

Rei publicae (in)felix est:

FELICITAS and the Romans' relationship with the divine.

Samuel Pierre Sigere

UCL

Thesis submitted for Ph.D. in the Department of History

I, Samuel Pierre Sigere confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

In memoriam avi mei Yves Auster (1931-2022)

Dedisti ut dem

Requiescas in pace

Abstract

This thesis examines the role of the divine quality FELICITAS in the political culture of the Late Roman Republic. Through a detailed examination of the way the divine quality is described in social and religious contexts, I argue that FELICITAS epitomises a series of symbolic relationships between the gods, a Roman general, and the Roman community to ensure the safety and the economic prosperity of the *res publica*. Those relationships allowed FELICITAS to work as ‘religious symbolic capital’ for Roman generals to obtain political and social advantages when the Roman people recognised and accepted their claim to be FELIX. Accepting or contesting the claim to the divine quality of a Roman general constitutes a new social role of the Roman people at the time with important political consequences.

Chapter One surveys the place of the word and concept of FELICITAS in the social discourse of the second and first century BCE by exploring both its shared meanings at the time (fertility, good fortune, success, and happiness) and two of the main social contexts in which it was used, ethics and religion. Throughout I argue that the concept was part of a shared Roman cultural heritage involving Romans from all social classes. Chapter Two explores how FELICITAS symbolises the relationship between the gods and the Romans to make the *res publica maior* and *amplior* through military victory, that is FELICITAS *Romana*. FELICITAS *Romana* found its clearest expression and enactment in two important Roman rituals, the *lustrum* and the triumph. I argue that Roman generals played a particular role in realising FELICITAS *Romana* as their connection with the divine in addition to their skills helped bring victory and prosperity to the Romans. Chapters Three, Four and Five examine in detail the ways Romans conceptualised the relationship between the gods and a Roman general, FELICITAS *imperatoria*, to bring about FELICITAS *Romana*. I argue that there were two different synchronous conceptions for FELICITAS *imperatoria*: one in which FELICITAS was a transient quality of the general emanating from the relationship of the Roman people with the divine, the other in which FELICITAS was a permanent quality of the general stemming from his

personal relationship with the divine. The latter conception became prevalent at the end of Late Roman Republic. Chapter Six investigates several examples of the acceptance and the contestation of the divine quality to highlight two points: how Roman generals used their FELICITAS *imperatoria* to gain social and political honours from the Roman community, and how the abuse of power from Sulla and Caesar led to a redefinition of the divine quality on philosophical grounds by members of the Roman elite to ensure that military leaders claiming to be FELIX acted in a way that secured the wellbeing of the *res publica*.

Impact Statement

By exploring the meaning of FELICITAS (broadly translatable in English as success/good luck/happiness) and its uses by various actors in Roman society in their social and political discourses, this thesis aims to contribute to two on-going debates: the first about the role of Roman people in the fall of the Roman Republic and the second one about the meaning of happiness, success and luck in our modern society.

By demonstrating that the Roman people were active agents in the erosion of the power-sharing system between members of the Roman elite through the grant of more political powers to elite members claiming to be FELIX, this work expands our understanding of the social and political role of the Roman people and could contribute to the debate about the role of the Roman people in the fall of the Roman Republic. This new research could be achieved through the methodology developed for this thesis. By allying tools from discourse analysis, social anthropology, and sociology, this analysis intends to create a cross-disciplinary dialogue that could lead to the development of innovative approaches in the study of the social, conceptual and political history of the Late Republic.

More broadly, this work aims to contribute to a debate about our modern conceptions of success, good luck and happiness and their roles in contemporary Western societies. Since the reception of Roman political and social ideals informed Western culture, understanding Roman conceptualised FELICITAS can provide us with insights into the way success, good luck, and happiness is conceived and used in Western culture. This work has never been so timely in the light of events such as the 2016's election of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency on account of his claim that his success as a businessman would make him a successful president. More recently the Covid-19 crisis with its numerous lockdowns has led many to rethink their conception of success and happiness and their value for them, leading many to change their job or their way of living as a result.

This research fed into a blog named 'The Modern Romanist' as well as a talk intitled 'FELICITAS in the twenty-first century'. In my blog, which has an audience of two dozen followers, I analyse current social and political affairs using examples from Roman history to show how Roman conceptualisations of FELICITAS can help us explore the ideologies underpinning modern social and political actions and discourses. My talk uses Roman examples of FELICITAS to question the audience about their conceptions of success, good fortune, and happiness, and their role in their life. This talk has been given as part of a series of lectures organised by private individuals and associations, and I aim in the future to reach a wider audience through new partnerships.

Acknowledgements

“No man is an island,
Entire of itself,
Every man is a piece of the continent,
A part of the main”
(John Donne, *Meditation 17*, 18)

Those lines have never rung truer than through the completion of this thesis, which would have never been possible without the emotional, financial, and intellectual support of several people over the last seven years.

I would like to thank wholeheartedly my supervisor Prof. Valentina Arena, for her insightful comments on my work which has made me a better researcher, and for her personal support through thick and thin. I would also like to extend my thanks to my secondary supervisor Prof. Martin Holbraad for his reading recommendations which made me explore anthropology, and to Dr. Fiachra MacGóráin, for our discussions about the goddess FELICITAS.

I am grateful to my aunt Veronique Burgo for her financial support, to Benoit Vancauwenberghe for letting me use his personal office, which has been an invaluable space for me to read, think, and write, and to Dafyd Elis and George Dew for providing me with accommodation when in London.

Thanks to all my friends for putting with me through all the various twists and turns and listening to my rants about FELICITAS, in particular Camille Paly and her family, Melissa Benson, Massimo Del Gaudio, Benoit Vancauwenberghe, Daphne Budasz, Pieterjan van Langenhove, Lawrence Luyten, Ala Aboudaka, Pim Verbunt, and Adrien Gantner. Particular thanks to Victoria Jordan, Rosa Mehal, Vincent Marquis, and Melissa Benson for their help proofreading this thesis.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my family, my sister Agnes, my mother Simone, my father Pierre-Emile, and my brother Jimmy for their indefectible love and support.

This one is for you all guys.

Table of contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| ABSTRACT | 5 |
| IMPACT STATEMENT | 7 |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | 9 |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS | 10 |
| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS | 13 |
| 0 INTRODUCTION | 14 |
| 0.1 SETTING THE SCENE | 14 |
| 0.2 SCHOLARSHIP ON FELICITAS: A BRIEF REVIEW | 18 |
| 0.3 APPROACHING FELICITAS | 29 |
| 0.4 A NEW INTERPRETATIVE MODEL | 37 |
| 0.5 METHODOLOGY..... | 41 |
| 0.6 SOURCES | 44 |
| 0.7 STRUCTURE OVERVIEW | 48 |
| 1 DEFINING FELICITAS: MEANINGS AND PREVALENCE | 52 |
| 1.1 THE MEANINGS OF FELICITAS | 53 |
| 1.1.1 Fertility/fecundity..... | 54 |
| 1.1.2 Good luck..... | 56 |
| 1.1.3 Success | 61 |
| 1.1.4 Happiness..... | 66 |
| 1.1.5 Conclusion | 68 |
| 1.2 THINKING WITH FELICITAS: <i>ARBOR FELIX</i> | 69 |
| 1.3 FELICITAS AND THE ROMAN GOOD LIFE | 78 |
| 1.4 CONCLUSION | 84 |
| 2 FELICITAS ROMANA AND THE ROMAN COMMUNITY | 87 |
| 2.1 RECONSTRUCTING THE <i>LUSTRUM</i> | 89 |
| 2.2 THE FELICITAS ROMANA | 93 |
| 2.3 <i>RES MELIOR AND AMPLIOR</i> | 96 |
| 2.4 THE CENSUS AND THE <i>LUSTRUM</i> | 99 |
| 2.5 THE ROMAN REPUBLICAN TRIUMPH: FELICITAS ROMANA ENACTED..... | 106 |
| 2.6 CONCLUSION | 114 |

| | | |
|-----------------|--|------------|
| 3 | FELICITAS IMPERATORIA AND THE ROMAN TRIUMPH | 117 |
| 3.1 | ATTRIBUTING A TRIUMPH: FELICITAS, AUSPICIUM, AND IMPERIUM | 118 |
| 3.1.1 | <i>FELICITAS and the public auspices</i> | 122 |
| 3.1.2 | <i>FELICITAS as criteria for the triumph</i> | 131 |
| 3.1.3 | <i>Summary</i> | 134 |
| 3.2 | PLAUTUS' DIVINE MIMESIS: TRIUMPH AND <i>FELICITAS IMPERATORIA</i> | 135 |
| 3.3 | OF GODS AND MEN: LIVY'S <i>FELICITAS IMPERATORIA</i> | 143 |
| 3.4 | CONCLUSION..... | 151 |
| 4 | LUCULLUS, THE GODDESS FELICITAS, AND FELICITAS IMPERATORIA | 154 |
| 4.1 | RECONSTRUCTING LUCULLUS' TEMPLE..... | 156 |
| 4.1.1 | <i>The Vow</i> | 156 |
| 4.1.2 | <i>The Finance</i> | 158 |
| 4.1.3 | <i>The Construction</i> | 160 |
| 4.1.4 | <i>The Dedication</i> | 168 |
| 4.2 | FORTUNA AND ROMAN IMPERIALISM | 170 |
| 4.2.1 | <i>Varro, Augustine, and the goddess FELICITAS</i> | 178 |
| 4.2.2 | <i>Dialoguing with Fortuna, the goddess FELICITAS</i> | 183 |
| 4.3 | LUCULLUS' MUSE..... | 189 |
| 4.4 | CONCLUSION..... | 193 |
| 5 | <i>FELIX SUM</i>: LEGITIMACY IN TIME OF CRISES..... | 196 |
| 5.1 | SULLA, DREAMS, AND THE CRISIS OF 88 BCE | 197 |
| 5.2 | POMPEY, CICERO, AND MITHRIDATES VI | 209 |
| 5.3 | CAESAR IN GAUL..... | 218 |
| 5.4 | CONCLUSION..... | 226 |
| 6 | HONOUR AND DUTY: ACCEPTING & CONTESTING FELICITAS IN THE LATE ROMAN | |
| REPUBLIC | 229 | |
| 6.1 | OF THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING FELIX: FELICITAS AND <i>DIGNITAS</i> | 230 |
| 6.1.1 | <i>FELICITAS, Murena & the consulship</i> | 233 |
| 6.1.2 | <i>FELICITAS, Fonteius & Acquittal</i> | 237 |
| 6.1.3 | <i>Conclusion</i> | 241 |
| 6.2 | FELICITAS OR HOW TO ACT HONOURABLY | 242 |
| 6.2.1 | <i>Preserve social cohesion</i> | 244 |
| 6.2.2 | <i>Do NOT desire power and glory</i> | 246 |
| 6.2.3 | <i>Do NOT act like a tyrant</i> | 253 |
| 6.2.4 | <i>Or, simply, Live in accordance with Nature</i> | 261 |
| 6.3 | CONCLUSION..... | 266 |

| | | |
|----------|---|------------|
| 7 | CONCLUSION: FELICITAS AND THE LATE ROMAN REPUBLIC | 270 |
| 8 | APPENDIX I: AUGUSTINE, VARRO, AND THE GODDESS FELICITAS..... | 279 |
| 8.1 | METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES | 280 |
| 8.2 | AUGUSTINE'S USE OF VARRO..... | 282 |
| 8.3 | AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTION OF FELICITAS..... | 287 |
| 8.4 | AUGUSTINE AND THE GODDESS FELICITAS | 290 |
| 8.5 | CONCLUSION | 303 |
| 9 | BIBLIOGRAPHY | 305 |

List of abbreviations

- ANRW* 1972–. *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*. Berlin.
- CIL* 1862–. *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*. Berlin.
- FRHist* Cornell, T.J. ed. 2013. *The Fragments of the Roman Historians*, 3 vols. Oxford.
- ILLRP* Degrassi, A. 1965. *Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae*. 2nd ed. Florence
- Inscr. It.* Degrassi, A. 1937. *Inscriptiones Italiae, xiii: Fasti et Elogia*. Rome.
- LTUR* Steinby, E. M., ed. 1993–2001. *Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae*. Rome.
- ORF*⁴ Malcovati, E. 1976. *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*. 4th ed. Turin.
- RE* 1890–1980. *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Stuttgart.
- TLL* 1900–. *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*. Berlin.

0 Introduction

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the concepts of the idea of FELICITAS and their roles in the political culture of the Late Roman Republic.¹

In what follows, I am primarily concerned with the notion of FELICITAS, understood as the ability of victorious Roman generals to work with the divine to ensure the safety and the economic and political well-being of the *res publica*, and its use in the social and political discourses that took place in Rome in the last two centuries of the Roman Republic before Cicero's death in 43 BCE.²

0.1 Setting the scene

In that period, Roman generals claimed to have FELICITAS as a way of justifying the social honours and the political power given to them by the Roman people. One of the most explicit examples of this use of FELICITAS can be found in M. Tullius Cicero's speech in favour of a legislative proposal that would grant the Roman general Cn. Pompeius Magnus an extraordinary command of provinces and legions to fight against Mithridates VI, King of Pontus, and his ally, Tigranes II of Armenia, whose military advance threatened Roman eastern provinces. In *In Favour of the Manilian Law* Cicero presented Pompey as the general most capable of defeating the king of Pontus because of his FELICITAS.³ He defined Pompey's FELICITAS as one of the personal qualities that made Pompey a successful general and as a divine blessing granted by the gods to Pompey.⁴ Pompey's FELICITAS was evident according to the Roman orator from his all victorious campaigns, and most

¹ All the translations presented in this thesis are those of the Loeb Classical Library of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

² FELICITAS can be loosely translated in English as "fecundity," "good fortune," "success," and "happiness". For reasons explained below, I found none of those translations adequate, and thus I keep the Latin FELICITAS throughout the thesis. On this definition of FELICITAS, see Chapter Three.

³ For a detailed discussion of the speech with references to modern scholarship, see Chapter Five.

⁴ On FELICITAS as the quality of a successful general, Cic. *Leg. Man.* 28 and as a gift of the gods, Cic. *Leg. Man.* 47-8.

recently from his defeat of the pirates in the Mediterranean in less than a year.⁵ Cicero claimed that Pompey's FELICITAS made him hopeful that the Roman general would ultimately prevail and save the *res publica* from its eastern foes.⁶ Following Cicero's speech, the Roman people voted in favour of the proposal and it became law.⁷

Six years earlier, in 69 BCE, Cicero used very similar arguments to defend M. Fonteius against charges of extortion for making money in an improper manner during his governorship in Transalpine Gaul – a crime he may have committed.⁸ In *In Defence of Fonteius*, the Roman orator argued that his client should be acquitted because his FELICITAS, evident from his track record of military victories, could be useful to protect the *res publica* against the threats of invasion the Gallic witnesses issued during the trial.⁹ Cicero maintained that if given, this acquittal would be justified as part of the honours and protection usually given to victorious generals.¹⁰ While it is unclear whether Fonteius was acquitted, the fact that Cicero developed a line of defence centred around Fonteius' FELICITAS suggests that the ability of victorious Roman generals to work with the divine to win battles carried some weight with Roman jurors.¹¹

Cicero's arguments indicate that claiming FELICITAS could help Roman generals to argue for political power from the Roman people, by obtaining a military command for instance, and for legal impunity as part of the social honours the Romans gave to victorious generals. His definition of Pompey's FELICITAS also implies that FELICITAS was seen by Romans as both the personal quality of a Roman general and a divine blessing granted because of

⁵ For Cicero's discussion of Pompey's victory against pirates, Cic. *Leg. Man.* 29-35.

