Atlantic Canada: Heritage and Regeneration II

The Political, Environmental and Cultural Economy of Heritage in Atlantic Canada: Studies in Regeneration

London Journal of Canadian Studies

Volume 31

Autumn 2016

General Editor
Tony McCulloch, UCL Institute of the Americas

Guest Editors
Edward MacDonald, University of Prince Edward Island
John Reid, St Mary's University, Halifax
Robert Summerby-Murray, St Mary's University, Halifax

First published in 2016 by
UCL Press
University College London
Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT
Available to download free: www.ingentaconnect.com/content/uclpress/ljcs

ISSN 0267-2200 (print)
1475-1674 (online)

Printed by Formara Print

Contents

London Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 31 (2016). UCL Press• Print ISSN 0267-2200 • Online ISSN 1475-1674 • DOI 10.14324/111.444.ljcs.2016v31.001

Atlantic Canada: Heritage and Regeneration II

The Political, Environmental and Cultural Economy of Heritage in Atlantic Canada: Studies in Regeneration

Preface

The essays in this issue of the *London Journal of Canadian Studies* represent a continuation of the collection that was launched in the preceding issue (Volume 30). The two introductory essays that appeared in Volume 30 are relevant to the contributions to the current issue and can be accessed at http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/uclpress/ljcs

Contributors

Daniel Banoub is completing a PhD in Geography at the School for Environment, Education and Development at the University of Manchester. His doctoral research focuses on the restructuring of the fishing industry and the emergence of aquaculture in Newfoundland and Labrador since the early 1990s. He is interested in political economy, resource geography and social studies of science.

Dean Bavington is an Associate Professor in the Geography Department at Memorial University in St John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada. His latest book, *Managed Annihilation: An Unnatural History of the Newfoundland Cod Collapse* (University of British Columbia Press, 2010) explores the history and consequences of cod fisheries management in Newfoundland and Labrador.

Claire Campbell is an Associate Professor at Bucknell University, where she teaches Canadian history, environmental history and public history. Recent work includes editing *A Century of Parks Canada* (University of Calgary Press, 2011) and (with Robert Summerby-Murray) *Land and Sea: Environmental History in Atlantic Canada* (Acadiensis Press, 2013), and a new book about teaching environmental history at historic sites, titled *What Once Were You? Historic Landscapes in Canada.*

Jill L. Grant is Professor of Planning at Dalhousie University. Her research focuses on the planning of residential environments, urban development and planning history. She is the author of dozens of articles and four books, including *A Reader in Canadian Planning: Linking Theory and Practice* (Thomson Nelson, 2008) and *Planning the*

Good Community: New Urbanism in Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2006).

Erin Kelly earned her PhD from Oregon State University in Forest Resources. She then moved to Corner Brook, Newfoundland, for a post-doctoral fellowship at Memorial University, Grenfell Campus, with financial support from the Department of Natural Resources. She was hired as an Assistant Professor in forest policy, economics and administration at Humboldt State University in Arcata, California, in 2012.

Gladys Wai Kwan Leung graduated with a major in Urban Design Studies at Dalhousie University in 2013. Her honours thesis assessed the influence of interest groups on development debates. She continued her studies and earned a Masters in International Real Estate and Planning from University College London.

Simon Lloyd received his Master of Library and Information Science (MLIS) degree from Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 1997. After several years working at various Halifax-area archival institutions, including the Shambhala Buddhist Archives, Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management, and the Council of Nova Scotia Archives, he moved to Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, in 1999. He is currently University Archivist and Special Collections Librarian at the University of Prince Edward Island's Robertson Library.

Edward MacDonald is an Associate Professor of History at the University of Prince Edward Island, where he teaches Prince Edward Island, Atlantic Region and Canadian History. He has co-authored or edited seven books and over three dozen articles exploring various aspects of Prince Edward Island's social, economic, political and environmental history.

Jane H. Reid is a doctoral student in the School of Urban Planning at McGill University, where her research focuses on the role of evaluation programmes in urban regeneration in Canada and the United Kingdom. She holds degrees from Mount Allison University (BA, Political Science) and the University of Glasgow (MSc, Urban Policy and Practice).

John G. Reid is a member of the Department of History at Saint Mary's University, and Senior Research Fellow of the Gorsebrook Research Institute. His research areas include early modern northeastern North

America and the history of Canada's Maritime region. He is also co-editor of *Acadiensis: Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region*.

Robert Summerby-Murray is President of Saint Mary's University. He holds an academic appointment in the Department of Geography and maintains an active research programme focusing on industrial heritage in Atlantic Canada, environmental histories of coastal marshlands, the use of archives as narrative, historical GIS, international student mobility, and the writing of Canadian author Charles G.D. Roberts.

London Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 31 (2016). UCL Press• Print ISSN 0267-2200 • Online ISSN 1475-1674 • DOI 10.14324/111.444.ljcs.2016v31.002

Idyll and Industry: Rethinking the Environmental History of Grand Pré, Nova Scotia

Claire Campbell

Abstract

In June 2012, UNESCO named the landscape of Grand Pré, Nova Scotia, a World Heritage Site, as 'exceptional testimony to a traditional farming settlement created in the seventeenth century by the Acadians in a coastal zone with tides that are among the highest in the world'. Grand Pré is the gateway to the Annapolis Valley, a rare stretch of favourable soils and climate in a largely unarable province. From the early nineteenth century onward, ambitions to make the Valley 'the Orchard of the Empire' resulted in some of the most intensive rural development in Atlantic Canada. This transformed the physical, ecological and economic landscape of Nova Scotia profoundly, and became central to its sense of place in the global community. Its fields and orchards also inspired a second industry: tourism, promoting, ironically, a decidedly *non*-industrial picture of blithe fertility and prosperity. In recent decades, both agriculture and tourism in the region have created a new idyll, one that grafts the language of sustainability onto the pastoral image of apple blossoms, and so successfully draws attention away from the ecological costs and economic health of agriculture in the region. With its focus on pre-industrial Acadian settlement, historical commemoration at Grand Pré has the very real effect of affirming the possibility of local and sustainable agriculture in the area today. But the *pré* is also part of another history, another set of agricultural practices that followed the Acadians and that still frame most agricultural production in Nova Scotia. This essay offers a second public narrative for Grand Pré, one that treats the site as part of the Annapolis Valley as well as *l'ancienne Acadie*, part of an industrial landscape as well

as an idyllic one. It is only by recognizing both histories that we can really appreciate the realities of modern agriculture and the need for sustainable alternatives.

Introduction

In June 2012, UNESCO named the landscape of Grand Pré, Nova Scotia, a World Heritage Site, as 'exceptional testimony to a traditional farming settlement created in the seventeenth century by the Acadians in a coastal zone with tides that are among the highest in the world.' Using dykes and wooden sluices (*aboiteaux*), the Acadians reclaimed salt marshes along the Minas Basin in the Bay of Fundy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to produce nutrient-rich farmland (*pré*, or meadow) that is still drained and farmed today. To UNESCO, then, Grand Pré's universal heritage is primarily an artefact of early European coastal land management and a living tradition of agricultural practice, as well as a memorial to the Acadian deportation (*le grand dérangement*) by the British before the Seven Years' War. The same is true of its designation as a national historic site and Canada's first rural national historic district.[1]

By drawing a direct lineage between the *pré*'s creation and current practice, between Acadian settlers and 'their modern successors', the UNESCO designation permits and even encourages us to vault over the intervening era of industrial agriculture. There are certainly interesting continuities between the period of Acadian settlement and today, from the complementary use of uplands and dykelands to the collective management of the *pré* by a community-run marsh body. But this stewardship narrative, linking Acadian and modern farming, also perpetuates a rural idyll, an image of the region that has migrated easily from older preferences for romantic nostalgia to the newer language of environmental and community sustainability. While this suits the interests of both Acadian cultural nationalism and provincial tourism, it excises a kind of land use that bears far more directly on land use today and which formed the basis of Nova Scotia's economy and international image for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Global values in local history: why study Grand Pré?

Grand Pré sits at the northern entrance of the Annapolis Valley, a stretch of flat land about 130 kilometres long, between the North and

South Mountains (in a relative use of the term, since the 'mountains' are well under 300 metres high – but still high enough to be significant in the low-lying Maritime provinces). In a province with only 8 per cent land in agriculture, the silted shores of the Minas Basin and the sheltered microclimate of the Annapolis Valley have been especially valuable, making it the area of the most abundant and diverse agricultural production in Nova Scotia. Kings County – which encompasses the eastern half of the Annapolis Valley – has the most agriculturally based economy in Nova Scotia, in 2001 accounting for 30 per cent of the province's agriculture and 2.5 times the national average per capita.[2]

If the *pré* proper is the result of seventeenth-century dyking, its agricultural geography – like the rest of the Annapolis Valley – is at least as much, and much more directly, the result of *nineteenth*-century ideas about agriculture, the environment and the state. This essay proposes a second narrative for Grand Pré, one that places environmental history at the centre by treating the site as part of the Annapolis Valley as well as *l'Acadie*, and by recognizing the continuity of the industrial past and *its* lessons for sustainable practice as well as the continuity of dykeland farming. The challenge is to recognize the importance and the rarity (if not the uniqueness) of the *pré* as a seventeenth-century artefact operating in twenty-first-century time, while showing how it has been affected by *subsequent* decisions and historical patterns. To integrate these two strands is to present to the public a more complete (and a more truthful) history, a more expansive geography and a more constructive understanding of Nova Scotia's environmental past.

Grand Pré reminds us that what may appear to be a local history is in fact profoundly transnational. The site is the product of a migration of peoples and ideas about coastal settlement and agriculture, a migration that defined the early modern Atlantic world. Imperial conflicts of the eighteenth century gave way to global exchanges of the nineteenth; in both cases, land was an invaluable commodity, whether for enhancing state power, promoting agricultural settlement as a mark of social stability and prosperity, or satisfying new consumer preferences. Here those preferences were both material (agricultural products) and cultural (tourism). Grand Pré demonstrates how a place's cultural identity can be scripted externally yet prove indelible from, and inexpendable to, the place in the long term. From its relationship with a famous poem to its designation as a World Heritage Site (and thus as having 'universal value'), the place is granted meaning from afar. So this wider view also asks us to consider the value and freight of historic designation. More than a castle or a cathedral, a working agricultural

landscape cannot be isolated from its surrounding environment – indeed, historically, it would not have been.

It is at this intersection of representation and use – of idyll and industry – that we find the central themes of this essay. Regeneration must include ecological as well as socioeconomic and cultural sustainability. The growing popularity of organic and locavore food movements calls us to look more closely at their evolution, the industrial practices to which they are such a deliberate response and their claim of *terroir*. The term *terroir* suggests a respect for both regional heritage and environmental particularity, and the World Heritage list contains many agricultural landscapes that celebrate and preserve traditional practices. Other agricultural districts in northwestern Europe and the northeastern United States have likewise 'cultivated' an image of a pastoral existence that has diverged intentionally from large-scale, scientifically managed production.[3] Grand Pré has emerged as a locus for sustainable agriculture in Canada in recent years in a form of regeneration that is succeeding *because* it aligns with a recognizable heritage: in this case, centuries-old dykeland farming. But Grand Pré demonstrates how a place can be made iconic as an idyll, that is, as non-industrial, even as it participated in a global industrial economy. In this sense its cultural identity is more selective than its ecological heritage, a selectivity that rather problematically excuses the area from a history of more harmful practices. This story thus asks us to consider, again, a wider and more complicated historical context, one that adds succession to the themes of regeneration, heritage and cultural identity.

Historic sites and environmental history

In their article '"54, 40 or Fight": Writing Within and Across Borders in North American Environmental History', Wynn and Evenden write that '… there have been few efforts to situate canonical events and problems in Canadian history within an environmental context. What do environmental historians have to say about the building of the railroad, the growth of the welfare state or Quebec nationalism?'[4] Their examples reflect the modern, and westward, emphasis of most work in Canadian history, but the same could be asked of the explorations of the North Atlantic by the Norse in the tenth century – or more to the point, the *grand dérangement* of 1755. The two solitudes of national narrative and environmental change extend to, and are embodied in, the designation of protected places, divided as they are between nature

and history, between national parks and historic sites, and between 'natural' and 'cultural' World Heritage Sites. Since at least the 1970s we have acknowledged the human imprint in national parks, as 'cultural landscapes', but the inverse is not true at historic sites, which are generally tied to or responsible for representing a particular chapter in the national narrative. As such, they feature an older idea of heroic human enterprise (what Parks Canada calls 'human creativity') with the land as backdrop or raw material, transformed as part and evidence of the nation-building project.

Yet the ecological turn in organizations such as Parks Canada, which is responsible for both national parks and national historic sites, should prompt us to rethink our approach to public history as much as to park policy. These sites are ideal places to discuss the environmental context – and environmental impact – of human actions. The remarkable number of cultural World Heritage Sites in Atlantic Canada (L'Anse aux Meadows, Lunenburg and Grand Pré, and Red Bay) incorporate an equally remarkable number of issues in environmental history, whether in the politics of environmental management (marine and terrestrial, protection of viewscape, jurisdictional conflict, local/historical uses and preservation) or the efficacy of interpretation (presenting scientific, bio-archaeological and historical research; conveying successful occupations, and the disjuncture between present and past geographies).

With a century of commemorative, tourist and archaeological activity at the site, Grand Pré is well known in the history of Nova Scotia. Maritime historians have concentrated on either its position within *Acadie*, or its construction as a site of romantic pastoralism with a quintessential 'folk' to draw the tourist gaze.[5] But its environmental history can draw from work in other disciplines, notably a long tradition of historical geography and recent archaeology focused on the Acadians' salt-marsh farming, a subject also pursued by historians of the early modern Atlantic world.[6] Research on the history of Nova Scotia agriculture (including apples, the province's most iconic product) acknowledges the effect of climate and soil, but has concentrated on economic output rather than environmental circumstance or impact. I suspect this is because of the so-called Acadiensis School's preoccupation with the political economy of regionalism and the disadvantages of Canadian Confederation to the Atlantic region, and the longstanding – if not central – debate among Maritime historians (and politicians) as to whether Nova Scotia was made poorer or richer by Confederation with Canada.[7] Nature has always been present, but in the background

or in neighbouring disciplines. We have yet to script a history of environmental change at Grand Pré.

'The Fruitful Valley': Grand Pré in the Annapolis Valley

> In the Acadian land, on the shores of the Basin of Minas,
> Distant, secluded, still, the little village of Grand-Pré
> Lay in the fruitful valley. Vast meadows stretched to the eastward,
> Giving the village its name, and pasture to flocks without number.
> Dikes, that the hands of the farmers had raised with labour incessant,
> Shut out the turbulent tides; but at stated seasons the flood-gates
> Opened, and welcomed the sea to wander at will o'er the meadows.
> West and south there were fields of flax, and orchards and cornfields
> Spreading afar and unfenced o'er the plain …[8]

Henry Wadsworth Longfellow was not a salt-marsh biologist, nor did he ever actually visit 'the shores of the Basin of Minas', but his famous 1847 poem *Evangeline* got the basics of Acadian coastal agriculture more or less correct. (I say this with two rather substantial qualifiers: the opening line of the poem announces 'This is the forest primeval', hardly a precise description of the Fundy marshlands; and, of course, the storyline itself is entirely fictitious.) The *pré* was created when, beginning about 1680, Acadian settlers drained the salt marshes between the mainland, Long Island and Boot Island to create a roughly circular area of farmland now measuring about 1,300 hectares.

Anchored by marsh hay and cordgrass, fed by the silt of the Fundy tides and the wide, slow-moving Cornwallis and Gaspereau Rivers and sheltered from Atlantic weather by the uplands to the southeast, the area (see Figure 1) boasted all the advantages that are lacking in much of the rest of Nova Scotia, with its Atlantic exposure and slate bedrock.[9] Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the Edenic description of the New World and the references to fruit in the tenth-century Icelandic sagas in fact point to a location in southern Nova Scotia for the fabled Norse settlement of Vinland.[10]

The largest Acadian settlements (Grand Pré, Beaubassin, Port Royal) lined the eastern Fundy shore with farmland and pasture. The British eyed these rich farmlands even before the French surrendered mainland Nova Scotia in 1713, but especially after the founding of Halifax in 1749. Situated on a world-class harbour, but on a decidedly

Figure 1 Canada, Surveys and Mapping Branch, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, National Topographic Survey: Wolfville, Nova Scotia (1928), detail.

unarable peninsula of slate and granite, the new capital required settlements of supply. Anxious about their hold on the former (and still) Francophone *Acadie* – and, increasingly, the rest of America – the British encouraged a series of immigrations to the Annapolis Valley, first by so-called Planters from New England in the 1760s and then by Loyalists after the Revolutionary War. (At the head of the Bay of Fundy, on what is now the border of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the British also invited settlers from Yorkshire – people with experience in drainage farming.[11]) These transplanted Americans – advantaged by both the good conditions and the 'wind fall of Acadian lands and cattle' – adopted the complementary use of uplands and marsh, of woodlots and residences on the uplands and agriculture and pasture on the *pré*, with a similar profile of mixed farming with a heavy emphasis on livestock. Unlike the Acadians, though, they enjoyed a certain amount of state support, established an Anglo-American system of land division and town planning that persists to this day, and could count on emerging colonial markets for their produce.[12] Such was the rationale for building the Shubenacadie Canal – the longest in Maritime Canada – proposed as early as the 1790s and begun in the 1820s to supply

Halifax with the produce of 'our finest, best cultivated, and wealthiest agricultural districts'.[13]

As in most places, then, succession is a fundamental and crucial part of the environmental history of Grand Pré. If the *pré* worked by today's farmers is the product of Acadian expertise and labour, the cultural, political and technological landscapes they inhabit are generally the result of nineteenth-century Anglo-American ideas and practices. Consider the societal and moral standing bestowed by British, Americans and Canadians alike on agriculture as the key to both self-sufficiency and social stability. Little wonder that colonial and subsequently Canadian authorities would represent it as the preferred form of land use.[14] Accepting his nomination to represent Hants County in the colonial assembly in 1863, William D. Lawrence proclaimed:

> I am more in favour of agriculture than any other [industry], the first great employment of man – the noblest employment of man – agriculture, which takes one from his fireside, into the fields where with the plough he turns the soil to the face of heaven, and casts the seed on with his hands, and waits with patience to a kind providence for the reward of his labour.[15]

That Lawrence was a ship-owner and shipbuilder, in a colony at the peak of its merchant trade and shipbuilding industries, speaks volumes about how much weight voters placed on the social importance of farming. Historians ascribed similar qualities to the Planters, praising their 'love of the soil, sobriety, industry, and thrift' in 'planting well'.[16] This was also institutionalized in the provincial museum system. In 1971, the Nova Scotia government acquired Acacia Grove (built 1814–6), the stately Georgian home of Charles Prescott, located at Starr's Point across the Cornwallis River from Grand Pré. Prescott was a shipping merchant from Halifax who moved to the Valley to take up a new career as a scientifically minded gentleman farmer. While he experimented with hundreds of fruit species, Prescott is known primarily for introducing some key commercial apple types, notably the Gravenstein, which became the province's signature product. Thus Prescott House publically links an architecture of wealth and individual success (admittedly a common feature of local museums) to the new landscape of orchards and 'the development of the apple industry and its role in the local and provincial economy from the 19th century into the modern period'.[17]

By the middle part of the century, the orchards at Starr's Point had become the international image of the colony. When Nova Scotia apples won medals at the Royal Horticultural Society's International Fruit and Vegetable Show in 1862, it elevated the colony's profile within the empire and affirmed the prestige of the agricultural sector. Botanical display and exchange was fundamental not only to the imperial project but to Nova Scotia's view of its place within that empire, given the global traffic of its fleet. (This also fuelled much of the colony's opposition to Confederation with the Canadas in the 1860s: with the ties to empire visible daily in her ports, it seemed unnecessary if not counterintuitive to 'turn their backs upon England and fix their thoughts upon Ottawa'[18]). Nova Scotia would dine out on its standing as the 'Orchard of the Empire' for the next 80 years, enjoying the symbolic, political and economic currency of its special relationship with, especially, British markets.[19] While her sea captains brought home plants as biological trophies, Nova Scotia was itself reshaped to export its own plants, to compete actively (and successfully) with other agricultural producers around the world. Although the Shubenacadie Canal was operating by 1856, much more significant, especially for transporting perishables, was the network of railways already dominating the political and industrial landscape of British North America. Numerous lines – replete with new warehouses for produce storage – connected the Annapolis Valley to ocean ports such as Halifax and inland hubs like Truro.[20]

After Confederation in 1867, Nova Scotia found itself drawn into a second new network: a national programme of agricultural science. In 1886, the new federal Department of Agriculture established half a dozen Dominion Experimental Farms across the country, including one at Nappan, at the head of the Bay of Fundy. The Experimental Farms were designed to test and distribute crops that would fare best in different regional ecosystems; they thus encouraged specialization and concentration, whether Marquis wheat on the prairie or particular apple varieties in the Annapolis Valley. (The permanent effect is brought home in the popular memoir/manifesto *The 100 Mile Diet: A Year of Local Eating*, when the authors realize that the handful of apple varieties found in a grocery store are a mere fraction of the dozens that once were grown in British Columbia: a diversity now utterly forgotten.)[21] The province was equally invested in cultivating expertise: a School of Agriculture was established at the Provincial Normal School in Truro in 1885, and a School of Horticulture at Wolfville in 1905. Significantly, if unsurprisingly, there was also a vibrant culture of what Parks Canada now calls 'citizen science' at the local level. In January

1910, for example, the Berwick *Register* reported that the farmers' meeting ('well attended, and proved very interesting') heard a series of reports ('at length and most instructively') on methods of packing and grading, new forms of disease, fertilization and transport and reception in London.[22] That year, at the urging of the Nova Scotia Fruit Growers Association, Ottawa agreed to establish an Experimental Fruit Station at Kentville. Now known as the Atlantic Food and Horticulture Research Centre, the Kentville station remains a dominant presence in Valley agriculture: responsible for adapting the Honeycrisp apple, developing the L'Acadie blanc grape and gamely hosting the annual Kentville Pumpkin Festival.[23]

Indeed, tourism has been intertwined with farming in the Valley since the late nineteenth century. The same railway networks that helped industrialize agricultural production promised tourists from New England a romantic, arcadian landscape of prosperous farms wreathed in blossom. The Windsor and Annapolis Railway opened its line to Grand Pré in 1869; the Dominion Atlantic Railway purchased the site in 1917 and landscaped it (complete with a statue of the fictional Evangeline) as an ornamental flower garden visibly distinct from the working fields around.[24] Selling the Land of Evangeline meant selling the *land* as much as the Evangeline. Ambling by motorcar in 1923, Charles Towne grew impatient with:

> a certain lithograph which had greeted us from almost every inn at which we stopped, showing Longfellow's heroine standing in the midst of a radiant orchard . . . I was weary of the vicarious glimpses of apple-trees, and I knew that if we didn't find them soon in their bright abundance we should feel cheated.[25]

Travelogues paused for a moment of hushed regret for the poor, departed Acadians, but then resumed their rhapsodic descriptions of 'seas of bloom', and their praise for the rich soils and evident prosperity of the Valley.[26] 'Of Grand Pré it has been said it boasts a three-fold attraction: beauty, fertility, and sentiment,' explained the Canadian Pacific Railway.[27] 'No wonder the Acadians were blithe,' one 1894 tour book mused, 'this must have been a veritable land of plenty.'[28] And clearly, it still was: 'Acadie, home of the happy', then and now.[29]

The promotion of the region as a site of beauty, fertility and sentimental views of agriculture persisted throughout the twentieth century. Valley farmers launched the Apple Blossom Festival in 1933 to promote their exports and import the tourists. (Recognizing, as others

had done with Evangeline, the allure of the apple blossom as a picture of feminine innocence, the festival annually crowns a Queen Anapolisa from among the Apple Princesses representing the Valley communities; the first Queen was crowned at the Kentville research station, thereby uniting ceremony with practical interest.) Soon after, the province themed 'scenic travelways' to promote different micro-regions, with the blossom-ridden Evangeline Route – perhaps not coincidentally, provincial Highway 1 – a calming counterpart to the 'coastal sublime' of the Cabot Trail on Cape Breton; the regions, and their matching highways, remain the backbone of provincial tourism today.[30] Stan Rogers sang the lament of the expatriate recalling the view of the Bay of Fundy and the apple orchards of the Annapolis Valley from Gaspereau Mountain, above Grand Pré.[31]

Even Parks Canada is now cultivating an apple orchard on the historic site next to the church. Now the agriculture-themed celebrations aimed at urbanites from Halifax (or Ontario) fill half a calendar year: the Apple Blossom Festival in early June; Tastes of the Valley and Meet Your Farmer days in harvest season along with county and provincial exhibitions; a month-long wine festival in September and the Pumpkin Festival in October. (Windsor, Nova Scotia, is home to the Hants County Exhibition, the oldest agricultural fair in Canada, and to Howard Dill, who gained international recognition for his breed of 'Atlantic Giant' pumpkins.) Farmers from the Valley also maintain a year-round presence in Halifax, through community-supported agriculture subscriptions, farmers' markets and a new group of locally supplied grocers.

The current marketing of Grand Pré as a model of sustainable agriculture is thus both new and familiar. The image is still one of aesthetically pleasing, small-scale farming, still pinned to the dykeland, but adopting the newer language of sustainability and *terroir*. Wineries, in particular, have proliferated in the Gaspereau area since the 1990s. There are now nine in the area, with two more at the far end of the Annapolis Valley, touting distinct grape varieties and vineyard practices geared to the coastal soils and climate, and attempting to gain an international reputation, in language that recalls that of apple producers a century earlier. 'Tidal Bay brilliantly reflects its birthplace: the terroir, coastal breezes, cooler climate and our winemakers' world-class craftsmanship,' proclaims Domaine de Grand Pré, housed in an 1826 farmhouse.[32] Even non-agricultural products made elsewhere in Nova Scotia trade on the Valley imprint of 'lush fields and orchards … and the harmony man shares with nature'.[33] These messages of

local adaptation, regional character, food security and environmental empathy are then wrapped in the final sanction of Acadian precedent as 'people who nearly perfected the art of land cultivation and sustainable agriculture'.[34]

The environmental politics of commemoration

This association has been actively encouraged by the commemorative language used to designate and promote Grand Pré as a historic site. It has served as a *lieu de memoire* for the Acadian community since at least the 1880s, but in the early 1980s the older emphasis on the Deportation and the Seven Years' War gave way to language that celebrates Acadian settlement before 1755 and the emotional 'attachment [that] remains to this day among Acadians throughout the world to this area, the heart of their ancestral homeland and symbol of the ties which unite them'.[35] The dykeland, a substantial example of coastal engineering, is framed as a national achievement. With the Acadian community deeply invested in the management of the site (Grand Pré is jointly managed by Parks Canada and the *Société Promotion Grand-Pré*), with Parks Canada identifying 'cultural communities' as a strategic priority in national historic commemoration, and with the move away from the two-nations narrative in Canadian historiography, this is not surprising.[36] But neither is it surprising that the effect – as seen in paintings and murals commissioned for the site – is to show *l'ancienne Acadie* as a 'quasi-paradise' in perennial harvest, with 'wonderful weather, abundant agricultural productivity, and a happy and carefree existence'.[37]

The new emphases on the Acadian community and on landscape in site commemoration also reinforce a direct relationship between the Acadian past and current practice. Its designation as a national rural heritage district cited 'the blending of natural and built features, *in the retention and development of land use patterns originating with the Acadians*, particularly in the spatial distribution of arable land, orchards, dykelands, and residential hamlets'[38] (emphasis added). The designations also draw a direct line between pre-industrial and contemporary dykeland management, between the collective effort of the Acadian settlers and the marsh bodies of today. Presenting Acadian land-use patterns as effective in their permanence and sustainable in their footprint is understandable given Parks Canada Agency's investment in presenting itself as an agent of ecological integrity and 'citizen science'.

Likewise, it makes political sense for the Acadian community to link their historic claim to the area with good environmental stewardship.

That said, this raises three problems – one past, two present. For one, it perpetuates the Golden-Age characterization of *l'Acadie*. As Wynn has argued, we can credit the Acadians with knowledgeable affection and respect for the Fundy marshlands. But European colonization was fuelled by a confidence in human mastery of nature, and the Acadians, like most settlers, had a pragmatic, functional view of the land and its potential yield:

> Much as we may wish to see them as such, neither the early indigenous peoples of the region nor pre-expulsion Acadians can properly be counted as proto-environmentalists. We can allow them concern about the lives and livelihoods, the well-being, of their children, and even their children's children, but there is no evidence that they appreciated the biophysical limits of their settings or what we would now call ecological linkages in anything other than purely local and practical ways … we should not mistake these images as evidence of deliberately forward-looking, ecologically aware, sustainable practice.[39]

Meanwhile, the alluring image of farms in harmony with nature serves only to increase external pressures on the area – much like it did in the railway age, but now encouraged further by a feel-good stamp of sustainability. The Annapolis Valley is the most important liaison between the urban and rural in Nova Scotia, and Grand Pré is both the gateway to, and face of, that connection. The mutual dependency of the Atlantic and Fundy shores has existed since the eighteenth century, but the current twinning of Highway 1 makes 'our finest, best cultivated, and wealthiest agricultural districts' even more accessible. And it is worth noting that one of the main rationales for rebuilding and maintaining the dykes in the mid-twentieth century was to support the highways now so essential to both agriculture and tourism.

But in this relationship, the *pré*'s collectivist, non-industrial face is its fortune. Accordingly, there is no mention of the active, if not more problematic, history that was required to create this landscape, whether biological (species introduction and concentration), chemical (sprays and fertilizers) or material (the physical infrastructure of production and transport). Nor is there public discussion of the economic health of the agricultural sector: for example, the postwar loss of international markets and a lack of federal support leaving the industry – like

much of the region – in 'a dependent and underdeveloped state'; the growth of multinational agribusiness, farm consolidation and rural out-migration.[40] But the new interest in sustainability *has* necessarily affected the campaign for designation, with a growing recognition of the ecological pressures on the *pré* at least. These include a preponderance of non-native species, rising sea levels and tidal pressure on the dykelands, and other land-use development proposals in the area. The 2011 landscape management plan goes further, stating first that conservation of the property requires a working agricultural economy and, second, that the problems facing the farmers on the dykelands 'are not unique to Grand Pré'.[41] This is perhaps the frankest acknowledgement that the *pré* cannot be seen as separate from the larger economic and ecological life of the Valley.

Of course, the idealized, singular periodization we see at Grand Pré appears at historic sites across Atlantic Canada. The public image of Prince Edward Island (PEI) is also *its* rural golden age, in the latter nineteenth century, when the Island was one of the most agriculturally productive districts in Atlantic Canada. The island idyll, in television, tourism and Cavendish National Historic Site (home of 'Green Gables' of *Anne of Green Gables* fame), presents an era when thousands of small farms embodied the social coherence and stewarding sensibility of the family farm and the economic sustainability of mixed farming.[42] Back in Nova Scotia, Lunenburg does the same with the Grand Banks fishery of the same period, as a kind of proto-industrial, community-knit enterprise of low-impact technologies and sustainable abundance reflected in the prosperity of the high Victorian streetscape.[43] The heroics of daring sea captains and the romance of the 'saga of the sea' are untroubled with any reference to the groundfish moratorium, let alone the larger history of resource harvesting in the north Atlantic or the sociopolitical debates surrounding the fishery today.[44] While public history generally requires both a positive story and a clear-cut message, environmental history tends to muddy those waters.

This comes back to the value of Grand Pré's history – if taken altogether. As a model for small-scale, local and low-impact farming, it has the very real effect of affirming the art of the possible, of humanizing and cultivating support for sustainable agriculture. But it is not a straight line between the seventeenth century and today. It needs to be understood in *relational* terms: the Acadian past in relation to what came after, Grand Pré in relation to the rest of the Annapolis Valley and the province, and today's dykelands in relation to industry norms. The idyll is most useful, in other words, when contrasted with

what followed – when it is shown as an alternative to mainstream agricultural practices. But that means we must discuss those mainstream practices, a reality in which Grand Pré also exists. When we featured it as a case study in the Environment, Sustainability and Society Program at Dalhousie University, even my Nova Scotian students (who have been taught Acadian history since elementary school) want to see it as evidence of a once and future moment of sustainable agriculture, a wooden-shoed carbon footprint for the modern age. This is not surprising given the commemorative language at the site and the public image of (and desires for) Valley agriculture. But the site actually works better for teaching about succession and palimpsest. Even with the concrete artefact of the *pré*, a strong Acadian voice and sense of history in the community and a growing interest in sustainable practices among Valley farmers, most of the frameworks from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for industrial agriculture remain in place, frameworks of science, technique, infrastructure and identity. Until we incorporate this second story, we will continue to see Grand Pré simply as 'Acadie, home of the happy'.

Notes

1 Canadian Register of Historic Places, *Grand Pré Rural District National Historic Site of Canada, Statement of Significance, Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada,* minutes of July 1995/June 2004. http://www.historicplaces.ca/en/rep-reg/place-lieu.aspx?id=15751&pid=0; UNESCO World Heritage List, *Landscape of Grand Pré, 2012*. http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1404

2 W. Eilers, *et al*. (eds) *Environmental Sustainability of Canadian Agriculture: Agri-Environmental Indicator Report Series – Report No. 3.* (Ottawa: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2010). http://www4.agr.gc.ca/AAFC-AAC/display-afficher.do?id=1295983968944&lang=eng; Nomination Grand Pré, *Management Plan for the Landscape of Grand Pré*, 2011, 28. http://nominationgrandpre.ca/Dossier/2A%20-%20management%20plan%20landscape%20of%20GP.pdf

3 I am grateful to Conevery Valencius and the other members of the Northeast and Atlantic Canada Environmental History Forum from 2012 for their thoughts on this point.

4 G. Wynn and M. Evenden, '"54, 40 or Fight": Writing Within and across Borders in North American Environmental History,' in *Nature's End: History and Environment*, eds S. Sörlin and P. Warde (London: Palgrave, 2009), 230.

5 M.B. Taylor, 'The Poetry and Prose of History: Evangeline and the Historians of Nova Scotia,' *Journal of Canadian Studies* 23:1–2 (1988): 46–67; I. McKay, *Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994); M. MacDonald, 'Railway Tourism in the "Land of Evangeline, 1882–1946"', *Acadiensis* 35:1 (2005):158–80; I. McKay, with R. Bates, *The Province of History: The Making of the Public Past in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 2010).

