

OVERVIEW

Green New Deals in comparative perspective

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Editor and Maria Carmen Lemos, Editor-
in-Chief**Abstract**

In February 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey introduced into the US Congress a non-binding resolution for a Green New Deal, with the aim to catalyze policies and programs to rapidly decarbonize the US economy while achieving wider progressive economic, social and environmental goals. This motion sparked widespread interest, in and beyond the US, in the potential for more ambitious and solidaristic climate policy under the banner of a Green New Deal (GND). This Overview, after introducing the history of the GND concept and exploring its dimensions in theory, provides a snapshot of GNDs proposed (or adopted/enacted) by politicians, candidates for political office, political parties and governments around the world in the period 2019–2022. Drawing on theories of comparative politics and comparative political economy, the Overview illuminates key patterns in the prevalence and content of this set of GND proposals, as well as their ideological underpinnings and implicit “theories of change.” Specifically, it ventures that: GND policies are more commonly proposed in high-income, industrialized democracies; variation in GNDs’ prevalence and content are associated with varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions; GND policies are more commonly proposed by left-of-center parties and candidates; and GNDs are being proposed at all levels of government, but their content is shaped by constraints on government powers. On the basis of this analysis, the concluding section proposes a detailed research agenda on GNDs, with an emphasis on comparative research.

This article is categorized under:

The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Benefits of Mitigation
Policy and Governance > National Climate Change PolicyPolicy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change
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comparative politics, Green New Deal, just transition, varieties of capitalism, varieties of decarbonization

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1 | INTRODUCTION

In February 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey introduced into the US Congress a non-binding resolution for a Green New Deal.¹ Like President Franklin Roosevelt's original "New Deal," the resolution lays out "goals and projects" across key sectors of the US economy that combine progressive economic, social and environmental objectives. The Resolution envisages a "10-year national mobilization" to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, while creating prosperity and security for all people of the United States and counteracting systemic injustices. The initiative has attracted considerable attention from within and well beyond the community of stakeholders that has traditionally engaged with climate change policymaking. Notably, it has captured the imagination not only of activists and experts, but professional politicians, candidates for political office, political parties and governments (hereafter "political professionals") in many parts of the world. This Overview explores, in comparative perspective, patterns in GNDs proposed (or adopted/enacted) by political professionals from February 2019 to the end of 2022.

The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides historical and theoretical context on the emergence and content of the concept of a GND. Section 3 discusses patterns in GND policy programs proposed or enacted by political professionals around the world, drawing on theories from comparative politics/comparative political economy. The aim is to suggest plausible hypotheses to explain variation in GNDs' prevalence and content across jurisdictions, with a view to stimulating a comparativist research agenda on GNDs, suggestions for which are offered in the conclusion (Section 4).

2 | GREEN NEW DEALS: HISTORY AND THEORY

The idea of a GND in fact originated more than a decade before the Ocasio-Cortez–Markey resolution. Though the term was used in policy and academic circles since the mid-1990s (Czeskleba-Dupont et al., 1994; Henderson & Woolner, 2005), most accounts trace the first mainstream use of the term to a 2007 op-ed by *New York Times* Columnist Thomas L. Friedman (2007). Friedman argued that to move the US economy away from oil and tackle climate change required a wide range of industrial projects and programs to develop and roll-out zero- and low-emissions energy sources. At the time, the world was experiencing high prices for oil and other critical resources and commodities, alongside heightened concern over climate change. And shortly thereafter, the global financial crisis wrought financial and then widespread economic and social havoc. Against the backdrop of this "triple crunch," the GND idea was developed on the other side of the Atlantic by a group of British intellectuals who saw it as a vehicle for the combination of financial restructuring, economic stimulus and green innovation necessary to tackle these interlinked crises (Elliott et al., 2008). The ideas of this "first wave" of GND theorizing appear to have had some influence on governments during the initial phase of the economic recovery from the financial crisis, who saw an opportunity to stimulate economic demand through investments in low-carbon industrial projects (Barbier, 2010; UNEP, 2009). Some countries, including the US under the Obama Administration, made significant investments in clean energy as part of their recovery plans. However, overall, global levels of green stimulus were small relative to the scale of the escalating climate crisis, and by 2010 "the tide had turned against Keynesian demand-side macroeconomics, with the G20 meeting in Toronto heralding a new era of fiscal consolidation across high-income economies, and especially in the UK and Eurozone" (Kedward & Ryan-Collins, 2022, p. 273). With this turning tide the GND was swept out to sea. But it would return with renewed force a decade later.

The present article focuses on the "second wave" of GNDs beginning with the Ocasio-Cortez–Markey Resolution. It must be acknowledged, however, that there are important continuities between the two waves. Such continuities are especially relevant in the British context, where the Green New Deal Group, which developed the original 2008 proposal (Elliott et al., 2008), continues to this day and has played a significant role in developing and popularizing the GND concept in the United Kingdom (Brown et al., 2023). There are also continuities in the United States, with candidates from the country's Green Party having championed the idea since as early as 2010 (Aitkin, 2019), in Canada, where social movements advanced GND-like agendas around national elections (see S. Klein, 2023), and in South Korea, where the term had been used by the Lee Government to brand its stimulus package in 2009, only to be appropriated by the Moon Government in 2020 (Tienhaara et al., 2023).

The second wave of GNDs, moreover, draws inspiration from a wide range of social movements, ideological traditions, and contemporary scholarship. Surveying this output, one is struck by the diversity in what is envisaged by the

term GND. It is helpful to briefly consider this diversity using the parameters of *scope* and *scale*, and the underpinning *ideology* and *theory of change* (cf. Green & Healy, 2022).

In terms of scope and scale, GND proposals generally share a commitment to ambitious and joined-up policymaking to rapidly decarbonize economies, adapt to climate change, mitigate disruption and losses for ordinary people and the most vulnerable, advance environmental justice, and reduce (social, economic and political) inequalities. However, the scope of problems (beyond climate change) to which GNDs respond varies, as does the scale of solutions they propose (Boyle et al., 2021; Green & Healy, 2022; Tienhaara & Robinson, 2023).

GNDs also vary in their geographic scope and the social groups they cover or emphasize. A critique made by some GND advocates of second-wave US GND proposals is that they have mostly been framed as nation-building programs, with relatively little attention paid to global implications and foreign policy dimensions (Green & Healy, 2022; Kedward & Ryan-Collins, 2022). More specifically, many scholars and activists have expressed concern that the resource extraction necessary for the renewable-powered, electrified economies envisioned in GND proposals will, without due care and attention, involve neo-colonial forms of exploitation and the imposition of ecological and social costs onto poor, vulnerable, and indigenous, communities, especially in the global south (Ajl, 2021; Riofrancos, 2020; Táíwò, 2019; Zografos & Robbins, 2020), but also in the global north (Indigenous Environment Network, 2019).