⁶ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 48.

⁷ Plutarch reports that all thirty-five tribes of the Tribal Assembly (*comitia populi tributa*) voted for the proposal, Plut. *Pomp.* 30. For a good discussion of Cicero's role in the debate, see Gildenhard, Hodgson et al 2014, 9-10.

⁸ On the charges brought against Fonteius and Cicero's defence, see Chapter Six.

⁹ On Fonteius' military record, Cic. *Font.* 13. On threat made by the Gallic witnesses, Cic. *Font.* 33.

¹⁰ On Cicero's plea to acquit, Cic. *Font.* 42, 43

¹¹ On the outcome of trial, see Alexander 2002, 67-72.

his relationship with the gods.¹² Those two examples from Cicero illustrate well the social and political value of FELICITAS at the time.

Fonteius and Pompey were not the only Roman generals to use their FELICITAS in such a way: in fact, C. Marius, L. Cornelius Sulla, C. Julius Caesar and L. Licinius Murena, to name a few, did the same.¹³ Their use of the quality in their self-representation indicates that FELICITAS played an integral role in the competition between members of the Roman elite for honours in Rome. FELICITAS was thus part of the discourse that drove the political and social changes that led to the transformation of the *res publica* from a republican system of power-sharing between members of the elite to an imperial system with all the power concentrated with one individual.

Roman generals were able to argue that their FELICITAS could be used to protect the *res publica* because FELICITAS, it seems, was connected with its well-being. For instance, in a legal dispute brought by L. Minucius Thermus, M. Porcius Cato (the Elder) argued that the *lustrum* (the purification ceremony closing the census) he performed as censor in 184 BCE was FELIX because the storehouses of Rome were filled with crops, wine was flowing and olive oil was abundant.¹⁴ Against Cato's views, Thermus advanced the argument that the *lustrum* performed was *infelix* because a series of bad omens had happened between the years 183 and 180 BCE.¹⁵ The arguments presented by Cato and Thermus show that FELICITAS was not only connected with the *lustrum* but also that the FELICITAS of the ceremony was associated with and demonstrated by the well-being of the *res publica*. The ceremony defines a form of FELICITAS for the *res publica*.¹⁶ The legal dispute between Cato and Thermus over the *lustrum* suggests that the proper performance of the ritual

¹² Cic. *Leg. Man.* 47-8.

¹³ For a discussion of Sulla and Caesar, see Chapter 5; for Murena, see Chapter Six. On Marius' FELICITAS, see Assenmaker 2014, 98-112, 135-40; Avery 1967; Noble 2017.

¹⁴ *ORF*⁴ 135. For a detailed discussion of Cato's arguments, see Chapter Two.

¹⁵ Thermus' arguments can be reconstructed from *ORF*⁴ 134. For a detailed discussion of the trial, see Chapter Two.

¹⁶ For a detailed discussion of the FELICITAS of the Romans, see Chapter Two.

was important for the FELICITAS of the *res publica*, and that the FELICITAS of the *res publica* was of great importance for Romans.

Finally, sources suggest that not all claims by Roman generals to have FELICITAS were accepted by the Roman people. For instance, after Caesar's death, Cicero attacked the Roman dictator's claim to FELICITAS in a fragment of a letter to Cornelius Nepos using a new definition of FELICITAS which connected the quality of the Roman general with the adherence to a moral and ethical code articulated around the notion of *honestum*, "what is morally good".¹⁷ Cicero's definition suggests that by the end of the first century BCE FELICITAS was not just seen as the ability of a successful Roman general to win battles; it had a moral and ethical dimension. The fact that Cicero proposed a new definition of the quality implies that members of the Roman elite played a role in defining FELICITAS. It also denotes that, for the claim of a Roman general to have FELICITAS to be effective and grant him access to political power and social honours, it was necessary for a part of the Roman people to accept it.

Those different examples of the role of FELICITAS in the social and political discourse in the Late Roman Republic raise questions about its potency in this period. The prevalence of FELICITAS in Roman generals' presentation indicates its social and political value: but what made FELICITAS such a potent watchword in the first place?

Cicero's description of Pompey's FELICITAS and the legal trial between Cato and Thermus about the FELICITAS of the *res publica* brings into question the nature of FELICITAS: what exactly did Romans understand as the FELICITAS of a Roman general and how can it be understood as both a quality and a divine blessing? How is FELICITAS connected to the relationship of the Roman general with the gods as well as the well-being of the *res publica*? Finally, Cicero's contestation of Caesar's claim to FELICITAS brings into question the role of the Roman people *vis-à-vis* the quality: how did the Roman people

¹⁷ Cic. *frag* 2.5. cf. Amm. Marc. 21.16. For a detailed discussion of Cicero's new definition of FELICITAS, see Chapter Six.

define FELICITAS, arbitrate the claims of Roman generals, and define FELICITAS' social and political value?

This thesis investigates why Roman generals of the Late Roman Republic used FELICITAS as a justification for their social position and political power. In other words, this work examines the agency of FELICITAS in driving the social and political changes of the time.¹⁸

0.2 Scholarship on FELICITAS: a brief review

The study of the FELICITAS of Roman generals, and its role in the political culture of the Late Republic, has a long history in modern scholarship.

In the early twentieth century, in particular between the 1930s and the 1950s, FELICITAS was the subject of a rich and lively scholarly debate about its nature. Scholars of the time were attempting to determine whether, when talking about the quality of great military leaders like Sulla, Pompey or Caesar, FELICITAS represented for Romans a magical innate power of the Roman general or a divine blessing of the gods. The discussion was strongly influenced by the anthropological debate of the time, in particular the dichotomy between magic and religion.¹⁹ Ultimately, FELICITAS, interpreted as a divine blessing, became the *communis opinio*. It was only at start of the twenty-first century that some of the insights uncovered by scholars arguing that FELICITAS was the innate quality of an individual were used to understand the role of FELICITAS in the political and social debates of the Late Roman Republic.

While the magical interpretation of FELICITAS has been defended by a number of scholars, including Fritz Taeger (1933), Alfredo Passerini (1935), Leo Berlinger (1935), Mario Attilio Levi (1938), the main proponent of this thesis was undoubtedly Hendrik Wagenvoort.²⁰ In *Roman Dynamism*

¹⁸ On the historical agency of concepts, see for instance, Skinner 2002, Armitage 2012, Straumann 2020.

¹⁹ On the dichotomy between magic and religion in ancient Roman religion, see Versnel 1991. More generally, Geertz 1975.

²⁰ Taeger 1933, Passerini 1935, Berlinger 1935, Levi 1938, Wagenvoort 1947 and 1954.

published in 1947, the Dutch scholar likened FELICITAS to the anthropological idea of *mana*.²¹ *Mana* is found amongst Melanesian and Polynesian tribes and represents the possession by an individual (or an object) of a supernatural power or ability.²² *Mana* can be inherited or transferred, and is connected with the belief in spirits.²³ As Kessing summarises “things that are *mana* are efficacious, potent, successful, true, fulfilled, realised: they ‘work’. *Mana*-ness is a state of efficacy, success, truth, potency, blessing, luck, realisation – an abstract state or quality.”²⁴

For Wagenvoort, FELICITAS was the equivalent of *mana* for the Romans. He established the connection between the two concepts by analysing two important Roman notions associated with successful military leaders in early Roman religion, “command” (*imperium*) and “commandant” (*imperator*). He maintained that, for the Romans, *imperium* meant ‘*mana* of the chief’ and thus by extension *imperator* meant ‘the chief who transfers *mana*’.²⁵ When FELIX, which etymologically means ‘fruitful, productive’, is used in the context of a successful general, it signified a general who ‘is rich in *mana* to transfer to his soldiers.’²⁶ By transferring his *mana* to others, the Roman general demonstrated his personal excellence, his FELICITAS.

Harry Erkell argued against this magical interpretation of FELICITAS in his monograph entitled *Augustus, FELICITAS, Fortuna: Lateinische Wortstudien* published in 1952.²⁷ For him, when FELICITAS characterises successful Roman military leaders, it designates a divine blessing of the gods to win battles, and represents one of the conditions by which Roman general were granted the honour of the triumph in Rome. His approach is unique since, unlike scholars before him, he used the goddess FELICITAS to define the divine quality. From

²¹ More generally, Wagenvoort connects the concept of *mana* to *numen*, see Wagenvoort 1947, also Rose 1948 and Thurmond 1992, *contra* Hunt 2016, 58-62. For a history of the impact of *mana* in social sciences, see Smith 2002, 198-201; Holbraad 2006, 192-201.

²² See for instance, Codrington 1891, 278-9; Kessing 1984, 137; Holbraad 2006.

²³ See for instance, Codrington 1891, 56-57; Maher 1974; Rumsey 2016.

²⁴ Kessing 1984, 138.

²⁵ Wagenvoort 1947, 61-66.

²⁶ Wagenvoort 1947, 66; Wagenvoort 1954, 72.

²⁷ Erkell 1952, 43-109.

Augustine's discussion of the differences between the goddesses Fortuna and FELICITAS in *The City of God*, written in the fifth century CE, he concluded that the goddess FELICITAS was the divine agency that granted good fortune and/or happiness to the worshipper who deserved it.²⁸ Contrasting Augustine's definition of the goddess FELICITAS with Cicero's definition of FELICITAS in a fragment of a letter to Cornelius Nepos dating from the first century BCE led him to define FELICITAS as a gift of the gods given to good and pious worshippers based on their merits.²⁹ He argued that this divine blessing enabled victorious Roman generals to request from the Senate the honour of a *supplicatio*, a thanksgiving celebration to the gods for a military victory, and a triumphal parade in Rome.³⁰ Erckell's reading of FELICITAS was well-received by scholars and the conception of FELICITAS as a blessing of the gods became the scholarly *communio opinis*.³¹

In this thesis, I do not engage with the specific arguments developed in the debate between Wagenvoort (and others) and Erckell about whether the FELICITAS of a Roman general represented a blessing of the gods or an innate magical quality to win battles. This debate has been very well-researched and here I propose a different approach. While the main idea defended by Wagenvoort and the other scholars, namely that FELICITAS is the innate ability of a man to bring military victory to Rome, had been disregarded for a long time in subsequent literature, it has received much more consideration in the twenty-first century.³²

However, from Erckell and Wagenvoort's discussion I retain two points. Firstly, our evidence suggest that FELICITAS was understood by Romans as both a quality and a divine blessing. Yet no scholars in subsequent literature have articulated a framework that explains how FELICITAS can designate those two different states at the same time. This thesis elaborates such a framework by demonstrating that for Romans FELICITAS denoted at the same time a state,

²⁸ Erckell 1952, 51-2.

²⁹ Erckell 1952, 52-4.

³⁰ Erckell 1952, 55-8.

³¹ See for instance, Sprey 1954; Weinstock 1955.

³² See for instance Welch 2009 and Gildenhard 2011.

a proven ability, and the outcome of the use of this ability. As such, the FELICITAS of the Roman general then represents the unique ability of Roman generals to establish a partnership with the gods and the outcome of this partnership, namely divine blessings which help the general to win battles.

The second point I consider in this thesis is Erkell's definition of the goddess FELICITAS. It still is the most substantive discussion of the deity and her divine agency.³³ His interpretation of the goddess FELICITAS is based on a close, if not literal, reading of Augustine's description of the divine agency of the deity.³⁴ While the German scholar questions the reliability of Augustine as a source for Roman religion and suspects that Augustine's own Christian conception of FELICITAS may influence his portrait of the deity, he fails to explore what such Christian conceptions of FELICITAS would be and their impact. Rather Erkell compares Augustine's description of FELICITAS with Cicero's description, assuming that the two authors separated by more than four centuries are talking about the same FELICITAS.³⁵ Erkell's methodology is clearly thus less than satisfactory as he does not fully take into account the literary, cultural and political contexts of his sources, in particular that of Augustine. In this thesis, I re-examine Erkell's definition of the goddess FELICITAS to propose a more methodologically-sound and nuanced reading of the deity and her agency.³⁶

Following Erkell's analysis, scholars moved on from the question of the nature of FELICITAS to turn their attention to the role of FELICITAS in the political culture of the Late Roman Republic.

In his monograph *FELICITAS Imperatoria* published in 1987, Erick Wistrand's research on FELICITAS from Early Rome to the fall of the Western Roman empire constitutes an important contribution to the conceptual history

³³ There are other definitions of the goddess Felicitas: Wissowa defines FELICITAS as the goddess of Lucky Happening, see Wissowa 1912, 214-5; followed by Champeaux 1982-9, 1.207.

³⁴ Erkell 1952, 50-52.

³⁵ Erkell 1952, 52.

³⁶ See Appendix One for a methodological discussion of Erkell and Chapter Four for my analysis of the goddess FELICITAS.

of FELICITAS throughout the Roman Republic.³⁷ Indeed, the Swedish scholar was the first to demonstrate how the conceptualisations of the divine quality FELICITAS shifted in response to social and political changes in the *res publica*.

Taking FELICITAS as representing the divine blessing a Roman general received from the gods, Wistrand showed that there were two distinct representations of the FELICITAS of Roman generals in the Late Roman Republic. In the first representation, FELICITAS *imperatoria* is connected to the *imperium* and the *ius auspicandi*, the prerogative of a Roman magistrate to take the public auspices.³⁸ In keeping with Erkell, he maintained that FELICITAS *imperatoria* in connection with *imperium* and *auspicium* enabled a victorious Roman general to ask the Senate for the honour of a *supplicatio* and a triumph.³⁹ This conception of FELICITAS *imperatoria* was first challenged at the end of the third century BCE by P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, who presented his military victory as due to his special relationship with the divine.⁴⁰ For Wistrand, however, the real conceptual shift in FELICITAS *imperatoria* came with Marius and Sulla and their political rivalry in the first century BCE. In their self-representation, FELICITAS became for the Romans, the personal quality of a Roman general disconnected from his status as a Roman magistrate and his possession of the *auspicium*.⁴¹ He argued that those two conceptualisations of the FELICITAS of a Roman general are articulated around the notions of VIRTUS, which represents the ideals of manliness in Rome and *fortuna*, i.e. good fortune.⁴² He contended that Romans viewed military victory as the result of VIRTUS and FELICITAS of a Roman general manifested by his leadership and his divinely sent good fortune.⁴³

Wistrand also noted that the violence that followed Sulla's civil war victory against Marius' forces in 82 BCE and Caesar's sale of his enemies'

³⁷ Wistrand 1987.

³⁸ On the connection between FELICITAS and *auspicium*, see Wistrand 1987, 11-5, 15-26.

³⁹ Wistrand 1987, 16-7, 22-4.

⁴⁰ Wistrand 1987, 24-26.

⁴¹ Wistrand 1987, 27-34.

⁴² Wistrand 1987, 35-43. For a definition of VIRTUS and *fortuna*, see Chapter One.

⁴³ Wistrand 1987, 35-36.

property in 45 BCE, led members of the Roman elite to reckon with the moral, ethical and religious problems raised by both generals using their *FELICITAS imperatoria* to legitimate their actions.⁴⁴ This debate articulated around the support of the gods for individuals acting against the interest of the *res publica* concluded with the redefinition of *FELICITAS* on ethical and moral grounds.

