THE POLISH LANGUAGE AND POLITICS. LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES IN POLISH PROFESSIONAL METALINGUISTIC DISCOURSE (1970–2023)

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Signed:

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Abstract

In this thesis, I analyse language ideologies discernible in professional discourse of Polish scholars of language generated during three recent periods of Polish history: the last two decades of 'communist authoritarianism' (1970–1989), liberal democracy building (1989–2015), and the crisis of democracy under the rule of the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (2015–2023). I ask: What language ideologies are detectable in professional metalinguistic discourse developed by Polish scholars of language in these three periods? Are these language ideologies related to any political ideology, and if so, how? Why are certain language ideologies more salient than others in professional metalinguistic discourse in these three periods?

I argue that Polish scholars of language supported or challenged specific visions of socio-political order, even if inadvertently, by relying on language ideologies in their professional discourse. They explicitly discuss language, but implicitly make normative statements about the socio-political system that language represents. Because the construction of the socio-political world is always carried out within a specific language, discourse about language references two layers of reality: on the one hand, it refers to language, but on the other, to the socio-political world it constructs. I demonstrate that language ideologies are related to political ideologies, and this relationship is more evident in discourses produced under non-democratic or anti-democratic regimes. The Polish case suggests, I further argue, that regime changes are an important factor impacting the changes in professional metalinguistic discourse.

In my analysis of linguistic studies of communist propaganda written during the period of communist authoritarianism, I show that the underlying axiology of these studies is liberal. Consequently, liberal language ideology, founded on such axiology, challenges the legitimising principles of the communist regime. I also analyse a newspaper column authored by a professional linguist in state media, which employs standard language ideology. I argue that although the communist authorities may have hoped the column would legitimise their construction of Polish national identity, it promoted its alternative (nationalist-conservative) version.

Next, I analyse Polish professional metalinguistic discourse produced during the period of liberal democracy building. I show that they promoted the idea of 'protecting Polish', which led to the appointment of the Polish Language Council in 1996 and to the passing of the Polish Language Act in 1999. I argue that compared to the previous period, Polish scholars of language employed a much more elaborate and comprehensive version of standard language ideology 'thickened' by nationalist and purist language ideologies, which were aimed at constructing a specific version of national identity (homogeneous, guided by the elites, with a strong state) in the period of economic, political, social, and cultural transformations.

Turning to the period of democratic backsliding, I analyse two Polish Language Council reports on the state of the Polish language published in this period, arguing that professional metalinguistic discourse at the time underwent a liberal turn and is indicative of the ongoing culture war. On the one hand, Polish scholars of language again employed liberal language ideology (which was much more robust than in the period of communist authoritarianism) to explicitly defend democracy. On the other hand, Polish scholars of language continued promoting standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies dominant in the previous period. While these linguists explicitly criticised the government, their professional discourse may have continued creating a discursive opportunity structure for the right-wing populist discourse of the Law and Justice party.

Impact statement

Academic impact

The main goal of this study is to examine language ideologies underpinning professional metalinguistic discourse of Polish linguists and other scholars of language, highlighting its significance in promoting visions of socio-political order. The work contributes to the field of sociolinguistics by providing a definition of language ideology which not only can be used as an analytical framework, but also integrates the literature on ideology in general and language ideology in particular. In a deconstructive mode, this study focuses on exploring the unanalysed relationship between language ideologies and political ideologies. Liberal language ideology is identified, which previously was not systematically studied. Although in the literature it tends to be considered a subtype of standard language ideology, this study shows that liberal language ideology should be considered separate from standard, at least in the Polish context. Another contribution of this study to the field of sociolinguistics is the application of the concept of language ideology to an Eastern European, mostly monolingual context (Poland). This study also makes a methodological contribution by combining thematic analysis of ideological discourse with contextual analysis, which allows for a more comprehensive and multifaceted understanding. By means of contextual analysis, this study challenges some of the 'Western' ideas about 'Eastern' Europe, thus adding to the discussion about 'decolonising' the area.

Finally, this thesis is a contribution to related disciplines, primarily political sociology and anthropology as well as history in the post-communist context. It contributes to uncovering the ideological nature of liberalism as an ideology. A framework of a comparative analysis of three recent periods in such contexts is proposed: communist authoritarianism, liberal democracy building, and democratic backsliding. This framework allows for a complex perspective on socio-political phenomena shaped alongside regime changes and highlights the importance of the period of communist authoritarianism for an understanding of contemporary socio-political issues.

Impact outside academia

This thesis is particularly relevant in the context of democratic backsliding, which can be observed in many European and non-European countries. I demonstrate how state propaganda, as one of the mechanisms of control of power, can be used as a tool for autocratisation by non-democratic and anti-democratic governments, and how ideas on liberal language can be helpful in protecting democracy. On the other hand, I show that anti-democratic discourses can be successfully produced in liberal democratic regimes. Focusing particularly on the Polish context, this study contributes to an understanding of growing polarisation and even culture wars between liberalism and illiberalism.

This thesis is also relevant to policymaking, as it addresses issues of language policies associated with different political orientations (liberal and conservative-nationalist). It also explores discourses and practices of national identity construction, in which national languages play a key role, which are very prominent despite (or arguably because of) globalisation.

Finally, this study is relevant for international relations, which is particularly pressing in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine. This study explores the complex relationship between the European 'East' and the 'West' and shows that the two have a long history of mutual influence and interdependence. By broadening an understanding of the specificity of the 'East' and its relationship with the 'West', this study contributes to intercultural communication and international cooperation.

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Last but not least, I want to thank myself for my passion and all my hard work, for believing in myself and not giving up, and for getting up after falling down.

To the people of Ukraine

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1 Introduction

When I was in school, I sat innumerable dictation tests and participated in about a dozen dictation competitions. There was a huge number of them to choose from and in some I was quite successful. Dictation tests in school constituted a significant portion of the final assessment in Polish Language as a subject at all levels of education, where we were constantly told to consult a dictionary of the Polish language whenever in doubt, as it is important to speak and – perhaps even more importantly – spell correctly. I also have vivid memories of conversations when I or someone else was told to say this, not that, as the former was correct, and the latter was wrong.

I happened to enjoy learning about spelling rules, sitting spelling tests, and participating in spelling competitions. I wanted to be correct. I spent countless hours memorising the spelling rules section of the PWN Polish Spelling Dictionary[1] and reading books devoted to correct Polish. I realised very quickly that the number of sources on correct language in Poland was gigantic. Apart from numerous dictionaries, linguistic self-help books and manuals, there were popular TV and radio programmes and more recently YouTube channels and blogs, which had enjoyed widespread popularity, and whose hosts were household names in Poland. It also became clear to me that many people around me genuinely cared about correct Polish a lot. For some reason, correct Polish was a matter of utmost importance and excitement.

There must have been something about this obsession with correct language that fascinated me. During my last year of high school, I made it to the final of the National Olympics in Polish Literature and Language[2]. It was precisely the topic of Polish orthography and punctuation that I selected for the oral part of the final round of the competition. What struck me the most while reading about the history of Polish orthography was that the rules and their justifications introduced to us in school as

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[1] PWN, or Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe (Polish Scientific Publisher), is one of the most respected Polish publishers and the leading provider of scientific, educational, and professional literature, especially encyclopaedias, dictionaries, and university handbooks.
[2] It is one of the most prestigious competitions for high school students in Poland. Becoming a laureate gives one free entry to any university programme in the country.

'laws of nature' were in fact not only fairly recent, but always to a large extent a matter of convention agreed upon by people in a particular place and time.

I lost count of how many times someone asked me about correct forms or wanted me to check their spelling and punctuation. I even remember getting phone calls from friends and family, who needed, for instance, urgent language advice for an important meeting in their workplace. This became particularly frequent after I began studying Polish Philology at the Jagiellonian University. People somehow imagined that Polish Philology students only studied correct Polish, and that a Polish Philology student (who had only just started university) automatically became an expert on it. A close friend even told me that she was 'ashamed' to speak in front of me after I ended up winning the National Olympics in Polish Literature and Language.

These experiences got stuck in my memory along with the few issues I was finding puzzling. First, why was linguistic correctness ever so important? Secondly, why was the popularity of sources on correct language so enormous? Thirdly, why were the dictionaries and other sources on correct language, as well as Polish linguists themselves (and students of Polish philology), regarded as a linguistic authority?

I initially thought this was a phenomenon unique to Poland, but when I selected a paper in Sociolinguistics as part of my Master's degree at the University of Oxford, I found that in Britain, and indeed in many other countries, the interest in correct language was similar and equally substantial. It made me wonder: Why is correct language such a big deal? I was truly intrigued. During my time in Oxford, I also learned that this issue had fascinated numerous scholars, who had been trying to understand where this interest might be coming from. Many have argued that the root of this interest lies in the relationship between language and identity (e.g., Silverstein 1976). Gradually, I came to understand why people care about language so much; they want to be perceived in a certain way, and the language they use plays a crucial role in that perception.

I also understood why language is subject to heated debates. In her *Verbal Hygiene*, Cameron (2012) argues that this is because language, like other social practices, is based on social norms, which are overtly discussed and negotiated by the given society. She makes a point, however, that language tends to trigger more emotions than other social practices. The reason for that, she argues, is the

relationship between language and identity, which makes language capable of standing in for other issues. In addition, in the era of so-called political correctness, this symbolic capacity of language makes it the last place where discrimination can be expressed, albeit implicitly. This idea that discourse about language can ultimately be about something else became a fascination of mine.

Studying for the Sociolinguistics seminar at the University of Oxford, I came across a concept that tends to be used to describe such ideas about language: language ideology, defined as a system of ideas about language. The concept of language ideologies was first developed within linguistic anthropology, but quickly spread to other language-related disciplines. Studying numerous definitions, I realised that this concept most effectively captures this capacity of language to stand for other things. According to numerous scholars, language ideologies are explicitly about language, but they ultimately serve to legitimise a specific socio-political order (e.g., Irvine 1989). In other words, language ideologies are 'political': they promote specific political values to support or challenge specific configurations of power. Uncovering this socio-political order that the use of language ideologies aims to legitimise is precisely what makes this such a promising avenue of study. I explored language ideologies in Poland in my final Sociolinguistics project, where I focused on Poles' attitudes to Anglicisms in contemporary Polish. I quickly realised, though, that the project was the tip of the iceberg, and wanted to explore the topic in much more detail as a PhD project.

While the concept of language ideology has become very popular in academic studies, these tend to focus on multilingual contexts in the 'Western' world, that is Western Europe and North America (Duchêne and Heller 2007; Heller 2001; Lippi-Green 1997; Milroy and Milroy 2012), or postcolonial contexts (Lane, Costa, and De Korne 2018; Lupke and Storch 2013; Schieffelin, Woolard, and Kroskrity 1998). Very little has been written about language ideologies in the context of 'Eastern' Europe and the concept is hardly used in Polish scholarship. Among the few notable works focusing on this region are: Greenberg (2004), who discusses the development of the languages of Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the disintegration of Serbo-Croatian; Ćalić (2018, 2021), who studies language ideologies among teachers of Serbo-Croatian as a foreign language at higher

education institutions both within former Yugoslavia and worldwide; Tarsoly (2016), who looks at language attitudes and a variety of discourses of standardisation in the Hungarian context; Andrews (2011), who studies legacies of totalitarian language in post-totalitarian discourse in Eastern Europe and Russia; Gorham (2014), who explores language culture in recent Russian politics, linking it to authority, power, and national identity, particularly during times of radical change; as well as Offord et al. (2015a, 2015b), who look at language use, language attitudes, language ideologies, and the politics of the French-Russian heteroglossia in Imperial (18th- and 19th-century) Russia. Apart from Duszak's chapter (2006) exploring language ideologies and practices in Polish post-communist political discourse, there are scholars who have discussed debates about the Polish language and its standardisation, but not focused on language ideology (Brückner 1917; Jodłowski 1979; Mayenowa 1955; Mikulski 1951; Morawski 1923; Polański 2004; Saloni 2005; Tazbir 2011). Studying Poland is thus a valuable contribution to the field, as it is not only an 'Eastern' European country, but also a largely monolingual one.

Between 1795 and 1918, Poland did not exist on the map of Europe because of the so-called three Partitions conducted by Austria, Prussia, and Russia (1772–1795). At the end of the First World War, Poland regained independence and began building a sovereign democratic state, unifying people who until then had lived under different regimes. This was disrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War, which affected Poland severely. Then, as a result of Soviet dominance in Eastern part of Europe, Poland became part of the Soviet bloc, and was officially labelled the People's Republic of Poland in 1952. Despite its initial rigidity, the socialist-communist regime came under increasingly powerful challenges in the 1970s and 1980s and eventually collapsed in 1989. Poland then entered a period of liberal democracy building and integrating with the 'West'. The problems of establishing a democratic system out of a communist legacy became evident when the right-wing populist Law and Justice party won the parliamentary elections and formed the government in 2015. As a result, Poland entered into a period of democratic backsliding (Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley 2018; Haggard and Kaufman 2021a). I will argue that these regime changes are a very important context for understanding language ideologies promoted by linguists in recent Polish history.

After the Second World War, as a consequence of the movement of political boundaries and resettlements, Poland became a predominantly monolingual country, with just a few minority languages, the most widely spoken of which are German, Belarussian, and Ukrainian. In the 2011 census, as many as 96.19 per cent of Polish citizens spoke exclusively Polish at home (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2015). By 2021, this figure dropped slightly to 94.3 per cent, but as many as 98.4 per cent of people living in Poland spoke Polish as at least one of their home languages (Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2023). That has changed somewhat with the massive influx of people from Ukraine after 24 February 2022, but no fresh statistics on language use in Poland have been made available. I will argue in this thesis that in a monolingual context language ideology is by no means less significant than in multilingual ones. I will demonstrate that some of the functions language ideologies perform in this context are similar to multilingual settings, and some of them are different.

When I was writing my PhD project proposal, it was my intention to focus on the idea of 'correct' and 'pure' Polish in popular science books about language, dictionaries, newspaper columns, press articles, radio programmes, TV shows, and recently social media platforms. I was particularly interested in the role played by linguists and the Polish Language Council, as well as popular pundits promoting the idea of 'correct' Polish. I knew this material very well from my earlier experience and wanted to focus on the period after 1989.

Working on data collection, I understood that it would never be possible to analyse it all. Discussions with my primary supervisor made me realise that focusing not only on the period of liberal democracy building, but also on the preceding period, may strengthen my data interpretation. At that point, I began looking at material promoting 'correct' Polish before 1989 and found that there was much less of it than after 1989. But I also learned that the ideal of 'neutrality' related to the claim that language should be 'ideology-free' or 'apolitical' was very salient at the time, since Polish scholars of language often produced linguistic studies of communist propaganda. That is how I decided to expand my topic from the study of the discourse about 'correct' Polish in Poland after 1989 to a comparative analysis of professional metalinguistic discourse before and after 1989.

In this thesis, I understand 'Polish professional metalinguistic discourse' (Cappelen and Lepore 2007; Jaworski, Coupland, and Galasiński 2004a) as a field of discourse about Polish produced by Polish scholars specialising in the Polish language mostly in Poland, but also in the Polish diaspora (in the period of communist authoritarianism, many Polish scholars were forced to leave Poland due to their oppositional activities). In other words, it is metalinguistic discourse produced by academic lecturers in Linguistics and the Polish Language, as well as related disciplines: philologists, literary scholars (the philology tradition is very strong in Poland), and social scientists who study language, particularly in the socio-political context. The term 'professional metalinguistic discourse' includes not only these scholars' academic output (publications and conference presentations), but also their public discourse (produced in the media, for example, TV or radio shows). My study is thus a meta-analysis (or more precisely, a meta-meta-analysis) of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse.

As I proceeded with this project, it became impossible to ignore that linguistic and public discourse about language changed significantly after 2015, when the Law and Justice Party came to power. Many linguists who before that date had promoted 'correct' Polish suddenly changed their agenda and began criticising the language of Law and Justice propaganda. It struck me that this discourse resembled the discourse criticising communist propaganda before 1989. I then realised that 'correct Polish' has more than one meaning: in the liberal democratic period, it is about 'grammaticality', while in the socialist-communist period and the period of democratic backsliding, it is about 'neutrality'.

Through these different milestones, I developed the final versions of my three research questions in this thesis: What language ideologies are detectable in professional metalinguistic discourse developed by Polish scholars of language in the three periods of recent Polish history: communist authoritarianism, liberal democracy building, and democratic backsliding? Are these language ideologies related to any political ideology, and if so, how? Why are certain language ideologies more salient than others in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in these three periods?

My main argument is that in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse one can detect language ideologies, and this indicates that Polish scholars of language

supported or challenged specific visions of the changing socio-political orders, even if inadvertently. Because the construction of the socio-political world is always carried out within a specific language, any discourse about language references two layers of reality: on the one hand, it refers to language, but on the other, to the socio-political world it constructs[3]. Discourse about language is thus never solely about language. It is always to some degree ideological and hence cannot be assumed to be 'objective'. I also argue that language ideologies and political ideologies can be related because their purpose is often to legitimise the same socio-political order. Finally, I demonstrate that that regime changes are a critical factor in explaining the salience of specific language ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the three recent periods of Polish history.

In the next chapter, literature review and theory, I discuss the theory of social constructionism and provide a critical overview of the definitions of discourse, ideology, specific political ideologies particularly relevant for this study, language ideology, and specific language ideologies discussed in the literature. I then introduce my own definition of language ideology, which not only is used as an analytical framework in this study, but also integrates existent definitions of ideology in general, or political ideology (as I will call it for the sake of clarity), and language ideology. The two are, however, distinct: political ideologies reference a socio-political order overtly, largely by means of language, while language ideologies explicitly discuss language, but rarely explicitly reference a socio-political order. For this reason, language ideologies and political ideologies tend to appear in different discursive fields: the former are usually promoted by politicians, political thinkers, and political activists, who only occasionally employ language ideologies, whereas the latter are promoted by linguists and scholars of language-related disciplines much more consistently. Finally, I introduce the theoretical framework of my study, which is Swidler's theory of 'unsettled periods'. This theory holds that in periods of intense social transformations, ideologies become particularly significant and the ones that

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[3] As Gorham put it, '[l]inguists have as much right to attempt to tweak discourse (with the concurrent hope of tweaking reality) as politicians or anyone else possessing some semblance of linguistic capital and access to technology that can bring about that change' (2014:20).

become dominant depend on 'structural constraints and historical circumstances' (Swidler 1986:280).

In the third chapter, methodology, I provide methodological as well as ontological and epistemological foundations of this study. I then introduce the three methods I use in this study, together with key thinkers and studies. Firstly, I identify language ideologies and occasionally traces of related political ideologies in professional metalinguistic discourse in each of the three recent periods of Polish history by means of thematic analysis. Secondly, I analyse selected passages identified under specific themes, looking for expressions of ideology in discourse (Van Dijk 2006). In particular, I follow the Critical Metaphor Analysis approach. Thirdly, I interpret language ideologies and political ideologies identified through the lens of the context in which they were produced. For this, I use Critical Discourse Analysis, especially Discourse Historical Approach (Wodak 2007).

The next three chapters are empirical and correspond to the three periods I am looking at: the last two decades of 'communist authoritarianism' (1970–1989), liberal democracy building (1989–2015), and the crisis of democracy under the rule of Law and Justice (2015–2023). While dealing with the period of communist authoritarianism (Linz and Stepan 1996), I identify two main discourses in Polish linguistics[4]. On the one hand, I analyse linguistic studies of the language of communist propaganda published in oppositional ('illegal') books and magazines in Poland and in the 'West'. I argue that what underlies their descriptions and ultimate criticisms of the language of communist propaganda is liberal axiology, which is why they can be interpreted as a reaction to the way the Party controlling all state media used Polish to promote socialist-communist ideology. By calling for the ideal of a 'neutral' or 'value-free' language, which linguists claimed would provide an accurate description of reality – the opposite of ideological correctness or manipulation – they promoted liberal democratic values, such as individual liberty, freedom of expression and information, and popular sovereignty. I thus demonstrate that linguists in this period

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[4] I introduce the term 'communist authoritarianism' following the seminal conceptual analysis by Linz and Stepan (1996) in 4.4.3.1. To avoid repetitions, I will use the terms 'communist authoritarianism', 'state socialism', 'socialist-communist regime', and 'communist regime' interchangeably, all of which are used in the literature in comparative politics.

employed liberal language ideology, aimed at challenging the communist regime. On the other hand, I discuss examples of linguists' popular output in state media, where the idea of 'correct' Polish was promoted. I demonstrate that the key language ideology underlying such output was standard, which corresponds to conservatism 'thickened' (Freeden 1998) by nationalism as political ideologies. I thus show that the goal of linguists' state media publications and shows was to construct an alternative version of national identity (nationalist-conservative) to the one promoted by the state (nationalist-socialist). This is why they can also be considered a form of anti-communist resistance, even if it is much subtler than in the case of linguistic studies of communist propaganda.

For the period of liberal democracy building, I look at linguistics conference papers promoting the necessity to 'protect Polish', which led to the establishment of the Polish Language Council (1996) and to the passing of the Polish Language Act (1999). This is arguably the most striking link between Polish professional metalinguistic discourse and politics. I argue that by promoting the idea of 'correct' Polish, linguists employed standard language ideology 'thickened' by nationalist and purist language ideologies, which aimed at constructing a specific (nationalist-conservative) version of national identity in the period of socio-political transformations. In other words, the professional metalinguistic discourse after 1989 drew on the second discursive strand identified in the period before 1989, but the former was much more explicit, elaborate, and comprehensive than the latter. I thus show how the discourse of the endangerment of the national language plays an important role in national identity construction, and how despite growing globalisation, which theoretically puts the nature, future and arguably even existence of nations into question, defenders of national identity reassert themselves.

Turning to the period of democratic backsliding (Bauer et al. 2021; Bellamy and Kröger 2021; Bermeo 2016; Cianetti et al. 2018; Haggard and Kaufman 2021b), I analyse two Polish Language Council reports on the state of the Polish language published in this period, arguing that the professional metalinguistic discourse underwent a liberal turn. The first report drew heavily and explicitly on linguistic studies of communist propaganda, which, the authors argued, the language of the Law and Justice party and the national media resembled. Employing liberal language

ideology, these linguists produced linguistic studies of the language of Law and Justice propaganda in state media to defend democracy. I demonstrate that Polish scholars of language promoted liberalism between 2015 and 2023 in a much more forceful way than in the period of communist authoritarianism. The second report drew on the conservative-nationalist discursive strand produced in the period of liberal democracy building. Employing standard, purist, and nationalist language ideologies, Polish scholars of language called for the use of Polish in scholarship. I demonstrate that while this discourse may have inadvertently supported the populist discourse of Law and Justice, it was less conservative and nationalist than in the previous period, as liberal ideas can also be identified.

The final chapter is the Conclusion, where I summarise the argument of this thesis, synthesise answers to my three research questions, and identify directions in which this study can be expanded.

2 Literature review and theory

2.1 Philosophical foundations: social constructionism

The philosophical stance underlying my study is social constructionism developed by Berger and Luckman. The basic tenet of this theory is that

> 'social order is a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human production. It is produced by man in the course of his ongoing externalization. Social order is not biologically given or derived from any biological data in its empirical manifestations. Social order … is also not given in man's natural environment, though particular features of this may be factors in determining certain features of a social order (for example, its economic or technological arrangements). Social order is not part of the "nature of things", and it cannot be derived from the "laws of nature" … Both in its genesis (social order is the result of past human activity) and its existence in any instant of time (social order exists only and insofar as human activity continues to produce it) it is a human product' (1991:69–70).

According to Berger and Luckman, the social world as we know it is of a very different nature to the physical world. The social order is constantly produced by human externalisations, that is how a person 'projects his own meanings into reality' (Berger and Luckmann 1991:122). By interacting with each other, people assign meanings to their actions, which over time can become habitualised, meaning 'the action in question may be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort' (1991:71). In other words, they become a routine that is taken for granted by individuals. Habitualised actions can then be reciprocally typified 'by types of actors' (1991:72), that is individuals perform social roles in these actions. This is when institutionalisation occurs. Institutionalised conduct becomes part of social knowledge, or more precisely 'this knowledge is socially objectivated as knowledge' (1991:83), and language plays an important role in this process. When members of the social world share the knowledge about its rules, it becomes intersubjective. The social world is objective in the sense that 'it confronts man as something outside of himself' (1991:106). This is how it is passed on to future generations. The world perceived to be 'objective' is constituted by the elites, the

'hegemonic class' that 'is able to transform its own particular aims into those of society as a whole' (Laclau 2012:245)[5].

Knowledge, or the 'regime of truth' (Foucault 1980), is the source of power. Institutions transmitted to new generations (and therefore historic at this point) need to be legitimised, that is 'the salient elements of the institutional tradition' need to be 'explained and justified', because 'the self-evident character of the institutions can no longer be maintained by means of the individual's own recollection and habitualization' (1991:111)[6]. Legitimation comprises a cognitive element (knowledge) and a normative element (values). The means through which legitimation takes hold include language (objectivation), rudimentary theories (proverbs, moral maxims, wise sayings, legends and folk tales), explicit and complex theories providing comprehensive knowledge and transmitted through formalised initiation procedures, and finally symbolic universes, at which stage the process of legitimation is complete (1991:110–22). The universe has then to be maintained by means of such conceptual machineries as mythology, theology, philosophy, and science. Sometimes reification occurs, that is 'the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something other than human products – such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will' (1991:106). Children acquire, or internalise, these institutions, that is the rules of society, through the process of socialisation.

In this study, I explore the ways in which metalinguistic discourse produced by Polish scholars of language serves to legitimise, and thus maintain or change, specific forms of social order.

2.2 Key concepts

The key concepts for my study are discourse and ideology. Based on the extensive body of literature, I will now provide definitions of discourse, ideology, specific political ideologies relevant for this study (liberalism, nationalism, and

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[5] This thesis adopts Bourdesian definition of the elite as 'those within a "field of power" who have considerable social, economic, cultural, and/or symbolic capital', or those who have power 'over others' (Khan 2011). There have been different elites in Poland, depending on the time period. I am particularly interested in the ever-changing political elites and intellectual elites.
[6] In this thesis, I use British English spelling and punctuation. American spelling and punctuation are used only in quotes in which they are used originally.

conservatism), language ideology (focusing particularly on language ideologies within professional linguistics), and specific language ideologies (standard, nationalist, and purist). Finally, I will discuss concepts related to the concept of language ideology that are relevant for this study.

2.2.1 Discourse

Language is at the very centre of the social world. One of the first scholars to argue that using language is a social act was the philosopher of language John Langshaw Austin. In his famous lectures published under the title *How to Do Things with Words* (first published in 1955), Austin proposed what later became known as the Speech Act Theory, that is the theory that language has other functions than solely making propositions about the world. Austin identified what he called *performatives* (1975:6–7), that is utterances in which '*by* saying or *in* saying something we are doing something' (1975:12). Later in his lectures, Austin refined his theory, demonstrating that any statement can be regarded as a *performative*, because every utterance (locution) has an intention, or social function (illocution): 'whenever I "say" anything … I shall be performing both locutionary and illocutionary acts' (1975:133–35)[7]. Austin's work, as well as Paul Grice's, gave rise to a new subdiscipline of linguistics, pragmatics, which studies 'discourse', defined as 'language "above the sentence"' (Stubbs 1983), 'language in use' (Brown and Yule 1983), or 'language in action' (Blommaert 2005).

In the 1960s, scholars studying language began criticising structuralist approaches to language, represented by one of the 'founding fathers' of modern linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure, which assumed that language is a structure, or a system of signs. According to these poststructuralist approaches, language is

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[7] Another scholar who contributed to an understanding of language as a social phenomenon was Bronisław Malinowski, who (originally in 1923) coined the term 'phatic communication', that is communication for the sake of communication, or in other words, any expression the aim of which is interaction itself (1985). Jakobson later introduced the term 'phatic function' of language in his influential article entitled *Linguistics and Poetics* (2010, first published in 1960). The social role of language was also emphasised by scholars such as Bühler, who in 1934 discussed the representational function of language (2011), and Halliday, who argued that, contrary to popular opinion, the dominant function of language was not passing information, but encoding experience (ideational function), expressing social and political relations (interactional), and tying information to linguistic and non-linguistic context (textual) (1973).

constitutive of social reality, and thus it is inescapably related to power. A particularly influential poststructuralist thinker was Foucault, who defined discourses as 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (1972:49). This broader approach to language, linking it to power, led to the 'discursive turn' in the social sciences in the 1980s, which was founded on the idea that society is constructed discursively. Hence, 'discourse' is a central term for the theory of social constructionism.

Acknowledging the constitutive role of language, Schiffrin (1994) quotes and comments on a number of definitions of discourse, which are then summarised and analysed by Jaworski and Coupland:

> 'Discourse is language use relative to social, political and cultural formations – it is language reflecting social order but also language shaping social order, and shaping individuals' interaction with society … It is the key ingredient in the very constitution of knowledge … Discourse is implicated in expressing people's points of view and value systems, many of which are "pre-structured" in terms of what is "normal" or "appropriate" in particular social and institutional settings. Discourse practices can therefore be seen as the deployment of, and indeed sometimes as acts of resistance to, dominant ideologies' (2014:3–6).

Jaworski and Coupland note that discourses can be seen as 'carriers' of ideologies, which is particularly relevant for this study.

A definition that combines these two meanings of discourse, as 'content', but also a 'vehicle' of 'content', is provided by Schmidt:

> 'Discourse, as defined herein, is stripped of postmodernist baggage to serve as a more generic term that encompasses not only the substantive content of ideas but also the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed. Discourse is not just ideas or "text" (what is said) but also context (where, when, how, and why it was said). The term refers not only to structure (what is said, or where and how) but also to agency (who said what to whom)' (2008:305).

In other words, discourse is defined as 'not just the representation or embodiment of ideas, but the interactive discursive processes by and through which agents generate and communicate ideas' (Schmidt 2017:250). This is how discourse is understood in this study[8].

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[8] Within Critical Discourse Analysis, discourse has been defined as 'a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as 'texts', that

One type of cultural content that can be expressed through discourse is ideology, which will be defined next. Van Dijk explains the relationship between ideology and discourse in the following way:

> 'Ideologies have been defined as foundational beliefs that underlie the shared social representations of specific kinds of social groups. These representations are in turn the basis of discourse and other social practices. It has also been assumed that ideologies are largely expressed and acquired by discourse, that is, by spoken or written communicative interaction. When group members explain, motivate or legitimate their (group-based) actions, they typically do so in terms of ideological discourse' (2006:120–21).

Discourse can thus be interpreted as a vehicle of ideologies as well as other layers of culture[9]. Similarly, Blommaert and Verschueren argue that '[t]he most tangible manifestation of ideology is discourse (in a non-metaphorical, down-to-earth sense of discourse as an observable instance of communicative behaviour, whether verbal or not)' (1998:26). Fairclough also highlights the discursive aspect of ideologies. He argues that because an inherent part of discursive practice is ideological struggle, ideologies should not be seen as stable (1992:87–88). This study assumes that ideology is not just any content of discourse; it is a specific type of such content. I expand on it and define ideology in the section to follow.

2.2.2 Ideology

According to Ricoeur (1986), the most influential definitions of ideology are by Marx, who proposed the theory of distortion, Weber, who proposed the theory of legitimation, and Geertz, who proposed the theory of integration. The term 'ideology' was coined by Destutt de Tracy in the 18th century to mean a branch of zoology which 'sought to understand human "nature"': 'a science of ideas' based on sensation and

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belong to specific semiotic types, that is genres' (Wodak 2001a:5); 'linguistic action, be it written, visual or oral communication, verbal or nonverbal, undertaken by social actors in a specific setting determined by social rules, norms and conventions' (Wodak 2008:5); or 'meant in the broad sense of a "communicative event", including conversational interaction, written text, as well as associated gestures, facework, typographical layout, images and any other "semiotic" or multimedia dimension of signification' (Van Dijk 2001:98).

[9] According to Van Dijk, discourse and ideology are phenomena of a different nature: 'Although the theory presented here obviously accounts for ideological discourse, it does not reduce ideologies to discourse – nor does it do so with other cognitive notions such as knowledge, opinions, attitudes or norms and values. These cognitive notions are of another theoretical order – they are used in a theory of mind – than a theory of discourse, which is a theory of social interaction' (2006:132).

'clothed in signs' (Silverstein 1998:123). Many early thinkers discussing ideology saw it as part of epistemology. Karl Marx, for example, defined ideology as 'production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness'; all that 'men say, imagine, conceive', including 'politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc.' (1978:154). In his analysis of capitalism, Marx argued that dominant ideologies promoted the interests of dominant social groups (or classes). Marx's definition, like Karl Mannheim's, highlights the 'negative' aspect of ideology as 'erroneous', 'misleading' and 'illusory', which is why suppressed people do not fight against it (Thompson 1990:52–67).

Max Weber saw ideology as part of the system of the legitimation of authority. Legitimation can be defined as 'the process that transforms power resting ultimately on coercion into authority based on a modicum of consent, if not consensus' (Aronoff and Kubik 2012:77). Such consent (or consensus) can give a socio-political body hegemony, which 'refers to that aspect of power relationships which is not produced or guaranteed by coercion but by the acceptance (even if fragmentary and not fully conscious) of the rulers' definitions of reality by the ruled' (Kubik 1994:11). According to Weber, legitimation is the key 'motive for obedience' (Ricœur 1986:200): 'neither custom and practice, nor interests, nor the solidarity fostered by purely affectual or value-rational motives, could provide a reliable basis for rule. Normally, there is a further element: belief in legitimacy' (Weber 2019:339). Such an understanding of ideology, as a belief in legitimacy, seems to have become dominant in Western scholarship, as according to Thompson, 'to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination' (1990:56).

In his essay *Ideology as a Cultural System*, Clifford Geertz criticised non-neutral approaches to ideology, either belonging to 'the interest theory', according to which ideology is 'a mask and a weapon', or to 'the strain theory', for which ideology is 'a symptom and a remedy', arguing that they mistakenly pictured ideology as 'biased' and social sciences as 'objective' (1973:201). Geertz sees ideology as a culturally based, organised symbolic system, which draws its power 'from its capacity to grasp, formulate, and communicate social realities that elude the tempered language of science' (1973:210). Ideology can thus be compared to 'maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience' (Geertz 1973:220); it is one of the 'attempts to provide orientation for an organism which cannot live in a

world it is unable to understand' (Geertz 1973:140–41). According to Geertz, '[e]ven morally loathsome ideological expressions may still catch most acutely the mood of a people or a group' by objectifying it (1973:232)[10].

Similarly, Bocheński (2008) defines 'ideology' by means of the concept of 'world view'[11], which he argues has four characteristics: its content is based on unprovable assumptions, it is usually an attempt to come up with as comprehensive – yet simplified – system of knowledge of the world as possible (cognitive aspect), it explains the meaning of life (existential aspect), and has a form of norms (moral laws)[12]. According to Bocheński, ideology in its strong sense is defined as world view combined with 'advice how to change (improve) the world', and in its weak sense – as world view 'explicitly engaged in political action'. Van Dijk defines ideologies as fundamental, axiomatic, socially shared belief systems, perceived to be relatively stable. Ideologies are not 'personal beliefs of individual people', nor are they 'necessarily "negative" (there are racist as well as antiracist ideologies, communist and anticommunist ones)' (2006:116–17)[13].

In this thesis, I adopt Geertz's definition of ideology as a symbolic system but reject his idea of 'neutral' ideology. I follow Weber's idea that ideologies serve to legitimise a certain socio-political order, which may mean promoting the interests of dominant social groups (Marx). I also adopt Bocheński's point that ideologies can provide 'advice how to change (improve) the world' or at least be 'explicitly engaged in political action'.

I thus developed the following definition of ideologies, or more precisely, political ideologies: symbolic systems (configurations of ideas), sometimes organised into stories, whose function is to: (1) develop explicit, elaborate, comprehensive, and

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[10] Geertz argued that '[i]t is a loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological activity, an inability, for lack of usable models, to comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located' (1973:219). He identifies this disorientation as particularly characteristic of the contemporary world (1973:221).

[11] Geertz defined 'world view' as people's 'picture of the way things in sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of self, of society. It contains their most comprehensive ideas of order' (1973:127). The term has a similar meaning to Berger and Luckman's concept of 'symbolic universes', defined as 'a body of tradition that integrates a large number of definitions of reality and presents the institutional order to the individual as a symbolic totality' (1991:113).

[12] Translations of quotes from the Polish-language literature are mine – ASL.

[13] Although ideologies are socially shared, not every member of the society is familiar with them to the same degree (van Dijk 2006:119).

coherent value-laden representations of the world (What is the world like? How does it work? What should it be like?), (2) justify or challenge a specific configuration of power (that is, legitimise or delegitimise a specific socio-political order), and (3) provide blueprints (scripts, norms) for sustaining or changing the political system and/or changing the world (that is, provide instructions on what should be done for the political system or the world to be as it should)[14]. The three components of the definition are interrelated. I use it as an analytical framework in this thesis.

There are three comments to be added to my definition. In my definition, I am following researchers of culture such as Almond and Verba (1963), Geertz (1973), Swidler (1986), Hannerz (1992), and Strauss and Quinn (1998), whose work suggests the significance of making two crucial distinctions. The first one is between the symbolic and psycho-social (or socio-psychological) conceptualisation of elements of culture. While the symbolic conceptualisation is concerned with cultural meaning and thus focuses on such cultural phenomena as discourses, images, and performances, the psycho-social looks at people's 'psychological orientations to social objects', that is people's views, attitudes, and feelings, which Almond and Verba defined as 'propensities of individuals to perceive, interpret and act toward a particular subject in particular ways' (1963:13). In other words, the symbolic conceptualisation captures the external elements of culture, while the psycho-social captures the internal ones. While the psycho-social elements of culture can reveal which aspects of the symbolic ones people have internalised and how, I see ideology as part of these externalised expressions of cultural meanings. According to Kubik, these are two sides of the same coin and '[w]hat can bridge them is the assumption that culture is best conceived as communication, an incessant process of internalization (into individual minds) and externalization (into perceptible cultural vehicles) of meaning' (2019:84–85). Thus, for a cultural analysis to be complete, it needs to consider both of these, but as their nature is different, the way they are studied should also be different.

The second comment regards the distinction between ideology and common sense. Aronoff and Kubik define the latter as

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[14] This definition is introduced and discussed in: Stanisz-Lubowiecka A. and J. Kubik, Populist and Liberal Mythology in Polish Political Discourse. In Search of Linguistic Indicators of Mythologisation (in preparation).

'a type of knowledge that is close to practice, to what people do routinely, usually in an unreflective fashion. It orients people in everyday life without much self-consciousness. It is immediate, untheorized, taken for granted, and "unproblematic until further notice", contrasted with more elaborate, systematized, and codified forms of knowledge, such as symbolic systems, ideologies, or religious doctrines' (2012:244–45).

Common sense is thus a form of knowledge that has become so naturalised, or simply obvious, accepted, that there is no further need to promote it through ideological action (Fairclough 1992:87)[15]. Such fundamental, unconscious beliefs, they form an individual's habitus, or system of dispositions can also be called *doxa* (Bourdieu 2010). Ideologies can be seen as what is promoted 'from above', while common sense is what people accept. Common sense can be 'a potential source of (undesired) conformity or (welcomed) empowerment' (Aronoff and Kubik 2012:246). Because common sense includes naturalised conceptions of everyday life, it is the most effective way of sustaining hegemony, that is, an exclusive interpretation of reality[16].

The third comment concerns the term 'explicit ideologies', by which I mean ones formulated, for example, in political manifestos or treatises. There are, however, systems of foundational, guiding ideas that are discernible as a more or less coherent system that can be reconstructed from pronouncements and actions of a given actor. I will call them 'implicit ideologies'. By 'implicit', I mean ideologies that structure actors' thoughts as they engage in specific practices, that is individual and collective actions (Bourdieu 1977), although they are not explicitly identified in 'ideological treatises' and are usually less elaborate than explicit ones. The distinction between explicit and implicit is not always clearly cut, which is why it is useful to look at them as a continuum.

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[15] Bourdieu calls the processes of legitimisation and naturalisation 'symbolic violence' (2010). Drawing on Bourdieu, Fairclough defines naturalisation in this way: 'if a discourse type so dominates an institution that dominated types are more or less entirely suppressed or contained, then it will cease to be seen as arbitrary (in the sense of being one among several possible ways of "seeing" things) and will come to be seen as *natural*, and legitimate because it is simply *the* way of conducting oneself … in the naturalization of discourse types and the creation of common sense, discourse types actually appear to *lose* their ideological character … it appears to be *neutral* in struggles for power … together with the generation of common-sense discourse practices comes the generation of common-sense rationalizations of such practices, which serve to *legitimize* them' (1989:91–92).
[16] Kroskrity (1998) found a correlation between the level of awareness and the level of contestation of ideologies, arguing that highly naturalised, uncontested ideologies can usually be found in practice.

2.2.3   Political ideologies

In this study, three political ideologies will be particularly relevant: liberalism as well as nationalism 'thickened' by conservatism. I will define them in this subsection.

2.2.3.1   Liberalism

Liberalism can be defined in many ways, as it has evolved over time and differed across space. Holmes (1995), for example, defines liberalism by means of five political concepts: state power, interests, rights, democracy, and welfare. Holmes sees liberalism as 'an attempt to limit the power of the state for the sake of individual freedom', or 'taming absolute power' (but not strong state altogether) (1995:18). He argues that liberalism is associated with rights 'specified and maintained by state power' (1995:27), and liberal rights encompass not only economic liberty, but also 'religious toleration, freedom of discussion, the right to criticize government officials, the right to reasonable defense in criminal trials, and prohibitions against bodily torture' (1995:24) combined with the idea of 'universal self-interest', implying 'some sort of universalistic and egalitarian norm' and thus making all human beings 'fundamentally the same' (1995:26). The 'interconnection between liberalism and democracy' is grounded in the 'radically untraditional idea that public disagreement is a creative force' (1995:33). Welfare is an attempt to 'redeem individualism'; to help 'individuals who are disadvantaged by their involuntary membership in a social group' (1995:39). Finally, Holmes discusses 'liberal discontent', arguing: 'Classical liberals were reformers and social critics. They were not hand-holders and flag-wavers for established regimes' (1995:40). Despite changing political contexts, liberalism 'will always remain an aspiration. It can never be fully realized or institutionalized. But it can provide a guide and stimulus to action' (1995:41).

Fawcett provides a more succinct definition. He defines liberalism as a political ideology in politics and political theory characterised by four key ideas: (1) an inescapable conflict of interests and beliefs in society[17]; (2) human power that is

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[17] According to Fawcett, as opposed to 'shaken' contemporary liberals, early liberals in the 18th and 19th centuries, such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill, saw this conflict positively as diversity, since they believed in the power of dialogue (2018:8).

implacable unless it is resisted and checked by the law; (3) progress as key, as it will 'make society and its citizens less unruly'; and (4) superior power that cannot mistreat or exclude people no matter who they are, what they believe in etc. (2018:7–13). The values associated with liberalism are thus, respectively, (1) diversity and dialogue, (2) popular sovereignty and the rule of law, (3) progress, (4) individual liberty, equality, and inclusivity. Fawcett also demonstrates that liberalism provided the foundation for the development of democracy as a political system.

Kubik distinguishes between three meanings of liberalism:

'First, it means a feature of the political system (liberal democracy) in which the rule of the majority is constrained by a system of checks and balances, most crucially the rule of law. It is *political liberalism*. Secondly, liberalism is a form of social philosophy, a type of culture or social imaginary in which the value of individual choice and the right to individual self-determination and reinvention are central. Let's call it *cultural liberalism*. The third form of liberalism, in its most recent reincarnation known as neoliberalism, is an economic programme or regime that asserts the power of markets as the most efficient panacea for economic and social ills. It is *economic liberalism*' (2020).

The first two meanings of liberalism are relevant for this study. I will demonstrate how Polish scholars of language aimed to legitimise liberal democracy as well as a 'culture of liberalism' in the periods of communist authoritarianism and democratic backsliding. They were, however, not concerned with economic liberalism.

The political system preferred by liberals is liberal democracy, which, despite its problems, can provide the best foundation for liberal values. According to Diamond et al., who adapt Robert Dahl's definition, democracy is a political regime which meets three essential conditions:

'meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom of the press,

freedom to form and join organizations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation' (2022:xvi)[18].

Furthermore, for democracy to function properly, 'political moderation' defined as 'compromise and bargaining' needs to be exposed and protected (Craiutu 2012). In other words, actors, even if engaged in intense ideological conflict, should respect the democratic 'rules of the game'. This is captured in the distinction between 'agonistic' and 'antagonistic' conflict (Mouffe 2013).

Some of the liberal ideas have been adopted by other political ideologies. For instance, the idea of liberty has become the 'common ground' between liberalism and conservatism:

> 'I must emphasize that the liberty of the individual is a fine thing, both good in itself and worthwhile for its beneficial effects, when taken in the right proportion. It has, and will always have, an important place in a broader theory of political conservatism' (Hazony 2022).

This belief in the 'right proportion' is not the quality of conservatism alone. It is sometimes assumed by supporters of political ideologies alternative to liberalism that liberalism promotes unlimited individual liberty. Following Fawcett's definition, however, this individual liberty is limited by the rule of law on the one hand, and respect for everyone on the other.

In the context of this study, a particularly important civil liberty is freedom of speech, which John Stuart Mill in his essay *On Liberty* (2012), first published in 1859, portrayed as the key civil liberty[19]. Looking at professional metalinguistic discourse, Harris interprets freedom of speech as a defence of the right of inclusion in a community, or 'basically the right to participate in those communicational activities available in virtue of one's membership of a linguistic community' (1990:159). Drawing on Stanley, I will argue that inherently built into the main ideals of liberalism are certain linguistic norms for language in politics and the media, which are the

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[18] Coman and Volintiru define liberal democracy as 'a political system characterised not only by pluralism, free and fair elections but also by the rule of law, separation of powers, the protection of civil liberties and minority rights, the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property' (2021:4).
[19] According to Holmes, [t]he principal purpose of freedom of speech … is less the protection of individual autonomy than the production of intelligent (the term is relative) political decisions' (1995:33–34).

condition on which public discussion, or what Stanley calls 'democratic deliberation', is founded. Stanley argues:

> '… in a democratic state, i t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h a t a l l c i t i z e n s c a n p o l i t i c a l l y p a r t i c i p a t e , and that the resulting political discussion is reasonable and rational … In a democracy, t h e n o r m s g o v e r n i n g p o l i t i c a l s p e e c h , t h a t i s , s p e e c h b e t w e e n c i t i z e n s o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a b o u t p o l i c i e s a n d l a w s , a r e a l s o p o l i t i c a l i d e a l s [emphasis mine – ASL]. In fact, they are, together with liberty and freedom, the most important political ideals' (2015:80).

For this reason, liberal ideas are often expressed by means of metalinguistic discourse.

Postmodern critique of liberalism has shown that it fails to recognise its own ideological character, and liberal democratic ideas and values are often constructed as 'non-ideological' or 'objective' (Gamble 2009; Kaufman 2006). 'To be objective is to aspire to knowledge that bears no trace of the knower — knowledge unmarked by prejudice or skill, fantasy or judgment, wishing or striving' (Daston and Galison 2007:17). The ideal of objectivity, the foundation of modern science and scholarship, and its link to liberalism were fully developed in the Enlightenment. Pressman (2018), for example, demonstrates how the ideal of 'objective' language is linked to liberal values. My study is a contribution to uncovering the ideological nature of liberalism as a political ideology. As a liberal myself, I believe it is essential to acknowledge the ideological nature of liberalism in order to facilitate the analysis, acknowledge a possibility of alternative perspectives, and challenge the myth of objectivity. It is only then that pluralism, one of the key liberal ideas, can be facilitated, which is particularly pressing in increasingly polarised societies.

2.2.3.2   Nationalism 'thickened' by conservatism

Freeden defines nationalism by means of five characteristics:

> 'First, the prioritization of a particular group – the nation – as a key constituting and identifying framework for human beings and their practices. The realized condition in which this occurs is called 'nationhood'. Second, a positive valorisation is assigned to one's own nation, granting it specific claims over the conduct of its members. Third, the desire to give politico-institutional expression to the first two core concepts. Fourth, space and time are considered to be crucial determinants of social identity. Fifth, a sense of belonging and

membership in which sentiment and emotion play an important role' (1998:751–52).

The promotion of nationalist discourses is a way of constructing national identity. As Bhabha put it, nation-construction is subject to 'the complex strategies of cultural identification and discursive address that function in the name of "the people" or "the nation" and make them the immanent subjects and objects of a range of social and literary narrative' (1990:292)[20]. Effective use of collective history plays an important role in this identity construction. According to Malkki, 'collective histories flourish where they have a meaningful, signifying use in the present' (1990:54). According to Fox, a 'national culture starts out as a nationalist ideology, that is a consciousness or perception of what the nation is or should be, which then may gain public meaning and be put into action' (1990b:4). Fox also proposes the idea of multiple nationalisms: 'what may end up as the national culture starts out as one contending nationalist ideology among several. No nationalism is natural; they are all constructed through confrontation' (1990a:64).

Nationality is an important social identity category in contemporary Europe[21]. Fearon defines 'social identity' in opposition to 'personal' (1999:2): as 'a set of people designated by a label (or labels) commonly given to, or used by, a set of people' (1999:13)[22]. This label needs to be socially relevant: 'The label must be invoked often enough or in sufficiently important situations that people condition their behavior or thinking on it' (1999:13). Social and personal identity are related, as social identity (that is membership in a social category) 'might enter into or partially constitute personal identity' (1999:11). Identities (or social categories) are 'the basis of interest' (Fearon 1999:29–30)[23].

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[20] Hobsbawm (1990) discusses regional and social diversity, and argues that national belonging is uneven.

[21] Anderson argues that at the end of the 20th century 'nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time' (2006:3).

[22] The concept of identity is sometimes criticised for implying it is 'fixed' and 'static'. For this reason, some scholars propose new terms which would be more dynamic than 'identity', for example, Agha suggests the term 'social persona' (2007).

[23] Fearon's proposal allows to account for both constructivist, 'soft' theories of identity and its 'hard', essentialist meanings, which are often striven for by politicians and other important political actors trying to transform 'mere categories into unitary and exclusive groups' (Brubaker and Cooper 2000:1).

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In his *Nations and Nationalism* (first published in 1983), Gellner (2006) criticises essentialist theories of nation, attributing its development to the transition from agrarian to industrial society and from a familiar community into an anonymous, abstract one. In such abstract communities, culture becomes homogenised and education is key, since it facilitates communication with strangers and teaches skills necessary to adapt in the new world. Gellner emphasises the agency of the state in nation-building and defines nationalism as 'primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent' (2006:1).

In his influential *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (first published also in 1983), Anderson dubs nation an 'imagined political community'; 'imagined' because 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion'; 'community' because 'regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship', or 'fraternity' (2006:6–7). Anderson also argues that nation is imagined as limited 'because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations', and sovereign 'because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm' (2006:7). Both religion and dynastic realm offered a kind of cosmological order, and with their decline, coupled with development of modern science, 'the search was on, so to speak, for a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together' (Anderson 2006:36). According to Anderson, it was in colonies that nations were first formed, as Europe at the time was preoccupied with colonisation. He thus rejects the idea that nations are created 'by and for the people'; rather, they formed when one elite class seized power from another elite class (2006:47–75). Anderson argues that the emergence of the idea of nation led to the development of the concept of ethnicity, as before, monarchies ruled over ethnic groups beside their own. This, in turn, led to the development of two strains of nationalism: top-down 'official policy' and bottom-up 'popular' movements. The top-down nationalism soon began to strategically use the

bottom-up one as a legitimisation tool, as the latter posed a threat to the former (Anderson 2006:83–88)[24].

Both Anderson and Gellner emphasise the role of language in the development of national consciousness. Gellner links common language to education, an institution characteristic of industrial societies. Anderson attributes the development of nations primarily to capitalism; a change in the character of Latin, whose status moved from that of text, from language of ecclesiastical and everyday life, to that of the written and fixed 'language-in-itself'; the invention of the printing press (as well as related to it Protestantism), which created 'monoglot mass reading publics'; as well as the development of administrative vernacular languages, which at first were languages of 'state', rather than 'national' languages, and which contributed to the 'decline of the imagined community of Christendom' (2006:37–46). Anderson argues that the printing press 'created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars', 'gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation', and 'created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative vernaculars', as certain dialects became more influential than others (2006:44–45)[25].

According to Freeden, nationalism is not a 'comprehensive' ideology, but a 'thin' one, that is 'one that severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts' (1998:750). The reason is that:

> On their own, core concepts [of nationalism – ASL] are too vacuous to contain the meanings necessary to provide interpretations of political reality and plans for political action. Hence each core concept of nationalism … logically contains a number of possible meanings … The core concepts of nationalism may hence be attached to as many adjacent and peripheral concepts and ideas as there are interpretations of nationalism (1998:752).

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[24] Hobsbawm distinguishes between three paradigmatic stages of the development of nations: scholarly (literary or folkloric), visionary/political, and popular (1990:12).

[25] The idea that language, territory and nation should be linked resulted from the '"discovery" of grandiose civilizations' in Asia and Americas as well as the discovery that non-European languages were older than the 'ancient' languages, which in turn made it 'possible to think of Europe as only one among many civilizations, and not necessarily the Chosen or the best' (Anderson 2006:69–70).

Nationalism, therefore, often combines with a 'bigger' host ideology, such as socialism, liberalism, or conservatism (Freeden 1998:759–63)[26]. In the Polish context, the combination of nationalism and conservatism has become particularly frequent, if not dominant, after 1989 (Szeligowska 2016:236).

According to Fawcett (2020), conservatism developed in response to liberalism and thus needs to be defined in opposition to it (see 2.2.3.1). Fawcett demonstrates that while liberals 'embraced capitalist modernity', conservatives 'responded by opposing the liberal embrace'. While liberals 'saw themselves as opening up society, releasing energies, and letting people go', conservatives 'saw liberals as breaking up society, spreading disorder, and leaving people bewildered' (2020:42). Conservatism is thus characterised by the following four ideas: (1) society is harmonious and collectivity is more important than individualism; (2) respect for power and 'accepted customary authority'; (3) disbelief in material progress 'contrasted unfavorably with the supposed moral emptiness of liberal modernity' (2020:52); (4) disbelief in equality, or the belief that respect is 'due not to everyone regardless but to merit and excellence' (2020:50). Conservatism opposes 'progress', 'change', 'revolution' etc. in defence of 'tradition' and 'order', partly moral, and partly social, understood as 'stable institutions and social hierarchy with settled ranks and familiar duties' (2020:48). Authority for conservatives 'flowed downward through fixed, recognized channels' (2020:48) and, like religious or military authority, 'was absolute in this sense: it was to be obeyed and not forever asked for credentials by tiresome questioners' (2020:49).

I will demonstrate that Polish scholars of language often promoted the conservative-nationalist hybrid in their professional discourse.

2.2.4 Language ideology

My study explores ideologies in a very specific sense: ideologies about language known in the literature as 'language ideologies'. I will begin by discussing Silverstein and Bourdieu, who can be classified as pioneers of the concept before it was coined.

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[26] Also Bunce observes that 'the nationalist message can be … easily combined with other messages, liberal and illiberal, centrist and decentralist, state-serving and state-destroying' (1999:109).

I will move on to a critical overview of definitions of language ideology which can be found in the literature, and then introduce my own definition of the concept. Next, I will discuss specific language ideologies identified in previous studies. Although they can be related, the literature seems to distinguish three language ideologies: standard, nationalist, and purist. I will finish this section with a brief discussion of related concepts.

According to Silverstein (1976), the relationship between language and culture is rooted in the capacity of language to refer to the (cultural) context. This relationship can be studied in the field of pragmatics, which Silverstein defines as 'the study of the meanings of linguistic signs relative to their communicative functions' (1976:20). Drawing upon Peirce's division of signs into icons, indexes, and symbols (1991), Silverstein argues that some linguistic signs manifest 'the property of sign vehicle signalling contextual "existence" of an entity' – the property called 'indexicality' (1976:29). Such signs 'do not contribute to the referential speech event', but 'signal the structure of a speech context' (Silverstein 1976:30). In other words, any time people speak, a context for this particular interaction is created 'on the spot' by language. One aspect of such context is the role of interlocutors in a specific speech event, and this role depends on the way they project and interpret each other's identity.

In some situations, the use of language becomes the subject of discourse. This is what Silverstein calls 'metapragmatics' and defines as the 'characterization of the pragmatic structure of language', 'an overt conceptualization of speech events and constituent speech acts', and events in which 'pragmatic norms are the objects of description' (1976:48)[27]. Cappelen and Lepore call such discourse about language, or

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[27] Silverstein calls 'metapragmatics' 'n+1st order of indexicality', which is 'always already immanent as a competing structure of values potentially indexed in-and-by a communicative form of the n-th order' (2003:194). According to Moore, who draws upon Agha, '[w]hen such configurations of second-order indexicals – in language and in other communicative modes, including dress, posture, vocal quality, etc. – become to some degree publicly known and "naturalized" as emblems of this-or-that type of person participating in this-or-that type of interactional encounter, perhaps acquiring names along the way ("posh," "Cockney," "slang," "street language," etc.), we call them *registers* or, perhaps better, describe a process of *enregisterment*' (2020:16). Linguistic qualities can become emblematic of a group. An emblem is defined as 'an indexical icon. It is a performance of a sign that reveals properties or qualities (the iconic part) of the one contextually linked to it (the indexical part)' (Agha 2007:257). According to Irvine and Gal, this process of iconisation, 'a transformation of the sign relationship

'language turned on itself', 'metalinguistic discourse', and argue that 'not only is metalinguistic discourse not an add-on, it is among the very core linguistic devices in all natural languages' (2007:9). In other words, language can perform a metalinguistic function, as it 'is a unique communicative system in that it can be used to describe and represent itself' (Jaworski, Coupland, and Galasiński 2004b:3). Jaworski et al. offer yet another term to capture such 'use of language to describe and represent itself': 'metalanguage', defined as 'language in the context of linguistic representations and evaluations' (2004b:4). According to Silverstein, metapragmatic discourse is ideological because it provides a structure of cultural values, which

> 'emerge in the micro-contextual dialectic as essentializations (frequently straightforward naturalizations) of a kind of "logic" of evaluational stances (good/bad; preferred/dispreferred; normal/deviant; etc.) underlying social partitioning as the presuppositions/entailments of semiotic action that instantiate such partitions of social space' (2003:202).

These cultural values attributed to linguistic forms are thus embedded in social structure.

Bourdieu observes that language is one of the 'markers of power', or an instance of 'symbolic' or 'cultural' capital'. In his influential *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991), Bourdieu discusses 'legitimate language', defined as a 'semi-artificial language which has to be sustained by a permanent effort of correction, a task which falls both to institutions specifically designed for this purpose and to individual speakers' (1991:60). Bourdieu argues that such 'legitimate language' is one of the ways through which people can achieve 'distinction'. He shows that there is a 'relationship between the structured systems of sociologically pertinent linguistic differences and the equally structured systems of social differences' (1991:54). Bourdieu argues that the 'official' or 'standard language', which is a form of 'legitimate language', is a superimposed entity closely linked to the development of nations, where arguments of 'communication' (or 'universalism') are used as means of legitimation, and ultimately aimed at ensuring political unity. Specific linguistic

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between linguistic features (or varieties) and the social images with which they are linked', is the first of the three semiotic processes that form language ideologies. The next two processes are: 'fractal recursivity', 'the projection of an opposition, salient at some level of relationship, onto some other level', and erasure, 'the process in which ideology, in simplifying the sociolinguistic field, renders some persons or activities (or sociolinguistic phenomena) invisible' (2000:37).

authorities use language to define its 'speaking subject', or a 'linguistic community', which in turn is a 'product of the political domination that is endlessly reproduced by institutions capable of imposing universal recognition of the dominant language' (1991:46).

Bourdieu argues that what plays an important role in this process of legitimation and imposition is education and the literary field, which is where the struggle for linguistic authority takes place. By codifying 'correct' language, writers, grammarians and teachers, that is professionals who have the 'monopoly of the legitimate use of the legitimate language', continuously contribute to the 'production, consecration and imposition of a distinct and distinctive language' (1991:59). So do social mechanisms of cultural transmission, which 'reproduce the structural disparity between the very unequal knowledge of the legitimate language and the much more uniform recognition of this language' (1991:62). Bourdieu also highlights the performativity of the use of language, which is produced for and through the market to which it owes its existence and its more specific properties: 'There is no symbolic power without the symbolism of power' (1991:75–76).

The term 'language ideology' was first used by Silverstein in 1979, who defines it as 'a set of beliefs about language, articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use' (1979:193)[28]. Following this very popular definition, many scholars define language ideologies as ideas and beliefs about language that are rationalisations of language use and structure. Irvine and Gal, for example, define language ideologies as 'the ideas with which participants and observers frame their understanding of linguistic varieties and map those understandings onto people, events, and activities that are significant to them' (2000:35). Cameron stresses that language ideologies can shape people's language

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[28] According to Woolard (1998:4), the field of language ideology research can be divided into three approaches: the study of the relation of 'linguistic ideology' to linguistic structures (Silverstein 1976, 1979, 1985, 1993, 2003), which originates from linguistic anthropology; contact between languages and language varieties, which includes 'purist ideology', 'ideologies of standard(ization)', and linguistic constructions of identity categories, for example, gender (e.g., Heath 1991; Hill 1998; Hornberger 1988; Kulick 1998); as well as 'ideologies of language', which include the scientific ideologies of professional linguistics (Joseph and Taylor 1990). Cameron (2012:x–xi) identifies two other fields of enquiry closely related to the study of language ideology: language management, which arose from language policy and planning (Spolsky 2006, 2009a, 2009b), and the study of language learning, teaching, and assessment, which are now critiqued in terms of norms and their ideological implications (e.g., McNamara 2009; Shohamy 2014; Toolan 2009).

use and judgement, defining them as 'ideas and beliefs about what a language is, how it works and how it should work, which are widely accepted in particular communities and which can be shown to be consequential for the way languages are both used and judged in the actual social practice of those communities' (2006:143). Woolard argues for the word 'representations' instead of 'ideas' or 'beliefs', since, she argues, '[l]anguage ideologies occur not only as mental constructs and in verbalizations but also in embodied practices and dispositions and in material phenomena such as visual representations' (2020:2). Woolard thus sees language ideologies as either explicitly expressed or implicit in practices, knowledge, and material objects.

A few definitions highlight the relationship between language and social structure and/or power structures. For instance, Heath defines language ideologies as 'self-evident ideas and objectives a group holds concerning roles of language in the social experiences of members as they contribute to the expression of the group' (1977:53). Similarly, according to Gal, language ideologies are 'practices and discourses that are socially positioned and partial engagements with, as well as pictures of, a sociolinguistic world' (2005:23). Irvine defines language ideology as 'the cultural (or subcultural) system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests' (1989:255). According to Woolard and Schieffelin, 'such ideologies envision and enact links of language to group and personal identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology' (1994:55–56). Similarly, Kroskrity argues that 'language ideologies represent the perception of language and discourse that is constructed in the interest of a specific social or cultural group' (2005:501). He also observes that 'language ideologies are productively used in the creation and representation of various social and cultural identities (e.g., nationality, ethnicity)' (2005:509). Irvine and Gal link the concept of language ideology to that of ideology, arguing that language ideologies are 'suffused with the political and moral issues pervading the particular sociolinguistic field and are subject to the interests of their bearers' social position' (2000:35). According to Woolard, however, 'the political belonging of a linguistic form or a tenet of language ideology is not transparent and directly readable from linguistic practice or from social structure, but instead must be traced through the logic of the cultural and social

fields in which it operates in a given historical moment' (2020:17). Studies of language ideologies should thus include contextual analysis.

Many more definitions of language ideologies that can be found in the literature are problematic, for example, a frequently cited definition by Rumsey, which says that language ideologies are 'shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world' (1990:346). Rumsey's definition has been criticised for emphasising homogeneity over diversity and ultimately neglecting the possibility of cultural tension (Kroskrity 2005). In addition, in the terminology I am adopting in this thesis, ideology and common sense are different phenomena (see 2.2.2). A few other definitions confuse semiotic and psycho-social components of culture, for example, Milroy and Milroy's definition of language ideologies as 'popular beliefs and attitudes to language as being largely conditioned by factors that lie outside of the language itself' (2012:161) and Moore's as 'beliefs, or feelings, about languages as used in their social worlds' (2020:498). Studying language attitudes or feelings about languages can, however, reveal common-sense thinking, which in turn can show the hegemony of language ideologies[29].

Studies within the field of language ideology typically focus on ordinary people's ideas and beliefs (e.g., Hefright 2012; Hill 1998; Hornberger 1988), ideas about language in politics (e.g., Duchêne 2008; Jaffe 2013; Lane et al. 2018), language policy and planning (e.g., Heller 2013; Langston and Peti-Stantic 2014; Mar-Molinero and Stevenson 2006), language pedagogy (e.g., Ćalić 2021; Daniels 2018; Takeuchi 2021), language testing (e.g., Blackledge 2009; Milani 2008; Skific 2012), and language teaching policies (e.g., Kirkpatrick 2012; Bruen and Sheridan 2016). Deconstructing

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[29] Language attitude is 'not really an attitude to a language feature; it is an awakening of a set of beliefs about individuals or sorts of individuals through the filter of a linguistic performance, although, admittedly, association with a linguistic feature and a group may be so long-standing that the attitude appears to be to the linguistic feature itself' (Niedzielski and Preston 2010:9). Niedzielski and Preston call language attitudes 'folk linguistics' – 'folk' meaning 'held by non-linguists' (2010:viii). A notable study in the field of language attitudes was done by Preston (2010), who studied the way respondents drew maps of different speech regions in the United States as well as the way they characterised those speech regions by means of 'correctness', 'friendliness', etc. Preston argues that contrary to the professional linguistic conceptualisation of language, according to which 'the language' consists of 'dialects', which in turn consist of 'idiolects', what underlies folk conceptualisation of language is the hierarchy, in which the abstract, 'the language', is the highest, followed by 'good language', 'ordinary language', and finally 'dialects' and 'errors', (2010:129). He concludes that '[i]t is such a theory … which lies at the root of most evaluations and discriminations of language variety' (Preston 2010:129).

knowledge is, however, incomplete without deconstructing scholarly knowledge. Bourdieu argues:

> 'In choosing to study the social world in which we are involved, we are obliged to confront, in dramatized form as it were, a certain number of fundamental epistemological problems, all related to the question of the difference between practical knowledge and scholarly knowledge, and particularly to the special difficulties involved first in breaking with inside experience and then in reconstituting the knowledge which has been obtained by means of this break' (1988:1).

Deconstructing scholarly knowledge within the field of linguistics is the purpose of this study. Particularly relevant to this study are thus discussions of language ideologies that can be found within the field of linguistics (Joseph and Taylor 1990) and have had tangible socio-political consequences. Errington (2001, 2008) shows the role linguistics, especially comparative philology, has played in shaping knowledge, for example, by legitimising Spanish colonialism in Mesoamerica and Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, while Spolsky (2018a, 2018b) shows the role of European linguists in enforcing hegemonic language policies in colonies as well as the consequences of these language policies on the languages of indigenous communities. Taylor (1990) criticises the way the discipline of linguistics, in line with the norms of modern scholarship, defines itself as 'descriptive not prescriptive', that is aiming to 'capture the patterned regularities in language' (Cameron 2012:6) in an 'objective' manner, instead of producing 'voluntaristic' normative discourse about language (Taylor 1990:9–10). According to Taylor, the distinction is problematic, as there is a normative component in formulating empirical rules (cf. Cameron 2012; Harris 1981). 'Prescriptivism', which is strong in Polish and more generally Eastern European professional linguistics (Gorham 2014; Tamaševičius 2016; Zarycki 2022), is often combined with 'descriptive' arguments as to why certain forms are correct or not (see, e.g., Pullum 1991). Taylor argues that despite the perception of descriptive linguistics as 'independent of political issues of authority, power and ideology' (1990:10), it does not remove linguistic authority altogether, but 'places that authority under the institutional control of a newly empowered elite, the new masters: namely, the professional scientists of language' (1990:26).

