

Reverberations: Violence Across Time and Space

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Chapter 8

Infrastructural Violence in Jerusalem: Abjection, Incorporation, and Resistance in the “Cyborg City”

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In July 2014, Palestinian youths attacked the new Jerusalem light rail, demolishing stations and infrastructure where it passed through East Jerusalem. This highly visible attack on the first major urban infrastructure project to benefit Palestinian neighborhoods in five decades of Israeli occupation appeared confounding. Hadn't Palestinians long demanded better services, protesting against underinvestment in and municipal neglect of East Jerusalem? Hadn't they gladly made use of the light rail for the preceding two years? Using the lens of urban infrastructures, this chapter seeks to examine this tension between Palestinian Jerusalemites' exclusion from and their inclusion in the Israeli-administered city. It argues that both the disconnection from and the connection to the city's networks contain an element of “infrastructural violence”—one that reverberates with the deeper and longer-term violence of settler colonial dispossession and assimilation.

Understanding what is unique about violence in the city requires acknowledging the mutual constitution of humans and the non-human in urban space. In examining particularly urban forms of violence, Coward (2006) has criticized the prevalent “anthropocentric bias.” The post-human notion of the “cyborg” has been adopted as a useful concept for understanding urban spaces as assemblages of the human and non-human, embroilments of organic and artificial matter, and may thus also prove useful for understanding how violence operates in and through urban space. The cyborg was originally articulated by Donna Haraway as a political and intellectual project to challenge antagonistic dualisms underpinning domination (such as self/other, culture/nature, male/female, civilized/primitive) and break down the boundaries between them (Haraway [1991] 2000). The notion of the “cyborg city” thus highlights the hybrid nature of the city, which is both natural and cultural, environmental and social (Swyngedouw 2000), with physical infrastructures acting as the “material interface between the body and the city” (Gandy 2005).

Jerusalem itself is a hybrid city on several levels. Claimed by both Israelis and Palestinians as part of their national capital, the Palestinian east of the city has been occupied by Israel since 1967. East Jerusalemites carry Israeli ID cards but do not hold full citizenship, placing them in an interstitial and legally precarious position. While East Jerusalem was annexed under Israeli law, according to which it forms an integral part of the Israeli capital,¹ this was never recognized by the international community, which continues to view the “Green Line,” the pre-1967 armistice line bisecting the city, as the legitimate border between East and West Jerusalem. Since 2002 Israel has introduced another de facto border in the form of the Separation Wall, which cuts through East Jerusalem, effectively annexing most of its land to the west of the city but excluding approximately one-quarter of the city's Arab inhabitants. They now inhabit a no-man's-land that is neither part of the Israeli municipality nor under the jurisdiction of the Israeli army occupying the West Bank or the Palestinian Authority. Furthering the amalgamated character of the city, Israeli settlements are planted like islands across East Jerusalem, while traces of pre-1948 Palestinian life remain in many areas of “Israeli” West Jerusalem. This makes it difficult to speak of a “divided” city. Instead,

its multiple constituent parts may best be understood as fragmented yet entangled—socio-politically as well as in terms of spatial practice and materiality.

Examining the question of infrastructure in East Jerusalem through the lens of cyborg urbanism raises several questions: How do the various parts of this composite city interact—what forces hold a cyborg together and which participate in processes of division? Specifically, what is the role of infrastructures, as human–non-human interfaces of the city, in transmitting such force? How can we reconcile their seemingly contradictory effects of simultaneous exclusion and incorporation? And what are the timescales across which violence travels along these networks? Based on eight months of research in and around East Jerusalem,² this chapter examines urban contestations around infrastructure in East Jerusalem in recent years.

The first part of the chapter discusses how infrastructure (or lack thereof) serves to exclude Palestinian residents through the symbolic expulsion of abjection. This form of violence is particularly apparent in areas of Jerusalem cut off by the Wall, such as Shuafat Camp and Kufr Aqab. Most studies of “infrastructural violence” have focused on such exclusion from (equal) access to infrastructures as a form of urban injustice (Graham and Marvin 2001; Graham 2010; Rodgers and O’Neill 2012; Graham and McFarlane 2015). Yet, as the second section details, some infrastructural projects seek to incorporate East Jerusalemites, and constitute them as subjects in the city. While less overt, this infrastructural inclusion—most apparent in middle-class areas of East Jerusalem such as Shuafat and Beit Hanina—nonetheless constitutes a form of violence, I argue. In expanding on the existing understanding of “infrastructural violence,” this chapter reveals how the latter can also be caused by the incorporating effects of infrastructures. It does so through a focus on the affective and symbolic nature of infrastructural violence, following from Larkin’s (2013) observation that infrastructures act on several registers. That Palestinians perceive both infrastructural abjection and incorporation as violent can be seen in their reactions to both the absence and the expansion of infrastructure—demanding inclusion or refusing incorporation. This Palestinian resistance to infrastructural violence, often using infrastructural means, is discussed in the final section. Thus, the chapter shows how infrastructures create the potential for both conflict and vulnerability, but are also key sites of calibrating the manner in which the cyborg city’s disparate parts interact—sites of negotiating urban inclusion and exclusion.

Infrastructural Abjection

Exclusion from urban infrastructures has been argued to constitute a structural form of violence, because “the materiality of the city . . . plays a concrete role in the sedimentation and workings of unjust social relations, conventions and practices” (Rodgers and O’Neill 2012, 404–5). Beyond reinforcing unequal access to urban resources in this way, infrastructural violence also operates on embodied, affective, and symbolic levels. In particular, the metabolic circulations of water, sanitation, and waste have exclusionary and abjecting potential. The territorial stigma of abjection is a symbolic bordering process that can have very tangible spatio-political consequences. Furthermore, this symbolic expulsion functions as a way to externalize the constitutive violence of the state.