Finally, Wistrand maintained that the establishment of the Principate in 27 BCE with Augustus as sole ruler of the Roman empire marked another conceptual change for the *FELICITAS imperatoria*. The military victory of Augustus ushered an era of peace and prosperity for the Romans, referred to in literary sources as the *FELICITAS saeculi* or *FELICITAS temporum*.⁴⁵ The *FELICITAS saeculi* enjoyed by the Roman people stemmed from Augustus' *FELICITAS imperatoria*, the divine blessing he enjoyed because of his personal *fortuna* and of his ability to communicate with the gods in the name of the Roman people due to his permanent *imperium* and *ius auspicandi*.⁴⁶

Wistrand's analysis, however, presents several limitations. By covering such a large time span in less than a hundred pages, his discussion of the conceptualisation of *FELICITAS* feels very schematic as the social and political implications of the sources he examines are not fully drawn out. This has several consequences. While Wistrand has correctly identified the conceptual shift that took place in the first century BCE with Marius and Sulla, he has failed to explain the causes for this change or to provide an interpretative framework to describe it. This has led him to miss the connection between the arrival of the goddess *FELICITAS* in the mid-second century BCE in Rome and the new conception of *FELICITAS imperatoria* as the personal quality of a Roman general.

This thesis builds on and complements Wistrand's work. Using the associations he has identified between *FELICITAS* and *auspicium*, I show that *FELICITAS imperatoria* represented the ability of the Roman general to work in

⁴⁴ Wistrand 1987, 24-34.

⁴⁵ Wistrand 1987, 44-66.

⁴⁶ Wistrand 1987, 58. *FELICITAS temporum* has been well studied in the context of imperial coinage, see for instance, Lusnia 1995; Manders 2012, 193-199; Depeyrot 2014, 180.

partnership with the divine using the relationship between the Roman people and the gods. This interpretation enables me to demonstrate that, in the first century BCE, Roman generals such as Sulla presented their FELICITAS as their personal relationship with the gods to gain a competitive advantage against other members of the Roman elite vying for the same social and political honours. This change, I maintain, was initiated by the arrival of the goddess FELICITAS in Rome with the construction of her first known temple by L. Licinius Lucullus in 146 BCE. This shift, I argue, was possible because the connection Wistrand noted between the FELICITAS of a Roman general and the peace and prosperity enjoyed by the Roman people in imperial times was already present in Republican Rome as the FELICITAS of the Romans.

In the decades following the publication of Wistrand's book, scholars have refined his analysis, articulating more precisely the conceptual shifts of FELICITAS, and the actors involved in those changes.

Amongst those works, Kathryn Welch's article, *Nimium Felix: Caesar's FELICITAS and Cicero's Philippic*, published in 2009, Ingo Gildenhard's discussion of FELICITAS, in *Creative Eloquence: The Construction of Reality in Cicero's Speeches* published in 2011, and Alexandra Eckert's article *Good Fortune and the Public Good. Disputing Sulla's Claim to Be Felix* published in 2018, constitute major contributions that greatly deepen Wistrand's analysis.⁴⁷

Elaborating on Wistrand's insights into the moral debate raised by the use of FELICITAS by Sulla and Caesar, Welch argued that the perceived abuse of power by Caesar led Cicero to develop a new moral and ethical definition of FELICITAS in order to contest Caesar's and M. Antonius' claim to FELICITAS. Using Wagenvoort's perception of FELICITAS as representing the innate ability of a Roman general, she re-examined sources to demonstrate that FELICITAS meant to adhere to a particular moral and ethical code. Indeed, Welch showed how in Cicero's speech in favour of Pompey, the Roman author presented Pompey's FELICITAS as resulting from his adherence to Roman ethical values.⁴⁸ Cicero would further develop this dimension of FELICITAS by

⁴⁷ Welch 2008; Gildenhard 2011, 257-72; Eckert 2018.

⁴⁸ Welch 2008, 190-5.

proposing a new definition of the divine quality in a fragment of a letter to Cornelius Nepos, which connects FELICITAS with *honestum*, “what is morally right.”⁴⁹ She rightly noted the thematic connection between Cicero’s new definition FELICITAS and his philosophical treaty, *On Duties*, which redefined the Roman notion of *honestum* using Greek philosophy.⁵⁰ This new ethical and moral dimension to FELICITAS enabled Cicero to argue in the *Philippics* that neither Caesar nor Marc Antony were FELIX for, while their military victory allowed them to claim FELICITAS, their moral worthlessness negated their claim.⁵¹

Welch’s analysis is invaluable as it brings to light a new conceptual shift in the way some Romans understood FELICITAS. Her emphasis on the role of Cicero in refusing Caesar and Mark Antony’s claim to FELICITAS rightly highlights that some members of the Roman community played an important role not only in accepting or denying a Roman general’s claim to FELICITAS but also in defining the criteria by which FELICITAS was assessed. But, since her analysis only focuses on Cicero’s use of the divine quality FELICITAS to attack politically Caesar and Mark Antony, the extent to which Cicero’s use of FELICITAS is either unique or novel for the time is unclear. To better understand the originality of Cicero, it is necessary to place his use of FELICITAS within the wider context of Roman practices by taking into account other potential redefinitions of FELICITAS in the first century BCE on moral and ethical grounds. While Welch has rightly noted the connection between Cicero’s new definition of the divine quality FELICITAS and his philosophical treaty, *On Duties*, she did not explore the impact of Cicero’s redefinition of *honestum* “what is morally right” on his new definition of FELICITAS. Reading those two texts conjointly shows that, by connecting FELICITAS with *honestum*, the Roman orator is embedding the divine quality in ethical and moral code aimed at preserving Roman society.

⁴⁹ Welch 2008, 208-13. For a definition of *honestum*, see Chapter Six.

⁵⁰ Welch 2008, 210.

⁵¹ Welch 2008, 208.

Through a close reading of Cicero's speech in support of Pompey's extraordinary command against Mithridates VI, Gildenhard has highlighted that the conceptual shift between *FELICITAS imperatoria* before and after Sulla, identified by Wistrand, was already noted by Romans themselves. Indeed, Gildenhard has showed that the Roman orator operated with two different conceptions of the FELICITAS; one that he defined as traditional, and the other one, as Sulla's FELICITAS.⁵² For Gildenhard, the traditional model of the divine quality is a transient quality, which is temporary and subject to the whims of *fortuna*. This traditional model of *FELICITAS imperatoria* is the way, according to Cicero, Romans should understand the relationship between the gods and Roman generals, such as Maximus, Marcellus, Scipio and Marius, to name a few.⁵³ On the other hand, for Sulla, FELICITAS represented a permanent and secure quality because it is independent of the whims of *fortuna*. Building on Gildenhard's arguments that some Romans were aware of the shift in the way FELICITAS was conceived before and after Sulla, this work attempts to assess the prevalence of the different conceptualisation of FELICITAS in Roman society by looking at different representations of *FELICITAS imperatoria* in a variety of social contexts, such as the theatre, or religious rituals, such as the triumph.

As Eckert has shown, some of those religious rituals, in particular the *lustrum* and the triumph, outline a new conceptualisation of FELICITAS in the Late Roman Republic. Following in Welch's footsteps, Eckert investigated how Cicero contested Sulla's claim to FELICITAS, and in particular his argument that Sulla's proscriptions have failed to ensure the well-being of the *res publica*.⁵⁴ She has demonstrated that FELICITAS was connected with the notion of *salus rei publicae* (the safety or welfare of the *res publica*) in the prayers, and through the proper performance, of the *lustrum*.⁵⁵ This association found its ritualistic expression in the ceremony of the triumph as victorious Roman generals used their booty for the benefit of the *populus Romanus* by building

⁵² Gildenhard 2011, 268-70. On this passage, see Chapter Five.

⁵³ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 47.

⁵⁴ Eckert 2018, 285-7.

⁵⁵ On *salus rei publicae*, Marwood 1988, Clark 2007, 176-7, see Cattaneo 2011.

public infrastructure, giving public banquets, and dedicating temples.⁵⁶ This connection between the FELICITAS of Roman generals and the welfare of the *res publica* enabled Cicero to argue that Sulla cannot claim to have FELICITAS because the violence and cruelty of his proscriptions endangered the very fabric of Roman society.⁵⁷

From Eckert's reading of the sources, it is unclear whether all Roman generals claiming to be FELIX were expected to ensure the well-being of the *res publica* or whether this connection was brought to light by Cicero to argue against Sulla's FELICITAS. Her analysis of how Cicero used the connection between FELICITAS *imperatoria* and the well-being of the *res publica* to evaluate Sulla's claim to FELICITAS enables me to show that the safety and economic well-being of the *res publica* were the main criteria against which all those who claimed to have FELICITAS were evaluated.⁵⁸

The actors of this evaluation have been in part elucidated by Anna Clark in her monograph *Divine qualities* published in 2007. There, Clark has proposed a radically different approach to FELICITAS than previous scholars by emphasising the role of the goddess FELICITAS in the way Romans understood and conceived FELICITAS. In an attempt to better understand the role of conceptual deities such as FELICITAS, VIRTUS, or CLEMENTIA played in the social and political discourses of the first century BCE, she articulated the interpretive model of 'divine qualities.'⁵⁹ She defined divine qualities as "a cognitive vocabulary whose individual elements lay in the overlap between religion and qualities associated with Romans."⁶⁰ They were operated by being displayed, used, and contested by and in presence of various groups in Roman society.⁶¹ Those divine qualities exist in both the linguistic, materialistic, and

⁵⁶ Eckert 2018, 287

⁵⁷ Eckert 2018, 287-93.

⁵⁸ Other works have been carried out on the use of FELICITAS in connection with specific historical figures. They will inform my analysis and will be mentioned where appropriate.

⁵⁹ Clark 2007, 11. The other divine qualities are BONUS EVENTUS, CLEMENTIA, CONCORDIA, FIDES, (FORS) FORTUNA, HONOS, IUVENTAS, LIBERTAS, MENS, MONETA, OPS, PIETAS, PUDICITIA, QUIES, SALUS, SPES, VICTORIA, and VIRTUS.

⁶⁰ Clark 2007, 16.

⁶¹ Clark 2007, 16.

the religious sphere; they had temples, priests and festivals, and were represented on coins and in dramas. Because of those various so-called resources, the divine qualities were part of the everyday life of the community.⁶² For Clark, FELICITAS was an integral part of the social and political dialogue between Romans; it enabled individuals or groups to present themselves to the rest of Roman society and the Roman community as a whole to define itself as a social unit.

This approach has allowed her to show how Roman generals competed against each other to claim FELICITAS as their own in the eyes of the Roman people. To do so, they would build their own temples to the deity or present themselves as more FELIX than one another through their own (or their allies') writing.⁶³ As Clark has shown, Pompey's and Caesar's competition over FELICITAS illustrates those dynamics well: for instance, in response to Pompey's construction of a shrine to the goddess FELICITAS as part of his permanent theatre, Caesar had a temple to the deity built in the Roman Forum close by his new Forum.⁶⁴

Clark's analysis is the first attempt by modern scholars since Erckell to conceptualise the relationship between FELICITAS as notion and FELICITAS as a goddess in order to explain how Roman generals used the divine quality in the Late Roman Republic. It also constitutes the first attempt to conceptualise how the Roman community used FELICITAS to define itself and how the Roman community accepted or refused the claim to FELICITAS of a Roman general. Using her conclusion that the meaning and value of FELICITAS was negotiated in dialogue with various members of the Roman society enables me to identify the internal social dynamism between a Roman general and the Roman people and within Roman society at large.

Building on previous studies on the conceptualisations of FELICITAS and the actors involved in those definitions, this work aims at articulating a coherent

⁶² Clark 2007, 13-17.

⁶³ Clark 2007, esp. 225-46.

⁶⁴ For Clark's discussion of the Pompey's and Caesar's temple of the goddess Felicitas, see Clark 2007, 229-39. For her discussion of Cicero's speech on Pompey's Felicitas, see Clark 2007, 245-6.

picture of the social interactions between Roman generals and the Roman people which is underlying the use of FELICITAS in the political and social discourse in Rome in the Late Roman Republic. To that end, I propose to base my analysis on a new semiotic reading of extant sources on FELICITAS.

0.3 Approaching FELICITAS

At the heart of the reading developed in this work is Bourdieu's theory of symbolic capital which provides a potent framework to conceive FELICITAS and its social and political value as well as the semantic and conceptual challenges faced when analysing the divine quality in the sources.

Here, I follow in the footsteps of Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, who has proposed to conceptualise the 'credit' given by the rank and reputation of a family name to a member of the Roman elite by using the theory of 'symbolic' or 'social' capital' developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu⁶⁵. According to Bourdieu, social capital is "a credit, but in the broadest sense, a kind of advance, a credence, that only the group's belief can grant."⁶⁶ It can only be given from a community to an individual, because the community is the source of all capital, and after the community has recognised that the individual possesses the resources (actual or potential) needed to receive the social credit. For social capital to be effective, all members of the community must believe that it exists and functions according to particular rules; in contrast, for the social capital of an individual to be effective, it requires that a large part of the community believe that its possessor has it and can use it legitimately. Finally, social capital can be understood as symbolic capital, namely the resources available to an individual to accrue honours, prestige or recognition from their community, because when seeking honour, prestige and other kinds of recognition from the community, the social credit given to an individual by others in the community functions like symbolic capital.

For Hölkeskamp, at the heart of the Republic's meritocratic system was the symbolic capital of the *nobiles* which was passed down through

⁶⁵ Hölkeskamp 2010, 107-124.

⁶⁶ Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu 1990, 120.

generations: the capital was “created by the ‘ancestors’ and their steady accumulation of those achievements that were universally acknowledged as prestigious and constitutive of pre-eminence, on the one hand, and the visible manifestation and formal recognition of these achievements in the form of *horores* over generations, on the other hand.”⁶⁷ It was this interconnected reciprocity that made elite status in Rome quasi-heritable. Roman families’ claims of mythological descent or connections with particular temples or rituals were an integral part of the family’s symbolic capital and ‘corporate identity’, thus suggesting that symbolic capital in Republican Rome had a religious dimension⁶⁸.

My purpose in using Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic capital is twofold. On the one hand, I develop Hölkeskamp’s insight into the religious dimension of symbolic capital of the members of the Roman elite in Rome; on the other hand, I demonstrate that religious symbolic capital in Rome was not necessarily inherited, and could be created through the symbolic transformation of military victory into political power achieved by significant actions such as rituals, such as the ritual of the triumph, and by visible signs such as victory monuments or literary accounts of campaigns.⁶⁹ To do so, I use the application of Bourdieu’s theory in the field of religion as developed by modern sociologists throughout the twentieth century. Out of that research, three main approaches to religious symbolic capital were developed to explain the interactions between social agents with reference to religion.

The first definition of religious capital, commonly known in modern scholarship as ‘Organizationally Dispensed Symbolic Capital,’ postulates, as Bourdieu advances, that religious capital is symbolic capital guarded and dispensed by religious professionals in an organised religious framework.⁷⁰ For him, the differences between various religious specialists are not their personal qualities, “their charisma” as Weber says, but “the structure of the

⁶⁷ Hölkeskamp 2010, 108.