While the function of legitimising specific configurations of socio-political power is mentioned in a few definitions of language ideologies, their relationship with political ideologies has been observed, but not systematically studied. In his linguistic critique of *Imagined Communities*, Joseph disputes Anderson's argument that one of the conditions contributing to the emergence of modern nation-states is the development of national languages. Joseph argues that the two are shaped together:

> 'Anderson's constructionist approach to nationalism is purchased at the price of an essentialist outlook on languages. It seems a bargain to the sociologist or political scientist, to whom it brings explanatory simplicity...But...it is a false simplicity. National identities and languages arise in tandem, dialectically if you like, in a complex process that ought to be our focus of interest and study [emphasis mine – ASL]' (2004:124).

Cameron takes this argument further, making a point that while inevitably political ideologies are expressed mainly by means of language, language is not simply a vehicle for formulating and conveying ideologies but is itself shaped by them:

> 'In many discussions of ideology, language is rather like the mythical giant turtle that supports the world on its back, or like the god in a machine who comes down at the last moment to extricate the protagonists of a tragedy from whatever predicament they have got themselves into … Language should not be treated either as pre-existing raw material for the fashioning of ideologies or as a post-hoc vehicle for their expression [emphasis mine – ASL]. These are both idealizations of language which overlook the fact that it is itself shaped by the same social and ideological processes it is often invoked to explain' (2006:143).

My study will explore this unanalysed relationship between language ideologies and political ideologies. I will argue that while political ideologies reference a socio-political order overtly by means of language, language ideologies explicitly discuss language, but rarely explicitly reference a socio-political order. Ideas about language can, however, be interpreted as implying ideas about the social world, which is where language ideologies and political ideologies are related. Because language ideologies discuss language, and rarely other aspects of the social world, they tend to be less elaborate and comprehensive than political ideologies. In addition, while political ideologies are often explicitly formulated, for example, in political manifestos or treatises, language ideologies tend to be implicit, that is not explicitly articulated, which can be observed both in the definitions of language ideology cited above and

in analyses of standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies discussed in the sections to follow. Using my terminology, such implicit language ideologies – the term I prefer – could also be called 'linguistic common sense', and it can be reconstructed through analysis of linguistic practice. On the other hand, language ideology can be directly observed in metalinguistic discourse. My study will show that language ideologies can also be to some extent explicit.

As demonstrated above, numerous scholars of language ideologies define them as representations of the nature, structure, use, and role of language, which serve legitimising a certain social structure and political order. These two aspects correspond to, respectively, the first and second component of my definition. This second component, political legitimation, is shared by political ideologies and language ideologies. The third component of my definition refers to instructions on what needs to be done for the 'ideal' language to be used, which social actors often state explicitly. References to such instructions do not appear in other definitions, but they are discussed in analyses of language ideologies presented below and their importance is acknowledged within studies of language policy and planning (see, e.g., Gazzola et al. 2024). For this reason, I believe such proposals should be a separate component of the definition for analytical clarity. I will use this definition as an analytical framework, identifying components of language ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse by means of thematic analysis. In addition, my definition of language ideology integrates definitions of ideology in general and language ideology, which is very useful for the analysis of the relationship between them.

I define language ideologies as symbolic systems (configurations of ideas), whose function is to: (1) develop explicit and coherent value-laden representations of the nature, structure, use, and role of language in the social world (for example, 'there is a "correct" variety of language'), (2) justify or challenge the form and use of a specific type of language in (de)legitimising power (for example, '"incorrect" language would lead to the breakdown of the nation'), and (3) provide instructions (scripts, norms) on what needs to be done for the 'ideal' language to be implemented and/or maintained (for example, 'everyone should learn to speak "correct" language'). These three essential components of language ideology are interrelated.

By contrast to Van Dijk, who studies the way 'ideologies are expressed and reproduced by discourse' (1998:5) (see 2.2.1), my primary focus is to study how ideas about language are used to legitimise a specific socio-political order[30]. Because the construction of the socio-political world is always carried out within a specific language, any discourse about language references two layers of reality: on the one hand, it refers to language, but on the other, to the socio-political world it constructs. Empirically, the main goal of this thesis is to understand what ideas about language were promoted in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse between 1970 and 2023, how they can be interpreted as a means of discussing the socio-political world, and how the socio-political context in Poland influenced which ideas about language were more salient than others in different periods.

2.2.4.1   Standard language ideology

2.2.4.1.1   The 'standard' and standardisation

Standard language ideology posits that there is a 'correct' variety of language, the 'standard', which should be spoken in all areas of public life[31]. 'Standard' can be defined as 'prior to actual usage by individuals … the original, right, good form of the language from which all deviations are corruptions (except archaisms, which can attain a 'superstandard' status) … the absolute ideal' (Joseph 1987:161–62). This 'standard' variety is spoken by socio-political elites, whose privileged position is legitimised partly through promotion of standard language ideology. According to Lippi-Green, the standard language is an abstract concept denoting the 'correct' language 'spoken and written by persons with no regional accent; … with more than average or superior education; who are themselves educators and broadcasters; who

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[30] Van Dijk proposes that ideological beliefs may be represented in propositions or networks, which in turn may be organised by various knowledge schemata (1998:56–58). It is possible to consider ideas about the socio-political world and ideas about language as separate yet related clusters.

[31] Milroy and Milroy list popular assumptions about standard English:

'1. That there is one, and only one, correct way of speaking and/or writing the English language.

2. That deviations from this norm are illiteracies, or barbarisms, and that non-standard forms are irregular and perversely deviant.

3. That people *ought* to use the standard language and that it is quite right to discriminate against non-standard users, as such usage is a sign of stupidity, ignorance, perversity, moral degeneracy, etc.' (1985:40).

pay attention to speech, and are not sloppy in terms of pronunciation or grammar; who are easily understood by all; who enter into a consensus of other individuals like themselves about what is proper in language' (1997:58)[32].

A variety of language becomes the 'standard' through the process of standardisation, which is much more political than linguistic (Joseph 1987; Milroy and Milroy 2012). As Max Weinreich put it in an iconic sentence, 'a language is a dialect with an army and a navy' (see Lippi-Green 1997:43). It is engineered by political and intellectual elites, who 'dictate' what the national values and cultural models are and thus protect their interests (Bourdieu 2010). In early stages of standardisation, a dialect (spoken by the elites) is selected to become *the* language, which Joseph calls the 'synecdoche process' (1987:58–60). This dialect is then codified, that is uniform orthography is created (Joseph 1987:65–68). According to Joseph, the situation of a language is never the same once writing has been introduced (1987:25–39).

Following the model set by Latin (see 2.2.3.2), the 'standard' variety begins to acquire new functions: it becomes the national symbol and the symbol of formality and solemnity, it is used in the *lingua franca* function, in writing (that is in literature, broadcasting and scientific and technological writing) and education (Joseph 1987:72–81). Non-standard varieties are pushed to informal contexts. Joseph argues that literature is an important cultural symbol which 'begins at the moment of consciousness of language as a vehicle that can be manipulated to produce qualitative effects … a cultural manifestation by which language ceases to be an impartial means for conveying messages and becomes a message itself … revered as a manifestation of the "genius" of the language' (1987:76–78). That is why poets and writers tend to play a very important role in the cultural consciousness of the standard. The media are also important – because they 'promote an awareness of a standard spoken language' (Milroy and Milroy 2012:25) and 'the sheer numbers of people steadily exposed to standard languages by broadcasting greatly exceeds those previously exposed by literacy' (Joseph 1987:78). The use of the standard language in science, next to religion, again results from the model of Latin (Joseph 1987:78–79), and

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[32] In Lippi-Green's definition there is also a geographical and historical aspect to the standard variety, which in the case of standard US English means that it is spoken and written by those residing 'in the midwest, far west or perhaps some parts of the north-west (but never in the south)' (1997:58).

institutional education, which, as mentioned before, became a necessity in modern societies, plays a key role in 'diffusing the emerging standard to an ever wider community of users' (Joseph 1987:80). For these reasons, these areas are expected to be the models not only for written, but also spoken language.

The 'standard' involves total rejection of variation (Milroy and Milroy 2012:19). In other words, language standardisation is 'in some ways an attempt to stop language change, or at least to fossilize language by means of controlling variation' (Lippi-Green 1997:10), which, however, is 'intrinsic to all spoken language at every level' (Lippi-Green 1997:25–29). Attempts to control variation involve ensuring that the 'maturing standard' is used in the public sphere. Such attempts include 'elaborations of functions' of the standard in areas where it is considered to be 'inadequate' as well as the enforcement of control, by appointing language councils and continuous codification (Joseph 1987:88–131). The very discipline of linguistics, especially comparative philology and structuralist linguistics, is founded on standard language ideology, as it considers language to be 'an autonomous system, divorced from other human concerns', and the standard itself an 'artificial' analytical construct (cf. Crowley 1990; Joseph 1987:9).

The 'standard' is synonymous with 'correct' language. The concept of 'correctness' is, however, problematic, partly because it ultimately aims to legitimise a privileged position of socio-political elites, and partly because it is a value judgement on the speaker. Lippi-Green distinguishes between the meaning of 'correctness', or 'grammaticality', in popular discourse and in descriptive linguistics. In descriptive linguistics, what is understood by the grammar of a particular language is its syntax, semantics, and phonology. Only 'those constructions or usages which do not occur in the language at all, and cannot be generated from its grammar' can be described as 'ungrammatical' (1997:16). By contrast, in popular discourse, 'grammaticality' is assumed to mean 'socially-construed well-formedness or efficiency' (Lippi-Green 1997:16). In other words, what is often meant by 'grammatical correctness' is in fact 'communicative effectiveness', and 'the evaluation of language effectiveness … is often a covert way of judging not the delivery of the message, but the social identity of the messenger' (1997:17). Milroy and Milroy argue that because 'relatively educated and high status speakers are likely to have the

firmest command of public and formal styles' (2012:101), informal styles tend to be undermined and often 'equated with general linguistic inadequacy' (2012:101). The 'standard' language is thus associated with the ideal of 'eloquence', and ultimately with the power of the elites (Joseph 1987).

2.2.4.1.2 'Language complaints'

An important way to create and maintain the 'standard' is metalinguistic discourse. Milroy and Milroy identify a specific type of such discourse and call it 'language complaints' (2012). They distinguish two types of such 'complaints': those in the 'correctness tradition' and those in the 'moralistic tradition'. 'Language complaints' in the 'correctness tradition' tend to be about important areas of standardisation: the declining role of literature as a language model, the declining language standards in media, scholarship, and education, and the language of young people.

The worry about literature no longer being a language model is based on the association between being well-read and intellect, as well as the 'perceived superiority of the written language': since '[p]ersons with more education are more exposed to the written language and literary traditions; they may, in simple terms, write better than the "less educated"' (Lippi-Green 1997:55). The expectation that literature should influence spoken language is, however, problematic. Speech as transient, unplanned (produced simultaneously with thinking) and context-tied (accompanied with non-verbal measures: gestures, mimics, intonation etc.), is very different from literary language, or any other form of written language, which is solid, lasting, planned and context-free. The two are therefore very different channels (Milroy and Milroy 2012:54–58, 116–22). The wish for literature to be language modules is ultimately a wish for the 'fixedness' of language, associated with Latin. As speech is the primary form of language, it changes much faster than writing, and therefore only writing can be standardised and effectively controlled (Lippi-Green

1997:10–11, 25–40; Milroy and Milroy 2012:18–19, 25)[33]. The fact that Latin is no longer taught is often invoked in this argument because it is associated with precisely that: since it is no longer spoken, it is perceived as if it had never developed or changed.

The worry about the negative influence of the media on spoken language is what Aitchison dubs the 'Media are Ruining Language' myth (1998). Focusing on the English-speaking world, Aitchison argues that this myth is based on two fallacies: the 'dirty fingernails fallacy: journalists use language sloppily', and the 'garbage heap fallacy: journalism is junk writing'. According to Aitchison, rather than corrupting language, the media are 'linguistic mirrors: they reflect current language usage and extend it' (1998:18). Recent sociolinguistic studies show that the influence of the media on spoken language is not obvious (Stuart-Smith et al. 2013; Trudgill 2014). In addition, Aitchison makes a point that journalism is a 'demanding skill', and many famous English writers, such as George Orwell, were also brilliant journalists (1998:20–21)[34]. This worry can be interpreted as criticism of democratisation, since access to the media is no longer a luxury that only the elites can afford.

James Milroy (1998) calls a frequent language complaint about the dominant role of young people in declining language standards the 'Children Can't Speak or Write Properly Any More' myth[35]. The complaint misrepresents schools' responsibilities:

> 'children normally learn to read and write at school, they do not learn to speak at school … Spoken language is acquired without explicit instruction, and by the time the child goes to school, the basic grammar and pronunciation of the

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[33] 'Correct' spelling is a powerful symbol of respect for 'tradition', while 'incorrect' spelling is associated with 'progressiveness'. This symbolism was used provocatively by the Polish literary movement called 'futurism' in 1921. Futurists consistently used phonetic spelling in what is seen as a manifesto of the movement. Partly because of the spelling and partly because of the consistent use of black comedy, the manifesto received so much criticism that the whole circulation was prohibited by censorship after a month.

[34] Aitchison's argument also applies in the Polish context, as many famous Polish writers and poets were also journalists, especially in the 19th century, for example, Adam Mickiewicz, Bolesław Prus, Henryk Sienkiewicz, and Eliza Orzeszkowa.

[35] This complaint is frequently voiced by linguists, for example, Baron dubs young people's 'laissez-faire approach to language instruction' 'whateverism'. She argues: 'We are raising a generation of language users that genuinely does not care about a whole range of language rules … At issue is not whether to say who or whom, or whether none as the subject of a sentence takes a singular or plural verb, but whether it really matters which form you use' (2008:169).

variety of language that the child is exposed to has been largely acquired' (1998:63).

What is expected of schools is teaching the 'standard' variety. Since speaking the 'standard' is interpreted as a sign of intellect, the expectation that schools should teach it is not only a way of legitimising 'standard'-speaking elites, but also covert stigmatisation of non-standard speakers: 'the prescriptive comments on linguistic correctness amount to an indirect expression of a social prejudice which cannot acceptably be directly expressed' (Milroy and Milroy 2012:84). This complaint is frequent in post-communist Poland (Rozwadowska 2012). It is doubtful, however, that 'correct' Polish is indeed in decline because of high levels of illiteracy in Poland until the mid-20th century (Lewis 1994:132). This worry can also be interpreted as elitist criticism of democratisation and public access to education.

The complaint about the decline of the language among young people, expressed as the worry about the decline of 'formality', 'elegance', or the decline of manners and morality, is rooted in the 'fear of fragmentation' and is ultimately about 'obedience', that is 'respect' for 'traditional' values (Cameron 2012:78–115). The frequent idea that young people should study grammar, especially classical, which is a '*traditional* practice imposing *order* on languages by describing their structure in terms of *hierarchical rules* which have *authority* for speakers' (Cameron 2012:97), is a powerful moral metaphor in European culture:

> 'Ignorance or defiance of grammatical rules is equated with anti-social or criminal behaviour. Grammar needs to be taught … less to inoculate the norms of polite usage than to encourage respect for persons and property, to keep people clean and law-abiding, to build their "character" and discourage indiscipline or "sloppiness"' (Cameron 2012:94).

All these complaints are based on the belief typical for standard language ideology that 'an original, correct form of language has decayed to its present state, and … it is a cultural duty to restore it' (Joseph 1987:8). This belief is sometimes called the 'Golden Age myth' (Joseph 1987:8; Milroy and Milroy 2012:59). Joseph argues that the 'Golden Age myth' is based on, on the one hand, the role of Latin in Europe, and on the other, on the myth of God-given language erred by usage. This is an instance of how vernacular beliefs about language can be related to religious beliefs (Joseph 1987:163–67). The 'past', however, is a social construct used to legitimise

various arrangements of the present or propose models for a particular kind of future[36]. The 'past' is debatable and different ideological groups construct it differently (Appadurai 1981).

As for the 'moralistic tradition' of 'language complaints', according to Milroy and Milroy (2012), their aim is also to maintain the standard, but different arguments are used to do so. The focus is not on language 'correctness', but on 'official' language. An example they discuss at length are the writings of George Orwell on the distortive language of politics and more precisely, political propaganda. At the centre of Orwell's concern about 'official' language is the idea that the '"mis-use" of language can corrupt thought' (Milroy and Milroy 2012:37), and this can ultimately be used to manipulate people in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

The belief in the key role of language in affecting people's cognition has a long history. The idea of linguistic relativity, also known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, was particularly influential. It stated that 'Languages differ in the thoughts they afford to us' (Schlesinger 1991). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has 'weak' and 'strong' versions; the latter is known as linguistic determinism and assumes that language determines cognition. This version has been rejected as untenable due to implied inconsistencies and internal contradictions (Schlesinger 1991). But even if the 'weak' version is tenable, the exact extent to which language influences thought and how important other factors are – from my perspective, especially the social context (Lincoln 2014) – is still and most likely will forever be subject to debate, not only in the field of linguistics, but also anthropology, psychology, and cognitive science (see, e.g., Gumperz and Levinson 1996; Pütz and Verspoor 2000).

The idea that language can corrupt thought is what Woolard refers to as a 'referentialist ideology that dominates Western modernity and emphasizes one function of language, that of making propositions about a world that stands outside language, over pragmatic and performative functions that often go unrecognized' (2020:3). In other words, this ideology assumes that all language does is to *refer to* a reality that 'stands outside language', while ignoring other language functions. It also

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[36] Bernhard and Kubik define 'history' as 'a set of discourses about the past, produced by a multitude of actors and accepted in a given group (public) as valid ("natural," "obvious," "convincing," "authentic," "reasonable," etc.)' (2014:5).

ignores the role of the social world in shaping language and cognition, and *vice versa*. If language is just a way of talking about the reality that is 'already there', the discussion about it becomes merely a discussion about 'ornaments'. What this argument assumes is that, after all, *the same reality* could be described in a different way. While this may be the case for certain 'physical' aspects of the world we live in, in the case of social reality, what language does is to *construct* it, rather than simply describing it (see 2.1). The language of propaganda does not simply influence what people think on specific issues but constructs the social reality with enduring consequences.

This 'referentialist ideology', originating from de Saussure (Harris 1987; Joseph 2012; Key 2017), is often part of linguistic common sense[37]. It provides the foundation for the idea of communication as telementation, that is transfer of ideas from mind to mind by means of encoding and decoding meanings (Harris 1981). The 'referentialist ideology' and the idea of communication as telementation assume that language is a system in which meanings are fixed and identical for every speaker. Language, however, varies in time (like culture, it is dynamic and constantly changing), place, across social groups (e.g., Chambers and Schilling 2013), and among individuals, for which the term 'idiolect' has been developed (e.g., Lieb 1993). Meanings are rarely definite (Abbott 2006) and comprehension is achieved by interlocutors actively producing 'relevant' meanings and interpreting (interfering) them (Wilson and Sperber 2012). Cameron argues that

> '[t]he greatest strength of language – its flexibility, which enables us to use it in novel situations to mean an infinite number of things – also entails its greatest weakness, which is indeterminacy: the impossibility of ever definitively pinning down what a particular utterance means … We are constantly using our cognitive abilities to make sense of words we have never met before, as well as to make new interpretations of old words' (2012:23–25).

Underhill, who studies the way the language of communist propaganda is described by the Czech thinker Petr Fidelius, criticises the inclination 'to conclude that

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[37] Saussure is, however, misinterpreted. In Saussure's theory, the linguistic sign consists of the 'acoustic image' and the 'concept', both of which are mental constructs: '"the acoustic image is not the material sound, it is the sound's mental imprint", and … it does not serve to name an object' (Joseph 2012:578).

words are "misused" and that their meanings have been "perverted"' (2011:164) in a similar way:

> 'This paradigm reveals itself to be dysfunctional as soon as we remember that words do not belong to things (and that most words, such as verbs, adjectives and prepositions, do not even signify "things" but designate qualities or relationships between things). Meaning turns out to be shaped and structured through the dynamically flexible process of linking words together in order to allow us to model concepts out of them, and structure the relations between them. The lexical material of language can be seen as a pliable plastic material that offers itself up to be modelled by meaningful expression in discussion' (2011:165).

The 'referentialist ideology' also prioritises verbal communication, which has been criticised in the field of linguistics, as it entirely disregards the role of paralinguistic qualities (Ephratt 2011), such as prosody (Barth-Weingarten, Dehé, and Wichmann 2009), mimics and gestures (Antas 1995; 2013; Antas and Załazińska 2004), or extralinguistic context (Van Dijk 1977), in communication.

In addition, 'referentialism' and its opposite, the idea of 'manipulation', assume that the condition of the accurate correspondence of language to reality is 'honesty', which is also problematic. In her linguistic study of lies and lying, Antas (2000) proposes that lying should be studied as a speech act. Antas argues:

> '"telling the truth" is giving linguistic (or at least communicative) testimony t o the content of our beliefs about it, while lying is giving such testimony to the false content of beliefs about what we believe to be true ... when we are "telling the truth", in fact we only bear witness to our notions of what we believe to be true, not to the facts [emphasis mine – ASL]. And we may be wrong' (2000:113).

The foundation of honesty is thus not in language, but in our beliefs about what is true. Linguistic references to 'objective Truth' are therefore grounded in a particular axiology.

Orwell's criticism of the language of propaganda has been interpreted as an instance of liberal ideology (see 2.2.3.1). Explaining Orwell's influence, Cameron argues that his ideas on language are founded on the association between plainness or transparency and political freedom (2012), and thus 'encapsulate a liberal language ideology that continues to be common sense for the western political class, and which is rarely subjected to critical scrutiny because it is not generally apprehended as

"ideological"' (2006:147). Following Cameron, I will argue that 'language complaints' in the 'moralistic tradition' should be classified as a separate language ideology, and not as a subtype of standard language ideology. Although, as Milroy and Milroy suggest, one of the functions of these complaints may be to sustain the standard, I will demonstrate that this is not their main objective. Instead, 'language complaints' in the 'moralistic tradition' are meant to criticise non-democratic or anti-democratic political systems.

2.2.4.2   Nationalist language ideology

The key representation of language in nationalist language ideology is that it is a component of national identity (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998; Jaffe 2007). The national language is 'a tool used to naturalize and legitimate political boundaries' (Jaffe 2007:58), where the default are nation-states. The nation-state is defined as 'a linguistically and culturally homogeneous community ("volk": "nation", "people"), which lives within the borders of an autonomous territory or sovereign state' (Blommaert and Verschueren 1998:103). Nationalist language ideology corresponds and often co-exists with nationalism as a political ideology (see 2.2.3.2).

Nationalist language ideology is well established in contemporary Europe and sustained by a few deeply rooted conceptual metaphors, such as LANGUAGES ARE BIOLOGICAL SPECIES, LANGUAGE IS THE DNA OF A CULTURE and LANGUAGE IS THE SPIRIT OF THE NATION. The latter two originated in the Romantic period, especially in the writings of Johann Gottlieb Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt, although many ideas about language attributed to Herder and Humboldt had existed before (Gal 2006). Initially, their purpose was to support independence movements across Europe by emphasising the right of every nation to have its own (nation) state. The metaphor LANGUAGES ARE BIOLOGICAL SPECIES implies that the loss of a language disrupts the balance in the world in the same way as the loss of any species does in the ecosystem (Cameron 2007; Muehlmann 2007). The metaphor LANGUAGE IS THE DNA OF A CULTURE (Cameron 2007:273–77) implies that each language stands for a single culture and that the loss of a language equals the loss of the culture. Finally, in the Romantic naturalist metaphor LANGUAGE IS THE SPIRIT OF THE NATION,

'language is an organism with a life of its own, whose "soul" is the National Spirit' (Joseph 1987:8). This metaphor implies that an extinction of a language means the loss of the 'National Spirit'. The ultimate value in these metaphors is the nation, national culture, and national identity. In the discourse of endangerment of the national language (see 2.2.4.4.2), it is implied that without the national language, the nation will no longer have a legitimate claim to have its nation-state. The relationship between the national language and the nation is, however, problematic: a classic counterexample in the European context is that of Switzerland, which not only does not have one official language, but all of the four official languages are 'shared' with other countries.

Gal (2006) argues that the very concept of 'language' is a European invention, which is now used across the world. Language is not seen as a capacity to speak, but rather as a 'nameable … countable property … bounded and differing from each other, but roughly inter-translatable, each with its charming idiosyncrasies that are typical of the group that speaks it' (2006:14). Languages are also 'supposed to be the property of all citizens' (2006:15). In the European tradition, a complete homology between language, nation, and state is assumed, which Gal calls 'the Herderian ideology', and the process of standardisation follows it. Looking at European linguistic legislation, Gal shows that despite the EU's commitment to the promotion of linguistic and cultural diversity as well as support of minority languages, it is still embedded in 'the Herderian ideology' in the sense that no other configurations of speaking are recognised except languages associated with a specific social group of speakers and a specific territory (minority languages, regional languages, or migrant languages).

This assumption of language being a fixed, stable 'thing' is questioned in contemporary linguistics. One example is the concept of 'languaging' coined by Swain (2006), which is an attempt to define communication as an ongoing process that is creative and dynamic, in which people do not simply 'use' language, but they also create it while interacting with others. Another attempt to reconstruct languages not as 'stable, closed, and internally homogeneous units characterizing parts of mankind, but as ordered complexes of genres, styles, registers, and forms of use: languages as

repertoires' is made by Blommaert (2009:268)[38]. In other words, languages are conceptualised as sets of 'dynamic representational resources, constantly being remade by their users as they work to achieve their various cultural purposes' (Cazden et al. 1996:64).

2.2.4.3 Purist language ideology

Purist language ideologies depict languages as separate entities which should consist of exclusively 'native' forms (Hill 1998). 'Native' forms are assigned a high value, while it is argued that 'foreign' forms should be 'removed' from a language[39]. Purist language ideology can be interpreted as a linguistic expression of nativism, defined as 'an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state' (Mudde 2007:19). Disregarding ethnic minorities, nativism aims to legitimise the majoritarian definition of the ethnically homogeneous nation and thus the position of 'natives'. Purist language ideology can thus be interpreted as a way to sustain the political system in which 'natives' enjoy the privileged position.

The representation of languages as separate – 'native' – entities which should not influence each other, is unattainable. Linguistic influences from other languages result from inevitable language contact (Britain 2013). The idea of 'native' forms is questionable, because with time the awareness of the origin of linguistic influences drops and they are no longer felt to be 'foreign' (Drabik 2019). The idea of the 'foreignness' of borrowings is also problematic, as the moment they emerge in the target language, they begin to function independently of the source system (see, e.g., Mańczak-Wohlfeld 1999, 2004b, 2005, 2007).

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[38] According to Blommaert, '[t]he finality of language is mobility, not immobility' (2010:xiv). It is thus mobility that should define sociolinguistics, not 'languages'.

[39] Hill's study of language ideologies in the Malinche Volcano region (1998) shows that the Mexicano language is considered the 'pure' form, the one indicative of 'respect', while Spanish, or the mixing of Spanish and Mexicano, are thought to be indicative of 'today' and the 'loss of respect'. 'Purity' is thus associated with the 'authenticity' of the past (see Aronoff and Kubik 2012:247), which in turn is key to understanding what Bendix calls the 'ideology of folklorism' (1988, 1997); the idea originating in 19th-century Romanticism and still salient today that 'communal, preferably peasant settings', untainted by 'the forces of modernity, such as industry or media' (1997:338), are the most 'authentic'.

2.2.4.4 Related concepts

In this section, I will discuss a few concepts which are related to the concept of 'language ideology' and which will facilitate my analysis of language ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse.

2.2.4.4.1 Language myths

A very close concept to 'language ideology' is that of 'language myth'. The term was coined by Harris (1981) and can be defined as 'well-established ideas about language', some of which 'are so well established that we might say they were part of our culture' (Bauer and Trudgill 1998a:xvi). In the book *Language Myths* (Bauer and Trudgill 1998b), various contributors, linguists and scholars of related disciplines, examine examples of language myths well established in English-speaking countries, especially the UK, to understand where these myths come from and confront them with the latest linguistic research.

In the literature, the term 'language ideology' is sometimes used interchangeably with 'language myth'[40]. For instance, Lippi-Green (1997) uses both the term 'standard language ideology' and 'standard language myth'. When the term 'language myth' is used, scholars usually attempt to juxtapose people's common-sense ideas about language with linguistic research and theory. I decided to consistently use the term 'language ideology' in this study (unless I am citing sources

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[40] There are significant similarities between the way 'ideology' and 'myth' function in society. Cassirer considers myth as 'one of the oldest and greatest powers in human civilization' (1974:22) and defines it as 'an objectification of man's social experience' (1974:47). Cassirer argues that myth is not part of 'primitive mentality', as is sometimes assumed, but an expression 'of the same desire of human nature to come to terms with reality, to live in an ordered universe, and to overcome the chaotic state in which things and thoughts have not yet assumed a definite shape and structure' (1974:13–15). Similarly, Kołakowski argues that myth is an indispensable category, as it is inscribed in fundamental features of consciousness (2005:10). It arises from 'the need for answers to mortal questions, i.e. metaphysical, i.e. incapable of conversion into scientific questions' (2005:14) as well as 'the need for faith in the durability of human values' and 'the desire to see the world as continuous' (2005:16). Myth attempts to bring order to the 'accidentality of nature' (Kołakowski 2005:94–103) and escape pain resulting from the phenomenon of the 'indifference of the world' towards the perceived uniqueness of man (Kołakowski 2005:104–24). Myths can be used politically, 'giving a historical intention a natural justification and making contingency appear eternal' (Barthes 1982:130–31). To capture this, Flood coined the term 'political myth', which he defines as 'ideologically marked narrative which purports to give a true account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events and which is accepted and valid in its essentials by a social group' (2002:44).

that do otherwise) for a few reasons. Firstly, 'language ideology' is used much more often in the literature, especially since the 2000s. Secondly, as I am looking at professional metalinguistic discourse, the term 'language myth' which, as mentioned, is used to juxtapose people's common-sense ideas about language with linguistic research and theory, is less relevant than that of 'language ideology'. Thirdly, and most importantly, I argue that the term 'language ideology' is better suited to explore the phenomenon to its full potential. Instead of foregrounding the question of what constitutes the 'truth', the term enables us to examine the links between language and politics by studying the socio-political order that ideas about language aim to legitimise.

2.2.4.4.2 Verbal hygiene

The term 'verbal hygiene' was coined by Cameron to describe 'the motley collection of discourses and practices through which people attempt to "clean up" language and make its structure or its use conform more closely to their ideals of beauty, truth, efficiency, logic, correctness and civility' (2012:vii). Cameron proposes this new term instead of the – in a way overlapping – term 'prescriptivism', which in linguistics has negative connotations (2012:3–11). Linguistic criticism of prescriptivism suggests that 'language should be better off without the constant unwelcome attentions of its speakers' (Cameron 2012:3). Cameron argues, however, that verbal hygiene is not 'just an unnatural and futile enterprise rooted in a failure to appreciate how language works', but should be seen as a '*product* of the way language works: it is an outgrowth of the capacity for metalinguistic reflexivity', which, in its simplest form, enables us to correct errors and misunderstandings (2012:vii). As language is a social act, normativity is fundamental and may itself become the subject of overt reflection (Cameron 2012:2).

According to Cameron, verbal hygiene discourses and practices are deeply rooted in values; it is 'a discourse with a moral dimension that goes far beyond its overt subject to touch on deep desires and fears' (2012:xxv). In other words, in verbal hygiene discourses and practices, language stands for other things. The fact that

verbal hygiene 'mobilizes our desires and our fears' (2012:222) is what makes it effective[41].

2.2.4.4.3 Linguistic imperialism and discourses of endangerment

The key context for both nationalist and purist language ideologies is multiculturalism, which is particularly salient in the period of 'globalisation'. 'Globalisation' is an umbrella term for a number of different, though interrelated phenomena, such as the increase of the role of international institutions, globalised economy and trade, large-scale migration, technological development, including the development of the Internet, and even climate change. Globalisation is often represented in a catastrophic black-and-white way, while potential opportunities resulting from it and the reasons why it is pursued in the first place are left out of the picture (Cameron 2007).

Globalisation has brought about new levels of complexity in terms of forms of interconnectedness, mobility of people and resources, as well as relationships between the 'global' and the 'local' (Appadurai 1990). An aspect of this complexity is what the anthropologist Stevec Vertovec dubs 'superdiversity'. The term is

> 'intended to underline a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything. . . previously experienced . . . a dynamic interplay of variables including country of origin . . . migration channel . . . legal status . . . migrants' human capital (particularly educational background), access to employment . . . locality . . . and responses by local authorities, services providers and local residents' (2007:2–3).

Superdiversity can be observed in the area of language, with speakers of larger than usual numbers of languages and language varieties inhabiting the same space (Blommaert 2013). Blommaert (2010) discusses the phenomenon of 'truncation' of linguistic resources and 'deterritorialisation' of languages resulting from globalisation. Similarly, Alim and Pennycook (2007) observe the 'ever free-forming and flowing' quality of language, which questions our understanding of 'languages' as fixed, stable 'things' (see 2.2.4.2).

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[41] Cameron shows that verbal hygiene initiatives can be very effective. An example is the success of the feminist campaign for non-sexist English in the 1990s (2012:130–39).

Globalisation has led to the establishment of the role of English as a *lingua franca*, and the development of distinct local varieties of English known as 'global Englishes' (Pennycook 2008). Although the concept of *lingua franca* is often associated with equality, Phillipson calls it 'linguistic imperialism', as it reinforces the colonial legacy of the United Kingdom and current domination of the USA (1992, 2010)[42]. The *lingua franca* status of English has also been criticised because of the challenges and linguistic inequalities it has created in education and higher education (e.g., Gimenez, Salles El Kadri, and Cabrini Simões Calvo 2017; Kirkpatrick 2012; Onsman 2012), including education in Europe (Tatsioka and Seidlhofer 2018). According to Fairclough (2006), linguistic imperialism contributes to the promotion of capitalism worldwide.

Colonial policies and uneven power structures have led to the emergence of 'endangered languages', that is languages disappearing due to external political, economic, and socio-cultural pressures, for example, Maori spoken in Eastern Polynesia, Ancash Quechua, a variety of the Quechuan language spoken in Peru, or Kashubian spoken in northern Poland. Many linguists are currently involved in the preservation of endangered languages and revitalisation of extinct ones (see, e.g., Fernando, Valijarvi, and Goldstein 2010; Olko and Sallabank 2021)[43]. Since the mid-1990s, the term 'endangered languages' has been used in narratives about languages which are widely spoken and sometimes even belong to the group of dominant languages, such as English, yet are perceived to be under threat. Discourses of endangerment are usually about 'some threat from outside (from some Other) to the social order'; they are 'fundamentally discourses about other kinds of threats which take place, for specific reasons, on the terrain of language' (Heller and Duchêne 2007:4). According to Berger and Luckmann, confrontation with another society, which is particularly relevant in the era of globalisation, is often perceived as a threat because 'its very existence demonstrates empirically that one's own universe is less than inevitable' (1991:125–26).

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[42] Policies, practices, and discourses employed by Russia in relation to post-Soviet countries can also be classified as linguistic imperialism (Ryazanova-Clarke 2014, 2017, 2018).

[43] However, Joseph disputes the idea that the current loss of linguistic diversity is unprecedented (2004:186–88).

Schmidt (2007) identifies a discourse of endangerment in the 'Official English' movement (also known as 'English Only') in the United States, which Pullum calls a product of 'hatred and suspicion of aliens and immigrants' (1991:117), and a 'senseless yet still insulting affirmation of the pragmatically obvious' (1991:111). Del Valle interprets the discourse of 'the enthusiastic embrace of intralingual diversity' (2007:243) in the imagined community of *hispanofonía* as 'the best protection against atomisation' (2007:261), which is ultimately against 'the potentially dangerous identification of Spain as a privileged and interested player within the fraternal language community' (2007:264). Milani (2007) discusses the discourse of endangerment in Sweden, where Swedish is believed to be challenged by English both at the national (the use of English in education) and international level, and concludes that concerns about Swedish show 'the tension between multiculturalism and social cohesion' (2007:191). According to Moïse (2007), the French language has become the state religion in secular France (2007:218), with a number of values attributed to it since the French Revolution, primarily the idea of national homogeneity (based on the belief that French is a language of logic and reason, capable of expressing everything). Moïse interprets this as a way of legitimising the Republic, which is being challenged by increasingly diversified society in France. Crowley (2007) demonstrates that discourses of language endangerment in Ireland have been deployed to achieve similar political purposes, but to different ends. While the discourse of Irish language endangerment served as 'a social and political weapon against colonial rule' (2007:153), the discourse of the endangerment of Ulster-Scots language was then adopted by the opponents of Irish nationalism, who wanted to be part of the United Kingdom (2007:162).

All these cases show that the discourse of language endangerment is closely linked to nationalisms and nationalist language ideologies. In the period of globalisation, the institution of the nation-state is facing a double challenge: 'it must protect its internal coherence (increasingly under threat from both local and immigrant sources of diversity), and they must protect themselves with respect to other strong actors on the world stage' (Heller and Duchêne 2007:10). Cameron argues that the discourse of language endangerment is rooted in the association of globalisation with 'homogenisation', the opposite of 'diversity', which is believed to

be leading to the 'wiping out' of national identities (2007:283). For this reason, some scholars interpret the discourse of language endangerment as an attempt to maintain the current linguistic and socio-political *status quo* (Cameron 2007; Muehlmann 2007).

It seems, however, that there is a counter-force to this linguistic imperialism, which Joseph calls the 'need for linguistic diversification' (2004:192). Joseph argues:

> There is no indication that national and ethnic identities will cease to matter; no reported cases of people renouncing their mother tongue in favour of English, other than among third-generation immigrants to English-speaking countries, which has always been the case and occurs in reverse as well (2004:190).

In many countries, attempts are made to resist the linguistic imperialism of English. Pillipson (2015), for example, provides an overview of language policies in Nordic countries and Germany aiming to ensure that their national languages are not marginalised as a side-effect of the 'expansion' of English. According to Phillipson, there is an urgent need for language policies at national and supranational levels that would aim to ensure more balance between English and 'local' languages[44].

2.3 Theoretical framework: ideology in 'settled' and 'unsettled periods'

The theoretical framework for my study is Swidler's influential theory of the role of culture in social action, formulated in the article entitled *Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies* (1986). Swidler defines culture as 'a "tool kit" for constructing "strategies of action"' (1986:277), and argues that in 'unsettled periods', or 'periods of social transformation',

> '[e]stablished cultural ends are jettisoned with apparent ease, and yet explicitly articulated cultural models, such as ideologies, play a powerful role in organizing social life [emphasis mine – ASL] … In such periods, ideologies – explicit, articulated, highly organized meaning systems (both political and religious) – establish new styles or strategies of action. When people are learning new ways of organizing

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[44] Gazzola (2016) criticises the dominance of English in the context of the European Union and its proposal to make English the only official language. The use of English in the European Union is particularly controversial after Brexit, especially with the reduced funding for translation (Gazzola 2023).

individual and collective action, practicing unfamiliar habits until they become familiar, then doctrine, symbol, and ritual directly shape action' (1986:278).

In other words, '[b]ursts of ideological activism occur in periods when competing ways of organizing action are developing or contending for dominance' (1986:279). In such periods, ideologies, '[r]ather than providing the underlying assumptions of an entire way of life … make explicit demands in a contested cultural arena' (1986:279). What makes one ideology rather than another achieve dominance depends on 'structural constraints and historical circumstances within which ideological movements struggle for dominance' (1986:280).

A similar point is made by Lotman and Uspensky (1978), who argue that

'a change of culture (in particular, during epochs of social cataclysms) is usually accompanied by a s h a r p   i n c r e a s e   i n   t h e   d e g r e e   o f   s e m i o t i c   b e h a v i o r   [emphasis mine – ASL] (which may be expressed by the changing of names and designations), and even the fight against the old rituals may itself be ritualized' (1978:211–12).

According to Lotman and Uspensky, '[t]he dynamism of the semiotic components of culture is evidently connected with the dynamism of the social life of human society' (1978:223)[45].

On the other hand, according to Swidler, in 'settled periods', culture,

'provides the materials from which individuals and groups construct strategies of action. Such cultural resources are diverse, however, and normally groups and individuals call upon these resources selectively, bringing to bear different styles and habits of action in different situations. Settled cultures thus support varied patterns of action' (1986:280).

In 'settled periods', culture does not shape action directly, but provides a repertoire of 'strategies of action' that individuals can choose from. In such periods, an important role is played not by 'explicitly articulated cultural models', but by tradition and common sense (Swidler 1986:282).

In his study of language ideologies in Russian culture, Gorham identifies

'two distinct perceptions of Russian: one as a tool, the other as an essence. The essentialist view treats language as more of an abstract ideal (langue) that reflects innate features of "Russianness," whereas the instrumental view regards

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[45] Bourdieu's theory (1991) of 'the dichotomy of heretical and orthodox discourses vying for legitimacy at times of dramatic social change' (Ryazanova-Clarke 2008:224) also shows that socio-political transformations are associated with discursive intensification.

it more as a more concrete tool or weapon (parole) that can either be used adeptly by the tongue of the speaker … or inadequately, if not dangerously' (2014:12–13).

I will demonstrate that similar two 'perceptions' of Polish, as a tool and as an essence, coexist in Polish culture, providing the foundation for two distinct discursive strands produced by Polish scholars of language in recent Polish history. Gorham further argues that while there is constant tension between the two,

'[r]evolutionary times ascribe greater import to language's instrumental capacity to break down and transform reality, whereas periods of restoration place more value in language's immutable, institutional function as a marker of identity and therefore stabilizing force, and regard with suspicion more discrete manifestations of verbal imperfection, resistance, or excess' (2014:13).

The perception of language as a tool is thus associated with socio-political change, while the perception of language as an essence is associated with preservation. In addition, Gorham observes that the discourse of language as a marker of identity resides mainly in cultural institutions, whereas the instrumental discourse on Russian tends to be associated with political discourse.

It seems useful to think of 'settled' and 'unsettled' periods, or periods of 'revolution' and 'restoration', as a continuum, rather than binary oppositions. One could argue that the social world is in a constant process of transformation and that any period is to a certain degree 'unsettled' due to cultural, social, political, and/or economic factors (see Kubik 2019). Each of the three periods of recent Polish history I am looking at in this thesis is 'unsettled' in one way or another, which I will discuss at length in relevant chapters. However, based on the relative intensity of 'unsettleness', I am going to treat the periods of communist authoritarianism and democratic backsliding as 'unsettled', and the period of liberal democracy building (1989–2015) as 'settled'.

Kubik (2019) distinguishes three stages of post-communist transformations in Central and Eastern Europe: (1) decomposition of the old regime/system, (2) power transfer, and (3) consolidation of a new system. In the case of Poland, the first two took place in the first period I am analysing: the last two decades of communist authoritarianism (1970–1989). The third stage took place arguably in the whole period of liberal democracy building (1989–2015) but it was particularly intense in

the early 1990s. The transformation was thus much more intense in the former period. In the period of democratic backsliding (2015–2023), power rested with an illiberal anti-democratic party, which gradually proceeded with the decomposition of the, by then fairly consolidated, democratic system. The transformations in this period, which have been demonstrated to be related to the communist past (Mole 2024), are thus again more intense than in the previous period.

While the influence of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse on Polish politics is not the subject of this thesis, I am going to test Swidler's theory, complemented by Gorham's findings, asking if the role of language ideologies increases in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the 'unsettled' periods of Polish recent history. I hypothesise that in the periods of communist authoritarianism and democratic backsliding, there is an increase in the number of distinct ideological discourses about language (one of which conceptualises language as a 'tool') as well as an increase in the intensity of language ideologies promoted in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse. On the other hand, the number of distinct ideological metalinguistic discourses and intensity of language ideologies decreases in the period of liberal democracy building, when the focus is on language as a marker of identity. I also hypothesise that in this period, an important role is played by tradition and common sense, rather than ideology.

3 Methodology

3.1 Methodological foundations

The key methodology in this study is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA was founded by Van Dijk, Fairclough, Kress, van Leeuwen, and Wodak in the early 1990s, and it developed as part of the linguistic and cultural turns in sociology, political science, anthropology, and history (Wodak 2008:2). These turns are visible in the poststructural definitions of 'discourse' as constructing society, including power relations (see 2.2.1). For these reasons, according to Fairclough, interdisciplinarity is one of the three fundamental principles of CDA, alongside relationality and dialectality:

> '[CDA] is a relational form of research in the sense that its primary focus is not on entities or individuals (in which I include both things and persons) but on social relations … Dialectical relations are relations between objects which are different from one another but not what I shall call "discrete", not fully separate in the sense that one excludes the other … It is not analysis of discourse "in itself" as one might take it to be, but analysis of dialectal relations between discourse and other objects, elements or moments, as well as analysis of the "internal relations" of discourse. And since analysis of such relations cuts across conventional boundaries between disciplines (linguistics, politics, sociology and so forth), CDA is an interdisciplinary form of analysis, or as I shall prefer to call it a transdisciplinary form' (2013:3–4).

I am particularly interested in the 'dialectal relation' between professional metalinguistic discourse and political regimes, which is why in this thesis I combine insights and concepts derived from linguistics, political science, political sociology, and political anthropology.

Van Dijk calls CDA an approach 'with an attitude', since it 'focuses on social problems, and especially on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination' (2001:96). This focus makes Critical Discourse Analysis 'critical':

> 'Critique brings a normative element into analysis … It focuses on what is wrong with a society (an institution, an organisation etc.), and how "wrongs" might be "righted" or mitigated, from a particular normative standpoint. Critique is grounded in values, in particular views of the "good society" and of human well-

being and flourishing, on the basis of which it evaluates existing societies and possible ways of changing them' (Fairclough 2013:7).

According to Fairclough, values are the starting point for CDA, which contains a 'normative element' concerned with improving society. Fairclough also points out that 'critique' is not limited to pointing out 'social wrongs'. Reisigl and Wodak also argue that the results of CDA-informed studies should have practical applications 'for emancipatory and democratic purposes' (2016:57).

A way to diagnose 'what is wrong in a society' is to identify ideologies 'hidden', 'coded' or 'latent' in discourse (Wodak 2007:204). In other words, by analysing discourse, ideologies can be 'uncovered' (Van Dijk 1995, 2006, 2011) (see 2.2.1). In this thesis, I aim to 'uncover' ideologies 'hidden' in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse.

CDA is often criticised for being too 'ill-defined' or 'too vague' (Wodak 2001b:10). CDA scholars recommend two ways of strengthening an analysis. One is to conduct a systematic study (Fairclough 2013; Wodak and Kendall 2007). I will introduce my step-by-step approach in 3.3 and systematically apply it in empirical chapters. The other way of strengthening an analysis is by critical engagement with one's own context and position, i.e. through acknowledging the researcher's positionality. According to Wodak,

'"critical"' is to be understood as having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly, and a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research' (2001b:10).

I thus need to acknowledge my positionality: I am a young woman born and raised in the south-east of Poland (a Polish national) in a middle-class family. I emigrated to the UK in 2016 and received international education. My 'native' language is Polish and I am proficient in English. Through my international education I learned about the concept of 'language ideology', not used in mainstream Polish linguistic scholarship, which I apply to my study of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse I am familiar with through my first-hand experience of the Polish context. My political views are critical liberal. While liberal ideas are closer to my political views, I believe it is necessary to examine the ideological nature of liberalism in order to facilitate a more critical analysis, acknowledge a possibility of alternative

perspectives, and challenge the myth of objectivity. It is only then that pluralism, one of the key liberal ideas, can be facilitated, which is particularly pressing in increasingly polarised societies. I have presented my findings in both UK and Polish academic context. While my liberal-oriented research is closely aligned with the dominant British academic ideology, I experienced some resistance to my deconstructive interpretation of nationalist ideas from more conservative scholars in Poland. The liberal underpinning of my study was strengthened by the fact that major anti-democratic transformations took place in Poland while I was already doing this PhD in the UK.

3.2   Ontological and epistemological foundations: critical realism

In line with the principles of CDA, my approach is particularly influenced by the paradigm of critical realism. Critical realism developed from a critique of the other major form of realism, called 'empirical' or 'naïve'. Empirical realism is founded on the positivist beliefs that 'there is a real world "out there"' and it 'exists independently of our knowledge of it' (Marsh and Furlong 2002:30–31). Positivists thus assume that natural sciences and social sciences are roughly analogous, and 'there is a perfect (or at least very close) correspondence between reality and the term used to describe it' (Clark et al. 2021:24). Critical realism, largely influenced by the works of Marx, assumes that 'not all social phenomena, and the relationships between them, are directly observable', that is there are 'deep structures that cannot be observed' (Marsh and Furlong 2002:30). This has methodological implications: 'It means that realists do not accept that what appears to be so, or, perhaps more significantly, what actors say is so, is necessarily so' (Marsh and Furlong 2002:32).

On the other hand, critical realism has been influenced by interpretivist critiques of positivistic realism. According to interpretivists (Geertz 1973; Turner 1973), the world is socially constructed and social phenomena can be understood (*Verstehen*), or interpreted, by studying discourses or traditions (Marsh and Furlong 2002:26). In other words, while critical realists assume that social phenomena can be explained (*Erklären*) by uncovering underlying 'laws', they are also interested in the

meanings of social phenomena. This, in turn, is based on the assumption that the process of 'semiosis' is

> 'an irreducible part of material social processes. Semiosis includes all forms of meaning making – visual images, body language, as well as language. We can see social life as interconnected networks of social practices of diverse sorts (economic, political, cultural, and so on). And every practice has a semiotic element' (Fairclough 2001:123).

One of the philosophers mostly associated with critical realism is Roy Bhaskar (2016), who argues that critical realism is based on three principles: ontological realism, epistemological relativism, and judgemental rationality. Ontological realism posits that the social world, as opposed to the natural world, is socially constructed, but it is 'neither voluntaristically produced by, nor reducible to, the thoughts or actions of persons' (Groff 2000:408) (see 2.1). Ontological realism thus assumes a 'moderate' or 'contingent' form of social constructionism (Fairclough 2013:5) in which:

> 'a distinction is drawn between construal and construction: the world is discursively construed (or represented) in many and various ways, but which construals come to have socially constructive effects depends upon a range of conditions which include for instance power relations but also properties of whatever parts or aspects of the world are being construed' (Fairclough 2013:4–5).

Following Bhaskar, Fairclough argues that discourses can play a causal role in the construction of 'reality' depending on conditions outside of discourse, often conceptualised as structure (see 2.3). In this way, Bhaskar's theory, following Giddens (2013), attempts to overcome the structure–agency divide.

What Bhaskar means by 'epistemological relativism' is that 'scientific theory is ontologically "relative" to human subjectivity in a way in which real structures are not' (Groff 2000:409). In other words, Bhaskar makes a clear distinction between ontology and epistemology, arguing that the social world exists independently of our knowledge of it, but our knowledge of the social world is theory-laden, which in turn is value-laden. The social world is thus not directly observable. Bhaskar argues for a multi-layered view of reality: the 'real' or causal structure (underlying mechanisms), the 'actual' structure (events and processes generated by the causal structure), and the 'empirical' (observable structure) (cf. Bhaskar 2016:153–55). A critical realistic

approach is 'concerned with texts as (elements of) processes, and with the relations of tension between the two' (Fairclough 2013:356). According to Bhaskar,

> 'we will only be able to understand – and so change – the social world if we identify the structures at work that generate those events and discourses. These structures are not spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events; they can only be identified through the practical and theoretical work of the social sciences' (2011:2).

Finally, Bhaskar's concept of 'judgmental rationality' is the idea that 'the choice between competing theories is a rational one. Such choices … are made on the basis of the relative explanatory power of alternative accounts' (Groff 2000:409). However, the concept of 'explanatory power' needs to be developed further (cf. Groff 2000:417), for example, a framework should be proposed allowing for a detailed comparison of alternative theories.

By looking at instances of discourse ('empirical' reality), I am hoping to analyse social processes ('actual' reality) and understand the 'real' mechanisms behind these social processes. I will argue that although Polish linguists and other scholars of language discusses language in their professional discourse, this discourse is ultimately about the socio-political world. In other words, the 'actual' social processes 'behind' Polish professional metalinguistic discourse are about legitimising different political ideologies and regimes. I will also argue that regime changes are the socio-political mechanisms which make certain language ideologies more salient than others in each of the three periods I focus on in this thesis. In the next section, I will argue that CDA and my specific method within it provides the most effective methodological frame for my analysis, which, in turn, will lead me to a comprehensive explanation of the 'real' structure behind Polish professional metalinguistic discourse.

3.3 Method

In my analysis, I combine methodological guidelines offered by Reisigl and Wodak, Fairclough, and Van Dijk. I follow their approaches, as they are perfectly suited to the type of data I am dealing with in this project: written texts embedded in their socio-political contexts. These approaches are particularly informed by linguistics, which allows me to exploit the potential of my background in linguistics

and literary studies. The other 'founders' of CDA, Kress and Van Leeuwen provide methodological guidelines for multimodal data, which can be very useful in media analysis. Van Leeuwen's social actors approach is better suited for an analysis of representations of specific social groups, which is not the subject of this thesis.

I collected my data following Reisigl and Wodak's recommendations (2016:38), which include looking for specific political units (Poland and the Polish diaspora) or language communities (speakers of Polish), specific time periods (1970–1989, 1989–2015, and 2015–2023), specific actors (academics in the field of linguistics, Polish philology, literary studies, and sociology), specific discourse (metalinguistic discourse of language professionals), specific fields of political action (drawing on Reisigl and Wodak's classification of political action, my data is party in the academic field, that is dissemination of research, and partly in the political field of formation of public attitudes, opinions) (2016:29), as well as specific semiotic media or genres (academic outputs in partly academic and media publications)[46]. I will expand on data selection for each of the three periods I analyse in the relevant chapters.

I followed guidelines for CDA Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) outlined by Reisigl and Wodak (2016), which looks particularly at racist and nationalist discourses in the political field. I adopt its interdisciplinary orientation (linguistics, political science, political sociology, and political anthropology), the principle of triangulation of data (different data for each chapter and more than one source in each), methods (CDA, thematic analysis and Critical Metaphor Analysis), and theories (social constructionism, theories of ideology and language ideology, and Swidler's theory of 'unsettled periods'), as well as the historical analysis, allowing for the diachronic perspective. I will mention practical applications of my analysis in the Conclusion (see 7). Investigator triangulation was not feasible within the scope of this PhD project.

I used Fairclough's three-dimensional model (2015), which corresponds to the three strata of reality assumed by critical realism (see 3.2). The first dimension is description (micro), which is about linguistic, textual, and graphical features of the text. The second dimension is interpretation (meso), which is about looking at the discourse context: production, consumption, and co-texts. The third dimension is

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[46] I was familiar with some of the sources through my BA degree in Comparative Polish Studies and used library searches (UCL Library, British Library, Polish National Library) to expand on them.

explanation (macro), in which the social context is analysed, for example, history, nation/community, market/business. This model enables me to combine interpretation, or the question of the ideological meaning of professional metalinguistic discourse, with explanation, which is the third research question of this study. Fairclough stresses that the model is not linear. I mostly focus on the micro and meso level when I present the description of content of the data through the interpretive lens of the concept of language ideology (thematic analysis), and on the meso and macro level when I discuss the context (contextual analysis).

In each empirical chapter, I will focus on the first two of the three aspects of social critique as recommended by Reisigl and Wodak (2016:24–25).

1. 'Text or discourse immanent critique' aims to discover inconsistencies, (self)contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in text-internal or discourse-internal structures.

2. 'Socio-diagnostic critique' is concerned with uncovering the – particularly latent – persuasive or 'manipulative' character of discursive practices. Here, we rely on our contextual knowledge and draw on social theories and other theoretical models from various disciplines to interpret discursive events.

3. Future-related prospective critique seeks to improve communication (e.g. by elaborating guidelines against sexist language use or by reducing 'language barriers' in hospitals, schools and so forth).

As mentioned, I will propose a 'future-related prospective critique' in the Conclusion.

Each of my empirical chapters will be divided into two analytical parts: thematic analysis of the corpus (where I will formulate 'text or discourse immanent critique') and contextual analysis ('socio-diagnostic critique'). After an Introduction, I will introduce the data and criteria for its selection. While these criteria are slightly different for each chapter, because of the ever-changing political context, the main overarching criteria were the topics of metalinguistic discourse and their political significance[47]. Bios of the authors whose texts are included in the corpora can be seen

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[47] There is a certain overlap between data selected for each of the three periods and major processes in Polish linguistics in relevant periods. Zarycki (2022) shows that in the 1970s and 1980s, Polish linguistics moved from structuralism to theory of Newspeak, while the dominant trends in the field after 1989 included pragmatics, discourse analysis, and preoccupation with Polish language standardisation.

in the Appendix[48]. Data introductions will be followed by a thematic analysis of the corpus, where I will answer the first research question of this thesis: What language ideologies can be detected in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in each of the three periods of recent Polish history? I will identify components of language ideologies (and ideas characteristic of political ideologies) in the corpus I compiled for each empirical chapter based on a thematic analysis conducted in NVivo, qualitative data analysis software. In my analysis, I follow the three-component definition of language ideology I have discussed in detail (see 2.2.4).

Thematic analysis, which is usually used in the analysis of qualitative interviews, is also very useful in the analysis of language ideologies, as it allows to identify ideas about language in specific discourses (Rowley and Cormier 2021; Takeuchi 2021; Vessey and Nicolai 2022; Zhu and Bresnahan 2021), which is the main objective of this study. I followed Deterding and Waters' 'flexible coding' approach (2021). At stage one, I familiarised myself with the data to get a provisional idea of emergent themes. At stage two, I coded the corpora and matched themes (subthemes) with the relevant top-level code (key themes), which I created based on the three components of my definition of language ideology, i.e., representations of language, political legitimation, and instructions for the ideal use of language. I thus used a combination of the inductive and deductive approach. To ensure consistency across corpora in the process of code evolution, I reviewed the codes after all the three corpora had been coded. Next, I used annotations to mark pragmatic devices (implicatures and speech acts) and rhetorical devices (mostly metaphors and hyperboles). At stage three, theory refinement, I prioritised certain texts based on how significant they were for Polish politics in each of the examined periods. In Chapter 4, I selected themes to be included in this thesis based on whether they appeared in at least two different essays, meaning they were likely to be influential at the time. I prioritised essays by Karpiński and Głowiński (who coined the term *nowomowa* to describe the language of communist propaganda in the Polish context), as they were the only authors of more than one essay in my data set (six and twelve, respectively), and their essays were published chronologically first. In Chapter 5, I prioritised the paper by Pisarek

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[48] Bibliographical data was compiled mainly from websites of universities the authors have been affiliated with. Occasionally, additional information was collected through a broader online search.

and Rokoszowa, which directly led to the establishment of the Polish Language Council and to the introduction of Polish language legislation in Poland, which continues to be an important political issue with 13 amendments since 1999 up to now. The paper explains the rationale for why the Polish Language Act should be passed and proposes a draft of such legislation. In Chapter 6, I selected themes to be included in this thesis based on whether they appeared at least three times in each Polish Language Council report.

While discussing passages identified under each theme through thematic analysis, I followed elements of Van Dijk's framework for studying expressions of ideology in discourse (2006): vocabulary (local meanings, lexicon), syntax, rhetorical structure, as well as pragmatics. In particular, I used Grice's and Levinson's theory of implicature, which Van Dijk and other CDA practitioners, for example, Wodak (2007) or Reisigl and Wodak (2016), apply when they look for ideologies in discourse. A method of studying discursive articulations of ideologies is not central to this study, since its main objective is identifying ideas about language in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse, but this method is helpful in interpreting them as ideas about the socio-political world.

Where relevant, I also used elements of rhetorical analysis. My approach is particularly informed by Critical Metaphor Analysis (Charteris-Black 2004), which combines CDA with cognitive semantics. It draws on the conceptual metaphor framework developed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who define metaphor as 'understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another' (1980:5). Critical Metaphor Analysis is 'an approach to the analysis of metaphors that aims to identify the intentions and ideologies underlying language use' (Charteris-Black 2011:45)[49]. Metaphors have been shown to be a very effective tool for the study of ideologies (Goatly 2007; Lakoff 2002; Musolff 2010; Underhill 2011).

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[49] In his essay on ideology, Geertz called for employing more tools of literary analysis, particularly the study of rhetorical tropes, in the study of ideology (1973:210–13). He argued that an ideological figure shows 'multiplicity of referential connections between it and social reality' (1973:213). Building on the work of Lakoff and Johnson, who note that ideologies can be 'framed in metaphorical terms' (1980:236), Van Dijk argues that conceptual metaphors are 'powerful semantic means to bias text and talk ideologically' (2013:187).

I follow the three-stage approach offered by Charteris-Black, which resembles Fairclough's three-dimensional model: 'first metaphors are identified, then they are interpreted and then explained' (2011:45). At stage one, '[m]etaphors are identified using the criteria of whether a word or phrase is used with a sense that differs from another more common or more basic sense as demonstrated by identifying a source domain that differs from the target domain' (2011:45). At stage two, metaphors are interpreted using the theory of conceptual metaphor. In other words, an underlying conceptual metaphor (an idea) is extracted from a number of actual linguistic expressions. At this stage, identification of ideology is possible[50]. Here I comment on what the metaphors highlight and hide, which is important for ideological reasons. Stage three enables the researcher to explain why a specific metaphor was used. To do so, Charteris-Black recommends that 'the cognitive semantic approach needs to be complemented with a summary of the social context in which the speeches were made and of the overall verbal context of metaphor' (2011:50).

In addition, Charteris-Black recommends looking at other rhetorical strategies, which includes the study of figurative language in the text. A few rhetorical devices are particularly relevant for my study. Metonymy is a 'form of substitution in which something that is associated with *x* is substituted for *x*' (Jasinski 2001:551), which 'allows us to use one entity to *stand for* another' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:36). Personification 'occurs when some nonhuman entity (e.g., an animal, a granite monument) is given human characteristics, especially the power of speech' (Jasinski 2001:555). Hyperboles can be defined as 'excessive exaggerations' (Jasinski 2001:549), similes (or comparisons) as 'one thing is *like* another' (Jasinski 2001:553), and allusions as 'nonspecific references that direct a listener or reader's attention to another work, person, place, or event and invite the listener or reader into open-ended exploration' (Kaufer and Carley 1993:208)[51]. I identify them in my corpora and discuss their functions.

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[50] For this, Charteris-Black recommends using the theory of conceptual blending. I am going to use the traditional division between the 'source' and the 'target' (also known as 'vehicles' and 'topics'). As a binary approach, it can capture the ideas of the metaphors and can thus be effective in identifying the ideological "essence" of the message.

[51] Allusions are also considered pragmatic devices, which allow one to 'suggest and address negative associations and connotations without being held responsible for them' (Wodak 2007:212).

A few leading CDA scholars, e.g., Fairclough (2015) and Van Dijk (2006) cited above, stress the importance of studying context in CDA. My method of contextual analysis follows Wodak's four-dimensional framework which she developed as part of DHA. She distinguishes:

> 'The co-text of each utterance or clause
> The context in the macro-text; the genre analysis
> The socio-political context of the speech event
> The intertextual and interdiscursive relationships of the respective speech
> event to other relevant events' (2007:211).

This four-dimensional contextual analysis framework is systematically applied in each empirical chapter (see 4.4, 5.4, and 6.4).

Firstly, I look at the co-text of the texts included in my corpus, that is the immediate context of where these texts originally appeared, for example, where they were published, what were the texts and other signs that appeared next to it, etc.

Secondly, I provide the context of the genre, discussing how the texts included in my corpus correspond to the genre(s) they represent. The concept of 'genre' developed in literary studies, where it is defined as 'relatively stable thematic, compositional, and stylistic types of utterances' (Bakhtin et al. 1987:64). Genre analysis later became a branch of discourse analysis (Bhatia 1993; Swales 1990), where scholars identify texts as belonging to specific genres, consider how well they meet generic expectations, and analyse generic creativity. Fairclough stresses the 'interdiscursive character of a text' (2003:67), arguing that 'there is not a simple one-to-one relation' (2003:67) between a specific text and a genre. He defines 'genres' as 'uses of language associated with particular socially ratified activity types such as job interview or scientific papers' (2013:93). As such, genres are characterised by specific purposes, registers, audiences, as well as (usually professional or specialised) communities.

Thirdly, I discuss the socio-political context of the corpus for the three periods, that is the characteristics of political regimes and the relevant socio-cultural processes. This aspect of context is perhaps the most interdisciplinary. In my thesis, I use it to identify and analyse the causal relationships between language ideologies and socio-political power in each of the three periods I study.

Fourthly, I focus on intertextuality and interdiscursivity. I discuss the texts explicitly referenced in the texts included in my corpus as well as related texts and discourses produced in specific periods. Looking at this aspect of context shows which discourses are the most politically salient in specific periods.

All my data is in Polish. Translations are mine. I translated selected passages into English during the writing phase, while data analysis was performed on the original texts.

3.4 Poland as a case study

Gerring defines a case study as 'an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units' (2004:342). Poland seems to be an 'extreme' case (Levy 2008:7) in a set of cases including countries emerging from state-socialism and undergoing democratisation and de-democratisation for a few reasons: it had the most rebellious civil society in the Soviet bloc (see 4.4.3.3), its democratisation and post-communist economy were the most successful in the region (see 5.4.3), and while it underwent very unexpected de-democratisation after 2015 (Haggard and Kaufman 2021a:1), it has also been a pioneer of re-democratisation after 2023. In addition, Poland is a predominantly monolingual country, which means that language ideologies almost exclusively concern just one language. Because, as argued before, language is central to the socio-political world, these 'extreme' changes of political regime in Poland are likely to bring about 'extreme' changes of language, but also language ideologies. This, in turn, makes Poland a good case to study the relationship between language ideologies and political regimes in order to build a theory of how political regimes can influence the production of language ideologies in other similar contexts, especially in other Central Eastern European countries. I examine Poland as a single unit under three different political regimes. Each of my cases is one of the three regimes: communist authoritarianism, liberal democracy building, and democratic backsliding.

3.5 Alternative approaches, or what this thesis is not doing

The subject of this thesis is language ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (1970–2023). In other words, my study is a critical meta-analysis of this discourse. As mentioned in the Introduction (see 1), my approach to the topic evolved over time. In this section, I will discuss a few other approaches that I considered on the way but decided not to pursue, as well as the reasons for my decision.

In the early stages of my work on this project, I intended to conduct a comparative study of top-down promotion of language ideologies and its bottom-up 'acceptance' among ordinary people. I wanted to find out which language ideologies promoted by linguists have become common sense for ordinary language users, and how language ideologies discernible in the metalinguistic discourse of ordinary language users differed from language ideologies promoted by linguists. I began by analysing language ideologies promoted by linguistic authorities to develop ideas about what ordinary language users may think about language, which I thought would enable me to design more effective survey and interview questions. I was going to conduct an online survey to see whether people are familiar with state- and linguists-led initiatives and sources on how to speak 'correctly' I had identified. The survey was going to be followed up by qualitative in-depth semi-structured interviews, in which I wanted to explore people's ideas about the Polish language in more detail[52]. In the first year of my PhD programme, I attended training on qualitative interviews and thematic analysis and began to work on my ethical approval application.

The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, soon after I started my second year and began data analysis, made me rethink this approach. I had intended to do fieldwork in the summer 2020, but ever-changing restrictions put the idea of fieldwork into question, and soon made me realise that it was indeed impossible. Instead, I chose to expand the timeframe of my project to include not only the period

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[52] I intended to do semi-structured interviews, as they are a perfect compromise between allowing respondents some degree of initiative, which opens the possibility of new, unexpected findings and perspectives, and giving all the interviews some structure that for one, ensures that the researcher collects answers to their questions, and for two, allows comparability between them. In-depth interviews, in turn, allow enough time to ask many questions and find out comprehensive answers, including detailed rationalisations for why a respondent has a particular view or opinion.

of liberal democracy building, but also the preceding period of communist authoritarianism. At that stage, I decided to study the relationship between language ideologies and political regimes. Soon afterwards, I also decided to include the period of democratic backsliding. The expansion of the timeframe, combined with the realisation that data on 'correct' Polish was abundant, made me abandon the idea of comparing sources promoted by professional linguists with those promoted by pundits, who have become very popular with the development of the Internet. I realised that the line between professional linguistics and pundits can be fine (a lot of pundits in question are Polish philology graduates), and such a comparative study would include comparing purely textual data with multimodal data (most of the sources authored by pundits are social media platforms and YouTube channels).