In Jerusalem, it is widely acknowledged, Palestinian areas have long been significantly marginalized in comparison to Jewish neighborhoods (Bollens 1998; Ir Amim 2014; ACRI 2015). Although Palestinian Jerusalemites constitute one-third of the city’s population, the portion of the municipality’s budget invested in East Jerusalem is only approximately 10 percent (Margalit 2006, 111). This results in severely neglected public works and services across all arenas—ranging from education to recreational facilities—but it affects in particular urban infrastructures (Cheshin et al. 1999). More than half of the houses in Palestinian areas are not formally connected to the

municipal water system or sewage lines. Palestinian areas thus suffer from low and irregular water supply levels, causing residents to ration their showers and laundry (Nidal and Amneh, Kufr Aqab, August 2014).³ In some cases, water supply ceases entirely, as when residents of Shuafat Refugee Camp were entirely without running water for several months during 2014. The marginalized state of Palestinian areas becomes especially evident when viewed in contrast to nearby Jewish areas or settlements, which enjoy urban amenities of much higher standards. The differing waste management in Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli parts of the city gives some indication of the severely skewed distribution of services: while there is one rubbish bin for every thirty-nine residents of West Jerusalem, in the east of the city, there is one per 5,641 residents (Margalit 2006, 126). Because they lack waste disposal facilities, Palestinians in many areas burn rubbish in the streets, causing the spread of toxic fumes. The infrastructural violence in East Jerusalem as a form of urban inequality, then, is a relational one, with the proximity of Jewish and Palestinian neighborhoods making the inequitable distribution of resources starkly apparent.

This infrastructural inequality is the result of a complex assemblage of factors, including urban planning decisions, legal arrangements over land ownership, and the topography of the city—making it difficult to point to a direct cause. Thus, “infrastructural violence” can be considered a form of structural (or systemic) violence in the sense of Galtung. Unlike in cases of direct violence, here there “may not be any person who directly harms another person.” Instead, the “violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power,” resulting in “unequal life chances” (Galtung 1969). As infrastructures are physically “built in” to the city, and often run underground, they can easily be taken for granted as banal spatial givens, or even become invisible, as has been widely argued (Lahiji and Friedman 1997; Star 1999; Kaika and Swyngedouw 2000; Graham 2010; Amin 2014). As such, their effects appear to come from everywhere and nowhere in particular at once. Because the acts of exclusion reinforced by infrastructures are not always declared policies, but may be incremental acts of omission, we might think of this violence as “creeping” (Yiftachel 2005).

Yet structural questions of urban planning also manifest themselves in rather direct forms of violence, as infrastructural exclusion affects residents’ embodied experience of the city. We rely on transport links to maintain our social lives, on water networks and electrical grids to maintain our humanity. Sewers funnel human waste, that which is no longer human, making infrastructures the ultimate nexus of the human and the non-human components of the city. Thus, Gandy (2005) refers to the infrastructural provisions of the modern home, on which we have come to rely for hygiene, warmth, light, and other essential needs, as an “exoskeleton” of the human body. The under-served areas of Jerusalem are prone to public health problems due to the lack of clean drinking water, openly running sewage, and garbage-related pests. Among residents of Kufr Aqab, a suburb of Jerusalem cut off by the Separation Wall and not served by municipal waste removal, for instance, the lack of infrastructure, and the resulting pollution, have led to high levels of respiratory and skin disease (lawyer for Kufr Aqab local council, August 2014). In the cyborg city, then, humans depend on technological extensions of our bodily selves and become vulnerable when the circulations of the urban metabolism they facilitate break down.

We have seen how the disconnection from urban circulations makes us vulnerable in physical ways. This exclusion is structural, but also experienced in embodied ways which affect residents’ sense of their own place in the city. In addition, infrastructural violence underpins Palestinian political exclusion when material conditions in the city are used to portray Palestinians as non-deserving subjects and legitimize symbolic, as well as political, expulsion. The lack of hygiene resulting from infrastructural exclusion is utilized in processes of abjection—a rejection of that which is Other within the self, and the ensuing delineation of a border of the self. In Kristeva’s terms, sewage and excrement function as the ultimate abject, because they have been expelled

from within (i.e., they are a former part of the self) and because the visceral feeling of revulsion they cause serves to delineate the border between self and Other, inside and outside (Kristeva 1982).

In addition to the ubiquity of waste, several Palestinian areas of East Jerusalem occasionally experience raw sewage flowing in their streets due to lacking infrastructure (Alyan 2009). Notably, Jerusalem's former mayor Teddy Kollek recalled "the unbearable stench" of East Jerusalem prior to Israel's occupation in 1967 (Wohlgelnerter cited in Weizman 2007). By highlighting the smell of native areas, he followed in a long colonial tradition in which expropriation could be justified through the olfactory dehumanization of locals (Nightingale 2012; Rotbard 2015). Building on Douglas's ([1966] 2002) notion that filth represents "matter out of place," Sibley has argued that dominant groups use abjection to minimize ambiguity and achieve a "purification of space" (Sibley 1988). Because bad odors, in particular emanating from excrement, are associated with transgression (Stallybrass and White 1986; Cresswell 1996, 97–145), such a characterization of East Jerusalem lays the groundwork for justifying the removal and replacement of residents.