6 G. Wynn, 'Late Eighteenth-Century Agriculture on the Bay of Fundy Marshlands', *Acadiensis* 8:2 (1979): 80–9; M. Hatvany, 'Wedded to the Marshes:

Salt Marshes and Socio-economic Differentiation in Early Prince Edward Island,' *Acadiensis* 30:2 (2001): 40–55; M. Hatvany, 'The Origins of the Acadian "Aboiteau": An Environmental-Historical Geography of the Northeast,' *Historical Geography* 30 (2002): 121–37; K. W. Butzer, 'French Wetland Agriculture in Atlantic Canada and its European Roots: Different Avenues to Historical Diffusion,' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92:3 (2002): 451–70; J.S. Bleakney, *Sods, Soil, and Spade: The Acadians at Grand Pré and Their Dykeland Legacy* (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004); J. Fowler, 'A Walk Back in Time at Grand Pré,' in *Underground Nova Scotia: Stories of Archaeology*, eds Erickson, P. and J. Fowler (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing, 2010); G. Kennedy, 'Marshland Colonization in Acadia and Poitou during the Seventeenth Century,' *Acadiensis* xlii:1 (2013): 37–66.

7 M. Conrad, 'Apple Blossom Time in the Annapolis Valley, 1880–1957,' *Acadiensis* 9:2 (1980): 14–39; K. Inwood and P. Wagg, 'Wealth and Prosperity in Nova Scotian Agriculture, 1851–71,' *Canadian Historical Review* 75:2 (1994): 239–64; J. Gwyn, *Excessive Expectations: Maritime Commerce and the Economic Development of Nova Scotia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998); D. Samson, *The Spirit of Industry and Improvement: Liberal Government and Rural-Industrial Society, Nova Scotia, 1790–1862* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008).

8 Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, *Evangeline: A Tale of Acadie* (Boston: William D. Ticknor & Co., 1847), 9–10.

9 J. Gwyn, 'Shaped by the Sea but Impoverished by the Soil: Chester Township to 1830,' in *The Nova Scotia Planters in the Atlantic World, 1759–1830*, eds T.S. Henderson and W. G. Robicheau (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 2012).

10 *The Vinland Sagas: The Norse Discovery of America* (London: Penguin, 1965, 1987); M.G. Larsson, 'The Vinland Sagas and the Actual Characteristics of Eastern Canada: Some Comparisons with Special Attention to the Accounts of the Later Explorers,' in *Vinland Revisited, the Norse World at the Turn of the First Millennium*, ed. S. Lewis-Simpson (St John's: Historic Sites Association of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2003).

11 N. Bezanson and R. Summerby-Murray, *Background Report: An Historical Geography of Tantramar's Heritage Landscapes* (Fredericton: Department of Municipalities, Culture and Housing, Heritage Branch, 1996).

12 A.R. MacNeil, 'Early American communities on the Fundy: A Case Study of Annapolis and Amherst Townships, 1767–1827,' *Agricultural History* 63:2 (1989): 101–19; D. McNabb, 'The Role of Land in Settling Horton Township,' in *They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime Canada*, ed. M. Conrad (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1988).

13 C.R. Fairbanks, 'Resolution of the Chamber of Commerce of Halifax (9 July 1825),' in *Reports and Papers Relating to a Canal Intended to Connect the Harbour of Halifax with the Basin of Mines: Remarks on its Nature and Importance, and a Plan and Section: Also, the Report of a Survey for Canals between St Peter's Bay and the Bras d'Or Lake in Cape Breton, and the Bay of Fundy and Bay of Verte* (Halifax, 1826), 30.

14 G. Wynn, '"Deplorably Dark and Demoralized Lumberers?": Rhetoric and Reality in Early Nineteenth-Century New Brunswick,' *Journal of Forest History* 24:4 (1980): 168–87.

15 W. D. Lawrence, 'Nomination Day Speech, 1863,' in *William D. Lawrence: Nova Scotia Shipbuilder & Anti-Confederation Campaigner, The Complete Archived and Annotated Writings* (Kennetcook: Heroes of Hants County Association, 2010), 205.

16 R.S. Longley, *The Coming of the New England Planters to the Annapolis Valley*, *Collections of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society (1961),* 33, reprinted in *They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime Canada*, ed. M. Conrad (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1988), 17.

17 K. Hatchard, 'The History of the Apple Industry of Nova Scotia,' *Nova Scotia Historical Quarterly* 7:1–4 8: 1 & 3 (1977–8): 342–52; Nova Scotia Museum, *Prescott House Mandate and Mission*. http://museum.gov.ns.ca/prh/en/home/aboutprescotthouse/mandatemission.aspx; Canadian Register of Historic Places, *Grand Pré Rural District National Historic Site of Canada, Statement of Significance, Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada, minutes*

of July 1995/June 2004. http://www.historicplaces.ca/en/rep-reg/place-lieu.aspx?id=15751&pid=0

18 J. Howe, 'Mr. Howe on Confederation, 1866,' in *The Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe (Based upon Mr. Annand's Edition of 1858)*, ed. J.A. Chisholm (Halifax: The Chronicle Publishing Co. Ltd., 1909), 476.

19 Conrad, 'Apple Blossom Time in the Annapolis Valley'.

20 While the earliest railways in Nova Scotia were geared towards coal deposits, by the mid-nineteenth century the Annapolis Valley was crisscrossed by several lines, including the Nova Scotia Railway, Windsor and Annapolis Railway (W&AR), Western Counties Railway (WCR), Cornwallis Valley Railway, Nova Scotia Central Railway and the Middleton and Victoria Beach Railway. Most important were the Intercolonial Railway (a condition of Confederation and completed to Quebec in 1879) and the Dominion Atlantic Railway (the result of a merger between the W&AR and WCR). See D.E. Stephens, *Iron Roads: Railways of Nova Scotia* (Windsor, Nova Scotia: Lancelot Press, 1972).

21 A. Smith, and J.B. Mackinnon, *The 100 Mile Diet: A Year of Local Eating* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2007), 96–7.

22 The Berwick *Register*, *For Better Fruit*, 20 January 1910.

23 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, *Kentville's Century of Science*, 2011. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/agr/A52-186-2011-eng.pdf

24 B. LeBlanc, *Postcards from Acadie: Grand-Pré, Evangeline and the Acadian Identity* (Kentville: Gaspereau Press, 2003); J. White, '"A Vista of Infinite Development": Surveying Nova Scotia's Early Tourism Industry,' *Collections of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society* 6 (2003): 144–69.

25 C.H. Towne, *Ambling through Acadia* (New York and London: The Century Co., 1923), 145.

26 Dominion Atlantic Railway, *The Land of Evangeline* (Nova Scotia: NP, 1931).

27 Canadian Pacific Railway, 'Nova Scotia by Canada Pacific' (n.d.).

28 Yarmouth Steamship Company, 'Beautiful Nova Scotia, the Tourist's Eden: The Brief Story of a Summer Outing in the Queen of Vacation Lands, with a Short Description of Some of its Delightful Resorts, Quaint, Old, Historic Towns and Surpassing Scenery' (Boston, 1895), 32.

29 Longfellow, *Evangeline*, 7.

30 A. MacEachern, *Natural Selections: National Parks in Atlantic Canada* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 2001); S. Osborne, 'The Road to Yesterday: Nova Scotia's Tourism Landscape and the Automobile Age, 1920–1940' (Master's thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 2009).

31 S. Rogers, 'Watching the Apples Grow', on *Fogarty's Cove* (Winnipeg: Barn Swallow Records, 1976).

32 Grand Pré Wines, Domaine de Grand Pré: Tidal Bay. http://grandprewines.ns.ca/winery/wines/white/tidal-bay/

33 Nova Scotian Crystal, Annapolis pattern. http://www.novascotiancrystal.com/shop-patterns/annapolis.html

34 *The Coast*, 'Top Chefs', quoting Craig Flinn, 13 September 2012.

35 Parks Canada, *National Historic Sites of Canada System Plan* (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 1997); Parks Canada, *Grand-Pré National Historic Site of Canada Management Plan* (Ottawa: Parks Canada, 2002 and 2012).

36 In the 1920s, the Acadian community responded to the DAR's Evangeline with a memorial cross and a replica of St Charles Church, styles of memorial grounded in their historical values rather than literary fiction. Ottawa acquired the site in 1957, but it was only in the early 1980s (the HSMBC/Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada designation was in 1982, and a new management plan in 1985) that the Acadian cultural claim became central. 'Ancestral homesite' is now used to describe both Grand Pré and the Melanson Settlement – an archaeological site of Acadian farming – on the Annapolis River.

37 A.J.B. Johnston, 'Imagining Paradise: The Visual Depiction of Pre-deportation Acadia, 1850–2000,' *Journal of Canadian Studies* 38:2 (2004): 122–3.

38 Parks Canada (2nd edn), *The National Standards and Guidelines for the Conservation of Historic Places in Canada. How Private Property Owners Can Preserve a Heritage District: The Case of Grand-Pre Rural Historic District* (Nova Scotia. Ottawa: Parks Canada, 2010), 10–12.

39 G. Wynn, 'Reflections on the Environmental History of Atlantic

Canada,' in *Land and Sea: Environmental History in Atlantic Canada*, eds C. Campbell and R. Summerby-Murray (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 2013), 239.

40 Conrad, 'Apple Blossom Time in the Annapolis Valley, 39.

41 Parks Canada, *Grand-Pré National Historic Site of Canada State of the Site Report 2009* (Kouchibouguac, New Brunswick, 2010a); Nomination Grand Pré, 2011, 27–35; Freedman *et al*. and Parks Canada, *Ecological Conditions at the Grand-Pré National Historic Site* (Halifax: Parks Canada, 2011).

42 M. Hatvany,'Wedded to the Marshes'; C. MacIntyre, 'The Environmental Pre-History of Prince Edward Island 1769–1970: A Reconnaissance in Force' (Master's thesis in Island Studies, Charlottetown, University of Prince Edward Island, 2010); J.D. MacFadyen, 'The Fertile Crescent: Wildland Resource Management and Prince Edward Island's First Soil and Energy Crisis, 1860–1935,' in *Time and a Place: Towards an environmental history of Prince Edward Island*, eds J. MacFadyen, I. Novaczek and E. MacDonald (Charlottetown and Montreal and Kingston: Island Studies Press and McGill-Queen's University Press, 2013).

43 C. Campbell, 'Global Expectations, Local Pressures: Some Dilemmas of a World Heritage Site,' *Journal of the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society* 11:1 (2008): 69–88; D. Bavington, *Managed Annihilation: An Unnatural History of Newfoundland Cod Collapse* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010); Lotze *et al*., 'Uncovering the Ocean's Past,' in *Shifting Baselines: The Past and the Future of Ocean Fisheries*, eds J.B.C. Jackson, K.E. Alexander and E. Sala (Washington: Island Press, 2011).

44 'Saga of the sea' refers to a popular series of photographs by W.A. MacAskill (c. 1936) of a fisherman and boy at Peggy's Cove lighthouse. http://novascotia.ca/archives/macaskill/

London Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 31 (2016). UCL Press• Print ISSN 0267-2200 • Online ISSN 1475-1674 • DOI 10.14324/111.444.ljcs.2016v31.003

Economic Dislocation and Resiliency on Prince Edward Island: Small Producer, Distant Markets

Edward MacDonald

Abstract

In some ways the story of post-Confederation Prince Edward Island can be told as a search to find a replacement for the Island's shipbuilding industry. For much of the nineteenth century, the export of locally constructed wooden sailing ships underpinned the colonial economy, providing widespread employment, enabling a profitable carrying trade and financing consumer expenditures. But in the late 1870s, the local shipbuilding industry essentially collapsed, squeezed between declining ship prices and freight rates, rising costs and competing technologies. Afterwards, the Island economy struggled to sustain itself, hampered by persistent out-migration, a small resource base and the state's financial incapacity. Several new initiatives did provide partial answers to the Island's economic dilemma. A case study of four industries – lobster fishing, fox farming, the seed potato industry and tourism – frames the issues facing Prince Edward Island in the century after 1873 and the strategies that the Islanders adopted to address them.

Introduction

Societies create collective storylines in order to justify their presents by reference to their pasts. The stories are simple and durable, linking heritage with identity, and rather than adapting themselves to changing times, the times have a tendency to adapt to them. Prince Edward Island (PEI) shares one such storyline with other island societies in the Atlantic Region, notably Newfoundland and Cape Breton: a master narrative of

intrinsic, internal virtue struggling against convenient external vice. In this species of scapegoating, virtue's failure to triumph, for example, in the quest for sustainable economic prosperity, can be traced to the blunders or self-serving machinations of malign outside influences: Old Country fishing merchants, 'absentee proprietors', misinformed and misguided imperial policymakers and, more recently, a combination of 'foreign owned companies'[1] and 'Ottawa mandarins' (both political and managerial).[2] These sorts of storylines may be convenient and culturally satisfying – they even have the ring of truth – but they inevitably obscure or ignore complexities and counter-narratives.

So it is with the storyline floated for Prince Edward Island's economy in the century and a half since Confederation. It is familiar to many for it resembles the regional narrative. Parts of the plot had already fallen into place by the 1870s and the finished narrative was received truth by the end of the Maritime Rights movement in the 1920s.[3] This is how it goes. Between the achievement of internal self-rule in 1851 and Confederation with Canada in 1873, 'The Island'[4] enjoyed a Golden Age of political autonomy and economic prosperity. The two were obviously if indistinctly connected. Like the rest of the region, the 'wood, wind and sail' economy mainly exported staple goods to international markets, primarily in Europe and the United States. Agriculture expanded as settlement spread across the 1.4 million acres of (mostly) arable land. A local fishery, shifting emphasis from cod to mackerel, finally found traction.[5] Forests were converted into exports or into wooden sailing ships. And shipbuilding both provided the hulls for Island exports and constituted the most lucrative export of all. Working from over 176 different locations, wherever water, wood, labour and capital might be brought together, Islanders led British North America in *per capita* construction of vessels in the middle decades of the century, finding markets mostly in the United Kingdom.[6] Colonists began to discover a distinctive 'Island' identity amid their imperial, ethnic and religious loyalties: an intensely parochial identity and yet also, in some measure cosmopolitan, given the international basis of its trade.[7]

The plot thickens. After a decade of 'splendid isolation' from British America's Confederation project, the little British colony was literally railroaded into Confederation, driven reluctantly into union by the ruinous cost of constructing a trans-island railway.[8] Political re-colonization was accompanied by economic stagnation. Federal policy privileged central Canadian interests over those of Prince Edward Island, and the Island's international export economy

waned into an inconsequential coasting trade. Iron and steam at last conquered wood, wind and sail and the Island's wooden shipbuilding industry quickly capsized, dealing the Island's economy a mortal blow. Stagnation followed. The resource sector remained static or shrank. A 'timber famine' killed the forest industry. Western wheat flooded commodity markets and Island farmers could not compete except in regional niche markets. The fishery struggled with both catch and price. Investment capital – such as it was – fled the province. So did Islanders. Decades of out-migration in search of economic opportunity emptied the Island's farms, sapped its collective self-confidence and robbed it of its best talent.[9] The provincial government, meanwhile, was reduced to haggling with Ottawa in a quest for federal funds and consideration.[10]

And amid all of this, the Islanders … endured. They coped. They made do with what they had. They preserved the old ways. They clung to their pride in the face of others' condescension. What they did *not* do in this storyline was deliberately set out to regenerate the post-shipbuilding economy. They did not create or innovate or generate new wealth. It was just this sort of passivity that Beck assigned to the Maritime region in a 1977 article.[11]

The master narrative is not so much inaccurate as incomplete. It regards the so-called 'golden age' as normative rather than exceptional. It ignores the special external factors that did so much to foster Island prosperity in the first place, even as it castigates outside forces for the province's eventual decline. It turns a wilful blind eye to *internal* considerations, such as the resource limits dictated by the physical environment. But it also glosses over the actual response on Prince Edward Island to the economic dislocation that bedevilled the post-Confederation decades. For Islanders did not just sit stoically by, arms folded, while their economy languished. They reacted vigorously, at times inventively, to the shifting political and economic landscapes of the Western world in the quest for economic regeneration. Four case studies illustrate this trope of economic resilience: the rapid rise of the shellfish industry in the 1880s; the invention of the silver fox industry in the 1890s; the innovative seed potato industry of the 1920s; and the gradual emergence of a tourism industry that rendered the Island's failure to industrialize a triumph of pastoral traditionalism. None of these innovations delivered complete economic regeneration, but, taken together, they suggest a stubborn resilience, a population seriously grappling with economic dislocation rather than simply learning to live with it.

The lobster boom

Some time around 1909, Archibald J. Macdonald of Georgetown, retired shipbuilder, merchant, fish packer and politician, reviewed the post-Confederation decade in his native province. 'About this time,' he wrote, 'also passed away the building of ships and it looked as if there was nothing for labour and commerce. A few years of hard times was followed by the rise of the Lobster fishing …'[12] It would deliver economic salve, if not salvation.

Lobster in the nineteenth century was considered a luxury food in urban America and Europe. It had always been abundant in Island waters, but until the adoption of canning technology in the province, there had been no way to match supply with demand. The Island was simply too far from major markets to compete in any live lobster trade, and there was no way to preserve the cooked product until the introduction of lobster canning.[13] The first reference to lobster canning in the province appeared in the late 1850s, but it was only in the late 1870s, just as the shipbuilding industry was imploding, that lobster factories began to proliferate along the Island coast. In 1873 there were two lobster-packing plants in the province. By 1879 there were 35. Two years later, there were 118.[14]

It is tempting to link the coincidental collapse of shipbuilding with the rise of lobster; in 1877 and 1878, while the Island's shipbuilding output fell by two-thirds, the Island's lobster pack more than doubled, from 640,000 to 1.6 million pounds, and its value more than tripled, from C$99,600 to C$330,000. But it is not yet proven that Island shipbuilders were shifting their capital from ships to canneries. Certainly, outside capital was instrumental in the creation of a lobster-canning industry, but there were ship-owners involved as well, though not the most prominent ones. It does seem that the earliest canneries were located primarily in areas along the Northumberland Strait coast, where there was no strong tradition of commercial fishing, suggesting that local fishing merchants were not leading the way.[15] Arguably, then, the industry was founded by outside interests and local investors not encumbered by heavy involvement in either shipbuilding or fishing enterprises.

In any case, success tends to be contagious. Islanders quickly piled into the rising industry. In 1881, 6.5 million pounds of lobster were canned in the Island's 118 factories, greater than the combined pack of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.[16] All at once the province had become

the Dominion's leading lobster packer. That year the value of the Island fishery reached C$1.95 million, nearly seven times the 1873 figure. In 1873, the lobster industry had been worth C$10,600. In 1881, it accounted for C$1.2 million – 60 per cent – of the fishery's total value. In less than a decade, lobster fishing had gone from nothing to become the backbone of a greatly expanded Island fishery. So it would remain. Between 1880 and the new millennium, lobster would generally comprise between 60 and 70 per cent of the total value of the Island's fishery, which, in turn, would consistently rank as the province's second or (in more recent decades) third most lucrative industry trailing only agriculture and tourism .[17]

For a brief, shining moment in the early 1880s, it might have seemed that the lobster fishery would succeed shipbuilding as the driver for sustained prosperity. Instead, uncomfortable realities soon took the wind from the industry's sails. By the end of the decade, the fishery had gone from boom to crisis as over-fishing and under-regulation threatened to destroy lobster stocks and poor quality control in canneries threatened the high-end markets. By 1888, the value of the fishery had fallen by over 50 per cent to C$877,000. The industry soon stabilized, but it would take 60 years for its annual earnings to rival the numbers from 1880–3. Even so, the lack of other economic alternatives continued to put demographic pressures on the lobster fishery. The number of canneries continued to rise, peaking at 246 in 1900, before government regulation, thin profit margins, transportation changes and market developments began steadily to curb their numbers.[18] Although greater numbers and greater effort did not yield higher catches or higher profits, lobster fishing became a seasonal income supplement for thousands of Island farmers practising occupational plurality, and cannery work proffered a rare opportunity for local employment outside the home to generations of Island women. In fact, instead of driving people out of the fishery, hard times tended to drive them to it. For example, the number of fishermen actually climbed by 50 per cent during the Great Depression of the 1930s, while the number of lobster traps rose from 278,000 in 1929 to 426,000 in 1937.[19] The long period of stasis in the lobster fishery ended abruptly in the 1970s, even as governments were trying to coax Islanders out of the fishery. Beginning in the late 1970s, a sharp – still unexplained – upturn in lobster landings and suddenly buoyant prices keyed a new lobster boom that persisted into the new millennium.[20]

Opportunity, technology and economic need had conspired to create a lobster-canning industry on Prince Edward Island in the late

1870s just as the province's keystone industry was failing. For many decades thereafter, the lobster-canning industry provided practically the only factory setting in a mineral-poor, energy-strapped province. If it failed to deliver economic salvation, the lobster industry, like the lobster themselves, proved surprisingly resilient. But there were natural limits to the industry, boundaries set by seasonality, fish stocks and fluctuating market prices. Moreover, Island lobsters had little that set them apart from those caught elsewhere in North America, no intrinsic quality to lend them a competitive advantage. Island foxes did.

The fox bubble

A well-worn adage argues that to corner a market a producer must be first, best or only. For a time the Island's silver fox industry was all three. Fox farming came to be seen as a livestock industry and in that sense is best understood within the context of post-Confederation agriculture. Given the high proportion of arable land on Prince Edward Island, it was a given to both policymakers and newcomers that farming should be the central activity for settlers. While ships became the most valuable Island export, the combined value of domestic consumption and export of agriculture was no doubt greater. Grain (which did not grow particularly well on Island soils) was the main international export by the mid-nineteenth century, but potatoes and livestock also found important regional markets.[21]

The eclipse of the shipbuilding industry and a rising population placed fresh pressure on agriculture in the post-Confederation period. Island farmers responded in various ways. While a new generation of farm-improvement societies, the Farmers' Institutes, tried to make farmers more productive, farmers pushed more land into production. The proportion of 'improved' land peaked in 1911, and the proportion in crops in 1921. Encouraged by government, small, mixed farms leaned increasingly towards some form of specialization. In the early 1890s, Dominion Dairy Commissioner James Robertson catalysed the creation of a self-conscious dairy industry by promoting community-owned butter and cheese factories, and in 1900 the provincial government established its own Department of Agriculture to encourage the Island's most important industry.

Behind the trends, meanwhile, a romantic story of individual innovation and ingenuity was unfolding. The black fox, with its sable pelt and silver guard hairs, was a mutation of the red fox, rare enough in

the wild for its pelt to fetch handsome prices from the Western world's fashion elites. Over the course of the 1890s, working in great secrecy on a small island near Alberton in western Prince Edward Island, Charles Dalton and Robert T. Oulton found a way to do something no one else in the world had yet done: breed black foxes in captivity. By 1900, their experiment was producing a reliable supply of premium-quality 'silver fox pelts', which they carefully fed into international fur markets. The profit margins were astounding. At a London fur sale in 1900 a single pelt brought C$1,807, and in 1910 Dalton and Oulton sold 25 pelts for C$34,649. That year, the average annual wage for an Island farm labourer was C$319.20.[22]

At the turn of the century, Dalton and Oulton had made a private compact with four other pioneer fox breeders in western Prince Edward Island. In order to prop up fur prices by controlling supply, this 'Big Six Combine' agreed not to sell live breeding foxes outside of their small circle. When their monopoly broke down in 1910, the emphasis abruptly shifted from selling fox pelts to selling live foxes to a growing mob of local and Mainland investors eager to create their own fox farms and cash in on the fur-farming bonanza. The resulting mania was intense, if brief. Between 1911 and 1914, breeding stock might sell for as much as C$20,000 a pair. By 1914, 312 fox ranches (though with only 4,587 foxes) had been incorporated in the province, valued – on paper – at C$26 million. According to the *Canadian Annual Review* for 1913, Island farmers had withdrawn C$4.5 million from savings' banks: 'As the people became restless and dissatisfied to some extent, farms were mortgaged and crops hypothecated.'[23]

The bubble burst in August 1914 with the outbreak of the Great War, which fatally compromised the luxury fur market in Europe and America. But the industry quickly organized and stabilized, and with the return of peace, fox farming took its place as an apparently entrenched livestock industry with other smaller industries – fox food manufacturers, fox pen makers, how-to manuals for beginners, fox ranch security providers – orbiting around it. Being first in a new industry requiring special expertise gave the province a considerable head start, and during the interwar period, Prince Edward Island remained the international headquarters of the fox industry. In 1923 there were 448 registered fox farms in the province. By 1929, there were 727 registered fur farms (almost all of them fox ranches) in the province, exporting both live foxes (6,703, valued at C$1,096,863) and pelts (6,824, worth C$643,789). Fox farms typically did not provide many new jobs; according to the *Canada Year Book* for 1924, the 458 registered

fox ranches in the province sported only 247 employees (compared to the fishery's 3,000 seasonal jobs in 1925). But the industry's sales were mostly off-Island and that brought new money into the economy, approximately C$1.74 million in the record year of 1929.

The actual impermanence of the fox industry was exposed only by the Great Depression. Because it was one of the few Island industries that retained any value during the global collapse of commodity prices, more and more Island farmers dabbled in foxes, usually without much reference to the organizational control that the Canadian Silver Fox Breeders Association sought to exert.[24] The live fox market had already withered, predictably, as mainland ranches developed their own stock, and Island breeders in desperate search of an income began to pelt more and more of their foxes. Quality inevitably suffered, and as the marketplace became glutted, prices sagged. Changing fashions did not destroy the fox industry so much as the loss of the exotic exclusivity that had given silver fox pelts their value. If the butcher's wife could afford a foxskin stole, why would the movie star want to buy one? Thus, an Island industry that had once been first, only *and* best lost its competitive advantage and then its markets. While postwar promotional films would continue to push silver foxes, their day was done. And when the industry staged a modest revival in the 1980s, the anti-fur lobby soon dealt it a second death blow.

As with lobster, the silver fox industry had taken a raw material and added value to it – in fox farming's case by domestication and selective breeding – in order to overcome the province's built-in disadvantages of being a small producer with distant markets. Without abandoning the small, mixed-farming model that defined the Island farmscape, agriculture had embraced and exploited an Island-based innovation to claw back a little of the prosperity lost in the stagnation of the post-Confederation period. The fox industry had been entrepreneurial and adaptable, though not, as it turned out, durable.

It is easy to romanticize the silver fox industry, and perhaps that encouraged more sober observers to dismiss it. For Clark, writing in the 1950s, it was a brief flash of minor celebrity in the larger story of Island agriculture.[25] But it is difficult to ignore the symbolic importance of the fox industry in the interwar period, when Prince Edward Island could credibly pose as a major player in an international luxury industry. It was that sense of lustre that prompted the government of Prince Edward Island to add to its automobile licence plates a slogan (the first province in Canada to do so) that paired 'Foxes' with another specialized Island export, 'Seed Potatoes'.

Inventing 'Spud Island'

While it is true that as far back as 1820 William Cobbett famously scorned Prince Edward Island as 'that lump of worthlessness . . . that bears nothing but potatoes', it is only in the past 90 years that the province has become synonymous with the tuber.[26] The twentieth-century penchant for sloganeering – witness 'Spud Island' – is partly responsible for the association. However, it also owes much to the emergence in the 1920s of the seed potato industry as a direct response to the inherent challenges facing Island agriculture. Introduced to the colony by British settlers in the 1770s, the potato quickly rooted itself in the Island's rural culture. Hardy, nutritious and high yielding, the potato was perfectly adapted to the Island's loose, sandy soil and cool climate, and the sets could easily be planted among the stump-fields of pioneer farms. Potatoes were a vital food crop for settler families. Even the smallest farms had an acre or two of potatoes.

Almost as soon as subsistence farming began to yield potato surpluses, Island farmers began to export them as table stock to feed fishing and lumbering communities across the Atlantic region. After 1890, however, potato acreage declined. According to one commentator, 'low prices and high costs hobnobbed together'.[27] The quasi-biblical descent of the Colorado potato beetle in the 1880s, encroachment by 'foreign' weeds, and high transportation costs drove up costs and lowered yields.[28] But there was also little room for growth in traditional potato markets within the region, and little progress in fulfilling Island legislator Joseph Read's 1909 prediction that Prince Edward Island 'was destined to be the great potato country of the world'.[29] But that was about to change.

The Island's seed potato industry blossomed through a series of partnerships.[30] In 1920, 160 Island farmers banded together to form a producer cooperative, the Prince Edward Island Potato Growers' Association. Its main objective was to promote and market certified seed potatoes, potatoes used to plant new crops. In this it received critical support from the Dominion Experimental Farm in Charlottetown, which provided plant research and the all-important certification, and the provincial Department of Agriculture, which lent both office space and personnel.

The association made the first shipment of its 'Garden of the Gulf" seed potatoes in 1920. With an eye to the higher prices (on average double the local price for table stock, according to the association)

and expanding markets, hundreds of Island farmers quickly paid their C$2.00 membership fee to the association and registered for seed production.[31] The industry's growth was uneven, but there was no mistaking the general trend. In 1920, Islanders had planted 36,000 acres of potatoes. The 1928 figure was 51,890 acres, 32,000 of it registered as seed.[32] The Potato Growers' Association handled 1.37 million bushels of potatoes that year and did C$2.1 million worth of business.[33] Like the fox industry, but in a different way, the Depression dealt the fledgling seed potato industry a heavy blow. Prices collapsed, from an average price of C$1.50 per hundredweight for seed in 1929 to as low as 18 cents for seed in 1931 and 12 cents for table stock. Forced to find storage for 500,000 bushels of unsold potatoes in 1931, the Potato Growers' Association lost money and credibility from which it struggled to recover. By 1935, it had gone out of business.[34] For the next 40 years, potato acreage held more or less steady while Island farmers rode out cycles of surge and slump.[35] By the time potato acreages began to climb once more, the whole nature of the industry had changed. Monoculture, mechanization and farm consolidation had transformed the farmscape, and frozen food processing had overtaken table stock and seed potatoes as the demand driver for growth. Island potatoes fed more and more consumers, but potato income fed fewer and fewer farmers.

But all of that was for the future in 1929, when potatoes, especially seed potatoes, were being crowned the king of Island cash crops. The seed potato industry had aggressively addressed the Island's double dilemma of being a small producer with distant markets. High-quality seed, certified free of disease, could command premium prices that would offset high shipping costs. Over the course of the 1920s, Prince Edward Island positioned itself as a major supplier for America's mid-Atlantic and southern states, which had difficulty generating their own seed stock. Not only did its soil and climate produce excellent potatoes, but because it was a small island, it was arguably better situated than mainland producers to avoid diseases that might damage seed stock (and to contain outbreaks should they occur). Just as important, the boundedness of being an island was easy to brand. Island potatoes may not have been much different from mainland ones, but it was easy for consumers to conceptualize them as such. In marketing its seed potatoes, Prince Edward Island had marketed its geographical liabilities as assets. Instead of being peripheral and isolated, the province was insulated against contagion by its 'islandness'. The same logic would inform the way in which it sold to the world its nascent tourism industry.

Packaging the pastoral

Like the rest of the Western world, Prince Edward Island discovered in the nineteenth century that 'place' could be an attraction, that people would pay to come and experience a landscape and culture that was different from their own – or which hearkened back to an imagined place from their own past. There was still a product to be packaged and sold, and distance remained an economic consideration, but tourism brought consumers to the product rather than the other way around. What was 'exported', through tourism advertising, was an image of something, not the thing itself.[36]

The challenges for any tourism industry were similar: to identify the potential attraction(s), to persuade visitors they should – and could – come, to get them conveniently to the tourist sites, to provide them with the amenities they desired and to convince them to come back. All of these considerations were already at play in the earliest known references to tourism promotion in the province. In October 1858, Albert Catlin, the newly appointed American consul in Charlottetown, reported on the colony's touristic possibilities in his annual report to the Secretary of State. Once rail and steamship communication was opened with the Island through Saint John, New Brunswick, he wrote, 'I will venture to say that our citizens can come here and spend three months in summer in as pleasant and healthy a country as exists in any part of the world.'[37] The following autumn, the Charlottetown *Islander* took up the theme in an editorial:

> There is another class of American Citizens whose attention we would invite to this Island – that class which comprises the wealthier Merchants and gentlemen, who, with their families, are in the habit of travelling Northward in the Summer season, in search of a healthy and agreeable retreat from the enervating effects of climate, and to recruit their health. We know of no more beautiful or more healthful place than this Island from the month of June to the end of October; and we are satisfied that its many advantages only require to be known in order to its becoming the favorite watering hole of North America.[38]

A month later, Catlin was lamenting 'the want of a good Hotel, conducted on the American principle' to cater to 'those whom business or pleasure induce to visit the colony'.

Within a decade the earliest tourist resorts had opened. The majority were located along the Island's 'North Shore', within easy reach, by rail and carriage, of Charlottetown or Summerside, the principal ports of entry. For already tourism promoters had settled on what they considered the Island's two greatest attractions for visitors: the health benefits of fresh air and salt-sea breezes and the restorative charm of the Island's pastoral landscape. 'To lie down,' wrote Beatrice Rosamund in *The Canadian Magazine*, 'stretched out luxuriously on the side of the sand bank and to gaze idly over the dancing waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence is to be insensibly drifted into a state of contented rest … Here peace spreads her wings over the white beach which fringes a green and undulating landscape.'[39] Garden metaphors had long abounded in literature about the province and by 1900 the term 'Garden of the Gulf" was gaining advertising currency.[40]

In 1900, when Raymond's travel article was published, Island tourism remained a minor industry, attracting a few thousand visitors a year, but during the interwar period, as the automobile began to transform the North American tourist experience, the industry self-consciously professionalized. A lasting tourist association, a private organization with modest public funding, was formed in 1923.[41] It continued to refine its message. In common with Nova Scotia, a new, anti-modernist trope gained ground in the Island's tourist literature.[42] In this sort of imaging game, Prince Edward Island's failure to industrialize served it in good stead. It had seemingly skipped straight from a pre-industrial to a post-industrial phase of development. Increasingly, the pastoral landscape was equated with a pastoral, traditionalist culture. For the Island was not only rural, it was rustic, and that identity posed a stark contrast to the angst-ridden, dog-eat-dog world of urban North America. Instead of being 'behind the times', Island culture was promoted as being somehow 'outside of time'. Nostalgia would now deepen the appeal of refreshing climate and soothing landscape. The Island would eventually package and promote its own heritage for tourists, but in the beginning, it encouraged visitors to invest the tourist landscape with their own personal heritage. In an odd way, they came to the Island to find themselves.

Through her many Island-based novels, world-famous author L.M. Montgomery did much to disseminate the pastoral romance of her native Island culture, but it was best articulated in a 1939 essay. 'Perhaps change comes more slowly in Prince Edward Island than elsewhere,' she wrote. 'We are not hide-bound or overly conservative but we do not rush madly after new fads and fashions because they *are*

new.' Islanders, she selectively averred, possessed old-fashioned virtues: 'Loyal and upright in dealing, hospitable … oh, *how* hospitable! … with a sense of responsibility and a little decent reserve still flowering fully on the fine Old Country stock.'[43] Here, then, was the tourist 'Islander' of the twentieth century: old-fashioned but not reactionary; intensely local but not parochial; dignified yet hospitable; paradoxically prideful and modest; reflexively 'authentic' but not 'quaint'.

