The Hungarian Nation Between East and West: The Limits of the Nationalist Imagination in the Long Nineteenth Century

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Throughout the long nineteenth century, Hungarian politicians, intellectuals, writers, and, presumably, members of the wider public, strove to define their nation, to formulate a clear, cogent, and compelling description of its characteristics, and to thereby answer the ever-popular question *mi a Magyar*? 'what [are the collective characteristics of] the Hungarian'?[1] It is the contention of this chapter that the failure of this protracted effort was not merely because, as Ernst Gellner influentially argued, nations are constantly being imagined and reimagined, or as Ernest Renan famously put it, nations are defined by 'a daily plebiscite' by a community that is voluntary and transitory.[2] Such plebiscites can even produce a broad and enduring consensus about key attributes of the nation, such as the American belief in freedom or the French belief in *laïcité*. In the case of Hungary, however, efforts to formulate a 'national characterology' actually deepened existing divisions, undermined the emergence of a consensual political culture, and contributed to the break-up of the country in 1918 and the brutal ideological polarization of what remained of Hungary's population.

Combining East and West: The Millennial Celebrations of 1896

To explain why attempts to conceptualize the Hungarian nation failed to obtain widespread and lasting agreement, a useful starting point can be found in the most grandiose of these efforts to depict the nation, the so-called 'millennial celebrations' that took place across Hungary in 1896 to celebrate the supposed one-thousandth anniversary of the arrival of the Magyar tribes into the Carpathian basin. As Brendan Gregory has noted, the Hungarian millennial celebrations reflected the international popularity of 'popular pageants of growing national self-consciousness' that presented 'an idealized image' of both the country and the nation to domestic and foreign observers.[3] Certainly, Hungary had good reasons to mount a spectacular celebration in 1896. Less than two decades after her bid for independence from Habsburg rule had been crushed in 1849, her governing class had, in 1867, as a result of the *Ausgleich* (settlement) they had agreed to with the emperor, secured substantial autonomy and a semblance of parity within the restructured, 'dualist' Austro-Hungarian Empire. The sense of self-confidence that flowed from this new era of self-government was bolstered by economic growth, massive investment in infrastructure, rapid urbanization, and cultural dynamism.

Hungary had, therefore, in 1896, the means, motive, and opportunity to present, with the millennial celebrations, an image of the state, and by extension the nation, that would appeal to both Hungarians and foreign observers alike.

Superficially, the 1896 celebrations were a striking success, attracting huge numbers of domestic, and a healthy number of international, visitors including an array of European monarchs. Moreover, the vast scale of the festivities, which included both official and unofficial exhibitions, a range of building projects, the erection of monuments across the country, and the contributions of artists and musicians, ensured that the image they depicted of the country, and the nation, was remarkably diverse and surprisingly nuanced. Nevertheless, as Alice Freifeld has observed, 'the segregation of communities so apparent in Hungarian society was re-created in miniature from within the exhibition grounds' with different parts of the exhibition charging different rates and appealing to different social classes.[4] Furthermore, the various ideological currents that were evident in fin-de-siècle Hungary were rarely enthusiastic about either diversity or nuance. Their proponents regarded the 1896 celebrations as a series of awkward compromises that had failed to resolve the competing claims and counter-claims about Hungary's 'national character' and its place within the Habsburg Monarchy. Certainly, conflicting visions of Hungarian national identity would re-emerge with fresh intensity in the years leading up to, and again after, the First World War.

To illustrate some of the tensions that existed between these different orientations of Hungarian national identity, we may note how on the one hand the millennium celebrations strove to combine a celebration of Hungary's unique status within the wider Habsburg Empire with due deference to the Habsburg emperor Francis Joseph (1830-1916), who remained Hungary's king, and who still exercised notable powers, such as his control of the army and foreign policy, and the right to appoint and dismiss every member of the Hungarian government. Indeed, the continuing construction of Hungary's new parliament on the 'Pest' side of the Danube, a magnificent manifestation of Hungary's (regained) self-government, was symbolically matched by the beginning of the construction of a new royal palace opposite on Buda's Castle Hill, which reminded the population that Hungary was still a part of the larger Habsburg Empire. Likewise, while the emperor formally granted the celebrations his approval by participating in the opening festivities, the emphasis on Magyar conquest and specifically on 'Prince' Árpád, who had reputedly led the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian basin and had founded the first dynasty of distinctly Hungarian kings, infused the celebrations with a distinctly historical 'Magyar' character that implicitly challenged the House of Habsburg.[5]

This symbolic juxtaposition of Habsburg authority and distinct Hungarian traditions was not, however, anything new. It had developed over the centuries in a context of conflict and compromise between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Hungarian political elite, who had retained a decisive role in shaping domestic politics, the local county administrations, and the country's judicial system, in exchange for their loyalty to the Royal Court in Vienna. At best it reflected the decentralized nature of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the centuries-old, if at times uneasy, alliance between the Habsburg dynasty and its Hungarian dominion. At worst, it suggested a process of nation-building that gradually undermined and ultimately dismantled the empire. In the post-1867 period, these competing visions of collective identity did not foster a new spirit of compromise between enthusiasts and critics of Habsburg rule. While the governing Liberal Party (Hungarian: *Szabadelvű Párt*) continued to insist that Hungary could only flourish within the secure confines of the Habsburg Empire, the opposition Independence and Forty-Eighter Party (Hungarian: *Függetlenségi és 48-as Párt*) explicitly venerated the revolution against Habsburg rule in 1848, and excoriated Habsburg rule from Vienna as a burden that needed to be eased and perhaps even jettisoned.[6] In the following years, the conflict between the pro- and anti-Habsburg camps would come to a head in a series of clashes, such as in 1905, when the emperor sought to appoint a compliant government that lacked the support of parliament; in 1912, when the government had to send soldiers into parliament to enforce the payment of Hungary's share of the imperial revenues; and in November 1918, when the Hungarian government dethroned the House of Habsburg and proclaimed complete independence from the Habsburg Empire. Even then, debates between 'legitimists', who argued that only a Habsburg could be Hungary's legitimate head of state, and the 'free-electors' who insisted that Hungary could elect whoever it wished, would continue to fester throughout the interwar period, even erupting into violence in 1921, when the last Habsburg Emperor, known as Charles 1 of Austria and Charles IV of Hungary (1887-1922), staged a last unsuccessful effort to reclaim his throne.

A similar duality in Hungarian national identity, and one that the 1896 celebrations also failed to reconcile, derived from a debate about whether Hungary possessed a 'European' or 'Asian' character. One the one hand, nineteenth century Hungarian jurists and politicians frequently stressed the European *Rechtsstaat* quality of the country that stood in contrast to the stereotype of oriental despotism. They claimed that Hungary's combination of law, decree, custom, and myth comprised an 'ancient constitution', one that was comparable to traditions of constitutional government elsewhere in Europe, notably England.[7] The assertion that Hungary fully conformed to European values also found tangible expression in the rebuilding

of the city of Budapest, which provided a stunning backdrop to the millennial exhibition. Its grand buildings, wide avenues, squares, parks, and underground railway were all specifically modelled on other European metropolises, and they ensured that successive generations of its inhabitants revelled in their city's modernity and the claim that they had built the 'Paris of the east'.[8]

On the other hand, the millennial celebrations also celebrated Hungary's oriental legacy. The panorama painted by Árpád Feszty (1856-1914), which was placed at the heart of the Millennial Exhibition, imagined the actual entry of the Hungarian tribes into the Carpathian basin, and depicted them in oriental dress led by shamans, while a new statue of Árpád, clothed in a lion skin, was erected at the entrance to the exhibition on *Hősök tere* (Heroes' Square). Even the incorporation of a large swathe of Hungary within the despotic Ottoman Empire between 1526 and 1700 was commemorated by a supposed reproduction of Buda Castle in that period, replete with whirling dervishes, Turkish belly-dancers, and a fakir fasting in a glass box. A funfair was constructed modelled on a clichéd image of Istanbul, and the exhibition even featured a supposed replica of Attila the Hun's personal tent.[9] However, this lavish attempt to celebrate both Hungary's European and Asian heritage failed to foster an enduring consensus about Hungary's place in Europe. Rival camps of Hungarian intellectuals continued to either berate their fellow countrymen for failing to fully conform to European civic values, or to insist that Hungary would only avoid European cultural 'degeneration' by protecting and nurturing its Asian heritage.[10]

There was, however, an additional political subtext to the historical portrayals of Árpád and the ancient Magyars in that they appeared to affirm the supremacy of the Magyar nation within the territories of Hungary, half of the population of which officially belonged to other minority 'nationalities'. For example, a state-sponsored ethnographic exhibition of village life, with recreations of the supposedly typical rural living conditions of the non-Magyar peoples, provoked furious protests among Hungary's neighbours, who were infuriated by the allegedly demeaning way their compatriots in Hungary had been depicted. More generally though, because the Millennium celebrations of 1896 focused upon the conquering Árpád, the implication was that the Magyars were the supreme ethno-racial group within the kingdom who possessed the single legitimate right to power through an ancient right of conquest. This sense of supremacy through subjugation was further buttressed by claims of the Magyars' longstanding political traditions and intellectual achievements, which could similarly give rise to haughty sentiments such as those expressed by the noted expert in Hungarian law Ákos Timon (1850-1925), who wrote that 'the Hungarian people arrived at the pure concept of

statehood, of real public power before other European state-forming people'.[11] Claims such as these sought not merely to highlight the Magyars' ancient provenance, but also their allegedly 'civilizing' influence on the other, less cultured inhabitants of the Carpathian basin. These often thinly-veiled attempts to legitimate nationalist claims of Magyar intellectual and political hegemony specifically antagonized the country's Slavic and Romanian speakers, who claimed to be the descendants of the original inhabitants of the Carpathian basin before its conquest by the Magyar tribes in 896.[12]