Even more than the toxic fumes of burning garbage, then, the organic smell of human waste demarcates the boundary of impurity. Perhaps for this reason, the Israeli security apparatus also actively utilizes the abjecting effect of the smell of sewage. Since 2014, an artificial liquid with a sewage-like smell called "skunk"—previously only used as a non-lethal crowd control mechanism against protesters in the West Bank—has been employed regularly in East Jerusalem (ACRI 2014). It is used to break up assemblies, as well as in a manner that might be called punitive: entire streets, including homes, storefronts, and parked vehicles are sprayed with the liquid. Its odor clings to surfaces for weeks and causes physical revulsion. The use of "skunk," then, serves as a means of marking Palestinians as "transgressors," as "matter out of place." In a sensory manner, it demarcates the boundary around those areas considered abject and those residents considered external to the Israeli state—or in need of purification. While the use of "skunk" may appear more extreme than the longer-term, accretive effects of insufficient services, both the acute and the structural form of infrastructural violence represent a symbolic expulsion of the Palestinians of Jerusalem—they are not considered part of the social body of the state or of Israeli Jerusalem. In processes of abjection, according to Ahmed (2004, 91), a "transference of affect" takes place when signs of disgust stick to other (unspoken, abjecting) notions. As residents wash their clothes, their cars, themselves, multiple times to rid themselves of the persistent odor, "skunk" associates the smell of excrement with the residents of affected areas—the revolting "skunk" liquid becomes a "sticky sign" signaling exclusion. It affects residents' perception of themselves and their neighborhoods, a constant reminder of their place.

The repetition of negative attributes in relation to marginal groups in media and political discourses, too, causes signs to stick together and eventually become inextricably linked. In reporting about the failure of infrastructural services in East Jerusalem, Israeli media from across the political spectrum regularly refer to neighborhoods located behind the Wall as lawless and chaotic, highlighting the prevalence of illegal construction and crime (Hasson 2011; Margalit 2014; Yashar 2014). The emphasis on criminality when reporting on lacking infrastructure suggests that such unruly subjects are not worthy of municipal service provision. Wacquant describes this process in which a location is labeled a "lawless zone" as "territorial stigmatisation": the label suggests the place is "outside the common norm" and thus allows the "authorities to justify special measures, deviating from both law and custom" (Wacquant 2008, 240). And indeed, the municipality uses the lack of security from which residents suffer as justification for not providing services. The areas are deemed so dangerous that municipal representatives or service contractors claim they could only enter with military escorts, to repair broken pipes, for instance.⁴ Thus, in a circular argument, the situation of insecurity, caused by governmental and municipal policy, is used

to justify further exclusion—both from infrastructural provision and from the city at large. The Israeli prime minister as well as the mayor of Jerusalem have advocated excluding areas located behind the Wall, which are home to a third of Jerusalem’s Palestinian population, entirely from the city by redrawing the city’s boundaries (Hasson 2010; ACRI 2011; Ravid 2015).

The incremental steps of infrastructural exclusion can be seen as a form of symbolic re-bordering, advancing a situation of *de facto* exclusion that will make the *de jure* exclusion inevitable or unnecessary. The extraordinary measures that Wacquant suggested may create further exclusion, reflecting the persistent stickiness and self-reinforcing nature of signs of marginality. Through polluting and territorially stigmatizing Palestinian areas, the Israeli state is able to outline an inside and outside of its body politic—constituting through abjection what Ahmed (2005) calls the “skin of the community.” Through infrastructural abjection and stigmatization, it retroactively justifies the spatial containment of Palestinians by the Wall and prepares the ground for a more permanent exclusion from the city.

The Israel Separation Wall cuts off Palestinians and their daily circulations from Jerusalem, leading to the functional exclusion of many of the city’s Arab inhabitants, who have diminished access to urban life and resources in the city center. As an imposing piece of infrastructure cutting through the urban fabric, the eight-meter concrete wall also serves symbolic purposes. While a long-term solution to the territorial conflict is suspended, the visual clarity and imposing physical presence of the Wall create an illusion of defined borders—and the sense that what lies beyond it is external to the city. Abjection is not only part of psychological subject-formation but also, as Wilcox (2015, 84) argues, an essential part of sovereignty, which “is a performance that differentiates wild, ungovernable land from peace and order; it is only the sign of sovereignty that distinguishes a chaotic outside from an orderly inside. . . . The division between the inside and outside, between domestic peace and external anarchy and danger, is produced by abjection.”

The Wall, and the infrastructural exclusion of the areas beyond it, performs sovereignty by demarcating the boundary between inside and outside in a highly visible manner, when there is in fact is no such clarity (cf. Brown 2010). The abjection of Palestinian Jerusalem, then, is more than a sum of infrastructural disconnections, but an effective mechanism to symbolize the internal integrity of the Jewish-Israeli nation-state vis-à-vis an “uncivilised out there” (Busbridge 2013).

The political purpose of abjection, according to Navaro-Yashin (2012), is to protect oneself from being confronted with the “originary violence” of the founding of the state. Making invisible the zones of the abject allows the creation of zones of supposed cleanliness, seemingly untouched by that which is “rotten” at the core of the state. Israel’s identity as both democratic and Jewish, Azoulay and Ophir (2013) argue, is called into question by its five-decade rule over Palestinians in the occupied territories—if given democratic rights, these subjects would threaten the Jewish identity of the state, but their continued colonial disenfranchisement undermines any notion of true democracy. In attempting to balance this internal contradiction, Israel must create the illusion that its occupation of Palestinian land and people is external to the state. Following from this, what is externalized through infrastructural abjection in Israel/Palestine is not only the Arabness within the state of Israel, but also the “founding violence” at the heart of the state.

The originary violence here lies in the founding of a politico-legal system with internal contradictions, as well as in the mass expulsion of 750,000 Palestinians which coincided with the foundation of the state in 1948 (Morris 2004). They are the “constitutive outside” which continues to haunt the subject. The Palestinians who remain are a reminder of the incompleteness of this project, which was followed by the expulsion of 350,000 Palestinians in 1967 (Segev 2008). At the same time, they experience the violence as enduring. The ethnic cleansing of what Palestinians call

the Nakba (catastrophe) might be viewed as an ongoing process, as displacement and dispossession of Palestinians from their land continues, albeit at a slower pace.⁵ Following the reasoning of Jabary Salamanca et al. (2012), who argue that settler colonialism should be studied as a “structure” rather than a singular “event” of ethnic cleansing, we find the founding violence of Israel cannot just be read in ruins, traces, and spaces of abjection. Rather, through abjection, it reverberates in current-day reiterations of violence and violent structures, which serve to functionally disconnect Palestinians from Jerusalem, revoke their symbolic membership in the city, and expel them from the body politic.