Having chosen to expand my timeframe, I also considered studying language ideologies in three different discursive fields (Bourdieu 1983) in Poland: academic, political, and media discourse. As my research progressed, I understood that the difference between academic, political, and media discourse in the case of Poland is not always clear-cut. I realised that what interested me most was the intersection between professional metalinguistic discourse and political discourse, often indistinguishable from the media discourse. Polish linguists and literary scholars, as part of the intelligentsia, have been important actors in Polish politics since the beginnings of the field of linguistics in the 19th century (Zarycki 2022). As I will demonstrate in the chapters to follow, many have been politically engaged by either publishing in oppositional academic publications and media, or by publishing in the official media and even making legislation recommendations. For this reason, I decided to focus on Polish professional metalinguistic discourse understood as not only academic output of scholars of language, but also their public discourse.

4 Liberal and Standard Language Ideologies as Anti-Communist Resistance Strategies in Polish Professional Metalinguistic Discourse (1970–1989)

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will look at language ideologies in two prominent strands of the Polish discourse linguistics in the last two decades of communist authoritarianism (1970–1989). On the one hand, I will look at linguistic studies of communist propaganda written primarily by Polish linguists, but also scholars in related disciplines: philology, literature, and sociology, in the 1970s and 1980s[53]. Many authors of these studies were involved in oppositional activities, and thus their work discussing communist propaganda was not published in official (censored) media. The goal of these studies was to describe and expose the way language was used in politics, particularly by Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or PZPR) politicians and all state media the Party controlled. According to the authors of linguistic studies of communist propaganda, Party politicians used the Polish language to promote communist-socialist ideology.

I will also look at the professional metalinguistic discourse in state media in this period. At the time, Polish scholars of language were involved in standardisation practices by writing columns and articles in official press and hosting shows on state TV and radio. The main idea behind these sources was that all Polish society should speak 'correctly' under the instructions of linguistic authorities, mainly professional linguists. Unlike linguistic studies of communist propaganda, this discourse was not concerned with the use of Polish in politics. It was thus not explicitly political, but I will argue that ideas about the Polish language promoted in this discourse suggested

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[53] Parts of this chapter, in particular the analysis of linguistic studies of communist propaganda, were recently published as an article entitled 'On the language of liberalism: Liberal language ideology in Polish discourse of linguistics (1970–1989) as a form of pro-democratic resistance' in the *Journal of Language and Politics* (Stanisz-Lubowiecka 2023).

a specific version of national identity, which was different to the one promoted by the Party.

I will begin this chapter by introducing my data and the criteria for its selection. I will then identify components of language ideologies and, where relevant, political ideologies in the texts included in my corpus based on the thematic analysis I conducted in NVivo, according to my three-component definition of language ideology (see 2.2.4). I will examine representations of language found in my corpus, the socio-political order they aimed to legitimise, and instructions for the ideal use of language they provided.

Next, I will move on to contextual analysis, following my four-component contextual framework inspired by Wodak (see 3.3). I will first discuss the co-text of my data, that is the immediate context of where the texts included in the corpus appeared. I will show that the co-text of linguistic studies of *nowomowa* was academic, cultural, oppositional, and international, while the co-text of Miodek's column was educational, informational, political, and local. Secondly, I will discuss the context of the genre. Looking at the nature of oppositional magazines in which linguistic studies of communist propaganda were published as well as professional profiles of their authors, I will argue that in my data there was an inherent tension between the genre of an academic study and the genre of a 'dissident' essay. Similarly, sources promoting 'correct' Polish can be considered a hybrid genre of a press column combined with an academic expert piece. Thirdly, I will talk about the socio-political context, situating my corpus in the context of the political regime in Poland in the last two decades of communist authoritarianism, including socialist-communist ideology and propaganda, as well as anti-communist opposition. In this way, I will demonstrate how ideological the texts included in my corpus are. Fourthly, I will discuss intertextual and interdiscursive relationships of the corpus to other relevant texts, namely previous literature about the language of propaganda that influenced the authors of my corpus, in particular the works of George Orwell, as well as standardisation practices Polish linguists were involved in at the time. I will conclude my argument in the final section of this chapter.

I will argue that linguistic studies of *nowomowa* can be considered an anti-communist resistance strategy. What underlies the description and ultimate criticism

of the language of communist propaganda in these studies is liberal axiology. For this reason, they should not be assumed to be 'objective'. Rather, these critical analyses of communist propaganda and related language policy proposals constituted a powerful political resistance strategy, which only superficially focused on language alone but ultimately promoted liberal ideology and a liberal democratic regime. By formulating and propagating a language ideology coupled with at least some tenets of liberalism, not only did these studies oppose the socialist-communist regime, but they also promoted liberal democratic values in a socialist-communist authoritarian state. By 'uncovering' the ideological component of the language of communist propaganda, studies about it can be classified as an early form of Critical Discourse Analysis understood as a method 'with an attitude' (see 3.1). However, the authors of these studies pay little attention to their positionality. 'Uncovering' the ideological positions of the authors of linguistic studies of linguistic propaganda is one of the aims of this chapter.

Sources promoting 'correct' Polish in state media were founded on very different ideas from those underlying linguistic studies of communist propaganda, but also from those promoted by the Party. Allowing these sources space on state media, the Party may have hoped they would legitimise the socialist-communist regime, but this strategy failed[54]. While the government promoted a nationalist-communist ideological hybrid, linguists such as Miodek promoted ideas about the Polish language typical for standard and occasionally nationalist and purist language ideologies, which in turn are associated with nationalism 'thickened' by conservatism. For this reason, the Polish discourse on 'correct' Polish in state media at the time can also be interpreted as anti-communist, although this oppositional aspect is very subtle and discreet.

I will thus argue that under the Soviet regime, Central Eastern Europe was more diverse than is often assumed. I will demonstrate that Polish linguistic studies of communist propaganda in the period of communist authoritarianism support

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[54] In the USSR, the language culture movement was legitimised by Stalin in an attempt to raise 'a minimally articulate population' (Gorham 2014:35–36). The 'normalisation' of the Russian language movement was prominent since 1952 and it was not concerned with the language of the state (Gorham 2014:36–48).

Lebow's argument (2013) that the influence of the communist state on people is often overestimated in academic discourse. I will also show that in Central Eastern Europe, political ideologies other than communism (liberalism, nationalism, and conservatism) not only existed, but in certain circles were even prominent, playing an important role in the breakdown of the regime and in the shaping of a new democratic reality afterwards (Kubik 2020; Szacki 2022). By demonstrating the prominence of domestic liberalism in Poland in the period of communist authoritarianism, my study contributes to the criticism of Krastev and Holmes's influential attempt to explain the rise of right-wing populism in post-communist Europe (2020), where they argue that one of the reasons is the resentment towards Western liberalism, which Eastern European countries are supposed to imitate. In other words, I will question some of the assumptions made about Poland in the 'Western' literature, and thus contribute to attempts at 'decolonising' the study of 'Eastern' Europe (see, e.g., Bielousova 2022; Todorova 2009; Wolff 1994). Finally, I will demonstrate that liberals and nationalists-conservatives adopted different metalinguistic discourses, which were consistently founded on different values.

4.2 Data: linguistic studies of communist propaganda and publications promoting 'correct' Polish

For my data, I selected three collections of academic essays on the language of communist propaganda: Jakub Karpiński's *Mowa do ludu: Szkice o języku polityki* (Speaking to the People: Essays on the Language of Politics) (1984), Michał Głowiński's *Nowomowa po polsku* (Newspeak in Polish) (1990), and a post-conference volume entitled *Nowo-mowa* (New-speak) edited by Adam Heinz and Jolanta Rokoszowa (1984a). Karpiński's book is a collection of essays published in London, which he had previously published in oppositional journals either clandestinely in the country or abroad (in the 'West') between 1972 and 1984 (see Table 1). Głowiński's book is a collection of his academic conference and symposium papers, journal articles, chapters in edited volumes, and essays published in oppositional journals between 1972 and 1988 (see Table 2). *Nowo-mowa* is a collection of papers presented at the conference entitled *Nowo-mowa* organised by the Philology Department at the

Jagiellonian University in Kraków together with the local Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union (NSZZ) 'Solidarność' (see Table 3). Presentations given at this conference, a lot of which discussed the language of communist propaganda, were later published as a book by an independent press in Warsaw (1984a) and then reprinted in London (1984b).

Title	Date of first publication
Mówi Warszawa… [Warsaw Speaking]	1972
Co słychać nowego? [What Is New?]	1977
O czym Polacy nie powinni wiedzieć [The Things Poles Are Not Supposed to Know]	1978
Internacjonalizm puka do szkół [Internationalism Knocking on Schools' Doors]	1978
Język polityki [The Language of Politics]	1980
Gwałt i perswazja [Violence and Persuasion]	1984

Table 1. A list of essays published in Karpiński (1984)

While there is a growing body of research on the language of communist propaganda in Poland, I was interested in texts written during state socialism, not afterwards. When I was collecting my data, I realised that linguistic studies of communist propaganda were only published in the 1970s and 1980s, which influenced my choice of timeframe (see 4.4.3.1). I was also interested in selecting texts that were influential during state socialism. Although because of censorship it is very difficult to assess the actual popularity of these texts at the time, which I will discuss later in this chapter, with the development of the Solidarity movement, underground publications were very widely read (Błażejowska 2010). For this reason, I selected texts which are most likely to have been relatively well-known, that it Głowiński's collection, who coined the term *nowomowa*, and collections that appeared both in domestic oppositional circles (predominantly intellectual elites and after 1980s often also workers) and abroad (in the 'West'). Only the selected three collections meet my criteria. For this reason, some texts discussing the language of communist propaganda that until now continue to be cited were excluded from my corpus. I will discuss them later in this chapter.

Title	Date of first publication
Nowomowa (Rekonesans) [Newspeak (Reconnaissance)]	1978
Nowomowa – rekonesansu ciąg dalszy [Newspeak (Reconnaissance Continued)]	1980
Peryfrazy współczesne [Contemporary Periphrases]	1972
Język marksizmu-leninizmu w komunikacji społecznej [The Language of Marxism-Leninism in Social Communication]	1982
Literatura wobec nowomowy [Literature and Newspeak]	1980
Figura wroga (O propagandzie marcowej) [Figure of the Enemy (On March Propaganda)]	1981
Opis papieskiej podróży [Description of the Papal Visit]	1981
Nowomowa tuż po Sierpniu [Newspeak Just After August]	1980
Wokół trzeciej wizyty [Around the Third Visit]	1987
Nowomowa po polsku (w roku 1988) [Newspeak in Polish (in 1988)]	1988
Wielka przebieranka [Great Dress-up]	1989
Nowa epoka, stary język [New Era, Old Language]	1989

Table 2. A list of essays published in Głowiński (1990)

As for the promotion of 'correct' Polish in state media, I selected Jan Miodek's collection of essays entitled *Rzecz o języku* ('Language Matters') published in 1983. The book was based on a weekly column published under the same title since 1964 and included about a fifth of all the articles that had been published in *Słowo Polskie* (Polish Word), a local daily published in Wrocław, by 1980 (Miodek 1983:5). The collection addresses 'correctness' issues in a few areas of language: lexicon, word formation, inflection, phraseology, syntax, proper names, pronunciation, spelling, and punctuation. Many articles are responses to letters (questions) from readers, which is indicative of the popular interest in linguistic correctness. What is striking in comparison between Miodek's essays and the essays on the language of propaganda is that the former is not concerned with the language of politics whatsoever.

Rzecz o języku was not the only source on 'correct' Polish authored by professional linguists in Poland at the time. I decided to only include Miodek's book in my corpus for three reasons. Firstly, I look at the last two decades of communist authoritarianism in this chapter, since, as I will demonstrate later, it was after the late 1960s that texts discussing communist propaganda were first published and the production of sources promoting 'correct' Polish accelerated in Poland (Foland-Kugler 1981). Secondly, it was impossible for me to access TV and radio shows promoting

Author	Title
Rokoszowa Jolanta	*Słowo wstępne* [Introduction]
Heinz Adam	*Kilka uwag o tzw. Nowo-mowie* [A Few Remarks on the So-Called New-speak]
Orwell George	*Zasady nowo-mowy* [The Principles of New-speak]
Bednarczuk Leszek	*Nowo-mowa. Zarys problematyki i perspektywy* [New-speak. Outline of the Issues and Perspectives]
Prower Emanuel	*O socjolingwistycznych wyznacznikach nowo-mowy* [On Sociolinguistic Indicators of New-speak]
Puzynina Jadwiga	*O pojęciu manipulacji oraz sensie wyrażenia: manipulacja językowa* [On the Concept of Manipulation and the Meaning of the Phrase: Linguistic Manipulation]
Bogusławski Andrzej	*Nowo-mowa, negacja, opozycja* [New-speak, Negation, Opposition]
Grzegorczykowa Renata	*O funkcji impresywnej zdań twierdzących* [On the Impressive Function of Constatives]
Bajerowa Irena	*Problematyka tzw. ubóstwa współczesnej polszczyzny* [On the Issue of the So-Called Poverty of Contemporary Polish]
Mayenowa Maria Renata	*O złej propagandzie* [On Black Propaganda]
Kurzowa Zofia	*Językoznawstwo wobec odnowy życia społecznego* [Linguistics and the Renewal of Social Life]
Bralczyk Jerzy	*Ograniczony świat propagandy* [The Limited World of Propaganda]
Lewicki Andrzej Maria	*Podstawowe nazwy zbiorowości ludzkich w języku publicystyki* [Basic Names of Human Communities in the Language of Journalism]
Antas Jolanta, Elżbieta Fajfer	*O szczególnym funkcjonowaniu modulantów składniowych w przekazach telewizyjnych* [On the Specific Function of Syntactic Modifiers in Television Broadcasts]
Wesołowska Danuta	*Neosemantyzmy w nowo-mowie* [Neosemantisms in New-speak]
Drawicz Andrzej	*Nowomowa po sąsiedzku. Propozycje wstępne* [New-speak Next Door. Preliminary Proposals]
Krasnowolska Anna	*Uwagi o języku propagandy Republiki Muzułmańskiej Iranu* [Notes on the Language of Propaganda in the Muslim Republic of Iran]
Solarz Kazimierz	*Opozycja „wiedza": „wiara" w aspekcie językoznawczym* [Opposition "Knowledge": „Faith" in the Linguistic Aspect]
Ozga Janina	*Pewne zjawiska intonacyjne w środkach masowego przekazu* [Some Intonation Phenomena in Mass Media]
Pajdzińska Anna	*Głos w sprawie autorskiego kryterium poprawności językowej* [An Opinion on the Voluntaristic Criterion of Linguistic Correctness]
Wysocka Felicja	*Głos w sprawie zmian nazw w Bieszczadach* [An Opinion on Name Changes in the Bieszczady Mountains]
Balbus Stanisław, Pisarek Walery, Pisarkowa Krystyna, Puzynina Jadwiga, Tischner Józef	*Dyskusja* [Discussion]

Table 3. A list of papers published in Heinz and Rokoszowa (1984a)

'correct' Polish that were popular at the time[55]. Thirdly, in light of the above, I decided to analyse Miodek's collection of essays, as this genre is the most comparable to the rest of the texts included in my corpus. Other sources on 'correct' Polish are, however, an important context for Miodek's book and I will discuss them later in this chapter (see 4.4.4.2).

4.3   Thematic analysis of the corpus

In this section, I will answer the questions: What language ideologies can be detected in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in 1970–1989? I will show the results of my thematic analysis in NVivo, comparing Polish linguistic studies of communist propaganda and Miodek's *Rzecz o języku*. I will identify the themes following my three-component definition of language ideology introduced in the literature review (see 2.2.4), and thus examine value-laden representations of language to be found in my corpus, the socio-political order legitimised, as well as instructions for the ideal use of language provided. I will also link the identified themes to components of standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies defined in detail in the literature review (see 2.2.4.1, 2.2.4.2, and 2.2.4.3). Finally, I will argue that some ideas identified in my corpus are characteristic of liberalism, nationalism, and conservatism as political ideologies (see 2.2.3.1 and 2.2.3.2).

4.3.1   Representations of language: Polish, 'the language', is a tool for communication, an element of thought, a component of national identity, and a sign of eloquence, good manners, and morality

In my corpus, Polish is depicted as 'the language', which is a tool for communication and an element of thought. The use of 'good' Polish is in turn depicted as a sign of eloquence and good manners. In linguistic studies of communist propaganda, whose language was dubbed *nowomowa* (the Polish calque of the word

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[55] I enquired the Polish Radio about Pisarek's show entitled *Lekcja języka polskiego* a few times, but never heard back. From the research I did, it looks like the show was not recorded and it cannot be accessed. As for Miodek's show entitled *Ojczyzna-polszczyzna*, it is available in TVP3 Wrocław Archives. However, TVP3 offered to give me access to the show only at a price which was not affordable either to UCL Library or myself.

Newspeak), 'classical', 'colloquial', and 'general' Polish is depicted as 'the language', while *nowomowa* as a linguistic abnormality ('quasi-language'). The representations of Polish as a tool for communication and an element of thought are implied in the explicit representations of *nowomowa* as 'devastating language' and 'corrupting' thought. The authors of these studies criticise *nowomowa* as manipulative language legitimising the socialist-communist regime. These representations of *nowomowa* assume that it destroys the accurate and straightforward relationship between words and meanings, which Woolard refers to as a 'referentialist ideology' (2020). By employing this ideology, the authors imply that Polish should be 'neutral', that is corresponding to reality. I will demonstrate that this linguistic norm of 'neutrality' is grounded in liberal democratic values, such as individual liberty, deliberation, and popular sovereignty (see 2.2.3.1), although the authors of linguistic studies of *nowomowa* did not use the term 'liberal'. The representation of 'neutral' Polish as a sign of eloquence is implied in the criticism of the linguistic incompetence of communist politicians.

The term *nowomowa* was introduced by Głowiński in an essay entitled *Nowomowa (Rekonesans)* (first presented as a conference paper in 1978)[56]. The paper and the concept quickly became influential and cited in many studies of the language of communist propaganda in Poland. Other names for the official variety of communist language in my corpus included 'drewniany język' ('the wooden language'), 'drętwa mowa' ('dry speech'), and 'mowa-trawa' (literally: 'speech-grass', meaning 'empty language', 'language with no content') (Bednarczuk 1985). Głowiński defines *nowomowa* in opposition to 'colloquial language' or 'classical Polish'. The two are different, yet inextricably related:

> (1) 'The relationship between *nowomowa* and colloquial language (or classical Polish in general) is ambiguous. On the one hand, *nowomowa* must separate itself from colloquial language to maintain its identity; thus, it must have its own forms, properly shaped vocabulary, etc.; on the other hand, *nowomowa* must constantly invoke colloquial language and use its resources' (1990:25).

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[56] Before, Karpiński used the term 'new language' ('nowy język').

The repetition of the imperative modal verb 'must' ('musieć') highlights the simultaneous distinctiveness of *nowomowa* from colloquial language and its relationship to it. Polish is thus constructed as 'the language', which is typical for standard language ideology, while *nowomowa* as a variety modelled and dependent on it.

The authors of my corpus provide two major criticisms of *nowomowa*. According to Głowiński, the function of *nowomowa* and at the same time the main danger associated with it is its goal to not only replace, but also 'devastate' the 'classical language'. For this reason, Głowiński explicitly calls *nowomowa* 'a quasi-language' (1990:10). This 'devastation' occurs by means of semantic manipulations, which lead to the 'decomposition of communication'. On the one hand, it is no longer possible to express 'authentic' content or attitude. On the other, *nowomowa* triggers 'reactions of distrust towards language':

> (2) '*Nowomowa* not only seeks to replace the classical language, but also devastates it in various ways. It devastates it, e.g., by taking over its components and giving them a different meaning – often in a hidden way, i.e., it creates the appearance that within it words mean what they normally mean, when they really mean something else. It devastates above all those areas of language that are used to talk about social problems, history, ideology, and politics. It also devastates traditions, such as traditions of the language of the revolutionaries and traditions of the patriotic language. It is devastating because everything in this matter is reduced to cliché, to formulas in which direct judgements and rituality prevail over meaning. *Nowomowa* thus decomposes communication – especially on public issues; it decomposes communication by distorting or, in a better case, neutralizing those formulas and styles behind which authentic content and authentic attitudes were hidden. It decomposes communication also because it affects social awareness, especially colloquial, it triggers reactions of distrust towards any language' (1990:21)[57].

To describe *nowomowa*, Głowiński uses the metaphor of natural catastrophes: 'devastation of language' (repeated five times in this passage, including in three parallel sentences), and the metaphor of decay: 'decomposition of communication'

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[57] All emphases in quotes from the data are mine – ASL.

(repeated three times in this passage, twice in parallel sentences). In this way, he creates a catastrophic image of destroyed language and communication being no longer possible. These metaphors present *nowomowa* in a negative light and its users as deliberate 'devastators' of Polish and 'decomposers' of communication.

The main representation of Polish here is that it is a tool for communication, while *nowomowa* is constructed as a deviation from 'colloquial language'. 'Communication' (especially on 'public issues'), 'authenticity', and 'distrust' seem like allusions to, respectively, public discussion or the right to be informed, individual liberty or freedom of expression, and popular sovereignty, that is legitimacy based on the consent of the governed, which are all liberal democratic values. Głowiński relates this 'devastation', achieved by means of semantic manipulations and ritualisation of language[58], to extralinguistic issues: 'social problems, history, ideology, and politics' as well as 'traditions of the language of the revolutionaries and traditions of the patriotic language'. *Nowomowa* is thus depicted as destroying Polish associated with patriotism, or the devotion to the nation and the country, which in turn is an implicit representation of Polish as a component of national identity. The theme of semantic manipulations is rooted in the same axiology. The criticism of 'giving [language] components a different meaning' implies the idea of language as telementation based on the ideal of pure correspondence between words and meanings, which is indicative of the (desired) speaker's honesty. The dishonesty of the speaker is implied in the 'hidden way' in which the 'real' meanings of words 'appear' to be used. This passage is thus an instance of the 'referentialist ideology', which, as argued, is seen as problematic in contemporary linguistics (see 2.2.4.1.2).

Nowomowa is explicitly called 'manipulation' in my corpus. Puzynina discusses it as one of contemporary threats, alongside another extralinguistic phenomenon, violence:

> (3) 'Contemporary man is aware of numerous threats. These threats …
> include, among others, human violence and manipulation. Both in the
> case of violence and manipulation, a m a n   i s   t r e a t e d   a s   a n

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[58] Głowiński discusses examples of such 'fixed', 'ritualised' phrases: 'the time of the cult of an individual', 'the period of errors and distortions', or 'the previous period' to mark the 'beginning of a new era' in mid 1950s (1990:31–37). According to Głowiński, the aim of ritualisation is to impose schematicity of thinking in the audience.

object: he is deprived of his proper dignity, his decisions are influenced in a brutal or deceitful way' (1985:48).

Calls for human subjectivity and dignity were characteristic of the oppositional discourse of the Catholic Church during the communist authoritarian period (Kubik 1994). At the same time, these calls were invocations of the ideal of self-determination, or individual freedom, which in this case is suppressed by manipulation 'in a brutal and deceitful way'. The adjective 'brutal' ('brutalny' in Polish, associated with aggression and violence) strengthens the parallel between violence and manipulation, while the adjective 'deceitful' ('podstępny' in Polish, associated with deceit, but also tricking someone into something) implies dishonesty and bad intent on the part of producers of *nowomowa*.

Semantic manipulations (Karpiński 1984), *nowomowa* as 'poor' Polish (Bajerowa 1985), the difference between *nowomowa* and 'colloquial Polish' (Bogusławski 1985), and the influence of *nowomowa* on 'colloquial Polish' (Bajerowa 1985; Kurzowa 1985) are common subjects of concern in my data. For instance, Kurzowa talks about the infiltration of informal Polish by *nowomowa*, resulting in the 'identicalness' and 'blandness of content':

(4) '*Nowomowa* is the language of political propaganda that makes its way into general language in its official variety, and what is worse, even in the unofficial one … The language of propaganda, as we know, uses certain fixed lexical, syntactical, and phraseological patterns, which in effect lead to the creation of texts that are identical and bland in terms of content' (1985:93).

Kurzowa's criticism of 'identicalness' and 'blandness' in individual speech resulting from the influence of political propaganda is a call for the ideal of 'eloquence', typical of standard language ideology. On the other hand, Kurzowa's criticism implies the liberal democratic ideal of respect for individual freedom and the freedom of expression, which can be classified as an instance of 'cultural liberalism' as defined by Kubik (2020). It is also implied that the 'correct' (in this case 'diverse') ideal form of language was used in the past.

The other main criticism of *nowomowa* in my corpus is its corrupting influence on people's thought. Karpiński engages in a philosophical discussion on the

relationship between language and thought, citing George Orwell, Francis Bacon and authors studying what he calls 'the pathology of language' (1984:28): Alfred Korzybski, Harold Lasswell, and Victor Klemperer. He also situates his criticism of communist propaganda in the context of social psychology, as a field of research explaining the link between language and thought. Karpiński argues:

> (5) 'The propagandist aims to b l u r i n t h e m i n d o f t h e r e c i p i e n t the differences between the state and the nation, between socialism and communism, between the party and society, between democracy and "socialist democracy", between Polish interests and the interests of the "socialist camp". It seems that these verbal identifications and confusions are supposed t o m a k e i t d i f f i c u l t t o t h i n k a b o u t p o l i t i c a l m a t t e r s h a r m f u l t o t h e a u t h o r i t i e s , with at least a certain degree of precision' (1984:71).

This criticism of *nowomowa* is based on the concern with its influence on people's thought, which is said to be achieved through the confusion of key political concepts and ideologies, such as 'the state', 'the nation', 'the party', 'society', 'socialism' and 'communism', as well as the confusion around the name of the political regime in Poland at the time, for which the expression 'socialist democracy' was frequently used in the official discourse. On the one hand, Karpiński criticises the purpose of the use of *nowomowa*, which is the legitimation of the communist authoritarian regime achieved through hiding (the theme of dishonesty again) not only the matters inconvenient for the government and the Party (which again implies the citizens' right to be informed and have a public discussion about socio-political issues), but also 'real' meanings of words. Hence, on the other hand, similarly to the concern about the devastation of language, this criticism implicitly promotes the idea of an accurate relationship between words and meanings, or an accurate correspondence of language to reality. This criticism is founded on an elitist distinction between people who are aware of propaganda and those who are not (Bernstein 1971; cf. Staniszkis 2019). Karpiński's criticism of blurring the distinction between 'democracy' and 'socialist democracy' implies a call for a 'truly' democratic system. This is an instance of what Kubik (2020) defines as 'political liberalism', that is a call for an introduction of liberal democracy as a political regime.

The theme of the relationship between language and thought is common in my data. Opening a plenary discussion, Balbus argues, for example:

(6) 'We are not interested in Orwell's question about how the authorities produce nowo-mowa and what this nowo-mowa carries with it. We are interested in precisely how it transforms the consciousness and subconsciousness of the society which in a way spontaneously, but not without "guided suggestions" transforms its language into nowo-mowa' (1985:178).

Referring to George Orwell, Balbus links the theme of the relationship between language and thought with the theme of *nowomowa*'s influence on informal language. Balbus justifies the linguistic study of *nowomowa*, arguing that the root of the linguistic interest in it is the influence of *nowomowa* on society ('its consciousness and subconsciousness'), rather than the description of the way *nowomowa* is produced by the authorities. The 'transformation' of the language of the society into the language of *nowomowa* is constructed as undesired, which, in turn, implies criticism of how the communist authorities are striving for hegemony.

Yet another criticism of *nowomowa* is based on the direct criticism of communist politicians' linguistic incompetence, which, as argued by Lippi-Green, is 'a covert way of judging not the delivery of the message, but the social identity of the messenger' (1997:17):

(7) 'There have always been people whose writing is inept. What is important in this case, however, is that this ineptitude is elevated to the rank of the prevailing style of speaking on public matters' (Karpiński 1984:75).

This passage appears in the context of Karpiński's discussion of various strategies of achieving semantic vagueness in *nowomowa*, so it is another implicit call for the ideal of linguistic 'clarity', which, according to Karpiński, should characterise 'the prevailing style of speaking on public matters'. Karpiński appeals to the ideal of 'eloquence', which, as argued, is typical for standard language ideology, and elitist. His criticism of the language of communist politicians, bluntly described as 'ineptitude', is a way of delegitimising their political power and, by extension, the socialist-communist regime they represent, coupled with a promotion of a liberal value of public discussion.

The nature of *nowomowa* is often represented through catastrophic imagery. Metaphors of pollution and contamination are particularly frequent:

(8) 'For both speaking and breathing, knowledge about the mechanisms that cause them is practically not needed by anyone. When we begin to "see the air", it means that it is p o l l u t e d , p o i s o n e d ; air, "perceptible", becomes d e a d l y f o r m a n . I f w e s t a r t t o "s e e t h e l a n g u a g e" – i t m e a n s t h a t s o m e t h i n g i s w r o n g w i t h t h e l a n g u a g e , t h a t i t s b a s i c s i g n i f y i n g f u n c t i o n h a s b e e n d i s t u r b e d' (Rokoszowa 1985:10).

Once again, signifying is assumed to be the fundamental language function. 'Air', a metaphor that captures 'proper' language, highlights its importance for people's communication and the potential consequences of its 'pollution' and 'poisoning'. The metaphor of pollution not only creates an image of propaganda as something unwanted, dangerous, and even poisonous to humans, but also anomalous, which assumes the ideal of 'neutral', 'transparent' language, whose goal is to perform 'its basic signifying function', and ultimately allowing freedom of discussion.

Some of Miodek's representations of Polish are similar to those identified in linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, and some are different. Miodek explicitly depicts Polish as 'the language' and 'the system' comprising different varieties, and as a tool for thought and communication. Occasionally, Miodek implicitly depicts Polish as a component of national identity. While he represents stylistic diversity, which includes borrowings, as the 'wealth' of language, he occasionally speaks about 'foreign' influences on the 'native' language negatively. Criticising various kinds of linguistic 'mistakes', Miodek also implicitly depicts the use of 'correct' language as a sign of eloquence and a sign of good manners and morality, which serves to legitimise not only the 'standard' variety of Polish, but also the elites using it and the desired moral order associated with it. While Miodek's approach to language can generally be described as moderate prescriptive, it is informed by more up-to-date linguistic theories at the time than linguistic studies of *nowomowa*.

Miodek explicitly depicts Polish as 'the language', which, as mentioned, is characteristic of standard language ideology. According to Miodek, Polish at the time was the most unified in its history:

(9) 'at the present time – on the one hand – the unification and integration of colloquial general language is progressing (the consequence of public schools, mass media), but – on the other hand – the number of stylistic varieties of the language (professional, community) is growing.

Therefore, it is undoubtedly true to say that there has never been a period in the history of our language so favourable for the stability of grammatical norms' (1983:7).

Miodek thus implicitly recognises that Polish has become a 'mature standard' (Joseph 1987) as a result of the unifying function of public education and mass media. On the other hand, he talks about the 'opposing force' to this unification, which is the 'growing' 'number of stylistic varieties' of Polish.

He observes a few times that:

(10) 'it is one language branching out into many stylistic varieties' (1983:54).

These new varieties are still part of 'one Polish'.

Miodek implicitly depicts 'the language' as a component of national identity, which is characteristic of nationalist language ideology. Discussing the Silesian dialect, Miodek shows how dialects also contribute to the construction of national identity:

(11) 'The Silesian dialect should be considered one of the most archaic Polish dialects … it is the most Polish dialect among all Polish dialects. It preserved many features that disappeared in general Polish... This persistent adherence to their dialect enabled the Silesians – despite their difficult situation – to keep their native language... The Silesian dialect was inevitably doomed to German influence. But – what may seem paradoxical – these Germanisms also prove its... Polishness, because such forms are usually adapted to the system of the Polish language. ... one should not lament the weeding of this language, but see how this dialect, by transforming specific foreign forms and bending them to the native linguistic system, confirmed its belonging to the homeland we all share – the Polish language' (1983:22–23).

In the final sentence of this passage, Miodek constructs the link between the language and the nation, using the phrase which is the title of his famous TV show: 'ojczyzna-polszczyzna'. It is impossible to translate, as it is a combination of the word *ojczyzna* ('fatherland'), which has strong patriotic associations in Polish, and *polszczyzna* – an alternative, slightly old-fashioned word for the Polish language, associated with independence movements before 1918. The 'fatherland' is thus prioritised and positively valorised in a way characteristic of nationalism as a political ideology. The phrase 'the homeland we all share' implies the conservative value of collectivity, which, alongside individualism and liberalism, was typical for the discourse of Solidarity, treating 'the nation' as 'the ultimate value to which group and

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individual interests are subordinate' (Śliwa 2000:129). The other value in this passage is 'nativism', which is based on antiquity associated with authenticity. Miodek unambiguously represents the Silesian dialect as not only Polish, but also 'the most Polish among all Polish dialects', thus protecting the boundaries of the Polish state, which is characteristic of nationalism as a political ideology. Miodek also argues that the presence of Germanisms in Silesian is evident of its Polishness since German influences were adapted to the Polish system. He thus challenges purist language ideology in the letters he had received from Polish language speakers, expressing concerns about the 'weeding' of Silesian. In fact, his ideas of 'transforming specific foreign forms and bending them to the native linguistic system' can be seen as very innovative in that they transcend the 'bounded', 'fixed', and 'stable' conceptualisation of language (see 2.2.4.2)[59].

Miodek discusses the stylistic diversity of Polish positively, as its 'wealth' and 'power':

> (12) 'I must confirm here the functioning of not just two, but very many stylistic varieties of one general Polish language: spoken and written, colloquial and official, artistic, official, office, scientific and specialised branches of science and technology, various professional and community groups, etc. ... The sheer wealth of possibilities is... the power of language! Thanks to it, we can meet the countless stylistic and communicative needs created by life' (1983:45–46).

Miodek again depicts Polish as 'the language', or 'general language', as well as a tool for communication. According to Miodek, the stylistic diversity of Polish makes it a richer communicative tool.

Miodek explicitly promotes the use of diverse varieties of Polish, including colloquial language, in the right contexts. Commenting on the informal use of the word 'małżonka', a very formal synonym of the word 'żona' ('wife'), Miodek praises an actor who had introduced his wife to him as 'This is my hag' ('baba'), which Miodek interprets as a sign of 'respect, love, and sense of humour':

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[59] However, while Silesian tends to be classified as a dialect of Polish in Polish linguistics, it is also sufficiently distinct from contemporary standard Polish to be classified as a separate language. In fact, there are a few bottom-up movements aiming at its standardisation and promoting the independent status of Silesian as a language and Silesian-speaking community as a nation (Szul 2014; Tambor 2002).

(13)'Let's not be afraid of colloquiality and simplicity! – it is probably the best
way to finish. This simplicity is not the same as vulgarity' (1983:51).

Apart from the negative representation of 'vulgarity', this passage can be interpreted as a very hidden criticism of the official variety of Polish in the last two decades of state socialism and thus a very subtle form of resistance against the regime. As mentioned, Miodek does not explicitly talk about the language of politics, which is hardly surprising, given that his column was published in the official press. As a 'coded' language was often used in Polish literature at the time, this passage could be interpreted as an allusion to the influence of *nowomowa* on colloquial Polish[60]. This influence is explicitly criticised in quotes (4) and (6).

Despite this celebration of stylistic diversity, Miodek finds a specific use of a Russicism 'wybyć' 'irritating':

(14)'"Wybyć" used in the meaning "to give way, to leave, to "depart" is a
Russicism that may still function among older people coming from the
Russian partition … contemporary Poles feel that the word "wybyć" has
a colloquial and frivolous character and can only be used as such. Using
it in official constructions must be considered a stylistic error' (1983:49).

This is the only Russicism discussed in Miodek's book, which shows, perhaps counterintuitively, that the influence of the Russian language on Polish was not a subject of concern in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse at the time (or such concern would not have been allowed to be expressed by censorship). The use of this specific Russicism is, however, only accepted in 'colloquial' and 'frivolous' contexts, according to Miodek. It is also implicitly described as 'old', that is used by 'older people coming from the Russian partition'. Pushing the use of this Russicism to 'colloquial', 'frivolous', and 'archaic' contexts can be interpreted as evidence of Miodek's negative attitude to Russian and as an attempt to construct a version of Polish national identity that is not linked to the Soviet bloc.

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[60] During the Partitions of Poland, or the so-called Positivist period in Polish literature (2nd half of the 19th century), Polish writers and poets experienced very strict censorship. All the main writers of the time, such as Bolesław Prus, Henryk Sienkiewicz or Eliza Orzeszkowa, were severely affected by it and often used coded language to write about patriotic themes. In the literature, this phenomenon tends to be called 'mowa ezopowa' (Aesopian speech), or 'język ezopowy' (Aesopian language) (Frybes, Jakubowski, and Kulczycka-Saloni 1964; Martuszewska 1977, 1986, 1991; Żmigrodzka 1963). Aesopian language is also used by writers and poets in the communist period to convey 'illegal' content (Smulski 1998).

Miodek also judges some forms characteristic for specialised varieties as 'strange, foreign-sounding':

(15) 'In many community varieties of Polish, strange, foreign-sounding linguistic creations also appear from time to time' (1983:59).

For Miodek, the ongoing specialisation of language is responsible for the occasional introduction of 'foreign' components to Polish, which he explicitly judges as 'strange'. In a different essay, Miodek reveals an elitist stance by calling the use 'foreign morphology' 'the buy-in' in academic texts, and an attempt to 'give the character of high style' to non-academic texts (1983:40–41). Some of the examples Miodek discusses are Anglicisms, for example, 'sparring partner'. Although not once does he use the term 'Anglicism' or explicitly talk about 'English' in his book, Miodek's negative attitude to the influence of English is evident when he discusses 'foreign' derivative models resulting from globalisation and calls them 'neomonsters' (1983:67)[61]. This is an instance of purist language ideology promoting the linguistic ideal of 'purity' as well as conservatism as a political ideology, characterised by the combination of the contrast between the positively constructed past and disbelief in material progress.

Miodek is positive about borrowings 'filling the gaps' in Polish:

(16) 'When attacking structures considered to be literal translations of a foreign pattern, it is always worth asking the question: maybe our language needed them, and they filled the gaps in the native language system?' (1983:137).

The 'native language system' and its needs are, however, prioritised, which is a moderate instance of purist language ideology.

Miodek also depicts Polish in the Saussurean way, as 'the system':

(17) 'A system is an arrangement of elements in which each of them achieves its functional value thanks to the oppositional existence of other elements … Our every linguistic behaviour is conditioned by the rules of this system. If we want our fellow language users to understand us properly, we must obey these rules' (1983:77–78).

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[61] The word he uses in Polish, 'nowopotwory' resembles the Polish equivalent of the word 'cancer': 'nowotwór'.

This representation of Polish as a system serves Miodek to make a point about linguistic rules, which users need to obey in order to be able to communicate with other users. The representation of language as a system governed by rules also portrays it as orderly. Since communication is a social process, this representation of Polish can be interpreted as representing the foundation of social order.

Although largely influenced by de Saussure, Miodek argues against the purely referential use of language:

> (18) 'Language would be an unbearably schematic creation if we operated only with the basic meanings of individual structures' (1983:63).

In other words, Miodek recognises the creative potential of language to be used in non-basic, that is metaphorical or implied meanings. He thus acknowledges the limits of Saussurean 'referentiality', which is represented as an ideal in linguistic studies of propaganda, in quotes (2), (3), and (5).

According to Miodek, the rules of the system are not formulated by linguistic authorities arbitrarily, but they are created by language users:

> (19) 'the linguistic norm is determined primarily by the so-called social usus, which may "not approve" systemically possible potential formations' (1983:83).

Miodek thus says that 'social usus' is the key source of linguistic norms, which resembles de Saussure's idea of 'arbitrariness' of linguistic signs. This quote also shows that Miodek can be characterised as both a descriptive and prescriptive linguist.

Miodek is critical of some norms promoted by dictionaries, which in his view, are in contrast with how people speak:

> (20) 'The dictionary serves people; it is a model of correctness for them. ... Individual recommendations of a spelling dictionary ... must not be in clear contradiction with general social custom. I am and will be a staunch defender of the "strong" historical and derivative–inflectional principles of Polish orthography. However, it is not the first time that I am calling for the simplification of many conventional rules, among which there are so many catches that the average Pole does not want to hear about any criteria – even historical or morphological ones, convinced of the incredible scale of difficulty of Polish spelling' (1983:219).

Miodek's prescriptivism is thus very pro-users. What matters to him is that people understand the rules, which are based on how people speak, as this, he argues, is the condition that they will speak 'correctly'. The rules should be transparent, according to Miodek, or else they become 'catches'. Despite this criticism of some dictionaries, Miodek explicitly rejects labelling his approach to linguistic mistakes as 'liberal', which is how it was sometimes described by Poles (1983:222). Moreover, it is possible to see Miodek's prioritisation of 'historical' rules as a position consistent with cultural strategies used to construct national identity and assuming the continuity of time and space.

Miodek represents speakers of Polish who show interest in the rules of language as 'ideal'. Commenting on a few correctness queries he received, Miodek says:

> (21)'I am pleased when readers of *Rzecz o języku* have these types of problems. They are indicative of an active attitude towards the Polish language, and only this allows for the improvement of linguistic skills' (1983:12–13).

While it is usage that is the source of norms, these norms still need to be mastered, according to Miodek, which in turn is conditional on 'an active attitude towards the Polish language'. The interest in 'correct' Polish evident in the number of queries Miodek was receiving is in turn indicative that many Poles had such an attitude.

Another explicit representation of Polish in Miodek's book is that it is a 'tool for thought and communication', which is very similar to the implicit representations of Polish in linguistic studies of *nowomowa*:

> (22)'as language develops, it becomes an increasingly precise and logical tool for thought and communication' (1983:9).

Here, Miodek depicts the development of language in a positive way: as a process of 'perfecting' in terms of precision and logic, which can be interpreted as an implicit endorsement of standardisation.

Miodek implicitly depicts the use of 'correct' language as a sign of eloquence and a sign of good manners. Speaking about the 'incorrect' stylistic choice made by a tour guide he had encountered, Miodek says:

(23)'I could not help thinking that not every statement has to fulfil the speaker's intentions, but it undoubtedly brings important information about him' (1983:44).

Awareness of stylistic diversity is thus constructed as communicative competence, which, as argued, is associated with social elites.

Elsewhere, criticising the overuse of a specific 'trendy' word, Miodek explicitly attributes 'intellectual effort' to those who do not use it:

(24)'Finding words that unambiguously express a given experience requires full intellectual effort' (1983:40).

This is another elitist point, which serves to legitimise not only the standard variety, but also the privileged position of the elites who speak it. Miodek's promotion of the standard as well as the intellectual elites can be interpreted as an attempt to challenge the idea of equality associated with the socialist-communist ideology.

The representation of 'correct' Polish as a sign of eloquence is also implied in the way Miodek describes 'mistakes' or 'incorrect' forms. His elitist judgement of 'mistakes' is evident in the use of highly emotional language. Discussing 'mistakes', Miodek frequently expresses irritation, for example, by calling them 'annoying' (1983:50) or 'irritating' (1983:57), and ridicules them, for example, 'It is hard to hide a teasing smile' (1983:34). In addition, the opposite of 'correct' forms is not just 'mistakes', but also 'hypercorrect' forms:

(25)'... it also happens that someone makes a mistake by trying to avoid it at all costs. Exaggerated correctness is also a breach! This is how the so-called linguistic hyperisms occur – errors that go beyond the norm' (1983:20).

This can be interpreted as an elitist argument against speakers 'appropriating' the standard variety. It is a frequent finding in the sociolinguistics literature that upper middle classes 'exaggerate' their usage of 'standard' forms, which are 'natural' for the upper classes (Trudgill 2022).

Miodek also argues that awareness of stylistic diversity is tantamount to good manners:

(26)'Let us be honest, manners, which are reflected in the language like in a mirror, also play a significant role here. The issue of choosing this or that

construction most often comes down to the question: what should and should not be said in a given situation?' (1983:47).

This is related to the representation of Polish as a tool for communication. Miodek equates communicative competence with conduct, which is reflected in language 'like in a mirror'. This is yet another elitist argument, as manners, as well as the 'right' language, comprise the 'cultural capital' of the elites (Bourdieu 2021).

Miodek also depicts 'correct' Polish as a sign of morality. This can be observed is Miodek's use of legal terminology, for example, as 'violations' (1983:44) and 'breaches' (1983:122), as well as vocabulary to do with 'danger' or 'threat', for example, 'harmful' (1983:122) or 'worrying' (1983:146), used to describe forms differing from the 'norm'. The same function is performed by Miodek's appeals to moral and aesthetic values. In one of the essays, for example, he discusses the 'incorrect' use (that is improper semantic choice) of adjectives 'influential' ('wpływowy') and 'disgusting' ('obrzydliwy'):

> (27) 'More and more often one can hear: "I am influential" and it is supposed to mean as much as "I am easily influenced by others" or "I am disgusting", meaning "I am sensitive to the sight of disgusting things". Both examples are, of course, worthy of condemnation, and the latter borders on grotesque' (1983:30).

The use of vocabulary to do with morality ('worthy of condemnation') and aesthetics ('borders on grotesque'), typical for the discourse of standardisation, implies Miodek's construction of 'correct' language as the foundation of the social and moral order. In addition, aesthetic and moral criteria are never universal, and this observation raises the question of who has the authority to make such judgements. The implicit answer seems to be linguists, or intellectual elites more broadly.

Miodek represents the use of 'incorrect' Polish as evidence of 'low-life' and associates it with young people. Discussing the Polish informal word for a hundred PLN note, 'stówa', Miodek argues:

> (28) 'These words are used in youth slang, in criminal circles, but more and more often even in the most decent homes (though probably not in the homes of the intelligentsia) – during casual family and social conversations' (1983:48–49).

In this way, Miodek protects order understood as morality, the opposite of which is criminality. Intellectual elites are constructed as the cornerstone of this order.

To sum up, 'classical', 'colloquial', or 'general' Polish is depicted as 'the language', a tool for communication and an element of thought in both linguistic studies of *nowomowa* and in Miodek's book, who also depicts Polish as 'a system' (see Table 4). Despite occasional similarities, these representations are founded on different values. While in the former, the ideal linguistic norm is that of 'neutrality' or, occasionally, 'clarity', which are grounded in liberal values (individual liberty, especially freedom of

Themes / subthemes	Key words	Language ideology
Polish as the language	colloquial Polish, colloquial language, general language, general Polish, classic Polish	standard
Nowomowa as a variety of Polish	quasi-language, poor Polish	liberal
Polish as a system	system, linguistic system	standard
Varieties of Polish	variety, dialect	standard
Borrowings as either enriching the system or foreign	native, foreign, stylistic, borrowing, Russianism, Germanism	purist
Polish as a tool for communication	communication, communicate	standard
Nowomowa as devastation of language and communication	devastate, decompose, mean, meaning	liberal
Nowomowa as manipulation	manipulation, meaning, mean, signify, deceit, appear, appearance, distort, hidden	liberal
Polish as an element of thought	mind, think, thought	standard/liberal
Nowomowa as corrupting thought	blur, confusion, consciousness, subconsciousness	liberal
Polish as a component of national identity	patriotism, Poland, Polishness, fatherland, homeland, native, archaic, historical	nationalist
'Correct' Polish as a sign of eloquence	norm, correct, incorrect, mistake, intellectual, effort	standard
Nowomowa as ineptitude	ineptitude, inept	standard/liberal
'Correct' Polish as a sign of good manners	norm, correct, incorrect, mistake, manners, annoying, irritating	standard
'Correct' Polish as a sign of morality	norm, correct, incorrect, mistake, moral, criminal, violation, breach, danger, threat, harmful, worrying	standard

Table 4. Thematic codes: Representations of Polish in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (1970–1989)

speech, equality, diversity, deliberation, popular sovereignty, and the rule of law), in the latter, 'correctness' and occasionally 'purity' are the ideal linguistic norms, which are grounded in the conservative value of order and the nationalist value of the nation and nativism. Both discourses implicitly depict 'correct' Polish as a sign of eloquence, which served to criticise and/or delegitimise specific speakers: communist politicians in linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, and non-elites in Miodek's book. Miodek also implicitly depicts 'correct' Polish as a sign of good manners and morality, which can again be interpreted as elitist and conservative. The necessity to protect this order is strengthened by the belief that the alternative is 'criminality'. I have demonstrated that both linguistic studies of *nowomowa* and Miodek's book can be considered instances of standard language ideology aimed at maintaining the 'standard' depicted as 'the language' or 'the system'. However, only Miodek is explicitly interested in maintaining the 'standard'. The two sources of data thus belong to different traditions of the discourse of standardisation: *Rzecz o języku* can be classified as an instance of the 'correctness tradition', while linguistic studies of *nowomowa* – as an instance of the 'moralistic tradition' of 'language complaints' (see 2.2.4.1.2). They also correspond to two distinct perceptions of Russian identified by Gorham (see 2.3).

4.3.2 Political legitimation: calls for 'neutral' Polish aim to legitimise democracy and calls for 'correct' Polish propose a conservative version of national identity

In the previous subsection, I demonstrated that the criticism of *nowomowa* is founded on implicit allusions to liberal democratic values and the associated linguistic norms of 'neutrality' and 'clarity'. The authors of my corpus deconstruct the ideological nature of *nowomowa* by demonstrating that its function was to legitimise the communist Party and regime in Poland. In this subsection, I will show that in this deconstruction, which serves to delegitimise the communist Party and regime, there are implicit calls for a liberal democratic regime, in which state power is 'tamed' 'for the sake of individual freedom' (Holmes 1995:18).

On occasions, calls for liberal democracy are more explicit in my corpus. Using a conditional clause, Głowiński, represents democracy as the only condition under

which *nowomowa* can disappear. His criticism of *nowomowa* implies that this regime change is desired:

> (29)'I do not know whether *nowomowa* is reformable, but I do know that i t
> can disappear only when democracy comes.
> Democracy without adjectives' (Głowiński 1990:135).

In this passage, Głowiński aims to delegitimise 'socialist democracy', criticised by Karpiński in quote (5), by explicitly calling for a liberal democratic system in Poland. Only liberal democracy, with its respect for the rule of law and ideals of liberty and equality (Laruelle 2022; Sajó, Uitz, and Holmes 2022), can be associated with calls for 'neutral' language, which can be observed in Głowińki's call for semantic precision in quote (2)[62].

A theme of political legitimation as the function of *nowomowa* is very common. According to Karpiński, for example, communist propaganda should be interpreted in the context in which it was used: by the communist Party in the People's Republic of Poland, whose aim was to conceal the failures of the system, when its claim to power was becoming increasingly contested:

> (30)'When analysing the language of political propaganda in countries ruled
> by communist parties, it is worth keeping in mind the socio-political
> background. We are talking about t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d b y t h e
> party that exercises power and shapes social
> reality. This party wants to make the public
> believe that its power is legitimate, and the reality it
> shapes – mostly the future, but also the present – is "bright"' (1984:73).

According to Karpiński, the Party's intention is to convince the public of their legitimacy. Karpiński argues that *nowomowa* is inextricably linked to the Party and communist ideology, and its goal is to procure legitimacy for the socialist-communist regime. The quotation mark implies Karpiński's disbelief in the alleged 'brightness' of the future, or indeed the present, of Poland under communism, and thus his disapproval of the kind of reality shaped by the Party.

A related theme is the role of the magical function of *nowomowa*. A few texts in my corpus recognise propaganda's potential to 'not only to describe reality, but

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[62] In one of his later essays, discussing the political language in post-communist Poland, Głowiński argues that *nowomowa* did not disappear right after democracy came. This can be interpreted as an expression of dissatisfaction with the regime changes (see 5.3.2).

also to create it' (Karpiński 1984:71–72). Głowiński represents this magical function by means of the metaphor of elements of nature ('the element of magic'; 'żywioł' in Polish), which creates an image of magic as a powerful force subduing and intimidating humans. A similar image is created by the attribution of the power of creation to 'authoritarian' words. In this image, people are represented as constrained:

> (31)'T h e e l e m e n t o f m a g i c plays a huge role in *nowomowa*. Words do not so much refer to reality, they do not so much describe it as c r e a t e i t . W h a t i s a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y s a i d b e c o m e s r e a l ' (1990:8–9).

This fundament of poststructuralist approaches to language (including CDA adopted in this thesis), which assume that language constitutes reality and is related to power/knowledge is here seen as negative. What is criticised is the use of the magical function of language as a legitimisation strategy by Party members. Głowiński implies that the ideal use of language is structuralist referentialism, which is believed to describe reality in an 'objective' way. He thus defends the citizens' right to be informed.

The theme of domination is often brought up, as well. Karpiński, for example, describes Orwell's work as an attempt

> (32)'… to record … new phenomena in the sphere of t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e o v e r m a n a n d t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f s o m e p e o p l e o v e r o t h e r s − b y l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s … He [Orwell] belonged to the witnesses of our epoch who could see the signs in it that are unpleasant for many but pointing to phenomena which in all likelihood w i l l f u l l y d e v e l o p a n d d o m i n a t e i f w e d o n ' t m a k e a n e f f o r t t o c o u n t e r a c t t h e m ' (1984:33).

Karpiński argues that the domination by some people over others achieved by linguistic means will only intensify and strengthen unless resistance movements start. This prediction can be interpreted as an attempt to mobilise people to oppose the socialist-communist regime. Karpiński's criticism of domination can, in turn, be interpreted as an implicit call for a political reality without domination, a reality of liberty, equality, legitimate representation, and popular sovereignty.

A similar mobilising function is performed by the theme of resistance to *nowomowa*, which becomes frequent in my corpus written in the 1980s in the context

of the August 1980 strikes[63]. Speaking about politicians, Głowiński pictures the use of *nowomowa* as a matter of personal choice or free will:

> (33)'… as a public figure, no speaking subject is c o n d e m n e d to *nowomowa*' (1990:92).

In this context, Głowiński discusses parody of *nowomowa* in Polish literature as a common resistance strategy (1990:43–59)[64]. Unlike the ideas of *nowomowa* devastating language or corrupting thought, which construct the receiver as passive, here a possibility and even necessity to reject *nowomowa* is discussed. Bednarczuk makes a similar point, yet again representing 'referentialism' as the ideal use of language:

> (34)'a conscious rejection of the forms and internal mechanisms of *nowomowa* … is the only way to restore the "captive words" to their proper meaning' (1985:38).

Bajerowa also argues for the necessity of 'speaking freely and individually' and 'awakening linguistic bravery' in the face of the 'impoverishment' of Polish resulting from *nowomowa* (1985:88). Once again, the liberal idea of the freedom of speech is implied.

Miodek's discourse aims to legitimise a different socio-political order. I demonstrated in the previous subsection that Miodek depicts Polish as 'the language' and a system (which is a tool for communication and an element of thought), a component of national identity, as well as a sign of eloquence, good manners, and morality ('correct' Polish). I argued that these representations are associated with nationalist and conservative values: the nation and the social order, respectively. The foundation of this order seems to be the privileged position of the elites. I will now demonstrate that Miodek justifies the use of 'correct' Polish to propose a conservative version of national identity, which is based on national values dictated

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[63] In the 1980s, Głowiński also discusses the 'crisis of propaganda', which he argues resulted from its 'unveiling' in academic conferences, literature and, perhaps most importantly, people's awareness (1990:89–108, 125–35). This crisis could be seen during the parliamentary election campaign of 1989 (1990:136–43).

[64] As argued by Głowiński, one of the 'defence reactions' against *nowomowa* was the rise of grotesque in Polish prose and poetry. One of its main characteristics was the parody of *nowomowa*, the aim of which was to criticise it, mock it, show its absurdity and effectively escape from it (Głowiński 1990:43–59).

by the elites. It is thus an alternative version of nationalism than the one proposed by the socialist-communist ideology.

A few times in his book, Miodek explicitly says that Polish belongs to 'the family of Slavic languages' (1983:7), which is based on the representation of Polish as 'the language' and 'a system':

> (35) 'We belong to the linguistic group in which the gender distinction of individual structures is strongly marked (how many languages are there in the world in which, even in the predicate – as in ours – the gender distinction is marked…?!)' (1983:173).

In line with the current trends in Polish linguistics (Bednarczuk et al. 1986, 1988; Nalepa 1968), Miodek stresses historical relatedness and typological similarity of Slavic languages in order to invoke a different, more ancient kind of belonging than those belonging to the socialist-communist bloc. Miodek represents the Polish language and its Slavic affiliation as a source of pride a few times. In this passage, Polish is exceptional because of the way gender distinctions are marked, according to Miodek.

Miodek also uses emotional language when discussing national identity, which is characteristic of nationalism as a political ideology. Talking about an overheard conversation between a mother and a few-year-old son who discussed a particular 'correctness' issue, Miodek says:

> (36) 'What is the most worrying in this family dispute is that a young Pole was misled' (1983:146).

This criticism of 'misleading a young Pole' implies is that the foundation for the promotion of 'correct' Polish is the good of the nation.

As argued in the context of quotes (15), (23), (24), (25), and (26), Miodek's idea of Polish as the foundation of the social order, implied in the representations of Polish as a system and of 'correct' Polish as a sign of eloquence, good manners, and morality, is elitist. His elitism can be illustrated by the following passage from an essay entitled *Disce puer latine!*:

> (37) 'The increasingly frequent voices of journalists defending classical languages – Greek and Latin – command my deep respect. The disappearance of universal cultural awareness, formed on the soil of these languages, can be truly worrying…' (1983:19).

In this passage, Miodek protects the interests of Polish intellectual elites by defending a social order in which the elites studied Greek and Latin. In this order, this education was only accessible to the European elites. Miodek also legitimises the privileged position of the elites 'dictating' cultural models (Bourdieu 2010) by equating the knowledge of Greek and Latin with 'cultural awareness' and calling it 'universal'. By positively portraying the education model of the past, Miodek implicitly criticises the popularisation of education, now less exclusive, which he associates with the deterioration of education standards. Latin is frequently invoked in discourses of standardisation (see 2.2.4.1).

In short, while the representations of Polish in linguistic studies of *nowomowa* and in Miodek's book sometimes overlap, my analysis in this subsection shows that the two propose and attempt to legitimise very different versions of socio-political order (see Table 5). The authors of linguistic studies of *nowomowa* promote liberal democracy, albeit mostly implicitly, by deconstructing and criticising *nowomowa* used by communist politicians as a form of 'domination', which, they argue, serves to legitimise the regime and the power of the Party. They thus idealise the democratic system as one in which only 'neutral' language is used. In other words, studies of *nowomowa* are attempts to delegitimise the socialist-communist regime in Poland. Miodek, on the other hand, implicitly promotes an order based on the value of the nation and the conservative values of the 'past' and order, whose guardians are supposed to be intellectual elites. His construction of ancient history as the model for the socio-political order proposed can be interpreted as very subtle attempt to delegitimise the socialist-communist regime.

Themes / subthemes	Key words	Language ideology
Calls for 'neutral' Polish as calls for democracy	propaganda, democracy	liberal
Nowomowa is a tool to legitimise communism	communist, party, system, power, legitimate, ideology, tool, failures	liberal
The magical function of *nowomowa*	magic, magical, element, create, authoritatively, real	liberal
Nowomowa as domination	dominate, domination	liberal
Resistance to *nowomowa*	parody, joke, rejection, linguistic bravery, condemned, freedom	liberal
'Correct' Polish as a call for conservative nationalism	Polish, language, Pole, nation	standard/nationalist
Polish as a Slavic language	Slavic, family, linguistic group	standard/nationalist
Greek and Latin as universal cultural awareness	Greek, Latin, classical languages, cultural awareness, universal	standard

Table 5. Thematic codes: Political legitimation in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (1970–1989)

4.3.3 Instructions for the ideal use of language: political freedom and linguistic authorities

Linguistic studies of *nowomowa* propose that for the ideal 'neutral' Polish to be used a system of political freedom should be introduced. I showed in the previous subsections that according to the authors of these studies, *nowomowa* is a manipulative 'quasi-language' used to legitimise the communist regime and Party in Poland. The authors demonstrate that the main principle governing *nowomowa* is 'ideological correctness'[65], which, to a large extent, is achieved by means of language. In their deconstructive analysis, the authors imply that 'neutral' language tantamount to telling the 'truth' is used in systems of political freedom, that is systems respecting freedom of information and sovereign power (and thus democratic). In this sense, my corpus can be considered a language policy proposal for the language of liberalism.

Karpiński implies that *nowomowa* is governed by the principle of 'ideological correctness' by arguing that it is used to achieve 'the monopoly of ideology and information':

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[65] The original Polish word *słuszny* is difficult to translate. It means 'appropriate', 'right', 'righteous', 'correct'. The key meaning is alignment with the promoted political ideology.

(38) 'In t o t a l i t a r i a n   r e g i m e s, political propaganda is a w a y   o f
g o v e r n i n g   t h e   s o u l s, and political authorities strive to be
ideological authorities; they strive for t h e   m o n o p o l y   o f
i d e o l o g y   a n d   i n f o r m a t i o n' (Karpiński 1984:65).

The metaphor of 'governing the souls', attributed to Joseph Stalin, represents
people (metonymically represented as 'souls') as designed to be controlled, and is
based on the belief in the relationship between language and thought. Karpiński links
nowomowa to censorship, arguing that 'in totalitarian regimes' both are used at the
service of the ruling ideology. He thus implies that in non-totalitarian (democratic)
regimes language is not used for ideological purposes, as plural ideologies co-exist.
Karpiński uses a hyperbole ('totalitarian') to describe the political regime in Poland,
which by 1980, when this essay was first written, was increasingly contested. Despite
the growing opposition indicating that at least some Poles had already distrusted the
national media, Karpiński labels the system 'totalitarian', creating a catastrophic
image of reality, most likely in order to mobilise the opposition against the system.

Quite a few texts included in my corpus are analyses of how this 'ideological
correctness' is achieved at the level of language. A few authors argue that the most
important quality of *nowomowa* is 'binarism':

(39) 'The most important procedure in *nomowowa* is t h e   i m p o s i t i o n
o f   a   c l e a r   v a l u e   s i g n; this sign, leading to transparent
polarisations, has no right to raise doubts, its goal is a firm,
unquestionable judgement. Often judgments leading to dichotomous
divisions become more important than meaning. Meanings can be
vague and imprecise, but j u d g e m e n t s   m u s t   b e   c l e a r   a n d
u n a m b i g u o u s' (Głowiński 1990:8).

Głowiński comments on the prevalence of judgement and 'clear value sign'
(positive or negative) over meaning in *nowomowa*, once again bringing up the theme
of semantic manipulations as well as the theme of semantic vagueness. According to
Głowiński, this 'imposition of a clear value sign' results in 'polarisations' and
'dichotomous divisions', that is black-and-white constructions of the world, which are
at odds with the liberal ideals of diversity, dialogue, and moderation. The desired ideal
Głowiński implies is that of semantic precision, that is the use of 'truthful' language
(making correct statements about the state of events), which, as argued, stands for

the value of political freedom, especially freedom of information and popular sovereignty.

'Emotionalisation' of language plays an important role in creating this 'binarism':

> (40) 'Names are (or rather are supposed to be) primarily carriers of emotions' (Karpiński 1984:19).

Once again, the authors of my corpus discuss the prioritisation of 'ideological correctness' over semantic precision.

A few authors argue that ideological correctness is also achieved by several linguistic devices, such as periphrases, understatements, euphemisms, and omissions, which lead to 'semantic vagueness', making the 'truth' difficult to know[66]:

> (41) '… information about an unsuccessful situation can be passed, but w i t h an ever growing degree of difficulty' (Bralczyk 1985:103).

Providing examples of linguistic devices frequently used in this context, Bralczyk argues, like Karpiński in (30), that they are used to hide the Party's failures in an attempt to divert people's attention from actual problems. Bralczyk yet again implies the ideal of 'neutral' and 'clear' language accurately representing reality, language that is 'truthful', 'apt' and 'precise', which – as can be assumed – would enable the liberal ideals of dialogue and public discussion. The association of such language with democracy is evident in examples of periphrases provided by Głowiński, who demonstrates that politicians used the phrases 'residents of cities and villages' or 'sons and daughters of the Polish nation' instead of 'citizens' or 'voters' (1990:31–37). The words 'citizens' and 'voters' are characteristic of the language of liberal democracy.

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[66] All these are rhetorical devices. Periphrasis is defined as 'a circumlocution, a roundabout expression that avoids naming something by its most direct term' (2012:1020). Understatement, or meiosis, is defined as 'a statement that depicts something important in terms that lessen or belittle it' (Jasinski 2001:550). Euphemism is 'the use of a vague term or expression in place of something more disagreeable' (Jasinski 2001:549). Omission is also known as ellipsis, that is 'the omission of a word or words' where you would normally expect them in a sentence (Jasinski 2001:547).

The theme of the persuasive function of language is often brought up, which is about making people share specific views or beliefs, often in a concealed or indirect way (Barańczak 2017:226–30):

(42) 'The intention of the administrators of political propaganda is that the language of this propaganda is primarily to perform the persuasive function: i t i s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e r e c i p i e n t s , to induce them to show solidarity with what the propagandist urges them to (in particular with the Party, with the "party line") and to condemn what should be condemned (the recipients of propaganda are to be against various "evil forces" and "specific groups")' (Karpiński 1984:72–73).

Karpiński once again implies the ideal of language only playing the informative (signifying) function, typical for the 'moralistic tradition' of 'language complaints'. He represents the persuasive function of language as a deviation, yet again making connections between *nowomowa* and the political interests of the Party.

Miodek proposes different instructions for sustaining the ideal 'correct' Polish. He argues that knowledge about 'correct' Polish should be popularised by professional linguists like himself, while Polish speakers should acknowledge linguistic authorities, such as dictionaries, grammars, and 'correctness' handbooks like his own book. While Miodek acknowledges the influence the media have on the way people speak, he expresses concerns about the media spreading the 'wrong' models.

According to Miodek, dictionaries, grammars, and 'correctness' handbooks, such as his own book, are linguistic authorities. As he argues,

(43) 'language handbooks are the best grammars of modern language – they are the best because they treat the patterns of our linguistic behaviour in a dynamic, not static way, they are future-oriented, not conservative' (1983:6–7).

Miodek thus establishes a principle of standard language ideology that there are linguistic authorities which all language users should follow. This positing of linguistic authority implies respect for power and 'accepted customary authority' (Fawcett 2020:52). Since this authority resides with intellectual, not political elites, this passage can again be interpreted as delegitimising the communist regime in Poland in a subtle and indirect way.

According to Miodek, the responsibility of professional linguists is to spread knowledge about the Polish language:

(44)'In my view, the primary responsibility of language handbooks is to spread explicit knowledge about the language. An average, ordinary user of a language – when presented with one or another solution to a correctness problem – can learn the mechanisms of how the language functions. For this reason, each phenomenon under study should be considered against the broadest possible background … From the description of the situation in contemporary language – through historical clarification – the methodological path leads to universal, general linguistic truths that allow us to detect systemic mechanisms. On their basis, it is possible to predict the future of specific forms. Behind almost every so-called correctness problem there are such general linguistic truths' (1983:6).

Miodek applies this rule in his book. He provides the readers with a host of general and historical linguistic theories to explain why certain forms are 'correct' and others are not. In this sense, his 'correctness' judgements are not arbitrary, but embedded in the scholarship on the Polish language of the time.

According to Miodek, the media are a *de facto* linguistic authority, a view consistent with standard language ideology:

(45)'…there is no doubt that the main linguistic model for modern man, which deserves special treatment in this book and in all publications on correctness, are the mass media (press, radio, television). In practice, the average member of society encounters the language of radio, television, and daily press more than the language of literature on a daily basis' (1983:8).

The role of the media as a linguistic authority is acknowledged reluctantly; Miodek suggests that this role should ideally be played by literature – another area of language use important for standardisation. At the same time, his comment constitutes an indirect conservative and elitist critique of the 'modern' broad access to knowledge and information. Since Miodek suggests that literature used to be a linguistic authority in the past, his criticism is founded on the conservative value of the 'tradition'.

In later parts of the book, he explicitly criticises mass media for spreading the 'wrong' language models:

(46)'There is no doubt that particularly socially harmful are linguistic breaches that appear in texts addressed to a mass audience' (1983:122).