Ultimately, the Magyar chauvinism that was on display in the 1896 celebrations was confronted by growing nationalist opposition from these alienated 'nationalities' that would culminate in the break-up of Hungary in 1918, when they embraced the mantra of 'self-determination' and joined the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic and the expanded kingdoms of Romania and Serbia (later Yugoslavia). Seventy percent of historical Hungary's former territories were, thereby, annexed by her new and expanded neighbours. This dismemberment of Hungary was then largely affirmed by the victorious Great Powers, specifically Britain, France, and Italy, with the Treaty of Trianon signed on 4 June, 1920. The result was a general crisis of identity that manifested itself, for example, in revolutionary violence during the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, and in the subsequent counter-revolution known as the 'White Terror' which produced a legacy of retribution and recrimination.[13] In an attempt to contain the spread of Bolshevism and assert its own neo-feudal, Christian-nationalist understanding of the Hungarian state, the inter-war regime encouraged a number of cults aimed at reinforcing national unity and pride, and portrayed the nation as a community bound together by its glorious past, linking all these motifs to the widely-supported programme of border revisionism.[14] Accompanying the latter ideas was a proliferation of symbolic references to a wounded, or otherwise maimed or 'dismembered Hungary' (*csonka Magyarország*), and the claim that the Hungarians had been 'humiliated' and 'victimized' by the victorious Western powers.[15] Once again, the problem of the eastern and/or western orientation of the Hungarian nation arose, and debates ensued as to whether St Stephen, anointed in the year 1000 as the first Christian king of Hungary (but born under the pagan name *Vajk*), had in fact erred in aligning Hungary with the 'West' and set the country on a path to ruination.[16]

The Pre-Modern Nation

To explore why the millennial celebrations of 1896 and the larger attempt to create a compelling image of the Hungarian nation in the nineteenth century failed, it is instructive to

examine how nationalism as a discourse developed in Hungary, beginning with attempts to redefine the very concept of the 'nation' and its collective 'national character' in the late eighteenth century. These attempts ultimately foregrounded the '[ethnic] Magyar character of the multiracial kingdom', and made allegiance to Magyar supremacy the primary focus of political loyalty.[17]

Prior to that point, however, it was the Holy Crown of St Stephen that functioned as the chief unifying symbol of the kingdom, and until the Enlightenment the very designation 'Hungarian nation' (Latin *Natio Hungarica*) referred only to those who possessed the corporate political right to attend the Hungarian Diet, namely the nobility, clergy, and a small number of enfranchised burghers, irrespective of language or ethnicity. The peasants, excluded from this nation, paid taxes, while the nobles were freemen who were exempted from onerous feudal duties on account of their (or their ancestors') service to the crown. This concept of a 'noble' nation was grounded in István Werbőczy's *Tripartitum Opus Juris Consuetudinarii Inclyti Regni Hungariae*, the main legal reference work for the nobility from its publication in 1517 through to the nineteenth century. In this work, Werbőczy affirmed the liberties, exemptions, and immunities of the *populus*, meaning the nobility, against encroachments of the crown. To the same end, he also asserted that the nobility were 'members' of the Holy Crown, alongside the ruling monarch (meaning that they exercised sovereignty together), and that as a class they shared in 'one and the same liberty' (*una eademque libertas*), regardless of discrepancies of wealth, rank, or title.[18]

Werbőczy further distinguished the *populus* as members of the crown from the *plebs*, who paid taxes, tilled the land, and possessed no right to political representation or to change their masters. In order to legitimize this division, he provided a short historical explanation that drew from a series of medieval chronicles that purported to narrate the story of the Hungarians' arrival in the Carpathian Basin at the end of the first millenium. Werbőczy explained how the nobility (*gens*, *natio*) had arrived from the land of the Scythians, from where Attila had also once left to conquer the land of Hungary. The Magyars under Prince Árpád, he claimed, were thus descendants of the Huns, and they had simply reconquered their own land at the cost of their own blood. However, while some Magyars' sacrifice of blood had granted them the right to rule, others who had refused to take up the call to arms were punished, and forever condemned to servitude. These were, allegedly, the ancestors of the Magyar *plebs*.[19] This account of the Magyars' Scythian origins had been largely lifted from Simon of Kéza's *Gesta Hunnorum et Hungarorum* (c. 1282), which attempted to create a prestigious past for the 'eastern' Magyars, one that mirrored the Trojan ancestry of the Franks and the similarly

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legendary origins claimed by other medieval European peoples. Yet although Simon of Kéza affirmed the oriental origins of the Magyars in that work, he also genealogically linked them to Hunor and Magor, sons of Nimrod from the Old Testament. By doing so, he staked his claim that the historically loathed pagan Magyar invaders in fact belonged within the symbolic world of European Christendom.[20]

Despite the medieval legal fiction that the Hungarian nobility were descendants of the conquering Magyars, the kingdom's nobility was ethnically and linguistically diverse. Within this context, Werbőczy's idea of noble equality took precedence over ethnic considerations, and the noble class included gradually assimilated ennobled members of all of the kingdom's *nationes* (including Germans, Wallachians, Slavonic peoples, and the Jassic and Cumanian tribes), as well as naturalised foreign nobles who received *indigenatus* status.[21] In this respect, and with Latin the *lingua franca* of the nobility, the early modern concept of the Hungarian nation possessed, at least to a certain extent, permeable boundaries, allowing all its members, regardless of ethnicity or mother tongue, to partake of the social customs, historical traditions, and political ethos that influenced the behaviour of the 'Magyar' political nation.[22]

Werbőczy's ideal of a unified political class or *natio* was also complicated by the Hungarians' catastrophic defeat by the Ottoman army at the Battle of Mohács in 1526. In the chaos that ensued after King Louis II died in battle without an heir, two factions fought over the Hungarian crown, the first led by Ferdinand I of Habsburg (1503-1564), the second by John Zápolya (c. 1490-1540), the voivode of Transylvania (whom Werbőczy supported). With no clear resolution in sight, both kings were crowned, and the country was split into three parts: 'Royal Hungary' ruled by the Habsburgs in the northern and western parts, the East Hungarian Kingdom, ruled by Zápolya, and which gradually became the Principality of Transylvania (in 1570), and the central portion of the medieval Hungarian kingdom, which remained under Ottoman rule until the late seventeenth century.[23] Werbőczy's idealised political nation had thus become divided along political and geographic lines. To complicate matters further, new confessional divisions also added to the malaise. Indeed, in many ways the tragedy of Mohács paved the way for the Protestant Reformation in Hungary, especially in the east and Transylvania, as contemporaries sought an explanation for their suffering and their kingdom's collapse, and Protestant preachers provided ready answers, claiming that Mohács was a form of divine punishment that God had inflicted because of the moral corruption of former elites and the Catholic Church (with whom the Habsburgs were aligned). Protestant diatribes also provided a message of hope for the future, as Calvinists in particular drew parallels between Hungary and the history of Israel, borrowing the idea of 'elect nationhood' to suggest that the

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suffering Hungarians, much like the Jews, were God's chosen people, and that their covenant with God could be restored by virtuous leaders.[24] The Protestant Reformation also saw increased interest in the vernacular tongue, as preachers attempted to proselytise among a much broader demographic than before. The result was a flourishing of literature, the printing of grammars and dictionaries, and the first complete translation of the Bible into Hungarian (by Gáspár Károlyi in 1590).[25] In contrast, especially in the more Habsburg-dominated western and northern parts of the country, Catholics responded by blaming the Protestants for the country's malaise, and during the Counter-Reformation different mythologies were revived and propagated in support of the Catholic Church and to counter the threat of Ottoman incursion. These included appeals to St Stephen's foundation of the Hungarian kingdom in alliance with Rome to historically justify the Catholic nation's predominant sociopolitical status within the Hungarian lands, the notion that Hungary was the *propugnaculum Christianitatis* ('bastion of Christianity'), and the idea of that Hungary was a *Regnum Marianum* ('Realm of Mary') that enjoyed the patronage of the Blessed Virgin Mary.[26] Catholics also made inroads into vernacular reform, with Jesuit György Káldi (1573-1634) publishing the first Catholic Bible in Hungarian in 1626, and Archbishop Péter Pázmány (1570–1637) leaving an indelible imprint on Hungarian prose with his intricately crafted polemics.[27]