These concerns also point to variation in the ideological bases and “theories of change” that underpin alternative visions of GND programmes. Most GND proposals envisage a larger role for the state in the economy, albeit within a growth-oriented, broadly capitalist system. Such proposals typically draw inspiration from the (“Green”) Keynesian macroeconomic tradition (Barbier, 2010; Chomsky et al., 2020; Ekins et al., 2013; Hepburn et al., 2020; Pettifor, 2019; UNEP, 2009; Zenghelis, 2014), the evolutionary economic tradition (Kedward & Ryan-Collins, 2022; Mazzucato, 2015, 2021; Mazzucato & Ryan-Collins, 2022; Perez, 2013), or the developmentalist tradition (“developmental environmentalism”) (Kim & Thurbon, 2015; Thurbon & Mathews, 2022). These traditions of economic thought all share a sense that economic and environmental tensions are fundamentally resolvable through elite-dominated processes of technical change, and in this sense can be considered members of a larger family of “ecological modernization” theories (Hajer, 1995; Murphy & Gouldson, 2000) or “green growth” theories (Bowen & Hepburn, 2014). Still, the ambitious scope and scale of many proposed GNDs, and the expanded role of state investment needed to achieve this ambition, has given renewed impetus to wider debates over the role and configuration of financial institutions and even the nature of money itself (see Box 1).

By contrast, more radically transformative GND proposals, rooted in economic ideas and strategies falling under the banner of “degrowth” or “post-growth,” have been advanced through grassroots activism and academic scholarship,

BOX 1 The debate over how to finance Green New Deals

States that issue their own currency could in principle finance government spending by expanding the money supply. Proponents of Modern Monetary Theory argue such states can always finance GND projects, provided there are sufficient real resources in the economy that could be utilized without increasing inflation (and inflationary pressures can always be mitigated, for instance, by increasing taxation) (Baker & Murphy, 2020; Kelton, 2020; Nersisyan & Randall Wray, 2019). However, this option is not available in jurisdictions that do not issue their own currency, such as the countries of the Eurozone.³

Some GND-supportive economists argue that GND expenditures should always be financed by targeted tax increases and government debt, which can be paid down with revenue raised from the taxes paid by the industries and workers whose profits and incomes were stimulated by the original investment (Chomsky et al., 2020; Pettifor, 2019; Pollin, 2018, 2019; Stiglitz, 2020). Degrowth proponents, however, argue that debt-financing leaves GNDs dependent on unsustainable, broad-based GDP growth. They argue GND outlays should be financed instead by reallocating money from socially and environmentally harmful sectors, progressive taxation, and monetary expansion (Mastini et al., 2021).

However, many states, especially in the global south, may be unable to implement any of these financing strategies, because under the current, private-capital-friendly global financial architecture investors can easily exit countries when they disapprove of government policy (Pettifor, 2019). This raises a wider set of questions about reforming the global financial architecture (see Section 4, below).

especially within the field of ecological economics² (Ajl, 2021; Buch-Hansen & Carstensen, 2021; Mastini et al., 2021). GND proposals that originate from, or explicitly center, the global south or historically oppressed or marginalized groups have also tended to advocate more fundamental transformations in the power relationships that determine how decisions are made in the first place, and in the ontological and epistemological bases of such decision-making (Ajl, 2021; Táiwò, 2022; The Red Nation, 2021; Whyte, 2020; Zografos & Robbins, 2020). Numerous GND proposals take a more agnostic, ambiguous, or pluralistic approach toward many of these axes of debate, seeking to work within existing system constraints to advance reforms that expand the political space within which to pursue more radically transformative agendas as social-ecological transitions unfold (Aronoff et al., 2019; Galvin & Healy, 2020; Green & Healy, 2022; Gunn-Wright, 2020).

What perhaps unites these disparate GND proposals, ideologically, is a (greater or lesser) break from the orthodox paradigm of neoclassical welfare economics, which has dominated policy thinking about climate change to date (Green, 2017; Meckling & Allan, 2020) and, more decisively, a rejection of a neoliberal capitalist ideology that exists to support the interests of corporations and their shareholders, through pro-business regulation, privatization, and disinvestment from public goods (cf. Fremstad & Paul, 2022).

3 | GREEN NEW DEAL POLICIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

3.1 | Review methodology and scope

In what follows, I discuss patterns in “second-wave” GNDs from the perspective of comparative politics / comparative political economy, utilizing dimensions of GND variability introduced in the theoretical discussion of GNDs in Section 2.

This part of the paper focuses only on GNDs proposed (and potentially adopted or enacted) by *political professionals*. The intention here is not to erase the crucial work of activist groups and researchers who have developed and championed GNDs and the ideas that inform them; indeed, many of the GNDs proposed by political professionals originated in civil society proposals, and variation in opportunities for civil society influence may partly explain variation in GND proposals by political professionals, as I explore in Section 3.2.1. Rather, the scope limitation has a theoretical motivation. The aim of this comparative discussion is to describe, and explore reasons for, variation across jurisdictions (especially across countries) in the prevalence of GNDs, regarding their content (scope and scale) and in their underpinning ideology and theory of change. An important reason for such variation, I will suggest, has to do with cross-jurisdictional variation in political and economic institutions. Such institutions have a much greater influence over what can get *done* in politics than they do over what can be *said* by interest groups and activists. Accordingly, we should expect that institutions will have a greater bearing on the content of a GND proposal the closer that proposal is to being enacted or implemented by a government. It will, therefore, be more theoretically illuminating to study variation in GNDs proposed (or adopted/enacted) by governments and, to a somewhat lesser extent, those proposed by candidates or parties seeking political office (who can expect to be held accountable if they do not deliver on their proposals, such delivery being institutionally-constrained) than to study proposals from groups who are less institutionally-constrained. GNDs proposed by political professionals also tend to be more detailed in their content than those proposed by civil society groups (see also Boyle et al., 2021).

