ECPR General Conference 2018 (Hamburg)

Section: New Parties in Europe: A Comeback for the Parties or Just Another Symptom for Their Decline? Panel: The Origin and Institutionalization of New Parties

Party (system) crashers?

Understanding the trajectories of genuinely new parties in Western Europe after 1945

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Abstract

Western European party systems have recently experienced increasing electoral instability and the emergence of successful new parties, leading in some contexts to party system de-institutionalization. Notwithstanding the growing relevance of these trends, poor attention has been dedicated to the rise of new parties from a comparative and long-term perspective, while case studies focusing on a single party or country are overwhelming. In this paper, we rely on the notion of 'genuinely new parties' that 'are not successors to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members' (Sikk 2005, 399). This concept was originally designed for Central and Eastern European party systems with the purpose of highlighting a difference with the insiders of the system (i.e., the founder parties, or their successors). For the first time, we apply this perspective to Western European party systems. By building a dataset covering 20 countries and more than 350 parliamentary elections, we have identified 127 genuinely new parties emerged in Western Europe after 1945. We have tracked the performance of those parties in terms of electoral success, parliamentary representation and government participation across time, countries, and party families. Through a latent trajectory model (Nagin 2005; Mustillo 2009) the paper provides a classification of such genuinely new parties in terms of their varying ability to enter the system and persist over time, thus becoming part of it.

Keywords: genuinely new parties; elections; party system change; latent trajectory model; Western Europe;

1. Introduction

The study of new parties in Western Europe has received scholarly attention at least since the 1980s, following the emergence of greens (Poguntke 1987; Müller Rommel 1989), left-libertarian (Kitschelt 1988), and radical right parties (Kitschelt 1995; Ignazi 2003), which broke up the golden age of party system stability established since the 1920s (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Scholars focused mainly on their organization and the factors explaining their variable success (Harmel 1985; Harmel and Robertson 1985; Hug 2001), political platform and ideology (Lucardie 2000) and the path to government (Deschouwer 2008). In the last years, the recent wave of successful new parties in Western Europe has reinvigorated the research on the organizational features and electoral fortunes of new parties (Hino 2012; Bolleyer 2013; Hobolt and Tilley 2016), the explanatory factors behind their success (Lago and Martínez 2011), and their impact on the respective party systems (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2016).

This growing body of literature has not yet found an agreement on two crucial issues: 1) the definition of what is a 'new' party and 2) the approach to study the fortunes of new parties and the (variable) role they play in the respective party system.

As for the definition of a 'new' party, there is significant variation, from very inclusive classifications, detecting the presence of new parties in the case of simple relabeling (Harmel and Robertson 1985), mergers (Birch 2003; Bolleyer 2013; Powell and Tucker 2014) and splits (Hug 2001; Tavits 2006; Zons 2015), to the use of increasingly demanding criteria, such as the presence of a start-up organization (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Emanuele and Chiaramonte 2016) and the discontinuity in the political personnel and leadership (Sikk 2005; Marinova 2015)[1].

In this paper we rely on Sikk's conceptualization of 'genuinely new parties' (GNPs), namely parties that 'are not successors to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members' (2005, 399). This concept was originally designed for Central and Eastern European party systems; however, we believe that given the increasing electoral instability and party system change in West European countries (Hérnandez and Kriesi 2016; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017; Dassonneville and Hooghe 2017), such rather conservative approach is useful to highlight a difference between the outsiders (GNPs) and the insiders of the system (i.e. the founder parties and their successors).

As regards the second issue raised above, most scholars study the fortunes of new parties by adopting an approach based on dichotomies: success/failure, persistence/decline, survival/demise (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013; 2017). However, such dichotomies are too simplistic to describe the actual patterns of new parties in Western Europe. Indeed, for parties generally considered as successful, what does success mean? To what extent do parties have success? Which is the threshold for success? To be voted by a large share of the electorate? To gain access to Parliament? To enter the government? Similarly, on the other side, for parties generally considered as failures, what does failure mean?

[1] For a detailed review on the existing conceptualization and operationalization of new parties in the literature, see Emanuele and Chiaramonte (2016).

Success and failure are relative concepts that depend upon multiple contextual factors parties face in each country. These can be related to society (cleavage structure, degree to which voters are encapsulated into existing 'pillars' politicized by existing parties, emergence of new and uncovered issues), institutions (electoral provisions related to the cost of entry, electoral system, degree of decentralization), economy and the political space (number of actual competitors, voters and parties' polarization, voters' dissatisfaction with existing parties and turnout levels). Moreover, success and failure may also depend upon the expectation voters, politician and pundits have vis-à-vis a specific party and its performance in a given election or time period.

Furthermore, which data should be used to assess whether a party is successful or not? Its electoral performance? Or its ability to gain parliamentary representation? Or even its ability to enter the government?

Indeed, we believe that we need to go beyond the dichotomy of success and failure and their ambiguous meaning for political parties, but instead to track parties' actual performances and modelling their trajectories across time, so as to achieve a comprehensive understanding of what have been the common patterns followed by new parties after their entrance into the party system, beyond the constraints due to the different national contexts.

In other words, unlike most studies employing a 'static' approach (Hug 2001; Tavits 2006), namely studying new parties' performances in their first election only, we follow Mustillo's dynamic approach (2009), by tracking their performances over a longer period of time (i.e., five elections). Indeed, it is only by studying party's behavior over several elections that we are able to distinguish the trajectories of, say, two parties that enter the system with a similar level of support, but take different paths afterwards: the first disappear in the following election, while the second becomes an important contender of the main established parties. This is why this article analyses new parties' performances and developmental trajectories in Western Europe through a novel theoretical and empirical approach, based on the latent trajectory models method (Nagin 2005; Jones and Nagin 2012). This approach was originally designed to be applied outside political science, in the fields of criminology and psychology. Mustillo (2009) used this method to find the electoral patterns followed by new parties in Latin America, but so far such dynamic approach has never found application in Western Europe. This paper aims at filling this gap.