Although the above ideas and early attempts to reform and standardise the vernacular arose in an era of confessional division and conflict, they would go on to play a role in the building of secular (or at least less religiously divided) nationhood in the modern era. They also, however, remained markers of a divided country, population, and political nation. The Principality of Transylvania became a semi-independent vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, and a bastion of Protestantism with its own religious freedoms—despite Habsburg efforts to the contrary. Calvinist resistance theory became intertwined there with the theories of Werbőczy, and noble elites played Ottomans against Habsburgs and vice versa as well as fomenting a number of revolts against Habsburg rule in the west. Eventually the Habsburgs gained the upper hand, and following victory at the Siege of Vienna (1683) and the Holy League's defeat and expulsion of the Ottomans, Leopold I obtained the right to permanent hereditary succession in all the lands of Hungary, including Transylvania. As King of Hungary, Leopold next incorporated the Principality of Transylvania into the Habsburg Monarchy, albeit as a region separate from the Kingdom of Hungary, with its own diet and laws, as stipulated in his *Diploma Leopoldinum* of 1690. Through the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottomans formally ceded Transylvania to the Habsburg Monarchy. These arrangements were

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consolidated after a series of *Kuruc* ('insurgent') uprisings against the Habsburg *Labanc* ('long-haired' or 'wigged') occupiers. Although the *Kuruc* rebels were often portrayed by later historians as being Hungarians and the *Labanc* as foreign or 'German' imperial troops, Hungarians fought on both sides, and *Kuruc* insurgents included Slovaks, Ruthenians, Romanians, Roma Gypsies and others, as well as foreign mercenaries.[28] Under the influence of later nationalist historiography, however, the term *Kuruc* came to designate not merely opponents to the Habsburgs, but those 'patriotic' (or 'chauvinistic') Hungarians who advocated strict national independence; similarly, the term *Labanc* came to be used as a slur to refer to 'disloyal' or 'treacherous' Hungarians who sought to cooperate with outside powers. This *Kuruc-Labanc* dichotomy would be applied to later political oppositions, and become a deeply entrenched element of Hungarian political thought even beyond the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, reflecting 'a more fundamental dilemma of how to secure the survival and development of a nation exposed to both external and internal challenges to its existence'.[29]

The *Kuruc* struggles ended with the defeat of Ferenc II Rákóczi's War of Independence and the Treaty of Szatmár (1711), which after nearly two centuries of devastating warfare ushered in a new era of peace and stability in Hungary under Habsburg rule.[30] The country, devastated by conflict, had seen widespread demographic change, as various peoples from the Carpathian Basin had fled to and from Hungary due to the ravages of continuous warfare, or had been moved to Hungary as part of Habsburg imperial policy to cultivate abandoned and underdeveloped areas. This meant that Hungary had become a highly multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, as the proportion of Magyars dropped from around seventy-five to eighty percent of the population in the old Hungarian kingdom to under fifty percent of the population in Habsburg-ruled Hungary.[31] Peace also seemed to usher in an era of bucolic indolence, and for these reasons, later Romantic thinkers described the period from the failed war of independence (1711) to the first signs of a modern national revival (1772; described below) as 'the Age of Dormant National Spirit'.[32] This epoch also saw the rise of a multi-ethnic adaptation of the earlier concept of the *natio Hungarica*, known as *Hungarus* identity. This existed in multi-ethnic parts of the kingdom, such as the northern highlands (today Slovakia), and eastern Croatia where it remained popular until at least 1918.[33] The *Hungari* saw themselves first and foremost as subjects of the Kingdom of Hungary, and defined themselves along historical and regional lines, with ethnic and linguistic considerations playing a secondary role. As the polihistor Dániel Cornides (1732-1787) wrote in 1778: 'Briefly, on the Hungari and the Magyars, whom I distinguish in the following way: while I hold all Magyars

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to be Hungari, the opposite is not true: not all Hungari are Magyars. Hungarus constitutes a genus, Magyar a species.'[34] The label *Hungarus* ('of Hungary') thus placed territorial identity above ethno-linguistic allegiance, and as such it could also accommodate identification with the kingdom's dynastic or imperial identity, which similarly eschewed forms of ethnic 'national' allegiance in favour of 'state' patriotism and loyalty to the crown.[35]

Re-Imagining the Nation

By the last third of the eighteenth century, these older concepts of 'national' identity were being challenged by overlapping waves of writers who sought to either appropriate or redefine the socially and politically exclusive concept of the nation under the influence of Enlightenment ideals. The first break with tradition came from noble language reformers such as György Bessenyei (1747-1811), whose first publications in 1772 are seen to mark the beginning of the Enlightenment, and with it, the birth of a more modern, secular form of linguistic nationalism. This was because Bessenyei promoted the increasingly widespread idea in Europe that the 'nation' was defined through the vernacular language.[36] In Bessenyei's vision, a reformed vernacular language was the key to progress: it could displace Latin as the language of science and erudition, and play a civilizing role as it had done in other countries. Thus, Bessenyei's vision of vernacular reform was detached from the earlier proselytizing activities of both the Protestant and Catholic churches in Hungary, as he and his followers rather argued that improved vernacular languages could help promote literacy and educate the masses, and thus stimulate trade, commerce, and the sciences. Furthermore, by providing a sufficient platform for the legal integration of entire communities, the political community and the surrounding culture could be brought into tighter alignment (even if Bessenyei rejected new forms of democratic nationalism). Language reform could thus in Bessenyei's view ultimately bring 'happiness' and prosperity to the 'nation' (as a linguistically-defined community) at large, and if it did not automatically allow the lower orders to break free from their ascribed social class, the 'pen' provided an alternative path to ennoblement, in addition to the sword.

Any sorting of the population into linguistically-defined national 'communities' was, however, inherently problematic in the hierarchically-ordered, multilingual, multi-ethnic, and pluri-religious Kingdom of Hungary. First, Latin had been the language of law, governance, and the registering of hereditary right since the kingdom's very foundation, and as a *lingua franca* it not only allowed communication between ethnically-differentiated nobles, but between the Magyar political nation and the 'German' Habsburg court; second, no 'standard' Hungarian language existed, and this required the refinement and the standardization of diverse dialects; third, the boundaries of linguistically-defined groups did not clearly coincide with

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contemporary state or class boundaries, and more than half of the population spoke a language other than Hungarian. The arguments of Hungarian language reformers, therefore, provided a series of implicit but radical challenges to *status quo* arrangements, and their enthusiasm for the Hungarian vernacular almost immediately came to overlap with claims made about political identity, legitimacy, and power.

Nevertheless, although this nascent sense of ethnolinguistic national identity in Hungary implicitly challenged the traditional concept of a distinct 'noble nation', it did not immediately undermine the power of the nobility, who continued to exert a profound influence over the new and much wider national framework.[37] This was because it was the nobility themselves, particularly the *bene possessionati* or middle nobility, who championed the re-imagining of the nation, for they largely constituted the domestic intelligentsia in Hungary, and they dominated both the county administrations and the lower chamber of the Diet (after 1848 parliament) that gave the new concept of the nation legal force. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, it was often amidst the Enlightenment's quasi-anthropological debates on the constitution of 'national character', and the supposedly innate differences between the nations and ethnic groups of Europe and the wider world, that understandings of the Hungarian language became subordinated to the nobility's genealogical understanding of their Scythian-Hunnic ancestry. Early evidence of such views arose in reaction to pioneering works by the Imperial and Royal Astronomer Maximillian Hell (1720–1792) and his associate János Sajnovics (1733–1785), who on expeditions to the northern climes of Europe had claimed the linguistic kinship of the pre-conquest Magyars with 'Lappic' peoples on the basis of empirical research.

This narrative of linguistic genealogy was then confused with claims about the purportedly racially-inherited 'national character' of the Magyar nobility, and the idea that the nobility were descendants of supposedly sedentary and servile Lapps clashed with the notion that the Magyar nobility were the proud and warlike descendants of Hunnish–Scythian ancestors.[38] In this latter view, language was an inalienable and intrinsic component of each quasi-racial nation that was passed down across the generations, and that embodied certain innate qualities and virtues which shaped the 'character' and destiny of each nation in the present. This 'genealogical' understanding of the fixed relationship between a nation and its character was more concerned with notions of noble glory than it was linguistic scholarship. Nevertheless, the medieval genealogy of the Hungarians' Scythian-Hunnic ancestry was difficult to displace, particularly after it became more broadly popularized through the publication of medieval chronicles such as Anonymus' thirteenth century *Gesta Hungarorum* (in 1746), Simon of Kéza's aforementioned *Gesta Hunnorum et Hungarorum* (1781), and the

works of Jesuit historians such as György Pray (1723-1801) and István Katona (1732-1811), who provided narratives of the primordial origins of the Magyars as an ethnic caste and propagated the idea of the conquest of the Carpathian basin by the 'House of Árpád', until the line was replaced by mixed foreign royal dynasties, and eventually the Austrian Habsburgs.[39]

Thus, scholarly debates about the origins of the language and the identity of the linguistic community almost immediately became focused upon the claimed historical identity and virtues of the noble political community. These debates, however, left a lasting legacy, as similar debates over the origins of Hungarian, known as the 'Ugric-Turkic War', would erupt after the *Ausgleich*, albeit in a more broadly controversial context of forced Magyarization and national chauvinism against minorities.[40]

Between 'Foreign' and 'Domestic' Models: The Struggle for Linguistic and Political Autonomy

