constitution, 1959 rev. 2011). Besides these councils, various boards and commissions oversee public service and government administration functions, pardons, and the elections of village heads and District representatives as members of the Legislative Council. Additionally, Brunei maintains two concurrent judicial systems: the conventional English Common Law under the Attorney General Chambers and the recently reinstated Sharia Law under the jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts.

1.3 Food standardisation and entrepreneurial growth: weighing the costs and benefits

One key question this research addresses is Brunei's halal standardisation and its linkages to entrepreneurial growth. The notion of entrepreneurial growth here is not limited to the business school's definitions, such as Porter's view of competitiveness that analyses transactional cost-effectiveness, cost-efficiency of production (Porter, 1990), niche market potentials of firms and their products (Porter, 2007) as well as higher productivity and market accessibility, which are deemed as necessary strategies towards growth and in preventing early market exits (Porter, 2008). Nor is it limited to describing growth based on statistics such as numbers of firms halalise or those successfully gained industrially recognised certification. Instead, entrepreneurial growth here is intrinsically defined based on the dynamic linkages between firms based on the notion of competitiveness, firms' quantity and quality, industrial ecosystem and support services such as banking and financing and the influences of institutions such as government industrial policies and governing strategies, directly and indirectly, towards sustaining such growth. Factors such as clarity of state strategies and its policies of facilitation and intervention, the influential role of information and knowledge dissemination between experts and market actors such as producers and buyers, the need to understand the fluidity and complexity that regulatory regimes such as convention or standards and institutions, the questions on poverty and welfare protection are essential in dictating growth outcomes. Such analysis of linkages redefined standards as more than just the *explanans* or means that served the *explanandum*, in this case, the notion of growth and instead, it looked at the *quomodo* or how these strategies or tools operate and affect the end goals (see p.132- 133 for details on terms). This prevents the rise of developmental-related issues or problems that conventions and standards have failed to address again.

Despite the benefits of its adoption, Ponte and Gibbon (2005) argued that conventions, referring to a form of exclusively mutual or consensual agreed-upon criteria that acts as acceptable guidelines that make up what came to be known as 'standards', from a political economy perspective, seem to ignore the differences in the power of influence of some actors over others. Although the power of the consumer and public opinion matters in reorganising production standards that adhere to societal requirements, there have been instances where producers can manipulate this to their favour through marketing strategies (Ponte & Gibbon, 2005). In studies on global value chains in agri-food manufacturing, the structural processes on the chain's governance affected manufacturers' behaviour, which resulted in high recurring cost of compliance, major restructuring of production assemblages, especially along the supply chains as well as its effects on institutional/ political governance and firms upgrading potentials (Nadvi, 2008; Gereffi et al., 2005; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2010; Farfan, 2005). Implementation of standards nationally is often seen as a catalyst for growth, contrary to recent writings on agri-food, highlighting the issue's complexity. Whilst standards promote social inclusiveness towards upstream producers, there exists evidence of welfare negligence, marginalisation of smallholders, barriers towards upgrading, and issues related to poverty despite the claims of its inclusivity. Part of the problem originated from the exclusive nature of standards, which exclude engagement with stakeholders fully or partially throughout the implementation processes.

The effects of conventional food standards throughout the agri-food industry have been mixed, particularly regarding the growth of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in the developing world. Initially, the imposition of industrial standards such as ISO, Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP), Hazards Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP), as well as both international and domestic food standards, i.e., Global-GAP, are aimed at improving the efficiency and productivity of firms to maintain competitiveness through products differentiation, risk sharing and better coordination (Nadvi, 2008). Certain technical specifications are adopted to ensure the products produced are healthy and safe for consumption (Renard, 2003). Its adoption in developing countries is meant to improve industrial production and open opportunities to gain access to various markets. However, the effects have been debatable. For example, in the case of US Starbucks, their involvement in Fair Trade purchases from smallholders is only a short-term strategy to maintain monopoly whereby the image of 'equity' allows for introducing their brand of cheap coffee (Renard, 2003). Fair Trade and other grassroots quality standards initiatives such as Utz Kapeh and Rainforest Alliances, which initially aimed at developing socially just, fair and equitable trade and production for small producers, are slowly catering towards corporations (Reed, 2009; Renard, 2003; Hatanaka et al., 2005). In Brazil, multinationals' implementation of food standards in the dairy industry leads to the exclusion of small-scale businesses stuck in the informal sector whilst only a few large-scale operators operate (Reardon & Farina, 2002). The introduction of new public standards in the 2000s forced informal businesses, which accounted for 30% of national production, to adopt it. The effects led to a new wave of smallholder exits in the primary, manufacturing, and retail (Reardon & Farina, 2002). For commodities like coffee and tea,

as part of the Sustainable Development (SDGs) agenda, the Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS) were introduced to assist sustainable production as well as to allow inclusive development through the empowerment of cultivators by enabling them to negotiate price and engage in trade. However, according to Fadillah et al. (2019), there is a slow uptake on the VSS as it failed to resolve issues relating to market price, the increase in costs due to standards harmonisation and challenges in meeting standard compliance, particularly among coffee smallholders. It also resulted in the imposition of trade barriers aimed at stifling imports to protect local producers. In the case of Kenya's green bean industry, the number of smallholders of 350 farmers is reduced to 50 with the introduction of food standards (McCullough et al., 2012). According to IME (2013) (cited in Swaffield, Evans and Welch, 2018), the UK retail food sector is also not spared from such problems as standardisation imposed by significant food retail companies on farmers locally and beyond the UK resulted in the creation of food waste, with an estimate of 57,000 tonnes from one major retail store alone, between 30-50% of all food produced in the planet end up lost before reaching the consumers. Maertens and Swinnen's (2006) study on Senegal's high-value-added fruit and vegetable industry also suggests the exclusion of small businesses because of a weak understanding of compliance and the inability to fulfil the desired procurement. A brief success story can be seen in India's Mahagrapes production. When the private sector withdrew from venturing into export procurement, the government intervened by providing technical support payment, training funds, and the salaries of firms' boards to maintain compliance and market accessibility (Narrod et al., 2009). Even where effective public-private partnerships are at their best, there is little evidence to suggest there are opportunities for primary producers to upgrade

to second-tier production, from agriculture and being producers of commodities to manufacturing or food processing. In relation to this research, the effects of halal standardisation towards food businesses have never been studied. It would be interesting to investigate whether the Brunei halal religious standard resulted in a similar outcome as found in the case of the conventional food standard or not.

1.4 Halal Vision and developing halal food industry: setting up a context

Whilst recent writings tend to suggest that Brunei Darussalam's goal to develop its halal food industry started in the mid-2000s after the introduction of the Brunei Halal Food Certification and Food Label Order of 2005, the interest in expanding its food industry started earlier than this. Though the initial focus was to modernise its primary and agricultural industries, ranging from rice production, poultry and livestock farming to fruit and horticulture, opportunities brought by the global halal industry provided an impetus to develop more complex food processing activities. Global development in the halal food industry saw unprecedented growth, from an estimated value of US\$ 580 billion in 2010 (Ayan, 2010) to US\$ 1.29 trillion in 2015 (International Trade Centre, 2015). Halal Food Industry is believed to have the potential to succeed as a new source of economic growth (Wilson & Liu, 2010) beyond the current capitalistic system centred upon the Euro-Americanistic development model. According to Elasrag (2016), this can be due to four prevalent trends. First, Islam is the fastest-growing religion globally, with a population of approximately 1.8 billion, thus fueling the global demand for halal food products (Africa Islamic Economic Foundation, 2019; Elasrag, 2016). Second, the rising consumer power

of Halal products as a market force is in tandem with the growth of the Muslim population and their rising disposable income (Elasrag, 2016). State of the Global Islamic Economy Report 2018/19 states a growing percentage of 6.1% of Muslims spend on food and beverages (Thomson Reuters, 2019). Furthermore, the halal food industry is expected to continue its steady growth with the Muslim population, which is expected to increase by 2.2 billion in 2030 and 2.6 billion in 2050 (Africa Islamic Economic Foundation, 2019). Third, there is greater awareness among Muslims of the need to consume Halal food (Elasrag, 2016). Finally, there is increasing acceptance of Halal products among non-Muslim consumers who associate halal with quality products and quality assurances (Risyawati, 2015; Elasrag, 2016). As such, it can be viewed that the values promoted through Halal are now focused beyond religious obligation and Sharia compliance, particularly on ethical consumerism and awareness associated closely with social and environmentally responsible consumption (Thomson Reuters, 2019).

The robust market force of the Halal food industry has witnessed a universal shift in supply chains and demand from Muslims and non-Muslims alike, creating a lucrative market and opportunities to conduct halal businesses regionally and internationally. Many countries have recognised the emerging global trend of the Halal food industry and are now competing to capture their share in this market. However, some countries are quickly developing to dub themselves a Halal hub to satisfy the market's demands (Temporal, 2012). Due to this development and the potential that the halal economy possesses, it is not surprising that Brunei also wanted to develop its halal food sector and tap into regional and global halal markets.

1.5 Institutionalisation of Brunei halal standards and critical milestones

The institutionalisation of the Brunei halal standards and certification was made possible in 2005 with the introduction of the Brunei Halal Certificate and Halal Food Label Order, which will be implemented in several phases. Prior to the halal standards, there was an existing halal regulation, i.e., the Halal Meat Act (183) of 1998, to regulate the meat industry but not on agri-food and other related businesses. Scrutiny of this law saw its 'emergency' (*darurat*) introductory status, which was likely linked to the change in the condition of the halal industry globally. The mid to late 90s saw the increasing importance of major beef-producing nations such as Australia, Brazil, and Argentina as suppliers of both halal and non-halal labelled meat products – slaughtered and processed by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) - for global export markets. Being the major importer of beef, Brunei must ensure that the meat and processed meat products supplied meet the religious dietary requirements based on Shafie's Islamic jurisprudence approach to halal. Hence, during this period, there was a rising awareness of halal and the crackdown on meat products, which were considered doubtful despite being labelled halal. Halal-labelled meat products from non-Muslim producing countries were at the crosshairs of local or national governmental regulatory bodies overnight, with the products considered doubtful and *haram* (forbidden) to be consumed. Some of the earliest halal-labelled meat products advised to be avoided from consumption were Australia's Carter's meat products, Imperial corned beef products, and the Argentina halal corned beef produced by the Philippines. Their doubtful statuses were only rescinded within the last few years.

The emergence of bovine and poultry-related diseases such as *Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy* (BSE), informally labelled as Mad Cow Disease in the late 80s and early 90s, and various variants of the Bird Flu, was further exacerbated by globalisation processes. This is particularly important for Brunei citizens' health, safety, and security since most of its raw and processed food is continuously imported within ASEAN and its other counterparts, such as Australia, Argentina, Brazil, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The table below shows the differences in value (B\$ millions) of imports and exports for food and beverages based on International Merchandise Trade Statistics compiled in the Brunei Darussalam Key Indicators 2021 report. Based on the table alone shows that the country is experiencing colossal trade imbalances concerning the food and beverage sector, marking an over-reliance on foreign suppliers. Food imports were valued at B\$ 360.1 million in 2005, increased to B\$ 610.3 million in 2015, and as of 2020, it increased to B\$ 707.8 million. With most of the raw materials and industrial inputs needed for food processing of foreign origin, any regulatory changes at the national level - be it in the introduction of various food, health and safety standards or the introduction of new policies centred on food production – are bound to have significant unforeseen implications and outcomes.

Year	Import (B\$ Million)				Export (B\$ Million)			
	2005	2010	2015	2020	2005	2010	2015	2020
Food	360.1	493.6	610.3	707.8	0	3.16	7	14
Beverages and Tobacco	69.4	76.4	68.7	59.4	0	1.26	2.7	0.1

Table 1. Import and export value in food and beverages between 2005 and 2020 (Brunei's Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, 2021)

By 2006, Brunei managed to launch the Brunei Halal Premium Brand aimed at utilising Brunei halal standards and certificates on live cattle imports, food processing and meat products from Australia, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, China, and India (Khalid et al., 2018). The State Mufti's Office issued a *fatwa* (religious ruling) on common issues raised on halal food, and this ruling covers not only the production aspects of halal food but also touched on the consumption and social aspects of business and marketing issues in 2007. The same year also saw the publication of four Brunei Halal Certification Guidelines, i.e., BCG 1 (certification guidelines), BCG 2 (halal compliance audit), BCG 3 (certification of halal compliance auditor) and BCG 4 (halal surveillance audit) aimed for use by Brunei agri-food businesses as well as state regulators administrators and auditors. A commercial Brunei Halal Brand under Brunei Wafirah Holdings was established in 2009 by MIPR, and 2011 saw the breakthrough into the UK market under Ghanim International Ltd. It was established to act as a platform to export locally produced halal products globally. The Brunei Halal Standard and Logo was designed as the central component behind this commercial brand to promote the Brunei halal standard to the world. Using its position as an Islamic nation as well as the fact that the standard is state-regulated and owned, Brunei wanted to use this image to push for its own national agenda of making the country as one of the halal hubs in ASEAN and the world. It is also aimed in developing the national Islamic economy. The Brunei Halal Standard and Logo was designed as the central component behind this commercial brand to promote the Brunei halal standard to the world. A consultancy firm called Ha Management Services was appointed to oversee local restaurant auditing in Brunei in 2010 (Chia, 2010). However, there is no information on whether they were still responsible for halal auditing since the

research began in 2016. It was in 2008 that compulsory halal certification was enforced whereby businesses such as restaurants and food processing premises need to be audited and halal certified or face nullification of business miscellaneous licenses (Othman et al., 2015). New agri-food businesses such as restaurants and processed food producers applying for business licenses must apply for halal certification beforehand, and in 2011, this compulsory certification gained momentum (Othman et al., 2015). A grace period of 3 years was given to obtain such certification until 2014. From 2013 onwards, the country saw an increase in business joint ventures (JVs) in agri-food processing, and these include JVs from the Middle East, such as UAE's Al-Saahtain Group, Al-Abraaj Group, Tunisia, as well as from East Asia such as Japan's Soy World Ltd and China's Guangxi Economic Corridor producers. All these joint ventures are expected to operate in the last quarter of 2016 in the Bio-Innovation Corridor (BIC). On top of establishing the BIC, the Brunei Halal Innovation Centre was also established in 2014, overseeing technical research on bio-sensor contamination detectors, halal product development and laboratory services for halal food analysis (Too & Shahminan, 2014). A diagrammatic representation of this development can be seen below to illustrate such changes:




Figure 6. Critical milestones in general halal industrial development between 1998- 2017

It was mentioned earlier that HFCD, as an agency, was responsible for ensuring the proliferation of halal-related information as part of DAA's strategic development plan for the halal industry. What is the actual role of HFCD? HFCD was an agency established because of the introduction of the Halal Certification and Halal Label Order 2005 (henceforth HCHLO), with the mandate of enforcing halal standardisation to the local food industry initially, which later expanded to include other consumer products such as pharmaceutical and cosmetics as of 2017-2018 revisions of the Act. The agency is under the Department of Sharia Affairs, Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). Apart from the enforcement, HFCD also functions as the secretariat to the Brunei Islamic Religious Council (BIRC). This authoritative body advises and guides His Majesty the Sultan in creating and formulating Sharia law in Brunei since the Monarch is also the Head of

Religion per Brunei's Constitution. Establishing the BIRC was part of the requirements of the Islamic Religious Council and Kadhi Courts under Section 5, Chapter 77. Apart from administrative and management of halal-related matters, HFCD is also tasked with having the role of an auditing, monitoring and surveillance agency. Other vital players in the halal inspection committees and surveillance team championed by HFCD's chairman include the Animal Quarantine Services of the MPRT, the Food Safety and Quality Control Division of the Ministry of Health (MOH) (Raffi, 2019), representatives from the State Mufti's Office, the District Office of each district [Ministry of Home Affairs (henceforth MOHA)], Health Services (MOH), Secretary of the BIRC, Department of Agriculture and Agrifood (MPRT) and the Municipal Board (MOHA) (HCHLO, 2005). The committee is also to meet up during a designated time, make decisions via voting and operate with at least six members to form a quorum (HCHLO, 2005). An additional two members are also to be appointed from any governing bodies by the Minister with the consent of His Majesty (HCHLO, 2005).

Domestically, based on the list provided by Brunei Islamic Religious Council (BIRC), there has been a dramatic increase in agri-food producers/ entrepreneurs, from 66 in 2014 to 147 in 2015. Interestingly, based on personal observation, between 2010 and the present, there has also been a boom in informal agri-food businesses operating online, with different operational strategies, i.e., direct connection to consumers through social media (Facebook and Instagram), home-based and own distributive networks (i.e., key nodes such as licensed businesses etc.). Food producers cum vendors such as Ajwa Kitchen and Sweet Buttons, for example, each has approximately 30 to 50 agri-food suppliers

(comprised of ready meal, bakery/ pastry, and traditional beverages suppliers) that use their 'cube' shops as distribution and retail centres (personal observation).

According to HFCD (2015), the number of halal products using the Brunei halal certification logo shows a drastic increase, from 110 in 2008 to a total of 4997 products both produced locally as well as internationally as of 2015. The number of firms applying for Brunei halal certificates within the same timeline also dramatically increased, as shown in Figure 7 below. In the first year of halal certification implementation, factory-processed food saw nine producers filing for halal certification auditing. This grew steadily to 147 as of 2015, excluding the informal food producers. Halal applications of SMEs increased from 4 in 2008 to 56 by 2015, whilst bakeries also saw a steady increase from 1 in 2009 to 75 by 2015. The total figures for halal-certified hotels, restaurants and canteens stand at 28, 1442 and 90 within the eight years. Fast food and drinks outlets have seen 64 certificate applicants since 2013. Domestic food processing factories have shown 102 applicants since 2008, while the demand from international food processors also shows an uptick between 2009 and 2015 with 27 total applicants. Small and Medium Enterprises also saw an increase in halal applicants, with 75 applicants within the eight years from 2008 onwards. Below are the diagrams showing the number of halal applications based on business typologies between 2008 and 2015 (Table 2). The justification for using the dataset until 2015 was due to the absence of breakdown by typologies in the newer datasets. This is followed by a chart on the overall annual halal certification applications between 2008 and 2021 (Figure 7):

TYPE OF BUSINESS	NUMBER OF APPLICANTS BY YEAR								TOTAL
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Pharmacy	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	3
Bakery	0	1	1	1	3	3	30	36	75
Small Medium Entreprises	4	1	4	5	7	6	15	14	56
Food premises/ Fast Food	0	0	0	0	0	3	26	14	43
Drinks outlets	0	0	0	0	0	2	11	8	21
Restaurants	0	1	6	10	124	202	761	328	1442
Canteen	0	0	0	0	1	10	55	24	90
Hotel	0	0	0	1	0	2	14	11	28
Food Processing Factory (Domestic)	5	4	6	7	13	5	35	27	102
Food Processing Factory (abroad)	0	1	7	4	3	2	4	6	27
YEARLY TOTAL APPLICATION	9	8	24	28	151	235	952	470	1887

Table 2. General trend of halal application based on business types between 2008 and 2015 (Source: Unpublished data, HFCD, 2016)




Figure 7. Annual trends of halal certification applications between 2008 and 2021 (Source: Unpublished data, HFCD, 2022)

Figure 7 shows the general trend for halal application from 2008 to 2021. This is an update for the previous figure without the breakdown based on business typology. Whilst it has

been mentioned that compulsory halal certification was made as part of business miscellaneous license renewal requirements in 2008 (1st phase), the number of halal applicants remained low in 2008, partly due to the long active remaining years of such licenses. 2011 saw the enforcement of compulsory halal certification (2nd phase) in formal food businesses, but a three-year grace period was given for businesses' ease of adaptation. This explains the massive jump in halal applicants, from 235 in 2013 to 952 in 2014. The following year also shows more applicants, 470 in 2015, only to drop to 113 in 2016. The announcement on compulsory halal certification or standardisation for all businesses (3rd phase), regardless of licensing status (formal or informal), was made in 2017. These involved firms or companies producing consumer products such as food, pharmaceutical products, etc. The number of halal applicants for 2017 was 752. The following years also show interesting trends of halal applicants, with 367 in 2018, 225 in 2019, 215 in 2020 and 161 in 2021. Interestingly, a second 3-year grace period was issued during the second compulsory halal certification phase in 2017 for easy adaptation and adjustments. This was due to the involvement of informal businesses as part of the compulsory standardisation processes.

Despite this development, the decline of halal applications in recent years, particularly from 2017 onwards, is quite dramatic given the governmental efforts. While the low numbers in 2020 might be due to COVID-19, which limits population movement and economic activities, the decline in 2018 and 2019 is baffling. HFCD provides no explanations for such a decline. However, its occurrences raise questions on whether such a decline is linked to the potential complexities surrounding the industrial halal

certification requirement, poor public reception of the certification, or laggards caused by the slow embracement of halalisation despite the increase in agrifood development shown in the previous charts. Analysing the effects of Brunei's halal standardisation towards food businesses is hoped to shed light on this dramatic decline.




Figure 8. Main requirements for halal certification and permit issuance based on BCG 1, PBD 24:2007 and the State Mufti's Office Halal Fatwas (Source: Azalie, 2016) (emphasis added)

A summary of the main halal certification requirements for the Brunei halal standard above (Figure 8) showed a broad coverage of themes that, interestingly, move beyond the traditional notion or interpretation of halal. Of all the BCGs published by the BIRC since 2007, BCG 1 offers insight into the guidelines for halal certification and the general

requirement for halalisation. The *Piawaian Brunei Darussalam* (PBD), which is also known as the Brunei National Standard (BNS), on the other hand, also provided a set of requirements that overlaps with the BCG 1 via the PBD 24: 2007. The requirements include criteria involving the hygiene, sanitation and safety of the food produced and its production environment. Another criterion consists of the personnel or labour requirement as production is being carried out, with the need to have two appointed halal supervisors and healthy and hygienic workers around the production premises. The halalness of the supply chain and the importance of overall logistics, including display and storage that meet or exceed the halal standard, are also part of the requirement. The details on where halal requirements divergence and convergence exist (marked in both single and multiple abbreviations respectively) can be seen at the end of each requirement coded as BCG, PBD and SMF for requirements based on State Mufti's Office Fatwa or rulings.

Based on this halal development, several scopes might be interesting to explore and address in this research. The first relates to investigating the effects of halal standardisation/ certification on formal food producers and potential issues that may arise when informal producers are brought into the picture. Secondly, it links to addressing how these halal industrial requirements are operationalised as part of the overall standard settings governing exercise and its effects towards businesses. This is followed by identifying the current tools and components used towards halalisation and even the logic behind Brunei's current drive towards halalisation.

1.6 Significance of research

Achieving these motives and goals allows the research to contribute towards the practical application of Islamic ethics and governance towards inclusive, responsible business development. Nevertheless, it will highlight the potential opportunities and challenges that have never been discussed and empirically addressed openly due to the absence of a solid and well-grounded study. Brunei is a hybrid state where, on the one hand, though limited, is a constitutional monarchy following that of the British and a traditional Malay polity with its hierarchy infused with Islamic teachings, on the other, makes it an interesting case to study how halal certification is being governed. With its movement into further Islamisation, especially after promulgating the Islamic penal code or Sharia law in 2013, it makes it more apparent to conduct an in-depth study on the certification's operationalisation. Investigating the effects such halal standardisation and governing have towards agrifood businesses provides evidence to support the government's current industrialisation initiatives as part of its economic diversification strategy. Addressing these questions allows for policy learning, better formulation, and coordination among regulators and producers. This is more meaningful as it is addressed by linking to actual industrial conditions and cases. The study's positive outcomes help to materialise the vision of adopting the Islamic economy and its governing framework as potential alternatives to the current development model beyond the normative approaches mentioned in the literature. If otherwise, it provides an excellent platform to experiment and improvise different ways of managing or governing halal, a heuristic way of developing new paths or directions towards halal standard settings.

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

Commentaries on the Brunei halal food industry previously provided groundings on the scope and determined the types of theories that the research uses. A high concentration of halal corpora in current writings mainly focused on diverse research fields from various disciplines and schools of thought. Themes such as halal production and consumption, focusing on halal standards and quality assurances, supply chains, marketing, and branding are the main focus of most halal research. This is supported by research on contemporary halal law and Islamic jurisprudence, which are primarily concerned with Islamic rulings on diverse aspects of halal, from religious dietary protection in the food industry to business transactions and communal ethos as well as Muslim religiosity and halal. These fields continue to be the main staple in mainstream halal literature.

Despite such vibrancy in these research fields, approaches concerning how such development in the halal industry affects those involved or investigations into whether ways of governing and changes in any halal policies generate desirable socio-economic and political outcomes remained understudied. This includes both economic and non-economic actors alike. Similarly, studies in the literature on halal food standards rarely question the establishment of such quality standards and their governing from the lenses of political economy or critical social theory.

Hence, this research posited the need to approach halal certification or standardisation from the perspective of industrial governing. Three major alternative perspectives, namely Convention Theory, Islamic Governance and Foucauldian Governmentality, were explored to deconstruct the academic disciplinary nuances that help provide an overview of their utility in industrial governing research while simultaneously threading on some shortcomings. Foucault's governmentality and derivative works, such as Mitchell Dean's work on Analytics of Government and Hallaq's Moral Governmentality in Islam, were selected and synthesised to allow for its application in studying the effects of halal certification and standardisation toward agri-food businesses in Brunei.

2.0 Convention Theory on Quality Standards

Within the social sciences, studies on contemporary economics and industrial development have focused on several themes. Sources of economic organisation and coordination among firms, industrial players, and networks - especially in the case of the production networks, commodity/ value chains (Gereffi, 2001; Pratt, 2008) and structuration theories on structure-agency relationships, usually between state and societal actors have been focused. Within development studies, concepts of political economy and governance are used to study the dynamism of actors or agents within the economy. These concepts have been used to understand the structural implications of policy, power politics, consultation, coordination, and decision-making processes relating to individuals and small collective groups at macro and micro levels (Biggart & Beamish, 2003).

Hence, what is convention theory? In the works of Boltanski and Thevenot (1987, 1989, 1991, 1999, 2000) (cited in Jagd, 2007), conventions and justifications on what is agreeable/ consensually agreed upon are multiply dictated by specific criteria. The aim of developing such a convention is to allow for the possibility of developing a shared way of interpreting, evaluating, and analysing any processes, objects and persons following the coordination logic (Storper & Salais, 1997; Boltanski & Thevenot, 2006). Its usefulness in provisions of an evaluative framework for any competent persons, on the premise that all processes, actions, and objects can be assessed (Swaffield et al., 2018) whilst at the same time acknowledging the plurality of conventions due to cultural differences (Diaz-Bone, 2016) led to the creation of the Convention Theory (CT). To understand the workings of conventions, Capron (1997) and Boltanski and Thevenot (1999) developed the fundamental principles of quality conventions and divided them into six orders of 'worth'. Baird (2008) simplified the six orders as shown below:

- i. market (merchant) – price-based quality assessment.
- ii. industrial – measurement of quality based on measurable criteria and statistics
- iii. opinion – assessment based on fame, renown signs, and signifiers
- iv. domestic – trust-based assessments of relationships, personal interactions of esteem and customary reputation
- v. civic – quality assessed based on its contribution towards the public or collective good
- vi. inspired or transcendent – assessment of quality based on personal experience of inspiration or creativity.

Conventions, however, are not fixated in time and space, as Ponte (2016) argued, as the criteria used when evaluating or assessing are not pre-given or ahistorical in their establishment. Instead, conventions are developed as results of constant reiterative processes of exchanges, scrutiny, and challenges that may call for testing and discussions of its criteria, resulting in either compromise or even defeat (Bolstanki & Thevenot, 2006; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005). It could even expose the collective systems to undergo further revisions and change to adapt to recurring changes happening in the market as well as industry resulting from innovation, the rise of ethical consumption, particularly on food waste and labour exploitation questions (see Renard, 2003; Hatanaka et al., 2005; Swaffield et al., 2018) as well as due to the obsessions with quality (Ponte, 2016). In other words, standards thought to be 'pre-given' were the results of these constant exchanges to resolve any problems arising that affected coordination or irregularities that, according to Diaz-Bone (2018), are necessary. CT, hence, should be viewed as a dynamic constant comprised of a selection of requirements that continuously change over time because of the changing consumer needs and demands. More importantly, it is a striking feature of the neo-liberal market economy system that supports freedom of choice and consumption.

A thorough exploration of the halal literature led to the conclusion that halal standards contain all the six principles of worth with one additional principle, i.e. as part of fulfilling Islamic teachings or commandments towards halal food consumption (see sub-section on halal standards for details). According to Thevonot (2002), economic forms and

justification are social processes. Decision-making on what constitutes an agreeable standard is dictated by the conditions under which it is being made. The six-worth order above gives an idea of how justifications are being made. According to Jagd (2007) and Wilkinson (1997), as part of the decision-making process, conventions also call for the importance of criticisms and disputes to resolve problems and conflicts.

Concerning the second order 'industrial', the work by Andre Orléan (2002, 2003) provided another insight into conventions. While Bolstanki and Thevenot investigated the multi-dimensional aspects of standards decision-making in conventions, Orléan's work discussed market coordination among the economic actors. In a nutshell, Orléan's work focused on the debates revolving around two hypotheses relating to the Walrasian approach to economics, i.e. the Nomenclature hypothesis and the Probability hypothesis (cited in Jagd, 2007). Under the first approach, the traditional view on conventions or standards emphasises the importance of economic order, the need to comply with a set of 'pre-given' standards, requirements and routines (a programme?) towards successful coordination (Jagd, 2007; Biggart & Beamish, 2003). Economic agents such as producers and food processors, as found in the case of food standards, are made to adopt a 'pre-given' standard by buyers in the name of compliance and health and safety reasons before gaining market access. Following the principles of the Nomenclature hypothesis, economic actors that are embedded or are involved with market coordination would usually be systematically categorised into a common category or taxonomic group based on their functionalities or common characteristics (Thompson, 2003), and in this case, based on their use value. According to Orléan, the utilisation of 'common' factors or signs

in terms of knowledge and language allows market exchanges to take place (Jagd, 2007) (emphasis added). This highlights the importance of interactions between economic actors, institutions, and consumers and the significance of adopting a specific behaviour to gain market access. However, from an economic sociology standpoint, the use value assigned to a particular product is socially constructed and results from codification, certification, standardisation, and regulation activities, which define contemporary markets (Jagd, 2007). Differences in consumption patterns and needs (Bauman, 2001; Baudrillard, 1998), the increasing heterogeneity of market and demands as seen from the works of Hartwick (1998), as well as the different meanings attached to things (Appadurai, 1986), affect how production and market functions beyond conventional economics approach to production and consumption. Such differences can also be categorised based on its typology of use, function and characteristics as well as via a ranking or hierarchical system. The example below helped define this argument.

Taking from Bourdieu's (1985) market of symbolic goods and Veblen's (1899) (cited in Trigg, 2001) idea on conspicuous consumption, the market is constantly evolving, dictated not only by the diversity of consumers but goods are produced according to the meaningful needs of the consumers, a reflection of their identity as well as purchasing prowess. Veblen's definition of luxury goods as elitist goods and a sign of economic and financial power is outdated in contemporary consumption (Barrere et al., 2006). The study on the taste industries in Paris, for example, saw a shift in consumer approach to food whereby the market has been divided into three main categories – i) elitist niche that comprised of two and three-star luxury restaurants serving a minimum of 100 euros worth

of meal, ii) mass consumer market marked by one star or non-starred eating place with a good and comfortable environment and iii) standard food market comprised of low-quality restaurants, fast food franchised (Barere et al., 2006). Similarly, standards also change spatially and temporally. As mentioned later, the halal industry is also undergoing a similar transformation but further complicated by different interpretations and approaches to halal standards based on Islamic principles. With the theory of convention, such shift in standards could be explained not only from the changes in the market and institutional structures, i.e. as effects from globalisation, changing demand structures and consumer preferences, but from a process view, it reflects on how standards are socially constructed, constantly evolving.

Traditional economics approach to convention often calls for a specific code of conduct when treating the future of production and markets. This is done by formulating probability hypotheses or assumptions that predict the market's outcomes, trajectories and trends based on observations of patterns and other known variables. According to Orlan, the issue of this hypothesis lies in its natural acceptance of the future as a result of economic actors who can predict and project market creation and directions through the provisions of the list of pre-emptive measures of 'probable' future events (Jagd, 2007) (emphasis added). This naturalising tendency of the future by over-socialised economic agents or actors failed to acknowledge the importance of market exchanges mediated by economic actors and the effects of structures on economic behaviour (Jagd, 2007), the importance of social capital and networks (Granovetter, 1985; Putnam, 1993) as well as the reflexive and responsive nature of economic actors in adepting to market conditions. Power and

income distributions play a mediating role towards institution-market and organisational behaviour (Wilkinson, 1997). Current approaches also showed a lack of interest among scholars in exploring the actual governance aspects of these standards and their operationalisation. This leads to the depiction of standard setting as neutral with no mention of conflict (Djama et al., 2011). Due to this failure, both conventional public and private food standards failed to achieve the intended desired effects. Foucault (2008) surmised all these problems as after-effects of the 'naive naturalism' that governors had when treating the economy and activities surrounding the market as a natural law of laissez-faire, defined initially from the rule of equal exchanges, and later based on the law of competition that state, managers and administrators have to obliged to as "it is as much as a natural datum" (p.120). In other words, due to the 'free' nature of the market, governors believed that the market should not be intervened and allowed to run based on the idealistic rule of 'pure competition', a notion that Foucault rejected (ibid, p.121). Government intervention is necessary, and it 'governs for the market rather than because of the market' (ibid, p.121). Concerning standards and growth, the government's role is to facilitate and intervene in any problems relating to the population, i.e., businesses and industries. Questions surrounding the kind of market mechanism and how the government assists the populace in achieving its visions and goals will be discussed in the latter subheadings on governmentality.

The importance of CT lies in its incorporation of fairness in evaluation, openness and close coordination based on democratic principles (Duvernay et al., 2005). Irregularity and inability to meet the standards criteria should result in a judgmental predisposition

from assessors/ evaluators, which could result in better decision-making. Nevertheless, it should allow for close coordination in improving collectively to pursue a win-win situation, a solution to break from repetitive economic routines, as part of Schumpeter's 'creative destruction' concept on innovation (cited in Biggart & Beamish, 2003). As seen from the case studies on the agri-food industry in the introductory chapter, such convention ideals are still debatable and highly contested. No studies have investigated the effects of the industrial guidelines towards halal standard implementation in Brunei or the potential differences in halal definition between regulators/ auditors and industrial producers. Although firms cannot be seen as sole industry representatives, CT is useful as a mid-level theory that probes the firms and their structural interaction that shapes conventions and how it affects production and industrial reorganisation warrants further studies. The relatively small number of halal firms in Brunei adjacent to its Southeast Asian neighbours and the less complex production chain or network in Brunei suggest that any changes occurring within the different components of the production chain and network could significantly impact the industry (see Azalie & Samad, 2022). To complicate matters further, CT embraces the principles of the neo-liberal and free-market economy. Its application to Brunei, an Islamic monarchical polity with a hybrid but parallel system of government, i.e., authoritative but constitutional in design, might not be a straightforward process. The influence of biopolitics and power-knowledge dynamics in operationalising standard governing makes CT not fully applicable in this study. There is a need to look beyond the focus on the quality, definition, religious interpretations, and the maintenance of halal alone.

2.1 The State and economic development: from good to effective governance

One of the usefulness of the governance theory is its provision of insights into how the State can act as an enabler and facilitator and empower businesses by creating spaces of enablement. In his work on the governance of welfare regimes, Jessop (1999) argued that the failure of the welfare state is closely associated with its inability to adapt its policy structure to new priorities. The problem associated with bureaucratic red tape, inflexibility to change, the centrality of the state, and the ineffectiveness of state policy towards goal realisation points to the demise of the welfare regimes. Brunei operates as a welfare state with 'experimental' public-private consultations in various state-led initiatives, of which halal standardisation is also part. Experimentation with democracy at a large scale in the 1960s, despite its traditional existence in the traditional polity, grounded to a halt due to the outbreak of rebellion in 1962. Since then, Brunei has been under emergency rule and in the 2000s, the state tried to revive the constitution by reviving the Legislative Council (LegCo). Best management practices toward development goals/ projects, such as stakeholder consultations, frequently occur as the country embraces the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030 Agenda. However, its effectiveness and its level of social inclusiveness have never been studied. Since the implementation of halal standards is part of a state initiative, exploring its effects on the growth of local food producers reflects the effectiveness of halal standard governing mechanisms and regulators' adaptive capacity and capabilities in resolving issues emerging throughout the implementation process. Success in its implementation and its positive effects on food businesses opens the potential for a hybrid form of governing that works against the conventional wisdom of governance, a combination of stewardship and agency theory.

The word 'governance' according to Jessop (1993b) (cited in Jessop, 1998) refers to the "deliberate act of bringing an autonomous system as an object of governance from one state into another". The success of the Developmental State model in the development of the Asian Dragons, the Entrepreneurial State theory in understanding state-private sector coordination and relationships (Mazzucato, 2014; Ebner, 2006) and the incorporations of good governance practices in environmental protection and monitoring (Born, 1994; Gu & Shearte, 2005) have all utilised the concept one way or another. However, good governance and its implementation alone do not warrant inclusive and responsible development. Numerous cases such as abuse of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) practices (Gu & Shearte, 2005; Hung Lo & To Yip, 1999), failure of entrepreneurial governance in Chinese mid-level cities (Xue & Wu, 2015) and the issues mentioned earlier on food standards among others, are testaments of the complexity, unevenness, and multi-layered nature of governing and governance.

Governance structure can either be anarchic (market-driven), hierarchical (the centrality of the state through top-down/ statist) or heterarchy (self-organize based on networks) (Jessop, 1998; 1999). Central to this argument is the role of agents as they operate through various forms of coordination. Effective governance should have mechanisms that allow (i) agents to learn, innovate and adapt to recurring changes and formulate better strategies and policies to their advantage (capacity and capability building), (ii) constructing coordination methods that could negotiate (renegotiate) actions operating at different space and time (multilevel governance framework), (iii) reduce the complexity of

models and practices through alignment of real-world processes with governing and governance objectives (through the acknowledgement of emerging and recurring problems/ issues, side effects as well as the interdependence of actors) and (iv) establishment of standard world view (a sense of purpose and purposeful agenda?), rules of conduct, key player's orientation and expectation (Jessop, 1998; 1999) (emphasis added). The state's effectiveness in this new model lies in its ability to handle state projects as separate and specific only for that time, and the way to maintain its internal coherence is by drawing in different agencies that can help and realise the vision (Jessop, 1998; 1999; MacKinnon, 2012). The neo-Foucauldian notion of the state, on the other hand, viewed the state and its power to govern not only in its institutional sites (Foucault, 1980) (cited in MacKinnon, 2000) but the state itself as an element that exists within more comprehensive circuits of power (Rose, 1999) (cited in MacKinnon, 2012).

The effectiveness of governance in a heterarchy is dictated by its modes of organisation, the objects of governance and the environmental conditions under which such coordination is to take place (Jessop, 1998). Unlike both market and state-driven coordination, heterarchy depends on inter-personal networking (trust, social capital, targeted partnership), self-organisation of inter-organizational relations (coordinate actions and resource mobilisations, shared objectives, positive coordination) and inter-systemic coordination (cross-institution/ agency consensus through noise reduction, i.e. acknowledgement of emerging issues and problems, its plurality through dialogue and prevention or reduction of negative coordination) (Jessop, 1998). Despite such arguments, governance will only succeed if its agents are reflexive to the changes

(Jessop, 1998,1999). As seen from the example of Fair Trade, the increasing exclusion of small domestic producers is due to their inability to reorganise and adapt their strategies in the face of new entrants comprised of large corporations, plus their inability to reorganise and conform to Fair Trade's food standards forces them to be reabsorbed back into the conventional market (Reed, 2009; Reardon & Farina, 2002; Renard, 2003). Griffin's work on EU fisheries (2010a; 2010b) reflects on the limits of good governance whereby governance innovation resulted in contradictions and new tensions between regulators, policymakers, and fishery industries where public accountability is in question and the dominance of specific agents in state-economic relations. This interplay of exertions of influence of one group to the other can also be seen in studies on Global Value Chains and Global Production Networks (see Coe & Yeung, 2015; MacKinnon, 2012; Henderson, 2002; Gereffi, 2008, 2001).

2.2 Islamic Governance, halal standardisation and Islamic business ethics:

A holistic approach to halal business and industrial growth?

It should be noted that this section is not meant to refute any Western or other conventional theories concerning governance within the Islamic economy. Instead, the concepts used add to existing theories beyond the dualistic self and other arguments and theoretical exploration of whether it falls within Islamic ethics and principles. This research explores the practical application of Islamic principles and ethics in the halal industry, using the implementation of the halal standards as its case.

According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2002), the differences between the Western philosophical tradition and Islamic traditions regarding governance can be summarised into three general arguments. Regarding ethical origins, Western business or industrial traditions are based on the “socially derived ‘secular humanist’ values rather than being based on the religious, moral authority” in contrast to Islamic traditions (Lewis, 2005). Other differences came from the roots of Western corporate culture, where self-interest is the guiding principle, void of the need to reconsider the broader needs of society despite its modifications (Iqbal & Lewis, 2009; Lewis, 2005). The agency is critical for operationalisation, highlighted in CT and the previous subsection, as it involves coordination and partnership. The agents are considered self-centred, opportunistic individuals who need extra supervision and monitoring (Lewis, 2005). Lastly, any emerging conflict from governance processes provides opportunities to reinvent and renew any existing governing tools and policy mechanisms by acknowledging its ‘given’ nature. This differs from Islamic approach where conflict needs to be avoided as much as possible as it causes instability (Salem, 1993).

In contrast, Islamic economics, in general, emphasised the importance of ‘stewardship’ (Davis et al., 1997) or governing in the concept of *Khilafa* (viceregents) (Ismaeel & Blaim, 2012). Whilst the basis of stewardship theory stems from the view that stewards are motivated groups or individuals who acted in the best interest of the principals, the concept of *Khilafa* revolves around the view that human existence and their ethical commitments are an act of worship whenever they behave as viceregents if it falls within the Islamic teachings (Lewis, 2005; Ismaeel & Blaim, 2012). In layman’s terms, being a

leader or as the one who governs, the responsibility is to lead the people towards public good by doing good (*halal*, permissible) and forbidding evil (*haram*), i.e. principles of *Amr Ma'aruf Nahyi Munkar*. As such, the role of Islamic principles and ethics in the contemporary Islamic economy is seen as an alternative to the current free market economy in its attempt to protect the collective interest.

Defining what constitutes Islamic governance and an Islamic government is complex. One of the reasons is that the changing environmental context, spatially and temporally, makes definitive or precise interpretation possible. According to Ismaeel and Blaim (2012), the success of past Muslims in implementing ethical business systems and effective mechanisms was partly due to the different environments and business conditions of that time. They gave the *hisba* as an example. Historically, the *hisba* were referenced to governing bodies or authorities responsible for overseeing trading activities and standards as exchanges were made in the marketplace. However, such authority could be deemed unsuccessful if it were to operate in the contemporary marketplace as the economy is internationalised and quite complex, especially with increasing inter or intrafirm linkages beyond arm's length transactions.

Furthermore, throughout the Islamic expansion history, the institutionalisation of Islam and its political ascendants changed geographically. Hence, the application of some Islamic principles requires some level of innovation, recodification of laws or re-modelling, i.e. through Islamic jurisprudence (*ijtihad-ijma* process)¹, but the essence still lies in the

¹ Lewis (2005) defines *ijtihad* as methods of Islamic jurisprudence which consists of the rules of linguistics and textual interpretation and guidelines on the modes of reasoning i.e. *qiyas* (analogy), *istihsan* (juristic equity – an

teaching of the Quranic scriptures and the Prophetic traditions (Hashem, 2007; Lewis, 2005). There should be room for flexibility and adaptability in Islamic ethics is necessary if religious ideals are to be successfully pragmatized (Ismaeel & Blaim, 2012).

Although not exhaustive, Hashem (2007) attempted to define Islamic governance as acts which strive to achieve justice in society, that aspire to maintain rights, group freedom and dignity of individuals regardless of religious or national affiliations/ belongings, steers or guide individuals towards means of achieving sustainable livelihood, i.e. needs first then luxuries, one that encourages virtue, limits vice, and rejects compulsion in matters of religion and achieves its aims objectives through consultation, participation, representation, accountability mechanisms and through legal conventional regulations in all social formations, low and high.

Islamic governance is all-encompassing, emphasising the need to be individually and socially responsible, accountable, just and fair by following the teachings of Shari'a through consultation (*Musyawarah*) and open discussions (*Muzakharah*). In this sense, Shari'a goes beyond its very definition of Islamic law, comprising sets of norms, values, and laws that should be embraced as a way of life (Ahmad, 2003) (cited in Dusuki, 2008). According to Lewis (2005), Shari'a claims sovereignty over the different aspects of life, from daily living to ethics and socially inclusive of criminal and civil jurisdictions. Ideally, about *shuratic* (consultation and decision-making) processes, the Islamic governance

act of dismissing or toning down the results of analogy is it could result in inconvenience, hardship or not in the interest of public good, against broad rule of justice or when common sense solution is more reasonable than analogy and *istislah* (public good). *Ijma* on the other hand refers to the unanimous consensus among the competent scholars, jurists (*fuqaha*).

frameworks incorporate the three questions of 'by whom', 'for whom' and 'with what and to whom' do these processes are for. The 'by whom' component of the *shura* consultation and decision-making process would usually involve multiple parties, the *shura* (the consultative body and affected stakeholders), *hisba* (religious institutions or authorities) and the sharia process as well as religious audits (Lewis, 2005; Hashem, 2007; Iqbal & Lewis, 2009). On the other hand, the question of 'for whom' is clear-cut as it is for the collective interest, safeguard, and protection of the *umma*. Iqbal and Lewis (2009) mentioned the 'With what and to whom' aspect:

"... religious auditors do it to provide juristic advice, regulate and monitor compliance following Islamic prescriptions and collect *zakah* (alms). Religious supervisors, according to Lewis and Iqbal (2009), are to provide advice to firms' board and management over the level of acceptance of firms' contractual agreement on new product development...to inform shareholders on the compliance of management following Islamic principles... as well as the collection and redistribution of *zakah* (Islamic tax) taken from businesses as part of their social responsibility to appropriate groups of community."

Ismaeel and Blaim (2012) argued that whilst there have been writings on the 'normative' aspects of Islamic ethics and governance, i.e., what can Islamic economies achieve should these two concepts be embedded in business management and state governance, the practical application is far from easy. Businesses and those involved in it are regarded highly from an Islamic perspective as the development and expansion of wealth is part of the other four objectives of the Maqasid Al-Sharia, i.e., faith, posterity, intellect, and

human self, towards human well-being (Chapra, 2008). Wealth expansion is permissible because it helps poverty alleviation, meets the needs of others, helps in increasing a comfortable life, and promotes equitable income distribution (Chapra, 2008; 2002). To be just and accountable is essential. Ibn Taymiyyah (1328) (cited in Chapra, 2002) summarised its importance in his quote, “God upholds the just state even if it is unbelieving but does not uphold the unjust state even if it is Islamic”. Regardless of the governance mechanism used, i.e. public consultation, coordination, stakeholders’ management and others, if it affects the public negatively (through poor decision-making, exclusive and poor governance), it goes against the Islamic ethics and principles of fairness and justice. With such checks and balances, agents can be kept in check to prevent irresponsible and corrupt practices (opportunistic behaviour) via self-accountability, public monitoring, and effective stewardship.

Despite the existence of mechanisms to conduct good governance practices, the evolution of power within the Islamic tradition is organic. After the death of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him), the first election was held to choose the next leader for the Muslims among the Companions. The process of *Musyawarah* and *Muzakharah* mentioned previously marked the beginning of the institutionalisations of Islam, which later spread beyond religious rituals to the new Islamic economy and in the establishment of social institutions to govern social needs. According to Hallaq (2012), despite the spread, the political power of the Caliph and other Islamic leaders (the human sovereigns) was seen as separate from the Islamic jurists or the *ulama* (religious order and knowledge experts). The Islamic jurists were not part of any of the executive branches of the political

sphere, and their study of Islamic law was private. During the early years of the Islamic empire, the knowledge of the law (*ahkam*) was a matter of the personal whereby individual jurist would have their debates and Qur'anic circles in the discussions of the legal reasonings whose conclusions were highly individualistic (Hallaq, 2012; Lewis, 2005). Since the ethos that the Quran engendered revolves around the theological principles of no master but the Great Master and no sovereign but the One Sovereign, it also leads to the creation of a religious governmentality that lasts until the present (Hallaq, 2012). The Quranic message denounced the need for any mediating authority and unintentionally created the previously mentioned principle of separation of power. Only the *alim* (people of knowledge) have jurisdiction over religion and Islamic law (Hallaq, 2014; Lewis, 2005). Hence, it was due to this that Muslims generally put their faith and trust in any religious rulings brought forward by these religious groups as it is based on the Quran as the constitution (Hallaq, 2012). The mechanisms to conduct such activities need to be kept in check.

Regarding the research on the halal standard, the thoughts behind its implementation were due to the religious needs and the need to protect the dietary. However, one of its key aims is also to achieve economic growth, part of the wealth accumulation process, which also hopes to benefit the present and future generations for posterity purposes. Hence, it is essential to look at how the process of halal standardisation is carried out. Should it burden businesses, it indirectly failed one of the critical components of Maqasid Al-Sharia as part of the enrichment of society. Being a country with a British colonial past and modern political system, understanding the effects of halal standardisation on agri-

food businesses and the processes carried out in halal standardisation provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of halal governmentality towards industrial growth.

2.3 Application of Islamic principles, ethics and governance in industrial practices and development

The general approach or theory that the halal industrial certification and governing follow is based on a mix of stakeholder and stewardship theories. The stakeholder approach in the Islamic sense comprises the embodiment of the principles of just (*adl*), trust (*amanah*), benevolence or excellence (*ihsaan*), fair (*qist*), faith (*iman*) as well as permissible (*halal*) and non-permissible (*haram*) on top of the adherence to the Holy Quran and prophetic traditions (Beekun & Badawi, 2012). In this sense, their interpretation of stakeholder theory in Islam should be viewed as relationships between diverse stakeholders, i.e. shareholders (firm to its shareholders), employees (firm to employees), firm (employees to firm) and derivative stakeholders such as suppliers, debtors, competitors, consumers and the environment. Whilst other stakeholder theorists such as Goodpaster (1991) questioned the rights of shareholders to claim their rights over others should some act against the best interest (fiduciary) of others, Freeman (2001) considers that all stakeholders share equal claims (cited in Beekun & Badawi, 2012). How different is the Islamic approach to stakeholder theory? According to Beekun and Badawi (2012), the Islamic approach falls between Goodpaster and Freeman's approaches. As quoted:

“Whereas Freeman considers all stakeholder's claims equally valid, Islam recognises that a firm's owners and financiers have a right to make a profit, but not at the expense of others. Islam does not view all stakeholders as having equal claims. Owners/ financiers and employees (including management) form part of a priority group, followed by suppliers, customers, and external parties” (Beekun & Badawi, 2012).

A diagrammatic reference of this can be found below:

Islam's emphasis on key ethical issues by stakeholder		
Relationship	Stakeholder(s)	Issues
Relationship of the firm to its shareholders	Shareholders	Safeguarding and fructifying the investments; transparent and ethical business transactions in permissible (<i>halal</i>) business ventures
Relationship of the firm to its employees	Employees	Hiring and firing; emphasis on competence and fair working conditions; rejection of sexism; wages and working condition; privacy
Relationship of employees to the firm	Firm	Conflicts of interest; secrecy; honesty; skills training and qualifications
Relationship of firm to derivative stakeholders	Suppliers	Cost of inputs; transparent production process; provision of <i>halal</i> products/services
	Buyers	Hoarding and price manipulation; quantity and quality of goods sold; selling strategy; use of <i>riba</i> in financing sales
	Debtors	Repayment terms
	Competitors	Fair competition
	The environment	Use does not imply abuse; stewardship

Figure 9. Diagram on Islam's ethical consideration with or among crucial stakeholders (Source: Beekun & Badawi, 2012, p. 135)

Whilst there have been arguments concerning the number of rights or priorities given to businesses, the strengthening of the moral core of the business through the utilisation of the above principles would keep businesses in check, i.e. to remain self-accountable and responsible by following Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the principle of Corporate citizenship (Ismaeel & Blaim, 2012; Lewis, 2005). The application of Islamic ethics and governance in halal food production can be seen in the studies mentioned in

the first chapter on halal supply chain management and its effects on industrial organisations. Ismaeel and Blaim (2012), however, argued that Muslims generally have different levels of ethical awareness and commitment dictated by different levels of religious experiences. Hence, regarding halal production, certification process, and governance, there ought to be potential problems or issues that might be ‘invisible’ or have yet to be studied primarily between producers and auditors/ regulators. The structure of halal standards governance can be seen in the figure below:




Figure 10. The multi-level governance framework of Halal Food and Islamic Finance
(Source: Ismaeel & Blaim, 2012, p. 1096)

Their paper argued that the only way to ensure a holistic approach to governing the halal food industry is to establish a multilevel halal certification and Islamic ethics framework. In their argument, the sharia is dictated by three objectives, i.e., the essentials, complimentary and embellishment² (Ismaeel & Blaim, 2012). About the essentials, for

² As cited by Ismaeel and Blaim (2012), Essentials (*Daroriyyat*) refers to the precise rules of right and wrong stated in Islam, Complimentary (*Hajiyyat*) refers to the rightness of action depends on its consequences rather than its intrinsic nature, meaning the action or decision, can be right at one context but also wrong at another depending on the situation or context and the third level is embellishment (*Tahsiniyyat*). It refers to the concept of virtue

instance, the emphasis is more on meeting the basic halal requirements, i.e., based on what has been commanded in the scriptures and prophetic traditions, whilst the complimentary refers to the meeting of basic halal and its extended standards, i.e. extra criterion deem to be necessary, beyond basic or the essentials, the cleanliness of premises, animal welfare as well as health and safety standards. The third level, on the other, refers to the business and firms' strategies towards meeting or exceeding halal standards towards the public good (Ismaeel & Blaim, 2012) (emphasis added). Although it is applicable, the emphasis of their proposed framework revolves more on firms' and businesses' ethical responsibilities rather than that of the auditors or regulators. The definition of halal in an everyday sense might differ from those institutionally proposed. Hence, it is worth looking into these potential differences to avoid what may look like a just and fair decision but fail to look at its potential chain or network effects on producers as the halal standard is being implemented. Exploring this based on the Foucauldian governmentality approach will be useful as it allows the researcher to understand and analyse the diverse processes involved towards the halalisation process of Brunei's agri-food industry. With the state at the helm of the development agenda with low participation of civil society in policymaking and enforcement, it would be interesting to explore whether the state's aim or vision aligns with the actual ways of governing (statification) of the standardisation programme or vice versa. It could also be used to measure the efficacy and effectiveness of current governmentality processes towards halalisation. This could be beneficial, especially in the attempt towards inclusive halal certification and standardisation in a country with a hierarchical governance structure, particularly for

ethics, looking at ethics as a living experience for those with ethical personalities rather than being the arbiter judging right and wrong. These concepts have thus far been used in separation from one another.

formal and informal producers. Furthermore, if not managed, such enforcement could also affect formal halal agri-food producers in terms of cost-effectiveness and efficiency, as standardisation and reorganisation of supplies could mean an increase in costs, putting them at a disadvantage compared to unregulated, informal businesses. This is the potential overarching effect that could hinder growth.

Meeting the socio-religious expectations of consumers and regulators is essential, but standardisation's effects on producers have yet to be studied in greater detail. Ismaeel and Blaim (2012) argued that Muslims generally have different ethical awareness and commitment levels dictated by different religious experiences. As such, the emerging halal standards' political aspects are often muted. To date, few works have managed to touch on this, from the politics of halal standards between different standards owners, i.e., in terms of acknowledgement and recognition, to ethnographic and anthropological studies on defining and practising halal among different communities (see Bergeaud-Blackler et al., 2016). Quality standards are not given. It is a by-product of convention and quite often fails to acknowledge the dynamism of structure and agency that lead to the creation of such standards. Food standards, though advantageous, could have detrimental implications towards upstream players, as in the case of Kenya's green bean producers and Madagascar's high-value rice producers. Whether such effects exist in the halal standardisation process needs thorough studies. This could help answer the practical application of Islamic principles or ethics between regulators and producers, which remained understudied.

One of the limitations of conventional stakeholder theory, as mentioned before, is its failure to acknowledge the importance of public policy, i.e., the role of the government in providing policy directions, its influence upon corporate behaviour well as the importance of firms to operate or manage and deliver based on social expectations of society as a whole (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2004). In Islamic governance, governmental institutions play a fundamental role in safeguarding or protecting society by facilitating and nurturing businesses to adopt Islamic ethics while upholding civil liberty and justice. It has been mentioned earlier on the three critical questions over *shuratic* practices based on Islamic principles and ethics of governance (see Iqbal & Lewis, 2007). Despite such ideals, issues have continuously plagued the effective implementation of Islamic principles and ethics towards economic governance in general. For instance, religious auditors would ideally comprise private prosecutors working closely with shareholders and stakeholders whilst supervised by independent religious supervisors, detached from firms and state management. However, there have been instances where it falls short, resulting in nepotism. Ali (2005) identified the existence of sheikocracy, a hierarchical authority based on personal connections and networks where rules are made to empower those who make them, leading to inefficiency and unethical decision-making processes devoid of Islamic principles and ethics (cited in Iqbal & Lewis, 2007).

Furthermore, historically, decision-making during the early years of Islam was community-based and was only politically institutionalised with the creation of Islamic states after the fall of the Rashidin Caliphates. This has been discussed in detail in recent literature, particularly in the works of Ahmet Kuru (2019), who attempted to study the relationship

between Islam, authoritarianism, and underdevelopment as experienced in the Muslim world. Kuru (2019) discussed the emerging problems resulting from the expansion of the Muslim world, from small communities into emerging Islamic states, undergoing its process of Islamic enlightenment, progress, and modernism, as well as the institutionalisation of various aspects of life, from the economy to politics and religion. According to him, this development throughout the 1400 years of Muslim progression and episodic periods of collapse were the results of not only the marginalisation of Islamic scholars and intellectuals since the rise of Islamic military states of the 11th century. However, he also attributed it to political processes in which Islamic intellectuals or jurists became more involved in real politics. Their indirect subjectification further worsened this as religious institutions with the emergence of a centralised authoritative structure. This concern over the power of the religious orders over those who do not possess it is real. In Malaysia and Indonesia, Islamic counter-models of governance replaced Islamic grassroots governance in the 1960s that works in close association with politicised groups, and these could well have close connections with the ruling political elites (Stark, 2004). Totalitarian and despotic rule of the state, unnecessary rules, blind judgment, and decision-making process could curtail innovation and initiatives due to excessive control over individual/ small group's freedom (Chapra, 2008). About the research, it will be worthwhile to explore the actual application of shuratic principles within the monarchical setting, particularly in implementing halal standards, which are owned and managed by the state and their effects on agri-food and business development. How is the governing of the halal certification, in the case of the Brunei halal standard, operationalised based on the context and condition of which it is governed?