The paper is organized as follows: following this introduction, section two outlines our choices related to the operationalization of GNPs, time and space of data collection, and presents the first empirical pieces of evidence about the emergence of GNPs and their fortunes across countries, time, and party families; the third section introduces the latent trajectory model, while the fourth one presents the empirical analysis and the results, by offering an original classification of GNPs in Western Europe according to the trajectories they tend to follow after their emergence in the party system. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss the main findings of the article and their implications. The paper focusses on party performances on the electoral arena; a short comparison to the parliamentary arena is included in Appendix A.

2. Genuinely new parties in Western Europe: data and evidence

We have collected comprehensive data on GNPs in all parliamentary elections (Lower House) in 20 West European countries held from World War II to 2018 (full list in Table A1 in Appendix).[2] In order to be included in our analysis, a party should have obtained 1% of the vote share at least once, starting from the third post-WWII or democratic election in each country. The choice to count new parties starting from the third post-WWII election is due to take into account changes occurring after the initial institutionalization of the party system, with the two post-WWII elections taken as a reference of the status quo at the beginning of the democratic period[3]. As regards the threshold of inclusion, it allows us to exclude marginal actors and consider only parties that at least in some moments of their history have been relevant for the respective party system. This operationalization led us to detect 127 GNPs emerged in 20 Western European countries since World War II.

Some countries (Denmark, Portugal and Norway) have experienced only a limited number of new parties, while others, like Greece, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, where innovation in the party system is much more frequent there have been more (Emanuele and Chiaramonte 2016)[4]. In terms of temporal variation, the first result we obtain is that the 'fundamental bias towards stability' detected almost 30 years ago by Bartolini and Mair (1990, 68) appears confirmed until the end of the 1970s; since the 1980s the number of new parties significantly increases, up to the last decade characterized by a major shift towards electoral instability (Hérnandez and Kriesi 2016; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017; Dassonneville and Hooghe 2017). Indeed, since 2010 30 GNPs have emerged, more than in 1945-1979. Many of them have been particularly successful, like the French La Republique en Marche (LaREM), Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Spanish Podemos and Ciudadanos (Gougou and Persico 2017; Decker 2016; Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Orriols and Cordero 2016)[5].

Data on party performance confirm the bias towards stability and clearly show that the creation of a successful new party is a rare event in the history of Western Europe: the average electoral support for GNPs, by taking into account all the elections they contest (603 party-election observations), is 4.9%, with an increase to 6.2% since 2010. If we consider only the first election they contest, their average support is even lower especially if we consider all elections and not just the ones in which a GNP is present (1.4% see Table A2 in Appendix). Once again, we note a massive upsurge in the last decade (3.6%). While Iceland and Belgium show the highest number of GNPs, they are on average weaker than in other countries, such as Spain and France, where a smaller number of much more successful parties has appeared . Consistently

[2] The last election considered is the Italian parliamentary election of March 4 2018. The total number of elections included is 344.

[3] The empirical observation carried out by Morlino in Southern Europe (1998) confirms that party systems tend to stabilize over a period of three elections after the (re-)establishment of the democratic regime. Note that for those southern European countries where democracy comes back in the 1970s (Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain), our analysis starts from the third democratic election.

[4] Furthermore, in Malta no genuinely new party has ever emerged, which means that the party's landscape is virtually unchanged compared to the first post-WWII elections.

[5] For an alternative visualization of the same data, see Figure A1 in the Appendix.

with the analysis performed by Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2016), Italy emerges as the country where new parties have exerted the largest impact, particularly in the last decade where they obtain, on average, a resounding 17.5% of the vote share. The analysis of the electoral performances confirm that the wave of new parties emerging in the 2010s is by far the most successful one, with six countries showing a record-high vote share for GNPs (Austria, Germany, Italy, France, Spain and Greece; see also Figures A2 and A3 in the Appendix), – even higher than the wave in 1980s that has received much scholarly attention.

Figure 1 and 2. Aggregate vote share for GNPs in each election since 1945 (left) and average support of GNPs since 1945 (right).



As Figure 1 and 2 show, support for genuinely new parties has generally been limited. Out of the 344 elections under study, only 98 saw genuinely new parties breaking through and their (combined) support was at least 3 percent in 41 cases. Only 10 elections registered overall support at least 10 percent. However, we can detect a noticeable trend in the overall frequency of breakthroughs and overall support for genuinely new parties over time, particularly since the turn of the century. Roughly a quarter of elections in our dataset took place since 2000 but these account for more than a third of genuinely new party breakthroughs and five out of the nine (56%) elections with genuinely new parties winning a considerable share of votes (more than 10 percent). As shown by the trend line on Figure 2, the average support for genuinely new parties has more than doubled since 2000 from about 1.5 to about 4 percent.

Figure 3 and 4. Vote share for GNPs in their first election (left) and second election (right) since 1945.



When looking at individual genuinely new parties (elections without them excluded), we see limited change in initial and second election popularity over time. However, we see again an uptick in the most recent years that is interestingly more noticeable in their vote shares in their second election. In other words, in recent years, genuinely new parties seem to be doing better and particularly in terms of extending their success beyond their first election.

Table 3. GNPs across party families.

		Vote % in first election		Mean vote % in all elections	
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
Green/Ecologist	26	3.1	4.8	4.8	5.6
Special issue	26	2.0	1.2	1.8	1.0
Right-wing	21	4.1	3.9	4.8	3.7
Liberal	16	6.5	7.3	6.3	6.7
Communist/Socialist	11	3.8	5.8	4.6	5.9
Conservative	11	5.0	6.3	5.9	7.6
Social democracy	7	4.8	6.3	4.1	3.5
Agrarian	4	1.5	0.5	3.4	3.6
Christian democracy	2	1.9	0.1	3.3	1.3

Source: Authors' elaboration based on www.parlgov.org.
Note: three parties (Free Citizen Movement in Cyprus; New Force in Iceland; Independents for Change in Ireland) are not coded with a specific family in the ParlGov party dataset.

Table 3 presents the distribution of GNPs across party families according to the ParlGov classification[6]. Despite the dispersion of cases across families, three families contain more than half of the sample. The first of these are the single-issue parties (Independents, Pirates, Pensioners, Military conscripts, Animalists, and Feminists) but includes also some ethno-regionalist parties for which ParlGov do not provide a specific category (like the Catalan, Canarian and Galician regionalist parties). The other two groups are, not surprisingly, the two main families of new parties emerged in Western Europe since the 1980s, the Greens (Poguntke 1987; Müller Rommel 1989) and the radical right (Kitschelt 1995; Ignazi 2003). However, in terms of electoral success, green and special issue GNPs pale compared to the rarer liberal, conservative and social-democratic parties. Hence, the most successful new parties are *mainstream* ones – this is surprising given the usual emphasis scholars put on the challenge new parties pose on the established ones by politicizing new issues, values and interests.