⁶⁸ Hölkeskamp 2010, 116-119. For other studies which have applied symbolic capital in Roman religious, see for instance Goldberg 2015.

⁶⁹ On the process of the transformation of military victory to power, see Hölcher 2006.

⁷⁰ Bourdieu 1987, 121-7. Vertet 2003, 151.

objective relation between the positions these agents occupy” in a relatively autonomous field.⁷¹ By religious field, Bourdieu means, a hierarchically structured social arena or market in which actors compete for religious power, i.e. the authority “to modify, in a deep and lasting fashion, the practice and world-view of lay people” through “the absolutisation of the relative and the legitimation of the arbitrary.”⁷² In other words, for Bourdieu, religious capital is inherent to the position of an individual in a religious field in which this individual is competing with others for the authority to change practice and world view and legitimise a power structure in society, i.e. religious power. The notion of competition between religious specialists is central to Bourdieu’s concept of religious capital as it defines both the forms and the representation of the structure’s dynamic.

In contrast to Bourdieu’s view of religious capital, some scholars see the relationship between symbolic capital and religion in terms of the individuals, and have argued that capital, rather than being organisationally dispensed, is individually accumulated.⁷³ They call this ‘Spiritual capital’ or ‘Individually Accumulated Symbolic Capital.’ There are two definitions of the ‘spiritual capital’ based on two different models.

The first definition of ‘Spiritual capital’ sees this capital as a resource which “individuals draw upon to meet challenges in their lives.” Spiritual here is seen as “the area of belief or faith that actually energises or motivates our ethical and public living.”⁷⁴ It may be seen as “a more diffused commodity, governed by complex patterns of production, distribution and exchange, and consumption.”⁷⁵ The second definition holds ‘Spiritual capital’ as “the skills and experience specific to one’s religion including religious knowledge, familiarity

⁷¹ Weber 1968, 440, see Bourdieu 1987, 121.

⁷² Bourdieu 1987, 127. Bourdieu further defines religious authority as “a product of a practitioner’s ability to meet the religious needs of his audience – a theodicy of suffering for the dominated (class) and a theodicy of good fortune” for the dominant (class), cf. Vertet 2003, 153.

⁷³ Iannacone 1990; Baker and Miles-Watson 2010.

⁷⁴ Baker and Miles-Watson 2010, 18-19, 28.

⁷⁵ Vertet 2003, 158.

with rituals and doctrine, and friendship with fellow worshippers.”⁷⁶ This model conceives religious capital as more of a human capital, accumulated individually, produced within families, and transferable into social capital. The main difference between the two definitions is that the latter places less emphasis on competition than the former.⁷⁷ However, both definitions highlight the religious experience, be it through the role of faith and belief in an individual’s life or through their personal religious knowledge, as a form of symbolic capital with currency in society.

Rejecting the dichotomy between ‘religious capital’ and ‘spiritual capital’, between the organisational and personal roles within religion, Montemaggi has proposed a synthesised model of ‘religious’ capital in which capital is the result of the interaction between individual and the community, known in scholarship as ‘Synthetic Symbolic Capital’.⁷⁸ Montemaggi has argued that ‘Synthetic Symbolic Capital’ requires that “the community and the individual come together in order to develop a mutually agreeable form of capital, which agreed value benefit both the community and the individual equally.”⁷⁹ This definition of religious capital thus places emphasis on the relationship between the individual and the community, which determines not only the form but also the value of the capital.

This brief presentation of symbolic capital in the field of religion has highlighted the conceptual potential of religious symbolic capital to understand the social and political value of FELICITAS and the actors involved in its creation. It has also shown that neither of the definition of religious capital developed from Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic capital can be fully applied to Roman religion. ‘Organisationally Dispensed Symbolic Capital’ is based on observations done in strictly-organised religion like Christianity. However, Roman religion is characterised by its multi-polarity with various institutions

⁷⁶ Iannacone 1990, 299.

⁷⁷ Vertet 2003, 153, cf. Bourdieu 1987, 121.

⁷⁸ Montemaggi 2010.

⁷⁹ Montemaggi 2010, 186; Grusendorf 2016, 7.

holding religious authority, such as the Senate or the college of pontifices.⁸⁰ 'Individually Accumulated Symbolic Capital' places too much emphasis on the individual. Roman religion is a space in which the individual and the community are constantly negotiating the relationship between each other and toward the divine.⁸¹ The process of construction of votive temples in Rome, in which the Roman Senate needs to accept the claim that a new deity has helped a Roman general win a battle to build a temple with public money, illustrates this dynamic perfectly.⁸² Because Roman religion is characterised as a place of dialogue between the individual and the community, 'Synthetic Symbolic Capital' comes the closest to approximate Roman religion, but it unfortunately lacks the methodological insights that the other two definitions provide.

To apply those theories to Roman religion, it is necessary to create a synthesised framework of 'religious capital' which allies characteristics of the three main definitions outlined above.

This framework is based on four main characteristics. First, 'religious capital' in ancient Rome is a form of credit given by an individual to the community which has to acknowledge and to recognise that the individual possesses the necessary resources for it, namely divine support. Second, 'religious capital' in ancient Rome would be characterised by a competitive nature. Individuals accumulated and used religious capital within a competitive social arena in which actors compete for prestige and political power. Third, 'religious capital' in ancient Rome would be individually accumulated. The lack of a strictly rigid religious organisation means that religious capital is based on the religious experience of the individual, namely his knowledge of the religion, his familiarity with rituals, and the piety he exhibits – in other words, his own experience of the divine. Finally, the social and political value of the 'religious capital' would be defined by the individual and the community together in a way which is equally beneficial to both.

⁸⁰ On the multi-polarity of Roman religion, see for instance, Beard, North and Price 1998, 18-30, 99-108, 149-156; Scheid 2001, 47-76; Rüpke 2011a, 25-38.

⁸¹ See for instance, Scheid 2016, 32-43.

⁸² On this point, see for instance Orlin 1997; Russell 2016, 96-126.

This conceptual framework is well suited to the analysis of FELICITAS. The divine quality, it seems, represented the support given to Roman generals by the gods to win battles and was an integral part of the competition between members of the Roman elite for social and political honours in Rome. The Roman people arguably played a role in defining the divine quality and to whom it was attributed. The framework also puts into perspective the semantic and conceptual challenges faced when analysing FELICITAS in sources. On one hand, the various meanings attached to the words *felicitas* and its cognates *felix* and *feliciter* relate to the capacity of FELICITAS to represent a form of capital. On the other hand, FELICITAS' religious status as both a divine blessing and a divinity relates to the ability of divine quality to describe the religious resources necessary to be granted religious symbolic capital.

In ancient sources, the divine quality FELICITAS is denoted by the noun *felicitas*, the adjective *felix*, and the adverb *feliciter*, implying that FELICITAS is the concept attached to those words. However, *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter* have a multiplicity of meanings. In the Late Roman Republic, they denoted four different characteristics of the individual (or object) they qualify, namely to be fertile and fecund, to be lucky, to be successful, and finally, to be happy.⁸³ While context can help to understand which of those characteristics Romans aimed to convey, for a large part of our attestations, there is certain ambiguity. The difficulty presented by the different characteristics represented by the words *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter* stems from our modern perception that the ideas of fortune, success, happiness, and fertility and fecundity, are quite distinct from one another.⁸⁴ From a modern perspective, it is hard to understand how in Romans' mind one concept could represent such different and distinct characteristics.

To address this issue, the 'triangle of signification', used in modern linguistic theory, constitutes a useful tool to understand how Romans conceptualised FELICITAS. Indeed, it holds that the meaning of a word is

⁸³ On those qualities, see Chapter One.

⁸⁴ On the difficulty in approaching FELICITAS from a semantic point of view, see Calasso 1962.

composed of two key elements: a 'referent' and an 'idea' or 'concept'.⁸⁵ A word denotes a referent, a thing in the real world, while expressing a concept, a thing in the mind, which represents the referent. The word 'reference' then denotes the relationship between words and things, or the things related to the words. Similarly, the word 'concept' expresses the relationship between words and ideas, or the ideas related to the words. Concepts or 'ideas' are themselves composed of elements organised according to a particular set (or sets) of conditions.

When applied to sources, this approach suggests that Romans conceptualised FELICITAS as representing the ability of an individual (or an object) to produce or contribute something positive for themselves or others. This conception of FELICITAS is born out of the etymology of the word *felicitas* and its cognates. They all derive from the Indo-European root *dhea¹ – which expresses both the ideas of fertility, the proven capacity to have offspring, and fecundity, the potential to produce offspring.⁸⁶ The word then expresses both the potential for the process of reproduction to happen and the outcome of the process of reproduction, proof that an individual is able to use his potential to reproduce. Romans thought of this ability in three different ways as either (1) a state of being able to bring about a positive action, in other words a potential, or (2) an enacted ability to carry out a positive action, or (3) the positive outcome the action has created.

The concept of FELICITAS, therefore, embodies three different aspects of production, namely capacity, enacted ability, and outcome. While context can help determine which of those three different aspects of FELICITAS Romans are discussing, it is necessary to think with them to the idea conveyed. As we will later see in Chapter One, this conceptualisation of FELICITAS remains constant as the semantic fields of the words *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter* grew over the last two centuries of the Late Roman Republic. Therefore, I have decided not to translate the words *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter* in English as the

⁸⁵ Davis 2005, 206-9.

⁸⁶ De Vaan 2008, 209 and its bibliography. For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter One.

usual translations, 'felicity', 'happiness, happy, happily', 'luckiness, lucky, luckily', 'success, successful, successfully', fail to capture the idea that FELICITAS represents the ability of an individual (or object) to act productively.

The second issue to take into consideration when approaching FELICITAS in ancient sources is that the quality represented by FELICITAS was conceived as both a concept and a divine object, namely a divine blessing and deity. This dual nature was integral to the way Romans understood FELICITAS. FELICITAS embodies the conception(s) behind the four characteristics the word *felix*, *feliciter* and *felicitas* denote. On a religious level, FELICITAS is a divine object, conceived as both a goddess and a gift of the gods. Cicero's definition of Pompey's FELICITAS, as a power granted by the gods to good generals for them to win battles and conquer lands for the *res publica*, indicates that the FELICITAS of a Roman general laid at the intersection of how Romans conceived of good fortune and success in their society, and of how divine agency mediated this good fortune or success. In 145-2 BCE, the goddess FELICITAS received her first known public place of worship with the construction of a temple by the general Lucullus after his victory in Spain.⁸⁷ Subsequently, three other temples were built in Rome testifying to the increasing importance of the goddess FELICITAS in the religious landscape of the Late Roman Republic.⁸⁸ Although context can sometimes provide clues as to whether Romans refer to the goddess FELICITAS or the concept of FELICITAS, in most cases there is a certain ambiguity which makes it difficult to distinguish between the two.

The problem of separating the divine and the discursive nature of the quality is anachronistic because FELICITAS was a fluid notion for the Romans. As Denis Feeney neatly summarised, "from a modern point of view, the problem of abstracts [divinities] seems to be compounded by the Romans' lack of a distinction between majuscule and minuscule letters. Thinking about the difference between Pax and pax is not easy but it would appear to be a good

⁸⁷ Dio, 43.21.1; Strabo.8.26.3. For a detailed discussion of Lucullus' temple, see Chapter Four.

⁸⁸ On the temples with ancient and modern references, see Chapter Four.

deal easier than thinking about the difference between PAX and PAX.” He then added that such a differentiation obscures the “advantages resulting from a mentality that did not rigidly impose demarcations between words, qualities, and instantiations and that could fruitfully mobilise this indeterminacy.”⁸⁹ The fluidity of the boundary between quality and divinity is best illustrated by Plautus’ jokes. Toward the beginning of the *Bacchides*, when the slave Lydus asks the young man Pistoclerus who lives in the house he is entering, Pistoclerus answers “Love, Pleasure, Venus (VENUS), Venusness (VENUSTAS) (...).”⁹⁰ Here, VENUS, meaning loveliness, charm or beauty could refer either to the quality of a person in the house or to the goddess herself.⁹¹ The use of small and big capitals to mark the difference between the different categorisation of the divine quality is unhelpful and the need for a circumstantial differentiation at each instance can prove arduous and hazardous.⁹² I therefore follow Clark’s convention to refer to divine qualities in small capital letters as a way to reflect the indeterminate nature of the quality and to “remind us that we are dealing with a spectrum and not two separable categories.”⁹³ However, I make an exception for *fortuna* since Daniele Miano has shown there are clear boundaries between the concept and the deity, making it possible to distinguish between the two.⁹⁴

0.4 A new interpretative model

Re-reading ancient sources with the conceptual frameworks of the religious symbolic capital and ‘the triangle of signification’ yields a new interpretative model to understand FELICITAS and its political and social value.

Romans ascribed FELICITAS as part of a deeply social process. The quality was attributed to an individual by an observer through the *ex post facto*

⁸⁹ Feeney 1998, 88. The artificial nature of the separation is also recognised by Clark 2007, 21-3; Fears 1981a, 845 n.69.

⁹⁰ Plaut. *Bac.* 115-116.

⁹¹ See Feeney 1998, 88 and Clark 2007, 25 for discussion of the passage.

⁹² Clark 2007, 20-2 and Axtell 1907, 7-9 for a discussion of the difficulties inherent in the process of differentiation.

⁹³ Clark 2007, 21. Clark

⁹⁴ Miano 2018, 7-8.

comparison of the obtained and desired outcomes of the action undertaken by the first individual. This means that to be declared FELIX is inherently a matter of perception as the outcome of the action must be acknowledged by an individual. It was a matter of perspective, since an external observer is needed to make the assessment, and finally, of judgement as the external observer needed to assess the outcome of the action comparing it with defined expectations.⁹⁵ Both the individual and the observer must have knowledge of the criteria which defined FELICITAS in the particular context in which the claim is being made. Ascribing the divine quality FELICITAS to an individual is thus part of a social exchange between individuals.

This way of attributing the divine quality is at the heart of how Romans used FELICITAS in their social and political discourse in the Late Roman Republic. In the case of the FELICITAS of Roman generals, three main actors were involved in this process: the Roman general, who performed the productive action and wanted to be recognised as having FELICITAS; the gods, who contributed to the action performed by the Roman general; and finally, the Roman community, who recognised the action and granted the honours. The Roman community was composed of all Roman adult male citizens, the sole group which Roman society recognised as politically active agents in the civic community. The Roman community I refer to corresponded to the Roman people in political terms.

When applying the way Romans ascribed FELICITAS to Roman generals, sources show that it is important to consider both the relationships between the three different actors outlined above and the benefits of those relationships. This allows us to distinguish between two different notions of FELICITAS.⁹⁶ FELICITAS *Romana*, or the FELICITAS of the Romans, represented the partnership between the Roman people and the gods and the benefits of this partnership, namely to make the *res publica amplior* and *melior* – as

⁹⁵ I use ‘to have FELICITAS’ and ‘to be FELIX’ interchangeably since those two ideas were equivalent for Romans. On the relationship between FELICITAS and FELIX see Chapter One.

⁹⁶ FELICITAS *Romana* and FELICITAS *imperatoria* are my own labels to refer to those two notions of FELICITAS.

expressed through the prayers of the *lustrum* - through military victory, conquest and the economic and political well-being of the *res publica*.⁹⁷ FELICITAS *imperatoria*, or the FELICITAS of Roman generals, was the partnership between the gods and the Roman general to bring about the benefits of FELICITAS *Romana* for the Roman people.