Although the literature on Islamic ethics, branding and marketing emphasises the need for halal-certified products and producers to incorporate the concept of CSR and Corporate citizenship to increase product competitiveness and enhance firms's market position and practice through ethical business practice, such measures are only applicable to a mature and developed halal market. In the case of Brunei, despite the introduction of the HCHLO of 2005 and its gradual compulsory implementations in phases, the size of the agri-food business is still small and growing. Formal and informal agri-food businesses are thriving, whether following the conventional factory/ traditional home-based or using social media. Improper implementation of halal standards could impinge growth/ upgrade potentials. Rather than focusing more on the consumption segment of the halal industry, it would be interesting to investigate whether halal standards' implementation considers the producers' welfare or not, brought about by the stringent standards criteria. What ethical responsibilities do auditors/ regulators have towards business owners/ producers? Do differences in interpretation/ perceptions/ views of halal (institutional and everyday halal) pose a challenge in implementing harmonised halal standards? If business is central based on the Islamic stakeholder theory, in what way do auditors assist them? Is there any consultation, advisory, or training given for producers towards halal production (generally) and those who failed at auditing? How do standard owners maintain halal integrity of food production concerning informal businesses? What are the challenges encountered by agri-food businesses/ producers towards halal certification? All these questions need to be addressed thoroughly.

Fairness, justice and equity form the inner core of Islamic economics. However, the physical mechanism to conduct or operationalise it must still be stipulated clearly within the economy's religious scriptures and prophetic traditions. Current management forms are a by-product of the interaction between the state, society, Islamic jurists, and ulama (the upholder of Islamic knowledge), particularly after the prophet's death when Islam spread beyond Arabia. Interaction with local cultures produces some adaptation and innovation of the practices and rituals. Brunei is also included in these processes, as Islam came to the state in the 15th century. Despite such cultural biasness, the core remains the same, where the Quran is the constitution that transcends the society, the economy and the State until today. Earlier in the chapter, it was mentioned that the implementation of conventional agri-food standards, despite the novelty aimed at its inclusiveness and good governance, has resulted in the marginalisation of small producers from developing economies. The study on halal standards mainly focused on the technical aspects of halal standardisation, quality control, and establishing conceptual frameworks on good halal governance. There needed to be more literature or empirical studies on the governmentality of the halal standard and its effects on producers beyond monitoring and industrial management. As such, the recently introduced Brunei halal standard needs to study the effects of its implementation towards business growth from the producer's perspective. Issues derived from experiences of conventional food standards, such as accountability of auditors, regulators, state institutions and its supporting institutions in resolving potential issues and how standardisation is being carried out, must be identified if ever present. This is timely since the country has considered the halal food industry as one of the major drivers towards its 2035

development vision, in Foucauldian terms. This economic project requires the implementation of programmes.

2.4 Between governance and governmentality: Approaching the underlying processes of governing through the Analytics of Government (AOG)

The critical turn in development studies not only questioned the epistemological and material foundations of the modernist development paradigm but also opened space for alternative frameworks that had been marginalised or dismissed under the secular, economistic logic of mainstream development discourse. Among these emerging perspectives is a renewed interest in the role of religion—not merely as a cultural variable or obstacle to progress, as earlier secular paradigms often framed it—but as a constitutive force in shaping ethical, institutional, and governance frameworks of development (Clarke & Tittensor, 2014; Rakodi, 2012). This has been particularly evident in scholarship on Islamic governance, which explores how Islamic moral economies, institutions, and state practices intersect with development goals. Building on this body of work, this research contributes to this conversation through the concept of *halal governmentality*, which draws on Foucault's notion of governmentality to examine how halal certification regimes in Muslim-majority contexts like Brunei embody a form of ethical governance rooted in Islamic norms. Rather than opposing modern development, such frameworks may constitute parallel modalities of organising economic and social life, thereby challenging the presumed universality of secular-liberal models of development.

In this research, the theory on governmentality, particularly Dean's (2010) *Analytics of Government* (henceforth AOG), will be used as it allows the researcher to see beyond the dualist structure and agency nexus through the focus on the governing processes and how it is being carried out. As an analytical tool, it provides multiple ways of analysing the diverse processes involved by focusing on not only the reasons why things happen but also on how they happened and how different political rationalities bore newer ways, tools or technologies of governing compared to before. This is linked to the idea of snapshots. Identifying different technologies and governing techniques allows for empirical mapping of governmentalities. Due to its constant inventiveness and flexibility, charting the different ways shared visions are materialised is possible.

Since the study aims to examine how halal industrial governmentality through halal standardisation affects agri-food business growth and industrial development, it is hoped that utilising the governmentality theory will bridge the gap between Islamic perspectives and those of its Euro-American counterparts. The gaps to be addressed relate to the proposed notion of effective Islamic governmentality that would examine the utilisation of diverse governing technologies within halal industrial governing as a function of economic growth that considers the preservation and safeguarding of the welfare of food businesses as its utmost priority. This differs from the common Islamic scholarly writings that feed upon the romanticisation of Islamic governing narratives on Islamic economy and development, void of real-world evaluation and assessment of its efficacy and effectiveness towards industrial growth. This, on the other hand, has been at the cornerstone of geographical and development studies in other parts of the world, as seen

in the works of scholars like Amartya Sen, David Harvey, Nikolas Rose and Bob Jessop to name a few. In other words, it provides an analytical bridge to Islamic concepts requiring rereading and re-examination due to the change affecting Islamic civilisation thus far.

This study, hence, is grounded in the concept of Islamic governmentality, which extends Foucault's (2007) notion of governmentality to religious contexts. Islamic governmentality has been used to explore how states institutionalise religious norms to regulate behaviour, shape ethical subjectivities, and produce moral order (Agrama, 2012; Mahmood, 2005). In Brunei, halal certification represents not only a system of food regulation but also a state-led mechanism for instilling Islamic ethical conduct within market and bureaucratic domains.

This analytical lens is brought into conversation with critical development theory, particularly post-development critiques that interrogate the discursive and institutional operations of development as a form of power (Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1994). From this perspective, halal certification is conceptualised as both a developmental and ethical technology—producing subjects who are not only compliant with global market standards, but also aligned with the state's vision of Islamic modernity. In synthesising these frameworks, the thesis argues that Brunei's halal regime exemplifies how religious governance can function as a modality of development—advancing state legitimacy, fostering compliant citizen-consumers, and enacting a national vision that fuses religious authenticity with economic ambition.

Furthermore, the influence of the religious scripture and prophetic sayings towards such halal industrial governmentality allows for a revisit to Foucault's 'governing by the scriptures', which may help to address the operationalisation of Islamic governmentality in parallel with other multiple governmentalities that existed within the State's halal certification system. Effective programmes marked by fair and just decision-making with logical policy directions are also important. This is one of the reasons why part of this research also focused on the effects of the Brunei halal standard towards businesses, as the standard is a technical guideline adopted and modified from HACCP and ISO. Should it burden agri-food businesses and their growth despite successfully creating a halal industrial code of conduct, this would go against the Islamic principles of enrichment of well-being. It could also reflect the difficulty of balancing Islamic ideals and actual practices. In the end, studies on governmentalities are meant to be critical and to ensure that criticism can be made possible, not as a critique of existing theories but rather as a different way of studying a particular phenomenon (Rose et al., 2009), further emphasising the work in progress characteristics of governmentality as a theory (Huxley, 2009).

Discussions on the concept of good governance under the Islamic vision, as well as those emanating from theories of stakeholders and stewardship, in a nutshell, revolve around the dualistic interplay between structure and agency where good governance is seen as determinants towards an inclusive, fair and just society. This is particularly true in the relationship between the government and the people under them. However, Foucault

argued that such a notion needs to be more complex to understand how the state and society interact and relate. Arguing against Althusser's ideological apparatuses of the state and how society reacts, combined with the inadequacy of Marxism in understanding the economy, Foucault proposed a new way of approaching the study of state and society, beyond the grand theories and narratives of the state by looking into the detailed processes that govern daily life and how it came to be, i.e., translated from mere thoughts and reflected on to actual practices of governing. Foucault's theory on governmentality, questions surrounding its relevance, and the rationale behind its conceptualisation, in general, were effects of significant changes in Europe, not only stemming from the emergence of industrial capitalism but a change in all aspects of society which resulted in stern questioning of European philosophical origins (Koch, 1993; Sandu, 2011), the rise of anti-foundationalism and social activism within the academia raised the need to have alternative paradigms in trying to understand the changes, processes involved, and how do these changes affect the relationship between the state and the society (Huxley, 2009; Baert & Rubio, 2009; Rosenthal, 2019). For instance, Foucault's approach to the genealogy of the state differs significantly from the narratives and approaches undertaken by 'modernist' social theorists and post-modernist cultural critiques in explaining socio-cultural changes in the name of or as by-products of societal progress. Whilst 'modernists' viewed social progress as imperative and universally necessary for the betterment of society, post-modernist cultural critiques, on the other hand, argued for its unwarranted outcomes such as social fragmentation, rising inequalities, and politicisation of the economy, to name a few, as a reversal of such utopian vision of progress. Foucault (1986) argued that rather than taking positions in the two camps, he called for observing and

analysing events and phenomena based on their circumspection analysis by considering types of processes. These happenings exist within the given spaces temporally, at that moment in time. It is only by doing so that state processes can be analysed not solely based on the lenses of historical continuities nor from the view that the current can be explained by embracing a universal past model of statecraft, but from a more intrinsic understanding of what it is and the rationality behind such governing, based on the context and current experiences of those governing and living in the moment. It was this insight that led to the creation of the governmentality theory, an approach used by Foucault to understand the political rationality behind the government's actions, the mentality of the governors over the governed (Foucault, 1991a, p.89) as well as the ways of implementing disciplines through penal codes, laws, policy, regulations through the use certain technologies, an art of government (Foucault, 1991a, p. 100).

From this work, Foucault (1991) constructed an interpretation of governmentality based on the interlinkages or dynamism of sovereignty-discipline-government trinity (cited in Fletcher & Vasquez, 2020). According to Fletcher (2017), this trinity was meant primarily for the general public or population to be used as targets of disciplining using security apparatuses of the state. Such disciplining is operationalised by encouraging subjects to "internalise norms and values by means of which they self-regulate as well as enforce compliance by others via social sanction" (Fletcher & Vasquez, 2020, p. 291). This act of disciplining is also known as disciplinary governmentality. Such internalisation is made possible by creating a near identity among the subjects through socialisation processes or by creating what Anderson (2020) called an imagined community that shares a

collective political destiny bounded by fixed national boundaries with common cultural characteristics.

Despite this initial use of governmentality, Fletcher (2017) argued that there is a marked shift in Foucault's approach to governmentality within the two years after the publication of his first lecture series in 1977. This can be seen when the term was further refined to describe governmentality as not only a way of subjugating individuals (Fletcher & Vasquez, 2020). According to Fletcher (2010), these multiple governmentalities can be divided into four types – sovereign, disciplinary, neoliberal, and truth or scripts. But rather as a generic term used to describe and the existence of distinctive multiple ways of governing that co-exist temporally in any given context but not necessarily mutually exclusive (Fletcher, 2010). It is used to describe the diverse strategies that used by the governors in directing the conduct of conduct (Fletcher, 2017) through the utilisation of diverse range of biopower (Fletcher, 2010). The sovereign form of governmentality is more concern on the top-down approach in which the State are more concerned of producing subjects that conforms or comply in fear of punishments or from being labelled of morally deviant (Fletcher, 2010). Neoliberal governmentality is more concerned on positioning or situating the subject in an environment where they could be influenced to conduct in a way both the state and the market 'prefer' by incentivising structures or apparatuses which are external to them (Fletcher et al., 2019). Whilst disciplinary governmentality has been discussed previously, the final governmentality on absolute truth or religious texts and scripts refers to this idea that authority, the prescriptions of taxonomic type of 'preferred' behaviour and conduct do not stem from the agency and

structures of humans but rather it lies in accordance with laws of the nature, the universe or divine commandments (Fletcher, 2010). These multiple governmentalities quite often “overlap, lean on each other, challenge each other, and struggle with each other” (Foucault, 2008) (cited in Senellart, 2008, p. 313). With such overlaps, continuous dissonances and convergences, how can we identify, understand and assess the operationalisation as well as the resulting effects of these multiple governmentalities on the object of study? As will be discussed in the later paragraphs, by adepting the definitive works of Fletcher and Oels as part of Dean’s AOG framework, it provides an interesting way on how multiple governmentalities particularly Islamic governmentality works with regards to Brunei’s halal certification governance in light of these complex nuances which governmentality is attributed to.

The utilisation of disciplinary power as part of governing (Walker, 2010) to shape certain types of code of conduct by subjecting, training, or exposing it continuously to constant surveillance or via punishments or rewards (Foucault, 1991a; Peet, 1998) allows for the production of productive and subjected communities as required by the economy. This disregards their individualistic needs or wants through the veiling or ‘removal’ of the individuals from the governmentality equation as they became embedded or part of the generalised society governed in a specific sovereign territory. The conduct of conduct acts as a ‘defacto delimitation’, a disciplinary boundary that the government have to follow or abide to, to maintain its rationality as well as its way of doing things (Foucault, 1979) (cited in Senellart, 2008, p. 10). Failure to abide or stay within this zone does not necessarily delegitimise the State; it just means that the State’s government is being

clumsy, an inadequate government that does not do things properly (ibid, p. 10). Foucault (2004) hence argued that it is through such diverse disciplining that the sovereignty and security of the territory can be safeguarded through the management of the multiple (ways of governing, population, and the economy, among others), of organising it, of fixing its points of establishments, coordination, side or horizontal trajectories, vertical and pyramidal trajectories, hierarchy, etc. (p.13-14). This statement highlighted the need to view Foucault's governmentality, the arts of government and governing technologies as idiosyncratically relational due to being multi-layered and multifaceted but operating in dissonances, can either be broad or narrow in its scope and utilisation depending on one's positionality as a researcher, of which the scopes covered relate to the 'problems of population' beyond mere investigation on political legitimacy per se. To make sense of how these three spheres of political rationalities, governors conduct of conduct and the governing apparatuses work or are applied, "Governmentality two", conceptualised as Dean's AOG, will be used as a framework to not only analyse the processes of governing between the governor, i.e. halal certification governors and the governed, in this case, agri-food businesses. It will also study the after-effects of governing agri-food businesses to investigate the government's policy learning capabilities. This is tied to this notion of critique of governmentality that Foucault introduced as a means of being reflexive, as a way of 'not to be governed like that' (Foucault, 1991a), which could help the governors learn and improve in the current governing mechanism. These are results of critical attitudes developed within the governed towards the governors, which, according to Yu (2009), are games played as both partners and adversaries.

Concerning how the State governs society, works by Burchell et al. (1991), Dean (2010) and Miller and Rose (2011) addressed the questions on processes of governing, the arts of governing that the government took through analyses on such processes as well as on the existence of discontinuities, disjuncture necessary for the betterment or improvement in government governing mechanisms. The centrality of the State is evident, although its role is continuously shaped by the dynamism between the state and the society in which it governs. Hence, before analysing how such processes work, there is a need first to define the word 'government'. What is a government? According to Guillaume de La Perriere, as quoted by Foucault (cited in Burchell et al., 1991) (p.93), government is "the right disposition of things, arranged to lead to a convenient end". Government is defined as the right manner of disposing of things to lead not to the form of the common good as the jurists' text would have said, but to an end which is convenient for each of the 'things' to be governed. The convenient end in the Foucauldian sense here refers to the endgame that the State desires, which is to achieve greatness, sturdy, and permanence through wealth generation or accruals and posterity (Foucault, 1979) (cited in Senellart, 2008, p.4) within its subjects and territories. To achieve this, the government, which acts as the political arm of the State, needs "to bring in the best possible way of practising governing through consideration, calculation, crafts that the State should or ought to be" (ibid, p. 4). The concept of 'things' defined by Foucault here refers to those governed, 'objects' that eventually include communities or subjects located within a particular territory or another object. According to Foucault (1991a), treating people or communities as objects requiring a specific type of conditioning and governing helped converge the contrasting nature of both subject-object, providing new avenues to analyse power relations between

the governor and those who were governed. It is through this that the government, according to Foucault (1991a), has to do with “a sort of complex composed of men and things” (cited in Burchell et al., 1991) (p.93). This is what was later labelled as sovereign governmentality.

The change in the relationships, from the sovereign and their subjects to that of governors and the governed, the change in the political structures, the economy, market systems and society allows for a new rationale in governing the state. The rise of problems of population ranging from poverty, income inequalities, unequal resource allocation and distributions to development issues such as overpopulation and hunger, among others, led to the rationale coined by Foucault as *raison d'état*, i.e., reason of the state. Such problems justify not only the political rationalities or government mentalities that require the state's intervention in governing its populace but also the need to discipline and introduce new governing technologies to resolve problems as they exist or develop, to achieve different types of finalities, not limited to economic finalities only. Henceforth, the population is considered a political subject that requires constant administering, monitoring, counselling, curing, disciplining, educating, and so on (Foucault, 1991b). Foucault defined the state as ensembles of things, *dispositifs*, comprising diverse regimes of practices, governmentalised based on multiple political rationalities. Hence, the governing power required to achieve these finalities is not necessarily one of domination or coercion like those of the sovereign or associated with *imperium* or Empire. Still, Foucault introduced this notion of positive power or ‘power through’ that functions to get things done, facilitate, create, and manage possibilities and structure the possible actions

of others (McKee, 2009). Hence, power is seen as a productive force. To carry out such tasks, those who govern, be it the state or other institutional actors from state and non-state alike, would practise diverse arts of government using diverse technologies. According to Foucault (1979), the arts of government is not about studying how real governmental practices were carried out but on the 'reasoned way of governing best' and at the same time, to be able to reflect on it, to search the best possible way of governing (cited in Senellart, 2008) (p.2). This allows the state and those involved in governing to acknowledge the stakes involved in such programmes and create a sense of accountability and responsibility towards the significance of the prescriptive programmes and their consequences (Dean, 2010). All are made possible through 'problematization' of the problems related to the population that require solutions to be prescribed, moulded, and implemented. Then, about this research, how productive and positive is power in governing the halal standard?

According to Foucault (1988), the term 'Government' then shall be defined as an intermediate region which exists between the primary type of power of liberties and domination, exercising its power over those whom it governed, operationalises, and made possible due to the freedom or liberties of those whom it is exercised upon (cited in Dean, 2010). In other words, whilst the government may exercise degrees of authority towards creating conduct of conduct, those governed may also exercise the freedom to act and respond to their government as part of disciplining or keeping things in check. This is part and parcel of the neo-liberal governmentality, which saw the arts of governing; the role of the governor towards the governed has transformed as their role is no longer solely

focused on safeguarding the trinity of sovereignty-discipline-government. Instead, the arts of governing have now moved towards the need to act dynamically, proactively, and systematically change or revise the variables without further demand for the subjugation of individuals, as domination is no longer the sole purpose of governing (Foucault, 2008). Concerning the market, neoliberal governmentality is used as part of the state's intervention of the market at the outset to allow for the creation of a more enabling environment (Fletcher, 2010). Civil liberties allow for such exercise to exist through the technologies of agencies that help the populace to mobilise and regulate their conduct. Furthermore, subjects can also be manipulated through the provisions of incentives created from the external incentive structures as part of the governing strategy (Fletcher, 2017). This is imperative towards the formation of subjects that optimise their human-environment relationship through calculative, rational approach that weighed on the cost-benefit and potentials of their actions (Fletcher, 2020).

Based on Machiavelli's work on the prince, the centrality of the state and the influence of the prince's genealogy as a way of making sense of his function within the state can be used to elucidate the notion that the King reigns but not govern, reflected in the use of 'government by council' functions. The acquisition of power, the ability to rule over not through conquest but inheritance, makes his relationship with not only state institutions but also the population he governed one of externality and transcendence (Burchell et al., 1991). Arts of government exist throughout the population, regardless of where the political rationalities and the diverse governing arts exist, be it within the government or society via socio-cultural institutions such as the family. Such plurality of the government

shows that governing is multi-layered and multifaceted, not singular as the prince views it. This led to the question of how the government governed then.

The strategies used by the government to govern shall be viewed as an interplay of different governing arts and artists of government (Dean, 2010), with multiple reference points (Ha, 2013). These strategies can be analysed via Dean's AOG. Dean (2010) defines the AOG as regimes of practices by making clear the form of thought implicated in them, looking at disjunctures between the stated aims of a particular programme and other external rationalities and the logic or strategies of practices reflected from the diverse effects that it caused at different moments in time". Rather than treating the way government governed at one point in time based on what is deemed conceptually ideal nor approaching them as causality effects of governing per se, AOG "examines the conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained and are transformed" (Dean, 2010, p.31). Governing technologies or programmes, according to Bröckling et al. (2011), are introduced by the programmer deliberately in a descriptive as well as prescriptive manner where it helps to define and redefine the roles of the governing through the creation of presumptions of the reality as they view it, problematise it and on the other, creates a solution and transform it through intervention. Regimes of practices, in a sense, are objects of definite programmes, i.e., deliberate and systematic forms of thought that endeavour to transform those practices (Dean, 2010). Such critical attitudes towards the government, as well as conflicts relating to the problems of the population, create new perspectives or directions, new ways of mitigation and mediation through rational planning as well as a harbinger for growth (Bröckling et al., 2011; Dean,

2010; Abu-Nimer, 1996). As such, by understanding the complexities of the multiple governmentalities that embody what we later refer to as the State, analyses can be made not only along a unilinear pattern type of relationships between the governing and the governed but also on the intersection, overlaps, contestation, fragmentation and cooperation that exist across regimes of practices i.e. institutions and their institutional support, social groupings among others, an act of borrowing (Dean, 2010). To do this, understanding how devices and practices are being operationalised is essential to know the effectiveness and efficacy of any constructed programmes (Merlingen, 2011; Bevir, 2011). For this research, the concept of multiple governmentalities is used to study the governing of the Brunei halal certification and standardisation programme by looking at the role of Halal Food Control Divisions (HFCD) as well as agri-food businesses in the halalisation of the food industry. This includes the analysis of the regimes of practices both government and the governed used towards halalisation, identifying the technologies or mechanisms used and extending the concept of governmentality by examining the effects of such multiple governmentalities on businesses. The Brunei halal certification programme can be seen as an ensemble where intersections, overlaps and even contestations may exist due to the multiplicity of governing rationalities rooted in its wake whilst at the same time operating in dissonances but towards a common endpoint. In the Foucauldian sense, businesses undergoing halalisation can be treated as smaller governments due to the diverse degree of operations and practices in which each regime is involved. This is also made possible as halalise businesses become halal because of the extension of the State's *raison d'etat*.

The question of 'who is governing' and 'who is to govern' itself reflects both power and hierarchical relationships pointing to the existence of a degree of subjugation, the existence of states of domination within multiple governmentalities linked to Foucauldian plural state concept (Bröckling et al., 2011; Dean, 2010). The AOG, however, is not so much concerned with locating political power sites within a centralised state's various institutions. Instead, the interest is in relocating how the state governs within more comprehensive power circuits (Rose, 1999). Rose's approach treated Foucault's positive power as multiple, situated in the different layers of the government or, in what Jessop (2007) called terminals, are utilised to meet certain convenient ends or truths using diverse governing technologies exercised in different organisations, agencies or departments be it formal or informal. Through this identification and acknowledgement, posing the question of 'how to govern' within the diverse state institutions and mechanisms allows for developing what Foucault termed a sense of self-criticism (Senellart, 2008). This leads to the understanding of current ways of governing, the creation of new strategies, and new knowledge to improve current ways of governing and steer the activities of local institutions (Dean, 2010; MacKinnon, 2000). In effect to those who are governed, it allows for examination of how well such strategies, programmes and technologies that follow are received or implemented by those who experienced it. The emergence of issues or conflicts allows for new prescriptions, programmes, and technologies to be introduced, marking its relative sense of stability in a constant restructuring state. To do this, reflexivity to these processes is vital to understanding the workings of the diverse modes of governmentalities. Such 'codes of conduct' are necessary to formulate any calculated attempts to direct society, including human

behaviour, towards a particular goal (Dean, 2010), regardless of where they are within the governmentality continuum.

The existence of discontinuities or what Dean (2010) called inconvenient dissonance allows the AOG to not only offer critical attitudes or input through studying the disjuncture between “the claims and objectives of programmes and rationalities of government and the ‘intentional but non-subjective’ character of regimes of practices, that is to say, their logic, their intelligibility and even their strategy” (p.4). It can be concluded that the aims of the AOG then is not only to understand the governors’ intentions and rationalities over the introduction of programmes, policies and other governing technologies deemed necessary towards the creation of a particular conduct of conduct, but it is also intended to study and measure how governors strategically operationalise, reform, and critique the ways they governed. Its usefulness as an analytical framework is not in its mere descriptions or depictions of processes involved in governing per se but in its strength as diagnostics to current governing processes and its effects on the ‘subjects’ (Dean, 2010; McKee, 2009). For Foucault, one of the ways of ensuring such a constant shift in mentalities, practices, and reformulation to be possible is via the creation of a near identity between the state and those it governed (Hallaq, 2012).

The problem of government, according to Burchell et al. (1991), also needs to be highlighted as the government itself is a result of heuristic processes, outcomes of trial and error designed to adapt to constant changes experienced by communities. Due to this, it is not free of limitations and problems. Similar processes can also be traced to the

development of the Islamic government. Historically, the political institutionalisation of Islamic religious functions and establishment of Islamic states are associated closely with the development trajectories that Islamic civilisations take, especially after Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) demise – from the Companions as Caliphs to Family-based Dynasties as evident with the prominent dynasties of the Umayyad, Abbasid and Ottoman Turks (Hallaq, 2012; Kuru, 2019). Initially, Islam and how it was practised was based on communes. Still, Islam's dramatic increase and expansion to other parts of the world resulted in the need to establish institutions or *hisba* to govern the Muslims. Unlike Foucault's view, where "the arts of governing shall find itself not to be embedded in transcendental rules, a cosmological or a philosophico-moral ideal" (as cited in Burchell, 1991), Islamic moral governmentality and its arts of governing shall still be rooted in the Islamic principles and ethics, using the Quranic texts and the Prophetic sayings or the *hadith* as its constitution. However, since most of the Muslim World had experienced colonialism directly or indirectly between the 19th and the mid-20th century, it would be interesting to see how Islamic moral governmentality governs the state's different aspects. Hence, the investigation into the Brunei industrial halal standard governmentality, which existed in a mix of both traditional, i.e. a system of Malay Sultanate and Monarchy, and conventional, i.e. following Britain's Constitutional Monarchy and English Common Law as well as religious i.e. declaration of Sharia Law to co-exist with current law, provides empirical examples of these dynamisms as well as to assess the depths of which Islamic principles and ethics are utilised in the governmentality of the halal industrial standard.

To investigate Foucault's arts of government, Dean's AOG or analytics, introduced three key aspects where insights can be made. One of the ways is to investigate the strategic relations between the governing and the govern, followed by understanding the technologies used in governing and, finally, by examining the states of domination (power) (cited in Bröckling, et al., 2011). Such arts of government are also dictated by the governmentality or political rationalities of the government. The political technologies used the inscriptive devices deployed to make sense or justify the need to introduce new programmes, as argued by Merlingen (2011) and McKee (2009), come in the form of charts, tables, graphs, forms of texts, and government policy documents. These support the political rationale behind newly introduced programmes and problematisation processes. To be able to utilise such programmes and technologies points to the importance of knowledge and power at the centre of governing, which targets the population or society. Hence, this raised the question of whether governmentality has been applied to the study on standards or whether standards have been used as strategic governing technology. Exploration of the literature on governmentality and food standards showed the existence of few studies that adopted such theory in studying conventional agri-food standards or even normative nutritional health social standards envisioned by families and communities (see Swislocki, 2011; Ristovski-Slijepcevic et al., 2010) in support of or against established Western food standard but not on the halal food standard. In another study by Drake (2014), the standardisation of community gardens involved in food production can become sites of governmentality that are inclusive, exclusive or negotiate differences. Some of the commonalities that this literature shared are on the use of expert knowledge usually wielded by people of power or specialists

such as physicians, food nutritionists or scientists, mothers, and garden leaders, to name a few, on the subject as a benchmark to measure the degree of conformance of the political object, i.e., people, citizens or members of families. Studies by Ristovski-Slijepcevic, Chapman and Beagan (2010) show that mothers' role in their family's dietary governmentality is defined not only by the intangible knowledge of food they inherited. However, it is also increasingly being defined and redefined by the constant comparisons of their knowledge with the present, morally acceptable and often industrially defined healthy standards, i.e. low carbohydrates, non-fatty, rich in vitamins, vegetarians and non-vegetarians, as part of current food regimes discourses. The study by Djama, Fouilleux and Vageneron (2010) on palm oil producers' standard settings found how the act of socialising standards through educating, familiarisation and disciplining palm growers and conflict avoidance from the use of veto power in favour of consensus are parts of varying technologies used to meet the changing governing rationalities of the governor. The change in governmentality is also often linked closely with the change in market requirements, such as the rise of organic food and branding (Swaffield et al., 2018) and rising opposition towards palm oil production-related climate change movements (Djama et al., 2010), and to stem potential market failures associated with standards mentioned earlier under the entrepreneurial growth subsection. A recent study by Jhagroe (2019) used Dean's AOG in his study on food governmentality, emphasising food citizenship's identity creation resulting from the power dynamics between multiple players within food systems. In these studies, the role of consultants as experts holds more weight in swaying opinions and ensuring the degree of conformance of the citizens. In a way, some of these standards should be treated as governing strategies or part of technologies undertaken

by any form of government, operated to achieve the desired truth envisioned through their rationalities. Other aspects that characterised these studies are the relational aspects between the governors and the governed, the relationship as insiders-insiders (Government-to-Government or G2G), insiders-outsiders, (Government-to-Business or G2B) and outsiders-outsiders (Business-to-Business or B2B) as well as the orientation that the diverse governmentalities are geared to often resulted in constant revisions, renegotiations and change within the political object. These studies also highlight the centrality of power-knowledge vested in experts and their ability to translate political rationality and discourse into practice by establishing governing technologies such as standards, monitoring and auditing risks. Rose, O'Malley and Valverde (2009) and Weidner (2009) touched upon the utilisation of technologies of risk and its centrality in creating or problematising new ways of governing, made possible via subjectification of threats via interiorisation processes, acknowledging its harmful effect should government failed to manage the present and the resulting multiplier effects. At the same time, it also creates opportunities for those in power or governing to manage and mitigate risks via calculating and predicting its probabilistic effects via imagining or creating mental fights or exercises (Weidner, 2009). How is halal governmentality then implemented? What role does the Brunei halal standard play as part of the technologies of governing and towards the creation of a halal code of conduct? These are questions that shall be addressed in this research.

The rationalities of the government and its processes are dynamic, modified and revised, following the needs and requirements of specific time frames, providing either new

solutions or creating new problems whilst retaining certain styles of thoughts and technological preferences (Rose et al., 2009). It helps the researcher avoid the taken-for-granted attitude or naturalisation of the state's role and how it governs society, including politics, economy, and society (Dean, 2010; Merlingen, 2011). For Foucault (2008), though, what matters the most in this approach is to “try and grasp the level of *reflections* in the practice of government and on the practice of government... to grasp how this practice that consists in governing was conceptualised both within and outside of the government, and anyway as close as possible to governmental practice...a study on of the rationalisation of government practice in the exercise of political sovereignty” (cited in Bröckling et al., 2011).

In the Islamic sense, the end goal or finality is beyond the material or worldly affinities due to the belief that following God's commandments will lead to the accrual of good deeds, eventually leading to salvation in the next life. What makes Islamic principles of moral governmentality interesting and resonates closely to modern Muslim scholars is due to the belief that the governed and those who govern share the same collective responsibility towards achieving community goals so long as they remained steadfast and follows the Islamic constitution i.e. the Quran and the hadith (Hallaq, 2014). To do this, there is a need to practise just and fair governing and acknowledge the importance of public ethical responsibility. This governmentality is what Foucault referred to as governing by the scripts or by religious texts. This type bears semblances to the European churchdom when it used to centrally govern societies using the Church's pastoral power (Foucault, 1988, 2007). However, in the Islamic sense, such institutions are non-existent.

Whilst pastoral power was considered part of the earthly government's theological continuum, which gave the sovereign authority to govern and models to exercise how governing takes its form (Foucault, 2007), the Islamic notion of the government and governor has no specific references to a particular sovereign be it rulers, chiefs or even Caliphs. Instead, God commanded the Faithful to "Obey God and obey the Apostle and those in authority among you" (Quran 4: 59). Al-Bukhari and Muslim further narrate this in the prophetic hadith on the authority of Abu Hurairah where the Prophet said, "He who obeys me, obeys God, and he who disobeys me, disobeys God And he who obeys the *Amir* obeys me and he who disobeys the *Amir*, he disobeys me" (cited in Asad & Grunebaum, 1961). The definition of the Amir here is not limited to the head of state, but it also refers to those who are more righteous among the Muslims and chosen on merit alone. Such obedience to the leaders and government came with the condition "so long as he is not ordered to sin, but if he is ordered to sin, there is no hearing and no obeying" (narrated by Al-Bukhari and Muslim, on the authority of Ibn Umar). This resonates with Foucault's concept of the State's maintenance of a degree of domination while allowing for some civil liberties to be exercised by the population, even more so when tyranny is committed and resistance is a must.

However, the effects of the halal certification governing the people, especially the businesses and approaching it from the perspectives of governmentality have been limited at best. This owes to the fact that corpuses surrounding halal certification, its creation, implementation, and management had been studied mainly from firm's and industrial management perspectives based on theories of convention, stewardship, and

governance apart from those that dissected the halal food and certification studies purely based on theology previously mentioned. The setting of the halal standard itself can be classified as an intermeshing of three types of governing. Firstly, it is a by-product of adherence to the religious dietary requirement found in the Islamic scriptures, as commanded by God, whose actual rulings and implementations were done by highly knowledgeable Islamic jurists on the *Ahkam*, also known as Sharia-based rulings. Foucault refers to this as being governed by the scripts. Secondly, the criteria used, how standardisation takes form, operates, and is managed were combinations of the Islamic teachings and the conventions of the industrial food standards found in neo-liberal governmentality, results of constant adoption, revisions, and reconfigurations of agreeable food standards beyond quality only per se. This art of governing focuses on the increase in emphasis on the ethics and responsibility of players, but not of the governors, who are involved in standardisation for the common good of the people. It is also tied closely with the notion of being Sharia-compliant. Thirdly, because of the *raison d'état* (Reason of the State), the State requires such standardisation not only to open opportunities for growth and industrial advancement or development. This is on top of the need to even out the playing field and safeguard the religiosity, food consumption, and security of subjects or citizens within its territory. The Brunei halal standard governing can be seen as a hybrid of these multiple governmentalities. This research investigates how standardisation is operationalised in these conditions and its subsequent effects on businesses, making it worth analysing.

In Islam, the religion transcends the state and other human worldly affairs. The daily dealings within the social, economic and political are seen as part of *ibadah*, i.e., fulfilling God's commandment (Chapra, 2011; Hallaq, 2012). The absoluteness of the concept of justice that overrides everything else, the acknowledgement of the separation of power between the political and the religious, the importance of the technologies of the self, as well as the rooting of the self to the commandments to create a moral just individual hence, contribute towards the creation of a sound community (Hallaq, 2014). Technologies of the self here, according to Foucault (1987), can be defined as practices or ways in which how the subject's self-identity formation is not outcomes of self-invention, rather, it is influenced by patterns, practices that are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society and his social group (p.77) (cited in Bakardjieva & Gaden, 2011). The self is responsible for putting in laborious effort towards the final form it and its environment envision, clearly marking the dualistic delineation between the actor and the actions (Kelly, 2013). This final form that the subject constitutes itself can be different in many ways as it is created by varying historical variables and settings (Hernandez-Ramirez, 2017). Within the Muslim's worldview in relation to daily community dealings and defining their relations within their community and their Creator, incorporating human qualities such as honesty, sincerity, and fairness in decision-making and being principally accountable and responsible are, of utmost importance. Combined with the understanding of the role of humans in this world mentioned under Islamic governance's viceregents subsection, moral governmentality can be developed. In a nutshell, the Quran is pivotal in Islamic moral government as it is the constitution. For Hallaq (2012):

“...the genealogical legitimacy of the Quran lies in its originating power as an eloquent expression of a divine plan of justice owing nothing to imperfect human agency and reflecting neither private nor partisan interests nor still the power struggles that permit domination of one class by another”. (p.46)

Embrace this, and the technologies of the self with practical application of Islamic ethics provide an alternative art of governing. Rather than incorporating the concept of ‘economy’ solely in understanding the state and societal governing, embracing God’s divine word as the foundation or as the ‘code of conduct’ towards governing influenced how politics, economy and society operate. Due to this identification, Islamic societies, according to Chapra (2008) and Hallaq (2012), have developed a compelling sense of justice, and it affects the way they, i.e., the communities, see those who govern as a ‘just’ institution. Knowledge, both religious and worldly, is paramount in upholding justice. In the Islamic sense of morality, to be just requires knowledge, but there is no justice without knowledge (Hallaq, 2012; Chapra, 2008; Lewis, 2005). However, despite such a romantic view of those who know about the religion, Islamic scholars should exercise extreme caution over their power to influence part of the religious order. As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, the Islamic religion and government have undergone periods of innovation as the faith expanded post-Muhammad’s (PBUH) period. Acculturalisation and colonialism alter the State and communities. The Islamic jurists who were part of the religious orders were detached from any form of government in the past. However, due to localisation and colonialism, these religious orders have played a part in decision-

making or exercising executive powers by establishing councils, ministries, or offices within the State over time. According to Enroth (2014), the use of power and knowledge in governmentality came in the form of policy as a way of managing. Governing uses power and knowledge to control, subjugate and later dominate targeted groups, be it men or things, in tangible form or metaphorically (Yu, 2009) (cited in Peters et al.). At the heart of this power-knowledge relationship, Foucault (1978) argued on the role of discourse as the conjoining factor that connects the two as 'it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together'. The centrality of power knowledge is helpful in this research as the halal standards can be seen as by-products of such relationships, undergoing processes of hybridisation into what it is known at present. Hence, when it comes to governmentality, one should not only be knowledgeable but also needs to be able to codify or 'translate', in Foucauldian terms, that knowledge in its actual application by taking into consideration the dynamism in the power-knowledge relations between those in power and those who are not.

Upon reviewing the existing literature on halal standards and industry growth, the first chapter highlights a notable absence of emphasis on addressing the intricate aspects of halal governance among contemporary scholars. The approach to halal governance and standardisation has predominantly revolved around mere checklists, tick boxes, or guidelines, primarily focused on compliance processes, without delving into the emerging issues and challenges arising from the halalisation processes and the exponential growth of the global halal industry since the early 2000s. Moreover, as cautioned by Hallaq (2012) and Chapra (2008), the prevailing forms of governmentality, even within self-proclaimed

Islamic states, exhibit a hybrid nature, combining elements of Euro-American models of governmentality with Islamic principles. A comprehensive evaluation of these hybrid governmentalities in Brunei and an in-depth analysis of halal governance and the effects of standardisation would undoubtedly yield valuable insights. Any modifications or revisions in the approach to halal standardisation and its subsequent impact could signify a progressive shift. The overall growth of the industry in all aspects, while potentially beneficial, may also necessitate a deeper understanding of equity, accountability, and justice within society. The incorporation of the theory of governmentality in this research is instrumental in providing a contextual framework for each event, aligning with the reasoning and logic prevalent at that time, regardless of its rationality. These foundational aspects set the stage for the focal points of this research.

2.5 Governmentality and digital technologies: new tools towards industrial governing

The proliferation of information, communication, and technology (ICT), brought about by globalisation and the rise of the internet, influences how society functions and operates. Whilst most of the impact of globalisation has been studied in greater detail within the socio-economic and cultural realms as seen from both Friedmann's World City and Sassen's Global City hypotheses, the political implications concerning the use of ICT as part of technologies of government need further studies, more so from the lens of governmentality. The use of e-government, in the Foucauldian sense of technologies, is treated as strategies and tools used by the governors to create halal certification

awareness and condition the governed to be moulded into an acceptable halal industrial code of conduct. However, it also necessitates forming a near identity with the government to further create a sense of collectivity through the sharing of visions as well as power knowledge.

Choudhury (2014) argued that the current Web 4.0, in contrast to Web 1.0, is not only used for information sharing and provisions of readable content materials, but it has now moved beyond the e-commerce realms where transactions can also be carried out between people within communities as well as between government and its citizens. The rise of social media in parallel with the advancement of the ICT sector, mainly linked to the smartphone sector, not only allows for its integration into daily lives. With the rise of Web 4.0, the web has become an outlet where content sharing and creation are not limited to a specific group per se. Still, citizens and their civil participation can now be made using the platforms (Choudhury, 2014) as part of growing socio-political activisms. Concurrently, within the domains of industrialisation, consumers have also increasingly played a vital role in value creation (Almeida, 2017). With such advancement, the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) has undoubtedly opened new avenues not only for civil society to act but at the same time, governments are also increasingly utilising such platforms to assert control and effectively govern their citizens. This is made possible with the introduction of cloud technologies and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to process and manage big data (Okano, 2017; Almeida, 2017; Kavanaugh et al., 2012). Using social media platforms, governments are now able to visualise and monitor the public based on geotagging or cloud hashtags (Kavanaugh et al., 2012), operating in a more critical but

transparent manner through both live and recorded channels (Bertot et al., 2010) whilst at the same time aimed at garnering more trust be it fiduciary, mutual or social beliefs resulting from varying degree of power symmetries or asymmetries (Thomas, 1998) (as cited in Welch, 2004) moving beyond mere information sharing. The rise of these platforms also allows for e-government evolution, from one that only uses the web for legitimising its existence digitally (Chun et al., 2010) to one that utilises it as a strategic space that engages the people, a way to harness collective ingenuity aimed at the achievement of vision and mission (Dadashzadeh, 2010).

For this research, the social media platforms are used as an entry point in studying the tools used by the government in governing the halal certification of the agri-food industry, to acquire real-time data on what they did as well as to compare whether there exist differences in governing, information and content shared between the year 2011 to 2018. Studying the posts from different periods provides the researcher with snapshots of the ways of governing to see the fluidity, adaptiveness, or rigidity of government's governing mechanisms and address how this has an impetus on the community they govern. Although it is beyond the scope of this research to address questions surrounding the use of new technologies beyond social media and its effectiveness towards industrial governing, nevertheless, this research provides a foundation for the benefit of social media both as an entry point towards analysing halal industrial governmentality whilst at the same time assess whether these new technologies are a sure, best way of creating the desired code of conducts among industrial players or vis-à-vis. This helps measure the effectiveness of the information plus the current effort being put into halal governing

by the leading agency in charge of halal food control, monitoring, surveillance and auditing, the Brunei Halal Food Control Division (HFCD henceforth), the technical committee as well as secretariat to the Brunei Islamic Religious Council (BIRC).

CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

In any academic research, the ability to synthesise theories with the methodological design that ‘answers’ key research questions determine the quality, clarity, and cohesiveness of its outcome. Its design allows the researcher to process relevant information whilst also adequately meeting the aims and objectives of their research. Identification of the most suitable and appropriate design, data collection methods and analysis are hence imperative. This chapter will address the research questions and hypotheses concerning halal certification governmentality based on the AOG framework whilst factoring in the reasons behind the choice and adoption of mixed method research design and the designated data collection methods. These ranged from the selection of data collected, reasons for the designation of selected target groups or respondents and the rationale behind the choice of descriptive, thematic and content analyses as the analytical methods. Topics on the research’s ethical considerations, challenges and limitations experienced throughout the fieldwork, and the time constraints due to the nature of PhD research will also be discussed at length. All these are also important as they could influence the research’s progression and the validity and reliability of the research outcome. The study’s theoretical and analytical frameworks will be presented at the end of this chapter, linking the discussions, literature and theoretical reviews mentioned in the first two chapters with the overall research design. The research questions to be addressed in this research can be found in the following section.

3.1 Research Questions and Hypothesis

To answer the research statement and problems mentioned in the first chapter, the following overarching research question (ORQ) is developed to capture the focus of the thesis.

ORQ: How does Brunei's halal certification regime function as a form of governmentality that integrates Islamic authority, regulatory knowledge, and development rationalities, and what are its implications for the halal governing and growth of Muslim food businesses?

This overarching question is addressed through two core sub-questions:

RQ1: What are the governing rationalities and technologies used around Brunei's halal standardisation of the food businesses?

RQ2: How do multiple halal governmentalities, deemed Islamic, affect the growth and development of halal food businesses?

Main hypothesis

The implementation of Brunei's halal certification regime reflects the productive but fragmented nature of power as theorised by Foucault. Despite its ethical grounding in Islamic governance, the coexistence of multiple halal governmentalities—shaped by differing interpretations, institutional limitations, and technical complexities—has led to dissonance between intended rationalities and actual effects. These divergences hinder the growth of food businesses through regulatory burdens, information asymmetries, and

misalignments in knowledge and practice, thereby reshaping the dynamics of productive power within Brunei's halal governance landscape.

The ORQ provided a thematic umbrella or anchor point for the thesis, whilst the two RQS help streamline the analytical strands that follow. The sub research question (SRQ) and sub hypotheses (SH) below address specific dimensions of halal certification using Dean's (2010) Analytics of Government framework—covering political rationalities (SRQ1), technologies of governance (SRQ2), effects on the governed (SRQ3), and outcomes of state strategy (SRQ4). Each SRQ is linked to a corresponding sub-hypothesis (SH), allowing for a structured yet complex exploration of how halal governing operates in Brunei's sociopolitical and economic context.

SRQ 1: What are the political rationalities behind Brunei's current halal certification processes undertaken by Brunei Halal Food Control Division (HFCD)?

SH 1: The problems associated with dubious food production practices affecting locally produced and imported food and the need to halalise the industry led to adopting the Brunei halal standard as part of Brunei's economic diversification strategy, providing the rationale for halal transformation.

SRQ 2: What are the governing strategies used by the HFCD towards achieving an overall halal code of conduct?

SH 2: The utilisation of expert knowledge and information on halal production and certification, the role of knowledge-sharing, coordination, and consultations through

educational programmes within and beyond academic institutions such as social media platforms, roadshows and conferences are the governmental technologies used to create a near halal identity and achieve overall halal code of conduct. The role of the religious scripture of the Quran and the prophetic sayings, the *Hadith*, is central in dictating the arts of governing the halal certification and how governors act as a constitution in the Islamic sense.

SRQ 3: What are the implications of multiple halal governmentalities for agri-food business development?

SH 3: The existence of multiple halal governmentalities in the halal certification leads to unintentional socioeconomic costs that impinge on the competitiveness and performances of entrepreneurs due to the need to reorganise their production as they are halalised. The increase in cost associated with lengthy certification processes, the technically complicated halal production requirements, the problems related to market accessibility and the existence of information asymmetries in the knowledge shared and those along the governing chains also resulted in uncertainties and confusion among the food producers (relates to diverging halal governmentality approaches and questions surrounding near identity creation). The standard-settings programmes also inadvertently unravel the diverging paths that halal regulators/ authorities and businesses have towards halal governing and their competencies despite utilising standardised criteria (technical, every day and personalised halal).

SRQ 4: How effective are current HFCD strategies on halalisation of the overall food businesses?

SH 4: Despite the incorporation of Islamic ethics and principles towards Islamic governmentality of the halal certification, partial decisions made by both regulators and decision-makers in protecting the public good or the collective (Ummah) often neglect the plight of micro, small and medium businesses (both formal and informal) as seen from the compulsory halal certification. The positivity of power as a productive force and the use of known halal governing technologies in addressing growth, development, coordination, and consultation matters are all but ineffective due to the failure to acknowledge the influence of biopower or power knowledge in dictating outcomes, as seen from the abovementioned effects.

3.2 Research epistemology and ontological stance

For any research, understanding one's positionality within the research domain and body of knowledge is vital, as it also influences how the study is being constructed. This study adopts a critical realist stance, which acknowledges an external reality independent of human perception (ontological realism) while recognising that our knowledge of this reality is mediated through social, discursive, and interpretive processes (epistemological relativism). Epistemology deals with the body of knowledge and its possibilities, how we can know about it, and how it exists based on one's way of viewing (Blaikie, 2010), whilst ontological assumptions deal with the nature of the being which we intend to study, its bare existence, which can exist based on a single truth, multiples, or relative owing to

one's interpretation. Critical realism reconciles these by positing stratified reality: observable events ("empirical"), underlying generative mechanisms ("actual"), and deep structures ("real") that interact dynamically (Danermark et al., 2002). This framework aligns with Giddens' structuration theory, which emphasises the duality of structure and agency—where agents both shape and are shaped by social systems (Blaikie, 2010; Kort & Gharbi, 2013). However, Foucault's governmentality lens complements this by foregrounding how power-knowledge regimes materialise through discursive and non-discursive practices (Chaffee & Lemert, 2009), shaping subjects and institutions in ways that transcend linear causality.

Reality exists independently beyond the researcher; it is multi-layered with diverging levels of integration structured for each reality, making it more complex as each reality requires its own approach (Sandu, 2011), and the role of the researcher is not limited to interpreting or defining the observed phenomenon. As a critical realist, the researcher navigates between positivist and constructivist approaches. While reality exists independently (contra strict constructivism), our understanding of it remains partial and fallible, necessitating methodological pluralism. This study thus employs quantitative methods to identify patterns in halal governance outcomes by examining compliance rates (based on the halal application acceptance and rejection) and institutional efficacy, alongside qualitative content analyses of both social media and interviews to unpack the historical, cultural, and political mechanisms underlying these phenomena. Foucault's genealogical approach proves instrumental here, as it traces how present realities—such as halal certification regimes—emerge from contingent historical struggles and power

relations (Foucault, 1997; Rosenthal, 2019). Critical realism's emphasis on "explanatory critique" (Bhaskar, 2016) dovetails with this by demanding investigation of both observable governance structures, such as policies and audits, and the hidden social relations, i.e., neoliberal rationalities and identity politics among the few, that sustain them.

The Foucauldian notion of anti-foundationalism—rejecting universal laws in favour of plural, contested truths (Ettlinger, 2014)—resonates with critical realism's rejection of positivist reductionism. However, this study diverges from purely postmodernist hermeneutics by asserting that halal governmentality, while discursively constructed, operates through material mechanisms such as economic sanctions and standardised audits that exert objectively measurable effects. Joseph's (2004) caution against conflating knowledge with reality is heeded: historical variables inform hypotheses about governance efficacy, but explanations remain provisional, open to revision as new layers of reality are unearthed. By integrating positivist empirical analysis i.e. by measuring policy outcomes with constructivist interpretation in the form knowledge and discourse deconstruction, the research avoids the extremes of naive objectivism and radical relativism.

3.3 Framing the research: Utilisation of Dean's AOG towards research design and methods

As mentioned in the AOG framework in the previous chapter, the approach towards halal governmentalities requires addressing the political rationality and governing strategies chosen as part of the sense-making and strategic positioning of the government before analysing any halal mechanisms. Understanding the governors' visionary fields requires identifying the intentions, governing objectives, and the problems of the population they seek to resolve. This is supported by the need to identify Dean's dominated but non-subjugated subjects that will be subject to halal governmentalities. Part of the governmentalities processes require transforming them into halal-compliant businesses or, in the case of the governors, creating authorities that share the same goals or objectives by creating near identities and a sense of collectivism necessary for governing halal. This involves creating a halal industrial code of conduct and ethical governing that supports entrepreneurial growth. Some of these political rationalities on halal transformations and development logic have been mentioned briefly in the previous two chapters. However, voids still need to be addressed, particularly concerning the dynamics between the Monarch and his governors and how this interplay resulted in the type of governing techniques adopted. Reflection from reading Foucault's governmentality resulted in this afterthought on Brunei's current system of governance which spelled hybridity. The hybrid governmentality that existed in the Bruneian sense, i.e., a State in which 1) a traditional hierarchical order existed, 2) based on a constitutional monarchy, 3) an Islamic revivalist order of administration, and 4) neoliberal art of governing that concerned with strengthening of the state and well-being of the population through its *raison d'état*, requires a new way of understanding its multifaceted and multidimensional dynamism. Question on how this is packaged as part of rationalising halal and unveiling

the complex interplay and dynamics of this hybrid governmentality should be of interest particularly on how it affects businesses. Hence, SRQ 1 and SH 1 are created to address what would be later labelled as T1 component of this thesis, the problematisation aspects of Foucault's governmentality, which lay the foundation for the political rationality (ies) in either introduction of new programmes or its revision through technologies of standards (Dean, 2010; Rose et al., 2009), as a way to mediate current reforms to mitigate the emergence of 'real' problems in the foreseeable future (Ha, 2013; Dean, 2010) and also steer as well as project the directions of programmes through the use of various governing mechanisms in existence both new and old (McKee, 2009; Miller & Rose, 2008).

Since governmentality is both discursive in its rationalisation and interventionist in its practised (Lemke, 2001), there is a need to analyse the governing strategies used by the government towards halalisation addressed in both SRQ 2 and SH 2. Within the T2 components, four governing techniques and technologies are identified as potentially valuable for this study on halal governmentalities. This involved (1) the use of experts' knowledge and information, the role of educational and awareness programmes as part of halal identity creation and knowledge co-sharing, as well as public coordination and consultation. Furthermore, the role of 'power-knowledge' within experts' agencies holds more weightage in legitimising and influencing the governed. This opens new avenues of (2) investigation of its operationalisation, mainly using halal audits and surveillances. Investigation on (3) the role of halal laws stemming from the Quran and Hadith as part of the halalisation strategy also needs reconsideration as it acts as a constitution in the Islamic sense. The scripture holds absolute power due to its divine origin. However, it is

fallible in terms of human agency due to the imperfection of humans (Hallaq, 2012), hence the need to study its real-world implementation. The use of social media (4) in T2 has two functions: first, as a new technology of governmentality due to its function as a platform for sharing information, knowledge, and coordination over a wider swath of the digital user or population through its multiplier effects. This further supports near identity creation and the desired code of conduct (Fletcher, 2010; Jhargoe, 2019). Its function as spaces of interaction, conformance, resistance, and opposition also makes it helpful in evaluating it as a governmentality mechanism. Secondly, it is a tool for data gathering and information on halal governing due to the updates shared by the relevant agencies on what has been done thus far by the said agencies.

The focus of the T3 component of the halal certification governing analytics has been mentioned in the previous chapter. SH 3 and SH 4 are formulated to answer SRQ 3 and SRQ 4 of this thesis by analysing the effects of halal governmentalities on business performance and growth, particularly with the incorporation of the Islamic governmentality component. As Foucault argued, questions over whether governors obliged or followed Islamic ethics in governing through responsible decision-making or the facilitation and easing of burdens surrounding certification are raised to gauge the degree of power's positivity. The successful translation of the hybrid governmentality mechanisms into entrepreneurial halalizations and growth would mean a positive relationship between the government's strategic position, governmentality tools, political rationale, and governed subjects. Hence, components such as information symmetries and clarity, the existence of government technical supports, questions surrounding costs of operations or

productions as players reorganise, growth in halal-certified businesses based on certificate or permit issuances, subjects conformances or resistances and market access are some of the empirical datasets used to measure this notion of growth or effectiveness in current halal governing. Hence, business experiences will be used to capture this scope of the research. Comparison is also made with informal agri-food businesses. This group has gained importance in the last few years due to using unconventional platforms, i.e., social media and home-based production, to conduct marketing and business. The increasing importance of the informal economy towards socio-economic development has been acknowledged as it is also one of the most productive sectors that helps to generate and expand employment and self-employment opportunities (Abdullah & A. Ghafr Ismail, 2013; Webb et al., 2009; Chen, 2007, 2012; Chapra, 2008; Williams et al., 2007). It is assumed that failure to acknowledge these potential issues could impinge firms/ business growth.

Reconsidering the interplay and dynamism between T1, T2 and T3 could help explore the inclusiveness of halal standards across the agri-food business. This exploration assesses the extent to which Islamic ethics and principles are practically applied, especially with its governing, decision-making, and the welfare of the producers. It helps to identify the effects of halal standardisation on agri-food businesses. The existence of any governing reflexivity between the study period of 2011 and 2019 would also answer the policy learning component of the halal governmentality vis-à-vis. In other words, it functions as a way to “not govern like that”, a reflexive and heuristic process that reminds governors of the implications they should face should their governing programme be adhered to.

In the case of this research, Dean's AOG is, hence, used to understand the workings of multiple governmentalities within the Brunei halal certification processes and how it affects Brunei's food business growth regardless of its size and formal or informal nature. It attempted to prove, disprove, or revise Foucault's notion of positive power, which works and continues to work despite dissonances. The novelty in this research lies in the effort of unwinding the application of Islamic governmentality in the halal food standard settings and governing and addressing whether it resulted in the desired effects envisioned by the Maqasid Al-Sharia or vis-à-vis.

3.4 Operationalising the research: From strategies, data sources, analyses, and collection methods

A 'critical realist governmentality' approach (Stenson, 2005, 2008) to the research is taken where attention is given more to the specific situations in which the activity of governing is problematised (cited in McKee, 2009), beyond the discursive focus, i.e., on the analysis of texts/ policy or discourses, that have dominated much of the research on governmentality. Research strategies of a dualistic nature, a mix of quantitative and qualitative research designed using analytic induction, are adopted. Analytic induction will also analyse data by testing existing concepts or theories retroductively as analysis is being made heuristically. Smelser and Baltes (2001) argued that:

“Analytic induction calls for the progressive redefinition of the phenomenon to be explained (the explanandum) and explanatory factors (the explanans) such that a perfect (sometimes called “universal”) relationship is maintained. Initial cases are inspected to locate common factors and provisional explanations. As new cases are examined and initial hypotheses are contradicted, the initial explanation is reworked in one or both ways. The definition of the explanandum may be redefined so that troublesome cases either become consistent with the explanans or are placed outside the scope of inquiry, or the explanans may be revised so that all cases of the target phenomenon display the explanatory conditions.”

In this instance, the explanandum refers to something that appears to be explained with its meanings mainly derived from the semantic interpretations given by interpreters limited to the signs and signals triggered in the minds of the interpreters (Peirce, 1897) (cited in Huneman, 2019). The explanans, on the other hand, is closely tied to the explanations given to a particular phenomenon not based on the ‘assumed’ interpretations of meanings, which are usually external to the object of study, but instead based on its representations, internalised or rooted in the dynamic relationship between the self or object of study and the world or the living plane in which they are positioned (Salvatore, 2019). In other words, if explanandum refers to meaning-making, explanans, on the other hand, refers to sense-making and the term *quomodo*, in essence, refers to the answer to the ‘how’ question, a focus on identifying and analysing the processes that influence the coming of being of both explanans and explanandum.

Like deductive research strategy, analytic induction involves testing concepts or theories of a studied research phenomenon over time, leading to hypothetical or theoretical remodifications or its maintenance, i.e., relatively unchanged. The differences lie in the operationalisation of the strategy, particularly in the final stages of data findings and analysis. Unlike the deductive research strategy, where actual results of the study are highly dependent on the majority of cases, which determine the acceptance or refutation of the hypothesis formulated, analytic induction accepts both the majority and minority of cases indiscriminately. This is due to the potential and importance that such minor cases and happenings play in affecting the general outcome of the research. In the case of this research, Dean's AOG is used to understand the workings of multiple governmentalities within Brunei's halal certification processes and how they affect Brunei's food business growth regardless of their size and formal or informal nature. It attempted to prove, disprove, or revise Foucault's notion of positive power, which works and continues to work despite dissonances.

One of the principles of analytic induction is that generalisation is made based on the conceptual abstraction of significant and minor cases, which help construct variables that allow the researcher to categorise and formulate hypotheses. Since analytic induction studies the causal mechanisms and the processes that lead to such a phenomenon, the variables will be chosen from known cases (Smelser & Baltes, 2001; Tacq, 2007). From this first or negative case, the researcher will try to test, develop, and expand the theoretical explanation, eventually examining all cases (Cressy, 1953; Hyde, 2000). With regards to the halal standards, some of the variables used to measure whether

businesses grew or not are based on the known effects experienced by producers that use conventional food standards such as ISO 22000, GMP and HACCP, as well as from criteria originating from Porter's work on business competitiveness. Additionally, criteria from unreported cases and general issues in Brunei's public domain were later applied to the halal standards. For instance, the existing Brunei halal certification criteria or guidelines mentioned in Chapter 1 (see Figure 8) are used to set a preliminary benchmark for measuring halal knowledge and compliance. New variables generated from the survey's open-ended questions are treated as newly emergent. As the research progressed, data analysed from interview transcripts were used to enrich and further confirm positive or negative correlations with the generated hypotheses. According to Tacq (2007), the exceptions or outliers, i.e., analysed cases that did not 'follow' hypotheses or models, will also be examined as their insights could have some bearing and be equally valid. This openness differentiates analytic induction from other qualitative research methods (Tacq, 2007).