Infrastructural Incorporation

We have seen how infrastructures can operate in violent ways when they are disconnected; however, recent work has shown that not only the disconnection of infrastructures but also the construction of roads and other ostensibly connective networks can perpetuate violence by hindering circulations (Weizman 2007; Pullan 2013; Handel 2014). Going further, I argue that infrastructural connection itself bears violent potential as it advances and perpetuates Israel’s incorporation of the Palestinian east of the city. For Palestinians, infrastructures, as a material embodiment of policy and planning, become a reflection of the Israeli occupation and annexation of the city as an everyday lived space. Through the metaphor of the city-as-body, annexation through urban circulation is normalized, and framed as desirable. And through the affective workings of modern infrastructures, incorporation takes place on the very bodies of Palestinians making use of these services.

In over the past decade, and in particular during the mayoralty of Nir Barkat (2008–18), the Jerusalem municipality has sought to increase investment in the city’s east, focusing in particular on the “upgrading” of the built environment and linking the east to the west of the city using connective infrastructures (Ministry of Transport 2012; Government of Israel 2014; Prime Minister’s Office 2014). The Jerusalem Light Rail (JLR or tram) in particular, which passes through Palestinian neighborhoods and began operating in 2011, has also introduced visual changes to those areas, creating a closer resemblance to West Jerusalem. By aligning Palestinian neighborhoods visually and administratively, these “upgrades” made to roads, pavements, street furnishings, and public transportation constitute a “normalization” in the sense of Foucault: they seek to “reduce the most unfavourable, deviant” elements and “bring them in line with the normal” (Foucault 2007, 62). The threat of Otherness here is contained not through exclusion but through assimilation.

It is commonly asserted that infrastructures are so deeply embedded in our experience of the built environment and are so banal or “taken-for-granted” that they only become visible when they cease to function (Graham and Marvin 2001; Graham and McFarlane 2015, 12). Yet in the case of East Jerusalem, infrastructure also becomes visible as a political question when it suddenly appears. Upon seeing construction works on the road surrounding the East Jerusalem bus station at Nablus Road, a young woman I’ll call Mariam (Kufr Aqab, August 2014) pointed to the new pavement and said: “You see how they are improving the area? It looks nice, right? But this is how you know they will never give it back.” Her statement reflects surprise at construction work in the city’s east after decades of municipal neglect, but also the ambivalence with which Palestinians view any apparent infrastructural improvements, which may ease their daily life in the short run, but are viewed as part of a longer-term plan to permanently annex East Jerusalem. Many Palestinians are similarly keenly aware of the implication of “mundane” objects. They have learned to read the landscape for signs of impending dispossession, for the slow but steady introduction of “facts on the ground.”

Beyond constituting a material manifestation of violence, infrastructure often serves as its “instrumental medium,” as Rodgers and O’Neill (2012, 404–5) point out. That is, infrastructure not only reflects decisions from the political realm but has the capacity to engender violence beyond the scope intended by human actors. Infrastructural developments, and in particular trains and roads, are “an ideal colonial technology” in that they facilitate access, extending the colonial reach into previously peripheral areas (Freed 2010). Because large-scale material interventions are difficult to reverse, such infrastructure projects are also a powerful means of establishing a permanent hold on occupied spaces. Both the construction of new roads linking East and West Jerusalem and the Jerusalem Light Rail are seen by Palestinians as strengthening the grip of the occupation by linking settlements to the west of the city and making the Israeli annexation of the east more permanent, if not irreversible (Barghouti 2009). Underground, the infrastructural annexation has already taken place, with the nominally independent East Jerusalem water and electricity companies in fact dependent on Israel, which determines the width of their pipes and the capacity of their electrical lines, as well as access to sources and distribution centers.⁶ The possibility of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, of independent and autonomous spaces, is undermined with every new infrastructural connection made (cf. Dumper 1993). Thus the ostensible technical function of infrastructural expansion, improved circulation, has much broader political repercussions in that it quite literally “cements” the annexation of East Jerusalem.

The ever-deepening infrastructural linkages between East and West Jerusalem are promoted by advocating “connectivity” as a seemingly neutral urban value (Tsur 2012).⁷ I read this as part of a discourse in which the functional city is understood through the metaphor of the human body. Notions of health and wholeness naturalize and depoliticize the annexation of East Jerusalem by means of infrastructural expansion as a mere issue of technical functionality. Yet, often this connectivity serves settlement expansion rather than enabling improved mobility for Palestinian residents.

The projects under the umbrella of recent infrastructure upgrading efforts in East Jerusalem include new roads that will connect Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem with the west of the city, while also serving the Palestinian neighborhoods through which they pass. While these roads provide some improvement to congestion issues in East Jerusalem, their primary purpose appears to be the expansion of settlements. Mahmoud, a Beit Hanina resident who uses Road 20, completed in 2013, every morning to commute from his home to West Jerusalem, noted: “It has cut twenty minutes out of my trip to work, but they didn’t do it for us.” Despite the benefits for his daily routine, in other words, he does not see the new roadway as a service the municipality has provided for his benefit, but rather assumes the motivation lies in strengthening the settlements—it links the main road of Pisgat Ze’ev settlement with Begin Boulevard (Mahmoud, Beit Hanina, January 2016). Similarly, according to observers, the main purpose of Road 21, under construction as of 2017, is that it will serve as an access road to the settlement of Ramat Shlomo, forming the basis of its expansion (Bimkom 2013).

