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**Insecure Spaces, Precarious Geographies:
Biopolitics, Security and the Production of
Space In Jerusalem and Beyond**

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INSECURE SPACES, PRECARIOUS GEOGRAPHIES: BIOPOLITICS, SECURITY AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE IN JERUSALEM AND BEYOND

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CONTENTS

FIGURE AND MAP LIST

"In a cruel, if well known, irony, the very strategy that, nominally, is meant to provide security, contributes to further insecurity." Tony Roshan Samara (2010: 211)

"Blockade, suffocation, provisionality. We are doomed, so it seems, to live this way for years to come." Tamar Berger, 2006: 255.

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

The question of security and planning in the city has long historical roots. Indeed, according to Leonie Sandercock "planning and urban management discourses are, and always have been, saturated with fear" (cited in Wekerle and Jackson, 2005: 34). A good early example of this is provided in French Renaissance scientist Bernard Palissy's 1563 paper *De La Ville Fortresse* (Klauser, 2010). Palissy was a French Huguenot, subjected to Catholic persecution and violence. As a result he was deeply concerned with the design of a city that would protect both his life, and that of his religious community. Given this longstanding concern with creating secure urban spaces it is surprising that up until the last decade comparatively little was written about the relationship between security and urban space. Since then however, inspired by both the events of September the 11th, 2001 and growing levels of inequality, poverty and crime, a burgeoning and increasingly diverse literature has emerged detailing the effects of the "security agenda" on urban geographies (Coaffe, 2004; Coaffe and Murakimi-Wood, 2006; Graham, 2004, 2010; Wacquant;Lemanski, 2004). This body of critical urban and planning theory has done much to expose the "highly fragmented, polyspherical patchwork of more or less detached and controlled enclosures" (Klauser, 2010: 332) demarcating between secure and insecure spaces. Nevertheless, despite the otherwise encompassing nature of this work, there are a number of important avenues of critical enquiry that have received little attention. First, although much has been written about secured spaces, produced to ensure the safety and promotion of life – gated communities, airports, public squares etc. – almost no attention is paid specifically to those marginal spaces beyond secured spaces. That is to say spaces that are made insecure in the city, where life is made vulnerable (ibid.); how are they produced? what form do they take? and importantly what is their relationship with secure spaces?

Secondly – and this applies to urban and planning theory in general – there is a noticeable dearth of research concerning the relationship between the body and the city (Gandy, 2006) both in terms of the political control over the body (or biopolitics) and the ways in which this relates to security. This is clearly relevant in cities that are severed between more or less secure spaces and more or less insecure spaces, which – it follows – will create more or less secure people and more or less insecure people.

The aim of this paper is to explore the production of spaces that are deliberately made insecure (less stable, less certain, less protected) in the city; the discourses and ideologies that frame their production; the policies and practices that make insecurity concrete in space; the forms that insecurity takes in these spaces; and lastly the nature of precarious life that emerges in these spaces. Where the literature on the current urban security agenda has sought to investigate the "importance of urban space as the locus, medium and tool of security policies", this paper will seek to do likewise with policies that make spaces insecure. In order to do this, I develop a novel conceptual framework based on the hitherto un-theorised nexus of relations between the body–security–space. This framework draws mainly on the insights of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, and their contributions to the theory of biopolitics. I also take inspiration from urban theorist Henri Lefebvre and his understanding of the production of space. Through this framework I hope to show how biopolitics, in its relationship with urban security agendas, permeates the heterogeneous ensemble of discourses, policies and practices (sic. urban planning) that produce biopolitical spaces of insecurity. More specifically I believe that this framework can show us how insecure spaces control, contain and enervate the life of certain groups in society, demarcating between subjects of urban life, living in secured spaces, and objects left vulnerable to urban death – bare life. Consequently this paper speaks to, and in many ways furthers, critical discussions surrounding the geographies of "socio-spatial domination" (Chari, 2008: 1911) and the role of planning as a technique of regressive power and a mechanism of oppression and control (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Yiftachel, 1998).

In sum this paper will seek to explore four broad questions

- How can an analysis of the relations between the body, security and space help us critically explain the production of insecure spaces in the city?
- How, and through what processes, are spaces of insecurity produced in the city?
- What forms do spaces of insecurity assume?
- What are the implications for those people living in these spaces?

The rest of this paper is divided into three further chapters. The next chapter is theoretical in nature, and will introduce the nexus of relations between the body, security and space, and specifically how issues of the body and security relate to produce biopolitical spaces of insecurity and biopolitical bodies of insecurity in the city. In order to critically unpack the process through which such spaces are produced, grounding the nexus of relations introduced in the urban context, I will utilise the spatial triad developed by Lefebvre (1991) in his seminal book *The Production of Space*. The reason for using Lefebvre's spatial triad, comprising of conceived, perceived and lived spaces, is that it helpfully enables us to articulate the complex path from the discourses and ideologies that represent space, to the policies and practices that are enacted in space, to the lived experiences of those inhabitants of these spaces. Before this can be done however it is necessary to fully introduce the concept of biopolitics, the main concept that guides this work, and to trace its genealogy from its intellectual origins in Michel Foucault, to Giorgio Agamben's more recent contributions.

The third chapter will seek to ground and give meaning to this otherwise largely conceptual and potentially abstract discussion, by presenting the case of urban planning in Jerusalem. This chapter is divided into three sections based on Lefebvre's spatial triad, and will discuss how space is conceived, perceived and lived in Jerusalem. The rationale behind choosing this particular example lies in the fact that the ethnic struggle that currently divides Jerusalem is above all an inherently spatial struggle (Hanafi, 2006). Indeed the ethno-spatial logic behind the modern development of Jerusalem is almost unique in its intensity, thus facilitating the discussion of this paper's spatial concepts.

The fourth and final chapter concludes this paper. In this chapter I will seek to draw out the important themes from the case study and present a case for the relevancy of this paper's arguments to a wider range of contemporary cities. I argue that although Jerusalem is undoubtedly an extreme case, producing extreme spaces of insecurity and through such spaces extremely precarious life, it can be seen in many respects as a microcosm, serving to elucidate a broader trajectory along which to greater or lesser extents perhaps all cities, be they divided, conflicting, developing or developed, are travelling.

CHAPTER 2: FRAMING INSECURITY AND SPACE IN THE CITY

In recent years critical academic interest in the concept of biopolitics has led to a growing and increasingly diverse literature concerning the ways in which the political control of the body is expressed and the affects these expressions have had on society. Interestingly however, despite emergent studies of the geographies of spatial containment and control and the existing literature discussing the regressive potentialities of planning as a tool for social control and oppression, there has been comparatively little work linking biopolitics, urban planning and the production of space in the city. In this section, in order to deconstruct the production of insecure spaces in the city I will develop a conceptual framework that is underpinned by the concept of biopolitics, and in so doing introduce biopolitics to planning and geographical literature interested in the role of space in exposing and making vulnerable certain "Other" groups in society.

Foucault and Biopolitics: "the Entry of Life into History"

Towards the end of his academic career, and in some of his later writings, Michel Foucault identified and sought to analyse two modalities of power. The first he called the ancient sovereign power, or the power to "make die and let live", the second he termed biopolitical power – a more modern form of power – characterised as the ability to "make live and let die" (Lentin, 2008). According to Foucault (1998: 136) up until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the defining privilege of sovereign power was "the right to decide life and death", achieved through what was in practice the right to "make die and let live". Interference in life at this time therefore occurred chiefly

through the "seizing" of life and not through the fostering of life. Indeed if life did flourish at this time it was largely tangential to the work of the sovereign.

From the eighteenth century this first ancient form of sovereign power was superseded by a power with an altogether different logic. As Foucault (ibid) explains, this was "a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them...". Unsurprisingly this biopolitical power, as Foucault called it, had a markedly different approach to life than the ancient privilege of sovereign power. Rather than life being of coincidental importance, the welfare of the body – and the population at large – became "one of the essential objectives in political power" (Foucault, in Gandy, 2006: 503). For Foucault biopolitics was a "positive influence on life that endeavours to administer, optimise, and multiply it..." (ibid: 137) achieved through a set of regulatory regimes (insurance, public health, welfare programmes etc. (Gregory, 2007: 206)) that emphasised a novel focus on the wellbeing and benign control of the body specifically, and of society as a whole. In short, the power to "make die" had given way to the power to "make live" (Lentin, 2008).

Biopolitics, however, is not only about the positive power over life and the benign regulation of the body. During a set of lectures, delivered at the Collège de France between 1975-1976, Foucault drew his attention away from the ways in which biopolitics fosters life and towards a darker side of biopolitics, taking the following question as his starting point:

> How can a power such as this [biopolitical power] kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances...? (Foucault, 2004: 254).