According to Miodek, the use of 'incorrect' forms by mass media are 'particularly socially harmful' because of their mass influence on the way people speak. As argued (see 2.2.4.1.2), this influence is, however, problematic.

Linguistic studies of *nowowowa* and Miodek's book thus propose different instructions for the use of the 'ideal' Polish – understood differently – which correspond to two different traditions of the discourse of standardisation (see Table 6). In the former, a system of political freedom is proposed, mostly implicitly, for sustaining the ideal 'neutral' and 'clear' Polish. This is implied in the criticism of *nowomowa* as governed by 'ideological correctness', which is attributed to 'totalitarian regimes'. The authors once again prioritise the informative (signifying) function of language, disregarding other functions as 'ideological', which is characteristic of the 'moralistic tradition' of 'language complaints'. This ideal of 'neutrality' is thus also a language policy proposal for the language of liberalism. Miodek, on the other hand, explicitly promotes linguistic authorities, such as dictionaries, grammars, and 'correctness' handbooks, which, in his view, should promote 'correct' language and be respected by language users. These ideas are typical for standard language ideology. Miodek also prioritises literature as a linguistic authority over mass media, which he blames for spreading the 'wrong' language models. This, in turn, can be interpreted as a conservative and elitist idea.

Themes / subthemes	Key words	Language ideology
A system of political freedom should be introduced	ideology, information, propaganda	liberal
Nowomowa is governed by ideological correctness	totalitarian, govern, soul, monopoly, clear, value, judgement, polarisation, dichotomous	liberal
The persuasive function of *nowomowa*	persuasive, propagandist, influence, induce	liberal
Linguistic authorities should be respected	dictionary, language handbook, grammar	standard
The role of linguistic authorities	spread, knowledge, correctness problem, mechanism, linguistic truth	standard
Media as incompetent linguistic authorities	mass media, radio, television, press, mass audience, literature	standard

Table 6. Thematic codes: Instructions for the ideal use of language in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (1970–1989)

4.3.4 Summary: language ideologies (and political ideologies) in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (1970–1989)

4.3.4.1 Standard language ideology in *Rzecz o języku*

In this thematic analysis section, I have demonstrated that a lot of ideas about Polish in Miodek's book are typical for standard language ideology. Such are representations of Polish as 'the language' and 'the system', which is a tool for communication and thought, as well as representations of 'correct' Polish usage as a sign of eloquence, good manners, and morality, which aim at legitimising a social order 'dictated' by the elites. Miodek's idea that linguistic authority resides in specific persons and institutions is also typical for the discourse of standardisation. Miodek occasionally invokes purist and nationalist language ideologies to support the standard language ideology he promotes. 'Nativism' he refers to, however mild, is targeted specifically against cultural globalisation.

It should be stressed, however, that although language ideologies can be identified in Miodek's book, one can also find Miodek's attempts to strive for 'objectivity'. Firstly, his discourse is embedded in linguistics knowledge of the time, especially Saussurean structuralism (Zarycki 2022), which until now continues to be linguistic common sense (Woolard 2020). Secondly, his prescriptive approach is accompanied by both descriptive and theoretical evidence, visible, respectively, in the idea of 'social usus' in quotes (19) and (20), and in his 'methodological' approach to linguistic 'correctness' formulated in quote (44).

In Miodek's book, I have also identified all the five components of nationalism as a political ideology as defined by Freeden (1998): (1) the prioritisation of the nation; (2) its positive valorisation; (3) the desire to give it a politico-institutional expression; (4) the determinist construction of national identity through space and time; and (5) a sense of belonging and membership based on sentiment and emotion. I have also demonstrated that Miodek combines his nationalism with conservatism, promoting (1) the value of collectivity; (2) respect for power and 'accepted customary authority'; (3) disbelief in material progress; and (4) undervaluing equality (see 2.2.3.2). The components of these two political ideologies are, however, implicit in

Miodek's book. It is this combination of Miodek's nationalism and conservatism that makes it an alternative to the nationalist-socialist hybrid promoted by the Party (see 4.4.3). At variance with the Party's construction of Poland is Miodek's lack of interest in the language of politics combined with the association between the Polish language and Polishness, the representation of Polish as a Slavic language combined with an implied negative attitude to Russian, as well as the description of Poland as 'the fatherland', in which the guarantee of order is associated with the privileged position of the (especially intellectual) elites of the past, rather than the then political elites.

4.3.4.2 Liberal and standard language ideologies in linguistic studies of *nowomowa*

The language ideology underpinning linguistic studies of *nowomowa* is more difficult to classify. I have demonstrated that a few representations of Polish are characteristic of standard language ideology, especially in its 'moralistic tradition': Polish as 'the language', a tool for communication and an element of thought, which should therefore be 'neutral'. In addition, I have observed some variation among different texts included in my corpus. The socio-political order that linguistic studies of *nowomowa* promote as well as instructions for the use of the ideal 'neutral' and 'clear' language are very different to those identified in Miodek's book. Linguistic studies of *nowomowa* are explicitly political and the socio-political order they promote is explicitly founded on liberal democratic values. These studies can thus be interpreted as language policy proposals for the language of liberalism. For this reason, I argue that while the 'moralistic tradition' of 'language complaints' explicitly concerned with the language of politics may serve the purposes of standardisation, the language ideology underpinning linguistic studies of *nowomowa* is distinct from the standard language ideology. The main tenet of this liberal language ideology can be captured as 'Language, which is a tool for communication and an element of thought, should be used in a neutral way in order to introduce or sustain a system of political freedom'.

I believe the most accurate name for this language ideology is 'liberal' as it is closely aligned with liberalism as a political ideology (cf. Cameron 2006). They share

the same values and aim at legitimising the same socio-political order: a liberal democratic regime. I have demonstrated that most of the components of liberalism as defined by Fawcett (2018) are alluded to in Polish linguistic studies of *nowomowa*: (1) diversity and dialogue, (2) popular sovereignty and the rule of law, as well as (4) individual liberty, equality, and inclusivity (see 2.2.3.1). While I have not identified the value of (3) progress in my corpus, which may be because of its association with socialism and communism[67], a few quotes I have analysed can certainly be classified as 'a guide and stimulus to action' (Holmes 1995:41). Although a few representations of Polish I identified in these studies are typical for standard language ideology, they are also typical for Polish linguistic common sense of the time. I thus propose that the language ideology discernible from Polish studies of *nowomowa* is liberal and occasionally supported by standard. I am not claiming that linguistic studies of *nowomowa* included in my corpus can be considered full-fledged manifestos of liberalism, but I am arguing that components of liberal ideology provide the normative foundation for the criticism of *nowomowa* and the political regime it was used to legitimise.

Because of this close alignment with liberalism, I decided against calling the language ideology identified in linguistic studies of *nowomowa* 'anti-totalitarian'. The word 'totalitarian' is 'native' to the studies that constitute my corpus, which can be observed in quote (38). The term 'anti-totalitarian' was, in turn, used by Wierzbicka (1990) to talk about oppositional linguistic practices of Polish people in the period of communist authoritarianism. However, many scholars argue that after 1956, the regime in Poland was not totalitarian, as it was considerably more 'relaxed' than in other Soviet states (Ekiert 1996; e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996) (see 4.4.3.1). This approach, although backed up with strong empirical evidence, has been criticised as part of the political power struggle in contemporary Poland. One of the key policies of Law and Justice is the so-called 'deubekisation', which aims to eradicate the communist past from Polish history. For this reason, some Law and Justice party

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[67] Progress is, however, understood differently by liberals and socialists. 'For socialists, progress meant radical transformation of society, whereas liberals took progress for gradual improvement within society as it largely was' (Fawcett 2018).

members and its supporters openly attack scholars arguing that Poland under communism was not a totalitarian regime (Piegza 2017).

I believe that calling this language ideology 'anti-communist', or more precisely 'anti-real-socialist', is also inaccurate. These names would suggest a considerable degree of uniqueness of the ideas identified in my corpus, uniqueness attributable to the specific political regime it described. As mentioned, and as I will demonstrate later in this chapter, similar ideas can be found in the works of other authors criticising non-democratic regimes, such as Orwell or Klemperer (see 4.4.4.1.1).

While criticism of the language of *nowomowa* is key in my corpus, the language ideology underpinning it is not just against 'totalitarianism', authoritarianism, communism, or state socialism. By consistently alluding to liberal democratic values, the authors propose a language that would work well with a new political system and a different cultural model, both consistent with political and cultural liberalisms (Kubik 2020). Even if these proposals are implicit and thus not always 'robust', they are very important in my corpus.

4.4 Contextual analysis

In this section, I will develop my interpretation of the corpus by means of the four-dimensional model of contextual analysis adapted from Wodak (2007:211). I will answer the question: Why are certain language ideologies more salient than others in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of communist authoritarianism? I will thus look at the co-text (the texts in the immediate context of where my corpus was published), the genre (the inherent hybrid of academic studies and 'dissident' essays in the case of linguistic studies of *nowomowa* and the hybrid of a press column combined with an expert piece in the case of Miodek), the socio-political context of the communist regime, propaganda and its opposition in Poland at the time, as well as the intertextual and interdiscursive context (linguistic analyses of propaganda referenced in my corpus and produced in the Soviet bloc in this period as well as other standardisation practices Polish linguists were involved in at the time). This analysis is intended to support my argument about the ideological nature of the texts included in corpus.

4.4.1 Co-text: academic-cultural-oppositional-international and educational-informational-political-local

I will now consider the immediate context of the texts included in my corpus as they were published or presented. In brief, I will show that linguistic studies of *nowomowa* appeared in academic, cultural, oppositional, and/or international co-texts, while Miodek's essays and book – in the co-text of education and a local political daily.

4.4.1.1 Linguistic studies of *nowomowa*: academic, cultural, oppositional, and international co-texts

Karpiński's essays and his book *Mowa do ludu* appeared in the co-text of other oppositional texts. His essays were originally published in the oppositional press, for example, alongside other oppositional essays in *Głos* (Voice), a political monthly published in Warsaw between 1977–1981 and edited by Antoni Macierewicz and Adam Michnik, oppositional activists and prominent public figures after 1989[68]. Its reach was, however, limited to intellectual elites (Friszke 2011:137). Karpiński's essays had also been published in *Kultura* (Culture), aka *Kultura paryska* (Paris Culture), one of the most influential oppositional magazines published in the 'West' (Jeleński 2005), especially among intellectual elites, primarily preoccupied with political and cultural issues[69]. It featured regular sections on current affairs in Poland and neighbouring countries, Polish diaspora abroad (in the UK, US, Canada, Australia), major cultural events in Poland, recently published books, as well as prose and poetry[70]. The editors and authors of underground publications were subject to harassment by the communist authorities and their supporters, which is why texts were usually printed

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[68] Macierewicz was Minister of Internal Affairs (Minister Spraw Wewnętrznych) (1991–1992) and Minister of National Defence in the Law and Justice government (2015–2018), while Michnik was an MP in the Polish Sejm (1989–1991) and editor-in-chief of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, a centre-left daily, where intellectuals (for example, Jakub Karpiński and Jan Józef Lipski) and other important contemporary politicians (Ludwik Dorn, Jarosław Kaczyński, Jacek Kuroń) have published.

[69] It was published first in Rome between 1947 and 1948, and then in Paris between 1948 and 2000, that is until its editor-in-chief Jerzy Giedroyc died, as his wish was for the journal not to be continued.

[70] The authors of texts published in *Kultura* were diversified in their ancestry and views, but, as shown by Jeleński, what they shared was anti-nationalism (2005:16–19). Many of them emigrated from Poland, but some prominent non-Polish authors, such as George Orwell or T.S. Eliot, occasionally published in *Kultura*, as well.

under pseudonyms (Unger 1992). The *Mowa do ludu* collection was published by a London publisher Puls (Pulse), an influential emigree publisher of Polish literature (mainly prose and essays) in the 1980s. The collection was later reprinted as a brochure under the same title by Grupy Oporu 'Solidarni' ('Solidary' Resistance Groups) in Warsaw in 1989, which was likely to be very popular at the time due to the widespread significance of the 'Solidarity' movement. Apart from participating in demonstrations, the Groups published and distributed publications, such as leaflets, announcements, banners, and painted on murals.

I have already mentioned that some of Głowiński's essays were originally prepared as academic conference and symposium papers, journal articles or chapters in edited volumes, mostly in Poland, but also in Germany. The co-text of Głowiński's essays was thus constituted by other academic texts in linguistics and literary studies. The rest of his essays had originally been published in an oppositional social-cultural monthly of trade unions *Kultura i życie* (Culture and Life) published in Warsaw 1956–1981 and a cultural-literary monthly *Kultura Niezależna* (Independent Culture) published in Warsaw 1984–1990[71]. The collection *Nowomowa po polsku* was only published in 1990 by a publisher called PEN, printing literary texts in Warsaw in the 1990s. An expanded edition was published by the Society of Authors and Publishers of Scientific Works 'Universitas' associated with the Jagiellonian University in Kraków in 2009. The outreach of Głowiński's works were thus limited to the intellectual elites.

The co-text of the conference entitled *Nowo-mowa*, which is impossible for me to fully access, was also both academic (and thus elitist) and oppositional. But, since the conference was co-organised by the Philology Department at the Jagiellonian University and the local branch of the Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union (NSZZ) 'Solidarność', potentially the co-text of this work was also 'oppositional'. In addition, the post-conference volume was first published in Warsaw (1984a) by Wydawnictwo Społeczne KOS (Social Publisher 'Blackbird'), an independent publisher supporting underground education, and then reprinted in London (1984b) by Polonia Book Fund Ltd, a USA-sponsored oppositional emigree publisher.

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[71] In this time, 63 issues of *Kultura Niezależna* were published (Iwaszkiewicz and Rudzińska 1996:66). I have not been able to access similar data for *Kultura i życie.*

4.4.1.2 *Rzecz o języku*: educational, informational, political, and local co-text

Miodek's column was published in the co-text of local news articles in a state daily. *Słowo polskie* (Polish Word), in which Miodek published his weekly column, was a local daily published in Wrocław between 1945 and 2004, when it was renamed into *Gazeta Wrocławska* (The Wrocław Newspaper). The daily had previously appeared in Lviv (1895–1934). It was then revived in Wrocław, as many people living there had been resettled from Lviv after the Second World War. The function of *Słowo polskie* was mainly informational and particularly focused on local news. It was black-and-white. Miodek's articles were accompanied by the column's logo: its title next to an owl sitting on a pile of books. An owl is an archetype of wisdom, which is also symbolised by the pile of books. The column thus had its own 'brand' due to its regular appearance. It was also associated with knowledge, rather than local information. The co-text of Miodek's column was thus less elitist than the co-text of many texts on *nowomowa* in my corpus.

The collection of articles which had previously appeared in *Słowo polskie* was published in 1983 by Ossolineum, one of the oldest Polish cultural and scholarly institutes, a library, archive, and publisher, located in Lviv until the Second World War and then in Wrocław. The co-text of Ossolineum associates Miodek's book with national culture and history, as well as a respected publisher of scholarly texts in the arts and humanities. In this sense, it is elitist. The front cover of the book features the name of the author, the title, the publisher, and a background image of a few articles of the column. At the centre is a picture of Miodek's article entitled 'Stefan Kardynał Wyszyński' ('Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński'), a Polish cardinal considered a hero by many Poles due to his oppositional stands against the socialist-communist regime which led to his persecution (see 4.4.3.3). This is the only title that can be read in full. The back cover features a picture of Miodek, his short bio, which focuses on his academic profession and mentions the column published in *Słowo polskie*, and a logo of Ossolineum.

4.4.2   Genre analysis: hybrid genres

In this part, I will demonstrate how the texts included in my corpus are instances of hybrid genres, that is two genres simultaneously (Badran 2010; Lauerbach 2004) (see 3.3). I will argue that linguistic studies of *nowomowa* can be classified as academic publications or conference papers on the one hand, and as 'dissident' essays on the other. Miodek's essays, in turn, can be classified as a press column, but also as an academic expert piece. The hybrid nature of these publications resulted from certain features of the political regime in Poland at the time (see 4.4.3.1). According to Ossowski's classification (1983), the People's Republic of Poland, as an authoritarian system, had a monocentric socio-political order, where political life was regulated by a single centre. In such systems, the authorities try to make their values dominant in the public sphere, often making use of culture. Culture, together with academic disciplines studying it, thus become inherently political by either supporting or opposing such regimes.

4.4.2.1   Linguistic studies of *nowomowa*: academic studies and 'dissident' essays

Linguistic studies of *nowomowa* included in my corpus were originally published as academic journal articles or presented as conference papers, which I will broadly call 'academic studies'. I define science, following Popper, as the opposite of myth: 'what we call "science" is differentiated from the older myths not by being something distinct from a myth, but by being accompanied by a second-order tradition – that of critically discussing the myth' (1974:127). 'Knowledge cannot, therefore, completely escape mythology, but, in order to remain true to itself, must always and everywhere try to tame the indestructible impulse to mythologize by maintaining a distance and continuing to critique' (Kubik 2023b:37). The scientific aspect of linguistic studies of *nowomowa* can be seen in their critical and systematically analytical nature, references to the literature, the use of linguistic or rhetorical terminology, as well as the professional profiles of the authors, who were all lecturers in linguistics or related disciplines (philology, literature, or sociology) and were thus equipped with the necessary knowledge to describe and analyse the language of communist propaganda in a scientific way (see Appendix).

On the other hand, linguistic studies of *nowomowa* can also be classified as what I will call 'dissident' essays. I define a 'dissident' essay as a text intended to undermine or challenge a political regime, while being classified by the authorities as 'illegal'. Such texts combined argumentation and persuasion. The articles included in my corpus were first published in underground magazines in Poland and abroad, while the conference on *Nowo-mowa* was co-organised by NSZZ 'Solidarność', the main oppositional body in Poland at the time. What makes linguistic studies of *nowomowa* inherently political is also their very topic. By critically discussing the language of political propaganda of the current regime that disallowed any public criticism of itself, they are inherently politically engaged. Finally, the 'dissident' nature of linguistic studies of *nowomowa* resulted from the authorities' attempt to control every sphere of public life. By publishing and presenting their academic studies in oppositional media and at oppositional conferences, often under pseudonyms (especially in the 1970s), the authors, who were often involved in oppositional activities, engaged in a courageous act of 'everyday rebellion' (Scott 1990). From the perspective of the regime, their publications were illegal and thus they could face adverse consequences. As a consequence, these are not 'purely' scientific texts, characterised by academic rigour and striving for 'objectivity', but also inherently political essays.

4.4.2.2 *Rzecz o języku*: a press column and academic expert pieces

Miodek's book is based on an expert press column he had published in the official press. His articles were regular pieces on language-related issues, addressed to the general public. However, Miodek's university affiliation makes him an academic expert, which gives the column a scientific component. Similarly, his book belongs to the genre of popular science in that it was written by a scholar (which is very prominent in Miodek's bio on the back cover), but not addressed to an academic audience.

I have mentioned that Miodek does not discuss any political issues explicitly in his column. However, like in the case of studies of *nowomowa*, Poland's monocentric social order at the time makes Miodek's column political. It was published in an official

daily, which was subject to censorship and only allowed texts supporting or at least not undermining the regime in any obvious way. While unlike linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, Miodek's column did not undermine the regime in an obvious way, it also did not support it. This lack of support for the authoritarian regime means that Miodek's column can be interpreted as subtly oppositional.

4.4.3 The socio-political context: People's Republic of Poland (1970–1989)

In the following section, I will discuss the socio-political context in which the texts included in my corpus were written. Situating my corpus in the context of the nature of the communist authoritarian regime, communist propaganda, and anti-communist opposition, I will develop my argument about the ideological nature of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in this period.

4.4.3.1 Communist authoritarianism

The People's Republic of Poland was a non-democratic state. It was one of the Central-Eastern European states in the Soviet bloc, influenced by the USSR, but not part of it. For this reason, for example, Russian was not spoken in Poland, but it was a compulsory school subject right after the invasion of the Red Army in 1944 (Figarski 2008). As argued by Nowak (1991), the communist elites strived to control simultaneously the economic (the means of production), political (the means of coercion), and cultural/spiritual sphere (the means of indoctrination). The dominant ideology was a hybrid of communism and socialism (Kubik 1994:71).

Communism was first outlined by Marx and Engels as a utopia of 'an eventual communist society'; 'a future of universal freedom and equality, underwritten by shared control of the means of production' (Calhoun 2002; cf. Marx and Engels 1978). In 20th-century Europe (but not only Europe), communism was known as 'actually existing socialism', which 'resembled Marx's transitional stage to communism, characterized by the "dictatorship of the proletariat"' (Calhoun 2002; cf. Marx and Engels 1978). This is why the political system in the Soviet bloc is often described as 'state socialism' (Bunce 1999; Verdery 1996). According to Kołakowski, communism in 20th-century Europe originated from 'socialist ideas, workers' movements, a

gigantic accident which was World War I' and 'was a degenerated offshoot of the Enlightenment' in that it 'presented itself as the victory of reason over superstition, the victory of a rational thought that knows how to order the world' (1993:13). The communist ideology evolved, but its two stable tenets included the idea that communism is 'historically inevitable': it was 'to inculcate in people's minds a sense of hopelessness and to plunge them into apathy'; and the promise of security at the expense of freedom: 'Communism was to give people the sense that they did not have to think too much, to assure them that somebody at the top knew how to get things done' (Kołakowski 1993:15).

In my corpus, the political regime in Poland is referred to as 'totalitarian'. It is, however, problematic in light of current research. Linz and Stepan argue that despite efforts to install a totalitarian regime in the People's Republic of Poland, it was the most 'relaxed' post-totalitarian system in the post-Soviet bloc[72]. For this reason, they developed a specific term to describe it: 'communist authoritarianism' (1996:261). According to Linz and Stepan,

> 'Poland always had a significant de facto degree of societal pluralism … this de facto societal pluralism increased the ability of parts of civil society to resist the regime's ideology and somewhat checked the will of the aspirant totalitarian regime to impose intense mobilization, especially in the ideological area' (1996:255–56).

Ekiert (1996) makes a similar point, arguing that the success of the opposition in Poland in 1989 can be attributed to the fact that the regime was less oppressive than in other states of the bloc, which, according to Ekiert, was a result of the 'thaw' of 1956. After the death of Bolesław Bierut, who implemented the Stalinist system in Poland, Władysław Gomułka, first secretary between 1965–1970, adopted a less rigid approach and tried to follow a 'Polish way to socialism'.

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[72] Linz and Stepan define 'totalitarianism' as a regime that 'has eliminated almost all pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism as a unified, articulated, guiding utopian ideology, has intensive and extensive mobilization, and has a leadership that rules, often charismatically, with undefined limits and great unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and nonelites alike' (1996:40). They stress, however, that they treat 'the concept of a totalitarian regime as an ideal type' (1996:40). Similarly, Kołakowski argues that '[t]otal totalitarianism—absolute control of all aspects of life – is impossible' (1993:14). According to Linz and Stepan, post-totalitarianism differs from totalitarianism 'on at least one key dimension, normally some constraints on the leader' (1996:42).

In the ideology of the ruling party in Poland, as in the rest of the Soviet bloc, there was an inherent tension between internationalism and nationalism (Verdery 1991). The Party often employed nationalist discourse in order to legitimise their power. Kubik argues that the strategy of communists was 'partially remodeling the existing … n a t i o n a l [emphasis mine – ASL] culture to create a discourse that was "socialist in form and national in content"' (1994:3). The version of nationalism that was promoted by the communist authorities was, however, relatively 'mild'. Such 'mild' nationalism was adopted by Władysław Gomułka before the relaxation of the regime in the early 1970s, and by Edward Gierek in the 1970s. Gierek 'espoused and aggressively propagated a more inclusive and liberal version of Polish nationalism, socialist patriotism' (Kubik 2003:336). His version of national identity was 'relatively open, tolerant, and devoid of negative images of other nations (particularly anti-Semitism)', and 'although it promoted a version of Polishness that was associated with socialism, it also emphasized the European roots of Polish culture' (Kubik 2003:336). Gierek founded his communist message on what could be described as 'national pride', which can be seen, for example, in Gierek's tourist policy, based on the promotion of Kraków, the major cultural centre and the symbol of the 'glorious past' (Majowski 2008). Gierek's main counter-candidate for the position of the first secretary, Mieczysław Moczar, promoted a nationalist-communist hybrid that was founded on the 'aggressive exclusivistic version of nationalism' (Kubik 2003:336). Because it was Gierek who eventually came to power in December 1970, Moczar's version of nationalism was never particularly prominent in the Polish official discourse of the early 1970s, 'Polish communists entered a path of social-democratization', and a nationalist-communist (socialist) hybrid 'founded on a mild version of Polish nationalism' was proposed (Kubik 2003:342)[73]. Over time, nationalism was reclaimed by oppositional groups: one associated with the Movement for Defence of Human and Civil Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela, or ROBCiO), and the other,

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[73] Artwińska (2009) discusses the strategies of 'appropriation', or enculturation of the Polish Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz by the communist authorities in the first two decades of communism (and a similar 'appropriation' of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in East Germany), as part of the attempt to establish the 'foundation myth'. Artwińska shows that these enculturation strategies took place in different spheres: politics (anniversary ceremonies, monuments etc.), university (supporting Marxist and socialist interpretations of Romanticism), and literature (promoting socialist pictures of Mickiewicz in contemporary poetry).

which gradually gained more and more influence, with the Catholic Church and related oppositional bodies (Śliwa 2000). The version of nationalism promoted in the official discourse was thus contested, and in effect right-wing nationalism tends to be associated with the opposition.

The last two decades of state socialism was the time of increasingly powerful challenges to the communist power (Andrzejewski 1987; Kamiński 2003; Rothschild 2008; Zaremba 2021), and an intensified polarisation between the Party and the populace, which eventually led to the collapse of the regime (Kubik 1994). In March 1968, Polish students joined by some academics first in Warsaw and then in many major universities in the country protested against censorship. As a culmination of a severe economic crisis in the 1960s workers' strikes took place in Baltic cities in December 1970. The protests of March 1968 and December 1970 were brutally suppressed by the party-state and its supporters faced severe repressions. However, they were followed by the trend-reversing change at the top of the pyramid of power and the significant relaxation of the regime in the 1970s. This trend-reversing change is evident in my data: it was not until 1970 that oppositional texts discussing the language of communist propaganda were first published and the publication of sources promoting 'correct' Polish accelerated.

The relative 'relaxation' of the communist authoritarian regime in Poland is also evident in the relative freedom of expression in Poland compared to other Soviet countries and less severe forms of repressions of the opposition, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Over the course of time, the severity of repressions as well as specific strategies of handling the opposition varied, depending on the ever-changing political situation (Kamiński 2003). Overall, there was no one specific strategy, and the tactics ranged from 'attempts to terminate the opposition to attempts to its at least partial incorporation into the existent system'. The reason was the 'clear tension between the desire to go back to the Marxist ideal and the fear of an escalation of the oppositional movements' (Kamiński 2003:32). From December 1970, the way the authorities penalised the opposition sent 'a clear message that any attempt at serious oppositional activity will be severely punished, but the PZPR is ready to forgive the "mistakes of the past" and create opportunities for a "new start" for ex-oppositionists' (Kamiński 2003:11). As Andrzejewski put it, 'after an attempt to

suppress the spreading oppositional movement in its first phase (the death of Pyjas and a wave of arrests in 1977), the authorities took actions that were aimed at harassing or making the life of the members of the movement difficult, rather than at its complete termination (which, technically speaking, was arguably still possible at the time)' (1987:224)[74]. What this meant was that the measures used by the authorities included dismissing from jobs, expelling from universities, 24-or 48-hour detentions, interrogations, searches, but also assault and battery, kidnapping, defamations, blackmailing (anonymous letters, phone calls with threats) etc., all of which are 'less severe' than persecution, imprisonment or armed termination of oppositional groups (2003:14).

4.4.3.2 Propaganda in the People's Republic of Poland (1970–1989)

In this part, I will provide a definition of propaganda based on the extensive literature and reconstruct the way propaganda worked in the People's Republic of Poland based on the literature on communist propaganda in Poland and in the Soviet bloc. The aim of my discussion of propaganda is to situate the texts included in my corpus in the socio-political context in which they were written and to put some of the ideas about *nowomowa* I identified in them into question. Where relevant, I will make connections between how communist propaganda is discussed in the extensive literature on the subject and in my data.

There are numerous studies of propaganda. Some attempt to develop a general theory of propaganda (e.g., Dobek-Ostrowska, Fras, and Ociepka 1999; Patrick 2013), some focus on propaganda in liberal democracies (Stanley 2015)[75], and some look at

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[74] Karpiński (1987) shows that in the Stalinist years even though censorship was strict and some professors were expelled from universities for 'expounding "bourgeoise" scholarship' (1987:47), they were still allowed to work on approved topics (Władysław Tatarkiewicz), or they decided to continue their work on 'bourgeoise' topics knowing it would not be published (Roman Ingarden). Similarly, some poets and artists who did not promote socialist realism decided not to exhibit their work (for example, Tadeusz Kantor) or publish their poetry (for example, Zbigniew Herbert). Many students and professors involved in the March 1968 protests against censorship were expelled from universities by the authorities, but in the aftermath of the 1970 workers' protests independent journals, publishing houses and groups proliferated, despite a few arrests of activists and confiscations of printing presses (Karpiński 1987:51–53).

[75] Focusing on the USA, Stanley argues that in the 'West' propaganda is about 'the use of democratic language to mask an antidemocratic worldview' (2015:25), and it thus 'poses an existential threat to

totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Mussolf (2012), for example, studies propaganda in Nazi Germany, Sériot (1985), Thom (1989), and Zaslavsky and Fabris (1982) look at propaganda in the USSR, Fidelius (1998) explores the language of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and Konstantinov (1990) discusses 'Newspeak' in communist Bulgaria. Many studies of the language of the Polish United Workers' Party and communist state media have also been published after 1989 (e.g., Głowiński 2016; Kotański 2003; Ligarski and Łatka 2020; Semków 2004). In addition, there are comparative studies of propaganda in different parts of the world across time (Lasswell, Lerner, and Speier 1979, 1980a, 1980b). Most of these studies are founded on liberal values and are thus critical of propaganda.

My definition of propaganda draws on Lasswell's, who defines it as 'the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols' (1927b:627). Lasswell stresses the semiotic dimension of propaganda ('manipulation of significant symbols') but he is also aware of its institutional-organisational aspect, as indicated by the use of the word 'management'. I build on Lasswell's definition, concluding that propaganda has a political function of legitimising a specific configuration of power, and adding the idea that propaganda messages are uniform, although accuracy is usually not the concern of the propagandists.

To support my reconstruction of propaganda in the People's Republic of Poland, I will look at classified internal documentation of censorship and propaganda, the Main Office for the Control of the Press, Publications, and Public Performances (Główny Urząd Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk, or GUKPPiW), particularly censorship instructions[76]. Some of this documentation was published in *Wielka*

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liberal democracy' (Stanley 2015:27). Stanley further argues: 'The problem raised for liberal democracy by propaganda is whether the most central expression of its value, liberty (realized as the freedom of speech), makes liberal democracy fundamentally unstable' (2015:29). Depending on whether propaganda serves 'supporting' or 'eroding' political ideals, Stanley distinguishes between two types of propaganda: supporting (defined as a 'contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to increase the realization of those very ideals by either emotional or other nonrational means') and undermining (defined as a 'contribution to public discourse that is presented as an embodiment of certain ideals, yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals') (2015:52–53). It is the 'eroding' type of propaganda that poses a threat to democracy, by ultimately undermining the ideals of liberty and equality.

[76] In her analysis of the language of censorship documents from 1974–1976 (instructions and other materials), Grudzińska-Gross (1981) argues that this language illustrates the world of censors as bland, uncharacteristic, devoid of any specified ideology except for the subordination to the authorities. The

Księga Cenzury PRL ('The Big Book of the People's Republic of Poland Censorship'), which is a collection of classified censors' documents smuggled to Sweden from communist Poland by an ex-censor Tomasz Strzyżewski (2015), first published in English translation as *The Black Book of Polish Censorship* (Curry 1984). The publication has had many editions, the latest of which is from 2015 published in Polish as *Wielka księga cenzury PRL w dokumentach*.

More data can be accessed in the archives, especially the recently opened Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw, which has a substantial collection of internal GUKPPiW documentation. I did fieldwork in this archive in December 2022. I will discuss this documentation in this section to facilitate my analysis. This documentation is, however, not included in my corpus. The types of data I saw included censor instructions and instructional notes, updates, information on annulment of some of these instructions, information on censorship interventions in articles published in state presses, protocols from Party conventions, as well as 'shredding protocols' ('protokoły zniszczenia'), which provide evidence that classified GUKPPiW documentation was destroyed to make sure nobody outside of GUKPPiW accessed it.

Finally, I will consider whether there is a language ideology in communist propaganda.

4.4.3.2.1 Communist propaganda and the state apparatus

The first component of my definition of propaganda is institutional: propaganda is supported by whole organisations, and often the whole power apparatus, in particular the media (Dobek-Ostrowska et al. 1999; Patrick 2013). In contrast to the authors of linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, I argue that while propaganda may be characterised by typical linguistic qualities, it is not just the question of language. Discussing the relationship between language and power more broadly, Fairclough (2015) argues that mass media have 'hidden power'. The groups in power need to

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censors play only a servant role to the regime. Grudzińska-Gross also argues that this language is characterised by dichotomic simplicity and clarity, which shows that censorship documents assume the reader to be, as she bluntly puts it, 'stupid', unable to make their own judgement. She calls it the 'paternalistic' attitude of the authorities to the society.

work closely with the media as well as other state institutions for propaganda to have a chance to be effective. According to Stanley, propaganda is 'a multidecade process that involves seizing power and therefore control of the information flow, in the form of media and schools' (2015:5). In other words, propaganda is just one of many 'mechanisms of control' (Stanley 2015:125–77). Propaganda exists in all political systems, although it varies in form and intensity. According to Kubik, '[t]he major difference between political propaganda in Communist countries and in Western democracies is not to be found in the political languages used by these systems but in the state monopoly of the means of communication and strict preventive state censorship in the East and its lack in the West' (1994:42; cf. Patrick 2013).

In the People's Republic of Poland, propaganda promoting socialist-communist ideology and regime was part of the whole state apparatus. All state (official) media were controlled by the communist authorities: the press[77], the only two TV channels of the Polish TV (Telewizja Polska, TVP – 1952–1989)[78], and the three channels of the Polish Radio (Polskie Radio)[79]. In this time, the language of propaganda dominated all the public domain, while '[o]ther forms of language are eliminated or contained—they appear in elite publications and are cultivated only in the private lives of citizens' (Kubik 1994:48).

While there was very strict censorship during the Partitions and some censorship is the so-called Second Republic of Poland (1918–1939)[80], when Poland became part of the Soviet bloc, censorship and propaganda in accordance with communist ideology were in place. On 22 July 1944, the Polish Committee of National Liberation passed a decree that granted democratic liberties, including the freedom of speech, but stressed that civil freedoms could not be used 'to serve the enemies of democracy' (Romek 2015:11). On 5 July 1946, GUKPPiW became active and censorship was officially imposed (Romek 2015:12–13). Since then, every printed

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[77] Some of the most important examples of communist press include dailies *Trybuna Ludu* and *Życie Warszawy*.
[78] Until 1970, where the channel TVP2 was launched, only one channel existed. While TVP1 focused on politics, TVP2 was meant to broadcast content primarily to do with culture and entertainment.
[79] Channel One of the Polish Radio was launched in 1926 and is predominantly about the news. Channel Two was launched in 1949 and its content is more cultural (literature, philosophy, and music).
[80] The term 'First Republic of Poland' is traditionally used to reference the period of the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland (from the mid 15th century until the Partitions).

text, including bus tickets and product labels, had to be approved by GUKPPiW (Curry 1984; Kubik 1994; Strzyżewski 2015). Many researchers argue that apart from GUKPPiW, the whole apparatus of the Polish state and the Party actively participated in implementing propaganda, including social organisations, schools and other institutions (Kamiński 2004; Romek 2015). Romek, for example, lists Naczelny Zarząd Wydawnictw (The Chief Management of Publishers), Ministerstwo Kultury i Sztuki (Ministry of Culture and Art), Radiokomitet (The Radio Committee), Naczelna Rada Programów Filmowych Telewizji (The Chief Council of TV Film Programmes), the customs, controlling what was transported from abroad, and even libraries, which only stored 'ideologically correct' resources (2015:21–22). Typically for non-democratic regimes, the control of information was equal in importance to the police or the armed forces (Sosin 1986:3).

In addition, propaganda was spread not only by linguistic means in the People's Republic of Poland. Kubik, for example, demonstrates the role of ceremonies and rituals in the official public discourse in promoting the official ideology in the 1970s (1994:35–63). Lewandowski (2015) discusses the importance of posters, while Dąbrowska (1991) examines caricatural images of enemies in satirical magazines (*Szpilki* ['Pins'] in Poland and *Ludas Matyi* in Hungary). The communist government also used popular culture to convey the 'right' message. Kotański (2003), for example, talks about propaganda in communist cinema and TV. Barańczak distinguishes four persuasive strategies the communist authorities adopted in popular culture in the 1970s: the emotionalization of reception, which leads to unreflective perception, which Karpiński comments on in (40); creating an illusion of the 'complete agreement' between language and the world by presupposing some sort of 'us' between the sender and the receiver and constructing some 'them' in opposition, discussed by Karpiński in (42); the simplification of valorisation, or a simple axiological orientation ('black and white' view of the world), observed by Głowiński in (39); and alternative-less reception, that is one-sided representation which leads to exemption from decision, which Karpiński observes in (30) (2017:231–37)[81]. Barańczak argues that the

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[81] The list is not exhaustive. One could think of, for example, 'catchiness' of slogans Barańczak discusses later in his book (2017:250–77), or selectivity of information, observed by Bralczyk in (41).

regime controlled popular culture by creating the illusion of affluence, and effectively compensating for the omnipresent experience of shortages (2017:190–204).

4.4.3.2.2 Communist propaganda and the uniformity of messages

Because propaganda is supported by whole organisations, messages spread across all involved media and institutions are uniform. To put it simply, all propaganda channels are instructed to represent a particular topic in the exact same way.

In the People's Republic of Poland, all propaganda channels conveyed the same messages. Communist propaganda consistently talked about the 'good socialist East' and the 'evil capitalist West' (Kubik 1994:63). In the Gierek era (1970–1980), for example, state media consistently represented Polish society as ideal, one that was 'harmoniously organized without any conflicts between its segments or between the whole and its parts (individuals), constantly developing and growing, securing the best possible conditions for the unlimited and universal development of individual people, and secular' (Kubik 1994:64). The People's Republic of Poland was represented as an ideal political community, 'socialist' (but also 'nationalist'), that was ethnically and culturally homogeneous (Kubik 1994:64–66). The phrase 'propaganda of success' is often used to describe the 'Gierek's decade' (Kubik 1994:31–74).

All state media portrayed specific events in the same way. Goreczna (2007) shows how the USSR invasion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1968) was consistently described using the rhetoric of 'friendship', 'fraternity', 'socialist family', 'international help', and 'international unity' in Polish press. Gogol (2003) compares propaganda messages about March 1968, December 1970 and August 1980, showing that March 1968 protesters were described by means of 'antizionist' and 'revisionist' language (cf. Dąbrowska 1991; Osęka 1999; Sęczyk 2009), December 1970 was represented as a 'renaissance of the relationship between the working class and the party', and August 1980 as support for 'socialist democracy' and 'working self-governments'. Dmochowski (2003) illustrates how all local newspapers in the so-called seacoast 'Tricity' (Gdańsk, Gdynia, Sopot) were instructed to portray the August 1980 protests in the same way. Kubik emphasises the strategy of careful selection and

diminishment in the official portrayal of the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1979 (1994:140–41).

The consequence of the uniformity of messages is what the authors of my corpus identified as 'ritualisation', 'blandness', or 'identicalness' in quotes (2) and (4). The synchronic uniformity of propaganda messages is not, however, tantamount to its diachronic 'stability'. Many scholars of communist propaganda argue that it differed in specific countries and evolved over time (Weiss 2000; Yurchak 2006).

4.4.3.2.3 Communist propaganda and the legitimation of communist power

The third component of my definition of propaganda concerns its political function which is performed by semiotic or discursive means. In other words, the ultimate goal of propaganda is legitimation of a specific configuration of power by promoting specific political ideologies (Dobek-Ostrowska et al. 1999:47–49). Occasionally, the goal of propaganda may be to mobilise people around a particular political goal. Bernays, for example, defines 'propaganda' as 'a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to the enterprise, idea or group' (2005:25). For this reason, propaganda is very important in times of war (Wilke 2008)[82].

The authors of linguistic studies of *nowomowa* are correct in deconstructing its ultimate goal to be legitimation of the communist regime (see 4.3.2) through the promotion of socialist-communist ideology, which is achieved largely by means of language (see 4.3.3). Kozłowski (1987) also argues that the key criterion for censors was not 'the truth', but 'rightness', which is characteristic for authoritarian regimes. A few justifications for specific censorship instructions in GUKPPiW documentation show that the Party intended to present the people only with information that was compatible with this ideology:

> 'In order to prevent the emergence of s o c i a l l y h a r m f u l m o o d s in some environments' (10, 2/1102/0/7.2.11/3519).

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[82] In this context, Lasswell distinguishes four objectives of propaganda: '(1) To mobilize hatred against the enemy; (2) To preserve the friendship of allies; (3) To preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure the co-operation of neutrals; (4) To demoralize the enemy' (1927a:195).

'There is a fear that reading [this book] may e v o k e a m b i g u o u s r e a c t i o n s i n s o m e r e a d e r s , n o t a l w a y s t h e m o s t favourable from the point of view of the goals of political education of society' (7, 2/1102/0/7.2.11/3523).

Some censorship decisions were based on the fact that texts in question were 'against the objectives of propaganda' (173–174, 2/1102/0/7.2.11/3523), created 'undesirable atmosphere from the perspective of propaganda' (163, 2/1102/0/7.2.11/3524), 'bad purport' (126, 2/1102/0/7.2.11/3523) or 'harmful political purport' (159, 2/1102/0/7.2.11/3523).

In line with the socialist-communist ideology was Poland's close relationship with the USSR. GUKPPiW documentation shows that no information about any economic cooperation between Poland and 'Western' countries was allowed in the official discourse:

'Information about licenses purchased by Poland in capitalist countries must be eliminated from the mass media' (Strzyżewski 2015:71).

In this way, the authorities attempted to construct an image of cooperation between the states of the Soviet bloc.

Some of the censor instructions I saw in GUKPPiW documentation banned any satirical or anecdotal content about products promoted by the regime, for example, the car model Fiat 126p, which was produced in Poland since 1973:

'We would like to point out that the publication of satirical cartoons and the dissemination of jokes about the Fiat 126p by the press have a n e g a t i v e s o c i a l o v e r t o n e . Ridiculing the adopted automotive programme i n d i r e c t l y d i s c r e d i t s i n t h e e y e s o f t h e p u b l i c n o t o n l y t h e s p e c i f i c e c o n o m i c d e c i s i o n s t a k e n , b u t a l s o t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f l o n g - t e r m e c o n o m i c c o n c e p t s ' (18, 2/1102/0/7.2.11/3518).

The Party clearly attempted to create a positive or even perfect image of everything they did, and no negative opinion about it was allowed in the public space[83].

Censorship did not allow information about problems, either:

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[83] Macyra (2019) demonstrates how statistical data were manipulated by *Statistics Poland* (Główny Urząd Statystyczny, GUS) to show that Poland was an 'economic superpower' under Gierek's regime.

'In order to prevent the emergence of socially harmful moods in some circles, the editors-in-chief received a recommendation from the Press and Publishing Department of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party to prevent the printing of alarming information about influenza, eliminating e.g. information about the occurrence of influenza in other countries, and in the case of information about influenza outbreaks in Poland, it is limited to the content provided by the Chief Sanitary Inspector of the Ministry of Health' (10, 2/1102/0/7.2.11/3519).

This is especially the case when the government may be held accountable for such problems:

'No information may be published about the catastrophe in the "Katowice" mine, in which four miners died' (Strzyżewski 2015:112).

Censors thus consistently avoided information about failures of the regime, which Karpiński observed in (30). This necessitated the use of certain linguistic devices identified by the authors of my corpus, for example, by Bralczyk in (41). For this reason, communist propaganda in the People's Republic of Poland may at least partly be classified as an instance of 'disinformational' or the so-called 'black' propaganda (Dobek-Ostrowska et al. 1999:30, 34–35).

Discreditation of political 'enemies' is yet another attempt to legitimise the Party and the regime, which is related to 'Manichean' binarism discussed by Głowiński in (39)[84]. Dąbrowska (1991) distinguishes between internal and external enemies in communist propaganda in the People's Republic of Poland. The external enemy was generally the 'non-East, while the internal enemy was anyone who did not support the communist regime, mainly protesters[85]. Niwiński (2004) illustrates how official discourse constructed protesters as 'hooligans', 'dishonest people', 'constructors of plots', a 'global' threat to 'besieged' Poland etc., it undermined their rationale as purely 'emotional', and emphasised the protesters' connections with social and political groups with negative connotations, such as bourgeoise,

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[84] 'Enemies' are often dehumanised in propaganda (Patrick 2013).

[85] Native Poles under the influence of 'evil' external powers were represented as party internal and party external enemies. Poles living abroad, especially in the USA were described as 'instruments of American imperialists. Emigree editors were discredited in the press with the same strategy of showing their connections with Western intelligence services, especially the CIA. Sowiński (2019), for example, shows the case of Andrzej Chilecki, the founder of an important publishing house in the USA, *Polonia Book Fund*, which transported books to Poland. On the other hand, a positive image of a Polish businessman living abroad yet investing in his country was propagated in the 1970s (Cenckiewicz 2004).

nationalists, capitalists, liberals, Stalinists, and Jews. Mazur (2003), for example, shows how the workers on strike of 1976 as well as members of the Workers' Defence Committee were pictured as enemies by the official press[86]. A hostile propaganda campaign was run against Radio Free Europe (Radio Wolna Europa) and Radio Liberty (Radio Swoboda), the most popular, and continuously jammed, radio stations established in the USA and funded by the Congress (Grabowska 2002). The stations broadcasted to 23 countries in 27 languages, including Polish, from its headquarters in Munich. The Catholic Church was also subject to hostile propaganda, for example, against the bishop signatories of a conciliatory letter to German bishops in 1965 (the millennium of Christianity in Poland) (Knyspel-Kopeć 2020), and so was the 'Solidarity' movement in the 1980s (Miłosz, Lipski, and Grudzińska-Gross 1984).

4.4.3.2.4 Communist propaganda and constraints on deliberation

Lasswell distinguishes between propaganda and deliberation, which he defines as 'the search for the solution of a besetting problem with no desire to prejudice a particular solution in advance' (1927b:628). I have argued that deliberation is associated with liberalism and effectively with democratic regimes, where the expected role of media and state institutions is to provide citizens with accurate information (see 2.2.3.1). Propaganda constrains deliberation as a consequence of its political function and the associated disregard for reporting accuracy. An objective account of facts is of course impossible, but there are a number of techniques and strategies one can adopt to convey information that is as accurate as possible. According to Patrick, 'dispensing truth, facts, logic and science' is one of the 'commandments' of propaganda (2013:156). For this reason, propaganda is often talked about as 'biased' or 'misleading' information (Wilke 2008:2) or more bluntly as 'deception' (Stanley 2015:11). However, Stanley argues against the commonly held beliefs that 'a propagandistic claim must be false' and that 'a propagandistic claim must be made insincerely' (2015:41).

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[86] Eisler (2004) shows the overall similarity of understatements, dissemblance, and slander of protesters in protests of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980.

The authors of my corpus often point out, in quotes (2), (8), (31), and (34), that the informative function of language is not the main concern of the communist authorities. The persuasive function of language is prioritised over 'signifying', as argued in quote (42). For this reason, the word 'manipulation' in quote (3), or even 'untruth' (Kozłowski 1987) is used to talk about communist propaganda. The authors of my corpus do not, however, consider the reception of propaganda, or how effective it was. Drawing on Bloch's theory of the effectiveness of the establishment of ideology, Kubik argues that for an ideology to be effective in its main function of putting forth legitimacy claims, its promoters need to strike the right balance between defying certain elements of everyday knowledge (condition of successful mystification) and confirming others (condition of credibility) (1994:147). In the Polish People's Republic, the growing discrepancy between the reality and its image in the official discourse led to the intensifying violence done to the condition of credibility and thus significant increase of distrust in the authorities in late 1970s (Zaremba 2004).

Since propaganda is not concerned with reporting accuracy, 'propaganda' as the term tends to be associated with totalitarian and authoritarian states and has thus gained negative connotations in the 'West', where a new term 'public relations' was developed to replace it (Wilke 2008)[87]. In the 'West', we can thus talk about a 'secondary' meaning of the term 'propaganda'. For instance, Gary (1999) shows that 'propaganda' tends to be attributed to our opponents, while what 'we' do tends to be seen as 'communication that is free'. Esser notes that '[t]he demonization of spin is to be understood as a counter-strategy of journalists to prove their independence and legitimacy' (2008:4786). In has thus been noted that 'Western' criticism of propaganda is also ideological, but it tends to be associated with liberalism. I have demonstrated that linguistic studies of *nowomowa* are also embedded in liberal ideology and their criticism of *nowomowa* is a way of criticising the communist

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[87] Wilke also points out that in the 19th century, 'propaganda' had a positive meaning adopted by the European labour movement, which in turn is one of the reasons why it became central for communist ideology. Kamińska–Szmaj (2017) argues that the language of the communist propaganda was deeply rooted in the long tradition of the language of the Polish Left, which was, however, used or abused by the communist authorities in order to gain and maintain power. She demonstrates how this propaganda led to the development of negative connotations of the word 'lewy' ('left'), lewica ('the left') and the like, which was key under the rule of Law and Justice.

regime. My corpus thus shows that a strategy of attributing propaganda to political opponents is used not only in the 'West'. It was also used in 'Eastern' Europe as a resistance strategy under communism.

4.4.3.2.5 Communist propaganda: recap

The analyses presented in this part confirmed that the propaganda practiced by the ruling party in the People's Republic of Poland had all four qualities assumed in my definition: the dominant role of the state apparatus, uniformity of messages, legitimation of communist power, and constraints on deliberation. My reconstruction of communist propaganda in Poland shows that linguistic studies of *nowomowa* are important contributions to the study of communist propaganda. They correctly argue that its main function is legitimisation of communist power by promoting socialist-communist ideology and identify linguistic devices used for persuasion and contributing to the uniformity of comprehensive propaganda messages. Two ideas I identified in my corpus are, however, problematic: that of propaganda being only the question of language and that of manipulating the citizens. As for the former, apart from Karpiński, who in quote (30) mentions the fact that the Party 'exercises power and shapes social reality', the dominant idea in my corpus is that propaganda can be sufficiently explained by uncovering its linguistic principles. As for the latter, while the communist authorities were indeed not concerned with reporting accuracy, their propaganda stopped being effective when the picture of reality it presented became too divorced from the commonsensical understandings of what was going on, which challenges the idea of 'manipulation' as elitist.

4.4.3.2.6 Language ideologies in communist propaganda

I will now consider whether the semiotic dimension of communist propaganda in the People's Republic of Poland contained not only a political ideology (communism-socialism) promoted in order to legitimise the regime, but also a language ideology as defined in this thesis (see 2.2.4). I will argue that the way communist authorities used language can be interpreted as an implicit language

ideology, whose main tenet may be captured as 'Language can shape people's worldviews and attitudes, legitimising the desired political regime'.

GUKPPiW documents show that although, understandably, the communist authorities' control of information and use of propaganda was not an explicit strategy expressed publicly, and in fact, they wanted censorship to be as invisible as possible (Romek 2015:14–23), they were open about their information and language policies in instructions to the state apparatus. At times, censorship instructions were accompanied by comments, which made this intention very explicit, for example 'This provision is strictly confidential' (Strzyżewski 2015:84), 'The content of this provision may not be transferred to editorial offices' (Strzyżewski 2015:90), 'This provision is restricted for the censors only' (Strzyżewski 2015:93, 94). Apart from instructions on *what* can be said and *how* (see 4.4.3.2.3), which show that information provided to citizens had to be compatible with the communist-socialist ideology, in GUKPPiW documentation, one can occasionally detect components of implicit language ideology in statements about *why* some things can or cannot be said.

For instance, in a section on international relations between the People's Republic of Poland and other countries, among numerous instructions on how specific countries can or cannot be named (e.g., 'Berlin' could only be applied to the part of the city located in East Germany, while the Western part had to be called 'Western Berlin'), there is an extensive subsection on the Middle East. One of the instructions says:

> 'In light of the inter-Arab polemics that have intensified since August 1970 between the proponents of searching political paths to solve the Middle eastern crisis and the adherents of extremist views, it is vital to be highly cautious in literal quotations of statements of Arab politicians and journalists on these issues' (Strzyżewski 2015:64).

This instruction is followed by the following comment:

> 'The flamboyance of the Arabic vocabulary may e v o k e u n n e c e s s a r i l y e x a g g e r a t e d i m a g e s i n t h e P o l i s h r e a d e r ' (Strzyżewski 2015:64).

In another section, on international trade and economic relations between the People's Republic of Poland and other countries, one of the instructions says that

information about licences bought by Poland from capitalist countries should be eliminated from mass media. The following justification is provided:

> 'This instruction is dictated by the need to avoid an excess of material on the purchase of licences from capitalist countries. The cumulation of such information c o u l d   c r e a t e   a   v i e w   i n   a n   a v e r a g e   r e a d e r that the fundament of the path to modernisation of our economy is the purchase of licences from developed capitalist countries' (Strzyżewski 2015:71).

An illuminating context to consider the language ideology behind the communist propaganda, discernible in the two quotes introduced above, is offered by two quotations coming from important Soviet figures. One is attributed to Lev Shestov, Russian philosopher, and goes as follows: 'Russian Bolshevism is first of all a tsardom (empire) of words'. It thus recognises the importance of language in gaining and maintaining political power. The other tends to be attributed to Joseph Stalin: 'The production of souls is more important than the production of tanks.... And therefore I raise my glass to you, writers, the engineers of the human soul'. Stalin says that people's 'souls' can be 'engineered', which reveals his belief in the relationship between language and the mind. In other words, according to Stalin, what is said (the kind of information) as well as how it is said influences 'images' in people's heads and 'creates' their 'views'. Stalin's belief in the relationship between language and thought is also evident in his article entitled *Marxism and Linguistic Issues* first published in the newspaper *Pravda* in 1950 and then as a pamphlet. While at the surface level the article is about language (Marrist theory in particular), its function is demonstration of Stalin's power. This shows that Stalin recognises a connection between language and politics in general, and between language and communist ideology in particular (Dobrenko 2015).

The idea about language I identified in GUKPPiW documentation, that people's minds can be influenced by means of language for political reasons, is related to constraints on deliberation (see 4.4.3.2.4) and characteristic especially of non-democratic regimes. While the idea of influencing people's minds is coherent with communist ideas of 'historical inevitability' and security at the expense of freedom (see 4.4.3.1), Orwell and Klemperer linked it to totalitarianism more broadly (see 4.4.4.1.1). For this reason, I will call this language ideology 'totalitarian'. The idea that language 'corrupts' thought in linguistic studies of communist propaganda is thus

paradoxically the same as the one attributed to propaganda they intend to criticise in the first place.

Right after a communist government was established in the People's Republic of Poland, the decree of 30 November 1945 was passed, which regulated the position of Polish as the official language of the country and state institutions, limiting the acceptability of other languages and emphasising the necessity of linguistic unification of Polish people (Czarnecki 2014:22–23). After over a century of Partitions and varied language legislation in different parts of the country, the communist politicians introduced the first language legislation that applied to the whole Polish territory. According to Mostowik and Żukowski, there was no need for regulating the official language of the judiciary or education at the time, because Poland was already ethnically homogeneous (2001:18–19). This shows that the legislation should be interpreted as a symbolic attempt to build a new state founded on communist ideology, combined with nationalism (see 4.4.3.1). The idea that there is one language which should be used in official contexts, and this is a national language, implicit in the text of the legislation, is characteristic of standard and nationalist language ideologies, which, I have argued, underpinned Miodek's book (see 4.3.4.1).

4.4.3.3   The nature of anti-communist opposition

In this subsection, I will discuss the nature of anti-communist opposition in the last two decades of the People's Republic of Poland, substantiating my argument that the texts included in my corpus can be interpreted as one of oppositional resistance strategies.

The term 'opposition' in the People's Republic of Poland did not mean a proper parliamentary opposition or a homogeneous group, but rather the people who for various reasons and in various ways did not support the communist regime both in the country and abroad in the 'West'[88]. For instance, the USA supported two

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[88] Karpiński argues that the Polish 'attitude' (however problematic the concept is) towards communism was negative from the very beginning (after the Second World War) because of historical experience of the Partitions, the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1920, and the Second World War (1987:44–46). He also shows that the communist party was not explicit about its truly communist character. At the beginning they obscured it by avoiding words such as 'communism', 'revolution', 'Bolshevism', and even 'socialism', and 'described itself as Polish, progressive, and democratic' instead (1987:46).

government-funded broadcasters targeted at non-American audience, including Eastern Europe: Radio Free Europe, which about a third of Poles listened to at the time (Friszke 2011:129), and Voice of America. Anti-communist opposition comprised part of intellectual and cultural elites, some workers and peasants, and the Catholic Church. Different oppositional groups to a large extent united as part of the Solidarity movement in the 1980s[89]. The history of anti-communist opposition in the People's Republic of Poland was very dynamic (Bernhard 1993; Ekiert 1996; Friszke 2011; Karpiński 1987; Madej 2003).

Among different oppositional groups, a variety of political views were represented (Bernhard 1993; Śliwa 2000). Friszke distinguishes three ideational opposition groups: revisionists, who confronted the tenets of Marxism with reality; liberals, who defended the freedom of speech, that is predominantly students and academics (who protested in the March 1968 political crisis); and radical anti-communists, a group called 'Ruch' ('Movement') which drew upon the patriotic independence movement led by Józef Piłsudski (the First Marshal of Poland from 1920) and the Home Army during the Second World War (2011:129–32)[90]. These different groups later developed into more formal organisations with specific goals. Even in the late 1970s, when the nature of specific organisations crystalised, they differed in terms of their views and arguments they used to fight for reforms. Some groups stressed democratic and civil ideas, in particular the Workers' Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, or KOR), while others highlighted national traditions and advocated for independence, as in 1918 (ROBCiO) (Friszke 2011:141–42). According to Śliwa, liberal ideals were 'the most popular' among Polish anti-

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[89] The need for the intellectuals and workers to unite continued to be recognised until the fall of communism (Karpiński 1987:57). Among undertaken initiatives was the creation of the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR), a civil society aiming to support workers repressed during protests in June 1976 (Friszke 2011:34–35). According to Karpiński, despite the decentralised nature of Polish anti-communist opposition, it was a relatively 'mass movement' compared to other East European countries at the time (1987:57).

[90] In the 1980s, after the implementation of martial law in Poland (13 December 1981), the opposition became divided on what should have been done to avoid it and what should be done next, but according to Karpiński, the opposition was 'in agreement about the problems in Poland and their magnitude, even if it does not always agree on how to resolve them' (1987:54). Karpiński distinguishes three different 'strands' of opposition: '"liberals" choose to defend freedom, "socialists" choose social welfare and social security, and "nationalists" opt for national interest and national solidarity' (1987:53–54). These 'strands' seem to have survived until the ruling of Law and Justice, with 'nationalists' and 'socialists' taking over after liberals.

communist opposition (2000:117), especially among intellectual elites. Friszke argues that the weakness of the opposition was on the one hand its limited influence on the larger society, as it was predominantly an intra-elite (especially intellectual) activity, and on the other, the necessity to compromise with the authorities, as any radical opposition would have stood no chance of succeeding (2011:132–33). It was not until 1978 that other social groups (workers) joined, making the opposition a mass movement (Friszke 2011:139). An anti-communist coalition between liberals and conservatives was formed in the late 1970s, an indication of which was the coalition's programmatic manifesto entitled *The Church and the Left* by Michnik (1977). This coalition shows how close liberals and conservatives were in Poland at the time[91]. It can also explain why some of the authors of my corpus who represent more conservative views still produced liberal critiques of *nowomowa*.

Forms of resistance included strikes and protests, involvement with civil society groups supporting protesting and repressed workers such as KOR or ROBCiO, open letters, and uncensored (underground, 'independent' or 'illegal') publications[92]. Occasionally, the content that was not consistent with 'the Party line' was conveyed by means of 'coding' techniques in official publications. It was in such 'independent' presses and journals that linguistic studies of *nowomowa* included in my corpus were first published domestically or abroad in the 'West' (and then they were 'illegally' smuggled to the country) by academic and cultural elites, who were often persecuted for their oppositional activity.

The development of the opposition in the People's Republic of Poland indicates that contrary to what linguistic studies of *nowomowa* assumed, for example, in quote

[91] In the final decades of the communist period in Poland, the word 'liberal' roughly meant the equivalent of 'anti-communist' (Szacki 2022:5–6).

[92] Friszke discusses a few oppositional initiatives in 1977-1980, such as the Independent Publishing House (Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza), which published uncensored Polish and world literature; numerous newspapers; as well as regional student groups at several Polish universities, such as the Student Committee of Solidarity (Studencki Komitet Solidarności) in Kraków, which held demonstrations after the murder of a student activist Stanisław Pyjas, and Academic Courses Society (Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych), an independent educational society at the University of Warsaw, which coordinated lectures on the aspects of the humanities and social sciences that were prohibited from teaching (2011:136–38). Kubik discusses the relative independence of student theatres in Poland in the 1970s, focusing on the example of the Theatre STU in Kraków (1994:75–102). Zwiernik (2003) discusses the development of the oppositional Radio 'Solidarność' as an example of independent radio stations.

(5), not just the elites were aware of being manipulated. At later stages of communism, when the polarisation between 'us' (the nation) and 'them' (the authorities) became very strong, largely because of the development of counterhegemonic discourses (Davies 1984; Kubik 1994), it seems that people were aware of communist propaganda[93]. Kubik argues that what eventually led to the collapse of communism in Poland was the 'symbolic/discursive polarization between the Party-state and the populace' (1994:5), characteristic of later stages of communism. Wierzbicka (1990) shows resistance to communist language among Poles, who developed an alternative anti-totalitarian language, characterised not just by specific vocabulary, but also some aspects of inflection and even syntax:

> 'Linguistic self-defense in a totalitarian or semitotalitarian state consists of finding ways of giving expression (in a more or less permanent form) to those emotions, attitudes, and preoccupations which in a country dominated by severe political controls cannot be expressed openly. For example, if the fear and hatred toward an oppressing regime and its institutions cannot be expressed via free speech, free press, or free publications, they can be expressed in underground words and expressions, and this very fact can bring a captive population a measure of psychological relief and liberation. The fact that those underground ways of speaking can be shared by everybody links people together and provides a substitute for the free associations, organizations, and so on, that are not allowed by the regime' (1990:8).

As mentioned by Głowiński, 'anti-totalitarian' language also developed in literature. The authors of my data do mention the development of anti-communist language among ordinary language users, for example, in quote (33), but only in the late 1980s, arguably with an intention to further mobilise anti-communist opposition.

As shown by Kubik (1994), the term 'opposition' is very complex in the communist period in Poland in yet another sense. In Polish society at the time there was 'an incongruity between the (objective, practical) everyday *interpenetration* and the (subjective, symbolic/discursive) *polarization* of the Party-state and society' (Kubik 1994:4–5). In other words, despite being involved in oppositional movements, members of the opposition still participated in the communist reality, which – as the only 'official' reality – shaped their everyday lives. The polarization between the Party-state and society grew in strength and importance in the late 1970s. In *The Power of*

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[93] Even today people frequently talk about communist propaganda, which I have seen in private conversations with not only people older than me, but also my peers.

Symbols Against the Symbols of Power (1994), Kubik argues that it was culture where this polarisation first developed, eventually leading to the collapse of the communist regime in Poland. Unofficial (that is 'oppositional') organisations (which gathered intellectuals, students, workers as well as members of the Church) and their publications, demonstrations, ceremonies, and celebrations, the most significant of which was the Pope's visit to Poland in 1979, produced counterhegemonic discourses, thanks to which 'people realized the need and the possibility of common action' (1994:180). The Pope's visit led to a major social transformation in both public discourse and individual attitudes, as for the first time people could realise that other discourses than 'Marxist' were possible in the public domain that could be applied to social, political, and even economic issues. That in turn showed that 'civil organisation of the society outside the state was possible' (Kubik 1994:145).

The relationship between the communist state and academia was complex. On the one hand, academics comprised a significant part of anti-communist opposition. Polish intellectual and cultural elites protested against the communist regime in various ways, for example, some Polish academics actively participated in protests of March 1968, where they joined students protesting against censorship. Some also supported other protesting groups, for example, workers in 1976, when the Workers' Defence Committee was created. Especially in later stages of communism, academic elites published texts critical of the regime in independent publications (Barańczak 1983; Miłosz 1953; Miłosz et al. 1984), which includes linguistic studies of *nowomowa* included in my corpus. Zarycki (2022) demonstrates that since 1968 many Polish linguists and literary scholars became important anti-communist activists often with liberal views.

On the other hand, many academics supported the Party and promoted the official ideology at some point of their careers. Because of their subject matter, the arts and humanities as well as the social sciences are particularly susceptible to socio-political influences. Social realism was the 'official' trend not only in literature and art, but also in literary criticism in the communist period, which served to legitimise the power of the Party (Mazurkiewicz 2020; Pietrzak 2008; Smulski 2000; Tubielewicz-

Mattsson 1997; Wierzbik 2010)[94]. At the time, philosophy and the social sciences were largely influenced by Marxism (Karpiński 1973). In 1956–1961, when sociology as a discipline was restored at Polish universities, after its absence in Stalinist years (1949–1955), the Party officially supported the discipline by holding sociology conferences, explicitly instructing Polish sociologists about the expected ideological content of their sociological research (Wincławski 2011:23).

As mentioned, the Catholic Church was an important actor among anti-communist opposition. The Church was one of the most significant producers of counterhegemonic discourses in the 1970s and 1980s. Kubik shows that contrary to the official representation of Poland as a socialist state which is part of the Soviet family, the Church, especially Pope John Paul II and primate Cardinal Wyszyński, constructed Poland as an inherently Catholic country (1994:142). In the context of workers' protests, the Pope and Wyszyński talked about people's 'freedom and dignity', especially in the economic sense (1994:102–52). Wyszyński saw the individual as above all *homo Dei* and in the second instance, *homo oeconomicus* or *homo politicus* (1994:121). Although from the contemporary perspective it may be easy to associate the Catholic Church in Poland with nationalism rather than liberalism, in the communist period it was not so easy. The values of 'freedom and dignity', even if understood differently than in linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, are echoes of liberalism as a political ideology.

4.4.4 Intertextuality and interdiscursivity: literature on propaganda and Polish prescriptivism

In this subsection, I will discuss the intertextual and interdiscursive context of linguistic studies of *nowomowa* and Miodek's book included in my corpus. I will first

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[94] In the period of communist authoritarianism in Poland, many poets and writers supported the regime at some point of their careers not only by becoming Party members, but also by promoting the socialist-communist ideology through their poetry and writing. Some names include: Władysław Broniewski, Wisława Szymborska, Aleksander Ścibor-Rylski, Kazimierz Brandys, and Tadeusz Konwicki. Also visual artists (for example, Aleksander Kobzej, Juliusz Krajewski and Helena Krajewska, Włodzimierz Zakrzewski), musicians (Tadeusz Baird, Kazimierz Serocki, Jan Krenz), film directors (Jerzy Kawalerowicz, Andrzej Wajda, Aleksander Ford), and architects were involved in promoting the dominant ideology at some point. Most of these authors, however, sooner or later withdrew from supporting the Party.

discuss a few intertextual references explicitly made in linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, and then other texts discussing communist propaganda in Poland and in the region, as well as the presence of *nowomowa* in Polish literature. I will demonstrate that numerous criticisms of communist propaganda were written both in the Soviet bloc and in the 'West' at the time. I will next focus on Miodek's book, arguing that it should be considered in the context of the long Polish prescriptive tradition. In addition, texts included in my corpus can be seen as each other's interdiscursive contexts.