Joseph II's language decree of 1784 brought tensions over language to the forefront of political attention. An enlightened absolutist, Joseph II attempted to improve the efficiency of his empire by introducing German as the language of administration in Hungary in the place of Latin, which he considered a 'dead language'. However, this was broadly seen as an attempt to 'Germanize' Hungary, and while many contemporary Hungarians leapt to the defence of Latin as the *patria lingua* 'father tongue' of the kingdom, reformists, often combining both the utilitarian and identitarian strands of linguistic understanding outlined above, argued that Magyar, the 'mother tongue' of the kingdom, should be made the language of state and administration. In this context, one's use of language became more clearly associated with stances of loyalty to the Hungarian (noble-)nation, or 'unpatriotic' allegiance to the supranational Habsburg *Gesamtstaat*. From the 1790s onwards, the struggle to have the 'native' Hungarian language taught in schools and recognized as the sole language of state would become symbolic of the Hungarian nation's struggle to free itself from 'foreign' influence and achieve political autonomy. Seen in these terms, earlier attempts to establish vernacular press organs, scholarly journals, and a 'national' literature and theatre in Hungary gained broader backing by the nobility. The result was the emergence of broader 'vernacular' readerships and audiences in Hungary, a circumstance which contributed greatly to the rise of ethnolinguistic nationalism as the dominant framework of identity by the beginning of the nineteenth century.[41]

A further challenge to the traditional understanding of the nation arrived with the French Revolution of 1789, with its theoretical transfer of sovereignty from a monarch to a

body of ‘citizens’ who constituted a nation of equals. While the idea that language could promote trade and learning and provide a separate path to ennoblement did not necessarily undermine traditional class structures, the revolutionary French conceptualization of the ‘nation’ promised a break with previous feudal arrangements. In Hungary, the reception of these ideas was mixed. On the one hand, the idea that the ‘nation’ was a territorially and linguistically united community who enjoyed equal rights under a written constitution appealed to a small group of enlightened Hungarian reformists, who wished, *inter alia*, to remove noble privileges and abolish serfdom, maintain press freedoms, and promote trade and commerce for the advancement of the common weal. Moreover, for Hungarians who chafed at Habsburg rule, the revolutionary and anti-monarchical connotations of the ‘French vocabulary’ of politics had an obvious appeal. Ultimately, however, the idea of granting equality and freedom to the peasantry remained anathema to the majority of nobles, who saw themselves as the rightful ‘nation’, and who sought to maintain their privileges and domination of the peasantry. Thus, during a threatened noble insurrection against the Emperor Joseph II (1741-1790)’s rule in 1790, traditionalist nobles rhetorically exploited the vocabulary of the French revolutionaries to promote their own class interests: for example, the jumble of traditional laws and customs was rebranded as a ‘constitution’, albeit an ‘ancient’ one that did not break with the past, but rather maintained traditional class distinctions and noble privileges, and reaffirmed the nobility’s exclusive right to participate in legislation. Furthermore, references to the ‘people’ and the ‘nation’ referred not to the community as a whole, but to the traditional class concept of the *Natio Hungarica*. Bolstered by the aforementioned narratives of Scythian-Hunnic identity, this was a version of ‘national’ consciousness that resorted to French political terminology and spoke in the name of the entire people, while retaining traditional medieval and feudal hierarchies, and continuing to exclude the peasantry from the ‘nation’.

Eventually, at the Diet of 1790/91 compromise was reached with the incoming monarch Leopold II, who promised to rule ‘constitutionally’ (i.e. in consultation with the Hungarian nobility and in respect of their privileges), recognise Hungary as an autonomous kingdom with its own laws and customs, and introduce necessary reform in the spirit of gradualism, unlike his brother. However, Leopold’s reign was short-lived, and politics took a reactionary turn following the accession of Francis II in 1792. As the French Revolution descended into bloody anarchy, those who championed ‘French’ ideas of reform and a wider definition of Magyar nationality, and even many of those employed during the Josephine era, were dismissed. The Royal Court in Vienna introduced strict policing and censorship, and declared war on France.

Neither of these moves clashed with the priorities of the more conservative members of the Hungarian nobility, as they, too, feared the outbreak of popular revolution in Hungary.

Nevertheless, for a small group of radical Hungarian intellectuals, many of them freemasons, the 'French' ideals of nationhood carried a lasting appeal. Led by Ignác Joseph Martinovics (1755-1795), these self-styled 'Jacobins' formed two secret societies, the first sought to stir the conservative nobility into overthrowing the Habsburgs, the second to then overthrow the conservative nobility. For an underground movement mostly unknown to the public, this plan was somewhat over-zealous. Even so, the Jacobins demonstrated an acute awareness of the external and internal obstructions to reform, and presciently, even recognized the problematic nature of applying the 'French' concept of nationhood to the multi-ethnic and multi-denominational territories of Hungary: in imagining an independent republic (with a bicameral parliament, expanded suffrage, press freedoms, peasant emancipation, and free trade), they sought not to create a centralized state dominated by the Magyars, but rather transform the multi-ethnic kingdom of Hungary into a federation of free 'nations', each possessing its own constitution.[42]

The Hungarian Jacobins were arrested by Francis II's spies, and their leaders tried and executed. Those who had colluded were imprisoned or hounded out of office, and political programmes for democratic reform and economic liberalisation were stifled. Among those arrested was Ferenc Kazinczy (1759-1831), whose imprisonment constituted a setback to those exponents of language reform who wished to model the vernacular on the basis of foreign models (at least until he resumed activities following his release in 1801).[43] Fearing further reprisals, many prominent intellectuals withdrew to the private sphere in the following years. In symbolic opposition to the centrifugal forces of nationalism that had erupted during the Napoleonic Wars, Francis II renamed the lands of the Habsburg crown as the 'Austrian Empire', and reaffirmed both his divine right to rule and the empire's possession of Hungary as one of its 'Indivisible and Inseparable' territories in 1804. Despite disastrous defeats by Napoleon, Austria emerged as one of the victorious Great Powers following the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. The post-war reaction, spearheaded by Chancellor Metternich, ensured that there would initially be no room for compromise with Hungarian liberal-national demands.

Nonetheless, although pro-French democratic elements, 'foreign' style liberal economic reform, egalitarianism, and 'nationalism' were initially smothered by watchful Habsburg officials, and although landowners were partially placated by the agrarian upswing following the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, the ideas of the French Revolution were not so easily supressed. Furthermore, modern warfare had demonstrated the inadequacy of the

noble-led military levy in battle, further undermining the nobility's privileged martial status.[44] Thus, a perceived need for social, economic, and political change began once again to challenge the nobility's traditional self-image as a class that prided itself on its 'Scythian' martial virtues and that functioned as the sole representative of the 'nation'. With democratization and 'national' independence officially struck from the political agenda, proposals for reform and the development of a form of proto-liberal 'nationalism' flourished instead in the sphere of language and culture. From around 1815 onwards, the Hungarian literary movement saw an upsurge of activity, as writers received new inspiration, often from German Romanticism, to create a 'national literature' aimed at 'awakening' national consciousness and creating 'unity' among the population. Most writers did not (yet) formulate specific proposals for political reform, but they did enthusiastically explain the importance of the national language, culture, and education, and discussed the place of non-Magyars, Jews, and even women in the 'national' community.[45]

Furthermore, members of the Hungarian literary elite remained keen to reaffirm the idea that their 'nation' constituted a historically-conceived and autonomous 'body politic', although now they often did so in a pronouncedly Herderian style of argumentation. Herder's idealization of the *Volk* and the uniqueness of 'folk-life' as expressed in *Volkslieder* ('folk songs') had already seen parallel attempts in late eighteenth-century Hungary to collect folk songs and poetry, and to discover through their exploration the nation's origins and its supposedly distinctive worldview. Indeed, Herder's claims that each nation possessed its own distinctive manner of thinking and acting that was transferred through language and custom (not to mention his intimation that nation, state, and *Volk* were virtually synonymous) fell upon fertile ground, and a search for a more 'native' and 'naïve' sense of community and authenticity intensified as Magyar authors entered into mimetic competition with their German counterparts and asserted, as Herder had done, that the Hungarian nation possessed its own distinct personality and *Volksgeist* ('spirit of the people'). The equation of national identity with language and purportedly 'authentic' *népi* (*völkisch*) characteristics went on to become one of the foremost constituents of Hungarian national self-identification in the nineteenth century.[46] Eventually, it would find powerful expression in the works of 'populist' poets such as János Arany (1817-1882) and Sándor Petőfi (1823-1849), who wrote to his friend Arany in 1847, 'Let's make [the poetry of the people] predominant in the realm of literature. When the people are prominent in poetry, they are very near to power in politics.'[47]