To answer this Foucault developed his concept of State Racism; racism "inscribed in the mechanisms of the state" (ibid). The defining characteristic of State Racism is the break between "what must live and what must die" (ibid.) and the separation of life within society based on this distinction. This break is based on a biopolitical relationship, best described in Foucault's own words, which works from the assumption that:

> The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I – as a species rather than individual – can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. (Foucault, 2004: 255)

The death of the "Other", those "abnormal individuals" and "degenerates", makes for a healthier and purer life for the "Self". Following from this logic, in order to create and maintain homogenous stability and purity, society must be insulated by the state from "the outside (the sick, the mad, the criminal)" (Gregory, 2007: 4) by way of a variety of regulative regimes, including the use of "constitutions, border controls, the law, policy making, bureaucracy, population censuses, invented histories and traditions..." (Lentin, 2008: 7). The aggregative sum of these regimes rarely results in visually spectacular images of genocide, instead State Racism kills by creating living conditions in which life becomes compromised and eventually disallowed to the point of death. Taken to its extreme what we see here is a biopolitics bent not only on the management of life, but also the management of death, or as Achille Mbembe (2003) terms it *Necropolitics.* The connection between the positive and negative logics of biopolitics, between biopolitics and necropolitics, is the formation of two distinguishable and related biopolitical subjects; (s)he who must live, and is protected, and (s)he who must die – who is unprotected, and whose life is enervated, potentially unto the point of death.

Giorgio Agamben and Biopolitics: Homo Sacer, Security and the Camp
Similarly to Foucault, the work of Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998,2005) is concerned with the biopolitical relationship between life that is included in society (that which must live) and life that is excluded (that which must die). Taking the two modalities of power identified by Foucault, sovereign and biopolitical power, as his starting point, Agamben seeks to discern where these modalities converge and what happens at this intersection. In doing this Agamben successfully manages to complicate the dichotomous relationship posited by Foucault between those included in society and those excluded. Furthermore,

Agamben also develops a spatial theory of power – something missing throughout Foucault's work on biopolitics – by stressing the spaces in which this intersection takes place and highlighting the importance of such spaces in the production of biopolitical bodies (Minca, 2007).

The point at which Agamben identifies sovereign and biopolitical power converging, the point of intersection, is in the production of what he calls "bare life" (Gregory, 2006a). Bare life, simply put, is life that is no longer seen as politically or socially important, life that can be stripped of subjectivity and rights, and exposed to death. For Agamben the formation of bare life is not simply a question of an included/excluded dichotomy – where bare life is the excluded (that which must die so that society may be defended) – but rather is based on the paradoxical relationship between inclusion and exclusion, termed "inclusive exclusion":

> He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but is rather *abandoned* by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and the law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable. (Agamben, in Minca, 2006: 391-392, *emphasis in original*)

This paradoxical relationship is embodied in what Agamben believed to be the originary distinction of western politics; that between biological life (zoë), excluded from the *polis*, and political life (bios), included in the *polis*. Significantly Agamben argued that although zoë is excluded from the *polis*, (s)he would nevertheless be included when "affected by the more or less violent consequences of politics" (Ek, 2006: 366). In this way people can be both excluded from enjoying the protection of political and civil rights, as their subjectivity, agency and ability to contribute to society is removed (Gregory, 2006a), yet simultaneously subjected to sovereign power. Where this occurs "bare life", or *Homo Sacer*, can be killed with impunity; made bare death so to speak.

Agamben's spatial theory of biopolitics, what he calls the space of exception, begins with the camp, the most "pure and absolute biopolitical space" (Ek, 2006:368), and the organising space of bare life and death. The camp itself is a territory, or piece of territory, placed outside of the juridical-political order

during times of exceptional need. It is a space of non-protection, of exposure and vulnerability where the sovereign effectively abandons life by relinquishing its responsibility of life, and the duty to foster or reproduce it. However the camp "is not simply an external space" (Minca, 2007: 92). Indeed this space is founded on the inclusive exclusion paradox, existing at the convergence of sovereign and biopolitical power, where the legal order of the *polis* is indifferent and where life is subjected to the control and violence of sovereign power. In short, creating the conditions under which the inhabitants of the camp are stripped down to homo sacer – being excluded from the law, but very much included in the realm of sovereign power. Their deaths no longer count as deaths (Schlosser, 2008).

Another reason for not seeing the camp as "simply an external space" is that the logic of the camp is no longer contained within four walls. For Agamben, the camp increasingly represents "the territorialisation that precedes the normalization of the state of exception", both a concrete space and the new *nomos* of modern political space. As Diken and Lausten (2003: 3) put it, "the outside of the camp reflects the inside: sovereign power reigns on both sides of the divide as potentiality and as actuality". The logic of the camp, the latent potential for it to be enacted, is delocalised, it permeates all political space as a threshold that can at any moment be crossed by the enactment of the exception. Although the horrors of Auschwitz or Guantanamo Bay (Gregory, 2006b; Reid-Henry, 2007) may seem wildly divorced from the lives that the majority of people, especially in the west, live, Agamben warns that increasingly the logic of the camp is diffusing throughout modern society. Following Walt Benjamin's assertion that "the "state of the emergency" in which we live is not the exception but the rule" (cited in Enns, 2004), Agamben stresses that in the post-9/11 political landscape, security and the state of exception are rapidly imposing themselves as the primary rationale of state activity (ibid.) infiltrating society at diverse points and at multiple scales (for examples see, Agamben, 2004; Bigo, 2002; Gregory and Pred, 2007; Pain and Smith, 2008). As the security paradigm becomes societies' new *nomos* – legitimised by playing on fears of imminent, colour coded, terrorist threats – a permanent state of the exception emerges in which the rule of law is suspended and unchecked sovereign power gains ever

increasing control over life and death (Ek, 2006). The walls of the camp and the inside/outside distinctions are thus collapsing, blurring into indistinction (Diken and Lausten, 2003) making us all potential Homines Sacri.

The Body-Security-Space Nexus
What then can biopolitics tell us about the production of insecure space? Reading Foucault and Agamben together, I believe it is possible to develop a conceptual framework based on a nexus of relations between the body–security–and space, where biopolitics and security link to produce biopolitical spaces of insecurity, and extreme spaces of insecurity – the exception. Of central importance to understanding this nexus is the dialectic relationship between biopolitics and security.

As noted in previous sections, a key facet of Foucauldian biopolitics is the differentiation between groups of people, summarised in Table 1. At the heart of this differentiation is the issue of security: Foucault's break between that which must live and that which must die is fundamentally a break between people who must be secured and those whom people must be secured against. To ensure the security of the "Self", the life of the "Other" must be excluded, or in Foucault's words disallowed. Agamben's thoughts follow from Foucault's. What Agamben describes in his work is more specifically what occurs when the "Other" poses a significant (real or perceived) threat to the ordered system. In such a scenario, a state of emergency or exception my be enacted, converging biopolitical and sovereign power to create bare life of those threatening "Others". Combining Foucault and Agamben's insights it can be concluded that, in order to secure one group, ensuring their welfare and vigour, another group must be made more vulnerable – their lives must be exposed to the conditions of bare life, and potentially "bare death": the actual point

at which their lives are taken with impunity. dimensions, especially in urban contexts. As mentioned in the introduction, in recent years a growing literature has emerged in urban studies pointing to the ways in which "contemporary security policies permeate the production and management of everyday urban spaces" (Klauser, 2010: 326), splintering the urban form between spaces to be secured, "the more or less purified insides", and spaces beyond this protection, the "more or less dangerous outsides" (Klauser, 2010: 332). What this literature has been less attentive to however, is the relationship between the spaces to be secured and the more or less dangerous outsides. This relationship, I argue, is inherently biopolitical, as the securitisation of certain spaces, and the people living in these spaces, in fact necessitates the insecurity of "outside" spaces and "outside" people, where the aim "is not to create a sphere of protective refuge but a zone of increased exposure and vulnerability" (ibid: 338). In other words the biopoliticisation of contemporary security policies, based on a Foucauldian break between (s)he who must be secured and as a result (s)he who must be made insecure, permeates the production of urban space – creating both secure urban space *and* insecured urban space; spaces of exposure and vulnerability. Following from this, the nature of such spaces, the spatial forms that exposure and vulnerability take, can be critically deconstructed using Agamben's spatial theory of power and biopolitics – the space of the exception. Insecure space therefore emerges as an important locus, medium and tool through which life is made bare and potentially killed with impunity. What we must ask ourselves now is how we might best root this nexus of relations in the urban context, to critically unpack how these spaces are produced, what form they take, and how they affect the lives of people that live in them. To do this I will now turn to Henri Lefebvre and his analytics of spatial production.

Fig. 1: (S)he Who Must Live/Die.

(S)he who must live (*bios*)	(S)he who must die (*Homo Sacer*)
Biopolitics as a "positive influence on life that endeavours to administer, optimise and multiply it…" People as subjects and citizens People are included in the *Polis* People protected by the juridical-political order Sovereign power is accountable to citizens with political and civil rights	Biopolitics and Sovereign power intersect to produce "bare life", a part of State Racism People as objects People are excluded from the *Polis* People excluded from the juridical-political order People subject to sovereign power with no legal recourse

A Framework for Exploring the Production of Biopolitical Spaces of Insecurity

A central argument of Henri Lefebvre's work was that critical knowledge must capture the process through which space is produced. As Merrifield (2006: 108) aptly summarises:

> Theory must trace out the actual dynamics and complex interplay of space itself – of buildings and monuments, of neighbourhoods and cities, of nations and continents – exposing and decoding those multifarious processes, as well as those visible practices of brute force and structural injustice.