The interaction of those two notions of FELICITAS articulated a mutually beneficial relationship between Roman generals and the Roman community. Following military victory, the Roman community evaluated the claim of a Roman general to FELICITAS by comparing whether his FELICITAS *imperatoria* had ensured the safety, prosperity, and well-being of the *res publica* with the support of the gods. Once the claim has been accepted, in recognition of his services and in expectation that his proven FELICITAS may be useful to *res publica* again, the Roman community gave honours to Roman generals who claimed to have FELICITAS *imperatoria*. Those honours could take multiple forms such as a triumph, special military commands, increased social prestige leading to high political offices, or even legal impunity from Roman laws. However, they came with social duties, imbedded in a social and ethical code articulated around the idea of *fides*, to which FELICES Roman generals were expected to adhere.

This interpretative model of FELICITAS is useful to understand the role of the divine quality in the political culture of the Late Roman Republic for several reasons.

First, it allows me to map out the different conceptualisations of FELICITAS by analysing the evolution of the relationships between Roman generals, the gods and the Roman people over the course of second and first centuries BCE in connection with the social and political changes happening at the time. This, in turn, enables me to fill some gaps in our knowledge of conceptualisation of FELICITAS as it provides a single conceptual framework to explain not only how FELICITAS was seen as both a quality and a divine

⁹⁷ For ancient references to FELICITAS *Romana*, see for instance, Aug. *Civ D.* 3.20; *Pan. Lat.* 10.37.5.

blessing but also how FELICITAS transitioned from being the transient quality of a Roman general to a permanent one.

At the centre of this interpretation lies the idea that FELICITAS *imperatoria* represents the ability of a Roman general to work in partnership with the gods for the benefits of the *res publica*. Romans did not take their relationship with the gods for granted as their dealing with *pax deorum*, ‘the peace of the gods,’ attests. *Pax deorum*, as Santangelo has highlighted, was “the outcome of a process or a process itself rooted in background of conflict and struggles.”⁹⁸ Romans frequently sought (*impetrare*) or asked for (*exposcere*) or prayed for (*adorare*) the *pax deorum*, and sometimes found it (*invenire*).⁹⁹ For Romans, the ideal peace was the unequal one formed between conquerors and vanquished. In religion, the Romans were the conquered ones, forced to beg the gods for mercy.¹⁰⁰ In this context, FELICITAS *imperatoria* thus represents the unique ability of a particular Roman general to win over the gods, or in other words, to establish a peace with them.¹⁰¹ This divine peace allowed him to enjoy the gods’ favours during warfare. In this way, FELICITAS *imperatoria* can be construed as both a quality of and a divine blessing for the Roman general.

Second, this interpretative model of FELICITAS also enables me to conceptualise the social and political value given to FELICITAS in two ways. On the one hand, in terms of the prevalence of the representations of the relationship between the Roman general, the Roman community and the gods found in our sources and their impact on Roman politics. Indeed, Romans had to be aware of the criteria needed to assess whether an individual was FELIX. On the other hand, in terms of the benefits for the Roman general and the Roman community obtained because of those relationships. Analysing the political and social discourse of the Late Roman Republic shows not only that

⁹⁸ Santangelo 2011, 163.

⁹⁹ For reference to ancient sources, Santangelo 2011, 162-8.

¹⁰⁰ Barton 2007, 245–6.

¹⁰¹ Implicit to this statement is the idea that not all Roman generals were able to commune with the divine to win battle. For a good discussion of military defeat in connection with FELICITAS, see the discussion on C. Flaminius’ defeat in the battle of Lake Trasimene in Chapter Three.

those relationships were well-known in Rome, but also that Roman generals had a strong incentive to claim the divine quality for themselves because of the social honours and political advantages given by the Roman people to a FELIX general.

Finally, this interpretative model of FELICITAS helps me demonstrate the role of Roman generals and of the Roman community in defining FELICITAS and its social and political worth. Analysing examples of acceptance and contestation of the divine quality shows how Roman generals – by developing new representations of their relationship with the divine – and how the Roman people – by accepting those new representations and by awarding ever more honours or political power to Roman generals claiming to have FELICITAS – both develop new criteria and standards that define the divine quality and its social and political value. The role of the Roman people, as audience and judge of Roman generals' claim to the divine quality FELICITAS and as arbiter of the honours and political power FELICES Roman generals received, suggests that it played an important role in the erosion of the power-sharing system between members of the Roman elite which characterised the Roman Republic.

0.5 Methodology

To support this new interpretation of FELICITAS and its use in the political culture of the Late Roman Republic, I borrow two methodologies from social anthropology to expose the social dynamics at the heart of the divine quality.

Firstly, Jörg Rüpke's new definition of religion in Antiquity offers tools to analyse the conceptualisations of FELICITAS as a reflection of the relationship between Roman generals, the gods, and the Roman people. Using the ethnographical analytic theory of Lived Religion, Rüpke has defined religion in the context of social communication between individuals within a community.¹⁰² He has described religion as "the temporary and situational enlargement of the environment – judged as relevant by one or several of the

¹⁰² Rüpke 2015.

actors – beyond the unquestionably plausible social environment inhabited by co-existing humans who are in communication (and hence observable)”.¹⁰³

This broad definition of religion holds distinctive advantages to the study of FELICITAS. Conceptualising religion as a form of social dialogue between social actors makes religion a reflection of the relationships between individuals in a community. This implies that religious communication provides us with insights into these relationships. Therefore, analysing the conceptualisations of the divine quality and of the goddess FELICITAS is a way to analyse the relationship between Roman generals and the Roman community.

This new definition of religion in ancient time also highlights the relationship between religious agency and human agents – or in other words, the religious experience of the individual. As Rüpke detailed, it is within the course of an action, performed in order to solve an imminent problem, that a divine agency is created by social actor(s).¹⁰⁴ The aims, strategies and meanings of this creation process are further developed or modified by the social context shared with other agents and the traditions of actions within that social context. Implicit in this view of religion is that the religious field is competitive; each individual can experience the divine differently but only forms of divine experience validated by other members of the community are acceptable. Therefore, by analysing the social context, i.e. the imminent problem that needs to be solved, in which the divine quality and the goddess FELICITAS is used, will help us understand how and why the Roman generals’ experience of the divine evolved over time.

Rüpke’s analytical definition of religion in ancient time places special emphasis on the social context in which this communication takes place. Indeed, as Rüpke has explained, the implausible nature of the divine agency entails a certain risk for the individuals who ascribe their actions to this agency since other social actors may not accept their explanation.¹⁰⁵ This means that

¹⁰³ Rüpke 2015, 348.

¹⁰⁴ Rüpke 2015, 351.

¹⁰⁵ Rüpke 2015, 349-50.

the 'divine' agency must be deemed appropriate to this social context in which the religious communication is taking place for other individuals to accept or reject it. A direct consequence is that the social context influences not only the 'religious' communication but also the relationship between social actors. Analysing the social context in which the divine quality and the goddess FELICITAS are used provides us with insights into how the Romans' conception of good fortune influences the conceptualisation(s) of those two divine agencies.

Secondly, the framework of 'ritualisation' enables me to articulate the mutually beneficial relationship of the Roman people, the Roman general, and the gods embodied by FELICITAS through the analysis of the two public religious rituals associated with the divine quality, namely the *lustrum* and the triumph. Developed at the turn of the twenty-first century, 'ritualisation' provides a useful set of tools to examine the constitutive elements of rituals and their social meanings, to bring new light to the performativity of the ritual, and to highlight the power of those rituals to create social and symbolic relationships for its participants. By taking rituals as texts imbued with social and cultural meaning, 'ritualisation' designates the creative process of the ritual onto its participants to form 'ritualised bodies' (participants who can perform ritualised actions in ritualised environment) through the interaction of a social body (an individual and/or a community) with a symbolically constructed spatial, temporal and linguistical environment that forms a scheme of world structures.¹⁰⁶

'Ritualisation' is suited for the analysis of the Roman society as it is an "effective tool to analyse social action in society with emphasis on hierarchical position as opposed to personal identity and yet presents a general social consensus which upholds the system."¹⁰⁷ Through this conceptual lens, analysing the constitutive elements of rituals such as prayers or clothing of participants, looking at their content and contextualising them in the ritual, sheds light on the set of relations between the gods and the Romans on the one hand and between the Roman general and the Roman community, on the

¹⁰⁶ Bell 1992, 93-95.

¹⁰⁷ Douglas 1966, 33, 103, 178-9; Bell 1992, 178, 180.

other hand as well as on the role of FELICITAS in the formation of those relationships.

0.6 Sources

I use the methodological tools outlined above to examine a wide variety of sources referring to the divine quality or the goddess FELICITAS. The depth and type of the analysis feasible is determined (and limited) by both the availability and the nature of existing sources. Indeed, on the one hand, we are constrained by the amount of information regarding the way the divine quality was conceived by Romans and used in Roman political and social discourses. On the other hand, the nature of the sources forces us to come to terms with the probability of historical inaccuracy of the reported representations. Their nature also limits the analysis of the actors and their role in those discourses.

The sources analysed in this thesis were either produced during the Late Roman Republic or narrated events that took place during that period based on sources written at the time. They represent the most illustrative examples of the way Romans conceived FELICITAS and used the divine quality during the second and first centuries BCE. They can be broadly grouped in three categories: those focusing on political use of FELICITAS, those focusing on the social use of the divine quality, and finally those focusing on the goddess FELICITAS.

First amongst the sources which focus on the political use of FELICITAS is Cicero's writing. His political and forensic speeches as well as his philosophical treatises provide valuable insights into the conceptualisations of FELICITAS and its use in Roman politics. His major role in many of the political events of the period under consideration guarantees us the account and reflections of a protagonist in the Roman political culture of Late Roman Republic. Bearing in mind that my aim is to reconstruct the way FELICITAS was used to justify a Roman general's particular claim to social honours, prestige and political power, the potential discrepancy between the delivered and published version of the speeches does not constitute an obstacle to this kind

of research. Actually, the presence in the published speeches of arguments centred around FELICITAS, which could possibly not have been present in the version orally delivered, demonstrates the importance of those arguments to the Roman audience according to Cicero. However, the partiality of the Roman orator as social and political agent requires careful consideration, on the one hand, of the audience to which those speeches and treaties are addressed and the impact of those speeches and treaties on this audience, and, on the other hand, of the singularity of Cicero's ideas on, and use of, the divine quality.

To address those issues, I consider the place of Cicero's writing in the wider context of Roman practices, by looking at whether other orators have developed similar arguments to those Cicero presents in his forensic and defence speeches. When it comes to Cicero's philosophical writing about FELICITAS, this would mean looking whether members of other philosophical movements in Rome have written about the divine quality as well.¹⁰⁸ To evaluate the extent to which Cicero used FELICITAS in a novel way, I pay close attention to the audience of the speeches and their reaction. For instance, the success or failure of Cicero to get a client's acquittal can be a usual indicator of whether Cicero's use of FELICITAS was commonly known – understandably with the caveat that other factors came into play during the trial. Indeed, the persuasiveness of the case Cicero argues implies that the jury would know, recognise and understand Cicero's use of FELICITAS.¹⁰⁹

The second type of sources available to reconstruct the conceptualisations of the divine quality and its use in Roman political debate consist mainly of the historical narratives written by Caesar, Livy, and Plutarch. Livy's history of Rome allows us to examine both the social honours associated with the divine quality and the relationship between the Romans and the gods. Livy's 'triumphal debates' in the second century BCE describe well the deep connection between the divine quality and the ritual of the triumph.¹¹⁰ They are also valuable sources to inform us about the role of the Roman people in

¹⁰⁸ On approaching Cicero's philosophical writing, Lintott 2008, 215-300.

¹⁰⁹ On how to approach Cicero's oratory, Lintott 2008, 45-123.

¹¹⁰ For a list of Livy's triumphal debates, see Pittenger 2008, 299-302.

assessing the claim to have FELICITAS of a Roman general and in determining the proper honour for it. His reconstruction of the practices and the ways of thinking about Roman religion in the second century BCE reveals how Romans thought about the impact of the divine on their life and during warfare. Livy's history of Rome is a reconstruction of historical events, practices, and attitudes, reflective both of the historical sources the Roman writer uses and of the practices and attitudes of the time of his writing, i.e. the end of the first century BCE.¹¹¹ Since I aim to reconstruct the conceptualisations of FELICITAS and their use in the political culture of the Late Roman Republic, this tension does not constitute an obstacle to my analysis because what Livy presents as old conceptions of FELICITAS are still circulating in Roman culture, albeit less predominantly, throughout the Late Roman Republic.

Plutarch's biography of Sulla is a valuable source to understand how a Roman general sought to present his FELICITAS as based on his personal relationship with the gods. Plutarch's use of Sulla's *Autobiography* as a source for his narrative of the Roman general's life provides us with the unique opportunity to understand how Sulla presented his own FELICITAS.¹¹² Since Plutarch aims to create a positive portrayal of Sulla's character and relationship with the divine, the fragments of Sulla's autobiography identified in Plutarch's writing can be taken as a faithful representation of Sulla's ideas.¹¹³ However, since Plutarch wrote in Greek and Sulla in Latin, it is necessary to understand not only how Plutarch translated the various terms Sulla used to describe his FELICITAS but also to what Roman notions those terms referred.

The historical account of Caesar's campaign in Gaul will enable me to examine how Roman generals sought to legitimise their political and military actions using FELICITAS. The partiality of Caesar as a social and political agent does not impact this analysis; on the contrary, it is precisely Caesar's point of view on the events and his own portrayal of FELICITAS which I want to explore. Just as in the case of Cicero, however, it is necessary to pay attention to the

¹¹¹ On Livy and his sources, see Chapter Three.

¹¹² On Plutarch's use of the *Autobiography*, see Chapter Five.

¹¹³ For a detailed discussion of this point, see Chapter Five.

transmission of Caesar's point of view through evidence of the circulation of his military account at the time to evaluate the prevalence of his view on FELICITAS in Roman society.

The sources which focus on the social use of FELICITAS consist of Plautus' plays, Valerius Maximus' writing on Roman ethics, and Latin epigraphy. Plautus' play *Amphitryon*, dated between 191 and 187 BCE, provides a unique insight into the way Romans understood the dynamics of the relationship between Roman generals and the gods at the time. Valerius Maximus' examples of what constitutes a good Roman life in *Memorable deeds and sayings* provide us with insights into the connection of FELICITAS with Roman ethics. Since Valerius Maximus is writing in the first century CE, it will be important to consider the extent to which the examples he presents were known, used, and debated in the Late Roman Republic. To do so, I will endeavour to show that the examples from Valerius Maximus discussed in my analysis were known either in the second or first century BCE.

The epigraphical evidence in connection with FELICITAS comes from the city of Pompeii, destroyed by the eruption of the Vesuvius in 79 CE.¹¹⁴ Those epigraphical remains are valuable attestations of the characteristics denoted by the words *felicitas*, *feliciter* and *felix*. Their locations in the city provide insights into the social contexts in which they were used. The information we get from those sources is limited by the fact that some epigraphical attestations are difficult to read and that it is sometimes unclear which characteristics are referred. To overcome those limitations, I am using the reading of the *CIL* if newer readings of those inscriptions are not available.