3.4.1 Data sources, collection methods, sampling, and recruitment: operationalising the research design

It has been mentioned in the previous chapter that social media platforms are used as points of entry not only for data collection purposes. Nevertheless, it also functions as one of the governing technologies used in halal certification processes. Hence, social media in this research acts as the primary data source for any upcoming analyses on halal certification governmentalities while providing insights on the government's current

governing techniques or tools in their attempt to create a halal code of conduct among food businesses. The principal agency's social media account used in this study is those of the Brunei Halal Food Control Division (HFCD henceforth), the key agency that regulates halal certification and permit issuance processes whilst at the same time also functioning as the core group that conducts halal monitoring, surveillance, and audits. This is on top of their other role as the critical player in informing and socialising the public on the Brunei Halal Standards. Their function as the secretariat for the decision-making body known as Brunei Islamic Religious Council (BIRC henceforth) resulted in their selection as the primary source of any information relating to standard-settings governing. Most of the data obtained on the Brunei halal standard governing came from their Facebook and Instagram accounts called halal.bn. At the time of writing, both platforms had 9,666 followers, with a total of 8,014 likes on Facebook alone. It shows how digitally connected the public is with the governing agency. Any potential updates or reporting made by HFCD on these accounts assisted the researcher in identifying the tools used by HFCD at any given time. With the aid of date and timestamps created in any new updates, it allows the researcher to analyse the potential patterns and, later, changes in governing strategies, which can either be influenced by recent changes in the business climates or monitoring and surveillance practices held by HFCD. The number of social media posts used in the sample is 334 out of 462 postings (as of December 2019) between 2011 and December 2018. The analysis section of this chapter will discuss the generation of themes (what and how) and the identification of different types of halal governing mechanisms captured through such social media postings.

Apart from social media, data sources for this research were also obtained from questionnaire surveys (see Appendix 1 for sample). Each survey contained 20 questions, some of which were divided into different sub-questions with closed (majority) and open-ended (minority) questions. The surveys were distributed to 286 food businesses, both formal and informal, of which only 48 (16.78%) were returned and usable. The breakdown of the surveyed samples against the total population based on the type of businesses (as of 2018) was as follows:

Food Business Typology	Total Population	Sampled (% of total population)
Formal Businesses (Halal Certified)	141	16 (11.35)
Informal Businesses (Not Halal Certified)	64	22 (34.37)
Village Cooperatives (1K1P)	81	10 (12.34)
Total	286	48

Table 3. A sample of food businesses studied against its total population based on categories

The total population of businesses captured for each category was based on multiple sources. The numbers of halal-certified formal businesses were based on the lists provided by HFCD on their website, www.kheu.gov.bn. The website offers the number and details of the companies' halal-certified products. The total population of online businesses that operate home-based food production and retail activities were collated based on their online presence on the social media platforms identified between 2015 and 2019. The details of the village cooperatives producing products under the one village and one product (1K1P) scheme, their numbers, typologies of products made, as well as other relevant information such as their industrial location and contact persons were provided by the District Offices of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and the now defunct Global Halal Industrial Development Division of the former Ministry of Energy,

Manpower, and Industry (MEMI). Creswell (2014) argued that conservatively, a researcher would usually decide on the size of their sample, either unusually based on previous studies or basing it on the margin of error that such sample size entails. The degree of tolerance the researcher would tolerate (concerning the degree of biasness, data accuracies, etc.) or based on the conventional 10% fraction of the total population without putting forward the analytical plans projected for the studies. Initially, the intended sample size for the questionnaire surveys was 286 businesses for all three categories owing to the small number of Brunei food businesses in contrast to other major geographical regions or countries. However, experiences from past studies before the PhD show poor response rates across various projects. Hence, the 10% fraction is the minimum for all groups. The survey managed to capture 11.35% of the total population of formal businesses (16 out of 141 firms), 12.34% of the 1K1P cooperatives (10 out of 81 cooperatives) and 34.37% of the informal and online food businesses (22 out of 64). The list of agri-food businesses or firms can be found in Appendix 2.

In any quantitative inquiry, the concerns mainly lie in narrowing the margin of error and degree of tolerance that researchers should have or identify regarding the metadata provided by their respondents to ensure data objectivity, validity, and reliability. Despite the importance of these components, however, using such a small sample size in this study is justifiable. Due to the inadequacy of other sampling techniques, such as random or stratified sampling, owing to the minuscule total population of businesses and its highly specialised group, purposive sampling was used to prevent further pitfalls and questions of data validity and reliability. Purposive sampling was used to ensure that the sample fit

some essential criteria that met the research needs (Suri, 2011). Purpose sampling is used to identify and select individuals or groups of knowledgeable and experienced individuals affected by the compulsory halal certification phenomenon. This is done to save time and keep the research focused by selecting well-versed respondents in the area being researched. This can be done via snowballing or chain sampling (Patton, 2002), i.e., utilising firms' or businesses' social networks as part of fact-finding and identifying gatekeepers before approaching. This works since Brunei society has deep social capital due to the importance of extended family ties based on kinship and hierarchical relations.

Semi-structured interviews were used as this method allows for the collection of rich, in-depth data since the research involves a study on experiences, understanding and perceptions of research participants surrounding the halal governing and the standard settings (see appendix 3a and 3b for a sample of interview schedule). The sample for these interviews comprised halal certification governors and businesses (both formal and informal) affected by the halal certification processes. This thesis has mentioned that the Brunei halal certification body includes an amalgamation of government agencies responsible for overseeing the multidimensional aspect of the *halalan tayyiban* principles in halal production (see Chapter 1, p. 18). Despite multiple agencies involved in the certification processes, the interview sample for the halal governors was mainly officials from HFCD. The justification for this resonates with reasonings given on the study of HFCD's social media only, i.e., due to their centrality as the principal agency which boasts

industrially specialised halal certification, halal surveillance and auditing knowledge as well as their functionality as the secretariat to the BIRC.

Furthermore, semi-structured interviews that attempt to understand the effects of the standardisation at the ground level is a way to “visualise and interpret the interpretation of lived reality” (Hoggart et al., 2002, p. 210) whilst at the same time helping the researcher to “collect a series of intense, full and saturated descriptions of the experience under investigation” (Polkinghorne, 2005, p.139). The interpretive approach taken in this research is not so much on trying to arrive at interpreting the meanings behind texts, in this case from the interview transcripts, nor utilising some textual criticisms to sieve out discourses that construct the lived reality as supported by the hermeneutical traditions. Instead, the interviews and respondents’ shared experiences allow for building a good rapport necessary for situating the researcher and understanding the phenomenon from the viewers’ perspectives by taking the respondent’s role. This is important as it allows the researcher to view reality from an insider’s viewpoint (Fontana & Frey, 2005) (as cited in Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 708). From a critical realist standpoint, the words, statements, and viewpoints shared by the food businesses are treated as ‘real’ as possible, with limited attempts to redefine their meanings and intentions. Coding was used only to help thematise the categories to which the statements belong, and the answers were also triangulated to cross-examine possible linkages between the observed phenomena, i.e., halal-governed experiences and the implementation of halal standardisation.

According to the HFCD, there is a total of 54 officers currently working within the HFCD, of which 21 are graduates with first degrees in Food Science and Technology (17) and pharmaceutical chemistry (4). For this study, out of the intended ten individuals, only five respondents were successfully recruited for interviews out of the 21 individuals from the expert group, representing 23.8% of the specialist group and 9.2% of the staff working in HFCD. There were 16 interviewees from the MSMEs regardless of the food business typologies they belonged to. Although the interview samples for both governors and the governed are smaller, evaluating and assessing the success of multiple halal governmentalities and the positivity of power based on its real-world industrial and commercial effects should be sufficient. This is more of the case as analysis of social media postings is the primary data source in analysing HFCD's governmentalities.

The previous theoretical chapter mentioned that Foucault's governmentality often studies different technologies used throughout the governing processes to make sense of or justify their adoption and utilisation. The interview method can be categorised as a technology used to study the arts of governing, its interactive and reiterative processes, and its outcomes. Since knowledge, from a Foucauldian standpoint, is an outcome co-constructed from interactive processes between agents and institutionalised structures, which is often historical and accidental, any analyses and conclusions derived from interview-based data should be treated differently (Bastalich, 2009). Such an approach enables the researcher to adopt an adept interpretation of any social processes occurring at different timelines based on the context in which it happens at that moment. This is suitable and compatible with studying people's experiences. Methodologically, the

implication of adopting this method allows for the return to the debates surrounding the authenticity, validity, and reliability of research data per se, nor does it claim to provide only analyses on structural processes.

Informal observations conducted during site visits, halal workshops, and unstructured conversations offered important contextual insights that complemented the primary data sources. These observations, sometimes referred to as “peripheral participation” (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2011), included noting interpersonal dynamics during certification briefings, body language and informal remarks by MSME producers, and participant reactions during training sessions. Similar insights were also made when interviewing the halal food officers from HFCD where the insights of the seniors, usually promoted into the positions from their experiences teaching in religious institutions, differ compared to that of the juniors, whose recruitment were based on their area of specialisation as food nutritionist, chemical engineers or quality assurers. Such moments, though not always formally recorded, helped to illuminate underlying tensions, accommodations, and ambiguities present in the implementation of the Brunei halal regulation and certification. Informal observation has long been recognised in ethnographic and interpretivist research as a way of accessing unspoken meanings and social norms (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011), although in this research, the interpretation was done based on a constructivist-positivist approach i.e. based on how it was represented. These insights were critical in shaping the interpretation of broader patterns in the data and in identifying dissonances within the halal governmentalities and governance structure that may not have been fully captured through the semi-structured interviews alone.

Nevertheless, it allows for the critical framing of these processes, its co-creation of outcomes and, significantly, its rejection of centralised, regulatory claims of an organised scientific discourse (Bastalich, 2009). Any conclusion derived from this research shall differ from a grand narrative or discourse on governmentality and governance. Instead, differences and uniqueness are bound to be due to the research subjects' experiential nature. The utilisation of Foucault's approach in the methodological design of this research also helps uncover the complex web of multi-layered processes involved during the implementation of the halal standards and its outcomes on agri-food businesses specifically and industrially in general.

Some datasets were also gathered by collating raw tabulated spreadsheets from relevant agencies. The appropriate raw dataset to address SRQ 3 and SRQ 4, where an evaluation of HFCD's halalisation against the number of failed or KIV applications, for instance, was provided by HFCD. This was collected in its paper form, and the researcher was responsible for data entry, cleaning, and analyses before being presented in its final form in the following few chapters. Procedures on how these datasets were analysed will be mentioned in the subsequent few subsections. Below is the snippet of the document received from the authorities:

	2014	2014		KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	
1	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
2	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
3	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
4	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
5	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
6	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
7	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
8	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
9	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
10	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
11	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
12	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
13	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
14	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
15	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
16	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
17	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
18	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
19	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
20	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
21	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
22	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
23	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
24	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
25	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat

	2014	2014		KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	
50	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
51	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
52	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
53	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
54	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
55	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
56	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
57	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
58	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
59	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
60	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
61	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
62	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
63	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
64	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
65	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
66	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
67	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
68	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
69	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
70	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
71	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
72	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat
73	2014	2014	KEBUN	KV / PENGUNG (DETILAN AUDIT)	di tanggapan pemerintah dan masyarakat

Image 1. Physical paper and raw data tables collated from government agencies (Source: Unpublished data, HFCD, 2018)

As for the criterion on halal requirements mentioned in the first chapter (see Figure 8), the sources used to generate those main themes or summaries originated from the laws, policies and guidelines listed in the table below:

No.	Established & Redacted Acts, Regulations, Standards and Guidelines in Brunei	Regulatory Bodies/ Regimes
1	Miscellaneous Licenses Act, Chapter 127, 1984 (Redacted)	Brunei Municipal Board & Committee, Ministry of Home Affairs
2	Halal Meat Act, Chapter 183, 1998, Amended 2014	Halal Food Control Division, Ministry of Religious Affairs
3	Brunei Certification Guideline 1 - Guideline for Halal Certification	
4	Brunei Certification Guideline 2 - Guideline for Halal Compliance Audit	
5	Brunei Certification Guideline 3 - Guideline for Halal Compliance Auditor	
6	Brunei Certification Guideline 4 - Guideline for Halal Surveillance Audit	
7	Piawai Brunei Darussalam (PBD) 24: 2007 - Brunei Darussalam Standard for Halal Food	
8	Halal Certificate and Halal Label Order 2008, Amendments 2012, 2016 and 2017	
9	Wholesome Meat Order 2011	Brunei Department of Agriculture and Agrifood (currently under Brunei Darussalam Food Authority)
10	Public Health (Food) Act, Chapter 182, 1998, Amended 2012	Food Safety and Quality Control Division and Public Health Services, Ministry of Health
11	Public Health (Food) Regulations, 2001, Amended 2013	
12	Piawai Brunei Darussalam (PBD) 25: 2016 - Code of Hygienic Practice for Pre-Cooked and Cooked Foods for Masss Catering	Department of Energy, Prime Minister's Office and Food Safety and Quality Control Division and Public Health Services, Ministry of Health
13	Piawai Brunei Darussalam (PBD) 30: 2016 - Standard for Crackers from Marine and Freshwater Fish, Crustacean and Molluscan Shellfish	Department of Energy, Prime Minister's Office, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Primary Resources and Tourism and Food Safety and Quality Control Division and Public Health Services, Ministry of Health
14	Compilation of State Mufti's Fatwa and Rulings on Issues on Halal Products 1994 - 2007	State Mufti's Office

Table 4. Secondary sources are used to surmise the core industrial halal requirements and the governing regimes responsible for regulating and implementing the diverse food-related regulations, policies, and guidelines

3.4.2 Data Generalisation and Representation: Statistical, Analytical or Both?

It has been mentioned under the previous subsection that generalisation is one of the tenets of analytic induction. However, using mixed methods in this research requires a further added dimension that needs addressing. As part of AOG's framework in studying the governing of halal certification, this research used numerical measures whilst analysing the social media postings made by HFCD to answer how and what governmental technologies were used in the halal governmentalities. It aimed at describing the general patterns, trends and characteristics in halal governing, which revolves around using 'soft power' technologies such as knowledge, the Islamic constitution, i.e., the Holy Quran and the *Hadith*, among others. Statistical generalisation is paramount in understanding the operationalisation of halal governing by examining the shared information types, the arts of governing that HFCD implemented over the study period and the numbers or units of occurrences of the governing sphere. Only by identifying these patterns of information and knowledge can co-relations be made between governing and the effects of multiple governmentalities on the affected population. This allows a higher degree of accuracy to which the targeted population is subjected and makes the properties or characteristics well-known (Hyde, 2000; Kinnear & Taylor, 1996). The role of the questionnaire survey, on the other hand, helps to elucidate further the effects of standardisation towards businesses by posting numerical analysis associated with costs, the types of spatial reorganisation and changes that producers must undergo as they halalised as well as evaluation of their knowledge and understanding towards halal. The use of qualitative methods such as the semi-structured interviews with halal governors and the subjects of governing, i.e., the food producers, on

the other hand, is aimed at providing a detailed explanation of the standardisation phenomenon both from the lens of the authority and the businesses. It is such analytical generalisation (Yin, 1994, 2013) that the case study on the halal agri-food businesses is aimed at generating. In-depth research on the experiences of food producers undergoing halal and deeper insights into their case allow for the potential of the provisions of explanation on the general halal phenomenon as it happens elsewhere. This can be particularly true in Muslim countries with similar post-colonial experiences and changing their halal food industries. Only by linking the working hypothesis with related research literature and the existing gaps can analytic generalisation be made, enhancing the potential of replications and applications to many cases (Bennet, 2004: Yin, 2013).

In this study, the qualitative component of the interviews allows us to strengthen further or confirm the quantitative element's effectiveness concerning contemporary halal governmentalities, their effects on standardisation and the businesses evaluated earlier. This is how triangulation was made in this research. In other words, whilst the governing strategies generated from the social media platforms act as the primary source of data findings and analysis, those analyses that address the effects of these strategies generated from both questionnaire surveys and interviews provide supplementary supporting evidence or arguments on the efficacy and effectiveness of the governing technologies or mechanisms used as shown from the social media postings.

3.4.3. Methodological Insights on Data Analyses and Analytical Procedures

Descriptive statistics and analyses were used for this subsection of the research. The justification for using descriptive statistics came as the research needs to identify frequencies of occurrences or utilisations of specific governing technologies in the form of nominal in terms of means (averages) and mode as well as in ordinal terms such as percentiles, counts or units. According to Kaur et al. (2018), descriptive statistics are helpful when studying patterns. They provide the researcher with initial data analysis via different measuring methods, from frequencies, distribution, and central tendency to positioning. Proches (2015) also argued the usefulness of descriptive statistics in helping researchers visualise the patterns of development, growth, and dispersals if such studies involved timeline or historical data. The incorporation of temporal characteristics made it possible to conduct a time-series analysis. Not only does time series analysis allow for assembling events chronologically, but any significant intervening event within the study time frame can also serve as a primary counterpart to an interrupted time series (Yin, 2012). Any trends and patterns that show upward, downward or neutral directions can be associated with interruptions by examining their causal relationships. This analysis is vital to evaluate the effects of significant changes in the halal certification programme, from voluntary to compulsory, on food producers between 2011 and 2018. Also, assessing the number of governmental efforts through counts or units of occurrences helps measure the intensity or degree of involvement the governors made towards halalisation.

Concerning the data entry and analysis for the questionnaire surveys, the feedback given by the respondents was tabulated into the Excel spreadsheet. Each survey was

designated a unique code or ID, a descriptor containing information on when and who collected or filled the survey. Each row represents the business being studied, whilst the vertical columns of the spreadsheet represent the questions asked and the responses recorded. The responses were coded. When multiple answers were received for one given question, the columns were again subdivided based on the answers coded. '1' (one) represents a 'YES', and '0' (zero) means either a 'NO' or 'NOT APPLICABLE'. The number '1' is used to differentiate responses and help ease numerical analysis, particularly if summation or unit of counts is needed for such categories. The diagram below provides a snapshot of how data entry and analysis were carried out for the conducted surveys:



Figure 11. Diagram showing the data entry and analysis processes carried out for the conducted questionnaire surveys for both formal and informal businesses

Cross-sectional analyses were also done in some parts of the data by triangulating the data from the social media posts with producers surveyed and interviewed between September 2016 and August 2018, as well as from interviews made with the specialists. For instance, processed data generated from HFCD physical datasheets on the halal application was also used in triangulating HFCD's governing strategy and effort (derived from social media and interviews), identifying the typologies of information shared to enhance and create halal awareness in contrast to the numbers of failed, rejected or keep in view (KIVs) applications along with the reasons for these statuses. HFCD's posts from the moment they started utilising Facebook in 2011 until December 2018 were analysed to highlight whether there are changes in the activities carried out by the relevant agency as part of their industrial management and engagement. Since Foucault's governmentality can also be used to take 'snapshots' of processes occurring at each time, it might also be possible to categorise the social media data based on various stages, i.e., introductory, growth, and mature/ enhanced stages once analysed and when needed. This depends highly on the type of posts made in the different periods and the results from the quantified data showing the patterns, trends and intensity of governing mechanisms used and information shared. Analysing the public comments on these social media pages or platforms will also highlight whether some positive and negative feedback mechanisms exist in governing Brunei's halal standards. The intensity of interactions on these pages might emphasise the importance of social media as a technology to shape the halal code of conduct and to disseminate information or vice versa.

Whilst descriptive statistics are the simplest to perform and interpret (Fisher & Marshall, 2009), they also have their limitations, as discussed at length by Zaidan et al. (2012) in their studies on social sciences postgraduates, which revolve around misconceptions of data visualisation and interpretation as well as by Proches (2015), concerning generalising complex web of interrelationships of code into simple linear model of explanations of causality. Nevertheless, its usage in this study proved helpful as the researcher did use it via triangulating it with other qualitative dataset findings, which helped in visualising the flat, two-dimensional analysis layers into multidimensional analysis, as found in chapters 4 and 5. This indirectly transformed the linear approach of data interpretation and analysis to one that is networked and complex.

Both thematic and content analyses were used in analysing the interviews, social media posts and the open-ended questions generated within the social surveys. The use of these analyses, particularly content analysis in this research is a clear divergence from the usual Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) that Foucauldian scholars used when studying governmentality. Justification for its use will be discussed towards the end of this chapter. The thematic analysis allows for the identification and flexible categorisation of emergent themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006) derived from interview transcripts and online postings. Based on the Dean's AOG, identification of these themes was made possible by associating it with the T2 section of the theoretical framework on monitoring and surveillance technologies linked to governmentality's 'technologies of risk' and 'technologies of fear'. Hence, categories were created based on strategies for auditing apparatuses, specialists, or experts' knowledge of halal certification requirements and

coordination and consultations between the governor and their non-subjugated but dominated subjects. Knowledge of cross-contaminations, existing industrial and religious criteria on hygiene, sanitation and critical control points were used in thematising and coding the technologies of risk. Evaluation of the levels of knowledge and source of information of these themes are used later in this research. Since there is a need to create a near identity to justify further the rationality of halalisation, Brunei halal laws, policies, and guidelines, coupled with verses from the Holy Quran and the Hadith, were also used as part of thematic and content extractions as well as components of the technologies of fear. Only by understanding and being wary of the ethical responsibilities of being the governor and the governed subjects, on top of punishment and retribution in this world and the hereafter, can industrial standard compliance be attained. Only by juxtaposing the relations and dynamics between the governors' intended yet diverse governing strategies and their subjects and the reality of tools used and their actual implementation can the discursive, multidimensionality and multifaceted aspects of the power-knowledge economy be identified, assessed, and evaluated. Categorisation and extraction of themes are based on data coding. Hence, the focus on information typologies, types of knowledge, function of rules and regulation are some of the highly relevant dimensions to decipher and elucidate Foucault's multiple governmentalities. Dean's AOG provides the analytical lens on who, how, and what governing strategies HFCD used in their halal certification programs.

The use of thematic analysis is further justified since semi-structured interview transcripts are rich in data and, in this case, are based on socioeconomic actors' personal

experiences. Since interviews based on experiences are unique, multilayer, complex, time and contextually dependent, the extraction and categorisation into themes help bind together the findings and help make sense of the arguments derived from the generated data. As for the social media posts, the data was analysed using codes once the data entry was completed. These codes help categorise or thematise the posts concerning halal application, halal awareness, halal production enhancement, and awareness of halal food-related laws and regulations. By codifying these datasets, capturing or ‘snapping’ the moments in which halal standard governing occurred is possible. Identifying the interrelationships between the diverse codes via the graphical display of its co-occurrences and co-relationships, a critical function that goes beyond merely categorising by linking concepts, was also made (Namey et al., 2008) (as cited in Alhojailan, 2012). The codes were also used and triangulated to increase academic rigour with the support of findings from the descriptive statistics from the Facebook posts and the survey to ensure logical clarity and coherency, a characteristic needed in this type of analysis (Fereday & Cochrane, 2006). Tabulation of metadata descriptors such as postings ID, month, and year other than the emerging subthemes generated from the analyses into the Excel spreadsheet allows for time-series analysis to be carried out.

It has been mentioned in the previous paragraphs that some of the criteria or codes generated were based on power-knowledge apparatuses or tools used in standard-settings initiatives involving both complex structural physical power such as royal decree, law, regulation, audits and fines, and soft power, i.e., knowledge, information, divine commandment, and judgements to name a few. When analysing the social media posts,

the first codes were generated deductively based on the initial or main themes associated with halal certification's AOG framework. The researcher's interpretation of the raw social media posts was fundamental in this first cycle of data coding by identifying the keywords or phrases used. Once the main themes were identified, content analyses of the posts were carried out to allow for specific codes to be generated progressively. Similarly, such coding cycles were also implemented in analysing the interview transcripts. According to Weligodapola and Darabi (2018), such processes are a form of data condensation task used to retrieve meaningful and valuable materials while helping amalgamate the rich data chunks. However, unlike the thematising processes proposed by Weligodapola and Darabi (2018), the analytical procedures in this research were carried out inversely. Where overlapping general codes existed, a second coding process was carried out to better classify the themes into groupings or subthemes that best reflect their associations with the governmentality processes. This is part of the processes that support Analytic Induction, where data are inductively extracted based on known themes generated deductively from existing case studies (Yin, 1994; Hyde, 2000). Amid the data entry and analysis, both thematic and content analyses were, in a way, guided by the questions on what the posts are all about, themes they fall under, whom the posts targeted and who the leading players involved, as reported in the postings. These questions are linked closely to the AOG framework as they help identify the tools and technologies used in Brunei's halal standard-setting exercises whilst providing the required details necessary to create a halal code of conduct and the near identity required towards industrial conformance and compliance of the targeted populace. The diagrams below surmised

the data entry and coding procedures, as well as the chart generation, using the ‘Halal Workshop’ theme extracted from HFCD’s social media reporting as an example:

Step 1: Identify the Online Post:



Step 2: Translate into English, enter into Excel (metadata of the post including month and year of posts) and identify the themes

THE HALAL FOOD CONTROL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF SHARIAH AFFAIRS, RECEIVED A SPECIAL INVITATION TODAY FROM THE MANAGER OF THE SUMBANGSIH MULIA PREMISE TO GIVE A TALK TO LOCAL VENDORS OF THE PREMISE. THE TALK TITLED "HALAL FOOD CONCEPT" WAS DELIVERED BY MR AWG MOHD IDULFITRI BIN HJ AHMAD, A RELIGIOUS TEACHER TRAINEE OF THE HALAL FOOD CONTROL DIVISION. THE TALK/ BRIEFING AIMED AT GIVING INFORMATION AND EXPOSURE TO THE PARTICIPANTS ABOUT THE HALAL FOOD CONCEPT AND THE BRUNEI HALAL CERTIFICATION. THE TALK ALLOWS FOR SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SESSIONS AS WELL.

Step 3: For Workshop theme – subthemes identified based on the type of workshop/ talks held and the target of the activities (governors-governed, public and private alike)

ID	Month	Year	Public	Workshop (As it is)							Info on HFCD roles and responsibilities
				Industry (General)	Production (SV)	Production (Processing)	Education (Learning and Empowering) (ADM)	Education (Learning and Empowering) (PUB EXC SV)	NGOs (Business Awareness)	Application (How to)	

Step 4: Tabulating the dataset, numerically sum the frequencies of occurrences of each subtheme by year or months where possible. The number ‘1’ in each subtheme represents its ‘linked, presence or occurrences’ whilst ‘0’ represents ‘none or irrelevant.’

ID	Month	Year	Public	Workshop (As it is)							Info on HFCD roles and responsibilities	SOCIAL MEDIA POSTINGS
				Industry (General)	Production (SV)	Production (Processing)	Education (Learning and Empowering) (ADM)	Education (Learning and Empowering) (PUB EXC SV)	NGOs (Business Awareness)	Application (How to)		
285	SEPT	2018	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	THE HALAL FOOD CONTROL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF SHARIAH AFFAIRS, RECEIVED A SPECIAL INVITATION TODAY FROM THE MANAGER OF THE SUMBANGSIH MULIA PREMISE TO GIVE A TALK TO LOCAL VENDORS OF THE PREMISE. THE TALK TITLED " HALAL FOOD CONCEPT " WAS DELIVERED BY MR AWG MOHD IDULFITRI BIN HJ AHMAD, A RELIGIOUS TEACHER TRAINEE OF THE HALAL FOOD CONTROL DIVISION. THE TALK/ BRIEFING AIMED AT GIVING INFORMATION AND EXPOSURE TO THE PARTICIPANTS ABOUT THE HALAL FOOD CONCEPT AND THE BRUNEI HALAL CERTIFICATION. THE TALK ALLOWS FOR SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SESSIONS AS WELL.
286	SEPT	2018	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	KHATIB ASY-SYARIBI RAHIMAHULLAH SAYS "KNOWING THE LAWS/ RULING ON HALAL HARAM (OF FOOD AND DRINKS) IS AMONG ALL IMPORTANT THINGS AS WITHIN THE CONSUMPTION OF HARAM FOOD/ PRODUCTS LIE HARD THREATS (MADE BY GOD)".
287	SEPT	2018	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	HALAL SUPERVISION ENHANCEMENT WORKSHOP TITLED TOWARDS RULES AND GUIDELINES COMPLIANCE WHICH WAS DELIVERED BY AN OFFICER FROM HFCD AS A WAY TO FAMILIARISE AND IMPROVE THE INTEGRITY OF PRODUCTION AS WELL AS ENHANCE MANAGEMENT AND SAFEGUARD THE HALALNESS OF ALREADY CERTIFIED PREMISES.
288	SEPT	2018	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	A TOTAL OF FIFTY SCHOOLCHILDREN AND THEIR TEACHERS FROM MATAMATA PRIMARY SCHOOL HAD THE CHANCE TO GO ON AN EDUCATIONAL VISIT ON THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF HFCD AS PART OF THEIR LEARNING ACTIVITIES. THE TALK/ BRIEFING WAS DELIVERED BY MISS HARDEWI HASSIM, A TRAINEE OF THE RELIGIOUS TEACHER'S COLLEGE, WHO SHARED ON THE HALAL FOOD CONCEPT AND HFCD JURISDICTION AND CONTROL WITHIN THE GOVT AND IN THE COUNTRY.
289	SEPT	2018	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	HFCD OF THE SHARIA DEPARTMENT, MORA, WAS INVITED TODAY TO DELIVER A SERIES OF TALK ON HALAL FOOD CONCEPT AND HALAL CERTIFICATION FOR TEMBURONG RESIDENTS UNDER THE INFORMED COMMUNITY PROGRAMME ORGANISED BY THE LABU ESTATE VILLAGE. THIS IS A SPECIAL INVITATION PROGRAMME MADE BY THE INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF THE TEMBURONG DISTRICT BRANCH. THE PROGRAMME WAS ORGANISED TO INCREASE THE KNOWLEDGE AND UPDATE THE RESIDENTS ON THE CURRENT ONGOING SOCIO-ECONOMIC UPLIFTING PROJECT CARRIED OUT BY THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.
290	SEPT	2018	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	HALAL AWARENESS AND ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE PUBLIC TO UNDERSTAND THE BASICS OF HALAL FOOD PRODUCTION AND SHARING INFORMATION ON HALAL HARAM PRINCIPLES IN ISLAM AS WELL AS A WAY TO CREATE RESPONSIBLE AND WELL-INFORMED INDIVIDUALS. THE PROGRAM ALSO AIMED TO HELP THE PUBLIC THINK OF BECOMING ENTREPRENEURS, AS WELL AS THOSE WHO WANT TO PRODUCE LOCAL PRODUCTS.
SUM OF THEME (FREQUENCY)				4	3	1	3	0	4	2	3	1

Figure 12. Step-by-step procedures of data entry, processing, and analysis of the social media postings – from thematising to content and statistical analyses.




Figure 13. Thematising, codifying and content extraction processes, chart generations and relational/ cross-sectional analyses, in this instance, for the Workshop theme

This subsection highlighted some procedures and data analyses throughout this research. Not only were derivative themes closely linked to the theoretically informed codes, as highlighted in the analysis of the social media posts, but the frequency occurrences of the emerging subthemes described in counts or numerical units allowed for statistical analysis to be carried out. This is important as it allows for evaluating or assessing the efficacy of halal governing and information-sharing as a function of effective halal certification governing and standard-setting. A deluge of halal-related information shared on social media shall allow for more knowledgeable and well-informed businesses and industrialists. At the same time, it can also curtail the socialisation process and reduce potential growth in halal-certified operators should the information shared be too technical or complex, or there exists some misinformation or disinformation resulting in reduced competency and capacity building as well as capabilities development.

The notion of growth is measured through the statistical analysis of the survey output. Dimensions such as business profitability concerning the cost of operations, the industrial reorganisation of production activities as they undergo halal certification, workers' compensation, and diversity of products, to name a few, helped in identifying the co-relationships and dynamics between halal certification governing and its subsequent effects towards businesses. Assessment of operators' halal knowledge and the halal protocols they followed or practised helped to triangulate further the effectiveness of social media usage as a means of spurring halal knowledge dissemination.

3.4.4 Respondents' Confidentiality, Anonymity and Data Protection

Respondents were briefed on the nature of the study and required to have their consent taken before the data collection exercises began. All the data recorded falls under the purview of the United Kingdom's (UK) Data Protection Act 1998. Personal information attached to businesses, such as the name and address, were anonymised via pseudonyms or codes and were known only to the researcher and the supervisors. Businesses that shared their industrial secrets were also briefed on the typologies of data that would be used and published. Individual datasets that directly affect businesses' competitive advantage are usually omitted or anonymised, whilst some are treated as a compilation or in sets, further eliminating their individuality. Some direct quotes from the managers affected by the compulsory halal certification programmes will also be shared, especially in chapter 5 of this thesis. However, the allocation of pseudo-names to these individuals and their companies was made to protect their identity since some information shared was deemed sensitive. All these disclaimers have been made clear in the data sharing confidentiality and consent form (see Appendix 4). A research ethics approval was granted on the 16th of September 2016, with an additional extension through the 1st of January 2018.

As for data collected through social media such as Facebook and Instagram, the researcher utilises the data protection and confidentiality policy offered by the service provider, i.e., Meta, in navigating ethics-related matters concerning online information. Since the sharing of information via social media platforms, the responsibility for the content shared publicly and the typologies of information shared is that of the owner, potential issues on data sharing and use of data for other purposes shall be at the owner's sole discretion as in the case of HFCD's IG halal.bn account and its Facebook *Bahagian Kawalan Makanan Halal* (HFCD) page. These public pages exist in the public domain where access to information does not require the data user, i.e. the researcher, to be a 'friend' via invitation or application, nor do they have to 'follow' the said page as followers. In other words, it is an open-accessed page or account protected by Meta's data collection, sharing and privacy policies.

3.5 Pilot Study

The researcher conducted a pilot study from 1 September 2016 to 28 November 2016 in Brunei Darussalam. The aims of this trip were to test whether the survey and interview questions were easy to understand and could capture the required data or not. Secondly, it was made to build rapport with local entrepreneurs. Most potential respondents were outsiders, so recruiting them were time-consuming. The challenges of gaining their trust, especially regarding sharing confidential business insights, i.e., their production costs, profits, losses, and information such as their key markets and future expansion plans, affected the speed of recruitment. To increase efficiency, the researcher used either the

gatekeepers, i.e., those who had some affiliation with the companies or, as mentioned earlier, via snowballing. For example, for companies such as MSB and SMC, the researcher used his network, i.e., MSB, in terms of extended family relationships or networks where the business owners were cousins and from the same village as the researcher's elders and for SMC, it was based on the tutor-student relationship or network since the manager was an alumnus of the researcher's home institution. A similar approach was also used when recruiting the firm NORB into the project. In the case of NORB, the researcher used his family network (i.e., uncle and brother) to recruit them. Trust created between the firms and researchers helped generate deeper business and commercial insights and improved data quality extracted from the informants. Respondents beyond the researcher's network were recruited via telephone or email. Some of the recruitments were also made using the network of the business communities who believed that their contacts would also be able to contribute towards the research.

3.6 Data Collection Challenges and Limitations of Research

The research encountered several limitations and challenges that also influenced the outcome. One limitation was focusing on only social media postings as the primary data sources in analysing halal certification and standard settings governing processes. Whilst the upcoming findings and analysis managed to render exciting results, particularly in using social media as data analytical sources and as a tool or technology of governing in the Foucauldian sense, the reality is only a partial reflection of what is happening elsewhere. This is because halal industrial governing is more complex, involving multiple

agencies beyond the HFCD and BIRC and requires more time to study, a luxury that is limited in any doctoral research. This, however, did not reduce the significance of the findings from this research as it managed to highlight and pinpoint the mechanisms and depth of the halal certification processes centralised around HFCD whilst, at the same time, juxtaposing the effectiveness and efficacy of the halal governmentalities by linking it to its subsequent effects towards businesses as they halalised.

Furthermore, the researcher captured some of the components of halal governing beyond HFCD through social media reporting, mainly where governmental campaigns or events surrounding the halal industry were made available. HFCD is also the principal agency responsible for halal certification processes, supported by its own Act and internalised certification guidelines. All of this helps to validate further the output data generated, increasing further the reliability of this research.

Another challenge relates to the recruitment of samples. Since the target group comprises local Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), getting them involved with the research is the challenge. As mentioned previously, before any formal engagement with the research, the research participant will be informed of the research aims and objectives and their research rights to confidentiality and anonymity. However, there were numerous times when the participants either redirected the researcher to other businesses or enterprises on the grounds of either not being interested in being part of the research due to the view that it does not affect them directly or them is not the 'right' person to deal with it. For instance, based on the researcher's experiences dealing with local bakeries and

international franchises, the researcher has always communicated directly with either the CEO/ manager or the production and operations managers. The researcher was often directed to other companies due to a lack of knowledge on halalising their production lines. It often raised the question of how they gained their certification in the first place. There have also been instances where the researcher could not arrange face-to-face surveys and interviews once samples were recruited. Part of the cause was the tight fieldwork and data processing schedules of the managers or the person in charge. Throughout the data collection period, the number of arrangements that needed to be made via telephone was between 3 to 6 times for each business on average. It consumed precious resources, monetarily and in terms of time. For respondents who have managed to set appointments, there have also been instances where the respondents either failed to turn up or the sessions were cancelled on the day and time of the arranged data collection, not only once but often twice or more. These cancellations wasted time that could have been made for other surveys or interviews and disrupted some of the time allocated for other respondents. This usually happens when businesses insist they can only be surveyed at a specific time and day. This is particularly the case with formal businesses. There were also times when surveys distributed online, i.e., through email and social media, were not returned or being ignored. This prompted the use of the traditional meet-and-greet approach mentioned under the previous subheadings.

Another issue relating to the recruitment of potential respondents was the inability to trace the firms or businesses involved, especially the informal producers. Unlike formal or licensed agri-food businesses with contact details in business directories and government

records, informal businesses such as home-based and online businesses are the opposite. Most of their activities are almost invisible in contrast to conventional business activities, as their presence was made either using social media such as Facebook and Instagram or through pop-up stalls in multiple locations. For the sample recruited online, one of the challenges is to trace whether these businesses are still around during the fieldwork. Since their presence can only be detected based on their status updates and the frequency of new product updates, once the business goes offline for more than four weeks, it can only be assumed that it is no longer active. Out of the 64 online businesses tracked, only 22 managed to be surveyed and interviewed, whilst 27 either did not want to participate or were non-responsive, nine were inactive, five could not be contacted, and one was busy.

As for home-based or cottage producers, although they came under the One Village One Product (1K1P) Scheme, most of them remained informal. Hence, their production frequency and active status activities are not fixed. Even with the obtained list from the government agency involved, i.e., the Department of District Office, Ministry of Home Affairs, some contact details needed to be corrected, making recruiting impossible. Based on the data from the fieldwork, it has been found that out of 43 businesses under 1K1P, only ten managed to be surveyed, eighteen either did not want to participate or did not reply, two were inactive, four businesses could not be contacted due to incorrect phone number whilst two were busy with other commitments. Out of the eighteen who chose not to participate, three businesses were needed to pay attention to the research request. This was based on the blue-ticked icons from their online messengers, whilst the rest

remained silent or refused to answer calls. All these factors above contributed to the low response rate from the businesses. Below is the chart showing the response rate for all these informal businesses, together with reasons for not participating:




Figure 14. Sample distribution and participation [informal businesses, online and offline (home-based and 1K1Ps)] throughout the study period

As for recruitment of samples from the halal standard-related governing agencies, the challenge was identifying the 'right' person involved in the certification project, particularly from the supporting sister agencies other than those from HFCD. At times, the researcher must abandon tracking those involved altogether due to the time consumed in getting hold of them. Another difficulty is the recent reshuffling of the ministerial cabinet and government departments. This saw the reallocation of responsibilities relating to halal industrial governing to newly established agencies. This further limits the researcher's ability to get them on board. Even if they were successfully identified, due to their different responsibilities, it is limited for them to share their insights regarding the research subject.

This resulted in using secondary sources as another way of data gathering. Another challenge comes in the form of a longer waiting time for returns from government agencies regarding obtaining data. For example, attempting to obtain lists of known enterprises involved in the agri-food businesses from the Global Halal Division of the Energy Industries and Division in the Prime Minister's Office took multiple correspondences from the researcher's contact for more than three weeks, which the attempt failed. The researcher ended up contacting the District's Office Department for a list of home-based entrepreneurs, which was successful. Similar lengthy waiting times were also experienced when setting up interview dates and times with government agencies involved and acquiring data from the survey.

Gaining the respondents' trust also proved challenging, especially concerning the entrepreneurs. Since some of the data shared were firms' secrets, which directly affected their competitive advantage, the researcher tried to emphasise the data protection tool made available by the university and ensure the maintenance of their confidentiality and anonymity. There were numerous times when questions had to be altered to ensure that respondents were comfortable responding to them. For example, regarding the question on the cost of production, rather than asking for the exact costs, the researcher would request either the average cost, a 'range-type' of answer or in percentile. Similarly, such changes were also made to the daily or monthly sales question whereby averages were expected as the answers rather than the actual sales figure. Below are images showing the range response:

j) What is the total average cost of producing your products per production (for top three products)? Please tick the appropriate boxes	Product 1	Product 2	Product 3
i) Less BND 150	☒	☐	☐
ii) BND 150- 300	☐	☒	☐
iii) BND 301- 600	☐	☐	☐
iv) BND 601-900	☐	☐	☐
v) BND 901 -1200	☐	☐	☐
vi) BND 1201- 1500	☐	☐	☐
vii) More than BND 1500 (but less than BND 3000)	☐	☐	☐
viii) Other amount (BND)	☐	☐	☐

j) What is the total average cost of producing your products per production (for top three products)? Please tick the appropriate boxes	Product 1	Product 2	Product 3
i) Less BND 150	☒	☒	☒
ii) BND 150- 300	☐	☐	☐
iii) BND 301- 600	☐	☐	☐
iv) BND 601-900	☐	☐	☐
v) BND 901 -1200	☐	☐	☐
vi) BND 1201- 1500	☐	☐	☐
vii) More than BND 1500 (but less than BND 3000)	☐	☐	☐
viii) Other amount (BND)	☐	☐	☐

Image 2. The range type of response from the actual survey sample

These are just some of the adjustments the researcher has to make to get the much-needed insight related to the research. Whenever there is a request for a part of the interview to be off the record, the recorder will pause before the recording resumes. For those who requested their interview to be written, such omission will not be recorded in the journal.

Since the survey questions and interviews were conducted in Brunei Malay, translating the data required time and patience. The researcher must carefully translate the surveys and interviews as some words could have multiple meanings or different connotations and contexts. This is particularly the case when the producers refer to government agencies. For example, when respondents refer to MUIB (BIRC), they may not be referring to the religious council per se, but the reference was made to HFCD. Similarly, when they refer to the Ministry of Primary Resources and Tourism (formerly known as the Ministry of Primary Industries and Resources) when describing support and assistance, the researcher must probe more than once to confirm this as the current responsibilities towards industries have been transferred to the Energy Industries and Divisions under the Prime Minister's Office. This is crucial to prevent distortions which would affect the

image of a particular governing body. Another way to reduce such conflict is by looking at the time frame that the respondents were referring to within their shared experiences.

Other than translation and reference issues, issues of clarity of survey questions answers are also evident. Survey answers such as responses on the nature of businesses, i.e., between part-time and full-time, show that several respondents see their business activities as part-time, temporary, even though they are the main/ primary source of their income. To overcome such issues, the researcher did some cross-sectional analyses by triangulating three types of questions and their various responses. For example, some producers labelled themselves as retired (RET) and categorised their business activities as part-time and informal (PT and INF). However, it was the primary income generator, and they were self-employed but not unemployed. A similar issue can also be noted in the response from graduates in the food processing industry who interpret their business as informal (INF) despite relying on it for primary income and it being their full-time (FT) involvement. There have also been instances where the food processing businesses are just one of many different businesses in which the producers operate. To determine whether the business activities are the primary income generator, additional categories such as production frequency and follow-ups during in-depth interviews were necessary to confirm the data's validity and reliability and cleanse it.

3.7 Analytics of Government (AOG) and Halal Certification Governing

Analysis: The Study's Theoretical and Analytical Framework




Figure 15. Dean's Analytics of Government (2010) adapted to works by Oels (2005), Fletcher (2010), and Hallaq (2012), combined with Porter's measure of industrial performance (Porter, 1998, 2008)

Since the research interest stems from the need to analyse the governmentality of the Brunei halal certification, the AOG framework adopted originated from the works of Dean (2010), revised and adapted to include criteria carried out in the research by Oels (2005), Fletcher (2010) and Hallaq (2012). To understand why the government governs how it governs, it must investigate and highlight the political rationalities (T1) of the governors involved in halalising Brunei's food industry. Three governing spheres need to be addressed for T1: (a) their field of visibility, i.e., intention, the problem of the population and objectives sought (problematization), (b) the forms of knowledge required to push for halalisation in this case, using the traditional (Islamic), conventional (industrial, consensual, agreed) and liberal/ neoliberal (laissez-faire, market competition etc) knowledge and (c) the type of near identities (code of conduct) required for both governor and the governed. The final component (c) revolves around the question of 'who' governing should be exercised upon and how it should be done. This part of the research involves analysing the rationalities of halal governors as they govern and those of halal businesses as they comply with standard-setting initiatives.

Analyses of the actual strategies, tools, and technologies towards halalisation (T2) are paramount to exercising the desired or envisioned political rationalities (T1). These include identifying the technologies used, evaluating the efficacy of governing and facilitation measures, and determining the role of moral-politico-economic instruments in dictating the governed code of conduct. Informed by the theories and works of literature reviewed, there are four main strategies or tools that the government hypothetically could

have used as they governed: (d) one is via the utilisation of experts/ specialised knowledge to educate, regulate and monitor the controlled subjects, followed by (e) the role of social media and other educational instruments to create halal awareness. Another way is (f) by consultation and coordination and, finally, (g) the use of religious (Al-Quran and Hadith) and political and economic instruments (laws, guidelines, convention) to implement halalisation through surveillance and audits. The underlying assumption for this focus lies in the need to decipher or understand the discursive role of power-knowledge by such strategies in halal governing. Understanding its operationalisation within these multiple governmentalities despite the dissonances or disjuncture allows for justification, reaffirmation, and confirmation of the positivity of power as argued by Foucault or vis-à-vis. However, it should be noted that the halal governing strategies or tools that this study analysed through social media and from the perspective of HFCD are just snippets of what is happening elsewhere.

The third tier of this framework (T3) explores the usefulness of current mechanisms or governmental technologies by studying the effects of halal governmentalities towards the governed subjects. Rose (1999) argued that governmentality as a research focus should also reconsider how it affects the managed to benefit from such studies on biopower and politics. Hence, using an adaptive version of the criteria used by the business schools to measure entrepreneurial growth [see Porter's work on entrepreneurial performances and market accessibility (1998, 2008)] coupled with challenges and issues surrounding standard settings and conventions (see Renard, 2003; Hatanaka et al, 2005; Swaffield et al., 2018; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005; Ponte, 2016), the same criteria is used to measure the

after-effects of halal standardisation on Brunei's food producers. The effectiveness of Islamic ethics and governmentality and its application over non-dominated subjects have also limited studies since writings on Islam, the State and government, in general, are normative. Hence, using the criteria from Sen's seminal work on Ethics and Economies (1988) and the notion of good and ethical governance in Islam (Ibn Khaldun, 1405; Al-Mawardi, 1058), this tier will also try to answer the application of Islamic ethics in the halal governmentalities of the halal standard. This includes exploring whether such governmentalities resulted in the creation of a halal code of conduct that adheres to religious and industrial compliances or vis-à-vis provides empirical evidence on the formation of new identities that support current rationalities of government towards halalisation (T1). Only by assessing these effects can Foucault's idea on the need for a 'critique' on governmentality and its reflexive impact as part of the governor's and governing regime's policy learning can be achieved (Foucault, 2008). As they undergo certification, positive effects on the producers would help support Foucault's view on the positivity of power and the governmental technologies used (T2) by translating governmentality into an actual code of practices (Rose, 1999).

To operationalise the AOG framework, the research design explicitly mapped each tier of the analysis to specific data sources and analytical procedures. For T1 (political rationalities), royal edicts, public policy statements, and social media posts by HFCD were examined to understand the justifications and shifting objectives behind halal certification. For T2 (technologies of governance), qualitative coding was applied to HFCD's Facebook posts, interviews with auditors, and training materials to identify instruments used for halal

enforcement. Finally, for T3 (effects), survey and interview data from food producers were analysed to determine perceived barriers, cost implications, and operational impacts—shedding light on the dissonances between halal policy design and implementation.

By analysing the three components, it helps to answer how such power- knowledge is used by the halal governors comprised of experts who are part of the religious orders, halal industrial auditors, regulators and managers and the halal subjects' responses and reactions to such disciplining as they undergo halalizations can lead to new understanding on how multiple governmentalities work within the halal standards. So, the question here concerns the research, "Does the governmentality of the halal standard follow fair practices and consider the protection of the business communities it tries to regulate? Does its implementation lead to halal food businesses envisioned or desired growth?"

3.8 Embedding Dean's Analytics of Government (AOG) Framework into Brunei Halal Certification Governmentalities Study: Research Design's Summary




Figure 16. The overall research design by embedding the researcher's extended version of Dean's AOG framework on halal governmentalities and its effects towards businesses

The diagram above summarises the analytical framework utilised based on the arguments and justifications in the previous subsections and the methods proposed in conducting this research. The diagram shows the relationship between the choice of methods used, the research objectives or scopes it tries to address, the origin of data sources used in addressing these objectives, and the analytical method used to generate the research output to answer the arising research questions. The researcher also wants to bring the reader's attention to the use of social media platforms in this research. These platforms served two core functions. Firstly, it relates to its function as a governing tool or platform for knowledge sharing, information dissemination and socialising processes that HFCD carried out towards halal code of conduct creation within the agency and beyond. Secondly, it also functions as a data source, highlighting other governing tools or

mechanisms that HFCD and other agencies use to halalise Brunei's food industries. Hence, information that revolves around government-to-government (G2G) or government-to-business (G2B) collaborations or cooperation, as well as those that highlight competencies, capabilities, and capacity development in the food industry, are some of the critical information analysed as part of exploring the efficacy of halal governing as it unfolds within the time frame of the study period. It also hopes to capture, if any, information surrounding the political rationalities towards the halalisation of the industry. Since HFCD clearly stated that the function of their social media pages is to "implement the enforcement of the laws on Halal-related matters" and to assist the public in dealing with any problems and inquiries about halal more efficiently, it is, hence, possible to extract any information on halalisation rationale from these pages, i.e., Instagram's halal.bn account and BKMH's Facebook Page. Analyses of the social media platform, whether on information and knowledge shared or on the governing technologies used towards halalisation, address the study's SRQ 1 and SRQ 2 components.

The questionnaire survey answers the T3, i.e., the theoretical framework's business effects and economic component, by quantifying the data generated from the themes the survey addressed. Descriptive statistics is the most relevant analytical method to describe the economic dataset-type results, apart from those that measure the degree of the halalisation requirements or procedures experienced during the pre-certification application processes and surveillance audits as captured by the open-ended questions. This is further supported by the semi-structured interviews dataset that provides rich, in-depth data, further validating the findings generated from the survey. The respondents'

words and personal experiences are fundamental as reflections of their overall feedback and climate surrounding the compulsory halal certification programme, be it that of regulators cum managers and auditors when conducting halal governing as well as those of the businesses as they underwent certifications and audits. Where the involved certifiers and halal standard-setters might feel their current halal governing mechanisms are well-functioning and work wonders, the ground experiences shared by those affected could be the reverse. Hence, it is also used to evaluate the effectiveness of halal governing via social media by gauging the typologies of information shared in contrast to businesses' knowledge of halal and identify potential concerns or problems associated with the halalisation processes, if any. Due to these needs, descriptive, thematic, and content analyses of both questionnaire survey and interview transcripts are justifiable by presenting reality based on an empiricist analytical lens. These methods answer the SRQ 3 and SRQ 4 components of this research.

3.8.1 Mapping AOG to Data Collection and Analysis

To ensure theoretical coherence and analytical precision, the application of Dean's (2010) *Analytics of Government* (AOG) framework was systematically mapped onto the research design. Each tier of Dean's AOG—political rationalities (T1), technologies and practices (T2), and effects on the governed (T3)—was operationalised through specific data collection strategies and analytical techniques. This mapping enabled a structured examination of how halal certification functions as a regime of practice within Brunei's Islamic state governance.

AOG Tier	Core Concept	Analytical Focus	Methodological Approach	Key Data Sources

T1	<i>Political Rationalities</i>	How halal certification is problematised and justified as a development strategy	Thematic and Content analyses (discursive constructions, legitimations)	Royal speeches, HFCD Facebook posts, policy statements
T2	<i>Technologies and Practices</i>	Instruments and institutional mechanisms used to implement halal governance	Content analysis and institutional mapping	HFCD Facebook Posts, Halal audit reports, Workshop materials, Brunei Halal Certification Programme documents, procedural guidelines
T3	<i>Effects on the Governed</i>	How business actors respond to, comply with, or resist halal regulation	Mixed-methods: qualitative interviews and survey analysis	Interviews with MSMEs, consultants, regulators; survey responses from informal food producers

Figure 17. Summary of AOG linked to data collection and analysis

This structured alignment between AOG and the research methodology not only provided analytical clarity but also allowed for a layered understanding of the complex intersections between state power, Islamic norms, and market governance. By empirically anchoring each tier of the framework, the research could move beyond abstract theorisation to interrogate how halal certification functions as both a moral and developmental technology within Brunei's contemporary governance landscape.

While governmentality studies often draw upon Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to interrogate how power operates through language, representation, and ideology (Fairclough, 2013; Rose, 1999), this study adopts a mixed of analytical methods, with content analysis as the main approach to engage with institutional texts (both physical and digital) as mentioned under subsection 3.4.3. This divergence is deliberate and stems from the analytical focus of this research. Rather than concentrating on how halal governance is ideologically constructed or contested in discourse, this study aims to trace the patterns of information, knowledge deployment, and regulatory emphasis embedded within documents such as halal guidelines, Facebook announcements, training manuals, and certification forms. In line with Dean's (2010) AOG, particularly his emphasis on

identifying political rationalities (T1) and technologies of governance (T2), content analysis allows for a systematic reading of texts to uncover the knowledge forms and governance practices encoded in Brunei's halal certification regime. This approach focuses on identifying recurring themes, codes of conduct, and normalising mechanisms, offering a more structured view of how governmental technologies become institutionalised. While content analysis may not delve into the rhetorical or ideological nuances prioritised by CDA, it complements a governmentality analysis by providing insights into the structured rationalities and codified instruments of rule that shape halal governance in Brunei. It allows for identifying both what is made visible and how knowledge is regulated which are the key concerns in governmentality studies.

In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted the rationale behind the chosen research design and methods for this study on halal governmentalities. The stance provided by the researcher on his ontological and epistemological positionalities and how this affects how his research is being designed consolidated further the linkages between the study's rationale, the methods being used and the desired study outcome. Due to the need to evaluate the efficacy, effectiveness and effects of halal governing towards Brunei's food businesses, both statistical and analytical representativeness of data are imperative as they provide numerical, quantifiable data counts, further enhanced with rich real-world experiences and accounts from those who undergone halal governing. Like other studies, this research also had its share of limitations and challenges mentioned towards the end of the chapter. Furthermore, the novelty of this research can be identified in three main aspects. One is the application of Foucault's governmentality to a State-based religious standard, which is the Brunei halal certification and standard within the perspective of a

monarchical system. Secondly, the use of governmentality to assess the effectiveness of new governing technologies such as social media like Facebook and Instagram as part of the new halal technocracy towards creating industrial halal conduct of conduct. It would also use the online platforms to identify governing processes across different time frames, a way of detecting any reflexive changes in the governing methods based on reported posts made by the relevant agencies. Last is to look at the impact of this new type of governing on halal business development, specifically and industrial development in general, as part of measuring vision-to-end goal achievement. All in all, the final diagram on the application of Dean's AOG framework in the study of Islamic halal governmentality of the halal certification programme ties in all the various components the study aims to look at, i.e., the research objectives covering the domains or sphere of halal governing, whilst at the same time merged it with the methods of data collection and analyses necessary to address the constructed research questions mentioned earlier in this chapter. The upcoming chapters will address the findings and analyses on halal governing and its subsequent effects on the food businesses.

CHAPTER 4 - BRUNEI'S HALAL GOVERNMENTALITIES: MAKING HALAL GOVERNING PROCESSES POSSIBLE

This chapter presents findings organised by Dean's Analytics of Government. From Sections 4.0 and 4.2 focus on the field of visibility and rationalities as well as the processes relating to identity formation (T1), Section 4.3 specifically on technologies and apparatuses of government (T2), while Chapter 5 engages with the effects of halal governmentlities on business actors (T3). It also examines the institutional dynamics of halal certification in Brunei, focusing on the operational practices of the Halal Food Control Division and its interactions with industry actors. While the certification process is often described in technocratic terms—as a standardised procedure for ensuring product compliance—it also functions as a moral-political project aligned with the state's Islamic development agenda. Drawing on official reporting and content analyses of the postings made by HFCD on their social media page, the chapter highlights how halal certification is discursively framed as both an economic strategy and a religious duty. The alignment between Brunei's *Wawasan 2035* (Vision 2035) goals and the expansion of the halal industry illustrates how halal governance has become a central pillar in constructing an Islamic developmental state. As such, this chapter situates halal certification as a key apparatus of governmentality, mediating between global economic demands and the production of moral Islamic subjects. The use of digital media spaces to rationalise government rationalities while at the same time constructing halal knowledge to be internalised later on, as the desired halal code of conduct, brought in interesting insights of these dynamisms.