An academic literature search for the terms (“Green New Deal” OR “Green Deal”) was used to identify GNDs proposed by political professionals around the world, the assumption being that prominent government proposals would attract scholarly attention. This was supplemented by a search of the database of US subnational GNDs in the Green New Deal Resource Hub (GNDRH) maintained by the Global Center for Climate Justice.⁴ The literature search yielded no large-n comparative studies and no systematic medium-n comparative studies of GNDs, though two articles review multiple GNDs (Boyle et al., 2021; Green & Healy, 2022) and one edited book contains multiple articles covering various GNDs, mostly at national level (Tienhaara & Robinson, 2023). Beyond these works, the scholarly literature consists mostly of single-case analyses, and is heavily biased toward US GND proposals and the EU’s European Green Deal. After identifying GNDs from my literature search, I then conducted additional desktop research on each GND, starting with Google Scholar queries.

3.2 | Comparing green new deals: Patterns and potential explanations

Table 1 lists the GND proposals disclosed by my search, some of their main characteristics, and key scholarly works that refer to that GND (or the GNDRH, where mentioned there only). Patterns in the prevalence and content of GNDs are then discussed in subsequent subsections.

3.2.1 | GND policies are more commonly proposed in high-income, industrialized democracies

The first striking pattern among GND policies is that they are almost exclusively being proposed in high-income, industrialized democracies (the US, Canada, the EU and numerous of its member states, the UK, Australia and South Korea). There are some obvious reasons why this might be so.

Consider first the role of (per capita) income and industrialization. The prevalence of GNDs in high-income, industrialized countries seems likely to be in part a symptom of the greater prevalence of climate mitigation policies in such countries more generally (Schmidt & Fleig, 2018). It is thought that higher incomes generate both stronger preferences for regulation to mitigate climate change among the public (demand-side explanation) and greater financial, technological, and institutional capacity to provide it (supply-side explanation) (Bernauer, 2013). The supply-side explanation may apply, *a fortiori*, in the case of GNDs given their large scale and scope, and their significant reliance on public investment; poorer and less industrialized states are less likely to have the administrative capacity and de facto monetary sovereignty necessary to endogenously develop and implement a GND.

Comparative political research has also identified that democracies, all else equal, are more likely to adopt ambitious climate policies in general than non-democracies (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Böhmelt et al., 2016). Again, both demand-side and supply-side explanations have been suggested. Democracies enable a freer flow of information (including about environmental matters) than non-democracies, supposedly increasing environmental awareness (especially of less visible environmental problems like climate change), and democratic institutions allow environmentally aware citizens and environmental NGOs to express their demands more effectively than in non-democratic systems (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009; Böhmelt et al., 2016). Meanwhile, democratic institutions are thought to be more likely to motivate policymakers to meet public and interest group demand for climate change mitigation (Bättig & Bernauer, 2009). These mechanisms seem all the more applicable in the case of GNDs, at least insofar as the GND paradigm is associated with a civil society-led theory of change.

That said, the developmentalist tradition in economic policymaking envisages the potential for a more state-driven theory of change, incorporating the GND idea into a paradigm of “developmental environmentalism” (Kim & Thurbon, 2015; Thurbon & Mathews, 2022) more common in countries that have industrialized relatively recently, as I will discuss below in regard to South Korea.

In countries of the Global South, especially in Latin America, vibrant grassroots movements and some scholars have proposed radical visions for environmental and climate justice. These visions inform and, in more recent iterations, are informed by GND proposals, and in some cases are identified as GNDs (Félic & Melón, 2023). However, as yet, these appear to have made only limited inroads into professional politics.

3.2.2 | Variation in GNDs' prevalence and content are associated with varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions

There is also considerable variation in the prevalence and content of GNDs among the rich democracies. Specifically, GNDs have been more commonly proposed by political professionals in the United States and United Kingdom, and these GNDs are more transformative (in scope, scale and ideology) than their national-level European counterparts. At first this pattern in GNDs might seem puzzling, since continental Europe tends to have more stringent climate policies *in general* than the other rich democracies (Finnegan, 2022). Institutional variation may explain this otherwise puzzling observation.

Drawing on longer-standing theoretical work in comparative politics and comparative political economy on varieties of political institutions (Lijphart, 2012) and varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), recent comparative scholarship on climate politics points to different constellations of political-economic institutions to explain variation in climate policy stringency and timing (Finnegan, 2020, 2022; Mildenerger, 2020). Specifically, we should expect to find variations in GND prevalence and content associated with a country's proximity to one of two ideal-type political-

TABLE 1 Green New Deal proposals around the world.

GND identifier	Jurisdiction (level)	Year	Proponent Party family or ideology	Formal nature of proposal	Status	Key scholarly works citing
H. Res. 109 (AOC GND)	US (federal)	2019	Democratic socialist	Nonbinding resolution (legislature); roadmap	Resolution tabled; not adopted	(Boyle et al., 2021; Galvin & Healy, 2020)
Green New Deal for Public Housing Act	US (federal)	2019	Democratic socialist	Bill	Introduced	(Cha et al., 2022; Galvin & Healy, 2020)
Green New Deal for Public Schools	US (federal)	2021	Democratic socialist	Bill	Introduced	(Cha et al., 2022)
THRIVE (H. Res 104—Dingell)	US (federal)	2020	Social Democrat	Non-binding resolution; roadmap	Introduced	(Boyle et al., 2021)
Biden campaign plan	US (federal)	2020	Liberal	General policy → Programme for Government	Partly enacted/ implemented	(Boyle et al., 2021; Green & Healy, 2022)
Harris campaign plan	US (federal)	2020	Liberal	General policy	Candidate not elected	(Green & Healy, 2022, sec. S2 and S3)
Sanders campaign plan	US (federal)	2019	Democratic socialist	General policy	Candidate not elected	(Boyle et al., 2021; Galvin & Healy, 2020; Green & Healy, 2022)
Warren campaign plan	US (federal)	2020	Social Democrat	General policy	Candidate not elected	(Green & Healy, 2022, sec. S2 and S3)
Booker campaign plan	US (federal)	2019	Liberal	General policy	Candidate not elected	(Green & Healy, 2022, sec. S2 and S3)
Inslee campaign plan	US (federal)	2020	Social democrat	General policy	Candidate not elected	(Green & Healy, 2022, sec. S2 and S3)
Green Party (US) GND	US (federal)	2019 (and since 2009)	Green	Manifesto	Candidate not elected	2016 proposal mentioned in (Smol, 2022)
Green Party (Canada) GND	Canada (federal)	2021	Green	General policy (manifesto)	Party did not form government	(Smol, 2022)
Peter Julian, New Democratic Party MP	Canada (federal)	2019	Social Democrat	Private member's motion (legislative); roadmap	Motion placed on notice; not adopted	^a

TABLE 1 (Continued)