The notion of the city as sustained by circulation is compounded by descriptions of Jerusalem as one inextricable unit. At the opening ceremony for Road 20, Israeli prime minister Netanyahu—while naming an intersection in East Jerusalem in honor of his father—described the construction as part of an effort to “link Jerusalem with itself” (Lazaroff 2013). His words imply that there is no difference between East and West Jerusalem; they are not even two separate parts of a city to be linked, but constitutive of one “self.” Similarly, Israeli politicians frequently describe Jerusalem as the “heart” of Jewish people (Prime Minister’s Office 2012), highlighting the centrality of Jerusalem for Judaism and Israel, or the city as a heart or body whose division would result in death (Jerusalem Center 2010). Swyngedouw (2006) reminds us that the image of the city-as-body has a long history precisely because “circulation” has always been a key tenet of the urban. The

discovery of the body's circulatory system led to health becoming associated with continuous circulation—in cities in particular, with regard to traffic, air, light, and waste. Thus continuous circulation, based on William Harvey's model of the metabolic processes of the body, became the metaphor used for the functioning city (Sennett 1994; Cresswell 2006, 7–8; see also Foucault 2007, 26). As the spatial arrangement of the city is often understood as a metaphor for society as a whole (Cohen 1985, 205ff), and since the notion of the “body politic” had long served to naturalize the political order (Harvey 1999), the newly understood metabolisms of the body served as a useful schema to legitimize the systems of power at work in cities (cf. Usher 2014).

In Jerusalem, we see this not only when anatomical metaphors are invoked to suggest indivisibility, but also when unimpeded circulation is invoked as central to the health of the city. The focus on circulation in the city-as-body schema depoliticizes the situation in Jerusalem by making it one that can be normalized through technical solutions related to traffic flow, and glosses over the facts that connectivity merely serves to deepen the grip of Jewish-only settlements on East Jerusalem and that the city's Palestinian population is not considered part of the body politic. The unity promoted by the metaphors of bodily circulation thus refers to a purified whole rather than the linkages within a hybrid city.

Not only does the city-as-body serve as a metaphor that naturalizes the infrastructural violence of annexation, but this incorporation of East Jerusalem is also achieved through the bodies of Palestinians making use of Israeli infrastructures in the city. This is in part due to the fact that colonial infrastructures, beyond their potential for seizing territory by establishing linkages, also function through symbolic registers, as icons of modernity vis-à-vis a less “civilized” local population (Masquelier 2002; Jabary Salamanca 2015; also see Shamir 2013). The JLR has similarly been associated with imagery of progress. The tram's sleek, futuristic appearance has been directly linked to the Zionist project as a modernization of (implicitly backward) historical Palestine. The light rail operator, Citypass, emphasizes that it constitutes part of the realization of Theodor Herzl's vision of Jerusalem as a modern metropolis (Jerusalem Transportation Masterplan n.d.; Herzl [1902] 2015). This explicitly stated link to the vision of the founding father of Zionism emphasizes the tram's character as a Jewish-Israeli project, yet at the same time, the light rail aims to project a sense of cosmopolitanism (Nolte and Yacobi 2015). Trilingual signage and announcements on the trains include Arabic, a language that is usually excluded from Israeli public transport, and efforts were made to encourage Palestinian participation. Indeed, the municipality aimed for the JLR to promote “peaceful co-existence” (Jerusalem Transportation Masterplan 2014) and “bring all the people and the neighborhoods of Jerusalem closer than ever” (Alstom, promotional video for the Jerusalem Light Rail in Shuafat, March 2010). When the light rail commenced its operations, the response from Palestinians was indeed surprisingly positive.

For Palestinians, being offered a high-quality urban service by the municipality, and being included in this showcase project, was unusual and unexpected. They noted the level of comfort of the JLR, with the unimpeded movement of the train resulting in an embodied sense of modernity, what Sheller (2004, 226) refers to as a “co-constitution of motion and emotion.” The old buses of the East Jerusalem bus companies were described as loud, hot, rattling, and often stuck in traffic. The light rail, by contrast, was air-conditioned and moved smoothly and quickly, providing an undeniably more comfortable experience. Thus, Hamdi (Shuafat, July 2013), a well-educated young professional, laughed about a colleague who boycotted the light rail although his commute to work led precisely along its route: “He comes to work every morning, late, sweaty, and exhausted from sitting in traffic the whole time. On the same street where the train runs. He could be there in ten, fifteen minutes!” There was a sense that those who didn't utilize one of the few services the municipality provides for them were adding to their own burden unnecessarily.

Modern urban forms have intended uses, Söderström (2013) argues, which require “educating” the population in their proper use. Such pedagogies were also part of the outreach program for the JLR, which sought to raise public awareness of traffic safety. Inside the carriages, too, passengers included in the community of public transport riders are “normalized” to behave within acceptable parameters (Semiaticky 2006; Butcher 2011; Höhne 2015). On the JLR, a variety of explicit prompts seeks to enforce the adherence to such behavioral scripts. Passengers are reminded of proper etiquette: announcements, flyers, markings on station platforms, and videos instruct them to let others off the train first, rather than pushing ahead, for instance. Further, a sense of community and ownership was invoked that went beyond a mere customer-service provider relationship: outreach workers spoke with religious leaders in East Jerusalem, hoping they would encourage Palestinian youths to purchase tickets and arguing “It is your train, please tell them to pay.”⁸

The role of Palestinian buy-in has been important not only to project an image of harmonious co-existence in the city. Security considerations apparently also played a key role, according to the CEO of light rail operator CityPass: “From the security point of view, there were some experts who thought that if Arabs are using a transportation system, they may not harm it. They thought it would be even much more safe and secure than other public transportation in Jerusalem—because Arabs are using it.”⁹ In light of this, the extensive efforts and community outreach to ensure Palestinian participation take on another meaning. The train was meant to foster more than good inter-communal relations. In this urban conflict setting, the bodies of civilian Palestinian residents were turned into involuntary elements of the security apparatus, their physical presence on the light rail protecting the infrastructure and the Jewish passengers on it.