In these analyses and findings chapters, the sequencing will be based on the AOG framework developed and adapted to study Brunei halal's certification governmentalities (see Fig. 15). Chapter 4 addresses both the T1 and T2 components of the framework, encapsulated in the SRQ 1 and SRQ 2 of the dissertation. SRQ 1 attempted to uncover the political rationalities behind Brunei's halal certification drive from voluntary to compulsory standardisation, whilst SRQ 2 aimed to identify the strategies used by HFCD towards achieving halalisation and an acceptable halal code of conduct. Findings for SRQ 1 highlighted the existence of a dynamic and adeptive monarchical government whose political rationalities moved from halalising merely for religious dietary protections to using halal as a tool towards national economic growth. It also suggested that for SRQ 2, HFCD managed to utilise the online platforms to disseminate information on halal certification and further legitimise its authority and relevance by reporting on the multiple initiatives that HFCD carried out throughout the eight years. These involve managing halal certification through physical campaigns, talks, clinics and workshops, identifying the target for which the halal information is used, and using religious technologies to mould the desired halal code of conduct. All this is aimed at capturing the best reasoned and possible way the government governs the halal certification programme and prevent from 'governing like that' (Foucault, 1979) (cited in Senellart, 2008, p. 2), 'That' in this instance refers to a state of clumsiness, inept or incapable. The use of a diverse range of halal-related information and technical knowledge aimed at halalising the agri-food industry based on the requirements of the Brunei halal certification and standards is also apparent. Questions surrounding the effectiveness of these halal governmentalities will only be

addressed in the next chapter (Chapter 5). Hence, what are the political rationalities behind Brunei's halalisation efforts? (SRQ-1)

4.0 Visualising halalisation rationalities: Defining the field of visibility

To understand the political rationalities behind the halalisation of Brunei's food businesses, the jigsaw puzzle of these rationalities must be unravelled using the Halal AOG framework (see Fig. 15). One of the ways is first to define the field of visibility that the halal governing is rationalising itself based on. There is a need to investigate whose intent these rationalities are based on, the 'problems' that the intender problematised, and the potential endgame or objective it wants to achieve primarily. In the case of halal standardisation governance, there were three key players whose intentions have been identified based on the data. They are as follows:

a) The Sovereign or Monarch's Intentions

Examination of the rationalities towards halalisation identified the centrality of the sovereign, in this case the Monarch, towards the halalisation. Whilst the intentions of His government towards halalisation had been mentioned at the beginning of the thesis (see Chapter 1 on short-term strategic plans on food and agriculture), findings from the analysis of the fourteen royal decrees' posts between 2011 and 2018 showed interesting themes summarised in the following chart:




Figure 18. Central themes in Sultan's speeches posted online between 2011-2018

Analysis of the online postings found that under the code R2S (Royal to Subjects), fourteen (14) royal decrees or speeches were shared between 2011 and 2018. Eleven (11) sub-themes were identified, with sixty-five (65) hits altogether. Within the eight (8) years, a post on royal speeches for 2011, 2013, and 2014 has yet to be posted. The year 2018 has the highest number of subthemes mentioned at thirty-one (31), followed by 2012 at thirteen (13), 2017 at twelve (12), six (6) for the year 2015 and only three (3) for 2016.

As for the breakdown of the speeches based on subthemes, the royal call for responsible monitoring and public cooperation came first at eleven (11), followed by the Sultan's halal vision at nine (9). Three of the subthemes, i.e., the halal economy and industry, halal products, and communal concerns, all shared seven (7) hits throughout the eight years. Emphasis on halal rule and regulation comes in fourth place with six (6) hits, and the importance of knowledge as a guide on halal haram is fifth with five (5). Royal calls for

establishing a monitoring agency and the importance of research and development come in sixth and seventh with four (4) hits, respectively. The need to practise sanitation and good hygiene, though part of the halal 'tayyiban' principles, came eighth with three (3) hits, and lastly, the call for maintenance of peace and stability came last with two (2) hits only. Five of all the royal decrees analysed played a crucial role in highlighting the transformations in the sovereign's field of vision as He defined the final direction or pathway that His government and industries should embark on. These are the decrees made in 1997 (1), 2005 (2), and 2016 (2), which were posted on HFCD's page in the years 2015, 2012, and 2018, respectively.

The Royal Decree of 1997 stated that Brunei must establish one agency responsible for controlling and monitoring food imports and exports out of its borders due to the increasing cross-contamination of halal-labelled food worldwide. The sovereign's intention here was mainly to protect the religious diet of Muslims by establishing monitoring and surveillance agencies for its cross-border activities. Decree on the promulgation of the HCHLO in 2005 marked the transition of an Act which only encompassed compulsory halal credentials for meat and its by-products to mandatory certification for all food products, be it raw or processed, as well as the implementation of Brunei halal standards on production/ processing activities using a new halal logo. Any form of non-compliance, ranging from utilising a halal logo other than the stipulated designs and specifications to using doubtful or questionable sources of materials, will be liable for punishments. A second decree made in 2005 also shows the intention of the Sultan to reinvent and develop the Islamic economy by creating cooperation and

collaboration with Malaysia in halal production and certification. The transformations in the rationalities, in general, were dictated by the dynamics found within the food security agenda and economic diversification vision that Brunei wants to achieve.

The remaining two decrees, delivered in 2016 and shared in 2018 online postings, further rationalise the national direction towards halal industrial development. In the first 2016 speech, three central components were identified. First is the Monarch's support on the capacity development effort linked to the establishment of a Halal Research Centre (hereafter *Halalan Tayyiban* Research Centre) at Brunei's only National Islamic University, UNISSA, in 2016, followed by the reiteration of His Vision in making the nation a Global Halal Hub and Halal industry as part of national economic growth strategies. Analysis of the second 2016 decree touched specifically on halal certificate monitoring, processing, and efficiency besides the call for responsible monitoring and public cooperation. These rationalities and the diverse halal governing apparatuses will be discussed later.

b) Those who govern (industrial governors, auditors, certifiers)

The political motivations behind current halalisation programs, especially among halal governors, can be understood through an analysis of interviews conducted over several years. The interviews revealed that the move towards halalisation since 1998 was initially in response to His Majesty's concerns about dubious halal food being imported and sold in the local market and an effort to diversify the economy by developing the halal food

industry. However, the 2017 amendments to the halal certification law, which made it applicable to all businesses regardless of their status, raised suspicions. According to interviews with HFCD officers who were members of the technical committee for certification procedures, the amendments were initiated by a directive from BIRC's board. The decision to expand halal certification to informal online and home-based businesses was influenced by strategies employed by the Singapore Islamic Religious Council (MUIS) in governing open stalls or bazaars. Due to the increase in informal businesses involved in the food and beverage industry, the compulsory standardisation was deemed to be necessary. The interviews also indicated that the rationality behind the HFCD's approach to halalisation has evolved, with a shift towards a greater emphasis on the managerial aspects of certification since 2017. This is on top of the earlier focus on the religious debates and their associated components per se.

Chapter 1 (p.33 to 35) mentions the governors' rationalities beyond BIRC and HFCD albeit briefly. However, considering its linkages to the current halalisation initiatives carried out by HFCD as the secretariat of the BIRC, particularly concerning halal certification and standardisation, it might be worth noting here. A revisit of the strategic short-to-medium plans for 2007- 2013 and 2016- 2020 showed the existence of multiple governmentalities. Utilising Foucault's sovereign governmentality, the initiatives proposed in these plans were identified as rationales influenced by the Sultan's decrees. This relates to the need to diversify the national economy away from oil and gas and increase the national food security via new economic and industrial alternatives offered by the Islamic economy. The culmination of these two plans contained elements called external

incentivise structures that not only should aid the government in intervening in the market per se but also aid economic players and industries, in general, to be enabled at the outset of the market (Fletcher et al., 2019). Plans on the establishment of industrial support services such as research centres and ISO laboratory support services, improvement in the overall value ecosystem coupled with the publication of technical handbooks and guidelines by DAA and marketing, rebranding and international export, among others helped condition the rationalities of the businesses involved in the halal food sector to be discussed in the next section.

c) Business owners/ food producers

As for the food producers in general, findings from the interviews and surveys on their intention or rationalities towards halalisation can be divided into at least three different groups experiencing halalisation in three distinct periods: (i) pre-2011 (voluntary for all except for meat producers), (ii) 2011 to 2016 (involuntary for all food businesses as part of business licenses renewal) and (ii) 2017 compulsory halal certification (involuntary and for all types of businesses be it formal and informal i.e. home-based).

For pioneer halal businesses coded as MSB, IDFD, SRB, SMC, NORB, AKM and CBRM, for instance, their rationalities to be halal standardised for the pre-2011 halalisation period were more towards formalisation of their 'halal' production activities via the Brunei halal certification programme, whilst at the same time, to support and materialise the government vision of developing the halal industry by rebranding or repackaging their

products under the commercial Brunei Halal Brand (see chapter 1). CMB and IDFD, on the other hand, have been 'halalised' earlier compared to the others under the Brunei Halal Meat Act of 1998. These are all part of their role as Bruneians who wanted to have their national food products made available beyond their national borders, i.e., as export products, whilst at the same time fulfilling their religious duties as Muslims, particularly in providing halal food for all. Based on the survey results from seven of the formal business managers and owners showed that their rationalities towards halalisation were firstly due to the need to gain customer confidence and trust in the products they are producing (5) as well as to fulfil their obligation as Bruneians operating within a Muslim majority Bruneian market (5). This is followed by three other themes where there is a need to ensure that their products are export-ready, high-quality, free from contamination, and pure, with three counts each. Apart from these rationalities, the businesses also intended to use the Brunei halal certification as a marketing tool, an added value that helps them leverage their product (2) and adhere to their duties as fellow Muslims (2).

From 2011 to 2016, businesses' rationalities towards halalisation, both for the pioneer group and new players or businesses, slightly differed from their previous intentions. While the pioneering group maintained their stance over halalising their production and businesses, they also showed concerns over its compulsory nature when the halal standard is required for their miscellaneous business license renewals. Based on these food producers' interviews, the requirements posed in the halal standard have some technically embedded elements in the miscellaneous licenses. These elements relate to structural matters, processing plants' fire hazard and safety, and public health and food

safety criteria. The domestic halal food pioneers' concerns over the compulsory nature in this time frame were more on the grounds of unfair management and injustices that this condition created, particularly between Muslim-friendly food facilities and premises that of the non-Muslims and between formal and informal businesses. According to them, the requirement created a new layer of bureaucratic red tape, which would also affect the daily operations of their companies. However, due to its overlapping nature and problems associated with the licenses relating to cost increases, misguidances, and increases in bureaucratic red tape, the Miscellaneous license was redacted and is no longer in use since 2016.

For 2017 food producers and business owners, their rationalities towards halalisation were not only due to the now compulsory status of the Brunei halal standard, but they were also intentions of 'going halal' for other various reasons. Data from the survey shows that twenty-six food businesses, i.e. eighteen from online and home-based and eight from 1K1P cooperative schemes, responded on why they intend to be halal certified. Eight themes were generated from this open-ended question and ranked according to the number of counts each theme made from the responses. One of the rationales towards halalisation was the need to gain customers' trust and confidence while buying their products (14). This is followed by its importance towards Muslim consumption in general (7), on top of the need to maintain cleanliness and purity in the Islamic sense (6). Coupled with this is also the need to produce halal due to the Muslim-majority nature of the domestic market (4). Some of these informal businesses also highlighted their intention for being halalised to export their products (3), to build trust among producers (2), gain

recognition from the government (1) and as a requirement to construct a 'proper' production facility (1).

4.0.1 Discussions on the Halal Field of Visibility

a) Halal Rationalities of the Monarch: A discussion

Whilst it is no surprise that the decrees analysed contained some religious elements in it, the analyses described in the previous sections highlighted the use of the absolute truths, i.e. the scriptures, as part of disciplining. However, the halal rationalities instilled by the Monarch are also rooted in the need to develop and enrich the state towards progress by using his power as the sovereign. To understand how such dynamism works, there is a need first to understand the differences between the terms subject and citizen. Simply put, this notion of being the subject and being a citizen lies in the definition of individuals' social contract with those with authority or control over a designated geographical location. Whilst being a subject linked closely to the idea of being part of the serfs or subservient to lords of the land, the idea of citizen is connected to a Westphalian concept of being part of a nation-state that shares common cultures, identities, political destinies and the ability to be self-determined without discrimination and prejudice (Anderson, 2020; Gellner, 2009). In Brunei's case, these terms were utilised interchangeably as the country operates both as a nation-state and a Sultanate. Having such a line of thought would assist in understanding the findings and the analyses to come.

Concerning the two 2016 royal decrees, Deuraseh (2019) argued that the resulting Halal Research Centre's development was inspired by the sovereign's view on developing halal research. However, it should be noted that inspiration alone does not warrant 'real' infrastructural and physical development. Based on the analytical evidence of the speeches, the decrees are absolute in terms of their power positionality because the position of His Majesty the Sultan is not only the Head of State but is also the Prime Minister, the Head of Religion and Customary Law for the country. Hence, not only does it provide the halal food sector with a directional sense. However, it should also be implemented by considering the priorities and essential needs of the nation regardless of the form it would take. In other words, every development initiative should fall within the framework that the ruler states.

A good example of this can be seen in his worldview over current halal monitoring and certification processing in the second 2016 decree. It inadvertently provides additional insights into current practises or approaches towards the halal industrial code of conduct, a unique Bruneian way of halal certification monitoring and auditing processes emphasising effectiveness over efficiency in halal certification and standard processing, strictly adhering to Islamic teachings. Differentiating Brunei's way of managing halal from other countries where corrupt industrial practices and law-breaking businesses were operating also gave insights into the nationalistic fervour highly attached to Brunei's industrial certification. His reminder of the need to process the halal applications neatly, strictly, and effectively by knowledgeable, competent, and non-complacent officers under full scrutiny based on the sharia reflects his envisioned governing form. In a way, it acts

as an assurance to gather the confidence of Brunei industrial players, halal consumers and other halal players on the stringent but effective certification the country is currently embarking on. The emphasis on maintenance and safeguarding Islamic rulings on food over industrial management processing also creates the dualistic approach towards Brunei's halal industrial development, with the development of the halal food industry as an economic necessity on the one hand and the need to adhere to Islamic rulings over wealth creation alone on the other. What effects does this have over business specifically and industry as a whole? How does it affect halal industrial governing? These aspects of the research need to be threaded carefully as industrial certification has real-world implications and higher socio-economic costs than previously imagined. This is a solid example of the sovereignty-discipline-government trinity dynamics for which Foucault's governmentality is well-known, with an additional coupling with the Islamic governmentality component. This creates a more complex layer showing the multidimensionality and multifaceted nature of the current halal governmentalities.

While the concern of the ruler is mainly tied to the overall religiosity of monitoring and certifying, the choice of effectiveness, i.e., strict adherence to requirements or higher compliance, over efficiency of processing, is undoubtedly detrimental towards business operations. The assumptions that to be compelling needs more time and heavy scrutiny over certification processes not only eliminate the possibility of innovating current certification processes but would also affect businesses. Both efficiency and effectiveness towards halal certification are possible by increasing competencies for halal managers, enforcers, and auditors and investing in capacity-building measures to improve overall

capabilities over standard processing and monitoring. This includes establishing systems to manage certification procedures, recruiting specialists or experts relevant to the field, and a degree of autonomy towards final decision-making.

Analysis of these decrees is of interest as it provides different perspectives in analysing the positionality of power, both in its absolute, objective term as a decree and its actual implementation by the government, i.e., in terms of pragmatism. It also showed the centrality of Monarchy in defining and redefining the directions in which the government works. Foucault (2005) mentioned that one of the reasons why there is a need to examine the arts of governing and its subsequent analytics is because it helps to provide information on how the State manages to govern and to see whether the State can be reflexive to change brought about by new problems leading to new problematisation. Such new problematisation was also made possible due to inherent risks that, according to Ewald (1986), were crucial in the functioning of a welfare state (cited in Rose, O'Malley and Valverde, 2009). By utilising risk as part of governing technologies, it allows for the subjectification of imminent threats to the State and those it governs via interiorising it (Weidner, 2009) whilst at the same time creating probabilistic techniques or procedures to predict and reduce potential harms (Rose et al., 2009). It helps to answer the hypothesis on the utilisation of multiple technologies, in this case, both in the use of political technologies in the form of royal decrees and theological or moral technologies in the form of Islamic principles the decrees were based on, as a way of governing, assisting the government in determining the direction of the domestic halal industry in general as well as in the creation of specifically Bruneian Industrial Halal Code of Conduct

as a guide. The royal decrees also served as key determinants in influencing the development of the halal industry.

These mutually reinforcing, autopoietic 'ruler-to-subject' and 'government-to-citizen' (G2C) relationships make establishing this code of conduct guideline possible. However, studies on its success and effects on businesses and the local halal industry have not been studied. The next significant chapter on the impact of the halal standard will try to address this scope of the research as studies on governmentality investigate the arts of governing and the effects of governing on agri-food businesses. The idea behind the postings of the royal decrees to halal online, in a way, functions to legitimise further the necessity of adhering and complying with the halal standard and halal vision that the Sultan has reiterated multiple times based on the charts shown as well as based on analysis on the content of the decrees and its resulting change in governing halal. Although the section on key milestones in Brunei's halal industrial development has mentioned the key developments concerning halal certification and industry, it is interesting that the following development is linked closely to the royal speeches analysed on HFCD's Facebook page. The details of these relations will be mentioned in the chapter on the effects of halal certification on both industries in general and agri-food businesses.

b) Rationalities of those who govern

For the governors involved in establishing the short-to-medium strategic plans for the DAA, the main governmentalities that govern their actions relate to neoliberal

governmentality. The use of keywords such as research-led, value-adding, export-ready, economies of scale, technical support with guideline provisions, as well as to be ISO certified, among a few, functions as critical factors that create the required near identity essential for the transformation of the businesses towards halalisation. This is sustained by the near identity created by the monarch on halalisation as part of a duty of the subject and their role as citizens. These 'enticing' supports offered by the government are not without pitfalls as they mask the inherent risks usually associated with the industry's first movers as discussed in the next chapter on the halalisation effects towards businesses.

For HFCD governors, their political rationalities during the earlier phase of its inception would be solely focused on religion as defined by the 1997 royal decree. This, however, changed with the HCHLO's introduction in 2005. Based on Figure 8 on the general halal requirements, it can be concluded that the adaptation of some technical components from conventional food standards into the PBD 24: 2007 and the BCGs helped transform the halal certification guideline. The motto of HFCD to solely implement the HCHLO (2005) and Halal Meat Act (1998) would also transform as social media became one of their critical platforms for raising halal awareness and sharing information. While the rationale of the increased number of informal businesses involved in the sector was one of the reasons for compulsory halalisation, the justification for copying Singapore's move was quite irrational, more so when it introduced the blanket rule towards halalisation for all in 2017 to emulate Singapore's success story. Foucault (1991) argued that states are unique, contextually driven and have different historical environmental variables, which

may affect the final form they try to connect or establish themselves into. How this will affect the growth or expansion of food business will be interesting to study.

c) Halal rationalities of the food producers

The data in the previous section shows that food producers' intentions or rationalities towards halalisation were undoubtedly influenced by multiple governmentalities, such as the neoliberal governmentality linked closely with the need to supply halal food and increase customers' confidence within the domestic market. To uphold the monarch's vision, the pioneer businesses disciplined their production activities by acknowledging their ethical responsibilities as Muslims to produce clean and pure halal food. Interestingly, the political rationalities identified from the survey and interviews with this group highlighted that halalisation has moved beyond protecting consumers via producing non-dubious food only. Instead, it has also expanded by incorporating the need to gain market access to other international markets, i.e. for export purposes, and the incorporation of ethically responsible production principles that merged religious halal with industrial halal. This mirrors the external incentivise structure that neo-liberal governmentality provided by offering or rationalising the potential of expansions and achieving economies of scale through export potentials. Regardless of whether it can be materialised or vice versa, the rationalities of the business owners and producers were undoubtedly the results of the operationalisation of the technologies of the self where businesses' approaches and worldviews were influenced by potentials, opportunities and the environment in which they live. All these factors contributed towards incentivising

these businesses to be involved in halalisation. Details on how these operate will be provided in the next chapter of the thesis.

4.1 Halal Rationalities and Forms of Knowledge: Moulding Halal's Islamic Governmentality

The Quran and Hadith serve as the foundation for knowledge of halal, rooted in sharia principles. This encompasses matters explicitly outlined in the scriptures and prophetic traditions and those interpreted by Islamic jurists to ensure sharia compliance. The rulings and interpretations of the Quran and Hadith form a framework for halal knowledge and practices within the Islamic tradition. If we use Foucault's take on governing by the scripts or absolute truth, both the Quran, with its eloquent content of divine commandments and the hadith, which transform these Quranic verses by provisions of set examples, do dictate any justifiable and actionable rationalities relating to halalisation. An interesting take on the role of the Quran and hadith, as found in this research, is that it served two purposes. First, it reaffirms its position as the constitution that rationalises the Muslim's act of 'being halal' as part of fulfilling their religious deeds and creed of permitting good and forbidding evil through the consumption of halal food. Second, the Quran and Hadith also function as disciplinary apparatuses. In Foucault's words, such function of the religious scripts as the 'defacto delimitation' provides the State and the government as its political arm to further rationalise the reasons of the state for implementing halal. In this section of the T1, the focus will be on the first. Not only does it serve as a guide towards creating a halal code of conduct among businesses, but it should also heighten the

reflexivity among governors on their conduct or conduct as they exercise halalisation. The Maqasid Al-Sharia or Islamic Law ensures that the well-being of communities is protected and guides leaders (Ulil Amri) towards reasonable, fair, and just governing. Thus, it is logical to analyse both the Quran and Hadith to understand and evaluate their relationship in creating a halal industrial code of conduct and governing agencies' role towards halal certification and industrial development.

The following chart shows an analysis of HFCD's Facebook posts between 2011 and 2018 to determine the existence of Quranic verses and the hadith linked to halal. For reminder purposes, each post analysed often addresses more than one theme. Hence, the chart generated is, in actuality, a representation of the number of themes found in one or more posts over seven years. It should be noted that the 'QUR' in the chart refers to the word 'Quranic', 'VERS' about the verses followed by thematic codes of 'HP' referring to halal production, 'HC' on halal consumption, 'CP' on compliance as piety, 'NCT' non-compliance as against teachings, 'WB' as well-being and 'HPU' as halal as protection of the community (Ummah). Six (6) subthemes are identified in total for 'QUR_VERS'.




Figure 19. Quranic verses and their associated themes extracted from the HFCD FB page between 2011-2018

There are one hundred and six (106) counts on the general theme of the Islamic constitution, of which fifty-five (55) fall under the Quranic verses, whilst the other fifty-one (51) are categorised under the Hadith sub-themes. In terms of percentage, the Islamic constitution theme covers 7.04% of the overall themes found within these seven-year datasets, with Quranic verses at 3.65% and Hadith at 3.39%.

Snapshots from using Quranic verses within the posts show uptick trends for the seven years, though staggered year-on-year. Significant upticks of more than 1 (>1) per theme can be seen in 2012, 2015 and 2018. For 2011, posts on the Quranic verses touched upon halal production, consumption, and compliance, with a one-time mention for each category. Further analyses for the year 2012 show an increase in the three categories mentioned in the previous year, with halal production at three (3), halal consumption at four (4) and compliance at six (6) with additional sub-themes on halal as protection of well-being, though a one-off, at three (3) and on halal as protection of the Ummah at three respectively. Trends in 2013, in contrast, show ones (1s) for five halal sub-themes involved in production, consumption, compliance as piety and protection. Years 2014, 2016, and 2018 in this category have no governing posts on 'QUR_ VERS'. There are three (3) hits for halal production and consumption, respectively, whilst verses on non-compliance is the same as the trend in 2012 by two (2). The highest sub-themes are on compliance as piety at four (4) for 2015. In 2018, the lowest for this year touches on non-compliance at one (1) and halal production at two (2) hits. Sub-themes on halal

consumption and compliance as piety have the highest hits, with the latter receiving five (5) hits and the latter at six (6) hits.




Figure 20. Main themes on Quranic verse and hadith use in online halal governing.




Figure 21. Patterns of halal governing based on utilisation of the Quranic verses and the Hadith between 2011-2018

The Quran and Hadith postings also shared the same pattern, whereas for 2014, 2016, and 2017, no posts were shared on the Islamic constitution. This pattern is also evident for other themes, albeit at much lower or restricted values (refer to previous subsection). In summary, each post's total number of hits on both 'QUR_VERS' and 'HAD' for the seven years was as follows. In ascending order, the theme on compliance as piety is the highest for both Quran and Hadith at twenty-six (26), halal consumption at twenty-five (25), halal production at sixteen (16), non-compliance as against teachings at fifteen (15) and both halal as protection of individual well-being and as protection of Ummah came in at twelve (12) respectively. Similarly, a look into the Monarch's royal decrees also showed the existence of the Islamic governmentality, particularly when analysing the rest of the other royal decrees.

4.1.1 The Quran and Hadith as a religious and disciplinary power: A discussion

A deeper analysis of topics within these sub-themes shows the multi-dimensional aspects of some sub-themes concerning one another. In other words, complementarities exist within each sub-theme. The chart below shows the in-depth typologies of halal-haram-related aspects shared in the Islamic constitution category. While the previous subsection provides descriptions of individual sub-themes over a given period, the chart below looks deeper into the details of each sub-theme and its implications for creating a halal industrial code of conduct.




Figure 22. In-depth typologies of Quranic verses and the Prophet's narrations shared by HFCD between 2011-2018

To ease analysis and discussions, the chart on the typologies above is again coded into four main categories: 1) Divine Revelation and Retribution, 2) Production, 3) Consumption and 4) Ethics and Principles (as part of human living).

Under the 'Divine Revelation and Retribution' category, there are four other sub-categories, namely retribution for haram consumption (general), retribution for alcohol consumption (specific), rejection of good deeds for haram consumption and becoming the fodder of hell for haram consumption. Halal and haram are discussed in detail in the

literature review. In the Islamic belief, for every act of kindness and misdeed, there exist retributions or consequences for doing such things. Hence, the categorisation for this category also includes the consequential aspects of consuming haram, i.e., being fodder for Hell in the hereafter and being Cursed by God due to haram consumption. For the sub-category on divine retribution for haram consumption in general, both Quran and Hadith have four (4) mentions each, whilst, for the specific retribution on alcohol, both Quran and Hadith have three (3) and two (2) mentions, respectively. Divine punishments or retributions for consuming in the form of rejection of good deeds or worship (ibadah) were mentioned three (3) and four (4) for both the Quran and Hadith, respectively. As for the punishment of becoming the fodder of hell, it is mentioned once (1) in the Quranic verse shared and three (3) times in the Hadith. The utilisation of such verses and narrations on divine retributions as part of the halal governing is partly to instil not only fear in humans of the repercussions of haram consumption both in this life and the hereafter but is also aimed at nurturing the sense of responsibility of humans as a servant of God in this life. The punishment in terms of rejection of good deeds or acts of worship for 40 days was specifically also aimed at deterring individual Muslims from involving themselves with haram-related activities. Retributions, in this sense, are critical towards fulfilling religious responsibility at a personal and societal level.

Under the second 'Production' category, four sub-categories deal with the multidimensionality of production: slaughtering in terms of its benefits, slaughtering as an act of kindness, utilisation of God's name (Allah) before slaughtering and decontamination. For the benefits of slaughtering, the posts shared touched three (3)

times in the Quran and five times (5) in the *hadith*. As for slaughtering as an act of kindness, both shared the Quran, and narrations mentioned it three (3) times. The sub-category on the need to utilise God's name before slaughtering is also mentioned three (3) times in the Quran and twice (2) in the narrations. Processes about container decontamination are only mentioned once (1) in the *hadith*, though in greater detail. Evaluation of the scope in the 'Production' category suggests the importance of slaughtering at the core of animal processing and the importance of invoking God's name, also known as the *Basmallah* when processing live animals. Though limited, processes or procedures concerning ritual cleansing of the contaminated containers are equally significant. HFCD shared in greater detail how the purification processes work and the ingredients used to cleanse and purify the contaminated items or space properly. In a way, mentioning these production procedures in the postings suggests the development of halal production awareness and understanding of the justifications behind such procedures. For example, in both slaughtering benefits and as an act of kindness, both verses and narrations mentioned how slaughtering not only helped in sanitising and keeping the meat fresh via draining of the blood. Nevertheless, it is also mentioned how slaughtering (using a sharp blade) helps in hastening the death of processed animals by reducing the suffering of animals drastically, an act of kindness which becomes part of the ethics of slaughtering. Slaughtering which defies the use of God's name not only results in the meat becoming not halal (regardless of whether it is that of swine or other clearly 'haram' animals) but also, upon consumption, will result in the acquisition of sin, punishable in the afterlife. From this example alone, it can be seen how defiance of one particular procedure can create 'haram' chain effects towards the whole process, i.e. from

farm to fork (production to consumption), life here and the hereafter (divine retribution), as well as for the well-being of Muslim communities (daily living and worship).

As for the 'consumption' category, the postings shared touch on three sub-categories, namely instructions to consume from halal sources, urged to refrain from eating suspect or syubhah food and a choice made by Mohammed over two leading food before one given their 'haram' ruling. For the category of instructions, the shared verses mentioned the need to consume from halal sources seven (7) times, whilst the narrations mentioned it five (5) times. This is followed by the second sub-category on the need to refrain from eating suspect or syubhah food five (5) times mentioned in the shared Quranic verses and six (6) times in the hadith. Specific use of the hadith on ingredients came once (1) within the shared posts, particularly in the story when Mohammed was brought to the Heavens; God instructed him to choose milk and alcohol as food, and he later chose milk over alcohol, resulting in alcohol's prohibition. The exciting aspect of this category is its similarity to 'production', particularly in its multidimensionality. Whilst this category is specifically on consumption, analysis of the content also proves this category's close correlations with the previous two on retribution and production. With the 'haram' or illegal rulings on alcohol consumption based on the prophetic story, it can also be expanded to its ruling on its usage in food production.

Another example that can be generated to illustrate this is based on one of the postings under the need to consume from halal sources sub-category. In one of the postings, it was instructed for Muslims to consume only from halal sources, refrain from charging of

interest/ derivatives or 'riba' and or consuming anything derived from it for such an act violates God's commandments; hence, it is punishable with heavy punishments. While charging interest is, in part, a part of financial practice, God makes its practice 'haram' or sinful due to the burden it imposes on the borrowers. Hence, any flesh grown from it will be burned in Hell. It is interesting to note the chain reactions one aspect can have to other actions occurring along the line. The theme of the 'Alcohol consumption verse' has no real detailed information, but it was supposedly complimented/ supplemented by HFCD information in previous subthemes.

As such, all the discussions within this subsection touched on the criteria of responsible, ethical, and accountable Muslims about halal, whether as individuals or as part of the Muslim communities. The verses from the Quran and the prophetic traditions mention the multiple dimensions of the communal Islamic code of conduct. Findings from the analyses thus far, in combination with those of the previous subsections, however, found the lack of mentioning of the criteria needed for an ethical, responsible, and accountable governing of halal standards. Apart from the requirements on the importance of a 'just leadership' (1) as well as the three subthemes on 'responsible monitoring/ public cooperation' (11), 'peace and stability' (2) and 'knowledge as guide on halal haram' (5) under the Monarchy subsection, the target of most of the governing mechanisms touched on the multiple subsections is mainly targeted for the public which includes businesses as well as the other government agencies i.e. the stakeholder. Such a sense of acknowledgement, reflection and review of current governing conduct are essential reflexivity tools and dimensions that allow for improvements in governing practices. The

lack or non-existence of it could hinder future development as it does not allow for critical evaluation and re-examination of current practices as they are being implemented. Analysis of the effects of these practices in the next chapter of the thesis will address the effects of such rigidity and inflexibility considering business communities and industrial development. However, the use of the Holy Quran and Hadith (scriptures and traditions) – as part of the divine, religious-politico-economic governing continuum, combined with both Islamic ethics and principles, as well as the use of gargantuan halal and halal-certification-related information and governing apparatus in the next section showed the enormous potentials of applied Islamic governmentality, particularly in the use of digital spaces as spaces of governing.

4.1.2 Dynamisms of forms of thought and knowledge within halal governmentalities

Determining the types of governing technologies to be used is usually linked intricately with the rationalities behind any acts of governing. In the case of the Brunei halal standards, the forms of thought and knowledge required to exercise governing are made possible and operationalised within the multiple governmentality framework. What kind of governing technologies, knowledge, or information did standard-setters and halal experts used in Brunei halal standard's governance? Analysis of the 334 Facebook posts posted on the halal.bn page between 2011 and 2018 shows the emergence of eight significant themes related to halal certification and governing including those discussed previously i.e. on the use of the Quran and hadith. These themes are workshops (WRKSHP), halal law and regulation (HAL-LAW-REG), halal food (HAL_FOOD), general post 1

(GEN_POST), government and public consultation and coordination (CONS_N_COORD), on Quranic verses relating to halal (QUR_VER), prophetic sayings (HAD_VER) and general post 2 (GP). General post 1 refers to postings that provide general information such as time and space relating to events, conferences and matters concerning halal application workshops and clinics, the role of HFCD in general and halal standard criteria. General post 2, in contrast, refers explicitly to postings on halal knowledge regarding production and processing and religious views on compliance and piety. The figures and table below show the patterns of themes shared based on the number of occurrences in one post (figure 22) and the distribution of the themes by year across the eight major themes in percentile.




Figure 23. General themes on halal-related posts between 2011-2018

YEAR	WRKSHP	HAL-LAW-REG	HAL_FOOD	GEN_POST	CONS_N_COORD	QUR_VER	HAD_VER	GEN_POST 2
2011	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3
2012	1.1	0.7	6.4	5.5	4.7	1.4	1.3	5.3
2013	1.5	0.1	2.2	2.0	1.1	0.3	0.8	1.3
2014	0.0	0.1	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.0	0.0	1.2
2015	0.0	0.0	0.7	1.9	0.1	0.8	0.0	0.8
2016	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
2017	0.0	0.9	0.9	1.7	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.7
2018	13.2	3.7	6.3	8.4	7.4	0.9	1.0	8.6
2011-2018	15.8	5.6	17.6	20.9	14.7	3.7	3.4	18.4

Table 5. Percentage of halal governing posts by general themes between 2011-2018

Based on the findings from Figure 22, the patterns of distribution of all eight themes across the 8-year data period are uneven. Total percentage share of all the eight themes throughout the studied data set shows most of the postings were covering aspects on (GEN_POST) at 21%, (GEN_POST 2) at 18%, on halal food (HAL_FOOD) at 18%, WRKSHP 16%, CONS_N_COORD 15%, HAL_LAW 5%, QUR_VER at 4% and HAD_VER at 3% respectively. Most activities occurred mainly in 2018, whilst there is a significant number of activities which started in the year 2012, only to dwindle further from the year 2013 onwards. Between 2014 and 2017, only 67 online posts were made on the halal.bn page, covering only 13.8% of the eight themes in total, with most postings related to GEN_POST at 5.1%, GEN_POST 2 at 2.9%, HAL_FOOD at 2.5%, CONS_N_COORD at 1.4%, HAL-LAW-REG at 1.1% and QUR_VER at 0.8%. There is no post concerning the prophetic saying between 2014 and 2017. For the year 2018 alone, there were 153 posts of which the highest post was related to the themes on WRKSHP at 13.2%, followed

by GEN_POST 2 at 8.6%, GEN_POST at 8.4%, CONS_N_COORD at 7.4%, HAL_FOOD at 6.3%, HAL-LAW-REG at 3.7%, HAD_VER at 1% and QUR_VER at 0.9% respectively. An interesting aspect of Figure 19 was the dwindling number of postings posted from 2012 onwards, only to resurge in 2018. This is inconsistent with the number of halal applications received between these hiatus years (see Fig. 7), where drastic increases were experienced potentially linked to the compulsory halal certification directives made in 2011 for all formal food businesses and in 2017 for all food businesses regardless formal and informal status. This shows that the lack of postings does not reflect the lack of governing activities elsewhere. A follow-up survey was conducted with the HFCD officers in 2022 regarding this hiatus or 'information blackout' phenomenon. It was confirmed to be due to the lack of officers managing the agency's social media accounts during the period, with retirements and lack of dedicated staff cited as the leading cause of the hiatus. Nevertheless, with such discrepancies in halal information and knowledge sharing, there are bound to be some effects on the general halalisation processes of the food businesses. This will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Concerning general posts (GEN_POST), nine subthemes touched on multiple pieces of information on halal and others. Two of these subthemes shared general information beyond halal, such as on HFCD's corporate social responsibility and trivial details not directly related to halal, labelled under the other (OTH) category. CSR activities, such as aiding the needy, poor, and underprivileged, as well as cleaning campaigns on public spaces such as cemeteries, parks, and beaches, are the information shared. The only important information or sub-themes relevant to this study are those linked to information

on the application (APPL_HWTO) at 13.7% in total, information related to workshop or talks dates, location, and time (INFO_WDTP) at 13.3%, general information on HFCD's role and responsibility at 8%, listings on halal premises (LIST_HALPREM) at 8.6%, information on halal standard criteria (HAL_STDCRIT) at 8.2%, brief information on halal roadshows (HAL_RDS) at 6% and information on halal technology (HAL_TECH) at 5%.

Below is the graph showing the distributions:




Figure 24. Thematic information on industrial halal governing, ranging from roles and responsibilities of HFCD and time/ date of roadshows to halal application and standard requirement

Despite the interesting distribution of general halal sub-themes and the linkages that HFCD made as part of their attempt to spread awareness and educate the public online, the information shared is, at best, uneven and, as mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter, with a gap of 4 years of hiatus where a limited amount of information was shared.

Under this sub-theme, information relating to halal certification processes was primarily made in 2013 and from 2017 onwards. Information on halal standard criteria was only mentioned once in 2012 and 2017; the highest was in 2018, with 17 coverage. Brief information on halal roadshows was also made on the page three times in 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2017, respectively, and eight times in 2018.

4.1.3 Multidimensional aspects of halal food postings: From general to technical knowledge on halal




Figure 25. Percentage of halal food-related themes shared online between 2011-2018

In terms of specific halal food-related themes, the total number of coverages extracted from seventy-seven (77) posts under the halal food (HAL_FOOD) category for eight

subthemes between 2011-2018 is at one hundred and ninety-seven (197). The top 3 ranking for these single themes can be seen as follows. Posts on 'questions on food' (QN_FOOD) cover 24.4% of the total information and knowledge shared at first, followed second by knowledge on ingredients at 20.3% and third shared by both subthemes on 'halal food safety and security' (hereafter SAF_N_SEC) and on halal food hygiene and sanitation or Tayyiban (hereafter TAYY) each at 15.7% respectively. The subtheme coded as 'halal definition' (HAL_DEF) comes in fourth at 12.7%, followed by 'Syubhah advisories' (SYUB_ADV) in fifth at 5.6%. The bottom three for the halal food subthemes were 'halal food alerts' (hereafter ALRT) at 4.1%, postings on 'religious compliance' (hereafter COMP_RELG) in seventh at 1% and 'questions on product recalls' (REC) at 0.5%. Detailed discussions on this chart are as follows.

Thematic analyses on specific postings related to halal food subthemes showed interesting patterns of information sharing, in which both general and technical knowledge were shared concomitantly throughout these eight-year posts, among other themes. The details of shared information types have yet to be discussed in depth. Apart from categorising information and identifying multiple themes in each post, the shared details of posts are vital to determining the effectiveness of such information and knowledge in creating a halal industrial code of conduct, which will be addressed in the later chapters. Since some of this information can, directly and indirectly, be linked to some of the general Brunei halal standard requirements postings mentioned in Figure 8, it is reorganised into five subcategories based on its scopes. Subcategory one (1) is on religion and information on halal, followed by subcategory two (2) on the status of halal food in the market. This

is followed by a third subcategory on halal processing, specifically on four technical components such as disease, using additives and gelatines, cleanliness, and cleansing rituals. The fourth subcategory touches upon government technical advisories and procedures (Procedural), and the fifth (others) relates to general information on halal, exchanges between the government and the public over certain food products, viral posts and public opinions of halal status of restaurants, listed, under HFCD's annual listings, among other themes.




Figure 26. Five subcategories of halal food knowledge

Based on the pie chart above, most of the posts on halal food were concerned with the halal status of current food available in the Brunei home market, covering 40% of the total posts on halal food, followed by information on technical aspects of food and halal at 22%. General postings on religion (not limited to Islam) and its relationship with halal were at 16%, followed by other miscellaneous postings categorised as 'others' at 12%. There has also been sharing of some information on halal jurisdictions and roles and responsibilities

of agencies related to halal certification within the halal food postings, covering 10% of the 77 posts posted online.

a) Halal Food Posts: Religion and Halal

Findings from a more profound analysis of these five subcategories show that 21 subthemes can be identified. The subthemes from the first subcategory on religion and halal cover five main aspects, ranging from information on slaughtering and allowable food to be consumed to the recital of prayers during and after slaughtering to divine prohibitions, health benefits, and similarities (differences) with Kosher.




Figure 27. Posts content on halal food, religious prohibitions, commandments, and rituals

While the latter section on Islamic constitutions, the Quran, and Prophetic sayings will touch on their specific use in creating the halal code of conduct (see the last subsection of the chapter), this subsection will specifically look at how religion and halal, in general

as well as the ensuing debates surrounding it, is used as part of halal governmentality, as a way of managing people/ communities at a distance. This instance examines HFCD's themes in managing the halal industry and business communities. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to look at the actual content of each of these individual posts. However, some samples will be taken selectively to give insights into how the government governs the public using information specific to halal food. This will also be used to address the questions on the effectiveness of how they are governed in the latter part of the thesis.

Analyses from this subcategory show that during the earlier years of HFCD halal industrial governing, most of the information (8 out of 18 posts mainly on SLAUGH) shared between 2011 and 2012 relates to advisories on prohibition and public refrainment from consuming dubious and slaughtered meat that did not follow Islamic procedures (2), similarities and differences between Jewish Kosher and halal (2), on animals that are not halal to be consumed regardless slaughtered in the Islamic way or not (1), debates and justification on why the need to consume halal (1), on debates surrounding slaughtering as inhumane (1) and specifically on consuming burnt bone free sugar from animals slaughtered non-Islamically (1). Between 2013 and 2015, postings on SLAUGH (4 out of 18) also covered debates surrounding Islamic slaughtering in terms of its health benefits and relation to animal welfare (2) as well as on halal status of meat (1) and other products sold in the country with some have been raised previously in 2012 (1). The trends on information shared changed in 2017 when HFCD started to share more details on the specific industrial requirements for halal, which stems from the relinquishment of halal permits for certain food processing premises and restaurants which utilise dubious ingredients and

serve non-halal food on their premises (1). Four of the remaining posts shared in 2018 investigated the need for halalness (mainly on SLAUGH), halal maintenance and cleanliness as part of the entrepreneurial course (1), on GMP and GHP for halal regulators and auditors (2) and SLAUGH concerning additives (1).

Further investigation of the other four subthemes in this subsection revealed that each has relations to or linkages with the main postings on SLAUGH. For example, all four postings on BSM_REC (reciting the name of God), which occurred from 2011-2013 (3) and once in 2018, are linked to slaughtering posts. Whilst the recital of prayer before slaughtering falls under the religious aspect of processing, it is also treated as part of the technical requirement, as seen in the Brunei Halal Meat Act of 1999 and BCG 1 of 2008. Similarly, HFCDs' posts on the ten (10) divine prohibitions, religion, and halal in general show that six were linked to SLAUGH subtheme as well, whilst the remaining four (4) contained information linked to other subthemes such as SYUB_ADV under Food Market (Consumption) and Halal Processing subcategories. 6 out of the 18 postings on SLAUGH also relates to questions surrounding the health benefits (HEAL-BENE) of animals slaughtered Islamically with only one which talks explicitly about health benefits of giving up canned or soda drinks. All remaining five posts are also linked closely to postings on the justification for consuming halal (1), on additives, its benefits (concerning the nutritional importance of processed food), uses (based on its function as preservatives), and the agency responsible for monitoring its usage (1) and two (2) relate to the information on GMP and GHP for halal auditors and regulators.

Based on the trends and contents of the posts found in this subcategory, it can be argued that the postings shared during the years 2011-2013 were more leaned towards defining halal based on the Islamic jurisprudence and understanding the justification surrounding halal within Islamic teachings as well as in contrast to other religion, particularly to Jewish Kosher. Such sharing of the similarities and differences between Halal and Kosher stems from the religious knowledge that Muslims could consume meat slaughter by communities categorised as People of the Book or Scriptures (stated in the Holy Quran), of which the Jews were part, in an event where halal meat was not made available. Further investigation of the category also reveals that the information and knowledge shared mainly fall in line with conventional religious knowledge on halal, which usually are derived from Islamic religious schoolings in Brunei throughout all stages of socialisation, from primary to secondary education, part of everyday halal definition as argued by Graf (2016) (cited in Bergeuad-Blackler et al., 2016) but not those of industrial halal. These details will be reflected in the latter subsection on technicalities of food and halal. However, it can be concluded that the analysis in this subsection has transformed from sharing purely religious-centric information typologies only to including technical information types relating to halal food and industrial processing. This trend can be found throughout the following three subsections. It would be interesting to see how it affects the food businesses and industry.

b) Halal Food Posts: Halal food question in Brunei's domestic market

The second subcategory has eight main subthemes identified, which cover aspects relating to food components specifically such as sauces, doubt advisories, dairy, product expiration, ingredients sold and distributed locally, the origin of products, alcohol contamination, usage, and rulings, as well as price related aspects of halal food products. There was an attempt to distinguish the people who made such posts. However, due to the utilisation of privacy data filters, fake names, and digital avatars, making clear-cut distinctions and categorisations is impossible for otherwise meaningful insights. Between 2011 and 2018, questions related to dubious food advisories were at 33, followed by ingredients at 24, Dairy-related and Origin of food at 12, Alcohol at 9, Sauces at 8, and Price and Expiration at one each, respectively.




Figure 28. Questions raised on food sold domestically

For ease of analysis, the findings for this subsection will only touch the top three subthemes covered between 2011 and 2018. Under this subsection, the subthemes on SYUB_ADV were the central theme that the postings touched on, with 33 total postings.

Eleven of the postings contain information linked to the previous subcategory on SLAUGH (8) and DIV-PROHB (3). The remaining twenty-two (22) postings posted between 2012 and 2015 covered aspects or questions on food raised by the public relating to the halalness of the products sold in the domestic market (13), particularly those produced by Multinational Corporations (MNCs) based on its content of ingredients. This involved the dubious questions over MNC products such as the Golden Churn Butter produced in New Zealand and Australia, Magnum Ice Cream, and Maggie instant noodles produced by Nestle, Oreo and Jacobs crackers products by Mondelez International's Nabisco, HP Sauce by Heinz and Kellogg's Pringles Potato crisps. Other regionally produced products that were raised for doubtful ingredients were the Bengawan Solo Crackers of Singapore, Bin Bin Rice Crackers of Thailand's Namchow Ltd, Narcissus's canned Lychee of COFCO Ltd, China, as well as cosmetic products such as Dove Shampoo produced by Unilever. Seven (7) particularly touched on the lists of restaurants that have been certified and those that have their halal certificates relinquished. The remaining two (2) covered the aspects of public responsibilities to ensure that the food they consumed was as halal as mentioned from 2017 onwards.

For the second highest subthemes on 'ingredients' (ING) with twenty-four (24) contents, a majority of it is linked closely to SYUB_ADV with fourteen (14) content linkages, all related to questions over halalness of food consumed and sold on the market (10), which is also linked to ALCO (1) and ORIGIN (3), followed by linked to SLAUGH at six (6), two (2) on divine punishments (DIV_PROHB) and one each for dairy-related ingredients (DAIRY) and products expiry (EXP) respectively.

The public raised an important aspect under the ING subtheme: the halalness of meat slaughtered. The public touched upon the halal assurance and confidence over the already issued Brunei halal certificate and permit, particularly on processing and distribution facilities, shops and premises that bore non-Muslim names. This can be found in six (6) out of 24 posts in this subtheme. A look into the question over the product brand names raised as suspicious or dubious also seems to suggest a similar trend even though some of these MNCs and regional food producers did manage to acquire halal certification, especially those that relocated their production in Islamic countries like Malaysia (halal permit issued under JAKIM) and Indonesia (halal issued by MUI) or in countries whose halal certification had global recognition such as Singapore's Islamic Religious Council (MUIS). From the public standpoint, it can be argued that there seems to be a lack of knowledge, understanding and trust in the current Brunei halal certification programme. Public distrust of products imported outside, despite their availability locally after customs import clearances, also suggested issues surrounding halal assurances and certification of other countries. Another fascinating insight from trend analysis of the ING suggested that between 2012 and 2015, the same questions were found under the previous subtheme and subcategories, which revolved around the halalness of food with fourteen (14) questions. The remaining nine questions on food from 2017 onwards were mostly comprised of public reminders (2), reposts on food which went viral or questioned by the public since 2011, lists of halal premises (1), unanswered food product questions (2), relinquishment of certificate (2), on used of halal additives (1) and on questions over 'failed' or lack of monitoring (1) which resulted in operation of Muslim name restaurant

which served pork-related products. It would be interesting to see the perspectives of the food processing sector on these issues of standardisation and halal industrial code of conduct, as most of the ingredients used would usually be channelled or supplied by both local and regional/ international supply chains. This will be discussed further in the subsequent thesis chapter on the effects of halal certification on businesses.

As for the third subtheme, the questions on the halalness of food revolve around dairy-related products (DAIRY), with six linked to the SYUB_ADV and three to SLAUGH. The only single linked code on DAIRY that does not overlap with other previous subcategories was where food producers could obtain halal bakery products and ingredients (DAIRY-ING) addressed specifically to HFCD. However, such a question garners no response from the relevant agencies. Similarly, the other 12 under the Origin of Food (ORIGIN) subcategory are also linked closely to SLAUGH with five questions, five concerning SYUB_ADV, one on ING and another one about product expiration.

Public halal food questions and commentaries show the existence of liberal and religious accommodation towards one's concern over one's religiosity. A population that is proactive in meeting and safeguarding their religious dietary needs whilst being wary of the halalness of food produced beyond its borders indicates that a near identity was successfully constructed. This helps the State achieve the convenient end it desires by safeguarding halal food consumption to protect the Ummah's religious diet. However, whether similar near identity and shared collective vision have materialised among local agrifood businesses/ manufacturers requires further investigation.

c) Technicalities of food and halal: more than just food

Analysis of the subcategory on food technicalities and halal found four main subthemes covered with fifty-four counts. Twenty-one (21) of these were on additives (ADDIT), followed by a subtheme on Gelatines (GELAT) at sixteen (16), Cleansing (CLEANSE) at eleven (11) and on diseases ((DISEASES) at six (6). For the eight-year period, 2011 and 2016 marked no mention of the technical aspect of food. The year 2018 marked the most counts in four subthemes with 20 counts, followed by 2012 with eighteen (18) in total, 2015 with eight (8) in two subthemes, three (3) in two subthemes for both 2013 and 2017, respectively and two (2) in 2014. Below is the chart showing the trends mentioned:




Figure 29. Food technicalities shared between 2011 and 2018

Findings from the content of these posts suggested that between 2012 and 2013, the majority of the content about the ADDIT subtheme was mainly focused on questions

concerning the additives used in some products sold domestically in three postings linked to SLAUGH and SYUBH_ADV under previous subsections. The first 2012 post on ADDIT briefly describes what additives encompassed and the provisions of the definition of halal and incorporates information on the role of HFCD in halalisation. This is followed by another post on ADDIT covering specifically what additives are, their origin and their usage in food processing, with no direct linkages to halal but only with the use of gelatine (ADDIT-GELAT). An interesting development about ADDIT occurred within the next four years, ending in 2015, when this exact post was reposted five times on HFCD's halal.bn page. A website link concerning additives was also shared with the public and businesses in 2012, but this only occurred once. No other information was shared apart from the SYUBH_ADV-related posts initially mentioned. The year 2018 marked a new watershed about postings on additives as other than incorporating earlier information shared based on reposts, HFCD tried to provide new information on additives with a direct link to halal by mentioning the details behind the origin of each emulsifier codes and where it stands about halal food processing and production. The same post also mentioned specifically the agencies responsible for monitoring its usage, in this case within the purview of the Ministry of Health Laboratory Services as stated under the Public Health (Food) Act in collaboration with HFCD as the central halal managing agency. As for the GELAT subtheme, it is directly linked with the other posts relating to ADDIT-GELAT on SYUBH_ADV as well as on SLAUGH. The only specific posting on GELAT was made in 2012, focusing on how it was manufactured. However, like ADDIT, no direct linkages exist between halal and Brunei Halal Certification requirements previously stated.

On the technical component of cleansing, cleanliness, and sanitation (CLEANSE), the only post by HFCD that touched on CLEANSE in 2012 was on the sharing of photos or images online on how Islamic cleansing rituals of previously used utensils used to serve non-halal food were made and the cleansing technologies used to sanitise it. Other than the image, the only post that mentioned this subtheme linked to SYUB_ADV was the post in 2012 when a viral post emerged online on two premises: a Japanese restaurant that also processed food and a Chinese restaurant that produced bakery products. Based on the viral post, both premises operated on limited licenses usually issued only to non-halal businesses serving non-Muslim consumers. Other than the public questions over their halal status since both served Muslim consumers, an interesting aspect related to CLEANSE was HFCD's emphasis on their responsibilities to ensure halal religious cleansing was carried out since both either have already applied or are in the process of halal certifying. The CLEANSE subtheme only started to gain much more attention in 2018, with ten (10) postings linking to SLAUGH (5) and DISEASE (1). The remaining two (2) are linked to the production and processing environment (ENVT) and two (2) to Others (OTH), which will be discussed under the following subsection. As for the DISEASES subtheme, four (4) out of the six postings were also linked to SLAUGH with the prohibition of swine consumption (1), slaughtering as inhumane (1) (see previous subsection) and the importance of GMP and GHP (2) as part of the maintenance of product quality, disease prevention and clean environment. Whilst another post relates closely to the use of additives, the last two posts on DISEASES in 2018 touched on the aspect of Brunei Halal Certification requirement, specifically on the requirement of having a separate kitchen for food production and processing purposes which is encouraged for home-

based businesses but not compulsory. Besides the need for separate kitchens, HFCD also mentioned the need to fence the production facilities to protect against animals. This clause was part of GMP and HACCP standardisation but not under BCG 1. No specific mention of protection of facilities using fences against animals, both strays and domesticated, was mentioned in the current Brunei halal certification guidelines (hereafter BCGs).

In conclusion, subsection 4.1.3 best summarises the following: First, in HFCD's search on finding the best-reasoned way of halal governing, particularly in determining the type of knowledge to be used towards halalisation, the postings on food have highlighted the utilisation of religious knowledge, technical halal requirements as well as public correspondences and critical assessments over food to shape the desired code of conduct. This subsection highlights the technical knowledge used in the Brunei halal standard derived from religious and conventional food standards, adapted, contextualised, and decided upon based on what the standard setters deem helpful or appropriate. Their ability to dictate while conducting field audits and managing halal administratively highlights the importance of experts' power-knowledge positionalities in determining governing outcomes. While its effects on the governed will be mentioned in the next chapter, the following subsection will discuss further the technical aspects of food as a form of industrial knowledge used towards halalisation. This is imperative if transformations into technically endowed, well-informed and knowledgeable halalised industrial actors are to be achieved. Furthermore, these multiple rationalities in Brunei's halal industrial governing are a testament to the hybridity of current halal certification

governing, leading to the creation of multiple governing apparatuses that affect the growth of halal businesses, as seen in the following chapter.

4.1.4 Discussions on technicalities of food and industrial halal

While HFCD's posts were mainly geared towards halalisation, some technical aspects, particularly those concerning halal additives and preservatives, were only made explicit by the halal governors in their 2018 post. The technical postings between 2012 and 2015 were focused on defining ingredients such as additives and gelatines, describing their content, how they were formed or derived from their origin, and what they represented based on conventional food standards' alphabetical/ numerical codes. The earlier posts before 2018 were primarily geared towards sharing conventional industrial information concerning ingredients used in food processing, of which a similar trend can also be found under the previous subsection on ingredients used in current food products available in the local market. Ironically, a look into the certification guideline 1 (BCG1) shows that there are no clear listings on which additives or ingredients can or should be used for production or processing purposes apart from a clause that only states the need for ingredients to be used are from halal sources and not contaminated.

The existing certification guidelines do not mention several technical aspects shared on the FB page. For instance, analysis of the trends on the CLEANSE subtheme showed that the links to the technical component of industrial production hygiene, cleanliness and sanitation following the Halalan Tayyiban principles were only made in 2018 despite its

general mentioning in BCG 1 of 2007 under the guise of GMP. The first post on CLEANSE was about the religious cleansing ritual but only focused on sharing photos or images. However, 2018 showed the utilisation of GMP, HACCP and Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) industrial criteria as part of the Halalan Tayyiban principle. Other than the trends on the CLEANSE subtheme, a similar disconnect can also be seen between BCG 1 and information shared online. In the last post of 2018, under the DISEASES subtheme, HFCD stated that having a separate kitchen is unnecessary, although it is encouraged. Under BCG 1, there is no mention of a separate kitchen for production. The only reference concerning the processing and production activities and the space in which it was to be conducted can be found under section 7 of BCG 1, particularly from sections 7.4 to 7.9. However, this was only explicitly tied to the need for careful handling of materials, from raw to final product production to logistics, against possible non-halal contamination resulting from poor handling and negligence of in-place hygiene and sanitation procedures, apart from the need to be Sharia compliant. Based on interviews with HFCD technical officers, the requirement for a separate kitchen existed under a different 'terms and conditions' document that HFCD put forward to applicants when they applied for a permit and certification. The existence of such technical documents apart from other guideline or standardisation documents such as the PBD24:2007, PBD25:2016, and PBD30:2016 among the other three BCGs (BCG 2, 3 and 4) as well as compliance to GMP as mentioned in BCG 1, will undoubtedly have an impact upon food processing businesses and the industry in which they operate. Rather than providing answers to an already complex affair, more questions tend to emerge, which revolve along the following lines - 'What is tayyiban in its industrial halal sense? Is

it based on sharia? Is it an extension of other industrial processing hygiene and sanitation requirements, or is it a new emergent resulting from adapting multiple components from various industrial certifications or standards (Halal Plus)? What are the reasons behind such linkages to other globally recognised industrial standards and certification?'. Regardless of the answer, the findings from these postings show the use of Islamic religious knowledge and contemporary industrial standards as part of halal governing. Both were used as a way of disciplining, surveillance and monitoring that combined the political rationalities found in religious, industrial and neo-liberal governing. Though it would be interesting to understand the reasons behind such dynamism, assessing the effects of such overprescription of guidelines and standardisation documents on business growth and development over the years will also be of interest. The Brunei Halal Meat Act (183) 1998, with its basic halal slaughtering technical information to HCHLO of 2005 and the creation of the BCGs, proved the use of diverse knowledge and thoughts in Brunei halal's standard settings exercises as part of the everchanging halalisation rationalities. Within the FB postings, some sense of governmental reflexivity is also at the works throughout the eight years, specifically on only sharing general information on ADDIT, GELAT and CLEANSE to a more technical, halal-linked information that could benefit food producers and businesses in the long run. Such reflexivity on information typologies, a move from pragmatism to more objective halal-related themes, can also reflect what has been or is currently unfolding within Brunei's halal food industry. However, can the same phenomenon unfold in the actual surveillance and auditing practice compared to when it is used within the digital, information-driven space? This will be discussed in the

next chapter based on the experiences of businesses that have undergone or are currently undergoing certification.

4.1.5 Summation of critical arguments for these subsections

Analysis of the patterns shows the effort made during the earlier years of halal.bn page mainly was concentrated on disseminating information and creating awareness on halal and a few technical dimensions of which indirect relations were made on the halal standard requirement. Concerning halal food and issues arising on food, the first years of the online platform's utilisation show a much more responsive HFCD, particularly in answering public questions regarding questions surrounding food sold in local markets, in the issuance of prohibition or syubhah advisories as well as sharing of some technical information in the use of additives, alcohol or gelatine in food. However, the explanations given were sparse or in patches at best. It was only from 2017 onwards, specifically in 2018, that the technical requirements were explicitly linked to the Brunei halal standard requirement despite the lack of depth of information.

Similarly, information concerning the role of government agencies – HFCD and its sister agencies, which formed the technical halal committee – were only made available to the public in two years, eight times in 2012 and 13 times in 2018, with one each for 2013 and 2015. Due to the lack of information on their technical role in halal certification processes, it can be argued that this explains the aftereffects discussed in the upcoming chapter on rejections or failure of halal certification applications. Concerning the use of this online

platform, it can be seen how the Brunei government, particularly HFCD, had utilised this technology to disseminate information and readable content only, a characteristic of Web 1.0. Although there were exchanges, as discussed in the upcoming subheadings, the halal.bn page is mainly used as a space for governing, controlling, and censoring information deemed valid or vice versa. It is not a neutral space used by those who govern the halal industrial structure and agents within communities to exercise its legitimacy and logic. The following chapters will further back this claim by presenting evidence suggesting such tendencies.