GND identifier	Jurisdiction (level)	Year	Proponent Party family or ideology	Formal nature of proposal	Status	Key scholarly works citing
European Green Deal	EU	2019	Mixed (center-liberal balance)	Strategy and roadmap (executive); legislative proposals	Adopted by Commission; specific proposals at various stages of EU process in Parliament and Council.	(Boyle et al., 2021)
Labour Party Green Industrial Revolution	UK (Westminster)	2019	Social Democrat; democratic socialist	General policy (manifesto)	Party did form government	(Bailey & Hofferberth, 2023)
Green Party (UK) GND	UK (Westminster)	2019	Green	General policy (manifesto)	Party did not form government	(Bailey & Hofferberth, 2023)
Decarbonization and Economic Strategy Bill [aka “Green New Deal bill”]	UK (Westminster)	2019	Social Democrat (Lewis); Green (Lucas)	Private Member’s bill (legislative)	Not enacted	(Bailey & Hofferberth, 2023)
Socialist Party of Spain Green New Deal	Spain (national)	2019	Socialist	General policy (manifesto) → Bills (legislative)	Various separate components adopted/enacted	(Bolet et al., 2023)
Green New Deal Fund (Swiss Social Democrats)	Switzerland (national)	2021	Social Democrat	Constitutional amendment	Not adopted	^a
Green New Deal Fund (Swiss Greens)	Switzerland (national)	2021	Green	Constitutional amendment	Not adopted	
South Korea Green New Deal	South Korea (national)	2020	Social liberal	General policy (manifesto); Bill (legislative)	Partly enacted	(Tienhaara et al., 2023)
Green New Deal (Quit Coal and Renew Australia) Bill 2020	Australia (federal)	2020	Green	Bill (legislative)	Not enacted	(Stilwell, 2021) ^b
Scotland’s Green Recovery	Scotland (devolved national authority in UK)	2020	Social Democrat	Policy (Programme for Government)	Adopted	(Brown et al., 2023)
Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (New York)	New York (US state)	2019	Social Democrat	Act (legislative)	Enacted	(Boyle et al., 2021)

(Continues)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

GND identifier	Jurisdiction (level)	Year	Proponent Party family or ideology	Formal nature of proposal	Status	Key scholarly works citing
California GND (California COVID-19 Recovery Deal)	California (US state)	2020	Social Democrat	Policy	Broad proposal incorporated into various subsequent policies	(Boyle et al., 2021)
Green New Deal for Maine	Maine (US state)	2019	Social Democrat	Act (legislative)	Enacted	(Furnaro & Kay, 2022)
Green New Deal for Massachusetts (Meehan)	Massachusetts (US state)	2020	Social Democrat	Proposal (candidate manifesto)	Not adopted	(Boyle et al., 2021)
Green New Deal for Massachusetts (Chang-Diaz)	Massachusetts (US state)	2020	Social Democrat	Proposed plan	Not adopted	^a
Green New Democratic Deal (Ontario)	Ontario (Canadian province)	2021	Social Democrat	Proposed plan	Not adopted	^a
Green New Deal for Boston	Boston (city government in the state of Massachusetts, US)	2020	Social Democrat	General policy (Candidate Wu manifesto) → programme for government	Various specific GND measures adopted and operational	(Boyle et al., 2021)
Portland Clean Energy Fund	Portland (city government in the state of Oregon, US)	2019	Social Democrat	City-level law	Enacted; operational	(McConnell, 2023)
Green New Deal for Portland	Portland (city government in the state of Maine, US)	2020	[Unclear]	Act (legislative)	Enacted	GNDRH
Cambridge Green Deal / Building Energy Use Disclosure Ordinance	Cambridge (city government in the state of Massachusetts, US)	2023	[Unclear]	Act (legislative amendment)	Enacted	GNDRH
Seattle Green New Deal	Seattle (city government in Washington State, US)	2019/2020	Social Democrat	Council Resolution (2019); Executive Order (2020); Green New Deal Opportunity Fund (2022)	Adopted/Enacted	(Furnaro & Kay, 2022)
Los Angeles Green New Deal Plan	Los Angeles (city government in California, US)	2019	Liberal	Plan/Policy	Adopted, being implemented	(Furnaro & Kay, 2022)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

GND identifier	Jurisdiction (level)	Year	Proponent Party family or ideology	Formal nature of proposal	Status	Key scholarly works citing
New York City Climate Mobilization Act	New York (city government in New York State, US)	2019	Liberal	Policy; Acts (legislative)	Adopted, enacted, being implemented	(Furnaro & Kay, 2022)
City of Ithaca Green New Deal	Ithaca (city government in New York State, US)	2019	[Unclear]	Resolution; associated ordinances	Adopted, enacted, being implemented	GNDRH
London Green New Deal Fund	London (city-level authority in UK)	2020	Social Democrat	Policy	Adopted; operational	(Brown et al., 2023)
North of Tyne Combined Authority Green New Deal Fund	North of Tyne Combined Authority (city-level authority in UK)	2021	Social Democrat (Labor Mayor)	Policy	Adopted; operational	(Brown et al., 2023)

^aNot identified in academic literature search but identified during additional desktop research or by a reviewer.

^bStillwell (2021) refers to the Greens' policy commitment to a GND in December 2019. The bill referred to in the table was not specifically mentioned by Stilwell but identified through further research by the author.

economic systems: *Negotiated Political Economies* (NPEs) that have proportional representation electoral systems and corporatist structures for interest group intermediation (described below); and *Competitive Political Economies* (CPEs) that have majoritarian electoral systems and interest group pluralism, resulting in more freewheeling and combative struggles over policy (cf. Finnegan, 2022). The countries of western Europe are closer to the former, while the US, UK, Canada and Australia are closer to the latter.

Finnegan (2022) points to two factors to explain why NPEs have more stringent climate policies in general. First, corporatist structures of interest group intermediation give producer interests—both employers (capital) and workers (labor)—privileged access to the policymaking process. Unions and firms in NPEs are organized under encompassing, hierarchal, and monopolistic peak associations, and these associations enjoy privileged access to pre-legislative policymaking via long-standing linkages to political parties and the public administration. These “corporatist” institutions empower firms and unions to shape the design of policies to favor their interests in exchange for supporting government policies. In the case of climate policies, this typically means shielding firms from energy price increases by allowing for policy costs to be passed onto consumers or providing compensation to producers financed by taxpayers or via energy bills. Second, proportional electoral rules increase electoral safety by attenuating the relationship between a party’s vote share and the number of seats it wins in the legislature (so if a government loses a significant number of votes that loss is less likely to translate into a loss of legislative control than in majoritarian electoral systems), and by diffusing accountability for policies across governing coalitions. This insulates governing parties from voters to some extent, making it easier for them to design climate policies that impose short-term costs on consumers/voters. The two mechanisms complement one another, providing governments with a political pathway toward steady, incremental climate policy that enjoys broad-based support among interest groups and political parties across the political center (Finnegan, 2022; Mildenerger, 2020). However, these features of NPEs make them un conducive to more radical, transformative climate policies championed by social movements that aim to reconfigure existing power relations, redistribute wealth and make capital interests shoulder the costs of change, of which the federal-level GND proposals in the US and UK are exemplary (Green & Healy, 2022; Mildenerger, 2020). While proportional representation electoral rules in NPEs do tend to result in greater representation of green parties compared with majoritarian systems, and green parties in the former occasionally form coalition governments, Finnegan’s (2022) and Mildenerger’s (2020) studies suggest that over the long run the pro-industry mechanisms in NPEs, outlined above, have a more powerful, moderating effect on climate policy outcomes.⁵