As with the seed potato industry, islandness now became a virtue. Separation from the mainland served as a sort of a cultural preservative as well as a physical marker of distinctiveness. The sea passage to the Island even became part of the place's allure, providing a marker of 'otherness' that is part of an island's mystique for visitors.[44] But island tourism also requires that tourists have a reliable, efficient way to get to their island destination, and during the interwar period that requirement increasingly became the driver in local demands for improved ferry services between Prince Edward Island and the mainland. The Boards of Trade explicitly made the connection in a brief to the Royal Commission on Transportation in 1949: 'The tourist business, with our natural advantages, is capable of being developed into a third great industry. Given adequate transportation facilities, our very isolation, which is such a handicap to us in the development of other industries, can become an asset in relation to the tourist business.'[45]

And so, by a process of accretion, Prince Edward Island had by 1945 established a tourism image that bound together its climate, landscape and culture into an experiential package. The stage was now set for the province to exploit the phenomenal growth of the global tourism industry in the postwar period. From an estimated 30,000 visitors in 1949, the province would top 200,000 by the end of the next decade and over a million per year by the end of the century.[46]

The durable marketing tropes developed in the nineteenth century and refined in the twentieth persist in the twenty-first in the current 'Gentle Island' tourism advertising campaign. So, it seems, do the industry's limitations. As with the fur industry, a small province does not get to dictate cultural trends. 'Gentle islands' do not always compete well with 'What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas'. Like agriculture or lobster fishing, tourism also suffers from seasonality. Despite its best efforts to expand the tourist season, Prince Edward Island has not shed its image as a summer destination. Beyond climate, small-scale tourism promoters can do little about seasonal weather patterns, currency fluctuations, rising fuel costs or global economic swings.

But to make too much of the limitations would be to deny agency to Island entrepreneurs. Tourists had not simply discovered Prince Edward Island. The province's tourism promoters had groped their way to a clear sense of what the Island had to sell to visitors. They were active, not passive, participants in the struggle to overcome the province's physical challenges, to turn economic lemons into lemonade.

Conclusion

Each of these four attempts at economic regeneration soon found limits to its potential growth. In the end, none completely succeeded in breaking down the built-in limitations of the province's resource base or its reliance on federal transfers to make ends meet. Instead of a comfortable living, lobster fishing, fox farming, seed potatoes and tourism provided for most participants a valuable seasonal supplement to their income. Yet each stubbornly confronted the essential geographical dilemma of the Island's economy. Prince Edward Island is a small island on the margin of a great continent. For much of its history, winter ice conditions in the Northumberland Strait magnified its isolation and complicated those simple facts of size and distance. The province must export in order to prosper, yet the relative distance to large markets added an inevitable surcharge to the cost of production. (The same geographic reality applied in reverse to the logistics of the tourism industry.) At the same time, smallness dictated that the Island could seldom compensate for high shipping costs by economies of scale. In ordinary circumstances, Island exports have had to rely on quality rather than quantity in order to compete. 'Quality' meant adding value to a staple product to bridge the gap between price and cost. Such was the economic algebra that Island producers intuitively sought to master within the new realities of post-Confederation Canada. The lesson continues.

Notes

1 K. MacNeil, 'The Island,' SOCAN, 1997.
2 E. MacDonald, *If You're Stronghearted: Prince Edward Island in the Twentieth Century* (Charlottetown: Prince Edward Island Museum and Heritage Foundation, 2000), 345.
3 E.R. Forbes, *The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919–1927: A Study in Regionalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1979).
4 The definite article is a commonplace usage in the province. I will use the term 'Island' here as shorthand for Prince

Edward Island, not to imply there is no other island.

5 K. Wells, *The Fishery of Prince Edward Island* (Charlottetown: Ragweed Press, 1986), 121–30.

6 M. Moore and N.J. De Jong, *Shipbuilding in Prince Edward Island: Enterprise in a Maritime Setting* (Ottawa: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1994); D. Sobey, *Shipbuilding and the Forests of Prince Edward Island: An Analysis of the Types and Amounts of Wood Used in Island Ships– Based on the Surveyors' Reports of the Lloyd's Register of British and Foreign Shipping* (Charlottetown: Department of Environment, Energy, and author, 2011).

7 D. Weale and H. Baglole, *Confederation, the End of an Era* (Summerside: Williams and Crue, 1973).

8 J.J. Rowan, *The Emigrant and Sportsman in Canada: Some Experiences of an Old Country Settler; With Sketches of Canadian Life, Sporting Adventures, and Observations on the Forests and Fauna* (London: E. Stanford, 1876); F.W.P. Bolger, *Prince Edward Island Confederation* (Charlottetown: St Dunstan's University Press, 1964).

9 A.A Brookes, 'Islanders in the Boston States, 1850–1900,' *The Island Magazine* 2 (Spring/Summer, 1977): 11–15; A.H. Clark, *Three Centuries and the Island: A Historical Geography of Settlement and Agriculture in Prince Edward Island, Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959).

10 F. Driscoll, 'Prince Edward and the Dominion,' in *Canada's Smallest Province: A History of P.E.I.*, ed. F.W.P. Bolger (Charlottetown: Prince Edward Island 1973 Centennial Commission, 1973).

11 Among the shared characteristics Beck posited for the region were conservatism, traditionalism, suspicion of change and political cynicism.

12 A. Macdonald, Unpublished memoir (1909, copy in possession of author).

13 S.S. Hill, *A Short Account of Prince Edward Island* (London: Madden, 1839); K. Wells, *The Fishery of Prince Edward Island* (Charlottetown: Ragweed Press, 1986).

14 E. MacDonald and B. Beck, 'Lines in the Water: Time and Place in a Fishery,' in *Time and a Place: Towards an Environmental History of Prince Edward Island*, eds E. MacDonald, J. MacFadyen and I. Novaczek (Charlottetown: McGill Queen's University Press and Island Studies Press, 2016).

15 J.H. Meacham, *Illustrated Historical Atlas of Prince Edward Island* (Philadelphia: J.H. Meacham & Co., 1880); Meacham's Atlas of 1880, using surveys probably completed in 1878 and 1879, lists 35 canneries, 25 of them along the Northumberland Strait.

16 'Annual Reports of the Department of Marine and Fisheries,' *Sessional Papers of the Canadian Parliament (1873–1919)* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer); Government of Prince Edward Island, *Historical Statistics of PEI* (Charlottetown: Queen's Printer, 2007).

17 MacDonald and Beck, 'Lines in the Water', 2016.

18 N. Gorveatt, '"Polluted with factories": Lobster Canning on Prince Edward Island,' *The Island Magazine*, 57 (Spring/Summer, 2006): 10–21; S. Arsenault, 'Packing Lobsters on the Beach: Cannery Life on Prince Edward Island,' *The Island Magazine*, 60 (Fall/Winter, 2006): 13–21.

19 H.S. Gordon, *The Fishing Industry of Prince Edward Island* (Ottawa: Department of Fisheries Gordon, 1952), 11.

20 MacDonald, *If You're Stronghearted*, 313–14.

21 Prince Edward Island Legislative Documents, *Journal of the House of Assembly of Prince Edward Island, 1854–1873.* http://www.peildo.ca/; Clark, *Three Centuries and the Island*, 114–19.

22 J.W. Jones, *Fur-Farming in Canada* (Montreal: Commission of Conservation, Canada); J. Forester, *Silver Fox Odyssey: History of the Canadian Silver Fox Industry* (Summerside: Canadian Silver Fox Breeders Association, n.d.); F.A. Stilgenbauer, 'Geographic Aspects of the Prince Edward Island Fur Industry,' *Economic Geography* 3 (1927): 110–25; R.A. Rankin, 'Robert T. Oulton and the Golden Pelt,' *The Island Magazine* 3 (Fall–Winter, 1978): 17–22.

23 J. Castell Hopkins, *Canada Annual Review of Public Affairs* (Toronto: Annual Review Publishing, 1914). The fox boom inspired a number of other fur-farming experiments, notably mink, skunk (marketed as 'sable') and even raccoon, but foxes remained far and away the dominant fur-farming species.

24 Clark, *Three Centuries and the Island*, 150.

25 Clark, *Three Centuries and the Island*, 205.

26 W. Cobbett, *Rural Rides* (London: T. Nelson & Sons, 1830), 535.
27 *Summerside Journal*, Special Edition, 'P.E. Island Seed Potatoes' (20 June 1923): 21.
28 C. MacIntyre, 'The Environmental Pre-History of Prince Edward Island 1769–1970: A Reconnaissance in Force' (Master of Arts in Island Studies thesis, University of Prince Edward Island, 2010): 100–11.
29 *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1921–1938* (Ottawa: Canadian Review Co., 1939): 476.
30 MacDonald, *If You're Stronghearted*, 132–8; M.D. MacLean, 'Spud Island: The Development of the Prince Edward Island Potato Industry, 1920–1992' (Honours essay, Department of History, University of Prince Edward Island, 2009), 18–23.
31 The Prince Edward Island Potato Growers' Association, Inc., *Premiers' Fonds*, Record Group 25, Series 26, James David Stewart Papers, Series 1, File 6 (Public Archives and Records Office of Prince Edward Island, 1923).
32 Even so, that figure represented an average of just 7 acres of potatoes per association member, a reminder that the basic structure of Island agriculture – small, mixed farms – had not yet appreciably changed. 'Specializing' in seed potatoes did not mean forsaking traditional patterns of agriculture.
33 Dominion Bureau of Statistics (1921–39), *The Canada Year Book* (Ottawa: King's Printer); *Canadian Annual Review*, 1920–38.
34 MacDonald, *If You're Stronghearted*, 157; MacLean, 'Spud Island,' 26–7.
35 H. Spierenburg (ed.), *Historical Statistics of Prince Edward Island* (Charlottetown: Government of Prince Edward Island, 2007), Table 8.05. http://www.gov.pe.ca/photos/original/pt_historical.pdf
36 A. MacEachern, '"No Island Is an Island": A History of Tourism on Prince Edward Island, 1870–1939' (M.A. thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1991); E. MacDonald, 'Rights of Passage: Marine Transportation and Tourism on Prince Edward Island, Canada' (paper presented at the 6th IMEHA International Congress of Maritime History, Ghent, Belgium, 2012); E. MacDonald, 'A Landscape … with Figures: Tourism and Environment on Prince Edward Island,' in *Land and Sea: Environmental History in Atlantic Canada*¸ eds C. Campbell and R. Summerby-Murray (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 2013).
37 Public Archives and Records Office of Prince Edward Island (1858–9), Despatches from the United States Consuls in Charlottetown. Acc. 3024/1. Albert G. Catlin to Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, Washington, 1 October 1858; and Catlin to Cass, 1 October 1859.
38 *The Islander* (Charlottetown, 1859), 'The Alien Bill', 9: 2–3.
39 B. Rosamund, 'Amid Cliffs and Sand Dunes,' *The Canadian Magazine,* 15, 1 (May, 1900): 62–4.
40 MacEachern, '"No Island Is an Island",' 59–60.
41 MacEachern, '"No Island Is an Island",' 98–100.
42 I. McKay, *The Quest of the Folk*: *Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1994), 30–7.
43 L.M. Montgomery, 'Prince Edward Island,' in *The Spirit of Canada, Dominion and Provinces, 1939: A Souvenir of Welcome to H.M. George VI and H.M. Queen Elizabeth* (Montreal: Canadian Pacific Railway), 18.
44 MacDonald, 'Rights of Passage'.
45 PEI Collection, *PEI Boards of Trade Brief to Royal Commission on Transportation, 1949*. (Robertson Library, University of Prince Edward Island, 1949).
46 MacDonald, 'Rights of Passage'.

London Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 31 (2016). UCL Press• Print ISSN 0267-2200 • Online ISSN 1475-1674 • DOI 10.14324/111.444.ljcs.2016v31.004

Marine Fish Farming and the Blue Revolution: Culturing Cod Fisheries

Dean Bavington and Daniel Banoub

Abstract

The Blue Revolution promises to transform wild marine fish into docile domesticates, fish hunters into harvesters. As commercially fished marine species continue to face extinction in the wild due to over-fishing, pollution, global climate change and a host of other anthropogenic assaults, 'culture' has emerged as a keyword in the field of marine fisheries management. Like the terrestrial dreams and grandiose visions of their Green comrades a half-century earlier, Blue revolutionaries advocate the application of scientific expertise, industrial technology and trans-national capital in their oceanic culturing projects. These culturing projects influence and seek to transform human identity and ways of living as much as the genetic make-up, behaviours and metabolism of the wild fish species that are targeted for domestication.

Introduction

The Blue Revolution is a term used by the aquaculture industry to refer to the domestication and cultivation of aquatic plants and animals for profitable sale in global markets. It promises to transform wild marine fish into docile domesticates, fish hunters into harvesters. Using the recent development of cod farming in Newfoundland and Labrador as an empirical example of the Blue Revolution in action, we apply the three meanings of 'culture' outlined by Raymond Williams in *Keywords*[1] along with insights from critical[2] and cultural[3] geographers to explore some of the material and discursive transformations associated with the

shift from capture to culture cod fisheries. By selecting the cod fishery – a field of human practice with deep cultural meaning in Newfoundland and one that, while highly capitalized and industrialized, is only now undergoing an agricultural transformation that has been well established on land for thousands of years – we seek to articulate some of what is at stake in cultural framings of human–animal relations, and provide a case for the importance of comparative fisheries studies at this moment in history.

We explain how the codfish has been transformed into a domesticated animal both *conceptually* through fisheries management models and *materially* in laboratories, hatcheries and grow-out sites. This will be followed by a parallel story of the culturing process that has been applied to Newfoundland fishing people as they have been transformed throughout various historical periods from commons-dwelling fish hunters through to nationalized industrial fishery workers and finally to contemporary professionalized fish harvesters operating on an increasingly enclosed sea.

The cod story: a managed annihilation of wild abundance

Like stories of the plains buffalo and the passenger pigeon, tales of early cod abundance are legendary. According to reports from the first European explorers of Newfoundland and Labrador, cod were so plentiful they slowed the movement of ships and could be scooped from the sea in baskets.[4] The natural abundance of cod that supported fishing activities for over 500 years came to a sudden end in July 1992 when a moratorium was placed on all cod fishing, putting 30,000 people out of work – the largest single-day layoff in Canadian history. Since the fishing moratorium, codfish populations have not recovered and continue to decline despite the end of commercial cod fishing. Conservation scientists now recommend that cod be listed as an endangered species, leaving cod fishery workers little choice but to leave rural Newfoundland and Labrador in search of alternative employment.

The Newfoundland cod collapse shook the fisheries science and management community worldwide. Up to the eve of the collapse, scientific managers believed cod and other wild fish stocks could be easily controlled by regulating fishing. Scientific models indicated that the cod stock was growing faster than the fishing fleet's ability to catch

them and plans were in place to gradually increase catches up to a safe maximum sustainable yield.

In the wake of the cod collapse, the hubris associated with wild fisheries science and management has been replaced by a new sense of impotence and calls for dramatic restructuring of fisheries science and management. While developments are complex, one of the central themes in contemporary fisheries science and management has been the mobilization of a variety of meanings of 'culture' applied in different ways to both wild fish and those who once hunted them for their livelihood and subsistence.

Culture: domestication, development and way of life

The three dominant meanings of 'culture' outlined by Williams[5] provide an interesting framework to analyse the deployments of 'culture' in responses to fisheries science and management reinvention. The meanings of 'culture' include: the taming, domestication and husbandry of wild plants and animals; the development or civilizing of people presented as savage and barbarous by colonizers and administrators; and the anthropological description of distinct human ways of life.

Culture, in its original sense, referred to cultivation, a process whereby wild plants and animals are brought into a sphere of human influence where stewardship, husbandry and caretaking take place, and cultivator and cultivated each become adapted to conditions and terms dictated by human interests.[6] The various normative and symbolic associations with taming and bringing wildness into the domestic human sphere are complex, ranging from nurturing to exploitation.[7] This complex of meaning spills over into the connotation and operation of the other two meanings of culture discussed by Williams.[8]

Processes of culturing and domestication have framed relations that extend well beyond human dealings with wild plants and animals to include the development of hierarchically related groups of people in the context of the civilizing projects of imperial colonization, as well as transformative relations within societies.[9] Here 'culture' implies a general process of intellectual, moral, spiritual or aesthetic advancement from wild savagery through to civilized domestication and ultimately individual freedom and responsibility at the apex of a hierarchical chain of being.[10]

Romantic and resistance movements against the domestication of wild nature and the subjugation of human otherness and difference

grounded in hierarchical dualisms have also deployed 'culture'. In this third meaning, 'culture' stands for diverse and unique ways of living that are valued intrinsically without the need for improvement or eradication through taming, domestication, civilizing or development. Culture in this anthropological sense refers to unique ways of organizing, conducting and adding meaning to life associated with historic periods, places and groups of human beings and other forms of life often situated outside or beyond the dominant norm.[11]

These three meanings of culture provide a rich tapestry of relations between and among human beings and other forms of life. What we wish to do is to explore how some of these relations are playing themselves out with respect to the culturing of cod and fishing people in Newfoundland. We also wish to highlight, following Mitchell,[12] the agendas built into conceptualizations of culture and the way culture is being deployed to reorder fishing societies and relations between fish and people around the world.

Culturing cod: domesticating crisis into opportunity

The dramatic collapse of cod stocks and their failure to recover in the post-moratorium period led to increasing interest in the creation of an industrial cod-farming industry by seafood processors and government agencies who were attracted to the control and stability cod farming promised to deliver over aspects of the cod life cycle that were increasingly unstable and uncertain in the wild.[13] As monetary support from the Canadian welfare state – for cod fisheries workers, cod science and wild stock recovery efforts – declined in the post-moratorium period, funding for cod aquaculture research and development expanded in an attempt to domesticate cod throughout its entire life cycle, in what is referred to in the industry as 'egg-to-plate' farming. Within three years of the cod fishery collapsing, the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) had created an Aquaculture Development Strategy that defined 'culture' as both the domestication of wild aquatic species and the development of individual and corporate ownership of those species:

> Aquaculture is the culture of aquatic organisms, including fish, molluscs, crustaceans and aquatic plants. *Culture* implies some form of intervention in the rearing process to enhance production, such as regular stocking, feeding, protection from predators, etc.

> *Culture* also implies individual or corporate ownership of the stock being cultivated (emphasis added).[14]

The Aquaculture Development Strategy fused culture-as-domestication of the wild with culture-as-development in a context of market triumphalism where private property was coming to be understood as the most effective and efficient way of allocating and regulating ocean spaces and species. In so doing, aquaculture was tied to the enclosure of the coastal commons and connected to a narrative of economic and technological progress. This association of fish farming with individual and corporate ownership was also connected with a new form of culturing aimed at fishing people.

Culturing the fisherperson: developing savage hunters into professional harvesters

Just as wild codfish began to be cultured in post-moratorium Newfoundland, so did fishing people. Even though there were many other species of fish being hunted off Newfoundland and Labrador after the moratorium on cod, the fish hunter became constructed as an uncivilized 'welfare dope' unfit for the challenges posed by an increasingly competitive global seafood market and quality-obsessed industry.

In the wake of the cod collapse, the federal government provided cash support for fishing people. These welfare payments, however, came with strings attached. Fishery workers found themselves caught up in a number of managerial interventions aimed at fundamentally transforming their identity as hunters of fish. The culmination of these managerial interventions was a mandatory professional fish-harvester programme that hierarchically divided fishing people with the goal of transforming all who remained on the water into both efficient harvesters and ethical stewards of the sea. Fishery workers who could not or would not professionalize became *de facto* criminals, at risk of being arrested by fisheries officers or reported by their neighbours through poacher snitch lines based on the *Crime Stoppers* model.

Transforming the identity of fishing people involved direct coercive policing actions as well as subtle linguistic shifts. Fishermen and women deemed legitimate by fisheries management agencies were referred to as fish harvesters and they were assigned graded categories based on their level of formal fisheries training at Apprentice, Level I and Level II. Cod fishing for food was redesignated a recreational activity and was

framed as a privileged leisure activity as opposed to a right for local people guaranteed in the province's 1949 terms of union with Canada.

Linguistic reframing of the fisherperson was accompanied by academic and managerial claims in fisheries policy and management literature that fish hunters intrinsically lacked an ethic of stewardship towards the sea and its species. The professionalization programme adopted a code of ethics for responsible fishing and incorporated ethical training into its mandatory classes. The allocation of individual and corporate property rights to ocean spaces and species was promoted as the only viable form of ownership compatible with the development of stewardship ethics and professional fish harvester identity. In short, the ideal fisherperson became constructed in the image of terrestrial agribusiness.

The seductiveness of culturing cod and fishing people

The cultured cod and the professional fish harvester are seductive, holding normative and political appeal. Domestication is seductive because of the control it offers over the life cycle of animals, as Lockett plainly states:

> Cod aquaculture brings many things under control that were extremely uncertain when cod were hunted instead of farmed. Cod aquaculture's economic appeal is tied to the fact that it provides … a consistent supply of product, and steady, predictable year-round production … [by] getting animals to spawn when you want them to rather than when nature dictates.[15]

The cultured cod and fisherperson also provide managerial appeal for fisheries scientists and the state. The fisheries manager regains control over the unpredictable cod that proved to be unmanageable in the wild. The state gains a competent partner in the developed and civilized professional fish harvester – a partner, moreover, less likely to protest against fishery policy. Given the right set of incentives and retooled management 'culture', the professional fish harvester can assume risks and management responsibilities that were once the sole burden of federal government agencies, as explained in this quote from the DFO's *Atlantic Policy Review*:

> [By allowing professional fish harvesters to] make their own business decisions and be accountable for the consequences …

> [DFO hopes] to spawn a new and positive fisheries management *culture* and usher in a new era of public–private sector co-operation in Canada's fisheries (emphasis added).[16]

The domestication of cod can also draw on positive normative associations of caretaking, husbandry and stewardship that are not available in the wild capture fishery. These moral associations are evident in advertisements for aquaculture products. One, for example, displays a fish with a baby's soother in its mouth, and asks, 'Do your fish need a babysitter?' The text accompanying the ad goes on to explain that '*the YSI 5200 Recirculating System Monitor with Aquamanager software* delivers monitoring capabilities simple enough to monitor one tank and powerful enough to manage a full scale farming operation from anywhere in the world'.[17]

The ease with which aquaculture activities can be presented as caring and benign while masking their underlying hierarchical relations of manipulation and control over the genetic make-up, behaviours and metabolism of aquatic species illustrates the power and complexity of domestication and husbandry as material practices and symbolic metaphors. The irony is that the technology peddled by YSI and other water-quality monitoring companies is required because of the artificial and exploitative conditions under which the farmed fish are being cultivated. These conditions increase the stress on individual fish and provide opportunities for infection and die-off due to decreased oxygen content and disease outbreaks in their net pens and rearing tanks.

Obstacles to culturing cod and fishing people

While cod aquaculture is seductive to many, this is not the case for all. Wild cod resist domestication through their continued existence as a wild species and through their unique biological characteristics. The biological traits of wild cod make farming them extremely expensive. Unlike salmon, cod must be fed cultured plankton before they can be weaned onto commercial pellet feeds, and wild cod have a nasty habit of becoming cannibalistic and bullying their smaller neighbours, as described by Boyce, a cod culturalist:

> Cod are very cannibalistic at a young age, for this reason, periodic size grading is important to obtain good survival and yields, and

> to eliminate runts, which may encourage cannibalistic behaviour … Larvae are closely observed, once they reach 50–60 days of age, for noticeable size differences and for evaluating the percentage of larvae that are undergoing metamorphosis. They are also closely watched for evidence of cannibalism and bullying by larger-sized larvae.[18]

Fishing people have also resisted aims by managers to transform their identity and to divide them into professional fish harvesters, poachers and recreational fishers. Cod fishing for food is understood by most local Newfoundland residents as a right granted to all citizens under the terms of union with Canada. Fishing for cod is framed as a way of life that ought to be available to all rather than as an elite recreational activity for tourists or a commercial endeavour for a privileged few. Inshore fishing people contest scientific assessments of cod that claim they are endangered and argue there is plenty of cod available to feed Newfoundlanders, even if they agree there is not enough for a commercial cod fishery.

Several inshore fishing groups, finally, have called for alternative forms of cod aquaculture with the goals of wild stock restoration rather than profitable 'egg-to-plate' production.[19] There are a variety of ways in which the culturing of cod and fishing people can proceed. Each of these has substantively different material and normative practices associated with it, and varying amounts of taming, length of capture and incorporation into regimes of control with respect to the life cycle of cod and the identity and behaviour of fishing people.

Contradiction and struggle among domestication, development and ways of life

It is important to realize that full-cycle industrial cod aquaculture emerged in Newfoundland and Labrador as an economic opportunity only after wild cod became commercially extinct. Promoters of the Blue Revolution believe that technical solutions can resolve the problem of global overfishing and declining wild catches. The normative appeal of culture-as-domestication, however, which contrasts the fishing-as-barbaric tradition with farming-as-enlightened stewardship, obscures the many material connections that necessarily exist between wild fisheries and aquaculture. Most simply, farmed cod must be fed fish that have been caught in the wild.

Promoters of aquaculture, moreover, obscure the wider social effects of technological innovation. Advances in technology do more than simply introduce efficiencies within the firm. They are also revolutions in social relationships that remake landscapes, geographies and human-environment relations. For example, as Cronon argues, the introduction of the railroad to the American West freed the movement of goods and people from the limits of solar energy and animal physiology. This technical development became 'the chief device for introducing a new capitalist logic to the geography of the Great West',[20] accelerating the flow of goods, people and information, and refashioning the experience, and value, of time. The expansion of aquaculture, similarly, reflects a shift in the landscapes and social relations of coastal communities, framed around the capitalist logic of competition, profit and growth. Ultimately, however, our interest in cod aquacultures in Newfoundland and the insights that cultural studies can bring to the Blue Revolution, goes far beyond pointing out the biophysical contradictions of industrial fish farming. What we find most interesting are the multiple meanings of culture that emerge when one scratches the surface of fish domestication and the interconnections oceanic culturing projects have with the identity of fishing people and the material make-up of cod. Whether it is the physical domestication of the wild cannibalistic cod, the civilization of the barbaric fish hunter into the professional harvester, or resistance to both of these forms of culturing in the name of a way of life tied to hunting fish for food on a coastal commons, the diversity, complexity and interconnections of aquacultures in Newfoundland illustrate an ongoing process, stories in the making. What the outcome and moral of these stories will be remains open to interpretation and contestation, but the first step surely is to unpack the many meanings of 'culture' and the diverse practices of culturing that are currently operating in the world's oceans.

Notes

1 Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, revised edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
2 K. Anderson, 'A Walk on the Wild Side: A Critical Geography of Domestication,' *Progress in Human Geography* 21, 4 (1997): 463–85.
3 C. Barnett, 'Culture, Geography, and the Arts of Government', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 19 (2001): 7–24.
4 M. Kurlansky, *Cod: A Biography of a Fish that Changed the World* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997).
5 Williams, *Keywords*.
6 Williams, *Keywords*; Anderson, 'A Walk on the Wild Side'.
7 Williams, *Keywords*; Anderson, 'A Walk on the Wild Side'.

8 Williams, *Keywords*.
9 Anderson, 'A Walk on the Wild Side'; Williams, *Keywords*.
10 Anderson, 'A Walk on the Wild Side'; Williams, *Keywords*.
11 Anderson, 'A Walk on the Wild Side'; Williams, *Keywords*.
12 D. Mitchell, *Cultural Geography: A Critical Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).
13 J. Lockett, 'Aquaculture What's on the Menu?' *Atlantic Business Magazine* 12, 3 (2001): 52–62.
14 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, *Federal Aquaculture Development Strategy* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1995), 3.
15 Lockett, 'Aquaculture: What's on the Menu?' 56.
16 Department of Fisheries and Oceans, *The Management of Fisheries on Canada's Atlantic Coast: A Discussion Document on Policy Direction and Principles* (Ottawa: Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review, 2001), 26, 49.
17 YSI, *Water Quality Monitoring in Aquaculture— Do Your Fish Need a Babysitter from the Experts in Water Quality Monitoring?* (2013). https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/236x/7f/4e/73/7f4e73df1a8cbdaa3cecf4b039935bcd.jpg
18 D. Boyce, *Cod Aquaculture—'Egg to Plate Project 2001'*, Aquaculture Research Development Facility (Ocean Science Centre. Logy Bay, NL, 2002), 31.
19 D. Bavington, *Cod Aquaculture as a Restoration Tool for an Endangered Species*, Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans (St John's, NL, 2003).
20 W. Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 81.

London Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 31 (2016). UCL Press• Print ISSN 0267-2200 • Online ISSN 1475-1674 • DOI 10.14324/111.444.ljcs.2016v31.005

The Role of 'the Public' in the Management of Newfoundland's Forestry Heritage

Erin Kelly

Abstract

Forestry in Newfoundland has a long history of both subsistence and industrial uses, with separate associated tenure systems and property and use rights. Though most forest users on the island are subsistence or recreational users, the public plays only a minimal role in forest decision-making, which continues to revolve around industry-based harvesting decisions with little regard for the multiple forest uses valued by the public. With the rapid decline of the industrial pulp and paper sector, which has coincided with policy shifts from productivist to multifunctional forest uses, Newfoundlanders face difficult decisions regarding how to manage their forests, and for whom. This essay provides a brief history of forestry in Newfoundland, including recent changes to policies and practices on the island regarding public participation and ecosystem management. It frames some of the problems and solutions of forest governance as common-pool resource issues and suggests ways to better integrate existing forest users with forest management.

Introduction

The forests of Newfoundland long served as a backdrop for the primary industry of the island – the fisheries – providing subsistence fuelwood and sawlogs for rural outport villages, and a place for hunting and berry collection. But, from the early twentieth century, the industrial forest sector rose to prominence and, at its peak in the 1930s, the pulp and paper industry comprised 53 per cent of total goods exported from

Newfoundland.[1] The land tenure system of Newfoundland's forests has maintained remnants of both of these historical phases, with long-term industry-leased lands providing material for the remaining pulp and paper mill on the island, and a strong subsistence culture shaping a common-pool resource system to most of the island. Subsistence activities, which 'provide for material and cultural survival outside capitalist market relations',[2] play a vital role in the economic and cultural fabric of Newfoundland. But the industrial forest sector has declined as a result of global market forces, with two of three pulp and paper mills closing since 2005 and the remaining pulp and paper mill operating at reduced capacity, calling into question forest management and government subsidy programmes focused on maintaining industrial viability.[3]

Forestry in Newfoundland has mirrored some of the broader trends of Canadian forest policy. Howlett described Canadian forest policy as a shifting set of regimes, from unregulated exploitation to regulation with the rise of the pulp and paper industry and large-scale harvesting operations, to the scientific timber management regime, focused on optimizing yields and utilizing technically informed planning processes for efficient allocation of wood-fibre resources.[4] Newfoundland has largely remained in the realm of top-down, state-controlled scientific timber management, though the language of some policies has shifted to more wide-ranging goals such as biodiversity protection, sustainable resource use and more inclusive public input processes, called 'ecosystem-based management' or sustainable forestry.[5]

This brief overview, however, ignores the nuanced tenure system in Newfoundland that includes not only industrial forestry and government management, but the less regulated and more widespread system of subsistence use that has persisted alongside the growth of industrial management.

In this essay I consider the ways in which 'the public', or citizens of Newfoundland outside of the state and its agencies, influence forest management. I argue that forestry decision-making authority has remained in the expert-driven paradigm of scientific timber management and that decision-makers within Newfoundland's government have tended to support the pulp and paper industry to the exclusion of other considerations. Thus, public input processes have been procedural rather than substantive, though the public – and especially environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) – have used obstructionism to stop projects as they have little meaningful

upfront input into forest planning and management. I explore questions of access to Newfoundland's forests, in particular, who makes forest management decisions and for whom, and end with ideas about better incorporating the forest users of Newfoundland – the people who cut wood, hunt, fish, collect berries and recreate in the forest – with forest management.

Methods

I utilised interview data with forestry stakeholders, participant observation and a number of recent governmental documents, academic analyses and ENGO reports to frame changes. Analysis was primarily based on interviews (n=42) conducted with employees of several government departments, ENGOs, forest users and community leaders. Informal meetings were also conducted, often with academics and employees of government departments, to discuss the project, develop questions and clarify concepts, and I participated extensively in forestry discussions, meetings and conferences across the province.

The role of 'the public' in forest management

For many years, exclusive government-industry coalitions controlled forestry in Canada, though this situation changed in many regions in the late twentieth century with increasing public input into forest management decisions.[6] This change was largely in response to the growing ability of groups such as ENGOs to demand more voice in land use and natural resource decision-making through protests and market campaigns.[7]

The forms of public participation have varied according to government objectives for participation, such as mollifying an angry public, or creating empowered citizen groups and instituting collaborative forms of governance.[8] Governments devolve control over decision-making processes to public constituencies with trepidation, and 'people from the wider community often come to the participatory process expecting to gain greater control over the process while at the same time government agencies rarely want to relinquish control'.[9] A traditional scientific timber management view is that expertise is largely confined to the state and its experts, and this technocratic view of participation means that the public has little ownership over planning

processes or problem-solving.[10] Public participation can therefore be authentic, involving citizens upfront as collaborators in a dynamic and visible process, or (more commonly) unauthentic, involving citizens only after important decisions have been made.[11]

Table 1 Authentic and unauthentic participation[12]

	Authentic Participation	**Unauthentic Participation**
Interaction style	Collaborative	Conflictual
Participation is sought	Early, before anything is set	After the agenda is set and decisions are made
Role of administrator	Collaborative technician/ governor	Expert technician/ manager
Role of citizen	Equal partner	Unequal participant
Administrative process	Dynamic, visible, open	Static, invisible, closed
Citizen options	Proactive or reactive	Reactive
Citizen output	Design	Buy-in
Administrator output	Process	Decision
Decision is made	As a result of discourse, with equal opportunity for all to influence outcomes	By administrator, perhaps in consultation with citizens

These changing roles of the public in forestry have accompanied changes to rural land uses. Rural regions have long been identified with natural resource commodity production, or productivist land uses, though this has shifted in many places towards conservation and amenity-based rural consumption.[13] Forest practices emphasizing timber growth and harvesting, with well-regulated, homogenized landscapes, are emblematic of productivist forestry.[14] While productivism has not ended, and extractive industries continue their important roles in many rural places, the *dominance* of the framework of productivism is being replaced through the creation of government policies, global market dynamics and changing norms regarding land use. The transition from productivism towards multifunctional landscapes, characterized by a blend of conservation, consumption and productive uses, may change the relationships between rural development and rural land use.[15]

Common-pool resources

Forest resources are considered common-pool resources (CPRs), which have two characteristics: it is costly to exclude physically potential users from benefiting from such resources; and use of such resources by one person subtracts from the ability of others to use the resources.[16] CPRs are situated within different property regimes. Open-access regimes, functioning without oversight or rules, can lead to over-exploitation, famously described by Hardin as the 'tragedy of the commons'.[17] Hardin suggested two solutions to this tragedy: privatization of the commons, or top-down regulation by government.