4.2 The intended ‘halal’ subject: Rationalising halal identity formation

To rationalise halal and attain the aspirations of developing the industry, it is imperative to know to whom the halal governing is geared, coupled with how to create a collective sense over the halal certification initiatives. To do so, the role of power knowledge is central to its formation. Targeting the relevant group could help governors nurture the sense of having shared politico-economic objectives while maintaining the ‘order of things’ despite the diverging dispositions that might exist within the target groups. Analysis of the total 462 posts on HFCD’s Facebook page found four categories of halal subjects that both the ruler and his government aimed to condition, as shown in the chart below:




Figure 30. Governmental targets or actors in Brunei halal governing exercises

The first group are the ‘subjects’, extracted from the ‘Ruler-to-subjects’ (R2S) posts marked by information that addresses calls by the Sultan towards His subjects relating to halal transformation and adherence mentioned previously under section 4.0. There was a total of 14 posts regarding the R2S category. This is followed by the second group from the bottom, identified as the ‘government’, which refers to other government agencies that become part of the political arms of the state that make governing possible. This group, labelled G2G, had 38 posts throughout the eight years. Like R2S, the G2G postings are not as much or are almost redundant between 2011 and 2017, with numbers less than four annually and zero at times. It was only in 2018 that the numbers increased drastically to 33 for the G2G group and 10 for the R2S. The sudden increase might be due to the change to the compulsory requirement for all-over halal certification in 2017, which prompted the boost in socialising the halal certification and related requirements.

The royal decrees under the R2S mentioned previously helped legitimise the compulsory nature of the certification further. This is due to the absoluteness of the decree and the cultural attributes of the Bruneian subjects being in full compliance, whose allegiance and loyalty to their leaders or those in power should be unquestioned, providing those in power or authority did not commit tyranny or being oppressive. This is based on the Islamic teachings on the relationships between the governor and the governed mentioned under the Islamic governance section in Chapter 2.

Interestingly, the third target group of the halal posts with the second highest number is the 'businesses', which have 129 posts in total. Labelled as the G2B group, this group is one of the critical economic actors that is targeted towards halal certification. Unlike R2S and G2G groups, the patterns of information shared with G2B fluctuate with a higher number of posts in 2012 (23), 2015 (16), 2017 (13) and 2018 (64). These fluctuations can be attributed to the compulsory halal certification for food businesses that occurred well at the end of 2011 as they renewed their miscellaneous business licenses, hence the uptick in 2012. Similarly, this can be the case with the postings in 2017 and 2018 due to the compulsory implementation of halal for all businesses in 2017. As for the 'citizens' group labelled as G2C, 281 posts were shared during the study period with similar patterns to those found in the G2B group. The postings fluctuated with a higher number in year 2012 (88), declining slightly for years 2013 (20), 2015 (15), and 2017 (18), before increasing drastically in 2018 (122). The graph undoubtedly shows the diversity of actors that the State identified as fundamental towards the halal standard governing, as it tried to exercise governing as best as possible.

The role of the G2G, also defined as intragovernmental aspects aimed towards halal identity formation, is crucial to signal this notion of being the same and being part of a much bigger government linked to holism as a driving force towards halalisation. Similarly, targeting businesses under the G2B is also part of the same strategy of internalising and integrating the role of this group in the halal socio-economic landscape by influencing and exerting the importance of these players in the halal economy as part of disciplining. This also stems from the fact that business is where most economic transactions occur. The idea of conditioning halal for the G2C is more intricate as it requires not only the sharing of a common halal industrial goal as part of reeling citizens in but also requires them to be more proactive, collaborative and cooperative in exercising their rights for the nation-state. Exercising halal governmentality towards these groups requires certain governing technologies for it to materialise, and hence, the following subsection will tackle the governing apparatus used towards halal governmentality. Investigation on its effects towards business growth and the effectiveness of these mechanisms, on the other hand, will be mentioned in the next chapter.

4.3 From information sharing and political legitimacy into actual halal industrial governing (translating visions into practice)

SRQ 2 – What are the governing strategies used by the HFCD towards achieving an overall halal code of conduct?

To achieve the rationalities behind the halalisation of the food industry, it is imperative to identify the governing technologies and tools used by the standard-setters to achieve halal conduct. This section will address the second research question (SRQ 2). As part of dissecting the technologies of governing, particularly those involving the socialisation of halal knowledge, sharing, and its co-creation, the diagram below is constructed as a result. This is done by identifying the initiatives HFCD carried out in governing halal based on their FB reporting and the target groups identified as part of these socialisation processes. This has implications towards near identity creation between the governor and the governed and among the halal governors. The AOG framework helps analyse halal governmentalities and a sense of halal collectivism. This notion implies the existence of halal-aware and proactive communities that are responsible for halal social and religious policing and surveillance. This study will focus on agrifood businesses, the effects of which will be addressed in the next chapter.




Figure 31. Trends and themes of workshops, talks and briefings held by HFCD towards specific groups between 2011-2018

As part of realising the Brunei Government's vision of a halal-comply food industry through utilising its state-backed halal standard, workshops, talks, and briefings conducted by the HFCD show an interesting development trend. Like other governing technologies, these programmes aim to increase halal awareness in the industry. Still, it is also hoped to assist in shaping the halal industrial code of conduct. During the study period, eighty-four (84) halal workshops, briefings and talks were carried out targeting various groups, namely the public and industry in general. The nature of these workshops is short in terms of duration, of which the majority of the workshops last at most half a day or at least two hours for each session whilst some can last up to 14 months, such as the programme ran for auditor groups which will be discussed later. The patterns on the intensity or frequencies of the workshops also vary within the 8-year period, where eleven

(11) of these workshops/ briefings were carried out in 2012 whilst only six (6) were organised in 2013. No programmes were organised between 2014 and 2017, confirming the major trend in other subthemes on halal governing based on the FB posts. 2018 shows a significant increase in activities, of which all programmes totalled sixty-seven (67) throughout the year. The absence of FB reporting programmes between 2014 and 2017 may not reflect what happens elsewhere.

In terms of the general trend on themes shared within these workshops, there are ten (10) subthemes generated for the workshop theme, which cover subthemes such as Public (PUB) that touch on workshops or talks for the Public, Industry (GEN) for those workshops organised for the industry in general, Production (SV) which specifically intended for halal supervisors supervising manufacturing or processing whilst the code (PROC) is meant for workshops or talks specifically for production and processing in general. Two categories were created for workshops targeted at educating the public and administrators in general, coded as Education (ADM) and Education, which excludes halal supervisors (PUB EXC SV). The categories of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are divided into two groups: NGO awareness (AWR) and NGO business consultations (BUSC). It should be noted that though the NGO category here refers to organisations that are not tied to the government, NGOs in Brunei liaise closely with the government by making joint collaborations, monitoring specific issues within their purview but also, at the same time, maintaining a degree of autonomy at the grassroots level. Hence, the governing concerning this mutual collaboration will later be coded as G2G plus (G2G+) in the cross upcoming cross-sectional analyses of the details of the

workshops or programmes. There are also categories on Application (APP) and HFCD's roles and responsibilities (ROL-RESP). Before going into the cross-sectional analyses of the workshops based on their content, targeted communities, and related agencies, there is a need to investigate the general pattern based on the ten subthemes or subcategories mentioned in this paragraph. The researcher would also like to note that the numbers represent the frequencies of each subtheme mentioned in all 84 workshops.

For the subtheme on PUB, thirty-four (34) workshops are meant for the public, of which two (2) were carried out in 2012, four (4) in 2013 and twenty-eight (28) in 2018. Workshops on the industry in general (GEN) have four (4) workshops or talks organised in 2013, whilst the other thirty-one (31) were carried out in 2018, bringing a total of thirty-five (35) altogether. Regarding halal supervision workshops (SV), one (1) workshop was organised in 2012, whilst the other eighteen (18) workshops were organised in 2018, bringing a total of nineteen (19) supervision workshops throughout the years. Workshops or talks related to PROC numbered twenty-six (26) in total, of which one (1) was organised in 2012, whilst the other twenty-five (25) were carried out in 2018. Education for administrators (ADM) was organised on seven different occasions, of which four (4) were carried out in 2012 and another seven (7) in 2018. In contrast, programmes related to public education (PUB EXC SV) which exclude halal supervisors totalled forty-nine (49) altogether, of which five (5) were organised in 2012, another five (5) in 2013 and the other thirty-nine (39) organised in 2018. As for awareness programmes for NGOs (AWR), there were four (4) organised in total, of which one (1) was carried out in 2012, whilst the other three (3) were organised in 2018. As for NGO's business consultation (BUSC), eight

workshops or briefings were conducted only in 2018. As for workshops or talks on halal application, there are a total of twenty-three (23) organised throughout the 8-year period, of which five (5) were carried out in 2013, whilst the remaining eighteen (18) were organised in 2018. Talks or briefings on the role and responsibilities of HFCD totalled twenty-nine (29), of which two (2) were carried out in 2012, five (5) in 2013 and twenty-two (22) in 2018, respectively.

If we are to arrange it in order of frequencies, the category on (PUB EXC SV) came 1st with forty-nine (49) educational workshops, followed by general workshops, on halal related industry (GEN) at 2nd with thirty-five (35), PUB at 3rd with thirty-four (34), HFCD's ROL-RESP came in at 4th with twenty-nine (29), general talks on production and processing (PROC) at 5th with twenty-six (26), on halal certification application (APP) at 6th with twenty-three (23) talks or workshops, halal supervision (SV) at 7th with nineteen (19), education for government administrators (ADM) at 8th with eleven (11) programmes and both NGO's awareness (AWR) and business consultation (BUSC) at 9th and 10th with a total of eight (8) and four (4) workshops carried out respectively.

4.3.1 Discussions on halal workshops/ talks as a tool towards halal industrial code of conduct

It has been mentioned earlier that the governing technologies used are mainly aimed at creating halal conduct of conduct through the socialisation of halal among the industrial players. The use of expert knowledge in standard-setting activities and its sharing via

physical platforms publicly showed the strong commitment and direct or hands-on approach undertaken by HFCD as best as possible. The synergies between the typologies of information shared with the diverse groups online and the physical educational and socialisation processes conducted by HFCD, and its sister agencies showed their aspiration and commitment towards governing the best-reasoned way possible to avoid governing pitfalls, i.e. to not govern like that.

Based on the analysis of the workshop and talks analysed above, HFCD has carried out its role as the regulator and enforcer of Brunei halal certification. Nevertheless, HFCD is also responsible for empowering and enhancing the public through various programmes, cutting across diverse groups from those involved directly with businesses and the halal industry to those involved within academia and other government agencies.

Despite the few amounts of training and workshops being organised for the auditors (AUD), the creation of lengthier training programmes locally in 2011, such as HFCD's 14 longed months auditors training programme with the Islamic Da'wah Centre (IDC) and the training camps organised by international halal auditing consultant Al-Sahl International proved the desire of the Brunei halal certifiers to improve their competencies and capabilities via knowledge sharing and transfer as well as technical skills development. The training organised for the certifiers by the Police Crime Scene Unit (PCSU) was also aimed at improving the technical aspect of evidence collecting and prevention of suspected tampering of 'doubtful' halal processing/ materials in 2011 and their training on GMP and GHP in 2018 are evidence that suggests the seriousness of

the government in enhancing and empowering its workforce. The increase in G2G collaborations towards Brunei halal certification and halal law surrounding it through technical slaughtering programmes, the close cooperation with the Attorney's General Chambers (AGC) and Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) with emphasis on law awareness, peace, stability and trust development particularly in 2018 roadshows is linked closely to Sultan's call towards the need to maintain peace and increase public cooperation towards responsible halal development (see previous subheadings on Monarchy for details). The only explanation why such calls for public and government cooperation were made part of the subject in the halal workshop relates to the existence of distrust or grievances following the amendment made to the 2017 halal certificate and food label order, which made halal certification compulsory for all businesses.

The constant training and enhancement of existing halal supervisors (SV) of already halal-certified premises by the auditors in the forms of 23 workshops, coupled with its co-relationship with the eight other programs designed for enterprises under the halal certification briefings and talks for enterprises, show an increase in the drive to ensure enterprises to be well-rounded in their competencies and capabilities towards halal certification. The increase in 2018 was also marked by a four-year hiatus of such programme deliverables between 2013-2017. The change in pattern coincided with the amendments to the halal certificate and food label order of 2005 in 2017, with the introduction of a new scope of halal, going beyond food to include all products used and consumed by the public, including medical and cosmetics. Apart from the supervision enhancement programmes, the increase in HFCD – educational institutions partnership

(EDU code) also shows the recognition of the need to educate the public, particularly the younger generation, on the halal certificate and initiatives the government is embarking on. Based on the analysis of the five EDU-SCH talks they organised in 2018, eight primary schools, seven of which are located within or in the suburbs of BSB whilst one on the east end of Brunei-Muara District, were involved as part of increasing awareness and on the role of HFCD as a regulatory and enforcement department, on halal food and importance of hygiene and sanitation within two hours per session. Some of these institutions, i.e. one secondary school (Temburong Arabic) and one technical education (Wasan Agrotechnology School), also had hands-on experiences with activities involving real live animals under the slaughtering programmes (SLAUGH) as part of developing the technical dimension of halalising meat. The need to create such a sense of shared collective aims and visions via educating the students and enterprises is essential towards creating the halal code of conduct to directly or indirectly control or limit the field of action the governed practised and experienced daily.

In a way, such programmes aimed at the identification of government directions and the inclusion of halal visions into these programmes are a part of the political process, which inevitably leads to the following governing rationality. Through the problematisation of the problem under the banner of industries 'need to be halal', through the 'fulfilment of requirement under halal certification' as well as by understanding the rationale behind halal through 'halal food concept' workshops and lastly, with the sharing of 'technical know-hows' towards diverse actors, in this case, other government agencies, schools and educational institutions, businesses as well as regional partners, allows for the movement

towards halalisation possible. When it comes to regional networking, local universities like UNISSA maintain partnerships as part of their Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). These partnerships are used as part of general government measurements on workers' performance, enhancement, and regional or world ranking requirements through visits, talks, and conference organisations. Their role as human resource suppliers, particularly from their halal science degree program, puts them in the spotlight as one of the key players in halal institutionalisation. Based on the international linkages with Osaka University of Japan, Malaysian Science University, Australia's Queensland University, Thailand's Thammasat, Chulalongkorn Universities, as well as Halal Institute of Thailand and Central Islamic Council, these educational partnerships show how diverse the players are and how far-reaching the interest concerning halal is beyond Brunei. These linkages and networking help legitimise the standing and prestige of Brunei halal certification further within and beyond national boundaries. It creates a brand image by considering the heavy emphasis on regional and international networking within the educational institutions over Brunei halal standards. It connects the local halal certification at the international level as part of a marketing stunt. However, it also has a role in strengthening the foothold of Brunei's halal standard among its regional partners as a potential option compared to other regional halal standards. All these processes, occurring at multiple depths and scales, can be considered as part of the 'governmentalised' processes that Foucault is referring to, part of the ensembles which help create governmentality(ies), in this case, at different geographical levels of government, from local (national), regional to global. The role of HFCD as a choice for industrial placement and learning centres for universities and higher educational institutions at a national level also shows the centrality

of HFCD beyond regulating and monitoring halal only. Such a value-adding role is vital in educating and nurturing confidence in Brunei's certification programme as part of its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). It helps centralise further the halal certification initiatives made by the Brunei Government.

The final analysis of the intensity of G2G, G2C and G2B of halal certification linkages and relationships over workshops and other enhancement programmes can be seen in the diagram below, which shows both the inward and outward orientation of the linkages based on the numbers of programmes organised for different groups. The intensity of linkages was made based on the FB postings. This halalisation process is part of the statification processes of the government, centralising a certain degree of power and authority over a central agency (in this case, HFCD) responsible for controlling one dimension of industrial development (in this case, standardisation). The move towards standardisation through creating a particular code of conduct of specific criteria is vital for harmonising the industry. In the case of HFCD, one particular halalisation dimension is still decentralised at the entrepreneurial level regarding SOPs handling in manufacturing. However, it still falls within the framework of government requirements. In this instance, the government maintains absolute power and control over essential state functions regarding decision-making, approvals, and support.




Figure 32. Intensity of Government, Private and Public interlinkages and relationships via workshops, enrichment and training programmes oriented towards internal and external HFCD

Based on the above diagram, HFCD acts not only as the main feeder on halal certification and related processes, but it also receives enhancement from other agencies through training and internalisation as part of their capacity/ competency development based on FB postings. There are 82 interlinkages between HFCD and other institutions, of which 11 are inward and 71 outwards. A breakdown of these are as follows. As indicated in the red arrow, the internal training and enhancement are tallied at 11, with 10 occurring at the inter-agency or ministerial level (8 within government and 2 with a GLC and domestic firm), whilst 1 with international auditing firm assistance. This completes the inward assistance that HFCD had as part of its competency and capacity building. As part of halal socialisation and educational exercises, HFCD, as the specialists or standard-setters, carried out 27 training exercises with domestic government agencies, including educational institutions (16) and other ministries (11), such as the army, attorney chambers, and MCYS, to name a few. G2C was at 9, with eight workshops and talks targeted at the public and one NGO. G2B was at 22, with 20 in the form of local talks or workshops and two as invitations from businesses. Five linkages were made with GLCs, 1 with DARE and 4 with Brunei Shell Joint Venture (BSJV). For regional linkages with supranational institutions, there is a total of eight outward linkages.

HFCD's whole-encompassing role in institutionalising halal is acting as the mediator and as the key informant, regulator, enforcer, and technical halal specialist. Although their role

is legitimate and authoritative by law, new critical questions arise about the unevenness in and effectiveness of halal governing. For instance, although programmes, workshops, roadshows and clinics were being held targeting the various groups previously mentioned throughout eight years (2011-2018), there is hardly any mention of halal supervision and enhancement programmes which targeted specifically businesses that have not been halal certified. The 20 enhancement programmes/ workshops linked to local companies based on the diagram were meant only for businesses that have undergone and successfully obtained halal permits/certifications. It begs the question, 'Why is this the case?' and 'What about firms planning to be halal certified?'. A similar question was raised concerning halal talks designed for primary school students. 'How well-versed or intellectually mature are these students?' 'Will they be able to understand talks on halal certificates and the role of HFCD at the primary educational level?'. 'How relevant are the topics covered for students at this level?'.

Although there exist workshops and briefings which deal with technical requirements and training over the Brunei halal standard, such as auditors training both locally and internationally, talks on hygiene and sanitation, in-depth technical requirements workshops for businesses, especially the 'not yet halal' certified business communities, are almost non-existence. For instance, regarding the certifiers and auditors' knowledge enhancement programme with industrial standards such as GMP/ GHP, why are no such programmes organised for halal and non-halal-certified businesses? Logically, such programmes will benefit businesses that aim to grow, yet they were only targeted at regulators and certifiers. It asks whether such governing processes will result in the

desired knowledge transfer and trickling effects on businesses or the opposite. The fact that these programmes were only run for regulators as late as 2018 also raised the question of the reliability and accuracy of decisions made by halal certifiers in the absence of such technical programmes between late 2012 and mid-2018. The last enrichment programmes for auditors and certifiers were held in 2012 based on the online posts. According to Tampoi (2007), the halal auditing training programme was also organised in 2007, 2 years after the promulgation of the Brunei Halal Certificate and Food Label Order of 2005 following ISO19011. However, data from interviews in 2018, as discussed in the next chapter, showed changes in the structure of the halal agency human resources whereby workers' retirement and movement to other government agencies affect the efficiency and effectiveness of halal certification. The existence of such disconnects between workshops and training to whom it targeted, the hidden cost or charges being charged on 'citizens' and institutions for technical and educational training in the case of slaughtering and entrepreneurial programmes under Brunei-Shell's 'Livewire' programmes raised questions on the effectiveness of the programmes. Although the trend in 2018 shows an increase in the number of halal clinics organised for both the public and businesses respectively, the short duration of the clinics carried out, i.e. 2 hours on average per session, as well as the unknown nature of the topics being touched in the clinics, whether it touches on application 'how-to' only or it dealt with the technicality of certification, or vice versa, elevated further the question over the effectiveness of such initiatives. This will be touched on in the upcoming chapter based on business experiences.

4.4 HFCD's role in communicating information and on food-related questions: Beyond workshops

The year 2012 showed HFCD's proactiveness in answering eight public queries on food products believed to be tainted with dubious ingredients. The remaining eight for the same year covered topics already addressed previously (SLAUGH and DIV-PROHB). One post in 2012 was of interest when HFCD responded to viral text messages shared via social media, which accused HFCD of abusing their authority by declaring a restaurant they visited as not halal. According to HFCD, the agency, whilst responsible towards processing halal certification and auditing, has no authority to decide which restaurants are halal or vis-à-vis. Instead, BIRC made those decisions based on reports from the Ministry of Health laboratory tests, and the least HFCD does is inspect the meat used and refrigeration. As seen in subsequent chapters, this function has changed with the centralisation of functionality. The sharing of information relating to halal-certified premises started in 2013. An interesting aspect of the post on HFCD's response in 2012 and the sharing of these listings in 2013 was the responsiveness and accountability of the government in informing the public, including businesses, as part of its ethical responsibilities, a way to protect the communities and their religious dietaries. This followed through until 2015 when the public had the opportunity to debate and discuss questions relating to lists of premises that HFCD shared by questioning reasons for why certain restaurants and halal food premises, including processing factories, that have been certified halal, were not on the lists. Such exchanges resulted in the issuance of newly amended lists with justifications on why such oversight happened. These posts

were done to enrich and enhance the public, particularly the followers of HFCD's Facebook page, by providing relevant information. Whilst postings from 2012 until 2015 mainly were geared towards specific food products sold in the market, questions over halalness of ingredients used by local ice cream producers, halalness of imported butter and cheese products manufactured in New Zealand and Australia, questions over sauces produced in the United Kingdom as well as products produced by Malaysian TNCs such as dry crackers and cakes to name a few, the trends from 2017 showed a different approach towards public consultation and engagement.

The government's approach towards public consultation and coordination shifted from 2017 onwards. Such reversal of approach towards halal governing can be seen from the postings which urged the public for more proactive public engagement and responsibilities, particularly ensuring the food consumed is halal and upping public halal surveillance. The public was told to ensure halal consumption and report any food or activities suspected of non-halal and illegal to the relevant authorities. This U-turn was due to the belief that the public, by 2017, was already mature enough to do their part in halal maintenance, assurance, and monitoring. By contrast, this differs from earlier government responses that are more considerate, compassionate, and voluntary than mandatory and hard enforcement. Examples of hard enforcement are evident in postings that showed the withdrawal or relinquishment of halal permits and certificates for a few premises that went against halal requirements, specifically on utilising dubious ingredients in processing and serving alcohol within an already halal-certified premises.

This will be mentioned in Chapter 5, which analyses the effects of halal certification on food businesses.




Figure 33. The trend of exchanges between the public and HFCD online between 2011 and 2018

For the year 2012 alone, there were 437 public commentaries made from 39 out of 90 posts throughout the year. There were 65 HFCDs' responses, with some details to be mentioned in the following paragraphs. Public commentaries declined further from 2013 onwards, in tandem with the number of updates posted by HFCD. However, public queries were still made, and some received feedback from HFCD depending on the questions asked. The number of public participation was at its lowest in 2016, with only seven commentaries receiving zero responses from HFCD. Whilst this was attributed to the lack of staff handling the FB page based on the interview transcripts with HFCD's officer, this moment also unintentionally set the tone for the inefficiency and the ineffectiveness of online platforms as part of a new governing mechanism through the inflation of unattended queries, feeding further into growing frustrations that resulted in

the outburst of critique against halal governing as seen in Shahiran's case and the abrupt change of permit fees, to be touched under the following subsection and in the next chapter. Supporters of governmentality, such as Dean (2015) and Rose (1999), argued that whilst governmentality was an attempt to understand the government's rationality and its practise of governing at a given moment in time, the existence of critique is necessary to allow for self-criticism and, hence, reduction of the need of more governmentality in the near future in part due to the creation of critical, well aware and socially active citizens responsible in holding accountability when it is due to relevant parties involved. It would be interesting to note the effects of current halal industrial governmentality on businesses and examine the link between the practises and their impact in contrast to the governing mission and vision.

Regarding matters on halal standard requirements criteria, halal certification, and permit applications, HFCD also shared some information online, though in a much more limited manner. Analysis of the themes mentioned in Figure 20 previously, particularly on halal standard criteria (hereafter HAL_STDCRIT) and on how to apply (hereafter APPL_HWTO), showed a total of 42 online posts shared by HFCD on these halal certification components throughout the eight years (see appendix 5 for details of chart and patterns based on year-on-year distributions). Of the 42 posts, 12 dealt with halal application and related questions, 13 specifically on halal standard requirements and criteria, and the remaining eight posts on HAL_STDCRIT and APPL_HWTO combined. As the hypothesis tried to address research questions on the tools used by the Brunei Government towards halal industrial code and conduct and in evaluating the effectiveness

of current governing tools or mechanisms to create such code of conduct, it is worthwhile to investigate these subthemes.

Analysis into the patterns of the three subthemes found that most of the activities on information sharing tops in 2018 with APPL_HWTO alone have twelve posts addressed on application per se. HAL_STDCRIT also had ten posts in 2018, specifically on halal criteria and requirements. Information on both HAL_STDCRIT + APPL_HWTO was also the highest for 2018, with six (6) posts in 2018. The year 2017 also marked a good amount of information communicated by HFCD for public use with five (5) posts for APPL_HWTO, two (2) posts for both HAL_STDCRIT and the combined HAL_STDCRIT + APPL_HWTO. Between 2011 and 2015, four (4) postings were made on APPL_HWTO once yearly, except for 2014, with no posts. HAL_STDCRIT only had one post in 2012. The general trends are in line with analyses from other subthemes with zero or less than two coverage for years between 2014 and 2016 for topics related to application and criteria apart from experiences from public exchanges and HFCD response mentioned earlier, of which there exist some two-way communication though declining between 2011 and 2015, only to stop abruptly from for both 2016 and 2018. In the case of HAL_STDCRIT and APPL_HWTO, the trend is far worse as HFCD responsiveness was nil throughout 2012 until 2018, with zero response for 2012, 2015 and 2018, two responses in 2017, respectively and none for the years 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2016 due to no public questions or queries. This might correlate with some of the significant changes that HFCD carried out as part of the revised amendments made to Brunei Halal Food Label and Order in 2017, where halal workshops, talks and briefings were held mainly by HFCD in 2018,

leaving no actual need for online exchanges to be made, although findings at the ground level based on the interview with agri-food businesses stated otherwise. A look into the chart on the exchanges, i.e. specifically on queries relating to both halal standard requirements and application procedures below, provides an insight into the responsiveness of HFCD on the two subthemes:




Figure 34. Public queries and HFCD’s rate of response to the queries between 2011 and 2018

General analysis of the HAL_STCRIT, APPL_HWTO and HAL_STDCRIT+APPL_HWTO, as addressed online, found that information related to halal supervision and requirements tops at eleven (11), on par with topics related to halal application also at eleven (11) per se. This is followed by technical information related to halal monitoring and processing at eight (8), procedures on how to apply for both certification and permit at seven (7), information on who should apply at six (6), arising issues concerning halal certification in the past and present at four (4). At the lower tiers, information related to payment and pricing was shared three (3) times, like those concerning information on the types of

documents needed when submitting for halal certification and permit application. Religious requirements as part of the halal standard criteria were addressed twice (2) in the posts, with another two mentioning general criteria needed for application purposes. Information specifically on Brunei halal certification and permit logo, i.e., from the size of the logo, printing specs and requirements such as colour to labelling, was only mentioned once throughout the eight years, coupled with sharing of a link to frequently asked questions (FAQs) relating to Brunei's halal certification and permit standard at one (1). Similarly, public questions and commentaries about HFCDs are also on the abovementioned topics. However, the only problem is that such commentaries and queries were not met as there was no response from the relevant agency.

A couple of takes that can be sieved out of these analyses. Concerning theme diversity, most of the posts on HAL_STDCRIT only focus on the halal supervisory aspects of the standardisation. Apart from the two religious requirements emphasise the need to appoint two knowledgeable and practising Muslims to become halal supervisors as well as their attachment to recognise the Islamic School of Jurisprudence - Shafie, Hanafi, Hambali and Maliki schools, the majority of the halal supervisions and requirements posts touches upon some technical dimension of supervision. These include the responsibilities of supervisors and halal managers to prevent the use of religious idols, puppets and other accessories that reflect religions other than Islam to be used within the premises as well as the additional task of ensuring food and drinks that other workers brought into processing facilities are halal and not mixed or in proximity with processing areas. In addition to these tasks, they also need supervisors to take up the responsibilities of

keeping records of raw materials purchases and processing procedures via proper filing systems; they are also required to be ever-present within facilities during processing activities and field inspections by halal auditors. The other three supervisory requirements relate to technical dimensions mentioned under the section on food technicalities, i.e., separate kitchens, fence building and hygiene and sanitation maintenance.

As for APPL_HWTO, the HFCD has also constantly updated on significant changes, particularly with fee payment, rates of halal certification procedures and permits, and who needs to be certified after the law amendment made in 2017. Despite such efforts, the information shared on these postings is limited and lacks depth. There is also no mention of the existence and need for other documents besides the BCGs, which comprise the entire halal certification and permit requirements and criteria within these posts. In terms of exchanges, the lack of reciprocal communication and exchanges between HFCD and the public online, both for general queries as well as with halal application and criteria, also dampened the efficacy and effectiveness of the use of the online spaces, in this case, Facebook, as new governing technologies in industrial governing. These create potential rifts and pitfalls for both the industry and businesses alike over the halal certification and permit as the government opted for pragmatism, particularly with the use of online space as a medium of information sharing whilst physical events such as workshops, talks and briefings as the actual site of information sharing and issue resolution over achievement of its mission/ vision objectivity on its usage as part of their halal governing, stated in the early years of the page establishment in 2011. Regarding power relations, the real power lies in the hands of those involved in governing. The fact that public queries became less

important as part of positive feedback mechanisms based on authority's unresponsiveness in the latter years undoubtedly creates further centralisation as critique over current governmentality weaning or almost in absence whilst government governing deepens. Will current halal governmentality create the desired industrial halal code of conduct? This will be addressed in the upcoming chapters.

4.5 Halal laws/ rules and regulation: Hard institutionalisation of the Brunei Halal Standard

Apart from the use of information relating to industrial, manufacturing or processing aspects of halal food, the utilisation of controlling mechanisms such as laws and regulations has always been crucial as part of conditioning or, in Foucault's words, 'disciplining' of communities to adhere to the envisioned code of conduct, in this case, the industrial halal code of conduct. Hence, as part of the ensembles in which governmentality works or operates, the use of judiciaries acts in general, as well as the actual execution of these acts via penalties, fines, reforms and authorise inspections by one or more authorise institutions towards businesses, have been paramount in ensuring standard conformity or compliance. In the case of the Brunei Halal Certification or Standard, the core agency, HFCD of MORA, utilises their online Facebook page as a site for not only dissemination of halal law-related information but also as a site of performing both real and staged authoritative governing. Staged here refers to these interplays between the government and those being governed, where information on laws, acts, and the subsequent fines, penalties and courts' actions shared online are used as a deterrent

should communities break the laws. These technologies act as part of anticipating or determining which action should be taken if inherent problems arise. The 'real' aspect of the authority is self-explanatory, where real cases of non-compliance are used as examples for the public, businesses, and general citizens alike to prevent any misdemeanours from taking root. In other words, within Foucault's disciplinary governmentality, the point of disciplining is not to punish, but rather functions to deter, a way to prevent the subjects via technologies of shame (Foucault, 2008). By instilling the need to govern themselves and be reflexive of their own conduct of conduct, communities can use this technology of the self as a critique in preventing themselves from being governed like that (Dean, 2015).

Analysis from the online page found four subthemes that the postings on halal law and regulation cover. The first concerns halal law and regulation itself, which includes brief information on it and the scope of the law. This subtheme covers 58.1% (50/86) of the overall posts on halal regulation. This is followed by the fines, penalties or legal actions the halal law could impose on communities over non-compliance at 24.4% (21/86). The third subtheme covers the aspects of amendments or changes that halal law subjects to as the legislations are reviewed. This stands at 15.1% (13/86). The final theme highlighted online is information on laws/ regulations that are not directly related to halal but have components that intertwine with current halal law at 2.3% (2/86), respectively. An example is the law that prohibits other religious symbols, merchandise, and idols apart from Islamic ones to be displayed within premises and its vicinities, which have received halal

certification and permits for fear of confusion or raising doubts. Below is the chart showing the distribution of the halal law-related contents:




Figure 35. Postings on halal-related regulation together with information on penalties or compounds

Based on the chart above, similar patterns with other subsections of this thesis can also be found with the halal law postings, whereby 2018 marked the highest for all four subthemes with 60 coverage. This is followed by the year 2017, with a total of 12 coverage for all four. The year 2012 is third, with ten coverage for all four subthemes. A look at the coverage for the remaining year was as follows. There were only two coverages for 2014, one for 2013 and one for 2016. As for 2011 and 2015, halal laws and regulations on HFCD's halal FB page were not mentioned.

The emphasis on fines and penalties as part of its industrial halal code conditioning is also used, though less extensive than the theme of information sharing. Some of this

emphasis usually used real-world cases to highlight the intensity of fines or penalties as well as what it did to the public's trust in some of the products that used to be certified. In two cases mentioned online, the utilisation of undeclared ingredients and doubtful materials in one of the premises served as a café and a bakery, and the imposition of a maximum fine of BND\$8,000 on one of the premises. Both had their halal permit revoked or withdrawn. A visit to one of the premises also found that as of 2020, their premise remained not halal certified, and this translates to the damage in credence, faith and trust that both the government and the public had as a result of the event in 2018 whilst the other premise exited the food business within weeks after the news of it serving non-halal meat in an Islamic-named restaurant in 2018. Another example of penalisation and the use of the hard apparatus of the state to maintain and solidify further implementation was in the use of legislation that is not directly linked to the halal law or act. One of the country's high-profile cases, referred to as Shahiran's case of 2017, this instance shows how Brunei's internal security law called the Sedition Act, was used against a government employee named Shahiran Sheriffuddin after he called for dissent and the public to rise against the implementation of the newly revised halal certification and food label order. From pinpointing the detrimental effects that such compulsory certification has towards small businesses to the use of foul language and insinuating insults against the government order and the relevant religious agencies managing halal, he was charged with one count for inciting public outrage whilst undermining the peace and stability of the country. The final verdict was made when he was sentenced to an 18-month jail term in absentia in 2019 due to his flee from the country whilst on bail (Faisal, 2019). Despite the use of the case as part of example settings or disciplining the masses, it did not deter the

public from raising questions as well as commenting on current government practises as seen from the graphs in Figures 32 and 33 if it follows within the acceptable framework of government-public exchanges whilst maintaining the status quo. From real-world cases of penalisation, the emphasis on fines for misuse or non-compliance in using the halal logo, its specifications, and improper placement of the permit/ certificate in facilities were also mentioned five times on the halal.bn page, of which four were in 2018.

Apart from using both information and penalisation to mould communities into the designated or desired code of conduct, the online sharing of information on changes in law and its components are signs of the government's willingness to keep track or update communities as part of fair governing. This can be seen when the HCHLO of 2005 were revised in 2011, 2014 and 2017 with the compulsory need for all businesses, premises and processing facilities, both formal and informal, to acquire halal certification and permits should they be involved in selling of halal 'products' encompassing of food, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals. Before this amendment, the halal law only covered the aspect of food, not all products, as revised. The part on amendments for 2017 and 2018 covers 12 out of the 13 times covered since 2011. The scope of amendments ranges from the question of who is liable or requiring such permits to the changes in the rate of charges for certification and permit, from \$50 per product to a classification of charges based on the number of products produced and the product types.

Shared information on halal law linked to the smuggling of dubious meat and other products was also shared twice in 2018, a sign of the further centralising role that HFCD

played in overall halal governing processes as well as informing and reiterating the public on the scope of halal monitoring and governing that HFCD is also part of. Under the old Halal Meat Act of 1998, all importation of products, meat and other processed products would fall under Royal Brunei Customs and Excise Department jurisdiction, whilst quality control would be under the Department of General Health Services, Ministry of Health. However, the HCHLO of 2005 also included HFCD and DAA as new members who could serve the same role as these two agencies. Coupled with this was also posting showing real-world surveillance that HFCDs did with its sister agencies by conducting roadblocks and spot checks in designated areas with information on the laws that authorised them to implement it. Below is the table showing the detailed breakdowns of the four subthemes by subcategories:

SUBTHEMES	FREQUENCIES	SUBCATEGORIES	FREQUENCIES
HAL_LAW_REG_ACTS	50	Information on halal laws/ Acts (Jurisdiction, scope and brief info)	35
		Importance to adherence and compliance to halal law (with information on law)	11
		Halal Law and Smuggling (Other scope of governing beyond halal alone)	2
		Common Law that intertwined with halal law (Public Health Act)	2
HAL_LAW_REG_PEN	21	Fines and Penalties (General Halal Law)	14
		Fines and Penalties (Specifically on Halal Logo)	5
		Fines and penalties (incorrect information, viral posts, fear mongering, peace disruption, etc)	2
HAL_LAW_REG_AMD_ACTS	13		
HAL_LAW_REG_NON_ISLAMIC	2		
TOTAL	86		

Table 6. A detailed breakdown of analyses on halal law and regulation postings posted on halal.bn Facebook page between 2011-2018

In summary, utilising the legal aspect of halal governing is paramount as part of the control measure that the government uses to ensure further compliance and safeguarding of the religious dietaries of Brunei Muslim communities, specifically the Bruneian general

populace. A fascinating insight that can be identified from this subsection's analysis was the use of penalties and fines. Based on the chart, it can be argued that during the formative years, information on fines and penalties was extensively used as the 'stick' to ensure overall compliance of businesses and industry. However, from 2017 onwards, the sharing of more information on the law governing halal, plus provisions surrounding recent amendments and changes other than that of penalisation alone, proved the existence of the ability of the government to reflect and be reflexive towards past implementations. Although this shall not be interpreted as a reduction in surveillance or relaxation in terms of implementation, it would be interesting to see how it affects food businesses undergoing or who had undergone certification within this timeframe. Hence, looking into their experiences is vital to evaluate whether such industrial halal governmentality achieved its desired vision and mission of halal code of conduct creation and growth. Further tightening and being able to reconsider, reflect, and be reflexive towards halal governing could also centralise the government's role and functionality further.

4.6 General discussion on the use of digital technology and conventional platforms by HFCD as part of halal governing

In addressing the hypothetical assumptions made to answer SRQ 1, analyses of the findings throughout this chapter found the centrality and dynamism of the sovereign or monarch in rationalising the move towards halalisation. Analyses of the royal decrees found on HFCD's posting identified a dynamic but complex relationship between the need

to protect religious dietary practices through oversight and monitoring agencies and the necessary adoption of technical and industrial halal innovation to promote economic growth through technical standardisation and halal certification. The use of religious and technical knowledge to rationalise, dictate and inform governing activities was also evident with the combination of conventional and religious as part of knowledge and information sharing. The creation of a near identity with the 'governed' i.e. via the use of terminologies such as Ummah, citizens or subjects within the postings, as well as the heavy emphasis on halalisation as the responsibility of the governed is apparent. All these formed the required political rationalities towards halalisation, marking a need to refine SH 1 further. Such rationalities provided HFCD with legitimate justifications to enforce halalisation as part of adherence to the calls of the sovereign while designing a halal standard acceptable to the standard-setters based on the convention adapted to the Brunei context. Whilst such complexities and multidimensionality were captured to make sense of why the governors governed in such a way, the differences between governing visions and its actual translation into governing practices coupled with aftereffects towards the governed remained elusive, yet to be understood and invisible.

The analysis of the apparatus towards halalisation, particularly the use of FB in the earlier years, was more focused on information dissemination. It also showed some use as a platform for coordination, consultations and discussions with those affected directly and indirectly by certification. The sharing of information relating to procedures of halal standard applications, technical halal criteria towards the end of the studied period, as well as the questions on food, among others, showed attempts to ensure a wide coverage

of topics necessary towards effective governing. Still, the FB page transformed into a one-way traffic information-sharing medium with limited exchanges as years passed. For an industry to develop, information and feedback from industries are vital for understanding whether policies, in this case, standards formulated, positively impact development. Earlier discussions on the use of social media platforms suggest the existence of government initiatives to disseminate information on the halal standard. However, further analyses highlighted the existence of information asymmetries ranging from halal-specific in terms of technical and religious halal to general food safety and best industrial production practices. It would be interesting to assess the effects of such a mix of general and specialised halal industrial knowledge on food businesses. The FB posts also identified the utilisation of the Quran and the Prophet's narrations as part of the strategy for creating halal conduct of conduct. This is on top of the utilisation of power technologies such as royal decrees and national regulatory regimes involving food and public health laws. These have governing consequences for the government, the businesses, and the general industrial direction, as is evident previously under the monarchy subsection.

The analysis of the findings also suggested the existence of a transfer of responsibility to the public to practice responsible halal production, monitoring, surveillance, and reporting as urged via the FB postings but none on responsible halal governing targeted for the halal governors. This is based on the absence of postings and texts on responsible leadership, accountability, fairness and justice in decision-making. The need to be more reflexive and critical of the arts of governing might also help reduce how we perform the art of governing. More profound governmentalised initiatives also mean that a degree of

automation allows for stronger institutionalisation, but this requires the reduction or abolition of individually centralised power. The role of civil institutions and civil societies is also fundamental should such an autopoietic system, borrowing from Luhmann's (1988) applications of this biological origin theory towards social organisations concerning communication, be required to work effectively and efficiently where it works based on the positive and negative feedbacks generated from the G2C and C2G framework. Decision-making, expertise, and specialisation are positioned within the governing agency and its structures. In the case of halal, the BIRC with HFCD's role as its enforcer, regulator, manager, administrator, and secretariat needs to evaluate the effectiveness of their current strategies.

Further scrutiny of the consultative and coordinated efforts made by the HFCD showed the existence of some feedback mechanisms by looking at G2C and R2S interaction. Foucault (2008) argued that the reason why such feedback is necessary is that, as a critique of governmentality through reflexivity and reflection, processes of reviews are vital to reduce the future need for governmentality, which marks the transition from the centrality of government in terms of its 'real' power to new power which may exist in the forms of capillaries, braided or network type of power. Based on the analysis of HFCD's way of governing from their FB pages, it is evident that there exists a degree of religious consultation and participation based on the exchanges between HFCD and the public concerning halal certification and other halal-related matters, though limited despite the centrality of government as the authority governing halal related matters. Such socialisation of halal certification can be deduced as a way of creating the religious halal

near identity which is vital for the creation of the sense of being part of a collective whilst at the same time adhering and complying to the required needs and wants of the State as halalisation takes place. Whilst some scholars might argue on the absolute nature of decision-making, the public is well-informed on their responsibilities as part of the Muslim communities or the Ummah in trying to adhere to the religious obligations of halal. This is because even at the political Islamic institutional level, religious rulings are based on Islamic jurisprudence, which is informed by the Quran and Hadith as the constitution. Religious indoctrination and deviation are only possible when religion is used as a tool to govern the weak unjustly to achieve worldly matters rather than to achieve piety and fulfilment of good deeds for life in the hereafter. To a certain extent, the rulings and interpretation of halal are very much part of the divine commandments mentioned in the Quran, with the hadith providing detailed instructions and procedures for implementing it. However, it is undeniable that establishing an industrial halal standard, such as the Brunei halal industrial standard, incorporates a certain level of technical and social engineering while remaining connected to the divine principles and guidelines found in the Quran and prophetic narrations. It is the existence of such humanistic aspects of the execution or governing of halal that raises the probabilities or potential of misdemeanours leading to unwarranted community effects if not managed carefully. God has reminded this in verse below to remind humans of their responsibilities and the existence of retributions for any misdeeds they committed, be it now or in the life after death:

“Whatever good comes to you, it is from Allah, but whatever evil comes to you, it is from your self” (Quran 4:79).

The function of social media in this research thus far has gone beyond being a platform for knowledge sharing and relaying information. It also served as a source for identifying other halal governing strategies in the physical world. For instance, the use of halal workshops, clinics, and talks is a testament to HFCD's commitment to exercising its governing mandate. However, a few points of concern need to be addressed. One relates to whether such technical requirements on halal are well known to the public, particularly business communities affected directly, and whether the halal certification had an unwarranted impact beyond the desired effects envisioned. This is a valid governmentality question as governing without any clear-cut direction or the existence or establishment of required mechanisms, failed or ineffective governing due to failure to understand or be reflexive on the current effects of social engineering or socio-conditioning of the communities will result in negative growth or development.

The 2013 workshops under HAL-CERT show initiatives to assist applicants for halal certificates and permits to resolve some issues with their forms. However, of course, the issue goes beyond the forms but rather the criterion/requirements. Should all the earlier initiatives work, the problems of failed/ rejected/ KIV applications would be drastically reduced, and this begs the question of the effectiveness of historical and current governing mechanisms. All the government initiatives were a way to share or develop a sense of collective responsibility and allow the public to identify themselves with the government through the problematisation of potential inherent threats that could affect the national political outcomes. The consultation and coordination that the government is

involved in merely aim to nurture and socialise the citizens (subjects?), not so much to review, reflect and critique current governmentality as the citizens or the public is not seen as the stakeholders. Instead, the definition of stakeholders from the government perspective refers to other agencies with some stakes in halal governing. The public and business communities are just numbers in statistics, not communities. Treatment from the government by viewing businesses or industrialists as opportunists and exploitative is also not Islamic. Regarding the consultations throughout the duration or processes of pre-, during or post-halal certification, they need to be carried out carefully and wholeheartedly, not just as a way of fulfilling checklists on what has been done or in part of fulfilling one's performance indices. However, there is a need to reflect and review current initiatives should they result in problems.

HFCD is an authoritative agency that also has its way of governing, though not as an autonomous body altogether but as a part of the Monarchical polity with its own embedded autonomy, whilst at the same time sharing the same mission and vision/ goals with the broader government structures, i.e. towards the creation of halal code of conduct and development of halal food industry, as an active part of government in the moved towards industrial transformation (Evans, 1995)(cited in Siyambalapitiya, Zhang and Liu, 2018). The intergovernmental coordination and consultation (G2G) analysis showed some degree of collaboration and cooperation, but this is limited to what has been reported via the FB page. An investigation of the effectiveness of all these initiatives shall be conducted in the following chapter.

Hence, as for SRQ 2, the findings and analyses thus far presented the utilisation of a wider swath of state mechanisms and apparatus as part of halal governing. The use of the Quran and Hadith, as well as the sharing of knowledge and information via both social media and physical platforms, as well as halal guidelines and laws as part of halalisation, underscore the efforts put in by the governors and standard setters to get things done, marking the positivity of power. This confirms the SH 2 as it corroborates with the findings relating to knowledge sharing, creation and co-creation as the influencing factors towards halalisation. However, they are limited to the early stage of the halal certification governing. The use of FB postings thus far has rendered very interesting results. It provides potential towards a more innovative way of collecting and analysing data due to rich and more profound datasets. However, in studying halal governing, its use is limited to investigating what has been reported and visible, a partial reflection of what is happening elsewhere. Hence, an investigation of its effects on the governed and its effectiveness is conducted to ensure a meaningful evaluation of current halal governmentalities. This research extended the field study on governmentality by looking beyond political rationalities and the AOG, through the analyses of halal governing actual effects.

The main thing missing from the online postings is on the actual economic component of governing halal. Throughout the halal monitoring and management postings, there is no mention of the actual economic cost of converting or adopting the Brunei halal food certification or standard. Apart from the old one-off costings per product or the new categories in which permit would be charged based on product numbers and the cost of

the application and issuance of permit/ standard, there is no actual estimation or approximate costings that HFCD provided once businesses take up or undergo certification audits. Implementing the Brunei halal technical criteria and adopting some practices stipulated in national and international industrial codex/ standards would usually involve some actual economic cost, which could impinge on the standard's conformity or compliance. This was based on the literature on conventional food standards and their effects on small-scale or new start-ups or infant industrial players in most third-world countries attempting to move up the industrial ladder. Would the Brunei halal standard result in similar outcomes despite the success of creating a halal industrial code of conduct? What other effects does this development have towards halal auditors and managers? Is there any industrial transformation? A look into the next chapter will answer these parts of the thesis, particularly concerning SRQ3 and SRQ4 of the thesis.

CHAPTER 5 – HALAL GOVERNMENTALITIES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON AGRI-FOOD PRODUCERS

In the following chapter, we will delve into the examination of SRQ 3 and SRQ 4, focusing on the impact of current halal certification governmentalities on the development of agrifood businesses in Brunei. Simultaneously, an assessment of the effectiveness of the present halalisation strategies of HFCDs within the framework of halal governmentality will also be carried out. The preceding chapter's findings and discussions centred on the political rationalities that shape the design and implementation of halal certification governance by HFCD. This involved an analysis of the diverse ensembles constituting the instruments or tools enabling governance, irrespective of the dispositions embodied by each component, player, or agency. By scrutinising the questions surrounding halal governmentalities and their contribution to upholding the *raison d'état*, the research aims to demonstrate the utility of current mechanisms and the applicability of Foucault's governmentality as an analytical tool, particularly within the context of a religious standard purportedly safeguarding the welfare of the communities associated with halal businesses. This approach offers new potential avenues for scholarly exploration, as the concept of halal governmentality utilised in this research permits a comprehensive analysis of the governing standards, commencing with the problematisation and rationalisation of issues and extending to the formulation of governing technologies facilitating the attainment of visions or objectives, as well as the identification of effects stemming from such governing transformations. This comprehensive process analysis enables the evaluation of the efficacy and effectiveness of governing technologies as they

manifest in practical applications, thereby promoting governing reflexivity and policy learning to encourage governors to adopt best practices. Consequently, this chapter will examine the effects of halal governmentalities by analysing their impact on various stakeholders, including halal regulators, auditors, enforcers, support service providers, and non-dominant subjects such as food businesses and the broader halal food industry. Additionally, the researcher will also measure the efficacy and effectiveness of halal governmentalities by discussing their influence on business growth-related aspects, including firms' performance, operational costs, market accessibility, and knowledge sharing, creation, and enhancement. The assessment of information symmetries or asymmetries shared via social media, with its profound impact on businesses' halalisation processes, will also form part of the knowledge components. Furthermore, evaluating the compliance and resistance of the 'governed' subjects to halal standards served as a proxy for assessing the effectiveness of current halal certification governing technologies. Hence, what are the implications of multiple halal governmentalities for agri-food business development? **(SRQ 3)** How effective are current HFCD strategies on halalisation of the overall food industry? **(SRQ 4)**

5.1 Halal Certification and Halal Food Sectoral Development: A Detailed Insight

With the implementation of compulsory halal standardisation in 2011, the diverse sectors of the overall halal food industry experienced significant growth in the first four years of its implementation (see Figure 7 for details). Despite such impressive growth, which

lasted until 2014, the number of halal certifications for new and renewal purposes has significantly declined. Further analysis of the application data sets revealed the existence of applications that were either not processed, kept in view, cancelled, or dismissed, as will be seen in the next few sections. The chart below shows some of these halal applications ended up either not processed or put on hold:




Figure 36. Halal applications based on status (Source: Unpublished data, HFCD, 2016)

An examination of HFCD's halal application status categorised as 'on-hold' reveals a noteworthy trend. Among the 1887 halal applications processed between 2011 and 2015, 309 (16.3%) were either not processed or were placed under the 'keep in view' (KIV) status. According to HFCD's officers, the applications' KIV status was segmented into pre- and post-audit categories. As of November 2016, halal applicants with open stalls or bazaar-like businesses were automatically placed in the KIV pre-audit category, as their businesses were deemed ineligible for halal certification. These applicants accounted for over 90% of the five-year period. Many of these businesses have been under KIV status

since 2011, indicating a protracted processing period when applications encounter issues. Further discussion on this matter is forthcoming. For applications categorised as post-audit on-hold or KIVs, the relevant chart is presented in Figure 36, and the reasons for the KIV status are in Figure 37.




Figure 37. Halal applications under post-audit KIV status between 2011-2016




Figure 38. Reasons for post-audit KIV status between 2011-2016

Based on the aforementioned data, it can be contended that among the 15 identified reasons for utilising the KIV status, 2 reasons stand out as the most significant. One reason for placing applications under the four-year KIV status was the lack of cooperation between HFCD and businesses/applicants and the applicants' requests to suspend the audits. While 10 KIVs were attributed to premises renovation, the remaining reasons were associated with the existing halal requirements. Eight applications were KIV due to insufficient support from the Brunei Islamic Religious Council (BIRC), followed by seven cases where the absence of a halal supervisor led to KIV status. Four applicants were placed on hold due to unsatisfactory hygienic conditions. Furthermore, five applicants were awaiting audits from sister agencies, and five others had inexperienced halal supervisors. Two applicants were delayed in submitting new ingredient lists, while another

two had ingredients that were not halal certified, resulting in their applications being put on hold. Two applicants failed to meet the halal technical specifications and requirements. Additionally, seasonal producers were placed under KIV.

Whilst the number of applications rejected for incomplete documentation is low, i.e., 9 out of 1887, the number of cancellations proves otherwise. This can be seen in the following charts (Figures 38 to 40), where between 2011 and 2015, there were 57 application cancellations.




Figure 39. Cancelled applications based on business type and reasons for failure in percentiles




Figure 40. Reasons for failed or dismissed halal applications 2011-2016




Figure 41. Pending or KIV halal applications based on business typologies and reasons

The data provided by HFCD indicates that the primary reasons for the cancellation of applications were attributed to various factors. These included the cessation of business operations (27 applications), change in management (10), business relocation (5), owner's request (5), and sharing the same address with other businesses. In addition, cancellations related to core halal requirements involved four applications that failed to submit the required list of ingredients, two applications lacking support from the BIRC, and one application without a designated halal supervisor. Two other applications were cancelled due to a lack of owner cooperation and the use of non-halal certified ingredients, respectively.

The increase in halal applicants does not necessarily reflect the actual growth of the halal industry. Analyses in Figures 37, 39 and 40 indicate the failure of regulators and businesses in certain technical dimensions despite the organisation of workshops, talks, and briefings as part of socialisation and enhancement processes. This points to persistent challenges in meeting the halal certification requirements, raising questions about the current halal governance's efficacy, particularly in knowledge-sharing, creation, and enhancement as part of competency and capacity building. Evidence of information asymmetries has been mentioned in the previous chapter, and how they are translated as part of governing practices will be presented later, particularly when analysing the typologies of knowledge acquired and used in business operationalisation as firms became halalise. The lack of cooperation from the businesses towards the completion of application or fulfilment of requirements signalled the presence of pockets of resistance

to these changes towards compulsory halalisation, reasons for which will be tried to be addressed later on in this chapter.

5.2 Effects of Royal decrees on halal governing: Internalisation, centralisation of role, competencies, and capacities development within HFCD and beyond

The preceding chapter's analysis highlighted the strong connections between royal decrees and significant government and industrial advancements. However, it did not address the resulting development of capabilities, competencies, and capacities at the operational level, particularly concerning halal certification programs, human resources, and cross-agency industrial competency and capacity development. Examination of interview transcripts with HFCD's officers and official reports revealed efforts toward centralisation and the development of halal monitoring and surveillance capabilities from 2007 onwards. The introduction of the Brunei halal certification law in 2005 spurred an increase in training and the recruitment of new staff for halal monitoring and surveillance. By 2007, twenty-five government officers from various departments and ministries had completed a halal auditing and monitoring program. Information from the transcripts also indicated an influx of recruits under HFCD, with 35 officers being permanent staff, primarily former religious teachers who had been teaching in schools. Over the subsequent decade until 2017, the staff numbers grew to 65, with 54 directly involved in inspection and auditing. According to HFCD, this increase was an indirect result of the newly revised Halal Certification and Standard law, which mandated halal certification for

all businesses, necessitating an expanded halal-related workforce. While recognising the need to centralise and efficiently process the growing number of halal applications, HFCD endeavoured to internalise some roles typically carried out by sister agencies such as the Fire and Rescue Department, Ministry of Health, and Department of Agriculture and Agri-food, MPRT, by developing their competencies. These encompassed areas such as fire hazards and safety within premises, hygiene and sanitation conditions within production facilities, and food quality and safety for consumption. This was facilitated by adding 13 fresh graduates specialised in the food industry and four specialists in pharmaceutical and chemistry to the 54 staff under HFCD in 2017, as revealed in the interviews. The remaining 34 staff, according to the officer, comprised religious teachers well-versed in Sharia and related fields. Each team of inspectors and auditors comprised two religious officers and one technical officer. As of 2018, staff distribution across the four districts showed that Brunei-Muara, where the capital city and mainly urban areas are located, had a total of 40 staff, while the other districts, such as Tutong and Belait, had five staff each, and Temburong had four staff. As of 2018, teams of inspectors and auditors were operational nationwide.

The government's implementation of royal decrees has significantly influenced halal certification and standardisation, particularly on institutionalisation, monitoring and surveillance. This impact particularly pertains to developing competencies, capacities, and capabilities within the industry. Initially, the push for halal compliance was only geared towards establishing halal monitoring agencies. The introduction of the Brunei Halal Certificate and Food Label Order in 2005 was pivotal, leading to the creation of

Brunei's distinctive halal standard and food label. This development, accompanied by unveiling a new halal logo, prompted the formulation of initiatives by various governmental bodies, including those operating within the BIRC halal technical committee responsible for fostering halal food business development in Brunei. The Department of Fisheries (DOF) and DAA, operating under MPRT, provided the majority of the support, while MOHA's assistance was channelled through the District Offices. My survey involving 48 businesses (see Table 3) revealed that only 17 entities received government assistance or support. Among them, 11 were formal producers, with the remaining six being informal, comprising two home-based businesses and four cooperatives participating in the Ministry of Home Affairs' 1K1P program under the District's Office.

Other than the existence of 3Cs development occurring at the HFCD's governmental auditing and monitoring level, there have also been initiatives developed by different ministries such as MPRT, MOHA and MOFAT (present MOFE) as well as GLCs such as BEDB, Ghanim International and DARE as part of assisting the development of the halal food businesses in Brunei. A detailed breakdown of the type of support concerning the supporting departments or agencies can be found in Appendix 6, and such support excludes the initiatives carried out by HFCD. Based on the table and information available during writing, formal businesses received more support than informal businesses. For instance, in the case of MPRTs, 27 counts of support have been given to businesses, of which the majority were given to formal producers (24) whilst the informal only received 3. The DAA were the most significant contributor towards these with 19 counts of support ranging from support for international exhibitions and expos (6), provisions for packaging

support under the Agriculture and Agri-food Incentive Schemes (SIPA) (2), granting of lease land under the temporary occupational lease schemes (2), to provisions of technical expertise and advisories (1), GMP/ GAP adherence advisories (1), collaborative formulation of Brunei halal SOPs and manual (1), subsidise labels and stickers for products (1), letting of production space (1) and attending supranational training workshop under ASEAN banner (1). For the cooperatives, DAA supported them by providing subsidies on packaging, involvement in local exhibitions and technical advisories, with one count each.

Compared to DAA, the DOF assisted in five key areas, as found in the survey. Out of the total of eight counts, the main areas of intervention DOF contributed to are in training producers in processing seafood into finished products (fish and prawn crackers) with three producers experiencing assistance, two on packaging-related activities, and one each for areas pertaining to production space letting, advisories and adherence to production criteria based on GAP/ GMP and on assistance in terms of standard applications and licensing. All this support was given to formal producers. Besides training and production support, DOF supported businesses by meeting the compliance stipulated under the PBD30:2016 national standard on seafood-based crackers production. Discussions will be held in the later subheadings.