3. The latent trajectory model

Beyond examining the success of genuinely new parties in Western European countries, the goal of this paper is to find a generalizable method to model the trajectories of their performances and classifying some qualitatively distinct patterns that parties tend to follow after their entry into the party system. To do this, we rely on the latent (or group-based) trajectory model (Nagin 2005; Jones and Nagin 2012, Proust-Lima, Philipps and Liquet 2017). The group-based approach for modelling developmental trajectories provide – as reported by Jones and Nagin – 'a flexible and easily applied method for identifying distinctive clusters of individual trajectories within the population and for profiling the characteristics of individuals within the clusters' (2012, 1). As anticipated before, 'latent trajectory models were first developed for application in the fields of criminology and psychology to analyze distinctive trajectories of human behavior, such as criminal recidivism and childhood delinquency' (Mustillo 2009, 319). Mustillo (2009) has applied this method to model new parties' trajectories in Latin America. Latent trajectory models identify qualitatively distinct groups of trajectories within a population.

For our purposes, this method estimates a number of discrete groups of parties, each having a distinct trajectory with specific functional form and its own population prevalence[7]. In other words, parties can be qualitatively distinct into a certain number of groups. Parties within each

[6] The ParlGov dataset is a widely-used source of information regarding party families (Abou-Chadi 2016; König, Marbach, and Osnabrügge 2013). Nevertheless, we cannot help but notice the presence of some questionable choices, like those concerning, for instance, the Finnish True Finns, included in the Agrarian family and the Italian M5S, included in the Green family. These choices are due to the origins of the two parties but they do not adequately reflect neither the actual ideological platform nor the group membership in the European Parliament of such parties.

[7] As argued by Mustillo (2009), a latent trajectory model is particularly appropriate in two cases: 1) when the developmental trajectories found within the population are expected to have different functional forms (zero-order constant trajectories, first-order linear trajectories, second-order quadratic trajectories, etc.); 2) when the various individual trajectories do not vary regularly within the population (some are monotonically increasing, whereas others are monotonically decreasing while still others are not monotonic). 'In the study of new political parties, theory suggests that both circumstances apply' (2009, 319).

group follow similar trajectories across time. For example, in the electoral arena, some parties representing a specific societal group (i.e., ethno-regionalist parties) may enter with a small share of votes and may be able to maintain such support relatively constant in the long run. In this circumstance, the intercept (corresponding to the share of votes with which these parties enter in the system) will be sufficient to summarize their future behavior properly. Of course, many other different cases may occur: two parties may enter the system with a relatively similar share of votes, but follow very different trajectory afterwards. For instance, one party rapidly disappears, while the other one continuously increases its vote share and eventually challenges the main established parties. In these circumstances, the first party will show a positive slope, while the second a negative one.

Unlike Mustillo (2009), we believe that a linear function – with or without quadratic terms – is not the best way to assess parties' trajectories over time. Linear functions without quadratic terms can result in trajectories with a constant level of support or one that is increasing or decreasing at a constant rate (Figure 5). Only the first of these is entirely realistic – a party appears and maintains its support. Increasing support at a constant rate is less realistic as we would expect a new party to reach its potential peak level of support at one point, rather than keep growing in eternity (that is obviously impossible with parties at high initial levels of support or those that grow at a high rate and would reach 100% quickly). Constantly decreasing rate of support is even more problematic – even if a party has high initial level of support, such a trajectory is likely to predict support dropping to the zone of impossibility (under 0%).

Allowing the latent trajectories to take quadratic forms only provides a partial cure (Figure 6). It does allow for curvilinear growth trajectories as well as fall and rise of parties, but imposes (a perfect) symmetry around peak support. This means that once a party reaches its peak, its support must decrease mirroring the trajectory of its rise. This is not only unrealistic, but is also likely to take the parties into the impossibility zone. Initially decreasing trajectories that follow a convex curve are perhaps even more problematic leading to the expectation that after a party's support has bottomed at zero, it will miraculously raise from ashes, following a trajectory that mirrors its descent.

Figure 5 and 6. Linear trajectories (left) and quadratic trajectories (right).



This is why we have opted for a beta link function estimation implemented in the *lcmm* package in R (Proust-Lima, Philipps and Liquet 2017).[8] Compared to the linear function, the beta link function is at the same time more flexible and meaningful. It is flexible in that it allows parties to follow their own trajectory without being too rigid in the specification of the order of the functional form (i.e., zero-order, first-order, second-order, and so on). At the same time, the linear function has no upper or lower limits, and it follows that parties are expected to take very unreasonable or merely impossible trajectories (i.e., falling below 0 or showing eternal exponential growth). Conversely, the beta link function is constrained by the presence of a lower and an upper boundary: it assumes a trajectory between zero and vote maximum amongst all parties in the five elections included. Hence, parties cannot fall below 0 by definition here (i.e., they cannot take less than 0 votes). As a result, trajectories are more realistic and meaningful than in the linear function.

From a methodological viewpoint, the modelling procedure takes place in four steps.

The first consists in the estimation of the 'shape parameters' for alternative specifications on the number of groups. It is an inductive method, where the researcher addresses the question of how many qualitatively-distinct groups (i.e., groups characterized by parties showing different trajectories) should be considered.

The second step consists in the estimation, for each specification, of the 'population prevalence', namely of the prevalent trajectory group in the population, given the sample. In other words, the researcher assesses, for each estimated model, how many parties fall into each estimated group.

The third step is the comparison of the models following from the original alternative specifications, and the choice of the best model. This step should follow both theory-driven expectations about the number of group and their trajectories and method-driven ones (i.e., statistical criteria like the Bayesian information criterion, BIC).