Building the Nation

Three major trends characterized the development of Hungarian nationalism along these lines. The first was the attempt to develop the Magyar vernacular in order to replace Latin as the official language. The second was opposition to 'Germanization', a trend which not only involved the rejection of foreign customs, but which also saw a concerted effort by the middle nobility to 'Magyarise' the public sphere, revive Magyar traditions, and even re-Magyarise the 'aulic' aristocracy. The third was the attempt to assimilate Hungary's non-Magyar populations through the use of the Magyar language.[48] Crucial here was an increasing belief that a reformed Hungarian language, in combination with liberal political and economic reforms, would eventually create a homogeneous national speech community and give rise to a culturally-coherent body politic within the multi-ethnic kingdom.[49] Furthermore, liberal nationalists also believed that the Hungarian language required urgent defence, in part because the Royal Court saw little value in its cultivation or use (in fact, they saw the language movement as a surrogate emancipation movement), but also because they believed that language was the key marker of national identity. Even more influential was the fact that Herder himself had predicted the extinction of the language in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1791). In that work, Herder had claimed that the Magyars formed "…now, among the Slavs, Germans, Vlachs and other peoples, the smaller part of the country's inhabitants, and after centuries one will perhaps hardly be able to find their language".[50] Although a single comment, this 'prophecy' would exert an apocalyptic influence on the development of Hungarian national identity. Buttressed by social and demographical data that highlighted how ethnic Magyars constituted significantly less than half of Hungary's total population, it symbolized a fear of culturally-defined 'national' death that stemmed from larger pan-Germanic and pan-Slavic pressures, not to mention the erosive influence of other, smaller non-Magyar nationalities. However, as a consequence of Herder's prophecy, it was also claimed that the nation's lack of power, virility, or its fading *Volksgeist* would lead to its disappearance from the face of the earth. With this in mind, the idea of 'national death' was also often cited to give urgency to efforts to promote the 'national' cause, linguistic or otherwise, often at the expense of other nationalities. The idea that the organically-conceived and morally-pure 'people' or 'folk' was besieged by threatening outside elements thus became a prominent *topos* of later Hungarian nationalist discourses of (in)security and ethno-national dissolution, and often served to obscure the contradictions of promoting the Hungarian national project in a country characterized by ethnic plurality.

With its emphasis on the folk and the unique 'genius' and 'character' of each nation, the influence of Romanticism marked a shift away from Enlightenment preconceptions that

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traditional rural culture was barbarous and should be supplanted by the 'high culture' found in more advanced parts of Europe.[51] Instead, nationalist writers now stressed that their nation constituted a unique cultural entity that had developed organically along distinctive historical lines, and that had to be preserved to prevent its 'death'. Following Herderian and other German Romantic examples (such as that provided by Friedrich Schlegel's *Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur*), the most prominent early nineteenth century Hungarian writers similarly sought to discover their nation's mythical pre-history. However, Hungarians possessed no epic poetry in the ilk of Homer or the recently fashionable Ossian. This led a number of poets, such as Mihály Vörösmarty (1800-1855), to write their own. In *Zalán futása* ('The Flight of Zalán', 1825), Vörösmarty, too, borrowed from the medieval chronicle *Gesta Hungarorum*, and celebrated the nation's greatest military victory: the conquest of the national homeland. In this work, Zalán, the ruler of an ancient Bulgarian-Turkish people, was put to flight by Árpád and the Hungarian tribes, whose national God was called *Hadúr* ('Warlord').[52] Other writers, such as Károly Kisfaludy (1788-1830), depicted the Magyar's heroic struggles against the Tatars in 1241, as well as the capture of Belgrade by the Magyars in the eleventh century.[53] But in doing so, these writers also sought to foster a sense of collective historical purpose in the present—while national epics were ostensibly tales of origin, their narratives of conquest seemed to bleed into the present, expressing latent desires for independence or the 'reconquest' of the country after centuries of foreign rule.

Even so, by the 1830s tales of national heroism ran parallel to another, more tragic *topos* that had become prominent in literary expression. This was the lamentation of the Magyar Kingdom's defeat by the Ottomans at Mohács in 1526.[54] The tragedy of Mohács was, of course, a prominent theme in earlier centuries, and a potent symbol of the country's lost independence. But now it was becoming part of a broader martyrology of defeat, one that often drew upon older religious ideas of elect nationhood, and that was perhaps intended to create a sense of solidarity and responsibility borne of collectively suffered tragedy. Based upon selective renditions of the 'facts' of history, it suggested that the nation's fate had been imposed upon it by malevolent external forces (e.g. Tatars, Turks, or Habsburgs), and thus cultivated an understanding of national victimhood. For example, Ferenc Kölcsey (1790-1823), the author of *Himnusz* ('Hymn', 1823), which would later become the Hungarian national anthem, wrote of a nation 'Long torn by ill fate', suffering at the hands of the Tatars and Turks, and exhorted God to pity the Hungarians and ensure them a better future. Vörösmarty's *Szózat* ('Appeal', 1836), the country's second anthem, similarly spoke of a 'thousand years of suffering' and concluded:

In the great world outside of here
There is no place for you;
Should fortune's hand bless or beat you,
Here you must live and die![55]

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Notions of national victimhood and powerlessness, often at the hands of malign foreign powers, would become enduring *topoi* of Hungarian national identity. In the nineteenth century, they were complemented by another prominent concept of external threat in the national vocabulary, that of *sérelmi politika* ('grievance politics'). This latter term derived from an older practice whereby the nobility aired their *gravamina* ('injuries') or complaints to the king for restitution. In the national context, however, there was a common implication that the nation at large was being oppressed, and its rights violated. Rhetorically, all these themes (national death, victimhood, grievance) operated by evoking a powerful and emotively-charged symbolic world based upon a triadic pattern of metaphorical 'victims', 'persecutors', and 'rescuer-heroes'. The conception of the nation as victim in Hungarian nationalist rhetoric also meant that narratives of national identity often paradoxically alternated between poles of bombastic Magyar superiority and a fear of annihilation by an all-powerful 'other'.[56]

Nation building was, however, not always as emotionally charged as the above rhetoric might suggest. Pragmatic liberal programmes of reform began to emerge in the Hungarian 'Reform Age', which is considered to have begun in 1825 with the first convocation of the Diet since 1812.[57] There, one of the country's wealthiest aristocrats, István Széchenyi (1791-1860), gave a speech in Hungarian and offered one year's income from his estates to establish the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and spur interest in the nation's language, literature, and culture. Széchenyi came from a family with a long history of dual Habsburg-Hungarian loyalty (his father had both served the Royal Court and helped establish a library which became the National Museum in 1802). After serving as an army officer during the Napoleonic wars, Széchenyi travelled to England in 1815, where he was impressed by the British constitutional monarchy, the country's high level of education, and modern industry, and he returned to Hungary as an advocate of nineteenth-century liberalism, tolerance, and utilitarianism. In a series of works indicating that national life would henceforth focus on political and not literary matters (including *Hitel* 'Credit', 1830; *Világ* 'Light', 1831; and *Stadium* 'Stage', 1833), he promoted freedom of speech and conscience, equality before the law, and campaigned against noble economic privilege and tax exemption and other 'traditional' legal obstacles to

commerce and the bourgeois development of the 'nation', including the medieval law of entailment, an institution which affirmed the inalienability of landed property from noble families and their descendants, and which thus blocked land ownership by non-nobles, and also prevented landowners from raising loans against their property. Széchenyi also established a 'National Casino' or club where reform could be discussed, and he initiated numerous other commercial and industrial developmental programmes (including agriculture, horse racing, ship-building, and the manufacture of silk, not to mention the regulation of the Danube and Tisza rivers, and the construction of the Chain Bridge, the first stone bridge over the Danube).[58] However, Széchenyi was also a gradualist; he believed in the Enlightenment vision of progress and the social contract, and although he was convinced that liberal reform was inevitable in Hungary, he argued that it was best conducted through a process of peaceful evolution towards manumission, led by the aristocracy in conjunction with the Crown, instead of through bloody revolution, led by radical elements. Furthermore, he subscribed to the Herderian vision of the nation, and believed that each nation must nurture and develop its own culture in similar slow stages to avert its 'death', and maintain a course along the path of universal human progress.[59] Indeed, in *Kelet Népe* ('People of the Orient', 1841), Széchenyi wrote that 'The Hungarian people have no lesser calling than to represent – as that single heterogenous offshoot of Europe – its specific qualities, hidden in its Asian cradle, that until now were never developed, and never blossomed into maturity'. Although as a tribe the Magyars, as the 'scourge of God' (a reference to Attila), had caused much devastation in Europe's more developed regions, it was now their task to temper 'wild fire into noble flame, brute force into the resilience of champions, and the thirst for destruction into magnanimity.'[60] Thus, Széchenyi saw that 'Western' forms of liberal reform could be implemented while honing the heterogenous but originally oriental characteristics of the Hungarian people.