In contrast, 14 out of the 17 total support given by MOHA's District Office were geared towards cooperatives operating under the 1K1P programme and the assistance came in the form of subsidies in terms of food labelling and stickers (3), branding and advertising

(3), provisions of kitchen utensils and machinery (2), product packaging assistance (2), provisions of long term space to conduct businesses i.e. in the form of using existing hall facilities under the office's jurisdiction (2) as well as short term platforms to exhibit and showcase products locally (2). The remaining three assistants were given to formal businesses regarding standards and business licensing applications for businesses (2) and providing local media coverage for one company.

In the case of SIPA, it was short-lived; no reasons were given to producers/ businesses. However, according to enterprises involved in the scheme, the packaging support was withdrawn due to payment-related issues with the relevant tendered company. As for most Brunei government projects, any supply-related activities, such as the establishment of monitoring systems to supplies of hardware, are usually tendered out to the private sectors for a specific contract period, some annual, others on a much longer tenancy depending on the length of the project. Hence, programmes' continuity is a real issue that affects businesses in the long run. The withdrawal of the support for SIPA might be related to the tightening of the government budget due to the drop in the global oil price in 2014, which led to the reduction of the yearly budget and, hence, programme withdrawal. Similar programme withdrawal can also be seen in the government subsidies towards ISO and HACCP certification programmes meant for producers or manufacturers with high success probabilities and export potentials, which will be discussed later in the chapter.

The level of support varied between formal and informal sectors based on the businesses surveyed. In the case of cooperatives participating in the MOHA's 1K1P program, government support was reported to be present across the entire end-to-end processes, covering production, marketing, branding, provision of industrial locations, and assistance with bureaucratic matters such as licensing and standards application.

However, some concerns were raised by certain officers interviewed regarding HFCD's requirements for separate kitchens and technical specifications related to cooking temperatures, control of harmful microbes, and using preservatives for halal certification and permit requirements. While these requirements are essential for consumer protection, the cooperatives, mainly home-based, cottage, and informal businesses, found it challenging to comply. Meeting such high technical specifications increased production costs. It necessitated an overhaul of their entire production ecosystem, reprogramming production capabilities and enhancing human resources to meet halal criteria. As outlined in the previous chapter, these overarching requirements should have been addressed in the halal workshops, talks, and enhancement programs organised by HFCD. Subsequent sections will illustrate that DAA, DOF, and DO (MOHA) support is insufficient in facilitating halal certification and industrial development. This posed a challenge for micro and small enterprises requiring competencies, capacities, and capabilities development to meet mandatory halal requirements.

The provision of financial support for formal and informal businesses in Brunei to market and promote local products at international exhibitions overseas varies. The surveyed

companies, coded here as MSB, CBRM, SMC, NORB, EBS, UOS, and AST, were afforded opportunities to establish networks at international events such as the Nanning Expo, Canton Expo (CAEXPO), and other regional expos organised in ASEAN. Government sponsorship covered most of their expenses, including registration and booth rentals, while other costs, such as travel, accommodation, and sustenance, were either self-funded or sponsored by the organisers. However, companies like IDFD and AKM did not receive financial assistance for international expos, bearing all expenses, including registration and booth rentals. According to IMAS of IDFD, their company was exempted from sponsorship due to its successful nature and classification as a large corporation. Similarly, AKM faced similar issues and raised concerns about unequal treatment. Regardless of company size, both companies emphasised the importance of equal assistance, considering that all are local companies with daily operational costs. The presence of subsidies would undoubtedly be beneficial, although this may only be the case for companies that pioneer the emerging halal industry.

The Sultan's royal decrees, particularly made in 1997, 2005, and 2016, have had significant impacts not only on directing the industrial direction of the halal industry but also on influencing the development of competency and capacity in halal governance. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the decrees have enhanced competency and capability, moving beyond mere surveillance and monitoring. A closer examination of the development patterns based on the decrees suggests a gradual and consistent progression.

Following the promulgation of the halal laws (refer to Figure 6), monitoring and surveillance agencies were established in 1998 for the purpose of consumer religious dietary protection. This was followed by the introduction of the 2005 Halal Certification and Food Label Order and the four BCGs in 2008, which focused on labelling and halal production to develop the Islamic economy, also known as the first halal vision of Brunei. Subsequently, the declaration of the second halal hub vision in 2016 established multiple institutions and joint ventures to facilitate halal industrial development. This demonstrates how, over the course of 20 years, the directives initiated by the royal decree directly influenced the industry's trajectory.

The ripple effects of the decrees are also evident in the actual development of competency and capacity at the middle level of industrial governance, particularly within HFCD and beyond the agency. This is apparent through the recruitment and enhancement initiatives that government agencies have been involved in since 2008, along with HFCD's internalisation of roles and functions to address potential backlogs and red tape despite pending halal certification applications.

Beyond HFCD, various government agencies, including DOF, DAA, and DO, as well as Darussalam Enterprise (DARe) later on, have pursued national goals dictated by the decree. While each department and agency retains some degree of autonomy to plan and execute programs, these efforts should align with the framework stipulated by the decree. Despite these initiatives, experiences within the industry, particularly among businesses, have revealed the ineffectiveness of certain programs, with some being

abruptly discontinued as quickly as they emerged, as seen in the case of SIPA and the subsequent ISO and GMP subsidies program.

5.3 Multiple halal governmentalities: Negotiating between everyday and industrial halal approaches to production

In the previous section, the researcher identified the justifications for halal certification based on the State's *raison d'état* and strong emphasis on its need. According to Foucault's concept of governmentality, programs are typically designed using various technologies to shape behaviour in line with a specific mission and vision. With multiple governmentalities co-existing and, at times, overlapping within the halal certification governance, what implications can be identified as halal surveillance and monitoring are implemented? The findings suggested the existence of such overlaps, often in contradiction or conflict with one another in terms of halal knowledge practices. Throughout the implementation of the halal standard, basic halal knowledge, coined here as everyday halal, has existed for generations. This led to conflicts of interest as everyday knowledge of halal differed from industrial halal requirements, especially on technical grounds. Regulators argued that the halal standard was meant to seamlessly transition everyday practices into the more technical and industrial interpretation of halal production. However, previous statistics showed that numerous failed or pending applications contradicted this expectation. While the 'everyday' halal code of conduct was successfully established, the technical industrial halal code of conduct faced unprecedented challenges. Additionally, adopting technical guidelines from non-Islamic sources such as

HACCP and GMP into the Brunei halal standard has become an issue, which will be discussed in this subsection based on recent findings. This also highlighted the existence of multiple Islamic halal governmentalities that significantly impact the overall halal certification, halal monitoring, and surveillance, as well as governing halal production. In the upcoming section of this paragraph, discussions will be centred on identifying the source of halal knowledge for all the businesses sampled. It is crucial not only to trace the origins of their halal knowledge but also to compare whether differences exist in the sources of halal knowledge between formal and informal business producers. Below is the diagram showing the sources of halal knowledge for all formal and informal businesses i.e. home-based, online and 1K1Ps.




Figure 42. Source of halal knowledge between formal and informal businesses

The diagram illustrates the significance of school education in imparting knowledge about halal. Among the 46 businesses surveyed, 31 indicated that their primary source of halal knowledge was their formal education. Following closely behind was family upbringing,

with 30 businesses attributing their knowledge to this source, while 27 and 21 businesses, respectively, cited social interactions and religious sermons/books. Social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and the Internet were also recognised as contributors to halal knowledge, with 15 businesses acknowledging these platforms. Interestingly, only 13 out of the 46 businesses reported gaining halal knowledge from public halal workshops, and only one business obtained knowledge from a privately organised halal workshop. It is important to note that the "public halal workshop" category refers to workshops organised by non-government affiliated agencies, such as community or village-based associations and traditional mosque groups, both the youth (*Belia Masjid*) and elderly (*Takmir*) associated groupings. This category differs from the halal training workshops analysed in previous chapters, encompassing training and consultation organised by government and private agencies (see Fig. 43). Additionally, comparisons between formal and informal businesses revealed no significant differences in the distribution of sources of halal knowledge.

Regressing to Foucault's notion of a 'government', it was mentioned in the second chapter that it was not restricted solely to agencies or institutions established by the State to exercise governing. Instead, within the population or the communities in which governing takes place, the 'governed' may also establish their own institutions comprising of smaller governments to materialise the visions and missions they were entrusted with. In this instance, the agri-food producers also exercise halal 'governing' by introducing halalisation strategies regardless of both everyday and technical halal knowledge.

In the survey, the findings highlighted the differences in the interpretation of halal. Incongruency between industrial and everyday halal existed, and it posed a huge challenge for local, yet-to-be halal-certified businesses in adopting the extended halal definition. There also exists unevenness in how information was gathered on top of the general confusion that such halal interpretations and requirements had towards businesses. Some of the informal businesses approached particularly the pioneers of the halal industry for training and advice, whilst some approached regulators on their own. Analyses of the data from the surveyed sample show that the local businesses have employed a socially responsible 'halal' governing approach in their production. These are done by triangulating their responses on their understanding of halal as well as by looking into their actions on ensuring halalness in their production. Based on the survey conducted for both formal and informal businesses alike, their responses on the question on their understanding on halal showed an interesting insight. Below are the responses from 36 respondents (11 formal and 26 informal businesses) out of the total of 46 survey carried out:

DEFINITIONS	FORMAL (16)	INFORMAL (ONLINE, 1K1P) (30)	TOTAL
Clean	10	10	20
Pure	6	7	13
Ingredients use are halal	6	10	16
Permissible by religion/ Sharia	4	11	15
Hygienically produced by factories and individuals	4	3	7
Following Islamic way of processing (slaughtering)	4	6	10
Social responsibility to gain blessings from God, a responsibility as Muslims, avoiding sins	4	0	4
Ability to locate. Source materials from halal origins	3	3	6
Trusted for consumption	3	10	13
Food for all (Muslims and non-Muslims alike)	2	1	3
Knowing how the food is processed	2	0	2
Well cooked, not bloody or raw	1	0	1
Healthier	1	2	3
Food for Muslims only	0	5	5
Producers should be Muslim	0	2	2
Certified or recognised by other bodies	0	4	4

Table 7. Halal as understood by both formal and informal business producers

Findings from the table, as defined based on the higher number of theme occurrences (more than 10), showed that whilst the definition on halal provided by the industrial food producers can be defined as “food which are clean, pure permissible to be consumed based on the Sharia principles or in compliance of it, using ingredients which are halal, processed following the Islamic principles and trusted/ fit for Muslim consumption”, there seems to be no real depth when those questions were probed further. For instance, when asked what they mean or refer to when halal is clean and pure and using halal ingredients, 90% of the informal respondents referred to the need for food to be not tainted or

contaminated by 'forbidden' ingredients, which normally refer to as porcine and alcohol. When it comes to 'Islamic processing', the processes that the producers referred to is mainly on the Islamic slaughtering processes, not so much on the cleansing rituals such as removing the skins and removal of flesh and fur or feathers from the skin, nor in the use or recital of the God's name before slaughtering, a component that had been shared under the previous Islamic constitution subsection as well as part of the training that workshops or briefings have conducted as part of enhancement. Only one producer managed to pinpoint this, whilst the rest did not.

Further investigation revealed that whilst meat-based processing, particularly those that have been halal certified, put their emphasis on this matter on processing and origin of supplier, informal meat processing producers, however, solely defined halal meat as those that have been halal certified by relevant governing agencies such as BIRC or Malaysia's Islamic Development Department (JAKIM) or Indonesia's Islamic Religious Council (MUI), sourced from local retail outlets or supermarkets. These differences in approach stem from the fact that the informal businesses were not part of any enhancement and supervision programmes, unlike the workshops or briefings and other programmes run mostly for already halal-certified businesses. This unevenness leads to a lack of knowledge and information asymmetries pertaining to halal among local industrial players, highlighting the ineffectiveness of the current state of governing. In terms of technical halal food, only one producer mentioned the need to ensure that the halal food produced needs to use halal additives such as gelatines and other

preservatives as part of halalising their production, whilst the majority touched along the lines of strict monitoring and supervision.

The technical aspects of industrial halal, defined by 31 (7 formal and 24 informal) out of the 46 surveyed producers, also showed an interesting trend. It should be noted that the technical aspects that are covered here should reflect what has been shared on the halal.bn page of HFCD as part of their information sharing mentioned in the earlier chapters. The responses were based on the question of how the producers ensured their production followed the halal principles as stipulated under the Brunei halal certification programmes. Based on the findings, the themes were organised into five subthemes covering the processes of sourcing raw materials, production, consumption as well as compliance with SOPs or requirements. Below is the table that shows the level of technical knowledge that producers have as part of achieving the desired industrial code of conduct under the Brunei halal certification and standardisation banner:

Main theme	Processes (subthemes)	FORMAL (n/7)	INFORMAL (n/24)	TOTAL
Raw materials sourcing	Suppliers of multiple industrial standards (ISO, GMP, HACCP, GAP)	3	0	3
Production	Utilisation of basic ingredients	2	1	3
	Suppliers having multiple halal standards (MAS-JAKIM, MUI, MUIS, and others)	4	0	4
	Suppliers that adhere to Brunei Halal Standard Requirement	6	4	10
	Bought from retail outlets/ Stores	7	14	21
	Industrial supervisions (HFCD trained)	2	0	2
	Industrial supervisions (Knowledgeable supervisors on Hygiene)	2	0	2
	Maintaining hygiene, sanitation of production spaces	4	3	7
	Passed MOH Hygiene requirements	4	3	7
	Ensuring no contamination in relation to workers	2	1	3
	Utensils (new/ not mixed with daily utensils)	3	1	4
	Food processed - not raw, no blood, cooked	2	0	2
	Recital of Basmallah - name of God	1	0	1
	Following Miscellaneous license requirements	2	0	2
	Employ all Muslim staff	1	3	4
	Food packaging and materials (food grade)	1	0	1
Consumption	Food produced (not doubtful)	0	1	1
	Food produced not harmful	1	3	4
Comply with government SOPs and requirements		4	0	4

Table 8. Technically derived dimension on halal assurance between formal and informal producers

Based on the analysis, it was found that the main themes that producers were concerned about when it comes to maintaining or ensuring the food that they produced remained halal showed the need to manage and monitor production, ranked first at 33 and followed by concerned over raw materials at 31. Interestingly, the concern over how their production affected consumers only comes at six, followed by the general belief that complying with government procedures is a way of maintaining halal production at four.

Concerning sourcing of raw materials, both formal and informal producers understand the requirement made by industrial halal as mentioned in the BCG 1. Ranging from the need to acquire raw materials supplies directly from suppliers, either holders of multiple industrial or halal standards to those that adhere to Brunei Halal certification requirements, be it supplied locally or bought from retail outlets, all the understanding on how they maintained halal assurance comply fully with the certification requirement. Most informal producers believed that purchasing halal-certified raw materials from retail outlets was acceptable as their production was not as large scale and quite often seasonal, reducing the need to acquire stocks in bulk at once as well as the request for halal certification directly from the suppliers or processors.

The technical aspects of halal production, concerning health and safety requirements, encompassing the principles of tayyiban, revealed significant differences between formal and informal producers. The aspects of hygiene, sanitation, and food safety encompass both the production and consumption phases of the products, while tayyiban in production covers several key aspects. Notably, the knowledge required to meet Brunei's Ministry of Health (MOH) standards, including pest control activities, microbial testing for ingredients like meat, restroom cleaning, and the condition of raw materials and semi-finished goods within storage spaces and equipment, was ranked as the most critical, with seven respondents emphasising its importance. Equally essential was the maintenance of hygiene and sanitation in production spaces, as highlighted by seven respondents. This technical knowledge, specific to formal and informal producers, differs from MOH's

requirements by focusing mainly on production spaces. It includes criteria such as workers wearing masks and headscarves, frequent cleaning of countertops, production machinery, and utensils used in production. Both formal and informal producers had an equal number of matching responses on this aspect – four formal and three informal producers, respectively.

Specific knowledge on BCG 1, which emphasises the separation of utensils and ingredients used in production from those in daily kitchens, was ranked second, with four respondents underscoring its significance. This separation is vital for preventing cross-contamination between ingredients used daily and those intended for mass production while ensuring compliance with halal ingredients as declared in halal applications and audits.

Moreover, three respondents highlighted the maintenance of workers' hygiene during food production, covering aspects of disease control, managing workers' interactions, and socialising within production spaces.

The remaining three technical requirements, falling within supervisors' industrial knowledge of hygiene and focusing on full compliance with now-defunct miscellaneous business license requirements as part of halal assurance, were each underscored by two respondents. Additionally, "the need to ensure that food is fully cooked, without being bloody, for salmonella and other bacterial contamination prevention" was emphasised by 2 respondents. They highlighted the importance of regulating food cooking temperature,

particularly for canned food, and ensuring deoxygenation to prevent microbe growth. Notably, all the respondents for these last three criteria came from formal businesses, with no representation from informal producers.

Regarding health and safety requirements for halal consumption, the technical specifications provided were somewhat limited in outlining criteria related to food packaging and the non-harmful nature of food production. The discussion on food packaging underscored the necessity of ensuring that materials such as cups and containers are of food-grade quality, devoid of solid or peculiar odours, and free from the potential transfer or seepage of printed materials such as ink or dyes onto processed food. Additionally, it was highlighted that packaging should have dual or triple internal layers. These insights were gleaned from both formal and informal food producers. Based on the experience of LIC, for instance, the auditors questioned her company over the safety of packaging used on her confectionary products, even though it had been approved during the first certification and permit application years before. The absence of the requirement from the guidelines was puzzling to her, and it disrupted her long-term partnership with the packaging supplier. This problem was experienced during the secondnd renewal of her halal certificate and permit.

Regarding the non-harmful aspect of food, it was generally agreed by four respondents – one formal and three informal producers – that strict safety consumption criteria must be met, with producers being responsible for ensuring that the food they produce is safe for consumption upon distribution to stores or supermarkets. Further inquiry on this matter

revealed that among the four respondents, only the formal producers provided detailed information, emphasising the importance of engaging logistics providers with proper refrigeration, vehicle cleanliness, sanitation records, and punctual delivery services. The significance of such service providers in the halal manufacturing industry was stressed, as improper storage and refrigeration, along with inefficient supply delivery, could compromise food quality, leading to deterioration before reaching consumers. These insights were based on the personal experiences of the producers, highlighting instances of mishandled food resulting in losses due to rejection by market distributors or sellers.

5.4 Everyday halal, technical halal or personalised halal? From basics to technical to customise: a discussion

Based on the descriptions of the businesses' halal knowledge and their understanding of its definition in Table 8, it can be argued that their definitions are, at best, basic and only capture what the researcher called the everyday halal aspect of production. The unevenness in halal definition and knowledge between formal and informal businesses, apart from the uneven access to government-organised workshops and talks, was also considered an outcome of the non-uniform access to the social media page, [halal.bn](#), which the government used as part of their information sharing and dissemination. Such unevenness stemmed from incongruity in HFCD's approach whereby most government briefings and workshops were solely dedicated to halal-certified businesses rather than the non-halal-certified businesses, both formal and informal. It raised the question of the effectiveness of current supervision enhancement programmes as it can

be argued that those who needed inputs and knowledge on halal certification the most should also include those who are involved in production and processing informally, particularly home-based businesses who are yet to be halal certified. This has been discussed in the previous chapter. While e-government via the halal.bn page did incorporate some technical information pertaining to gelatines, additives and their alphanumeric codes; clear linkages to halal were only made in postings from 2018 onwards. Halal knowledge sourced from school educational years (be it conventional or religious schools), family upbringing and socio-communal interactions are not enough to allow for more understanding of the technical halal side of production. The utilisation of religious books and religious sermons as part of halal knowledge acquisition is also not enough as the technical halal and other halal-related requirements exist beyond these realms of socialisation and interactions, in physical books or on the web which require the competency and ability to conduct research and be more resourceful, to be networked to the 'right' information bearer which also consumes more time that most these businesses did not possess.

In relation to technical halal, a minority of the 31 survey respondents demonstrated a comprehensive understanding of the intricate technical intricacies associated with halal certification, production, and oversight. Despite the dissemination of technical information on halal food in the preceding chapter, the survey and interviews revealed a noticeable absence of reference or application of this knowledge. The respondents, particularly informal producers, exhibited a limited grasp of the health and safety requirements related to halal production, as well as the crucial aspects involving components from GMP and

HACCP/ HCCCP in supervising and monitoring production processes. Their knowledge primarily revolved around basic, everyday halal practices, with minimal mention of the use of halal additives and preservatives in responsible halal production among informal businesses. The presence of a digital divide, along with the absence of workshops and briefings addressing the production aspects of halal aimed at informal, home-based, and online businesses in contrast to formal enterprises, stands out as a key contributing factor to the existing imbalance in industrial halal knowledge. These information asymmetries between the different business categories underscore the shortcomings of the halalisation strategies implemented during the study period.

For most formal businesses, their ability to gather information from various sources facilitated access to industrial halal knowledge. Companies such as AST, SRB, and NORB obtained information on Brunei halal, related halal requirements, and additional details about GMP/HACCP through their business associates, partners, and networks, some of whom had obtained Brunei halal certification. Additionally, they took the initiative to enhance their knowledge through online channels. On the other hand, companies like LIC, IDFD, and SMC also received direct technical assistance from the government during the certification process, although the outcomes were often mixed. Apart from networking and government technical support, the participation of formal halal producers in the halal supervision and improvement programs organised by HFCD can also be identified as a reason why these businesses possess a competitive advantage over informal enterprises in terms of technical halal knowledge and expertise. Some formal companies, such as CBRM, SMC, and IDFD, benefited from exposure to other industrial

standards like ISO, GMP and HACCP, which enhanced their knowledge and streamlined the halal certification process. Similarly, companies like AST and UOS take advantage of coupling their productions with halalised, experienced manufacturers to gain insights into Brunei's halalisation requirements. While interesting to study, such dynamisms show the existence of disparities in information, knowledge, and support between the two groups. The disparities in halal knowledge pose potential repercussions if left unaddressed over the long term, with informal, home-based, and transient businesses at a higher risk of suffering compared to well-connected, seasoned producers. This inequality also highlights a gap between standard-setting bodies, regulators, examiners, and enforcers, with discrepancies between their envisioned objectives and the practical realities of business and industry. The actual certification processes often deviate significantly from the ideals outlined in the guidelines.

With engagement from different government branches, the businesses' certification processes are expected to be smooth and without issues. However, these analyses were found otherwise, as evidenced by the emergence of spaces of resistance and opposition resulting from incoherency and incongruency in halal knowledge and information as it is operationalised and due to multiple halal governmentalities. For instance, the standard-setters and regulators' view that food producers should employ all Muslim staff is not in line with industrial halal, as stipulated in the certification guidelines, item 7.9 of BCG-1. The view that raw materials must be purchased directly from suppliers/ producers, not third parties, is also highly contentious, as viewed by NORB, IDFD, CBRM, and SMC, which are the first few to be certified. The point of contention is linked to

whether the use of intermediate ingredients processed by other firms but regarded as part of raw materials by these producers falls into this requirement. Regarding BCG-1, item 7.2. of the guideline stated, "every company applying for Halal Certificate and Halal Label must ensure that all raw ingredients used are halal and suppliers or sub-contractors who supply only halal materials or having halal certificates are selected". The four producers found that the requirement did not address their concerns. They explained that procuring directly from halal suppliers or their local distributors emerged early in halal certification. At that time, halal auditors from HFCD mandated sourcing all halal raw materials directly to eliminate the potential for contamination, mishandling, or uncertainty caused by business practices such as negligence, ignorance, or opportunism in procuring or supplying questionable materials, which are typically lower in cost and lack assured quality. This clause affected their businesses in the first two years of their certification, from 2008 to 2010. They faced problems obtaining information from distributors or suppliers, who refused to provide information because the businesses were too small to make such requests or because the suppliers did not intend to partner with local producers. This led to ongoing scrutiny from both HFCD and distributors, wasting valuable time and resources that could have been used for other aspects of business and industrial development.

In most recent updates over this technical requirement surrounding suppliers, it has been noted that HFCD has relaxed some of the requirements on item 7.2 above by allowing small home-based producers to acquire their raw materials, including certified finished products from supermarkets. The change of stance, particularly from 2012-2013,

according to the formal producers, was related to the outcry and grievances highlighted by most producers as they were forced to apply for standardisation, particularly when it was made compulsory for renewal of business miscellaneous licenses and more so in during the 2017 amendment. According to IDFD, SMC and NORB, the increase in halal applicants forced the certifiers to rethink the current requirement, shifting the goalposts towards a more irrational, subjective and circumstantial approach. Whilst those who had undergone earlier certification viewed the change as frustrating given the time they had wasted in the past, it was also necessary to allow businesses to operate slightly better. This reflects the experiences of EBS, SRB, and NORB in the following paragraphs.

The recent improvements in halal standards have raised new questions due to the shift from objectivism to pragmatism in halal governing. Halal standards previously adhered to objective requirements; however, evolving management methods, influenced by criticisms from the current governors, have introduced uncertainties. For example, the *ad hoc* requirements for direct raw materials suppliers compared to retail-based supplies, subject to certifiers' discretion, have affected item 7.2 in the BCG-1, presumably legally binding. This lack of objectivity and documented grounding leaves room for subjective changes, potential misinterpretations, reversals of decisions, and the emergence of new issues. Institutions play a crucial role in providing clarity and security through policy directions to help producers mitigate potential economic risks such as losses, low competitiveness, lack of market access, and over-regulation. The impact of halal certification on Brunei's businesses has leaned toward the negative due to diverse factors

encompassing institutional, localised industrial dynamics, and asymmetry in halal industrial governance.

Among the issues raised by producers were the conflict or contradictions between what has been preached and its actual practice in contrast to the understanding and approaches taken by producers, resulting in confusion and misinformation. Coupled with these confusions are the longer processing time and vague certification guidelines, which are holistic in name but divided in their implementation. Unsurprisingly, some of the KIVs in the post-audits main reasoning relate to a lack of business cooperation. Whilst HFCD claimed that businesses refused to cooperate or resubmit their applications, survey and interview findings proved otherwise. Some businesses endured months or years of constant visits to HFCD or through chain email communications to resolve issues. There have also been cases where halal applications submitted to HFCD, which were painstakingly being prepared, got lost or were misplaced, as experienced by SMC, IDFD and LIC, resulting in other rounds of preparations and reapplications.

Inconsistencies in certification challenges are apparent across various segments of the food industry. Notably, bakeries often encounter fewer obstacles, as indicated by interviews with two bakeries, EBS and SRB. Both establishments asserted that their production processes primarily utilise ingredients or raw materials from local supermarkets or grocery stores. Consequently, they do not need to request halal certification from local distributors and supermarkets since the products have already been certified as halal before entering the local market. SRB cited an example where the

meat used in their corned beef-based pastry and sausage-related products is typically sourced from retail outlets, with the company only needing to specify the products' source and the type of foreign halal certification obtained in the reports submitted to HFCD for permit applications and renewals. All three bakeries and pastry producers (SRB, EBS, and NORB) contended that their experiences, on the whole, are considerably smoother compared to other food sectors, primarily due to their use of basic ingredients and the nature of their predominantly baked and dried foods, which carry lower contamination risks.

Compared to bakeries, companies operating in diverse sectors such as SMC, SBFD, CBRM, and AST reported that their raw materials often necessitate more rigorous scrutiny and audit reporting to HFCD due to their products' more complex production processes. For instance, concerning meat, using processed, packed, or canned finished products from previously halal-certified producers is impractical as it contravenes BCG-1, which mandates direct sourcing from suppliers. Local manufacturers must not only furnish halal certification from their raw materials suppliers but also ensure that the abattoirs adhere to Brunei's halal standard requirements. This typically involves the dispatch of auditors from Brunei's HFCD to their production facilities overseas, mandatory microbial testing (as part of *tayyiban*) following MOH's Public Health Food Safety Act, and scrutiny from DAA before importation as well as during loading at Brunei's port, before approval for use in production. According to all four manufacturers, the producers bear the expenses incurred in bringing in auditors and covering their sustenance and accommodation, along with the costs of laboratory and field testing. Some of their products may fail these

laboratory tests, leading to production halts lasting weeks or even months, as previously experienced. CBRM, for instance, stated that the logistic costs alone could amount to BND20,000 (GBP11,230) for a single shipment, and parking at ports also incurs significant expenses. The more intricate the production process, the more challenging it becomes to secure halal certification. Additionally, the waiting time for obtaining halal certification is shorter for simpler production activities than other experiences. Consequently, there is a pressing need for regulatory authorities to aid and delineate the required level of rigour for the Brunei halal standard, as the findings indicate the presence of confusion in this regard.

Implementing technical halal standards is subject to customisation at departmental and individual levels and may vary domestically across different geographical locations. Auditors and surveillance managers often customise the interpretation of requirements based on their own understanding, akin to practices seen in ISO/HACCP/GMP audits. While this approach may align with basic or general halal principles, issues arise when applied to Sharia-compliant components. This jurisdiction encompasses the technical requirements of halal in industrial settings.

In the context of IDFD's varied business operations, which ranged from meat processing to restaurants and cafes, discrepancies were frequently observed where the technical halal requirements not only deviated from those specified under BCG-1 but were also subjectively applied by individual auditors. Similar occurrences were noted when SMC

relocated their production facilities to a site that manufactured a product distinct from their dry crackers. Enclosed below are excerpts from transcripts that substantiate these claims:

We had multiple stores, café and production premises across the four districts... The first to be halal certified was the premise in the capital. With the success, we copied the same template, processing zonation and what not for all our facilities, same layout and yet guess what? We failed the first few audits in Tutong district. We even employed the same contractor, using the same building materials, follow guidelines strictly but it was rejected. When we asked, the auditor only said, "in Bandar (the capital) is different, we have different requirements here". Also, we had one experience when our auditor, the officer in charge with our certification retired midway of our halal application processing. When a new officer came, a resubmission was required. We did ask why, and we showed him that we have followed the guidelines as advised. The usual answer given to us was, the retired officer did not know what he was doing, and we are in charge now since we are the specialist. So, we had to realign our activities based on these new officers, hence the 4 years delay in our certification and permit, loss of opportunities is inevitable.

(Imas, Manager of IDFD)

When we moved our fish and shellfish crackers production from our factory in the suburbs to the capital, we are confident that we are not against the procedures. We followed the previous SOPs in place in the former site, organised our current site following the ISO and HACCP layouts, and demarcate clearly between our current production site for sauces production and the crackers. We also informed HFCD on this move as stipulated in their instruction. But when the auditors came, they said we are not allowed to do this and hence, relinquished the permit for the crackers production. We pointed out that we have followed the requirements, instructions, we even pointed out why other factories can have mixed production sites and ours could not. It took us few months before they finally agreed. When we asked why the change in decision, there was no answer. Similar problem also experienced when one of our ingredients, a preservative from Malaysia, were considered not halal as the company had not get a valid halal certificate due to expiration. The company informed us and HFCD in writing that their halal certificate and permit is still being processed and there is no change with their production. But our side did not give in. So, we experienced months of no production due to this. We tried using other brand name but if we do that, we must start the process all over again. It is problematic.

(Manager of SMC)

For CBRM, the inquiry revolves around technical nuances of the extent of Brunei halal certification and permits. The company has raised queries regarding the comprehensive nature of Brunei halal certification and permit. Drawing from their operational encounters with halal standards, CBRM predominantly utilises imported raw materials such as meat,

chicken, and lamb in their production processes. These processed meats have often obtained halal certification from Brunei auditors at overseas slaughtering sites. Consequently, CBRM expected a streamlined process to secure halal certification and permits for their locally produced diversified products. However, this was not consistently realised as local audits impose additional requirements that resemble HACCP or ISO 22000 standards. This has raised a fundamental question about the definition of halal and the criterion used. Tsang, the manager of CBRM, possesses a comprehensive understanding of fundamental halal requisites. Consequently, incorporating the health and safety aspect, the *tayyiban*, has presented considerable challenges and perplexity since the company is also bound by other significant industrial standards such as ISO 22000 and HACCP, apart from the Brunei halal standard. Tsang contends that addressing this issue is imperative, as conformity to similar or identical requirements could result in redundant or repetitive processes that are inefficient and resource intensive. This challenge stems from Brunei halal standard incorporating HACCP, GMP, and ISO templates into its requisites, necessitating a clear delineation of its depth and breadth.

The incorporation of other criteria from major standards has led to some confusion, as revealed in interviews with businesses (MSB, SMC, IDFD CBRM) and suggesting a need for a shift in halal site auditing and visits practices. Interviews indicated that standard bearers/owners continuously negotiate and renegotiate their roles based on audit conditions. Despite businesses' compliance with halal Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and manuals submitted to the Halal Food Control Division (HFCD), auditors were perceived as lacking objectivity during site audits, as expressed by MSB, SMC, IDFD,

and CBRM. The HCHLO of 2005 gave rise to four Brunei Certification Guidelines (BCGs). BCG-1 is a guideline for businesses seeking halal certification, while the remaining three BCGs are intended for auditors and auditing purposes. However, as reported by businesses, audits often deviate from proper procedures and become mere 'checklist' exercises with minimal scrutiny of SOPs and manuals. Businesses claimed that auditors, burdened with heavy workloads, conducted surveillance audits hastily, only skimming through files rather than thoroughly scrutinising them. This approach not only consumes business resources but also calls into question the credibility of the halal certification process. With a staff of only 54 tasked with inspection, auditing, and processing and filtering of halal applications for the entire country, the governing capacity is overstretched. This overload has shifted from systematic, objective and logical halal standardisation to a more irrational, precarious and at times circumstantial approaches, undermining the purpose of impartial halal management. Such moves even raised doubts on whether religious questions rooted on halal are even considered in these instances.

In the context of the 1K1P scheme, businesses that have received support from government agencies, such as cooperatives under the Department of Agriculture and fish and prawn-based cracker producers supported by the Department of Fisheries, encountered challenges during the certification process. Renewals of halal permits for producers like SMC, MRB, and NORB were sometimes not approved due to non-conformances to the HFCD halal standard during compliance audits. Moreover, the Standard for Crackers from Marine and Freshwater Fish, Crustacean, and Molluscan Shellfish (PBD30:2016) under the BNSC, enforced by the Department of Fisheries, also

posed difficulties. Auditors attributed non-conformances to failing to adhere to standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Producer claims point to rigorous adherence to standards like PBD30:2016 and BCG-1 requirements, making the failed renewals seem unjustifiable despite assistance given by DOF. Their requests for proper SOPs yielded no response from HFCD. This lack of clarity is attributed to the fact that fish production standards within DOF's jurisdictions fall outside the purview of HFCD, which only holds authoritative status in halal product certification. Moreover, informal businesses that sought assistance from sister agencies such as the DAA also faced challenges obtaining halal permits due to technical requirements such as separate production kitchens. Such power unevenness within the halal authoritative structures added more complexities to an already complex structure-agency dynamics, with the industry and businesses bearing the shocks on the receiving end of the spectrum.

Adherence to the commandments and regulations outlined in the holy book and prophetic traditions poses no challenge for Muslims. However, meditating or mitigating the negotiating tendencies stemming from the everyday halal definition remains problematic and challenging. This is particularly evident when translating or codifying these basic principles into technical elements that were previously non-existent. Products created strictly adhering to Sharia-based requirements may be acceptable, yet they may not fully meet industrial halal technical requirements.

The industrial halal requirement represents an innovation, introducing new rulings to accommodate products and services that did not exist during the time of the Prophet. These rulings, known as Sharia-compliant requirements, create a dualism that necessitates balancing between Sharia-based and Sharia-compliant principles. The human responsibility of justifying, implementing, and making decisions in this regard introduces the potential for flaws due to the imperfect nature of humanity and its logic. Subjective interpretations of halal requirements also contribute to the confusion, as evidenced in the discussed transcripts.

Moreover, certain technical elements specified under the technical halal were originally imposed under the repealed Business Miscellaneous Licenses. As a result, it can be argued that the current Brunei halal certification and permit represents an updated version of the defunct Miscellaneous Licenses, infused with a halal dimension and subject to additional layers of personalisation and auditor subjectivity. Combined with conventional standards such as HACCP, ISO, or GMP, this creates a new layer of compliance and conformance checks, further complicating an already complex certification system.

5.5 Halal logo compliance: Status of compliance as of 2020

Findings from the research also suggested that halal standard adherence and compliance are achieved through legislation and enactments. Apart from granting certification and permit, HFCD is also authorised to levy fines and issuance of summons to businesses that fail to comply. Based on the interviews with HFCD, the officials argued that under Chapter 4 (5) of the HCHLO, businesses that refused or failed to apply for certification

after the end of the 2nd grace period will be fined not less than BND\$8,000 (GBP4,570) or imprisoned for not less than 2 years or both if found guilty. Subsequently, an amount of not less than BND100 (GBP40) will also be charged per day from the date of the guilty verdict onwards, should the offender continue to be non-compliant. Most officers argued that such legal fines and actions are necessary as these businesses are opportunists who need to be continuously monitored. Though harsh, the legal suits are meant as a deterrent rather than mere punishment. Under Chapter 6 (4) and Chapter 12 (3) of the HCHLO, similar legal fines and actions can also be applied to utilising an unpermitted or unrecognised halal logo, with the same fine amount but with a 3-year imprisonment period. According to the officers, any food products, be they processed or not, which are meant to be distributed to the public or sold from various distribution facilities such as groceries or department stores, cube stores or kiosks should have halal certification and permit and use the Brunei halal standard logo only. The use of other logos which both explicitly and implicitly state that their products are guaranteed halal or utilisation of statements such as “produced by healthy Muslims” will result in legal actions and forced removal of products from store shelves.



Image 3. Improper halal logos that failed to meet specifications (i. Brunei halal logo but not following required specs, in terms of colour, size, ii. & iii. using a halal logo considered illegal)

Despite using online platforms to disseminate information and use some real cases to set examples of non-compliance under the law and regulation subchapter, the images above showed the existence of some producers who still managed to sell their products even without using proper or acceptable halal logos. This includes using the simple Arabic halal logo against the proper Brunei halal standard logo specifications for distribution and retail. Clearly, such products should not be accepted by wholesalers/ retailers or distributors for sale. Its existence showed an unevenness in the applications of governmental corrective or surveillance action. Confusion over the approved use of Brunei halal logo stickers, particularly for imported food products, compared to an embossed or printed type of

Brunei halal logo to be used by domestic producers, also affects the price competitiveness of the local products against imported goods. Food that local non-Muslim home-based producers produce, on the other hand, was also refused by food kiosk vendors for fear of it being not halal or produced in an environment where fear of contamination, which is unproven due to no auditing at all, is high.

5.6 Reassessing the Effectiveness of HFCD’s Halal Consultation and Enhancement Workshops: A View from Below

As part of the good governing process and in an attempt to create a near identity with those affected by standardisation, the HFCD held public workshops and roadshows to inform stakeholders about any changes and new developments concerning halal certification. Findings from the survey conducted on the sampled groups showed the extent of their involvement in halalisation activities:




Figure 43. Sampled populations involved in various halal activities

Based on the chart above, out of the 44 samples, 16 (36.3%) of the businesses have attended government-sponsored halal training workshops or talks, 18 (40.9%) have applied for halal certification, and 26 (59%) have had some issues and concerns over the halal certification initiatives. Cross-sectional analysis of these samples reveals an interesting insight. Out of the 7 1K1Ps halal applicants, only two managed to proceed further with halal certification, one with being able to gain certification whilst the other is currently in progress. Of the five failed, three have undergone halal training workshops sponsored by the government. Two of the remaining firms that attended the workshop did not proceed with halal certification applications. As for the online businesses, only 2 out of 22 applicants formally applied for halal certification. These, however, were not successful. From the cross-sectional analysis, it can be argued that businesses that managed to gain support from the government, in this case from the District's Office, Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), were not guaranteed to obtain any halal certificate.

Based on the data collected, it was noted that only 10 out of the 16 businesses in attendance could provide feedback on the content of the workshops, specifically in response to question 11 of the survey. The feedback analysis from these 10 businesses revealed that the workshops predominantly covered six subthemes. These subthemes mainly revolved around information related to the application process for halal certification, including procedures, documentation, and processes (4), concepts related to halal food (3), and the enhancement of halal knowledge (2). The remaining feedback touched upon the workshop's role as a platform for government-public exchanges (1), the

importance of halal production (1), and its relevance in strengthening the Malay Islamic Monarchy (MIB) national ideology (1).

It was noted that the technical requirements for halal, which are essential for compliance and surveillance audits prior to halal certification or renewals, were not adequately addressed in the workshops. Additionally, deeper aspects of halal, beyond what was covered in the workshops, as well as requirements outlined in standards documentation outside the scope of halal, were mentioned as areas of omission. These technicalities were emphasised in previous discussions on the technical aspects of food but were not integrated into the workshop content.

Analysis of the transcribed data from the interviewees and observations on the recent public consultations on the amended HCHLO 2017 highlighted the ineffectiveness of these consultations further. Rather than garner public feedback or inputs in improving the amended halal standard and its requirements, it was used as a rubber-stamping platform to ensure that the public was updated on the current regulatory needs and fulfilment. In an interview with one of the online businesses, PPN, which is engaged in producing locally produced popcorn as well as one of the many informal distributors of imported international popcorn brands such as Garrett's, the respondent argued that his engagement with the HFCD during one of their roadshows resulted in the emergence of new issues. As mentioned before, informal local businesses, be it online, home-based or communal based, must have halal certification. In the case of PPN, the respondent's matter can be seen in the transcript below:

“When I attended one of the roadshows, I was asking for clarification whether finished popcorn product such as Garretts, mostly sold in the food cubes (kiosk) should also have halal certificate or permit. Since I am selling my own brand of popcorn as well, I just want to know what MORA’s stand on this is. I end up confused. How on earth is Garrett’s popcorn brought into the country informally through personal shoppers given options whether to be halal certified or not whilst my product has to apply for the compulsory certification? Does it mean it (Garret’s) is not compulsory to be certified? Might as well just sell the international products, which I think I will be opting for. When I pointed out that what they are doing would affect local producers negatively, they just responded that the rules have been set and it is what it is. There is nothing much you can do. It’s their decision”.

(Manager of PPN)

When asked in relation to the response from the HFCD, he informed that HFCD is still holding to their position of making local producers standardised in contrast to the informally imported goods. One of the reasons given by HFCD was due to the difficulty in monitoring goods brought in informally across the border. In the interviews with some of the HFCD officers, they argued that the Brunei Royal Customs and Excise Department monitors these activities. HFCD will only act should it receive complaints or official reports from the border agency about the entry of food products with no permit. Furthermore, the officers argued that it is their responsibility to maintain the halalness of the products processed and sold in the country. Hence, are the unevenness or unfair rules imposed on local producers, particularly the micro and informal producers, justifiable? This is unfair and unjust for businesses that operate based on sustenance rather than profit maximisation.

Similarly, SWB, a Brunei halal certificate holder, raised concerns about the newly revised halal certification and permit regulations during a recent interview. The manager highlighted how the regulations increased confusion and burden for distributors of home-

based products. SWB operates restaurants and food kiosks, using these platforms to sell and distribute traditional cakes and sweets to local customers. During a roadshow, SWB inquired about the status of their non-halal certified home-based clients, as the new regulations made certification compulsory. However, HFCD urged SWB to ensure their clients are halal certified and stated that distributing uncertified products would violate the updated 2017 halal regulation, potentially leading to prosecution and withdrawal of their halal certificate. SWB emphasized that most of their clients are small-scale producers and urging them to apply for certification could lead to their failure and exit from the market. According to SWB:

“These are businesses that are run by single-mothers, widows, old pensioners or even unemployed graduates. Urging them to be certified is like asking them to be guillotined. I am pretty sure that they will fail the field audits. How many of them really have stainless steel tables, bowls, pans or even trays to do the product mixing? These are not mentioned in the guidelines. It is too complicated....also, why do I have to ask them to be halal certified? I have a business to run, and this double checking does not help the businesses either”.

(Manager of SWB)

From these two encounters of producer experiences, the workshops are meant to be a tool to further enforce the authorities standing on the halal certification regardless of whether it is rational/ logical or not, or whether it protects the welfare of businesses or vice versa. The concerns brought up by SWB on behalf of their home-based partners are real. These are real issues which require real and sound solutions. Failure to address these affects further growth of the industry. These findings also suggest that the current ways in which halal certification is being governed is not effective and efficient. This is despite the implementation of pre-, during and post-halal certification processes coupled

with online spaces as a medium to share information and utilisation of real physical spaces to conduct learning and knowledge enhancement. The workshop lacks depth in sharing effective technical information regarding the certification marked by application failures or pending (KIVs) certifications. The disjuncture or disconnect that it unprecedentedly creates, stemming from normative Islamic ideals of governing that was envisioned showed the challenge of bridging the gap in translating theory into actual practices.

5.7 Inflexible Production and Product Development: Challenges towards business competitiveness and innovation

Continuous innovation and developing new products are essential for businesses to remain competitive. This is particularly pronounced in industries that emphasise their unique characteristics. The Brunei halal certificate and permit serve to ensure that production processes and resulting products meet standard requirements while also safeguarding the dietary needs of both Muslims and non-Muslims. One approach to achieving this is by implementing Halal Critical Control Points procedures (HCCPs), a modified version of the conventional Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) system. This procedure safeguards critical control points that pose potential contamination risks in each production phase and integrates the need to consider the halal aspects during product conceptualisation. This includes scrutinising the halal status of raw materials to be used.

The stringent nature of Brunei's halal certification is also evident in the scrutiny applied to each individual product throughout its manufacturing phases. However, these stringent requirements have also brought about inflexibility in production processes and product development for Brunei producers. Based on a survey of 13 halal-certified producers, 8 producers indicated that the halal certification limits their ability to choose from multiple suppliers for raw materials. Regarding flexibility in new product development, 4 producers reported positive developments [(Y+ve)], while one remained neutral [Y(N)]. The remaining six producers [$N = N(-ve) + N(N)$] cited limitations imposed by the certification in developing new products, with 4 [(N(-ve))] experiencing these limitations negatively. Please refer to the chart below for a visual representation of these findings.




Figure 44. Responses of producers on product development flexibility

Follow-up interviews were made with these producers, particularly those who answered no and were affected negatively. The following are excerpts from the interview transcripts and a summary of some conversations used to understand how the standard adoption

dictates new product development. CBRM and IDFD are mainly meat-processing companies that also produce other food products, such as beverages, whilst NORB is a bakery producing multiple products. Based on the experiences of IDFD, the requirement to have one permit for each product has quite often resulted in delays in new or rebranded products released into the market despite having used the same ingredients which was already Brunei halal certified under the guise of older products but with a new name or different way of processing. In their other experience in producing their gelato, IDFD also experienced setbacks in processing their new gelato. Based on the interview, the causes of such delay were related to the ingredients used. In IDFD's case, it was caused by their Italian imported green tea powder that does not have any verified halal certifier or logo, as well as the use of milk of the same brand but certified by different halal certifiers and imported from two different countries. For IDFD, some of their experiences with other products have led them to either continue developing or completely shelf the ideas.

As for CBRM and NORB, the transcripts below highlight their experience of going through such inflexibility. Other than the issue with ingredients, both of their experiences suggest the difficulty in trying to keep a close eye on each product's different stages of processing.

Below is the snapshot of the transcripts:

"What concerns me the most regarding the permit is not so much on the ingredients to be used but it was the additional process of looking into every little detail related to the production. You see the permit not only wants us to declare the ingredients use, but we must also monitor each step-by-step process, from taking the meat out of storage, prepping the meat to transferring them along the belt and grinder before it goes to the next stage of mixing with other ingredients. Oh, you need to also make sure that the mixing process follows the steps that you declare when you apply. Like, for example, if you declare that after adding salt, adding pepper is next, you have to follow this. It must be in order. This goes on for every single product produced every day. Made worse we have to keep records of this. So, let's say you want to change the ingredients a bit or wanted to make new recipes just to keep up with the current customer taste, you cannot do it with

the current permit. You have to apply for a new permit to do this. It will take a while. By the time approved, consumer already moved on to a different in-thing altogether...”

(Tsang, Manager of CBRM Company)

“When we were first audited, we have to work hard for it. The people from HFCD have to conduct 2-3 times on-site audit. There was one time where they wanted to know the origin of the brush that I used to spread butter and egg on our pineapple tarts. Since it was doubtful, we couldn’t get the permit. Alas, I have to substitute it with *Pandan* leaves. It is from nature so let’s see how they could get the certificate for that hahaha... We used to produce multiple products here but when we first applied for halal certification, we were advised to also includes these products for certification on top of what has been applied for. Because they won’t allow the mixing of ‘not yet’ Brunei halal certified with the ones that has been certified... So, all Brunei halal certified products must use the declared products, the raw materials in their processing... When the Golden Churn butter issue (porcine contamination) came up last time, we have to stop production and wait for the green light from MUIB. That was during *Ramadhan*, and we were supplying for *Eid*. We have no alternative materials because the declared ingredient was that brand. It affects our production timeline and that year it affected our sales”.

(HAB, CEO of NORB)

Based on other experiences by producer such as AKM, a noodle manufacturing company and AST, a micro meat processing firm, the inflexibility of the halal certification and requirements pushed them to be more extra cautious even before products are mass-produced. The interview with AKM, for instance, highlights some of their anxiety:

“Before applying for the certification, I made sure that all ingredients have been certified halal. For example, ingredients from Malaysia will have to be certified by JAKIM. They have to use this as it is acknowledged by MUIB. Since there are numerous certification bodies in Malaysia, I think the government is more confident if it is issued by the religious authority of the host country especially where the government is part of it. If you are using let’s, say halal certificate or permit issued by Halal Development Centre in Malaysia, it will not be acknowledged. Majority of our materials came from Malaysia. For our noodle products, the raw materials came from multiple partners within the region such as from Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, China and Indonesia... I would request for the halal certification of the supplies from each of their accredited institutions or lab....this is one of the new products that we will introduce in the local market soon. We are now in the process of registering the product under the Brunei halal certificate and permit. In order to ensure that this application is a success, I have discussed this with my 5 key partners/suppliers on what we should do and be aware of the key requirements that is needed under the Brunei halal certification. We will only proceed once we know everything is in place. Last thing we want is a delay in our production and product released. The thing that

makes it tough is that the Brunei halal certification processes differ from the others as it embraced the criterions or templates of HACCP...”

(HMR, CEO of AKM)

MH, manager of AST, on the other hand, shared her experience of going through the requirements. In her case, her production is not straightforward as the caning processes is being done by another local company. Below is an excerpt of her transcript:

“Before I applied for certification and permit, I would usually inquire on the requirements that they (HFCD) need. This is a way to prevent delays and other complications... I know I am not that young anymore, but I am still studying on factory processing practises via the internet and Malaysia’s MARDI. I studied GMP and compare and contrast which practises suits my processing... I used to use the giant wooden spoon or the plastic ones when cooking my products but (with halal certification) I cannot use them. I have to use stainless steel for everything from knife to spoon and pots as part of GMP... Since my food is canned by others, my products are cooked twice, once at home and then at their factory to kill off the bacteria and germs. In order to get halal, they will be looked at how you transport the material (to the factory), what containers is being used, vehicles cleanliness among others... As long as our production follows what we stated in our declared SOPs, during halal application, it should be fine.”

(MH, owner of AST)

Analysis of these transcripts shed light on some inherent issues that were hardly touched. From the need to follow religiously the step-by-step SOPs in manufacturing each good closely to the policy of ‘sticking to the declared ingredients only’, it proves that innovation in new products is challenging. The processes are so refined that it requires a lot of time and effort to ensure compliance are met both by the regulators/ auditors and the producers themselves. Even in cases where contamination occurred, producers were not allowed to adapt to these changes and choose different materials on the grounds that there were not listed as ‘approved’ under the product’s permit. Production have to come to a halt whenever this occur. In the case of NORB, the chain effects of such an event

resulted in declining sales during the *Eid* season that year. This is burdensome, and it does not reflect any enrichment for the producers. Based on the transcripts above, producers decided not to change their ingredients and apply for a new permit due to the longer processing time to approve it. On top of the time consumed in ensuring SOPs and halal monitoring were implemented, certification preparation also takes time and resources. This can be seen when AST and AKM companies have to put in extra effort in the preparatory stage of product development. For AKM, constant communication with her fellow suppliers and partners is vital during product conceptualisation and selection of 'acknowledged' halal certifiers for their raw materials. AST ensured that extensive research was done before applying for the halal certificate. Her partnership with another medium-sized processing firm for her canning process was also one of the ways to ensure her certification was followed through, i.e., by leveraging the use of automated machinery and anti-microbe processing. More questions emerged, particularly regarding the logic of adopting such a tedious monitoring mechanism. Why does the Brunei halal certification require in-depth scrutiny and procedural requirements for each product? What are the pros and cons of just endorsing the halalness of the raw materials to be used and allowing multiple products to be developed from it as being done by majority halal certifiers? These questions are beyond this research's scope and must be addressed in future research.

Analysis of the production spaces utilised by informal producers also showed an interesting finding that would impinge on their ability to expand and develop further because of HCHLO requirements. One of the common issues surrounding the halal application was the failure to meet the basic requirement of having a designated space

for production. The surveyed sample on online and 1K1Ps businesses showed that 26 out of 33 processed their products from home, where 18 used their daily kitchen whilst another eight provided designated spaces for production purposes. 3 of the informal businesses had standard production facilities (factories), while the remainder operated from mobile units (food trucks) or non-standard production facilities such as the Mosque's kitchen. Below is the chart highlighting this information:




Figure 45. Types of production spaces of informal food producers

The amended HCHLO of 2017 affects online businesses either to adapt to these changes or withdraw from the industry. This relates to the higher cost of fulfilling the requirements, where companies have to bear the cost of reorganising their production and investing in new infrastructures to meet the halal requirements. Previous analysis on the reasons for documentation KIV and cancellation/ dismissal reflected some issues relating to the halal requirements, significantly affecting the firm's growth. As of 2018, although there have been some amendments in certification requirements of which having a separate kitchen

for home businesses is highly encouraged but not compulsory (see previous chapter under technicalities of food), such amendment is still risky to some business owners as it is not endorsed legally by law or amended in the halal guidelines. The potential of being fined or compounded is inherently present. Plus, this amendment is likened a double-edged sword which can undermine the credence of the Brunei halal standard as the possibilities of cross-contamination from daily use materials is high. Businesses who had undergone the stringent certification of the past viewed this as an unfair decision and lamented on the loss of time, money and productivity that they could never recover due to the old halal regulatory requirement.

5.8 Ineffective time usage and additional monitoring

The current halal certification process has brought about several effects on production, including the inefficiencies resulting from excessive monitoring and compliance required from producers. The pre-certification process has also led to increased bureaucratic paperwork for producers, with some aspects being perceived as the responsibility of the authoritative body.

Based on interviews conducted with CBRM, UOS, IDFD, and NORB, it has been observed that producers are expected to furnish the auditors cum regulators with copies of halal certificates for each ingredient used in their production. While it is customary for such requests to be made for imported raw materials such as meat, poultry, chemical additives, and flavouring, it is surprising that these certificates are also required for

natural-based products. This was evident in the case of IDFD, where even green tea powder and Pakistani salt faced scrutiny, leading to the withdrawal of a local importer from the market.

For IDFD, dealing with such requests resulted in additional expenses and time to obtain halal certification for products like green tea powder, and a local importer faced market withdrawal over the halal certificate requirement for Pakistani salt. In the case of SMC production was delayed for over 6 months during their second halal certificate renewal process, as they were unable to provide a halal certificate for one of the acids due to their supplier's renewal process. Despite the supplier having provided ingredients to SMC for several years, the HFCD stood firm in not granting certification approval. The SMC manager, AH, had to maintain constant communication and appeal visits to the regulators to address the issue.

According to interviews, producers sourcing raw materials from supermarkets faced similar challenges. Micro-firms and cottage-based producers also had to request halal certificates for materials acquired from local distributors. Despite existing halal certification, small producers were obliged to provide HFCD with foreign halal certificates. Some small producers such as NORB, MSB and SRB faced difficulties as local distributors often ignored their requests due to the limited volume of their purchases. Medium to large enterprises such as AKM, CBRM and UOS also reported similar issues from small producers. LIC, a local confectionary producer, had to replace their plastic packaging with food-grade plastic to meet HFCD requirements. This led to the termination

of their partnership with the local supplier. The supplier later requested technical specifications from their overseas partner to resolve the issue. These instances highlight the vulnerability of local producers and their counterparts when facing challenges related to halal certification. CBRM's inefficiencies in setting up separate internal halal auditing teams and constant internal auditing processes have been noted. Tsang argued that the constant monitoring required for over 100 products is highly inefficient operationally, posing challenges not only for producers but also for enforcement agencies and auditors conducting surveillance audits.

The challenges faced by local producers, including YVG, IDFD, NORB, and UOS, present not only significant burdens but also illogical inconsistencies. An example of this is the requirement for a halal certificate for natural products such as Pakistani salt, a product originating from a Muslim-majority country, which seems unnecessary. Similarly, IDFD encountered difficulties when seeking certification for her green tea powder from an Italian supplier, as questions arose regarding the necessity for halal certification for natural products like coffee beans, tea leaves, and dairy milk. These experiences raise concerns about the lack of standardisation and logic in the approval process. NORB's experience with certification approvals for her pastry brush, made of natural pandan leaves, poses similar questions about the lack of standardised approval processes. Additionally, IDFD's encounters with the milk used in her gelato production and rebranded coffee highlight issues related to different certifiers and changes in supplier names. UOS faced challenges related to her packaging manufacturer's lack of a halal certificate, a situation that seems unnecessary considering the materials used. These hurdles not only burden

local producers but also call into question the fairness and justness of the halal certification process. Such challenges have detrimental effects on businesses and industry, revealing the ineffectiveness of the current governance in facilitating industrial growth. Furthermore, they shed light on the discrepancy between the preached ideals of the religion and their actual implementation, particularly concerning ethics, fairness, and justice within the Islamic community of which the businesses are part of.

5.9 Effects of halal governmentalities on food producers: Business performances, cost-efficiencies and effectiveness, and market accessibility

a) International Market Accessibility for MSMEs

The compulsory implementation of Brunei halal certifications, as detailed in previous sections, is attributed to its perceived superiority over non-state-backed, third-party standards. This is evidenced by the rigorous certification process and the incorporation of the HACCP template for the creation of HCCP, which accentuates its prestige, credibility, and quality as a state-regulated certification program. Nevertheless, it is imperative to acknowledge an alternate perspective in the context of export, which highlights the challenges faced by local producers in penetrating the international market. Among the 13 producers who endeavoured to engage in export activities, 7 expressed the view that the Brunei halal standard failed to facilitate international market access, primarily due to its lack of recognition by foreign trade partners. Additionally, the limited international exposure and recognition of Brunei halal standards and certified entities by pertinent agencies such as HFCD and MOFAT, among the few, emerged as significant

hurdles. As much as trade barriers are concerned, deficiencies in export management capacity, competence, and trade-related knowledge have contributed to the impediments encountered in the global trade of Brunei's halal commodities. Hence, while adherence to halal principles remains of paramount significance, the broader facets of industrial norms and conduct necessitate comparable attention to fortify the holistic advancement of the halal food sector.




Figure 46. Issues and concerns arising from product exports

The analysis of interviews conducted with six halal certified enterprises, namely AST, SMC, CBRM, MSB, NORB, and UOS, revealed the presence of persistent trade barriers. Despite being within the ASEAN region, the Brunei Halal Standard did not yield the anticipated positive impact. During an international expo in Dubai, SMC was surprised to learn that the halal standard was not recognised, as it had not been registered with the

regional halal institutional body. Similarly, CBRM faced obstacles when attempting to export processed meat products to Malaysia, being required to adopt Malaysia's MS certification to enter the market. UOS encountered a similar experience.

NORB, SMC, and AST's venture into the Vietnam market offered valuable insights. Although initially successful in securing an MOU with Vietnamese suppliers, SMC, a medium-sized firm with a daily production capacity of 40,000 bottles, faced challenges due to the lack of recognition of the halal standard, in addition to the necessity of obtaining ISO certification and addressing halal renewal issues. While initial market entry into the Czech Republic and Japan was successful in the first few years following halal certification (2008-2011), they had to withdraw from these markets due to the requirement for ISO or, at least, HACCP requirements. Their plans to enter Walmart in the USA were also postponed due to ISO requirements.