4.4.4.1 Intertextual and interdiscursive relationships of linguistic studies of *nowomowa*

A few 'Western' authors explicitly mentioned in my corpus include George Orwell, Francis Bacon, Alfred Korzybski, Harold Lasswell, and Victor Klemperer. In the 1970s and 1980s, other texts about communist propaganda were written in Poland, in the rest of the Soviet bloc, and in the 'West'. In addition, satires and parodies of *nowomowa* were very frequent in Polish literature in this period.

4.4.4.1.1 Intertextual references in linguistic studies of nowomowa *and their interdiscursive links*

The most significant intertextual influence on linguistic studies of *nowomowa* is George Orwell's. The term *nowomowa* is a Polish calque of the term *Newspeak* coined by Orwell in a novel entitled *Nineteen Eighty-four* (1949). In this novel, *Newspeak* is the language of a fictional socialist totalitarian state Oceania used to communicate ideological content. Its purpose is to make it impossible for people to think about anything that would be incompatible with the official ideology, and ultimately 'make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it' (Orwell 2003). The concept of 'Newspeak' was used by linguists to describe the language of propaganda in many Soviet countries (Konstantinov 1990; Thom 1989), as was the phrase 'the wooden language', both of which are associated with deficiency and the lack of referents in the real world (Ryazanova-Clarke and Petrov 2015:5–6).

The appendix to the novel entitled 'The Principles of Newspeak' was published in the post-conference volume entitled *Nowo-mowa* as the third essay, right after the introductions by the two editors, Rokoszowa and Heinz. A few of Orwell's ideas about language can be found in my corpus. First and foremost, the idea that language can express ideological worldviews and can thus be used as a powerful tool of political manipulation. This idea was also expressed by Orwell in an essay entitled *Politics and the English Language* (1946). Secondly, the authors of linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, for example, Głowiński in quote (1), were inspired by the idea that *Newspeak* is based on a natural language, in the case of Orwell, Standard English, which it aims to supersede. Thirdly, Orwell's influence can be seen in the idea that propaganda can corrupt or diminish thought. An important part of this idea is the assumption that words and objects in the world can correspond to each other perfectly. A final idea inspired by Orwell and evident in my corpus is that of *Newspeak* being a language of 'the insiders': in order to use this language correctly, you needed a full understanding of its principles (Orwell 2003). Uncovering those principles at the level of language is one of the main objectives of the authors of my corpus.

In quote (5), Karpiński mentions other authors to support the argument about the relationship between language and thought. He references Bacon and his concept of the 'idols of the mind', that is impediments which mislead human perception, one type of which, the 'idols of the market', result from human interactions and use of words. Karpiński names Korzybski for his idea that human knowledge is limited (which is summarised in Korzybski's famous dictum 'The map is not the territory') partly by language people use, which is thus a tool of selection and potential deformation. Karpiński also refers to Laswell's work on propaganda (see 4.4.3.2) and Klemperer's book *The Language of the Third Reich* (*Lingua Tertii Imperii*) (2000), first published in 1947, where Klemperer argued that it was through the use of a specific language that the Nazis inoculated the Nazi ideology in German people.

4.4.4.1.2   *Other linguistic studies of* nowomowa *in Poland*

Ryazanova-Clarke and Petrov demonstrate that at the end of the socialist-communist period, the communist language was the subject of many linguistic

studies in the Soviet bloc. These studies were an attempt to 'capture the communist idiom that was becoming obsolete' (2015:5). Ryazanova-Clarke and Petrov distinguish two unconnected streams of study of the communist language, which, they argue, only converged right before the collapse of the USSR:

> 'One, inside the Soviet Union, was focused on the typology of communist communication …, and on the microanalysis of linguistic forms in their historical development during the Soviet period, construing the object of their study positively, within the official linguistic framework, as evidence of linguistic productivity and stabilisation of the norm… The other stream emerged outside the Communist bloc and engaged with the analysis of the communist language that was largely linked to the criticism of the regime and was governed by the narrative of linguistic depletion and poverty' (2015:5).

It seems that in Poland only the latter stream existed, and it was produced both in the country and outside the Soviet bloc. This is indicative of the close network between domestic and 'Western' opposition in the Polish case (see 4.4.3.3).

Among Polish studies of *nowomowa* published in the 1970s and 1980s was Polish linguist Anna Chmielewska's article *Kampania* ('The Campaign') printed in the 4th issue of a literary quarterly *Zapis* ('The Record') by an independent press called Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza, or NOWA ('Independent Printing House') in London (1977), which was targeted at intellectual elites (Friszke 2011:137–38)[95]. Focusing on the official representations of the protests of 1976 in Radom and Ursus, Chmielewska discusses the linguistic qualities of communist propaganda in Poland, which she argued intensified in periods of important events, state celebrations, and political campaigns. In his book entitled *The Captive Reader* (*Czytelnik Ubezwłasnowolniony*) published in Paris (1983) and reprinted by one of the independent presses in Kraków a year later, Stanisław Barańczak discusses persuasion strategies the communist authorities used in Polish mass culture (or what would now be called 'popular culture') of the 1970s. Barańczak argues that mass culture was an important area where communist propaganda was disseminated[96]. Jerzy Bralczyk also discussed the

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[95] 'Nowa' in Polish is an adjective in feminine gender meaning 'new'. NOWA was the longest active and most efficient underground publisher in the 1970s and 1980s (Błażejowska 2010:11–12). It published about 100 books, mostly literature, each in an edition of 3,000–5,000 copies (Friszke 2011:138).

[96] Barańczak left Poland after persecution he faced for signing the so-called Letter of 59. He emigrated to the USA, where he was a lecturer in Polish literature and language at Harvard University.

language of political propaganda in Poland in his doctoral thesis entitled *O języku polskiej propagandy politycznej lat siedemdziesiątych* (*On the language of Polish political propaganda of the 1970s*). Bralczyk received his doctorate from the University of Warsaw, but his thesis was published in Uppsala (1987).

4.4.4.1.3   Nowomowa *in Polish literature*

I mentioned that Głowiński discusses literary parodies of *nowomowa* in one of the essays included in the corpus (see 4.3.2). There seem to be three main ways in which *nowomowa* was used in Polish literature at the time, particularly by the poetic movement called 'New Wave' ('Nowa Fala'), which gathered poets debuting in the mid-60s, who were profoundly influenced by March 1968. Firstly, satires of *nowomowa* were frequent in Polish poetry at the time, e.g., Stanisław Barańczak's *Te słowa* ('These Words') or Julian Kornhauser *Urząd poezji* ('Poetry Office')[97]. Secondly, Polish poets, e.g., Stanisław Barańczak in his poem *Określona epoka* ('Certain Epoch') or Leszek Moczulski in his poem *Salon mód* ('Salon of Fashions'), parodied the language of *nowomowa*, using satirical stylisations, in order to unmask its ritualisation and lack of meaning in a comic manner. Thirdly, Polish poets used *nowomowa* in a critical way as an attempt to develop their own poetic language, the 'real' one, based on colloquial Polish. Examples include Stanisław Barańczak's *Przejściowe ograniczenia* ('Temporary Restrictions'), Ryszard Krynicki's *Jesteście wolni* ('You Are Free'), or Adam Zagajewski's *Mała piosenka o cenzurze* ('A Little Song about Censorship'). This use of *nowomowa* was the most frequent in Polish literature (Nyczek 1995). Poetry using *nowomowa* was rarely officially published (Hobot-Marcinek 2000; Kozaczewski 2004; Tokarz 1990).

4.4.4.2   Polish linguists and standardisation

Miodek's book should be considered in a different interdiscursive context. His ideas about language were not new in Poland. Prescriptivism in Polish linguistics had

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[97] Yurchak (2006) shows that Russian artists used similar ironic aesthetic practices in the 1980s, which he calls *stiob*, aimed at ridiculing the Soviet system.

a long history and Polish linguists had been actively involved in standardisation practices at least for decades[98]. Codification of the Polish language began in the 16th century (Jodłowski 1979). First Polish dictionaries were published in the 19th century, but it was after Poland regained independence in 1918 that the publication of Polish dictionaries developed (Bańko 2003:3–4). Polish prescriptivism is thus associated with the building of and the fight for an independent Polish state. After 1918, a number of new standardisation practices were launched. While there is a long history of Polish prescriptivism, there seems to be an intensification of standardisation practices in the late 1960s, which Miodek's book seems to exemplify. I will now present a wide variety of such practices initiated by Polish linguists in the last two decades of communist authoritarianism, demonstrating how salient standard language ideology was in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse at the time.

4.4.4.2.1 Academic associations and journals promoting 'correct' Polish

In the 1970s and 1980s, a few academic associations devoted to the study and promotion of 'correct' Polish were active and a few academic journals concerned with this issue were published. The most influential one was the Society of Polish Language Enthusiasts (Towarzystwo Miłośników Języka Polskiego), established in 1920 and active until now. It gathers both professionals and non-professionals interested in studying and popularising the Polish language. According to the founder, Professor Kazimierz Nitsch, 'all intelligent Poles should create a great Society of Polish Language Enthusiasts without separate statutes and consider our journal as their organ' (Towarzystwo Miłośników Języka Polskiego n.d.). The association is thus founded on nationalist and elitist values. One of the main initiatives of the Society has been a Polish linguistics journal entitled *Język Polski* (The Polish Language) published in Kraków since 1920. Since 1901, a journal entitled *Linguistic Guide* (Poradnik Językowy) has been published in Warsaw, which gave rise to the Polish Language Correctness Association (Towarzystwo Poprawności Języka Polskiego) (active 1929–1933),

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[98] Polish linguistics in the 20th century was primarily influenced by Lviv logicians, Russian formalism, and the Prague Linguistic Circle (Zarycki 2022). A brief overview of Polish language culture since the 15th century is provided by Walczak (2013).

renamed the Association for Promoting Polish Language Correctness and Culture (Towarzystwo Krzewienia Poprawności i Kultury Języka Polskiego) (active 1933–1939), and revived in 1966 as the Language Culture Association (Towarzystwo Kultury Języka). Yet another academic association concerned with 'correct' Polish is the Language Commission of the Warsaw Scientific Society (Komisja Językowa Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego), active since 1948.

4.4.4.2.2 Dictionaries

Central to the process of language codification and standardisation is publication of dictionaries, which enjoy a respected and unquestioned authority in many societies. The aim is to legitimise not only the 'correct' or 'standard' variety, but also institutions assumed to have linguistic authority, whose role is to ensure that the 'correct' or 'standard' variety is spoken by the whole society, presumably also as a way of sustaining socio-political order. Between 1945 and mid-1989, 116 editions of *Słownik języka polskiego* (Dictionary of the Polish Language) and 13 editions of *Słownik ortograficzny* (Dictionary of Spelling) were published, but publications of Polish language dictionaries accelerated rapidly in the late 1960s. For example, *Słownik ortograficzny i prawidła pisowni polskiej* (Dictionary and Principles of Polish Spelling) by Jodłowski and Taszycki was first published in 1946 and new editions came out in 1958, and then in 1967, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1990. Other dictionary genres, as proposed by Bańko (2003:2), were also published between 1968 and 1989, for example, *Słownik wyrazów bliskoznacznych* (Dictionary of Synonyms) (Skorupka 1968), *Słownik poprawnej polszczyzny* (Dictionary of Correct Polish) (Doroszewski and Kurkowska 1973), *Słownik frazeologiczny* (Dictionary of Collocations) (Skorupka 1974), *Słownik wyrazów obcych* (Dictionary of Foreign Words) (Tokarski 1980). In addition, since 1980s, many so-called 'phone-in language clinics' (telefoniczne poradnie językowe) were founded, mainly in Warsaw, Kraków, Wrocław, Łódź, Gdańsk, Słupsk and Opole. During their 'shifts', professional linguists answer questions asked by either individuals or institutions. Foland-Kugler mentions a single record-breaking session in the Warsaw branch of the 'clinic', where as many as 90 questions were asked (1981:387–88). The medical metaphors in the

names of these services create an image of Polish needing 'treatment' as well as a sense of urgency of language-related issues.

4.4.4.2.3 Popular science publications and shows popularising 'correct' Polish

According to Foland-Kugler (1981), there was a rise of sources promoting correct Polish to the wider public after the Second World War, and yet another sharp rise from the late 1960s. Many popular science books about correct Polish were published by renowned professors of linguistics primarily since the 1960s, for example, by Witold Doroszewski (1899–1976) or Stanisław Urbańczyk (1909–2001). 'Correct' Polish was also the subject of many columns, press articles, radio, and TV programmes. Miodek's column entitled *Rzecz o języku*, which is included in the corpus, had previously been published by Anna Cieślarkowa. It was initiated and written by Professor Stefan Reczek until 1964. Another famous columnist in this period was Witold Kochański, who published three columns: *Z kulturą na ty* (With Culture on a First Name Basis) in *Kultura i Życie* (Culture and Life), *Pogotowie językowe* (Linguistic ER) in *Płomyk* (Flame. Illustrated Weekly for Children and Teenagers), and a column in *Kamena* (the name of the Roman goddess Camena and in old Polish 'poem' or 'poetry), a literary magazine published in Lublin from 1949 to 1988. Doroszewski hosted a radio programme entitled *Radiowy Poradnik Językowy* (Radio Linguistic Guide) on the Polish Radio from 1948, which he started in 1935 but paused because of the outbreak of the Second World War. Based on the show, whose content is very similar to Miodek's book, Doroszewski then published a three-volume book entitled *O kulturę słowa. Poradnik językowy* (For Speech Culture. A Linguistic Handbook) in 1964, 1968, and 1979. The show continued to be aired until 2015 (mc 2015). Professor Walery Pisarek hosted a 10-minute TV show entitled *A Polish lesson*, the idea of which was inspired by Professor Zenon Klemensiewicz. Since 1987, Miodek hosted a popular weekly TV show entitled *Ojczyzna-polszczyzna*, which he continued until 2007[99].

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[99] The show *Ojczyzna-polszczyzna* was produced by TVP Wrocław (the Lower Silesia Province local broadcaster), but broadcast on TVP2 (Channel 2 of the public broadcaster in Poland). The format was a mini-lecture on various aspects of the Polish language. Each episode lasted for about 15 minutes.

4.4.4.2.4 Polish National Dictation Competition

In 1987 and 1988, the first two editions of the Polish National Dictation Competition, known in Poland as Ogólnopolskie Dyktando, Ogólnopolski Konkurs Ortograficzny 'Dyktando or 'Narodowe Dyktando' (National Dictation) were held. The aim was to make as few spelling and punctuation mistakes as possible in a text written by Antonina Grybosiowa, Professor of Polish at the University of Śląsk in Katowice. The winners won the title of the 'Master of the Polish Spelling' (Mistrz Polskiej Ortografii) and a substantial financial award. The competition was initiated by the journalist Krystyna Bochenek, who at the time had long been working for the Katowice branch of the Polish Radio. She then became a member of the Polish Language Council and later of the Polish Senate and was awarded a number of state and language-related awards, including posthumously. She died tragically in the Smoleńsk plane crash (2010).

4.4.5 Contextual analysis: summary

In this section, I have looked at four components of the context in which the texts belonging to the analysed corpus originally appeared. Firstly, I showed that the co-text of linguistic studies of *nowomowa* can be classified as academic, cultural, oppositional, and international, while the co-text of Miodek's *Rzecz o języku* – as educational, informational, political, and local. These co-texts show that both linguistic studies of *nowomowa* and Miodek's column (although the latter a little less so) were addressed to intellectual elites. Secondly, I have demonstrated that the texts included in my corpus can be classified as a hybrid genre: academic studies and 'dissident' essays in the case of linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, and a press column and academic expert pieces in the case of *Rzecz o języku*. Thirdly, I have discussed the nature of the political regime, political propaganda, and anti-communist opposition in the People's Republic of Poland, arguing that the texts included in my corpus can be seen as oppositional (anti-communist). Linguistic studies of *nowomowa* can be associated with liberally-oriented branch of anti-communist opposition, while Miodek with conservatively-oriented one. Fourthly, I have demonstrated how some ideas promoted in linguistic studies of *nowomowa* were inspired by other influential

texts that discuss the language of propaganda, and how these ideas were popular in studies of communist propaganda written both in the Soviet bloc and in the 'West'. On the other hand, I have demonstrated that ideas promoted by Miodek had long been present in Polish linguistics, where the prescriptive tradition is very strong. However, Miodek's column is an example of the intensification in standardisation practices that could be observed in Poland after the late 1960s. All in all, my analysis of the context in which the texts included in my corpus appeared supports the argument that their nature was political. These texts can thus be seen as one of many anti-communist resistance strategies adopted by members of the opposition at the time. My contextual analysis shows that liberalism and nationalism 'thickened' by conservatism were in clear opposition to the dominant discourse and ideology, which is why liberal as well as standard language ideologies were more salient than others in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the last two decades of state socialism.

4.5   Conclusions

In this chapter, I have argued that Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the last two decades of communist authoritarianism was an important area of political resistance. Linguistic studies of *nowomowa* deconstructed and critiqued it, while Miodek promoted 'correct' Polish, following the prescriptive tradition and constructing an alternative version of national identity to the one promoted by the Party: nationalism 'thickened' by conservatism rather than socialism-communism. I have demonstrated that linguistic studies of *nowomowa* are an example of the 'moralistic tradition' of 'language complaints', which I call liberal language ideology, as it is consistently founded on liberal democratic values. My analysis shows that the political regime influences the nature of standardisation: in non-democratic regimes the discourse of standardisation is centred not only on 'correctness', but also on 'neutrality' and 'clarity'. I have also observed that this liberal language ideology is occasionally mixed with components of standard language ideology in linguistic studies of *nowomowa*. On the other hand, Miodek's book, while embedded in the linguistic knowledge of the time, is a typical example of standard language ideology,

occasionally 'thickened' by nationalist and purist language ideologies. This combination corresponds to the combination of nationalism and conservatism in the field of political ideologies. Miodek's book is also an example of the intensification in Polish standardisation practices characteristic of the period. By identifying these language ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the 1970s and 1980s, I have argued that its nature was fundamentally ideological, and thus it should not be assumed to be 'objective'.

I have then demonstrated that the salience of these language ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the last two decades of state socialism in Poland can be explained by the nature of the regime in which it was produced. My analysis of the co-text and the genre of the texts included in my corpus shows their intertwined academic and political nature. By discussing the socio-political context of my corpus, I have demonstrated its oppositional nature in a non-democratic regime governed by censorship and propaganda. The intertextual and interdiscursive context shows that the ideas I identified in my corpus were popular in the field of linguistics at the time, but also in 'Western' and Soviet academic and political discourse as well as in Polish literature.

I have thus shown that metalinguistic discourse, including the intellectual discourse of professional linguistics and related disciplines, can not only be a vehicle for language ideologies, but also for political ideologies. In this way, such discourse becomes an important area of political contestation. I have also shown that neither liberalism nor associated with it linguistic 'referentialism' are pushed by 'Western' elites: in Poland, liberalism was an important political ideology even under state socialism, and 'referentialism' was part of linguistic common sense, both in the Soviet bloc and in the 'West'. On the other hand, the role of nationalism-conservatism should not be underestimated in the discussion of Polish anti-communist opposition. The oppositional role of this ideology in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse was more subtle and hidden than that of liberalism, but it was important in constructing an alternative version of national identity to the one promoted by the Party. I have also demonstrated that different ideological fractions of Polish anti-communist opposition adopted different discourses about language, consistently alluding to different values. They were, however, occasionally mixed in specific texts,

which is indicative of the closeness between oppositional liberals and nationalist-conservatives at the time.

Both linguistic studies criticising communist propaganda and the linguistic discourse promoting standard language ideology may have contributed to the contestation of the communist regime in Poland and its ultimate collapse by creating a discursive opportunity structure (Koopmans and Statham 1999) for anti-communist opposition. Unlike the concept of political opportunity structure developed in the theory of social movements, which denotes 'political-institutional opportunities for successful movement mobilization' (McCammon 2013:371), DOS highlights the role of culture in 'laying ground' for socio-political changes. The oppositional network in which linguistic studies were circulated may have increased people's awareness of the nature of propaganda, contributing to the development of an oppositional language (Wierzbicka 1990). The local, yet political network of Miodek's column may have played a role in contributing to the polarisation between the Party and the populace (Bernhard 1993; Kubik 1994). To what extent this was indeed the case is, however, outside the scope of this study.

5 Nationalist, Purist, and Standard Language Ideologies as a National Identity Construction Strategy in Polish Professional Metalinguistic Discourse (1989–2015)

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will look at Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building (1989–2015). I will argue that it drew primarily on the discourse promoting standard language ideology in the previous period, an instance of which was Miodek's book, with occasional echoes of some of the ideas promoted in linguistic studies of *nowomowa*. In other words, the 'correctness' tradition of language complaints became dominant in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse between 1989 and 2015. After the collapse of communism in Poland, standard language ideology in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse became much more comprehensive and elaborate than before 1989. It focused on the language of ordinary language users, and promoted the values of 'correctness', 'neutrality', 'elegance', and 'purity'. The assumption seems to have been that in order to ensure that such 'correct' Polish was spoken, linguistic authorities, such as professional linguists, should be promoted, and relevant language legislation should be passed. The ultimate concern behind these language-related proposals was discipline in conforming to the rules, which, as the argument goes, is indicative of respect to national culture and tradition. This, in turn, corresponds to nationalism-conservatism in the field of political ideologies, which, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, were used in the national identity construction that competed with the hybrid of nationalist-socialist discourse employed by the communist authorities. The goal was to make sure that the whole nation spoke according to aesthetic and ethical rather than political norms, dictated by linguistic authorities. I will argue that the professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building was ultimately a platform for a construction of a specific version of national identity, similar to the one promoted by linguists in the previous period, yet much more comprehensive and elaborate.

Standard language ideology employed in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the 1989–2015 period was complemented by nationalist (according to which language is an essential component of national identity) and purist language ideologies (based on the assumption that language should not be 'tainted' with 'foreign' influences). The cluster of these ideologies often underpins the discourse of 'language complaints', especially in the 'correctness' tradition (see 2.2.4.1.2), and the discourse of language endangerment (see 2.2.4.4.3), that is narratives about language which are either likely to disappear, or argued to be so. This discourse in turn provides the foundation for calls for language protection. I will demonstrate that the discourse of the endangerment of Polish produced by Polish scholars of language between 1989 and 2015 was a way of constructing a specific version of national identity at the time when Poland was developing a new democratic system after years of Partitions, wars, and foreign domination, with few models from the past to follow, and an ambition to join the 'Western' globalising world after the collapse of communism. I will thus argue that despite globalisation, which, as some argue, puts the nature, future, and arguably even existence of nations into question, defenders of national identity reasserted themselves. I will demonstrate how Polish scholars of language contributed to the promotion of nationalism-conservatism in Poland after 1989.

As in the previous chapter, I will begin by introducing my data and criteria for its selection. I will focus on linguistic conference papers presented at the 1st Speech Culture Forum (Forum Kultury Słowa) conference in Wrocław in 1995, which, I will argue, is critical for understanding the professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building. By means of a thematic analysis conducted in NVivo, I will then identify components of language ideologies and, where relevant, political ideologies in the corpus I compiled, through the lens of my three-component definition of language ideology (see 2.2.4). I will examine representations of language identified in my corpus, the socio-political order they served to legitimise, and instructions for the ideal use of language provided.

I will next present the results of my contextual analysis, following my four-component contextual analysis framework inspired by Wodak (see 3.3). I will first discuss the co-text (immediate context) of my corpus, that is the topic of the conference and how it was introduced by the organisers, as well as the co-text of the

post-conference publication. Secondly, I will discuss the genre of the texts included in my corpus, which, as in the previous chapter, can be considered a hybrid of academic conference papers and language policy proposals. This hybridity creates a tension between academic rigour and political engagement. Thirdly, I will introduce the socio-political context, situating my corpus in the context of cultural, social, and political processes taking place during the period of liberal democracy building in Poland. Fourthly, I will discuss intertextual and interdiscursive relationships of the corpus, presenting a wide variety of standardisation practices taking place in Poland at the time. I will show that these practices, which intensified after the late 1960s, intensified further after 1989. Finally, I will conclude my argument.

5.2 Data: linguists' proposal for Polish language legislation

For my data, I selected conference papers presented at the 1st Speech Culture Forum conference at the University of Wrocław in 1995, and later published as a post-conference volume entitled *O zagrożeniach i bogactwie polszczyzny* (On the Threats and Richness of Polish) (Miodek 1996a) (see Table 7). The conference was devoted to a range of issues defined as 'language culture', especially the current situation of the Polish language (Miodek 1996b:7)[100]. The conference was organised by the Polish Academy of Sciences (Polska Akademia Nauk), the Polish Ministry of Culture and Art (Ministerstwo Kultury i Sztuki)[101], and the Ministry of National Education (Ministerstwo Edukacji Narodowej). After the conference, the participants petitioned the First Institute of Social Sciences (Pierwszy Wydział Nauk Społecznych) of the Polish Academy of Sciences to appoint the Polish Language Council (Rada Języka Polskiego)

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[100] The terms 'speech culture' (*kultura słowa*) and 'language culture' (*kultura języka*) originated in the USSR and were popularised through the works of the Prague Linguistic Circle. They are extensively used within Slavic philology across national contexts in Eastern Europe. Gorham shows that the term *language culture* is used in a few meanings. While the Russian linguist Grigorii Vinokur, who coined the term, defined it as 'linguistic practices of a society and its members on all levels of verbal production', it later assumed 'a narrower, more didactic, meaning more akin to "speech etiquette" or "proper usage"' (Gorham 2003:6). The term *language culture* can also reflect latest trends in sociolinguistics which stress the relationship between language and power, to refer to 'the sphere devoted specifically to the production, circulation, and use of meanings'. In addition, *language culture* can also be defined as 'scholarship in the social and cultural history and theory of language usage' (Gorham 2003:6; cf. Sewell, Jr. 1999).

[101] Now: Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego).

Miodek Jan	*Słowo wstępne* [Introduction]
Polański Kazimierz	*Uroczyste powitanie* [Welcome Address]
Markowski Andrzej, Halina Satkiewicz	*Kultura języka w powojennej Polsce* [Language Culture in Poland After the Second World War]
Cegieła Anna	*Norma wzorcowa i norma użytkowa komunikacji we współczesnej polszczyźnie* [The Exemplary Norm and the Standard Norms of Communication in Contemporary Polish]
Puzynina Jadwiga, Anna Pajdzińska	*Etyka słowa* [Language Ethics]
Pisarek Walery, Jolanta Rokoszowa	*Prawne ramy troski o język* [Legal Framework of Care for Language]
Saloni Zygmunt	*Głos w sprawie prawnej ochrony języka* [An Opinion on the Issue of the Legal Protection of Language]
Majkowska Grażyna	*O języku polskiej prasy* [On the Language of Polish Press]
Dolacka Maria, Jerzy Podracki	*Praca nad kulturą języka w Telewizji Polskiej* [Work on Language Culture in Polish TV]
Lewicki Andrzej Maria	*Styl oficjalny i styl potoczny w reklamie* [Official and Colloquial Register in Advertisements]
Bralczyk Jerzy	*Język polityki i polityków* [Language of Politics and Politicians]
Zdunkiewicz-Jedynak Dorota	*Kultura słowa w komunikacji kaznodziejskiej – uwagi na marginesie tekstów homiletycznych i oficjalnych wypowiedzi kościelnych lat dziewięćdziesiątych* [The Language Culture in Preaching Communication – Remarks on the Margins of Homiletical Texts and Official Church Statements in the 1990s]
Michałowska Danuta	*Polszczyzna w teatrze* [The Polish Language in Theatre]
Lubaś Władysław	*Polszczyzna wobec najnowszych przemian społecznych* [The Polish Language and the Latest Social Transformations]
Kucała Marian	*Terytorialne zróżnicowanie polszczyzny* [Territorial Diversity of the Polish Language]
Siciński Bogdan	*Ustalanie polskich nazw miejscowości na Ziemiach Zachodnich jako złożony proces kształtowania się fragmentu normy językowej (na przykładzie Dolnego Śląska)* [Determining Polish Local Names in the Western Territories as a Complex Process of Shaping a Section of the Linguistic Norm (The Example of Lower Silesia)]
Paryl Władysław	*Polszczyzna Ziem Zachodnich* [Polish in the Western Territories]
Rymut Kazimierz	*Kultura nazewnicza* [Naming Culture]
Kreja Bogusław	*Słowotwórstwo w aspekcie normatywnym* [Word Formation in the Normative Aspect]
Gajda Stanisław	*Kultura języka naukowego* [Academic Language Culture]
Zgółkowa Halina	*Język subkultur młodzieżowych* [Language of Youth Subcultures]
Głowiński Michał	*O dyskursie totalitarnym* [On Totalitarian Discourse]
Piotrowski Andrzej	*O dyskursie politycznym* [On Political Discourse]
Doroszewski Jan	*O języku medycyny* [On the Language of Medicine]
Wróblewski Andrzej Ibis	*Polszczyzna nam się kundli, czyli Kaczor Donald z hamburgerem w dziobie* [Our Polish is getting mongrelised, or Donald Duck with a hamburger in his beak]

Table 7. A list of papers published in Miodek (1996a)

and the Minister of Culture and Art to begin working on Polish language legislation (Miodek 1996b:8). I thus argue that the papers presented at the conference volume are a 'crucial case' (Levy 2008) of the relationship between language ideologies

promoted by Polish scholars of language and the new democratic regime. The volume is particularly significant because of its explicitly political ambitions to influence legislation as well as its actual political consequences.

Papers published in the post-conference volume provide a corpus of texts analysed in this chapter. In particular, I will focus on a paper given by two linguists, Walery Pisarek and Renata Rokoszowa, who lobbied for an appointment of the Polish Language Council, proposed that Polish language legislation should be introduced, providing the rationale for why they believed that was the case, and even put forward a draft of the Polish Language Act. I will also focus on a paper by Zygmunt Saloni, who explicitly disagreed with the proposed argument about the necessity of Polish language protection. His paper can be classified as a deconstructive analysis, resembling analytical techniques developed within CDA. Saloni's text is the only one in the volume disagreeing with Pisarek and Rokoszowa's legislative proposal. As opposed to the majority of standardisation practices, which tend to focus on promoting very specific 'correct' forms, rarely giving the rationale for what makes them 'correct' and why they should be used, papers in this volume provide an in-depth justification for the promotion of linguistic 'correctness'. In addition, Pisarek and Rokoszowa mention their draft of Polish language legislation incorporated feedback they had received in a few linguistic debates they had moderated before the conference (1996:65). This shows that the idea had been widely discussed among linguists at the time and was usually positively received. This is yet another reason why the volume is a particularly representative instance of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building.

5.3 Thematic analysis of the corpus

As in the previous chapter, in this section I will answer the question: What language ideologies can be detected in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building? To identify components of language ideologies in this discourse, I conducted a thematic analysis of my corpus in NVivo, following my three-component definition of language ideology. I will now present the results of this analysis.

5.3.1 Representations of language: Polish as a vehicle of national culture and identity, a criterion of legitimacy, and a sign of morality and manners is endangered

I found three main representations of Polish in the analysed texts: Polish is a vehicle of national culture and identity that should be 'pure', 'correct' and 'neutral'; 'correct' Polish is a criterion of legitimacy; and 'correct' and 'elegant' Polish is a sign of morality. These representations correspond to the 'worrying phenomena' (Polański 1996:9) Polish is argued to be facing: the 'invasive' nature of Anglicisms (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:49), 'the aggressive and authoritarian use of language in politics' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:49), 'the [low] quality of language in mass media' (Dolacka and Podracki 1996:99), and the 'vulgarisation of language' (Polański 1996:9).

The biggest worry expressed by the authors of analysed texts is about the 'invasive' nature of Anglicisms that are construed as a threat to the very existence of Polish. Citing Moseley and Asher's *Atlas of the World's Languages*, who estimate that half of the 6,000 existent languages will die by 2100 (2,000 of which are languages spoken by less than 1,000 speakers), and 'nearly the same number' by 2200, Pisarek and Rokoszowa argue that Polish could be one of them:

> (47)'One of these 3,000 or 5,000 languages and their varieties which are to die before the end of the 22nd century may be Polish. – So what? The world will exist without it, as it did until the 11th or 12th century AD. It is certainly true that the world can exist without Polish, but it will be poorer for everything that we have to say in Polish to Polish and to each other. The protection of the Polish language – like the protection of regional and minority languages – "contributes to the preservation and development of European cultural wealth and tradition"' (1996:56).

In this passage, Polish is represented as a vehicle of specific cultural 'content', which can only be expressed in Polish, which is an instance of the conceptual metaphor LANGUAGE IS THE DNA OF A CULTURE, characteristic for nationalist language ideology. On the one hand, Polish is personified as the addressee of whatever is said in Polish, and thus elevated to the ultimate value. On the other, it is constructed as constitutive of the Polish-speaking community's sense of group belonging. The representation of Polish as a tool of communication, significant in

Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the previous period, is narrowed down to communication among Polish speakers. Polish is explicitly represented as endangered, as it may 'die before the end of the 22nd century'. This is reinforced by the comparison between Polish and 'regional and minority languages', which should be equally 'protected'. This promotion of linguistic diversity is explicitly about 'the preservation and development of European cultural wealth and tradition', which is based on the conceptual metaphor LANGUAGES ARE BIOLOGICAL SPECIES. The protection of Polish is thus fundamentally about the protection of Polish culture against 'Western' globalisation[102].

The existence of Polish is constructed in a neo-national Romantic way as the condition of the very existence of the Polish nation. Polish is depicted as a 'fundamental value' 'that united the fragmented and degraded nation' in the period following the Partitions of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1795–1918):

> (48) 'After the crisis of the Saxon night, and especially after the collapse of statehood during the Enlightenment, care for language took on a special character, elevating the Polish language to the position of a fundamental value that united the fragmented and degraded nation. In the modern era, the sense of concern for language resulted from patriotic reasons and was related to the 150-year-old struggle for the survival of the nation for which language was the most important binder' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:48).

The period preceding the Partitions, when the Polish state was increasingly weaker, is described by means of the metaphor: 'the crisis of the Saxon night'. The reign of the Electors of Saxony: Augustus II known as the Strong and Augustus III (1697–1763) is called a 'crisis', which is reinforced by the metaphor of the 'night'. Because of its association with darkness, it creates a double pejorative evaluation. In the time when there was no Polish state, Polish is constructed as 'the most important binder' of the nation, which is founded on the metaphor LANGUAGE IS THE SPIRIT OF THE NATION. According to Pisarek and Rokoszowa, 'care for language' during the Partitions was rooted in 'patriotic reasons' and possessed 'a special character', as it was related to 'the 150-year-long fight for the survival of the nation'. In this way, 'care

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[102] Similar narratives about the Russian language are produced by the Russian government to construct 'enemies' in the 'West' (Ryazanova-Clarke 2018).

for Polish' is equated with patriotism and constructed as a factor contributing to the very existence of the nation. The ultimate value is the condition of the nation and its state, which again is reminiscent of the nation-state Romantic ideal.

Polish is also constructed as an 'autotelic value of culture' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:55). This representation is problematic, because values are rooted in the social structure, and thus elitist (Bourdieu 2010). Similarly, Polish is represented as a 'cultural value' by Puzynina and Pajdzińska, who coined the term 'language ethics'. They argue that language ethics is not just concerned with 'communicative morality', but also with

> (49) 'the attitude to language itself as a cultural value, appreciating it both as a means of communication and as a component of national identity, perhaps also an extraordinary gift of human nature, for believers – an extraordinary gift of God' (1996:42).

Puzynina and Pajdzińska depict Polish in a similar way to Miodek in quote (11), explicitly calling it 'a component of national identity'. This representation of Polish (once again based on the metaphor LANGUAGE IS THE DNA OF A CULTURE), implying that national identity is incomplete without it, is, however, 'milder' than Pisarek and Rokoszowa's, who portray Polish as a vehicle of national culture and ultimately the condition of the existence of the Polish nation. The communicative function of language is only mentioned in passing. In addition, Puzynina and Pajdzińska explicitly sacralise Polish.

Wróblewski (1996) is even more catastrophic in his vision of the future of the Polish language and even more pessimistic about the condition of Polish national identity:

> (50) 'I think that the endangerment of the Polish language is real, not imaginary. But there is still a chance to counteract it, because in 100 years it may be too late' (1996:260).

According to Wróblewski, Polish may become extinct in as few as 100 years if nothing is done to counteract its 'endangerment'. He explicitly attributes it to 'the destructive influence of the English language' (1996:257). The metaphorical title of his paper: *Our Polish is getting mongrelised, or Donald Duck with a hamburger in his*

beak[103], implies that languages should be 'pure breeds', devoid of 'foreign' components, which is why Polish national identity is transforming into 'American' under the influence of English. Polish is thus again constructed as a vehicle of national culture and identity, without which they are endangered.

Saloni produces a counter-discourse, explicitly disagreeing with the representation of Polish as endangered. He describes the idea as 'nearly catastrophic' (1996:71):

> (51) 'If a language has a stable position in many, specialised and diversified, spheres of life of a large linguistic community (preferably in all of them), its life is not endangered. The vitality of the language is strengthened by its cultural position: use in literature and, above all, in school... As a monolingual Pole, who has been teaching Polish professionally in Poland all his life, I do not see any possibility that such conditions would develop in the Polish-speaking community. And I do not see a real threat to the position of the Polish language... From the moment when we can talk about the Polish language, its existence has never been weakened enough to seriously consider the possibility of its disappearance... However, there was a real threat to its position – during the Partitions ... Such a threat to Polish was posed only by German in the Prussian state, where, however, the stratified Polish community developed forms of resistance and defence of the Polish language ... Karol Libelt's maxim is widely known: "A nation lives as long as its language lives, without a national language, there is no nation". Although it may be doubted whether it is universally true (cf. the case of the Jews or the Irish), it plays a huge role in the consciousness of Poles' (1996:71–73).

Saloni deconstructs Pisarek and Rokoszowa's argument that Polish is endangered, arguing that its position is well-established, as it is used in many (arguably all) spheres of life, and the Polish-speaking community is 'large'. Further, Saloni distinguishes between the existence and position of a language, arguing that only the latter was indeed endangered in Polish history and that was the case only in one of the three partitioning states. Questioning the maxim by Libelt, a Polish

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[103] It is an allusion to the Polish coat of arms (a white crowned eagle with a golden beak and talons) and a famous sentence: 'Polacy nie gęsi, … swój język mają' ('Poles are no geese … and have their own language') written by the Polish poet and writer Mikołaj Rej (1505–1569), who was the first one to write in Polish, not Latin. Wróblewski's negative attitude to 'America' and its influence on Polish culture is implied in stereotypical metonymies of American popular culture: Donald Duck and a hamburger.

Romantic philosopher, Saloni challenges the nationalist language ideology underlying Pisarek and Rokoszowa's argument but observes that it is strong among Poles.

As argued before, Anglicisms are associated with globalisation, the new international reality, the symbol of which is English, its *lingua franca* (see 2.2.4.4.3). To discuss them, the authors of analysed texts use a few pejorative metaphors. Pisarek and Rokoszowa talk about the 'invasive' nature of Anglicisms (1996:49). The very adjective 'invasive' is metaphorical and represents English in military terms as the 'invader' of Polish, which in turn is represented as endangered as a consequence of globalisation. The adjective 'invasive' can also be interpreted as a biological metaphor of a (non-native) plant spreading so rapidly that it threatens a native plant community. Particularly frequent in my corpus are phrases: 'a deluge of foreign languages' (Polański 1996:9), 'a violent deluge of Anglicisms' (Lubaś 1996:157) and 'a deluge of foreign vocabulary' (Kreja 1996:209). This metaphor of the elements of nature implies that Anglicisms are dangerous and difficult to control, partly because of their huge numbers[104]. To talk about the use of Anglicisms in medicine, Doroszewski (1996) describes it as a 'problem' and 'weed infestation' (1996:255). The metaphor of 'weeds' pictures 'native' Polish as a value, while Anglicisms as undesirable, harmful, and arguably worthless[105]. All these metaphors imply that Polish should be 'pure', which means it should not be influenced by other languages. The ideal of 'purity' is typical for purist language ideology, but it is also founded on the belief characteristic of nationalist language ideology that language is a vehicle of

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[104] Despite the representation of Anglicisms as an 'invasion', 'expansion', and 'deluge' in my corpus, the actual influence of English on Polish has been proven to be almost negligible, or at least much smaller than seems to be assumed (Mańczak-Wohlfeld 1996, 2004a, 2008; Otwinowska-Kasztelanic 2000). Some authors have pointed out that Anglicisms contribute to the stylistic variation of Polish (Stroińska and Andrews 2018:255). Although in my corpus the use of Anglicisms is attributed to negatively constructed 'pragmatism' (as opposed to seeing Polish as a 'value'), many linguists argue that the ability to use stylistically different forms in different contexts is indicative of social and communicative competence (Cameron 2012:16; Milroy and Milroy 2012:100–102). In addition, while there is a lot of criticism of the influence of English on modern languages, English has also been associated with 'coolness', especially in the trade sector (Backhaus 2007; Piller 2003; Schlick 2003), which can explain the worry about the use of English in the field of economy.

[105] This negative valorisation of 'foreignness' can be seen in Polish vocabulary and idioms denoting foreign nationalities or in the negative meanings of many borrowings in Polish (Pajdzińska 2001). This negative valorisation of 'foreignness' can also be seen in the discussion about representatives of Poland's national football team who did not grow up in Poland but had a Polish descent: Ludovic Obraniak and Demien Perquis. Both were fiercely criticised for not speaking Polish (pr 2012a, 2012b, 2013).

national identity and that national languages are 'bounded'. In other words, each nation-state should speak its own national language to preserve its unique identity and national languages should not blend with others, as this poses a threat to national identity.

The 'deluge of Anglicisms' is often attributed to young people. Kreja, for example, calls it 'an observable language fashion'. This idea is related to the negative attitude to language change, which is frequent in my corpus. Discussing morphological changes in contemporary Polish, Kreja explains that his

> (52) 'normative objections result from the fact that the language does not keep up with assimilation of this new strong wave' (1996:205).

Linguistic changes are thus constructed similarly to Anglicisms, by means of the metaphor of the sea or ocean waves, described as 'strong', which can be dangerous and difficult to control. In addition, new forms are implicitly constructed as 'non-native' by means of the word 'assimilation'. The underlying belief is that language should not change. The implied value is thus the (immutable) 'past' and 'tradition'.

Anglicisms are argued to be particularly 'invasive' in the area of the economy, that is in 'trade, services, and related advertising' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:65). The use of English on shop signs and notice boards is constructed as particularly worrying:

> (53) '*You regained independence, you are in your own country, what forces you to use such second-rate English?* This statement by an American tourist in the Krakow market square in the summer of 1995, prompted by the sight of mainly English shops signs and notice boards in the street, may serve as an interesting example of the divergence between the aspirations of Polish society and the expectations of the people to whom these aspirations are addressed, that is visitors from the West' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:53–54).

This opinion of the anonymous American tourist is quoted to make a case that even 'foreigners' are concerned about the condition of Polish, which is meant to support the claim that Polish is endangered and needs protection. The tourist implies that every nation should speak their own language (and thus other nations should not speak hers). Language is thus yet again constructed as a vehicle of national identity. While the use of English in the economic sphere is undesirable, according to

Pisarek and Rokoszowa, they recognise that the Polish language, as a component of Polish culture, can be used as a commodity (Cameron 2000; Heller 2010; Ryazanova-Clarke 2017) in an attempt to meet expectations of 'visitors from the "West"'. The worry about 'mainly English shop signs and notice boards' can be interpreted as an indication of the worry about globalisation as well as an instance of the discourse about contemporary 'consumerism', which is said to be rooted in 'America' and infiltrating Polish culture. It is contrasted with 'national values'[106]. It is striking that the authors of the analysed texts never mention the role of English in enabling global trade.

It is argued that 'national values' need to be promoted in the face of globalisation constructed as a threat:

> (54)'… it should be remembered that we are entering the global market as its important part, and the jobs of many Poles and thus their bread will depend on what our advertising will be like. As reported in the press, global advertising concerns are striving to eliminate national and regional agencies and to standardise forms of advertising on a continental scale. In order to keep our face in this area and to stand up to the mighty competition, it is necessary to work on our advertising style, referring to our system of values' (Lewicki 1996:120).

Lewicki represents 'global advertising concerns', attempting to 'standardise forms of advertising', as a threat to 'national and regional agencies', and thus to economic interests of nation-states and specific regions. Criticising the 'stylistic dissonance' in the language of Polish advertising, where formal and informal styles co-exist, Lewicki argues that Polish advertising style needs to be improved as a way of maintaining authority and respect ('keep our face') and defending the international position of Poland, threated by the global competition ('stand up to the mighty competition'). According to Lewicki, the way to improve Polish advertising style is to 'refer to our system of values'. The recurring use of the possessive pronoun 'our'

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[106] The importance of the construct of 'America' in my corpus can be explained by the worry about globalisation leading to homogenisation, the opposite of 'diversity' (see 2.2.4.4.3). The United States is often associated with homogenisation due to its cultural influence, for which the term 'Americanisation' has been developed, and which results from its political position in the international arena. 'America' in my corpus becomes a synecdoche for the 'West', which is where globalisation is believed to come from. Perhaps due to its stereotypical 'lack of history', the country is often constructed as 'lacking values', which 'consumerism' is indicative of.

refers to the nation constructed as homogeneously patriotic, that is placing a high value on the nation. Lewicki thus attempts to construct a specific version of national identity.

According to Pisarek and Rokoszowa, the second threat to Polish is 'the aggressive and authoritarian use of language in politics' (1996:49). However, their criticism is very different to criticisms of *nowomowa* discussed in the previous chapter. Pisarek and Rokoszowa argue that it is not 'manipulation' that leads to the 'confusion' of Polish citizens, but linguistic mistakes in state administration, which produce often 'unclear' and 'incomprehensible' documents:

> (55) 'From the perspective of official pragmatics in state administration, the now forgotten circular letter of the Presidential Office of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers on linguistic correctness of official letters from 1952 (P-O 10/52) could have had some significance. We read there, among other things: "Many official documents contain linguistic mistakes… The lack of concern for the correctness of the language means that citizens receive official letters that are not always clear and comprehensible"' (1996:64).

Pisarek and Rokoszowa argue that 'linguistic correctness', the opposite of 'linguistic mistakes', is a guarantee of 'neutrality', which is based on the idea of communication as telementation. Implied is the expectation that state authorities should be concerned about linguistic 'correctness' and if they are not, they are not doing their job properly. This in turn implies that the socio-political order, which is a conservative value, is in crisis. Polish is thus implicitly depicted as a criterion of legitimacy. In other words, the idea is that if political actors do not use 'correct' Polish, this is an indication that they are not legitimate political actors. This representation is similar to the representation of Polish as a sign of eloquence identified in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the previous period, in quotes (7), (23), and (37).

Speaking about communicative competence of academics, Gajda (1996) also combines the value of 'neutrality' with 'correctness', which he equates with 'high language culture', in a similar way. The ideal is constructed as:

> (56) 'behaviour exemplifying high culture (exemplary), meeting not only the utmost standards of scientific communication, but also elegant (the aesthetic criterion) and "polite" (the ethical criterion)' (1996:226).

Gajda argues that to be recognised as a 'proper' academic, one needs to communicate by means of 'exemplary', 'elegant', and 'polite' language, which is equivalent to respect for the reader on the one hand, and as a sign of mastery of the subject on the other. In addition, he equates such use of language with 'behaviour exemplifying high culture', which, as argued, is 'dictated' by the elites (Bourdieu 2010). Gajda demonstrates that Polish academics often fail to do so. Polish is thus again constructed as a criterion of legitimacy. In this way, the standing of academics as recognised customary authorities is challenged, implying a crisis of the socio-political order.

When it comes to the 'quality of language in mass media', a few authors complain about 'mistakes' in the press and on TV. This is a frequent language complaint associated with the discourse of standardisation since the media are seen as its important area. According to Majkowska,

(57)'... journalists and media owners all over the (free market) world declare their allegiance to the principle that respect for the truth is the most important right of the press ... Winning over the reader at any cost is becoming the dominant principle in the profit-oriented and threatened by the competition press, for journalists subordinated to this principle, breaking the norm of speech culture becomes a secondary or irrelevant issue altogether' (1996:86).

The opposite of the capitalist 'principle' of 'winning over the reader at any cost', called the 'dominant principle' of contemporary press, is construed as 'respect for the truth'. Like in the previous quotes, 'respect for the truth' is not achieved by using 'neutral' language, but 'correct' language, that is a language conforming to 'the norms of speech culture'. The use of 'correct' language is yet again constructed as a criterion of legitimacy: to be recognised as a 'proper' journalist, one needs to use 'correct' Polish. 'Incorrectness' in the media implies a crisis of recognised customary authorities and ultimately a crisis of the socio-political order, which is a conservative value[107].

According to Wróblewski,

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[107] Bańko comments on the social status of 'correct' spelling in a similar way: that it is interpreted as tantamount to intellect and manners (2003:5–6).

(58)'linguistic correctness of newspapers has significantly dropped' (1996:258).

Wróblewski identifies numerous types of mistakes in the press, especially in terms of syntax and spelling, which he attributes to computer editing and advertisements. He implicitly portrays 'traditional' press positively, as obeying the norms of 'linguistic correctness'. Wróblewski's concern indicates his expectation that the media should be linguistic authorities. Once again, the use of 'correct' Polish is associated with recognition as, in this case, 'proper' press and 'proper' journalists.

Similarly, Dolacka and Podracki (1996) list frequent idiomatic, lexical, and stylistic 'mistakes' in Polish Television, which they see as a linguistic authority:

(59)'In all certainty, [the language and style of TV shows] is a very real and perhaps even dominant "language model"' (1996:99).

Dolacka and Podracki then discuss the language culture training they ran in Polish Television at the time. Its ultimate goal was to make sure that all Poles spoke 'correctly', instructed by the 'correct' language of TV presenters. The privileged position of linguistic elites is thus emphasised, as they play an important role in creating a homogeneous nation speaking 'correctly'.

The final threat to Polish, vulgarisation, is linked to the lack of manners and morality:

(60)'Colloquial language is becoming... vulgar. Vulgarity entered literature, the screen, and the stage. In the media, boorish epithets and vulgar expressions do not shock journalists anymore, because they use them without restraint. What is worse, this is the language our ladies and children already speak' (Wróblewski 1996:258).

Vulgarisation is said to be taking place in all areas of language, including areas of standardisation. Vulgarity, bluntly equated with 'boorishness', is supposed to 'shock', like bad manners or immorality[108]. The implied linguistic value is that of 'elegance' associated with obedience of 'traditional' norms of morality and good

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[108] In an interview devoted to an alleged use of vulgarisms in US media (Młocka 2010), Kłosińska describes the United States as a country where people do not care about manners, and criticises its influence on Polish culture and language.

manners[109]. In other words, 'elegant' Polish is implicitly depicted as a sign of manners and morality (in the case of Miodek's book, it was 'correct' Polish). What is especially striking about this passage is the expectation that women ('ladies') and children in particular should conform to the norms of good manners and morality. This can be interpreted as a belief that (obedient) women and children are cornerstones of the socio-political order, which with their 'vulgarity' is in crisis.

Young people are a figure which appears frequently in this context. Zgółkowa (1996) criticises the language of what she calls 'youth subcultures', characterised, among other things, by 'vulgarity':

> (61) 'The category of vulgarisms is particularly shocking in rock lyrics, but also in all other language varieties associated with youth subcultures ... The degree of saturation [with vulgar vocabulary] in rap lyrics is probably the highest. This variety is not only a rebellion, but also a moral provocation' (1996:235).

Despite claiming that she is not going to continue the (negative) axiology frequently applied to the language of young people, Zgółkowa describes them with the highly evaluative expression 'youth subcultures'. She thus implies that young people adhere to different (presumably less conservative and nationalist) values than the 'rest' of Poles[110]. Like Wróblewski, Zgółkowa uses the word 'shocking' to describe vulgarisms. By calling rap lyrics 'a rebellion' and 'a moral provocation', she explicitly links 'vulgarity' to disobedience and immorality and implies that the current socio-political order is under threat. The focus on young people is likely to result from the fact that young age tends to be thought of as formative years, also in terms of the use of language[111].

Zgółkowa also attributes subversive intentions to another aspect of the language of 'youth subcultures': 'graphics and spelling':

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[109] According to the World Values Survey, in 1997 in Poland 'good manners' ('dobre maniery') was selected the third and 'obedience' ('posłuszeństwo') the fifth quality that children should be encouraged at home, being mentioned by 63.4 and 48.7 per cent of respondents, respectively (Inglehart et al. 2014).

[110] It may be significant that most of the authors of the texts included in my corpus were born between the 1920s and the 1940s.

[111] Sociolinguistic studies support this view (see, e.g., Kerswill et al. 2013), showing that individual speakers are fairly stable in their language use after the end of adolescence (Sankoff and Blondeau 2007). Studies also show intergenerational differences in language use (Hua 2008; Lee 2021; Rubino 2015).

(62)'Breaking spelling rules is treated in this circle in a demonstrative way –
not as a mistake, but rather as a conscious disregard, a mockery of
official regulations (1996:237).

What is thus at stake is obedience, indicative of respect for traditional 'official'
authorities and traditional socio-political order[112].

Themes / subthemes	Key words	Language ideology
Polish as a vehicle of national culture and identity	Polish, language, nation, culture, cultural wealth, tradition, patriotic, binder, struggle, survival, identity	nationalist
Polish is a component of national identity	component, national, identity	nationalist
Polish as a value	value, fundamental, autotelic, cultural, unite	nationalist
Polish is endangered	die, endangered, endangerment, protection, preservation, regional language, minority language, Anglicisms, invasive, deluge, foreign, native, weed, global	nationalist/purist
Polish as a tool for communication	tool, means, communication, communicative, say	standard
Polish should not change	assimilation, new, wave	standard/purist
Polish is well-established	stable position, sphere, linguistic community, position, weaken, endangered, threat, disappearance	anti-nationalist
'Correct' Polish as a criterion of legitimacy	correct, incorrect, correctness, incorrectness, mistakes, elegant, official, scientific, press	standard
'Incorrect' language leads to confusion	clear, comprehensive, respect	standard
'Elegant' Polish as a sign of morality and good manners	vulgar, vulgarity, vulgarism, boorish, shock, shocking, polite, subculture, rebellion, moral, provocation, breaking, rules, regulations	standard

Table 8. Thematic codes: Representations of Polish in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (1989–2015)

In summary, there are three main representations of Polish in my corpus. Firstly, typically for nationalist language ideology, Polish is depicted as a vehicle of national identity and culture or, alternatively, as a 'component of national identity', a 'value', or the 'binder' of the nation (see Table 8). It is argued that Polish should be 'pure', that is devoid of Anglicisms, as only this way can national identity and culture be preserved in the face of globalisation. This is an instance of purist language ideology. The representation of Polish as a vehicle of national identity is deconstructed by

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[112] Young people can use subversive language as a way of constructing identity (see, e.g., Eckert 1998).

Saloni, who argues that neither the Polish language nor Polish national identity is endangered. Secondly, 'correct' and 'neutral' Polish is depicted as a criterion of legitimacy, which is turn is characteristic of standard language ideology. By attributing 'mistakes' to 'traditional' language authorities, that is politicians, academics, and journalists, their authority is challenged. What is implied here is a conservative idea that if the people and organisations considered to be 'traditional' language authorities do indeed use 'correct' and 'neutral' language, then the functioning of the whole socio-political order is improved. Thirdly, 'elegant' Polish is depicted as a sign of morality and good manners. The underlying value seems to be obedience as the foundation of the socio-political order. The description of the language of the media and young people as 'vulgar' also implies that the 'traditional' socio-political order is in crisis.

5.3.2   Political legitimation: 'care for Polish' as a 'value' is aimed to legitimise a specific version of Polish national identity

The representation of Polish as a vehicle of national identity provides the foundation for the argument that the condition and even existence of the Polish nation as well as the strength of the Polish state depend on the condition of Polish. A 'good' condition of Polish, understood as its 'purity', 'correctness', 'neutrality', and 'elegance', is seen as related to 'care for Polish'. The authors of the analysed texts argue that those who 'care for Polish' see it as a value, which in turn is indicative of patriotism, perceived as endangered. These are usually the socio-political elites, especially those with conservative values. The use of 'pure', 'correct', 'neutral', and 'elegant' Polish is thus justified to legitimise a specific version of Polish national identity: one modelled on the 'past', when the nation was the highest value for the whole nation, guided by the elites, and the state was strong as a consequence.

Pisarek and Rokoszowa define 'care for language' as 'a variety of manifestations of interest in language', including 'the creation of spelling regulations, grammars, and dictionaries' (1996:47). As the Polish phrase 'troska o język' means not only 'care' in a positive sense, but also 'worry' about a difficult situation in the present or potentially in the future, they distinguish between two types of such care:

(63) 'On the one hand, care inspires the creation of positive models of the Polish language, on the other, it is expressed by naming and combating negative phenomena' (1996:47).

In my corpus, the times when Polish thrived coincide with the times when the Polish nation and nation-state were strong. The 16th century, which Poles often call the 'Golden Age of Polish culture', is represented as the ideal time for Polish. Linguistic norms were shaped then and its status as the main state language was legally codified:

(64) 'Historically, care for language has taken various forms, accompanying the Polish language from the very beginning of its functioning as the language of culture, religion, and politics. The period of shaping the canon of Polish language models falls in the 16th century. The history of the Polish language emphasises both the participation of the elites and the practical activity of publishers in establishing the rules and regulations of grammar and spelling ... The period of shaping orthographic, grammatical, and stylistic models falls around the time when the first Polish strictly legal acts concerning language appeared' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:48–49).

Pisarek and Rokoszowa represent the 'Golden Age of Polish culture' as the time when Polish became 'the language of culture, religion, and politics', that is the language of the state. They argue that it is also the time when 'care for Polish' began, and list a variety of typical standardisation practices, including language legislation, in which the elites (and publishers) played an important role. By constructing a connection between 'care for language' and its status of 'the language of culture, religion, and politics', Pisarek and Rokoszowa suggest that without care for language, the condition of Polish may deteriorate, and it may ultimately lose its privileged status. They thus imply that the condition of Polish depends on care for it.

According to Pisarek and Rokoszowa, the condition of Polish deteriorated in the 17th century, which Poles often refer to as 'the Silver Age'. This, in turn, was linked to the decline of care for language:

(65) 'For the Polish language, this is the beginning of a slow yet systematic and widespread degradation of the language, combined with the decline of printing, weakening of publishing activities, the spread but also increased superficiality of education, and the decline of culture, which affected our community for the entire century. The overall situation was such that even isolated examples of the creation of excellent literature did not result in any change. The critical mass of the corrupt language was too great to be outweighed by individual gems created mostly in the

privacy of home, without the possibility of dissemination in print and without a wider impact' (1996:51).

The 'degradation' of Polish, a similar hyperbole to ones used by Głowiński to describe the influence of *nowomowa* on Polish in (2), is attributed to the slowdown in standardisation practices: 'the decline of printing', the 'weakening of the publishing activities', the 'spread, but also increased superficiality of education', and the 'decline of culture', which made Polish too 'damaged' to be improved by instances of 'excellent literature'. Literature is explicitly expected to be an important language model (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:52). Pisarek and Rokoszowa's 'language complaints' again serve to construct the condition of Polish as dependent on 'care for language'.

Pisarek and Rokoszowa represent the condition of the Polish language in the 16th century as the ideal, while they explicitly call its condition in the 17th century 'a slow yet systematic and widespread degradation'. This mirrors the deterioration of the condition of the Polish state. In the 16th century, as a result of the Union of Lublin of 1569 mentioned by Pisarek and Rokoszowa, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was established, consisting of the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Dutchy of Lithuania. It was one of the largest and populous states in the 16th- and 17th-century Europe, including parts of what is now Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. The Commonwealth had a strong international position and experienced economic prosperity as well as rapid development of culture. The position of the Polish *szlachta* (nobility) who are often seen as enjoying the greatest liberties in Europe in contrast to absolute monarchies, was very strong. In the 17th century, the Commonwealth was challenged by numerous wars, including the so-called 'Swedish Deluge' (1655–1660), the rebellion of Ukrainian Cossacks initiated by the Khmelnytsky Uprising in 1648 (which escalated into the war with the Russian Tsar, as a result of which Ukraine was divided between Poland and Russia in 1686), as well as wars with Turkey (1672–1683)[113]. The 17th century is also associated with the abuse of noble liberties and the decline of mores, which is believed to have eventually led to the loss of Poland's

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[113] This belief is strengthened by Henryk Sienkiewicz's 'Trilogy', a compulsory reading in Polish schools. All the three novels, written between 1884 and 1888, are set during the 17th-century wars, and their aim was to 'lift the spirits' of Poles after two unsuccessful uprisings (the November Uprising of 1831 and the January Uprising of 1863), which not only did not restore the Polish state, but also resulted in severe political repressions.

independence. A parallel between the condition of the Polish language and the condition of the Polish state implies a correlation between the two. This parallel serves to legitimise a strong Polish state, which is perceived as the foundation of order.

The authors of my corpus represent two other periods of Polish history as ideal. Kreja contrasts contemporary Poland with the pre- and early post-war period when there were attempts to replace borrowings with native structures:

> (66)'In the pre-war and immediate post-war period, considerable word-formation invention developed in Poland... the aim of which was to replace part of foreign vocabulary with native word-formation structures... Today, such efforts are not observed, at least not on a large scale' (1996:209).

The period in the 'past' that Kreja portrays as one of the ideal times to be followed is the Second Republic of Poland, a parliamentary democracy right after Poland regained independence, which in Poland tends to be constructed positively as the time of political, economic, and cultural development. In this way, Kreja suggests a connection between 'care for language', understood in a purist way, and the prosperity of the Polish state. Kreja portrays the immediate period after the Second World War (1945–1947) as the other ideal time, most likely because of the anti-Soviet rebellion by some partisan military formations consisting of members of the former Polish Armed Forces, who followed the 'independence' traditions of the pre-1939 intellectual elites. In other words, the 'immediate post-war period' was the time when some Poles continued the legacy of the Second Republic, and the nation was the value they fought for.

A few authors of the texts included in my corpus argue that in difficult times for the Polish nation and state, 'care for Polish' increased. This argument serves to delegitimise the challenging powers and ultimately promote the Polish nation-state. According to Pisarek and Rokoszowa, the hightened sensitivity to Russian and German influences on Polish was a defence mechanism against the power of the partitioning empires. They argue that this mechanism helped the Polish nation survive:

> (67)'During the period of the Partitions, sensitivity to Germanisms and Russicisms developed. The vigilance that arose at that time allowed, to

some extent, to resist the administrative pressure of the partitioner's language' (1996:49).

Similarly, Pisarek and Rokoszowa argue that Poles' rejection of *nowomowa* was an act of a rebellion, aimed at delegitimising the People's Republic of Poland and its authorities. By distinguishing between the authorities and Polish 'society', which, as argued, was not that straightforward (see 4.4.3.3), Pisarek and Rokoszowa prioritise Polish 'society':

(68)'In terms of activities directed against phenomena considered to be negative, it is worth mentioning the reaction of society in the 1970s and 1980s to the then *nowomowa*, already perceived by specialists as a variety of totalitarian language used to communicate between the authorities and society in the People's Republic of Poland' (1996:49).

According to Pisarek and Rokoszowa, Polish 'society' actively 'cared for language', counteracting the threat of the 'pressure of the language of the partitioners' during the Partitions and the 'variation of totalitarian language' in the communist period, respectively. Pisarek and Rokoszowa represent Germanisms and Russicisms very differently to Miodek in quotes (11) and (14). In addition, out of many ways in which *nowomowa* was discussed in the previous period, they only focus on the theme of resistance, covered in quotes (33) and (34). Pisarek and Rokoszowa ultimately construct the struggle for 'pure' and 'neutral' language as the struggle for national independence and the sovereignty of the nation. In this way, a homogeneous vision of the Polish nation is constructed, where the nation is a value recognised by all Poles, and their right to their own state is claimed.

In my corpus, a distinction is made between Polish language users who see it as a value and those who see it 'pragmatically'. Markowski and Satkiewicz distinguish between 'exemplary norms' and 'standard norms', arguing that their coherent codification is a necessary step in Polish normative linguistics:

(69)'Compliance with the requirements of the exemplary norm is characteristic of conscious users of the Polish language who treat the language not as an instrumental value, but also (and perhaps above all) as a v a l u e i n i t s e l f, a u t o t e l i c, t h a t i s a l s o c u l t u r e - f o r m i n g, n a t i o n a l, e t h i c a l, o r a e s t h e t i c. A lower level of norm (standard, practical, colloquial norm) is characteristic primarily of unofficial contacts (both public and private) of a significant portion of contemporary Poles. At this level, language is treated primarily as a value in use, as a tool

of communication, persuasion and expression, a tool that should be efficient and economical. This lower level is a reality that cannot be ignored if one wants to properly and truthfully describe today's Polish language' (1996:23).

Markowski and Satkiewicz explicitly call the ideal use of language 'the exemplary norm', or the 'higher level of norm', which is used by 'conscious' Polish language speakers who see it as 'a value in itself, autotelic, that is also culture-forming, national, ethical, or aesthetic'. The 'standard norm', equated with the 'practical' and 'colloquial' norm, is constructed as a 'lower level of norm'; a 'reality' of 'a significant portion of contemporary Poles', who, by contrast, see it instrumentally as a 'tool'. Markowski and Satkiewicz thus portray one of the main representations of Polish in the professional metalinguistic discourse in the previous period as undesirable, at least to an extent. Typically for standard language ideology, they discredit varieties other than 'official' (see 2.2.4.1.1). In their view, the ideal speakers are the 'conscious' users of Polish who care about the nation, that is the elites with nationalist-conservative views.

According to Cegieła, 'the exemplary norm' is impossible to preserve, as

(70) 'Poles' interest in high culture is decreasing, the number of people with a higher education is dropping, and linguistic awareness is low' (1996:33).

Cegieła attributes the 'exemplary norm' to people interested in 'high culture', people with higher education, and 'high' 'linguistic awareness'. Her argument is very elitist.

By contrast, the popularity of Anglicisms is attributed to

(71) 'the domination of utilitarian values over spiritual (patriotic, national), in the pragmatism of the new, emerging middle class' (Lubaś 1996:57).

While Lubaś associates seeing Polish as a 'spiritual', 'patriotic, national' value to upper classes, he blames the 'middle class', which sees Polish as a 'utilitarian' value, for the 'worrying phenomena'. Care for the nation is thus attributed to the elites, and the negative valorisation of the present implies the positive valorisation of the past.

A common theme in my corpus is that not only Polish is in decline. So are 'patriotic' values:

(72) 'In public consciousness, patriotic reasons behind caring for language are becoming less and less important. Currently, there is no sense of threat to the language or threat to national existence due to the abandonment of language issues. On the contrary, the concept of nation, and perhaps also native language, sometimes seems to be an embarrassing or limiting corset that hinders the march to modernity' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:53).

It is yet again clear that the 'threat to language' is tantamount to the 'threat to national existence', which implies that Polish is an essential component of national identity. Pisarek and Rokoszowa construct an opposition between the 'past', when patriotism and the national language mattered, and the 'present'. 'Patriotic reasons behind caring for language' are contrasted with the metaphorical 'march to modernity', seen as illusory progress, which seems to have intoxicated large crowds. Poles are constructed as proponents of such 'modernity', who consider the nation and national language 'embarrassing and limiting'. In this way, Poles themselves are represented as a source of threat for Polish, which linguistic elites are supposed to counteract. Once again, the division between 'ordinary people' and the elites is created. The Polish nation is thus constructed in a very specific way: on the one hand, it includes 'all Poles', but on the other, it must be guided by the elites, since 'ordinary people' themselves may be too 'intoxicated' with 'modernity', endangering the Polish language and nation.

Wróblewski is even more explicit in his argument, as he proclaims that:

(73) 'patriotism, which was the main argument for the care for the language, is losing value' (1996:257).

In this way, Wróblewski promotes a specific version of national identity, in which all Poles should see the nation as the highest value.

Wróblewski, who explicitly describes himself as a 'traditionalist, even conservative', is also explicit about who the protection of Polish is ultimately against:

(74) 'it is worth slowing down the actions of various revolutionisers, who are ready to accept anything new, especially if it is western' (1996:257).

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The protection of Polish is aimed to legitimise 'domestic' 'conservatives' who instead of 'accepting anything new' from the 'West' protect what is 'native'[114]. A specific 'traditional' and 'local' version of national identity is thus promoted.