Finally, in the last step, the estimates of the best model are used to compute group membership probabilities ('posterior probabilities') for each of the parties in the data set. The posterior probability indicates the probability that a given party is a member of a given group and allows to predict the future performance of relatively recent genuinely new parties. This information is particularly important especially for recently-emerged parties, which may be difficult to classify. This is because for those parties we do not observe the full trajectory across five elections, but, say, only the first or the first two elections. In these cases, it may be too early to assign a party to a given group simply because we do not know its subsequent behavior. Take for instance the case Emmanuel Macron's party, *La République en Marche* (LaREM) in France (28.2% in 2017). We have just one observation, and we cannot estimate its future behavior and know whether in the next election it will retain its support, increase its past share, decline, or even

[8] The class-specific trajectories are modelled through a general linear model using a link function on the dependent variable (vote share). The 'beta' link function is the rescaled cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a Beta distribution. Simply put, it ensures that all trajectories are constrained between zero and the maximum vote share of genuinely new parties. See Proust-Lima, Philipps and Liquet (2017) for full details of the models, estimation and *lcmm* package in R.

disappear. The model provides a posterior probability based – in this case – upon the only relevant available information, its vote share in the first election. However, a more accurate determination of the group membership will be possible only by observing the performance of the party in (at least) another election. While uncertainty related to those cases of incomplete trajectories is an obvious (and justifiable) consequence of the model estimation[9], great uncertainty for parties with complete trajectories would be an indication of a bad fit of the model. Conversely, a model with a good fit is one that 'places most or all parties solidly in one group or another with a high probability' (Mustillo 2009, 321).

4. Analysis and results

Sample and methodological choices

Following the abovementioned criteria (selection of GNPs reaching 1% of the vote share in the Lower House at least once since the third democratic election of the respective country), we have tracked the electoral performances of our 127 GNPs in the first five elections since they reach the 1% threshold for the first time (i.e., when they become relevant according to our criteria).

The choice to limit the analysis to the first five electoral cycles is of course somewhat arbitrary, but it relies on Mustillo's argument that 'the early years of a party's life are developmentally distinctive from its mature years. The farther in time that we go from birth, the more the result will incorporate elements of a party's life that are unrelated to early developmental characteristics' (2009, 323). We believe that five elections are a sufficient time to observe the development of a new party, but such period is also not yet as long as to incorporate elements of a party's life that are unrelated to early developmental characteristics. Moreover, for the purpose of the current analysis, chronological time (i.e., whether a party was born in 1946 or 2010) is not important for estimating the party's performance trajectory over its lifetime. Only its lifecycle matters, regardless of the period in which it occurred.[10]

Therefore, the dataset is composed of 385 party-election vote percentage observations (on average, 3.03 observations per party). Yet, in order to produce correct estimates, we need to distinguish parties that die or cease to compete from parties that merge with larger established parties or from parties for which some observations lack just because they have emerged only in very recent years. Otherwise, as argued by Mustillo (2009), a party that die or cease to compete will appear healthier than it actually is. This is why for parties that die or cease to compete we have added a zero vote percentage in the elections following the last election in which they compete. This specification will provide a more reliable trajectory of their true

[9] Furthermore, note that this outcome will be more likely in the case of models yielding two or more groups with similar intercepts.

[10] Consequently, the five elections, or election cycles taken under consideration for a given party, represent the 'age' of that party. For instance, an Italian party emerged above 1% for the first time in 1994 will be 1 cycle old in 1994, 2 in 1996, 3 in 2001 and so forth.

lifecycle. Once accounting for party death, the final party-election vote percentage observations increase to 529 (4.17 per party).

We estimated multiple models with alternative specifications on the number of latent classes, namely the party groups (from one to six). The purpose was to obtain the model with the best goodness of fit. By moving from one to five groups, improved fits (i.e., lower BIC) were obtained but allowing for a sixth group the statistics related to goodness of fit decrease. Therefore, the estimation of the shape parameters supports the five-group model as the best fitting[11].

The five-group latent trajectory model in Western Europe

The result of the latent trajectory model is plotted in Figure 7, while the statistical outputs are reported in Table 4. The analysis provides some different results compared to Mustillo's study based on Latin American parties (2009). The differences concern not only the trajectories followed by each group but especially the population prevalence within each group[12]. Such differences are an expected finding, given the distinct nature of the party systems in the two regions and their level of institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Sanchez 2009; Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2017).

[11] The analyses have been performed by using the latent class mixed model (command: lcmm in R). For the sake of reliability, we have also replicated the analyses through the linear link function and the spline link function. Although similar in terms of empirical results (i.e., the five groups show almost identical trajectories), these models provide a higher BIC (2702.24 v. 1857.84), a higher number of parameters (20 vs. 17) and a less even distribution of cases among classes compared to the model using the beta link function with five latent classes. Furthermore, we have also rerun the beta link function on a sample including also the early elections of genuinely new parties, namely those elections where such parties ran before getting the 1% threshold for the first time (22 parties for a total of 47 observations, like, for instance, the French National Front in 1978 and 1981). The results are substantially similar to those reported in Figure 1, and this is a further confirmation that the five-class model is the best estimation to track the performance of genuinely new parties over time and such result is not affected by a selection bias due to the 1% threshold of inclusion. All these results are available upon authors' requests.

[12] In Mustillo's study (2009), among 299 new parties and 758 party-year vote percentage observations, almost the 90% of the cases belong to the 'flop' category, while the remaining parties are divided between 'flat', 'contender', 'explosive', and 'flash'. This latter is analogous to the 'meteoric' type found in our analysis. It consists of parties characterized by a good level of entry (about 12%) and a subsequent sharp decline until death.

Figure 7. GNPs trajectories in Western Europe.



The first trajectory group outlined by the model involves the so-called 'explosive' parties: their entry results in an electoral earthquake and a following restructuring of the party system. Parties in this category are strong from the very beginning, and they further improve their performances in subsequent elections. As expected given the nature of party politics in the region, such parties represent a minority in Western European politics. As reported in Table 5, which lists the parties falling into each group, the model detects only 14 explosive parties (11% of the sample) either showing these features – the French Gaullist party[13] and *Forza Italia* – or having the potential to develop such trajectories, like the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Spanish *Podemos*[14]). Interestingly enough, in spite of the relevant variation in terms of party families (Table A4 in the Appendix), many parties of this group seems to belong to the recently theorized 'anti-establishment reform parties', namely a group combining 'mainstream ideology on economic and socio-cultural issues with fierce anti-establishment rhetoric and demands for

[13] The French Gaullist party emerged as Gaullist Union in 1946 and subsequently changed many times its official name (see Nohlen and Stover 2010). For the sake of simplicity, we refer to it with the generic label of 'Gaullist Party'.