But alternative views of CPRs have emerged with distinctions between unfettered open access and common property arrangements. The latter were observed in field studies, especially in developing countries, in which local actors maintained sustainable natural resource practices through locally created norms, agreements, contracts and other incentives that addressed the exclusion and subtractability problems of CPRs through collective action.[18]

As described below, both the industrial and subsistence uses of Newfoundland's forests suggest CPR problems, with limited (and subtractable) timber resources and widespread physical management of the forests. Newfoundland has largely relied on top-down regulation to deal with common-pool forest resources, though access to forests has been much more complex than government mandates and citizen compliance, and in common with the framework of Ribot and Peluso has included both. The framework of access described by Ribot and Peluso includes both formal, state-mediated opportunities for benefiting from forests, as well as the many informal and illegal activities in which people engage to derive benefits from forests.[19]

Newfoundland's forests are almost entirely owned by the provincial government and held as Crown lands. This ownership, however, tells us little about how forests are managed, by whom and for whose benefit. Schlager and Ostrom categorized the ability to benefit from land in terms of rights, from operational-level rights – access (right to enter) and withdrawal (right to obtain products, such as timber) – to collective-choice property rights – management (right to regulate use patterns), exclusion (right to determine who has access) and alienation (right to sell).[20]

The general public of Newfoundland, with its culturally and economically vibrant subsistence practices, has exercised access and

withdrawal rights for many years. Property rights such as management and exclusion, however, are largely vested in either the government or the pulp-and-paper industry, as described below. This essay raises the question of whether the forests of Newfoundland could benefit from a formalized commons system of governance, in which existing forest users – especially subsistence and recreational users – could influence or even control forest planning processes.

A brief history of forestry in Newfoundland

Human beings in Newfoundland have depended on forests for millennia. Prior to European settlement, multiple Palaeoeskimo and Indian groups supplemented marine-based diets with forest animals such as caribou, fisher (a small mammal) and fox, and engaged in wood-working.[21] This essay begins with Euro-Canadian settlement, and two parallel tenure systems that developed on the island: the commons, called the '3-mile commons' or 'fishermen's reserve', and the industrial pulp and paper tenure. The 3-mile commons developed over time near the rural outport communities that dotted the coast, extending 3 miles from the coast into the forest interior. The commons was utilized by fishers and their families for both fuelwood and sawlogs and was formalized around 1898 to delineate industrial activity, centred on the interior forests of the island, from the subsistence domestic and small-scale sawmilling uses of the population along the coast.[22]

The forest industry of Newfoundland, initially centred on commercial sawmilling, developed in the 1870s and grew rapidly with the completion of the railroad from St John's to Port aux Basques in 1890; there were approximately 195 sawmills utilizing the large white pine on the island by 1900.[23] The large-scale sawmilling phase of forest industry lasted only until about 1911, largely as a result of overharvesting of white pine,[24] and sawmill production after this time was undertaken in the numerous small mills that processed black spruce and balsam fir for domestic consumption, but which were not valuable as export.

At this time, industrial forestry shifted towards pulp and paper industry dominance, a shift facilitated by government subsidies in the form of long-term tenure agreements and inexpensive wood supply, guaranteed loans and grants, road building and free hydropower.[25] Pulp and paper leases were created to attract foreign pulp and paper investment, granting 99-year leases at C$20 per square mile plus small

periodic fees, with no royalty charges on the trees.[26] Pulp and paper manufacturers were therefore immediately favoured over sawmill operators, who had to pay rent, land bonuses and royalties. Subsequent legislation maintained this favourable payment scheme for pulp and paper.[27] Favouritism towards the pulp and paper industry was in keeping with longstanding Newfoundland policies that emphasized export-based industrial development, often financed through foreign loans and under foreign management.[28]

From the early twentieth century until 2009 almost all of the industry-leased lands were consolidated and controlled by two pulp and paper companies: the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company in Grand Falls, established in 1909, and the Newfoundland Power and Paper Company in Corner Brook, established in 1925. In 1962, the Grand Falls mill had 7,577 square miles in total under its domain and the Corner Brook mill had 14,618 square miles.[29]

Though technically Crown property, the pulp and paper companies created management, harvest and road plans, and granted cabin permits, effectively 'regulating internal use patterns' of the landscape, in the words of Schlager and Ostrom,[30] and determining the end uses and beneficiaries of forest utilization. While the companies were bound by provincially established forest practice guidelines and reporting regulations, long-term leases in Newfoundland were essentially equivalent to private landholdings because of their duration and autonomy regarding forest practices.[31] Lands that were not leased by the pulp and paper industry, including the 3-mile commons, were referred to as 'unalienated Crown Lands'.

Pulp and paper exploitation grew alongside and finally encroached upon the 3-mile commons along the coast.[32] Projects around the communities of White Bay South and Roddickton intruded upon the 3-mile limit, blurring distinctions between the commons and the industrializing interior forests, and 'weaken[ing] the integrity of the three-mile limit'.[33] Cadigan described long-standing tension between the domestic users who protected the integrity of the 3-mile commons and industrial forces, often supported by government, who sought to weaken it.[34]

On the other hand, subsistence and domestic forest uses also spread to interior leased lands. The public had been primarily confined to the 3-mile commons because of their proximity to coastal fishing towns ringing the edges of the island. With the establishment of an extensive road network, and broader access to technology such as vehicles, ATVs and snowmobiles, Newfoundlanders gained physical access to the interior of the island and brought with them expectations

of rights to withdraw resources such as timber, build cabins, hunt and recreate. Though the 3-mile commons tenure ended in the 1970s, its cultural influence persisted – partly through a sense of entitlement among Newfoundlanders to access and withdraw resources from forests. Recreational and subsistence activities therefore extended across both unalienated Crown and leased industrial lands.

The pulp and paper industry went through multiple ownership changes, but eventually two companies owned three mills on the island: the Grand Falls mill, owned by AbitibiBowater, which closed in 2009; the Stephenville mill, with the same ownership, which was established as a pulp and paper mill in 1981 and closed in 2005; and the Corner Brook mill, called Corner Brook Pulp and Paper (CBPP) and owned by Kruger, Incorporated. CBPP closed two of its four paper machines in 2008, but is still operating as of 2016.

Despite mill closures, the province continued to subsidize industrial pulp and paper operations, with subsidies totalling over C$26 million from 2008–10 for the continued functioning of CBPP.[35] These subsidies were either for management (C$13.3 million) or to reacquire the rights to 447,700 hectares of leased land (C$12 million), indicating that when faced with dramatic changes in the forest industry, the province continued to support an increasingly tenuous industry rather than modify its approach to forestry. In the words of one Department of Environment and Conservation employee, 'everything is being done to keep [Kruger] around, which makes it hard to plan'.[36] In 2013, the province granted CBPP a C$90 million loan.

Because of mill closures and subsequent land relinquishments, the island of Newfoundland in 2011 (with 11.1 million hectares) had less than 14 per cent of its land base under pulp and paper industry leases, with the bulk of the remainder unalienated Crown lands. Approximately 7.7% of the land base, or 860,000 hectares, was legislatively protected, either as provincial protected areas (636,000 hectares) or as federal protected areas (224,000 hectares).

Newfoundland had a total of 11.1 million hectares, half forested and half non-forested, and CBPP had 1.5 million hectares of leased lands, with lease rights extending to 2037.

Work in the woods

As the pulp and paper industry grew in terms of volume produced through most of the twentieth century, employment dropped with



Figure 1 Map of the island of Newfoundland, with tenure system (leased, Crown and other ownerships) indicated.

mechanization in both sawmills and in logging operations. For example, in 1954, 154 m3 of wood was required for one pulp and paper industry job, while in 1989, 651 m3 of wood was required for every pulp and paper job.[37] The number of loggers in the province declined from 10,333 in 1951 to 3,085 in 1971, largely because of the technological transition to capital-intensive mechanical harvesters.[38] Employment for both mill workers and woods workers continued to decline throughout the early twenty-first century with mill closures, and from 2004 to 2007 the province had a 35 per cent decline in forestry employment, the highest of any province in Atlantic Canada.[39] In 2007, CBPP shut down one of its paper machines and in 2009, Abitibi closed its Grand Falls mill, with a loss of 410 mill jobs and 345 logging jobs.[40] By 2009, forestry and logging represented just 0.2 per cent of the employment in the province.[41] Some areas of the province, such as the remote Northern Peninsula, saw the pulp and paper industry essentially vacate their regions, leaving a few remnant sawmills and logging contractors.

Despite this industrial downturn, Newfoundlanders continued to work in and utilize the woods, largely through subsistence and recreational uses. As Omohundro explained, subsistence activities such as hunting and domestic fuelwood and sawlog harvesting were maintained on the island 'as a recreation, a regional mark of distinction, a bank of useful skills, an expression of self-esteem, a way to stretch

limited cash and an insurance against sudden drops in a household's income'.[42] The net effect of these activities provided substantial supplemental economic and social benefits for many residents, especially in rural areas.[43] In the Northern Peninsula, the remote northwestern finger of the island, as many as 80 per cent of households used firewood as their primary heat source,[44] and domestic firewood and sawlog harvests constituted more than one-third of the total harvest.[45] The state maintained some nominal control over the domestic wood harvest through a permit system, and in all there were more than 2,800 domestic harvesting permit holders on the peninsula in 2011, although non-permitted domestic cutting was common. In addition, hunting, snaring, berry collection and other subsistence and recreational forest activities were vital components of many Newfoundlanders' livelihoods. More than 27,500 moose permits were distributed to Newfoundlanders by the Department of Environment and Conservation in 2016–2017 and an additional 4,000 will be distributed to non-residents, supporting a growing outfitting and tourism industry.[46]

Table 2 Timber harvest information for the Northern Peninsula of Newfoundland[47]

	The Northern Peninsula
Total land	1.12 million ha
Productive forest	362,192 ha
Total harvest scheduled (2008–12)	995,367 m^3
Total domestic harvest scheduled (2008–12)	342,427 m^3
Domestic as proportion of total harvest	**34%**

Tensions arose frequently between domestic timber harvesters and the Department of Natural Resources, Forestry Department of Newfoundland (Forestry Department), the regulatory agency charged with overseeing and managing forest resources. The Newfoundland government and its Forestry Department had criticized domestic fuelwood and sawlog harvests for decades as wasteful or inefficient and at odds with commercial forestry.[48] One community forest model was attempted in the GNP from 1984–6, which addressed the perceived problem of 'uncontrolled indiscriminate domestic cutting'.[49] The community forest model was initially recommended by the 1981 Royal Commission on Forestry, which promoted 'delineate[d] areas of non-alienated Crown Lands as community forests for provision of domestic wood supplies … to assess the potential for greater community participation in managing

local forest resources'.[50] The pilot community forest was created on 500 hectares near the community of Parsons Pond, just north of Gros Morne National Park. Residents were consulted, but they were not granted control over management or decision-making on the forest. Rather, the 'community forest' consisted of paying domestic harvesters to cut according to the specifications of the Department of Natural Resources Forestry (DNR-Forestry) in an attempt to restore degraded forests. The experiment ended when funding dried up.

Forest policy in Newfoundland: a pulp and paper-dominated planning system

The central policies and planning documents in Newfoundland were established by the Forestry Act of 1990, which outlined the process of forest planning that was to be conducted by the Forestry Department. Planning processes were temporally and spatially nested, with 20-year forest strategies providing the broadest level of vision and guidance, five-year operating plans providing more specific forest management directives, and annual operating plans providing spatially and temporally explicit harvesting plans.

Five-year operating plans, created by the Forestry Department on unalienated lands and CBPP on industry-leased lands, were the focus of forest decision-making. These plans were based on various inputs, particularly the technical knowledge gleaned from wood supply analyses and the calculation of the Annual Allowable Cut (AAC), in addition to market signals and public input. Each forest plan was then submitted to the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) Environmental Assessment process, which stipulated that the Minister of Environment and Conservation could accept the plan, require more environmental review or reject the plan. Members of the public could comment on submissions and their comments could impact the Minister's decision, though the vast majority of plans were approved without further environmental review.

Forest policy objectives stemmed from an Environmental Preview Report (EPR) prepared in 1995, which greatly influenced the policy direction of forest management in the province. The EPR highlighted inclusive public participation and 'adaptive forest ecosystem management' involving all stakeholders 'with an interest in the local forest land'.[51] The EPR arose as a result of multiple nationwide commitments in Canada to sustainable forestry such as the National

Forest Strategy and the Canadian Biodiversity Strategy, which affirmed Canada's participation in international conservation agreements.

Who manages the forest, and for whom?

Forest planning documents created in Newfoundland reveal the primacy of the calculated AAC, and the very narrow and limited contribution from the general public regarding forest resource management. This section explains the calculation of the AAC, and the following section elaborates upon public input processes. The process of creating the AAC began with input from forest inventories and wood analyses, which helped determine a computer model-generated aspatial 'optimum' harvest allocation. This harvest level was then restricted through multiple rounds of limitations, and with every limitation on the model, the AAC dropped because the model had less flexibility for allocating harvesting. These limits included spatial and temporal constraints, operational constraints (steep slopes, isolated stands) and environmental requirements. Environmental (or non-timber) requirements proved to be the most vexing for some in the Forestry Department, as some members of the department felt they had lost control over the land base: 'We're losing our land, the land base is eroding because of preserves and habitat areas.'[52]

The forest planning strategy thus optimized harvests then deducted other values, without a mechanism for prioritizing various forest uses. According to one interviewee from the Department of Tourism, Culture and Recreation, 'there is no criteria-based process to balance competing uses … it's a forest cutting plan that decides how much, where and when forests will be harvested'.[53] The process of AAC determination created a chasm between Forestry Department employees and industry on the one hand, and ENGOs and other government departments on the other, in terms of whether the models adequately captured non-timber values. This led to conflict over the value of different lands and, as an employee from the Department of Environment and Conservation said, 'every time we say you can't harvest there, their AAC goes down … whether it's parks, wildlife, tourism, whether it's outfitters, it takes away from what they have because they allocated everything'.[54]

Most harvest planning was conducted prior to any public input, largely in the interests of optimizing wood fibre, despite declining demand. Though the AAC remained fairly steady over every five-year period from at least 1991, the actual harvest was much lower than the

AAC due to mill closures.[55] The discrepancy between the AAC and the actual harvest did not explicitly address non-timber concerns, though it may have unintentionally benefited them.

Subsistence cutting was also overseen by the Forestry Department, though it was mostly on a case-by-case basis. Fuelwood and sawlog harvests required a C$21 permit, and total harvest volume per permit could not exceed 23 m^3. As already noted, non-permitted harvesting was common. Legal wood removal was generally limited to non-commercial species (hardwoods, larch) in cutover stands, or on designated domestic harvest units. According to multiple interviewees, however, many of the trees left after industrial harvests for wildlife use were later cut for domestic wood use.

Other recreational and subsistence forest uses were regulated by different departments. The pattern of regulation was generally lax and correlated with the perception that Newfoundlanders should be able not only to access but also to withdraw resources from (and even build on) forest lands. For example, cabin lots could be purchased from the Crown Lands division, though if a cabin was built on any forest access road without permission, the cabin owner paid C$500 in fees. All cabin owners, whether their cabins were legally or illegally built, paid C$100 annual land rent.

How the public influences forest management in Newfoundland

In its own words, the Forestry Department worked 'to manage, conserve, enhance and use the forest ecosystems … with the appropriate balance of values *desired by society*' (emphasis added),[56] and the 2003 Sustainable Forest Management Strategy identified a need to 'establish a proactive planning framework to include stakeholders'.[57] However, determining social values through the public input process proved frustrating for both forest managers and planners and public participants. The preferred channels of participation were through public meetings held for the development of five-year forest plans, though many ENGOs and others participated through comments to the DEC during the Environmental Assessment process in an attempt to influence the Minister's decision to accept or deny plan approval. In general, plans were already substantively finished when the public was brought in for consultation; public expectations exceeded the authority of the Forestry Department; and non-timber concerns were treated

as constraints, rather than integrated into plans, and therefore public input was limited to obstructionism.

Rather than being brought in at the beginning of a plan, participants at five-year planning meetings were faced with maps based on the calculated AAC that already showed suggested harvesting areas. The bulk of planning had already occurred, and public participants were able to make only small changes to plans. One Forestry Department manager said, 'There will be a public meeting, we'll have maps, showing where our proposed harvesting areas are for the next five-year period. So they will be put up for people to look at, evaluate. And if there are issues, we'll try to mitigate.'[58] Every concession granted would then subtract from the AAC and was therefore resisted by the Forestry Department. Rather than public consultation or a two-way flow of information, the five-year planning meetings thus became one-way flows of information about the decided-upon course of action.

In effect, public input was dealt with on a case-by-case basis, with no clear mechanism for ranking or evaluating public values. But Forestry Department five-year operating plans offered one of the few opportunities for many Newfoundlanders to have a voice in land use planning. Because the department was decentralized, with offices in many rural communities across the province, it was a direct connection to provincial government for many rural people. Many who participated in forest planning meetings expected much more than the department could deliver:

> We have public meetings, we go out there and say here, come, participate … a lot of people will say it's flawed. They'll say they don't get their own way, but we have a responsibility to manage forests, so to say we're going to set everything aside for other values, no, it's not going to happen.[59]

While the focus of the Forestry Department continued to be allocating commercial AAC, individual citizen concerns often centred on domestic wood cutting, access to cabins and cutting near cabins, viewshed issues, and hunting, fishing and trapping. Some of these values were incorporated – buffers could be left for viewsheds, there were some provisions for domestic cutting, and individual cabins could be avoided in harvest plans as part of mitigation. But there was no over-arching system for prioritizing the values of the general public, which were found by Bath in two separate surveys to be decidedly non-timber and non-commercial.[60] In the two surveys, researchers randomly selected

residents of western and central Newfoundland to monitor attitudes and knowledge regarding forestry in the province. Residents listed their top five forestry priorities as wildlife, scenic beauty, protection of watersheds, wilderness preservation and plants, ranking them much higher than industrial uses.[61]

The bulk of the public, from those employed by the forest industry to recreationists and subsistence users, did not participate in public meetings. This meant that though public meetings occurred, general public input was lacking, as was the ability of forest planners to gauge public values. Public apathy and low attendance at meetings may have indicated satisfaction with status quo planning, but the Bath surveys revealed that a majority of residents thought that forest management was harmful in terms of habitat and other non-timber values.[62] In addition, while many members of ENGOs indicated that they went to public meetings for a time, most 'burned out' at some point and stopped attending, leaving very few participants. As members of ENGOs and outfitters stopped taking part, or refused to attend meetings, their views could be more easily dismissed: '[ENGOs] were like little dogs at the heel, kind of yapping from the outside … and forestry and government would say well, we have the process and you're not involved, too bad, you had the chance.'[63]

A particularly illustrative example occurred in 2011, with the closure of the Grand Falls AbitibiBowater mill. Though the provincial government had promised extensive public consultation regarding future management on the relinquished lands, the Forestry Department relied on standard five-year operating plan public meetings as a substitute for more thorough discussions. A review of meeting minutes and discussions with participants revealed (in the words of King *et al.*), an unauthentic public participation process.[64] In total, there were 14 meetings throughout 2010, with an average of 30 people at each meeting, about 40 per cent of whom (~13) were from government. Other participants included private citizens and woodcutters (~7 people per meeting on average), members of the sawmill, logging and value-added wood sector (~5) and outfitters and tourism operators (~3). No members of ENGOs participated.

The first two meetings established ground rules; meetings 3–11 largely consisted of presentations from government agencies, plus forest industry and outfitters; and meetings 12 and 13 involved discussions of concerns. Meeting number 14, which occurred six months after meeting 13, was a summary discussion of the proposed plan. Presentations largely involved one-way flows of information and, according to the

minutes, it was not until the end of the process (meetings 12 and 13) that the plan as a whole was discussed and systemic problems were brought to the table, including a perceived lack of representation from non-timber values. At meeting 11, the meeting chair explicitly stated that meetings 12 and 13 would be dedicated to 'discussing the five-year plan, identifying potential concerns and determining appropriate resolutions'.[65] Participants were largely directed to submit comments online, and time ran out for further discussion of issues at several meetings.

A number of concerns were mentioned throughout the meetings that were identified for mitigation or further review: domestic wood cutting, road decommissioning, aesthetics and viewsheds, wildlife habitat, agriculture, water supply areas, municipal boundaries and impacts on outfitters, cabins and protected areas. This suite of concerns indicated that many non-timber issues were raised, but they were not integrated into the plan prior to creation of the harvest maps; rather, they were brought up for 'mitigative actions'. In effect, people were welcomed to comment on the plans, but the bulk of the actual forest management was already determined.

The new five-year operating plan was released with a full, optimized AAC allocated. While a portion of this was for the use of nearby sawmills, much of the allocation was intended for a prospective new small-diameter fibre operation advertised by the government through an Expression of Interest in 2009, as the government moved ahead to effectively reinstate *status quo* industrial operations despite industry downturn. While little interest was generated regarding the aged mill, there was no coherent attempt from government to re-evaluate priorities on the relinquished lands. Rather, the full AAC was allocated to a non-existent demand.

Conclusion: moving forward

Rather than anticipating a new role for forests, the provincial government has mostly continued to support industrial forestry through subsidies and planning processes despite industry contraction in the early twenty-first century. The decreasing relevance of the industry to rural people has meant that forest uses – primarily subsistence or recreational – and forest management are not well integrated. The government has maintained a system allowing the public access and withdrawal rights, but little input into the collective-choice property

rights described in Schlager and Ostrom, such as management or rights of exclusion.[66]

The difficulties encountered in Newfoundland in conducting meaningful and inclusive public participation are not unique. Many of the barriers identified in the discussion were similar to those in LaChapelle *et al*., especially a lack of agreement on planning goals, inflexibility in processes and concern with procedural obligations over meaningful dialogue, and inability for members of the public to impact decisions.[67] Models and standards of effective public participation exist, and more closely meet the description of 'authentic' participation in King *et al*., with citizens as designers of natural resource decisions, participating in transparent and proactive planning processes.[68] The province itself has had a few authentic public participation efforts, and has suggested (but failed to implement) several more.

For example, the province effectively integrated multiple stakeholders during the creation of a five-year plan in Labrador, the mainland component of the province. During the creation of the operating plan, public values (especially from the Innu Nation) were identified prior to planning, and the results of scientific modelling and assessment were analysed and discussed by stakeholder groups through an iterative process.[69] This model was described by several interviewees as infeasible on the island of Newfoundland because of the absence of the Innu Nation, which exercised its rights to force the government into a transparent and inclusive process.

Within the province, failure to implement suggested public input ideas has been more common. In 1995, the provincial government suggested a comprehensive public input plan, with: identification of forest objectives and issues by the public (solicited prior to planning); two- or three-day workshops at the start of every five-year planning process; creation of alternate forest forecasts with varying management objectives; draft plan review through a one-day workshop; continuous evaluation and co-monitoring with various groups; and evaluation of forest conditions and comparison between forest conditions and forest management objectives.[70] In 2003, the province also suggested annual meetings 'comprised of provincial stakeholders [to] provide advice to the Minister on forestry matters that are provincial in scope',[71] as part of the five-year planning process. None of these ideas have been adopted.

Though the public input processes in Newfoundland may be unauthentic, citizens of the island have a long-standing relationship with its forests steeped in traditional subsistence uses. Emery and Pierce claimed that subsistence users may regard themselves as

legitimate stewards of resources regardless of formal management authority.[72] But their forest activities are often overlooked, or viewed by governments as barriers to rationalized, scientific timber management and economic development, reinforcing a commonly held view that economic processes in the First World are entirely devoted to industrialized production and global trade.[73] Newfoundlanders, with strong ties to their forests and extensive experience as forest utilizers and informal managers, are already in the woods and deriving benefits, though their actions are largely uncoordinated, potentially creating common-pool resource problems such as overharvesting of domestic wood in some locations. Bringing forest users formally into the planning fold is a strategy for managing common-pool forest resources. Contrary to the over-exploitation and resource degradation found in open access regimes, researchers have found that inclusive, collective-action natural resource management can result in efficient, sustainable and equitable resource allocation.[74]

Ostrom linked successful commons governance with agreed-upon norms and rules, effective enforcement of those rules and nested systems of governance,[75] but the criteria of effective common-pool resource governance vary widely, with divergent user group characteristics, institutional arrangements and influences from external economic, political and social forces.[76] Residents of Newfoundland would need to create their own system of natural resource governance to fit their particular circumstances.

Newfoundlanders have begun experimenting with governance systems for collective action, such as through the proposed creation of a community forest on the Northern Peninsula. Community forestry, or community-based natural resource management, is based on the idea that local citizens should control natural resource management, as well as the flows of benefits derived from the management. On the Northern Peninsula, a proposal was created by a consortium of rural development agencies in cooperation with the local Forestry Department office and area politicians, and submitted to the Minister of the Department of Natural Resources, the parent agency of the Forestry Department, in December 2011. The community forest would create a new tenure essentially within the traditional 3-mile commons to allow local control over forest management. Most participants indicated interest in developing small-scale, entrepreneurial economic opportunities such as monetization of non-timber management products and promotion of tourism, as well as more effective regulation of domestic wood harvests.

Community forest governance and development would likely favour small businesses, and therefore not create the 'boom' that typically accompanies megaproject development long favoured by the Newfoundland government. But there would also be no 'bust' in the wake of failed projects. Remote regions such as the Northern Peninsula, in which pulp and paper industry exited after prolonged periods of disinvestment, could implement a diversified and nimble approach to community development in the absence of industry interest. This is one vision of an 'alternative' rural economy, merging the subsistence uses described by Emery and Pierce[77] with the community forest movement.[78]

In Newfoundland, a tentative shift from industry-dominated planning and policymaking towards consumption (amenity-based) and protection (conservation-based) land uses mirrors the rural restructuring of Britain[79] and Australia.[80] This has occurred in Newfoundland as a result of industrial disinvestment and changing norms regarding land use, indicating a decline in the dominance of the productivist regime. But in Newfoundland, as opposed to many other First-World places, this shift is intertwined with an ongoing subsistence culture with economic and cultural importance, a type of culturally vital productivism that has persisted since Euro-Canadian settlement and which can inform facets of forest management going forward. Newfoundlanders also have increasingly blended subsistence with consumption practices, with recreation and subsistence activities essentially parallel, such as the building of cabins for both recreation and subsistence purposes.

This essay presented a brief history of forestry in Newfoundland, and ongoing forest uses on the island. But it has sidestepped several important economic trends with important future implications for forest tenure and management – particularly mining and oil and gas exploration. Further research is needed to uncover the policy implications of these burgeoning non-timber commercial forest uses. It is certain that the forests of Newfoundland will continue to be utilized by Newfoundlanders, whether through subsistence and recreational activities, or through further commercial development. How the government integrates citizens with forest management as the pulp and paper industry declines remains to be seen. Questions centre particularly on how the people of Newfoundland, who already use their forests and know them, can help craft forest policy and management, and how their skills, knowledge and needs can contribute to the future of forestry on the island.

Notes

1 J.A. Munro, 'Public Timber Allocation Policy in Newfoundland' (PhD thesis, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 1978).
2 M.R. Emery and A.R. Pierce, 'Interrupting the Telos: Locating Subsistence in Contemporary US Forests,' *Environment and Planning A*, 37 (2005): 989.
3 Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC) 'Building Competitiveness in Atlantic Canada's Forest Industries: A Strategy for Future Prosperity'(2008). https://www.apec-econ.ca/publications/view/?publication.id=126; P. Milley, *Newfoundland Forest Sector Strategy, Final Report*, submitted to Forestry Services Branch, Dept. of Natural Resources, Government of NL (Corner Brook, NL, 2008); C.M. Wernerheim and B. Long, 'Commercial Forestry at a Cross-roads: Emerging Trends in the Forest Sector of Newfoundland and Labrador' (St John's, NL: Harris Centre of Memorial University, 2011). https://www.mun.ca/harriscentre/reports/arf/2010/ARFWernerheimForest2010.pdf
4 M. Howlett, *Canadian Forest Policy: Adapting to Change* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
5 M. Nazir and L. Moores, 'Forest Policy in Newfoundland and Labrador,' *The Forestry Chronicle* 77, 1 (2001): 61–3.
6 M. Howlett, 'Beyond Legalism? Policy Ideas, Implementation Styles and Emulation-Based Convergence in Canadian and U.S. Environmental Policy,' *Journal of Public Policy* 20, 3 (2000): 305–29.
7 D. Rossiter, 'The Nature of Protest: Constructing the Spaces of British Columbia's Rainforests,' *Cultural Geographies* 11 (2004): 139–64; P.R. Sinclair and H. Janes-Hodder, 'Contested Forest: Management of the Main River Watershed in Western Newfoundland, Canada,' in *Rural Governance: International perspectives*, eds L. Cheshire, V. Higgins and G. Lawrence (Oxon: Routledge, 2006).
8 C.S. King, K.M. Felty and S.B. O'Neill, 'The Question of Participation: Toward Authentic Public Participation in Public Administration,' *Public Administration Review* 58, 4 (1998): 317–26; G. Rowe and L.J. Frewer, 'Evaluating Public-Participation Exercises: A Research Agenda,' *Science, Technology, and Human Values* 29, 4 (2004): 512–57.
9 M. Buchy and S. Hoverman, 'Understanding Public Participation in Forest Planning: A Review,' *Forest Policy and Economics* 1 (2000): 19.
10 P.R. Lachapelle and S.F. McCool, 'Exploring the Concept of "Ownership" in Natural Resource Planning,' *Society and Natural Resources* 18 (2005): 279–85.
11 King *et al*., 'The Question of Participation,' summarized in Table 1.
12 Adapted from King *et al*., 'The Question of Participation'.
13 G.A. Wilson, *Multifunctional Agriculture: A Transition Theory Perspective* (Oxfordshire, UK: CABI, 2007); J. Holmes, 'Divergent Regional Trajectories in Australia's Tropical Savannas: Indicators of a Multifunctional Rural Transition,' *Geographical Research* 48, 4 (2010): 342–58.
14 S. Prudham, *Knock on Wood: Nature as Commodity in Douglas-Fir Country* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
15 T. Marsden and R. Sonnino, 'Rural Development and the Regional State: Denying Multifunctional Agriculture in the UK,' *Journal of Rural Studies* 24 (2008): 422–31.
16 E. Ostrom, 'The Rudiments of Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common-Property Institutions,' in *Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice, and Policy*, ed. D. W. Bromley (San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1992).
17 G. Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons,' *Science,* 162 (1968): 1243–8.
18 R. Wade, 'The Management of Common Property Resources: Collective Action as an Alternative to Privatisation or State Regulation,' *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 11 (1987): 95–106; E. Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
19 J.C. Ribot and N. L. Peluso, 'A Theory of Access,' *Rural Sociology* 68, 2 (2003): 153–81.
20 E. Schlager and E. Ostrom, 'Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis,' *Land Economics* 68, 3 (1992): 249–62.

21 M.A.P. Renouf, 'Prehistory of Newfoundland Hunter-Gatherers: Extinctions or Adaptations?' *World Archaeology* 30, 3 (1999): 403–20.
22 S.T. Cadigan, 'Recognizing the Commons in Coastal Forests: The Three-Mile Limit in Newfoundland, 1875–1939,' *Newfoundland and Labrador Studies* 21, 2 (2006): 209–33.
23 Munro, 'Public Timber Allocation Policy in Newfoundland'.
24 E. May, *At the Cutting Edge: The Crisis in Canada's Forests* (Toronto, ON: Key Porter Books Limited, 1998); R. Ommer, *Coasts under Stress: Restructuring and Social-Ecological Health* (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007).
25 Ommer, *Coasts under Stress*.
26 Munro, 'Public Timber Allocation Policy in Newfoundland'.
27 Munro, 'Public Timber Allocation Policy in Newfoundland'.
28 V.A. Summers, *Regime Change in a Resource Economy: The Politics of Underdevelopment in Newfoundland since 1825* (St John's, NL: Breakwater, 1994); D. Letto, *Chocolate Bars and Rubber Boots: The Smallwood Industrialization Plan* (Paradise, NL: Blue Hill Publishing, 1998); S.T. Cadigan, *Newfoundland and Labrador: A History* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
29 Munro, 'Public Timber Allocation Policy in Newfoundland'.
30 Schlager and Ostrom, 'Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources'.
31 APEC, 'Building Competitiveness in Atlantic Canada's Forest Industries'.
32 Cadigan, 'Recognizing the Commons in Coastal Forests'.
33 Cadigan, 'Recognizing the Commons in Coastal Forests'.
34 Cadigan, 'Recognizing the Commons in Coastal Forests'.
35 Auditor General of Newfoundland, *Annual Report Part 2.14, Forest Management* (2011). http://www.ag.gov.nl.ca/ag/annualReports/2011AnnualReport/AR2011.pdf
36 Author interview with a Department of Environment and Conservation [DEC] employee, May 16, 2011.
37 J. Pollard, 'The Influence of Logging Technology on Employment and on the Boreal Forest Landscape of Newfoundland, Canada' (Master's thesis, Memorial University, St John's, NL, 2004).
38 Ommer, *Coasts under Stress*.
39 APEC, 'Building Competitiveness in Atlantic Canada's Forest Industries'.
40 Wernerheim and Long, 'Commercial Forestry at a Cross-roads'.
41 Department of Finance, *The Economic Review 2010* (2010). http://www.economics.gov.nl.ca/ER2010/TheEconomicReview2010.pdf
42 J. Omohundro, *Rough Food: The Seasons of Subsistence in Northern Newfoundland* (St John's, NL: ISER, Memorial University of NL, 1994), xviii.
43 M. Den Otter and T Beckley, *This Is paradise: Community sustainability indicators for the Western Newfoundland Model Forest*. Information Report M-X-216E. Fredericton, NB: Natural Resources Canada, Atlantic Forestry Centre, 2002.
44 Omohundro, *Rough Food*; unpublished DNR Forestry data (2011).
45 Table 2.
46 Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) *2016–2017 Hunting and Fishing Guide* (2012). http://www.env.gov.nl.ca/env/wildlife/pdf/Hunting_Trapping_Guide.pdf
47 Data from A. Anderson, *Domestic Fuel Wood Feasibility Study* (Corner Brook, NL: Anderson & Yates Forest Consultants, 2011).
48 Cadigan, 'Recognizing the Commons in Coastal Forests'.
49 M. Roy, 'Guided Change through Community Forestry: A Case Study in Forest Management Unit 17 – Newfoundland,' *The Forestry Chronicle* 65 (1989): 345.
50 Roy, 'Guided Change through Community Forestry,' 346.
51 Department of Natural Resources Forestry, *Environmental Preview Report: Proposed Adaptive Management Process* (St John's, NL: Newfoundland Forest Service, 1995), 7.
52 Author interview with a member of the Forestry Department, May 3, 2011.
53 Author interview with a member of the Department of Tourism, August 18, 2011.
54 Author interview with a member of the Department of Environment and Conservation, August 8, 2011.
55 Auditor General of Newfoundland, *Annual Report Part 2.14, Forest Management* (2011). http://www.ag.gov.nl.ca/ag/

annualReports/2011AnnualReport/AR2011.pdf

56 Department of Natural Resources Forestry, *2006 Island Wood Supply Analysis: Public Review* (Corner Brook, NL: Department of Natural Resources, 2006), 1.