In CPEs, majoritarian electoral rules and interest group pluralism make enacting climate policy challenging in general (Finnegan, 2022). Majoritarian electoral rules leave governments with little electoral safety: a loss of public support is more likely to translate into a loss of government. This means governments are highly sensitive to public opinion, while the prospect of returning to government at the next election incentivizes opposition parties to oppose government policies. The result is usually two dominant parties engaging in fierce, zero-sum competition for the support of the median voter. Additionally, interest groups are not hierarchically organized and they lack formal access to pre-legislative policymaking processes. Still, business enjoys wide influence over political parties and candidates due to its instrumental and structural power, especially among economically liberal (right of center) parties (Mildenerger, 2020, pp. 51–54), while unions typically enjoy influence over left-wing parties (though this influence varies across both CPEs and NPEs) (Mildenerger, 2020, p. 52).⁶ Since ambitious carbon-centric climate policy threatens the profits and competitiveness—even the *existence*—of carbon-dependent industries, both business and labor in those industries tend to mobilize against such policies, by both lobbying and financing politicians and political parties, and by seeking to sway public opinion via public influence campaigns (Brulle, 2018; Chubb, 2014; Colgan et al., 2021; Cory et al., 2020; Mildenerger, 2020; Stokes, 2020). Because the carbon pricing policies advocated by economists involve imposing short-term, salient costs on voters for long-term, global and uncertain climate mitigation benefits, ambitious (and hence more costly) policies, such as high carbon taxes, tend to be unpopular among voters, as evidenced in both opinion surveys (Ansolabehere & Konisky, 2014; Bergquist, Konisky, & Kotcher, 2020; Drews & van den Jeroen, 2016; Stadelmann-Steffen & Dermont, 2018) and case studies of political campaigns in which carbon pricing proposals were salient (Chubb, 2014; Harrison, 2010; MacNeil, 2016; Mildenerger, 2020; Rabe, 2010).

However, these conditions in CPEs actually present sporadic opportunities for more radical policy shifts in ways that arguably make them more conducive than NPEs to GND policymaking (Green & Healy, 2022; Mildenerger, 2020). First, CPEs are more open to pluralistic interest groups, which creates opportunities for social movements with more transformative GND proposals to influence policy (at least if they can mobilize support among more influential interest groups) (Skocpol, 2013). Second, because polluting industries do not have guaranteed access to pre-legislative policymaking processes (which they *do* in NPEs), it is theoretically easier for governments to impose costs on industrial

interests that significantly reduce their profitability and hence their political power to influence future policy battles (Finnegan, 2022; Mildenerger, 2020). Industrial interests mobilize political conflict into the public realm, but GNDs, being investment-centered, have politically attractive features (salient benefits, hidden costs) that make them more plausible policy vehicles for building a successful mass movement to counteract industry obstruction tactics (Bergquist, Mildenerger, & Stokes, 2020; Green & Healy, 2022; Mildenerger, 2020; Stokes, 2020). Indeed, GND policies *should* appeal to the *economically rational* median voter, given that they would be economically net-beneficial for all but the wealthiest in society.

Still, GND proponents can expect to face some significant political headwinds in building mass public support in the contemporary media and political environment. In the United States, where the GND has been most widely discussed, conservative media outlets such as Fox News have presented GND proposals in a highly unfavorable light (Bhatti et al., 2022), and established among conservative viewers a partisan association between the GND and liberal Democrats (Gustafson et al., 2019). In the context of the country's highly partisan-polarized politics, GND support has thus evolved from being broad-based when the idea was relatively nascent to being highly mediated by party affiliation after it received sustained media and political attention (Gustafson et al., 2019; McConnell, 2023).

Nonetheless, the central focus of the US GND on mass investment in clean energy, and the civil society coalitions and wider social movement behind it, evidently influenced the design and political feasibility of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)—the most extensive climate legislation in US history. The IRA may not be a GND—certainly not in the more radical sense of the Ocasio-Cortez–Markey resolution—but by increasing investment in green energy production and manufacturing in the United States it may have reinforcing feedback effects that enable more socially just climate policy in future. Ultimately, proponents hope that the GND can be a vehicle for an epochal shift in dominant ideologies and beliefs on a par with that of the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, or the original New Deal before it (Girgenti & Shahid, 2020).⁷

East Asian political economies sit somewhat outside the CPE–NPE dichotomy. Since the literature discloses only one GND from East Asia—in South Korea—it is apt to consider the factors that may explain this case, of which policy diffusion, its electoral institutions and a developmental state tradition appear to be the most plausible. Since South Korea interacts closely with the US and European countries, its elites may have “learned” about the GND through international interactions.⁸ Moreover, the Korean electoral system, which is closer to that of a CPE,⁹ could in theory facilitate more transformative climate policymaking (albeit sporadically), for the reasons discussed above. Indeed, with his centrist/center-left party's landslide election win in the National Assembly in 2020, President Moon advanced a GND agenda, along with a pledge to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. The content of this GND, however, seems more readily explained by the country's developmental state tradition: it consisted of a large green investment package centered on the manufacturing of green technologies such as electric and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, the deployment of renewable energy and the greening of public buildings (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2020). On the one hand, there are clear continuities here with the developmental-environmentalist “green growth” model of which the country has become synonymous since the Lee administration championed the concept in the late 2000s. On the other hand, compared with the country's earlier green growth policies, the Moon government's GND signals a more concerted attempt to shift away from coal-fired power generation and to incorporate justice-based and solidaristic policies to manage that transition (Tienhaara et al., 2023).