Yet Széchenyi's gradualism led him into conflict with the other chief 'national' icon of the era who is thought to have shaped the pre-conditions for the 1848 revolution in Hungary, the journalist, orator, and later revolutionary leader Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894). Imprisoned for his liberal leanings in the second half of the 1830s and later editor of the progressive paper *Pesti Hírlap*, Kossuth shared many of Széchenyi's beliefs, including the need to free the serfs and to expand the political community, bring about equality before the law, and end the economic privileges of the nobility by introducing liberal economic and land reform in order to 'polish' or 'civilize' the nation. However, Kossuth, whose support base was among the middle nobility**,** embraced radical mass politics more openly than his peer. Imbued with the ideas of the French Revolution, he composed impassioned editorials and speeches in favour of

much greater Hungarian autonomy from the Habsburgs; rejecting the primacy of elites in government, he argued for a modern parliamentary democracy with responsible government and popular representation. Unlike Széchenyi, he favoured protectionism, and while he agreed that non-Hungarian nationalities could become part of the Hungarian 'nation', gaining constitutional liberties, welfare, and education, he embraced a more impatient assimilatory approach. While he initially embraced the idea of a linguistically-defined community of Hungarians, Kossuth later rejected the idea, describing the nation as a community of free, emancipated people. Nevertheless, he also suggested that different nations could achieve different levels of national self-determination, and that only those communities which possessed historical traditions in public law and politics should form a nation. This was a nod to the supposedly centuries-old 'constitution' of Hungary, and to the supposed cultural supremacy of the Magyars over the kingdom's other nationalities, a stance that Kossuth would only later come to regret.[61]

These ideas went well beyond the limits of the reform movement that Széchenyi had helped bring into being. Széchenyi responded to Kossuth's reform proposals and what he saw as dangerous agitation that could potentially result in a disastrous intervention by the Habsburg dynasty. In 'People of the Orient', Széchenyi turned against Kossuth and his followers, criticizing them for their stance towards Vienna and the non-Hungarian nationalities. The result was that Széchenyi became increasingly estranged from the liberal national opposition.

In contrast, Kossuth presented the drive towards reform and independence as a forced reaction to the unbearable ethno-political tyranny of the Habsburgs. His claim that the 'ancient constitution' could be extended to the peasantry (often metaphorised as a 'castle', with its drawbridge lowered to offer them sanctuary) proved irresistible, particularly to those social classes who had previously been excluded from political influence and who were now elevated, at least theoretically, to equal influence with the nobility. However, this vision was not so enthusiastically greeted by the nationalities, as a string of language laws that culminated in the introduction of the Magyar tongue as the language of state in 1844 had left German, Romanian, Slovak, and South Slav minorities feeling excluded from state power and public influence.[62] To them, it seemed that the Magyars were pursuing autonomy for themselves, while ignoring the rights of other national communities.

Even so, when news reached Hungary in March 1848 that revolutions had broken out elsewhere in Europe, Kossuth and his fellow reformers seized their chance. The legislation known as the April Laws, that they persuaded both the Hungarian Diet and the Habsburg emperor to endorse, helped by fear of popular insurrection and the threat that Hungary would

immediately break away from the empire, 'broke the back of the old social order based on hereditary right and laid the foundation of the new Hungary'.[63] The new national colours of red, white, and green were used to identify the nation in its own form of tricolour in accordance with the French model, the old concept of the *Natio Hungarica* was replaced with the new concept of the nation as a community of liberty, and the iconic poet of the revolution, Petőfi, portrayed the people as having broken the chains of slavery. A degree of popular representation was also introduced with a government that was purportedly 'responsible' to the people. It seemed that the revolutionaries had succeeded in their goal of creating a new 'nation state'.

However, claims to have created a new 'national' state were complicated by a variety of factors, as Hungary was anything but unified, and even the liberal revolutionaries of 1848/9 could not exercise full control of the medieval feudal apparatus. The combined might of the Habsburgs and Romanovs, who sent their loyal armies into Hungary in 1849, as well as revolts by Hungary's minorities including the Croat, Romanian, Serbs, and Slovak speakers, who were experiencing their own 'national awakenings' led to the failure of the revolutionary state. Thirteen leading Hungarian generals were executed, Kossuth fled into exile, and Széchenyi succumbed to depression, leading to his suicide in 1860. German was then reintroduced as the official language of administration, and for purposes of taxation, administration, and commerce, and Habsburg court officials dreamed of turning Hungary into an integral part of a single, centralized state.

Despite its failure, the Revolution of 1848/9 left an indelible mark on Hungarian politics. It established the tenets of territorial unity and Hungarian supremacy over that territory as axioms of the national cause. At the same time, many Hungarians embarked upon a programme of 'passive resistance', unwilling to participate in the occupation and thus subjugation of their country. Reformers and the leaders of the revolution became heroes and martyrs, and the cult of Kossuth, especially among the peasantry, endured into the twentieth century.[64]

The Settlement (*Ausgleich*) of 1867, signed by Francis Joseph and a delegation headed by Ferenc Deák (1803-1876), created the dual state of Austria-Hungary, each half of which possessed its own prime minister and parliament, but was bound into one by the person of the Emperor-King (of Austria and Hungary respectively) and the ministries of Foreign Affairs and War. As a result, the Hungarian Diet, now considered a national parliament rather than a regional assembly, revelled in its new-found or restored authority. The separate status of Transylvania and the Military Border was nullified, and a mass of legislation including statuary law and ministerial decrees was churned out with the explicit goal of modernizing the country.

Thus, although separatists still desired a completely sovereign and independent Hungarian state, and although Kossuth dismissed those Hungarian nobles who sided with the Habsburgs in 1848-1849 as 'traitors' and accused the architects of the 1867 settlement of having signed 'a death warrant for the Hungarian nation', the Magyar-dominated political elite welcomed the opportunity to legitimate their claim of 'national' supremacy: while a new Nationalities Law was passed to protect the rights of non-Hungarians, it was often ignored in practice, and many Hungarians, rather than seeking full political independence, instead set about consolidating and legitimating Magyar 'national' power over the country's ethnic minorities.[66] Within this context, it became an established 'nationalist' axiom that Hungary (as the name implied), belonged to the Magyars, an idea embodied in the Magyar name for their country (*Magyarország* – the land of the Magyars).

The privileged position of the Magyar nation over the other 'nationalities' in Hungary was matched by the privileged position of the traditional political, noble-dominated elite who rhetorically lauded the entire population as citizens of the 'Hungarian political nation' but, nevertheless, continued to deny most of them the right to participate in politics. The upper house of parliament was essentially the preserve of the aristocracy, the lower house was elected by no more than eight percent of the adult male population, and only the largest taxpayers were permitted to take part in municipal politics. The possibility that a more consensual political culture might emerge was also hindered by the governing Liberal Party's willingness to use censorship, judicial proceedings, rampant corruption, and a politicized bureaucracy to maintain its grip on power.[67] By the time of the 1896 millennial celebrations, the Liberal Party had convincingly won the previous five national elections and it remained in power, (with a brief hiatus between 1905 and 1910 and a name-change to the National Party of Work) until the end of the First World War.

It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that a smattering of peasants and self-proclaimed representatives of the growing industrial proletariat, were able to secure representation in parliament, while representatives of all of Hungary's minorities never managed to secure even ten percent of the seats in parliament for their various representatives. Decades of largely uninterrupted economic growth after 1867 and a relentless effort to promote a patriotic loyalty to the country, eagerly supported by, for example, the leadership of all of Hungary's religious denominations, tempered these ideological antagonisms. By 1918, however, these binds had frayed to breaking point. The most active representatives of Hungary's minorities, along with socialist and progressive critics of the government, alienated by decades of fruitless opposition, had concluded that Hungary's entire political structure, legal

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framework, and elitist national culture, was the result of narrow self-interest and fundamentally illegitimate.[68]

There were also those champions of Magyar national supremacy who worried that the political elites' policy of assimilation in which all citizens of Hungary were encouraged to embrace a Magyar identity, was actually too inclusive rather than exclusive. In particular, the governing regime's philosemitic policies, which had encouraged the growth of Hungary's Jewish population, from around 100,000 to almost a million persons over the course of the nineteenth century, provoked particular alarm. The solution that the census adopted, which demanded that alone among Hungary's inhabitants, Jews were classified according to their religion not their mother tongue, underscored that language knowledge alone could not become the sole characteristic of Hungarian national identity but still failed to placate anti-Semites. They insisted that Jews were infiltrating and undermining the Magyar nation.[69] Their calls for the Magyar nation to be narrowed by religious or racial criteria, found its echo in the frequent allegation that political opponents were 'unpatriotic', 'foreign', 'unnational', and should also be excluded from the nation.[70]

Moreover, through the influence of scientific positivism from the 1860s, more rigid, racial evolutionary doctrines, and the concepts of Social Darwinism began to emerge in a new political parlance which asserted that the co-existence of different races was impeded by racial incompatibilities.[71] Furthermore, roughly conterminously with the Millennium Exhibition, a new-form of Hungarian ethno-racial rhetoric also began to emerge, that of 'Turanism', which sought to amalgamate older ideas of the 'eastern' and warlike origins of the ancient Magyars into modern racial categories. In this ideology, it was not so much language, as 'race' that would become the main vehicle of national development, and the Magyars were no longer an elect nation, but rather a chosen biological race.[72] The realignment of politics that took place following the *Ausgleich* saw a revival of neo-conservative activism and new forms of chauvinism which meant that, by the early twentieth century, liberalism and nationalism had parted ways. One strand of liberal politics turned towards ideas of democracy, individual autonomy and rights, a free society and parliamentary traditions, whereas a growing number of nationalists turned more in the direction of illiberal conservativism.[73] Thus, in 1929 the political scientist, sociologist and politician Oszkár Jászi could claim that the Hungarian political elite 'regarded their serfs, especially those of a foreign tongue as an inferior race, incapable of understanding their thoughts and feelings'. Furthermore, when 'these century-old servants and slaves' demanded 'the same national rights as those claimed by the "conquering

and state-building" Magyar nation' it appeared to them as 'an effrontery, almost as a rebellion'.[74]