57 Department of Natural Resources Forestry, *Provincial Sustainable Forest Management Strategy* (Corner Brook, NL: Department of Natural Resources, 2003), 2.

58 Author interview with a member of the Forestry Department, February 14, 2011.

59 Author interview with a member of the Forestry Department .

60 A. J. Bath, *Understanding Forest Management Issues on the Island Portion of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador*, Report Submitted to Government of Newfoundland and Labrador and Western Newfoundland Model Forest (2006); Bath, *Attitudinal and Knowledge Monitoring, Human Dimensions in Forestry Issues: Understanding How Attitudes toward and Knowledge about Forests Have Changed since 2006*, Report Submitted to the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador and Western Newfoundland Model Forest (2010).

61 Bath, *Understanding Forest Management Issues on the Island Portion of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador*; Bath, *Attitudinal and Knowledge Monitoring, Human Dimensions in Forestry Issues*.

62 Bath, *Understanding Forest Management Issues on the Island Portion of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador*; Bath, *Attitudinal and Knowledge Monitoring, Human Dimensions in Forestry Issues*.

63 Author interview with a forest scientist, October 22, 2010.

64 King *et al.*, 'The Question of Participation'.

65 From meeting minutes for Zone 5 five-year operating plan, page 2.

66 Schlager and Ostrom, 'Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources'.

67 P.R. Lachapelle, S.F. McCool and M.E. Patterson, 'Barriers to Effective Natural Resource Planning in a 'Messy' World,' *Society and Natural Resources* 16 (2003): 473–90.

68 King *et al.*, 'The Question of Participation'.

69 B.R. Sturtevant *et al.*, 'A Toolkit Modeling Approach for Sustainable Forest Management Planning: Achieving Balance between Science and Local Needs,' *Ecology and Society* 12, 2 (2007): 7.

70 Department of Natural Resources Forestry, *Environmental Preview Report* (1995): 17–18.

71 Department of Natural Resources Forestry, *Provincial Sustainable Forest Management Strategy* (2003), 67.

72 Emery and Pierce, 'Interrupting the Telos'.

73 J.K. Gibson-Graham, 'Diverse Economies: Performative Practices for 'Other Worlds,' *Progress in Human Geography* 32, 6 (2008): 613–32.

74 Ostrom, *Governing the Commons*.

75 Ostrom, *Governing the Commons*.

76 A. Agrawal, 'Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources: Context, Methods, and Politics,' *Annual Review of Anthropology* 32 (2003): 243–62.

77 Emery and Pierce, 'Interrupting the Telos'.

78 J. McCarthy, 'Rural Geography: Alternative Rural Economies – the Search for Alterity in Forests, Fisheries, Food, and Fair Trade,' *Progress in Human Geography* 30, 6 (2006): 803–11.

79 Wilson, *Multifunctional Agriculture* .

80 Holmes, 'Divergent Regional Trajectories in Australia's Tropical Savannas'.

London Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 31 (2016). UCL Press• Print ISSN 0267-2200 • Online ISSN 1475-1674 • DOI 10.14324/111.444.ljcs.2016v31.006

'Not Just Another Anonymous Spot': Government Support for Memory Institutions in Prince Edward Island and Wales

Simon Lloyd

Abstract

In view of the important role that libraries, archives and museums – collectively referred to here as memory institutions – can play in regenerating communities that have faced economic and social difficulties, this essay examines government support for this sector in Prince Edward Island (PEI) through a comparative study with Wales. A historical sketch of the development of government administrative and planning capacity in this field in both Wales and PEI is offered, followed by a comparison of current funding commitments by each government. The study finds that relative funding levels are about the same in both jurisdictions, but that the Welsh government can offer an instructive example to the government of PEI through the former's commitment to planning for museums, archives and libraries, and for cultural and heritage activity as whole.

Introduction

As two relatively small parts of the Atlantic World, both at the edge of larger and more powerful political entities in which they find themselves relatively marginalized and disadvantaged, and accustomed to grappling with issues of identity and autonomy, Prince Edward Island (PEI) and Wales can find many points of sympathetic (and instructive) identification with each other. Furthermore, now that devolution

has brought Wales a measure of political capital at least somewhat commensurate with her immense cultural and historical riches, its government can be a useful exemplar for other Westminster-style democracies – such as those found in Canadian provinces – which must also function within larger political units.

It is a confluence of recent, current and upcoming events, however, that offers a particularly compelling invitation for the province of Prince Edward Island to look to the Welsh example, specifically in the management and planning of government support for libraries, archives and museums (collectively referred to here as memory institutions). The year 2014 found Prince Edward Island embarking on a decade of commemorations: the sesquicentennial of the 1864 Charlottetown Conference, which ultimately led to Canadian Confederation, will soon be followed, in turn, by the 150th anniversaries of Confederation itself (1867) and of Prince Edward Island's belated joining of the same (1873). Moreover, 2015 marked the 250th anniversary of the completion of British cartographer Samuel Holland's survey of Prince Edward Island, an epochal event in Island history and a landmark achievement in British imperial mapmaking.[1]

The year 2014 also proved momentous for Wales. In March, the Welsh government positioned itself firmly at the forefront of any discussion of cultural identity and memory, and their place in socio-economic regeneration, with the release of a remarkable report from Baroness Kay Andrews, entitled *Culture and Poverty: Harnessing the Power of the Arts, Culture and Heritage to Promote Social Justice in Wales*. Andrews' report offers sweeping recommendations for arts, culture and heritage bodies – including memory institutions – to improve cooperation and engagement with the educational and voluntary sectors and the community at large, '[to] help to raise achievement, reduce poverty and foster pride in community'.[2] In May 2015 the Welsh government unveiled the first phase of its action plan to implement the report's recommendations, under the title, 'Fusion: Tackling Poverty Through Culture', an initiative in which libraries, archives and museums will play a lead role.[3] These promises, of course, come hard on the heels of heightened expectations for expanded powers for the Welsh government, in the aftermath of the referendum on Scottish independence, with Wales's First Minister, Carwyn Jones, envisioning nothing less than 'a new constitutional future for the UK'.[4]

Just as Wales and the UK are contemplating questions of culture, heritage and identity, so, too, are PEI and Canada (albeit without the high drama of narrowly averted Scottish separation). At a 2014 Island

meeting of the federal and provincial/territorial ministers responsible for culture and heritage, PEI Tourism and Culture Minister Robertson Henderson spoke of 'our investment in culturally significant events like the 150th anniversary of the Charlottetown Conference and Canada's 150th anniversary in 2017. It strikingly illustrates the importance of the social impact of arts, culture and heritage that "helps shape our identity".'[5]

But what should this government investment look like? How should it be managed? As this essay will show, the Welsh experience could prove especially instructive to PEI in embracing the challenges and opportunities raised by these questions. Essential context, however, is provided by recent history.

The PEI government and memory institutions: twenty-first-century challenges

Prince Edward Island's 2014 anniversary celebrations attracted C$29 million of state funding, including C$18.5 million from the government of PEI,[6] and so the preparations for upcoming anniversaries should, in turn, invite considerations of the role of memory institutions and government involvement with them. There have certainly been benefits. Prince Edward Island has a vibrant and dedicated culture and heritage community, and extra government investment and promotion in 2014 has given Island memory institutions the opportunity to undertake an array of innovative projects, including the PEI Public Library's '14 Books, One Island' campaign, celebrating Island authors,[7] and the PEI Public Archives' creation of an 1864 commemorative almanac.[8]

Unfortunately, however, and notwithstanding the current celebratory climate and the sustained high quality of professional service on offer at Island memory institutions, PEI government policy in this area is clouded by uncertainty and disappointment. Going forward, the provincial government will have successes and strengths on which to build, but it will also have to contend with the lingering effects of some significant errors and omissions. Two issues, in particular, continue to cast shadows over any discussion of the PEI government and memory institutions:

- In 2006, the incumbent Progressive Conservative government announced plans to move 'the Artifactory', the PEI Museum and Heritage Foundation's ageing artefact storage facility,

from Charlottetown to Murray River, a small, relatively remote community in the then-Premier's home riding. The planned move was widely decried as politically motivated, and fanned long-standing discontent about the lack of a central museum facility on PEI into a fully-fledged controversy on the eve of the 2007 provincial election.[9] Following the Conservative defeat in that election, the new Liberal government quickly acted on its campaign promises to halt the planned Artifactory move and to proceed with plans for a new provincial museum, in the context of a broader Island heritage strategy.[10]

- Another issue relating to funding of memory institutions that has become particularly controversial over the past decade is the unfortunate legacy of Charlottetown's Founders' Hall. Opened in June 2001 in a handsomely refurbished former railway building on the city waterfront, the facility cost C$6–C$8 million (estimates vary), with most of the money coming from the federal and provincial governments. Offering a range of multimedia displays and exhibits celebrating the Charlottetown Conference of 1864, the 21,000-square-foot facility was meant to be a major tourist draw and money-making enterprise, with an average of 75,000 annual visits projected. In the event, Founders' Hall never drew more than a fraction of expected visitation, and operated at a heavy financial loss for years, earning it the derisive nickname 'Flounders Hall'.[11]

While the root causes of the unfortunate outcomes in these two cases are varied and complex, one could point to the government's inadequate planning and consultation with the Island culture and heritage community as being at least partly responsible. Though both projects had their supporters, they received far more criticism than praise from constituencies that would normally have been expected to offer strong support for major capital investment in memory institutions.

In the case of the planned Artifactory move, such criticism was widespread and vocal as soon as word of the impending move became public; so great was the hue and cry over the lack of public discussion and planning that a research agency affiliated with the University of Prince Edward Island, the Institute of Island Studies, felt compelled to organize public consultations independently of the provincial government.[12] Despite being organized in haste, and in the dead of winter, the consultations drew more than 100 attendees, and received dozens of written submissions. One of these, from the PEI

Scottish Settlers Historical Society, included this apt summary of the prevailing mood:

> It is extremely unfortunate that these plans have been developed without consultation with the very people who will be effected [sic] by them – those dedicated Islanders who devote a considerable amount of volunteer or professional time and energy to improve the public knowledge and understanding of Prince Edward Island's history … [W]e sincerely hope the provincial government will reconsider their current plans and heed the advice of many who have said this is the time to conduct a long-overdue review of the policies and objectives regarding our responsibilities to our ancestors.[13]

As for Founders' Hall, concerns had been expressed publicly as soon as funding for the project was announced in 1999. *The Guardian* (Charlottetown) newspaper reported in September of that year: 'Cultural groups in the province say the proposal excludes Islanders and will drain provincial coffers of millions of dollars long after it's built'.[14]

Not surprisingly, these criticisms have been echoed repeatedly in the years since, as the plight of Founders' Hall became steadily more apparent. A 2007 scholarly discussion of the Hall's mandate to 'make history fun', which provides the most erudite and even-handed assessment available on the whole venture, concluded it was reasonably entertaining and informative, but noted major concerns at the limited role granted to the consultants from the heritage sector:

> A group which included local heritage professionals as well as nationally and internationally recognised Canadian history scholars. This body played an important role in establishing a broad outline for the narrative and designing the basic chronological template for the Confederation story. However, their influence waned once the designers began the task of creating the installations and shooting footage … We find it significant that the discursive input of professionals and academics was made secondary to the creative role of media professionals, who had the ultimate power to shape messages.[15]

The display/exhibit part of the hall closed early in 2012, and it was even suggested that these spaces would be entirely given over to other uses

by the end of 2014.[16] At time of writing, this has not come to pass, but the future seems uncertain, at best.

These incidents left a difficult legacy for succeeding provincial governments. To its credit, the Liberal administration of Premier Robert Ghiz made a strong start on confronting this challenge upon winning the election in 2007, cancelling the Artifactory move almost immediately and commissioning a comprehensive public review of PEI heritage and memory institutions the following year. That review, the first exercise of its type undertaken on PEI, also identified the government's poor planning and inadequate consultations, along with chronic underfunding, as widespread and longstanding problems for Island museums and associated memory institutions, contributing to a 'sense of urgency at what is at stake – what is being identified and what is being lost'.[17] Topping the prioritized list of the reviewers' recommendations was: 'Develop a heritage strategy to guide government action.'[18] The other major recommendation was for work to begin on a central provincial museum facility (which the reviewers suggested could also serve as an expanded home for the Provincial Archives), with a view to having it ready for occupation in approximately five years.[19] The provincial government publicly welcomed the reviewers' recommendations upon their release in November 2008 and did take some action, including modest funding increases to the Prince Edward Island Museum and Heritage Foundation, and urgently needed repairs at the existing Artifactory. A consultant was also hired to begin detailed consultations and planning for a new museum/archives facility.[20] However, neither a museum nor a heritage strategy has yet materialized. Government officials have commented that the estimated price tag of C$50 million for a central museum was 'somewhat larger than the community had anticipated',[21] but the ongoing lack of a heritage strategy has never been publicly addressed.

Why Wales?

While the pressing need for creative and strategic thinking by the PEI government on the province's memory institutions is clear, we might still ask why Wales is a useful place for Island legislators and policy-makers to look towards. To put it in the simplest possible terms: while PEI is – even in the midst of what should be a time of excitement and celebration for its memory institutions – beset by uncertainty and disappointment (at least as far as provincial government policy

is concerned), one searches in vain for signs of similar high-profile controversies and missteps in the Welsh government's relationships with memory institutions and their supporters. Indeed, the available indicators on Welsh museums, archives and libraries are remarkably positive. Representative examples include the following:

- Even as funding to the local authorities responsible for Wales's public libraries has been cut, CILIP, the leading professional advocacy body for UK librarians, recently praised the Welsh government's commitment to public libraries,[22] while an independent mid-term evaluation of the government's *Libraries Inspire* support programme found that visits to libraries had increased in 2012–13 and that most users had noticed improvements in their library service.[23]
- In spite of a difficult restructuring and layoffs at National Museum Wales, 2013 visits to the national museum system were at an all-time high, and the latest *Wales Visitor Survey* found that nearly a quarter of all visitors to Wales planned to visit a museum (making it the third most popular activity), with 80 per cent of those who had done so saying [they] would recommend it to others.[24]
- Recent data for archives and records offices was more difficult to locate, but the latest Archives and Records Association's 'Survey of Visitors to UK Archives' shows user satisfaction with archival service in Wales trending steadily upwards, with 78 per cent rating it 'very good', the best results in the UK.[25]
- Perhaps the most striking indicator of the value accorded memory institutions in Wales, of course, is Andrews' 2014 report and the ensuing *Fusion* programme, already noted. The report's comments on the achievement, and potential, of Welsh memory institutions were laudatory: 'Libraries, archives and museums are probably the most visible of the local cultural "anchors" – and many are already pushing at the boundaries of what can be done both to welcome and cherish visitors, and to take their precious collections out into community settings.'[26]

It would, of course, be no more reasonable to suggest that all is well in Welsh memory institutions than it would be to say that the circumstances of their PEI counterparts are entirely negative. Strengths and weaknesses exist in both jurisdictions. However, Wales has valuable public policy lessons to offer from its work with memory institutions in recent years. Furthermore, Wales enjoys no great 'head start' or

unfair funding advantage over PEI in the development and support of its public memory institutions. What could be called the 'Welsh Advantage' in this area is rooted not in experience or money, but rather in planning.

The development of public memory institutions in PEI and Wales

While the idea of Welsh nationhood pre-dates the existence of the province of PEI by many centuries, the key memory institutions in Wales are not so very much older than analogous provincial agencies in Prince Edward Island.

- The groundwork for a free, universal public library service in Wales, as elsewhere in Britain, was laid with the *Public Libraries Act* of 1919;[27] in Prince Edward Island, the provincial government assumed responsibility in 1936 for the province-wide regional system of public libraries established three years prior as a 'demonstration project' by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.[28]
- The National Library of Wales was established by Royal Charter in 1907.[29] As a province, not a nation, PEI has never had a 'national library', but the Library of the Legislative Assembly was, by the dawn of the twentieth century, making some effort to act as a central reference and research service for Prince Edward Island.[30] The Legislative Library faded out of existence during the latter part of that century, however, and a somewhat ad hoc mix of services has developed over the past 40 years to fulfill the need for something like a provincial library of record: the University of Prince Edward Island Library has been building a PEI Collection since the early 1970s, with the aim of acquiring all published material relating to the Island; the main branch of the PEI Public Library Service has also developed a large PEI Collection, though its acquisitions mandate is not as exhaustive as that of the UPEI Library.[31] More recently, the PEI Legislative Library has been revived, though it currently functions mainly as a research office for provincial Assembly members and their staff.[32]
- Wales still lacks a National Records Office.[33] The National Library has a long-standing practice of acquiring manuscript collections relating to Wales, and the Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales – established in 1908 – maintains

a large archive, the National Monuments Record of Wales, while National Museum Wales also has significant archival collections.[34] For now, however, the UK National Archives at Kew remains the official public record office for the Welsh government and Assembly. Prince Edward Island established a provincial Public Archives and Records Office in 1964,[35] which serves as the official repository for provincial government records and also acquires other records of provincial significance from such sources as private citizens, business firms and community groups.[36]

- National Museum Wales (formerly the National Museums and Galleries Wales), which originated with a 1907 Royal Charter, boasts the greatest head start over any comparable institution in Prince Edward Island.[37] On PEI, the provincial government offered no support of any kind to museums until the early 1970s, when it began offering grants to a newly established private trust, the Prince Edward Island Heritage Foundation.[38] The Foundation operated essentially as an independent contractor to run several museum sites on the Island for a number of years, although it became much more closely affiliated with government in the 1980s, as its operations expanded. The 'PEI Museum and Heritage Foundation', as it is now known, operates seven provincial museum sites on the Island, along with the central artefact storage facility.[39]

Both PEI and Wales have active networks of smaller memory institutions, primarily local museums and archives (or museum/archive hybrids). Valuable as these entities are, however, the involvement of governments above the local authority level in both Wales and PEI has been very limited, and so they are largely excluded from the scope of this essay. Also not considered here are archaeological and historic sites and monuments, as there is such a vast gap between the age and extent of built heritage and archaeological sites in Wales and PEI that any meaningful comparison would be difficult. European settlement in numbers on PEI dates back less than three centuries, and the far older Mi'kmaw civilization traditionally drew most of its strength from living lightly on the land, leaving practically no built heritage and only a modest archaeological record.[40] The main focus here, then, is on those memory institutions through which the governments of Prince Edward Island and Wales have exercised the greatest responsibility and influence in their respective jurisdictions.

The place of memory institutions in the governments of PEI and Wales

With the post-devolution changes in Welsh governance, the governments of PEI and Wales are now quite similar in overall structure. The leader of the political party holding the most seats in the elected assembly becomes the head of government – as First Minister in Wales, and Premier in PEI – and selects a cabinet of ministers from the ranks of other elected assembly members to be appointed by the Crown as ministers and to oversee executive functions.[41] Any functional area of cabinet responsibility that is assigned its own ministry (or 'line department', in the common Canadian parlance) may, therefore, be taken to have particular importance.

Prince Edward Island

Although Canadian federalism is predicated on an explicit division of powers between the federal and provincial governments, matters pertaining to culture, the arts and heritage were not foreseen as state responsibilities in the era of Confederation and have never been included in these arrangements. As a result, a hybrid network of federal, provincial and municipal programmes and institutions in this sector has developed over the years. Broadly speaking, however, provincial governments have been left to develop provincial memory institutions – and programmes supporting the same – largely as each one sees fit.[42]

As noted above, the PEI government's first significant involvement with memory institutions began when it assumed responsibility for public libraries in 1936. The government's work with memory institutions expanded during the mid-1960s, when the Provincial Archives was established, and yet again with financial support for the PEI Heritage Foundation in the 1970s. Culture and heritage matters did not appear in any cabinet minister's portfolio, however, until 1974, when the newly appointed Finance Minister was also assigned responsibility for 'Cultural Affairs'.[43] Though the sums allocated were modest, Cultural Affairs then began appearing recurrently in provincial budgets, with the portfolio usually assigned to either the Finance Minister or the Premier, until a Department of Community and Cultural Affairs, with its own minister, was created in 1982.[44]

The creation of this department foreshadowed a further expansion of the provincial government's memory institution role, with the

designation of the PEI Museum and Heritage as a provincial Crown corporation (and the inclusion of its personnel in the PEI civil service) under the *Museum Act* of 1983. Because the Foundation had operated for over a decade as an independent, not-for-profit trust, with the provincial government's role largely confined to the offering of a modest annual operating grant, the move to bring the organization more fully under the government's umbrella was a significant departure. Though nominally independent still, the PEI Museum and Heritage Foundation effectively operated thenceforth as a unit of the Department of Community and Cultural Affairs.[45]

The Provincial Archives, meanwhile, had spent its first years with no departmental home at all, before being taken up by a short-lived Department of the Provincial Secretary in the mid- to late 1970s. With the demise of that department, the Archives transferred to the Department of Education in 1980.[46] In 1988, the Archives transferred again, to the Department of Community and Cultural Affairs, 'further consolidating Government's operational mandate in the historical resources field'. In 1990, the Provincial Library Service, which had been under the Department of Education ever since the 1930s, was also moved into the Department of Community and Cultural Affairs, so as to bring it, 'within a department whose focus on cultural activities and community development are very complementary with those of the library'.[47] Thus, by the beginning of the 1990s, the province's key memory institution responsibilities were, for the first time, concentrated within one department. Another positive administrative development came in 1992–3, when a Culture and Heritage Division within the department was established.[48]

The unification of the PEI government's memory institution functions in a single department has endured for more than 20 years, though the responsible department has continued to change. The Department of Community and Cultural Affairs was reorganized in 1993 and the Culture and Heritage Division, along with the Provincial Library Service, was transferred to the Department of Education and Human Resources.[49] In 2000, the Culture, Heritage, Recreation and Sport Division of the Department of Education was transferred back into a revived Department of Community and Cultural Affairs, along with responsibility for the Provincial Library Service and the Archives.[50] In 2003, this unit was reorganized as the Division of Culture, Heritage and Libraries, with the sporting and recreation responsibilities hived off to another division.[51] This administrative integration was retained with the division's 2010 move to the Department of Tourism, which became

the Department of Tourism and Culture.[52] Shortly thereafter, however, the incumbent Director of Culture, Heritage and Libraries retired, and his replacement was given responsibility only for the provincial library system and the Provincial Archives, effectively ending any notion of a 'heritage' portfolio within the provincial government. Early in 2015, responsibility for the library system and the Provincial Archives shifted once again, to a newly reorganized Department of Education, Early Learning and Culture.

This interminable shuffling of museum, archive and library responsibilities within the PEI government is an unfortunate indicator of the lack of a clear government plan for these institutions and for heritage more broadly. Indeed, the PEI government has never developed a provincial strategy in this area, though it has commissioned many reports – especially in the museums field – over the past 40 years.[53] A 2002 'Cultural Policy for Prince Edward Island' usefully articulated general principles on a range of culture, arts and heritage matters, but offered no specific planning or budgetary prescriptions.[54] As noted above, a Liberal government came to power hard on the heels of the 2006–07 Artifactory controversy, promising both a central PEI museum and a broader provincial heritage strategy. It commissioned a comprehensive public review of PEI heritage policy in 2008,[55] and *Charting a Course: The Study of Heritage on PEI*, was duly presented in September of that year,[56] but there has been little concerted action to date to address the report's most urgent recommendations.

Wales

By contrast the Welsh government has identified culture and heritage as one of 12 priority areas in its *Programme for Government*,[57] and the *Fusion* initiative has recently added further urgency. Looking at the years since 1999, the speed with which the devolved government in Wales has grasped the opportunity to support and coordinate cultural, arts and heritage enterprises in general, and memory institutions in particular, is striking, especially when contrasted with the slow, piecemeal incrementalism seen in PEI.

The Welsh government has enjoyed a particular asset from the start in this regard, since the original instrument of devolution, the 1998 *Government of Wales Act*, gave the Assembly broader powers in the field of culture and heritage than in any other area. Section 32 of the Act empowered the Assembly to: 'do anything it considers appropriate to support – a) museums, art galleries or libraries in Wales; b) buildings

of historical or architectural interest, or other places of historical interest, in Wales'.[58] In 2002, the incumbent Minister for Culture, Welsh Language and Sport remarked to the Richard Commission on devolution that his portfolio was: 'probably the best job in the Cabinet … You are not confined in any way by the constitutional settlement, whereas you would be in other portfolios, and you can make a real difference, as is happening, I think, in terms of culture in Wales.'[59]

Less than a year into its first mandate, the National Assembly for Wales (as it was then known) launched a 10-year action plan, *A Better Wales*, recognizing the Welsh language and 'a rich and diverse cultural inheritance' as key national strengths, and pledging support to the National Library and the National Museums and Galleries of Wales.[60] Later that year, the Assembly's Post-16 Education and Training Committee outlined a bold vision for culture, heritage and the arts in Wales in its report, *A Culture in Common*, which included a declaration from the Chair, Cynog Dafis, that 'culture … is at the heart of our national enterprise'.[61]

By the time *A Culture in Common* was released, the government had already created a new cabinet position for a Minister of Culture, Sport and the Welsh Language. This ministry, in turn, oversaw the development of *Cymru Greadigol – Creative Future: A Culture Strategy for Wales*, released early in 2002. While this report did not include any overarching strategy for memory institutions, it did offer some direction and support for museums, archives and libraries to cooperate with schools-based initiatives and encourage cultural tourism. It also projected increased funding throughout 2003 for a range of cultural organizations and agencies, including the National Museums and Galleries of Wales, the National Library of Wales and the Council of Museums Wales.[62]

While the two national memory institutions, the National Library of Wales and the National Museums and Galleries of Wales, had both been operating semi-autonomously under Royal Charter for some 80 years prior to devolution, the UK government, via the Welsh Office, was providing roughly 80–90 per cent of their funding by the late 1990s, and had developed strong working 'arm's-length' relationships with both institutions. A post-devolution review in 2002 found that these funding and reporting arrangements had transferred from the Welsh Office to the Welsh Assembly without serious difficulty or disruption.[63] The National Museums and Galleries for Wales, meanwhile, simply shifted from reporting on performance indicators agreed to with the Secretary of State for Wales in 1998/1999 to those arranged with the National

Assembly in 1999/2000.[64] Furthermore, the Minister for Culture, Welsh Language and Sport soon began issuing annual 'remit letters' to a range of Assembly Sponsored Public Bodies (ASPBs), including the National Library and the National Museums and Galleries, outlining the Welsh Assembly government's expectations of these institutions.[65]

Perhaps the single most significant development as far as the relationship between the Welsh Assembly government and memory institutions was concerned, however, was the creation of CyMAL: Museums Archives and Libraries Wales in April 2004. CyMAL was a new division of the government, with a staff of some 25–30, reporting to the Minister for Culture, Welsh Language and Sport, and tasked with 'an ambitious agenda to work with the sector to help develop local museums, archives and libraries and to build on their contribution to Welsh culture and heritage'.[66]

CyMAL represented an imaginative approach to the challenge faced by the Welsh Assembly government, arising from the fact that museums, archives and libraries were clearly critical to any culture and heritage strategy, but were not directly under its control. For the national memory institutions, close ties with CyMAL were ensured by including representation from the National Library and the National Museums and Galleries on the CyMAL Advisory Council, and the formal delegation of Assembly government funding 'sponsorship' arrangements for both agencies to CyMAL in 2007.[67]

Most libraries, archives and museums in Wales, however, are not, and never have been, 'national' in any sense of the word. There were, for example, more than 350 public libraries in Wales at the time of devolution, controlled by 22 local authorities, but this did not deter the Assembly government from asserting its influence. In September 2001, the government promulgated its first set of *Welsh Public Library Standards*, to cover the years 2002–05, asserting that: 'The *Public Libraries and Museums Act, 1964* makes it the duty of the Minister for Culture, Sport and the Welsh Language within the National Assembly for Wales "to superintend and promote the improvement of the public library service provided by local authorities"'.[68] Considering that the Minister's office was less than a year old when these words were written, and the Act in question had not originally contemplated the existence of a Welsh Assembly, this arguably represented a certain sleight of hand. Nevertheless, the Welsh Assembly government confidently identified public libraries, local jurisdiction notwithstanding, as part of the Assembly's national vision: 'Public libraries can contribute substantially to the achievement of many of the policies of the National Assembly for Wales.'[69]

In addition to the *Public Library Standards* – which are now in their fourth iteration, covering the years 2011–14[70] - as well as the remit letters to the national memory institutions, and the broader cultural strategies already discussed, the Welsh Assembly government has embarked on sector-specific planning and development for libraries, archives and museums in Wales, especially since the establishment of CyMAL in 2004. Welsh public libraries, for example, have benefited from three multi-year funding and planning programmes, covering the years 2005–07, 2008–11 and 2012–16.[71] Museums have also been drawn into closer ties with CyMAL and with each other. In addition to the funding and reporting arrangements with National Museums and Galleries Wales (which became National Museum Wales in 2005) already discussed, CyMAL also established itself as the administrator, in Wales, of the *Accreditation Standard for Museums* maintained by the United Kingdom's Museums, Libraries and Archives Council, a move analogous to the agency's involvement with the Public Library Standards. In 2010, CyMAL released *A Museum Strategy for Wales*, intended to guide the development of Welsh museums through to 2015.[72]

The Welsh government's public libraries policy, its boldest and longest-running intervention in memory institutions to date, was found to have strong support during a recent inquiry on Welsh libraries by the all-party committee of the Welsh National Assembly on Communities, Equality and Local Government. The committee recorded unanimous praise from a host of organisations – including the Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA), CILIP and the Carnegie UK Trust – for the work of CyMAL in general and for the Public Library Standards in particular. On the Standards, WLGA declared: '… it has been recognised by all partners that the previous frameworks were extremely effective … in ensuring a more consistent and better quality of public library service across Wales and raising the standards of libraries'.[73] As for CyMAL, generally, the WLGA and the Carnegie Trust, among others, testified that it had played a critical role in placing Welsh libraries in a better position than those elsewhere in the UK, even in the face of ongoing austerity, since the agency was able to 'make connections between libraries and other service providers, and encourage regional or national responses to issues which are most cost effective when dealt with at those levels'.[74]

The Welsh government seems to have been slightly less assertive with archives and records offices – possibly due to the lack of a central Public Records Office for Wales and to the limitations of the relatively small and new (post-1994) network of local authority archives[75] – but

it has certainly not been idle in this area. CyMAL played an active role in developing a Welsh edition of the *21st Century Archives* strategy, spearheaded by the UK National Archives, and is now overseeing the Welsh implementation plans arising from this document. CyMAL is also involved with the Archives and Records Council of Wales and has funded important Council initiatives, notably a comprehensive 2008 study of uncatalogued backlogs in Welsh archives.[76]

For the present, however, the Welsh government in general and CyMAL in particular have evidently reconciled themselves to the UK National Archives' lead role in Welsh public archives and records, though the National Archives' new UK-wide Archives Services Accreditation Scheme will be administered in Wales by CyMAL.

In the years since the creation of CyMAL, the agency and its partners have doubtless benefitted from the Welsh government's continuing policymaking enthusiasm in the culture and heritage arena. The 2007 agreement establishing the Welsh Labour and Plaid Cymru coalition, *One Wales: A Progressive Agenda for the Government of Wales*, included the protection and promotion of 'a rich and diverse culture' as one of its key elements.[77] As part of the *One Wales* agenda, the Welsh government sought, and obtained, increased powers from the UK government over cultural matters in a Legislative Competence Order on 'Culture and Other Matters', granted in 2010. This Order gave the Welsh government powers to, 'plac[e] a statutory obligation on local authorities to promote culture and encourage partnership to deliver high quality cultural experiences for their communities'. The aim was to support and encourage local authorities in providing a uniformly high level of access to cultural and recreational opportunities throughout Wales.[78]

Although the Welsh government has not yet made significant use of its legislative powers in this field – aside from a planned Heritage Bill, focusing on historic properties, marine areas and landscapes[79] – it has managed to accomplish a great deal without resort to legislation, and the 2011 *Programme for Government* has, as already noted, plenty to say on culture and heritage matters generally. Among the items most pertinent to memory institutions are continuance of the popular free entry at National Museum sites, the encouragement of cooperation between the 'Heritage Department' and other Welsh government agencies on projects such as the Book Prescription programme, and ongoing grant funding 'to develop regional and national collaboration in the museums, archives and library sector in Wales'.[80] Most recently, of course, has come the announcement of the *Fusion: Tackling Poverty Through Culture* initiative.[81]

Comparing government investment in Welsh and PEI memory institutions

Financial issues are inseparable from government actions regarding memory institutions, as in every other area. Differences in the public accounting and reporting regimes of the two governments make direct comparisons challenging, but it is possible to get some sense of the public funds allocated by each jurisdiction to culture, arts and heritage in general, and to memory institutions in particular.

- For the 2014–15 fiscal year, the PEI government budgeted total programme expenditures at just over C$1.46 billion. Of that, the Department of Tourism and Culture was allocated C$17,877,700, roughly 1.2% per cent of the total budget and about C$121 in per-capita terms. It can be assumed most of this money was actually directed to culture, arts and heritage, broadly defined – including the Provincial Library Service, the PEI Museum and Heritage Foundation and the Provincial Archives, as well as a programme of arts and culture grants – since tourism functions receive a separate budgetary allocation.[82]
- The Welsh government budgeted for spending of £15.3 billion for the same fiscal year. If this amount, just a little over £125 million – about 0.8% of total Government expenditures, translating into per-capita spending of just over £40 (about C$70, at the current exchange rate) – was earmarked for culture, arts and heritage, broadly defined, including Museums, Archives and Libraries, the Welsh Language, the Historic Environment and support to the Welsh Arts Council and media and publishing in general. [83]

All governments in the UK have faced recent fiscal difficulties, in that the impact and aftershocks of the 2008–09 financial crisis have been much more severe than in Canada. This has forced a steady retrenchment in Welsh public finances in recent years.[84] Clearly, then, the Welsh government is not, proportionally, outspending the government of PEI in this area, nor is there any prospect of it doing so in the near future.

Nevertheless, Prince Edward Island has significant fiscal challenges of its own, with perennially high levels of unemployment and a persistent public debt. Politically unsympathetic central governments have further deepened the financial woes of both Wales and PEI in recent years, with right-leaning administrations in Ottawa and Westminster making

significant and ongoing cuts in the amount of money available to other levels of government.[85]

Looming over all, meanwhile, in Wales, PEI and many other places besides, are spiralling health-care costs, which already account for about one-third of total spending by the Welsh government and the government of Prince Edward Island.[86]

The Way Forward?