[14] The estimates produced by the model consider both the Five Star Movement and *Podemos* as explosive parties given their very high level of entry in the first election and their improvement in the second election (respectively, 25.6% and 32.7% for the M5S and 20.8% and 21.3% for *Podemos*). While it is likely to be an accurate estimate given the quick institutionalization experienced by both parties, only their subsequent performances will tell us if this is the correct choice.

political reform, transparency and new ways of 'doing politics''. (Hanley and Sikk 2016, 522). A careful look at the explosive group reveals that parties like the LaREM, the M5S and *Ciudadanos* certainly fit this definition (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Lavezzolo and Ramiro 2018). In addition, also the Gaullist Party and Forza Italia, before becoming mainstream conservative parties, entered the electoral game with strong anti-establishment rhetoric.

The second group is represented by only two parties showing an idiosyncratic trajectory compared to the rest of the sample and therefore resulting in a separate latent class from the model. The Pim Fortuyn List (LPM) in the Netherlands and the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) in Portugal are two 'meteoric' parties (Taagepera 2006). They are characterized by a strong electoral performance in their first election (17.7% on average), even higher than that of the explosive group. This is also witnessed by the positive value of the intercept shown in Table 4, where the class of reference is the explosive group. After this outstanding entry, such parties dramatically decline in the following couple of elections and then disappear. Our analysis reveals that the usual behavior for parties entering the system with such a remarkable vote share is a subsequent consolidation as one of the main actors of the respective party system (like parties in the explosive group usually do). Conversely, the trajectory of the meteoric group soon departs from that of the explosive group (the confidence intervals of the two groups overlap only in the first election) and join that of the flop group.

Table 4. Five-group model of new party electoral performance (latent trajectory model; parties N=127; panel N= 529).

Group	Population prevalence	Shape parameters			
		Intercept	se	b	se
Explosive	11.02%	(class of reference)		0.06	0.13
Meteoric	1.57%	1.00	1.04	-1.54***	0.28
Contender	20.47%	-3.08***	0.45	0.47***	0.08
Flat	13.39%	-2.69***	0.54	-0.11	0.11
Flop	53.54%	-2.78***	0.44	-0.73***	0.05
Maximum log- likelihood		-887.74			
AIC		1809.49			
BIC		1857.84			
N of latent classes		5			
N of parameters		17			
N of parties		127			
N of observations		529			

Note: General latent class mixed model with beta link function. †Significant at 0.1 level; *Significant at 0.05 level; **Significant at 0.01 level; ***Significant at 0.001 level.

This latter is the most populated class, including more than half of the sample (53.5%). It consists of parties entering with a modest vote share (2.4% on average) and then rapidly declining until their disappearance, which usually occurs after the second or the third election (as shown by their negative coefficient, significant at the 0.001 level). In other words, these

parties move from humble beginnings to obscurity, and this is the most common fate for genuinely new parties that have emerged in the Western European context since World War II. This finding also confirms that political entrepreneurs act in a context of bounded rationality (Simon 1957) since many new parties should not be formed at all under full information concerning the surrounding electoral setting, the institutional constraints and so on (Hug 2001).

Despite a similar electoral performance in the first election, a different trajectory is outlined by the group called 'flat'. It includes all those parties that follow a fairly constant trajectory over time after their entry into the party system. As reported in Table 5, the flat group involves 17 genuinely new parties. These parties are usually small (their average vote share is 2%) but they are able to retain their 'niche' support over time. Green parties are the typical member of the flat group, where we find also other niche parties (Meguid 2005) such as the Dutch Party for the Animals, or ethno-regionalist parties (De Winter and Türsan 1998) such as the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and the Scottish National Party (SNP).

Table 5. Party classification using posterior probabilities, by country.

	Trajectory				
Country	Explosive	Meteoric	Contender	Flat	Flop
Austria			Green Alternative		Team Stronach
Belgium			VU; RW; FDF; Agalev; Ecolo	National Front	Rossem
Cyprus			New Horizons; ELAM	Mov. of Ecologists	Free Citizens Movement
Denmark	Progress Party		Christian People's Party		The Greens
Finland			VIHR; True Finns		Young Finns
France	Gaullist P; FN; LaREM			Greens	Poujade List
Germany	AfD		B90/Gru; PDS|Li		Pirate Party
Greece	Golden Dawn		The River	Ecologist Greens	Recreate Greece
Iceland	Women's List; Pirate P		People's Party		Citizens' Movement
Ireland			SF II; Green Party		Sinn Féin
Italy	FI; LN; M5S			Radical P; Greens; IdV	Civic Choice
Luxembourg	ADR		Green Alternative Party		Popular Indep. Mov.
Netherlands		List Pim Fortuyn	Socialist Party; D66	Bp; PvdD	General Elederly Alliance
Norway			Progress Party; Green Party		Coastal Party
Portugal		PRD			National Solidarity Party
Spain	*Podemos*; *Ciudadanos*			ERC	Galician Nationalist Bloc
Sweden			SD; MP	Christian Democrats	New Democracy
Switzerland			Swiss Green Party	NA; FGr; FPS; POCH	
UK			UKIP	SNP; Green Party	Referendum Party

Note: For the sake of readability, in the case of the flop category, only the party with the largest vote share in the first election is reported for each country. The complete list of parties with full party names is reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.

Overall, the fact that the most populated group is that of the flop parties is a significant finding. It reveals, on the one side, that this analysis produces consistent results with other studies

using different techniques of investigation (first and foremost, Bartolini and Mair 1990)[15]. On the other side, this finding tell us that notwithstanding the recent increase in the number of new parties and the unquestionable wave of electoral instability (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2016; Hérnandez and Kriesi 2016; Hobolt and Tilley 2016), the fundamental feature of Western European politics across more than 70 years of democratic elections is still the persistence of stability. More than 2 out of 3 genuinely new parties emerged in Western Europe after 1945 have not succeeded to significantly alter the respective party system since they have either rapidly disappeared (the flop parties) or survived but maintaining only a small niche of supporters (the flat parties).