The production of space is not a simple, linear process. Rather it involves the complex interplay between the concrete and the abstract, "between the articulated and the visible; the discourse and the material" (Ploger,2008: 52). But how then can we begin to capture these processes and trace these complex interplays? How can we root the body-security-space nexus in the reality of the urban context, to demonstrate how insecure spaces are produced?

I believe the answer to these questions lies with Lefebvre's spatial triad, the fluid sum of "three specific moments that blur into each other" (Merrifield, 2006:109); conceived space, perceived space and lived space. Fortunately, by being frugal in the development of this triad, Lefebvre left much scope for future researchers to use and adapt his framework, "leaving us to add our own flesh, our own content, to rewrite it as part of our own chapter or research agenda" (ibid.).

In what follows I attempt to rewrite Lefebvre's framework as part of this research agenda, grounding more firmly the potentially abstract body-security-space nexus in the urban context, and consequently demonstrating more clearly the processes through which insecure spaces are produced.

Figure 2. The Production of Insecure Space

Conceived Space

-Discourses and ideologies that represent spaces

- Foucault's break between spaces that must be secured and spaces that must be insecured

The Production of Insecure Space

Perceived Space

- Policies and practices that articulate the conceived spatially and materially

- The production of insecure and exceptional spaces following Agamben

Lived Space

- The everyday lived experience of insecure space and the exception

Conceived Space refers to the ideas and values concerning how space should be. This is space as imagined by professionals, technocrats and politicians, and so reflects their social and political power. Although Lefebvre makes no reference to Foucault, this is a space that Foucault would know well, saturated with ideology, power and knowledge, framed by dominant discourses. Conceived space is about representations of space. Lefebvre linked conceived space to the dominant mode of production, which he argued was inevitably capitalism. Although capitalism is a powerful and pervasive ideology, it is not the only lens through which space is conceived of in the urban context. Based on the spatiality of Foucault's break between that which must be secured and that which must be unsecured, biopolitics and security exert an important – though largely unrecognised – influence over how space is conceived of and thus how it is planned for, and ultimately produced. This influence is clear in urban discourses and imaginaries surrounding the need to secure certain spaces against threatening "Others". Gated communities, with their ringed fences, security guards and 24 hour surveillance are a good example of this way of conceiving space.

Perceived Space is the space where conception and execution meet, where the representations of space are translated onto space and are made concrete. It is here that ideologies take form in space and where ideologies (if well translated) are enacted. Consequently this is the space where the relationship between biopolitics and security makes itself known on the urban form; through the fragmentation of urban space between secured and insecure spaces, through the emergence of enclosed and controlled spaces, through policies of urban segregation, the creation of identity based hierarchical landscapes, and through the production of spaces of insecurity. In particular I believe it is here that we can locate those policies and practices responsible for the conditions in which Agamben's space of the exception can emerge.

Lived Space is "the space of everyday experience" (Merrifield, 2006: 109). This is the space of the inhabitant and their embodied and qualitative reality. This is also the space where biopolitics and security are felt by the inhabitants, by those excluded from the *polis* and from political life, yet simultaneously subject to sovereign control,

power and violence. Lived spaces in this context involve being denied access, being forced to pass through checkpoints, being forced to obey curfews, being watched by police and security forces, and ultimately being subjected to the enactment of the exception and the violence characteristic of sovereign power.

The use of Lefebvre's conceptual triad to this work is that it helps us to think through and critically unpack the "thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble [of factors] consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures…in short, the said as much as the unsaid" (Foucault, in Ploger, 2008: 55) that collectively contribute to the production of space in the urban context. In particular it can serve to illuminate the complex processes through which space becomes imbued with biopolitical discourses, that are in turn articulated spatially and materially onto the urban landscape. Moreover, understanding how these spaces are bought into being; the discourses mobilised in their justification and the techniques employed to give these discourses material form, and then following from this, highlighting the consequences these spaces have for those living in them, is, I would like to argue, critical if we are to mount a coherent critique of such socially unjust planning in any urban context.

In the following chapter of this essay I will apply Lefebvre's framework to the context of urban planning in Jerusalem in order to highlight and critique how biopolitical ideologies and security discourses intersect in the planning process to produce insecure, controlling and almost unliveable spaces. The first section will seek to provide some context to the recent spatial developments in the city over the last 100 years or so, and locate the focus and scope of this essay in East Jerusalem and the history of the last 43 years. The second section will explore how space is imagined and represented at a national level in Israel, and how such representations – permeated by biopolitical and security imperatives – frame how Israeli and Palestinian spaces are conceived of in Jerusalem. These national representations, I argue, shape the ways in which planners and politicians envisage the future of Jerusalem through their city mission. After establishing that this mission is the product of ethnically exclusive, and biopolitical, security discourses, belying an ultimate will

for ethno-spatial homogeneity, I will seek to uncover what policies and practices have been, and are being, implemented in order to serve those interests and bring them from the minds of the municipality to the urban fabric. The relationship between the conceived and perceived spaces, the translation from one to the other, is not a simple and linear process, but rather messy and complicated. As I will show however this complexity is in its self important in so far as it reflects the complex and indistinct spatial forms that characterise Jerusalem, and the eastern part of the city in particular. Finally, the last section in this essay will focus in on a concrete example of insecure space in Jerusalem – the checkpoint. Following Jones (2009: 880) I will seek to "identify the agents, the targets and the spaces" where biopolitical power and sovereign power converge to create insecure and potentially exceptional spaces on the ground, and show how these spaces, produced by politicians and planners through the translation from the conceived to the perceived, are lived, experienced, and negotiated by the Palestinians unfortunate enough to live in them.

CHAPTER 3 – JERUSALEM AND THE PRODUCTION OF INSECURE SPACE
Jerusalem: From Convivial Cosmopolitanism to Ethnic "Exclusivism"

The long history of Jerusalem, a centre of great significance for the three largest monotheistic religions, has been wrought with conflict, dispute and war. On more than one occasion this ancient city has been levelled and subsequently rebuilt (Misselwitz and Rienietz, 2006). The more recent history of the city however has been marked by a shift from relative convivial cosmopolitanism during the late 19th and early 20th centuries to the current situation of the as yet unresolved struggle between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, who for more than eighty years have each been "nurturing a long-established emotional and cultural attachment to the city, each claiming the city to be its legitimate capital" (ibid: 25).

From the late 19th century until the end of the First World War, Jerusalem under the Ottoman empire was the centre of a nascent "cosmopolitan multinational citizenship" (Benvenisti et al., 2006: 36) where a Jerusalemite identity, transcending differences in nationality and ethnicity, was emerging. Despite the residential

segregation of Jews, Arabs and Christians, in the business districts economic, social and cultural mixing and exchange was commonplace up until 1948 (ibid).

The unravelling of this convivial cosmopolitanism occurred gradually under the British mandate, lasting from 1922-1948, as nationalism and ethnic "exclusivism" grew more prominent, leading to heightened tensions within the city. After the UN's "Corpus Seperatum" plan to make Jerusalem an international city failed, the developing struggles between Jews and Arabs for control over the city – and the Palestinian region more generally – lead to War, lasting from November 1947 to May 1948 when Britain ended its protectorate mandate over the area. A significant product of this war was the partition of Jerusalem into two seperate zones – the Israeli West and the Arab East (under Jordanian sovereignty) – divided by the UN administered Greenline running along a North-South axis (Map 1.). As Wendy Pullan (2009: 40) explains:

Effectively, Jerusalem was two truncated but autonomous urban centres with UN supervision of the border and crossings closed to Arabs and Israelis. The border areas became derelict, and as might be expected, the two halves of the city shrank away from each other; one side was oriented westward to Israel whilst the other focused east on Jordan.

The division of the city did not last long. In 1967, after the Six-Days War, Israel annexed Jordanian East Jerusalem and expanded the municipal boundaries deeper into the West Bank, although as Map 2 shows the city remained demographically segregated along the same north-south axis in spite of the municipal unification with the exception of several Jewish settlements in the east. This "unification" of the city has not been recognised internationally. East Jerusalem is therefore seen by all except Israel as an occupied territory.

Map 1. The 1948 partition   Source: Dumper (2008:22)

The focus and scope of this case study is the 43 years since the six days war, and more specifically on East Jerusalem than the West. During these years the urban landscape of the eastern part of the city has been indelibly imprinted by the dialectic relationship between the policies and practices that define Israeli control, separation and containment, and Palestinian *intifada* (1987–1993, and 2000–circa 2005) creating an "interminable cycle of military incursions, suicide attacks, and collective punishment" (Misslewitz and Rieniets, 2006: 67). As a result Jerusalem has morphed into a "laboratory for the production of extreme spatial configurations" (ibid.). The city can no longer be experienced by its inhabitants in its entirety, rather it is spatially fragmented into segregated enclosures; a spatially discontinuous landscape dotted by archipelago like islands (Weizman, 2007) of security, protected by fences, walls and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), and insecurity, spaces existing outside of Israeli political, economic and social life, but defined by Israeli sovereign control.

This chapter seeks to interrogate this splintered urban form applying and testing the conceptual arguments outlined in the previous chapter to uncover and unpack the processes that create these biopolitical spaces of security and insecurity. Framed by Lefebvre's spatial triad, this chapter is composed of three sections that seek to answer the following questions:

- Conceived Space: What discourses and ideologies are mobilised in the representation of spaces in the city? What roles do biopolitics and security play in the conceptual framing of urban policies and plans?