The fear that government support for culture, arts and heritage generally, and for memory institutions in particular, might be swept aside or trampled in a rush to meet daunting fiscal challenges is not unreasonable. And yet, the very smallness of memory institutions in the overall picture of government finance and operations may ultimately be their salvation. Both the Welsh government and the government of Prince Edward Island ultimately owe their very existence to the cultural health and integrity of the places they seek to govern. The Second Assembly Welsh government put it neatly in *One Wales*:

> In a globalising economy, those places which will prosper in the future will be those which offer the clearest sense of stability, sustainability and identity … In a world where people and organisations can go anywhere, the *somewhere* has to be not just another anonymous spot on the world's surface but a place which offers a sense of identity which is confident and out-going …[87]

Viewed in this context, the wisdom of emphasizing strategic planning and investment, especially apparent in the Welsh government's work with museums, archives and libraries, becomes clear. One or two per cent of total government expenditure looks like a very small price to pay to help safeguard the repositories of cultural heritage. Furthermore, while huge sectors such as health and education can absorb significant public funding increases without producing 'good news' improvements, even small investments in a library, archive or museum can produce demonstrable benefits out of all proportion to the amount spent. Indeed, the Welsh example even offers the tantalizing possibility that it might be possible, with careful consultation and long-term planning, to do more with less. Reminding our governments, and the electorates they serve, of these facts will be the great task of the twenty-first century for all who care about memory institutions in PEI.

Notes

1 J. Day, 'Gathering the Goods on Samuel Holland,' *The Guardian* (Charlottetown), December 4, 2013.
2 K. Andrews, *Culture and Poverty: Harnessing the Power of the Arts, Culture and Heritage to Promote Social Justice in Wales* (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2014); Welsh Government, *Tackling Poverty Through Culture – Landmark Report Released* (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2014).http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/0/666A6DFD90178C1A80257C9A005C132D?OpenDocument
3 Welsh Government, *Fusion: Tackling Poverty Through Culture. Pioneer Area Programme: Pilot Year 2015–2016* (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2015).
4 G. Henry, 'David Cameron Points to New Devolution Settlement for Wales as Scotland Votes No in Independence Referendum,' 19 September 2014, *WalesOnline.* http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/david-cameron-points-new-devolution-7797171
5 Prince Edward Island, Department of Tourism and Culture, 'Federal, Provincial and Territorial Ministers Meet to Discuss Importance of Culture and Heritage,' 10 September 2014. http://www.gov.pe.ca/tourism/index.php3?number=news&dept=&newsnumber=9815&lang=E
6 D. Stewart, 'The Legacy Debate,' *The Guardian* (Charlottetown), 13 September 2014.
7 Prince Edward Island, Public Library Service, '14 Books One Island Celebrates Island Authors,' 11 June, 2014. http://www.gov.pe.ca/newsroom/index.php3?number=news&newsnumber=9675&lang=E
8 Prince Edward Island, Public Archives and Records Office, *The Public Archives 2014 Almanac and Miscellany Celebrating 1864: A Look at Prince Edward Island in the Year of the Charlottetown Conference* (Charlottetown, PE: Public Archives and Records Office, 2014).
9 University of Prince Edward Island, Institute of Island Studies, *Public Consultations on the PEI Museum System* (Charlottetown, PE: Institute of Island Studies, 2007), 4–5.
10 J. Day, 'Province Commits to Creation of Central Museum,' *The Guardian* (Charlottetown), 15 November 2008.
11 J. Day, 'Hall of Plenty?' *The Guardian* (Charlottetown), 31 January 2004.
12 University of Prince Edward Island, *Public Consultations on the PEI Museum System* (2007).
13 University of Prince Edward Island, *Public Consultations on the PEI Museum System*, 16–17.
14 W. Thibodeau, 'Province Gives Approval to City Discovery Centre: Tory Government Will Contribute to $8-Million Waterfront Project,' *The Guardian* (Charlottetown), 9 September 1999.
15 S. Mullally and E. MacDonald, 'On National Heritage, Grand Narratives and "Making History Fun": Founders' Hall, Prince Edward Island and the Story of Canada,' *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 13, 3 (May 2007): 290.
16 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Founders Hall to close after 2014,' 17 June 2013. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/founders-hall-to-close-after-2014-1.1305123
17 IRIS Group, *Charting a Course: The Study of Heritage on Prince Edward Island* (NP: IRIS Group, 2008), 5–6.
18 IRIS Group, *Charting a Course*, 86.
19 IRIS Group, *Charting a Course*, 86–7.
20 Prince Edward Island, Department of Tourism and Culture, *Annual Report 2009-2010* (Charlottetown, PE: The Department, 2010): 29.
21 M. Carson, 'Provincial Museum Project Still "Very Much Alive",' *The Guardian* (Charlottetown), 15 February 2011.
22 CILIP Cymru Wales, 'CILIP Welcomes Welsh Minister's Statement on Value of Public Libraries,' 9 December 2013. http://www.cilip.org.uk/cilip-cymru-wales/news/cilip-welcomes-welsh-minister-s-statement-value-public-libraries-0
23 Welsh Assembly Government, CyMAL: Museums, Archives and Libraries Wales, *Maintaining a Valued Service – the Fourth Framework of Welsh Public Library Standards 2011–14* (Welsh Government, CyMAL, 2011); Scotinform Ltd, *Evaluation of Libraries Inspire: Mid-Term Review Report – Final* (Edinburgh: Scotinform, 2014), 20–24.
24 Strategic Marketing, *Wales Visitor Survey 2013: CyMAL Booster* (Welsh Government, CyMAL, 2013), 6–8, 15–18.

http://www.tourismhelp.co.uk/objview.asp?object_id=715

25 Public Services Quality Group, *Survey of Visitors to UK Archives 2012* (London: Archives and Records Association, 2012), 29–30. http://www.archives.org.uk/images/documents/PSQG/Survey_of_visitors_to_uk_archives_2012_-_national_report.pdf

26 Andrews, *Culture and Poverty*, 28.

27 J. Davies *et al*., *The Welsh National Academy Encyclopedia of Wales* (Boston, MA: Credo Reference, 2010).

28 H.B. Chandler and J.T. Croteau, *A Regional Library and its Readers: A Study of Five Years of Rural Reading* (New York: American Association of Adult Education, 1940), 109–10.

29 Davies *et al*., *The Welsh National Academy Encyclopedia of Wales* (Cardiff: 2010).

30 W.H. Crosskill, *Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Prince Edward Island 1904, Appendix Y: Report of the Librarian on the Legislative Library for 1903–1904* (Charlottetown, PE: the Assembly, 1904), 3–4.

31 S. Clark, *Robertson Library: P.E.I. Collection Report* (Charlottetown, PE: University of Prince Edward Island, 1999), 3–4.

32 Prince Edward Island, Legislative Assembly Legislative Library and Research Service, *2011 Annual Report of the Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island* (Charlottetown, PE, 2012), 30; United Kingdom National Archives, Local Government Acts, *Information Management: Legislation and Regulations: Other Archival Legislation* (London: 2013). http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/information-management/legislation/other-archival-legislation/local-government-acts/.

33 United Kingdom National Archives, Local Government Acts, *Information Management*, 5.

34 Welsh Assembly Government, *Archives for the 21st Century* (Cardiff, 2009), 7. http://gov.wales/docs/drah/publications/091203archives21stCenturyen.pdf

35 L.C. Callbeck, 'Economic and Social Developments since Confederation,' in *Canada's Smallest Province: A History of P.E.I.*, ed. F.W.P. Bolger (Charlottetown, PE: Prince Edward Island Centennial Commission, 1973), 328–54.

36 Prince Edward Island, Public Archives and Records Office, 'Our Collections' (2011). https://www.princeedwardisland.ca/en/topic/public-archives-collections

37 Amgueddfa Cymru – National Museum Wales, *Financial Report 2011–12* (Cardiff: The Museum, 2012).

38 D. Nemetz, *A Report on the Administration of the Prince Edward Island Heritage Foundation* (n.p., 1977), 1–3.

39 Prince Edward Island Museum and Heritage Foundation, *Annual Report, 2011–2012* (Charlottetown, PE: Prince Edward Island Museum and Heritage Foundation, 2012), 4–13.

40 A.J.B. Johnston and J. Francis, *Ni'n na L'nu: The Mi'kmaq of Prince Edward Island* (Charlottetown, PE: Acorn Press, 2013), 16, 18.

41 R. Deacon and A. Sandry, *Devolution in the United Kingdom* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 118–19, 136–40; F. MacKinnon, *The Government of Prince Edward Island* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951), 168–94.

42 J.H. Marsh, 'Cultural Policy,' in *The Canadian Encyclopedia*, 2nd ed., ed. J.H. Marsh (Edmonton, AB: Hurtig Publishers, 1988), 552–3.

43 Prince Edward Island, Legislative Assembly, *Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Prince Edward Island, 1974* (Charlottetown, PE: Legislative Assembly, 1974), 21.

44 Prince Edward Island, Department of Community and Cultural Affairs, *Annual Reports for 1982, 1988, 1990, 1993, 2000–2001* (Charlottetown, PE: The Department, 1982–2001).

45 Diomedia Consultants, *A Planning and Development Study for the Prince Edward Island Museum and Heritage Foundation* (Ottawa: Diomedia Consultants, 1986), 27–8.

46 Prince Edward Island, Department of the Provincial Secretary, *Annual Report for 1979* (Charlottetown, PE: The Department, 1979), 14; Prince Edward Island, Department of Education, *Annual Report for 1980* (Charlottetown, PE: The Department, 1980), 39.

47 Prince Edward Island, Department of Community and Cultural Affairs (1988), 6; (1990), 25.

48 Prince Edward Island, Department of Community and Cultural Affairs (1993), 1.

49 Prince Edward Island, Department of

Education and Human Resources, *Annual Report 1993* (Charlottetown, PE: The Department, 1993), 12.

50 Prince Edward Island, Department of Community and Cultural Affairs (2000–01), 6.

51 'Province Creates Culture/Heritage Sport/Recreation Divisions,' *The Guardian* (Charlottetown), 19 March 2003.

52 Prince Edward Island, Department of Tourism and Culture, *Annual Report* (2010), 23–4.

53 IRIS Group, *Charting a Course*, 99–112.

54 Prince Edward Island, Department of Community and Cultural Affairs (2002).

55 Day, 'Province Commits to Creation of Central Museum'.

56 IRIS Group, *Charting a Course*.

57 Welsh Government, National Assembly for Wales, *The Welsh Government's Legislative Programme: 2013 Update (2013)*. http://www.assembly.wales/Research%20Documents/The%20Welsh%20Government%E2%80%99s%20Legislative%20Programme%202013%20update%20-%20Research%20paper-10072013-247966/13-051-English.pdf

58 United Kingdom Parliament, *Government of Wales Act* (London, 1998).

59 Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly for Wales, *Report of the Richard Commission* (Cardiff: National Assembly, 2004), 97.

60 National Assembly for Wales, *A Better Wales: The Strategic Plan* (Cardiff: National Assembly, 2000), 13, 32–3.

61 National Assembly for Wales, Post-16 Education and Training Committee, *A Culture in Common* (2002), 3. http://www.assembly.wales/Committee%20Documents/Post%2016%20Education%20and%20Training%20Committee%20Report%20-%20A%20Culture%20in%20Common.-01112000-35705/39fff269000bac180000299400000000-English.pdf

62 Welsh Assembly Government, *Cymru Greadigol – Creative Future: A Culture Strategy for Wales* (Cardiff: Welsh Assembly, 2002), 2, 10, 63.

63 GCL Management Consultants, *National Library of Wales Quinquennial Review: Stage II Final Report* (2002), 33–8. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.196.1091&rep=rep1&type=pdf

64 National Museums and Galleries of Wales, *Annual Report of the Council 1998–1999* (n.p.: National Museums and Galleries of Wales, 1999), 26; National Museums and Galleries of Wales, *Annual Report of the Council 1999–2000* (n.p.: National Museums and Galleries of Wales, 2000), 24.

65 National Assembly for Wales, Members' Research Service, *Topic Brief – Museums, Archives and Libraries* (Cardiff: National Assembly, 2007), 1.

66 A. Pugh, 'Welcome Message,' *CyMAL Magazine* 1 (Winter 2005): 2.

67 National Assembly for Wales, Members' Research Service, *Topic Brief*, 1.

68 National Assembly for Wales, *Comprehensive, Efficient and Modern Public Libraries for Wales: Standards and Monitoring* (Cardiff: National Assembly, 2001), 2.

69 National Assembly for Wales, *Comprehensive, Efficient and Modern Public Libraries for Wales* .

70 Welsh Assembly Government, CyMAL, *Maintaining a Valued Service* (2011).

71 Scotinform Ltd, *Evaluation of Libraries Inspire: Mid-Term Review Report – Final* (Edinburgh: Scotinform, 2014).

72 Welsh Assembly Government, CyMAL: Museums, Archives and Libraries Wales, *A Museums Strategy for Wales* (n.p.: CyMAL, 2010).

73 National Assembly for Wales, Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee, *Public Libraries in Wales* (Cardiff Bay: National Assembly for Wales Commission, 2014), 9–10. http://www.assembly.wales/Laid%20Documents/CR-LD9868%20Report%20by%20the%20Communities,%20Equality%20and%20Local%20Government%20Committee%20on%20public%20libraries%20in%20Wales/CR-LD9868-e.pdf

74 National Assembly for Wales, Communities, Equality and Local Government Committee, *Public Libraries in Wales*, 17.

75 Archives Council and Records Council Wales/Archives Wales, *Find Your Archives* (2013). http://www.archiveswales.org.uk/find-your-archive/

76 Archives Council and Records Council Wales/Archives Wales, *Catalog Cymru: An Audit of Uncatalogued Collections in the Records Repositories of Wales* (2008), 1. http://www.archiveswales.org.uk/

fileadmin/arcw/doc/CATALOG-CYMRU_eng.pdf

77 Labour Party Wales and Plaid Cymru, *One Wales: A Progressive Agenda for the Government of Wales* (Cardiff: Welsh Assembly Government, 2007), 34.

78 National Assembly for Wales, *Memorandum … The Draft National Assembly for Wales (Legislative Competence Order) (Culture and Other Fields) Order 2010* (Cardiff: National Assembly, 2010), 5. http://www.assembly.wales/Laid%20Documents/LCO-LD7918-EM%20-%20The%20Draft%20National%20Assembly%20for%20Wales%20(Legislative%20Competence)%20(Culture%20and%20other%20fields)%20Order-18022010-167947/lco-ld7918-em-e-English.pdf

79 Welsh Government, Five-Year Legislative Plan, *Legislation: Legislative programme* (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2013). http://web.archive.org/web/20150302050752/http://gov.wales/legislation/programme/?lang=en

80 Welsh Government, *Programme for Government Annual Report June 2013, Annex* (Cardiff: Welsh Government, 2013). http://gov.wales/docs/strategies/130604annex12en.pdf

81 Welsh Government, *Fusion: Tackling Poverty Through Culture.*.

82 Prince Edward Island, Department of Finance, Energy and Municipal Affairs, *Prince Edward Island Estimates of Revenue and Expenditures, 2014–2015* (Charlottetown, PE: The Department PEI, Department of Finance, Energy and Municipal Affairs, 2014), 10, 115–20.

83 Welsh Government, *Supplementary Budget, June 2014* (2014): 13, 23–5.

84 E. ap Gwilym, 'Spending Review Heralds More Economic Pain for Wales,' *clickonwales*, 25 June 2013. http://www.clickonwales.org/2013/06/spending-review-heralds-more-economic-pain-for-wales/

85 ap Gwilym, 'Spending Review Heralds More Economic Pain for Wales'; R. Ross, 'Province's Finance Minister Cries Foul over Flaherty's Transfer Comments,' *The Guardian* (Charlottetown), 27 April 2011.

86 Wales Audit Office, *Health Finances 2012–13 and beyond* (Cardiff: Wales Audit Office, 2013). http://www.audit.wales/publication/health-finances-2012-13-and-beyond; Corpus Sanchez International Consultancy, *An Integrated Health System Review in PEI* (2008). http://www.gov.pe.ca/photos/original/doh_csi_report.pdf

87 Labour Party Wales and Plaid Cymru, *One Wales* , 37.

London Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 31 (2016). This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited• UCL Press• Print ISSN 0267-2200 • Online ISSN 1475-1674 • DOI 10.14324/111.444.ljcs.2016v31.007

The Multiple Deindustrializations of Canada's Maritime Provinces and the Evaluation of Heritage-Related Urban Regeneration[1]

Jane H. Reid and John G. Reid

Abstract

The Maritime provinces of Canada share with many other nations the experience of nineteenth-century industrialization and twentieth-century deindustrialization. For deindustrialized areas, the social and environmental pressures imposed by deindustrialization are frequently held to be open to mitigation through urban regeneration projects that seek to build on existing cultural heritage and ultimately enable communities to thrive in both cultural and economic terms. In the Maritime provinces, however, two factors have greatly complicated the emergence of effective urban regeneration. One is the historical complexity of both industrialization and deindustrialization in the region, while the other is the critical weakness of evaluation criteria for defining success in urban regeneration and thus assessing the effectiveness of regeneration projects. Without advocating the adoption of a 'one-size-fits-all' model, and recognizing the complexity – even intractability – of the 'wicked problems' that attend any regeneration project, this essay will argue that historical and policy-related analysis can be combined to generate a regional approach to urban regeneration and its evaluation, which will take account of the need to maintain existing cultural integrity and to support processes of policy learning and social learning.

Introduction

The Maritime provinces of Canada – New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island (PEI) – share with many nations the experience of nineteenth-century industrialization and twentieth-century deindustrialization. For deindustrialized areas, the social and environmental pressures imposed by deindustrialization are frequently held to be open to mitigation through urban regeneration projects that seek to build on existing cultural heritage and ultimately enable communities to thrive in both cultural and economic terms. Yet two factors can greatly complicate the emergence of effective urban regeneration. One is cultural and historical. Urban regeneration that is explicitly connected to cultural heritage depends crucially on an accurate understanding of the historical memory that underpins any heritage sensibility. Industrialization and deindustrialization are complex processes that typically leave mixed and often contested historical memories. Secondly – since urban regeneration projects depend on approval by public authorities and are often funded wholly or partly by public funds – the policy framework is also of central importance. As an element of this framework, the process of evaluation forms a notably important, and often forgotten or underestimated, part. Urban policy, in which, in Canada, municipalities are by their nature accountable to other levels of government, is an area in which evaluation is critical to the making, review and persistence of policy. It is the engine of accountability and the process by which ongoing policy can benefit from iterative change and future urban interventions can be informed. At the same time, however, effective evaluation of urban regeneration projects depends in turn on early intervention and the application of consistent and well-founded criteria. In the absence of effective evaluation, regeneration projects may risk becoming haphazard and ineffective. Equally important is the recognition that the absence of evaluation is obviously a hindrance to an exploration of what does or does not work. The complexity of the historical and cultural factors with which regeneration deals, notably particularly in post-industrial areas, demands a rigorous evaluation of outcomes and outputs in order to inform future policy and promote policy learning, which, particularly in the context of complex cultural and historical urban regeneration initiatives, can lead in turn to 'reflexive social learning'.[2]

Both of these factors apply to urban regeneration in the wake of industrialization and deindustrialization in the Maritime provinces. Nineteenth-century industrialization in the Maritimes was

geographically uneven and distributed among cities, smaller towns and even rural areas. Deindustrialization was a lengthy process, originating in the nineteenth century itself with the decline of shipping and shipbuilding but attaining new dimensions with the undermining of heavy industry from the 1920s onwards and extending into the 1990s and beyond. Along with the decline of industries directly depending on the steam-and-steel economy, severe fluctuations also took place in resource-based industries that depended on export – ranging from fisheries to mining and pulp and paper production. Accordingly, regeneration efforts cross a broad spectrum of circumstances as well as both societal and environmental challenges. Moreover, recognized guidance and evaluation criteria for regeneration programmes are largely absent. The lack of recognized criteria is owed in part, of course, to the status of the three provinces as separate jurisdictions – each responsible for its own urban policy – as well as, more broadly, the nature of Canadian federalism. In a more unitary state – such as the United Kingdom, even though centrifugal trends arising from devolution and possible Scottish independence are arguably on the ascendant there – central policy guidance is more feasible. Yet state guidance tends understandably to concentrate on economic and fiscal outcomes, rather than engaging with the more intricate social, cultural and environmental issues that are central to the development and sustainability of any project. We argue that, in the Maritime provinces, historical and policy-related analysis can be combined to generate a regional approach to urban regeneration and its evaluation that will take account of the need to maintain existing cultural integrity while promoting both policy learning and social learning and embracing the opportunities offered by regeneration initiatives.

Industrial history of the Maritimes

The industrial past of the Maritime provinces is as complex in terms of historical analysis as it has become in cultural memory. The origins of such complexity lie in part in the unusual characteristics of the era of early non-indigenous exploitation of the region's natural resources. Here, resource exploitation pre-dated substantial and geographically extensive settlement by almost three centuries. Thus, any period of colonial history worthy of the name was severely truncated when compared to other areas of eastern North America. European fishers of various nationalities frequented the coastlines from approximately

1500 onwards and the small-scale fur trade that developed soon afterwards was transformed by the late sixteenth century into a pursuit that was profitable independently of the fisheries. Resource harvesting, in collaboration in the case of the fur trade with indigenous peoples, led to attempts at colonial settlement in the early seventeenth century. While these efforts gave rise to securely founded French colonial communities populated by the settlers whose descendants became known as Acadians, the geographical reach of settlement itself – though its social and economic reach was extended by largely waterborne transportation routes – was limited, and was largely confined to a handful of areas bordering the Bay of Fundy. Imperial and other considerations led in the first half of the eighteenth century not only to a small British outpost at Annapolis Royal, but also to larger and strongly defended towns at, respectively, Louisbourg and Halifax. Still, however, these places had only a small geographical footprint and their ability to encroach on indigenous territory was not only fragile and dependent on diplomacy but was also further retrenched by the British expulsion of the Acadians between 1755 and 1762. While the prospect of British expansion was enhanced by treaty-making with indigenous nations in 1760–1 and by the abandonment of French imperial claims in the Treaty of Paris (1763), following the fall of Louisbourg some five years earlier, the reality of large-scale settlement expansion had to await the Loyalist migration after the American Revolutionary War and subsequent waves of immigration from the British Isles. By 1820, the non-indigenous populations of the Maritime colonies totalled a modest figure of some 200,000.[3]

Also by the early nineteenth century, however, urbanization had begun on a small scale. Halifax remained the largest town at some 11,000 by 1817,[4] but the Loyalist settlement of Saint John, New Brunswick, had expanded rapidly to more than 10,000 by 1824.[5] It remained true that society in the Maritime colonies was largely rural. Some smaller towns had emerged on the basis of essentially rural resource harvesting in areas such as fisheries and timber production, while others were market towns for agricultural areas. Military and naval outlays represented a major economic factor in Halifax, and to a lesser degree elsewhere, while other public expenditures figured modestly both there and in smaller government centres such as Charlottetown, Fredericton and Sydney. Capital accumulation stemmed overwhelmingly from merchant activity – based essentially on resource exports and military or naval contracting – and social mobility depended largely on successful (or, in the case of downward mobility, unsuccessful) participation in local,

regional and imperial trade networks. Importation from the West Indies, Great Britain and the United States supplied a large proportion of needs for both foodstuffs and manufactured items.[6] Thus, domestic goods production was confined primarily to pre-industrial trade and craft settings, and frequently associated directly with transportation and trading needs such as coopering and sail-making. Coal mining was longstanding in Cape Breton Island, but despite elaborate plans canvassed during that colony's autonomous existence from 1784 to 1820, the scale remained stubbornly small.[7]

However, trade itself provided the impetus for a significant expansion of manufacturing activity during the first half of the nineteenth century. The British need for timber during the Napoleonic Wars had created what was, for all practical purposes, a new export trade and the scale of the demand for this commodity from a rapidly industrializing metropolis ensured that the trade would continue postwar. This trade and others required, in turn, investment in transportation. Although the beginnings of an economy rooted in steam power were concurrent, the most cost-effective oceanic freight transportation remained wooden sailing ships. Shipbuilding emerged by the 1820s as the first manufacturing industry – even though it was based on a disparate complex of often tiny yards – that was regional in scope and was shared by towns large and small and even by small coastal or riverine communities.[8] The availability of timber was ubiquitous, even in the eventually depleting forests of Prince Edward Island, and timber itself provided a high-volume commodity that was eminently exportable. The demand, to be sure, varied according to the vicissitudes of the British economy, and recessions such as that of the late 1840s could wreak havoc among the merchant houses of even such a now-substantial city as Saint John. Nevertheless, the trade was resilient and it was complemented by shorter-range export trades to New England and elsewhere, through which less durable commodities such as fish and agricultural products could be marketed. Larger merchants operated ships as well as building them, as researchers at Memorial University established conclusively during the 1980s, contradicting earlier interpretive understandings that shipbuilding and ship-owning were largely separate.[9] In that linkage, however, lay the origins of later decline. Steam and steel did not replace wood and wind in any rapid or simple pattern. Wooden shipping remained viable in some contexts well into the twentieth century, notably in the continuing use of fishing schooners. For merchant houses that relied on the timely seizure of emerging investment opportunities, however, there increasingly existed attractive alternatives to building

and operating wooden ships. Investment in the Canadian west – where the indigenous economy had recently been destroyed and replaced by a non-indigenous economy with accelerating rates of growth – was one such alternative, while even within the Maritimes new industries were emerging by the early 1880s. The decline of wooden shipbuilding represented the region's first substantial deindustrialization.

It was a deindustrialization that has often been misunderstood, even by historians who exaggerated its effects. It was gradual, with certain shipbuilding centres – notably Maitland, Nova Scotia, in the 1880s – actually intensifying their shipbuilding operations while others declined. Because some merchants shifted their investment to land-based industry, such as a cotton mill, in the same community where ships had been constructed, local unemployment did not necessarily ensue. Nevertheless, in conjunction with a retrenchment in agriculture at the turn of the twentieth century, stemming from competition not only from western Canada but also (in the era of refrigerated shipping) from Australia and New Zealand, the decline of wooden shipbuilding led to substantial migration away from rural areas and small towns and towards centres of newer industries and out of the region altogether. For some places, shipbuilding could not and would not be replaced and decline became a pressing threat. Sub-regions that experienced lasting dislocation included the coastal area of Nova Scotia from Great Village to Advocate Harbour, while on a larger scale much of Prince Edward Island had to develop a resilience founded on successive efforts to reach outside markets for diverse Island products.[10] There were extensive areas of the Maritimes, however, where the new industries came to prevail. Entry into Canada – New Brunswick and Nova Scotia as founding provinces in 1867, Prince Edward Island as a slightly later entrant in 1873 – brought exposure to the influence of federal policy. The joining of all the provinces by railway construction took a significant step in 1879, when New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were linked to Quebec. Rail ferries would link Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton Island to the main lines. Also in 1879, the federal government's National Policy took effect, offering tariff incentives on the import of raw materials for processing by Canadian manufacturers. In the Maritimes, partial but rapid industrialization followed. In cities and towns, and even in some rural communities, cotton mills, sugar refineries, steel mills and other plants sprang up. Coal mining increased dramatically in scale on the region's four coalfields – at the time the only known source of coal in Canada. An industrial future seemed to beckon.[11]

The deindustrialization that followed only 40 or so years later was a phenomenon the causes of which have been exhaustively debated by later historians. For some, the seeds had been sown soon after the very emergence of the new industries, as under-capitalized merchants, who were also inexperienced in manufacturing as opposed to commerce, succumbed to cyclical recessions and lost control of their factories to better-funded competitors from Quebec and Ontario.[12] For other historians, the responsibility rested more heavily on Maritime merchants and financiers themselves, as they continuously sought better returns by exporting their capital rather than reinvesting it at home.[13] For yet others, shifting federal policies were to blame, as Maritime representatives were increasingly outnumbered in Parliament by central and western Canadians, and the safeguards built in originally to the National Policy were eroded.[14] Most plausibly, a combination of such factors had emerged by the beginning of the 1920s and it quickly proved lethal when combined with international excess capacity in key industries following the First World War. During what was remembered in some parts of the industrialized world as 'the roaring twenties', the Maritime economy suffered from major plant closures and retrenchments, wholesale unemployment and a level of out-migration that reached drastic proportions during the first half of the decade.[15] Desperate rearguard actions by, for example, the United Mine Workers in Cape Breton succeeded in mitigating some wage reductions but could not stem the more general tide of decline. The second major deindustrialization of the Maritimes left its scars in all of the larger cities and many of the smaller towns that had come within a short span of years to rely on heavy manufacturing.

Some of the industries, however, persisted. Coal continued to be mined, although on a reduced scale. Steel continued to be made in centres such as Sydney and Trenton, again in quantities adapted not only to the reductions of the 1920s but also to the international depression that prevailed during the following decade. Some other manufactures, including secondary steel, also survived in places. With the onset of the Second World War and the mobilization of industrial capacity throughout Canada, all of these sources of production were at least temporarily reinvigorated. As E.R. Forbes showed many years ago, however, the federal state exercised close control over war production, and its priorities did not favour any lasting revival of the Maritimes as an industrial node. Not only were shipping repairs shifted to Quebec, with dubious strategic implications, but also Ontario steel manufacturers were plied with subsidies largely denied to the Sydney steel mill.[16] The

result was that Maritime industries, and notably the Sydney plant, had scant opportunity to build genuine renewal on wartime activity.

Although fears that a deep recession might follow the end of the Second World War – just as had taken place after the previous conflict – were far from implausible, there were safeguards for the time being. By the early 1950s, and for 20 or more years thereafter, the Canadian economy grew rapidly. While the Maritimes did not share fully either in the expansion or in the employment it created, and instead began again to lose large numbers of out-migrants to other areas of the country, nevertheless rising levels of demand for manufactured goods created some opportunities for those industries that persisted. Moreover, with overall economic expansion came dramatically increasing federal revenues, and with them increases in transfers to the provinces and also – with effective political representation by Maritime premiers – innovative regional development programmes. Industrial stresses remained and were dramatically illustrated in 1967 when the Sydney steel plant, with some 3,000 employees at the time, was narrowly saved from closure by being put under the control of a provincial crown corporation, while a federal crown corporation was charged with overseeing the expected extinction of coal mining in Cape Breton and mitigating it as far as possible by introducing new employers. Regional development subsidies and other sources of revenue enabled the provinces to act imaginatively with a similar goal. In Nova Scotia, it might be heavy water plants in Cape Breton, high-technology manufacturing in Pictou County, or Michelin tyre factories in selected rural areas. In New Brunswick, it was making luxury automobiles or introducing home-produced nuclear power. Prince Edward Island, in conjunction with Ottawa, developed a complex economic plan that envisaged scaling down agriculture in favour of service trades such as tourism and some light manufacturing. At the same time, secondary steel manufactures were able to hang on in some places, while rising public expenditures in areas such as health and education joined with such other factors as transportation activity in the ports and a move in each province towards systematic marketing of tourism to create at least a pale impression of postwar prosperity.[17]

With the slowing of the economy during the 1970s, however, and the entry of governments into deficit financing, the third major deindustrialization of the Maritimes intervened. It was not complete or comprehensive, in that some of the initiatives of earlier years survived and prospered. Michelin factories, despite controversies over the company's labour policies, persisted in, ultimately, three locations

in Nova Scotia. Industrial Marine Products (IMP), which had begun its aerospace operations in Halifax in 1970, expanded to own plants in Amherst and elsewhere. Food processing – whether of seafood in coastal areas or of agriculturally derived products such as French fries – had a strong presence in New Brunswick, and French fry production also became a major employer in Prince Edward Island. New Brunswick, its Official Languages Act passed in 1969, reaped the benefit of offering a bilingual workforce in key areas of the province. Manufacturing industry, therefore, supplemented other sectors such as service and retail industries, and resource and energy production, to maintain areas of economic strength. Nevertheless, the post-1970 era also saw substantial deindustrialization. Many of the new ventures that had begun with high hopes and regional development subsidies, including some that had been seen as mega-projects, proved short-lived. The Bricklin automobile ceased production in New Brunswick amid cost over-runs. The production of Clairtone televisions in Pictou County, Nova Scotia, lasted only a short time, while the two heavy water plants in Cape Breton were scarcely more successful, even though the one in Glace Bay soldiered on until 1985.[18] And so it went. Older industries suffered too. Still in Cape Breton, the Sydney steel plant limped along with increasingly controversial provincial subsidies before it was sold to a private-sector company in 2001 for dismantling, and immediately ceased operations. The last major coal mine closed in the same year, replicating the experience on the other coalfields in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The old heavy industries had now effectively disappeared from the region, as had a significant proportion of the new manufactures that had been intended to replace them.

Industry and historical memory

The deindustrializations of the Maritimes, therefore, were complex in their causes and staggered in their chronology. Their cultural assimilation, and embodiment in public memory, also had significant complexities. The initiatives of the post-war decades, except insofar as they survived, had minimal impact on public memory. They were ephemeral, and perceived to be outside the boundaries of rational economic planning. The major exception, the Bricklin automobile project in New Brunswick, has generated a considerable literature as an example of the quixotic temperament not only of Malcolm Bricklin but also of the premier of the day, Richard Hatfield.[19] Thus, the Bricklin

has come to stand as a symbol of impractically romantic values and of their supposed place in the political culture of the era – notwithstanding that Hatfield's position in favour of bilingualism made him one of the principal architects of modern New Brunswick in a thoroughly practical sense – and certainly not as an appropriate foundation for urban renewal of any kind.

The older heavy industries, notably coal and steel, have generated historical memories that are more robust in at least two major respects. The role of trade unions – and especially of District 26 of the United Mine Workers of America and its most influential leader of the early decades of the twentieth century, James Bryson McLachlan – has persisted in memory in many places. Treatments of McLachlan's life have ranged from a major scholarly biography[20] to a popular ballad,[21] and a prominent face of his monument in Glace Bay expounds in McLachlan's own words his commitment to 'telling children the truth about the history of the world' – the history, that is, of working people as opposed to that 'of Kings, or Lords or Cabinets'.[22] Also commemorated by a monument, in nearby New Waterford, is William Davis, a striking miner who was shot and killed by company police in 1925. Labour memorials, more generally, populate the map of all the provinces.[23] Not all commemorate workers in urban settings, or in manufacturing or mining industries, but collectively they represent a powerful element of public memory focused in part on the legacy of the heavy industries that dated from the second half of the nineteenth century. The second persistent form of popular memory of such industries is environmental. Again, Cape Breton provides a prime example, though not the only one. Waste products of the coke ovens that produced fuel for the Sydney steel mill formed a toxic lake in the heart of the city known as the tar ponds. 'Welcome to the Gates of Hell,' proclaimed a hand-lettered but durable sign that long highlighted the environmental dangers associated with the site.[24] That by 2013, after procrastination and many false starts, the site had been reclaimed and turned over to 'green' industries is one indication of the power of environmental challenges to provide an incentive for regeneration. Elsewhere, more cultural factors have come into play, leading to the creation of miners' museums in Glace Bay and Springhill and a more general provincial Museum of Industry in Stellarton – all important employers and generators of tourism and all evincing the trade union heritage along with the culture and the material culture of an important, though troubled, industrial past.