The election of conservative president Yoon Suk-yeol in March 2022 has not resulted in a major change in the country's long-term climate targets, and the government is still targeting a significant reduction in coal-fired power generation by 2030. However, the new government has placed greater emphasis on nuclear power and the research and development of more controversial technologies such as “green hydrogen” and carbon capture, utilization and storage, while scaling back plans to expand renewable energy, leaving analysts concerned about the country's progress toward decarbonization (Wang & Gopal, 2023). This renewed reliance on traditional, centralized energy industries to lead decarbonization also signals a shift away from the GND-orientation of the Moon era.

3.2.3 | GND policies are more commonly proposed by left-of-center parties and candidates

Almost every GND policy disclosed in the academic literature was proposed by a politician or political party on the political left. This is hardly surprising, given the typical ideological underpinnings (or rather, the range thereof: see Section 2) of GNDs, their historical origins, and their prominent second-wave association with the democratic-socialist

wing of the US Democratic Party, especially Rep. Ocasio-Cortez. But it is instructive to consider patterns and variation across and within left party families, as well as the (partial) exceptions to the left's GND-monopoly.

First, let's consider the prevalence and content of GNDs among "big tent" social-democratic or socialist parties of the left or center-left. Here, as noted, the most prominent GND proposals have come from the United States and United Kingdom. In the United States, the Ocasio-Cortez–Markey Green New Deal Resolution, and the social organizing that underpinned it, helped propel a wave of GND-style proposals by Democratic Party candidates leading up to the 2020 presidential election (see Table 1). Many of these proposals were ambitious in scope and scale, reflecting a democratic-socialist ideology with a focus on state investment and regulation of the economy, and a concern for socio-economic equality/justice. However, the prevalence and content of these US proposals is partly explained by the system of party primaries for selecting presidential candidates: candidates are incentivized to appeal to their party's base during the primary, which in the Democrats' case is skewed to the left. But the corollary of this is that the party's nominee is incentivized to tack to the center for the general election, which means GND proposals are likely to be less prominent in post-primary election campaigns and less likely to be institutionalized than might appear the case from the primary season alone (that said, the prominence of GND policies in the 2020 primaries clearly *influenced* the Biden administration's agenda, as discussed above).

Inspired by these developments in the United States, a civil society movement revived the GND idea in its birthplace, the UK, in the lead up to the 2019 British election. The campaign resonated not only with the rank and file membership, but also with the Labour Party leadership, at that time controlled by the socialist left of the party under Jeremy Corbyn: a plan for a "Green Industrial Revolution" was a centerpiece of the UK Labour Party's policy platform for the 2019 UK Parliamentary election (Bailey & Hofferberth, 2023). The proposal focused on state-led green investment as a means of ameliorating regional and class inequalities, reversing austerity measures and expanding public ownership of production across a number of key industrial sectors (Bailey & Hofferberth, 2023). However, the Labour Party lost the election. While the election was primarily fought over the Brexit issue and there were no obvious signs that the loss was attributable to Labour's GND policy, the status of the GND, as a concept, was somewhat diminished in Westminster, only for it to undergo a reincarnation in the context of campaigns to "build back better" after the COVID-19 pandemic (All Party Parliamentary Group on the Green New Deal, 2020; Bailey & Hofferberth, 2023). While the Labour Party's policy has been truncated under the leadership of centrist Kier Starmer, it is notable that commitments to a green investment strategy and a state-owned energy company, and an emphasis on job-creation and consumer energy price reductions, remain centerpieces of Labour's policy platform going into the 2024 election (Labour Party, 2024).

It is interesting to contrast the relative embrace of GNDs by center-left parties in the United States and United Kingdom with those in the other rich-democracy CPEs (see previous section), Canada and Australia. In Canada, the GND (and substantively similar predecessor programs) have been the object of significant civil society activism (N. Klein, 2019; S. Klein, 2023; MacArthur et al., 2020). Key activists were connected to the New Democratic Party (NDP), and the GND-related activism evidently somewhat influenced the substance and rhetoric of the NDP's, 2019 election manifesto, entitled "A New Deal for People" (NDP, 2019) and the private member's resolution by NDP MP Peter Julian listed in Table 1.¹⁰ But it has not been wholeheartedly embraced by the NDP. GND rhetoric and policy proposals have been entirely absent from the Australian Labour Party, which has been in government at the national-level since May 2022. In both cases, export-oriented fossil fuel production tends to divide these parties' natural constituencies on the left, which may explain why they have not embraced the GND. The structure of party competition among center-left and green parties may also help to explain why these two parties have diverged from their center-left counterparts in the United States and United Kingdom—a topic worthy of future research.¹¹

In continental Europe, the GND label has been less prominent overall among political parties, despite a widespread campaign around the idea spearheaded by the Diem25 movement (The Green New Deal for Europe, 2019).¹² A GND has been proposed or adopted by some parties on the left, such as Spain's Socialist Party, which ran on a platform that included a GND and won the April 2019 national election (Bolet et al., 2023), and Switzerland's social democratic and green parties, which have jointly proposed a Green New Deal Fund (Ammann, 2022). A GND-style policy package has been adopted by the European Commission, known as the "European Green Deal" (EGD), which since its launch in December 2019 has become a central organizing strategy for Europe's energy, climate, biodiversity, circular economy, and economic recovery objectives under the von der Leyen Commission (Bloomfield & Steward, 2020; Dupont et al., 2020). Given the EGD's central position within the Commission's agenda, it seems likely that it has influenced the way GND-style policies have been, and will be, developed and framed across EU member states.

The EGD represents something of an exception to the left monopoly on the concept, since President von der Leyen is a member of the center-right European People's Party (and was a cabinet minister in Angela Merkel's center-right

government in Germany). However, the Commission as a whole is relatively centrist (commissioners are drawn from multiple party families) and responsibility for the EGD portfolio in the Commission was held by Executive Vice-President Frans Timmermans, of the Party of European Socialists. Scholars have also debated how much of a transformation the EGD really represents relative to earlier periods of EU climate policymaking (Dupont et al., 2024). The EGD contains strengthened climate targets and expanded mechanisms for social protection and a “just transition” in vulnerable regions and sectors (Dupont et al., 2024), but it lacks the transformative decarbonization and redistributive policy elements characteristic of the US and UK GND proposals (Adler & Wargan, 2023; Pianta & Lucchese, 2020; Storm, 2020). Instead, it mainly uses limited public funds to subsidize and leverage private capital investments into green technologies, layered onto pre-existing regulatory market mechanisms (i.e., the European Emissions Trading Scheme). For these reasons, one could plausibly reject the characterization of the center-right von Der Leyen Commission’s EGD as a partisan-anomalous GND, and see it instead as an instance of ideologically coherent liberal-environmentalism, dressed in left-populist GND garb (Adler & Wargan, 2023).