Conclusion: The Contested Nation

Efforts to define the Hungarian nation were, therefore, always thoroughly politicized. The question of who was included, and excluded, from the nation, and whether it belonged to 'the east' or 'the west', were symbolic weapons that could de-legitimize opponents and empower competing ideologies. The symbolism ran deep: in 1905, the Hungarian writer Endre Ady (1877-1919) famously described Hungary as a *komp-ország* 'ferry-country' travelling endlessly between the 'barbarian' or ethno-protectionist, feudal, and despotic East and the 'civilized' or liberal and democratic West.[75] Soon after, Hungary's leading literary journal was entitled *Nyugat* ('West', 1908-1941), suggesting its contributors' affiliation with liberal 'Western' political and cultural ideals, while the journal *Napkelet* ('Orient', 1923-1940) served as a platform for conservative writers. To illustrate further, Hungary's first written constitution, imposed on the country by the Bolsheviks in 1919, eschewed both liberal 'western' and conservative 'eastern' identities, and described Hungary as a republic of 'workers, soldiers and agricultural workers' from which all other social classes were, at least rhetorically, excluded. Later that year, alongside a resurgence of anti-Bolshevik and anti-Western Magyar ethnic 'Turanism', the victorious leader of Hungary's counter revolution Miklós Horthy (1868-1957), publicly denounced the entire population of Budapest, which he claimed had supported the Bolsheviks, and in his words 'had become the corruptor of the Hungarian nation'.[76]

As a result of the deep-rooted and increasingly sharp ideological tensions that were evident in Hungary in the decades before the First World War, the millennial celebrations of 1896, despite much pomp and ceremony, were doomed to be a merely transient success that offered no lasting answer to the question '*mi a Magyar?*'. The belief of Hungary's political elite that they had the right to determine how the Hungarian nation should be imagined was, invariably, inseparable from the larger debate about their own legitimacy and dependent on their own grip on power. If the Hungarian nation did, as its Romantic proponents claimed, possess a 'spirit' or a 'soul', then Hungarians of different classes and political persuasions were continually wrestling over it, dragging it from East to West and back, and attempting to mould it in their own image. But while struggles over national identity are, of course, common to the warp and weft of much political debate, nineteenth century Hungarian nationalism, which developed from an old exclusive concept of 'noble' nationhood, never really lost its sense of hierarchical superiority. Thus, although the communists ostensibly believed in international

cooperation, they too attempted to steer Hungarian national identity towards the legitimation of their own dominant ideology, and away from what they termed 'revanchism' or 'anti-Soviet' forms of national expression.[77] After the fall of Communism in 1989, new attempts were made to re-establish or re-define Hungary's place between east and west. Following the dawn of the new century, similar contestations of national identity arose in the wake of new challenges, inevitably drawing upon older ideas, but now amidst new configurations of power, and new understandings of Hungary's place on the geo-symbolic map of Europe. As with the 1896 Millennium Exhibition, it appears that the extent to which Hungarians should embrace either the 'orient' or the 'occident' will remain controversial and contested, particularly as the country's political compass remains divided between those who look 'west' and those who gaze 'east' to plot the paths of their past, present, and future selves.

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[1] An excellent chronological overview of intellectuals' efforts to define a Hungarian national characterology during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is provided in Balázs Trencsényi, *The Politics of 'National Character': A Study in Interwar East European Thought.* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 70-120.
[2] Ernest Renan, 'What is a Nation?', in *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 8-22 (19).
[3] Brendan Gregory, 'Theatre of Nationalism', *Maske und Kothurn*, 33.1-2 (1987), 125–134. (125).
[4] Alice Freifeld, *Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary, 1848-1914* (Washington: John Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. 274.
[5] See Brendan Gregory, 'The Theatre of Nationalism', p.129 and András Gerő, *Imagined History. Chapters from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Hungarian Symbolic Politics* (New York: Social Science Monographs, 2006), pp. 181-182.
[6] See, however, the discussion of the similarities between the two parties in Andrew C Janos, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1982), pp. 135-141.
[7] András Cieger, 'Reform Fever and Disillusionment: Constitutional Fiascos of the Hungarian Liberals after the Settlement of 1867", in *A History of the Hungarian Constitution. Law, Government, and Political Culture in Central Europe* (London: IB Tauris, 2018), pp. 123-124.
[8] Gerő, *Imagined History*, p.185.
[9] Gregory, 'The Theatre of Nationalism', p.130.
[10] For a useful summary of these debates, see Zsolt Nagy, *Great Expectations and Interwar Realities. Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy 1918-1941* (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2017), pp. 94-105.
[11] András Cieger, 'National Identity and Constitutional Patriotism in the Context of Modern Hungarian History: An Overview', *The Hungarian Historical Review*, 5.1 (2016), 123-150.
[12] Freifeld, *Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary*, p.277.
[13] The best account of the break-up of Hungary in 1918-1920 is provided in Ignác Romsics, *The Dismantling of Historic Hungary; The Peace Treaty of Trianon 1920* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2002). See also Robert Gerwarth, 'The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War', *Past & Present*, 200.1 (2008), 175-209 (193-209).
[14] Cieger, 'National Identity and Constitutional Patriotism', pp. 135-136.
[15] Anna Menyhért, 'The Image of "Maimed Hungary" in 20th-Century Cultural Memory and the 21st-Century Consequences of an Unresolved Collective Trauma', *Environment, Space, Place*, 8.2 (2016), 69-97.
[16] Zoltán Varannai, 'Közép- és Kelet Európa-koncepciók a két világháború közötti Magyarországon', in *Társadalmi önismeret és nemzeti önazonosság Közép-Európában* (Budapest: Teleki László Alapitvány, 2002), pp. 63-76.
[17] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1961), p. 527.

[18] These were that (1) noblemen could only be arrested according to due legal process (2) they were only subject to the lawfully-crowned monarch's authority (3) they were exempted of all taxes and dues but obliged to take up arms in defence of the realm, and (4) they were entitled to resist any monarch who attempted to violate their privileges without incurring the crime of infidelity. This last point first appeared in Andrew II's Golden Bull of 1222, and Werbőczy claimed (erroneously) that all previous kings had upheld this right. Werbőczy also implied that Hungary was a republic of nobles headed by a monarch, and claimed that all noblemen were thus 'members of the Holy Crown' of Hungary. László Péter and Miklós Lojkó, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century: Constitutional and Democratic Traditions in a European Perspective (Central And Eastern Europe)* (Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2012), pp. 46-47.

[19] Pál Engel, *The Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 374-375; See also János Gyurgyák, *Ezzé Lett Magyar Hazátok* (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2007), p. 24.

[20] See Jenő Szűcs, 'Theoretical Elements in Master Simon of Kéza's Gesta Hungarorum (1282–1285)', in László Veszprémy and Frank Schaer, eds, *Simon of Kéza, Gesta Hungarorum. The Deeds of the Hungarians* (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 1999), pp. xxix–cii.

[21] Benedek Varga, 'Political Humanism and the Corporate Theory of State: Nation, Patria and Virtue in Hungarian Political Thought of the Sixteenth Century", in *Whose Love of Which Country?: Composite States, National Histories and Patriotic Discourses in Early Modern East Central Europe* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2010), pp. 285-314 (293-4). 293-4

[22] László Deme, 'Writers and Essayists and the Rise of Magyar Nationalism in the 1820s and 1830s', *Slavic Review*, 43.4 (1984), 624-640. 624

[23] Martyn Rady 'Rethinking Jagiełło Hungary (1490–1526)', *Central Europe*, 3.1 (2005), 3-18. 3.

[24] See Graeme Murdock, 'The Importance of being Josiah: An Image of Calvinist Identity', *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 29.4 (1998), 1043–1059.

[25] Lóránt Czigány, *The Oxford History of Hungarian Literature from the Earliest Times to the Present* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), pp. 34-52.

[26] See Gábor Tüskés and Éva Knapp, 'Magyarország - Mária országa. Egy történelmi toposz a 16-18. századi egyházi irodalomban', *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények*, 104.5-6 (2000), 573-602.

[27] Czigány, *The Oxford History of Hungarian Literature*, pp. 53-63.

[28] See, for example, Ágnes R. Várkonyi, 'A „népi kurucság" ideológiája', *Történelmi Szemle*, 6.1 (1963), 44-55 for an early discussion.

[29] József Litkei 'The Molnár Debate of 1950: Hungarian Communist Historical Politics and the Problem of the Soviet Model,' *East Central Europe*, 44.2–3 (2017): 249–283 (274).

[30] Györe, Zoltán. 'War and Demography: The Case of Hungary 1521–1718' in *The Treaties of Carlowitz (1699)* (Leiden: Brill, 2019), pp. 253-272 (269).

[31] Ibid., p. 271.

[32] Czigány, *The Oxford History of Hungarian Literature*, p. 65.

[33] See, for example, Alexander Maxwell, Choosing Slovakia: Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language and Accidental Nationalism (London: IB Tauris, 2009).

[34] The Latin original is cited in Moritz Csáky, 'Die Hungarus-Konzeption. Eine "Realpolitische"' Variante Zur Magyarischen Nationalstaatsidee?', in *Ungarn Und Österreich Unter Maria Theresia Und Joseph II* (Wien: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1982), pp. 71-89 (80).