- Perceived Space: How are these representations of space translated on to the configuration of Jerusalem's urban fabric? What constitutes Jerusalem's spaces of insecurity and exception?

- Lived Space: What are the lived experiences of those living in these enclosed and segregated spaces of insecurity and exception? How is the space of the exception enacted in time and space?

The division of the city did not last long. In 1967, after the Six-Days War, Israel annexed Jordanian East Jerusalem and expanded the municipal boundaries deeper into the West Bank, although as Map 2 shows the city remained demographically segregated along the same north-south axis in spite of the municipal unification with the exception of several Jewish settlements in the east. This "unification" of the city has not been recognised internationally. East Jerusalem is therefore seen by all except Israel as an occupied territory.

Conceived Space: On Representing "Other" Spaces and "Other" People

I start this section with a simple premise: That we cannot begin to understand how urban space in Jerusalem is being – or has been – conceived of, without first uncovering the larger, more historical, ways in which other spaces and other people have been represented in Israel/Palestine. The foundations of the biopolitical and security oriented discourses that currently shape Israeli representations of urban space are embedded within a wider "imaginative geography" of Israel that not only operates beyond Jerusalem, but which has formed the main themes and tropes depicting the entire region for almost two centuries. As Edward Said (1978) wrote, imaginative geographies are a form of invention or fabrication which create a certain way of understanding, knowing and representing other places and people in dichotomous opposition to the self. They are formed through the unique intersection between landscape, power and knowledge production which has most commonly been associated with the legitimising of imperial designs and conquest. Central to the Israeli imaginative geography described here are the twin ideologies of "entitlement and improvement" (Fields, 2008: 244), which in conjuncture have sought to efface the historical presence of Palestinians in Palestine, and simultaneously reconstruct and relocate their presence outside of Israel as external "Arab" terrorists, divorced from any historical context or specificity (Hage, 2003). Far from being static and unchanging, or belonging to one particular moment, this imaginative geography has changed and reverberated through Israel's modern history – making it a powerfully pervasive force.

Map 2. Jerusalem circa 1967
Source: Dumpster, 2008: 24

Israel's Imaginative Geography: Civilisation and Barbarism

Since the late 19th century prominent Zionist advocates have, with unerring persistency, sought to re-imagine Palestine as "a land without a people" freely available for "a people without a land" (Nasser, 2006: 223). In landscape paintings, photography, journals and more recent historiography (see in particular Joan Peters (1984) book *From Time Immemorial* and for a critique (Said, 1988a)) the land has been represented as though it were a desert wasteland, devoid of any human or social activity, save for perhaps a small scattering of

"backward" shepherds whose primitive lifestyles and agricultural techniques had failed to unlock the lands latent potential. In this way what was "by its very nature a colonial project" (Gregory, 2004a: 78) – culminating in the expulsion of thousands of Palestinians in 1948 – was re-imagined as the entitled Jewish return to the empty promised land, and even more prophetically as a *mission civilatrice*;

> The country [Palestine] was mostly an empty desert, with only a few islands of Arab settlement; and Israel's cultivable land today was indeed redeemed from

11

swamp and wilderness. (Shimon Peres, quoted in George 1979: 88).

By redeeming the once barren and wasted desert and making it "bloom", Israel proclaimed itself a beacon of enlightened modernity and improvement in an otherwise backward, medieval land; "an outpost of civilisation as opposed to barbarism" as Theodor Herzl wrote in 1896 (Gregory, 2004: 79), or in Ehud Barak's words, "a villa in the middle of a jungle... a vanguard of culture against barbarism" (ibid: 1 21). In this Manichean division of Israeli/Arab space between lightness and darkness, civilisation and barbarism, the Palestinian identity has been subsumed into the apparent barbarity of the Arab world, a mass of un-differentiated and irrational terrorist "Others" (Said, 1988b). Far from being the victims of dispossession and a militarised occupation that has denied them any semblance of land rights, Palestinians are cast as "denizens of a barbarian space lying beyond the pale of civilization" (Gregory, 2003: 9) (Figure 2).

This teleological abstraction of Israeli and "Arabic" space into two fundamentally opposing factions; civilisation vs. barbarism, was intensified in the wake of September 11, as the Israeli government sought to take advantage of the emerging global war on terror, and justify and legitimise belligerent actions against Palestinians as part of the fight against Islamic fundamentalism. Aerial Sharon in particular proved adept at drawing parallels between the attacks on New York and the Pentagon, and Palestinian attacks on Israeli cities, notably Jerusalem:

> Acts of terror against Israeli citizens are no different from bin Laden's terror against American citizens... The fight against terror is an international struggle of the free world against the forces of darkness who seek to destroy our liberty and our way of life (cited in Gregory, 2003: 4).

In the space of a few sentences, Palestinian history and the complex folds of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is smoothed over, ironed out, so that what remains is the simple fact that Israel is a beacon of liberty surrounded by the darkness of radical Islam – an outpost in the larger battle between good and evil. Echoing Sharon's sentiments, and demonstrating that

they extend beyond senior politicians and ex-IDF generals, Robert Wistrich, professor of modern European history at the Hebrew University stressed that "it is a clash of civilisations", and that radical Islam poses a constant threat to the state of Israel and the welfare of Israeli Jews (Gregory, 2003: 9).

Figure 3. The Abstract Spaces of Israel's Imaginative Geography. (Palestinians are subsumed into the barbaric space of "Arabia" – the polarised negative of Israel – and pose a constant security threat to Israeli people.)

This ever present anxiety, created by the fear of the Palestinian barbarian infiltrating Israeli space, is elucidated well by Julia Long's (2006) use of Kristeva's (1982) theory of *Abjection*. The theory of *Abjection* centres on the "boundary between the inside and the outside of the body and the anxieties which transgressions of that boundary produce" (Long, 2006: 111), in particular Kristeva spoke of the fear of contamination from that which was cast out of the body; spit, mucus, vomit. For Long (2006: 112) Israeli security discourses and border policies exhibit a very similar concern, "the leaking back inside of that which was cast out so that Israel could live, a leak which would contaminate the Israeli body and question its integrity". This analogy, where Israel is the body and Palestinians are the contaminating agent, is confirmed frequently in Israeli political discourse through the common usage of biomedical and zoomorphological metaphors. The Sharon government for example often spoke of the need to "cleanse" the body

politic" of the "cancerous tumour" that is "destroying the ordered host" (Gregory, 2004: 134), whilst former Minister of Housing and construction Effi Eitam called Palestinians a "cancer in the body of the nation" (Eldar, 2002). In a similar vein senior politicians Rafael Eitan, Yitzhak Shamir and Ehud Barak have likened Palestinians to "drugged cockroaches", "grasshoppers", and "mosquitoes", again invoking images of contagion, though making a shift from the disease to the vector (Peteet, 2005).

Returning to Foucault, it is not difficult to see how the polarised imagined geographies and abstracted spatial representations detailed above form the basis upon which an Israeli biopolitics and national security rationale is produced and justified. The Israeli case is demonstrative of a clear Foucauldian break between different groups of people; those that must live, and as a consequence those that must die. On the one hand we have Israeli Jews, the rightful inhabitants of Israel, a space of civilisation and progress. On the other hand, inhabiting the barbaric spaces outside of Israel, we have the Palestinians – the alien Arabic threat to the ordered host. In order to ensure internal homogenous stability and purity in Israel, so that Israeli Jews can be stronger and more vigorous, they must be insulated from the outside; the sick, the mad, the criminal, the Palestinian terrorist.

Jerusalem: A City Besieged
The ideologies, discourses and imaginative geographies that shape how "Other" people and "Other" spaces are represented at the national scale in Israel, frame how urban space is conceived of through the "city visioning" process in Jerusalem by a range of national and local level politicians, academics, think tanks, and importantly urban planners. This occurs on the one hand because municipal planning in Israel is centrally controlled by the state; indeed "for many years, national policy has dictated every detail of urban planning in Jerusalem" (Marom, 2006: 351), but also, as Scott Bollen's (1997) work illustrates, because most of Jerusalem's Israeli Planners embody a strongly partisan ideological penchant. The following quotes from Israeli planners in Jerusalem demonstrate this well:

On this issue I cannot be indifferent. I can not speak objectively. You cannot be about this situation.

We [Israeli planners] are first of all Israelis and officers of the government of Israel; first and foremost.

From the very first, all major development represented politically and strategically motivated planning.

Of course, admitting that planning is a political process and that all planners have biases is not inherently problematic, indeed most progressive planners since Paul Davidoff have stressed the political nature of planning and the dangers of presuming to be objective. However in this case Israeli planners are not simply biased, but politically partisan, furthering the aims and goals of one group at the expense of severely disenfranchising another. In confirmation of these arguments, Shaul Cohen (2002: 213) adds:

Since the unification of Jerusalem in 1967, the municipality (along with the national level politicians, and many in the general population) has deployed the trope of the "Arab threat" in conjuncture with the sanctity, both sacred and profane, of Jerusalem. The paramount importance of maintaining (Jewish) control of the city abrogates all obligations… any feature, initiative, or ideology that threatens the ongoing pursuit of hegemony is represented not only as a parallel threat, but also a betrayal of the national ethos.