This section has focused mainly on the *prevalence* of GNDs across party families. However, it is worth noting that there are also patterns of variation in GND *content* across party families—as one would predict based on party ideology. More centrist parties (or representatives of their parties’ centrist factions) have tended to propose GNDs that envisage a more significant role for the private sector in the delivery of GND-related investment and innovation, with the social components tending to take the form of increasing the generosity of liberal welfare state policies. More socialist or social-democratic parties (or factions or politicians) envisage a more central role for the state in GND delivery and more solidaristic and generous welfare-state provisioning. Green parties tend to adopt the most ambitious GNDs in terms of scope and scale, and, while they embrace a central role for the state, also in some cases advocate more decentralized forms of ownership and control over green assets and a post-growth orientation (e.g., Green Party [England & Wales], 2019).

3.2.4 | GNDs are being proposed at all levels of government, but their content is shaped by constraints on government powers

GNDs should be understood as a multi-level governance programmes: while “the majority of GND investments require implementation at the local level” (Brown et al., 2023, 2; see also Cha et al., 2022), core GND elements such as financial system reforms and expansionary fiscal and monetary policy require policy change at national and supra-national level. While this makes it challenging to fully fund and deliver a GND without a national programme (see also Furnaro & Kay, 2022), Brown et al. (2023) emphasize the value of local-level experimentation and bottom-up coordination in the absence of national leadership.

In any event, some GNDs have been proposed at subnational levels of government (Boyle et al., 2021; Brown et al., 2023; Furnaro & Kay, 2022; Tienhaara & Robinson, 2023; Wittmann, 2023).¹³ These appear to be concentrated in the United States and United Kingdom, where antecedent political advocacy of national-level GNDs was also greatest. Possibly, partisan elite cues from national parties may play a role in the within-country diffusion of GND ideas. Another possible explanation is that party structures at different levels of government are influenced by a common antecedent diffusion mechanism, such as a strong civil society campaign.

Subnational governments typically face significant constraints in raising and spending revenue, lack control over monetary policy and financial regulation, and in some cases have only limited powers over relevant sector-specific domains of policymaking (Brown et al., 2023; Furnaro & Kay, 2022). Still, in many cases, state/provincial governments and large city governments/mayors have significant powers and levers at their disposal that can be used to implement relatively ambitious GND programmes within the scope of their authority. In the United Kingdom, the Mayor of London launched a £10 million “London Green New Deal Fund” in 2020 to invest in decarbonizing buildings, reducing transport emissions, and expanding green businesses, and the North of Tyne Combined Authority launched a £9 million fund of the same name in 2021 to invest in a range of carbon reduction and green economy development projects (Brown et al., 2023). Both authorities have elected mayors with increased powers relative to other local governing bodies in the United Kingdom. Another notable example is Boston, where then City Councilor Michelle Wu ran successfully for mayor on a platform that included a prominent and detailed GND (Boyle et al., 2021; Office of Boston City Councilor Michelle Wu, 2020; Wittmann, 2023). Mayor Wu is at the time of writing enacting and implementing that platform. For example, in May 2022, she launched a \$2 billion plan to overhaul Boston Public School facilities—which account for nearly half of City-owned building emissions—including new construction and renovation projects, as well

as district-wide upgrades, to improve energy efficiency, climate resilience, and educational opportunities (Boston Mayor's Office, 2022).

4 | CONCLUSION: TOWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA ON GREEN NEW DEALS

This Overview, after introducing the history of the GND concept and exploring its dimensions in theory, has provided a snapshot of GNDs proposed (or adopted or enacted) by political professionals in the period 2019–2022, illuminated some key patterns in the prevalence and content of GNDs, and drawn on theories of comparative politics and comparative political economy to venture hypotheses that could explain this variation. In this concluding section, I suggest some fruitful lines of future political science (and neighboring social science, e.g., sociology) research on GNDs, with an emphasis on comparative research.

First, befitting the immaturity of this research agenda, more foundational data-gathering, classificatory and descriptive work is sorely needed. We need richer datasets of GNDs around the world. One potential starting point would be to recode existing manifesto data for GND-related language. But original data collection efforts would also be welcome, especially to extend coverage beyond those jurisdictions covered by existing manifesto datasets, and beyond party manifestos to include proposals by individual legislators and candidates for office. Such data could then be used to develop schemes to classify GNDs along relevant dimensions, and to describe variation systematically.

Moving from description to explanation, work is needed to help illuminate why GNDs are (not) proposed, enacted and/or implemented.¹⁴ Consider first “demand-side” explanations. Given the grassroots and social-movement origins of many GND proposals, future work could usefully draw on social movement theory and policy process theories to explore the social forces driving GNDs and the factors shaping their success. This work could help to resolve contemporary internecine debates among GND advocates over which groups within civil society are likely to be the animating force of a GND movement. Some focus on labor unions (Henry, 2020; Huber, 2022), some on cross-racial solidarity among frontline and vulnerable communities (The Red Nation, 2021; Zografos & Robbins, 2020), some on decentralized, post-capitalist, prefigurative political “experiments in living” (Mastini et al., 2021, p. 7), and some combine many or all of these (Ajl, 2021; Aronoff et al., 2019). Comparative case-studies using in-depth qualitative data would be especially useful here in exploring the potential of different groups and strategies, under different conditions, to mobilize effectively for GNDs.

GND advocates plausibly assume that campaigning on a wider platform that speaks more closely to ordinary people's day-to-day economic, social and local environmental concerns, while shifting the costs of decarbonization onto wealthy individuals and corporations, will help build politically effective social movements and coalitions. But the democratization and redistributive policies associated with such an agenda are also likely to attract a wider coalition of (wealthy and powerful) opponents (Green & Healy, 2022; Gustafson et al., 2019; Seidman, 2019). More studies of GND opposition networks and tactics would therefore be valuable, building on the rapidly growing work on “climate obstruction” (e.g., Brulle, 2021).

While social movement actors and interest groups will likely be central to the political success or failure of the GND agenda, public opinion dynamics also matter, as GND proponents acknowledge (Girgenti & Shahid, 2020; Prakash, 2020). US opinion polling (Gustafson et al., 2019; Leiserowitz et al., 2021) and survey-experimental evidence (Bergquist, Mildenerger, & Stokes, 2020; Stokes, 2020) attest to the potential popularity of GND proposals among voters. Yet we also know that media framing of GNDs can be polarizing, with adverse effects on public opinion (see above, Section 3.2.2). Scholars of public opinion should keep this “campaign effect” (Anderson et al., 2019) in mind when designing surveys and experiments. Using panel data, or experimental methods involving realistic negative framing treatments, are among the ways public opinion scholars could enhance our understanding of the evolution of public opinion relating to real-world GND campaigns. Additionally, since many GND proposals aim to mobilize a mass movement of working people, interviews or focus groups with working-class voters could help to test and refine the theories of change that underpin such proposals.