However, undoubtedly the most visible public memory of an industrial past, and the legacy most often evoked for purposes of urban

regeneration, has been that of shipping and shipbuilding. Frequently attributed a past significance that sits uneasily with more recent historical analyses, the age of sail – with its associated material culture in the form of vessels, lighthouses and waterfront facilities – has been repeatedly drawn upon for tourist and other regenerative purposes. Indeed, waterfronts in general have emerged as a recurrent theme of urban regeneration in the region, whether in larger urban centres such as Halifax, Saint John and Sydney, or medium to smaller ones such as Charlottetown or Pictou. The public memory involved has been deep-seated and long-established. As early as during the 1920s there emerged the mythology of the Golden Age of the Maritimes. This was perhaps compensating for the deep economic problems of the era – especially in mining and heavy manufacturing – and setting up a nostalgic source of pride in the past existence of a more vigorous economy based on shipbuilding expertise and trading activities that spanned the navigable oceans of the world. The myth could have a darker side in the hands of those who contended that Maritime entrepreneurship had ultimately proved lacking and that, accordingly, the region had been the poor relation of more productive areas of Canada ever since the supposedly abrupt collapse soon after Confederation. But the imagery of industrious shipbuilders, bold merchants and intrepid navigators was compelling enough and eminently saleable for tourist purposes, especially if for some the baleful constraints of Confederation itself could be blamed for the undermining of it all.[25]

Industrial heritage and urban regeneration

Public memory of the industrial past of the Maritimes, therefore, is just as complex as the history of the deindustrializations that have punctuated that past. But what do these complexities mean for the realities of urban regeneration? Urban regeneration in a heritage- and culture-driven context is complicated by the reality that all initiatives (notably those that are closely connected with tourism, such as waterfronts) offer in some sense a physical representation of a particular version of historical memory. Regeneration efforts in the Maritime provinces have been numerous and disparate, rural as well as urban. Prominent among the rural examples is the conversion of the large Marysville cotton mill, a National Historic Site in a village setting some 5 kilometres from the central district of Fredericton, into a provincial office building, still adjoined by the Italianate buildings

that formed the managers' and workers' housing.[26] Urban projects are characterized most frequently by museums and monuments, by avowedly environmental renewals, and by waterfronts. Clearly, in the difficult economic context of the region that reaches far back into the past, and has been especially evident since the 1970s, urban regeneration of any effective kind – the reinvigoration of urban areas as contributors to social, cultural and economic vitality – offers valuable opportunities, and individual initiatives should not be lightly disparaged. Yet the absence of a consistent urban policy framework, and the piecemeal nature of the efforts launched, tends to raise both specific and general questions. Some have to do with waterfronts themselves: their strengths and limitations, and whether they tend to produce healthy linkages with nearby retail and residential areas, or whether they carry a danger of encapsulating economic development in a restricted setting. More generally, how far can heritage-related developments readily incorporate residential elements, so that they become places where people live at the same time as capturing community-driven historical memory, and how far does a concentration on tourist marketing discourage such mixed uses? Similarly, how can museums and monuments be integrated most effectively into the cultural fabric of a regenerated area? Is the Marysville model of an integrated historic district one that larger centres might emulate more closely? And how is it best to integrate environmental health as an essential value of any urban regeneration – not just one such as the tar ponds development that is explicitly environmental in its goals?

These are questions that have varying answers depending on the place or initiative to which they are applied, but it is questions such as these that collectively bring to the forefront the importance of evaluation regeneration activities. Regeneration itself is a complex and slippery concept. Libby Porter and Kate Shaw usefully define regeneration as constituting 'reinvestment in a place after a period of disinvestment'.[27] For Sara Dodds, urban regeneration represents a complex of strategies brought to bear when social, economic and infrastructure decay in given areas have become so pronounced that market forces alone cannot reverse the tide.[28] Regeneration, then, characteristically involves targeted investment that aims to combat decline. While private involvement in regeneration projects is common, and may even be a leading factor depending on the project, public expenditure is a necessary component of regeneration that fulfills the criterion of inability to rely on market forces. Yet how regeneration should be undertaken is an even more difficult question, as it is necessary to

grapple with the social, economic, environmental, physical and cultural elements of regeneration, and question how they relate to each other and how they can be properly balanced. Not considered in this essay are regeneration efforts focusing wholly or largely on ameliorating physical infrastructure (roads, industrial parks and the like), which has been a central concern of regional development programmes since their initiation during the 1960s.[29] The focus is, rather, on heritage-related redevelopment of post-industrial areas, in which cultural considerations are crucial and, more specifically, the historical memory of a given place must be built upon successfully. This is particularly true of areas such as waterfront developments, where the attraction of tourism is often a central goal. As noted above, waterfront regeneration areas in the Maritime provinces, such as those of Halifax and Lunenburg, are tied closely to the area's shipbuilding past, which is deeply engrained in the historical memory of the province of Nova Scotia.

Indeed, in many cases the best practice for urban regeneration – whether based explicitly on heritage and culture, or defined more generally – is for an initiative to be 'place-based' and to avoid a cookie cutter-style regeneration typical of the 1980s and 1990s. David Harvey warns of the dangers of 'serial reproduction' of past successful regeneration efforts, including waterfront developments themselves, as well as trade and convention centres, and even large-scale shopping malls.[30] A place-based approach to regeneration aims to make a more comprehensive appraisal of the needs of a place; it moves beyond simply considering the need for physical infrastructure to consider as well the social and cultural infrastructure required by the community.[31] This comprehensive appraisal of place is necessary when considering how to approach regeneration, for a reason that reaches back into the complexity of the process. Regeneration often deals with the most convoluted of problems – 'wicked problems'[32] – for which the only solutions are ones that will bridge traditional sectoral and departmental boundaries in order to provide creative solutions. The consideration of culture and heritage is integral to the successful implementation of place-based regeneration. Historical memory, and the interpretation through it of local heritage and culture, forms an important part of regeneration, not just for tourist purposes, but to help determine the bond or link that the community is able to form with the regenerated area. Atlantic Canada, like many parts of Northern England, Wales and Scotland, is an area rich with post-industrial history, deeply entrenched in both the culture and the identity of the area. Fred Taggart commented on the meaning of industrial buildings to community members: 'people

who worked in them see them as part of their lives, are proud of what was achieved there and appreciate the buildings as icons for their local community'.[33] Heritage has both cultural and economic value,[34] and both are significant when considering the role of heritage in regeneration. Using the cultural aspects of heritage in regeneration can give a local identity to communities, which, either due to the processes of deindustrialization, or of globalization, have begun to lose a sense of place.[35]

At the same time, however, the relationship between heritage and regeneration has ample capacity to become a troubled one. Heritage, argued Brian Graham, is 'that part of the past which we select in the present for contemporary purposes'.[36] As Lachlan B. Barber has recently illustrated in a Halifax context, heritage is an inherently contested concept.[37] When applied to urban regeneration, one person's venerated heritage can be another's memory of oppression, and considerations of gender, ethnicity and social class are never far from the discussion. More generally, the process of incorporating heritage into regeneration is susceptible to the criticism of being a process of 'sanitization' of historical memory,[38] implying both selection of a heritage that will identify a place, and commodification of that heritage for the public and a possible tourist market. Heritage can create a link to the past and an identity for a community, and in areas of Atlantic Canada it provides small deindustrialized communities with the potential to attract tourism. But heritage and regeneration also run the risk of commodifying the past for future gain,[39] leading not only to distortion of historical memory but also to the risk of alienation from, rather than integration with, community values, and also to a loss even of the economic benefits that potentially flow from the accurate reflection of identity through space and the urban 'animation' that can result.[40]

The roles of evaluation and evaluation guidance

The complexity of the task of regeneration, owing to the severity of the problems that it tackles and the hazards arising from the necessary association with culture and heritage values, is a key reason why effectively evaluating regeneration is essential. The incorporation of heritage in regeneration has both cultural and economic repercussions, and thus can have effects on both the social and economic levels of regeneration. Information gleaned from the evaluation of past regeneration initiatives can aid in understanding the cultural,

economic, environmental and physical impact of interventions through the processes of policy learning. Evaluation should not be solely a way of measuring the efficiency with which a policy or programme works, although that is one of its roles. More broadly, it can also be a generator of policy learning, understood as a 'change in thinking … a structured, conscious change in thinking about a specific policy issue'.[41] Ian Sanderson reflects that this action of policy learning also promotes 'reflexive social learning', and that this action of policy and social learning 'informed by policy and programme evaluation constitutes an increasingly important basis for "interactive governance"'.[42]

The process of policy learning, particularly in a field such as urban regeneration that has a complex historical and cultural context, can facilitate not only policy learning to inform future regeneration endeavours, but also social learning in two related senses: continued community-driven development and evolution of historical memory based on an iterative social learning process as historical memory grows and develops; and a form of interactive governance that can result from ongoing dialogue between regeneration planning and the heritage sensibilities of the surrounding community. As Willeen Keough has pointed out with respect to Irish heritage initiatives in the development of cultural tourism in Newfoundland, 'residents have been active in shaping and reshaping the cultural landscape in which they live', reflecting 'a contemporary and adaptive response that is unquestionably an economic survival strategy, yet is also, more significantly, an attempt to maintain cultural community and continuity in the face of significant social and economic upheaval'.[43] Evaluation has the ability to provide a forum through which community and regenerative development can inform one another. As noted by Penny Gerstein and Leonora Angeles, 'reflexive social learning within the context of participatory monitoring and evaluation, integrated impact assessments, or participatory budgeting … can constitute an important basis for participatory governance'.[44] Within a social learning environment, as facilitated by evaluation in the context of complex urban regeneration, reflection on the interpretation of historical memory can take place. This in turn can promote more 'interactive governance' in the field of complex cultural and historical urban regeneration interventions, encouraging communities to voice their own understanding and view of collective historical memory, allowing a community-driven understanding of historical memory to grow and develop, and thus shaping the process of regeneration.

Yet the evaluation of regeneration programmes and policies is certainly as complex as the formation and implementation of regeneration efforts themselves. Evaluation of urban development initiatives in Atlantic Canada has an extended history, notably as implemented by the federal agency ACOA, the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency.[45] As Donald Savoie has recently argued, however, programme evaluation in Canada has all too often been ineffective, as well as suffering from the narrow application of quantitative, and so easily measurable, criteria at the expense of qualitative assessment – resulting, in Savoie's analogy, in 'turning cranks that are not attached to anything'.[46] These shortcomings have especial significance for heritage-related regeneration, in two important respects. First, and most obviously, conventional evaluations as analysed by Savoie are clearly inadequate to encompass the complexities of the place-based approach as defined by Neil Bradford.[47] Secondly, because qualitative considerations and sensitivity to place are inherent in heritage-related urban regeneration, this field has the potential to become a leading area for innovative approaches to evaluation, and one in which evaluation guidance is necessarily qualitative as much as quantitative. Simply put, if regeneration programmes and policies embrace a place-based ethos, then it follows that a place-based approach should be adopted for the evaluation of these programmes. If the role of evaluation is to gain insight into the consequences of regeneration, either positive or negative,[48] in order to promote policy learning and feedback, then a comprehensive evaluation must consider not only the physical and economic results of regeneration but the social, cultural and environmental impacts as well. Place-based evaluation, like place-based regeneration itself, can and must tap into local knowledge and consider local experience. Accordingly, a deepening relationship of regeneration to historical and cultural understandings is not only possible through reflexive social learning but is also a necessary and integral element of evaluation in this area.

Implied in this principle is a wider view of evaluation that far from being a pro forma expression of fiscal accountability, rather it is an essential component in the process by which complex goals can be met through state investment. Savoie indicates the political nature of evaluation in the Canadian context, commenting that public servants remain wary of programme evaluation as 'a kind of "gotcha" tool',[49] which inevitably means that evaluations will have difficulty in highlighting the pitfalls and weaknesses of departmental programmes. It is here that guidance is crucial. While honouring the importance of context and place in the evaluation of regeneration areas, government guidance

on the evaluation of regeneration can form an effective framework to help ensure the successful evaluation of regeneration activities. Moreover, having guidance in place can tend to enhance the degree to which evaluation is integral to any given project from the outset, and is not merely an afterthought; without proper benchmark measures, accurate evaluation can be problematic, making the integration of evaluation into the project from the outset of paramount importance. Although some countries, such as the United Kingdom, offer structured guidance on the evaluation of regeneration, Canada does not. This is owed in part to the nature of Canadian federalism, with municipalities and urban affairs being the creature of the provinces. The government of Canada implemented its first government-wide evaluation policy in 1977,[50] with revisions in 1991, 2001 and 2009. This evaluation policy certainly indicates the commitment of the federal government to the monitoring and evaluation of programmes and while it is a vital exercise at the federal level, provincial jurisdiction on urban affairs means that federal evaluation policy does not always have to be applied.

Certainly, government guidance on evaluation elsewhere, such as the United Kingdom's government guidance on regeneration evaluation, Assessing the Impacts of Spatial Interventions: Regeneration, Renewal and Regional Development: '*The 3Rs Guidance*', released by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in the United Kingdom in 2004, is not without its detractors. The tenor of the critiques reflects in part the concerns expressed by Savoie for Canada. Suet Ying Ho, for example, stated in examining British approaches to evaluating urban regeneration that 'the current … government approach to evaluation is based on the ideology of value for money and hence skews towards the "stocktaking" of programme outputs'.[51] Prior to the implementation of specific government guidance on how these regeneration programmes should be evaluated, concerns were raised as to the ability to evaluate properly the effects of these policies. H. Lim stated that regeneration was 'too general in contact and conclusions, a situation clouded by the fact that there were no clear guidelines as to how the effects of these developments should be evaluated'.[52] But due to a largely indicator-based (quantitative) approach to evaluation that was used by the UK government in its '3Rs' guidance, the guidance is said to have the tendency 'to ignore indicators that required a more subjective or qualitative assessment, given that these tended to be more difficult to measure'.[53]

For all that, to observe that government guidance on evaluation in the United Kingdom has not escaped the shortcomings to which

programme evaluation is frequently susceptible is not to establish that these restrictions can never be transcended. Rather, it is cause to anticipate that a field such as heritage-related urban regeneration is ideally suited to model a more comprehensive approach to guidance, and to expect that an evaluation will remain culturally sensitive and place-based while taking guidance from a formal framework. The success of evaluation of regeneration is strongly dependent on the collection of baseline data and the ability to comment on change. This change can be considered only if current observations can be compared to those collected prior to the beginning of a regeneration programme. Indeed, one of the problems associated with regeneration evaluation is the inability of predicting the counterfactual[54] – there is no way to know what would have happened in an area if no regeneration programme or policy had been implemented. There is no question that the place-based element of evaluation should never be compromised. Indeed, linking an evaluation to the history and culture of a place allows a deeper understanding of the effect of a regeneration project on a community scale. A formal policy document, therefore, should not aim to generalize the evaluation of regeneration. Rather, evaluation guidance aimed specifically at the evaluation of regeneration could help clarify the expectations of regeneration evaluations and the roles of the various departments and governmental levels that are often involved in work in Canadian cities. Moreover, evaluation focused in this way can enable processes of policy learning and social learning to promote more interactive forms of governance. These processes can inform future culturally and historically based urban regeneration projects and also allow for community reflection regarding the interpretation of historical memory by any particular urban regeneration intervention. Canada has acknowledged its cities as playing a key role in the productivity and competitiveness of Canada as a whole. Consequently, a 'joined-up' and comprehensive evaluation platform for urban areas is becoming more and more important. Although they remain creatures of the province, cities play an integral role in Canada as a whole. Regeneration strategies require both the context of place-based evaluation and the structure of government guidance in order to foster successfully an understanding of how and why regeneration programmes do or do not work in Canadian cities. This is certainly no longer a concern that is limited to municipalities, or even to provincial governments, and yet the constitutional division of responsibilities complicates any attempt to bring urban issues under the aegis of federal evaluation policy.

Evaluation guidance and the Maritimes

In a Maritime context, evaluation of urban regeneration – and, more specifically, of heritage-related regeneration projects – has no established framework and depends at best on piecemeal criteria. Individual planning policies of urban centres, of course, form one part of the complex of possible guiding influences. However, by their nature they are embedded in the localized priorities of the urban community concerned. As important as this local focus undoubtedly is, it also brings two significant problems. One is that local guidance is uniquely susceptible to contested views of both regeneration and heritage, as the example of conflicts over urban development in Halifax, and Nova Scotia has illustrated in recent years.[55] A second is that, by definition, local guidelines do not address provincial or regional dimensions. Provincial investment in regeneration projects creates at least a prima facie entitlement on the part of the provinces to provide guidance. Even though state guidance characteristically has a fiscal emphasis – ensuring that disbursements bring 'value for money' – this can be one essential facet of an effective guidance regime.[56] The regional dimension is also crucial in gauging the relationship of heritage and regeneration, since the complexities of Maritime industrial history and heritage can be fully understood only through a regional perspective. Some guidance elements are already in place among provincial priorities. In Nova Scotia, for example, the Municipal Government Act includes a series of 'statements of provincial interest', of which the statement on housing imposes an obligation on municipalities to plan for the provision of multiple forms of housing, including affordable, special-needs and rental accommodations.[57] Federal involvement in evaluation, as noted above, is longstanding in the context of regional development agencies such as ACOA, and is also found in the application of other requirements such as the stipulations of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.[58] Furthermore, General Development Agreements (GDAs) with the provinces, entered into by the earlier federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion during the 1970s, also had explicit urban dimensions that were evaluated, with a strong focus on infrastructure.[59] Yet these elements of evaluation do not amount to a purposeful consideration of urban regeneration in all of its economic, social, historical and cultural complexities. They do not so much contribute to a focused guidance regime as highlight its absence.

Thus, a central question subsists: given the complexity of Maritime industrial history and heritage, and the current absence of effective regional guidance for heritage-related urban regeneration projects, where should the responsibility for evaluation of urban regeneration policy lie? Closely related is the question of what the optimum role of a policy framework should be. It is not difficult to make a case in principle for systematic fiscal oversight, but the success of urban regeneration is characteristically measured not just in fiscal terms but according to the less tangible qualitative criteria sometimes referred to as the 'softer side' of regeneration.[60] This can be stated even more emphatically for heritage-related regeneration, which carries an additional cultural freight beyond more general social and cultural considerations. Heritage, as Graham points out, is 'an elusive, ambiguous, and hybrid knowledge'.[61] Evaluation of its representation in regeneration projects presents obvious complexities, not least the possible accusation of imposing a state-sponsored view of the past, and yet the necessity of the relationship of heritage to post-industrial regeneration in the Maritimes is made increasingly evident by the sophisticated recent study of historical memory.[62] Also clear, as emphasized in a 2003 report prepared for the Greater Halifax Partnership, is the need for a regional approach to Maritime – or, indeed, Atlantic Canadian – urban policies, to reflect the distinctive characteristics of cities that, while sharing the need for regeneration initiatives, differ in scope and scale (and history) from their counterparts farther west.[63]

Should, therefore, the thickets of municipal-provincial-federal relations be braved with a view to developing a comprehensive policy framework that accommodates Maritime needs and encompasses qualitative as well as quantitative elements of evaluation guidance? The diffuse nature of Canadian governance makes for a challenging landscape in which to implement any such over-arching structure. ACOA requirements notwithstanding, intergovernmental relationships consist primarily of federal-provincial relations, without interaction between individual municipalities and the federal government.[64] Even at the provincial-municipal level, relations remain complex. There has been significant offloading of responsibilities from provincial to municipal jurisdictions, and while provinces maintain the control of policymaking and decisions as to what services municipalities must undertake, cities have been left to foot the bill themselves. This has created a worrying dynamic of separation between policy formation (provincial) and policy delivery (municipal), which certainly extends to evaluation.[65] Furthermore, purely provincial frameworks run the risk of

ignoring the regional character of history and heritage. In this context, the development of best-practice guidelines through the Council of Atlantic Premiers (CAP), even if voluntary in character, unless and until specifically adopted by provinces or municipalities, may represent one possible road forward – but the creation by the CAP of an Urban Agency would offer even greater potential for addressing urban issues in regeneration and other key areas. Within such a framework, coordinated approaches to the broad range of implications of urban regeneration, and to their connections with cultural and heritage considerations, would become feasible as never before.

Conclusion

The inclusion of heritage and culture in implementing urban regeneration, like the evaluation of regeneration programmes and policies, is as essential as it is problematic. Considering heritage means considering in a cultural sense the lived experience of place. In evaluating a regeneration area, it is this lived experience of the people in the community that provides context to the quantitative evaluation provided by measurement indicators. Both of these processes are determined by a particular perspective of a place and a perspective on what that place should be. This study has contended that both the regeneration process and the evaluation of regeneration should be place-based, and so be considerate towards the particular social and cultural needs of a community, as well as those that are economic and environmental. In a Maritime context, however, complexity prevails in important respects. The multiple deindustrializations that have characterized industrial history have given rise to mixed and often contested manifestations of historical memory. Notwithstanding a focus on 'place,' both the heritage of a place and the evaluation of heritage-related regeneration activities are complicated by this factor. For this reason, an effective guidance framework for evaluation can provide a needed structure within which regeneration can be assessed, and so provide a policy environment that can lend itself to policy learning. It is through these mechanisms of policy learning and feedback that communities, urban planners and policymakers have the opportunity to reach a better understanding of the relationship between historical memory and urban regeneration interventions. But in a Canadian context in general, and a Maritime context more specifically, calling for over-arching government guidance on regeneration evaluation is problematic and raises difficult questions.

A regional approach, informed by best practices in evaluation and by a historical understanding of the nature of industrial heritage in the Maritimes, offers the possibility of an integrated framework that will allow for the promotion of policy learning and for the associated development of a process of community social learning. A healthy and dynamic relationship between heritage-related urban regeneration and collective historical memory is a necessity if initiatives are to succeed at the necessary cultural, social and economic levels, and evaluation provides an essential tool to sustain the learning process that underpins this relationship.

Notes

1 For valuable comments on an earlier version of this essay, the authors wish to thank Donald J. Savoie and the participants at the Swansea Conference organized by the Canadian Studies in Wales Group on Regeneration, Heritage and Cultural Identity: Trans-Atlantic Perspectives, June 2013.
2 I. Sanderson, 'Evaluation, Policy Learning, and Evidence-Based Policy-making,' *Public Administration* 80, 1 (2002), 1.
3 Phillip A. Buckner, and John G. Reid (eds), *The Atlantic Region to Confederation: A History* (Toronto and Fredericton: University of Toronto Press and Acadiensis Press, 1994), xii.
4 J. Fingard, J. Guildford and D. Sutherland, *Halifax: The First 250 Years* (Halifax: Formac Publishing, 1997), 7.
5 T.W. Acheson, *Saint John: The Making of a Colonial Urban Community* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 252.
6 J. Gwyn, *Excessive Expectations: Maritime Commerce and the Economic Development of Nova Scotia, 1740–1870* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), 54–67.
7 R.J. Morgan, *Rise Again: The Story of Cape Breton Island, Book One* (Wreck Cove: Breton Books, 2008), 159–62.
8 E.W. Sager with G.E. Panting, *Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820–1914* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 23–46.
9 E.W. Sager and L.R. Fischer, *Shipping and Shipbuilding in Atlantic Canada, 1820–1914* (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1986).
10 E. MacDonald, 'Economic Dislocation and Resiliency on Prince Edward Island: Small Producer, Distant Markets,'*London Journal of Canadian Studies* 31 (2016): 19–34.
11 T.W. Acheson, 'The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880–1910,' *Acadiensis*, 1, 2 (1972): 3–28.
12 Acheson, 'The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880–1910'.
13 C. Howell, 'The 1900s: Industry, Urbanization, and Reform', in *The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation*, eds E. R. Forbes and D. A. Muise (Toronto and Fredericton: University of Toronto Press and Acadiensis Press, 1993), 164.
14 E.R. Forbes, *The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919–1927: A Study in Canadian Regionalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1979), 13–30.
15 Forbes, *The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919–1927*, 65–6.
16 E.R. Forbes, 'Consolidating Disparity: The Maritimes and the Industrialization of Canada During the Second World War,' *Acadiensis* 15, 2 (1986): 3–27.
17 D. Stanley, 'The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress,' in *The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation*, eds E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise (Toronto and Fredericton: University of Toronto Press and Acadiensis Press, 1993).
18 J. Reid, 'The 1970s: Sharpening the Sceptical Edge,' in *The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation*, eds E. R. Forbes and

D.A. Muise (Toronto and Fredericton: University of Toronto Press and Acadiensis Press, 1993).

19 R. Starr, *Richard Hatfield: The Seventeen Year Saga* (Halifax: Formac Publishing, 1987), 85–104.

20 D. Frank, *J.B. McLachlan: A Biography* (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1999).

21 'The Ballad of J.B. McLachlan', *The Beaton Institute of Music*. http://www.beatoninstitutemusic.ca/mining/ballad-of-jbmclachlan-the.html

22 'Photographs of J.B. McLachlan monument,' *Nova Scotia's Electric Scrapbook*. http://ns1763.ca/cbrm/mclachlanmem.html

23 D. Frank and N. Lang, *Labour Landmarks in New Brunswick/Lieux historiques ouvriers au Nouveau-Brunswick* (Edmonton: Athabasca University Press for Canadian Committee on Labour History, 2010); L. MacKinnon, 'Labour Landmarks in New Waterford: Collective Memory in a Cape Breton Coal Town,' *Acadiensis* 42, 2 (2013): 3–26.

24 S. MacAulay, 'The Sweat in the Tar Ponds,' *Labour/Le Travail* 50 (2002): 394.

25 I. McKay, *The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994); I. McKay and R. Bates, *In the Province of History: The Making of the Public Past in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010).

26 Canada's Historic Places, http://historicplaces.ca/en/rep-reg/place-lieu.aspx?id=7672

27 L. Porter, and K. Shaw, *Whose Urban Renaissance? An International Comparison of Urban Regeneration Strategies* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 2.

28 S. Dodds, *Government Urban Regeneration Practice: Review of UK Evidence* (Communities Analytical Services, Scottish Government, 2011).

29 Stanley, 'The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress,' 426–7.

30 D. Harvey, 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism', *Geografiska Annaler B* 71, 1 (1989): 11.

31 N. Bradford, *Place-Based Public Policy: Towards a New Urban and Community Agenda for Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks Inc., 2005), v.

32 H.W.J. Rittel and M.M. Webber, 'Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,' *Policy Sciences* 4 (1973): 155–69.

33 F. Taggart, 'Regeneration through Heritage: Combining Commercial Skills and Community Interests,' in *Industrial Buildings: Conservation and Regeneration*, ed. M. Stratton (London: Taylor & Francis, 2000), 70.

34 L.B. Barber, 'Making Meaning of Heritage Landscapes: The Politics of Redevelopment in Halifax, Nova Scotia,' *The Canadian Geographer* 57, 1 (2013): 90–112.

35 R. Summerby-Murray, 'Interpreting Deindustrialised Landscapes of Atlantic Canada: Memory and Industrial Heritage in Sackville, New Brunswick,' *The Canadian Geographer* 46, 1 (2002): 48–62.

36 B. Graham, 'Heritage as Knowledge: Capital or Culture?' *Urban Studies* 39, 5–6 (2002): 1006.

37 Barber, 'Making Meaning of Heritage Landscapes'.

38 Summerby-Murray, 'Interpreting Deindustrialised Landscapes of Atlantic Canada,' 50.

39 Summerby-Murray, 'Interpreting Deindustrialised Landscapes of Atlantic Canada,' 48–62.

40 Graham, 'Heritage as Knowledge,' 1014.

41 R. Kemp, and R. Weehuizen, *Policy Learning: What Does it Mean and How Can We Study It?* (Oslo: Nifu Step., 2005).

42 Sanderson, 'Evaluation, Policy Learning, and Evidence-Based Policy-making,' 1, 7–9.

43 W. Keough, 'The Creation of the "Irish Loop": Ethnicity, Collective Historical Memory, and Place,' in *Heritage, Diaspora, and the Consumption of Culture: Movements in Irish Landscapes*, eds R. Boyd and D.S. Nititham-Tunney (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 69.

44 P. Gerstein and L. Angeles, *Learning Civil Societies: Shifting Contexts for Democratic Planning and Governance* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 12–13.

45 Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, 'Audits and Evaluations'. http://www.acoa-apeca.gc.ca/eng/Accountability/AuditsAndEvaluations/Pages/home.aspx

46 D.J. Savoie, *Whatever Happened to the Music Teacher? How Government Decides*

and Why (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2013), 168.

47 N. Bradford, *Place-Based Public Policy: Towards a New Urban and Community Agenda for Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks Inc., 2005).

48 P. Roberts and H. Sykes, *Urban Regeneration: A Handbook* (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2000).

49 Savoie, *Whatever Happened to the Music Teacher?*, 154.

50 R. Lahey, *The Canadian M&E System: Lessons Learned from 30 Years of Development* (Washington: The World Bank, 2010).

51 Suet Ying Ho, 'Evaluating Urban Regeneration Programmes in Britain: Exploring the Potential of the Realist Approach,' *Evaluation* 5, 4 (1999): 423.

52 H. Lim, 'Cultural Strategies for Revitalizing the City: A Review and Evaluation,' *Regional Studies* 27, 6 (1993): 594.

53 L. Hemphill, J. Berry and S. McGreal, 'An Indicator-Based Approach to Measuring Sustainable Urban Regeneration Performance: Part 1, Conceptual Foundations and Methodological Framework,' *Urban Studies* 41, 4 (2004): 750.

54 P. Lawless, 'Urban Regeneration: Is There a Future?' *People, Place, and Policy Online* 4, 1 (2010): 24.

55 Barber, 'Making Meaning of Heritage Landscapes' ; J.L. Grant and G.W.K. Leung, 'Disputing the Character of the City: Heritage, Regeneration and the Urban Design Turn,' *London Journal of Canadian Studies* 31 (2016): 113–130.

56 J.H. Reid, 'Evaluation Guidelines for Urban Regeneration: The Role of the State' (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Evaluation Society/Société canadienne d'évaluation, Toronto, 2013).

57 Nova Scotia Municipal Government Act, 1998. http://nslegislature.ca/legc/statutes/municipal%20government.pdf

58 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012. http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=16254939-1

59 D.J. Savoie, *Visiting Grandchildren: Economic Development in the Maritimes* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), esp. 99–108.

60 Reid, 'Evaluation Guidelines for Urban Regeneration'.

61 Graham, 'Heritage as Knowledge,' 1016.

62 The Pasts Collective, *Canadians and Their Pasts* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).

63 Greater Halifax Partnership, *Are We Urban? The Urban Growth Agenda in the Atlantic Canadian Context* (Halifax: Greater Halifax Partnership, 2003), iv–vii.

64 C. Andrew, C.A. Graham and S.D. Phillips, *Urban Affairs: Back on the Policy Agenda* (Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002).

65 Andrew, Graham and Phillips, *Urban Affairs: Back on the Policy Agenda*.

London Journal of Canadian Studies, Volume 31 (2016). UCL Press• Print ISSN 0267-2200 • Online ISSN 1475-1674 • DOI 10.14324/111.444.ljcs.2016v31.008

Disputing the Character of the City: Heritage, Regeneration and the Urban Design Turn

Jill L. Grant and Gladys Wai Kwan Leung

Abstract

Like many cities with an abundant legacy of heritage structures and aspirations to expand their economic and population base, Halifax (Nova Scotia) experiences significant tensions between heritage conservation and urban development ambitions. On the one hand, Halifax has a vigorous heritage movement spawned in the wake of slum clearance and urban redevelopment efforts in the 1960s; heritage advocates work consistently to conserve the low-rise character of the historic city. On the other hand, it has an emergent urban design lobby supported by economic development interests and creative class ideas; development advocates call for signature high-rise buildings to attract investment and young people. With each new development proposal, community groups argue about the meaning of past and future, the nature of cultural identity and the image of the city. In this essay we examine the recent emergence of a social network of young urban professionals whose influence is growing rapidly in local debates about urban regeneration. Whereas a decade ago heritage conservation enjoyed high priority in planning debates in many parts of the world, today it competes with arguments for signature architecture and greater urban density. The urban design turn reflects changing cultural priorities but also reveals the operation of new governance mechanisms within local growth machines.

Introduction

We live in a time when global cities are competing for growth. Cities such as Bilbao and Barcelona in Spain,[1] and Birmingham and Liverpool in the UK,[2] have embraced an urban design agenda as a key component of economic development strategies for urban regeneration.[3] John Punter notes that the focus on urban design and regeneration penetrates further down the urban hierarchy as local professionals and policy-makers emulate successful models and practices they see elsewhere. Thus cities increasingly look for signature structures or prestige projects designed by 'starchitects' to establish a vibrantly innovative and contemporary identity.[4]

Canadian cities are not immune to this international fever. In a context where the largest cities are growing most quickly,[5] smaller cities such as the eastern seaport of Halifax feel a strong need to keep pace. The earliest major settlement planted by the British in Canada, Halifax conserved its major heritage assets over the centuries by virtue of relatively slow growth. In recent decades, however, Halifax has experienced something of a renaissance and has enjoyed increasing success in terms of attracting young people.[6] The turnaround in the city's prospects at a time when international competition among cities was growing significantly affected the nature and dynamics of local development discussions.

Development debates shift through time to incorporate new planning theories and popular wisdom about urban conditions.[7] Planning processes that determine the character of development and the processes used for making decisions about urban regeneration occur in a broad cultural, political, social and economic context. In many Western countries, planning hearings provide venues for citizens and other players to express visions of the city and influence development priorities. We can interpret the discourse of development cases as scripts within which actors enact their attitudes about themes such as heritage, class, age and urban design. In this essay we discuss the way that development discourses have been changing in Halifax. Recent developments in the city centre reveal the growing influence of creative class arguments, drawing on the work of Richard Florida.[8] Cities as disparate as Johannesburg, South Africa,[9] Barcelona, Spain,[10] and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK,[11] have pursued creative class and creative city strategies to promote an urban renaissance. Such approaches reflect a turn towards prioritizing contemporary urban design and innovative

architecture. We profile the role of a social network of young professionals in Halifax as evidence of the new dynamics of local growth machines at work in the neoliberal city.