The final category of evidence under discussion consists of sources about the goddess FELICITAS. Varro's description of the goddess FELICITAS in his lost work *Antiquities of Humane and Divine Things*, as reported in Augustine's fourth century CE *The City of God*, constitutes our main source on how the deity was conceptualised in the first century BCE. The transmission of Varro's ideas by Augustine raises a series of methodological issues, which

¹¹⁴ On a good discussion and a list of epigraphical attestations of FELICITAS in Pompeii, see Clark 2007, 306-9.

are primarily centred around the reliability of the Christian writer as a source for Varro's writing. The issues are addressed in detail in the Appendix I.

0.7 Structure Overview

This thesis is divided in six chapters and an Appendix. Chapter One will lay out the conceptual foundation for the rest of the work. Using linguistic theory, I analyse the meanings of the words *felicitas*, *felix*, and *feliciter* in the Roman discourse of the second and first centuries BCE to outline how Romans conceptualised FELICITAS. Then, to illustrate how Romans ascribed FELICITAS to an individual at the time, I examine the example in which this process is the clearest, namely the categorisation of the sacred trees used in Roman rituals as FELICES. Finally, I explore the various Roman social ideals attached to the divine quality FELICITAS in the Late Roman Republic by analysing examples of what constituted a good Roman life in the first century BCE found in Valerius Maximus' ethical writing.

Having established that to be recognised as FELIX an individual must meet certain criteria, in Chapter Two, I explore the criteria a Roman general must meet for him to claim FELICITAS. Using the anthropological framework of 'ritualisation', I first examine the ritual of the *lustrum* to show how its prayers define FELICITAS *Romana* as the relationship between the gods and the Romans to bring about a better future for the *res publica*, *melior* and *amplior*. The ideals of *melior* and *amplior* are a means to judge and assess the state of the *res publica*, present and future, and are connected to military victory and conquest, or agricultural productivity. I then analyse the parade of the triumph to show how Roman generals demonstrated to the Roman people that their military victory has made the *res publica amplior* and *melior* through the display of their booty and its use to finance the works of the *res publica*. By wearing the *insigna* of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, the general visually shows that he has successfully worked with the gods to bring about the benefits of FELICITAS *Romana* for the Roman people.

Since winning a battle in partnership with the gods is one of the main conditions for a Roman general to be recognised as FELIX, the relationship

between Roman generals and the gods and its evaluation is the subject of the subsequent chapters.

Chapter Three, Four and Five present two different synchronous conceptions for *FELICITAS imperatoria*, the relationship between the general and the gods to make the *res publica amplior* and *melior* in the Late Roman Republic: one in which *FELICITAS imperatoria* represents a transient quality of the general emanating from the relationship of the Roman people with the divine. It was the most prevalent way Romans conceived the divine quality *FELICITAS* in the second century BCE. The other conception, in which *FELICITAS* refers to a permanent quality of the general stemming from his personal relationship with the divine, was the most prevalent way in which Romans conceived the divine quality in the first century BCE.

In chapter Three, I analyse representations from the second century BCE of the figure of the triumphant general in the official language of the *res publica*, in popular culture and in historical narrative to outline how the *FELICITAS* of Roman generals was understood at the time. Analysing one of the best examples of the official language used by the Senate to decree a triumph, namely the inscription recording the triumph of L. Aemilius Regillus celebrated in 189 BCE for his victory against the fleet of Antiochus II, shows that *FELICITAS imperatoria* was conceived as the transient ability of a Roman general to work with the divine by consulting the gods on behalf of the Roman people because of his *ius auspicandi*, his prerogative to take the auspices. It also shows that his military success was evaluated by the Senate to determine whether he was *FELIX*, and thus worthy of receiving a triumph. I explore how this conception of *FELICITAS* was represented in popular culture, by analysing one of the best instances Plautus used *FELICITAS* to describe the impact of the divine on the life of his characters, his play *Amphitryon*, and in historical narrative, by exploring Livy's reconstruction of religious practices and thinking in the second century BCE in his narrative of Roman history.

In chapter Four, I argue that this conceptualisation of divine quality *FELICITAS* was challenged by Lucullus' construction of the first temple of the goddess *FELICITAS* in 145-2 BCE. Using Rüpke's definition of religion, I

examine our best description of the agency of the goddess FELICITAS in the Late Roman Republic, Varro's description of the deity in the *Antiquities of Divine and Humane Things*, as transmitted by Augustine's *City of God*, to argue that the goddess was seen as the divine agency working with Roman generals to bring the benefits of FELICITAS *Romana*, by granting good fortune to Roman generals on the battlefield on account of their VIRTUS. As such, she was conceived as response to the instability and uncertainty of the goddess Fortuna, whom Roman generals feared. I also investigate the statues decorating Lucullus' temple to maintain that Lucullus actively sought to present the deity as a divine inspiration, akin to one of the Muses, to implicitly claim that it was his personal relationship with the goddess FELICITAS which led to his victory as opposed to the Romans' relationship with the divine.

In chapter Five, I demonstrate how in the first century BCE Roman generals adopted Lucullus' conception of FELICITAS *imperatoria* for political gains. To do so, I survey Sulla's own justification for his decision to march on Rome in his *Autobiography*, Cicero's support for Pompey's command against Mithridates in *In Favour of the Manilian Law*, and Caesar's own justification for his war against the Gauls in his *Gallic War*, as those examples draw on each other to develop new ways to portray the FELICITAS of a Roman general as their personal relationship with the gods. Analysing those sources outlines how Roman generals (and their allies) articulated religious and political arguments to present themselves as the best capable men to deal with the military threats the *res publica* was facing at the time. To claim divine support enabled them to legitimise decisions taken in response to crisis, and gave them an advantage over other members of the Roman elite competing for the same honours.

In Chapter Six I explore in detail the relationship between the Roman general and the Roman people by detailing both the honours FELICES generals could claim and the social and ethical code they had to adhere to. To do so, I primarily analyse Cicero's use of the divine quality in his defence of Murena and Fonteius as they illustrate well how Roman generals used their FELICITAS *imperatoria* to gain social advantages and political honours from the Roman people. I examine how Sulla's and Caesar's abuses of power as perceived by

members of the Roman elite led to a debate about the ethical and religious implication of the divine quality. Out of this debate, only two redefinitions remain in our sources. Analysing the definition of FELICITAS proposed by Cicero in a fragment of a letter to Nepos written in 44 BCE, in his philosophical treaty *On Duties*, and his speeches against Marc Antony, the *Philippics*, and by followers of Stoic philosophy in Rome demonstrates how members of Roman society used Greek philosophy to articulate a new moral and ethical code for the divine quality. The analysis of the honours and duties implied by FELICITAS enables me to outline how the Roman people played an active role not only in accepting and refusing the claim to the divine quality but also in defining the moral and ethical code FELICES generals were expected to adhere to.

In Conclusion, I summarise the findings of this work and evaluate their implications for our understanding of FELICITAS and of the role of the Roman people in the political culture of the Late Roman Republic.

In Appendix I, I deal with the methodological implications of the transmission of Varro's description of the goddess FELICITAS by Augustine in his discussion of the deity in *The City of God*. I first ascertain the reliability of the bishop of Hippo as a source for Varro's ideas on the goddess FELICITAS. Using Augustine's own Christian notion of FELICITAS, I then attempt to distinguish what Varro's conception of the goddess FELICITAS in the first century BCE may have been from Augustine's own criticism of the deity.

1 Defining FELICITAS: Meanings and Prevalence

In the Late Roman Republic, FELICITAS played an important role in Roman political, social and religious discourse. In this chapter, I analyse the meanings and prevalence of the noun *felicitas* and its cognates, the adjective, *felix*, and the adverb, *feliciter*, to show that FELICITAS was part of a shared Roman culture involving Romans from all social classes. My analysis has three aims. First, I argue that FELICITAS represents the ability of an individual (or an object) to produce or contribute something positive for themselves or others. Second, I defend the idea that the characterisation of an individual (or an object) as having FELICITAS is done by an external observer through the *ex post facto* comparison of the obtained and desired outcomes of the action undertaken by the first individual. Lastly, I maintain that FELICITAS was understood and used by all members of Roman society to talk about their social position, the effects of the divine in their life, and their impact on the world.

In my analysis, I use modern linguistic theory, namely ‘the triangle of signification’, which postulates that the meaning of a word represents a series of relationships between ‘a referent’ and a ‘concept.’ I apply it to a wide range of sources in order to elucidate the conceptual relationship between the words *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter* and the divine quality FELICITAS and to expose the components by which FELICITAS was conceptualised by Romans.¹ To discuss the relationships between the concept, the characteristics, and the words, I will use the same verbs as in modern linguistic theory: to represent, to talk about the relationship between FELICITAS and a characteristic; to express, to describe the relationship between FELICITAS and the word *felicitas* and its cognates; and finally, to denote, to designate the relationship between the words *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter* and a characteristic.

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part explores the different characteristics represented by FELICITAS at the time to elucidate how the divine quality was conceptualised by Romans. In doing so, I highlight the

¹ For a more detailed discussion, see Introduction.

conceptual connections of FELICITAS with other important Roman notions, such as *fortuna*, VIRTUS, and *dignitas*. The second part elucidates how Romans ascribed the divine quality to an individual (or an object) by exploring the process and criteria Romans used to categorise sacred trees used in their religious rituals as FELICES and INFELICES. The final part of this chapter reveals the social values and ideals embodied by FELICITAS in the Late Roman Republic through the analysis of examples of what constituted the ‘good life’ for Romans in the first century BCE as preserved by Valerius Maximus.

1.1 The meanings of FELICITAS

The word *felicitas* and its cognates *felix* and *feliciter* have four meanings, namely 1. fertility/fecundity, 2. good fortune/luckiness, 3. success, and 4. happiness.² Those meanings denote characteristics of an individual (or object) qualified as FELIX or as having FELICITAS and were known and used by Romans to describe themselves, others, the world around them, and to pray to their gods. In this section, I show that those characteristics were thought of by Romans along the same lines, namely that FELICITAS represents the ability of an individual (or an object) to produce or contribute something positive for themselves or others. This ability was conceived as both the outcome of a particular process or action and the potential for this process or action to happen (again). This conception of FELICITAS stems in ancient sources from the etymology of the word itself and its cognates, its literal and conceptual association with important Roman notions such as VIRTUS or *fortuna* and the context - primarily military, religious and ethical/philosophical - in which FELICITAS is used.

² Their antonyms are *infelicitas*, *infelix*, *infeliciter*. They generally denote bad luck, see *TLL* s.v. *infelicitas* 7.1 1359.75-60.18, s.v. *infelix* 7.1 1361.25-37; s.v. *infeliciter* 7.1 1365.19-26; misery, see *TLL* s.v. *infelix* 7.1 1361.40-63.70; s.v. *infeliciter* 7.1 1365.43-61; infertility, *TLL* s.v. *infelicitas* 7.1 1359.70-3; s.v. *infelix* 7.1 1361.11-23; and wrongdoing, *TLL* s.v. *infelix* 7.1 1363.73-65.14; s.v. *infeliciter* 7.1 1365.27-41. There is also the verb *infelicare* only found in Plautus’ plays to represent divine ill-fortune, see Chapter Three.

1.1.1 Fertility/fecundity

The first characteristic FELICITAS describes is the fertility and fecundity of a living being. This attribute stems from the etymology of the word itself. The Latin adjective *felix*, from which the noun *felicitas* and the adjective *feliciter* derive, stems from the Indo-European root *d^hea₁- l(u)- i- which expresses the ideas of ‘suckling/having breasts’, of ‘being with suckling animals’, and of ‘being able to give birth’. It thus broadly describes the state of ‘being with child.’³ This state is represented as both the outcome of the process of reproduction, i.e. giving birth, and the potential for it, i.e. being able to feed an offspring by having breasts or being able to give birth again. Central to the etymological root of the Latin word *felix* are the notions of fertility - the proven capacity to have offspring - and fecundity - the potential to produce offspring.⁴

This original meaning is attested in a number of sources, of various nature, from the second century BCE to the third century CE, in which the word FELICITAS or the adjective *felix* denote the fertility and fecundity of the earth, of trees, and of men.⁵ For instance, in a fragment reported by Festus, Cato declares that “FELICES trees were those which bore fruit, and INFELICES trees were those that did not” (*FELICES arbores que fructum ferunt, INFELICES quae non ferunt*).⁶ Writing in the first century BCE, Virgil uses the association between the words *infelix* and *sterilis* in the lament of Mopsus, who deplores that the departure of Pallas and Apollo from the fields has led the earth “to produce sad darnel and infertile grass” from good grain (*INFELIX lolium et steriles nascuntur auenae*) to highlight the infertility of the earth.⁷ In the third

³ De Vaan 2008, 209 with bibliography.

⁴ In social and medical sciences, fecundity is the physiological potential to bear children whereas fertility is the actual delivery of a live birth. Fertility is often used as measure of fitness whereas fecundity is related to reproductive value, cf. Frank 1993; Leridon 2007.

⁵ For instance, for the FELICITAS of the earth, see Verg. *Georg.* 1.154; 2.187-8; *Ecl.* 5.37; Plin. *HN* 1.12.41, 16.108, 18.170, 24.68; of vegetation or trees, see Livy 5.24.2; Ser. *Aen.* 6.230; Macr. *Sat.* 3.20.2-3; Front. *Epis. ad amic.* 2.7.14; Colum. 3.3.2; Front. *Epis. ad amic.* 2.7.14; and of man, see Val. Max. 3.2.16; Vell. 2.93.2; Iust. 36.2.4; *CIL* IV 8858, 1454. For more attestations, see *TLL* s.v. *felix* 435.75-437.37; *TLL* s.v. *felicitas* 431.59-84.

⁶ Cato apud Fest. p.81(L).

⁷ Virg. *Ecl.* 5.37.

century CE the historian Justin employs a similar association between the words *felix* and *fecundus* to describe how “exceptional seasonal rains” (*FELICIBUS et tempestivis imbribus*) make Spanish lands “fertile for all kind of fruits” (*in omnia frugum genera fecunda est*) to nourish the whole Roman empire.⁸ Beside the literary evidence, there are several epigraphical remains which connect the word *FELICITAS* with the idea of sex, fertility and pleasure.⁹ Most well-known of these is the relief found in a bakery in Pompeii displaying a phallus, symbol of a man’s fertility, surrounded by the inscription ‘*Hic Habitat FELICITAS*’.¹⁰

Those different types of sources covering such a large span of time testify that the meaning of the word *felicitas* and its cognates, *felix* and *felicitate*, as fertile and fecund remains constant throughout the centuries.¹¹ The nature of the sources also attests that a wide range of Romans were exposed to this meaning of *FELICITAS*. Any inhabitant of Pompeii who went to buy bread - whether they were Roman citizens, foreigners, slaves, woman, rich or poor - was reminded of the connection between *FELICITAS* and fertility when seeing the phallus and the inscription of ‘*Hic Habitat FELICITAS*’ in the bakery. Similarly, listeners of Virgil’s poems at public performance would have understood the lament of Mopsus only if they knew that the word *felicitas* denotes fertility and fecundity. Quite telling, Servius’ anecdote reporting that the mime-actress Cytheris gave lively recitals from the *Eclogues* in the theatre with Cicero in the audience testifies to the acquaintance with Virgil’s poetry by ordinary and elite people alike.¹² Ancient sources then indicate that diverse groups of the Roman community understood that one of the characteristics of *FELICITAS* was to be fertile/fecund. This then implies that Romans may most likely have conceived the quality as describing both a potential and an actual outcome.