Turning to “supply-side” explanations, this study has illuminated some interesting patterns in partisan (non-)adoption of GND proposals. When and why do different types of political parties support GNDs? Comparative studies analyzing variation in GND adoption and content across and within left-of-center party families would be a particularly fruitful area of investigation (see Section 3.2.3).

Institutions are likely to be important contextual variables shaping both demand for and supply of GND policies. In Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, I suggested that democratic institutions, electoral systems, and institutions for interest group intermediation are likely to be especially important. Future work could usefully test this hypothesis using comparative data. But other institutions also merit further study, including variation in welfare state-type (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and in capacities for industrial coordination in areas such as finance and education/training (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Given the expanded role for the state envisaged in GND proposals, moreover, bureaucratic capacities—for instance, for vertical and horizontal coordination—are likely to be especially important in explaining the (un)successful implementation of GNDs. It is therefore crucial that the growing literature on climate institutions (Dubash, 2021; Meckling & Nahm, 2018, 2021; Zwar et al., 2023) expand to cover not only institutional capacities for carbon-centric climate policies, but the wider range of capacities that will inevitably be necessary to implement GNDs.

As discussed in Box 1, the fiscal constraints imposed on states under the prevailing global financial architecture point to the importance of reforming that architecture as part of a more globally coordinated and institutionalized response to climate change. There is growing scholarly discussion of such issues (Chen & Li, 2021; Elliott et al., 2008; Gallagher & Kozul-Wright, 2019; Green & Healy, 2022; Kedward & Ryan-Collins, 2022; Muchhala, 2020; Newen et al., 2018; Paul & Gebrial, 2021; Pettifor, 2019; Táiwò, 2022; Táiwò & Cibralic, 2020; Varoufakis & Adler, 2019). As more political actors seek to globalize GNDs through foreign policy, this will open up valuable new research agendas in international relations, international political economy, and comparative foreign policy.

Of course, large-scale institutional reform is politically challenging, but crises and other “critical junctures” create opportunities for major reform. Scholars have already begun to explore how GND advocates were able to integrate their ideas into COVID-19 response strategies (Bailey & Hofferberth, 2023; Dupont et al., 2020; S. Klein, 2023; Rosamond & Dupont, 2021). The response to the war in Ukraine and associated energy shocks appears to reflect another critical juncture through which to advance the energy transition (Kuzemko et al., 2022; Meckling et al., 2022), and potentially GND ideas. Accordingly, a historical institutionalist research agenda (Thelen, 1999) on GNDs should also yield valuable insights.

In moments of crisis and institutional failure, “ideas” take on a heightened significance, since elites rely on coherent ideological templates to interpret uncertainty and advance alternative institutional proposals (Blyth, 2002). The GND is nothing if not a bold set of ideas about how society should be organized in order to minimize and navigate the unfolding destabilization in key planetary systems. These ideas are worthy of study in their own right, by normative and critical political theorists and by scholars of political ideologies. They are also worthy of study as discrete causal factors in processes of social and political change—for instance, as part of a constructivist research agenda that explores how GND ideas and norms are shaped, framed, transmitted/diffused, contested, institutionalized (or not) and internalized (or not). For instance, in July 2021, a group of politicians from around the world campaigning for an international GND launched the Global Alliance for a Green New Deal.¹⁵ Forums such as these could be leveraged to study the socialization and diffusion of GND ideas.

Finally, while it is crucial for scholars to study GND politics post hoc, numerous scholars have argued that the climate crisis demands that researchers and policymakers make greater use of, collaborative, experimentalist, problem-solving approaches (e.g., Sabel & Victor, 2022; Samii, 2023). It is hard to envisage a more worthy topic for such a research agenda than GNDs.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Fergus Green: Conceptualization (lead); investigation (lead); methodology (lead); writing – original draft (lead); writing – review and editing (lead).

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ *H. Res. 109—Recognizing the duty of the Federal Government to create a Green New Deal*. 116th Congress (2019–2020). Available from <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/109/text>.
- ² Or “social ecological economics” (Spash, 2020).
- ³ Galvin (2020) has shown that the Eurozone, nonetheless, has the means to finance a GND.
- ⁴ “Green New Deal Resource Hub,” <https://www.gndcities.org/>. Accessed March 1, 2024.
- ⁵ See especially Mildener (2020, pp. 62–63) and Finnegan, 2020, 2022.
- ⁶ Corporate influence is extreme in the United States, especially since the 2010 US Supreme Court decision in *Citizens’ United*, which allowed unlimited election spending by corporations and labor unions.
- ⁷ An additional feature of majoritarian systems conducive to GNDs is that they tend to confer greater legislative control over the governing party, which means that governments elected on GND platforms are more likely to be able to enact and implement their proposed GNDs.
- ⁸ I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possible explanation.
- ⁹ South Korea has a plurality-based Presidential system and (predominantly) majoritarian electoral system for the National Assembly.
- ¹⁰ See [https://www.ourcommons.ca/members/en/peter-julian\(16399\)/motions/10599252](https://www.ourcommons.ca/members/en/peter-julian(16399)/motions/10599252)
- ¹¹ See also the earlier discussion of the US presidential primary system, which no doubt also explains differences in the United States case compared with Canada and Australia. I’m grateful to Kathy Harrison for helpful discussion of the Canadian case.
- ¹² See <https://diem25.org/campaign/green-new-deal/>
- ¹³ My literature search disclosed only 16, excluding Scotland (see Table 1). This may reflect a lack of uptake at sub-national level, which would perhaps be unsurprising given the constraints subnational governments often face. It may alternatively, or additionally, reflect a limitation of the data collection method used for this review, which relied primarily on academic articles: scholars tend to focus on national, EU-level and international climate policies more generally, and the same is probably true of GNDs.
- ¹⁴ Some existing single-case case studies seek to explain how GNDs came about, see for instance a number of the chapters in the edited volume by Tienhaara and Robinson (2023). For an example of in-depth case study analysis that considers how the LA and Boston city-level GNDs came about, in the form of a masters thesis, see Wittmann (2023).
- ¹⁵ See <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jul/19/politicians-from-across-world-call-for-global-green-deal-to-tackle-climate-crisis>

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