It has been argued that marginalized residents may come to “feel part of the city” through the adherence to shared codes of deportment on public transport, perhaps more so than through the improved access to the city center (Brand and Dávila 2011, 656). Yet, many Palestinians viewed the light rail as an Israeli space in which they were self-conscious. Palestinian commuters related that they were stared at fearfully or targeted by ticket controllers for being Arab (Rania, Ramallah, July 2014; Asma, Shuafat, December 2015). Especially during politically sensitive periods, when “abnormal” behavior could result in being shot on the spot by security services or armed civilians, they closely monitored their own comportment. Despite the cosmopolitan image projected by the trilingual announcements and signage on the light rail, Hebrew maintains a dominant role. Palestinian commuters said they avoided speaking Arabic on the light rail so as not to be identified as Palestinian, and potentially attacked (Ahmad, Beit Hanina, August 2014). Through the internalization of certain behavioral scripts, for many Palestinians, the light rail reinforced a sense of difference rather than a feeling of being part of the city.

In that it extends public services to previously marginalized urban areas, the expansion of infrastructure appears more benevolent than infrastructural exclusion. Yet this incorporation—advanced through functional links, bodily metaphors, appealing atmospheres, and behavioral scripts—also entails increasing Israeli control over Palestinian everyday lives. Unlike the disciplinary power of infrastructural exclusion, infrastructural incorporation normalizes: it integrates elements deemed dangerous—such as Palestinian commuters—in order to minimize risk (cf. Foucault 2007, 65). In descriptions of Jerusalem as one circulatory system, body, or self, the abjecting notion of creating a boundary between self and Other appears all but erased. In this ongoing incorporative process, in which infrastructures are deeply implicated, Palestinian Jerusalem is rendered invisible as an entity in its own right, and Palestinian residents feel alienated from their surroundings, displaced without having moved.

The Israeli approach of concurrent abjection and incorporation receives an at times similarly ambivalent response from Palestinians, who are forced to negotiate between maintaining their basic individual quality of life in the city through services, and collective political visions of halting annexation and maintaining the autonomy of East Jerusalem. Thus, rather than refusing infrastructural services or connectivity to West Jerusalem on ideological grounds, many Palestinians focus on the here and now, on improving their quality of life by making use of the resources available to them. They demand infrastructural connections, which they view as a right deeply linked to urban citizenship. At the same time, these pragmatic responses are not a reflection of surrendering all political visions of an autonomous Palestinian city. The refusal to be incorporated was displayed in a sensational manner when residents attacked the Jerusalem Light Rail on its path through Palestinian neighborhoods. Foregoing ease of movement and quality of life, they sent a symbolic signal of refusal.

In light of the symbolic exclusion enacted through infrastructures, the demand for infrastructural service provision has become a stand-in for Palestinians' right to the city in many ways—despite the fact that demanding such services requires appealing to Israeli authorities. Members of the Kufr Aqab local committee pointed to lack of water and irregular waste disposal as examples of how the municipality treats them as “second-class citizens.” In 2012, the local committee took the issue of their infrastructural neglect to the Jerusalem municipal courts. Although the Separation Barrier's route cuts them off from the rest of the city, they argued, they have a right to the same services as other Jerusalem residents, in particular because they continue to pay for these services through municipal taxes.¹⁰ The Jerusalem District Court ruled in favor of the local residents (Hasson 2015), a verdict the residents and their lawyers viewed as an affirmation that Kufr Aqab remains part of the city. This was seen as an important symbolic victory, even if in reality the neighborhood experienced little improvement.

Rubbish collection is also a significant problem in Shuafat Refugee Camp, whose Emergency Committee made a call to action directly referencing the responsibility of the Israeli mayor of the city: “We will make it clear to Mayor Nir Barkat and his colleagues at City Hall: . . . Stop avoiding your responsibilities towards the residents of east Jerusalem! Act to regularize and resolve the efficient disposal of garbage from Shuafat Refugee Camp! . . . The funds allocated to garbage disposal per resident of the camp is only a fifth of those appropriated per citizen in West Jerusalem” (call for protest with Committee Against the Wall on 12 July 2015, by email).

By appealing to Israeli institutions and referring to the notion that all residents of the city should be treated equally, the local committees involved in organizing the protest employed a political vocabulary usually reserved for those who are part of a polity, although Palestinian Jerusalemites are considered merely permanent residents, not citizens of Israel. It appears that inclusion in infrastructural circulations is read as a signal of residency rights by those who fear they may soon be excluded from the city.

In seeking equal treatment, these East Jerusalemites do not necessarily signal acceptance of Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem. We might instead think of them espousing something akin to what Anand (2017) calls “hydraulic citizenship”—an enactment of residents' rights through infrastructural claims made and public services provided. Similarly, underscoring that infrastructural services are an essential part of how citizenship is conceived and shaped, von Schnitzler (2008) has shown how new regulations for water consumption in post-apartheid South Africa reflected a particular notion of citizenship shaped by neo-liberal logic. The market logic of the Israeli municipality, which constructs Palestinian Jerusalemites as “customers” rather than citizens or residents,¹¹ holds the promise of economic rather than ethno-national criteria playing

the main role in determining access to infrastructural resources. Yet it also means that Palestinians appear to have no inherent right to those resources, as access can be revoked if fees are not paid. Thus, Palestinian communities' supply of water and electricity is frequently turned off en masse in what has been criticized as collective punishment (Ho 2014; Abukhater 2015; Udasin 2015). In the neoliberal and settler colonial setting of Jerusalem, both the "infrastructural citizenship" and the residency of Palestinian noncitizens are always precarious, but residents find their tenuous links to the city affirmed when they are able to secure infrastructural services.