As a result of this conceptual filter almost all urban policies and practices are inevitably consistent with the aim of preventing convivial cultural exchange and mixing. Indeed two of the longest standing priorities in the city, inscribed in all master plans since the first in 1968, are the spatial separation/segregation of Israeli Jews from Palestinians, and the demographic goal of maintaining a 70% Jewish majority in the city. At the same time however, and somewhat paradoxically, ever since Israel successfully annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, it has been a national and municipal priority to ensure the "unification of the city":

13

The overriding, undisputed principle underlying Jerusalem's planning is the realisation of her unity… [by] building up the city in such a way as to preclude the bipolar emergence of two national communities and forestall any possibility of re-dividing it along such lines" (*from material prepared for the Jerusalem Committee*, cited in Pullan, 2009: 43).

Reading between the lines of these two seemingly contradictory priorities, if the future of Jerusalem is not to be divided along national lines, and is not to involve convivial cultural exchange and mixing between Jews and Arabs as current Master Plans insist, there can only be one conclusion. Jerusalem as a an urban space is being conceived of as an ideally unified and homogenous Israeli Jewish city, which must be in total Israeli control and involve, as much as is possible, demographic purity. This point, I think, is confirmed by the "politically conscious" (Bollens, 1997: 736) decision not to plan for Arabic areas in East Jerusalem. If planning is about readying a city or neighbourhood for its future development, what does it say about the future place of Palestinians if their areas are not planned for? For the Israeli municipality at least, it seems to suggest that they have no future.

Perceived Space: Jerusalem's Precarious Geographies

The force of imaginative geographies lies not simply in their powers of representation, but following from this, the ways in which these representations filter into urban plans and are enacted through policies and practices, thus inscribed in space and onto the urban landscape. As Gregory notes:

This protean power [of imaginative geographies]…is immensely important because the citationary structure that is authorised by these accretions is also in some substantial sense *performative*: it produces the effects that it names…imaginative geographies are not only accumulations of time, sedimentations of successive histories; they are also *performances of space* (Gregory, 2003: 308, emphasis in original).

If the previous section aimed to chart the protean power and historical sedimentations of Israel's Manichean imaginative geography, and

highlight how as a consequence Jerusalem's urban spaces are conceived of as being ideally homogenous Jewish spaces, this section is focused on how these representations are *performed* in space. I focus on these performances of space because, as I hope to show, they capture perfectly the joining point of Lefebvre's conceived and perceived space; the latter being the concrete manifestation of the former. Through this translation from the conceived to the perceived, from the mind of politicians, planners and others to the spaces of the city, I aim to highlight what I call (following Eyal Weizman) Jerusalem's architecture of indistinction – the methods of control and order that are imposed on Palestinians in Jerusalem, positioning them at the point of intersection between sovereignty and biopolitics, creating Jerusalem's spaces of insecurity and exception.

Silent Transfer and Time-Space Expansion in East Jerusalem

When Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967, it did not just unify a city, it also incorporated some 70,000 Palestinians within the enlarged municipal boundaries and thus within its legal control (Dolphin, 2006). Since then the Palestinian population has grown to around 250,000 posing an ever present source of anxiety gnawing away at the Jerusalem municipality – a "demographic time-bomb" (Weizman, 2007: 48). From the beginning it was clear that these Palestinians were not to be treated like Israeli Jews, but as the "internal enemy" (Bishara, 2001). The municipal response to this enemy within has been twofold; First, the municipality has attempted to encourage the removal of Palestinians, in a process known unofficially in municipal circles as the "silent transfer", by increasingly reducing Palestinians to second class "residents" and constraining the development of Palestinian communities. Secondly, the municipality has sought to spatially contain those Palestinians that remain in East Jerusalem, greatly limiting their mobility and access to the city.

For a Palestinian to become an Israeli citizen, and thus enjoy rights equal to those of an Israeli Jewish Jerusalemite, (s)he must swear allegiance to Israel – and in doing so accept the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem as legitimate. Only 2.3% of Palestinian Jerusalemites have done this since 1967. The rest of Jerusalem's Palestinians were granted residency status, inferring certain social benefits

(notably health) and the right to vote in local elections. It was initially understood that residency status would be permanent, however since 1995 Israel has sought to significantly reduce the numbers of people to whom these rights apply – even if it means revoking already issued statuses. In 1995 the Israeli Interior Minister introduced the "centre of life" policy, requiring that Palestinians in East Jerusalem prove they have lived and worked in Jerusalem for seven continuous years (Guego, 2006). As Guego (2006: 27) comments, however, "the standard of proof demanded is so rigorous that even persons who have never left Jerusalem have difficulties in meeting it". Moreover, many of the villages that make up East Jerusalem's suburban outskirts have been declared "outside" of municipal boundaries, consequently revoking residency for some 50,000 Palestinians (Guego, 2006).

Further evidence of the silent transfer in operation can be found in mundane planning regulations. As Weizman (2007: 49) explains:

> While issuing an annual average of 1,500 building permits to Jewish Israelis and constructing 90,000 housing units for Jews in all parts of East Jerusalem since 1967, the municipality has issued an annual average of only 100 building permits to Palestinians, thus creating a Palestinian housing crisis with a shortfall of more than 25,000 housing units.

Without access to land titles, and with a high natural population growth, Palestinians in East Jerusalem have been forced to develop informally/illegally and are consequently in a constant state of vulnerability to housing demolition. Between 1967 and 2004 over five hundred Palestinian houses have been demolished, leaving thousands destitute (Marom, 2006).

This conscious and systematic denying of Palestinians the right to develop is not only found in housing allocations and permits, but is also clearly apparent in the provision of infrastructure and public services, as former major Teddy Kolleck candidly elucidates:

> We said things that were just talk… we repeatedly promised to give the Arabs in the city rights equal to those enjoyed by the Jews in the city – it was all empty

words… For Jewish Jerusalem, I have accomplished something over the past 25 years. For East Jerusalem… nothing… Yes, we provided them with sewage and we improved the water delivery system, but why? For their benefit? To make their lives better? Not at all. There were a few cases of cholera there, and the Jews panicked that it might come their way, so they improved the sewer system and the water system against the cholera (cited in Hilal and Ashhab, 2006).

As a result of this official neglect, where Arabic areas receive only 10 per cent of the total municipal budget for public services (Groag, 2006), and services are seemingly provided only in the context of Jewish security, Palestinian amenities in East Jerusalem have fallen into disrepair. This is in stark contrast to Israeli settlements both west and east (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2006).

Whilst denying Palestinians the right to develop, the municipality has also promoted the development of large "satellite" settlements – Jewish enclaves – in East Jerusalem. The reason for this seems to be two fold. First, as the Jerusalem Committee has made clear during the first years of construction in 1982, "the ring of settlements will provide a necessary buffer in case of any political or military pressure" (Pullan, 2009: 41). These settlements are therefore frontier outposts, ensuring the defence of West Jerusalem behind them. The fortress nature of these settlements is difficult to miss; they stand on the top of hills and on high ground overlooking Palestinian villages on the slopes, surrounded and protected by "heavy stone walls, buttresses and towers" (ibid: 43). The second reason, as Wendy Pullan suggests, is that these outposts physically block the growth and contiguity of Palestinian residential areas, as "each [settlement] was built adjacent to, or in some particular relationship with, one or more Palestinian village or neighbourhood". These outposts thus form part of what Weizman (2006: 89) terms the "intricate matrix of control over the terrain", foreclosing the possibility of a continuous Palestinian presence by fragmenting East Jerusalem into a patchwork of increasingly isolated Palestinian spaces and dominant Israeli fortresses. In the 1980s for example, the Har Homa settlement was developed, completing the outer ring of Israeli settlements, and providing

continuity between them. In doing this however, Har Homa also blocks East Jerusalem from Bethlehem. Similarly if plans to develop the E1 area, expanding eastwards into the occupied territories goes ahead, a narrow corridor will be created connecting Maale Adumin with West Jerusalem and effectively splitting East Jerusalem in two (Pullan, 2009) (see Map 3).

Beyond the strategic use of new settlements, the municipalities politics of containment also extends to an elaborate assault on Palestinian mobility, achieved in recent years through the splintering of the Palestinian road network. There has long been a marked disjuncture between Israeli mobility and Palestinian mobility in Jerusalem. This, up until recently, was mostly a product of the unequal road investments – with Israelis enjoying rapid mobility on modern and well maintained roads, connecting freely West Jerusalem and its satellites to the east, whilst Palestinian roads have fallen steadily into disrepair, being narrow, poorly lit and having no sidewalks (Groag, 2006). More recently this "politics of roads" has been further complicated by the expansion of checkpoints (post-1993) and the "separation wall" (Figure 3).

The proliferation of checkpoints and the construction of the separation wall demonstrate aptly the dramatic changes to the urban landscape brought about during the Oslo and Post-Oslo years (1993 - present) and the dialectic climate of intifada, suicide bombings and Israeli military "retribution". Currently the separation barrier – consisting of walls, fences, road blocks and checkpoints – extends in an erratic loop roughly around the municipal borders, separating all of West Jerusalem and most of East Jerusalem from the West Bank. The effect of this barrier on Palestinian access and mobility to, and through, East Jerusalem has been significant.