⁸ Just. *Epit.* 44.1.4.

⁹ See for instance, *CIL* IV, 8858, *CIL* III, 5561; *CIL* X, 8053.

¹⁰ *CIL* IV, 1454.

¹¹ Zieske 1972, 10.

¹² Serv. *ap. Ecl.* 6.11. The veracity of story has been questioned by Panayotakis 2008, 191-4 and Höschle 2013, 48-60. On the popularity of Virgil, see Tac. *Dial.* 13.

1.1.2 Good luck

The second attribute FELICITAS describes is to be lucky or to have good fortune. In the Late Roman Republic, FELICITAS as good fortune was the most prevalent meaning of the words *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter*.¹³ It can be found in poems, speeches, historical writing, plays, and proverbs to talk about the effect of divine and chance on one's or other's life in political, social, military, and religious context.¹⁴ The conception of FELICITAS as good fortune in sources is negotiated between its association with *fortuna* and its opposition to VIRTUS.

An example that illustrates well how FELICITAS represents luckiness is a proverb, reported in the *Rhetoric for Herennius* written in the 80's BCE, which says that "another man's prosperity is a gift of fortune, this man's good character has been won by hard work" (*alii fortuna dedit FELICITATEM, huic industria VIRTUTEM comparavit*).¹⁵ The proverb highlights that FELICITAS describes the positive effects of *fortuna*, suggesting a cause-and-effect relationship between the two ideas: *fortuna* is the agency that provides FELICITAS and FELICITAS represents the positive outcome of the action of *fortuna*.

Since the late third/early second century BCE, *fortuna* expressed two ambivalent ideas, good fortune and chance for Romans. On the one hand, *fortuna* designates what happens by chance with no apparent cause.¹⁶ In early Latin literature, *fortuna* describes a benevolent power giving good luck.¹⁷ She was worshipped in Rome and in Italy as a goddess connected to good fortune,

¹³ This meaning of the words *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter* has the greatest number of entries in *TLL* and especially from authors writing in and about the second and first century BCE, see *TLL* s.v. *felicitas*, 426.62-427.78; s.v. *felix*, 439.56-441.6.

¹⁴ For instance, in poetry, see Verg. *G.* 2.490, *Aen.* 4,657; in speeches, see Cic. *Leg. Man.* 49, *Sull.* 83, *Verr.* 6.79; in proverbs, see *Rh. ad. Her.* 4.20.27; Publ. 168, 525; in historical writings, see Livy 10.24.16, 28.32.11, 30.30.23, Nep. *Lys.* 1.1.; and in philosophical writings, see Cic. *Fin.* 5.92, *Nat. D.* 3.83.

¹⁵ *Rh. ad. Her.* 4.20.27.

¹⁶ Isid. *Etym.* 8.11.94: *fortunam a fortuitis nomen habere dicunt (fortuna, they say, is what happens by chance)*. On the etymology of the word *fortuna*, Kajanto 1981, 521-2; Champeaux 1982-7, 1.429-37; De Vaan 2008, 236; Nishimura 2019 with references.

¹⁷ For instance, see Plaut. *Mil.* 287, *Bacch.* 916, *Asin.* 105, 716-8, *Poen.* 973, *Aul.* 100, *Capt.* 864; Ter. *Eun.* 134-5, 1046-7, *Andr.* 609.

to the protection of the *ager Romanus* and Roman matrons, and to military victory.¹⁸ For instance, in Plautus' *Poenulus*, when Agorastocles is looking for witnesses to free his lover from slavery, Milphio, his slave, declares "that Fortune will come to [his] help" implying that the goddess Fortuna will save him.¹⁹

On the other hand, *fortuna* represents a fickle, malicious power responsible for the ups and downs in human life. This conception of *fortuna* is the Roman translation of the Greek idea *tyche*, the personification of chance.²⁰ Starting in the late fourth /early third century BCE the goddess Fortuna was equated and translated into the goddess *Tyche* by Greek speakers praying to Fortuna in the city of Praeneste.²¹ Over time, this process led the goddess Fortuna to be associated more and more closely with the idea of chance, and eventually to share with her Greek counterpart characteristics associated with bad fortune in literature and in philosophy.²² Many of those negative aspects were taken up by the concept, which frequently appears as bad luck in early Latin literature where the word *fortuna* is associated with adjectives such as "adverse", "uncertain," or "miserable."²³

The synchronicity of the two opposite conceptions of *fortuna*, found in Roman discourse from the second century BCE onwards, is central to how Romans conceived FELICITAS: in contrast to them, FELICITAS always represents the beneficial side of *fortuna*.²⁴ For this reason, Romans developed a series of strategies to ensure that FELICITAS denotes a state of good fortune independently of whether *fortuna* expresses good or bad fortune.

¹⁸ Champeaux 1982-7, 1.200-422; Miano 2018, 86-98; 101-122.

¹⁹ Plaut. *Poen.* 973. see Miano 2018, 114; Champeaux 1982-7, 2.105-6.

²⁰ For an history of *tyche*, see Kajanto 1981, 525-9; Champeaux 1982-7, 2.37-86; Miano 2018, 162-171.

²¹ On the translation of *tyche* to *fortuna*, see Miano 2018, 171-8 with reference to previous scholarship.

²² In a fragment of a play written by Pacuvius in the late third/early second century BCE, the goddess Fortuna is described as "insane," "blind", "brutal," "cruel," "uncertain," and "inconstant," see Pac. 366–75 Ribb. = fr. 262 Schierl. For a good modern discussion, see Champeaux 1982-7, 2.190-8; Miano 2018, 184-7.

²³ *Adversa*: Pac. frag. 200 Schierl; Lucil. 237; Acc. *trag.* 460; *incerta*: Plaut. *Capt.* 245; *misera*: Plaut. *Rud.* 185.

²⁴ August. *De civ. D.* 4.18; Varro *Ant.* fr. 44 (Cardauns).

The proverb also highlights that, when representing good fortune, FELICITAS is conceived in opposition to VIRTUS. For Romans, VIRTUS, which derives from the Latin word *vir*, meaning man, represents the activities and qualities associated with manliness.²⁵ In early Latin literature, VIRTUS describes the physical courage, the endurance and the aggressive bellicosity displayed by Romans in a military context.²⁶ Starting in the second century BCE, VIRTUS came to be associated with the Greek concept of ἀρετή, ‘what is best’, and through literary and cultural borrowing, the semantic range of references and meanings of the word expanded.²⁷ In particular, by analogy with ἀρετή, VIRTUS was used from the first century BCE onwards as a general term to designate various other virtuous qualities in philosophical and rhetorical works.²⁸ Four cardinal virtues, “prudence” (*prudentia*), “justice” (*iustitia*), “self-control” (*temperantia*), “courage” (*fortitudo*), are commonly presented as aspects of VIRTUS.²⁹ Some words denoting activity and hard work, such as “purposeful activity” (*industria*), “toil” (*labor*), “attentiveness” (*diligentia*), and the adjective “vigorous” (*strenuus*) can be seen as conditions for VIRTUS while describing the general moral, physical and intellectual excellence of the individual they qualify.³⁰ In the case of the proverb, the opposition between *fortuna*/FELICITAS and VIRTUS/*industria* emphasises the hazardous nature of the state represented by FELICITAS compared to the state described by VIRTUS/*industria* which is obtained by a man’s hard work.

²⁵ For an ancient discussion of VIRTUS, see Cic. *Tus. Disp.* 2.18.43. For a modern discussion of VIRTUS, see Hellegouarc’h 1963, 242-6; Eisenhut 1973; McDonnell 2006; Sarsila 2006; Balmaceda 2017.

²⁶ See for instance, Cato *FRHist.* 5.F76; Plaut. *Amph.* 191, 212, 260, 534, 648-9, 652-3, *ILLRP* 309 = *CIL* I² 6-7; *ILLRP* 311 = *CIL* I² 10; *ILLRP* 312 = *CIL* I² 11, cf. McDonnell 2006, 12-59.

²⁷ On VIRTUS-ἀρετή, see McDonnell 2006, 72-134 with reference to ancient sources; Balmaceda 2017, 19-25.

²⁸ See for instance, Cic. *De Or.* 1.47–48, *Mur.* 60, 63, 66, *Planc.* 78, 80, *Font.* 28. McDonnell 2006, 128-34; Balmaceda 2017, 34-42.

²⁹ For instance, for VIRTUS- *prudentia*, see Cic. *Planc.* 78, 80, *Font.* 28; for VIRTUS – *iustitia*, see Cic. *Mur.* 30; VIRTUS – *temperantia*, Cic. *Mur.* 60, *Leg. Man.* 36, *Verr.* 2.4.81; for VIRTUS – *fortitudo*, see Cic. *Tus. Disp.* 2.43; *Caes. B Gall.* 1.2.5.

³⁰ For instance, see *Enn. Ann.* 326-8 (Skutch); Cic. *Pro Rosc.* 27. For a modern discussion, see McDonnell 2006, 130.

This representation of good fortune by FELICITAS defined by its conceptual association with *fortuna* and VIRTUS is quite common in the Late Roman Republic, particularly in rhetoric, philosophical, and historical works of the first century BCE.³¹ For instance, in his plea for Caesar's clemency for Marcus Claudius Marcellus in 46 BCE, Cicero makes use of these conceptual associations for political and rhetorical purposes. Appealing to Caesar's clemency, Cicero emphasises how Caesar's virtues, and not his FELICITAS, have won him the war against Pompey, declaring that "when [Caesar] shall call to mind all else that is [his], though very often it will be [his] virtues, still frequently it will be [his] FELICITAS that [he] will thank (...) for so bright is the lustre of true glory, so high the dignity that lies in magnanimity and prudence, that while these seem to be a gift of virtue's bestowal, all else is but a gift of fortune" (*cetera cum tua recordabere, etsi persaepe virtuti, tamen plerumque FELICITATI tuae gratulabere (...) tantus est enim splendor in laude vera, tanta in magnitudine animi et consilii dignitas, ut haec a virtute donata, cetera a fortuna commodata esse videantur*).³² Cicero presents FELICITAS as a gift of fortune and opposes it to the state created by Caesar's VIRTUS shown by his magnanimity and good judgement. This conceptual and rhetorical opposition allows Cicero to prove that Caesar's *dignitas*, his prestige or social standing, does not stem from his FELICITAS but his VIRTUS, and ultimately to argue that, by forgiving Marcellus, Caesar would exert his VIRTUS and thus increase his *dignitas*.³³

Decades earlier in 66 BCE, the Roman orator used the same conceptual association between FELICITAS, VIRTUS and *fortuna* to diminish rhetorically the achievements of Lucullus against Mithridates VI, the king of Pontus, and to highlight why Pompey should be put in charge of the war in the Eastern provinces. He declared that Lucullus' "early successes depended not

³¹ For instance, Cic. *Inv.* 1.94, *Leg. Man.* 10, *Mil.* 6, *Sull.* 83, *Mur.* 12, *Dom.* 16, *Phil.* 14.11, 28,37, *Nepos, Lys.* 1.1; *Val. Max.* 6.2. ext. 3; *Sall. BJ* 95.4. *Livy*, 6.27.1, 8.31.2, 22.58.3, 30.12.12, 38.38.7. On the relationship between VIRTUS, *fortuna* and FELICITAS, see Kajanto 1957, 72-75; McDonnell 2006, 84-95.

³² Cic. *Marcell.* 19, see Tedeschi 2005, 109-12; Dugan 2013.

³³ Cic. *Marcell.* 20. On *dignitas* and FELICITAS, see Chapter Six.

so much on his FELICITAS as on his VIRTUS, and whose inability to bring the conflict decisively to an end was due to *fortuna* rather than any fault on his part” (*ut initia illa rerum gestarum magna atque praeclara non FELICITATI eius, sed VIRTUTI, haec autem extrema, quae nuper acciderunt, non culpa, sed fortunae tribuenda esse videantur*).³⁴ Just as in the case of Caesar, Cicero emphasises the VIRTUS of an individual over his FELICITAS. For him, Lucullus’ FELICITAS was not the primary agent at play in his military success because the Roman general experienced ill-fortune. This argument has three implications. Firstly, for Cicero, FELICITAS presents constant good fortune as the positive outcome of and the potential for the action of *fortuna*. Secondly, as a direct consequence of this conception of FELICITAS, as soon as bad fortune comes, for Cicero, FELICITAS stops. This logic would then imply that Cicero conceived two different temporalities: one in which Lucullus experienced FELICITAS because of the agency of good *fortuna* and another in which Lucullus did not experience FELICITAS because of the agency of bad *fortuna*. This dual temporality then enables him to doubt whether Lucullus ever experienced FELICITAS in the first place. Cicero’s use of FELICITAS in this instance illustrates the main way Romans dealt with the conceptual tension that arises when FELICITAS is associated with the negative meanings of *fortuna*.³⁵ Finally, Cicero’s overall argument suggests that military success in Roman discourse resulted from the actions of FELICITAS and VIRTUS of a Roman general.

Assuming that the Roman orator delivered his plea to Caesar and his speech in favour of Pompey as transmitted to us, Cicero would not have been able to use the conceptual association between FELICITAS, *fortuna* and VIRTUS for rhetorical and political purposes if those connections and oppositions were not commonly known to Romans at the time. His political arguments would also have been lessened if his audience, in one case Roman senators, and in

³⁴ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 10. Clark 2007, 245-6; Welch 2009, 192-3; Gildenhard 2011, 261-3. For the political implication of this passage, see Chapter Five.

³⁵ For other use of different temporality, see Livy’s account of Hannibal’s speech to Scipio Africanus before the battle of Zama, Chapter Three.

the other case, Roman citizens at large, were not aware of the connections between the divine quality and *dignitas*, as well as FELICITAS and military success.

Consequently, FELICITAS as good fortune is conceptually negotiated in its association with *fortuna*, the idea of good and bad luck, and its opposition with VIRTUS, the idea of manliness. FELICITAS refers to a state resulting from *fortuna* and denotes both the outcome and potential for the action of *fortuna*. Since *fortuna* denotes 'what happens by chance', FELICITAS refers to the positive state that results from what happens without cause. Since for Romans, *fortuna* represented good and bad luck, they used time to deal with the conceptual tensions that arise when FELICITAS is associated with the idea of chance and bad fortune.³⁶ The presence of the conceptual associations between FELICITAS, *fortuna* and VIRTUS to represent good fortune in a wide range of ancient sources such as speeches or proverbs, suggests that they were widely known in Rome.

1.1.3 Success

The third characteristic that FELICITAS describes is to be successful. This meaning is well attested in sources of literary and epigraphical nature and in political, religious, and philosophical contexts.³⁷

The use of FELICITAS to represent success is particularly prevalent in the language used in the published official decrees of the Roman Senate that grant two important rituals connected to military victory in Rome: the triumph and the *supplicatio*, a day of public prayer either to seek the gods' support for a military victory (propitiatory *supplicatio*) or to thank them for their aid (gratulatory *supplicatio*).³⁸ In his history of Rome, Livy reports several examples of those decrees.³⁹ For instance, the Roman people having voted to

³⁶ For other examples, see for instance, Plin. *HN* 143-6; Livy 30.30.19-23.