This version of national identity is constructed in opposition to the communist past. Proposing Polish language legislation, Pisarek and Rokoszowa provide examples of language legislation in Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovakia:

> (75)'It may seem that countries that have recently gained sovereignty will be more willing to legally protect their language as an important factor of their identity and distinctiveness' (1996:60).

Language legislation in these countries is explicitly constructed as legitimising their 'identity and distinctiveness', which can now be cultivated thanks to the regained 'sovereignty'. Pisarek and Rokoszowa thus exclude the communist period from the narratives about 'proper' Polish history. This is paradoxical, since the authors of the analysed texts repeatedly promote the idea of Polish cultural and linguistic homogeneity, which originated in the period of communist authoritarianism and can be exemplified by the Decree of 1945 (see 4.4.3.2.6)[115].

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[114] After the collapse of communism, a double narrative about the 'West' can be observed in Poland. On the one hand, the 'West' tends to be associated with democracy that Poland started to build, but on the other, this attitude to the West is 'founded on a conviction that Poland managed to preserve and cultivate the "truer" and "purer" version of Western civilization (inescapably embedded in the Western variant of Christianity), whereas in the western part of the continent this civilization has been corrupted perhaps beyond repair' (Kubik 2003:341). These constructions resemble the 15th-century idea of Poland as 'the fortification of Christianity' due to its then border with Turkey. By constructing Poland as 'the "truer" and "purer" version of Western civilization', where 'native' 'values' still matter, an argument for a special position of Poland in the 'West' is made. It is a position of special privilege based on independence from external influences (the flip side of which is xenophobia and exclusivity) and innocence resulting from sticking to 'traditional' values, as opposed to 'modern' ones (Kotwas and Kubik 2019). Duszak observes this negative attitude towards Europe and the 'West' on the terrain of language: 'The Western values in communication become targets of a new "axiological revisionism". Criticisms are directed at what is seen as a negative Western influence on traditional Polish values' (2006:100).

[115] In the 17th century, ethnically Polish people constituted only 40 per cent of the whole population of the country, with a large proportion of Russians, Belarussians, Lithuanians, Jews and Germans, and only 53 per cent of the population were Roman Catholic (Kuklo 2020). In the interwar period, ethnic Poles constituted less than 70 per cent of the population, with significant Ukrainian, Jewish, Belarussian, and German populations (Zieliński 1982:124–26). Although '[t]he tradition of ethnic heterogeneity and cultural and political pluralism … developed during the several hundred years of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth', which is constructed positively in my corpus, it is used to promote 'the vision of the Polish state as an ethnically and culturally homogeneous entity' (Kubik 1994:64).

The promotion of this version of national identity is often combined with an attempt to delegitimise current political authorities, which is based on the representation of 'correct' Polish as a criterion of legitimacy. Combining the criticism of the qualities of *nowomowa* in 'public language' after 1989 with the promotion of 'linguistic correctness', Lubaś (1996) criticises a certain phonetic form used by Lech Wałęsa, the former leader of the 'Solidarity' movement, who was elected president in 1990:

> (76)'this type of pronunciation is still considered dialectal, not regional or colloquial, and thus is not entitled to be used in public. Allowing the above-mentioned regional-dialectal variants in public pronunciation may lead to the degradation of the phonological system of standard Polish' (1996:154).

Lubaś contrasts 'standard Polish' with 'regional-dialectal' and 'colloquial varieties', which 'are not entitled to be used in public'. He thus explicitly promotes standard Polish, denying 'regional-dialectal variants' the right to be used in public contexts. Lubaś's representation of dialects is thus very different to Miodek's, who presented the Silesian dialect as the most 'native' and 'authentic' variety of Polish in quote (11), embraced Polish dialectal diversity in quote (12), and explicitly promoted the use of colloquial forms, although only in the right contexts (13). Although Lubaś does not specify what geographical or social variety he considers to be the 'standard', it seems to be the variety (or varieties) spoken by the elites in 'central' Poland[116]. The implied value is 'correctness', tantamount to standard forms and indicative of patriotism, which is ultimately a sign of the speaker's legitimacy. In this way, Lubaś criticises Wałęsa for his linguistic incompetence, which can be interpreted as an attempt to delegitimise his power as president.

A few authors, especially the authors of linguistic studies of communist propaganda published before 1989, discuss the language of politics after 1989, arguing that it resembles communist propaganda (cf. Andrews 2011; Kreß 2012; Ryazanova-Clarke 2015). This criticism of the language of politics is ultimately an

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[116] The two recognised varieties in contemporary Polish descriptive grammar are the 'Warsaw' and the 'Kraków-Poznań' ones (see, e.g., Chojnacka-Kuraś et al. 2017).

expression of dissatisfaction with the way the transformation was going (Duszak 2006). According to Głowiński,

> (77) 'The fall of totalitarianism is not, unfortunately, equivalent to the disappearance of totalitarian language from social life … totalitarian discourse in its acute form is conspicuous not so much in the language of politicians and journalists for whom it could be a continuation, but it is much more distinct among some radical anti-communists, who unconsciously and thoughtlessly copy the way of speaking of those they hate' (1996:245).

Głowiński, who expands on his linguistic description of *nowomowa* by formulating a more 'general' theory of 'totalitarian discourse', argues that it is the construction of the whole discourse that distinguishes totalitarian from democratic language. By attributing the use of 'totalitarian discourse' to the new political elite (previously 'radical anti-communists'), Głowiński invokes liberal language ideology and thus diminishes this elites' authority.

Bralczyk (1996) finds qualities of *nowomowa* in the speeches of four prime ministers after the fall of communism: Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Jan Olszewski, Waldemar Pawlak and Hanna Suchocka, explicitly calling their language *new nowomowa* (1996:134). On top of qualities characteristic of communist *nowomowa*, Bralczyk finds their language 'manipulatory' (1996:128) due to its colloquiality and even vulgarity (1996:124), 'celebration' of a new political terminology (1996:128), as well as 'pathetic theatralisation' (which Bralczyk defines as bad oratory skills) and 'populist tricks' (that is drawing on colloquial models) (1996:128). Bralczyk thus yet again combines the ideals of 'neutrality' and 'correctness'. He attributes the development of *new nowomowa* to the change from the Party-state monopoly to pluralism and the subsequent shift of power to the public that can now 'decide who they are going to listen to' (1996:124):

> (78) 'The syndrome of megaphone is replaced with the syndrome of stage: here the addressee has the advantage, even if it is an addressee who is in a way imagined – because a true interaction rarely takes place, and the voters' reaction is usually delayed, e.g., to the time of an election' (1996:124).

The use of 'manipulation' is thus attributed to political interests of politicians competing for power, who use language as a political tool, like communist politicians

in the previous period. Bralczyk contrasts such 'manipulation' with the use of 'neutral' language, which he suggests is indicative of the democratic ideal where voters' 'real' (not 'imagined') interests are represented. Once again, the authorities' claim to power is questioned by the invocation of liberal language ideology.

Piotrowski (1996) discusses the brutalisation of the language of politics. He argues that the key concept describing the contemporary language of politics is 'conflict' or 'battle', as there is a 'growing inability to resolve conflicts and reaching compromises, but also a growing inability to search for them' (1996:247). An indication of that is the division into 'us' and 'them' (1996:250), characteristic of *nowomowa*:

> (79) 'the rhetoric of a sharp conflict between the principles of moral rightness winning on the Polish political scene and the rhetoric of compromise in the name of the principles of instrumental effectiveness, is a manifestation of the struggle for the presence, clarity, and resonance of the voice regarding the direction of systemic changes' (1996:250).

Consequently, not only compromises cannot be reached, but the 'inclination for communication' is 'blocked' (1996:250). In other words, Piotrowski uncovers political interests of politicians as the driving force of contemporary politics, which is juxtaposed to the desired political scene, in which 'the rhetoric of compromise' prevails, that is democratic deliberation.

In summary, according to many texts in my corpus, 'care for language' contributes not only to the desired condition of the Polish language, but also to the desired condition of the Polish nation and the strength of the Polish state (see Table 9). Polish is said to be flourishing, largely due to standardisation practices, when the Polish state prospers. Conversely, Polish is said to have undergone 'degradation' when the situation of the Polish state was difficult. According to the authors of the analysed texts, 'care for language' was strong in the Second Republic and the period right after the Second World War, when the Polish state and independence traditions were strong, and it increased during the Partitions and in the communist period, when it served to delegitimise challenging powers. 'Exemplary' Polish is attributed to the

Themes / subthemes	Key words	Language ideology
The condition of Polish language and nation-state depend on 'care for Polish'	Polish, care for language, concern for language, positive, negative, model	nationalist/standard
16th century as a 'golden age' of Polish	16th century, canon, model, rules, regulations, grammar, spelling, legal	standard
17th century as 'deterioration' of Polish	17th century, degradation, decline, weakening, superficiality, damaged	standard
Pre- and early post-war periods as models	pre-war, post-war, native, foreign	purist
Polish as a defence mechanism against the partitioners and communist authorities	Germanisms, Russicisms, sensitivity, vigilance, resist, partitioner, totalitarian, *nowomowa*, People's Republic of Poland	nationalist/purist
'Exemplary norms' as evidence of patriotism	norm, exemplary, conscious, users, standard, practical, colloquial, unofficial, instrumental, lower level, efficient, economical	standard/nationalist
'Exemplary norm' is spoken by the elites	high culture, higher education, linguistic awareness, patriotic	standard
Anglicisms are spoken by the middle class	Anglicisms, middle class, new, emerging, utilitarian, national, domination	standard/nationalist
Care for language and patriotism are in decline	patriotic, patriotism, language, native, nation, national existence, modernity, western, revolutionisers	nationalist
Polish politicians after 1989 speak 'incorrectly'	politicians, language, discourse	standard/liberal
Varieties are improper for public use	standard, variety, variant, dialect, public, degradation	standard
New political leaders use *nowomowa*	(*new*) *nowomowa*, totalitarian, manipulatory, addressee, voter, election, instrumental	liberal/standard

Table 9. Thematic codes: Political legitimation in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (1989–2015)

elites, especially those with conservative views, who are said to see it as a value, and thus care about the nation. Otherwise, patriotism is believed to be in decline. The authors of my corpus often attribute the use of *nowomowa* to the new political elites, combining the discourse on official language, which should be 'neutral' to be democratic, with the discourse of standardisation, ultimately challenging the new political elites' claim to legitimacy. The use of 'pure', 'correct', 'neutral', and 'elegant' Polish is thus justified as an attempt to legitimise a specific highly homogeneous version of the Polish nation and a strong Polish nation-state modelled on the 'past', when patriotism mattered to the nation guided by the elites, and the nation-state was

strong. In addition, socialism-communism is explicitly excluded from this version of national identity.

5.3.3 Instructions for the ideal use of language: linguistic authorities and language legislation

The corpus of analysed texts contains two recommendations for sustaining the ideal 'correct' and 'pure' Polish: their authors promote linguistic authorities, who are members of the elites, suggesting that the Polish Language Council should be appointed, and argue that Polish language legislation should be introduced. The ultimate goal is to sustain the strength of the Polish state in the face of globalisation.

One of the recurring themes in my corpus is 'language culture' as a subdiscipline of Polish linguistics. Markowski and Satkiewicz define it as 'an academically underpinned activity' of 'practical linguistics' (1996:21). Such 'practical linguists' are meant to be linguistic authorities. According to Markowski and Satkiewicz, as a result of the change of borders and internal migration during the Second World War, the main task of linguists in the field of language culture was to

(80) 'help to integrate society at the level of language' (1996:13).

While some of the authors of the texts included in my corpus discuss linguistic variation in Poland, for example, in quote (76), this passage suggests that all Polish society should speak 'the same' language. Markowski and Satkiewicz continue to list numerous standardisation practices initiated by Polish linguists in recent years: dictionaries and other publications popularising knowledge about Polish, academic societies, camps for secondary school students, language phone-in 'clinics', language awards, radio, and TV shows, as well as studies of *nowomowa*. The ultimate goal of the 'integration' of Polish 'society' can be interpreted as an attempt to create order after a political crisis.

A few authors believe that the role of linguistic authorities, that is professional linguists, is to determine which linguistic forms are 'correct'. According to Polański, linguistic issues often cause controversies because language changes and

(81) 'the question always arises when a certain change can be considered a new standard' (1996:10).

Polański proposes that a professional body should be appointed to decide on this issue.

Such a body should be modelled on the French Academy, according to Pisarek and Rokoszowa. They juxtapose the 'lack of any institutional care for the Polish language' in the 17th century (1996:52), which led to its 'degradation', discussed in quote (65), with the simultaneous blossoming of the French language and French culture, which in turn they attribute to the activities of the French Academy:

> (82) 'At the exact same time in France, which was going through a completely different historical period, an institution was created, functioning to this day, whose task was and still is to care for the French language. It was the French Academy, founded in 1635 by Cardinal Richelieu. With a view to shaping the desired models, it published the first modern dictionary of the French language in 1694 and to this day continues to care for its subsequent editions' (1996:52).

France at the time was one of the great European powers. Its authority and the role of French as a *lingua franca* among European elites in the 18th century is unquestionable. The activities of the French Academy are typical standardisation practices[117]. The fact that Pisarek and Rokoszowa recommend the French Academy as a model for a Polish professional linguistic body can be interpreted as a call for a strong Polish nation-state, in which the elites play an important role.

Citing Zenon Klemensiewicz, one of the most renowned Polish linguists in the 20th century, Saloni criticises the idea of appointing a professional linguistic body to decide on language norms:

> (83) '"The linguistic norm resides in the collective use of language but is not elevated to the dignity of a law established by a legislative body appointed for this purpose. No single grammarian or team of grammarians have been authorised by anyone to enact language laws or even to guard and enforce customary linguistic law"' (1996:77–78).

Saloni's approach to language is thus descriptive: like Miodek's in quote (19), Saloni believes linguistics is about describing language as it is used, not about 'guarding and enforcing customary linguistic law', let alone 'enacting language laws'. By challenging the position of a potential body in Poland modelled on the French

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[117] The French Academy is often criticised for its conservatism and elitism, for example, the elite of 40 'immortals' takes ages to fill vacancies after deceased members, and many prominent French writers, including Balzac, Zola and Verlaine were never appointed (Nossiter 2019).

Academy, he explicitly opposes prescriptivism and argues that language (or more precisely, its speakers) should be 'left alone' (Hall 1950).

Saloni further develops his point by arguing against 'Poles' 'submissiveness to institutions', which he argues would be the ultimate goal of language legislation:

> (84) 'This [submissiveness to institutions] was not a quality that consolidated Polish society in times of danger and that helped it maintain and improve the Polish language. Neither does it seem like a quality we want to cultivate among young generations of Poles. The rigour of regulations seriously limits creativity' (1996:78).

Instead of ensuring order by promoting obedience explicitly called 'submissiveness to institutions', Saloni argues for the liberal ideal of individual liberty, which includes artistic creativity, stressing how Poles' disobedience has been useful in Polish history. Saloni seems to argue that it is ordinary language users who have the ultimate authority in language matters. Saloni's vision of what the Polish nation should be like is thus very different from Pisarek and Rokoszowa's.

In addition, Saloni explicitly deconstructs the international position of France as the explanation for the status of French:

> (85) 'We do not have global ambitions like the French. We want to speak our language and write in it efficiently in our country. We want it to be well used by people living outside Poland who, due to genetic or cultural conditions, want to maintain contact with our community or use Polish in their own group contacts. Our language seems to be serving us well and developing efficiently' (1996:81).

This passage suggests that Saloni is satisfied with the international position of Poland. He broadens the specific version of national identity promoted by other authors in my corpus by including people not living in Poland but connected to it. The value underlying this passage is that of communicative 'efficiency', which implies the representation of Polish as a social tool of communication. This representation, dominant in the professional metalinguistic discourse in the previous period, is explicitly disregarded in my corpus as evident of an instrumental approach to Polish.

Pisarek and Rokoszowa's invocation of the French Academy can be interpreted as an attempt to justify the privileged position of intellectual elites:

> (86) 'In Stanisław's period of the Enlightenment, when Poland woke up from linguistic stagnation, the same France, sweeping away the old political

system in the turmoil of revolution, promoted culturally lower classes. By introducing institutional conditions of something that, keeping the proportions, we could again call mass culture, it retained care for language as the highest good. Therefore, the dissemination of culture did not result in the degradation of the language in this case, even though it took place as a result of a bloody revolution. It resulted from conscious actions taken by state institutions and bodies. The activities of the Academy were expanded by including it in the framework of the newly established French Institute. Higher education institutions were established, education was reformed, publishing houses, encyclopaedias, and dictionaries were supported' (1996:52–53).

Stanisław August Poniatowski was the last monarch of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Once again, a positive allusion to the times of what Pisarek and Rokoszowa call the 'Crown' is made, which, they argue, was the time of prosperity of the Polish language. They also argue that French culture flourished as a consequence of the linguistic initiatives of the French Academy, once again implying a correlation between the condition of a language and the condition of a culture. The 'promotion' of 'culturally lower classes' is seen as one of the achievements of the French Academy, controlled by political and intellectual elites. In other words, the desired order is presented as a top-down creation.

This 'promotion', regarded positively by Pisarek and Rokoszowa, has been criticised in the literature on the French Revolution as a violent act of homogenisation, pushing regional identities and dialects out of existence in the name of the 'Jacobian idea that political unity was congruent with national unity' which 'presupposed an amorphous mass of citizens undivided by regional loyalties or languages' (Safran 1992:793–94; see also Moïse 2007)[118]. In other words, the representations of French as 'chaste, ordered and clear' (Underhill 2011:180) legitimised wiping out regional dialects and languages spoken by minorities, as '[o]nly by the annihilation of such languages and dialects could men be instructed and enlightened as to the ideals of the French revolution, the inspired project of Reason to transform the world' (2011:186). This argument implies that a society can only flourish if the 'state' is strong – a belief that seems traditional in France. Pisarek and

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[118] These ideas continued to be promoted at later stages of French history. Weber (1976) discusses an acculturation of local cultures, including local dialects, to French civilisation between 1870 and 1914, arguing that the process resembled colonisation.

Rokoszowa are thus advocates of a strong state, in which intellectual elites have a privileged position.

The same idea can be observed in their representation of the 17th century, which Pisarek and Rokoszowa call a time of 'degradation' of Polish. Further in their argument, they equate this degradation with the 'mass' nature of noble culture:

> (87) 'Keeping the proportions, we can say that in this period we were dealing with sui generis mass culture, but without the opportunity to shape positive models. Thanks to the popularisation of rather superficial education, every nobleman knew at least a little bit of Latin, and everyone could use some foreign words. Snobbery towards Latin words rather than its full command developed. Hence Latin entered the Polish language in the form of macaronisms, foreign, mainly Latin words incorporated incorrectly and against the spirit of the Polish language. The Polish language then adopted an excessive number of loanwords, mainly Latin; it accepted but did not assimilate them. It then lost its conciseness – the feature of an "internally focused" language with an extensive sphere of extra-lexical semantic references – in favour of a dispersed, external, foreign, sometimes incomprehensible "vocabulary"' (1996:51–52).

Pisarek and Rokoszowa criticise the 'superficial' nature of noble education, including partial command of Latin, which, they argue, resulted in 'scattered, external, foreign, occasionally incomprehensible "vocabulary"', used 'excessively' and 'incorrectly' and 'against the spirit of the Polish language'. This argument is based on the belief that languages (which have 'spirits') are separate systems, which should not interfere with each other, and on the idea of Latin associated with 'fixedness', which is frequent in the discourse of 'language complaints' aiming to promote the standard language. This passage also implies that 'meticulousness' is a value. According to Pisarek and Rokoszowa, Polish as a system 'lost some of its conciseness'. This implies the value of communicative 'efficiency', characteristic of the representation of language as a tool of communication.

Pisarek and Rokoszowa promote customary linguistic authorities and criticise mass media as the 'new' linguistic authority for being 'a source of negative models':

> (88) 'Models of culture, previously concentrated in the written language (in the language of literature, press, scientific publications) are now located elsewhere – in the means of mass communication... These means constitute real authority in the linguistic sphere, but at the same time they are a source of negative models ... Despite distinguishing between different types of norms and giving up high expectations for public

Polish, it is difficult to control the process of spreading negative phenomena in the language' (1996:55).

Pisarek and Rokoszowa argue that the role of linguistic authority should be played by the written language of 'literature, press, scientific publications'. The point about 'giving up high standards for public Polish' presupposes that 'public Polish' should be controlled by linguistic authorities, which in turn should be 'traditional'. It is linguists that are recognised as linguistic authorities deciding on 'norms' and 'expectations' for 'public Polish'. The metaphor of 'spreading negative phenomena in language' represents them as undesirable (like a virus) that needs to be brought under 'control' by 'traditional' linguistic authorities rather than mass media, which are an instance of 'modernity'. This passage is thus conservative and elitist, criticising broad access to knowledge and information[119].

The other proposed instruction for 'pure' and 'correct' Polish is to introduce language legislation in order to stop or even reverse progressing globalisation. A draft of a Polish Language Act is included in Pisarek and Rokoszowa's paper, who argue that language legislation would not only be about 'protection against destruction, damage, etc.', but above all about 'the creation of conditions for comprehensive development':

> (89)'language is a specific cultural good, because its protection cannot be reduced to preserving it and maintaining it in its current state. The protection of a language requires not only protecting it against destruction, damage, etc., but also, and even above all, providing it with conditions for comprehensive development, that is, the possibility of using it in all possible functions and in all possible areas of public and private life' (1996:57).

The authors explicitly demand that Polish be used in *every* possible function and area, public or private. Such a demand disregards linguistic variation and diversity and aims to legitimise a specific highly homogenised version of national identity. It also implies a high level of control, which is an implied guarantee of order, preventing language 'destruction, damage, etc.'. The underlying political ideology is a combination of conservatism and nationalism.

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[119] A similar point is raised by Lubaś, who explicitly argues that the reason for contemporary language changes is the structural change in the social hierarchy, with the increasing number of people with university education (1996:158–60).

To make sure that Polish is used in every possible function and area, Pisarek and Rokoszowa recommend that language legislation should be introduced which would grant Polish the status of the state language in Poland:

(90) 'the sentence "the state language in country *x* is language *z*" means that state institutions use this functional variety of language *z* which developed to fulfil the needs of public discourse' (1996:59).

It is not Polish in general that should be the language of the public discourse, but its specific 'functional variety', presumably the 'correct' one spoken by the elites, which is argued to have 'developed to fulfil the needs of public discourse'[120]. The theory of standardisation shows, however, that a variety does not 'develop to fulfil the needs of the public discourse' 'by itself', but it is a political process driven by the elites in order to maintain their privileged position.

Saloni explicitly argues against introducing such legislation:

(91) 'We may regret that there is too much English in our streets now, but should this justify legal action? Many companies have English names, but after all many operate in different countries and their names are adapted to the nature and scope of their activities. Often it is not even possible to clearly decide whether a specific name is Polish or non-Polish... Giving a foreign name can also be a conscious demonstration of a cultural connection. It also has an informative value' (1996:75).

Despite acknowledging that there may be 'too much English', Saloni argues against using it as an argument for language legislation. He justifies the use of English in brand names by the international market as 'a conscious demonstration of a cultural connection' and information about its origin. Saloni thus seems to be satisfied with the cultural transformations. He also recognises that the issue of 'native' language is problematic, illustrating how difficult it may be to separate languages. His approach to language policy is thus much more practical and realistic than that of Pisarek and Rokoszowa.

Saloni argues that granting Polish the status of the official language in Poland is the 'correct approach to the matter' (1996:83), but he points out that this was already done by the Decree of 1945:

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[120] Similarly, in Russian language legislation (On the State Language of the Russian Federation of 2005), Russian as a state language is treated as a different variety from 'general' Russian (Anon 2005).

> (92)'the decree was signed by Bolesław Bierut and Władysław Gomułka, but these names in themselves are probably not a sufficient argument for the change' (1996:83).

Saloni thus rejects Pisarek and Rokoszowa's ideological attempt for an emancipation from communist past, implicitly promoting historical continuity.

Saloni further argues that instead of protecting Polish spoken by the 'overwhelming majority', the rights of non-Polish-speakers in Poland should be protected, as these speakers often experience discrimination:

> (93)'As a Polish-speaking Pole, I do not feel threatened in my country or in my society; in fact, it seems to me that I am privileged. It is true that the overwhelming majority of people like me live in Poland, but maybe that is why we do not notice the problems of people who are different in this respect ... And there are people who live in Poland permanently, but do not speak Polish well, do not have Polish education (although they may be Polish citizens and even self-identify as Poles). How often do they encounter an impetuous, unfavourable reaction? How will they perceive the adoption of the law requiring "the use of the Polish language in the public sphere"? It will now be possible to punish and persecute those people under the majesty of the law if someone wishes to' (1996:74).

Saloni constructs an alternative version of Polish national identity, defending the liberal ideals of diversity, equality, and respect by explicitly criticising majoritarianism and nationalism. Discussing potential consequences of the introduction of the Polish Language Act, he also defends the rule of law, which is supposed not to discriminate, but to limit the rights of those in power. In this sense, he is a proper liberal.

A few more points are made to support the argument that Polish language legislation is needed. Firstly, an analogy is made between linguistic and legal norms:

> (94)'In codifying activity, the cognitive component has always been important, but the intension – as in the case of other codifications in social life – was primarily the need to set rules, models, norms, the need to create something like law, because from the very beginning, linguistic rules, models, and norms were involved in various sanctions for non-compliance' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:47).

The need for 'linguistic rules, models, and norms', characteristic of prescriptivism and the discourse of standardisation, is represented as one of the two reasons for codification, alongside the 'cognitive component', which most likely

means an interest in the grammar of a language. Linguistic 'rules, models, and norms' are called 'something like law' and are thus compared to legal norms[121].

The comparison is developed further by a point that failure to obey both sorts of norms may result in sanctions. In this sense, Pisarek and Rokoszowa explicitly refer to linguistic rules 'indirectly law':

> (95)'The rules of language are indirectly law. It is the regulation of a certain rule of social life much closer to statutory law than to customary law. Nowadays, there are institutions, bodies that are authorised to issue such rules. Grammars and dictionaries of the language are codes of language law, an institution of appeal and settling doubts. Language committees and commissions are to oversee the interpretation and issue regulations for the application of the rules' (1996:48).

Pisarek and Rokoszowa equate linguistic norm-making with legal norm-making, and list examples of institutions 'authorised' to issue linguistic rules. These institutions include grammar books and dictionaries explicitly called 'codes', as well as linguistic committees and commissions. Just as legal norms, linguistic norms are seen as guarantors of order.

Secondly, the idea that Polish is an 'autotelic value of culture', discussed in the context of quotes (49) and (69), is invoked to justify a call for legislation that would regulate its use:

> (96)'The way to disseminate a positive programme of care for language as an autotelic value of culture seems to be a legal regulation aimed at protecting the language as a cultural and intellectual good, using already developed and existing models both in relation to the native language and to nature and the natural environment' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:55–56).

As argued above, representing Polish as both an 'autotelic value' and a 'cultural and intellectual good' is related to the ambition of protecting 'native' culture and 'native' intellectual output. The explicit aim of proposed legislation is language

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[121] While the introduction of sanctions can contribute to the use of desired linguistic forms, the way language is used in society depends on so many social factors (Chambers 2013; Labov 1978) that the 'effectiveness' of language legislation is not automatically obvious (Gazzola 2014). The construction of globalisation as a threat, used to justify this language policy proposal, represents Poles as powerless actors who have no influence over language. While there are some aspects of language that are very difficult for its speakers to change, for example, their accent (Lippi-Green 1997), other aspects are under their control. These include the choice of a language used by multilingual speakers (e.g., Young 2020).

'protection', which implies that Polish is endangered. By representing Polish as a 'cultural and intellectual good', the authors imply that Polish culture and intellectual output are also endangered. They call for Polish language legislation, proposing that it should be modelled on legislation applied to other 'native' languages and legislation on natural environment. Echoes of nationalism as a political ideology as well as nationalist language ideology can be identified in this passage.

This argument is further supported by frequent analogies between language and the environment based on the idea that both are endangered values needing legal protection:

> (97) 'Legal protection of the human natural environment has become a problem of the last two decades... The environmental protection movement was born when we realised the threat to the biological basis of human life' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:50).

These analogies are founded on the metaphor LANGUAGES ARE BIOLOGICAL SPECIES.

In the case of the environment, the realisation of threat is brought up as the reason to introduce legislation. Pisarek and Rokoszowa argue that such legal protection 'may become a necessity' in the case of language, or else 'language degradation' would occur, like in the 17th century:

> (98) 'There are many indications ... that legal protection of the language as a cultural good may become a necessity, for which the alternative would be the process of language degradation' (1996:55).

Pisarek and Rokoszowa support their point that Polish needs protection by discussing histories of other languages. Particularly relevant is a comparison between Belarussian and Hebrew, which is used to demonstrate the correlation between language legislation and its condition:

> (99) 'Belarussian, once the language of the chancellery of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was withdrawn from official circulation in the 18th century, not as part of repressions against the language, but because it was not used ... The language did not survive in its colloquial, spoken variety either, giving way to Russian, Polish, and mixing with Ukrainian and Polish. The last referendum held in 1995 in the Belarussian community, recognising Russian as the state language of Belarus, sealed the fate of the Belarusian language. The legal question whether things can go their own way finds its sad illustration here. How the fate of the language is

influenced by official decisions is evidenced by the example of the revival of modern Hebrew, the state language in Israel, which is opposite to Belarussian' (1996:53).

In addition to the lack of legislation, the 'decline' of Belarussian is attributed partly to the failure to use it in favour of Russian and Polish, and partly to the 'blending' with Ukrainian and Polish. On the one hand, the implied belief is that nations should speak their 'native' languages, which is typical for neo-nationalist Romanticism. On the other hand, by attributing the 'death' of 'colloquial, spoken Belarussian' to the influence of other languages, which is a hyperbole, as the language is still used in Belarus and abroad (Republic of Belarus National Census 2009), Pisarek and Rokoszowa represent the existence of language in black-and-white terms: languages are either devoid of external influences, or they die. The implied belief that there should either be no Anglicisms in Polish or Polish will die is an instance of the widely questioned idea in contemporary linguistics that when people begin to use a foreign language, their 'native' language becomes distorted (see, e.g., Grosjean 1982)[122]. The idea that national languages should be entirely separate entities which should not mix is the foundation for the case that Polish is under threat. By contrast, Pisarek and Rokoszowa attribute the 'revival of modern Hebrew', the sacred language of the Bible, exclusively to language legislation.

A particularly meaningful positive example is that of Slovak legislation, which, according to Pisarek and Rokoszowa, is modelled on French legislation and is targeted particularly against 'Czechisms', 'Americanisms', as well as the language rights of 'the Hungarian minority'. Pisarek and Rokoszowa explicitly say that the newly appointed linguistic authorities in Slovakia are meant to be a 'sort of "language police"' (1996:60). The authors' ideal of language legislation is thus openly directed against linguistic minorities. Once again, the ideas of linguistic homogeneity and a strong state are promoted.

Saloni explicitly criticises the positive representation of Slovak language legislation, arguing that it is 'targeted against the Czech language' and can be used a tool of discrimination against Czech-speaking citizens:

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[122] Sorace (2020) calls this the ideology of 'native monolingual standard', which she argues has dominated linguistics and effectively distorted studies on multilingualism.

(100) 'In Slovakia, the decree on the use of the Slovak language is targeted against the Czech language: for three generations, Czechs and Slovaks lived in one country, and they communicated with no difficulties... In the micro-situation of the local community, this decree may be used against its member who does not speak Slovak fluently, but speaks Czech normally' (1996:73).

By discussing the time when Czech- and Slovak-speaking communities lived in one country and communicated 'with no difficulties', Saloni implies the liberal idea of 'an inescapable conflict of interests and beliefs in society' (Fawcett 2018:7), which, however, can be overcome through dialogue and respect for individual liberty.

Finally, a point is made that legal protection is 'naturally' about protecting 'the weaker' against 'the stronger'. This is illustrated by the contrast between the recognition of Irish as the official language in the Republic of Ireland and legal protection of French losing its international position on the one hand, and the lack of language legislation in English-speaking countries constructed as a 'liberal attitude to language issues' on the other[123]:

(101) 'nowadays, relatively the most liberal attitude to language issues can be observed in English-speaking countries, because the English language (especially its American variety) has been the most expansionary ethnic language in the world since the mid-twentieth century (as much as 80 per cent of all scientific literature is written in this language)' (Pisarek and Rokoszowa 1996:59).

The metaphor of 'expansion' of English, especially 'its American variety', meaning the growing territorial scope in which it is spoken, represents English as the 'conqueror' of Polish, which in turn is represented as a victim under attack. Pisarek and Rokoszowa focus here specifically on the use of English in scholarship.

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[123] Studies by Pullum (1987), Cameron (2012), Milroy and Milroy (2012), to name just a few, challenge the idea of no linguistic authorities in English-speaking countries.

Themes / subthemes	Key words	Language ideology
Linguistic authorities should be promoted	language, language culture, model, norm, written, authority, education, publishing, encyclopaedia, dictionary, literature, press, scientific publication, mass communication	standard
A professional linguistic body should be appointed	French Academy, standard, institution	standard
Mass media as incompetent linguistic authorities	mass media, negative, incorrect, mistake	standard
There should be no professional linguistic bodies	collective, customary, use, law, legislative, grammarian, authorise	standard/liberal
Language legislation should be introduced	(state) language, legislation, legal, protection, development, destruction, damage, function, private, public, discourse, English, expansionary	standard/nationalist/purist
Linguistic norms are legal norms	codify, code, model, norm, rule, regulation, law, sanction, institution, authorise, committee, commission	standard
Language should be protected like the environment	environment, environmental, threat, biological, human life	nationalist
Language legislation determines the condition of the language	fate, official, state, survive, mix, Belarussian, Hebrew, Slovak, Czech, Hungarian, minority, revival	nationalist/purist
Language legislation should not be introduced	legal, English, official language, privilege, Polish citizen, minority	anti-nationalist/liberal

Table 10. Thematic codes: Instructions for the ideal use of language in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (1989–2015)

In summary, the authors of the texts included in my corpus provide two instructions for the ideal use of language (see Table 10). They argue that the country needs linguistic authorities, specifically the Polish Language Council, and legislation protecting the Polish language to stop the progressing globalisation, preserve order, and champion the idea of a strong homogenous state. This order is founded on the privileged position of the elites. While the idea of linguistic authorities is characteristic of standard language ideology, the argument that Polish needs legal protection, primarily to reverse the influence of English, is founded on nationalist and purist

language ideologies. The ultimate goal of promoting linguistic authorities, who are to decide on linguistic norms, is to ensure that the whole society speaks the variety considered to be 'correct' or 'standard', accepting the order 'dictated' by the cultural elites. On the other hand, the political elites are to ensure that 'correct' Polish is spoken by means of language legislation. Opposing both instructions, Saloni promotes liberal ideas of liberty on the terrain of language and protects linguistic minorities in the name of diversity and respect for individual liberty.

5.3.4 Summary: language ideologies (and political ideologies) in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (1989–2015)

In this section, I have demonstrated that there are three main representations of Polish in my corpus: Polish is a vehicle of national identity and culture, a criterion of legitimacy, and a sign of morality and good manners. Polish is believed to be endangered. The explicit representations of Polish as a vehicle of national identity and culture, a 'value', the 'binder' of the nation, or in a milder version a 'component of national identity', are typical of nationalist language ideology, which is used to legitimise the international system which prioritises ethnically and culturally homogeneous, autonomous, and sovereign nation-states. The belief that Polish should not blend with English, a symbol of globalisation, is in turn an instance of purist language ideology, which is used to legitimise the privileged position of the 'natives' and a special international position of Poland as the 'oasis' of 'traditional' 'values'. The representations of 'correct', 'neutral', and 'elegant' Polish as a criterion of legitimacy and a sign of morality and good manners, are characteristic of standard language ideology. The authors of the analysed texts argue that the condition of language depends on 'care for language', and thus recommend that Polish should be protected by linguistic authorities, in particular the Polish Language Council, who should decide on what constitutes 'correct' Polish, as well as by the Polish Language Act, which is supposed to ensure that the influence of English on Polish is eliminated. These representations of Polish are aimed to legitimise the order in which the elites, particularly with conservative and nationalist views, enjoy the privileged position, which in turn is seen as a guarantee of a strong state. Nationalist, purist, and standard

language ideologies thus dominate in my corpus, and they serve to construct a specific version of national identity. Only one author of the analysed texts produces a counter-discourse, openly disagreeing with the dominant representations of Polish and occasionally promoting liberal ideas.

My corpus shows that nationalism as a political ideology was strong in Poland after 1989. Nations are socially constructed and as such are not given 'once and for all' but need to be constantly reinforced. This is partly achieved by means of discourses, including, quite centrally, the discourse of language standardisation and endangerment. I identified all five characteristics of nationalism as defined by Freeden (1998) in my corpus. The nation understood in a homogeneous way is prioritised over national diversity, which can be observed in the negative attitude towards linguistic minorities in Poland. The nation is valorised positively in the context of internationalism and globalisation constructed as threats. A strong nation-state is promoted as a way of ensuring that the common ends of the nation are pursued. Polish national identity is linked to a common space, both territorial and cultural (which includes the common language), and to time, since a smooth continuity is assumed between Poland of the 'past' and Poland now. Finally, representing the Polish language and patriotism as endangered values is aimed at evoking patriotic sentiments among Poles and mobilising them around Polish national interests. The representation of Polish as a vehicle of national identity and culture (which is why it should be 'pure') is explicitly deconstructed and rejected by Saloni.

I also argued, following Freeden (1998), that nationalism is a 'thin' ideology that is often combined with other, 'bigger' host ideologies, such as liberalism, conservatism or fascism. In Polish professional metalinguistic discourse after 1989, it is usually conservatism. I identified all four components of conservatism as defined by Fawcett (2020) in my corpus: the prioritisation of the nation over individual freedom as the foundation of order, the promotion of authority, especially 'traditional', the salience of the concepts of 'tradition' and 'the past' combined with negative constructions of 'progress', 'change', or 'revolution', and the lack of concern with equality.

The existence of nationalism-conservatism supports my interpretation of the corpus as an attempt to legitimise a specific version of a homogeneous Polish nation

and a strong Polish nation-state modelled on the 'past', when patriotism mattered to the nation guided by the elites[124]. Saloni's explicit criticism of the language policy proposal made by Pisarek and Rokoszowa reflects the author's liberal outlook, built on such values as individual freedom, equality, diversity, and the rule of law.

5.4   Contextual analysis

In this section, I will interpret my corpus through the lens of the four dimensions of context identified in the methodology chapter. I will look at the co-text (the immediate context of the Speech Culture Forum conference and post-conference volume), the genre (the hybrid of academic conference papers and a legislation proposal), the socio-political context of the political regime and socio-cultural changes taking place in Poland after 1989, as well as intertextual and interdiscursive relationships of the corpus to other relevant texts (other standardisation practices promoted by Polish linguists in this period). I will demonstrate that the ideas identified in my corpus were very popular at the time, which was related to the transformation of the regime and the subsequent socio-cultural changes.

5.4.1   Co-text: the immediate context of the 1st Speech Culture Forum conference and post-conference volume

The 1st Speech Culture Forum conference took place at the University of Wrocław, one of the oldest and most prestigious Polish universities, in 1995. The post-conference volume was published by the Society of the Enthusiasts of the University of Wrocław Polish Studies (Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Polonistyki Wrocławskiej) in 1996. The society is a charity publishing academic outputs of the University of Wrocław

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[124] The dominance of nationalist-conservative ideas in my corpus can also be explained by Bourdieu's theory of competition between heterodox and orthodox discourses in times of social turmoil (1991). In other words, these ideas may be interpreted as a response to changes in Polish political discourse after 1989, that is the 'heretic break with the established order' (Bourdieu 1991:128). Ad Bourdieu elaborates further, '[i]n contrast to this, dominant individuals, in the absence of being able to restore the silence of the doxa, strive to produce, through a purely reactionary discourse, a substitute for everything that is threatened by the very existence of heretical discourse' (1991:131). Changes in Polish political discourse in this period are discussed by Anusiewicz and Siciński (1994).

Polish Studies staff. The volume is entitled *On the Threats and Richness of Polish*. To justify this title, Miodek says:

> (102) 'the absolute majority of texts included in this book show genuine concern for the condition of the contemporary Polish language' (1996b:7).

The title of the volume was thus not the title of the conference. It was selected to reflect the topics of the majority of papers[125].

In his introduction to the volume, Miodek mentions a debate he moderated on the second day of the conference, which was about the condition of Polish:

> (103) '…opening the debate …, I asked its participants and listeners a question: is our language facing the most dramatic threat in its history, as some claim, or is it – on the contrary – experiencing a period of accelerated development and enrichment of means of expression?' (1996b:7–8).

This passage suggests that Miodek's view about the condition of Polish was open, but also that the organisers may have hoped for a balanced debate.

In his Welcome Address, Polański says:

> (104) 'There can never be too much attention to speech culture, but it seems that in the time of a turning point in which we are currently living, it is especially needed. Although in my opinion it would be an exaggeration to talk about the decline of Polish or about catastrophic threats to it, it seems that some phenomena may be seen as disturbing. These include the spreading vulgarisation of the language, the flood of foreign languages, and the lack of respect for the recipient, which is not uncommon, especially in written texts, and manifests itself in the carelessness of the argument and in the excessively hermetic and jargon language' (1996:9).

This passage once again indicates that the prevalent sense of 'catastrophic threats' to Polish was not necessarily felt by the organisers. They did, however, acknowledge that 'attention to speech culture' was particularly important at the time, because it was a 'time of a turning point'.

Finally, Polański's representations of Polish in his Welcome Address, as a tool of communication (understood as telementation) and as a 'a tool for thinking', were

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[125] In the 1990s, similar debates took place in Russia on new norms of the Russian language, following the 'landslide of the norm' in Russian political discourse, associated with the dissolution of the USSR (Lunde and Roesen 2006).

characteristic of linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, but are not very salient in the volume *On the Threats and Richness of Polish*:

> (105) 'Using language, we not only transmit certain content to others and receive it from others; language is also a tool for thinking' (1996:9).

This co-text of my corpus shows that the conference was the beginning of a major discursive shift in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse.

5.4.2   Genre analysis: academic conference papers and a policy proposal

The texts included in my corpus are once again instances of a hybrid genre: conference papers on the one hand, and a language policy proposal, on the other. This creates an inescapable tension between 'escaping mythology' and pursuing political ends. This tension, in turn, confirms the ideological nature of my corpus I uncovered in 5.3.

A conference paper is a specific scientific genre. It is a relatively short oral presentation of an argument addressed to an academic audience, usually with a similar area of specialty, and typically followed by a discussion. Papers published in a post-conference volumes are written, and usually edited, versions of such presentations. In 4.4.2.1, following Popper, I defined science, associated with rational thinking, as the opposite of myth, or mythical thinking. The authors of my corpus strive to 'escape mythology' (Kubik 2023b:37) in a few ways: by producing critical arguments, building on theories, using academic terminology, and providing empirical evidence. In addition, their professional profiles and titles as well as the very presentation of ideas in the form of conference papers confirms their status of recognised 'scientific' authorities and legitimises their ideas.

On the other hand, the texts analysed in this chapter are politically engaged. Firstly, the conference was co-organised with state institutions, which shows its explicit political connections (see 5.2). Secondly, Pisarek and Rokoszowa's paper is an explicit language policy proposal, which includes a draft of the Polish Language Act. The conference was thus the first step leading to the introduction of the Act. Spolsky defines language policy by means of three independent, yet interrelated components: (1) 'language practice', or 'the actual choice of language varieties and the nature of

speech repertoires known and used by speakers in the domain concerned', (2) 'language beliefs, often collected as established ideologies, which assigned values to named and unnamed varieties and to identifiable variations in language choice', and (3) language management, or 'the way in which some individual or group or institution set out to modify the practices and beliefs of members of the community' (2019:326)[126]. In my corpus, both model and 'incorrect' linguistic practices are described, values are assigned to specific forms and varieties, and there is an intention to modify the existent ('wrong') practices in society. Language policy is also a form of public policy, as it can only be made by specific political agents (usually the government from the local to the national or even supranational level) (Gazzola et al. 2023). The fact that it was linguists who initiated the process of introducing language legislation in Poland shows their privileged position in Polish politics.

5.4.2.1 The introduction of the Polish Language Act

The influence of some of Pisarek and Rokoszowa's ideas is visible in the text of the Polish Language Act[127]. The legislative work on the Act began in 1995, right after the Speech Culture Forum conference, and significantly accelerated after the Constitution of 1997 was passed. Czarnecki argues that there was no need to recognise the status of Polish as the official language of Poland, as this is done by Article 27 of the Constitution, which is the most important legal document (2014:27). This shows that the goal of the Polish Language Act was different. The final draft of the Polish Language Act was based on two legislative projects: one by the Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe), submitted on 20 October 1997, and the other submitted in response by the government on 24 July 1998. The influence of the latter is much more visible in the published version of the document (Mostowik and Żukowski 2001:22). The Act, however, was not passed by the Sejm (the lower house

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[126] Spolsky argues that these individuals or groups may not have recognised authority to do so and that 'self-management', that is 'the attempt of speakers to modify their own linguistic proficiency and repertoire,' is another important component of language policy (2019:326).

[127] Similar language policies were implemented around the same time in other countries in the post-Soviet region, e.g., Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan (Brubaker 2011). These states were, however, more ethnically heterogeneous than Poland and the policies were predominantly oriented against Russian-speaking communities.

of the Polish parliament) until 22 July 1999, quite unexpectedly, just before summer holidays, when many MPs were away – the controversy widely commented upon in the media (Hołownia 1999). Even before it was introduced, the Act provoked a major controversy at universities, in the media, and among politicians over whether it was necessary in the first place. When the Sejm voted to pass the Act, as many as 179 out of 394 (ca. 45 per cent) voting MPs were against it (Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1999). A lot of the official reasons for introducing legislation overlap with those identified in my corpus and include: outdated legislation on the matter, the vagueness of the Decree of 1945, the increase in the international reputation of Poland if it has legislation allowing only Polish in the public sphere, the sense of threat resulting from social, economic, political and technological changes, the bad condition of the Polish language, growing international cooperation, the role of language as an economic good (mostly in tourism), the need for protection of the right to conclude agreements in one's native language, and the lack of legislation protecting Polish in the public sphere, especially in advertisements, trade, scholarship, and law (Czarnecki 2014:26–31).

As mentioned in 4.4.3.2.6, the Polish Language Act was not the first piece of language-related legislation in Polish history, but it was certainly the first one in its kind (Czarnecki 2014:17). Except the Decree of 1945, which recognised Polish as the official language, the Act was the first document devoted solely to language in Poland, and its scope was far broader than that of the decree. Until the mid-16th century, legislation in Poland was passed only in Latin, a practice that continued until the time of the Partitions. The partitioning powers, bound by the regulations of the Congress of Vienna, were initially supportive of Polish identity, so Polish was used in official contexts until the November Uprising of 1831 (Mostowik and Żukowski 2001:10–11). Austria-Hungary was particularly supportive of multilingual language policy (see, e.g., Wolf 2015). Several legislative acts on language were passed in the period of the Second Republic. What characterised these legislative acts was its heterogeneity: different regulations were passed in different parts of Poland, but the aim was generally to grant Polish the status of the official language of the country, state institutions, jurisdiction, and education, while giving language minorities living in Poland (especially Rusyn-, Belarussian-, and Lithuanian-speaking) the right to use

their languages in these contexts (Mostowik and Żukowski 2001:11–17). The Jewish community, however, was conspicuous by its absence in these legislative regulations (Mostowik and Żukowski 2001:18).

The Decree of 1945, which was in force until the Polish Language Act was passed in 1999, did not mention linguistic minorities and no linguistic rights were granted to them. It is declared in the Act that the rights of language minorities are protected, but the legislation on linguistic minorities existent in 1999 granted them much fewer rights than the legislation in the interwar period. This changed when the National and Ethnic Minorities Act (Ustawa o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych) was passed on 6 January 2005[128]. In the legal literature, the Act itself is often commented upon as discriminatory to minority groups in Poland (Czarnecki 2014:36–37; Mostowik and Żukowski 2001:38–41).

5.4.2.2   The content of the Polish Language Act

The Polish Language Act passed in 1999 begins with the preamble, which explains the reasons for introducing the Act: the fact that 'the Polish language is a constituting element of Polish national identity and national culture', 'Polish historical experience that foreign rulers and occupants repressed the Polish language and endeavoured to denationalise the Polish nation'[129], the necessity to 'protect national

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[128] The National and Ethnic Minorities Act grants recognised minorities the right to use their original names, which includes their original spelling (unless they are originally spelled in a non-Latin alphabet, in which case they need to be transliterated), to use their language in private and public spheres, to disseminate and exchange information in their language, publicly display private information in it, study their language or in their language, and – if a number of requirements are fulfilled – they are entitled to use their language as a 'supporting language' in local governmental institutions. Czarnecki mentions the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages signed by Poland on 12 May 2003 and ratified on 12 February 2009 as well as the Constitution, particularly Articles 27 and 35, which grant national and ethnic minorities rights to maintain and develop their languages, maintain traditions and develop their cultures, open their own educational, cultural, and religious institutions, and to participate in initiatives related to their cultural identity (2014:33, 37–38). The right to use one's own language is limited, however, in the contexts in which the language of the state is supposed to be used (Czarnecki 2014:36–37). The legislation on the language of judicial proceedings grant Polish citizens and residents the right for translation at the expense of the state, while the state is granted the right to receive documents in its official language for both legal and administrative procedures (Mostowik and Żukowski 2001:67–75).

[129] The historical references in the preamble can explain the rhetoric of 'duty' and 'responsibility' to 'protect Polish' in the text of the Act. A similar rhetoric was used in Polish Romantic and Romantic-styled literature which served to mobilise Poles to protect their country – which in the 19th century often meant sacrificing one's life (see, e.g., Janion 1979).

identity in today's global environment', as well as the fact that 'Polish culture helps create a unified and culturally varied Europe' and that 'it can be preserved and developed only if the Polish language is preserved'. The final idea of the preamble is that 'the protection of the language is the responsibility of all Polish bodies and public institutions, as well as all Polish citizens'[130]. These ideas resemble those promoted in the post-conference volume analysed in this chapter, especially the representation of Polish as a component and vehicle of national identity and culture, whose 'purity' should be protected in the face of globalisation, as well as the idea that 'correct' Polish should be spoken in every area of life, both public and private.

The preamble is followed by five clauses. Clause 1: 'General Provisions' recognises Polish as the official language in different Polish national and administrative institutions, including local governments, as well as bodies appointed by them. Clause 2: 'Legal Protection of the Polish Language in the Public Life' requires the use of Polish – with certain exceptions introduced gradually by means of amendments (Czarnecki 2014:116, 120–33) – in the legal sphere. This includes the business sector (Czarnecki 2014:51): Polish is the official language of trade in Poland, international agreements should be concluded in Polish, job contracts as well as names, instruction leaflets, advertisements etc. of international products sold in Poland should be in Polish; and the education sector: Polish as the official language of education in Poland, which also includes higher education institutions. Clause 3: 'The Language Council and the Scope of its Competencies' describes the responsibilities of the Polish Language Council, which are – broadly speaking – to monitor the condition of Polish by submitting a biennial report on the state of protection of the Polish language to the Sejm and Senate, and to formulate spelling and punctuation rules[131]. The Council is also obliged to provide opinions on specific

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[130] As all authorities are bound by the Act, this provision also includes the linguistic 'correctness' of normative acts so that they are more comprehensible to citizens (Mostowik and Żukowski 2001:50) and all the state documentation, such as court sentences (Czarnecki 2014:71–72). State institutions are thus subject to similar control as citizens.

[131] The Polish Language Council displays qualities characteristic of both 'language planning boards' and 'language academies'. According to Joseph, 'Language Planning Boards' are 'the contemporary equivalent of Language Academies' (1987:111). While the listed responsibilities of the Polish Language Council, the fact that it was appointed by the state, and the fact that its members are predominantly professional linguists are typical for 'language planning boards', the 'fundamental belief that the

usages of Polish in the public sphere (public activity, legal transactions with customers, executions of regulations in the area of employment, administration) at the request of some recognised institutions or on the Council's own initiative[132]. Advice in terms of language correctness, however, such as spelling, inflection, syntax, word meanings etc. is not among the Council's responsibilities (Czarnecki 2014:157). Clause 4: 'Prosecution' introduces penalties (up to PLN 100,000) for breaking the Act[133]. Finally, Clause 5: 'Amendments and Final Provisions' obliges the media specifically to comply with the Act. The use of English in all state institutions, in the economic and education sector, and in the media, the appointment of the Polish Language Act, as well as the introduction of sanctions for speaking 'incorrectly' were explicitly demanded by the authors of the texts included in my corpus.

5.4.2.3 The aftermath of the Polish Language Act

The Polish Language Act continues to be an important and widely debated political issue in Poland. Between 1999 and 2015, it was amended 11 times (and later in 2016, 2018, and 2020). What is changed are not the basic tenets of the Act, included primarily in the preamble and Clause 1, but specific regulations. Some amendments were brought about by ambiguities and other faults found in previous versions, others – by the legal requirements of the European Union. For instance, the regulations directed at the media were significantly developed in the first amendment (31 March 2000), and the eighth amendment acknowledged that international agreements are binding in the original language, accepting the verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal, which ruled that the previous regulation was illegal (27

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language is in decadence, and that the goal is to forestall this for as long as possible' (1987:112) as well as the fact that some of its members are chosen 'on the basis of literary achievement' (1987:112) are typical for traditional 'language academies'.

[132] The Polish Language Council is often asked for opinion on first names. Under Article 50 of the Civil Registry Records Act, civil servants, who have name registries at their disposal (one of the most widely used ones is from 1983), have the right to reject to register first names that consist of over two names, that could be subject to ridicule, that can evoke obscene associations and that cannot be distinguished in terms of gender. The Provincial Administrative Court in Wrocław judged that these are the only reasons why parents' freedom could be limited in terms of their children's names. The regulations on first names show the high level of linguistic control in Poland (Czarnecki 2014:161–67).

[133] The exact amount was later removed, as it is very difficult to classify types of violations of the Act, which, according to Czarnecki, should be better defined (2014:172).

August 2009)[134]. On 11 April 2003, a subsection was added to Clause 2, which was entitled 'Official Qualifications in Polish' and devoted specifically to examination in Polish as a foreign language. This section was later amended a few times.

Although linguists, politicians, and journalists occasionally argued that the Act was ineffective (Tumiłowicz 2015), it had many legal consequences. The Act introduced institutions responsible for its execution: the Trade Inspectorate (Inspekcja Handlowa) and the Office for the Protection of Competition and Consumers (Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów). The amendment of 2004 added two other institutions at the regional or county level: consumer rights advocate and the Chief Labour Inspectorate (Państwowa Inspekcja Pracy). In 2003 and three quarters of 2004 alone, the Trade Inspectorate carried out 27,070 inspections, 1,800 of which were classified as 'violations' of Article 15 of the Act (names of goods, services, etc., which should be in Polish). 644 cases ended in court proceedings. The Office for the Protection of Competition and Consumers conducted a few thousand inspections on the execution of the Act each year, about 6.5 per cent of which were classified as 'violations' (Olszewski 2009:384). Many superstores were also found guilty of numerous 'violations'. In addition, one could also be sued for the use of vulgarisms in public, as was the case with Jerzy Urban, editor-in-chief of a radically left satirical weekly entitled *Nie* ('No') (Łukaszewicz 2002).

In the early 2000s, right after the Act was introduced, many press articles about violations of the Act were published. Articles published in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, for example, discussed the use of English in names of institutions such as cinemas (NOT. TER 2000), guest houses (Czyczło and Prais 2000), shops (KGP 2000) pubs (Niziołek 2002), names of festivals (Lewandowska 2012), shop windows (Piotrowiak 2001, 2003; Jopkiewicz and Rębalski 2004; Nawrot, Krogulec, et al. 2005; Nawrot, Szydlik, and NOT. AN 2005), and on product labels – especially in supermarkets (Bąk and Kruszona 2000; Kurowska and Powała 2000; Piotrowiak 2003; Natorski 2000; Tytu 2000; WB 2000; Niziołek 2003; Niedek and Bieniecka 2008). In line with the Act, some groups, for example, taxi drivers in Gdańsk, decided not to use English altogether, as

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[134] When this provision was changed, Walery Pisarek called it 'the first partition of the Polish language'. However, the Polish Language Council did not support his objections (Radłowska and Pszczółkowska 2000).

they considered it to be 'illegal' (Chrzan 2008). Some articles also dealt with queries related to Polish Language Act regulations (Anon 2000; Wieczorek 2000). Occasionally, complaints about the lack of executive power of the Polish Language Council were published (Rzemek, Hrycko-Skowron, and Horbaczewski 2013), which show that some people would have wanted the Act to be stricter. On the other hand, some articles discussed problems companies experienced because of the Act (not.mj 2000), some of which refused to change brand names and professional terms including English borrowings or English-sounding words into 'proper' Polish (Gogolewski and Kwiatkowska 2000; JK 2000). Many authors argued that the Act was pointless, contending that by protecting the purity of Polish, the MPs showed Polish national complexes (Marat 1999; Not. Szyh 1999). Some even explicitly argued that the protection of Polish is associated with uneducated, radical right-wing football fans (Varga 2012). Similarly, the literary critic Henryk Bereza argues that the Act, which he calls 'a desperate attempt to conserve the linguistic and mental backwater; pointless, harmful and – like any legal curios – ineffective', is an attempt to impede Polish global integration after 'almost half a century of enforced hibernation' by 'priests of the holy fire', who 'see linguistic anachronisms as guards of national values' (Mac 2001).

From the legal perspective, the Act has been criticised for similar reasons to those brought up by Saloni. Among concerns were practical issues resulting from regulations of the Act, civil liberties, equality of linguistic minorities, and the relationship between Poland and international organisations it is a member of. According to Mostowik and Żukowski (2001:45) as well as Olszewski (2009:379–80, 390), regulations explaining the meaning of the 'protection of Polish' are very vague, which makes it impossible to measure their effectiveness. Czarnecki criticises the lack of consistent structure of reports on the state of Polish produced by the Polish Language Council, which makes it difficult to draw comparative conclusions from them. As there is no obligation for language rules formulated by the Council to be published, it is very difficult to expect all language users to follow them (Czarnecki 2014:160–61). Mostowik and Żukowski also point out that the Act does not provide any definition of the Polish language (2001:25). According to Mostowik and Żukowski, although in some respects useful, the Act limits the liberties granted by the Constitution, including the freedom to choose a language a person wants to use

(2001:28–30), and goes against international agreements Poland is bound by, by imposing the obligation to use Polish in the spheres of social life remotely related or unrelated at all to the activity of Polish institutions (2001:42–43, 46). Czarnecki also criticises the Act for violating the freedom of speech, arguing that Polish cannot be imposed in the private sphere (2014:82). Mostowik and Żukowski (2001) as well as Czarnecki (2014) argue that protecting Polish is not necessary, as Polish is spoken by the vast majority of Polish citizens and in the whole of the public sphere. Commenting on the fact that there is little legislation to protect minority languages in Poland, Mostowik and Żukowski worry the Act can lead to social discriminations and conflicts (2001:47). Mostowik and Żukowski also criticise the Act's provisions on international agreements, which, according to the Act, should be concluded in Polish. They argue that for existing organisations which Poland is joining, it would be very difficult to create new versions of existing documents instead of making Poland sign them (2001:78–86). Czarnecki argues that although member countries of the EU have the right to decide on the language of information about imported products, which should be consistent with the language of information about native products, the decision to change the language of imported products into the local one is considered by the European Union to be the 'trade barrier between the countries of the community' (Czarnecki 2014:39–40). These legal criticisms identify nationalist and illiberal (contradictory to the values of individual liberty, equality, and diversity) sentiments in the Polish Language Act. These criticisms also confirm some of my interpretations of Polish linguists' proposal of language legislation.

5.4.2.4   Genre analysis: summary

In this subsection, I have demonstrated that the texts included in my corpus represent a hybrid genre: academic conference papers on the one hand, and a language policy proposal on the other. The scientific nature of these texts is evidenced in some attempts to 'escape mythology' as well as the position of authority resulting from the authors' professional profiles and the expression of their ideas in the form of conference papers. However, the fact that the conference was co-organised by state institutions and it directly led to the introduction of the Polish Language Act, the

fact that there is significant overlap between ideas I identified in the corpus and the ideas explicitly expressed in the text of the Act, as well as the fact the Act had tangible consequences in the Polish public sphere and became a subject of a robust public debate, including serious criticisms waged from the legal perspective, show that the texts examined in this chapter belonged, at least partially, to the political discourse of the period of liberal democracy building and were not ideologically neutral.

5.4.3   The socio-political context: Republic of Poland (1989–2015)

The year 1989 marked a turning point in Polish history. Poland started moving from socialism-communism to liberal democracy (see 2.2.3.1), leaving the Soviet bloc and joining the 'West'. The economic system transformed from planned economy to free market. The name of the country was changed from the Polish People's Republic to the Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska), often described as the 'Third'. This was accompanied by a symbolic change in the national coat of arms, which was modelled on the interwar period to signify clear opposition to the communist regime. On 12 March 1999, Poland joined NATO, and on 1 May 2004 – the European Union. The period of liberal democracy building was thus a time of political, economic, social, and cultural transformations when Poles had to face new challenges and negotiate a brand-new position in the global world.

Many changes took place in the Polish political system after 1989 in terms of competition among political parties and political participation (Myant and Cox 2008). After the so-called 'Roundtable negotiations', which took place between 6 February and 5 April 1989, where representatives of the communist government and democratic opposition negotiated the future of the political regime in Poland, the first semi-free parliamentary election took place on 4 and 18 June 1989. The democratic opposition associated with 'Solidarity' scored a resounding victory over the communist Party, beginning the gradual process of the establishment of democratic institutions and the rule of law (Lewis 2011)[135]. The Party-state monopoly was

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[135] The communist authorities agreed to 35 per cent of freely contested seats in the Sejm and the entirely freely contested Senate. The Solidarity opposition won all the freely contested seats in the Sejm and 99 out of 100 seats in the Senate.

replaced by a pluralist party system. In the first 'free' presidential election in 1990, Lech Wałęsa was elected president.

Poland did not have a strong democratic tradition, which made democratisation difficult. The new order was negotiated especially vividly in the 1990s. As demonstrated in 4.4.3.3, anti-communist opposition represented a number of ideological currents. After 1989, these currents continued to be represented, each promoting a different idea for what Polish politics and society should be like after the end of communist authoritarianism. The two most prominent ideological currents were liberalism, understood very differently by different people, and what Szacki calls 'Catholic-nationalism' (2022:177). Szacki argues, however, that economic liberalism was the most prominent, because it offered 'the most total response to the challenge of the new historical situation that came into being after the fall of real socialism', that is 'the most consistent blueprint for a new political-social-economic order' (2022:10). In addition, in Eastern Europe, liberalism was 'an anti-doctrine' or 'inverted Marxism', which 'sanctifies capitalism' instead of socialism (Szacki 2022:6)[136]. The communist past meant, however, that liberalism needed to be adapted to the specific post-communist context (Szacki 2022:11). Despite these challenges, democratisation in Poland is seen as successful, partly due to the proximity of the 'West' and partly due to the strength of Polish civil society. In 2010, Poland was one of seven post-communist countries considered consolidated democracies (Lewis 2011).

Civil and political liberties developed gradually, which can be exemplified by the media. In 1989, independent press started to be established, for example, *Gazeta Wyborcza* daily or *Solidarity Weekly*, and former 'underground' publications became legalised. In the 1990s, new radio and TV channels were introduced. In 1995, the Society of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Polskich Dziennikarzy), reactivated in 1989 after suspension following the introduction of the martial law in 1981, introduced the Ethic Charter of the Media (Karta Etyczna Mediów), where seven principles were listed: truth, objectivity, separation of information from commentary, honesty, respect and tolerance, prioritisation of the good of the recipient, as well as

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[136] Grabowski (2023) argues that the formerly German Western Territories of Poland, annexed by Poland and the Soviet Union after the Second World War, played a particularly important role in the process of democratisation, because the culture of individualism was strong there.

freedom and responsibility (Rada Etyki Mediów 1995). In 1992, National Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji) was established, the purpose of which was to monitor the freedom of the press. Article 14 of the Constitution of 1997 grants freedom of the media, while Article 54 grants freedom of speech and freedom of information. Concerned with freedom of information is also the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów), established in 2007.

Nationalism-conservatism is particularly salient in the texts analysed in this chapter, and it was very strong in Poland at the time. Survey results show that nationality was an important identity category to many Poles: in 1989, 66.8 per cent of respondents declared to be 'very proud' of being Polish and 27.8 to be 'quite proud'. In 1997, the figures were 68.8 and 26.6, in 2005: 62.1 and 33.6, and in 2012: 59.7 and 34.8, respectively (Inglehart et al. 2014). Contrary to the claim frequently found in my corpus that patriotic values are 'in decline', the World Values Survey shows that the influence of globalisation may be overrated, since national values were still persistent and resilient. In addition, individual identities of member states are protected not only by nation-states in question, but also by international institutions such as the European Union (see the Treaty on European Union, or the Maastricht Treaty of 1992). This shows that homogenisation of the kind Pisarek and Rokoszowa discussed does not seem likely.

In the 1990s, the number of Polish speakers in Poland was estimated for between 38 and 40 million (Dalewska-Greń 2002:584; Kucała and Urbańczyk 1999:156)[137], which, as argued by Saloni, casts doubt on the idea that Polish was endangered. In addition, the association of language with the nation, naturalised in many contemporary nation-states (for example, a study conducted by the ETHNOS Research and Consultancy in 2005, shows that the English language is one of the eight most commonly shared criteria of Britishness[138]), is particularly strong in Poland, where speaking Polish is considered the single most important indicator of Polishness, according to the survey entitled 'The Social Criteria of Polishness' carried out by the

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[137] At the time, there were also approximately 10,000 speakers of Polish abroad, e.g., in the USA, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Russia, and Brazil (Kucała and Urbańczyk 1999:156).

[138] In the case of the UK, the dialectal diversity was also seen as typically British.

Centre for Public Opinion Research agency (Kantar Public 2018). Similarly, in Przyszczypkowski's study, 89 per cent of respondents described Polish as an important marker of national identity, which means that 'the Polish language is not only the most important cultural marker of Polishness, but generally its first and most critical determinant' (1998). Bańczyk (2019) finds that 80 per cent of respondents in her study recognise the relationship between language and national or ethnic identity[139]. Additionally, almost half of her respondents state that Polish is 'an autotelic value' for them. This strong position of the Polish language makes the argument about its endangerment ideological and offensive to languages which are genuinely endangered.

The change of regime from non-democratic to democratic and from a monocentric (Ossowski 1983) to pluralist socio-political and cultural order, which needed to be negotiated both internally in the country and in the context of newly established international relations, provides an important context for ideas identified in my corpus. Representations of Polish as a criterion of legitimacy and a sign of morality and good manners, which are argued to be missing from 'traditional' social, political, and cultural authorities, as well as (especially young) Poles, are indicative of the 'unsettleness' of this period. The proposed solution is that of a strong state, which can be achieved by the promotion of authorities for society to follow. The implied alternative is anarchy.

5.4.4   Intertextuality and interdiscursivity: Polish linguists and standardisation

In this subsection, I will look at standardisation practices led by Polish linguists in the period of liberal democracy building in Poland. As demonstrated in 4.4.4.2, since the 19th century and especially after Poland regained independence in 1918, Polish linguists have been involved in promoting 'correct' Polish by means of activities of academic journals and associations, publications of dictionaries, popular science books and newspaper columns or articles, as well as by hosting radio and TV shows.

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[139] This relationship between language and the nation is also evident in the interesting imagery used in many press articles discussing the Polish language: the protection of Polish is compared to, for example, the fight for independence ('obronimy polszczyznę jak niepodległość') (AW 1999; Smolińska 2006) or to 'guarding Polish' ('na straży polszczyzny') (Czyczło and Prais 2000).

The promotion of 'correct' Polish accelerated in the 1960s. I also argued that although the purpose of the promotion of 'correct' Polish in state media was most likely one of the strategies used by the communist authorities to legitimise their rule in Poland, it ended up constructing an alternative, conservative discourse about national identity.