The wall has severed large areas of Palestinian land in two, enclosing certain areas and excluding other areas completely in an attempt to incorporate as few Palestinians within the wall as possible. The Abu Dis neighbourhood, for example, has been almost completely cut off from Jerusalem, with the road that used to lead into the city being turned into a cul-de-sac by a concrete wall. The only way to enter Jerusalem now is to negotiate a series of check points, turning what was once a simple 15 minute journey, into a journey of over 45 minutes –

providing of course you are let through at all. In total, 25% of the 250,000 Palestinians living in East Jerusalem have been cut off from the city by the wall (UN, 2007). Rather than being completely excluded from Jerusalem, the Shu'fat refugee camp, situated to the Nort East, has been split in two, with those on the inside maintaining certain freedoms of mobility, whilst those excluded from the city, about 30,000 people, have almost no access at all (figures 3 and 4) (Bulle,2008). Other Palestinian areas that were completely included in the outer boundaries of the wall have seen themselves hermetically sealed off in enclosed enclaves. The villages of al-Jib, Bir-Nabala and al-Judeira in Northern Jerusalem have all been enclosed by the wall in an area known now simply as Bir Nabala. The exits and entrances to Bir Nabala are both tightly controlled by check points. Despite remaining on the Jerusalem side of the wall, and with little regard to the historical ties that these neighbourhoods have had with central Jerusalem, residents of Bir Nabala have seen their access to the city cut off by checkpoints and reoriented instead to Ramallah in the North.

The constrained mobility caused by the wall and the checkpoints has had important humanitarian implications for Palestinians. In their 2007 report, the United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL) noted that as a result of the wall, and significant delays incurred at checkpoints, Palestinian health care was declining. This is occurring because the majority of the better Palestinian hospitals are located in East Jerusalem, and since the wall has been built access to these hospitals for East Jerusalemites caught on the Eastern side of the wall, such for as those living in Abu Dis, has been severely complicated. Fewer Palestinians are now checking in to hospitals in order to avoid the stress that accessing them involves. Not only does this mean that sick Palestinians receive poorer treatment, but that the Hospitals themselves risk closing due to limited numbers of patients. A further, and related, issue is that many of the staff that run these hospitals live on the Eastern side of the wall and have to constantly reapply for permits to enter East Jerusalem. In 2005 twenty staff from the Makassad Hospital were denied permits and so were unable to work (UN, 2007). The deleterious effects of the wall are also felt in education, where many staff and students have been unable to attend school or university, and the economy, which has been massively disrupted

by the wall and is declining into ever worse conditions.

Whereas for Palestinians the separation wall and checkpoints are intended limit mobility and contain them within enclosed enclaves, effectively expanding their experiences of time-space, for Israelis they are designed to ensure security against suicide bombings and other similar attacks, and are not in any way supposed to limit Israeli mobility. Indeed in order to ensure the free passage of Israelis in East Jerusalem and to connect them freely to West Jerusalem an arterial highway system of roads has been constructed, carving through, and under, East Jerusalem and bypassing Palestinian neighborhoods. In stark contrast to Palestinian residents in Abu Dis, for example, Jewish residents in nearby Maale Adunim enjoy quick access to the centre of Jerusalem on segregated roads that tunnel under Mount Scopus. The landscape of East Jerusalem has therefore not only been fragmented into a polka-dot of enclaves and exclaves, it has also been severed into two spatial realities; one of constrained boundedness and discontinuity, experienced by Palestinians, and one of fluid mobility and connection, experienced by Israelis. This reality on the ground chimes strongly with what Frantz Fanon called the "principle of reciprocal exclusivity". In the colonial city or town, wrote Fanon (1963 [1990]: 30):

> The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed… Obedient to the rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity. No conciliation is possible… The settlers' town is a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown and hardly thought about… The town belonging to the colonized people… the medina, the reservation… is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire.

From Fanon's insight we can begin to glimpse the Foucauldian relationship formed through Israeli spatial planning. The more Palestinian spaces and Palestinian life is enervated, weakened and disturbed, the healthier and more vigorous Israeli spaces and life can become.

East Jerusalem: At the Threshold of the Exception

The elaborate matrix of control that currently limits Palestinian development and constrains Palestinians in spatially concentrated areas with restricted mobility, is – I would argue – the attempt to perform in space the complete separation of two groups in society, and eventually perhaps the complete exclusion of Palestinians altogether, reflecting the Israeli desire for Jewish demographic and territorial hegemony in the city. This is in many ways strongly resemblant of Foucault's concept of state racism, whereby to ensure the growth and development of one group the "Other" must be cast out, and then kept out through a system of regulatory regimes (in this case the wall, the checkpoint and systematic municipal discrimination). However, although Jerusalem is commonly cited as a classic example of a divided city, the current spatial reality in East Jerusalem belies any "sense of clearly separated sections or two halves roughly equal to one another" (Pullan, 2009: 39) and cannot be simplistically reduced to an inside/outside, Jewish/ Palestinian divide – even if this may well be the driving rationale behind many of the municipalities urban policies and plans. Rather, I argue, the translation from spatial ideology to spatial materiality in East Jerusalem reveals a more complex, fluid and messy interface; a precarious geography captured most accurately in Agamben's paradoxical notion of "inclusive exclusion".

Exclusion: Despite their geographic proximity in East Jerusalem, Jews and Palestinians inhabit almost polar opposite spaces; whilst the urban fabric ensures the continued enjoyment of urban modernity for Jewish settlers, it concomitantly denies "Palestinian people their collective, individual and cultural rights to the city based modernity long enjoyed by Israelis" (Graham, cited in Gregory, 2003: 317). Indeed, in order to secure Israelis from real and perceived terrorist threats, the urban landscape has become saturated with biopolitical power which, in a very real sense, *defines* the quality of life of both Israelis and Palestinians; enervating Palestinian

life to protect and foster Israeli life. For many years this process has proceeded silently through discriminatory urban planning regulations that have prevented Palestinians from constructing enough houses to meet their needs, and simultaneously ensuring that those that did persist and choose to live in the city would do so in increasingly overcrowded neighbourhoods where infrastructure and public services were purposefully allowed to dilapidate. Since 2002 the construction of the wall and proliferation of checkpoints has further deepened the immiseration and enervation of Palestinian life in a more visible way; circumscribing Palestinian rights to health, education and a functional economy. Far from being "posited as full subjects capable of self-understanding, self-consciousness, and self-representation" (Mbembe, 2003: 13), deserving full civil, political and socio-economic rights, Palestinians are reduced in the eyes of the Israeli municipality to a demographic time-bomb, and at a national level, to a carcinogenic disease. Even the limited rights that Palestinians have enjoyed under residency status are proving more and more precarious under the "centre of life" policy, demonstrating the hard fact that what rights Palestinians do have can be taken away at any moment.

Inclusion: At the same time as being "largely excluded from Israeli political, social, and cultural life" (Misslewitz and Rieniets, 2006: 26), Palestinian life in East Jerusalem is still subjected, and therefore maintained in relation to, the power of Israeli sovereignty and violence. There exists a generalised condition of "inclusive exclusion" for Palestinians in East Jerusalem, forming the basis for an all encompassing state of exception and thus making all Palestinians hominess sacri. This, as Agamben would say, is the moment that the camp becomes the biopolitical *nomos* of society. At this point, however, it is useful to qualify Agamben's assertion of a generalised space of exception. In certain cases this paradoxical condition is made concretely apparent; neighbourhoods such as Bir Nabala, for example, have been reduced to archipelago like islands, surrounded not by the sea but by Israeli sovereignty in the form of a

wall, where residents are stripped of many basic human rights. However, this is not always so manifestly the case elsewhere in East Jerusalem. Indeed, rather than being subjected at all times to the visible expression of Israeli sovereignty, power and violence, much of Palestinian East Jerusalem is held in relation to a more invisible and latent expression of Israeli sovereignty. Whilst all of Palestinian Jerusalemites are clearly excluded from the *polis*, their inclusion exists through their *potential* to be included through the enactment of the exception. Such spaces are therefore inherently unstable, located precariously at the threshold of the materialised exception. The exception may be enacted at anytime and anywhere. Following from this uncertainty, Palestinian life in East Jerusalem is made – to borrow Judith Butler's apt term – "precarious life"; that is to say life made vulnerable at any moment to having its legal position compromised by the declaration of a national, or localised, state of emergency.

The force of this precariousness has been made all too clear since the al-Aqsa intifada by Israel's "politics of temporality", where "temporariness" has become the permanent state of the Israeli occupation" (Orphir, in Gregory, 2004b: 162). A good example of this "temporariness" is the erratic and shifting nature of the wall, itself a *temporary* security measure. As Weizman noted "throughout the process of its construction the wall was continuously deflected and reoriented, repeatedly changing its route along its path (Weizman, 2007: 162). Furthermore in October, 2003 the IDF declared Palestinian areas east of the Green line and west of the separation wall "closed military zones" and the 60,000 Palestinian inhabitants of these areas "temporary residents" who were then barred from entering either Israel or the West Bank.

