

## Introduction

José Luis Zalabardo

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* appeared for the first time in print in the *Annalen der Naturphilosophie* in 1921. The present special issue of *Teorema* commemorates the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of this event. In normal circumstances the 2021 calendar would be replete with events celebrating this unique work, but circumstances aren't normal, and much of what had been planned has had to be cancelled or postponed. Fortunately, there will be a second chance in 2022, one hundred years after the publication in England of the German text with an English translation. In light of the many mistakes of the 1921 publication, this is regarded in practice as the first edition of the book.

This is not the place to review the enormous influence that the *Tractatus* has had since its publication, both on philosophy and on other aspects of our intellectual life. The fact is that the work continues to be a source of inspiration for reflection on some of the central philosophical problems, including, of course, the problem of the legitimacy of philosophy. The articles collected in this volume demonstrate the enduring relevance to contemporary philosophers of the ideas presented in the *Tractatus*. There can't be a better tribute to the author of a philosophical book.

In his article, JONATHAN GOMBIN addresses a central issue concerning the Tractarian notion of elementary proposition. Elementary propositions, according to Wittgenstein, are logically independent of each other, and their constituents are simple. It's been argued that these two features are in tension with one another. Gombin argues, to the contrary, that they are perfectly compatible.

NAPOLEON MABAQUIAO discusses the all-important question of the status of Tractarian objects. He defends the view, first advanced by Hide Ishiguro, that Wittgenstein's concept of object is purely formal, and hence neutral with regard to the ontological category to which objects belong.

The subject matter of GILAD NIR's article is Wittgenstein's perplexing idea that inferences are solely justified by our understanding of premises and conclusion. Nir defends the viability of Wittgenstein's position as well as the cogency of his criticism of Russell and Frege on this point.

In their article, JOSÉ ANDRÉS FORERO and MARÍA JOSÉ FRÁPOLLI join the growing number of scholars to recognise the important role played in the Tractarian system by aspects of linguistic use. They argue that the ideas presented in the *Tractatus* can naturally be developed in the direction of an inferentialist metasemantics and an expressive conception of the meaning of logical constants.

OSKARI KUUSELA's article defends the idea that the special, 'non-substantial' status that the *Tractatus* ascribes to logic constitutes the philosophical core of the book. According to Kuusela, this is the ultimate reason why Wittgenstein feels that his insights cannot be communicated in the form of theses, relying instead on the implicit understanding of logical principles that his readers possess as language users.

The subject matter of ANTONIO SEGATTO's article is the interpretation of Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's theory of judgment, presented in section 5.5422 of the *Tractatus*. Segatto argues that many extant interpretations of Wittgenstein's criticism require attributing to him a substantial conception of nonsense that is alien to his thought. In Segatto's interpretation, the target of Wittgenstein's attack is Russell's treatment of the problem of the unity of the proposition, and his goal is to show that the problems that Russell's theories of judgment aimed to solve can only be solved by a correct analysis of propositions in general.

EDUARDO PÉREZ-NAVARRO's article is a contribution to the debate on the extent to which the *Tractatus* advances a contextualist conception of the individuation of content. Pérez-Navarro defends a contextualist reading of the book by showing how to provide contextualist-friendly interpretations of passages that appear to be in conflict with the view.

VICENTE SANFÉLIX's article focuses on Wittgenstein's discussion of solipsism in the *Tractatus*. Through a careful detailed analysis of the relevant texts, Sanfélix contends that Wittgenstein puts forward an argument in support of the truth of solipsism as his answer to the question of the relationship between thought, language and the world, and that this argument is built on purely logical considerations.

JORDI FAIRHURST discusses in his article Wittgenstein's contention that the point of the *Tractatus* is ethical. He argues that, by delimiting the ethical, the *Tractatus* makes manifest what it is to live a good ethical life, and that philosophy can be used as a tool to promote the transformations required for leading such a life.

In his article, RAIMUNDO HENRIQUES discusses the idea that the *Tractatus* should be read as an exercise in Kierkegaardian irony. Henriques assesses this assertion in light of contemporary theories of irony, concluding that the *Tractatus* does indeed instantiate a particular form of irony, that will make its readers come to terms with their inability to stop striving for philosophical goals that they know are unattainable.

The volume ends with an exchange between CORA DIAMOND and MICHAEL KREMER. The starting point of Diamond's paper is Wittgenstein's remark in the *Investigations* that there is an unbearable conflict between actual language and the logical order that we feel compelled to find in it. She proposes to understand the conflict by reference to ideas she extracts from Jonathan Lear's account of one of his patients. In his comments on Diamond's paper, Michael Kremer elaborates on Diamond's ideas by putting them in the context of some episodes in Wittgenstein's intellectual development. Diamond's reply to Kremer explains how Kremer's contribution helps with removing the puzzlement provoked by Wittgenstein's unbearable conflict.

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The background of the cover is an abstract, monochromatic painting with visible brushstrokes and textures. In the upper right corner, there is a dark rectangular box containing the publisher's name. The title is centered in large, bold, white letters. The author's name is at the bottom in a smaller, white, italicized font.

OXFORD

**REPRESENTATION  
AND REALITY IN  
WITTGENSTEIN'S  
TRACTATUS**

*José L. Zalabardo*