While decades of urban neglect and the looming danger of losing access to the city have caused Palestinians to insist on their access to infrastructural services, they are also deeply aware of the violent potential of infrastructural incorporation, which threatens to erase their claim to an independent east of the city. When tensions around the Jerusalem Light Rail came to a head, Palestinians chose the refusal to be incorporated over improved service provision from the municipality. In undermining Israeli-controlled infrastructure, they not only excluded themselves from the city's network of connectivity but also made use of the vulnerability caused by urban residents' "prosthetic" dependency on infrastructure (Freud cited in Larkin 2013).

In July 2014, a time when political tensions were on the rise, residents of Shuafat expressed their rage at the brutal murder of a local boy by Israeli extremists, by attacking the tram infrastructure. The destruction of the JLR infrastructure continued for several days, along with protests and clashes with Israeli security forces. Protesters systematically dismantled all installations associated with the tram at the two stations in Shuafat: security cameras, station shelters, signage, ticket machines, tracks, signals, traffic lights, and underground wiring, as well as electricity pylons supplying the train. The methodical and systematic dismantlement of the light rail's essential infrastructure suggests that the destruction was more than an outlet for frustration. Instead, Palestinians aimed to attack the very functionality of the light rail. Service was interrupted for over one week; those living in settlements at the northern end of the JLR's route were forced to take alternative bus routes circumventing Palestinian areas.

Palestinians had attacked a visible symbol of the Israeli occupation, however beneficial it was to their everyday lives. Yet, on a functional level, the train was also the physical means by which Israelis accessed the Shuafat neighborhood, and the presence of settlers had become normalized. With the disruption of settlers' mobility through the neighborhood, the boundaries of Shuafat were temporarily upheld. The cyborg quality of urban infrastructures makes everyone vulnerable—those groups who are more tied into infrastructural networks perhaps more so than those who are excluded. This was demonstrated again when a few weeks later, possibly inspired by the attacks on the JLR, Palestinians cut electricity pylons serving the Dolev settlement near Ramallah, causing a blackout in the settlement. Infrastructurally mediated violence, then, is not transmitted only from the top down, but can also be a tool of the marginalized to disrupt dominant circulations. Palestinians' ability to stop unwanted Israeli movement through their neighborhood resulted in reclaiming a level of territorial control, if only temporarily.

The attacks unhinged the functional operation of the infrastructure by disrupting Israeli mobility and its associated quotidian routines. Perhaps more importantly, however, they unsettled the narrative of the city's harmonious unification for which the train had been used as a symbol. Arguing that the picture of cosmopolitan inclusion and modernity projected by the light rail merely obscured its underlying violence, Ahmad stated: "People tried to convince themselves that this train is a civilized thing. But the happy picture is just based on racism; it's a fake. We don't want this kind of civilization" (Ahmad, Beit Hanina, July 2014).

Some Israeli officials portrayed the destruction of the light rail infrastructure as mindless vandalism that harmed Palestinians' own interests, or as an outlet for frustration that had accumulated elsewhere.¹² Instead, it becomes clear, the attacks were a way to make visible, in a spectacular manner, the less discernible structural violence precipitated and sustained by the infrastructure. While individual residents may see improvements in their everyday quality of life by being included in Israeli networks, the violence of incorporation is a long-term process, targeting Palestinians as a collective entity. By attempting not only to reshape the urban terrain but also to constitute certain types of subjects, it limits spatial possibilities and precludes possible futures of the city. While it works through individual bodies, this incorporative violence is also exerted against the collective and its political future. If continuous circulation, based on the metabolic processes of the body, was long the metaphor used for the functioning city, we might read this disruption of flows through attacks on infrastructure as a refusal to be incorporated into the city and the body politic it represents.

Conclusion

The two forms of infrastructural violence outlined here may appear, at first glance, to be at odds with one another. The violence of exclusion lies in being functionally cut off from the city's circulation, affectively marked as the abject Other outside of civilization and modernity, and thus symbolically expelled from a rightful claim to membership in the city. The violence of incorporation appears as an improvement of quality of life—in practical terms, it involves access to urban metabolisms; in affective terms, it can even come with increased comfort and a sense of belonging to the city, participating in a realm of modernity and progress. However, the collective claim to the city and its political future that is being undermined by spatial annexation and normalization in East Jerusalem lays the groundwork for appropriation. These processes of abjection and incorporation take place simultaneously in Jerusalem because they are attempts to overcome an ambivalence at the heart of the regime in Israel/Palestine as a whole, as well as in Jerusalem as a city—a contradiction which can never be fully resolved.

Under settler colonialism, Wolfe (2006) argues, the structural process of elimination and replacement of the indigenous population is continued through assimilation. In Israel/Palestine, we see the two logics—elimination by displacement and by assimilation—taking place concurrently. This is in part because the colonial frontier in Israel/Palestine has not been closed: Israel's five-decade-long occupation of Palestinian land has created an extreme sense of ambiguity of borders, as Israel maintains military control over the West Bank (and, effectively, the Gaza Strip—see Li 2006; Jabary Salamanca 2011) while abrogating political responsibility for the inhabitants. Because of the resulting lack of clarity over the location of borders, and the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty, Israel/Palestine has been referred to as “neither two states nor one,” with the paradoxical situation of the occupation referred to as one of “inclusive exclusion” (Yiftachel 2005; Ophir et al. 2009).