In the 1990s, a further intensification of standardisation practices led by Polish linguists can be observed. Similar trends have been observed in other countries, for instance, Germany (Pfalzgraf 2009), Russia (Gorham 2014), and post-Yugoslav lands (Ilić 2001; Langston and Peti-Stantic 2014)[140]. A few standardisation practices launched in the period of communist authoritarianism continued after 1989 and a few other developed. After the Polish Language Council was established in 1996, many Polish linguists following the prescriptive tradition became its members at some point of their careers. The Council ran numerous initiatives promoting 'correct' Polish, for example, National Dictation Competition and the so-called Polish Language Clinics. The Council also gave out national awards to Polish language activists. In addition, with the development of new media, 'pure' and 'correct' Polish began to be promoted via social media platforms and YouTube channels. I will demonstrate the large extent of the discourse of standardisation among Polish linguists as well as the salience of standard and nationalist language ideologies in this discourse. Its aim was to maintain standard Polish in order to maintain the privileged position of the elites, especially linguistic authorities, and promote a specific version of conservatism-nationalism.

5.4.4.1 Speech Culture Forum conferences

Since 1995, when the Speech Culture Forum was first organised, it has been held biennially in different parts of Poland[141]. The topics of subsequent conferences include: *Language Education of Poles* (1997), *Language in Mass Media* (1999), *Language of Public Persuasion* (2001), *Barriers and Bridges in the Linguistic*

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[140] Gorham shows that in Russia in the late 1990s, there was a shift from state-initiated linguistic purism to a more 'popular, vernacular form of monitoring', which 'had greater resonance among the reading and speaking population by virtue of its ability to entertain and engage them in matters of language usage in a nondogmatic manner' (2014:130).
[141] The 13th Speech Culture Forum took place in Zielona Góra in April 2023.

Communication of Poles (2003), *Poland's Language Policy in the European Union* (2005), *Polish languages. On professional and community languages* (2008), *The Culture of Poles' Linguistic Behaviours* (2011), *People say, on the pronunciation and eloquence of Poles* (2013), and *The Future of Polish – Polish of the Future* (2015) (Forum Kultury Słowa 2023). The continuation of the conference shows that the 1st Speech Culture Forum was very influential. The topics of subsequent conferences show that in the period of liberal democracy building, the value of language 'correctness' as well as the concern in Poles' language culture was very salient in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse. On the other hand, some topics were focused more explicitly on political issues, such as the language of politics and language policy, for example, in the context of Poland joining the European Union. The topic of the 2005 forum also shows that Polish professional metalinguistic discourse was very closely related to politics.

5.4.4.2 Dictionaries and Language Clinics

I showed in 4.4.4.2.2 that publication of dictionaries accelerated in Poland in late 1960s. I will now demonstrate that it accelerated even more after 1989. A search of the catalogue of the Polish National Library (Biblioteka Narodowa) in Warsaw shows that between mid-1989 and the end of 1999 alone, when the Polish Language Act was passed, 106 editions of *Słownik języka polskiego* were published, which is nearly as many as in the whole period between 1945 and mid-1989, as well as 54 editions of *Słownik ortograficzny*[142], which is over four times as many as the number of editions of *Słownik ortograficzny* between 1945 and mid-1989. In the period of liberal democracy building, a wide variety of Polish language dictionaries was published. The dictionary genres (Bańko 2003:2) published by Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe (National Scientific Publishers), one of the most prestigious Polish publishers, included: *Słownik języka polskiego* (Drabik and Stankiewicz 2014), *Wielki*

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[142] In Poland, the dictionary genre that enjoys the biggest popularity is the spelling dictionary, which many people believe is *the* dictionary of the Polish language (Bańko 2003:7–10). This is very different from the lexicography in the Anglo-American world. In Bańko's study conducted in 2002, spelling dictionaries available on the Polish market constituted nearly 50 per cent of all the dictionaries published at the time (46 out of 95).

słownik ortograficzny (*Grand Dictionary of Polish Spelling*) (Polański and Dereń 2012), *Wielki słownik poprawnej polszczyzny* (*Grand Dictionary of Correct Polish*) (Markowski et al. 2014), *Wielki słownik wyrazów bliskoznacznych* (*Grand Dictionary of Synonyms*) (Bańko and Kłosińska 2014), *Wielki słownik frazeologiczny* (*Grand Dictionary of Idioms*) (Kłosińska, Sobol, and Stankiewicz 2015), *Słownik wyrazów obcych* (*Dictionary of Foreign Words*) (Drabik 2014), *Słownik dobrego stylu* (*Dictionary of Good Style*) (Bańko 2014), as well as *Wielki słownik etymologiczno-historyczny języka polskiego* (*Grand Dictionary of Polish Etymology and History*) (Długosz-Kurczabowa 2008). The editors of these dictionaries are often the authors of the texts included in my corpus. After 1989, a few online dictionaries became available in Poland. Arguably the most prestigious one is a combination of three different dictionaries of the Polish Language published by Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe and available at [www.sjp.pwn.pl.](http://www.sjp.pwn.pl) The website also offers the so-called Language Clinic (*Poradnia Językowa*), where anybody can ask a question related to the issues of language 'correctness'[143]. The question is then answered by one of the committee members, all of whom are Polish professional linguists. Universities and other academic institutions also offer 'correct' Polish courses for the wider public, for example, 'How to Speak and Spell Correct and Efficient Polish' run by the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

5.4.4.3 Popular science publications and shows popularising 'correct' Polish

Between 1989 and 2015, popular science books promoting 'correct' Polish continued to be published. Examples include three editions of the book entitled *Formy i normy, czyli poprawna polszczyzna w praktyce* (*Forms and Norms, or Correct Polish in Practice*), edited by Katarzyna Kłosińska, and two editions of Jerzy Bralczyk's book entitled *Słowo o słowie: porady językowe profesora Bralczyka* (*A Word on the Word: Professor Bralczyk's Language Advice*). Polish linguists also continued to host radio and TV shows devoted to 'correct' Polish. Miodek continued publishing his weekly column entitled *Language Matters* and hosting a popular weekly TV show entitled *Ojczyzna polszczyzna* until 2007. The show was renamed *Słownik polsko-*

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[143] According to Bańko, the most frequent questions are about the spelling (2003:15).

polski (*Polish-Polish Dictionary*) in 2009 and broadcasted on one of the TVP channels, TVP Polonia. Since 1994, Katarzyna Kłosińska, has hosted a weekly radio show on Polish Radio Three. Like dictionaries, these sources not only aim to legitimise the 'correct' or 'standard' variety and its speakers, but also the linguistic authority of professional linguists.

5.4.4.4 National Dictation Competition

National Dictation Competition was launched in 1987 (see 5.4.4.4). Ever since, it has been organised in Katowice first annually, then irregularly, and since 2012 biennially. It became immensely popular in the period of liberal democracy building. Since 2012, the Competition has been sponsored by the Polish Language Council, National Culture Centre (national institution promoting the development of Polish culture), and the Ministry of National Education. A total of over 53,000 participants have taken part in all the editions so far and a few thousand participants in each edition. Graduates of Polish philology are not allowed to participate. In the 2000s, the Competition became so popular that it had to be held in a massive sports arena complex. In 2009, 2012, and 2020, online editions of the Competition were organised (in 2020 because of the Covid-19 pandemic). During some editions a special dictation was organised for children and teenagers. Since 2012, the Competition has been broadcasted by The Polish Radio and Polish Television[144]. There have also been

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[144] The Competition has continued to receive significant media coverage for many years, which illustrates how emotional the topic of Polish spelling is. An article entitled *Pechowcy polskiej ortografii* ('The Unlucky Ones of the Polish Spelling'), for example, published by *Wyborcza* (redPor 2001), presents profiles of finalists of a number of editions of the Competition. All of them talk about their genuine 'passion' for spelling and some about the enormous 'stress' they experienced while taking part in the Competition. This 'passion' for spelling can be illustrated, for example, by the fact that one of the finalists suspended his Master's degree in order to be able to participate in another edition. Another made this confession: 'Spelling is my pain, I'm allergic to it. And I can't get myself a dress to feel better because it won't help'. It is said about this Master that 'she would like to live off spelling, because she can't live without it'. She also buys *Wyborcza* in order to spot spelling mistakes but compliments it for 'good editing'. The authors call her 'the spelling oracle for her friends', while she calls herself and two other Masters the 'Holy Trinity of the Polish Spelling'. She also argues that renowned spelling dictionaries often cause confusion and include many 'mistakes' (in fact, her own copy is said to be full of notes and underlined words and phrases), as a result of which 'in order to win the competition, you need to copy mistakes from dictionaries'. She finishes stating that her dream is that 'a dictionary would be published that wouldn't cause confusion in its readers'. Another finalist argues that knowing the rules of spelling is 'a matter of being well-read and an erudite'. In a different

editions abroad, for example, in France, Austria, Sweden, Lithuania and Belarus, particularly in the 1990s, and smaller editions have been held in other Polish cities. In 2006, a special edition of the Competition was organised for members of the Polish Senate, which inaugurated the celebrations of the Year of the Polish Language. Since 1993, special guests have been invited for a number of editions, that is famous public figures, such as editors-in-chief of newspapers and magazines, TV and radio presenters, politicians, and artists.

The award is significant, although it has differed through the years. In the 2000s, it was increased to 30,000 PLN (rough equivalent of £6,000). On 21 February 2010, which is the International Mother Tongue Day established by UNESCO in 1999, another special edition of the Competition took place, entitled the 'Dictation of the Masters' (Dyktando Mistrzów), where only the Masters and 2nd prize winners could participate. The winner won the title of *Arcymistrz Polskiej Ortografii* (Grand Master of the Polish Spelling). Many Masters have later joined editorial boards of the PWN Spelling Dictionary.

The texts of the Competition have been written by Polish linguists, many of whom are the authors of the texts analysed in this chapter, who are well-known outside of academia, such as Jerzy Bralczyk, Bogusław Dunaj, Andrzej Markowski, Edward Polański, Wiesław Przyczyna (who happens to be a priest and a Professor of Theology, specialising in rhetoric), and Walery Pisarek, the head of the jury in the first edition of the Competition. The spelling rules respected by the jury follow the most up-to-date edition of the PWN Spelling Dictionary, which is officially recommended by the Polish Language Council. Needless to say, the texts of the Competition are extremely difficult, with numerous proper names, borrowings, and not very well-known or frequently used vocabulary. Some items, on the other hand, are very well-known, but only in the spoken language, which makes them difficult to spell properly. Participation in the Competition thus requires the mastery of highly specific spelling

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article published by *Wyborcza* (Kortko and Krzyk 1996), yet another finalist opposes, however, the assumption that knowing the spelling has to be associated with being old or unfashionable – the point implied by one of the finalists discussed before. She says: 'a spelling expert isn't a wrinkled, grumpy old woman, who only fiddles with dictionaries. As you can see, I'm not an unattractive, inconspicuous woman with no sex appeal'.

and punctuation rules. The text of the 2012 edition, for example, was a poem, and in 2018 it was a play.

The Competition, with its popularity, significant media coverage, and the demanding rules, aims to legitimise not only the 'correct' or 'standard' variety, but also the authority of the PWN Spelling Dictionary as well as Polish professional linguists editing it and writing texts of the Competition. Another aim of the Competition is to legitimise the authority of sponsoring state institutions. It is yet another attempt to sustain order by ensuring that as many members of society as possible speak the 'correct' or 'standard' variety. In this way, a homogenous version of national identity is promoted, in which intellectual elites enjoy a privileged position.

5.4.4.5   Language awards

A number of national awards and prizes were established between 1989 and 2015 to honour a variety of Polish language activists. Granting an award is an instance of

> 'the official naming, a symbolic act of imposition which has on its side all the strength of the collective, of the consensus, of common sense, because it is performed by a delegated agent of the state, that is the holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence … there is the authorized point of view of an agent who is personally authorized …, and above all the legitimate point of view of the authorized spokesperson, the delegate of the state, the official naming, or the title or qualification' (Bourdieu 1991:239).

As the state is the 'holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence', the 'point of view' of a person authorised by a 'delegated agent of the state' becomes legitimised and 'imposed'. In other words, by means of language awards, the Polish state authorises Polish language activists, legitimising the variety of language they promote as well as their point of view.

In 1969, already in the communist period, an award entitled *Złoty Mikrofon* ('The Golden Mic') was established. Except for the years 1975–1987, when the award was paused, it has been awarded annually to those 'contributing to the maintenance of the high standard, development and popularisation of public radio' by a weekly *Antena* (*Aerial*). In other words, the aim of the award is to legitimise the authority of

state media. Candidates are selected among people involved in any aspect of radio production. Since 1993, the awardees have been presented with the award during a splendid gala. Since 1995, a related award entitled *Diamentowy Mikrofon* ('*The Diamond Mic*') has been awarded to 'exceptional radio performers'. In 2002, a special Honorary Golden Mic award for 'exceptional merit to public radio' was launched. Some of the awards have been granted to honour the awardees' language, for example, its 'communicativeness', 'beautiful Polish', or their 'popularising its richness and beauty' (mc/jp 2017). These awards explicitly aim to raise the prestige of the Polish language.

In 2000, a journalist and entrepreneur Bogdan Chojna launched a campaign entitled *Mistrz Mowy Polskiej* ('Master of the Polish Language'). Its aim was to promote 'correct Polish' by awarding

'people using Polish with true mastery and passion' (Mistrz Mowy Polskiej 2023).

The jury consists of Polish linguists, who make two to four awards annually and grant other special awards. There is also a people's choice vote (Vox Populi award). The awardees include famous Polish artists, especially poets, actors, journalists, presenters, politicians, and occasionally members of local communities.

In 2006, the 'Polonicum' Centre of Polish Language and Culture for Foreigners established in 1956 and now part of the University of Warsaw, introduced an award to honour

'foreign researchers for exceptional achievements in promoting the Polish language and knowledge about Polish culture and history in the world. The aim of the award is to promote Polish culture abroad, with its language, literature, culture, history, and art' (Nagroda Polonicum 2023).

The award was the initiative of the then head of the Centre, a historian Professor Ryszard Kulesza. The jury consists of representatives of the University of Warsaw and state officials: the Speaker of the Polish Senate, Minister of Culture and National Heritage, and Minister of Science and Higher Education. This award explicitly raises the prestige of the Polish language and celebrates national identity it represents.

In 2008, the Polish Language Council also introduced an award entitled *Ambasador Polszczyzny* ('Ambassador of the Polish Language'), which is awarded to

'individuals and institutions for exceptional merits in promoting beautiful, correct, and ethical Polish. This means efficient and correct use of Polish in various areas: cultural, scientific, journalistic, preaching, and any other sphere of public life. Thus, the Ambassador of the Polish Language popularises beautiful and neat Polish through its model use in speech and participates in initiatives aiming at promoting the Polish language and culture in the country and abroad' (Rada Języka Polskiego 2023a).

In 2019, one of the awardees was Olga Tokarczuk, Polish Nobel Prize winner in literature.

In 2012, President Bronisław Komorowski (in office 2010–2015) established an honorary award entitled *Zasłużony dla Polszczyzny* ('Award of Merit for Service to the Polish Language'). The award is granted to

'people of culture, science, business, teachers, and social activists for special merits in raising linguistic awareness of Polish people and propagating Polish language culture – correct, efficient, ethical and aesthetic Polish – in academic and popular science publications, in TV, radio and electronic media appearances popularising Polish, as well as in teaching, acting and performing. The aim of the Award is to promote Polish as a value, protect Polish as a vehicle of national identity, shape linguistic awareness of Polish people, increase interest in the Polish language and promote correct language models' (Oficjalna strona Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015).

The awardees include famous Polish linguists whose work is analysed in this chapter: Walery Pisarek (2012), Jadwiga Puzynina (2013), and Jan Miodek (2014), as well as public figures known for their charity work and cultural activism, such as Anna Dymna (2015). The jury nominating candidates consists of a representative of the President's office, members of the Polish Language Council, the head of National Culture Centre (national institution promoting the development of Polish culture), and past awardees. The President has a final say in selecting the winner. The winner receives the award from the President in a solemn celebration on the International Mother Tongue Day.

This is not an exhaustive list of language-related awards launched in the period of liberal democracy building, but it shows their common rationale, popularity, and significance. Linguistic values promoted by these awards overlap with those promoted in my corpus and include: 'correctness', 'richness' and 'beauty', 'ethics', and

'aesthetics', as well as 'communicative efficiency', which in my corpus is associated with 'the lower level of norm'. Some of these awards are explicitly given out for promoting not only the Polish language, but also 'Polish culture and history'. The award *Zasłużony dla Polszczyzny* explicitly depicts Polish as a value and a vehicle of national identity. Awardees tend to be professional linguists, poets and writers, actors, as well as journalists and presenters. They thus represent linguistic authorities recognised by means of the process of standardisation. As the awards are granted by professional linguists and state officials, linguistic authorities as well as the authority of the state are legitimised. Language awards are thus yet another attempt to sustain order, whose condition is a homogeneous nation.

5.4.4.6   Initiatives of the Polish Language Council

After the Polish Language Council was appointed by the Presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences in 1996, it has run numerous initiatives aimed at promoting 'correct' Polish. I will now mention just a few examples to demonstrate how influential the institution became.

The year 2006 was entitled the Year of the Polish Language, which was widely celebrated across the country for almost two years (late 2005 to mid-2007). The Year of the Polish Language was initiated by Krystyna Bochenek, who at the time was the vice-Speaker of the Polish Senate and who had previously initiated the National Dictation Competition. The purpose of naming year 2006 the Year of the Polish Language was to

> 'raise the status of Polish in schools, state (central and local) offices and in science' (Hącia 2008).

A number of institutions were involved in the celebrations, including the Polish Senate, Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, and the Polish Language Council. The Council held a number of events, which received significant media coverage. Lectures on various aspects of the Polish language were broadcasted on the radio. The Festival of the Polish Language was held, where a competition *Mówca Znakomity* ('The Excellent Orator') was organised, and all the stations of the Polish Radio broadcasted the National Dictation Competition. A campaign was launched entitled

Na etykietach – po polsku ('Polish on labels'), aimed at enforcing the regulations of the Polish Language Act. A series of dictation competitions took place, including ones held on the radio and in schools, as well as a number of academic events on the Polish Language, such as conferences and special celebratory publications.

The Council has also held a number of initiatives and campaigns related to Polish as part of the International Mother Tongue Day. Since 2012, together with the National Culture Centre, the Council has run a social-educational campaign entitled *Ojczysty – dodaj do ulubionych* ('Mother Tongue – Bookmark it'), aimed at 'shaping the linguistic awareness of Polish people and propagating care for correct Polish' (Narodowe Centrum Kultury 2023). The purpose of the campaign was to

> 'remind people about the role and significance of the national language in the lives of Polish people, contribute to raising linguistic awareness, and to ground the belief that Polish is shaped by every user and everyone is responsible for it. Language is a value in itself, a common good, and thus we should all care for it' (Narodowe Centrum Kultury 2023).

Like in the texts analysed in this chapter, the organisers explicitly depict Polish as 'a value in itself' and 'a common good', but they also stress that Polish is one of the 25 most frequently spoken languages on the planet, with over 40,000 users, and over 90 per cent of Polish citizens speaking solely Polish.

On 21 February 2013, another campaign entitled *Język polski jest ą ę*[145] was launched, aimed at promoting the use of Polish diacritics, which is argued to be in decline. The aim of the campaign was to

> 'make Poles aware of the importance of using Polish characters on the Internet and in text message communication. Diacritics are a distinguishing feature of the Polish language. Not using them may pose a threat to Polish and lead to its impoverishment and to the weakening of the role it plays in transmitting Polish cultural heritage' (Rada Języka Polskiego 2023b).

Again, the idea is espoused that the Polish language and Polish culture, which Polish is explicitly argued to be the vehicle of, are under threat. Not using diacritics is attributed to 'laziness' associated with new media, that is 'modern' phenomena, the

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[145] The title of this campaign is difficult to translate. The letters *ą* and *ę* are examples of Polish diacritics, but the title also plays on the idiom 'być ą-ę' (literally: 'to be ą-ę'), which means 'to be pretentious'.

opposite of which is 'neatness' (Rada Języka Polskiego 2023b), which resembles the idea of 'meticulousness' promoted in quote (87).

The explicit aim of Polish Language Council campaigns launched after 1999 was the promotion of the status of Polish as the national language in institutions that are typically invoked in the discourse of standardisation: administration, education, and scholarship. These campaigns explicitly promote some of the representations of Polish identified in my corpus, especially the idea that 'Polish is a value in itself', that it performs the function of nation-building (it is 'a common good') and 'transmits Polish national heritage', which are the reasons why 'care for language' is argued to be necessary. Promoting the use of Polish on labels in one of the Council's campaigns is an instance of purist language ideology. So is the promotion of the use of Polish diacritics, as its decline, associated with the development of the Internet, is argued to 'pose a threat to the Polish language'. These campaigns launched by the Polish Language Council aim to legitimise linguistic authorities and state institutions, to ultimately sustain order understood as a homogeneous nation with a strong nation-state.

5.4.4.7 'Correct' Polish in new media

More recently, some experts and pundits on Polish have become immensely popular on the Internet. An example is a very popular YouTube channel, *Mówiąc Inaczej* ('In Other Words'), established in 2013 by a graduate of Polish Philology at the University of Warsaw, who now publishes popular science books on 'correct' Polish. In March 2024, the channel had 505,000 subscriptions. Another example of a digital standardisation practice is a Facebook group *O języku polskim po polsku* ('On Polish in Polish'), active between 2010 and 2018, whose members discussed a wide variety of issues associated with language 'correctness'. Sources promoting 'correct' Polish online show not only Poles' interest in language 'correctness', but also how many Poles see Polish linguists as legitimate linguistic authorities. These sources also show how 'correct' Polish can be a commodity and how a degree in Polish Philology can perform the function of authorisation.

5.4.4.8 Intertextuality and interdiscursivity: summary

In this subsection, I have discussed a wide variety of standardisation practices led by Polish linguists in the period of liberal democracy building. These practices included: publishing dictionaries, popular science books and press columns or articles about 'correct' Polish, running phone-in clinics and the National Dictation Competition, launching language awards and initiatives led by the Polish Language Councils, as well as producing sources on 'correct' Polish in new media. I have demonstrated how these practices are founded on similar ideas to those identified in the body of texts I examined in this chapter, especially the representation of Polish as a value in itself and an endangered vehicle of national identity that needs to be 'cared for'. These practices promote primarily the value of 'correctness' and occasionally 'purity', 'richness' and 'beauty', 'ethics' and 'aesthetics', as well as 'communicative efficiency'. Although some editions of the Speech Culture Forum conference were concerned with the language of politics and language policy, I have not found a single instance of promoting the value of linguistic 'neutrality' in the practices discussed in this subsection. These sources enhance the prestige of linguistic authorities, especially the Polish Language Council and professional linguists in general, as well as areas of language use that are especially important for standardisation: literature, theatre and cinema, media, administration, and education. On occasions, the goal of standardisation practices discussed in this subsection is to procure legitimacy for the state, as state institutions are often involved in promoting the idea of 'correct' Polish. The purpose of standardisation in the period of liberal democracy building in Poland was thus to sustain order in the relatively 'unsettled' period of political, economic, social, and cultural transformations by promoting a specific version of homogenised national identity.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in Poland after 1989 was founded on the combination of nationalist, purist, and standard language ideologies. The representations of Polish as an essential component of national identity and a vehicle of Polish identity and culture are

characteristic of nationalist language ideology. Polish scholars of language argued that national language should be protected, as without it, the Polish nation may not exist or at least may not be entitled to its own nation-state. Such discourse was a way of sustaining the internationally accepted order which prioritises homogeneous nation-states. The argument that the Polish language is endangered is embedded in the belief typical for purist language ideology that languages are separate, bounded entitles which should consist of exclusively 'native' forms. By arguing against any 'foreign' influences on Polish, especially against Anglicisms, Polish scholars of language attempted to legitimise the majoritarian definition of the nation, which prioritises the 'natives'. Finally, Polish scholars of language in the period of liberal democracy building produced the discourse of 'language complaints', depicting 'correct', 'neutral', and 'elegant' Polish as a criterion of legitimacy and a sign of morality and good manners. They argued that Polish needed to be spoken in all public sphere, which is why linguistic authorities should be promoted, the Polish Language Council should be appointed, and language legislation should be introduced. The purpose of standard language ideology in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse at the time was to legitimise the privileged position of intellectual and political elites, particularly those with conservative and nationalist views. I have argued in this chapter that the combination of nationalist, purist, and standard language ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse between 1989 and 2015, which is related to nationalism and conservatism as political ideologies, served to construct a specific version of Polish national identity: homogeneous, centred around 'patriotic' values, guided by the elites, and having a strong nation-state. Only one author in my corpus produced a counter-discourse, openly rejecting these ideologies and expressing explicitly liberal and anti-nationalist views.

By means of contextual analysis, I have deconstructed the ideological nature of my corpus. Discussing the co-text of the 1st Speech Culture Forum, I argued that the Forum can be seen as a turning point in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse, as ideas characteristic of the discourse on *nowomowa* in the previous period almost entirely disappeared, while the discourse of standardisation produced in the previous period became dominated by the discourse of the endangerment of Polish. I argued for the ideological nature of the texts included in my corpus by showing that they

represented a hybrid genre of academic conference papers on the one hand and a language policy proposal with very tangible political consequences on the other. By situating my corpus in the socio-political context of the regime change and the subsequent economic, social, and cultural transformations, I argued that the salience of nationalist, purist, and standard language ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse at the time can be explained by the changes associated with democratisation, leaving the Soviet bloc, and joining the 'West'. Finally, I have demonstrated the wide variety of standardisation practices Polish linguists were involved in at the time, arguing that the discourse of standardisation and Polish language endangerment were very significant in Poland in the period of liberal democracy building.

Looking at Polish professional metalinguistic discourse, I have observed that in the period of liberal democracy building, the discourse about the language of politics was much less important than in the previous period. In other words, while in the period of communist authoritarianism there were two major discursive strands in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse, in the period of liberal democracy building, it was only one: the discourse of standardisation. This discourse, however, intensified, because it was accompanied by the discourse of Polish language endangerment and included very explicit and specific language policy proposals. In other words, language ideologies detectable in the discourse of standardisation in the period of liberal democracy building in Poland were much more explicit, comprehensive, and elaborate than in the period of communist authoritarianism. In addition, an intensification of the discourse of standardisation after 1989 can be observed in the number of sources and initiatives promoting 'correct' Polish, often led by the Polish Language Council, which became an important actor on the Polish political scene. My findings thus complicate Swidler's theory, showing that the role of language ideologies can also increase in relatively 'settled periods'.

I have interpreted the construction of a highly homogeneous and 'patriotic' version of national identity and the promotion of a strong nation-state as indications of the frustrations of countries of medium international significance in the era of globalisation related to the inequalities in political power and the perceived lack of tangible influence. The salience of nationalist, purist, and standard language

ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse seems, however, to also have a cultural explanation; these ideologies are deeply embedded in European culture and history and seem necessary for maintaining mature nation-states, in which national languages play an important role. I have thus shown the importance of the category of the nation in Polish political discourse between 1989 and 2015.

Finally, I have demonstrated in this chapter that in times of liberal politics in Poland, when the fight for a democratic system was not necessary, anti-liberal ideas were promoted in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse. Although calls for language protection are usually associated with right-wing political groups in the literature (see, e.g., Pullum 1987; Pfalzgraf 2003; Ćalić 2018), I have not identified such direct connections in the case of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse after 1989. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, anti-liberal ideas I have identified in this chapter undermined a new Polish democracy and created a discursive opportunity structure (Koopmans and Statham 1999; McCammon 2013) for anti-democratic discourse of Law and Justice, which came to power in 2015. In response, after 2015, Polish professional metalinguistic discourse became much more liberal. On the one hand, while standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies continued to be promoted, they were occasionally accompanied by liberal ideas. On the other hand, liberal language ideology became salient again, which in professional metalinguistic discourse in Poland seems associated with times when democracy is threatened. In addition, while the Polish Language Act was passed and the Polish Language Council was appointed for conservative-nationalist reasons, after 2015 they were constructed as foundations of a liberal democratic system in Poland not only in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse, but also in independent media. I will discuss this liberal turn in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the next chapter.

6 Liberal, Standard, Purist, and Nationalist Language Ideologies as a Liberal Turn in Polish Professional Metalinguistic Discourse (2015–2023)

6.1 Introduction

The year 2015 marked another turning point in Polish recent history. In October 2015, the populist right-wing Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or PiS) won the parliamentary election. It then adopted numerous policies in the area of politics, law, media, and culture, which moved the Polish political system towards authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2020), beginning the process which in the literature is often called 'democratic backsliding' (Bauer et al. 2021; Bellamy and Kröger 2021; Bermeo 2016; Cianetti et al. 2018; Haggard and Kaufman 2021b). Consequently, Polish society polarised to the point of a culture war.

In this context, professional metalinguistic discourse in Poland shifted yet again after 2015. Like in the period of communist authoritarianism, I distinguish two distinct strands of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse, again corresponding to two traditions of standardisation. One strand resembles linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, which, as I argued in Chapter 4, were liberal in nature. The main object of concern in this discourse was once again the language of politics and the media. More precisely, what linguists criticised were components of a right-wing populist ideology employed in the discourse of Law and Justice, used to narrow down the definition of the Polish nation, and the ruling party's control of state media, which were used to broadcast official propaganda, much like in the communist period. In this discursive strand, Polish was depicted as a common good of all its users and a tool for interpersonal communication. Because this strand of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse criticised the language of Law and Justice-supporting media, uncovering its ideological nature and political interests behind it, this discourse again shows affinity with CDA, although this label is not explicitly used. The belief that the main function of language is informative is evident in the key instruction promoted in this discourse, that is conformity to national and international legislation in order to protect linguistic

'neutrality'. I will argue that professional metalinguistic discourse in Poland after 2015 was once again about reluctance to support for the populist regime and ultimately about the protection of democracy. The difference between liberal professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of communist authoritarianism and after 2015 is that in the latter, liberal language ideology was much more explicit, comprehensive, and elaborate than in the former.

The second strand of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse between 2015 and 2023 drew on the conservative-nationalist discourse produced by Polish scholars of language in the period of liberal democracy building. The ideologies detectable in this discursive strand are standard, purist, and nationalist. The main object of concern was the language of scholarship, which is an important area in the process of standardisation. The key representation of Polish in this discourse was that it is a national good, but also a tool for communication, which shows an overlap with the liberal strand. The linguists who called for the use of Polish in scholarship, especially in scholarship on Polish history, culture, language, and literature, aimed to elevate the prestige of 'local scholars' and 'local scientific communities', who, they argued, should be equal to the 'global' ones. In their argument, these linguists occasionally used liberal ideas of equality and inclusion. Like in the professional metalinguistic discourse in the previous period, these authors argued that legislation should be introduced, this time regulating the language of scholarship specifically. They promoted the use of the 'native' language in scholarship as a way of changing the socio-political order in which English dominates as an academic *lingua franca*. In this way, the professional metalinguistic discourse after 2015 created a discursive opportunity structure for the discourse of Law and Justice, even if inadvertently.

I will demonstrate that during the periods in Polish history when democracy is either non-existent or comes under attack, professional metalinguistic discourse tends to be mobilised around political issues and focused predominantly on promoting (the communist authoritarian period) or protecting (democratic backsliding) liberal democracy. In the 'democratic' period, in turn, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, professional metalinguistic discourse becomes predominantly conservative-nationalist, with few instances of liberal ideas. Although conservative-nationalist language ideologies can also be identified in Polish professional

metalinguistic discourse in times when democracy is threatened, these ideologies are either less 'thick', explicit and elaborate, or accompanied by components of liberal language ideology. My study reveals a fundamental paradox of democracy: democracy with its respect for individual freedom provides an opportunity for production of anti-democratic discourses, which becomes particularly 'loud' in the period of liberal democracy building.

I will begin this chapter by introducing my data: two Polish Language Council reports published in the period of democratic backsliding called 'reports on the state of the protection of Polish', and the rationale for their selection. I will move on to identifying language ideologies and, where relevant, political ideologies in the analysed texts by means of a thematic analysis in NVivo. Following my definition of language ideology (see 2.2.4), I will examine representations of language identified in these texts, the socio-political order they served to legitimise, and instructions for the ideal use of language provided.

Next, I will complement the thematic analysis with contextual analysis following Wodak's four-component framework (see 3.3). I will first discuss the co-text of my data, that is the immediate context of where the reports appeared: the Polish Language Council and the Polish government websites. Secondly, I will discuss the genre of the report, which yet again is a hybrid of an academic study and a political document commissioned by parliament and/or required by law. Next, I will consider the socio-political context, providing an overview of social, political, legal, and cultural changes that took place in Poland between 2015 and 2023, under the rule of Law and Justice. I will argue that this regime change was once again a factor impacting language ideologies used in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse. I will then look at the interdiscursive and intertextual context of my data: topics of previous Polish Language Council reports on the state of the protection of Polish, standardisation practices Polish linguists were involved in in this period, Polish linguists' academic and media publications discussing the language of Law and Justice, and a row between the Law and Justice government and the Polish Language Council over the *The Award of Merit for Service to the Polish Language* in 2017. Finally, I will conclude my argument.

6.2 Data: Polish Language Council reports on the state of the protection of Polish (2016–2019)

Two Polish Language Council reports on the state of the protection of Polish published between 2015 and 2023 will serve as my data in this chapter. The Polish Language Council, established by the Presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences in 1996 and consisting predominantly of Polish professional linguists, is obliged by the Polish Language Act to launch initiatives devoted to promoting 'correct' Polish (see 5.4.4.6) and to produce biennial reports on the state of the protection of Polish that are then submitted to the Parliament. These two reports, I believe, are particularly politically salient in terms of the intersection between professional metalinguistic discourse and politics. The reports are required by law and in the time of democratic backsliding they became a space in which criticisms of the ruling party could be expressed. The reports are also significant in the context of the ongoing culture war. The polarisation of Polish society is evident in the split among Polish scholars of language, who produce very different arguments and employ very different language ideologies in the two reports.

The report for the years 2016–2017, authored by Katarzyna Kłosińska, Rafał Zimny, and Przemysław Żukiewicz, was entitled *The Language of Political Information*. It focused on the language of the TVP1 News programme tickers (the so-called 'Main News' broadcasted at 7.30 pm). Through connections between Law and Justice party members and the executives of the Polish TV, the channel became a space for pro-Law and Justice propaganda. The report discussed the way TVP1 News represented what the authors classified as 13 main political stories in 2016–2017. According to the authors, these representations served to support the interests of the ruling party. It is thus paradoxical that the Polish Language Act, which was passed to construct a specific conservative-nationalist version of national identity, was used by liberals to protect democracy at the time when it was threatened. Invoking the Act, Polish linguists criticised the language of politics as well as the political system in Poland governed by the ultra-conservative and nationalist party. The report was rejected by

the Parliament on the grounds of not meeting the requirements of a parliamentary report (PAP 2019a)[146].

The report for the years 2018–2019, authored by Agnieszka Choduń, Danuta Krzyżyk, Renata Przybylska, Mariusz Rutkowski, and Helena Synowiec, was entitled *The Status of the Polish Language in Scholarship*. The authors studied the language used at international conferences held in Poland and in Polish academic journals. They also conducted a survey among Polish academics about the languages of scholarship in Poland. Ideas promoted in this report resembled those identified in the professional metalinguistic discourse in 1989–2015, which led to the passing of the Polish Language Act. However, components of liberal ideology can also be occasionally identified.

6.3 Thematic analysis of the corpus

As in the previous two chapters, in this section I present the results of a thematic analysis of my corpus in NVivo, based on my three-component definition of language ideology. I will analyse the two Polish Language Council reports comparatively, starting with the report for 2016–2017 and moving on to the report for 2018–2019.

6.3.1 Representations of language: Polish as a tool for (interpersonal) communication and a common good of all its users vs. a national good and component of national identity

In the 2016–2017 report, Polish is depicted as a common good of all its users, a social good, and a tool for interpersonal communication. Representations of Polish are different in the 2017–2018 report: Polish is depicted as a national good, a component of national identity, and a tool for communication. While the representation of Polish as a tool for communication was characteristic of linguistic studies of *nowomowa* in the period of communist authoritarianism, Polish was depicted as a national value and a component of national identity in the professional

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[146] This had happened only once before, in 1999, right after the Polish Language Act was passed, for the same reasons.

metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building, where Polish was constructed as endangered and in need of protection.

The representation of Polish as a 'common good of all its users' is much more inclusive way that its representation as a national value:

> (106) 'The Polish language is a common good of all its users, and therefore it cannot be appropriated by anyone, especially a television broadcaster, and treated as an instrument in political struggle' (Kłosińska, Zimny, and Żukiewicz 2018:82).

The opposite of this ontological claim ('the Polish language is a common good of all users') and an associated linguistic norm of 'ideological neutrality' ('cannot be appropriated by anyone') is the idea that language is a political tool, an 'instrument in political struggle'. Such a characterisation of the function of language, attributed to Law and Justice and the media it controls, is seen as deviant and harmful. This implies the liberal ideals of equality, inclusivity, and democratic deliberation.

The other representation of Polish in the 2016–2017 report is that it is a tool for interpersonal communication, which resembles arguments characteristic of the discourse of standardisation, but also post-structuralist conceptions of language. Polish was depicted in a similar way in linguistic studies of *nowomowa* in the period of communist authoritarianism. However, the use of the adjective 'interpersonal' in the 2016–2017 report creates an image of Polish as a tool for 'horizontal' social communication among people, rather than 'vertical' political communication between political authorities and citizens mediated by the media. The adjective 'interpersonal' again invokes the liberal ideals of equality, inclusivity, and deliberation.

Citing the Polish Language Act, Kłosińska et al. argue that 'creating conditions for proper development of the language as a tool for interpersonal communication' is a form of protection of Polish, which 'all public authorities as well as public institutions and organisations', including state media, are obliged to do. The authors conclude that the TVP1 News programme fails to fulfil this obligation:

> (107) 'Referring to Article 3 of the Polish Language Act of 7 October 1999, which imposes on all public authorities as well as institutions and organisations participating in public life the obligation to protect the Polish language, particularly by creating conditions for proper development of the language as a tool for interpersonal communication, it should be stated that also this obligation could have been fulfilled in

an improper manner by the persons responsible for broadcasting the tickers in TVP1 News programme. Language is often treated there not as a social good, but as an instrument in political struggle serving one of the political subjects to create its own view of the world and impose it on citizens' (2018:78).

The authors portray public authorities, institutions, and organisations as legally responsible for 'creating conditions' in which Polish is a 'tool for interpersonal communication'. In other words, the role of state media is to treat language 'as a social good' in order to ensure that the whole society can effectively communicate. In addition, this is a condition of democratic deliberation. What TVP1 News programme is doing, according to the authors, is treating language 'as an instrument in political struggle serving one of the political subjects to create its own view of the world and impose it on citizens'. Consequently, like in the case of state media in the period of communist authoritarianism, TVP1 News programme attempted to make democratic deliberation impossible by presenting a one-sided view of the world, which serves political interests of the ruling party. The authors consider such use of language a threat to Polish. This idea of threat to Polish is thus very different to the one constructed in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the previous period. In this way, the authors of the 2016–2017 report invoke the liberal ideals of not only equality and inclusivity, but also popular sovereignty and the rule of law.

The authors of the 2018–2019 report invoke the Polish Language Act differently. Here, 'public authorities as well as institutions and organisations participating in public life' are obliged to protect Polish as 'a national good and a component of national identity'. These representations are central tenets of nationalist language ideology:

> (108) 'The Polish language is undoubtedly a national good and a component of national identity, the protection of which is one of the obligations of public authorities as well as institutions and organisations participating in public life, which also finds its normative expression in specific regulations' (2021:12).

Once again, it is through its association with the nation that the Polish language receives the status of a 'good'. Such a representation of Polish implies that its protection is tantamount to the protection of Polish national identity, which is the ultimate value. As argued in the previous chapter, assigning value to one's nation is

characteristic of nationalism as a political ideology. However, the respect for the rule of law is characteristic of liberalism.

Choduń et al. also construct the threat Polish is facing differently than Kłosińska et al. According to Choduń et al., the 'status' or 'prestige' (2021:1, 5, 61) of Polish in scholarship is decreasing:

(109) 'A language that follows the development of scholarship has a chance to develop many specific conceptual systems and is therefore capable of reflecting the richness of world phenomena. Such a language – a language with high conceptual capacity – enjoys the prestige of its users, because they are convinced that if the most sophisticated content can be expressed in their native language, it is not worse than other languages, and it is certainly not worse than the global language of scholarship (which is currently English)' (2021:1).

Choduń et al. argue that Polish as the language of scholarship needs protection to 'enjoy the prestige of its users'. There is an implication here that Polish language speakers should unanimously value Polish at least as much as English, or even more. The idea that language has or should have 'high conceptual capacity' is frequently used in the discourse of standardisation, although it is problematic (Joseph 1987).

In the surveys Choduń et al. conducted with academic staff, the first question features a presupposition that Polish as the language of scholarship may become extinct:

(110) 'Do you think we are at risk of losing the Polish scientific language?' (2021:172).

The use of the pronoun 'we' presupposes the existence of Polish scholars as 'owners' of the 'Polish scientific language', who may be personally affected by its extinction. Unlike in the previous report, it is not all language users that are the subject of concern, but intellectual elites.

Another survey question presupposes that the status of Polish in scholarship should be increased:

(111) 'In your opinion, what steps should be taken to strengthen the position of the native language in scholarship?' (Choduń et al. 2021:173).

In other words, according to the authors, it is necessary to strengthen the position of Polish in scholarship. The explicit linguistic norm promoted here is

'nativity', which is characteristic of nationalist and purist language ideologies. The discussion on how the position of Polish could be strengthened in the area of scholarship is an attempt to resist linguistic imperialism of English (see 2.2.4.4.3).

To support their argument for the protection of the Polish scientific language, Choduń et al. argue that scholarship is a 'specialised section' of culture, which is shaped and manifested by means of language:

> (112) 'Language plays a fundamental role in the shaping and manifestation of both culture as a whole and scholarship as its specialised section' (2021:21).

By representing scholarship as part of culture, the authors construct a parallel between the condition of the Polish language in scholarship and the condition of Polish culture as a whole. A similar connection between the condition of the Polish language and the condition of the Polish nation was created by Pisarek and Rokoszowa in quotes (64) and (65).

Choduń et al. occasionally depict Polish as a tool for communication, but this communication is understood differently than in the previous report:

> (113) 'And finally, such a language [which follows the development of scholarship] serves society well – it is the basis for the language used in external circulation (on the line: specialist–non-specialist), it allows for maintaining the "communication flow" between researchers and society, gives access to achievements resulting from scientific research, recorded and stored most often in the form of linguistic data' (2021:1).

Communication between 'specialists' ('researchers') and 'non-specialists' ('society') is constructed in a 'vertical' way, and 'specialists' are represented as authorities. This implies the expectation of respect for power and 'accepted customary authority', which is frequent in conservative discourse (Fawcett 2020:52). On the other hand, the authorities promoted are intellectual elites, which can be interpreted as a way of directly opposing political elites.

In short, the two Polish Language Council reports published between 2015 and 2023 differ in their representations of Polish (see Table 11). In the 2016–2017 report, Polish is depicted as a common good of all its users, a social good, and a tool for interpersonal communication. Polish is represented as belonging to all its speakers, which means it cannot be used as an 'instrument in political struggle'. The criticised

relationship between political authorities and society mediated by the media is represented in a horizontal way, which implies the liberal ideals of equality, inclusivity, popular sovereignty, and democratic deliberation. In the 2017–2018 report, Polish is depicted as a national good, a component of national identity, and occasionally as a tool for communication. The first two representations are used to argue that the Polish scientific language is endangered, which puts Polish national identity under threat. The Polish nation is constructed as the ultimate value, which is typical for nationalism as a political ideology. The authors of the 2017–2018 report talk about Polish as a tool for communication only as a one-way vertical transmission of ideas from researchers to society, which implies the conservative ideal of respect for power and an elitist idea of respect for intellectual authorities.

Themes / subthemes	Key words	Language ideology
Polish is a common good of all its users	Polish, language, common good, social good, all, users, appropriate, instrument, political	liberal/standard
Polish is a national good and a component of national identity	Polish, language, component, national, identity, good, native, protection, obligation, institution, organisation, public life, public authorities, regulation	nationalist
The status of Polish in scholarship is decreasing	status, prestige, position, scholarship, conceptual, global, English, culture	standard/nationalist/purist
Polish is a tool for communication	Polish, language, tool, communication	standard
Polish is a tool for interpersonal communication	interpersonal, impose, obligation, institution, organisation, public life, broadcasting, protect, development, improper	standard/liberal
Polish is a tool for communication between researchers and society	risk, lose, strengthen, flow, researcher, society, specialist, non-specialist	standard/purist

Table 11. Thematic codes: Representations of Polish in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (2015–2023)

6.3.2 Political legitimation: the language of TVP1 News is a tool for claiming legitimacy for Law and Justice vs. the 'dominance' of English 'excludes' 'local scholars'

In the 2016–2017 report, the representations of Polish as a common good of all its users, a social good, and a tool for interpersonal communication provide the foundation for the criticism of the way TVP1 News used language as an 'instrument in political struggle'. In other words, the authors of the report argue that TVP1 News treat language as a tool for claiming legitimacy for Law and Justice.

In their justification of the choice of the topic for their report, Kłosińska et al. list four 'global' 'changes in the model and practices of public communication' taking place in approximately the last two decades. The first three are: 'the expansion of new media', 'the emergence of the phenomenon of fake news and the concept of post-truth', and 'creating political facts' (Kłosińska et al. 2018:4). The last one is:

> (114) 'changes in the way politics is understood and practised (shifting emphasis from concern for the common good to gaining and/or maintaining power, electoral success of populist subjects, development of the phenomenon of post-politics)' (2018:4).

Kłosińska et al. juxtapose two ways of defining and practicing politics: politics as 'care for common good' and politics as a tool for 'gaining and/or maintaining power'. These ways of understanding politics correspond to the representations of Polish as 'a common good of all its users' and as an 'instrument in political struggle', respectively. The authors criticise the current politics focused on 'gaining and/or maintaining power' and put forth the ideal of the politics as 'care for common good'. The 'electoral success of populist subjects' and the 'development of the phenomenon of post-politics' are related to the shift from politics as care for common good to politics focused on gaining and/or maintaining power. The quote does not state explicitly that Law and Justice is a populist party, but it is implied in the decision to focus on the 'language of political information' in Poland in 2016–2017.

The politics constructed as 'care for common good' is related to the idea of 'public interest', which is opposite to particular interests of specific groups and fundamental to democracy:

(115) 'This concept [of public interest] has a very different meaning if the deliberative or substantive model of democracy is considered the binding framework of the political system, in which the public interest is subject to consultations and public debates – carried out in the spirit of mutual respect and reflexivity – and is determined by the widest possible consensus' (Kłosińska et al. 2018:9).

The authors define 'public interest' as 'the widest possible consensus' on issues 'subject to consultations and public debates'. They invoke the liberal ideals of popular sovereignty, diversity, and democratic deliberation, as well as equality and inclusivity.

In other parts of the report, Kłosińska et al. explicitly criticise the language of TVP1 News tickers as devices designed to legitimise the ruling party and depreciate its opponents:

(116) 'The view of the world presented in TVP1 News tickers is one-sided (sometimes deformed), and its evaluative axis is in most cases the opposition: "the current government" – "those who do not support it"; the actions of the government and the ruling party are presented positively, while the actions of oppositional parties, civic movements, or European Union institutions that do not accept the decisions of the government are usually evaluated negatively, and sometimes become the object of generally understood depreciation (irony, mockery, ridicule, etc.). Evaluations are often made a priori and are therefore imposed on viewers' (2018:77).

The authors argue that TVP1 News tickers create a one-sided view of the world by associating positive values with 'the actions of the government and the ruling party' and presenting 'the actions of oppositional parties, civic movements, or European Union institutions that do not accept the decisions of the government' in the negative light. In other words, this view of the world, favourable to the government and the ruling party, is constructed by means of this evaluative language. A very similar idea was put forth in linguistic studies of *nowomowa* in the period of communist authoritarianism, for example, in quote (39), where Głowiński argued that the key quality of *nowomowa* was dichotomy, the opposite of linguistic 'neutrality'. Since these evaluations are made 'a priori', they are 'imposed on viewers'. The authors again invoke the liberal ideal of equality, inclusivity, and popular sovereignty, and imply the liberal idea that political power should be controlled by the rule of law.

Elsewhere, the authors argue that negative evaluations of the opposition are more frequent in their corpus than positive evaluations associated with the ruling party and its supporters:

> (117) 'The image of communicated reality constructed by this group of devices is dominated by negativity – positive evaluations are rare and apply only to subjects supporting the government. There is a very large quantitative disproportion between the evaluations of those subjects whose actions are evaluated negatively (opponents of the government) and the evaluations of those subjects whose actions are evaluated positively (supporters of the government)' (2018:61).

By pointing out this 'very large quantitative disproportion', Kłosińska et al. argue that the main strategy of TVP1 News tickers is to stigmatise political opponents of Law and Justice. They thus again imply the liberal ideals of equality, inclusivity, diversity, and deliberation, focusing specifically on political opponents of Law and Justice, who they believe are discriminated against[147].

The authors add that the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, or PO) is the only party that appears as the 'opposition' in their data, and conclude:

> (118) 'The way subjects of political life are linguistically named and evaluated in order to inform the public about their activities tends to be based only on a dichotomous division into "what is good (right)" and "evil (wrong)"' (2018:61).

The authors draw on Głowiński's idea of dichotomy, a linguistic way of conforming to the norm of 'ideological correctness', as a way of claiming legitimacy for the ruling party and stigmatising its opponents. As a result, the 'inclination to the construction of conflict is dominant' (Kłosińska et al. 2018:61), the opposite of 'the widest possible consensus'. The construction of this distinction once again implies the values of equality, inclusivity, and deliberation.

Kłosińska et al. explicitly call the way language is used in the TVP1 News tickers 'symbolic violence' and 'linguistic aggression':

> (119) 'In such cases, symbolic violence becomes the norm of linguistic communication, consisting in imposing a view of the world considered

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[147] The strategies Kłosińska et al. identify include avoiding formal names of political subjects, such as political parties, focusing on the opposition more than the ruling party, the depreciatory use of the name of the largest oppositional party: 'Platform' instead of 'Civic Platform', and describing the opposition by means of the adjectives 'radical' and 'total' (2018:29–30).

evaluatively obvious and in imposing a set of ideologically interpreted meanings on public discourse, corresponding to a specific, strongly valorised view of events … Using language to achieve the goals of a specific political subject and at the same time to discredit other subjects, the authors of the content of the tickers often use linguistic aggression – because they construct the statement in such a way as to harm the object of the statement' (2018:78–79).

The authors use Bourdieu's term 'symbolic violence' and the expression 'linguistic aggression' to make a case that TVP1 violates citizens' rights and ultimately to challenge its power. They yet again invoke the liberal ideals of diversity and deliberation.

Kłosińska et al. mention that Poland joined 'the pluralist information market' after the transformations of 1989 and argue that participation in this market is conditional on adherence to the principle of pluralism:

> (120) 'For a long time, there was an unquestioned view that the main principle of participation in this market for a public broadcaster should be pluralism, manifested in the transmission of content reflecting diverse social opinions represented by citizens' (2018:8).

The authors explicitly invoke the liberal democratic ideal of pluralism, which they define as the reflection of 'diverse social opinions represented by citizens', as the desired principle a public broadcaster should follow. Kłosińska et al. thus implicitly assign positive value to the transformations of 1989 as democratic, which can also be interpreted as an invocation of the liberal value of progress. They make it clear that TVP1 News does not adhere to the principle of pluralism and thus does not participate in the democratic 'information market' Poland joined in 1989.

By demonstrating how TVP1 News violates citizens' 'right of access to information' and criticising this 'violence', the authors imply that TVP1 attempts to undermine the democratic system in Poland:

> (121) 'Freedom of speech as the main social principle (in most cases constitutionalised) in democratic systems is also functionally related to the right of access to information' (2018:7).

The authors explicitly refer to the democratic ideal of freedom of speech and the related 'right of access to information' as the 'main social principle' of a democratic system. In other words, freedom of speech is a necessary condition of

democracy, according to the authors. In this way, Kłosińska et al. argue that the power of TVP1 and the ruling party it supports is undemocratic, thus challenging their legitimacy.

The 2017–2018 report aims to procure legitimacy for a different socio-political order. The representations of Polish as a national good and a component of national identity, which is under threat, provide the foundation for the criticism of the 'dominance' of English as the language of scholarship. The authors justify the use of the 'native' language in scholarship as a way of delegitimising the international academic system in which 'local scholars' and 'local scientific communities' are discriminated against. The 2017–2018 report is thus an example of a counter-discourse against globalisation, linguistic imperialism, and the prestige of English (see 2.2.4.4.2).

In the report for 2018–2019, the main criticism is focused on the 'dominance of English'. The phrase is used 13 times in the report:

> (122) 'In the 20th century, English became the global language of scholarship, which changed the position of the Polish language in many fields – Polish researchers specialising in engineering, technology, medicine, sciences, and natural sciences publish in both languages or mainly in English. The reasons for the observed changes in the language of scholarship – the decreasing prestige of the native language (Polish) and the increasing importance of the English language – are: firstly, civilizational and communicative factors, i.e., increased computerisation and transformations in scientific communication under the influence of the Internet (digital technologies); the desire of researchers to ensure the widest possible reach for their publications, and thus to enter the international scientific community; secondly – institutional factors (evaluation of scientific achievements of university employees, in which foreign-language publications are rated much higher); thirdly – shifts in the hierarchy of values: in contemporary scholarship, instrumental values (economic benefits, the desire to achieve scientific advancement and social prestige) increasingly come to the fore; this is also reflected in the choice of the language of publication. The choice of English as the language of publication makes it easier for academics to enter international circulation, which has a practical dimension (e.g., it contributes to the recognition of research outside Poland) and axiological (it is treated as prestigious). On the other hand, however, it may involve resigning from participation in local scientific communities that use national languages' (Choduń et al. 2021:1–2).

Choduń et al. argue that English is 'guilty' of contributing to the 'change of the position of Polish' or, more precisely, of the 'decreasing prestige of the native

language'. They attribute this change to the following three reasons: the development of technology and scholars' willingness to have broad readership, the current method of institutional evaluation of academic staff, and changes in the 'hierarchy of values' in contemporary societies. In the professional metalinguistic discourse in Poland 1989–2015, especially in quotes (69), (70), and (71), using 'the exemplary norm' of Polish was constructed as evident of seeing it as a value and thus patriotism, while using the 'standard norm' was constructed as indicative of instrumentalism. In addition, the use of Anglicisms was represented in quotes (72) and (74) as a sign of 'liberalism' and support for 'modernity'. The analysed quote seems to echo those ideas: the use of English in scholarship is represented as a sign of 'instrumental' values, purchased at the price of 'resigning from participation in local scientific communities that use native languages'. The authors construct a juxtaposition between 'local' and 'global' scientific communities, arguing that the choice of language is tantamount to the choice of which community a researcher wants to be part of. The 2018–2019 report is thus an instance of anti-globalisation discourse. By criticising the choice of English, the authors imply that it is the 'local' community that should be given priority. Elsewhere, the authors explicitly call those survey respondents who claim that the use of English as the language of scholarship is 'inevitable' and 'essential' for 'the internationalisation of Polish scholarship' 'the supporters of the dominance of English' (2021:5).

According to Choduń et al., the choice of English and resignation from the use of the 'ethnic language' has 'cultural, social, and identity' consequences:

> (123) 'At the same time, it is important to remember that choosing English and thus abandoning one's own ethnic language (e.g., Polish) has – like any use of language – not only a practical dimension, but also a cultural, social and identity one' (2021:29).

According to the authors, choosing English as the language of scholarship is tantamount to 'abandoning one's own ethnic language', which in turn leads to the marginalisation of 'local' scientific communities. In this way, the authors attempt to resist the linguistic imperialism of English.

Choduń et al. seem, however, to prioritise the 'local' scientific community over the 'global' one. This is evident in the argument that it should not be a requirement to write Polish governmental grant applications in English:

> (124) 'While this is justified in relation to large-scale research, in the case of local research (concerning Polish culture, Polish language, Polish society, etc.) it is often not justified, because the best, and usually the only specialists in a given field are Polish scientists' (Choduń et al. 2021:3).

The authors argue that 'local' scholars, especially those studying Polish culture, language, society etc., who are 'the best, and usually the only specialists in a given field', deserve a higher status. In this way, the interests of Polish scholars are explicitly protected.

Choduń et al. explicitly say that 'local' scholars are discriminated against:

> (125) 'This puts many scholars, e.g., those engaged in local, but – as indicated – socially important studies or those who do not speak English at all, in an inferior position, because it either completely excludes them from the group of applicants or forces them to use translators as intermediaries' (2021:30).

Choduń et al. invoke the liberal ideals of equality and inclusivity, aiming to protect the interests of 'local' scholars, defined as those studying 'local' phenomena or simply those who do not write in English. The authors argue that 'local' scholars should be given equal access to grant applications, without the necessity to engage translators. This invocation of liberal ideas can, however, be interpreted as masking the authors' real conservative-nationalist views in the world in which liberalism is often part of political common sense. The authors explicitly place responsibility for the underprivileged position of 'local' scholars on the Polish government that introduces legislation which puts 'the internationalisation of Polish scholarship' first (Choduń et al. 2021:19) and that evaluates English publications higher than Polish, thus making a 'conscious contribution to the trend for publications in English' and consequently, for 'the decrease in the status of Polish' (2021:58–59). In this way, the 2018–2019 report is a criticism of the government. Although it is not explicit which Polish government in particular is subject to criticism, the list of legislative documents passed in the period 2018–2019 seems to imply it is the one formed by Law and Justice (Choduń et al. 2021:13). This can be interpreted as a subtle criticism of the

party, although ideas identified in this report and those promoted by it seem to be founded on similar values (see 6.4.3).

Themes / subthemes	Key words	Language ideology
Calls for 'neutral' Polish as a way of protecting democracy	democracy, democratic system, political system, public interest, public debate, public discourse, consultation, respect, reflexivity, consensus, citizens, freedom of speech, right, access to information	liberal
TVP1 News uses language as an 'instrument in political struggle'	instrument in political struggle, politics, common good, gaining and/or maintaining power, electoral success, populist, post-politics	liberal
TVP1 News uses language to depreciate the opponents of Law and Justice	view of the world, one-sided, deformed, evaluative, evaluate, evaluation, government, ruling party, support, positive(ly), opposition, oppositional, negative(ly), deprecation, discredit, irony, mockery, ridicule, a priori, disproportion, subject, Civic Platform, good, right, evil, wrong	liberal
The language of TVP1 is symbolic violence and linguistic aggression	symbolic violence, linguistic aggression, harm	liberal
The principle of pluralism should be key to a public broadcaster	pluralism, principle, participation, pluralist information market, public broadcaster, diverse, social opinions	liberal
English should not be the dominant language of scholarship	Polish, English, language, Anglicism, dominance, value, native, local, global, international, scientific community, instrumental, practical	nationalist/standard
Choosing English as the language of scholarship means abandoning Polish	abandon, ethnic, cultural, social, identity	nationalist
The use of English should not be required in local research	local research, field, Polish culture, Polish language, Polish society, Polish scientists, best, only, specialist	nationalist
Local scholars who write in Polish should not be marginalised	inferior, exclude	nationalist/liberal

Table 12. Thematic codes: Political legitimation in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (2015–2023)

In short, in the 2016–2017 report, politics as 'care for common good' is explicitly constructed as the desired ideal, indicative of respect for public interest, and

ultimately democratic (see Table 12). The authors criticise the way TVP1 News uses language as a way of legitimising the power of the ruling party and depreciating its opponents. In other words, the authors challenge the way Polish is used in TVP1 News as 'ideological' (the opposite of 'neutral and objective'), thus delegitimising the power of TVP1 and the Law and Justice party it supports. In the 2018–2019 report, the 'dominance' of English in scholarship is constructed as a threat to Polish. The use of English as the language of scholarship is represented as indicative of instrumentalism, while the choice of Polish – as a sign of valuing the researcher's ethnic background and their 'local' scientific community. In other words, the use of the native language in scholarship is justified as a way of delegitimising the 'global' system in which 'local scholars' and 'local scientific communities' (in this case, those writing in Polish) are marginalised. The 2018–2019 report is thus an instance of resistance to the linguistic imperialism of English.

6.3.3 Instructions for the ideal use of language: observation of legal regulations vs. promotion of the use of Polish in scholarship

In the 2016–2017 report, the instruction provided for sustaining the ideal ('neutral and objective') use of language by the public broadcaster is observation of legal regulations, which require public broadcasters to be as objective as possible. In other words, 'neutrality and objectivity' is a legal obligation of the media, according to the authors. It is also constructed as a condition of democracy.

Kłosińska et al. list both Polish legislation (the Polish Constitution, which establishes the National Broadcasting Council, the Polish Language Act, and the Broadcasting Act of 29 December 1992) and international legislation Poland is bound by (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) (2018:8–15), to argue that Polish media are obliged to conform to the following norms:

> (126) 'pluralism, impartiality, balance and independence as well as innovation, high quality and integrity of the message' (2018:9).

References to this legislation shows the authors' respect for the rule of law, both domestic and international, which is one of the foundations of a democratic system.

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According to Kłosińska et al., it is a legal obligation of TVP to use 'neutral and objective' language:

> (127) 'The language of TVP News programmes should be characterised by neutrality and objectivity – this is a necessary condition for the broadcaster's mission resulting from its status as a public broadcaster to be fulfilled and for legal regulations regarding the quality of informational communication to be respected and – what is the most important from the point of view of this report – that the obligation of a public institution of the Republic of Poland towards the Polish language as a good of national culture and as a tool of interpersonal communication is fulfilled' (2018:81).

By using 'neutral and objective' language can a public broadcaster, an information channel, and a public institution meet legal requirements.

According to Kłosińska et al., 'neutrality and objectivity' are also required by the norms of the ticker as a genre, which performs three functions:

> (128) 'a) nominative (naming the text), b) descriptive or summarising (presenting content), c) pragmatic or persuasive (influence on the recipient)' (2018:22–23).

Kłosińska et al. argue that information, selectivity, and persuasion are inherently intertwined in tickers[148]. Their construction of the desired functions of language in the media is thus more nuanced than in linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, especially in quote (42), where persuasion was constructed as a deviation.

The authors argue, however, that in TVP1 News programme tickers there is an imbalance in the distribution of these three functions:

> (129) 'The conducted analyses revealed that the vast majority of the texts of TVP1 "News" tickers perform non-informative functions – mainly persuasive (influencing the recipient), magical (creating reality), and expressive (expressing the sender's emotions and evaluations). These types of texts are not created with the intention to provide the recipient with objective information about given events, but to create the author's views of these events and to influence the recipient's beliefs (including evaluations)' (2018:77).

The authors argue that this imbalance between the informative and non-informative functions in TVP1 News tickers indicates that it is not the broadcaster's

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[148] The authors decide not to focus on the nominative function, considering it to be 'obvious' (2018:22–23).

intention 'to provide the recipient with objective information', which it is legally obliged to do, but to 'influence the recipient's beliefs'. They thus construct the 'informative' function of language as the most important function of news programmes. Kłosińska et al. identify the intention to 'influence the recipient's beliefs' in TVP1 News programmes, but they do not construct a direct relationship between language and thought, unlike the authors of linguistic studies of *nowomowa*.

Kłosińska et al. argue that persuasion is achieved by means of evaluative language. This in turn is achieved by many linguistic devices, for example:

> (130) 'In conclusion, we argue that the authors of the analysed tickers use the structure of erotesis (rhetorical question) primarily to highlight the evaluative content of the following journalistic material' (2018:37).

Once again, the authors criticise the domination of persuasion over information in TVP1 News tickers, espousing the 'referentialist' ideology.

Kłosińska et al. demonstrate that many of the persuasive strategies used in their data are hidden, which makes their nature manipulative:

> (131) 'The linguistic and communicative practice in TVP1 News tickers is often manipulative in nature – the persuasive influences of the sender on the recipient are hidden and pursue the broadcaster's particular goals, without considering the broadly understood and inclusive category of the common good. Such linguistic activities may be assessed as unethical – in the act of communication, participants are not guaranteed equal and full participation in the communication community, because some of them are treated discreditably, which deprives them of dignity and excludes them from the community' (2018:79).

The authors explicitly call the use of language in TVP1 News tickers 'manipulatory', which is how Puzynina described *nowomowa* in quote (3), and 'unethical', as they treat some 'communication community' members 'discreditably', which 'deprives them of dignity' and leads to their exclusion. This is because the broadcaster pursues its 'particular goals' instead of pursuing the desired 'common good'. Kłosińska et al. once again invoke the liberal democratic ideals of equality, inclusivity, and participation.

In the 2018–2019 report, a few actions are proposed to promote the ideal ('native') use of language in scholarship, including making Polish the 'main language' of publications in certain disciplines, introducing legislation regulating the language

of academic publications, and developing 'independent' 'native' terminology. The alternative is the possibility that the decrease of prestige of scientific Polish will continue potentially to the point of its extinction.

Choduń et al. argue that to increase the 'rank' of the Polish scientific language the use of Polish in scholarship should be promoted, especially in studies on Polish history, culture, literature, and language. In Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building, there was a similar idea that the use of 'pure', 'correct', 'neutral', and 'elegant' Polish should be promoted in all public sphere. In the 2018–2019 report, because of its topic, the authors focus on the language of scholarship alone, which, as mentioned, is an important area for standardisation.

The authors explicitly list what should be done in the 'Conclusions and recommendations' section. Firstly,

> (132) 'The basic language of publications dealing with the issues of the history of the nation, its culture, literature, and language, and published in domestic journals should be Polish; publications in this language should not have a lower rank in the evaluation. Therefore, it is now necessary to reorient the current framework of research evaluation in the humanities and social disciplines in this thematic area' (Choduń et al. 2021:5).

Polish should be the 'main language' of 'domestic journals' discussing the 'history of the nation, its culture, literature, and language', according to the norm formulated in the analysed quote. In addition, the 'rank' of these magazines in research evaluations should be equal to the 'rank' assigned to English publications. The fact that it is studies discussing Polish 'history, culture, literature, and language' that should be published in Polish can be interpreted as not only an instance of standardisation activities, but also as an invocation of the idea fundamental for nationalist language ideology that Polish is a vehicle of national identity. This idea was also fundamental in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the 1990s. It seems that this connection between language and identity is the reason why studies discussing issues related to national identity should be published in the national language. In the remaining parts of the 'Conclusions and recommendations' section, Choduń et al. argue that Polish should be used in grant applications discussing these

topics, and it should be 'compulsory', regardless of the discipline, to include abstracts and key words in Polish in articles published in English. The authors also propose that articles and monographs should be published both in English and Polish.

In their recommendations, the authors explicitly argue against the use of English in academic publications:

> (133) 'It is necessary to rethink the issue of the language of journal titles. There is a tendency to change Polish titles to foreign ones, supposedly to increase the scientific prestige of the journal. One may encounter a peculiar situation where a journal that publishes articles only in Polish is given an English title, while only the table of contents and summaries are edited in the two languages' (2021:6).

The authors' normative stance concerning the use of English as the language of scholarship is evident in the negative connotations of the words 'foreign', which is typical for purist language ideology, as well as the words 'supposedly' and 'peculiar'.

Choduń et al. also imply that the use of English in scholarship is undesirable in one of the survey questions:

> (134) 'In your discipline, is the use of foreign-language terminology intensifying in contemporary publications?' (2021:173).

The verb 'intensify' ('nasilać się' in Polish) tends to collocate with words which have negative meanings, for example, 'problems' or 'conflicts'. The choice of this verb thus contributes to the negative representation of 'the use of foreign-language terminology'.

To support the argument that the 'prestige' of Polish as the language of scholarship should be increased, Choduń et al. list legislation granting Polish the status of the official language in Poland, including the language of education specifically (2021:11–15), which is an important area of standardisation. Choduń et al. argue, however, that there is no legislation regarding the language of scholarship in Poland, which leaves the decision of the language of publication to the publisher's discretion. What is implied is that such legislation is desirable:

> (135) '… in Poland, there are no legal regulations which would indicate the language in which academic publications should be published, and therefore, there is no legal requirement for publishing in Polish, nor is there an obligation to publish in a foreign language' (2021:14).