Finally, the last group emerging from the analysis consists of those parties entering with a meager vote share but subsequently being able to increase their votes and institutionalize in such a way to become a 'contender' of the established parties. They represent roughly one-fifth of the population. Here, as reported by Table 5, there are many 'populist radical right parties' (Mudde 2014) such as the Belgian People's Party (VU), the True Finns, the Norwegian Progress Party, the Sweden Democrats and the UKIP. Moreover, different cases also emerge, such as the post-materialist Dutch D66 or the radical leftist PDS-Linke in Germany and the Socialist Party in the Netherlands. This latter shows the prototypical trajectory of this category: it enters with 1.3% of the votes in 1994 and then continuously increases at each election, and eventually reaches the 16.6% of the votes in its fifth election (2006). Furthermore, this group contains also 10 particularly successful green parties (like the Austrian, the German, and the Swedish ones) that have clearly separated their experience from the rest of the family, whose representatives mostly fall in the flat and flop group[16].

The five-group latent trajectory model after five elections

So far, the analysis has focused on the trajectories followed by genuinely new parties in the first five elections after their emergence in the respective party system. But what occurs afterwards? Do five elections are a good proxy to capture the party's future development, as hypothesized at the beginning of this section?

Figure 8. GNPs trajectories in Western Europe including also the period following the fifth election.

[15] This represents a good indicator of the external validity of our analysis (Drost 2011). Moreover, for the sake of internal validity, posterior probabilities confirms the good fit of the model on our data. After excluding the 26 parties that have not completed their five-election cycle yet – for which the higher level of uncertainty concerning their classification is an obvious consequence of the model estimation – there are only 11 parties that the model assigns to one group with less than 90% confidence (the full list of parties and the related posterior probabilities are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix). See also Figure A4 in the Appendix for parties' individual trajectories within each class.

[16] According to the ParlGov party dataset, 13 Green parties fall, respectively, in the flat (six) and flop (seven) groups (see Table A4 in the Appendix).



Figure 8 addresses this question by plotting the trajectories of each group also after the first five elections. This addition involves 35 parties for a total of 169 observations. It can be noticed that the support for parties that lasted five elections remains remarkably stable afterwards, although there are significant fluctuations among individual parties. Meteoric and flop parties disappear before the fifth election[17], while parties in the other three classes maintain support at election 10, 15, and beyond. In particular, the explosive group actually becomes even more dominant in later periods. Given that most of its components are parties emerged only in the very last years, this increasing trend over time is due to two couples of parties that today represent – albeit with different nuances – the conservative front of the respective countries: the Gaullist Party and the National Front in France; Forza Italia and the Northern League in Italy[18]. The contender group is more or less steady on the same electoral levels reached at election five. It is worth notice that out of the 26 parties belonging to such group only three are no longer contesting elections nowadays, while the other 23 are still competing with almost 10% of the vote share, on average. Given the meager support they had at the time of their entry, this is an interesting result, as such group appear as clearly deviating from the main pattern characterizing parties with such a low entry performance. Indeed, in most cases, such parties are doomed to demise (i.e., the flop group) or to stay alive, but with just niche support (i.e, the flat group). In fact, the flat group shows an increasing trend over time after the fifth

[17] The only exception is the Italian Pensioners' Party, who did not contest the 1994 and 1996 election, and then re-emerged at the beginning of the 2000s.

[18] The only other party of this group that contested more than five elections was the Danish Progress Party, that progressively demised in the late 1990s, being replaced by its splinter, the Danish People's Party (see Sikk and Koker 2017).

election, and this brings them to approach the contender group around election 15 (the confidence intervals of the two groups overlap). This strengthening over time is mainly determined by a bunch of parties that are able to go beyond their initial niche support, like the Swedish Christian Democrats (11.8% in 1998, namely in their twelfth election), and to, a lesser extent, the French Greens and the Scottish National Party.

5. Conclusion

Genuinely new parties in Western Europe are an increasingly common and important phenomenon. In this paper, we show that recently, we have been witnessing a surge in their electoral support. The surge seems to be particularly pronounced in terms of new parties' longer-term performance – in other words, in the last decade new parties have not only become more popular but they have also become more likely to change their party systems. This begs the question what will be their longer-term impact.

In this paper, we go beyond the dichotomy of new party survival/failure and study genuinely new party performance over their first five elections (following Mustillo 2009). We distinguished five performance trajectories. Most commonly, the parties 'flop' – they are weak from the beginning and then dissipate. At the other end of the success spectrum are the 'explosive' parties that enter with fanfare and leave a permanent footprint on their countries' party systems, sometimes even strengthening over time. Notably, 'meteoric' parties – that are very successful only very briefly and then burn out – have been less common than the 'explosive' ones. Two other types of parties have broken through and (mostly) remained important party political players. Parties that follow 'flat' and 'contender' trajectories make a shy entry in their maiden election – seldom reaching even five percent of the vote. However, both groups of parties then stay around – 'contenders' generally increase their support over the first five elections (and possibly beyond) while parties following a 'flat' trajectory het alover around their initial level of support. Notably, 'contenders' are not only more common than 'flat' parties, but they are also more likely to survive over the longer term.

We make use of methodological developments since Mustillo's first use of latent trajectory modelling in the study of political parties. The implementation in R of latent class mixed models (LCMM) allowed us to model trajectories in a way that does not violate common sense assumptions about the functional forms of the trajectories (particularly the lower limit of 0 on vote shares) and also allows for more efficient estimation. This method could be useful for other political scientists in future research. Our own plans include utilizing LCMM for the comparison of the Western European trajectories analysed here to those in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America that will yield new insights about party development in these regions but the differences could also shed light on fundamental reasons why parties follow certain trajectories rather than others. This opens up new possibilities in the study of *determinants* of new party success, disappearance and performance such as using more advanced LCMM-related models that involve covariates of trajectory 'choice' and modelling survival by classes (Proust-Lima Philipps and Liquet 2017).