[35] Gábor Almási and Lav Šubarić, 'Introduction', in *Latin at the Crossroads of Identity: The Evolution of Linguistic Nationalism in the Kingdom of Hungary* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 1-23 (15-16) and the chapter by Ambrus Miskolczy entitled '"Hungarus Consciousness" in the Age of Early Nationalism' in the same volume, pp. 64-94.

[36] Ferenc Bíró, 'Nyelv, „Tudományok", Nemzet', *Holmi*, 2005, 580-594 (582).

[37] Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1969), p. 49.

[38] Gábor Klaniczay, 'The Myth of Scythian Origin and the Cult of Attila in the Nineteenth Century', in *Multiple Antiquities, Multiple Modernities: Ancient Histories in Nineteenth Century European Cultures* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2011), pp. 183-210 (196-7).

[39] Szabados György: *A magyar történelem kezdeteiről. Az előidő-szemlélet hangsúlyváltásai a XV–XVIII. században*. Budapest, 2006. Pray's five volume *Annales regum Hungariae* (1768-1770) covered Hungarian history from 977 to 1564, periodized according to the reigns of kings; Katona's forty-two volume *Historia critica regum Hungariae* (1779-1817) extended his chronology to include the Habsburg era; both works legitimized Habsburg hereditary rule and the eternal truths of the Catholic church. Katona, for example, created a developmental teleology between the Hunnish King Attila and the first Christian Hungarian King St. Stephen: 'The former was the whip of God, the latter the apostle of Christ; the former built on the power of arms that could be subverted, the latter on the cast-iron cliff of faith that proves unshakeable.' Lutheran historians Johann Christian Engel (1770–1814) and Ignaz Aurel Fessler wrote histories of Hungary in German that were similarly influential

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in the nineteenth century. Zsigmond Pal Pach, 'Old and New Syntheses of Hungarian History', *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 34.2/3 (1988), 291-306 (292-3).

[40] Peter Sherwood, '"A nation may be said to live in its language": Some Socio-Historical Perspectives on Attitudes to Hungarian', in *The Literature of Nationalism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 27-39.

[41] Almási and Šubarić, *Latin at the Crossroads*, p. 16.

[42] Kálmán Benda, 'Hungary', in *Nationalism in the Age of the French Revolution* (London: Hambledon Press, 1988), pp. 129-136 (135).

[43] Kazinczy and his followers, later styled as 'neologists', translated terms from foreign languages to create new words, added Magyar suffixes to foreign words, or attached new meanings to old words and expressions, in order to create a *fentebb stíl* 'higher style' or literary standard that would not only refine the critical sensibilities of Hungarians, but also enable them to occupy a place among the other 'polished' and civilized nations of Europe. Their innovations, however, provoked controversy, and opponents to their activities, so-called 'orthologists,' repudiated foreign influences, rejecting the need for reform or stressing the need to adhere to the rules and 'spirit' of the language as it was actually spoken by the people. New terms, if at all necessary, were to be derived from the roots of existing Magyar words. Deme, 'Writers and Essayists', p. 626.

[44] László Deme, 'From Nation to Class: The Changing Social Role of the Hungarian Nobility'. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 1.4 (1988), 568-584 (578-9).

[45] László Deme, 'Writers and Essayists', p. 624

[46] János M. Hermán, 'Herder életműve és magyarországi hatása', *Zempléni Múzsa*, 4.1 (2004), 5-33.

[47] Lóránt Czigány, *The Oxford History of Hungarian Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 191.

[48] László Deme, 'Writers and Essayists', p. 632.

[49] László Kürti, 'Liberty, Equality, and Nationality: National Liberalism, Modernization, and Empire in Hungary in the Nineteenth Century', in *Liberal Imperialism in Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012), pp. 91-114.

[50] 'Da sind sie jetzt unter Slawen, Deutschen, Wlachen, und andern Völkern der geringere Teil des Landeseinwohner, und nach Jahrhunderten wird man vielleicht ihre Sprache kaum finden'. Johann Gottfried Herder, *Werke*, Ed. by Wolfgang Proß. Vol. III/I: 'Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit' [1791], (München – Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2002), p. 633. However, Herder drew on similar ideas expressed by Adám F. Kollár and August Ludwig von Schlözer earlier in the century, and thus talk of 'national death' was already entertained before Herder's proclamation. See also Dezső Dümmerth, 'Herder jóslata és forrásai', *Filológiai Közlöny*, XI.1-2 (1963), 181-183; Susan Gal, 'Linguistic Theories and National Images in 19th Century Hungary', *Pragmatics. Quarterly Publication of the International Pragmatics Association*, 5.2 (1995), 155-166.

[51] Mihály Szegedy-Maszák, 'From Enlightenment Universalism to Romantic Nationalism', *Hungarian Studies*, 14.2 (2001), 182-191 (188).

[52] János M. Bak, 'From the Anonymous *Gesta* to the Flight of Zalán by Vörösmarty', in *Manufacturing a Past for the Present: Forgery and Authenticity in Medievalist Texts and Objects in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 96-107.

[53] Deme, 'Writers and Essayists', p. 627.

[54] Richard Aczel, 'Hungarian Romanticism: Reimagining (Literary) History', in *The Oxford Handbook of European Romanticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 357-376 (367).

[55] See the translation by László Kőrössy of the final four lines of the final verse, of the Szózat at www.laszlokorossy.net/magyar/szozat.html.

[56] Similar ideas, with reference to both historical and current data, have been expressed in Joseph P. Forgas, Laszlo Kelemen and Janos Laszlo, 'Social Cognition and Democracy: An Eastern European Case Study', in *Social Psychology and Politics* (New York: Psychology Press, 2015), pp. 263-286.

[57] Trencsényi, Balázs, Maciej Janowski, Monika Baár, Maria Falina, and Michal Kopeček, *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe: Negotiating Modernity in the 'Long Nineteenth Century'* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) [hereafter *Negotiating Modernity in the 'Long Nineteenth Century'*], p 131.

[58] See István Barta, 'István Széchenyi', *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 7.1/2 (1960), 63-102, and George Barany, 'The Hungarian Diet of 1839-40 and the Fate of Széchenyi's Middle Course', *Slavic Review*, 22.2 (1963), 285-303.

[59] Trencsényi et al. *Negotiating Modernity in the 'Long Nineteenth Century',* pp. 144-5.

[60] István Széchenyi, *A' Kelet Népe* (Pozsony: Wigand Károly Fridrik, 1841), pp. 16-17.

[61] György Miru, 'From Liberalism to Democracy. Key Concepts in Lajos Kossuth's Political Thought', *East Central Europe*, 1.41 (2014), 1-31 (24-25).

[62] 'Act 1830:8 required all public officials to know Hungarian and allowed counties to use it in their correspondence with the Hungarian Chancellery in Vienna; Act 1836:3 [...] widened the use of Hungarian in legislation and courts; [...] Act 1844:2, the crowning achievement of the 1843-1844 Diet [...] made Hungary the primary language of administration, education, and the judiciary in the Hungarian lands.' See, for example, Robert Nemes, *The Once and Future Budapest* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005), p. 84.

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[63] Péter and Lojkó, *Hungary's Long Nineteenth Century*, p. 207.
[64] Pach, 'Old and New Syntheses of Hungarian History', pp. 293-4.
[66] Cieger, 'Reform Fever and Disillusionment', p.128.
[67] See András Gerő, *The Hungarian Parliament 1867-1918: A Mirage of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 57-105.
[68] See, for example, Thomas Lorman, 'The Use and Abuse of Flexibility: Hungary's Historical Constitution, 1867-1919' in Hörcher and Lorman (eds), *A History of the Hungarian Constitution*, pp.153-155.
[69] See János Gyurgyák, *A Zsidókérdés Magyarországon* (Budapest: Osiris, 2001), pp. 55-87.
[70] For an insightful account in English of the institutionalisation of anti-Semitism in Hungary see Vera Ranki, *The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion: Jews and Nationalism in Hungary* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1999).
[71] György Miru, 'Ideas and Languages in Hungarian Politics during the Period of Dualism', *Történeti Tanulmányok*, 22 (2014), 186-203 (192).
[72] Marius Turda, '"The Magyars: A Ruling Race": The Idea of National Superiority in Fin-de-Siècle Hungary', *European Review of History: Revue Européenne D'histoire*, 10.1 (2003), 5-33.
[73] Miru, 'Ideas and Languages in Hungarian Politics during the Period of Dualism', p. 203.
[74] Oszkár Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 275-276.
[75] Csapody Tamás, 'Kompország politikusai: Koppányok és Szent Istvánok. A kompország és a Koppány-politikai metafora elemzése', *Politikatudományi szemle* 15. 1 (2006), 179-200.
[76] Hörcher and Lorman (eds), *A History of the Hungarian Constitution*, p. 304.
[77] Kovács, Dávid, 'A kádári politika és a nemzeti identitás. A viszonyrendszer értelmezései', in Iván Bertényi et al. (eds); *Varietas Europica Centralis. Tanulmányok a 70 éves Kiss Cry. Csaba tiszteletére.* (Budapest, ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 2015), pp. 219–235 (232).

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