The authors demonstrate that from the legal perspective it is not essential for academic studies to be published in English. They also imply that the lack of legislation regulating the language of scholarship in Poland is to blame for the publisher's preference of English and the subsequent decrease of the status of Polish.

In other two survey questions, Choduń et al. imply that Polish scholarship should develop its own 'independent' terminology, that is native equivalents of 'foreign-language terms'. This is explicitly called 'making it accessible', which is an invocation of the ideal of equality and inclusivity:

> (136) 'Are foreign-language terms made available in scientific publications and how?
> In your discipline, has an independent Polish scientific terminology been developed?' (2021:173).

The authors imply that all scientific terminology should be nativised so that in Polish academic publications there are no 'foreign-language terms'. This argument is typical for the discourse of standardisation (Joseph 1987:94–96).

The criticism of the use of English in scholarship is also founded on the notion of the 'native speaker'. Discussing survey results, the authors mention the poor command of English of many authors publishing in this language:

> (137) 'They [the respondents] also drew attention to Polish scholars' lack of knowledge of foreign-language literature, to the fact that many of them do not prepare papers and articles in English independently (the publications are sent for translation), to the insufficient knowledge of the English language' (2021:60).

The authors imply that in order to use a language, one needs a 'full' (presumably near-native) command of it. Otherwise, one's language level is evaluated as 'insufficient'. The authors frame the use of translation as undesirable and explicitly call 'limited' vocabulary and syntax 'a problem' (2021:60). This can be interpreted as a case of national embarrassment. In this way, the authors imply that every community should use their own language in scholarship, thus criticising the 'dominance of English'.

Choduń et al. occasionally mention the 'incorrectness' of the language of Polish scholarship:

(138) 'Analysing the texts related to the organisation of conferences, attention was paid to their linguistic, stylistic, punctuation and spelling correctness. Conference titles are sometimes formulated imprecisely, non-communicatively, they are illogical, stylistically awkward, or wordy; some are syntactic calques from English or contain fashionable words, including Anglicisms' (2021:37).

'Correctness' of the language of scholarship matters because scholarship is one of the central areas of standardisation. In this way, the authors promote respect for linguistic authorities, who are intellectual elites, usually speaking the 'standard' variety. Employing standard and purist language ideologies, the authors judge the use of Polish in scholarship as 'incorrect' because of its imprecision, inefficiency, lack of logic, stylistic awkwardness, lengthiness, as well as the use of English 'calques' or Anglicisms, which are described as 'fashionable words'. This description can be interpreted as conservative reservations about the idea of 'progress' and 'modernity'.

In summary, the two Polish Language Council reports published between 2015 and 2023 differ in the instructions for the ideal use of Polish they provide (see Table 13). In the 2016–2017 report, in order for 'neutral and objective' language to be used, the authors argue that the media should obey the existent law. The call for the use of 'neutral and objective' language ultimately serves to sustain the democratic system. In the 2018–2019 report, to increase the prestige of scientific Polish, the authors propose that Polish should be the 'main language' of publications on Polish history, culture, literature, and language, that legislation should be introduced regulating the language of academic publications, and 'independent' 'native' terminology should be developed. The call for the use of the 'native' language in scholarship is an instance of resistance to the linguistic imperialism of English. The ultimate goal of this call is to challenge the socio-political order in which English dominates as an academic *lingua franca*.

Themes / subthemes	Key words	Language ideology
The public broadcaster should observe the law	public broadcaster, legislation, legal regulation, obligation, Constitution, Act, international, covenant, convention, right, freedom, neutrality, objectivity, pluralism, impartiality, balance, independence, innovation, quality, integrity, message, communication, mission	liberal
TVP1 News programmes should be more informative	nominative, descriptive, summarising, pragmatic, persuasion, function, informative, persuasive, magical, expressive, objective information, influence, view, belief, manipulative, goal, inclusive, equal, unethical, participation, discreditably, dignity, exclude	liberal
The prestige of Polish in scholarship should be increased	prestige, Polish, English, language, scholarship, academic	nationalist/standard
Polish should be the main language of publications in certain disciplines	rank, evaluation, publication, culture, literature, and language, domestical journals, humanities, social, disciplines, monograph, title, foreign, intensify	nationalist/standard
Legislation should be introduced on the language of scholarship	legislation, publication, legal, regulation, requirement, obligation	standard
'Native' terminology should be developed	native, foreign, terminology, independent, knowledge, literature, translation	nationalist/purist
Polish used in scholarship is often 'incorrect'	'correctness', linguistic, stylistic(ally), punctuation, spelling, imprecise, non-communicative(ly), awkward, wordy, syntactic, calque, fashionable, Anglicism	standard/purist

Table 13. Thematic codes: Instructions for the ideal use of language in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (2015–2023)

6.3.4 Summary: language ideologies (and political ideologies) in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (2015–2023)

Ideas about language identified through a thematic analysis of my corpus in this chapter have a lot in common with those identified in the previous two chapters. While the 2016–2017 report in many ways resembles linguistic studies of *nowomowa* produced by Polish scholars of language in the period of communist authoritarianism,

the 2018–2019 report draws on the combination of standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies, which were central to Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building. I thus argue that the 2016–2017 report is founded on liberal and standard language ideologies, while the 2018–2019 report – on the combination of standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies, occasionally accompanied by liberal ideas.

6.3.4.1   Liberal and standard language ideologies in the 2016–2017 report

I have demonstrated that liberal language ideology is consistently employed in the report for 2016–2017. Polish is depicted there as a common good of all its users, a social good, and a tool for interpersonal communication, the opposite of which is the idea of using Polish as a tool for political power. The authors argue that the way TVP1 News uses Polish is an attempt to legitimise the power of the Law and Justice party. The 2016–2017 report promotes the linguistic norms of 'neutrality' and 'objectivity', which are founded on liberal values and are thus ideological. The authors argue that these norms are required by law and thus obeying them is the foundation of a democratic system. These ideas together with liberal values of individual liberty, equality and inclusivity, diversity and deliberation, as well as the rule of law are expressed more explicitly in the report than in linguistic studies of *nowomowa*. In addition, the attribution of propaganda to political subjects is a strategy of their delegitimation (see 4.4.3.2.4), which is not politically neutral. The representation of Polish, 'the language', as a tool for communication, as well as the idea that a 'correct', in this case, 'neutral and objective' language should be used in the media, are characteristic of standard language ideology. This report can thus be interpreted as an instance of the 'moralistic' tradition of 'language complaints'.

In the report for 2016–2017, I have identified all the four components of liberalism as a political ideology as defined by Fawcett (2018). The representations of language as a common good of all its users, a social good, and a tool for interpersonal communication, with the linguistic norm of 'neutrality' and 'objectivity', imply the values of individual liberty, equality, and inclusivity, as well as diversity and deliberation. The criticism of the TVP1 News programme for using language as a

political tool, ultimately serving to legitimise Law and Justice, is founded in the value of the rule of law. 'Change' is not seen positively in the report, but it is understood very specifically as anti-democratic trends. However, post-1989 transformations are constructed positively, which can be interpreted as an invocation of the liberal value of progress. In contrast to linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, where liberal values were mostly implied, in the 2016–2017 report they are often mentioned explicitly. The report is also very explicit about protecting democracy in Poland.

Despite this explicit ideological stance, attempts to reduce its ideological nature can be observed in the report. As opposed to the authors of linguistic studies of *nowomowa*, who relied on the elitist belief in the relationship between language and thought, the authors of the 2016–2017 report adopt more recent social theories of language, including those adopted in this thesis. The emphasis is placed not on language as a system, but on communication, 'language in use' (Brown and Yule 1983), as the foundation of the social structure, including power relations.

6.3.4.2 Standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies in the 2018–2019 report

The authors of the 2018–2019 report continue the discourse produced by Polish scholars of language in the previous period. They promote similar ideas about Polish and also employ standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies. The 'standard' that the 2018–2019 report promotes is 'correct' 'native' language in scholarship, especially scholarship on Polish history, culture, literature, and language, which is an important area of standardisation. The representation of Polish as a tool of communication is also typical for the discourse of standardisation. In order to increase the prestige of the scientific variety of Polish, the authors of the report propose that legislation should be introduced regulating specifically the language of academic publications. The representation of Polish as a national good and a component of national identity, which is under threat, is typical for nationalist language ideology. As in the previous period, language endangerment discourse and anti-globalisation discourse are produced by Polish scholars of language to increase the prestige of national language and scholarship, which is constructed as an important component

of national culture. A system in which 'local scholars' and 'local scientific communities' are marginalised is explicitly challenged. Finally, the representation of languages as separate entities which should only consist of 'native' forms is the tenet of purist language ideology. And so, according to the authors of the report, 'independent' 'native' terminology should be developed in all disciplines so that no Anglicisms are used in scientific Polish. In this way, the report tries to legitimise the position of the 'native' scholars, especially those studying 'native' topics of Polish history, culture, literature, and language, who are often marginalised, according to the authors[149].

Nationalist and conservative ideas, as defined by Freeden (1998) and Fawcett (2020), respectively, can be found in the report for 2018–2019. It explicitly prioritises studies about Polish history, culture, literature, and language. The report also promotes the belief in linguistic authority as well as the authority of intellectual elites and describes socio-political changes such as globalisation and scholarly 'instrumentalism' negatively. The past is constructed positively as the time when English was not 'dominant'. These conservative and nationalist ideas are thus similar to those identified in the professional metalinguistic discourse in the previous period. These ideas are, however, much more balanced in the 2018–2019 report. Drawing on liberal ideas of equality and inclusion, the authors argue against the marginalisation of 'local' scholars in the 'global scientific community'. The report thus shows that the conservative fraction of Polish scholars of language moved towards liberalism, in contrast to many Polish conservative politicians, who moved away from it. In that, all the texts analysed in this chapter show that professional metalinguistic discourse is much more liberal after 2015 than it was before.

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[149] While the idea of English as a *lingua franca* is problematic (see 2.2.4.4.2), I do believe in the importance of striving for a common language of scholarship, and in the related value of academic exchange. Although I agree with a few recommendations made in the report, in particular the idea of bilingual publications, I am critical of the report's rejection of English as a *lingua franca* in some disciplines, which ultimately rejects the idea of a common language of scholarship in favour of local academic communities.

6.4 Contextual analysis

In this section, I will interpret the two Polish Language Council reports published between 2015 and 2023 through the lens of the four-dimensional framework of contextual analysis I developed. I will first look at the co-text of these reports (the Polish Language Council and the Polish government websites) and the genre (the inherent hybrid of a report commissioned by parliament and an academic study). To examine the socio-political context of democratic backsliding in Poland after 2015, I will provide an overview of anti-democratic steps Law and Justice took in politics and culture, which led to the increase in social polarisation, and I will define populism, which is the dominant ideology discernible in the discourse of Law and Justice. Finally, I will discuss the interdiscursive and intertextual context of the reports, that is other trends in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse between 2015 and 2023. I will demonstrate that the liberal turn in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of democratic backsliding is related to the political and cultural changes taking place in Poland at the time.

6.4.1   Co-text: the Polish Language Council and the Polish government websites

All the Polish Language Council reports are published on the Polish Language Council website (Rada Języka Polskiego 2007). The main page contains the latest content published by the Council, such as its public statements, obituary notices of linguists associated with the Council, or information about Speech Culture Forum conferences. The options included in the main menu are: 'About the Council', 'The Statute of the Council', 'The Council's Teams', 'Calendar', 'Publications' (which include books published by members of the Council as well as the Council's statements), 'Conferences and academic debates', 'Speech Culture Forum', 'The Council's documents' (which include the reports), 'The Council's activities related to the Polish Language Council' (which also include the reports), 'Membership in the European Federation of National Institutions for Language', 'Linguistic and Honorary Patronages', and 'Contact'. Links to sources on 'correct' Polish and to the Council's campaigns can be found at the bottom of the main page. The co-text in which the Polish Language Council reports are published is thus academic on the one hand

(scholarship and popularisation of 'correct' Polish) and legal (the Council's legal responsibilities). The website shows that the Council has developed its own brand (for example, in the 'Patronages' section).

The reports can also be found on the official website of the Sejm of the Polish Republic (Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej n.d.). On the main page, announcements and information about what the Sejm is currently debating can be found. The next sections in the main menu include: 'What the Sejm is doing', 'MPs', 'About the Sejm', 'iTV Sejm' (with the recordings of selected sessions of the Sejm), as well as 'The Archive'. The reports can be found in the Archive of the 'Sejm's works' section. They are thus published on the official website of the Sejm, but not in a very conspicuous way.

This co-text shows the political and legal significance of the reports, which illustrates yet again that Polish linguists are important political actors in Poland and that their ideas appear in the political field and thus have political consequences.

6.4.2   Genre analysis: academic studies and reports for the Parliament

The reports analysed in this chapter represent a hybrid genre, having qualities of legally required parliamentary reports and academic studies. This hybridity accounts for an inherent tension between the political and academic dimensions of the reports. A report as a genre is an account of a specific issue, usually in the form of officially written documents, which present results of 'professional' investigations by various official bodies, typically appointed to do it by relevant authorities. The Polish Language Council reports are required by the Polish Language Act to investigate the effectiveness of the measures adopted to 'protect' Polish and to propose changes, if necessary. They thus have direct political and legal consequences. On the other hand, the Polish Language Act specifically requires the Polish Language Council, that is a body of scholars specialising in the Polish language, to produce these reports, drawing on their expert knowledge of the subject.

I have defined science, a form of rational thinking, as the opposite of myth. The reports analysed in this chapter are written with much more rigour than the texts analysed in the previous two chapters. The authors of these reports produce critical

arguments, building on multidisciplinary theories, drawing on the existent literature on the subject (Choduń et al. 2021:61–64; Kłosińska et al. 2018:144–48), using academic terminology, and providing empirical evidence. Kłosińska et al. define specialist term and concepts in a separate section (2018:15–20). In addition, the authors are more explicit and systematic about their data selection and methodology (Choduń et al. 2021:61–64; Kłosińska et al. 2018:144–48), which could partly result from the changing academic norms in recent years.

The reports are indicative of a rift between Polish linguists and state institutions, which were united in their efforts to protect Polish in the previous period. The report for 2016–2017 explicitly criticises the language of the TVP1 News programme controlled by Law and Justice and was subsequently rejected by the Parliament. The report for 2018–2019 explicitly criticises the authorities for their policy of 'internationalisation' of scholarship, although they do not mention any specific government. However, some of the ideas about language and the socio-political world underpinning this report are similar to those promoted by Law and Justice, which I will continue to discuss in the next subsection.

6.4.3   The socio-political context: democratic backsliding (2015–2023)

In this subsection, I will discuss the way in which Law and Justice dismantled the Polish democratic system between 2015 and 2023 and controlled public media, which spread pro-party propaganda. I will argue that anti-democratic trends in Poland, which led to the substantial polarisation of Polish society, were a significant factor in the liberal turn of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse, which makes it inherently ideological. In other words, I will argue that Polish professional metalinguistic discourse was a response to a specific political style adopted by Law and Justice. I will also demonstrate that some of the ideas promoted by Law and Justice and other influential cultural entrepreneurs seem to have been influenced by Polish professional metalinguistic discourse produced in the period of liberal democracy building. Since these ideas were continued in the 2018–2019 report, the 'nationalist' strand of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse could contribute to

creating a discursive opportunity structure for some of the populist ideas, even if inadvertently.

6.4.3.1 Democratic backsliding and populism

Between 2015 and 2023, Law and Justice took numerous anti-democratic steps, taking over all major institutions that constitute the system of checks and balances and guarantee the separation of powers in a democratic state: Poland's Constitutional Tribunal, its regular courts including the Supreme Court and the National Council of the Judiciary, as well as electoral commissions, civil service, and public media (Kuisz 2023; Sadurski 2019). In its political performances, Law and Justice frequently employs a populist political style, that is a specific set of 'repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations' (Moffitt and Tormey 2014:387), whose main feature is what Ostiguy describes as 'the flaunting of the "low"' (2017:73). By doing so, Law and Justice contributes to the culture war, generating and exacerbating the socio-cultural polarisation of Polish society. This polarisation is evident, for example, in recent election results, which show that Polish society is split almost exactly in half. In presidential election of 2020, Andrzej Duda received 51.03 per cent of votes, while his opponent, Rafał Trzaskowski – 48.97 (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2020)[150]. In addition, numerous protests of the opposition took place, for example, mass protests against the hardening of the abortion law (2020–2021) after the verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal of 22 October 2020 (Blackington 2024; Kubal 2023). Many protesters were detained.

Populism is also seen as an ideology, which Law and Justice adopts[151]. Kubik (2021) defines populism as an ideology which can have two variants: 'thin' or 'thick'.

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[150] The results of the parliamentary election in October 2023 were slightly different. The so-called 'democratic opposition', that is the Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska), the Third Way (Trzecia Droga), and the Left (Lewica) received 53.71 per cent of the votes, while Law and Justice and its coalition partner Confederation of Liberty and Independence (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość) received 42.54 per cent of the votes. Still, the Law and Justice party won the most votes, 35.38 per cent (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2023).
[151] Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) argue that there are four explanations to the contemporary 'explosion' of populism: economic insecurity (deprivation), political changes in the party system and governmental ineptitude (dealignment), social elite estrangement (distrust) and cultural endangerment (destruction). Populism, however, is not only discourse produced by the authorities; it also has to be 'accepted' and supported by the electorate (Wigura 2021).

The thin variant consists of four components: (1) vertical polarisation: 'the people' against 'the elites', seen as separate and mutually exclusive groups or categories of people; (2) a claim that there exists antagonism between the two groups; (3) a Manichean valorisation of this antagonism, that is a belief that an essential feature of social/human reality is the struggle of the forces of good and evil (which is related to the use of a specific kind of language); and (4) the idea that politics should be the expression of *volonté général* (general will), which is closely related to authoritarianism. Populists are therefore inherently hostile to liberal or constitutional democracy (Mudde 2004:561). Leadership is very important to the electorate with populists views, as they themselves often do not want to be very involved in political life (Mudde 2004:557–58) [152]. Müller argues that the populist leader, who does not need to 'embody' the people, but 'a sense of direct connection and identification needs to be there' (2016:35), 'correctly discerns what we correctly think, and sometimes he might just think the correct thing a little bit before we do' (2016:34).

In contemporary populism, the elites are often defined as 'the progressives' or the 'politically correct' (Mudde 2004:561). What the Law and Justice party classified as the 'elites' were previous political authorities, in particular the leaders of Civic Platform (the ruling party in Poland between 2007 and 2015) and intellectual elites who promoted ideas contrary to the historical politics of Law and Justice. An example of such intellectual elites are scholars studying the Holocaust. In 2018, the sociologist Barbara Engelking and historian Jan Grabowski co-edited a book entitled *Dalej jest noc* ('Night without end'), which covers the history of Jews in nine rural areas of the German-administered General Government. Engelking and Grabowski were sued by a relative of one of the Poles discussed in their book, who was supported by the Polish League against Defamation, a government-funded organisation promoting history coherent with the historical politics of Law and Justice. Although the first verdict of the court (in February 2021) was that the professors must apologise, the appeal court

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[152] Müller argues that the difference between the *volonté générale*, as it was defined by Rousseau in his *Social Contract* and the populist representation of the people is that the former 'requires actual participation by citizens', whereas populists 'can divine the proper will of the people on the basis of what it means, for instance, to be a "real American"' (2016:29).

ruled that the lawsuit was unjustifiable, arguing that 'Interference in academic research is not the task of court' (Klauziński 2021).

Similarly, Polish prosecution in Warsaw sued the historian Jan Tomasz Gross for the 'public defamation of the Polish Nation and the Republic of Poland' (PAP 2019b). In an article about Eastern European reluctance to help with the refugee crisis of 2015, published in *Die Welt*, Gross said: 'the Poles, who, deservedly proud of their society's anti-Nazi resistance, actually killed more Jews than they did Germans during the war' (2015). In January 2016, the office of the President considered taking away the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland Gross had received from President Aleksander Kwaśniewski in 1996 in recognition of his contributions to scholarship. On 10 February 2016, in protest against the idea of taking the Order away from Gross, 31 Polish professors, including Michał Głowiński, signed an open letter to President Andrzej Duda, expressing their indignation and arguing for freedom of academic research (red. 2016). Consequently, Gross added an explanation to the article, providing references to the actual figures.

The 'thick' variant of populist ideology features one additional component, which varies across contexts. It is about the need to define 'the people' (thickening), which generates horizontal polarisation: 'good' versus 'bad' people. 'Good' people are often defined by means of national identity and nativism, which is the case in Poland. This is related to the significance of the category of 'the Other' in the populist discourse, which is usually invoked to instil fear (Wodak 2015). 'The people' in populism is 'a mythical and constructed sub-set of the whole population', or an '"imagined community", much like the nation of the nationalists' (Mudde 2004:546). In populist discourse, 'the people' are 'oppressed' and therefore populists 'want to emancipate them by making them aware of their oppression, without, however, wanting to 'change their values or their "way of life"', which makes populism differ significantly from, for example, socialism (Mudde 2004:546–47). This can be observed in the area of culture. For instance, Kotwas and Kubik (2019) describe what they call 'symbolic thickening of public culture', a cultural mechanism adopted by Law and Justice and other influential cultural entrepreneurs based on the 'thickening' of already 'existent' national symbols. Such symbols were 'originally' relatively broad and inclusive, but the way Law and Justice members and supporters employed them

promoted an exclusionary version of national identity. In addition, the tropes of immigrants and refugees as well as LGBT+ community are significant in the discourse of Law and Justice (Kubik 2023a).

This socio-political context is key to understanding the professional metalinguistic discourse after 2015. Liberal language ideology is employed again when the populist party came to power, dismantling Polish democracy. The perceived threat to democracy is thus a factor in the liberal turn in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse.

6.4.3.2 Pro-Law and Justice propaganda in state media

Drawing on studies of the language of Law and Justice, I will now discuss the nature of the pro-Law and Justice propaganda spread in state media in Poland in the period of democratic backsliding. I will follow my definition of propaganda, based on Lasswell's and introduced in 4.4.3.2.

6.4.3.2.1 Pro-government propaganda and state media

Pro-Law and Justice propaganda was supported by state media. In 2016, Jacek Kurski, a former member of Law and Justice and head of Lech Kaczyński's presidential campaign, became head of TVP, which in turn became a pro-party channel. This is what the 2016–2017 report explicitly criticises. The Law and Justice party allocated a significant budget to state media. For instance, in February 2020, the Sejm decided to spend 2 bn PLN on TVP, although the Senate had rejected the motion and suggested spending this money on oncology. A few attempts were also made to limit the freedom of media: in 2017, the 'deconcentration bill' was passed against the 'concentration' of Polish media by foreign shares, which was ultimately against independent media, especially *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Agora SA) and TVN and TVN24 (owned by Discovery). In 2020, an additional tax was introduced for advertisements. The tax regulation was again designed to impact independent media in particular.

The Law and Justice government also engaged in acts of censorship. For instance, in May 2020, there was a scandal over station 3 of the Polish Radio, the so-called Radio Three ('Radiowa Trójka'). On 15 May 2020, the station played a song by

Kazik Staszewski, *Twój ból jest lepszy niż mój* ('Your pain is better than mine'), the winner of Marek Niedźwiecki's popular show *The Radio Three Charts*. The song was meant to criticise the leader of Law and Justice, Jarosław Kaczyński, for visiting the Powązki Cemetery, where many casualties of the Smoleńsk plane crash (10 April 2010) were buried, during the COVID-19 lockdown, when Poles were not allowed to visit cemeteries as part of numerous and strict lockdown restrictions[153]. In a statement released the next day, the head of Radiowa Trójka, Tomasz Kowalczewski, said that the rules of the show were violated, thus demanding the song not be played by the station anymore. As a result, Niedźwiecki resigned and other journalists who disagreed to go along with the Radio's official line were suspended. Many journalists working for the Trójka decided to follow him and quit their jobs (Onet 2020; Staszczyk 2020). An unintended consequence of the controversy was that the song became immensely popular in Poland.

6.4.3.2.2 Pro-government propaganda and the uniformity of messages

The level of control that Law and Justice had when it was in power was obviously much lower than in the case of the Polish United Workers' Party. Some consistent patterns have, however, been observed in the discourse of Law and Justice and TVP1 supporting it. For instance, in their book entitled *Dobra zmiana, czyli jak się rządzi światem za pomocą słów* ('Good Change, or How to Rule the World with Words') (2019), Kłosińska and Rusinek create a 'dictionary' of over 200 words or phrases that became associated with the discourse of Law and Justice[154]. The authors argue, similarly to the linguists criticising *nowomowa*, that the world that Law and Justice aimed to create was 'a world that is divided in absolute terms, according to the logic of the rhetorical figure of antithesis – you're either a *patriot*, or a *traitor*, *targowica*[155],

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[153] One of the casualties was President Lech Kaczyński, Jarosław Kaczyński's twin brother, and his wife Maria.
[154] The title of the book, *Dobra zmiana*, refers to the political slogan Law and Justice used in the 2016 election campaign and implies a new stage in Polish politics that is better than previous ones.
[155] Targowica is a reference to the Targowica Confederation (1792), which is often perceived as a 'national treason' of some Polish magnates (very wealthy nobility), who opposed the Constitution of 1791 with the backing of the Russian Empress Catherine II.

traitorous muzzles, *UBs*[156], *postcommunists*; *tertium non datur*' (2019:7). This dichotomy, contributing to the construction of the category of 'the Other', is also characteristic of Manichaeism, which is a component of populism. Antas and Kozień (2018b) analyse a number of specific words and expressions, which became fixed (or ritualised) in the narrative of the Law and Justice authorities. One such term is the noun 'lewak' ('leftist') and the adjective 'lewacki', which are negative terms denoting 'radical left', 'used to describe any views that are not right'. Consequently, a very strong polarisation was constructed between 'us' and 'them', the 'radical left' (Antas and Kozień 2018b:122).

6.4.3.2.3   *Pro-government propaganda and the legitimation of the power of Law and Justice*

The authors of the 2016–2017 report argue that language was used in TVP1 News is 'an instrument in political struggle' (2018:82), which can be seen in the frequent 'depreciation' of political opponents (2018:77). Other studies of pro-Law and Justice propaganda confirm that it was targeted particularly against the opposition, especially the Civic Platform party and its leader Donald Tusk. Antas and Kozień (2018b) demonstrate that members of the opposition were often referred to as 'national traitors', 'Nazis' or 'Communists', who Law and Justice needs to 'fight' (2018b:126–28), while their 'radical activities' were described as a 'coup', an 'attempt at putsch', or 'antipolonism'. Among 'depreciation' strategies adopted by TVP1 was a frequent presentation of an infamous image of Tusk with a red face and horns, saying 'für Deutschland' (Sitnicka 2021)[157], and an image of Tusk at the background of a gun sight, which he sued TVP for in 2022 (PAP 2022). Antas and Kozień also discuss the way Kaczyński divided Poles into those of 'higher' and 'lower' sort (2018b:123), that is 'true' and 'untrue' Poles (2018b:128).

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[156] The word *ubek* is a pejorative word used to describe not only the officials of the communist Security Office (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, or UB), which existed between 1944 and 1956, but also anyone who 'collaborated' with them, or in other words informed them about people involved in anti-communist activities.

[157] 'Germany' is one of the key enemy figures in the discourse of Law and Justice.

6.4.3.2.4 Pro-government propaganda and constraints on deliberation

The authors of the 2016–2017 report explicitly argue that the way language was used in TVP1 News shows was incoherent with a 'deliberative or substantive model of democracy' (Kłosińska et al. 2018:9). Similarly, Kłosińska and Rusinek argue that information was not the primary concern in the discourse of Law and Justice. Kłosińska and Rusinek show that Law and Justice used certain words and phrases to 'create a certain view of reality (and thus perform the magical function), they are meant to convince people to believe in this view (or perform the persuasive function) and to sustain it (thus performing the ritual function)' (2019:6). Kłosińska and Rusinek argue that

> 'it is not only words or expressions coined for political purposes that provide the foundation for Law and Justice's rhetoric—the peculiarity of the "good change' vocabulary is also about modifying meanings (and often obscuring them), characterisations (expressive and evaluative) and references of words that have existed in Polish for a long time" (2019:6).

For instance, standard meanings of some Polish words and expressions are given an extra meaning of being a sign of 'leftiness' (Kłosińska and Rusinek 2019:5).

6.4.3.2.5 Language ideologies in pro-Law and Justice propaganda

I have not been able to access any documents in which members of Law and Justice would explicitly produce metalinguistic discourse related to propaganda spread by state media. It is thus unclear whether the semiotic dimension of pro-government propaganda in the People's Republic of Poland contained a language ideology. Controlling state institutions, including state media, in the name of *volonté general*, is, however, coherent with populist ideology.

Ideas characteristic of nationalist and purist language ideology can be observed in the way Law and Justice politicians spoke about the Polish language. For instance, President Andrzej Duda gave a speech in a political rally in Zwoleń on 17 January 2020, where he commented on the rift between Poland and the European Union about the controversial judiciary reform in the following way: 'We won't have a political system or how Polish interests should be carried out enforced i n f o r e i g n l a n g u a g e s [emphasis mine – ASL]'. Duda refers to other countries by means of a metonymy of

'foreign languages', associating 'true' Polishness with the national language. Another example of how the Polish language was invoked in the discourse of Law and Justice to promote an exclusionary version of national identity is the case of Wojciech Wencel's award (see 6.4.4.4).

6.4.4 Intertextuality and interdiscursivity: previous Polish Language Council reports, linguistic studies of the language of Law and Justice, standardisation practices, and *The Award of Merit for Service to the Polish Language* (2017)

I will now discuss the interdiscursive and intertextual context of the two Polish Language Council reports, that is: the topics of previous reports, standardisation practices Polish linguists were involved in between 2015 and 2023, academic studies and independent media criticising Law and Justice propaganda and pro-Law and Justice media, as well as a row between the Polish Language Council and the government about *The Award of Merit for Service to the Polish Language* in 2017.

6.4.4.1 Previous Polish Language Council reports

The Polish Language Council has published biennial reports on the state of the protection of Polish since the Polish Language Act was passed in 1999. To date, ten reports have been published, each by different authors[158]. While the topic of the 2018–2019 report is fairly similar to the majority of them, the 2016–2017 report is distinct in that it is the only one discussing the language of political information, that is explicitly political.

The first two reports focused on the realisation of the regulations of the Polish Language Act by various institutions (Markowski 2002; Markowski et al. 2005). Later reports tended to have more specific topics. Occasionally, the so-called 'partial reports' were included, which focused on specific issues related to the realisation of the regulations of the Act. The main topics of these reports include the effectiveness of communication in coursebooks at different levels of school education (Gąsiorek,

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[158] A report for 2020–2021 entitled *The language of government messages addressed to the public during the health crisis*, which focuses on the COVID-19 pandemic, was published in January 2024 (Chojnacka-Kuraś et al. 2024), after I finished writing this thesis.

Krzyżyk, and Synowiec 2008); the correctness of the language of the business environment, as well as the communicative efficiency and correctness of the language of coursebooks for vocational education and in higher education (Markowski 2010); linguistic correctness and communicative efficiency of online materials for citizens published by Polish ministries and other state institutions (Kołodziejek et al. 2012); the communicative efficiency and correctness of the language of consumer documents (Zgółkowa et al. 2015); as well as the efficiency of the promotion of Polish on websites of Polish embassies, consulates, and Polish Institutes (Dąbrowska et al. 2016). The focus of previous reports is thus predominantly on the issues of 'correctness' and communicative 'efficiency' in specific areas of language use and in the 2016 report – on the promotion of Polish abroad. Standard language ideology dominates in these reports, occasionally 'thickened' by ideas typical for nationalist language ideology. The two were dominant in the professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building.

6.4.4.2   Standardisation practices

Between 2015 and 2023, many Polish linguists worked on promoting 'language culture' and examined the way Poles used language. For instance, the topics of the Speech Culture Forum conferences that took place in this period include: *Proper Names and Their Role in Language and Society* (2017), *Polish in the Era of Digitalisation* (2019), and *Linguistic Awareness in the Past and Now* (2023). Polish linguists also continued to be involved in standardisation practices during this period. Many sources and initiatives promoting 'correct' language which started before 2015 continued (see 4.4.4.2 and 5.4.4). These include: activities of academic journals and associations (e.g., Towarzystwo Miłośników Języka Polskiego), such as publications, conferences and language clinics, publications of dictionaries (e.g., the five-volume dictionary for the 100th anniversary of Polish independence Dubisz 2018), popular science publications (e.g., Hącia 2017) and shows (Kłosińska's weekly programme on Radio Three), National Dictation Competition, language awards, and activities of the Polish Language Council. In 2015, Miodek launched a series of TV shows entitled

Polska z Miodkiem ('Poland with Miodek')[159], which focuses on the etymology of Polish geographical names. Bralczyk also gave open lectures, for example in Rzeszów (Mieszawska 2017), and ran online courses entitled 'The Art of Speaking', 'Values in Language', and 'On Linguistic Persuasion and Manipulation', advertised on his blog. There were also blogs devoted to Polish language 'correctness', for example, *Prosty Polski* ('Easy Polish') established in 2016 by a graduate of Polish Philology, who also offered one-to-one tutorials in Polish, proofreading school essays, and even writing essays.

After 2015, the Polish Language Council launched a few initiatives and campaigns. As part of the International Mother Tongue Day established by UNESCO in 1999, since 2017, annual debates have been held in Poznań by linguists and otherb scholars of language on a variety of language issues, such as: 'Polish of (still) thinking people', 'The Standards of Polish', 'Language and Democracy', 'Language and Discrimination', 'Language in a Crisis', 'Simple Language', and 'Language and War' (after the Russian invasion of Ukraine). In February 2020, the Council launched yet another campaign entitled *Ty mówisz – ja czuję. Dobre słowo – lepszy świat* ('You speak – I feel. Good Word – Better World'), aimed at counteracting verbal violence in both the public and private spheres, which is intensifying by most accounts. The topic of this campaign seems unique compared to the previous ones held by the Council (see 5.4.4.6). These new initiatives and campaigns show that after 2015, the promotion of standard Polish co-existed with the increased interest in the language of politics in the discourse of Polish linguists.

6.4.4.3   The criticism of propaganda in linguistic studies and independent media

Many linguists discussed the language of Law and Justice and media supporting it in academic, oppositional, and popular science publications. Many ideas found in these publications are similar to those pronounced not only in the 2016–2017 report, but also in linguistic studies of *nowomowa* in the period of communist authoritarianism.

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[159] Miodek's surname is literally a diminutive of the Polish word 'honey' ('miód'), which the title is a pun on.

Among these studies are Kłosińska and Rusinek's book and Antas and Kozień's article cited above. In both of them, Polish is depicted as a political tool used by Law and Justice to legitimise their power and delegitimise their political opponents. The title of Kłosińska and Rusinek's book explicitly says that it is by means of language that Law and Justice manages to gain and maintain power. Kłosińska and Rusinek as well as Antas and Kozień promote liberal ideas, implying that neutral language should be used in politics, so that parties from across the whole political spectrum and their supporters are treated in an equal and inclusive way. Antas and Kozień promote the idea of a relationship between language and thought, arguing that the vocabulary Law and Justice members use activates certain cognitive domains (or, to put it more simply, associations) in the minds of the audience, the aim of which is to create their own, very specific view of the world. Antas and Kozień conclude that the language of Law and Justice is largely modelled on the language of communist propaganda (2018b:129)[160].

In recent years, Michał Rusinek has also authored a weekly column in *Gazeta Wyborcza* entitled *Pypcie na języku* ('Pimples on the Tongue'), where he often discusses the persuasive nature of the language of the 'good change'. For instance, on 2 July 2020, Rusinek wrote an article about a specific logical fallacy committed by Andrzej Duda in his presidential campaign, which is *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, that is 'after this, therefore because of this'. Rusinek challenges Duda's legitimacy by pointing out that as a person with an advanced law degree, hence someone ostensibly trained in logic, he should be aware of this fallacy. Before the first round of the 2020 presidential election in Poland (which triggered a controversy, as the Law and Justice authorities pushed for them to take place in the early stages of the Coronavirus pandemic), Duda said: 'During the rule of Platforma Obywatelska, a party Mr Rafał Trzaskowski represents, Russia attacked Ukraine' (in 2014). This statement insinuates causality. It prompted a rapid response on the Internet, where people

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[160] In another paper, where they analyse the most frequently used gestures by members of Law and Justice, Antas and Kozień (2018a) argue that the party 'gave up on the rules of political correctness', because they use numerous gestures expressing disdain, lack of respect, and belittlement in parliament and other public situations – that is where such gestures should not be used whatsoever.

commented on many things that happened 'during Duda's rule' (#ZaDudy). Rusinek concludes that 'insinuation is unfortunately an effective form of persuasion'.

In May 2020, Marcin Napiórkowski published an essay entitled *Postępująca anadiploza Jarosława Kaczyńskiego* ('Jarosław Kaczyński's Progressing Anadiplosis') on his popular science blog entitled *Mitologia współczesna* ('Contemporary Mythology')[161]. The essay discusses the rhetorical style of Law and Justice, which Napiórkowski explicitly calls 'the secret of the party's successes', inseparable from its political programme (2020). Napiórkowski argues that Kaczyński frequently uses various forms of repetitions, which are powerful rhetorical devices, as they make concepts familiar, create an impression of aesthetic beauty, and make a text seem logical. Repetitions also contribute to the vagueness of what is said, which makes it seem universal, according to Napiórkowski. Like Rusinek, Napiórkowski aims to delegitimise Kaczyński as the leader of the ruling party, depicting his (partly ineloquent) use of Polish as a political tool.

After the publication of the 2016–2017 report, the issue of tickers in the TVP1 News programme received a lot of coverage in independent media. For instance, the topic of the report was frequently discussed in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Błażejowska 2019; Ferfecki 2019; Kublik 2019; Lewińska 2019; Nogaś 2020). The expression 'the tickers of terror' ('paski grozy') caught on. The language of Law and Justice and TVP was also discussed in other articles published by *Gazeta Wyborcza*. In 2020, for example, an interview with Jolanta Antas was published on the infamous 'fuck you' gesture by MP Joanna Lichocka after the parliamentary vote which decided that 2 mln PLN would be given to Polish national media and not oncology. This shows a close cooperation between linguists and independent media, who promote similar criticism of the language used by Law and Justice and the media supporting it.

Focusing solely on language as a factor legitimising the power of the Law and Justice party, the authors of these linguistic critiques of the language of Law and Justice fail to account for the role of the electorate's acceptance of the party. In other words, they ignore economic, political, social, and cultural factors in the rise of populism. Similar power was attributed to language in linguistic studies of

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[161] The phrase 'progressing anadiplosis' in the title of this essay imitates names of medical conditions, which the word 'progressing' often collocates with in Polish.

nowomowa. In this way, the criticism of populism from academic elites, who are usually biased towards liberal democracy, was counter-productive by strengthening, rather than weakening populist tendencies (Mudde 2004:557–62), even if inadvertently[162]. By failing to understand the source of support for populism in Polish society, Polish professional metalinguistic discourse did not encourage dialogue in the liberal sense. Although the 2016–2017 report was meant to be considered by the Parliament, the criticism of the language of state media, which is often published in independent media, was intended to be read by the electorate who already did not support Law and Justice.

6.4.4.4 *The Award of Merit for Service to the Polish Language* (2017): Polish Language Council vs. President Duda

In the period of liberal democracy building, linguists worked closely with politicians on the Polish Language Act and other initiatives promoting 'correct' Polish. In the period of democratic backsliding, linguists openly disagreed with the ruling party. An illustration of this are not only the Polish Language Council reports analysed in this chapter, but also is a row over *The Award of Merit for Service to the Polish Language* (see 5.4.4.5).

In 2017, one of the candidates put forward by the jury was Wojciech Wencel, a relatively unknown poet, whose poetry, right-wing journalism, and political statements feature nationalist themes. Wencel was politically engaged, openly supporting Jarosław Kaczyński in the 2010 presidential campaign. He also promoted conspiracy theories about the Smoleńsk plane crash, which, in his view, was an assassination orchestrated by Russia. The Polish Language Council members of the Jury: Jerzy Bralczyk, Katarzyna Kłosińska, and Andrzej Markowski issued an open letter to the President declaring their lack of support for the nominee (*votum separatum*), for the first time in the history of the award. The letter was supported by previous

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[162] Ryazanova-Clarke makes a similar observation in the context of counter-discourses against propaganda in contemporary authoritarian Russia: 'It seems … that a society in which stigmatisation and repression increasingly becomes the norm, linguistic counter-violence while performing the role of a quasi-liberating gesture … fails to achieve a relief of a resolution, instead multiplying violence and aggression' (2016:22).

awardees and members of the Council: Jerzy Bartmiński, Jan Miodek, Walery Pisarek, Jadwiga Puzynina. Nonetheless, President Andrzej Duda granted the award to Wencel.

In his speech during the award ceremony, Duda highlighted the fact that Wencel's poetry triggers debates, which, according to Duda, was rarely the case at the time. This is how he described Wencel's language:

> 'Beautiful Polish, rich Polish and interesting Polish, that preserves absolutely all the values of language which we need so much for the cultural foundation of every man, every young Pole, and on the other hand – important messages. You can disagree with them, you can agree with them, but the messages are undoubtedly important, worth discussing and worth thinking through' (Kublik 2017)[163].

In their *votum separatum* letter (published on 18 October 2016), members of the Polish Language Council combined two arguments as to why Wencel should not be a nominee for the award. One was a legal or procedural argument, as it pointed to the fairness and transparency of the decision process, which explicitly invokes the liberal ideal of the rule of law. The authors argued that they had not had a chance to familiarise themselves with his poetry before the meeting of the award jury. The other argument was an explicit criticism of the nationalistic tendencies of the Law and Justice regime, which were, according to the authors, pronounced in Wencel's work. Citing the official rules of the award, Bralczyk et al. (2016) compared Wencel to previous awardees referred to as 'great propagators of good and ethical Polish' and argued that he did not meet similar criteria. On the contrary, according to the authors of the letter, Wencel's poetry consisted of 'journalistic texts, which are politically engaged and contradict the idea of language ethic; the language used in them divides instead of connecting and is full of disdain for people with views different from those of the author'. The authors continue: 'a nominee for the *Zasłużony dla polszczyzny* award should be a model: they should use language with respect, and not create or deepen already existent social divisions, not exclude anyone from the Polish-speaking community'. For these reasons, the authors refused to sign the protocol from the

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[163] Wencel admitted that there were people more distinguished in promoting 'correct' Polish, but considered himself deserving the award for his poetry, as his contribution was about 'rebuilding continuity between past and contemporary poetry' (Łuchniak 2017).

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meeting (Bralczyk et al. 2016). While the linguistic norms the award was intended to promote included 'correctness, efficiency, ethics, and aesthetics', which were vividly pronounced in the professional metalinguistic discourse before 2015, the authors of the *votum separatum* letter depict Polish as a 'common good' of all its users, invoking the liberal ideals of equality and inclusivity, like the authors of the 2016–2017 report. The letter is thus explicitly politically engaged and anti-nationalist.

The controversy over the award was widely covered in independent press, which again shows the 'coalition' between Polish scholars of language and independent media. Some articles (in Gazeta *Wyborcza* and other newspapers and online portals) simply commented on the unprecedented case of the Polish Language Council declaring *votum separatum* and repeated its arguments (IAR 2017; Kublik 2017; msz 2017; mw/sk 2017; prz/dro 2017; Sobolewska 2017). Some journalists expressed disapproval for Wencel's 'language of scorn' (Kożyczkowska 2017)[164]. Many journalist challenged Wencel's claim to be a poet. Varga, for example, called him 'the tamer of Satan', 'the eulogist of death', and 'the Smoleńsk poet'. Nurek (2018) called Wencel 'the Smoleńsk bard' and 'the prophet of Good Change', which is a mockery based on the combination of the slogan associated with Law and Justice and the title ('prophet') used to talk about Mickiewicz, Słowacki, and Krasiński, who are considered the most important Polish Romantic poets. Both Varga and Nurek expressed discontent with the fact that Wencel's was destined to become compulsory reading in schools.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have looked at two Polish Language Council reports on the state of protection of the Polish language published between 2015 and 2023. I have demonstrated that Polish professional metalinguistic discourse underwent a liberal turn in this period. I have also shown how Polish scholars of language in this period drew on ideas about language I identified in Polish professional metalinguistic

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[164] Wencel, for example, uses the word 'dung' ('gnój') to describe 'postmodernism, gender, homosexual propaganda, disdain for your own history' and argues that this '"dung" should be limited to the outside toilet and not spread at universities or national culture institutions' (Wencel 2014).

discourse in the period of communist authoritarianism and in the period of liberal democracy building.

On the one hand, the dominant language ideology underpinning the report for 2016–2017 was liberal, with the idea that language should be 'neutral' and 'objective', which was seen as a way of sustaining democracy. I have demonstrated that liberal ideology in this report was much more explicit and robust than in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of communist authoritarianism. The 2016–2017 report thus explicitly resisted the ruling Law and Justice party and their specific use of language, aiming for the restoration of liberal democracy in Poland.

On the other hand, standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies associated with political ideologies of conservatism and nationalism, which dominated the professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building, continued to be prominent in the report for 2018–2019. In line with standard language ideology, the authors of the report argued for 'correct' (that is 'native') language in the area of scholarship, especially on Polish history, culture, literature, and language. In order to increase the prestige of the scientific variety of Polish, the authors demanded that legislation should be introduced to regulate specifically the language of academic publications. This, in turn, was intended to preserve the socio-political order endangered by the 'dominance of English'. In line with nationalist language ideology, Polish was depicted in the report as a national good and a component of national identity, which was under threat. By invoking this ideology, the authors argued for equality and inclusivity of 'local scholars', which can be interpreted as a liberal component of this report. Finally, in line with purist language ideology, Polish was depicted as an entity separate from other languages, which should only consist of 'native' forms. The authors argued that in the area of scholarship, Anglicisms should not be used, and 'independent' 'native' terminology should be developed. In this way, the report called for a privileged position of 'native' scholars, especially those studying 'native' topics of Polish history, culture, literature, and language. The occasional presence of liberal ideas in the report together with explicit criticism of the governmental language policies can be interpreted as an indication of a liberal turn in the professional metalinguistic discourse in the period between 2015 and 2023, directly clashing with increasingly right-wing and illiberal

political stance of the ruling coalition in Poland at the time. However, since some of the ideas pronounced in the 2018–2019 report were similar to the ideas promoted in the discourse of Law and Justice, this strand of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse may have inadvertently continued creating a discursive opportunity structure for Law and Justice and other important cultural entrepreneurs.

By means of contextual analysis, I have documented the political engagement of the reports by a close examination of their academic, political, and legal co-text and their hybrid genre of a parliamentary report and an academic study. I then scrutinised the socio-political context of anti-democratic tendencies in Poland, which, I argued, needs to be considered to understand why liberal language ideology became prominent again in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse. Finally, I supported my argument about the liberal turn in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse, showing the difference between the topic of the 2016–2017 report and the previous ones, pointing out the increase in academic publications criticising the language of Law and Justice, and highlighting the actions of the Polish Language Council concerned with the language of politics. I also reviewed several standardisation practices that Polish linguists continued to be involved in between 2015 and 2023 and analysed the row between the Polish Language Council and President Duda over *The Award of Merit for Service to the Polish Language* (2017).

My findings in this chapter show that Polish scholars of language were yet again involved in political struggles. The fact that the discursive strand about the Polish language in politics became salient again as well as the fact that liberal ideas were present in the 'nationalist' discursive strand about Polish in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse shows that liberal language ideology is associated with times of threats to democracy. This, in turn, suggests that regime changes are a salient factor shaping Polish professional metalinguistic discourse. This finding supports Swidler's theory about the particular role played by ideologies in 'unsettled periods'. In addition, the 'robustness' of liberal language ideology in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse suggests that there seem to be different intensities of ideological explicitness.

7 Conclusion

This study has explored language ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in three recent periods of Polish history: the last two decades of communist authoritarianism (1970–1989), the period of liberal democracy building (1989–2015), and the period of democratic backsliding under the rule of the right-wing populist Law and Justice party (2015–2023). I have argued that Polish scholars of language supported or challenged specific visions of socio-political order, even if inadvertently, by relying on a variety of language ideologies in their professional discourse, which evolved from period to period. Identifying language ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in these three periods was the first of my research questions.

In my analysis of professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of communist authoritarianism, I have identified its two strands: linguistic studies of *nowomowa* published in *samizdat* publications in Poland and/or abroad, which were founded on liberal language ideology, occasionally supported by standard language ideology, and the prescriptive discourse promoting 'correct' Polish in state media founded predominantly on standard language ideology, occasionally coupled with ideas characteristic of nationalist and purist language ideologies. While the former explicitly criticised the communist regime, casting doubt on its legitimacy, the latter did so in a very subtle way, by constructing an alternative version of national identity to the one promoted by the Party. I have concluded that Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the last two decades of communist authoritarianism was an important area of political resistance.

My study of professional metalinguistic discourse produced in the period of liberal democracy building demonstrated that it predominantly continued the prescriptive discourse of standardisation known from the previous period and based on the combination of standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies. I have shown, however, that language ideologies employed by Polish scholars of language in this period were much more explicit, elaborate, and comprehensive, and so were their ambitions to introduce highly exclusive Polish language legislation. I have argued that Polish scholars of language thus constructed a very specific version of Polish national identity, much narrower than in the professional metalinguistic discourse in

the period of communist authoritarianism, which can be interpreted as an indication of anxieties associated with economic, political, social, and cultural transformations after 1989.

Turning to the period of democratic backsliding, I have demonstrated that Polish scholars of language once again produced two discourses: one explicitly criticising the populist regime and founded on liberal language ideology (which, however, was much more robust than in the period of communist authoritarianism), and the other similar to the one promoted in the previous period and founded on standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies with occasional instances of liberal ideas. I have concluded that Polish professional metalinguistic discourse underwent a liberal turn in the period of democratic backsliding, in response to the increasingly illiberal political stance of the ruling coalition in Poland at the time (see Table 14).

Period	Discourse	Language ideologies	Political ideologies
Communist authoritarianism (1970–1989)	Linguistic studies of *nowomowa* Linguists' publications on 'correct' Polish in state media	liberal (standard) standard (nationalist, purist)	liberalism conservative nationalism
Liberal democracy building (1989–2015)	'Speech Culture Forum' post-conference volume	nationalist, purist, standard	conservative nationalism
Democratic backsliding (2015–2023)	Polish Language Council reports (2016–2017 and 2018–2019)	liberal (standard) standard, nationalist, purist	liberalism conservative nationalism (liberalism)

Table 14. Language ideologies (and political ideologies) in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse (1970–2023)

I have drawn a few conclusions from this analysis. Firstly, answering my second research question, I have demonstrated that language ideologies are related to political ideologies, and this relationship is more evident in discourses produced under non-democratic or anti-democratic regimes. In the Polish context, liberal language ideology is consistently related to liberalism as a political ideology, and the combination of standard, nationalist, and purist language ideologies are related to nationalism 'thickened' by conservatism. This shows that language ideologies play an important role in preparing the discursive ground for attempts to (de)legitimise

political regimes and specific configurations of power. Identifying language ideologies and political ideologies in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse, I have contributed to the deconstruction of the field.

Secondly, answering my third research question, I have argued that the reasons why certain language ideologies were more salient than others in each of these three periods are related to the political regime at the time. I have thus demonstrated that regime changes are an important factor in the evolution of Polish professional metalinguistic discourse. In the non-democratic and anti-democratic periods, professional metalinguistic discourse is mobilised around the language of politics, describing and criticising the language used to legitimise a non-democratic or anti-democratic regime, and thus promoting liberal democracy. In the period of liberal democracy building, professional metalinguistic discourse in Poland focused almost exclusively on the language of society, that is the language of ordinary language users, moving away from liberalism to promote more conservative and nationalist ideas. The absence of the political strand in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in this period reveals a fundamental paradox of democracy: democracy with its respect for individual freedom provides an opportunity for production of anti-democratic discourses.

Thirdly, drawing on Swidler's theory supported by Gorham's findings, I hypothesised that the role of language ideologies was going to increase in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the 'unsettled' periods of Polish recent history, that is in the periods of communist authoritarianism and democratic backsliding. I have indeed observed an increase in the number of distinct ideological discourses about language produced by Polish scholars of language in these periods. In addition, I observed a quantitative intensification in standardisation practices in Poland after the late 1960s. While Polish linguists engaged in the prescriptive discourse of standardisation in all the three periods studied in this thesis, it was only in 'unsettled' periods that Polish scholars of language were concerned with the language of politics and argued for its 'neutrality'. However, in the relatively 'settled' period of liberal democracy building, the intensity of the ideological discourse produced by Polish scholars of language increased. Not only did the number of standardisation practices increase (which can partly, but only partly, be accounted for

by the development of mass and new media), but also language ideologies identified in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse after 1989 were much more explicit, elaborate, and comprehensive, and its proponents became more ambitious, as they pushed for introducing language legislation. Language ideologies thus continued to play an important role in this period, and they were not replaced by tradition and common sense. This suggests that there indeed seem to be different kinds of 'unsettleness', which contribute to the increase of the role of ideologies.

My study thus shows that Swidler's theory needs more nuance. The Polish case shows that semiotic behaviour about language never stops, and language ideologies never cease to be promoted. Since language has an important symbolic function in a society, discourse about language is a platform for negotiating such socio-political categories that language represents as national identity and political affiliation. My study also reveals that there seem to be different intensities of ideological explicitness. Under communist authoritarianism, when the experience of the democratic system was in a relatively distant past, the liberal language ideology in metalinguistic discourse was less 'robust' than in the time of democratic backsliding, which directly followed a period of relative liberal democratic hegemony.

A few further observations have arisen from this study, which need more exploration. Firstly, I have observed numerous discursive connections between the three periods. I have argued that the discourse of the members of the Polish United Workers' Party inspired the discourse of the Law and Justice party. Similarly, linguistic critiques of the language of Law and Justice drew on linguistic studies of *nowomowa*. The standardisation discourse of Polish linguists evolved, drawing on prescriptive traditions formed in earlier periods. I have argued that Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of communist authoritarianism may have created a discursive opportunity structure for anti-communist opposition, thus contributing to the collapse of the communist regime in Poland. I have also argued that Polish professional metalinguistic discourse in the period of liberal democracy building and in the period of democratic backsliding may have created a discursive opportunity structure for anti-democratic discourse of the Law and Justice party 2015–2023, thus undermining Polish democracy.

One of the ways in which my study could be expanded is to look at the intersections between Polish professional metalinguistic discourse and other discursive fields in Poland (political discourse, media discourse, and popular discourse) to examine to what extent this intersection has been influenced by Polish politics and to what extent it has shaped Polish politics. The period of democratic backsliding, characterised by the polarisation of Polish society, shows how important the context of the previous two periods is in explaining causes of the ongoing culture war in Poland. Such a study would contribute to an understanding of the current socio-political situation in Poland.

Secondly, I have demonstrated on numerous occasions that the ideas identified in Polish professional metalinguistic discourse were not at all isolated, which supports Zarycki's findings (2022) and proves how problematic the division between the 'East' and 'West' is. Another way in which my study could be expanded is to explore discourses of linguistics in other countries, both in the 'Western' and the post-Soviet contexts, in a similar way. Such a comparative study would be an important contribution to an understanding of how mobile ideas are, which includes ideas about language.

Thirdly, throughout this study, I have attempted to show the existence of a relationship between language ideologies and political ideologies in the Polish context. It would be interesting to see how similar and/or different this relationship is in other metalinguistic discourses (both in other discursive fields in Poland and in discourses of linguistics in other countries). Another question arising from this observation is whether specific political ideologies are characterised by any specific linguistic qualities and/or whether certain characteristic linguistic qualities are shared by a number of political ideologies. Such a study could be conducted both in the Polish context and in a comparative perspective, and it would be helpful in managing extreme polarisation which can be observed in multiple contemporary societies.

Finally, I mentioned that formulating two of the three aspects of social critique as recommended by Reisigl and Wodak (see 3.3) would be among the central tasks in this thesis. Yet another way to expand on this study is to focus on the third one, that is 'future-related prospective critique [that] seeks to improve communication' (2016:24–25). While it has been touched upon, the current socio-political situation in

Poland (the culture war and growing multilingualism resulting from mass migration from Ukraine) shows how useful it would be to formulate recommendations for language policy makers who want to strengthen the language of democracy and facilitate an equal, diverse, and inclusive multilingual community, especially in countries such as Poland, which have been predominantly monolingual for decades. My study suggests that such recommendations would include not only prioritising the informative function of language over other functions in public discourse, especially in the media, but also encouraging pluralism by raising awareness about the relationship between language and identity, the symbolic functions of language, as well as the way in which language can be invoked in discourse to legitimise certain visions of socio-political order.

Appendix

Bios of the authors of texts included in the corpora and discussed in the thesis

Bajerowa Irena (1921–2010) was a Professor of Polish Linguistics and a Vice-Rector of the University of Silesia in Katowice. She worked for the Polish Red Cross during the Second World War and was arrested by the communist authorities during martial law. Her husband was imprisoned and tortured by the Ministry of Public Security.

Balbus Stanisław (1943–2023) was a Professor of Literary Theory at the Jagiellonian University since 1969. He appeared on numerous shows devoted to literature on the Kraków sections of the Polish TV and Polish Radio. He was a member of NSZZ Solidarność since 1980.

Bednarczuk Leszek (born in 1936) is a Professor of Linguistics and Slavonic Philology at the Pedagogical University of Kraków, where he has been based since 1960, and a member of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences. He is interested in the history of underground troops of the Polish National Army during the Second World War.

Bogusławski Andrzej (born in 1931) is a Professor Emeritus of Linguistics and the Russian Language at the University of Warsaw as well as a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences. On the introduction of martial law, he was arrested for refusing to sign an oath of loyalty[165].

Bralczyk Jerzy (born in 1947) is a Professor of Polish Linguistics at the University of Warsaw and the Warsaw School of Social Psychology (SWPS) in Warsaw. He has been a member of the Polish Language Council since it was established in 1996. His doctoral thesis entitled *O języku polskiej propagandy politycznej lat siedemdziesiątych* ('On the Language of Polish Political Propaganda of the 1970s') was published in the *Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis* series at the University of Uppsala in 1987. He has been hosting a few TV and radio shows:

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[165] A few scholars, including Noam Chomsky, called for his release in a letter entitled *Free Bogusławski* in *The New York Review* in 1982.

Mówi się ('Word Is') on Polish TV Polonia (2001–2007), *Na słówko* ('A Quick Word') on TVN Lingua (2008–2009), and *Słowo o słowie* ('A Word on the Word') on the Polish Radio. He is also an author of a column in a popular science monthly *Wiedza i życie* ('Science and Life') devoted to 'correct' Polish. He has also written national and regional dictation competitions conducted on TV and radio.

Cegieła Anna is a Professor of Polish Linguistics at the University of Warsaw, specialising in language culture, lexicology, pragmatics, and language ethics. She is a member of the Polish Language Council Language Ethics Team. She has been frequently interviewed in the media to talk about language issues.

Choduń Agnieszka was a Professor of Law at the University of Szczecin, specialising in the language of law. Between 2021 and 2022 she was a member of the Polish Language Council.

Dolacka Maria is an expert on the language of TV and an author and co-author of popular science books about 'correct' Polish.

Doroszewski Jan (1931–2019) was a medical doctor and professor of medicine at the University of Warsaw. He was a son of an influential linguist, Witold Doroszewski, and a member of the Polish Language Council.

Gajda Stanisław (1945–2022) was a Professor of Polish Philology at the University of Opole specialising in Polish and Slavonic linguistics, lexicology, sociolinguistics, and stylistics. He received a few civil state decorations, including the Gold Cross of Merit.

Głowiński Michał (1934–2023) was a Professor of Polish Literature at the Polish Academy of Sciences Institute for Literary Studies, specialising in the history of Polish literature as well as the language of propaganda. In August 1980, he signed the so-called 'letter of 64' scholars, writers, and journalists supporting the striking workers in Gdańsk. *Nowomowa po polsku* is one of his approximately 30 publications.

Heinz Adam (1914–1984) was a Professor of Polish Linguistics at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. He co-organised the *Nowo-mowa* conference at the Jagiellonian University on 16–17 January 1981.

Karpiński Jakub (1940–2003), aka. Jan Nowicki, was a Polish sociologist. As a lecturer at the University of Warsaw, he supported the March 1968 protests, was arrested and imprisoned. He then emigrated to London and New York in 1978. The essays *Mowa do ludu: Szkice o języku polityki* were originally published in uncensored journals *Kultura* and *Głos* (1972–1984).

Kłosińska Katarzyna is a Lecturer in Linguistics at the University of Warsaw Department of Polish Studies. She has been a member of the Polish Language Council since 1999 and its President since 2019. Her research interests include Polish language culture, language narrativisation, politics of language, media, and political discourse. She has been involved in promoting the Polish language through numerous initiatives, for example, a weekly programme entitled *Co w mowie piszczy* ('Keep Your Ear to Speech') on Radio Three. When Law and Justice was in power, she published on the language of the party.

Kreja Bogusław (1931–2002) was a Professor of Polish Linguistics, lecturing first at the Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań and then at the University of Gdańsk. He specialised in morphology, especially word formation. He was a member of the Polish Language Council, the Polish Academy of Sciences Linguistics Committee, and the executive committee of the Polish Society of Polish Language Enthusiasts.

Krzyżyk Danuta is a Lecturer in the School of Polish Language and Culture at the University of Śląsk in Katowice, specialising in Polish language teaching, including teaching Polish as a foreign language. She was a member of the Polish Language Council (2015–2022).

Kurzowa Zofia (1931–2003) was a Professor of Polish Linguistics at the Jagiellonian University, where she worked since 1969. She specialised in the so-called Eastern Borderlands, but she also studied the language of the Polish TV.

Lewicki Andrzej Maria (born in 1934) is an Emeritus Professor of Polish Linguistics at the Marie Curie-Skłodowska University of Lublin, specialising in syntax, phraseology, and history of linguistics. He is the founder and a former member of the Linguistics Committee Phraseology Team of the Polish Academy Sciences.

Lubaś Władysław (1932–2014) was a Professor of Polish Linguistics, specialising in onomastics and sociolinguistics in the context of Polish and Slavonic languages,

and lecturing first at the Jagiellonian University and then at the University of Silesia. He was head of the Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of Polish and a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences Linguistics Committee.

Majkowska Grażyna is a linguist and lecturer at the University of Warsaw Institute of Journalism, specialising in the language of the media.

Markowski Andrzej (born in 1948) was a Professor of Polish Linguistics at the University of Warsaw, specialising in semantics, lexicology, and lexicography, as well as language culture. He is a member of the Polish Language Council, and a member of the executive committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences Linguistics Committee. Apart from academic publications, he authored numerous popular science books and articles promoting 'correct' Polish. He also authored a few editions of the National Dictation Competition.

Miodek Jan (born in 1946 in Tarnowskie Góry) is a Professor of Polish Linguistics at the University of Wrocław Institute of Polish Philology and a member of the Linguistics Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences. He has been a member of the Polish Language Council since it was introduced. Miodek is the author of numerous sources on 'correct' Polish. He has published a column entitled *Rzecz o języku* since 1968, hosted a weekly TV show entitled *Ojczyzna polszczyzna* between 1987 and 2007, which was renamed *Słownik polsko-polski* in 2009 and broadcast on one of the TVP channels, TVP Polonia. Since 2015, he has hosted another series of TV shows entitled *Polska z Miodkiem*, which focuses on the etymology of Polish geographical names.

Pajdzińska Anna (born in 1953) is a Professor of Linguistics at the Marie Curie-Skłodowska University of Lublin, specialising in phraseology and lexical semantics. She is a member of the Polish Society of Polish Language Enthusiasts and the Polish Academy of Sciences Linguistics Committee. She was awarded the Gold Cross of Merit and the Merit of the Polish National Education Commission.

Piotrowski Andrzej (born in 1947) is Lecturer Emeritus in Sociology at the University of Łódź, specialising in sociological theories of communication.

Pisarek Walery (1931–2017) was a professor of Polish Linguistics and Media Studies at the Jagiellonian University and after 2009 at the John Paul II Pontifical

University in Kraków. He became interested in the language of propaganda in the 1960s and published a book entitled *Język służy propagandzie* ('Language Serves Propaganda') published by the Jagiellonian University (1976). In the communist period, he was involved in oppositional activities, imprisoned (twice), and prevented from resuming his university education, because the Ministry of Public Security confiscated his documents. He also hosted a 10-minute TV show entitled *Lekcja języka polskiego* in the 1970s. He died during the Ambassador of the Polish Language gala, where he was supposed to give a speech.

Podracki Jerzy (born in 1942) is a Professor of Linguistics at the University of Warsaw, specialising in 'language correctness', codification of Polish spelling, and Polish language teaching. He is a member of the Polish Language Council and an author and co-author of many popular science books about 'correct' Polish.

Polański Kazimierz (1929–2009) was a Professor of Linguistics at the Jagiellonian University, specialising in Slavonic languages and English. He was a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences (he was president of the Linguistics Committee) and the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Przybylska Renata (born in 1957) is a Professor of Polish Linguistics at the Jagiellonian University, specialising in semantics, lexicology and lexicography, sociolinguistics, pragmalinguistics, 'teolinguistics', onomastics, and cognitive linguistics. She was Head of the Department of Polish Language Studies (2012–2020) and a member of the Polish Language Council (2019–2022).

Puzynina Jadwiga (born in 1928) is Professor Emeritus of Polish Linguistics at the University of Warsaw and a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences as well as the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences. She worked closely with the Workers' Defence Committee after the June 1976 protests and was one of the signatories of the so-called 'Memorial 101', an open letter of Polish intellectuals against changes in the Constitution in 1976. In 1982, she was detained for her oppositional activity.

Rokoszowa Jolanta (1944–1997) was a Professor of Polish Linguistics at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. She co-organised the *Nowo-mowa* conference at the Jagiellonian University on 16–17 January 1981 and published linguistic

studies of the language of propaganda in 1980s. Rokoszowa was also actively involved in setting up NSZZ Solidarność structures at the Jagiellonian University.

Rutkowski Mariusz (born in 1970) is a Professor at the Institute of Polish Studies and Speech Therapy and current Head of the Department of Arts and Humanities at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn. He specialises in onomastics, discourse analysis, conversational analysis, and language of politics. He was a member of the Polish Language Council (2019–2022).

Saloni Zygmunt (born in 1938) is an Emeritus Professor of Polish Linguistics. He was a lecturer at the University of Warsaw and the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn. Trained in Polish literature and language as well as mathematics, contribution to computer processing of Polish is one of Saloni's main academic achievements.

Satkiewicz Halina (1928–2012) was a Professor of Polish Linguistics at the University of Warsaw, specialising in morphology. She was a member of the Polish Language Council, a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences Linguistics Committee, and the editor-in-chief of the popular science monthly entitled *The Language Manual* (*Poradnik Językowy*).

Synowiec Helena is a Professor at the Institute of Linguistics at the University of Śląsk in Katowice. She specialises in Polish language teaching and 'language efficiency'. She was a member of the Polish Language Council (2003–2022).

Wróblewski Andrzej aka. Ibis (1922–2002) was a Polish journalist and populariser of the Polish language, for which he received numerous state awards. He fought in the Polish Home Army during the Second World War and was awarded numerous military and civil state decorations. He studied Polish Literature and Language at the University of Warsaw. He published for dailies *Życie Warszawy* (1948–1978), where he authored a weekly column devoted to 'correct' Polish, and *Gazeta Wyborcza* (1992–1997).

Zgółkowa Halina (born in 1947) is a Professor of Linguistics at the Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań, specialising in the language of the youth and lexicography. She is a member of the jury in a few national competitions, including The Master of the Polish Language.

Zimny Rafał is a Lecturer at Linguistics Department in the Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, specialising in stylistics and pragmatics. In 2019 he became a member of the Polish Language Council to examine the language of the media.

Żukiewicz Przemysław is an Associate Professor at the University of Wrocław Political Science Institute and a member of the Polish Language Council. Among his specialties is the language of politics.

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