In Jerusalem, where numerous types of boundaries and frontiers overlap—Dumper (2014) refers to the city as “many-bordered”—this sense of unresolved in-betweenness is heightened. Thus a similar process is at work at an urban scale. Because bordering processes can never be completely successful, the tension between inclusion and exclusion manifests itself in simultaneous processes of abjection and incorporation. Because infrastructures connect the political realm and the lived everyday—the physical manifestation of policy as well as agents in their own right—they are key sites for determining relationships and negotiating who is part of the city, thus enacting violence of various types on the urban scale.

Maintaining a Jewish demographic majority in Jerusalem has been the core tenet of Israeli urban planning (Kaminker 1997; Cheshin et al. 1999), an aim for which the city's Arab population must

be dis-enfranchised, or excluded through re-bordering. In fact, multiple re-redrawings of the municipality's outline have had the exclusion of the highest number of Palestinians as their object (Benvenisti 1996; Bollens 2000). The Israeli insistence that Jerusalem will always remain united and undivided does not allow for the reversal of the annexation of East Jerusalem's territory, however. Abjection serves as a means to construct Palestinian East Jerusalem as separate and outside, to exclude it symbolically without forfeiting the territorial grasp.

Yet this abjection can never be complete; it is always challenged. On the scale of the city, the entangled nature of its constituent parts is all too apparent: ethnic fault lines are scattered across dense urban space, fragmenting it into often minuscule segments. Yet, various circulations across this space intertwine the two parts. Abjection is an attempt to develop clear-cut borders where there is ambiguity—but at the same time, the abject is the constant reminder of the impossibility of such clear-cut borders (Grosz 1990). Thus, the court decision in which residents of Kufr Aqab successfully sued the city for better services was justified with the argument that the neighborhood's rubbish problem was “exporting disease by bird” to nearby Israeli areas.¹³ The stark infrastructural division of the Separation Wall was not able to disentangle the ecological connections between different parts of the city, and indeed the issue ultimately affirmed that Kufr Aqab continued to be part of the city. Thus, the abject not only makes boundaries visible but moves to erase them.

Because abjection always carries within it the potential of destabilization, unless there is full-on expulsion of all Palestinian residents, the city can never be fully “purified.” The incorporation of Palestinians into Israeli circulations, their normalization in order to curtail their Otherness, serves as the alternative means of unifying the city, one which is in line with the liberal-democratic nature of the state. Yet while Palestinians demand urban services and equal treatment, they resist normalization and incorporation that undermine autonomous spaces and thereby eradicate collective claims to the future of the city. Due to the impossibility of either full exclusion or full incorporation, then, the bordering and re-bordering in Jerusalem appears as an ongoing, dynamic process. Infrastructures are the main tool used in this constant shifting of boundaries, making them key sites of contestation over the city—participating actors in the struggle over who belongs to the city, and who the city belongs to.

As the violent potential of infrastructures lies in their capacity to draw or undermine boundaries, to link bodies into the system or exclude them, the interconnection of human and non-human actors through infrastructures creates a particular vulnerability. The violence of infrastructures is experienced on an embodied level—in material disadvantage, bodily harm, or the pressure to alter one's behavior—but at the same time, the violence they advance is political, and targets the collective. Lefebvre links the fact that “every state is born of violence” to the ongoing violence in that space: “State power endures only by virtue of violence directed toward space” (Lefebvre [1974] 1991). The spatial violence of bordering is not a one-off event of division at the foundation of the state, but a continuous process. Urban infrastructures are not merely reminders of violent acts past; they enact violence on a day-to-day level, and even point toward a violent future. Thus the no longer trivial elements of urban space, such as the street furnishings to which a passer-by assigns significance, are not only a memory of past violence, or a symbol of a violent policy. They themselves reverberate with violence that continues to be felt.

The notion of the cyborg calls into question singular myths of origin and shows how they are involved in domination. Haraway asserts the impossibility of the autonomous individual subject, which we might take to reflect the impossibility of “purified,” unambiguous urban space: “To be One is to be autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an illusion, and so to be involved in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other. Yet to be other is to be multiple, without

clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial. One is too few, but two are too many” (Haraway [1991] 2000).

The Israeli prime minister’s paradoxical-sounding aim to “link Jerusalem with itself” is almost an acknowledgement that, despite Israel’s assertion that Jerusalem is eternally indivisible, it is made up of more than one self, and non-human structures play a vital part in negotiating between those selves. Following Haraway, a denial of the other self/selves promises ongoing conflict. The cyborg city is as always multiple, even if its different parts are intertwined against their will. But perhaps most importantly, the cyborg bears the promise of alliances, of being connected while living with contradictions, of inhabiting a space which is neither two cities nor one.

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Notes

- 1 Government of Israel, Basic Law—"Jerusalem, Capital of Israel," 30 July 1980.
- 2 Fieldwork was carried out between 2013 and 2016 in the frame of my doctoral research, which was funded by the Gates Cambridge Trust.
- 3 Respondents who do not hold public office are identified by pseudonyms and their home neighborhoods throughout this chapter.
- 4 David Koren, in charge of the East Jerusalem portfolio at Jerusalem municipal administration, August 2015.
- 5 Since 1967, over 14,000 East Jerusalemites' residency permits have been revoked (UN OCHA 2011).
- 6 Amir Cheshin, longtime adviser to Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek on Arab issues, July 2014; Director of Operations, Jerusalem Water Undertaking, September 2014.
- 7 Tamir Nir, Jerusalem Municipal Council member holding the transportation portfolio, July 2014.
- 8 Former CEO, CityPass, July 2014.
- 9 Former CEO, CityPass, July 2014.
- 10 Petition by the local committee of Northern Jerusalem, 4 April 2012; Court decision, 26 June 2012 (in Hebrew).
- 11 David Koren, deputy mayor for Arab Affairs, July 2014.
- 12 Tamir Nir, Jerusalem City Council, transportation portfolio, July 2014.
- 13 Kufr Aqab local committee, August 2014.