The politics of urban growth

Local authorities typically encourage urban growth. For Canadian cities, property taxes constitute the principal source of revenues. Increasing demands for expenditures can be accommodated only through growth in the tax base. Consequently, social networks of business, development, political and professional leaders mobilize to promote local growth, often through organizations such as chambers of commerce or business commissions. Molotch described such networks as local growth machines or growth coalitions operating to naturalize expectations of growth and facilitate urban development.[12] Of course, the political economy of cities reveals conflicts over growth as groups articulate competing social constructions and claims about place.[13] Since the 1980s, however, most cities have adopted governance strategies that involve collaboration between the public and private sectors in managing urban development: the shift to urban entrepreneurialism[14] reflects the growing influence of neoliberal thinking among governments at all levels.[15]

Canada witnessed a resurgence of political interest in cities during the 1990s, as the federal government initiated an urban agenda.[16] The decline of manufacturing and growth in the knowledge economy strengthened theories which argued that cities play a central role in the wealth of nations.[17] Several provinces acted to amalgamate their hub cities to make them more competitive nationally and internationally. For instance, Nova Scotia created Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM) in 1996, and Ontario unified Toronto with many of its suburbs in 1998. By the early 2000s Canadian cities were interested in supporting creativity to enhance growth prospects;[18] most accepted that attracting the creative class – that is, talented and creative young professionals – offered an important strategy for stimulating growth and investment.[19] Even in relatively small cities, such as Kingston (Ontario), growth machine politics and creative class logic combined to elevate 'the consumption and lifestyle preferences of mostly younger, dynamic, mobile, well-educated knowledge workers'.[20]

Finding ways to adapt policy practices to perceived market needs stimulated new governance mechanisms and processes in many cities as

neoliberalism gained in influence over the 1980s to the current period. New players and new scripts began to emerge in development debates in many cities. For instance, interest in regenerating waterfront areas to transform them for entertainment and commercial purposes grew, leading to the formation of new types of public–private development organizations and new citizen groups eager to influence outcomes.[21] At the same time, community groups formed in an earlier era, when protecting built heritage was a central concern in development debates in cities such as Halifax, found the discourse of discussions changing. Although, as Graham argued, 'heritage is part of the wider debate about the ways in which regions are being seen as the most vital sites within which to convene and capitalize on the flows of knowledge in contemporary globalisation',[22] heritage was often marginalized in discussions of appropriate choices for the knowledge-based city.[23] Even the critics of neoliberalism expressed reservations about heritage arguments in regeneration discussions, noting that heritage discourses typically privilege colonial history and advance the material interests of middle-class professionals living in historic houses in gentrifying (or gentrified) neighbourhoods.[24]

Marketing cities to the creative class soon aligned with the growing influence of urban design as a strategy for making places more attractive to people and investors.[25] Improving the quality and aesthetics of the public realm – buildings, streets and open spaces – gained impetus in planning during the 1980s following the influence of new urbanism and renewed attention to physical planning and design.[26] As Gospodini noted in discussing European cities:

> While for centuries the quality of the urban environment has been an outcome of economic growth of cities, nowadays the quality of urban space has become a prerequisite for the economic development of cities; and urban design has undertaken an enhanced new role as a means of economic development.[27]

Recent development debates in Halifax reflect these international trends. Local growth machines have adopted creative class strategies and have turned to urban design as a tool for attracting people and investment dollars to the city. The next section reviews the city's development history and the context of recent development discussions. As Madanipour suggested, development strategies and the role that urban design plays within them are heavily contested.[28]

Development disputes in Halifax

Established as a military stronghold to support the British foothold in eastern Canada in 1749, Halifax prospered in times of war and languished in peace.[29] Throughout the twentieth century it experienced relatively slow growth, while central and western Canada thrived. As early as the 1920s city councillors called for slum clearance to help modernize the city and help it keep up with developments in other parts of the country.[30] With federal government funding in the 1950s and 1960s, the city documented problem areas, expropriated properties and began the process of downtown redevelopment.[31] Large areas of the northern part of the city centre were cleared and replaced within the next decade by an expressway interchange and large modernist structures developed by a local partnership of major investors.[32]

By the late 1960s citizen groups had formed to try to prevent demolition of heritage properties, to safeguard views from the city's highest point at the Citadel, and to influence planning and development activities downtown.[33] From the 1970s onwards, debates over high-rise development projects typically pitted heritage advocates against those promoting growth.[34]

Citizen groups made strong emotional appeals, presented petitions with thousands of signatures and hired experts to offer scientific arguments against projects.[35] Although they drew on arguments from the planning literature – especially the work of Jane Jacobs[36] and new urbanists such as Andres Duany[37] – until the 1990s, citizen groups struggled to influence development decisions in a city eager for growth.[38]

Several events and decisions during the 1990s began to change the development dynamic in Halifax. In 1995 Halifax was the host city to the meeting of the G7 heads of state. To ready the city for the event, the federal government provided extensive funding for waterfront improvements. The city enjoyed its moment in the international spotlight and built tourism campaigns around the beauty of the waterfront and the heritage character of the city. As cities in western Canada began to experience rapid economic growth following a resource boom, Halifax struggled to keep pace. Under Liberal premier John Savage, in 1996 the province of Nova Scotia amalgamated the City of Halifax with three surrounding municipal governments (Bedford, Dartmouth and Halifax County) to form Halifax Regional Municipality or HRM.[39] The government aimed to increase Halifax's international and regional

economic competiveness by integrating resources, mitigating internal costs and increasing urban scale. Governmental restructuring initiated new strategies for promoting economic development targeted at revitalizing Halifax's urban core; such actions facilitated opportunities to take advantage of growing financial opportunities for real-estate investments.[40] Also in 1996, the Greater Halifax Partnership was created as a public–private partnership to direct economic development and to develop stronger relations with the private sector. Neoliberal policies and practices had come to Halifax.[41]

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, local planners were promoting new urbanism and smart growth ideas for development in the city centre.[42] In the context of some development disputes over high-rise buildings, they suggested that developers could achieve appropriate densities with more complementary scale and character: their arguments often aligned with those of community groups fighting high-rise projects in those years.[43]

Halifax began to move towards changing the context of urban development by the early 2000s. Like many Canadian cities, the municipality hired an urban designer and grew increasingly interested in creative city[44] and creative class[45] approaches. In 2004, the Greater Halifax Partnership brought Richard Florida to Halifax and commissioned a study of the city's potential to compete on creativity.[46] The economic development strategy produced the next year by a committee of business, political and community leaders reflected the ascendance of creative class sentiments, smart growth strategies and urban design qualities.[47] Projects such as the Seaport mixed-use redevelopment reflected the influence of social networks generated through new urban entrepreneurial policymaking processes.[48]

Following creative class arguments, the Partnership identified a need to develop strategies to encourage talented and creative young people to come to and stay in Halifax.[49] It commissioned a study of what talented young people need and want.[50] Based on the consultants' recommendations, the Partnership helped to initiate Fusion Halifax in 2007 as a formal network organization to connect young professionals and enhance their voices in the city.[51] The organization soon developed secondary functions within local regeneration debates.

In the wake of the terror attacks on the US in 2001, tourism to Nova Scotia declined. With tourism revenues diminishing, financial interest in real estate increasing, and creative class approaches becoming more influential among decision-makers, heritage arguments faced new challenges in Halifax. Often the same people who fought

earlier battles to protect heritage stepped forward to make their cases in new development applications: over the decades they had enhanced the rationality and professionalism of their presentations. While citizen groups did not abandon emotional appeals for conserving heritage and views, in recent years they more frequently augmented presentations with scientific data and consultant reports.[52] At the same time, however, advocates of urban growth in Halifax lamented the lack of high-rise cranes in the downtown area. Developers were clearly distressed with local opposition to development and bureaucratic red tape, as one explained to a reporter:

> … it's over-regulated, things take too long to get developed and it's not development friendly. There's a lot of developers in real estate that would love to come to Halifax, but the time things take to get approved, or the uncertainty more than anything, is a problem, particularly with that appeal process.[53]

Halifax changed its approach to planning in the 2000s. It began regional planning around 2002 and then initiated a process for transforming the planning and development of the city centre. The HRM by Design downtown planning process ran from 2005 to 2008, managed by the city's urban designer and run by Toronto-based consultants. The municipality established an Urban Design Task Force – comprised of local professionals, development representatives and community leaders – to work with staff in developing the city centre plan. Workshops, charrettes and open houses engaged community residents and built support for the plan.

The scale of projects proposed and the significance of urban design as a selling feature of development proposals increased during the 2000s in Halifax. One prominent case involved redevelopment of a former parking garage site in central Halifax. The developer hired a prominent Toronto architect to design twin towers twisting slightly as they soared 27 storeys above Granville Street.[54] Soon dubbed the Twisted Sisters, the proposed project garnered support in some quarters as an iconic structure that would generate economic activity; at the same time it faced resistance from groups concerned about views from the Citadel and the impact of such a large project on the historic city centre.[55] Planning staff acknowledged previous issues with high-rise buildings, but supported the project:

> The limited experience HRM has had with tall buildings *has* resulted in several tall buildings which have created harsh

> pedestrian environments and are unsympathetic to adjacent heritage assets. It is therefore not surprising that many citizens oppose taller buildings. Architecture and urban design, however, have come a long way towards understanding how to create liveable cities since the unadorned glass and concrete slabs, which were constructed in the 1960's and 70's. There are numerous proven strategies for making taller buildings fit into and even enhance a city.[56]

The progress of the Twisted Sisters proposal through the decision process parallelled and influenced HRM by Design. The city centre plan aimed to enhance the clarity of the city's vision, the predictability of the planning process and the design quality of development.[57] The plan embedded new urbanism, smart growth and creative class principles while simplifying and streamlining the approvals process for developers. The project manager of HRM by Design described it as 'a plan that strikes a balance between encouraging new growth and protecting our built heritage', while the mayor viewed it as enabling 'a new streamlined development approval process that will stimulate economic growth and, ultimately, make our downtown a more vibrant place to live and work'.[58] The plan introduced the planning tool known as form-based codes, used to regulate the form of development, and design guidelines to control aesthetics. While traditional land-use policies monitored the types of uses on a property, the downtown plan reinforced the growing role of urban design as a force guiding development outcomes. At the same time, by spelling out development requirements and removing many opportunities for public engagement and appeals of decisions, the plan transformed the political context of development in the city centre. As Rutland noted, the municipality facilitated the movement of finance capital into the real estate market by eviscerating the potential of citizen groups to oppose projects:[59]

> Rather than waiting for finance to arrive, the form of downtown Halifax has anticipated it; block by block, it now stands like a three-dimensional ghost upon the landscape, a set of hollow forms that push away development politics and wait simply and patiently to be filled in whenever developers and worldwide financial markets decide the time is ripe.[60]

By the late 2000s HRM had dealt with a flurry of high-rise projects.[61] Although the council had approved the Twisted Sisters project in 2007,

and appeals from citizen groups were denied, the developer failed to initiate work by the date required in the development agreement. Subsequently, in 2012 the developers sought permission for a different project – Skye Halifax –with 48-storey towers on the same site, asking for plan amendments to exceed the height guidelines of the downtown plan and waive some provisions of the view planes legislation. The developers argued that, 'It is time to re-consider whether protecting the rampart views on this site for the purposes of tourism is still preferred over the benefits of economic revitalisation, creating an interesting skyline with a new internationally recognised landmark, and the importance of protecting views at the pedestrian level for year-round downtown users'.[62] Moreover, the developers appealed directly to a younger cohort: 'There are now younger people in the marketplace looking for affordable housing options. Buildings need to be able to provide a range of housing for all the market groups: young students, empty nesters, professionals, and high-end buyers'.[63] Arguments about the importance of high-quality urban design and downtown density were increasingly linked with attracting and retaining specific types of young residents, while heritage arguments connected to tourism were minimized. Although the council denied the request for Skye Halifax, it was clear that young voices – often expressed by members of the group Fusion Halifax – had become a powerful lobby in the development debate.

Fusion Halifax[64]

In 2007, the Greater Halifax Partnership – the region's economic development agency – helped establish Fusion Halifax to connect young professionals (aged 20–40) across diverse sectors through providing social networking and entertainment opportunities. Those who established the organization positioned youth participation as intrinsically good for Halifax:

> We have a demographic that is eager to be engaged and our governments and businesses understand that young people must be involved in leadership opportunities, community capacity building and a plan for the future.[65]

Fusion incrementally assumed a prominent role in the urban development process by becoming an effective lobbying group.[66]

Organized with a small number of paid staff, Fusion engaged members in specific interest groups, or action teams, which tackled themes such as arts and culture, immigration, sustainability, professional development and health. The most active of the groups, the urban design action team, involved many young professionals from the disciplines of architecture, planning and real estate (alongside small-business owners, lawyers and others). Members of Fusion Halifax often participated in planning activities and offered support for prestigious development projects with contemporary urban design aimed at repositioning the city economically and symbolically. Fusion Halifax defined urban design as a challenge within the city and emphasized the issue within its strategic focus. The distinct voice that the organization developed often opposed long-standing heritage voices within the city.[67]

Barber suggested that developers are less organized than heritage groups in setting the agenda of dispute discourses in Halifax.[68] However, he noted that the Chamber of Commerce, the Downtown Business Commission and Fusion Halifax offered 'a platform of legitimacy' for those promoting growth.[69] With its appearance of being independent and not-for-profit, Fusion enjoyed a privileged position. One of the first projects that Fusion Halifax supported and later endorsed was the HRM by Design plan.[70] Along with those contributing to the Skyscraper Forum – a website devoted to those who love tall buildings – members of Fusion spoke out in favour of high-rise development and criticized prioritizing heritage conservation.[71] Their spokespersons were generally perceived as having no immediate self-interest at stake.

Although only some of Fusion's 2,000 members work for firms or groups involved in the development industry, the organization draws primary funding from the province, municipality, local firms, banks and media companies. In other words, those most closely associated with local growth machines provide sponsorship and other kinds of institutional support for Fusion. Membership in Fusion is free to those who accept the vision: 'By joining FUSION Halifax, you will be a part of a family of like-minded individuals, looking to make the city a better place for all of us'.[72] The focus on improving the city is a central tenet of the organization, alongside the opportunity to meet other young professionals. Is Fusion a disinterested party in urban development? Does it contribute to contemporary urban entrepreneurialism? In 2013, Leung examined five contested development projects with noteworthy architectural designs proposed in the city centre over recent years to assess the role that Fusion members and discussions of urban design played in development debates.[73]

In the development cases Leung reviewed, developers featured contemporary urban design as a strategy to enhance economic development. Actors repeatedly used the words 'signature', 'landmark', 'striking' and 'state-of-the-art' to describe proposed buildings. The developer for one project told the council, 'The site was purchased with the intention of creating a landmark for Halifax. The goal … is to create an innovative and artistic focal point for downtown and help revitalise the city core'.[74] Project proponents also played the youth card consistently in promoting projects. For instance, in supporting Skye Halifax, Leroy noted, '… Skye provides the necessary residential mass that will attract and retain an under-served youth market'.[75]

In each case, heritage advocates opposed elements of the projects, often looking for reduced height to conserve views from the Citadel, and more sympathetic design and massing to support heritage buildings in the vicinity. Heritage groups clearly acknowledged the growing influence of Fusion. A citizen spoke at one public hearing:

> The development would damage the integrity of a historic part of Halifax; I moved to the area from Ontario to start my career and part of the reason was the city's history and historic buildings. I acknowledge that Council often heard of young people wanting tall, modern buildings, however, I advise council to be careful about making such assumptions … as a building is much more than just its façade.[76]

Where heritage groups developed considerable sophistication in their presentations in order to enhance their potential influence before council and appeal tribunals,[77] those interviewed noted that Fusion members spoke with passion but proffered little research. One heritage group member explained to Leung that Fusion Halifax members 'lobby more on the emotional level rather than on the factual level',[78] employing what Bailey called the tactical use of passion.[79] Ironically, in an earlier period, planners and developers lobbed similar critiques at heritage groups.[80] Once they were using sophisticated codes in presenting their cases,[81] however, the heritage groups found that expectations had changed. Fusion members were saying what decision-makers want to hear, as a heritage group member explained: 'They [those promoting developments] can be constructive rather than be obstructive, because they all have the same opinion. Every time they stand up they say exactly the same thing, "I want to raise my children here and I want to stay here. I won't stay here unless this developer builds this 24 storey

class-A … building".'[82] As an organized lobby supporting regeneration projects, Fusion had significant influence.

Without necessarily identifying themselves by their organization, members of Fusion spoke in support of projects, often highlighting the quality of design and referencing the needs of young people. Municipal planners welcomed the coherent voice that Fusion represented as a counterpoint to heritage advocates. One planner told Leung that 'it seems quite a positive thing to have a group that promotes planning projects that fit within our planning structure'.[83] Another planner explained:

> There really wasn't a mechanism for that kind of conversation [in support of innovative design]: it was just individual e-mails. How did you find people, thoughts and ideas? And do they know that they have those kinds of opinions? You've got to get people together talking to others and explore the ideas before they even know that have got the ideas … That was the power of Fusion.[84]

Some cases reflected the challenge of establishing a coherent and consistent message on urban development in the loose organization that Fusion represented. For instance, some members spoke in favour of development projects that Fusion's board of directors felt contradicted the downtown plan, which the organization had officially endorsed. A Fusion member explained to Leung:

> The Waterside Centre is one of the first ones that Fusion took a stance on and they [the executive of Fusion Halifax] didn't really know how to properly represent that many people … when you are representing 1,000, 2,000 to 2,500 people it is really hard to get unanimous votes, and so you don't want to misrepresent. So then it became, you know, you can go to these public hearings and say 'I am a Fusion member and I support this' instead of 'Fusion supports this'. It's a bit about the dialogue and about how it is exactly worded.[85]

Outside the context of public presentations, young people supporting development projects often participated in exchanges on Skyscraper Forum pages. An urgent post on one project tried to rally action.

> **UNITED GULF 'TWISTED SISTERS' ACTION REQUIRED BEFORE EOB JANUARY 26, 2007.**
> IF YOU ARE IN SUPPORT OF THIS PROJECT YOU MUST INDICATE AS SUCH AT: uarb.board@gov.ns.ca.
> IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOU DO THIS BEFORE END OF BUSINESS FRIDAY JANUARY 26, 2007.
> IF WE FAIL HERE WE WILL LIKELY NEVER SEE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT PROPOSED WITHIN THE DOWNTOWN CORE AGAIN. WE MUST INUNDATE THE BOARD WITH OUR LETTERS OF APPROVAL. IT'S A NUMBERS GAME. 'JUST DO IT.'[86]

Between Fusion Halifax and the Skyscraper Forum, young people took advantage of mechanisms to engage actively in debates about urban design and heritage. A comment posted following Taylor's story about the Skye Halifax proposal[87] revealed disdain for heritage arguments that participants in the public hearings presented:

> This project needs to be approved and needs to start tomorrow. While all the anti-development types will be screaming bloody murder, their irrational fear of tall buildings needs ot [sic] be overcome once and for all. This would be truly iconic for Halifax and represents something that would revitalize the downtown. It needs to be done – no drawn-out debate, no arbitrary lopping off of a few floors to appease the obstructionists. Bring it on![88]

Recent debates not only pitted heritage against urban design but youths against older residents. One local planner explained that, 'What was going on in the downtown in terms of development was too much vested in older people, an older generation, people with a more traditional perspective and it was time to hear from young professionals who want to live in the downtown and see it become more vibrant'.[89] The interests of non-professional youths rarely garnered attention. Some participants found creative class arguments that privileged talented youths somewhat ageist. One member of Fusion saw the dichotomy as problematic:

> That's the nature of a young organization, run by passionate people, is that unless you have elder voices in the conversation, the group is biased based on the fact that it is young. To be completely honest I see value in it [Fusion Halifax] but ideologically, fundamentally I disagree with the idea of segregating people

into a young group to get a youth voice. It's like our politics where you have liberal voices versus conservative voices.[90]

Participants in development discussions in Halifax recognized that Fusion changed the content and dynamic of debates. Where prior to 2007 organized citizen groups primarily opposed high-rise projects on heritage grounds, Fusion members supported the projects on the basis of innovative urban design and the need for housing and jobs for talented young people. A member of the development community explained to Leung, '[Fusion Halifax] support is very important, as a label. There are certain labels or groups you want to support your project before you go to council, you want the Chamber of Commerce, the Downtown Halifax Business Commission and you want Fusion.'[91] A more explicit statement connecting Fusion Halifax with other organizations generally seen as central to local growth machines is difficult to imagine.

Growth machines and the urban design turn

Our overview of the way that development debates changed over time in Halifax provides an example of regeneration planning processes at work in many mid-sized cities with relatively slow growth trajectories. Heritage appeals prove powerful at times. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, heritage groups convinced decision-makers to stop freeway (motorway) projects and protect particular structures. Halifax benefited from powerful local investors who conserved buildings and repurposed them as the infrastructure for a booming tourism industry. Time has shown, however, that heritage arguments are not hegemonic, especially for sites farther away from amenities such as the waterfront and Citadel views, and certainly not at a time when creative class theories and entrepreneurial governance increasingly dominate development planning. In Halifax, the HRM by Design process changed mechanisms for downtown development. It ensured a turn to urban design as a development strategy. By setting regulations and heights for downtown and creating streamlined decision processes, the municipality limited the ability of community groups to affect outcomes and to appeal decisions.[92] The ability of community organizations to influence redevelopment of the city centre has been limited to participating in visioning and plan renewal processes. Such constraints on the ability of citizen groups to shape urban growth constitute a potential limit on democratic governance.

Conclusion

By promoting quality urban design in new development, Fusion Halifax played an important, if unacknowledged, role in facilitating the local growth machine in improving conditions for private property interests in downtown regeneration. Those advocating urban growth argued that Fusion members added balance to the debate: that is, young people offered a counterpoint to heritage spokespersons calling for reduced height and architecture sympathetic to historic forms. We suggest, however, that Fusion differs in many ways from the community groups it spoke against in development debates. Unlike the heritage groups that were founded and funded by community members with a shared commitment to protecting structures and landscapes, Fusion is a product of urban entrepreneurialism and corporate interests. It was initiated by and financed with the support of government, public–private partnerships and private-sector firms with the mission of attracting young people to the city. While Fusion is by no means a mere puppet of growth promoters, its identity and mission are so closely linked to seeing the city grow in a particular way that it functions to achieve many of the same ends as the Downtown Business Commission, Chamber of Commerce and Greater Halifax Partnership. Fusion played a key role in raising the profile of urban design as part of the development mandate and vision for the city centre. As a consequence of recent planning processes in Halifax that established form-based codes and guidelines as a streamlined way of making decisions, the city is now positioned to achieve private sector-led growth within a governance system that effectively excludes organized citizen groups from intervening on individual redevelopment proposals. Thus the urban design turn in cities everywhere is not a politically neutral innovation: it empowers developers and planners to get on with the business of growth without interference and delays from those who previously enjoyed and exercised the right to argue that heritage and community opinion matter.

Notes

1 S. González, 'Bilbao and Barcelona "in Motion". How Regeneration "Models" Travel and Mutate in the Global Flows of Policy Tourism,' *Urban Studies* 48, 7 (2011): 1397–418.

2 A. Barber and S. Hall, 'Birmingham: Whose Urban Renaissance? Regeneration as a Response to Economic Restructuring,' *Policy Studies* 29, 3 (2008): 281–92; M. Biddulph, 'Urban Design, Regeneration and the Entrepreneurial

City,' *Progress in Planning* 76 (2011): 63–103.

3 P. Loftman and B. Nevin, 'Prestige Project Developments: Economic Renaissance or Economic Myth? A Case Study of Birmingham,' *Local Economy* 8 (1994): 307–25; A. Gospodini, 'European Cities in Competition and the New "Uses" of Urban Design,' *Journal of Urban Design* 7, 1 (2002): 59–73; A. Madanipour, 'Roles and Challenges of Urban Design,' *Journal of Urban Design* 11, 2 (2006): 173–93.

4 P. Loftman and B. Nevin, 'Prestige Projects and Urban Regeneration in the 1980s and 1990s: A Review of Benefits and Limitations,' *Planning, Practice and Research 10*, 3/4 (1995): 299–316; S. Fainstein, 'Review of "Starchitecture: Scenes, Actors and Spectacles in Contemporary Cities",' *Planning Theory and Practice* 14, 1 (2013): 149–51.

5 L.S. Bourne and J. Simmons, 'New Fault Lines? Recent Trends in the Canadian Urban System and Their Implications for Planning and Public Policy,' *Canadian Journal of Urban Research* 12, 1, Supplement (2003): 22–47.

6 J. DeMont and A. Phillips, 'The Last Best Place,' *Maclean's* 108, 25 (19 June, 1995): 22–8; J.L. Grant and K. Kronstal, 'The Social Dynamics of Attracting Talent in Halifax,' *The Canadian Geographer* 54, 3 (2010): 347–65.

7 J. Grant, *The Drama of Democracy: Contention and Dispute in Community Planning* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1994).

8 R.L. Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

9 T. Winkler, 'Prolonging the Global Age of Gentrification: Johannesburg's Regeneration Policies,' *Planning Theory* 8, 4 (2009): 362–81.

10 González, 'Bilbao and Barcelona "in motion"'.

11 S. Cameron, 'Gentrification, Housing Redifferentiation and Urban Regeneration: "Going for Growth" in Newcastle upon Tyne,' *Urban Studies* 40, 12 (2003): 2367–82; P. Rogers and J. Coaffee, 'Moral Panics and Urban Renaissance,' *City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action* 9, 3 (2005): 321–40.

12 H. Molotch, 'The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,' *American Journal of Sociology* 82, 2 (1976): 309–32; H. Molotch, 'The Political Economy of Growth Machines,' *Journal of Urban Affairs* 15,1 (1993): 29–53.

13 J.R. Logan and H.L. Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

14 D. Harvey, 'From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation of Urban Governance in Late Capitalism,' *Geografiska Annaler* 71, B (1989): 3–17; P. Hubbard, 'Urban Design and City Regeneration: Social Representations of Entrepreneurial Landscapes,' *Urban Studies* 33, 8 (1996): 1441–61.

15 J. Hackworth, *The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology and Development in American Urbanism* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007) .

16 Bourne and Simmons, 'New Fault Lines?'.

17 J. Jacobs, *The Economy of Cities* (New York: Random House, 1969); J. Jacobs, *Cities and the Wealth of Nations: Principles of Economic Life* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984).

18 C. Landry, *The Creative City: A toolkit for urban* innovators (London: Earthscan, 2000).

19 Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*; R.L. Florida, 'Cities and the Creative Class,' *City and Community* 2, 1 (2003): 3–19.

20 M. Bedore and B. Donald, 'Revisiting the Politics of Class in Urban Development: Evidence from the Study of the Social Dynamics of Economic Performance,' *Urban Affairs Review* 47, 2 (2011): 203.

21 B. Hoyle, 'Global and local change on the port-city waterfront', *Geographical Review,* 90, 3 (2000): 395–417.

22 B. Graham, 'Heritage as knowledge: capital or culture?', *Urban Studies*, 39, 5-6, (2002): 1005–1006.

23 Graham, 2002.

24 L. Barber, 'Making Meaning of Heritage Landscapes: The Politics of Redevelopment in Halifax, Nova Scotia,' *The Canadian Geographer* 57, 1 (2013): 90–112.

25 Gospodini, 'European Cities in Competition and the New "Uses" of Urban Design'; Madanipour, 'Roles and Challenges of Urban Design'.

26 J. Barnett, *Redesigning Cities: Principles, Practice, Implementation* (Chicago: APA Planner's Press, 2003); J. Grant, *Planning*

the Good Community: New Urbanism in Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2006).

27 Gospodini, 'European Cities in Competition and the New "Uses" of Urban Design,' 60.

28 Madanipour, 'Roles and Challenges of Urban Design'.

29 J. Fingard, J. Guildford and D. Sutherland, *Halifax: The First 250 Years* (Halifax NS: Formac Publishers, 1999).

30 M. Paterson, 'Slum Clearance in Halifax: The Role of Gordon Stephenson' (Master's research project, Dalhousie University, School of Planning, 2009). http://theoryandpractice.planning.dal.ca/_pdf/history/mpaterson_thesis.pd

31 R. Collier, *Contemporary Cathedral* (Montreal: Harvest House, 1974); J.L. Grant and M. Paterson, 'Scientific Cloak/Romantic Heart: Gordon Stephenson and the Redevelopment Study of Halifax, 1957,' *Town Planning Review* 83, 3 (2012): 319–36.

32 Collier, *Contemporary Cathedral*; T.E. Bunting and H. Millward, 'A Tale of Two Bds: The Internal Retail Dynamics of Downtown Halifax and Downtown Kitchener,' *Canadian Journal of Urban Research* 8, 1 (1999): 1–27.

33 E. Pacey, *The Battle of Citadel Hill* (Hantsport, NS: Lancelot Press, 1979); Grant, *The Drama of Democracy*.

34 Grant, *The Drama of Democracy*.

35 Grant, *The Drama of Democracy*.

36 J. Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961).

37 A. Duany and E. Plater-Zyberk, 'The Second Coming of the American Small Town,' *Wilson Quarterly* 16, 1 (1992): 19–48.

38 J.L. Grant, 'Vision, Planning and Democracy,' in *Engaging the Future: Forecasts, Scenarios, Plans, and Projects*, eds L. Hopkins and M. Zapata (Cambridge MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2007).

39 J. Macleod, 'Clientelism and John Savage,' *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 39, 3 (2006): 553–70.

40 T. Rutland, 'The Financialization of Urban Redevelopment,' *Geography Compass* 4, 8 (2010): 1167–78.

41 J. Grant, R. Holme and A. Pettman, 'Global Theory and Local Practice in Planning in Halifax: The Seaport Redevelopment,' *Planning, Practice and Research* 23, 4 (2008): 517–32.

42 Grant, 'Vision, Planning and Democracy'.

43 Grant, 'Vision, Planning and Democracy'.

44 Landry, *The Creative City*.

45 Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*; Florida, 'Cities and the Creative Class'.

46 M. Gertler and T. Vinodrai, 'Competing on Creativity: Focus on Halifax. A Report Prepared for the Greater Halifax Partnership' (2004).

47 Halifax Regional Municipality, *Strategies for Success: Halifax Regional Municipality's Economic Development Strategy 2005–2010* (Halifax: Greater Halifax Partnership, 2005).

48 Grant, Holme and Pettman, 'Global Theory and Local Practice in Planning in Halifax'.

49 Grant and Kronstal, 'The Social Dynamics of Attracting Talent in Halifax'.

50 Next Generation Consulting, 'Attracting and Retaining Talent to Greater Halifax. Executive Summary' (2007).

51 Fusion Halifax, 'About Fusion Halifax' (2013). http://fusionhalifax.ca/

52 J.L. Grant and C. Gillis, 'The Twisted Sisters: Disputing Iconic Urban Design,' *Carolina Planning* 37 (2012): 27–34.

53 S. Massinon, 'Halifax's Arrested Development,' *The Daily News*, 5 February 2007. http://forum.skyscraperpage.com/showthread.php?t=125029

54 J. Bentley Mays, 'Twisted Sisters Not Just Another Dumb Box,' *Globe and Mail*, 1 March, 2009. http://m.theglobeandmail.com/life/home-and-garden/real-estate/twisted-sisters-not-just-another-dumb-box/article709943/?service=mobile

55 Barber, 'Making Meaning of Heritage Landscapes'; Grant and Gillis, 'The Twisted Sisters'.

56 Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM) Staff Report, *Case 00709, Development Agreement: Former Texpark Site* (16 December, 2006): 5. http://www.halifax.ca/council/agendasc/documents/TexparkStaffReport.pdf

57 HRM, *Downtown Halifax Secondary Municipal Planning Strategy* (2009). http://www.halifax.ca/planning/DowntownHalifaxPlanArea.php

58 HRM, *Regional Council Approves HRM by Design Downtown Plan* (2009).

59 Rutland, 'The Financialization of Urban Redevelopment,' 1176.

60 Rutland, 'The Financialization of Urban Redevelopment,' 1175.

61 G.W.K. Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue' (Undergraduate thesis, School of Planning, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 2013). http://theoryandpractice.planning.dal.ca/_pdf/creative_halifax/leung_thesis_2013.pdf
62 HRM Staff Report, *Case 17446, Amendments to the Regional Municipal Planning Strategy, Halifax Municipal Planning Strategy, Downtown Halifax Municipal Planning Strategy, and Downtown Halifax Land Use By-law to Permit a 48 Storey Mixed Use Building at 1591 Granville Street, Halifax* (30 October, 2012).
63 HRM Staff Report, *Case 17446*.
64 Our discussion of Fusion Halifax draws extensively on Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue'.
65 P. Moorhouse and C. Stewart, 'Cities that Attract Young People,' *The Chronicle Herald*, 8 June 2008. http://www.thechronicleherald.ca/Business/1061027.html
66 A. Queen, 'Next Generation is About to "Rock the Boat" in 'Networking and Engagement are the Foundation of Fusion Halifax,' HRM, 22 October 2007, Fusion Halifax Press Release.
67 Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue'.
68 Barber, 'Making Meaning of Heritage Landscapes'.
69 Barber, 'Making Meaning of Heritage Landscapes,' 104.
70 MacLeod, 'Fusion Halifax Pressures Council before HRM by Design Vote,' *Metro,* 9 April 2009. http://metronews.ca/news/halifax/86437/fusion-halifax-pressures-council-before-hrmbydesign-vote/
71 Skyscraper Forum, 'Halifax' (2013). http://forum.skyscraperpage.com/forumdisplay.php?forumid=221
72 Fusion Halifax, 'Become a member of FUSION Halifax' (2013). http://fusionhalifax.ca/join-us/
73 Leung's methods included extensive review of council minutes, hearing minutes, staff reports and newspaper coverage. She also interviewed Fusion members, local planners, developers and members of heritage groups opposing the projects.
74 HRM Council Minutes, *Case 00709: Development Agreement – Former Texpark Site* (2006).
75 P. LeRoy, 'Skye Would Add to Downtown Pie,' *Chronicle Herald*, 20 March 2012. http://thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/77745-skye-would-add-downtown-pie
76 HRM Council Public Hearing (9 September 2012), *Case 01114: Development Agreement – Hollis/Duke/Upper Water Streets, Halifax. Halifax Regional Municipality.* https://www.halifax.ca/council/documents/c080909.pdf
77 Grant, 'On Some Public Uses of "Planning "Theory"'; Grant, 'Vision, Planning and Democracy'.
78 Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue,' 43.
79 F.G. Bailey, *The Tactical Uses of Passion: An Essay on Power, Reason and Reality* (London, UK: Cornell University Press, 1983).
80 Grant, 'On Some Public Uses of Planning "Theory"'.
81 Bailey, *The Tactical Uses of Passion*.
82 Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue,' 54.
83 Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue,' 44–45.
84 Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue,' 42.
85 Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue,' 39.
86 Intrepid, 'United Gulf Twisted Sisters Action Required before EOB January 26, 2007,' Skyscraper Forum (25 January, 2007). http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=434616
87 R. Taylor, 'Higher Twisted Sisters Needed, Says Developer,' *The Chronicle Herald: Business,* 27 July 2011.
88 P. Keith, comment following Taylor, 'Higher Twisted Sisters Needed, Says Developer'.
89 Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue,' 55.
90 Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue,' 55.
91 Leung, 'The Role of Fusion Halifax in the Halifax Urban Development Dialogue,' 44.
92 Rutland, 'The Financialization of Urban Redevelopment'.