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Appendix A: The Parliamentary arena

To achieve a full understanding of the trajectories experienced by genuinely new parties in Western Europe we also need to take into account the parliamentary and the governmental arena. It is only by reaching the 'threshold of representation', and, even more, the 'threshold of executive power' (Rokkan 1970) that new parties can influence the policy-making and hold offices (Tavits 2006), namely realize their ultimate goal (Duverger 1954; Sartori 1976). Moreover, the entry into the Parliament will allow new parties to access state resources and gain other benefits, like a higher visibility on the media. All these elements will help their organization to survive and persist over time (Dinas, Riera, and Roussias 2015). Hence, we expect that parties gaining access to the parliamentary arena at least once in the early phases of their development are less likely to disappear before the end of their five-election cycle.

Given the lower number of cases compared to the electoral arena (243 party-legislature observations[19]), the latent trajectory model is not appropriate. The best way to assess the parliamentary trajectories of the previously detected five groups is to simply plot the mean parliamentary performances in comparison with the electoral ones (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Electoral and parliamentary performances of the five groups of GNPs.



Note: vote % in black, seat % in grey.

[19] This total represents the sum of the party-legislature observations for GNPs in the first five legislatures since they get 1% of the vote share for the first time.

The parliamentary trajectories are remarkably similar to the electoral ones for each group. As expected given the presence of thresholds for parliamentary representation in most Western European electoral systems, the explosive group shows an over-representation in Parliament (i.e., the share of seats is higher than the share of votes), particularly since election three, due to their high electoral support. All the other groups display an opposite situation, with a slight under-representation in Parliament[20]. As far as the role of electoral system is concerned, it is interesting to notice how in some countries the electoral barriers prevent parties (even important ones) from gaining representation, thus affecting their chances to survive in the long run and altering the format and the mechanics of party competition. For instance, despite belonging to the 'explosive' group, the French National Front is excluded from Parliament both in election three and five (1993 and 2002). Notwithstanding its relevant electoral performance (12.7% and 11.1% respectively), the majority formula prevented it from winning seats in the National Assembly. However, also formally PR formulas can produce remarkable disproportional effects thanks to the presence of high explicit thresholds. Here, the case of the German AfD strikingly emerges. The party belongs to the explosive group in our model, but in 2013 it was excluded from Parliament as it was unable to pass the 5% threshold. Conversely, in other contexts, parliamentary representation maybe granted to very small parties, for two different reasons: a strong regional or local support, as it usually occurs to the Spanish regionalist parties and, more rarely, to UK small parties that are able to win a plurality (like the Green Party since 2010); or the presence of a pure PR system, allowing representation to parties with 1% of the vote share or less, like Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy until 1994.

[20] In fact, the flop group shows a slight over-representation in elections 3 and 4 (0.8% in both legislatures compared to a vote share of 0.6 and 0.5% respectively), but this is because of the large difference in the number of cases involved: in the electoral arena, the flop group counts 15 cases in election 3 and 11 in election 4, while there are just three flop parties obtaining seats in these elections. In other words, the seemingly higher average in the parliamentary arena is due to the fact that only the few survivor parties contribute to that average.

Appendix B: Additional figures and tables

Figure A1. GNPs across countries and decades.



Figure A2. Mean share of votes for GNPs in their first election by decade and country.



Note: The gray line shows the average for all countries.

Figure A3. Mean share of votes for GNPs in their first election in each country, by decade.



Figure A4. Parties' individual trajectories within the 5 latent classes.



Table A1. GNPs across countries and decades.

Country	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	Total
Iceland				1	3		3	5	12
Belgium		1	2		3	3		1	10
Italy				2	2	2	1	3	10
Netherlands			2	1		3	3	1	10
France	1	1		2	1	1	2	1	9
Luxembourg		1	1	2	3			2	9
Germany					1	3	1	2	7
Spain					1		4	3	8
Finland					2	4			6
Ireland		1			3	1		1	6
Austria					2	2		1	5
Cyprus						2	1	2	5
Greece							1	4	5
Sweden			1		1	1	1	1	5
Switzerland				2	3				5
United Kingdom				1		1	2	1	5
Norway				1		1	1	1	4
Denmark				2	1				3
Portugal					1	1		1	3
Malta									0
Total	1	4	6	14	27	25	20	30	127

Table A2. Mean share of votes for GNPs (in their first election) by decade and country.

Country	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	Mean vote
Italy		0.0	0.0	0.9	2.0	9.9	1.3	17.5	4.4
Spain					0.4	0.0	2.1	12.0	3.9
France	3.0	3.9	0.0	1.9	3.3	1.9	1.5	14.1	3.5
Luxembourg		0.8	2.9	3.3	7.2	0.0	0.0	4.4	2.4
Netherlands		0.0	3.3	0.5	0.0	3.7	6.8	0.6	1.9
Iceland		0.0	0.0	0.5	4.2	0.0	3.8	4.0	1.7
Portugal				0.0	4.6	0.6	0.0	0.6	1.6
Greece					0.0	0.0	0.3	4.3	1.2
Belgium		0.7	1.4	0.0	2.2	2.1	0.0	0.7	1.0
Germany		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	1.6	0.7	2.9	0.8
Cyprus					0.0	1.4	0.6	1.2	0.8
Denmark		0.0	0.0	3.6	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8
Sweden		0.0	0.6	0.0	0.6	2.3	0.7	1.6	0.7
Ireland		1.8	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.6	0.0	0.8	0.7
Norway		0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.5	0.6	1.4	0.6
Switzerland		0.0	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
Austria		0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.5	0.0	2.9	0.6
Finland		0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
United Kingdom		0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.3	1.3	0.6	0.5
Malta		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	3.0	0.5	0.5	0.9	1.5	1.5	1.1	3.6	1.4

Table A3. Posterior probabilities for the 127 genuinely new parties included in the analysis.