This politics of temporality, has turned Israel "into an unrestrained, almost boundless sovereign, because when everything is temporary almost anything – any crime, any form of violence – is acceptable… the temporariness seemingly grants it a license, the license of the state of emergency" (Orphir, cited in Gregory, 2004b).

Map 3. The Metropolitan Jerusalem Area
Source: Pullan 2009.

Figure 4. A Segment of the Separation Wall Around the Shu'fat Camp
Source: Nouri Akkawi, in Sylvaine Bulle (2008).

Figure 5. Shu'fat Camp

Source: Noura Akkawi, in Sylvaine Bulle (2008).

In many respects East Jerusalem seems to have morphed into what Foucault, when describing the effects of plague on a town, termed the counter city:

> In the (plague-stricken town) there is an exceptional situation: against an extraordinary evil, power is mobilized; it makes itself everywhere present and visible; it invents new mechanisms; it separates, it immobilizes, it partitions; it constructs for a time… a counter-city that is reduced, in the final analysis, like the evil that it combats, to a simple dualism of life and death… (cited in Gregory, 2008: 36)

However, rather than there being a "simple dualism of life and death", in East Jerusalem we find more of a regressive biopolitical continuum flowing from the promotion of life (for Israelis) to the control/management of (Palestinian) life, and at the extreme end, death. Palestinians, the "extraordinary evil" or "plague", thus live at a threshold between bare life, excluded from social and political life, and bare death – the point at which they in fact are killed with impunity. They find themselves delicately poised between the "generalized instrumentalization" of a base human existence, and the "material destruction of human bodies and populations" (Mbembe, 2003: 14), between the biopolitical and the necropolitical, the management of life and the management of death. Slipping from one to the other is a constant possibility, making life above all uncertain and precarious.

In East Jerusalem therefore there exists a generalised and all encompassing state of precarious indistinction, which can, at any moment, slip into the material manifestation of the exception when and where life is subjected to the violence of the sovereign. However at the same time as this abstract state of precariousness clearly exists, this alone tells us relatively little about how the state of the exception is actually practiced, and in what concrete spaces Israeli sovereign power forcibly excludes Palestinians from politically qualified life and legal protection. The next section seeks to address this by locating more specifically the places at which sovereign power and biopower converge to create the slipping point between a bare life and death. In order to do this I will focus attention on the checkpoint as the everyday "lived space" of exception for many Palestinian

Jerusalemites. In doing this I hope to bring focus to how the space of exception is *performed* relationally between the "agents of exception" (IDF soldiers and District Coordination and Liaison Office (DCL) officers) and the victims of the exception (the Palestinians), thus showing how a generalised potential for the exception is locally enacted and actualised to produce bare life and death.

Lived space and the Checkpoint: Precarious Spaces, Precarious Life

Lived space, in Marc Purcell's words, "represents a person's actual experience of space in everyday life" (Purcell, 2002: 102). Importantly for Lefebvre, lived space is a critical meeting point of conceived and perceived space, in that together conceived and perceived space produce a certain configuration or type of space that is then experienced, negotiated, and even resisted by people in their everyday lived situations. For people that live in cities such as London, Paris, New York or Tokyo lived spaces might commonly be "the cafe on the corner, the block facing the park, the third street on the right after the Cedar Tavern, near the post office" (Merrifield, 2006:10). However, in cities such as Jerusalem, and especially East Jerusalem, fragmented by biopolitical control, separation and containment, lived spaces take on very different meanings to cafes, taverns and parks. Fences, walls, ditches and checkpoints more accurately form the lived experiences of people here. In this section I will attempt to provide a snapshot – for that is all I can hope to provide – of how spaces of insecurity are "lived" by Palestinians in East Jerusalem, using the checkpoint as my example.

So why use the checkpoint to illustrate how the all encompassing space of exception manifests itself concretely to produce bare life and homo sacer? There are a number of reasons that justify this decision. First, as Rashid Khalidi comments, the "quintessential Palestinian experience... takes place at a border... a checkpoint" (Kelly, 2006: 91). It is a space that is used across the West Bank and East Jerusalem by thousands of Palestinians daily as they seek to visit family, go to school and university, go to work or visit the hospital. For the hundreds of East Jerusalemites caught on the eastern side of the wall, it is a barrier to be crossed several times daily. Secondly, checkpoints are, by their very nature, liminal, in between spaces. They sit at the threshold,

neither fully inside nor outside. Moreover, as Tamar Berger (2006: 252) insightfully puts it:

> The checkpoint is a nonplace (or heterotopia, no-place), in that it renders mechanical the process that takes place there, in the anonymity it produces (crossers are no more than ID cards, document bearers), and in the tight surveillance it entails.

Checkpoints are quintessentially biopolitical spaces in both Foucauldian and Agambendian instances. Finally, checkpoints represent spaces at which the arm of Israeli sovereignty (IDF soldiers and DCL officers) and Palestinians are forced into interpersonal contact, and as I will argue in what follows, it is through this contact that the space of exception is performed in space and time.

Checkpoints have been in place between Israel and the West Bank, and throughout the West Bank itself, since 1991, as a response to increased levels of suicide bombings and the resultant desire to monitor and control Palestinian movement. Through the Oslo years and during the second intifada the number of checkpoints greatly increased. Throughout the occupied territories there are currently 100 checkpoints (Naaman, 2006) and between the West Bank and East Jerusalem there are 16 existing and planned (UN, 2007) (map 4). In theory the flow of Palestinians through these 16 checkpoints is contingent on identity cards. Holders of blue identity cards, issued to "permanent residents", are in theory allowed free passage between East Jerusalem and the West Bank, whilst holders of green identity cards (West Bank identity cards) must obtain permits. However, as mentioned the number of Palestinians now eligible for blue identity cards has been reduced in recent years through the "centre of life" policy and the exclusionary route of the wall. Gaining a permit if you have a green identity card can also be very difficult, especially since 2000. Moreover, even if one were to have all the relevant papers and documents, this is far from a guarantee of free, unhindered and un-delayed passage through the checkpoint.

When approaching anyone of the checkpoints in East Jerusalem the initial feeling is one of uncertainty, for checkpoints are above all changeable spaces (Kelly, 2006). Indeed from day to day, and even within the same day, checkpoints shift in a number of ways. On certain days a checkpoint might be open all day, on others it might close in the afternoon leaving you stranded over night. Some days only women will be allowed through, on other days only those with blue identity cards will have access. Every now and again there are days when a checkpoint might be closed completely (Kelly, 2006: 90).

Upon arrival at a checkpoint, if it is open, this initial feeling of uncertainty is compounded as documents are checked. Documents and identity cards form an integral part of Palestinian life, indeed in the eyes of Israeli officials at the checkpoint they are all that matter. A Palestinian becomes his/her identity card, nothing more. In theory one might assume that identity cards ensure a certain sense of stability, especially if one holds a blue identity card. This however is not the case, rather:

> Even as people try to gain a measure of security through holding the right documents, these documents also mean that their lives are shot through with uncertainty... the implications of holding identity documents are always partial and unstable, as the laws and regulations that give them meaning are of often incoherent... (Kelly, 2006: 90).

This incoherency gives a significant amount of power to those that control passage through checkpoints, as with incoherent laws comes the authority to act upon personal discretion. Unsurprisingly then, a central element of the "lived space" of the checkpoint for Palestinians are the officers of the DCL and IDF soldiers. Indeed it is the interpersonal relations between these groups that shape how the space of the exception is performed in real life and in real time.

Map 4: Crossing Points. Source: UN (2007: 13)

Through their interpretation of the law, officers of the DCL on the ground effectively exercise almost complete bureaucratic control over Palestinians, deciding to grant access into East Jerusalem or not based on unclear regulations and more often than not arbitrary and unaccountable personal judgement. This power is frequently abused according to Physicians for Human Rights – Israel, leading to what they term hidden bureaucratic violence, described as:

> ...the waiting for the permit which may or may not come, the lack of information as to whether the hatch will close before I have submitted my application for a permit, will they return me the documents supporting my application for a permit? (cited in Hallward, 2008: 29)

Similarly, as the embodiment of Israeli sovereign power IDF soldiers exercise enormous control and authority over Palestinians; deciding who will pass and who will not (regardless of paperwork), who will be detained and who will be allowed to pass, who will be body checked and who will not, and ultimately, who will be allowed to live and who will be killed. The IDF are therefore the "agents of exception" (Jones, 2009: 887), those men and women on the frontline that make the ultimate decision regarding the life of Palestinians, if they are to be stripped of social and political meaning, and further if they are to become bare death, killed with no legal consequence, victims of their constant precariousness. These "petty sovereigns... delegated with the power to render unilateral decisions, accountable to no law" (Butler, cited in Jones, 2009: 887) operate in an exceptional space, their decisions have almost no legal consequences.