NORB's deal with Vietnamese suppliers was abruptly terminated due to their failure to meet the required delivery procurements. The need for HACCP or ISO certification was also stipulated for market entry. Furthermore, their attempts to enter the East Malaysian market were hindered by issues such as products being rebranded and sold without authorisation by local distributors, as well as facing threats for exporting goods without the proper legal permit.

In the case of AST, challenges arose within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade when her company was questioned about its ability to provide products equivalent to a 40 cubic foot container, even prior to any agreement being reached. This requirement

stipulated that only producers able to meet this quantity could export their products. AST found that utilising the Brunei halal standard did not afford her an advantage when engaging with international producers. Ghanim International, a government-linked company (GLC) initially established to support local businesses in their international export endeavours, ended up entering competition with local producers by exporting products from their UK-based meat processing plant to Brunei. According to AKM, who maintains close ties with Ghanim, their recent endeavour to export the first OEM local Brunei prawn crackers under their brand to China encountered a significant obstacle when their shipment was held in Nanning due to inadequacies in documentation and permits. Similarly, MSB and UOS encountered comparable challenges when working with Ghanim to export their products to Singapore between 2010 and 2012, where their products were either detained at ports or inadequately marketed. Despite the demand for halal products, companies seeking entry into the East Asian market, such as suppliers from Japan and South Korea, not only demanded ISO certification but also insisted on highly competitive pricing. The substantial production costs in Brunei, coupled with the high logistics expenses as will be discussed later, position the Brunei halal certificate at a disadvantage for international exports, overshadowing its benefits. Even for AKM, who achieved multiple successful exports to Indonesia, China, and Hong Kong, it is acknowledged that the national halal certificate and permit lack significant recognition. In AKM's assessment, confusion surrounding the homogenous use of the term 'Brunei halal' in the branding terms adopted by Ghanim International for their 'Brunei Halal Brand' products and the 'Brunei Halal' Certification process of the HFCD is one of the contributing

factors. Indonesia's reception of Brunei's standard, according to AKM, was only moderately positive.

Based on the available evidence, it can be contended that the Brunei halal standard does not offer local businesses the necessary advantage to export their products internationally. While it has succeeded in establishing a specific halal code of conduct among producers, as briefly evidenced in selected interview transcripts, the current governmentality of the halal program has thus far been unable to achieve the intended goal of advancing industrial halal development. This issue further highlighted the problems on lack of harmonisation of ASEAN halal standards mentioned in the earlier chapters (see Sa'adan & Pauzi, 2017 and Rahman & Razak, 2024). Apart from the lack of international recognition of the halal standard, evidence from interviews also indicates a deficiency in government support with regard to equitable dealings deemed necessary as an enabler of growth. Most arrangements between local producers and their international counterparts have been based on B2B transactions. For prospective industrial players, support from G2G is crucial to ensure the protection of both their interests and welfare. Despite the marketing and branding strategies employed by GLCs and the government, there is a pressing need to enhance the capabilities and capacities of not only local producers but also the competency of government agencies, though present but clearly inadequate. The establishment of a legal framework that safeguards local businesses as they expand, as well as clear information delineating this process, are pivotal initial steps. However, it remains uncertain whether these measures will be

realised, especially considering the fluctuations in energy prices, which has prompted the government to implement stringent cost-cutting measures.

The HFCD, as the regulatory body for standards, has provided limited support to producers at an international level. According to HFCD, four government agencies have been involved in regionalizing and internationalizing the Brunei Halal Certificate and Halal Permit. These include the Foreign and Direct Investment Section of the Prime Minister's Office, the Global Halal Industry Development Division (under the Department of Energy and Industries), Prime Minister's Office, Darussalam Enterprise (DARE), and Brunei Economic Development Board (BEDB). These agencies have assisted in marketing and branding the Brunei Halal Certification and Halal Label. While the government has encouraged and promoted Brunei halal products at major local and international expos, trade facilitation has proven to be more challenging than simply increasing product exposure.

During the Trade Facilitation Workshop between Brunei and South Korea in July 2017, South Korean delegates advised local producers to enhance the image of their food products by obtaining international certifications such as ISO or HACCP and the Halal stamp (Kon, 2017). From the perspective of Islamic governmentality, there is a need for clear direction to guide the industry towards beneficial outcomes for the community. An impartial assessment of the economic impact of the certification on local businesses, including the external factors hindering industry progress, is crucial for the industry's advancement. This assessment should address the economic costs among MSMEs

resulting from the certification, as well as examine whether the current halal governance aligns with the five principles of Maqasid Sharia, specifically related to wealth accumulation and distribution (*Mal*), posterity (*Nasl*), safeguarding of the intellect (*Aql*), safeguarding of the human-self (*Nafs*), and faith (*Ad-Din*).

Furthermore, the multiple governmentalities governing halal certification are complex and multi-dimensional, necessitating a comprehensive approach to effectively manage the certification process. It is imperative to assess how this can be materialised despite the inconvenient dissonances.

Data obtained from interviews indicates that the majority of producers think that the utilisation of the halal logo does not confer additional advantages to their products. Initial analysis of the interviews suggests that one of the contributing factors to this sentiment is the attitude and preferences of local Bruneian consumers. Producers such as SMC, LIC, MSB, SRB, NORB, IDFD, and UOS generally posit that Bruneian consumers are generally indifferent to the presence of the halal logo, especially when they are aware that Bruneian Malay Muslims produce the products. For instance, SMC's market research on consumer preferences indicates that only 57% of consumers are concerned about the significance of halal certification and logo. Similarly, LIC, NORB, SRB, and MSB concur that Bruneian customer prioritise lower prices over certification, as evidenced in their interview transcripts. The combined analysis of the interviews, including IDFDs, reveals that most of their customers are repeat and intergenerational buyers influenced by family and cultural factors. The convergence of these preferences for lower prices and the

presence of loyal customers impedes these businesses from raising prices due to concerns about undercutting competition from cheaper, more varied imported goods. Paradoxically, local enterprises observe that the public demonstrates little apprehension toward purchasing imported products or dining at international franchise outlets, which escalates prices annually due to inflation. Additionally, local producers note that the inclination to raise prices is often thwarted by the fear of public backlash, potentially leading to complaints lodged with the Department of Economic Planning's price control division. This, in part, elucidates the rationale behind the low profit margins. For these enterprises, survival is contingent upon reducing the weight or quantity of food per unit or diversifying into ancillary ventures beyond food production.

b) Increase in Cost Operations: Unintended Outcomes of Halal Certificate

Analysed data on the average cost of production shows the high cost of processing products in Brunei. Concerning the halal certification and logo, the 2005 law stipulated the need for businesses to adopt the purple Brunei halal logo on their food products. Most producers argued that the current specifications of the halal logo, especially its colours, cost them more in terms of packaging, making it expensive for businesses to remain competitive. This is due to the special colour of the new halal logo. Most of the known halal logo within ASEAN and internationally comprised of primary colours that were cheaper to print. In the case of the Brunei halal logo, however, producers must opt for full-colour printing, where print moulds or blocks use more than four colours just for the logo alone. These exclude the additional colours that producers wanted for the rest of the

packaging. The table below shows the average cost of production in Brunei, including the profit margin for 9 out of the 12 certified halal producers surveyed.

Firm	AVERAGE COST PRODUCTION (%)			REMARK
	RAW MATERIALS AND OTHERS	PACKAGING	PROFIT MARGIN	
AKM	70	40	30	
NORB	40	50	10	
MSB	50	25	25	
IDFD	71	4	25	
UOS	80		20	
CBRM	90		10	Exclude maintenance and other recurring cost
AST	75		25	
SRB	65		35	Exclude operations
SBFD	85		25	Exclude compensation

Table 9. Cost of Production for sampled firms




Figure 47. Average cost of production for all sampled firms

The image below shows the differences between the old Brunei halal standard logo and the recently introduced Brunei halal standard logo introduced by the BRIC in partnership with the former MIPR:




Image 4a: Halal Certificate and Food Label Order, 2005,

Image 4b: Halal Certificate and Food Label Order, 2005 (Amended 2007)

Based on the information provided, the old halal logo utilised primary colours and consisted of three colours: black for the 'Halal' Arabic alphabets and circular outlines, white for the circular ream-filled colour, and green for the Arabic and Roman alphabets spelling the Brunei Islamic Religious Council. This old logo, due to its use of four primary colours, was more cost-effective to produce compared to the new halal logo, which required a minimum of six colours. Printing the new logo as a full-colour print incurred additional charges and using more colours for product packaging and branding increased the overall cost.

A review of the tabulated response showed that certain producers, namely AKM, NORB, and MSB, incurred high packaging costs, accounting for 40%, 50%, and 25%, respectively. In contrast, IDFD managed to maintain lower packaging costs. One contributing factor to this outcome was printed stickers with the halal logo, separate from

the wraps or skin. Most local halal-certified producers surveyed opted for embossed or embedded paper imprints, a standard practice among major international producers. It can be inferred that local businesses incurred high costs for logo printing in their production processes. Limited companies were willing to disclose the actual monetary value of such printings. For CBRM, the printing cost for 6 colour prints would be BND7,200 (GBP4,100) per printing, but to obtain the right colour for the Brunei halal logo, additional two-colour blocks are required, and each additional colour block costs BND28,000 (GBP15,500). The total cost of operations alone is CBRM BND150,000 (GBP84,300), which excludes raw materials and machinery maintenance. Hence, it was unsurprising that their production costs were at 90% or more. For AKM, 40% of the total 70% of their average cost of production was solely on packaging. The value they spent on full-colour printing, including the logo, was BND11,000 (GBP6,150) for 6 months of packaging. In their case, the amount spent on changing each mould or colour block is BND1,200 (GBP675). On the other hand, AST spent between BND8,000-9,000 for each of her production, which occurred once every 3-4 months for one type of product. A breakdown of her production shows that canning and packaging alone, which include halal logo printing, costs her firm BND2,000 (GBP1,120) and BND5,000 (GBP2,800), respectively. Other additional costs needed to be done in relation to the halal requirement. Other costs of production relating to halal requirements, such as costs of Food Safety Analysis, renovation of premises for ISO purposes (as part of the halal requirement in the case of IDFD and SMC), Veterinary logo and HACCP (as in the case of CBRM), as well as pest controls and others, will be mentioned in the next subsection of the analysis. In a nutshell, production cost in Brunei is very high, with a total average of 78.3% from the 9 samples.

With the halal certification, tightening the requirement meant more indirect leakages (spending) on halal-related management activities. Costs relating to logistics and production reorganisation have been touched on before.

5.10 Reorganising production and additional costing in the name of halal standard adherence and compliance: an unwarranted socioeconomic cost towards the *Umma*?

Whilst compliance and adherence to the halal standard can be used as a proxy for the envisioned halal code of conduct for Brunei agri-food producers, the issue of whether it is fair and just towards the socio-economic welfare of the producers needs to be investigated. Apart from the actual operational and production costs discussed previously, how the standard is being governed negatively affects wealth accumulation. Regarding the wealth creation aspect of the Maqasid Sharia, such detrimental effects of the halal standard governing are against the Islamic principles of fairness and justice, particularly at times when the affected communities are only doing business in the name of daily sustenance and survival, a way to make ends meet. In the previous subsection, it was found that other than the production cost of raw materials and packaging, producers were also demanded to comply with various production standards. These include the need to have food analysed for its safety before consumption and distribution, additional veterinary logo, and HACCP in the case of CBRM, renovation of production facilities or premises as experienced by IDFD and SMC, as well as environmental screening of facilities for the purpose of hygiene and sanitation. There have also been instances where

some producers must apply and acquire certification outside Brunei due to the inability to provide such services at home. All these issues will be discussed in depth in the next few paragraphs.

Throughout the inquiry into the impact of halal certification on production and processing methods, insights obtained from a survey of 13 halal-certified firms, detailed in the diagram below, revealed compelling feedback:




Figure 48. Effects of halalisation on production and processing activities

The findings indicated that most firms (n=13) reported that the transition had elicited positive changes [Yes-positive (Y)(+ve)] among the identified aspects of production and processing susceptible to change. Specifically, 9 respondents emphasised improvements in training and human resource development concerning halal practices. In comparison, categories on the enhancement of ‘processing facilities’ and ‘hygiene and sanitation systems’ garnered positive improvement from 5 respondents in each category. Furthermore, 4 respondents mentioned categories such as the ‘maintenance of hygiene

and sanitation systems' and the 'reorganisation of supply chain and networks' also garnered positive responses.

Contrastingly, 28 responses reflected 'no change' and 'neutral' (NN), while 14 indicated change with neutral effects (YN). Notably, 9 responses articulated that halalisation had led to negative changes (Y-ve) in their production and processing activities across all subthemes. Among these, 5 firms reported increased overhead costs in production-related activities, 3 highlighted challenges in adapting to the altered supply chains, and 1 expressed significant transformations in processing facilities, leading to substantial renovation and restructuring costs.

Regarding their halalisation strategies and compliance with the BCG-1 requirements between 2015 and 2016, firms IDFD and SMC encountered challenges in implementing HACCP and ISO 22000 standards, respectively. Both companies received encouragement from the then MIPR and Ghanim International to expand their market reach by adopting these recognised standards to align their products with the Brunei Halal Brand. While anticipating government subsidies, the companies were required to bear the initial costs associated with HACCP and ISO certification processes, including premises renovation and modifications to production systems to conform to the specified criteria.

However, despite the initial support, the anticipated subsidies did not materialise. IDFD reported that MIPR reversed its decision, leading to significant financial losses for the company. Similarly, although optimistic about ISO subsidisation, SMC did not receive the

expected support between 2018 and 2020, leading to substantial financial setbacks. Specifically, IDFD incurred expenses exceeding BND1 million (approximately GBP600,000) for facility renovations, equipment purchases, internal and external audits, and ISO auditor fees over a 4.5-year period. On the other hand, SMC recorded losses of approximately BND80-90,000 (approximately GBP50,000), excluding additional operational costs incurred during this period of certification pursuit.

The failure to receive expected government support undeniably contradicts the core principles of ethical, economic governance, particularly concerning fair and just wealth creation to foster communal prosperity, as envisaged in Islamic economic principles. These unforeseen financial burdens resulting from the withdrawal of promised support undermine the principles of the Islamic economy that were intended to promote equitable and ethical business practices.

Adopting existing criteria from other standards, integrated with supplementary halal requirements, particularly those encompassing the *halalan tayyibban* principles, can enhance the branding and prestige of halal products, thereby facilitating greater market penetration. However, the evidence thus far proved otherwise. Hence, what are the effects of this standardisation on communal well-being? Rooted in Islamic principles, the term *Umma* (Commune) is often closely linked with the collective well-being of the public, which should be safeguarded and prioritised. The prevalent literature on halal food and industry confines the concept of *Umma* to the public and consumers. As previously highlighted in this thesis, it is argued that the segregation of businesses, i.e., the private,

from the public not only dehumanises them as mere material objects but also disconnects them from society. While this approach may streamline policy implementation by reducing businesses to statistical figures, it adversely affects the well-being of these entities, which comprise individuals, families, and communities, prioritising the public's welfare over theirs. Notably, the Brunei research presents an intriguing aspect as many micro and small industrial players, including online businesses and participants in the 1K1P initiative, operate informally to sustain themselves and their families. Moreover, formal SMEs and micro-enterprises are also involved in multiple downstream activities, with food processing as a supplementary income source. The subsequent graphs depict these distributions:




Figure 49. Food processing as a primary and secondary income generator (ii) Distribution of groups relying on food processing as main and secondary income generator

Upon reviewing the data collected from 46 businesses, a noteworthy trend emerged. The analysis revealed that 5 out of the 46 surveyed businesses engage in multiple types of food businesses, considering them as the primary source of income for their families. Among the surveyed businesses, 22 formal establishments identified their food businesses as the main income generator, while 16 informal businesses held a similar perspective. Additionally, 5 formal businesses regarded their operations as a secondary income source, while 11 informal businesses shared this viewpoint. In summary, 38 business owners regarded their food processing business as their primary source of income, while only 16 considered it a secondary source. Further examination of the distribution in the chart demonstrated that among the food processing businesses, 10 business owners worked as industrial workers in low-income, blue-collar positions. Additionally, 8 producers were either unemployed graduates or retirees. Moreover, 5 business owners were engaged in restaurant ownership, and another 5 were in unspecified jobs. Notably, one business owner worked in the banking sector, while another served in professional services as a make-up artist. The secondary income group primarily consisted of individuals in the education sector (4), personal services (3), and wholesalers (3). Moreover, there were 2 business owners from the banking sector, 2 unemployed graduates, and one business owner each from the industrial and Defence services.

The ownership of multiple businesses by five producers is an interesting point to note. These producers argued that in addition to the high operational and packaging costs, the decision to diversify their businesses was influenced by the additional expenses

associated with monitoring and obtaining a halal label through certification. To mitigate the high cost and low returns of halal food processing, many of these businesses ventured into other enterprises, such as CBRM in bottled mineral water production, SBFD in construction and real estate, and LIC in eateries beyond confectionaries. Mandating halal certification without thoroughly understanding its implications on businesses could impede the growth of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). While the "Halal for All" initiative safeguards consumers, it poses new challenges for struggling halal food businesses, potentially leading to the exit of many players from the market, particularly micro-small, formal, and informal businesses that operate for sustenance rather than expansion.

Groups such as unemployed graduates, retirees, blue-collar industrial workers, and personal service providers may experience negative growth or a decline in their businesses if they pursue halal certification. Successful and unsuccessful certification applications from established formal food producers reveal the intricate nature and challenges of meeting the technical halal requirements. The high setup costs and low investment returns (ROI) further compound the challenges producers face.

Considering the backgrounds of the business owners, it is adequate to comprehend that these businesses are intended to generate additional income during economically challenging times. While Foucauldian governmentality aims to understand the methods of governance and the government's capacity to restructure and reorganize in response

to emerging issues, doing so without a clear purpose, and failing to address problems with solutions may lead to regressive governmentality.

Disciplining and normalising a code of conduct resulting from the spatial reorganization of governing structures, normalizing issues and grievances without a genuine intention to resolve them, and continuous disciplining without understanding the implications or associated costs signify a governance failure. Adjusting the rules through restructuring instead of directly intervening in the mentality of individual and communal conduct allows for dissipating criticisms or challenging questions of governance processes but also creates another layer of complex government-citizen interrelations, leading to further confusion, uncertainties, and anxiety for industrialists.

The emergence of issues related to the Brunei halal standard's industrial governmentality underscores a lack of competency and knowledge not only in how businesses function and operate, but also in understanding the industrial system. This has adversely impacted industrial growth. Despite the implementation of the Brunei halal standard and additional requirements, such as HACCP and GMP, the government's intended support for industrial growth has had counterproductive or negative effects. The need to obtain additional certifications from abroad, such as the Food Analysis Certificate and HACCP, reveals a lack of appropriate structures and support services to facilitate growth. Even when funds are allocated for ISO and HACCP certification purposes, the support provided is seen as only partial based on producers' experiences. This highlights the governing bodies' inability to fully understand and assess the implications of implementing the new

halal standard and withdrawing support for emerging businesses. The incorporation of HACCP and GMP requirements into the Brunei Halal Standard as part of its HCCP has further complicated the already complex processes governing halal production and its religious principles. Failure to address this issue will further hinder the already stagnant halal food production industry, making it difficult for domestic businesses to compete against major international players brought in by foreign direct investments. The compulsory HCHLO of 2011 and subsequent amendments in 2017 negatively affected business growth and laid the groundwork for new issues and problems for relevant agencies if left unresolved. This calls for an authoritative body that not only makes decisions following legislation or halal law but also considers the implications and costs of their governing across the industrial system while listening to feedback from stakeholders. Recognising this will enable the development of a more robust halal governing mechanism that can proactively respond to potential threats affecting government credibility and trust in the halal food industry.

5.11 Emergence of opportunistic agents: Consultants and freelance

An analysis of interview data has highlighted the rise of local consultants, both freelance and licensed businesses, due to the mandatory halal certification. While this has created a new professional market and job opportunities, these consultants have contributed to increased certification costs. Primarily, these entities assist businesses with tasks related to halal application, third-party auditing, and business advisories. According to a 2010 newspaper report, the minimum fee charged by these companies was approximately

BND1,500 (Chia, 2010). It was noted that one of the companies primarily employed retirees from the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) (Chia, 2010). The fees were determined based on the number of products or menus requiring auditing, as well as the complexity of the production process. LIC's manager, HL, confirmed these costs to be high based on discussions with business peers. It was reported that some new cafes in the sultanate were charged between BND3,500 to BND5,000 (approximately GBP1,950 – GBP2,850) for 100-150 products. Additionally, it was suggested by IDFD that consultants charged fees between BND1,000-2,000. While the number of these companies or individuals remains uncertain, interviews with HFCD officers estimated the presence of two companies and eight or more freelance consultants operating discreetly. These estimates were drawn from their encounters during surveillance audits. Furthermore, insights from IDFD, based on the experiences of their relatives or close family members running such businesses, revealed practices concerning under-the-table dealings and exploitative behaviour in utilising these services. It was argued that while IDFD underwent a two-year certification process, companies using consultant services managed to expedite their approval by leveraging their networks and insiders within the ministry. These consultant companies, which remained unmonitored and unregulated operations, have escalated certification costs in Brunei, leading to confusion among businesses and potential certification applicants. Evidence of this confusion is reflected in KIVs, rejections, and dismissals of halal certificate applications.

5.12 Distrust, Selective Market Entry, and Religious Materialism

The analysis of the interview data reveals a growing sense of distrust among businesses, especially between Muslim-owned or managed businesses and non-Muslim-owned/managed ones. This lack of trust has become apparent due to differences in the approval rates experienced by these businesses. Most Malay-Muslim-owned businesses seeking certification suspect the presence of corrupt practices, as their certification approvals tend to be delayed compared to those of non-Muslim-owned businesses. These claims, however, are unproven or, at best, hearsay, as seen in the following paragraphs, where even the non-Muslim owners experienced the same repercussions from the delays. While instances of such delays have been experienced, addressing this issue is beyond the scope of this research. The interviews with various organisations, including SBFD, LIC, SMC, and NORB, also confirm the existence of such distrust, although the reality of the claims remains unproven based on the analysed information.

According to the halal certification law, Muslim and non-Muslim-owned businesses are encouraged to apply for certification if they intend to serve Muslim consumers. However, they must appoint two Muslim halal supervisors to undergo a certification program involving religious knowledge tests, practical assessments, and matters related to production and operations. While medium and big businesses have the resources to employ Muslim workers, this poses a significant challenge for micro and small businesses, especially those owned by non-Muslims.

A respondent in the informal business survey, NR, who is of Chinese descent and a Brunei citizen, experienced prejudice when his products were rejected based solely on

his non-Muslim background without a formal investigation. IDFD reported similar cases from other suppliers. Assumptions were made about the non-halal nature of the products without substantial evidence or fair investigation. Despite challenges, some non-Muslim informal operators have successfully supplied food products to local Muslim consumers. For instance, LSW, a non-Muslim home-based food producer, managed to sell their products from their home kitchen due in part to their long presence in the market and the existence of a Muslim family member who intermarried with a local Malay. It is noteworthy that NR, despite being non-Muslim, demonstrated an understanding of the etiquette of Muslim food production. He diligently adhered to Islamic religious principles by using new utensils and refraining from mixing raw materials with non-halal products. Despite his efforts, his application for halal certification was rejected due to the requirement to employ halal supervisors and the perceived complexity of the certification requirements. Interviews with stakeholders such as AST indicated the challenges that non-Muslim businesses face in meeting the religious test for halal certification. Some questions were deemed irrelevant and digressed from the core concept of halal. From an Islamic governing and moral governmentality viewpoint, the emergence of distrust within the business community and institutional regulatory regime is deemed antithetical to Islamic governance. Fischer (2016), in his book, claimed that the halal industry might slowly see a rise in religious materialism, a phenomenon where the halalisation processes and its related activities at the industrial level are focusing more on material and mechanistic aspects of halal production rather than the deep religious debates and questions that matters the most (Fischer, 2010). These issues breed divisions, unfair practices, and contradictions in Islamic moral governance. After rejecting his halal certification

application, NR switched to producing different food products, such as pickled fruits. The 2017 trends in the halal industry may have significant implications for businesses, underlining the need for further research and intervention in this area to promote fairness and inclusivity in halal certification processes.

Concerns have been raised not only by non-Muslim-owned businesses but also by halal-certified Muslim-owned businesses regarding the current governance of standardisation. Companies such as CBRM, UOS, SMC, and NORB have expressed dissatisfaction with the personalisation of halal auditing and criteria requirements during certification surveillance audits and renewals. They have highlighted issues where previously approved standards were not revalidated during renewals, leading to uncertainty and a lack of transparency.

These companies have emphasised consistently applying standard operating procedures (SOPs) and other requirements during renewals. They have also pointed out the lack of feedback and communication from auditors, which hinders their ability to address non-conformance issues and make necessary improvements. Moreover, the absence of timely authorisation for document approvals has resulted in operational inefficiencies and increased business costs. This has been attributed to the lack of a comprehensive governance system, which inadvertently overlooks certain groups within the industry. The current processes for halal certification and permit-related activities may be experiencing capacity challenges, leading to lapses in feedback and administrative delays. This

situation raises ethical concerns and calls for a more transparent and supportive approach to rectify issues and resolve conflicts within the halal certification framework.

Therefore, issues such as distrust and racial marginalisation, particularly about new entrants in the halal food industry, as well as negligence resulting from government oversights, are undoubtedly non-Islamic, unfair, and unjust. Failing to address these problems breeds increasing distrust, creates new conflicts, and destabilises communities within society, going against the very principles of conflict resolution and avoidance that Islam preaches. The unevenness in approaches towards problem resolution and advisories also needs to be addressed to allow for uniform responses that will help increase the credibility and credence of HFCD as managers, regulators, and enforcers.

5.13 Summation of the chapter's key arguments

Despite the repetitive attempts by HFCD as the main halal certifying agency that manages applications, halal auditing, industrial management, enforcement, and information and knowledge bearer, numerous issues remain arising from the overall halalisation programme. Based on the findings and discussions in this chapter on the effects of halal governmentalities on the certification of local food producers (SRQ 3) and the evaluation of the effectiveness of current halal governing programmes (SRQ 4), the effects have been mixed with more problems arising rather than solutions. The effects of the vagueness of the certification process, as pointed out by SBFD, SMC, and CBRM to requirements on premises layout, for instance, as well as incongruency and lack of details

on the Halal Act and guidelines, have confused producers. Similarly, as seen with the issues on halal logo usage, for instance, the diverse or multiple interpretations of the halal law and guidelines have resulted in the non-uniform standardised implementation, with uneven cost implications towards the competing producers.

The experiences of respondents in relation to halal certification were shaped by multiple axes of social differentiation, including gender, class, digital literacy, and religious knowledge. For example, smaller informal producers—many of whom were women and retirees—expressed more difficulty navigating the certification bureaucracy, echoing findings from other studies where state regulation disproportionately affects marginalised or informal actors (Lynch, 2011; Kabeer, 2000). Larger or formally registered businesses, by contrast, often viewed halal certification as a strategic market necessity although its sought after effects have dwindled compared to the first time it was initiated. Age and digital literacy were also relevant factors; younger entrepreneurs were more comfortable engaging with digital application processes and social media branding, while older vendors cited challenges in adapting to digital technologies (Selwyn, 2004). Furthermore, differing levels of Islamic knowledge influenced how producers interpreted the purpose of certification: some framed it as a religious obligation, while others viewed it as a regulatory burden or both. These diverse positionalities illustrate the importance of recognising the stratified experiences of governance (Dean, 2010), and avoiding analytical overgeneralisation in interpreting how halal governmentality is enacted in practice.

Unevenness in halal certification guidelines implementation has been experienced by IDFD and SMC, contrasting with HFCD auditors who claim to follow the standards. The subjective interpretation of halal guidelines, especially IDFD's experience at a multi-district level and SMC at an intra-district level, has led to discrepancies. The current implementation of amendments to the Halal Certificate and Halal Label Order 2017 has further highlighted these discrepancies. HFCD is ready for enforcement in 2017 legislation-wise, but the terms and conditions regarding halal requirements for businesses are still undergoing amendments, leading to uncertainties. Businesses are currently required to use old terms and conditions documents for new certification and renewal purposes. Interviews with businesses revealed non-codifiable transferable knowledge, as there are differing depths of understanding of technical industrial halal requirements compared to the everyday, religious interpretation of halal among businesses. Furthermore, the implementation of industrial halal certification faces challenges in bridging the everyday and technical halal aspects, raising conflicts and contradictions within these halal knowledge spheres.

Inefficiency in certification process resulting from human resource problems of HFCD as experienced by SMC, AKM and LIC in certification renewals also affect the halalisation programme. HFCD's interview session on staffing and application KIVs, the officer's response on their overarching roles as auditors, administrators, enforcers as well as halal trainers, the questions they raised over the role of the halal lab as well as their statements on how at one time there exist only 20 out the 50 officers resulting from the need to monitor slaughterhouses outside of the country became the source of inefficiency.

Countless SOPs and different sets of guidelines have also been identified as the source of inefficiency, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The HFCD believed they had enough capacity to conduct everything, but statistics on halal KIVs or pending cases showed otherwise.

Ineffective information sharing mechanism as reflected in the diverse yet lack of depth information and knowledge relating to the standard's requirement, the multiple interpretations of halal – from everyday to technical to personalise/ customise halal among businesses and auditors, the unevenness in degree of awareness on the halal guidelines, halal logo's positive and negative feedbacks are empirical evidence to support such ineffectiveness. The exclusivity of halal standard governing, the shuratic principles practised by the BIRC or majlis did not reflect those of Islamic institutions but of overcentralised, hierarchical structures infused with the shura with none or limited feedback loops mechanism from the grassroots, operating with limited acknowledgement of feedbacks from business communities whilst at the same time operate as not one of consultation, but as implementers without consultation as shown from the lack of responses to public queries online. Government irrationality over the choice of respondents or communities targeted to undergo halal supervision enhancement i.e. halal certified against not yet halal certified businesses, and technical halal educational programmes such as primary school children in contrast to mature students or industrial players, are good instances of such ineffectiveness as well. The organisation of workshops and talks which lacks the depths or hands-on approach to halal requirements, resulting from limited time allocated for each talk or workshop plus the over-stretching of

content to be delivered covering diverse aspects in such short time span for each session, as evident from the analysis of the link-codes of the 8-year dataset, proves the ineffectiveness of these initiatives in providing technical halal grounding for businesses and communities alike. Hence, it is vital to note that the sharing of more topics bearing a certain amount of information, regardless of the media in which it takes form, does not guarantee the establishment or creation of the desired industrial code of conduct as it takes more than just information sharing to create the desired conduct. It also requires the 'right' governing mechanisms that suit the requirements of both who governs and who are governed towards achieving the desired end goal or outcome as envisioned during the problematisation of the problem.

The treatment of businesses as business (treating businesses as statistics/ numbers/ opportunists, which unintentionally 'dehumanise' them similar to how hard scientists treated cells as particles, test subjects etc, despite the fact that these businesses are also part of the social community/ ummah, run at times due to the need to make ends meet, not necessarily only profit-driven but rather for survival as in the case of the informal) makes the halal standard moral governmentality difficult to achieve its very own goal. If businesses are seen as opportunistic, a perception that is based on western perception of what they are, in contrast to embracing the Islamic principles of *husnuzon* (having the benefit of the doubt), there is bound to be issues of trust and abuse.

The unwarranted socio-economic effects resulting from such unevenness in governing the halal standards have increased costs of production and operations among local

Brunei food businesses, an increase in inefficiency due to the increase in monitoring the end-to-end processes as well as industrial reorganisation of productions once halalised. Uncertainties brought about personalisation of halal auditing requirements, particularly upon renewal of certificates and permits, as well as confusion surrounding such practices, undoubtedly affecting the functionality of the food industry in general. Such socio-economic effects are avoidable if only the relevant agencies have the competencies and capabilities to foresee the potential effects their industrial actions could have on firms or businesses' operations. Understanding the inner workings of the halal food industry and the current conditions of the industrial players, coupled with having preliminary information on who the key players are in both formal production or home-based and online businesses, will help the government to craft their strategy carefully by investing in more thoughts than on soulless implementation of the standard. The art of listening and understanding feedback from those who were governed goes a long way.

Foucauldian governmentality and Dean's AOG allow for a deeper analysis on the interrelationships between government rationality and mechanisms of governing across time, the dynamics of governing through the investigation of governing patterns and subsequently, on the aftereffects of such governing processes towards those whom it governs in comparison to the desired outcomes as it envisioned. The State is in a continuous state of flux, with change as a constant, whilst at the same time, maintaining its 'true' absolute power by being reflexive. Such reflexivity allows for reprogramming, which is vital for maintaining the *raison d'état* and the government, needs to undergo some degrees of reflection by re-evaluating how it governs and carry a sense of critical

examination of the self through learning, relearning as well as by acknowledging failures or mistakes. Through such acknowledgements, transparency, accountability and proactive governing will result in multiplier effects on growth, trust and integrated cooperation among the public and government.

Despite the mixed outcomes of such re-programming and adapting strategies to meet present challenges, there is a need to bolster efforts to surpass current limited outcomes. There have been some improvements in certification experience as mentioned in the previous chapter in relation to processing duration, fee levied upon businesses to start certification processes as well as relaxation of some halal industrial requirements to allow for industrial players to be certified. There have been efforts to increase efficiency in certification processes and institutional arrangements particularly the move towards internalisation of multi-agencies role by HFCD as well as further centralisation of technical competencies and capabilities through recruitments of specialists, a move seen as part of capacity building. The existence of the movers or shapers in all ministries and agencies are seen as necessary to create much-needed pressure for reviews and capacity buildings despite the problems of its overarching influence which in turn, affects efficiency because of more checks and balances and dictating ability of agencies to establish their own way of addressing and achieving missions. In terms of export, there have been some recent changes in export regulatory capacity, as evident with Ghanim – MSB export, but most activities are still confined to Government Local Companies (GLC) and not so much support for private limited, sole proprietors and cooperatives businesses. Evidence as shown in the private deals made by the local firms at a small scale did exist but at times

not so favourable due to the limited scale and scope of the arrangements. The diverging degree of leniency between home-based informal businesses in contrast with larger businesses also shows the existence of such renegotiating tendencies, though these were later curtailed or left at the mercy of the councils.

Some traditional issues, and problems, on top of new ones, still exist as experienced by the meat importers/ slaughterhouses. There is the need to increase human resources capacities and capabilities to execute in various halal initiatives – from halal enforcers, auditors to halal lab operators, analyst and halal workshop or talk specialists; coupled with the need to have a more centralised certification and clear guidelines. This is particularly related with the newly revised current guideline and halal act where its needs to be more detail and precise with the need to incorporate relevant and in-depth information on required technical specs. The need to set up a standalone, centralised halal certification body, beyond current governmentality is vital with some evidence of its development starting to take shape. This is done to ensure the maintenance of not only credibility and efficiency but also to avoid issues of unfairness and unjust certification process as seen from the experience of producers. Recent amendment of the halal act unfortunately, is a step backward in terms of industrial development as seen from the effects that it has towards micro or home-based enterprises operating formally and informally. More thought and consideration should be given to the plight of these players. Though efficiency in government processing increased, fair and just regulation that protects national industrial producers is still needed. The current low oil price environment and government tightening coupled with the challenges of certifying informal businesses,

especially online based on the analysis of the survey data, will pose a huge challenge for HFCD as a governing body as well as the industrial manager and enforcer to not only encourage businesses to participate in the halalisation programmes that the government envisioned. There is also a need to upgrade further current governing and halal initiatives to ensure that the businesses not only comply or adhere to the need for halal standards but also allow those who are halalised to reap the benefit of certification whilst at the same time reducing the costs associated with halalisation. A more effective halalisation programme which takes into consideration the feedback from the industrial front end of the halal food industry, as well as those on the consumer end of the spectrum, is also needed, as governing for the sake of governing alone is not enough towards the achievement of visions. At the end of the day, the government exist for the people, for the benefit of the nation and those in the position of power or authority, should craft their governing strategy carefully to ensure a fair and just way of governing as envision by the Islamic principles of governing.

5.14 Are Halal Governmentalities Islamic? Tying up the loose ends of the Islamic governing tapestry

In Hallaq's (2012) discussion of the legitimacy of the Holy Quran, it is emphasised that although the Quran is a perfect, eloquent expression of justice, human imperfection prevents establishing and implementing effective structural and institutional mechanisms to govern and address life's challenges. However, this imperfection should not be used as an excuse for failing to religiously follow the teachings and commandments towards fair and just governance. Such imperfection must be viewed as a worldly test, an

opportunity to perform good deeds, and a path connecting this life to the hereafter (Chapra, 2008; Hallaq, 2012). Hence, it begs the question, are the present halal governmentalities Islamic?

The Brunei State's motivation for prioritising the food industry was driven by the imperative of halal certification, safeguarding its citizens' religious dietary requirements, and the aspiration to foster an Islamic economy as an alternative to the conventional capitalist system, particularly through mandatory halal standards. These distinct governmental objectives were outlined in previous discussions, notably referring to the enactment of the Halal Food Act of 1998 (1st rationale), the introduction of HCHLO 2005 (2nd rationale), and the mandatory implementation of the HCHLO in 2011 (3rd rationale). Consequently, it can be argued that the evolution of the food industry in Brunei has transitioned from a focus solely on meat importation and slaughtering processes to encompassing selected food processing facilities as part of business permit renewals and, subsequently, the standardisation of all products destined for Muslim consumption, extending beyond food. The governance of halal certification, including mechanisms such as social media platforms and physical workshops, serves as instruments for promoting halal practices and engaging in value-adding activities and collaborative efforts.

However, beyond the State's transformative rationales, businesses espouse their own perspectives on halal certification despite its compulsory nature. For these entities, the imperative lies in survival, competitive positioning, business expansion, and contributing to the domestic halal industry's development, fuelled by the belief that embracing halal

practices would yield benefits and facilitate growth. In practice, however, the certification experience often yields contrary results. This disparity can be attributed to the policymakers' lack of comprehension and awareness regarding the operations of halal businesses and the industry at large. Furthermore, it stems from the failure to grasp the dynamics between the ruling authorities' political objectives (BIRC) and governors' (HFCD) stances regarding halal certification (see p.53). These dynamics, as conceptualised by Dean's (2015) AOG, involve the actual translation and institutionalisation, scrutinised through the lens of the technologies utilised with consequential impact on the governed, despite the incorporation of Islamic ethics and principles in the halal governance. It emphasises the need to create a sense of shared identity between the governors and these businesses by emphasising their responsibility as fellow Muslims. The complexities arising from disparities or divergences in rationales and attitudes toward halal were further compounded as they were translated into the actual administration of halal certification. The emergence of three distinct approaches to halal governing is evident in current practices. Firstly, there is the concept of everyday halal, which pertains to common or basic knowledge on halal. Secondly, industrial halal is defined by knowledgeable businesses and technical regulators. Lastly, personalised halal is employed by individual standard auditors and governors based on their interpretations and experiences with halal. These diverse approaches to halal certification and the associated knowledge underscore the complex, multifaceted, and multidimensional nature of halal governing. The presence of discrepancies, dissonances, and inconsistencies in halal governing raises the question of whether such discord could hinder the realisation of the vision of halalising and fostering the growth of the halal

industry. This is very much the case, particularly when power, seen as a positive force in governing, became counterproductive. In the concluding chapter, an integrated model of halal governing will be proposed to demonstrate how the components within the *Maqasid Al-Sharia* and Islamic governmentality can help address the issues identified in this study, based on evidence-based empirical research, moving beyond the normative solutions typically proposed by Islamic scholars.

An earlier section of the chapter noted that examining the impacts of halal certification governmentalities would serve as indicators for assessing the efficiency and efficacy of the halal certification program itself. Since SH4 of the research hypothesised on the ineffectiveness of halal standard governing despite the incorporation of Islamic ethics and principles as evident from the evidence and analyses on SRQ 3, it can be concluded that the findings thus far supported the hypothesis. Embracing Islamic governmentality in governing halal, hence, does not guarantee the growth potential of Brunei's agrifood businesses as it did not take into consideration the influence of power-knowledge dynamics, information asymmetries as well as multiple governmentalities in dictating outcome. Whilst positivity of power is evident as businesses become halalised to a certain extent, its role as a productive force is limited at best.

The evidence gathered thus far indicates a growing financial burden due to the cost increase associated with obtaining halal certification. This has decreased competitiveness for agrifood businesses in terms of pricing, productivity, and product distinctiveness compared to foreign products. These challenges stem from operational

rigidity and a lack of flexibility in product innovation, which result from strict and inflexible certification requirements. The majority of the business interviewees supported this by claiming that due to Brunei's global halal branding and stringent certification, former foreign buyers who initially approached their businesses for products eventually developed their own competencies and capabilities of becoming new manufacturing hubs, bypassing Brunei and now became industrial competitors for locally produced food. The implication of this is that it limits the potential growth of businesses as they failed to catalyse from the economies of scale and deepen their economies of scope, i.e., specialisation, which is necessary for future expansions.

The BIRC and HFCD governors should consider the challenges faced by the groups they aim to safeguard in pursuing ethical, sustainable, and inclusive growth and development. While online platforms in this study have been utilised as part of governing technologies, the abundance of shared information has not necessarily led to the generation of added value in knowledge among business operators and on the products on offer. Information unevenness and disparities mentioned in the previous chapter, the lack of information shared on halal technicalities, and the existence of information blackouts in certain years, as seen from the FB posts, lead to a lack of continuity and unnecessary confusion. Production and operations wise, lack of knowledge on the actual economic cost of halalisation has also resulted in adverse effects as experienced by food producers on conventional standards. Those responsible for establishing standards (standard-setters), individuals with expertise (people of knowledge), authorities and leaders (regulators, auditors, and enforcers) holding authority at various levels within the government should

exercise caution when formulating policies and implementing decisions. Decisions believed to be 'fair and just' that result in transgression, oppression, or a downward spiral affecting the very communities they aim to protect are considered tyrannical and unjust. In the context of Islam, it is a fundamental belief that the permissible actions of a believer are inherently aligned with their underlying good intentions. However, actions deemed haram or impermissible maintain this status irrespective of any positive intentions associated with them. Hence, when making decisions, accountability and ethical responsibility should not be solely delegated to industrialists, who are integral business community members. Instead, these principles should also form the basis of governance to ensure fairness and justice among decision-makers and those in authority. The governors should be fair and responsible in their actions should decisions result in adverse outcomes. Such introspection or reflexivity, emphasised in governmentality, must be practised to benefit the current generation and future inheritors. These principles are succinctly summarised in the verses from the Holy Quran, serving as a reminder for all humankind.:

“Do not forbid the good things Allah has made lawful to you. And do not overstep the limits. Allah does not love those who overstep the limits.” (5:87)

“Transgress not in the balance (*mizan*) and weigh with the justice and skimp not in the balance. And Earth: He (Allah) set it down for all beings”. (55: 8-10)

Therefore, based on the findings and analyses of the effects of halal certification on Brunei's agrifood producers, as well as the findings mentioned in the previous chapter, it can be concluded that the current strategies used by HFCD to halalise and stimulate the

growth of halal businesses are ineffective. The desired transformations by the governing bodies and within the industry highlight the challenge of translating vision into practice. While advocating the embrace of Islamic ethics and principles as part of halal governance is useful, it fails to highlight the significance of power-knowledge dynamics and differences between standard-setters and those being governed, as well as the multiple ensembles or dispositions within the government that dictates halal growth. The absence of knowledge on the real socio-economic costs of halalisation and lack of transparency towards the food businesses among halal regulators are notable, making an already challenging situation more complex. The lack of re-evaluation and reflection on the HFCD's halal governing strategies and the marginalisation of some businesses dependent on the food industry for sustenance and survival have dealt a final blow to an already ailing halal governing system, which requires major intervention and overhaul. This is necessary to facilitate and enable the growth of businesses and the industry.

To conclude, the current halal governing can be considered partially Islamic. However, it needs more than just the rationale of protecting the religious dietary needs of the Umma or collective as the foundation of introducing an all-inclusive halal governance. Rather, it is necessary to consider how it affects the plight of those whom Islamic ethics and principles are supposed to protect. Weaving effective Islamic ethics and principles into halal certification governing, i.e., Islamic governmentality, governors need to learn and take into consideration the effects of halal certification governing towards the businesses shown in this study as part of a deeper, meaningful, but enabling reflexivity rather than a shallow one.

CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study on halal industrial standard governmentality and how it affects Brunei's halal industry agri-food business development has given an interesting insight into how industrial certification is being managed. But it also sheds new light on the use of contemporary governing technologies, in this case, Facebook as a medium of information and knowledge sharing whilst at the same time, also as a tool to further investigate how halal governing is implemented and executed, beyond as means of enhancing the political legitimacy of governing institutions over those of whom it governed over a given period of time. Government, in Foucauldian terms, has no actual physical form; it is an agglomeration of ensembles which only 'exist' or came to form when the state utilises its power in the terminals via a particular apparatus of the state when needed. Dean's analytics of government is useful in analysing the mechanism that the state uses in the creation of the code of conduct to critically examine how the government use such mechanism to continuously subjugate to maintain domination even in the absence of the sovereign whilst at the same time use the critique to be constructive or reflexive of changes (when problematising). The analyses and findings addressed the political rationalities that dictate how the halal governors governed and highlighted the apparatus necessary for halal governing. Findings from the effects of halal certification governing also suggested the unintended consequences that the certification has made upon businesses, which are detrimental and against the principles envisioned under the Maqasid Al-Sharia. This chapter provides a summation of the findings and analyses whilst, at the same time, trying to address the hypothetical assumptions made

The whole notion of why Foucault's governmentality and Dean's analytics of government were used as part of this research stems from the lack of studies that investigate the relationship between the governor and the governed and how governmentality affects the real-world outcomes of the vision of which the governor's formulated or problematised. Based on Foucault's Governmentality 1.0, which deals with understanding the political rationality of the governed in governing and Dean's Governmentality 2.0, which looks into the analytics of government and its governing apparatuses, this research offers an extended application of governmentality by analysing and deducing the relationships between the ways in government governs the industry to the actual creation of a halal industrial code of conduct necessary for growth and development of food businesses and industry. This study provides Foucauldian governmentality scholars with empirical analyses and evidence of the strategies and instruments employed by the halal governors and their governing bodies whilst illustrating the multiplicity of the governmentalitys emanating from multiple regimes of facilitation and intervention. It also extended the notion of governmentality by elucidating the diverging effects, truths, and outcomes made possible by multiple rationalities and discourses and how they affect the governed. By relocating the position of the State in the wider circuits of power (Rose, 1999) as well as understanding its mediating or mitigating role towards achievement of the vision, mission and growth (Bröckling et al., 2011; Dean, 2010; Abu-Nimer, 1996) whilst following a certain type of prescribed programme (McKee, 2009), the research, hence, managed to identify the salient key features of Brunei's current way of halal standard governing and its subsequent effects towards businesses, as part of the overall halalisation programmes

aimed at halalising and developing the industry as a whole. It also highlighted the dynamism of Islamic governmentality as it occurs within Brunei's state-backed halal standardisation or certification processes.

Chapter 4 presents a comprehensive analysis of the findings and evaluations concerning SRQ 1 and SRQ 2. The examination of the royal decrees revealed various political rationales and practices connected to halal, demonstrating dynamic shifts in focus corresponding to the evolving development visualised and perceived by the sovereign or monarch. The strategies employed by the halal regulators, based on the adaptive halal political rationalities traced back from 1998 with the enactment of the Brunei Halal Meat Act onwards up until the present, were effectively identified based on the FB reporting. It revealed the diverse forms of governing strategies and mechanisms used as part of halalisation. These ranged from the utilisation of halal standardisation-related information and socialisation for knowledge creation and enhancement, as well as both hard and soft apparatus of the State, i.e., industrial law and guidelines, and religious commandments and knowledge, as the main strategies towards halal. As seen from the discussions in the fourth chapter, apart from the sharing of both basic and technical knowledge as a response to the compulsory standardisation, the after-effects of the royal decree upon the halal governing structure also show a degree of development in terms of competency, capacity, and capabilities (3 Cs). Intergovernmental and consultations via G2G and government-to-business (G2B) cooperation were also present. However, its actual function as the determinants of business and industrial growth is yet to be seen. Interestingly, analyses of the halal certification and governing strategies used also

highlighted the dynamics between the multiple governmentalities that exist, from one that is influenced by religious scriptures and texts and those that seeks to achieve both the worldly (material, wealth accumulation and growth) and immaterial (salvation and good deeds for the present and the afterlife) goals of halalisation, to one that legitimises the traditional political order by incorporating power positions and ranks as part of the halal decision-making processes. These findings and analyses, hence, supported the formulated SH 1 and SH 2 while also providing insights on the multifunctionalities of the digital space not only as a tool or technology of government in a Foucauldian sense but also showing its utility as a valuable source for collecting research-related data and information.

The effects of halal governmentalities on the halal certification processes and food producers (SRQ 3) and the effectiveness of current halal governmental strategies (governmentality 2.0) clearly showed the negative responses that halal governmentalities have over the food business communities. The existence of multiple halal governmentalities among the governors and the governed, the underestimated real economic costs associated with halalisation and industrial production reorganisation among food producers, and the information asymmetries resulting from the use of social media and the physical platforms towards halal governance have undoubtedly contributed towards the unwarranted effects. All these identified effects are used to deduce the ineffectiveness of current halal certification governing strategies as they are operationalised or practised in the real world. The uneven power dynamics between HFCD as the standard-setter and regulator and the food businesses also serve as a

testament to the hierarchical order and the centrality of the power-knowledge discourse in amplifying the dissonances of the diverse ensembles while maintaining government rationality towards halalisation. Such findings of the dissonances and uneven power dynamics are ever present even within the Islamic State due to human weaknesses and imperfections. All the findings and analyses of the fifth chapter supported the hypothetical assumptions (SH 3 and SH 4). The study provides a good case of an in-depth case study on how Islamic governmentality operates within the halal certification processes whilst at the same time empirically showcasing the challenges associated with implementing halal visions and the subsequent aftereffects resulting from halalisation strategies deemed to be beneficial conceptually but lacking and ineffective in its actual operationalisation and implementation.

Hence, this research thus far has shown how applying governmentality to a state-backed religious standard has identified not only the rationalities and mechanisms used in halal governing. However, it also identified issues and challenges from the power-knowledge discursiveness and the dissonances that emerge from its implementation in the standard-setting exercises. Whilst the majority of Islamic scholars tend to avoid putting to test or evaluate the Islamic normative claims and approaches they proposed towards the betterment of society, this research provided grounded, empirical-based findings that demonstrated the difficulty in implementing and threading halal governing that fully benefit and safeguard the five components of the Maqasid Al-Sharia' i.e. safeguards on wealth (Mal), the intellect (Aql), posterity (Nasl), faith (Ad-Din) and life (Nafs). Current halal governmentality must be transformed into a full-fledged Islamic governmentality, and

safeguards must be provided for these five components. The conclusion of this research, especially on the effects of halal governmentality on the food businesses, highlighted the major setbacks that the standardisation has towards wealth creation and accumulation, the intellect due to constant uncertainties and confusion caused by the standard-setters as they regulate and implement halalisation as well as its effect on posterity. The compulsory standardisation of the HCHLO in 2011 for licensed food premises and in 2017 for all types of businesses (informal and formal) showed the negative impact of the halal standard on businesses, particularly those who rely on them for sustenance purposes. For effective Islamic halal governmentality to be successfully implemented, the following model is hence developed that integrates the five dimensions of the Maqasid Al-Sharia and how evaluation of each component can be used as a yardstick to measure the extent of success of any current halal certification and development initiatives operating. Another model of an Integrated Sustainable Halal Policy (ISHP) has also been developed elsewhere (see Azalie, 2023), which integrates the components of Islamic governance of halal and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as well as its interlinkages. For this research, the Integrated Islamic Halal Governmentality (IIHG) model below is formulated to examine the points of interlinkages and intersections that each component has in relation to one another and how such political rationalities should be identified to achieve the desired outcome.




Figure 50. The Integrated Islamic Halal Governmentality Model (IIHG) link with Sustainability and Greening of the Halal Industry

For halal governing and development to be Islamic and inclusive, any governing technologies and strategies used should consider how they affect the five components of

the Maqasid. This research found incongruencies and, at times, negative outcomes resulting from the unevenness in halal certification governing. Whilst the rationalities of the certification were initially started due to the need to protect the religious diet of the Muslims as part of safeguarding their faith and health, the rest of the objectives of the Maqasid components were hardly met. The certification, thus far, does not necessarily lead to wealth creation and accumulation as the certification resulted in the inability for businesses to compete positively due to the increase in the cost of production and the force certification resulting from the 2017 HCHLO amendments. It affects businesses' survivability, and for those businesses that rely on food production and retail for sustenance, such compulsory standardisation prevents them from improving their living and livelihood. This can be seen when the halal transformation affected both primary and secondary income generations of the food producers, among those who are in need (see Fig. 48). Failure safeguards the wealth (Mal) is linked closely with SDG 1 on zero poverty, SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth, SDG 10 on the need to reduce inequalities as well as SDG 11 relating to constructing sustainable cities and communities. Issues surrounding the certification applications and the uncertainties developed due to the technicalities and lack of uniformity in standard governing exercises coupled with lengthier waiting time for approvals partly affect domestic producers' abilities to compete and seize existing market opportunities. Hence, safeguarding wealth creation and accumulation, so long it falls within the religious allowance, is vital as it also affects the intellect and mental health (Aql).

As mentioned previously, the current halal governing practices carried out by the HFCD often lead to uncertainties, which affect the intellect and mental health stability of those affected by the compulsory certification. For such necessary safeguards of the intellect and mental health to be achieved, the current governing strategies should not only be focused on mere information sharing and dissemination, but such activities should also allow for knowledge enrichment, creation, and enhancement among food producers regardless of their current halal status. Whilst the research findings highlighted the existence of knowledge sharing and transfer between the experts, who are also the standard-setters and the food producers, too much information shared does not guarantee successful halalisation programmes. Too little knowledge or oversimplification of necessary information also have resulted in redundancies. There is a need for the HFCD to design effective knowledge-sharing and creation programmes by identifying the typologies of information that matter the most or are of high relevance for the halal applicants as they embark on halalisation. This undoubtedly will help safeguard intellect and mental health as acquiring relevant religious and technical halal knowledge, combined with certainties provided by exchanges with relevant agencies, creates a stable condition that businesses can exploit for their growth. Downdrafting the worry and insecurities is also paramount. Through such efforts, it will help safeguard the intellect (Aql) of the governed, a component that is also linked to SDG 3 on having a good health and well-being, which is also further enhanced by the rest of the SDGs linked to wealth creation and accumulation (Mal).

Preserving posterity (Nasl) is a fundamental aspect of effective halal governing, which should also consider the sustainable impact of halalisation on individuals, the current generation, and the next. The family is an important institution in Islam; hence, empowering and enriching them helps provide the stability needed for the future, particularly in their function as important sources for labour creation, future leaders, and figures that help run society. It also served to prevent the problems of the broken window phenomenon currently experienced in the West, which studies the relationship between crime and delinquency and the family (see Weisburd et al., 2015; Welsh et al., 2015). The results of this study indicate that the ongoing halalisation initiative and the consequent standardisation of halal practices have repercussions on small-scale and informal food producers who depend on food-related activities for their livelihoods. The inability to meet their basic needs and those of their dependents has implications for the current generation and poses challenges for the future. According to Figure 48, which presents the demographics of informal food producers, mandatory halalisation undoubtedly disadvantages these economically vulnerable groups. Therefore, to ensure the preservation of posterity (Nasl), halal governmentalities should safeguard the economic viability and growth (Mal) of these enterprises while also contributing to the protection of their intellectual and mental well-being (Aql) by alleviating concerns and insecurities. Enabling these groups to prosper also improves health and relieves the debt service burden by empowering them economically. Plus, by allowing these groups to be able to sustain culture and knowledge for the benefit of both present and future generations, it also brings forward the centrality of human being as the vicereagents of Allah, using the concept of the Caliph or leader (Khalifah) responsible in protecting and maintaining the

environment, society and human socio-relational qualities through the virtues of fairness and justice. Hence, the Nafs component of the Maqasid is interlinked closely with components of Mal and Aql, with linkages to the aforementioned SDG 3 and 11, SDG 12 on responsible production and consumption, and SDG 13 on climate action.

The focus on safeguarding the human self and its needs (Nafs) is also paramount at the centre of the Maqasid principles. Conclusions from this research thus far address the centrality of meeting the religious dietary protections of the Muslim collective (Ummah), where individuals play fundamental roles in fulfilling their responsibilities not only as producers, as identified, but also as individual regulators, standard managers, and decision- makers. Those involved in governing halal certification and those engaged in production should achieve a sense of fulfilment, accountability, and ethical responsibility towards the common good. Their ability to exercise their will to protect their dignity, specifically in supporting themselves and those under their care through their involvement in halal businesses, should be safeguarded. Remaining economically active and employed in the food industry while simultaneously offering employment for others through their businesses not only fulfils the desire to be part of society but also satisfies the feeling of being needed. The forceful exit of home-based and informal producers from food production activities resulting from compulsory halal creates new barriers for businesses. Protecting this aspect of the Maqasid allows individuals to be industrious and obligated, building the necessary confidence when venturing into entrepreneurship. There is also a need to reconsider the various surveillance and regulatory regimes for such businesses to thrive. For this to happen, enabling policy mechanisms, innovation,

industrial certainties, and support beyond material incentives are needed. This is in addition to the necessity of practising fairness, equity, and justice as binding principles. In terms of its SDG linkages, it is closely linked to SDG 8 and 11, with synergistic relations with the other SDGs found in the other three Maqasid components. These four components (Mal, Aql, Naf, and Nafs) require protection and understanding of faith (Ad-Din), which is central to ensuring its potential culmination into real-world halal governmentality based on Islamic ethics and principles.

Throughout the chapters of this thesis, it has been established that one of the aims of halal governmentalities is to protect the religious dietary practices of Muslims, which are closely linked to the preservation of faith (Ad-din). The Muslim perspective on their relationship with their Creator and fellow human beings is shaped by the commandments in the Quran and the prophetic sayings. Adhering to halal consumption and ensuring that food is tayyib (wholesome and pure) are indicators of adherence to the faith. However, neglecting other aspects, such as equitable wealth creation and distribution, preserving mental acuity, ensuring the well-being of future generations, and protecting individuals' rights to maintain their dignity and self-determination, could be detrimental to advancing one's faith. Hence, based on the findings from the last chapter, halal food production, despite the compulsory certification, has been done following the everyday halal interpretation of production where producers saw their activities as the fulfilment of the religious commandments. Hence, it is crucial for the standard-setters or those who govern to ensure that their way of governing does not result in unfairness and injustice, particularly when making decisions over halalisation. Their choices and actions should be

considerate and holistic and ensure they do not impinge on the rest of the other four components of the Maqasid. Intention shall not beget actions; this point should be in constant remembrance if fairness and justice are to be achieved. After all, the world, from the Muslim viewpoint, is a bridge towards the Hereafter, and whatever good deeds, fairness, and justice are being carried out will be accounted for in the next life. Accountability and responsibility shall not be rested on the shoulders of the governed but also on the governors or leaders, in this case, the standard-setters and the BIRC. Relating to the SDG, the Ad-din component is connected closely to SDG 11 and 12. However, due to its absolute nature as part of the religious scripts found under the Islamic governmentality, it is deeply intertwined with the rest of the Maqasid components, making it as the core.