Country	Party	Maximum posterior probability	Posterior probability for each group				
			Explosive	Meteoric	Contender	Flat	Flop
Denmark	Progress Party	Explosive	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
France	National Front	Explosive	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Italy	Five Star Movement	Explosive	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Italy	Forza Italia	Explosive	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Spain	Podemos	Explosive	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Luxembourg	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	Explosive	1.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
France	Gaullist Union	Explosive	0.99	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
Spain	Citizens	Explosive	0.99	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Iceland	Pirate Party	Explosive	0.98	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00
France	En Marche	Explosive	0.92	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00
Germany	Alternative for Germany	Explosive	0.86	0.03	0.11	0.01	0.00
Italy	Northern League	Explosive	0.84	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.00
Iceland	Women's Union	Explosive	0.79	0.00	0.21	0.00	0.00
Greece	Golden Dawn	Explosive	0.71	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.00
Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn	Meteoric	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Portugal	Democratic Renewal Party	Meteoric	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Belgium	Christian Flemish People's Union	Contender	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Finland	Green League	Contender	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Finland	True Finns	Contender	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Netherlands	Socialist Party	Contender	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Austria	Alternative List	Contender	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Germany	Party of Democratic Socialism/Linke	Contender	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Germany	The Greens	Contender	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Norway	Progress Party	Contender	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	Contender	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Switzerland	Federation of Swiss Green Party	Contender	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00
Belgium	Democratic Front of the Francophones	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.01	0.00
Cyprus	New Horizons	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.01	0.00
Belgium	Agalev	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.99	0.01	0.00
Sweden	The Green Party	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.96	0.04	0.00
Netherlands	Democrats 1966	Contender	0.05	0.00	0.95	0.00	0.00
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.92	0.08	0.00
Belgium	Ecolo	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.92	0.08	0.00
Ireland	Green Party	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.82	0.18	0.00
Denmark	Christian People's Party	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.81	0.19	0.00
Luxembourg	Green Alternative Party	Contender	0.20	0.00	0.81	0.00	0.00
Iceland	People's Party	Contender	0.12	0.05	0.71	0.12	0.00
Belgium	Wallon Rally	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.65	0.35	0.00
Norway	The Green Party	Contender	0.00	0.02	0.60	0.31	0.07
Ireland	Sinn Féin II	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.58	0.42	0.00
Cyprus	National Popular Front	Contender	0.00	0.00	0.55	0.31	0.14
Greece	The River	Contender	0.13	0.26	0.47	0.14	0.01
France	Ecologists	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Netherlands	Farmers' Party	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Sweden	Christian Democrats	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
United Kingdom	Scottish National Party	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Belgium	National Front	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.99	0.00
Italy	Radical Party	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.99	0.00
Spain	Republican Left of Catalonia	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.99	0.00
Greece	Ecologist Greens	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.96	0.01

Switzerland	National Action	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.94	0.00
Switzerland	Feminist and Green Alternative Group	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.94	0.06
Italy	Italy of Values	Flat	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.93	0.00
United Kingdom	Green Party	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.91	0.01
Switzerland	Swiss Motorists' Party	Flat	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.91	0.00
Italy	Green List	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.90	0.00
Switzerland	Progressive Organizations of Switzerland	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.90	0.10
Netherlands	Party for the Animals	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.78	0.00
Cyprus	Movement of Ecologists	Flat	0.00	0.00	0.34	0.66	0.00
Austria	No - Civic Action Group against the sale of Austria	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Austria	The Independents - Lugner's List	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Austria	United Greens	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Belgium	Democratic Union for the Respect of Labour	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Belgium	Rossem	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Belgium	Vivant	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Cyprus	Free Citizens Movement	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Finland	Alliance for Free Finland	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Finland	Pensioners' Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Finland	Reform Group	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Finland	Young Finns	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
France	Ecology Generation	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
France	Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Tradition	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
France	Revolutionary Communist League	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
France	Workers' Struggle	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Germany	German People's Union	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Iceland	Candidature Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Iceland	Household Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Iceland	Humanist Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Iceland	Iceland Democratic Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Iceland	Icelandic Movement - Living Country	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Iceland	National Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Iceland	New Force	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Iceland	Right-Green People's Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Ireland	Anti H-Block	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Ireland	National Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Italy	Pensioners' Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Luxembourg	Enrôlés de Force	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Luxembourg	Independent party of the Middle Class	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Luxembourg	Popular Independent Movement	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Netherlands	Centre Democrats	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Netherlands	General Elederly Alliance	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Netherlands	Livable Netherlands	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Netherlands	New Middle Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Norway	Coastal Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Portugal	National Solidarity Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Spain	Ruiz Mateos' Group	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
United Kingdom	British National Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
United Kingdom	Referendum Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Denmark	The Greens	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Iceland	Citizens' Movement	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Luxembourg	Independent Socialist Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00

Luxembourg	National Movement	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
France	Poujade List	Flop	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.99
Greece	Recreate Greece	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.99
Italy	Act to Stop the Decline	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.99
Norway	Pensioners' Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.99
Greece	Teleia	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.99
Spain	Canarian Coalition	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.98
Italy	Proletarian Democracy	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.97
Austria	Team Stronach	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.94
Spain	Galician Nationalist Bloc	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.93
Italy	Civic Choice	Flop	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.08	0.89
Sweden	New Democracy	Flop	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.87
Spain	Union for Progress and Democracy	Flop	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.13	0.86
Germany	Free Voters	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.11	0.85
Germany	Pirate Party	Flop	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.18	0.80
Ireland	Sinn Féin	Flop	0.00	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.71
Portugal	People-Animals-Nature	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.19	0.71
Cyprus	Animal Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.16	0.67
Germany	Alliance '90	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.16	0.67
Spain	Animalist Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.16	0.67
Belgium	People's Party	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.23	0.63
Ireland	Independents for Change	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.18	0.61
Luxembourg	Party for Full Democracy	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.21	0.18	0.61
Netherlands	Forum for Democracy	Flop	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.20	0.55
Luxembourg	Pirate Party Luxembourg	Flop	0.01	0.01	0.34	0.25	0.39
Sweden	Feminist Initiative	Flop	0.02	0.02	0.35	0.25	0.36

Note: all other parties classified with > 0.90 probability.

Table A4. Party groups and party families

Party family	Explosive	Meteoric	Contender	Flat	Flop	Total
Communist/Socialist	1		4	1	5	11
Social democracy		1	2	2	2	7
Green/Ecologist	2		10	6	7	25
Agrarian			1	1	2	4
Christian democracy			1	1		2
Liberal	3		2	1	10	16
Conservative	3				9	12
Right-wing	4	1	6	3	7	21
Special issue	1			2	23	26
Total	14	2	26	17	65	124

Source: Authors' elaboration based on www.parlgov.org.
Note: three parties (Free Citizen Movement in Cyprus; New Force in Iceland; Independents for Change in Ireland) are not coded with a specific family in the ParlGov party dataset.