In this space of exception Palestinians are subjected to a range of humiliating and dehumanizing ordeals. They are made to endure the physical duress of the elements, often with little or no shelter, or herded like cattle into large "pens", whilst having to experience and obey the infantilising orders of IDF soldiers. On a daily basis many will be forced to undergo the maddening Kafkaesque scenario of being detained for hours at a time with no explanation or apparent due cause, only to be allowed through eventually with no hint of an apology. Even if they are not detained, passing through the checkpoint can still take over two hours at peak time, severely disrupting everyday life as the following suggests:

> Just imagine the amount of time you are wasting over the last four years. Even if you are crossing and people are polite, just try to calculate how much time is being wasted. People are late to their job if they are lucky enough to have one. People cannot really study, work or live because every inch of their autonomy is being controlled by someone else (a Machsom watcher, in Hallward, 2008: 31).

Palestinians are also commonly subjected to varying degrees of physical violence. This might take the form of beatings, being shot at with rubber bullets or being sprayed with tear gas (Berger, 2006). It might also result in the shooting of Palestinians with live ammunition, resulting in fatalities in the worst cases (Kelly, 2006).

It is important at this point to note that the position in which IDF soldiers are places at checkpoints is far from enviable. In many cases these are young soldiers who are moved from checkpoint to checkpoint as part of their compulsory military training. Immediately this serves to distance IDF soldiers from the Palestinians they regulate, foreclosing the possibility of regular contact and therefore further reducing Palestinians in their minds to mere card holders. Furthermore, as much as the checkpoint clearly marks a space of exception for Palestinians, checkpoints are far from safe spaces for IDF soldiers either. In February 2002, at a checkpoint near Ramallah for example, several soldiers were shot dead by a Palestinian sniper (Kelly, 2006). Events such as these unsurprisingly make Israeli soldiers anxious and as a result potentially prone to violence. Mirroring the conflict at large, violence at the checkpoint is met with retaliation and collective punishment, which in turn illicit further violence, and so on.

The everyday enactments between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians, the bureaucratic violence, the indiscriminate searchings, the hours detained, the tear gas, rubber bullets, beating and even killings, produce in the in-between spaces of the checkpoint the subjugation of (Palestinian) bodies to the intersection between biopower and sovereign

power, to the vagaries of the exceptional spaces where bodies are excluded from the *polis* yet held in relation to control and violence. Palestinians experience checkpoints with little agency and almost no dignity. At the checkpoint Palestinians are, on a daily basis, reduced to a precarious life. Not only is their passage and mobility at risk, which in turn greatly affects their livelihoods, but their physical wellbeing and even life is at potential risk. Subject to multiple forms of violence, oppression and abuse in a constantly changing context, Palestinians at the checkpoint find themselves precariously placed between being stripped of their dignity and human rights (bare life) and being killed with impunity (bare death). The only constant at the checkpoint is the brute fact of control: Israeli's have it, Palestinians are subjected to it.

CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSION: JERUSALEM AND BEYOND

Starting with the idea of a nexus of relations between the body–security–and space, and working through the application of this idea to the case of urban planning in Jerusalem, this essay has sought to explore and critically unpack the production of spaces of insecurity in the city. In particular this essay has utilised a Lefebvrian understanding of the production of space to frame how "Other" spaces and "Other" people are represented in Jerusalem as security threats (conceived space), how these representations are *performed* in space and made tangible in space (perceived space), and how these spaces affect the lives of those people that live in them (lived space).

From this case study three main comments can be made about the production of spaces of insecurity in Jerusalem, which I will argue have wider implications for a variety of other cities throughout the world:

First, from the case study it can be argued that the production of secured spaces and the production of insecure spaces are related processes. Based on Foucault's biopolitical break between (s)he who must live (and be secured), and as a result, (s)he who must die (be made insecure), an inverse relationship can be posited linking the increased insecurity of certain spaces to the increased security of others. Indeed in Jerusalem, the production of insecure spaces is a mechanism employed to secure Israeli space. This warns us against studying a cities "security agenda" uncritically,

and without simultaneously questioning whose lives as a result, are being made more precarious and through what spatial configurations is this being brought about.

Secondly, I believe that the case study highlights the theoretical benefits of thinking in terms of two related, though distinct, dimensions of insecurity based on the "inclusive exclusion" paradox posited by Agamben. First, we must seek to uncover the ways in which spaces are made insecure through their exclusion from the *polis.* That is to say how policies and practices contain and enervate life in space, denying people political, civil, and socio-economic rights, and protection and accountability that such rights infer. Secondly, we must ask ourselves how these spaces of abandonment, "in which human communities find themselves cut adrift from the institutional and legal frameworks underpinning modernity" (Gandy, 2006: 502), are also simultaneously "maintained in relation to the rule of the sovereign" (Ek, 2006: 365), subject to the "more or less violent consequences of [Israeli] politics" (ibid: 336). We must be mindful therefore of the space of exception and how this is enacted. As noted the exception is omnipresent throughout Palestinian Jerusalem, albeit frequently in latent form. This potentiality for the exception, in and of itself, makes spaces and the people who live in them inherently precarious, constantly at the threshold of the exception – the extreme space of insecurity where control, power and violence abound without limits and seemingly no accountability.

Thirdly we must be mindful of the complexities of the precariousness of life engendered by the concomitant inclusion and exclusion of space. Not only is life made bare, reduced to biological status, as it is excluded from the *polis*, but it is also – and as a result – continually at risk from being exposed to bare death, or death with impunity. In East Jerusalem Palestinians are victims of temporariness, and the uncertainty that such an exceptional politics produces. They are all potential, if not actual, homines scari. What this leads us to ask is how, where and by whom is the exception enacted. An analysis of exceptional spaces must therefore "identify the agents, targets and the spaces" (Jones, 2009: 880) that constitute the exception.

Together these three points form the basis of a critical examination of the policies and practices

that make up urban planning in Jerusalem, providing a detailed case study of the geographies of socio-spatial domination and some of the ways in which planning can serve regressive and oppressive aims, legitimised through discourses of security. However, beyond simply providing a case specific critique, these arguments also add substantive content to this papers conceptual framework, broadening its potential usage to a wider and diverse range of cities, and signposting areas for future research and examination. Trends in Jerusalem thus serve as a microcosm, albeit an extreme one, for understanding spaces of insecurity more generally.

At first glance using Jerusalem as a microcosm to elaborate a more general set of theoretical arguments might seem unwise, maybe even foolish. Surely Jerusalem is an exceptional case, an outlier as far as broader urban trends in Latin America, North America, Europe, Asia and Africa are concerned. Moreover urban planning and the production of space in Jerusalem are tightly controlled by the state (Marom, 2006). This is at odds with urban planning and governance in most other cities which in recent decades have expressly opened their planning processes to "market" stakeholders and the influence of neoliberal capitalism. However, through Jerusalem I am not trying to elucidate a universal theory or blueprint in which the complex and varied experiences of all cities will neatly fit. Rather, I would like to suggest that what emerges from a biopolitical analysis of security and the production of space in Jerusalem is a more general trajectory – along which Jerusalem has doubtlessly travelled the furthest – but which nevertheless seems to be guiding cities of all description to a certain extent. Furthermore, although the important role of neoliberalism has been largely ignored in this essay, this does not mean that the body–security–space nexus necessarily runs parallel or counter to neoliberal capitalist influences. Far from in fact, I believe that neoliberalism may well play a largely complimentary, if also complicating, role in the production of spaces of insecurity outside of Jerusalem.

Accordingly I believe that an analysis based on nexus of relations between the body, security and space could provide a rich framework for critically unpacking the spatialities of the growing neoliberal security agenda and what Warren Montag has called the "necro-economic" logic of capital" (Barkan, 2009: 255); including, the expansion of "laws targeting the urban poor and the informal economy, aggressive enforcement of these via "broken windows" and order maintenance policing, the privatisation of security... and the emergence or re-emergence of an often racialised discourse of the poor as dangerous and criminal, all contributing to spatial fragmentation and a massive fortification between rich and poor" (Samara, 2010: 199).

Further work is needed here to tease out the relationship between biopolitics, security and capitalism, and how this relationship works to produce spaces of insecurity. However even a cursory glance at the dynamics, past and present, of a range of cities indicates the potentially rich theoretical insights that might emerge from such studies. To name only a few examples, one could apply this framework to; the neoliberal "annihilation of space...[and]...the annihilation of the people who live in it" (Mitchell,1997:305), affecting, for example, homeless people in Los Angeles; the increasingly militarised approach to policing informality in cities – particularly in Brazilian cities such as Sao Paulo (Wacquant, 2002); the history and legacy of apartheid South Africa and its use of "temporary" law and order groups such as the Public Order Police (Samara, 2010); and the use of health and security discourses to free up prime real estate areas currently being used as shanty towns.   At a time when security agendas have risen to new prominence, when techniques and methods of "security" abound, more than ever it is essential that we subject the city, and the processes through which it is produced, to sustained critical analysis. Spaces of insecurity and spaces of exception, as defined and explored in this essay, are not confined to extreme cases of conflict urbanism. Nor are the politics, ideologies and discourses, so instrumental in producing these spaces. Rather to varying degrees such processes exist in a great variety of urban contexts, making their study of clear contemporary relevance and importance. If we are to critically analyse how such spaces are produced in the city, and following this mount a strong critique of such processes, a coherent framework is needed to guide future theoretical and empirical work. In this essay I do not flatter myself in thinking that I have come close to adequately achieving this in full. What I hope to have gone some way to doing is simply laying the foundations and tracing the outlines of what this might look like.

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