Climate change poses a profound and complex challenge that demands an integrative and multifaceted approach to sustainability, particularly through the lens of Islamic teachings. As mentioned elsewhere in the thesis (see also Khalid, 2019), the Quran and Hadith offer a rich ethical framework for environmental governance, emphasising the concept of stewardship (Khalifah) and the critical importance of stakeholder consultations and collaborative coordination among diverse community members and businesses. This governance model advocates for achieving zero emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), recognising it as essential to safeguarding the Ummah—both as a community and as a collective of businesses striving for sustainable practices linked as shown from their SDG linkages. However, for it to be effective, it requires scrutinising the governmentality processes that linked the political rationalities and the mechanisms used, as reflected

from the halal governmentalities of the food businesses in Brunei. It is imperative to enhance and empower communities by fostering increased awareness of environmental issues, encouraging active participation in sustainability initiatives, and promoting self-regulation through by internalising the associated governmental technologies of the self, of risk and fear for communities and governors to be reflexive. This strategy not only utilises the inherent risks associated with climate change and the deep-seated fears linked to environmental degradation and its socioeconomic impacts as the movers or rationale to move forward. It also consequently contributes to a robust governmentality approach focused on building climatic resilience beyond halal. Such an approach intertwines adaptation and mitigation strategies, grounded firmly in Islamic principles, and offers a unique, faith-based perspective on effectively confronting environmental challenges. By marrying spiritual tenets with practical environmental action, we can strive toward securing a sustainable future for present and future generations.

To embrace such highly integrated IIHG model, the greening of the halal industry is hence important to ensure the SDG targets identified in the model to be met. This is done by implementing halal governmental technologies that aim to foster sustainable practices within this sector as part of rationalising the Islamic environmental governmentality, in short, Islamic environmentality, linking the absolute truths (religious scripts) with the sciences. Based on conventional sciences, there is a need to reduce GHG emissions by tackling matters associated with ecological carbon footprints. As halal food production have gone regional or global due to the establishment of global value chains (GVCs) and global production networks (GPNs), Brunei's food processing producers are also

contributing to the expansion of the carbon footprints. In studies conducted by Azalie and Kamarulzaman (2022) on the coffee and tea sector, as well as by Azalie and Samad (2022) and Azalie (forthcoming) on emerging halal regional production networks, it was observed that Bruneian firms play a significant role as lead firms within these production networks. They occupy strong positions in the mid-value segment of the global value chains (GVCs). This positioning has led to the outsourcing of raw material supplies to neighbouring Asian plantations, farms, and ranches, which operate at the lower end of the value chain and primarily serve as generic suppliers. It brought to question on whether non-sustainable, discriminatory industrial and business operations do exist as they service the lead firms in or not, a topic that needs to be addressed beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as a starting point, there is a need to employ new technological innovations such as carbon credits and green financing and inclusive production chains and networks for the industry to move towards decarbonization, significantly mitigating its environmental and social impacts. This is on top of the need to measure the size of the carbon footprint and addressing the potential issues that it caused towards the production partners or outsourcers as they become part of the value chains. These efforts not only contribute to climate change mitigation but also enhance the sustainability of halal products.

A critical aspect of halal industrial production is the farm-to-fork approach, which emphasises ecological sound practices. This includes the protection of animal welfare, from the moment of domestication, the need for animals to be of good health to the period before slaughtering (see Omar et al., 2012; Campbell et al., 2011), as well as the

promotion of free-range organic production methods beyond conventional rearing or cage systems. While this development gained momentum in the niche halal industry in Europe (see Bonne & Verbeke, 2008; Bonne et al., 2007; Bergeaud-Blackler et al., 2016), such practice remained understudied or at best peripherally being practice in these parts of the World (see Fischer, 2011, 2015; Lever & Fischer, 2018 for insights). By prioritising regenerative resource utilisation and reallocation, the halal sector can ensure that its practices are ethical and aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals and assist in creating a more responsible food system that respects both animal welfare and environmental health.

Moreover, the implementation of flexible industrial production mechanisms is essential to prevent overproduction and wastage within the halal industry. Such practices not only improve efficiency but also contribute to a sustainable supply chain that can adapt to changing demands. This is very much the case where trade wars and geopolitical tensions affect the continuous supply of materials, forcing smaller firms to be exposed to uncertainties and rising costs that can be detrimental to their sustainability. Supportive and enabling policies, alongside robust regulatory regimes which include such negative externalities into its governing equation are vital for promoting sustainable growth within the sector. These policies should focus on creating an environment that encourages innovation and compliance with environmental standards on top of mechanisms that can help in absorbing the external shocks that ethically support communities and growth. A halal assurance mechanisms and consumption frameworks in the halal industry had been proposed by Shafii and Zain (2015) and Sulaiman et al (2018) as well as those concerning

halal supply chain sustainability or integrity (see Ab Talib et al., 2024; Zulfakar et al., 2024 and Mahbubi & Uchiyama, 2020) and its greening (Abdullah et al., 2018) among others to ensure current production supports the sustainability agenda. There have also been suggestions made by scholars on the need to introduce green financing into the halal food industry (see Yusup & Sulaiman, 2025; Oseni et al., 2025; Peristiwo, 2024 and Raimi & Bamiro, 2025). However, only a handful managed to conduct research on how this can be operationalised or implemented (see Rahman et al., 2024). There is a need to deepen the study on all these production, surveillance and financial mechanisms but, it should also address the Maqasid Sharia cum SDG components the author proposed under the IIHG model.

Lastly, effective surveillance and monitoring systems ensure accountability and transparency within halal production processes. Implementing checks and balances can help uphold the integrity of the halal certification and strengthen consumer trust, which was already mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis. Continuous evaluation and monitoring are critical in addressing potential ethical and environmental issues, ensuring that the halal industry remains committed to sustainability while satisfying the needs of consumers.

While the IIHG framework provides a normative model for aligning halal governance with the principles of Maqasid al-Sharia and the sustainability ambitions of the SDG 2030 agenda, its practical integration into Brunei's halal food industry remains limited. At present, the Brunei Halal Certification Programme primarily emphasises Shariah

compliance, food safety, and brand legitimacy, with less explicit focus on environmental sustainability, climate change mitigation, or green production practices. Although broader national policies such as Wawasan Brunei 2035 as well as the Brunei Climate Change Policy acknowledge the importance of sustainability, these concerns have yet to be systematically embedded within halal regulatory procedures or certification audits. Similarly, there is limited evidence that halal-certified MSMEs are currently incentivised or equipped to adopt greener practices. This highlights a gap between the ideological potential of Islamic sustainability frameworks and their operationalisation in industry. The IIHG model, therefore, should be understood not only as an analytical lens but also as a forward-looking blueprint that can guide future reforms in halal governance—bridging Islamic ethical commitments with concrete sustainability outcomes in Brunei’s evolving development trajectory.

From this framework, it can be concluded that there are opportunities for halal to be green and sustainable through the developed framework. However, it requires technical and capabilities building with a hybridised version of Islamic governmentality that celebrates Islamic sciences with the Quran and hadith as the constitution. When linked to halal governmentalities, it is the role of the state to create a near identity among the non-dominated subject to embrace such internalisation of conduct. As mentioned in the earlier part of the thesis, Muslims across regions and space have different levels of halal ethical awareness. While knowledge enrichment and empowerment of halal is crucial to achieve such a level of halal governmentality or environmentality among communities, findings from this study also require the same level of halal accountability and integrity to be

embraced by governors as they govern. This important as part of halal governmentality reflexivity in order to avoid the governors from 'governing like that' (clumsily).

Any future governing technologies and strategies designed to help the halal sector should consider this humanistic component of the Maqasid as part of their development strategies and those that help facilitate and enable economic growth and expansion by developing competencies, capacities, and capabilities. In a nutshell, through Foucault's Governmentality and Dean's AOG, the findings from this research confirm further the existence of disjuncture or disconnects between the current arts of governing, the multiple realities that it created at the ground level in contrast to the desired effects envisioned through initial problematisation. This study highlighted the multiple governmentalities within the halal certification processes and the complex dynamism and dissonances in which it takes form resulting from the power knowledge dynamics and the governors and governed interactions. Since Islamic governmentality, in theory, and normative terms, utilised the Holy Quran and Prophetic Sayings as the absolute constitution that governs the Muslim Ummah collectively, the existence of multiple governmentalities due to the hybrid nature of the macro system of governing and industrial halal activities added more complexities compared to what is politically and religiously rationalised. Though religious in its origin, the idea of halal standardisation was undoubtedly based on human ingenuity and industrial innovation opened to juristic interpretations with only certain degrees of clear-cut rulings, and its governing was also subject to humanistic flaws, as addressed in the last chapter. Due to this, approaching governmentality needs to follow a certain context and condition and is subject to varying variables. Hence, the findings from this

research may only apply to this contextual study on Brunei halal industrial governing while, at the same time, providing empirical evidence that addresses Islamic governing from the lenses of socioreligious and political economy, moving beyond the normative approach in Islam.

6.1 Answering the aims and objectives of this research, the research questions, and hypotheses

As mentioned in the first chapter, this study aimed to investigate the workings of Brunei's halal standardisation and certification towards agri-food businesses and industry. This aim is achieved with the findings and analyses made using governmentality as the framework to theorise and analyse the rationale, the governing technologies used as well as the effects that such halal governing have towards, and the effects that such halal governance has on producers.

In summary, the PhD research provided detailed insights into how Brunei Halal Food Control Division (HFCD) managed certification processes per se and highlighted the technologies the government used, as analysed in the 8-year dataset shared online. While the social media postings provided interesting insights and information about halal governing, the dataset might be incomplete and biased. To ensure data usability and reduce such bias, interviews, social surveys, reviews of literature, and official documents were conducted to ensure that the reality or the truth portrayed was relatively objective and reliable. Findings and analyses of SRQ 1 highlighted the multiple governmentalities

that exist through the study on the royal decrees, rationalities of other players, including halal governors and businesses and its influence in dictating the governing and industrial directions that the country takes towards halalisation. The utilisation of the royal decrees in HFCD postings acts as a legitimising force that further enhances the *raison d'état* behind the compulsory halalisation. The rationalities of other players, such as the governors and food businesses, on the other hand, provide examples of the influence the decrees had upon these groups as they internalised halalisation, leading to the diverse final Islamic governmentalised forms addressed in SRQ 3 and 4.

To achieve halal transformations, the analyses of SRQ 2 have revealed the use of the soft apparatus of the state, specifically the Islamic constitution, as an integral component of its halal governing beyond traditional apparatus, such as halal law and regulations, and the utilisation of online digital media platforms to communicate government vision and mission achievements. This approach has enabled the government to successfully shape and establish the desired halal industrial code of conduct, fostering a close alignment i.e. near identity, and anticipated compliance within communities seeking certification. The exercise of disciplinary power is evident through the analysis of the content of each technology employed to standardise government requirements and conditions in the pursuit of compliance. Notably, the use of social media as the primary tool for disseminating halal knowledge and concurrently evaluating government strategies facilitates the identification of diverse halalisation strategies tailored to specific groups affected by the process of halalisation. Concerning G2G, the analysis of the postings also highlighted inter-governmental coordination, consultation, and capacity development,

particularly between HFCD and domestic and regional educational and scientific institutions, as seen in Figure 31.

The final chapter (Chapter 5) addressing the effects of halal certification towards the food businesses (SRQ 3) is used as further evidence to support further the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of current halal certification governing and how it leads to contradicting outcomes, which limits or stagnates the envisioned industrial growth. It provides answers to SRQ 4 as well, particularly on the ineffectiveness of current governing strategies as viewed by those on the receiving end of industrial governing. Whilst the halal governing created a religious or halal code of conduct among the producers, creating a technical industrial code of conduct still faced an uphill hurdle as difficulty translating the technical industrial requirements is real. It owes to the ineffectiveness of the current governing mechanisms, which not only lack depth in relation to the workshops, talks, briefings and documentation, but at the same time, it also resulted from the lack of understanding of how the halal food industry works economically. It resulted in a pyrrhic outcome, of which a degree of compliance and adherence was achieved at the expense of the envisioned industrial growth and development.

In answering SRQ 4, it was found that though concerted efforts were made in terms of centralisation, internalisation, competency, and capacity development within HFCD and beyond, measures were still ineffective due to ineffective consultation and coordination influenced partly by unequal power relations as well as failure to resolve or rectify emerging problems. In the case of HFCD, the use on both online platform and physical

space as a method of sharing information and knowledge as discussed deeply in chapter 4 and based on the experiences of food producers undergoing certification in Chapter 5 also supported this hypothesis further. The lack of clarity on halal production-related information available online, the four-year hiatus in most governing-related activities as reported on FB and based on interviews, plus the ineffective workshops, talks or briefings that HFCD conducted, which targeted the 'wrong' group or community (as in the case of halal supervision and enhancement workshops and educational talks targeting primary schools' children below the age of 12 years old) despite its huge number, showed the ineffectiveness of current governing strategies. From this research on halal governing, the current practise of consultation and coordination within the context of Islamic governing, unfortunately, still falls short of accountability and responsibilities towards businesses as well where grievances and matters raised quite often remain unrectified. This is regardless of the governing efforts made from the beginning (prior to standardisation) to end (post standardisation) processes on top of sharing of information that was deemed related to the halalisation programme and certification but not necessarily precise or specific to the needs of the business communities and general citizens on the other end. The multiple governmentalities on halal production that resulted in the creation of multiple halalisation strategies, i.e. from everyday, industrial to personalise (customise) halal, highlighted the existence of such dissonances and the dynamics of the power-knowledge as it affects the governed. Findings from the inter-governmental governing dynamics showed uneven power relations in which the BIRC has more authority and dictates decisions which often go against the initiatives carried out by other agencies. Hence the role of power and its situatedness within various

governing bodies in dictating, influencing, or even halting any initiatives made towards the achievement of the country's vision of developing the halal food industry, its effectiveness and the creations of disconnects or disjuncture towards halal governing is ever present and have effects as discussed in SRQ 3 previously.

Despite the inclusion of Islamic ethics and principles in halal governing, the influence of biopower in shaping halal certification outcomes has led to distrust, confusion, uncertainty, and at times, socio-economic challenges, which hinder the vision of growth in the halal industry. To further develop halal practices in a nation with a Muslim majority, introducing more checks and balances as part of Islamic innovation under the concept of hisba and expanding halal into the technical industrial dimension puts the business community at a disadvantage. This also tests the aspect of wealth creation within sharia, as poor and ineffective governance leads to ripple effects with limited benefits. While preserving halal standards is important, it should not pose challenges for the diverse communities involved in the domestic halal food industry. A balanced approach is necessary, emphasising fairness and justice for all community members. It should consider the circumstances and challenges communities face before implementing any religious governance programs to prevent conflict. This is the role of the Shura, not only to address conflicts but, ideally, to avoid conflicts whenever possible. This is the foundation of Islamic governance, as previously discussed in the literature review (see Lewis, 2005; Iqbal & Lewis, 2009; Abu-Nimer, 1995). In the case of the Brunei halal food industry, it is considered a failure to uphold the welfare of the general Ummah, particularly in terms of wealth generation, accumulation, and distribution. Closing off opportunities for

smaller businesses leads to socio-economic problems, increasing dependency on state welfare provisions. Careful consideration is required to achieve sustainable economic development. Therefore, the IIHG model is established as a path towards integrated, accountable, and responsible halal governance, using empirical evidence from Brunei's food businesses to improve and reflect on the changes made as the sector progresses. By integrating the five components of the Maqasid, understanding how they interlinked with one another and how it affects business or industrial communities, any future governing technologies, be it competitive halal policies, halal monitoring and surveillance mechanisms, as well as 3 C's related development among others, should be more sensitive towards the end user. In a way, Brunei's halal certification hence can be seen as a good example of a pyrrhic victory which, whilst the halal code of conduct was in general successful based on the increase in the number of certifications, permit issuance and product certification between 2011-2022, in an industrial economic sense, the growth of halal businesses particularly among local SMEs and the industry, in general, remained slow and with no notable size increase. The diagram below (Figure 50) summarises the thesis, highlighting the linkages between the research objectives, research design and methodology employed, the utilised data sources and analyses used, and the findings in relation to the SRQs addressed. It complements the theoretical and analytical framework shown in figure 15 used to structure and examine the scope of the study.




Figure 51. End-to-end research processes and scope

6.2 Final Summation of the Halal Food Certification Governing in Brunei Darussalam

The research thus far has highlighted the issues and challenges arising from the halalisation program implemented by the country to formalise and industrialise the halal food sector. These challenges include governing halal through both online and physical platforms. The online challenges include the inability to keep track due to the fast nature of online platforms and constantly updated feeds. Furthermore, institutional bottlenecks and red tape hinder streamlining initiatives relating to agencies' capacities, competencies, and succession plans, and an imbalance between retirees and new staffing has implications for certification processing and decision-making. Information blackouts or

hiatuses occur due to either the absence of a social media manager manning the account or information symmetries and desk rejection of the content to be shared, making 'no information or no postings' more frequent.


Physically, the use of halal workshops, briefings, talks, and clinics as part of consultation and coordination proved to be ineffective owing to the short amount of time spent in each session, the limited amount of knowledge, and the discussions to resolve emerging issues and problems associated with their organisations as rubber-stamping events only. In other words, no real consultations were made as HFCD is responsible for governing and setting the standards whilst BIRC decide whether to grant certificates and permits to food businesses or vis-à-vis. To effectively address issues and assist the governed subjects in achieving growth, both HFCD and BIRC need to take seriously the effects of their regulatory and policy regimes. Providing these two governing bodies with evidence of the socioeconomic costs of halalisation on producers, as found in this study, will undoubtedly help these agencies to be wary of the effects of existing and proposed halal governing technologies whilst performing a more accountable and inclusive halal governing.

At the time of writing, the Brunei government recently established the Brunei Darussalam Food Authority (BDFA) in February 2021, which is responsible for ensuring the safety, cleanliness, and high quality of the food sold or produced in the country. Further research is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of this new governing body while understanding its role in industry development. Additionally, the Halal Food Control Division (HFCD) aims to reduce waiting times and prevent negligence by developing a

halal certification system as part of industrial consolidation. The system is still in the tendering stage, and its effects are too early to assess. It is hoped that these actions will not simply pass the responsibility to other parties without addressing the underlying issues. There is also a need to separate and decentralise the role of examination and approving agencies or councils, presently administratively under HFCD and BIRC as the decision-making body, with the role of industrial halal and market surveillance and monitoring as part of industrial reform. This ensures clarity in its function and increases the efficiency of governing and processing. The newly established BDFA provides opportunities for reforming the current halal governing regime. However, the question of whether the existing old guard will be willing to reform and modernise current ways of governing needs to be thoroughly reconsidered.

The final summation of this thesis resulted in the creation of the diagram below, which represents the halal knowledge-applications-competency, capacity and capability interrelationship. This trinity interrelationship is aimed at visualising the co-evolution of halal information and knowledge shared online and the activities surrounding halal application (i.e. reasons for non-adherence, non-compliance) as well as actual halal industrial governing (particularly concerning government centralisation and capacity building as well as 3C's development among businesses). The diagram showcases the interlinkages and interrelationships at different halal development stages as defined by the evolving Monarch political rationalities towards halal by the introduction and evolution of the halal laws, on how the absence or lack of availability of 'real' and greatly 'needed' information online based on HFCD's FB postings contributed towards the numbers of

failed, KIV applications as well as how such absences were tied to centralisation and attempt in improving the capacities, competencies and capabilities of the government industrial managers and auditors in some areas. As for the stages, the infancy stage (stage 1) refers to the period before the compulsory HCHLO of 2008 as part of business license renewal comes into force, i.e. from the introduction of the Brunei Halal Meat Act of 1998 onwards. The intermediate stage (stage 2) refers to the period when halal became compulsory for formal food producers, particularly with the amendment to the HCHLO in 2011 and finally, the maturity or consolidation stage (Stage 3) when HCHLO was further amended in 2017 to include all food producers and food production facilities regardless of their status, i.e. formal or informal, industrial or home-based businesses. The patterns shown here are based on combining and overlaying the different graphs and charts and drawing from real datasets from experiences of those involved in the three C's development within government and businesses, primary observations, as well as G2G coordination and development relating to technical build-up used in the analysis chapters.



	Infancy (<2011)	Intermediate (2011- end of 2016)	Consolidation? (2017 - present)
Halal Applications	- Low or almost absence due to no need for businesses to be halalised. Only few businesses such as slaughterhouses, abattoirs, and large food manufacturers (less than 15 in numbers)	- 2011- 2014: Low to Almost High (Compulsory for businesses licenses renewal) -2015 to end 2016: Mid to Low [Gradual decline as majority have applied in the previous cycle (2011-2014)]	- 2017: Upper Mid (Compulsory for all – formal, informal, home-based, online, conventional factories and premises). Increase in informal businesses due to new technologies (social media and I.R 4.0 related techs). - 2018 to 2021: Lower Mid to Low. Most businesses applied in the previous cycle and partly owes to the uncertainties surrounding the status of the 2017 amendments.
Halal Applications (KIV, Rejected and Cancelled)	Low due to low number of applicants and the voluntary nature of the halal certifications	-2011 to 2014: Low amid a slight increase in rejected, failed and KIV applications (from 8 in 2011, peaked at 141 in 2013 and dropped to 92 in 2014). - 2015 to end of 2016: Very low / almost negligible	- 2017: Mid (Highest number- 579 KIVs, Rejections, Failed, Cancelled against 752 applications). Owes to absence of information between 2013- 2017
Knowledge and Halal Information (FB posts)	- Low or limited owing to the use of old way of information sharing i.e., via government spoke persons, educational institutions and conventional mass media. Technical halal knowledge should be almost non-existence apart from those mentioned in BCGs.	- 2011 to 2012: Upper Low. Information on halal (basic) started to be shared on social media by HFCD. Technical industrial requirements also shared but not packaged or linked neatly with industrial halal. - 2012 to 2013: Low. Decline in information shared and government reporting online. - 2014 to end 2016: Very low/ blackout period with almost no information sharing activities.	- 2017 to 2018: Upper Mid. (For all information type, from general to technical across all players including public, businesses, government offices alike). High compared to previous years. Information quality – good (not brief but no depth), relevant but too difficult for public particularly on technical requirements. - 2019 to 2021: Low. Gradual decline. For 2020 to 2021, it might be due to the COVID-19 pandemic which limits activities.
3 Cs (Capacity, Competencies and Capabilities Building for Government)	-Low or almost non-existence. Low technical support services (no halal lab. Existing lab under Ministry of health). No halal educational centre of excellence. Existing regulators and auditors were appointed or upgraders from different positions. No real technical expertise. Guidelines mostly religious. Introduction of the BCGs and Halal Standards.	- 2011 to 2016: Low to Mid. Gradual improvement. Centralisation and internalisation of auditing/ surveillance role. -2014 onwards: Starting of recruitment of 'real' technical experts (nutritionist, food chemist, food health and safety, chemical engineers) on top of upgrading and enhancement of existing officers (religious and administrators) - Halal Research Centre developed, increased R&D activities - Establishment of halal lab - Business enhancement programmes liked SIPA introduced by short-lived.	- 2017 onwards: Mid. Enhancement in all aspects, from regulators, auditors to public. Education – Halal Science Degree at University Level. Technical development. Consolidation of halal lab and metrology activities under one-agency. Recruitments – more technical managers/ auditors/ specialists in food related fields, double the pre-2014 numbers, from 35 to 65 personnel.

3 Cs (Capacity, Competencies and Capabilities Building for Businesses)	Low. Majority of businesses are informal and home-based (cottage) with no understanding of halal requirements excluding formal businesses (less than 10) which have knowledge and idea of industrial halal.	-2011 to end 2016: Gradual increase in businesses activities and competencies but capacity and capabilities remained underdeveloped. Only big firms and GLCs have potentials to grow further. Competencies increased due to some enhancement from HFCD halal programmes but short-lived due to information blackout from 2014 and cancellation of capacity building programmes.	2017 onwards: -Halal clinics, workshops, talks and supervisors' enhancement programmes for all. - GLC such as Ghanim International built their production plant in 2022. FDI from Dubai, Tunisia in full operations since 2015. Simphor Pharmaceuticals restructured operations in late 2022 -MSMEs – still low in terms of capacities and capabilities. 10 firms managed to grow but export sustainability needs to be studied. - COVID-19 affected businesses ability to expand or sustain. Current status unknown.

Table 10. Three stages of the halal certification developmental phase relating industrial and halal governing development (3 Cs) to knowledge and information shared, halal applications growth and its cancellations between 2008 and 2022

Based on the diagram above, the stage 1 or infancy stage of halal development experienced low to almost non-existent halal-related governing activities. This is owed to the HCHLO, which was only established in 2005 and came into force in 2008, parallel with the introduction of the four BCGs relating to food manufacturing, processing and auditing. The period prior to 2005 was marked by the existence of the Brunei Halal Meat Act of 1998, which only focused on slaughterhouses and on regulating the importation of food coming into the country and knowledge and information-sharing activities that followed conventional methods of dissemination, i.e. via educational institutions, government public relations offices and directives as well as the mass media. From this diagram, it can also be argued that the factors surrounding the high number of failures, rejections, or even withdrawal of firms' halal applications, particularly among premises that requires to renew their miscellaneous business licenses between 2011 and 2013, were due to the low or sparse information relating to technical halal requirements in contrast to general information on halal, Islam and other topics deemed not directly

relevant to halal requirements. This is further worsened by the lack of capacity at the start of the compulsory regime in 2011 to audit, process, regulate and enforce halal law and its related requirements, particularly concerning actual halal awareness and governing activities. Ironically, halal applications between 2014 and 2016 showed fewer halal certification failures, rejections, and KIVs. This might relate to the existence of information on halal between 2011 and 2013, despite issues surrounding its symmetry, accuracy and actuality linked to the Brunei halal standard. The state of halal governors and expert recruitments during this period may also have influenced the few rejections as stage 2, particularly before 2014, was marked by a period of appointments of officers and standard setters who need not necessarily possess the real expert knowledge on halal as discussed in the previous chapters. From 2014 onwards, the intermediate stage also saw the rise in competency, capacity and capabilities building across government governing platforms, which lasted until the consolidation stage (see section 5.2), be it within HFCD via the employment of specialists from various industrial backgrounds towards centralisation and internalisation of multiple roles or beyond the halal regulators and managers particularly with the creation's halal research centres, increased R&D activities, and the re-emphasis on the desire to become a halal hub. The dwindling amount of halal applications, their cancellations and rejections, as well as the low amount of information shared with businesses due to the end of the peak cycle of 2014, which saw the end of the grace period and implementation of compulsory halal, marked the period between 2015 and end 2016. These resulted in the combination of a medium amount of halal failures or rejections and the almost non-existence of halal knowledge and information being shared but a high amount of 3 C's building. The lapse in halal-related information

sharing is due to the high rate of governors' labour turnover due to retirement, which affected the management of social media accounts. The slow rate of labour replenishment might also be due to the condition during that period when Brunei was affected by the severe low oil prices, which affected the budget and, hence, carrying out of any development projects. The consolidation stage from 2017 onwards suggested an increase in halal rejections and failures based on data gathered from HFCD. Based on the experiences of businesses that attempted to undergo certification, most have trouble renewing their certifications or applying for new ones, particularly those instructed to apply for certification post-2017 Halal Act amendments. Findings from the business surveys found the inability of online and home businesses to meet requirements based on their current competency and capabilities. Analysis of the evaluation of the samples halal industrial awareness surveyed also confirmed these findings with halal definition and interpretation as rooted only in everyday halal but not industrial halal. This contrasts with the initiatives done by the government through both physical and online platforms, where information shared in workshops and clinics was moderately high (in the upper mid) and aimed at alleviating problems surrounding the certification. The information shared as part of halal governing was good and relevant, though it lacked depth and was not technical enough, as evident from the analyses on the content of the posts. It also happened at times when industrial capacity and capabilities building were enhanced further across all levels, from educational and industrial enhancement to halal industrial managers enrichment, increase in recruitments, and increase in G2G collaborations. The consolidation stage question was left open to further interpretation and needs further studies, particularly the dataset from 2019 onwards.

From these three stages, it is evident that the patterns of halal governing did experience some changes over time. There is an effort to improve on competency, capacity and capability in halal governing, coupled with the major improvement in the use of online platforms as part of knowledge transfer, enrichment of the communities as well as a platform for building technical compliance of the domestic halal standard. However, such improvements are curtailed with the medium to high number of application failures and rejections, undermining the effort towards effective halal certification governing and industrial halalisation. Moreover, the effects of halal certification towards businesses' growth are somewhat mixed, and often, it leads to an increase in the costs of operations and productions coupled with the uncertainties surrounding halalisation due to information and knowledge asymmetries and market accessibilities, making halal governing to also affects the competitiveness of the players.

Foucauldian governmentality, of which Dean's AOG is used as the anchor in analysing the technologies used by HFCD towards their halal standard governing, was used as the main theoretical approach in identifying how the halalisation programme took off. It was also used as a theory which helped frame the end-to-end process of halal governing, from the problematisation of the halal problem into strategising the mechanisms and tools to be used towards achievement of the envisioned growth and compliance as well as in actual identification and manifestation of the real effects of halal governing and standardisation had towards the halal businesses and industry in general as experienced.

In a nutshell, all these findings not only supported the works of other governmentality scholars whose works have added diversity in the study of governing beyond Western liberal governmentality. But it also provides a case study on how Islamic governmentality of the halal certification operates concerning other existing governmentalities that existed within the country resulting from British colonialism, Bruneianisation through the monarchical system, Islamisation with the establishment of the Sharia law and its governing principles as well as industrialism following both West and East (Islamic) way of development. Within halal governmentality per se, findings from the study also highlighted the existence of multiple governing strategies utilised by businesses and regulators towards halalisation, creating a complex multidimensional and multifaceted dynamism that only existed in the Bruneian context. The existence of the halal certification and industrial governing through the certification programme, which supports the conceptualisation of governmentality as a programme (McKee, 2009; Choi, 2017), the use of the disciplining apparatus of the state (Sigley, 2006; Kipnis, 2008; Brännström, 2014; Vallentin, 2015) and new governing technologies such as the new media (Welch, et al., 2004; Bertot, et al., 2010; Dadashzadeh, 2010; Fink, 2010; Moore, et al., 2020) , the temporality of governing programmes (Binkley, 2009; McKinlay et al., 2012), the dissemination of information both traditional and online (Choudhury, 2014; Almedia, 2017), relevant towards the creation of the desired compliance and code of conduct (Choi, 2017; Sigley, 2006) and the after effects of such governmentalities towards compliance or creation of new spaces of resistance (Vallentin, 2015; Pyykkönen, 2015; Ettlinger, 2017) can all be found reflected at the centre of the study on halal governmentality in this thesis. Interestingly, linking Islamic halal governmentality with the principles of Islamic

governance opened new avenues of research by assessing the effectiveness of current halal certification governing from the lens of the five Islamic ethics and governance principles. The relationships between the governor and the governed and how governing affects the governed have never been made clear theoretically and empirically. Hence, this research provided an extended version of governmentality by examining its effects towards businesses. While this study does contain limitations, which will be discussed later, the use of digital technologies allows for the possibility of studying halal governing across different stages of its development whilst also helping in determining its effectiveness as a technology of governmentality. The use of social media as a source of information on government ways of governing through FB reporting, whilst examining the typologies of information and knowledge shared by the regulators and standard setters, makes for interesting insights into how halal governing occurs. This is especially the case in a country where official data recording and information sharing in the industry is sparse and, at best, limited owing to the confidentiality and sensitivity of some datasets.

6.3 Contributions towards Theories on Governmentality

This research contributes towards new knowledge creation and approaches in some of the main areas in governing studies:

- *Bridging the Western philosophical concept and Islamic principles on governing:* Governmentality as a theory has never been studied, examined, applied and tested in the Islamic system of governance. This study provided the case that shows the practical applications of Islamic ethics and principles

as part of the creation of the Islamic/ industrial code of conduct as well as the challenges associated with it, i.e. from the dynamics of power-knowledge relations, the abstinence, or the detachment of socio-religious leaders' and standard-setters responsibilities from those that they governed to the challenges brought about by the hisba and shuratic system within the traditional hierarchical settings. It also proposed a new way of approaching the concept of governing and statecraft, particularly in nation-states that have experienced a hybrid governing structure, a mix of Western, traditional, and Islamic types of governing, through an integrated approach. The operationalisation and workings of the halal certification governmentality are a testament to this complex dynamism, providing a case study on how multiple governmentalities worked in a fully State-Backed halal standard of a small state economy.

- *Use of online governing technologies as part of new halal technocracy and as an entry point for data mining:* The use of new technologies of governing, i.e. online platforms as tools of governing, is not only a point of entry in analysing government initiatives, goals and actions whilst governing. However, it is also a tool that identifies how the space can be transformative and act as a site of power exchanges or contestations between those who govern and those who are governed. The outcome of the analysis on the results of exchanges, the repetitive issues being brought up as well as the disciplining of communities via laws and regulations as well as the use of real-world cases to legitimise regulators' actions further are just some examples in which power was exercised in its degree of 'realness' within the online platforms.

- Industrial governing and practices:* The study also delved into the disparities between the concept of governing and its actual implementation. It underscored the challenges associated with establishing current governing methods and the mechanisms put in place by the government based on idealistic and utopian visions versus the practical realities of their execution and adherence to moral principles. Empirical evidence from the experiences of agri-food producers, the practice of governing and halal auditing and certification conducted by regulators, enforcers and members of the religious councils show the existence of dissonances or disconnects and its inner workings between government and communities that are governed, ineffective mechanisms on halal governing and the minute benefits it made towards the business communities and industry in general. Also highlighted were the over-prescriptions of unrelatable knowledge and information about halal certification, which suggests the multidimensional and multi-layered governing aspects, highlighting multiple governmentalities. Failure to understand the complexities and to acknowledge the importance of feedback mechanisms as a critique of governmentality whilst the oblivious stance that the governors took in their attempt to develop and strengthen the halal industrial foundations without developing the 3 Cs also contributed towards the current effects seen in this research's case study.
- Positivity of power:* The positionality of the State in the wider circuit of power, the governing of the halal standard, shows the existence of the State in every layer, in every step of halal governing, in dictating the final outcomes, which are quite often different in contrast to what has been envisioned. This indirectly

answers the positivity of the power component where, despite the ability of the State to get the work done via formulation of government institutions and other apparatuses to achieve the convenient end, such achievements may not be entirely positive as they got translated or applied into actual practices. It becomes complicated further once it is extended or weighted against the effects it has on food producers.

- *A theoretical extension of Foucault's governmentality:* Using the theoretical lenses on Analytics of Governing (AOG) and understanding the technologies used, the research managed to extend Foucauldian governmentality to both the digital space and industrial governing not only through the proliferation of information and knowledge as part of governing. But also using the new technology to understand actual governing in practice within different moments in time, which led to the identification of complex multilayered and multidimensional patterns and forms of governing. It also allows for understanding some of the issues brought about by new ways of governing, developmental questions that are either new or have been in existence throughout developmental studies as a discipline whilst at the same time providing in-depth analytical assessment on the diverse governing mechanisms used. The application of governmentality towards digital space has only recently gained prominence, particularly with recent developments in deepening digital media and Artificial Intelligence (AI) usage (see Rouvroy, 2011; Rodrigues, 2016; Collier & Whitehead, 2023; Bougeard, 2022; Bronholt, 2021) with the State using such platforms as part of its new governing

mechanism towards statecraft. However, unlike these studies, this research contributed towards governmentality by providing a case study on how halal governmentality operates in halal certification governing through digital media as part of its governing technologies and its centrality in knowledge-sharing, creation, and embeddedness towards the desired halal code of conduct. Extending it to include an examination of the halal governmentality effects towards businesses helps make clear the relationship between the governors and the governed as governmentality, thus far, was only concerned with understanding the political rationalities behind the government's action (Governmentality 1.0) and examining the technologies, tools, and mechanisms that the state used as part of its governance (Dean's AOG or Governmentality 2.0).

6.4 Limitations of the study

In all research endeavours, it is essential to acknowledge the inherent limitations and challenges that hinder the comprehensive acquisition and analysis of intricate details pertaining to the subject under investigation. The researcher encountered similar instances during this study, predominantly centred on the organisation under investigation and the impact of time on the necessity to proceed with this project to corroborate the conclusions. Extensions and study interruptions due to the impact of COVID-19 among others affects accessibility to data as well as respondents. While Chapter 3 explicitly addresses certain methodological limitations, the following paragraphs will provide a more comprehensive overview and suggest avenues for future research.

HFCD's centrality in Brunei halal certification governance is undeniable. The examination of their social media account yielded significant insights into its operationalisation. Yet, forthcoming studies should delve deeper into the involvement of other affiliated or subsidiary organisations, such as the MOH, MPRT, and DARE, in the regulation of halal certification. Specifically, attention should be directed towards the initiatives and programmes designed to support and drive industrial advancement. This is notwithstanding the initial discoveries concerning the interconnectedness and collaboration among government bodies and their endorsement of the food industry's progress. A comprehensive understanding of halal governance necessitates the illumination of these dynamics, thereby warranting further investigation in this area. Using governmentality as the lens in its investigation will be key in servicing and extracting the nuances of the certification governing.

During the period from 2014 to 2017, a significant limitation was the lack of information dissemination and reporting related to the social media analysis of the HFCD's Facebook page i.e. the information black-out or hiatus period. This raised initial concerns about the potential impact on data quality and reliability. However, upon further investigation and confirmation from HFCD respondents, it was determined that the absence of social media activity during those years accurately reflected a reduction in the agency's overall activities. While Chapter 4's findings indicated a lack of personnel managing social media accounts and retirement as primary factors influencing information dissemination, future research should address whether the absence of both online and offline halal knowledge

and information-sharing activities resulted from macroeconomic conditions affecting the country. It is presumed that the diminished information and knowledge-sharing activities among regulators cum auditors and the public could be attributed to the decline in oil and gas prices, impacting government agencies' allocated budgets and consequently affecting the operationalisation of halal regulatory and governing regimes. Further exploration of this hypothesis is warranted in upcoming studies.

The researcher's epistemological orientation, shaped by a critical realist perspective, significantly influenced the analytical direction and interpretation of this study. This orientation acknowledges that while governance, power, and religious norms are socially constructed, they manifest through concrete institutional structures and practices. The researcher's focus on examining the patterns of halal knowledge and information, and on uncovering the rationalities behind technologies of government, reflects a blend of constructivist and positivist sensibilities. This dual positioning informed the methodological choice to adopt content analysis over the more conventionally used critical discourse analysis in governmentality research. Rather than deconstructing discourse in purely rhetorical terms, content analysis allowed for the identification of systematic regularities, knowledge structures, and governance mechanisms embedded in the textual and institutional apparatus of halal certification. This approach enabled the study to foreground how religious authority and state power converge through formalised halal practices, and how such practices structure the experiences of regulated actors. The researcher's position thus shaped not only the analytic tools applied but also the

broader understanding of halal governmentality as a morally structured, technically mediated, and politically situated form of governance in Brunei.

While halal consumer culture featured throughout this thesis—particularly in the form of halal branding, social media messaging, and moral appeals to pious consumption—its analytical role was limited. These references were used primarily to illustrate how halal regulation circulates within consumer-facing domains. However, they were not fully operationalised through a framework that could account for how distinction and difference shape halal consumption in Brunei. Drawing from Bourdieu (1984) and subsequent work on Islamic consumer culture (Fischer, 2008; Rudnyckyj, 2011), such distinctions could have revealed how class, religiosity, and generational identity influence not just what is consumed, but how halal becomes a marker of social positioning. In Brunei, where halal is heavily regulated and state-promoted, exploring consumer differentiation could have shown how governance intersects with affect, aspiration, and identity formation. This thesis focused on state-business dynamics, but the absence of a systematic consumer analysis limited its ability to capture how halal governmentality is also enacted and contested through everyday consumption. Reflecting on this limitation highlights a future research opportunity: to integrate a consumer culture lens that examines how halal is not only governed but also lived and stratified.

In conclusion, it is vital to acknowledge the time constraints inherent in PhD research. There is potential value in extending the study beyond the predefined research period to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of halal governance beyond the 2018 cut-off

point, particularly in light of the significant impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Further research into the pandemic's influence on halal governance, knowledge dissemination, and its subsequent implications for business development could provide valuable insights for governing institutions and policymakers. Such insights could aid in formulating supportive policies as the country endeavours to foster industrial resilience with SDGs at its core on top of studies that looks into the diverging halal consumer culture as well as on the various government agencies linked to halal development in Brunei Darussalam.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Preliminary list of firms involved in agri-food business (formal and informal)

#	Name of Companies	Type	Fieldwork Status
1	CBRM	MPr/ Canned/RM	Surveyed
2	NORB	Bakery	Surveyed
3	SMC	Chilli Sauce	Surveyed
4	SM	Dry Food (Cr.)	Surveyed
5	UOS	Dry Food (TB)	Surveyed
6	AKM	Dry Food (N)	Surveyed
7	IDFD	MPr	Surveyed
8	SBFD	Dry Food (S)	Surveyed
9	SRB	Bakery and Pastry	Surveyed
10	AST	Canned food	Surveyed
11	LIC	Confectionary (I.Cream)	Surveyed
12	SRB	Bakery	Surveyed
13	MSB	Dry Food (Cr.)	Surveyed
14	SWB	Bakery and Pastry	Surveyed
15	EBS	Bakery and Pastry	Surveyed
16	PPN	Confectionary	Surveyed
17	NKR	Ready Meal	Surveyed
18	TK	Ready Meal	Surveyed
19	BK	Caterer	Surveyed
20	CP	Pastries	Surveyed
21	UAE	Fast Food	Surveyed
22	BNB	frozen food	Surveyed
23	UJSG	Fast Food	Surveyed
24	AJK	Bakery and Pastries	Surveyed
25	WA	Snacks	Surveyed
26	SLS	Desserts	Surveyed
27	ZC	Drinks	Surveyed
28	AC	Snacks	Surveyed
29	DHO	Bakery and Pastries	Surveyed
30	OK	Ready Meal/ Snacks	Surveyed
31	MM	Others (honey)	Surveyed
32	BB	Ready Meal	Surveyed
33	GG	Ready Meal	Surveyed
34	BG	Ready Meal	Surveyed
35	ES	Ready Meal/ Snacks	Surveyed
36	SB	Ready snacks/ Caterer	Surveyed
37	EK	Ready Meal	Surveyed
38	AF	Ready Meal	Surveyed
39	SD	Ready Meal/ Snacks	Surveyed
40	DY	Ready Meal/ Snacks	Surveyed
41	NKB	Ready Meal/ Snacks	Surveyed
42	MPKSER	1K1P	Surveyed
43	MPKMENT	1K1P	Surveyed
44	MPKDAN	1K1P	Surveyed
45	MPKLUM	1K1P	Surveyed
46	MPKKAP	1K1P	Surveyed
47	MPKJER	1K1P	Surveyed
48	MPKEKBEL	1K1P	Surveyed

List of businesses (formal and informal) recruited. Out of 286 distributed, 48 were returned and usable, and 16 were recruited for interview.

Appendix 2: Sample of Questionnaire Survey

Sample # & Code:

Date of Survey:

Surveyor:

Please read the information sheet carefully prior to answering the question.

1. Business owner personal information:

- a) Please state your level of tertiary education. (You may tick the appropriate answer).

#	Educational background	
1	Primary and Secondary (PCE, PSR, 'O' and 'A' level)	
2	Certificate/ Diploma (PND, ND, HND, BDVTEC etc)	
3	Undergraduate	
4	Graduate (First degree holder and beyond)	
5	Others (Please State)	

- b) (i) If you are currently employed/ belonged to **one (or more)** of the following sectors, please tick the appropriate boxes. Please also tick which one is primary and subsidiary if you have more than one line of business/ occupation:

	Employment Categories	Employment sector			Employment	
		Public	Private	Others	Primary	Subsidiary
1	Fishing					
2	Industry (incl. workshops)					
3	Education					
4	Health					
5	Banking, finance or insurance					
6	Restaurant or hotel					
7	Construction or real estate					
8	Public utilities					
9	Defence					
10	Emergency services					
11	Wholesale & retail					
12	Personal services					
13	Others					
13	Retired					

- (ii) If you are employed in more than one job, please mentioned the number of hours spent per week in each job/ occupation and time allocated in percentiles (%) in the table below:

Employment	No. of hours per week	Time allocated (%)
Primary		
Subsidiary		

Sample # & Code:
Date of Survey:
Surveyor:

Section A. General information of firm/ business

2. Please provide the following details and tick where appropriate:

a) i) Name of Business		
(ii) Address		
b) Business specialty (You can tick more than one)	Bakery and Pastry (cakes, desserts)	
	Food (cooked/ ready meal, fast food)	
	Frozen Food	
	Drinks and Beverages	
	Confectionary (ice cream, sweets, chocolates)	
	Dry Food (Spices, Noodles)	
	Canned Food/ Bottled sauces	
Others (please answer):		
c) Number of products/ menu varieties		
d) Employment in Business	Full-Time	
	Part-Time	
e) Type of Business	Formal (Licensed, factory-based, etc)	
	Informal (Home-based, social media based i.e. Facebook, Instagram)	
f) Number of years in operation		
g) Source of capital/ financing (You may tick more than one)	Bank Loans	
	Self-Funding (savings and salary)	
	Crowdsourcing	
	Government Schemes/ Grants	
	Private funding (from other people, shareholding, private funds)	
	Others (Please answer):	
h) Ownership	Family run (sole proprietor) (formal)	
	Family run (informal)	
	Personal (sole proprietor) (formal)	
	Personal (informal)	
	Partnership/ Joint venture (private limited)	
	Partnership/ Joint venture (public limited)	

Sample # & Code:
Date of Survey:
Surveyor:

e) i) Does being halal certified important in your opinion? Yes / No

ii) Please justify your answer in the box provided.

5. Are you aware of the term 'halal'? Yes / No

6. What is your understanding of the word halal? Please explain briefly.

7. Where did you learn of the word halal? (You may tick more than one)	Social interactions (Friends, office)	
	Family upbringing	
	School Education	
	Religious sermons/ books	
	Workshop/ Training (Public/ Government)	
	Workshop/ Training (Private)	
	Social Media/ Internet	
Others (Please answer):		

8. In relation to your food products, how do you ensure your products follows the Islamic halal principles? Please state briefly.

Sample # & Code:
Date of Survey:
Surveyor:

	Crowdfunded	
	State-Owned Enterprises (SOE)	
	Cooperatives	
	Others:	

Section B. Production, marketing and distribution activities

3. These questions are on general production-related activities. Please answer accordingly.

a) How many products are you producing on a weekly basis (average volume/ quantity)?		
b) Where did you get your raw materials/ ingredients? (You may tick more than one)	Retail Shops/ supermarket	
	Direct from Producer (Farms, agriculture site)	
	Distributors	
	Direct import	
Others (please answer):		
c) Where do you produce your products? (You may tick more than one)	Home (Kitchen)	
	Home (Designated place)	
Standard production facility/ premises		
Others (Please answer):		
d) (i) Number of employees (including managers, drivers, sales representatives etc)	1-5	
	6 - 50	
	51 - 100	
d) (ii) Workforce Origin (Number of employees by origin)	Domestic (local)	
	Foreign	
	(expatriate)	
e) How do you market your products? (You may tick more than one) (means of marketing)	Social media (Facebook, Instagram, Youtube)	
	Local Newspaper	
	Radio and TV station	
	Business Expos	
	Friends, families, social circle (office co-worker)	
	Others (Please answer):	
	Own shop	
Wholesaler		
Supermarket		

Sample # & Code:
Date of Survey:
Surveyor:

9. Are you aware of the recent compulsory halal certification/ standardization for food premises? Yes / No

10. Are you aware of the Brunei Halal Certification Guidelines (BCG 1) and other halal guidelines relating to manufacturing i.e BCG 2-4 and PB:2007? Yes / No

11. a) Have you ever attended any halal consultation or training workshops organized by any relevant agencies both government and private? Yes / No

b) If yes, what is your opinion with regards to the workshop? Answer in the box provided.

12. a) Do you have any concerns or issues regarding the halal certification/ standards? Yes / No

b) If yes, please share with us your concerns and issues regarding the certification/ standards in the box provided below.

Appendix 3a: Interview schedule for Brunei Halal Standard Regulators/ auditors and relevant committees (BIRC and related government agencies)

Interview schedule for Brunei Halal Standard Regulators/ auditors and relevant committees (BIRC and related government agencies)

Process of halal certification/standardisation, monitoring and auditing

1. a) What is your agency's role in implementing Brunei halal standards and certification process?

b) Can you briefly explain your role's terms of reference (TOR)?

Prompts: Where in the certification/standardisation process do you come in? How long does the certification process take, i.e., from application to final audit/ granting of certification? Do audited firms have to stop production whilst waiting for audit results?

What motivates HFCD/MUIB to develop/ establish the Brunei Halal Standard?

2. About developing the Brunei Halal standard, do you consult firms? How do you come up with the halal standard?

3. How deeply involved are the stakeholders?

4. How do firms apply for certification/ audits? (What are the ways firms need to obtain certification from MUIB?)

5. What guidelines do firms need to follow to be halal certified?

Prompts – BCG 1-4, PB:2007?

6. What are the criteria that HFCD/ MORA established for a firm to be halal certified? Are the halal requirements/criteria needed for food businesses different from one another, i.e. restaurants as opposed to food processing factories?

Prompts: in relation to raw materials insourcing/ origins/production-related activities, distribution, and human resources? Other recognised halal certifications?

7. On what basis do decisions were made when it comes to halal certification?

8. How do you monitor and ensure that firms and businesses meet halal compliance?

Prompts: Monitoring formal (conventional producers) and informal (traditional home-based/ social media)?

9. a) What is halal to you? (regulator)

b) How do you define halal in the context of Brunei halal standards?

Prompts: Is it basic (essentials)? Or is it the extended version (beyond products), which includes specific criteria (industrial standards)?

c) What is the significance of the State Mufti's ruling on halal product issues and its effects on Brunei halal standards? (Question should come under motivation/ how standard come about)

10. What are the challenges in implementing the halal standards so far?

Prompts: With 'halal' ingredients (outsourced from abroad), the rise of the informal businesses, private consultancies that assist in production vetting, etc., are there any issues?

11. When deciding on a particular audit/ halal application, what is your crucial measure of the success/ failure of particular business audits?

Prompts: Is it based on a field report, i.e., cleanliness, production environment? Or is it based on the knowledge of producers on halal? Is it based on failure to meet the stated halal technical standards?

12. How does your agency deal with the matter if food producers fail to meet the required halal standards? Are there any post-audit consultations? Or are businesses required to resolve issues on their own?

Prompts: Relates to transparency/ state's social responsibility question,

b) What actions does the agency take should businesses not comply?

Prompts: the imposition of a fine? Revoke of business licenses? Temporary ban?

Consultation, coordination and responses (stakeholder consultation)

13. What are the responses/feedback that you get from the public (business wonders, industrial players) regarding the halal standards implementation?

14. What type of consultation and coordination did your agency (together with other relevant agencies overseeing halal certification) do to ensure business compliance?

Prompts: Any training/ workshops/ information sharing/ technical assistance developed/organised for food businesses/ producers? How do you recruit stakeholders?

15. How effective are these measures for businesses' understanding of halal production?

16. What do you hope to see in the next few years concerning the halal standardisation process and industry in general?

Appendix 3b. Interview schedule for agrifood businesses/ producers

Interview schedule for agrifood businesses/ producers Halal standardisation/ certification processes, consultation/ coordination 1. What is your perception/ opinion on the compulsory halal standards required for food producers/ businesses? 2. Are your firm halal certified? If yes, answer the following question. If no, go to question 3. a) How do you obtain the information and knowledge on the certification requirement? Prompts: Are any workshops/ roadshows/ training required? Or is it through the media? b) Is there any assistance MUIB (BIRC) gives in attempts towards standardisation? c) What are the measures/ support given by MUIB (BIRC) to achieve this? d) In the event of both successful/ failed audits, are there any recommendations/ support given to improve/ pass certification? e) How involved are you during the stakeholder consultation between MUIB/ regulators and halal food producers? f) How effective do you think this stakeholder consultation is towards a streamlined certification process and your business/ firm growth in general? Prompts: Any resolution of issues or vis-à-vis? Any improvement in the certification process? Are there any channels provided for businesses/ firms should there be any feedback/ arising issues regarding the certification process? If not, how do you tackle arising issues? g) How long does it take to obtain halal certification? h) How long does it usually take to renew a halal certificate? Are there any arising issues relating to renewal processes? i) What are the critical criteria that food producers have to follow to be halal certified? j) What measures are in place to ensure that the food produced is healthy, clean and safe? k) Recently, the Halal Food Control Division introduced a shorter halal certification application and processing time where it only takes 45 days for the whole process to be completed i.e. from application to certificate issuance. Are you aware of this? l) Should you have gone through this process, what are the differences between the old and new procedures, especially in auditing? For not-yet halal-certified firms 3. Why are you not applying for halal certification? Prompts: Any issue regarding the certification? Time factor? Lack of information? No need for it? Cost related? Have you ever seen the halal requirement for food businesses? If yes, what is your opinion regarding these requirements, and will you be able to fulfil the requirements? Knowledge of halal production (formal and informal) 4. What is your understanding of the word 'halal'? (in the context of food production)	5. Based on your interpretation of the word 'halal', how do you apply it in your food business/ production? 6. How aware are you of the halal requirements based on the national standards (BCG-1)? 7. How do you ensure your production is following the religious requirements? Prompts: materials/ origin of intermediate products (where?) used in production 8. What is your view on cleanliness in relation to food production? What are your measures to ensure the food produced is clean and safe? i) Where do you get raw materials from? Is it sourced locally, i.e., from local producers or overseas via distributors/ food wholesalers and retailers in Brunei? ii) When you shifted your production to 'halal certified', were any significant changes in your raw material sourcing/ supply and production in general? iii) Does the shift put pressure or burden on your production as you reorganise? iii) Does your firm provide in-house halal training or a self-funded training program for your staff? Effects of halal standardization/ certification towards businesses (formal producers) 9. What are the costs and benefits you have experienced being Halal certified? 10. What are the issues/ challenges experienced in trying to fulfil the halal requirement? 11. How do you overcome such challenges? Prompts: reorganisation of production, infrastructural changes, market accessibility (local supermarkets, social media, etc)

Appendix 4: Confidential and Consent Forms of Halal Study

UCL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING UNIT

INFORMATION SHEET FOR RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

PhD Research Project:

Evaluating the effects of the halal standards and their implementation on the development of the agrifood businesses in the context of Islamic governance in Brunei

University and Department:

University College London, Bartlett's Faculty of the Built Environment, Development Planning Unit

Name of Researcher and contact details:

Izni Azrein bin Noor Azalie (izni.azalie.14@ucl.ac.uk)
34 Tavistock Square, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit, UCL
London, MC1H 9EZ, United Kingdom

Invitation and participation to research project

Date:.....

Dear,

We would like to invite you to be part of the respondents of this particular research project. Please read carefully the paragraphs below as it gives you information on the study of which your participation is highly appreciated. You still have the right to withdraw from this project without any further losses.

This study is part of a PhD research project whose focus is on investigating the effects of Brunei halal standard and its implementation towards halal food businesses and production. The study aim at understanding not only the ways in which the halal standard is being carried out, but it also tries to seek the practical benefits of standard's implementation following Islamic principles and governance. Potential success would allow the establishment of an alternative approach towards development. Hence, there is a need to inform the relevant agencies if there do exist gaps or issues that needs to be addressed by looking at the experiences of local food producers. Effectiveness of stakeholder consultations by examining experiences of those involved, exploring the understanding of the word halal and halal standards as well as the effects of standardization of halal standards on producers would assist policymakers to craft and introduce appropriate policies that are holistic and inclusive of the industries and society. This is important in order to achieve Vision 2035 of making Brunei as the global halal hub and creation of new employment opportunities through SME development.

The data collection will commence between June 2016 and March 2017 and it will involved key players especially the halal food producers and possibly related firms involved in the production. Interviews will be conducted among selected food producers and businesses as well as governmental agencies involved in halal standardisation processes (regulators, audits, decision-makers). Agencies such as the Brunei Islamic Religious Council (BIRC), Department of Agriculture and Agrifood and Ministry of Health are some of the potential agencies to be approached as part of this study.

Should you decide to become part of the study, further arrangements will be made between the researcher and interviewees in due course. Social survey respondents will be required to spare 10-20 minutes of their time to complete the distributed questionnaires. A consent form will be issued to respondents, which stipulate their rights to confidentiality and anonymity as well as agreement on the use of any information derived from interviews/ surveys for research purposes. Interviews will be recorded by various means i.e. voice, written, video and will be safeguarded and stored appropriately. Upon request, you will be able to gain access to a copy of the dissertation that will be produced out of this project in 2018.

UCL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING UNIT

Social survey/ Interview Consent Sheet

PhD Research Project:

Evaluating the effects of the halal standards and their implementation on the development of the agrifood businesses in the context of Islamic governance in Brunei

University and Department:

University College London, Bartlett's Faculty of the Built Environment, Development Planning Unit

Name of Researcher and contact details:

Izni Azrein bin Noor Azalie (izni.azalie.14@ucl.ac.uk)
34 Tavistock Square, The Bartlett Development Planning Unit, UCL
London, MC1H 9EZ, United Kingdom

Prior to going through the items below, information regarding the research project should have been conveyed to you. Any questions arising from the project information should be dealt before proceeding.

Declaration of consent

I, ..., hereby:

- ☐ have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet, and understand what the study involves.
- ☐ understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw immediately.
- ☐ consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study.
- ☐ understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.
- ☐ agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in this study.
- ☐ understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and I will be sent a copy. Confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained where possible.
- ☐ give permission for the use of my questionnaire surveys/ interview transcripts to be used for research purposes only (including its usage in research publications and reports)
- ☐ I understand that my participation will be taped/video recorded/ written in the field diary and I consent to use of this material as part of the project.

Signed:

Date:

Appendix 5: Table on trends and distribution of halal standard criteria as well as halal application trends

Table showing the trends and distribution for halal standard criteria (HAL_STDCRIT) post as well as on halal application 'how-tos' (APPL_HWTO) between 2011-2018 as shared on halal.bn Facebook page

YEAR	APPL_HWTO	HAL_STDCRIT	APPL + HAL_STD
2011	1	0	0
2012	1	1	0
2013	1	0	0
2014	0	0	0
2015	1	0	0
2016	0	0	0
2017	5	2	2
2018	12	10	6
SUBTOTAL	21	13	8

The total for all posts both for standalone themes and combined = 42 posts

Appendix 6: Table on supports acquired from relevant agencies

Business type	Type of support	Business Status		TOTAL	Brunei Government						GLCs			Private Sector
		FORMAL	INFORMAL		HFCD	MPRT (Agriculture and Agrifood Department)	MPRT (Fisheries Department)	MOHA (District Office)	MOFAT	BEDB	Ghanim	DARE		
Cooperatives (MPKs)	Packaging	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
	Labels and Stickers	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
	Branding and Advertising	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
	Kitchen Utensils and Machineries	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0
	Technical expertise	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Subsidies	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Space to conduct business	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
	Platforms to showcase products (locally)	3	0	3	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
	Production-space	2	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Temporarily owned land (lease)	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Formal (Factory and home-based)	GMP/ GAP adherence and support	2	0	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Halal Brunei SOPs and Manual	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Securing raw materials supply	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
	Training in production	3	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Regional training Workshops	3	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
	Packaging	4	0	4	0	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Branding and Advertising	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
	Applying for standards and licensing	3	0	3	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
	Accounting	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Media coverage (local)	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Formal (Factory and home-based)	Moral support	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Labels and Stickers	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	International Expos (Booth and registration)	7	0	7	0	6	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	Total	44	11	55	1	19	8	17	1	3	5	1	2	2