³⁷ For examples, see *TLL* s.v. *felix* 439.16-48, 446.20-447.38; *TLL* s.v. *felicitas* 427.79-430.63; *TLL* s.v. *feliciter* 450.58-451.84.

³⁸ On this distinction, see Halkin 1953, 10-13. On *supplicatio*, see Halkin 1953, Freyburger 1977; Hickson-Hahn 2000.

³⁹ For instance, see Livy 21.17.4, 31.7.14-6, 31.8.1-2; 31.48.12, 36.1.1-2, 34.10.

declare war against Philip V of Macedonia, the Roman Senate ordered three days of *supplicationes*, amongst other religious celebrations, so that the war “might have a good and successful conclusion” (*BENE ac FELICITER eveniret*).⁴⁰ The expression, *BENE ac FELICITER*, is commonly accepted as the formulaic terminology used by the Senate to pray to the gods for victory, to express their gratitude for a victory won, and to invite Roman citizens to take part in a communal religious ritual.⁴¹

The Senate also used a similar expression to justify the grant of a triumph to a victorious Roman general. Livy for instance records an inscription dedicated by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus to the god Jupiter in 174 BCE and placed in the temple of Mater Matuta.⁴² The inscription declares that “the *res publica* having been most successfully administered and the allies set free (...) for the second time he [Tiberius Gracchus] entered the city of Rome in triumph” (*re publica FELICISSIME gesta atque liberatis sociis (...) iterum triumphans in urbem Romam redit*).⁴³ The text is generally understood by scholars to emulate the terminology of the official Senate decree which awarded Tiberius Gracchus his triumph for his victorious campaign in Sardinia.⁴⁴ Since triumphs were awarded on account of the good administration of the *res publica* with the utmost FELICITAS, it would then suggest that the display of FELICITAS by the Roman general was potentially a condition to receive the honour.⁴⁵

The presence of FELICITAS in the terminology used by the Senate to decree rituals connected with military victory indicates that the divine quality was part of Roman imperialistic discourse. Romans used FELICITAS to think and talk about the impact of their army on the world.

How exactly Romans conceived FELICITAS as success is best illustrated by Cicero’s request for a *supplicatio* for the victory of the consuls of 43 BCE,

⁴⁰ Livy 31.8.1-2, see Halkin 1953, 11.

⁴¹ Wistrand 1987, 17-28; Pittenbergh 2009, 84-5. On the publication of Senate decrees, see Williamson 1987, White 1997, Ferrary 2009.

⁴² Livy 41.28.8–10.

⁴³ Livy 41.28.8–10 cf. *Insc. It* 13.1 81, 555.

⁴⁴ Versnel 1970, 176-7; Galli 1987-8, 137; Palmer 2019, 78-84.

⁴⁵ On FELICITAS as a condition to be awarded a Roman triumph, see Chapter Three.

Gaius Pansa and Aulus Hirtius, alongside the pro-praetor Octavian against Mark Antony at the battle of Mutina.⁴⁶ In his last *Philippics*, Cicero particularly emphasises Octavian's role in the battle declaring that "Gaius Caesar, imperator, by skilful and prudent leadership FELICITER defend his camp" (*C. Caesar imperator consilio diligentiaque sua castra FELICITER defenderit*).⁴⁷ The adverb *feliciter* plays two roles in Cicero's phrase. Its first role is to characterise the end result of Octavian's actions. It is only because he was able to save his camp from the enemy that he can be seen to have acted *feliciter*. Another way of looking at it would be to say that, because his action to save the camp was 'fertile' to use the etymology of the word, it can be said that Octavian has acted *FELICITER*. This implies that *FELICITAS* represents success when describing the productivity of an action in relation to its outcome.

The second role of the adverb is to describe the manner by which Octavian has defended his camp. Since the action was positively productive then it would be possible to say that Octavian has acted with 'fertility'. In other words, the adverb *feliciter* could be replaced by the expression 'with *FELICITAS*'.⁴⁸ This substitution implies that *FELICITAS* was seen by Romans as a quality of the person who performed the action. The conceptual connection between *FELICITAS* and *feliciter* was likely well-known in Rome. Senators listening to Cicero would have not understood his arguments if they were not aware of the two roles of *feliciter* and its implied conceptual association with *FELICITAS*. Since Cicero's language in this part of his speech mimics the official terminology used by the Senate to declare *supplicationes*, it is very likely that the Roman people at large was familiar with the use of the adverb *feliciter* to denote the success of an action and the quality of its performer as it would be present in the senatorial decrees published in Rome and in the provinces.

Another context in which *FELICITAS* as success is found in the Late Roman Republic is prayers. In this case, *FELICITAS* represents the success of

⁴⁶ Cic. *Phil.* 14.35-8.

⁴⁷ Cic. *Phil.* 14.37.

⁴⁸ For examples of *feliciter* not connected with *FELICITAS*, see for instance Cic. *Att.* 13.42.1; Sen. *epist.* 67.13; Luc. *Phars.* 2.371, cf. *TLL* s.v. *feliciter* 452.1-80.

the prayers, as attested by two religious expressions often used in private and public prayers, *FELIX fortunaque* and *BENE FELICITERque*.⁴⁹ A good example of the use of this expression in the private sphere can be found in Plautus' play *Trinummus*. Callicles, an old man, asks his wife to pray to the *Lares*, the household gods, "that the house may become good, blessed, *FELIX*, and successful" (*haec habitatio BONA, fausta, FELIX, fortunataque evenat*) before expressing to the audience his wish to see his wife dead as quickly as possible.⁵⁰

The prayer is informative about the use of *FELICITAS* in a religious context on several levels. First, it tells us how Romans conceived the divine quality. The expression '*BONUS, fausta, FELIX, fortunataque*' in connection with the verb, "to come about" (*evenire*) defines how Callicles and his wife would like their house to be as the outcome of the prayer. Therefore, for the prayer to be answered, both Callicles and his wife must consider the house to be *FELIX*. How exactly the house is to be *FELIX* for Callicles is detailed in his wish to see his wife dead quickly. This means that, in relation to the prayer, *FELIX* both describes the potential quality of the house, which will come about if the prayer is successful. It also refers to the effectiveness of the prayer in realising itself, since only when Callicles' wife dies will he consider his house as *FELIX*.

The prayer also indicates that *FELICITAS* was not exclusively used by male Romans. Callicles' request to his wife to pray to the *Lares* of the house using the expression '*BONUS, fausta, FELIX, fortunataque*' suggests that women in Rome knew and used *FELICITAS* as well. Women were indeed involved in the cult of the domestic *Lares*: in the prologue of the play *The Golden Pot* from Plautus, the *Lar* of the household praises Euclio's daughter Phaedria for making offerings to him every day.⁵¹ Similarly, in *On Agriculture*,

⁴⁹ For examples of *FELIX FORTUNAque* see Plaut. *Trin.* 39-40; Varro, *Ling.* 6.86; of *BENE FELICITERque*, see Plaut. *Aul.* 788; Enn. *Ann.* 108; Cic. *Mur.* 1; Caes. *Gall.* 4.25.3. Livy also reports as well as two variants of the expressions in his writing: *BONUM faustum atque FELIX*, Livy 1.17.10, 1.28.7, 3.34.1, 3.54.8, 8.25.10, 10.8.12, 24.16.9, 42.30.10; and *faustum atque FELIX*, Livy 2.49.7, 26.18.8, 27.45.8.

⁵⁰ Plaut. *Trin.* 39-40. On the cult of the domestic *Lares*, see recently Flower 2017 with reference to previous scholarship.

⁵¹ Plaut. *Aul.* 23-27, see Flower 2017, 31-35.

Cato describes how the “female farm manager” (*vilica*), usually a slave, makes monthly vows on specific days to the cult of the Lar at the hearth of the farm under the command of her mistress.⁵² In view of Roman women’s involvement in the cult of the domestic spirit(s) of the household, the use of FELIX by Callicles’ wife to describe the desired state of the house was most likely reflective of the audience’s own everyday personal religious experience.

The expression ‘*BONUS, fausta, FELIX, fortunataque*’ was also used in the public sphere. In *On the Nature of the gods*, written in the late first century BCE, Cicero writes that no public business started in Rome without the formulaic prayer “May this be good, fortunate, FELIX, auspicious” (*quod BONUM, faustum, FELIX fortunatumque esset*).⁵³ FELICITAS, expressed by the word *felix* here, represents as discussed above both the success of the public business to be undertaken and the effectiveness of the prayer in realising itself.⁵⁴ The use of the prayer at the beginning of any public business of the *res publica* suggests that FELICITAS is not only associated with important civic rituals in Rome such as elections or the census but also plays an important role in defining the outcome of those rituals.⁵⁵

The last context in which FELICITAS represents success is in the ethical and philosophical writings of the Late Roman Republic.⁵⁶ There, FELICITAS describes a quality born from VIRTUS. A good example of the conceptual connection between VIRTUS and FELICITAS in ethical/philosophical context can be found in one of Publilius Syrus’ *sententiae*, “moral maxims”, apophthegms delivered by different characters in mime performance.⁵⁷ The maxim says that “Valour secures FELICITAS in hazardous condition” (*FELICITATEM in dubiis VIRTUS impetrat*).⁵⁸ Here, FELICITAS describes both the result of the VIRTUS of an individual and the potential this VIRTUS can achieve. It is unclear from the

⁵² Cat. *Agri*. 143. see Flower 2017, 40-45.

⁵³ Cic. *Div.* 1.102.

⁵⁴ For more detailed discussion of this principle, see Chapter Two.

⁵⁵ For the use of FELICITAS at the beginning of election, see for instance, Cic. *Mur.* 1-2 with Stem 2004; Fantham 2013, 83-7; of the census, Varro, *Ling.* 6.86.

⁵⁶ See, for instance, Publ. 205, 227, 512.

⁵⁷ Skutsch, *RE* 23.2 (1959), 1920-8.

⁵⁸ Publ. 227.

maxim whether VIRTUS represents the courage or the general excellence of a man. This ambiguity indicates that conceptually FELICITAS can represent the outcome of the agency of VIRTUS whatever the meaning attached to it. The presence of this conceptual connection between VIRTUS and FELICITAS in mime performance firstly, and then in written catalogues memorised by schoolboys from the mid-first century CE suggests that Romans were aware of and used this conceptual connection in their everyday life. FELICITAS, it seems, played a role in the way Romans thought and spoke about the social bonds that tied them together from the first century BCE onwards.⁵⁹

Consequently, in the Late Roman Republic, FELICITAS describes the success of an individual and is conceived by Romans as the accomplished outcome of an action as well as the potential for an action done either by an individual or by divine agency. This meaning of the word *felicitas* and its cognates *felix* and *feliciter* is commonly found in the official language of the Senate's decrees, in public and private prayers to the gods and in ethical/philosophical writing. Members of Roman society at large, included woman, used it to ask for divine intervention in their life, and talk about their behaviour and their impact on the world and in society.

1.1.4 Happiness

The final characteristic FELICITAS describes in the Late Roman Republic is the happiness of an individual. This meaning of the words *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter*, to denote an emotional state, appears toward the end of the first century BCE.⁶⁰ Compared to the other meanings of the words, this meaning is quite marginal in the Late Republic but becomes more prevalent from the first century CE onwards.⁶¹

This meaning of the words *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter* comes about for two reasons. The adverb *feliciter* was used as a congratulatory acclamation in

⁵⁹ Cic. *Att.* 9.12.4; Sen. *epist. mor.* 33, 6; Gell. *NA* 17.4. see Clark 2007, 221-3.

⁶⁰ The early attestation of FELICITAS as 'happiness' is in Catullus' poetry, see Catull. 68, 155; 107, 7 and in Cicero's philosophical writing, see Cic. *Fin.* 3.7.26.

⁶¹ For attestation dating from first century BCE, see for instance, Catull. 68.155, 107.7; Cic. *Fin.* 3.7.26; Publ. 280, 485; Hor. *Sat.* 1.1.12, 2.7.31.

everyday life, and in particular in rituals such as weddings.⁶² It expressed the joy an individual felt for another.⁶³ At the same time, starting in the mid-first century BCE Greek philosophy was being translated into Latin permeating into Roman culture. Elite Roman men were more and more fashioning themselves as committed adherents of particular philosophical schools.⁶⁴ In this context, FELICITAS was used to define the ‘good life’ in Rome and, as a direct result of this usage, particularly in translating Stoic philosophy into Latin, FELICITAS and *beatus*, “to be happy” or “to be lucky”, were conceptually equated.⁶⁵

A good example of this new use of FELICITAS can be found in Cicero’s *On the ends of good and evil*. In the third book of the philosophical treatise, Cicero as the narrator-character engages in a discussion about the principles of Stoicism with the character of Cato the Younger, a well-known Stoic of the first century BCE.⁶⁶ At the beginning of the book, the character of Cato defines the ultimate aim of Stoic life as living with Stoic VIRTUS, namely “to live in agreement and harmony with nature, it necessarily follows that all wise men at all times live FELICITER, perfectly and fortunately, free from all hindrance, interference or want” (*cum igitur hoc sit extremum, congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere, necessario sequitur omnes sapientes semper FELICITER, absolute, fortunate vivere, nulla re impediri, nulla prohiberi, nulla egere*).⁶⁷ Interestingly, at the end of the book, Cato ends by telling the story of Croesus concluding that “had Croesus ever been happy, he would have carried his happy life” beyond death (*nam si beatus umquam fuisset, beatam vitam (...) pertulisset*).⁶⁸

The change between the adverb *feliciter* and the adjective *beatus* to describe the undisturbed happiness created by living in accordance with Stoic

⁶² On the use of *feliciter* in weddings, see *Comm. Lucan* 2.371, *lvv.* 1.2.119; as everyday congratulation, see for instance *Cic. Att.* 13.42.1, cf. *Petron. Sat.* 50.1.

⁶³ Calasso 1962, 16-18.

⁶⁴ On this process, see Long 2003, 184-201, esp. 184, and Griffin 1989.

⁶⁵ *Beatus* encompasses a wide range of states but at its most basic mean being ‘happy’ or ‘luckly’, see *Enn. Ann.* 280; *Cic. Fam.* 7.28.1; *Plaut. Truc.* 808. For the use of FELICITAS as an ethical category, see below.

⁶⁶ On Cato’s stoicism, *Cic. Mur.* 60-66, see also Craig 1986; Stem 2005.

⁶⁷ *Cic. Fin.* 3.27. For a more detailed discussion of this passage, see Chapter Six.

⁶⁸ *Cic. Fin.* 3.76.

principles signals that, in this particular context, the words *felix* and *beatus* can act as synonyms of one another; most importantly, it implies that the concepts of FELICITAS and *beatus* are seen as equivalent in Stoic philosophy. FELICITAS now represents the happiness of living according to Stoic VIRTUS. This re-definition of FELICITAS, which comes at an important political moment in Rome as detailed in Chapter Six, becomes a hallmark of Stoic philosophy in the first century CE especially in the writings of Seneca the Younger.⁶⁹

1.1.5 Conclusion

The four characteristics described by FELICITAS are conceptualised in the same way as the outcome of the process or action and the potential for this process or action to happen (again). This conception of FELICITAS is negotiated through its association and/or opposition with other important Roman notions such as *fortuna* or VIRTUS depending on context. For instance, in the proverb found in the *Rhetoric for Herennius*, the association of FELICITAS with *fortuna* in opposition to VIRTUS aims to represent a state born of an external intervention, either divine or chance.

Those conceptual connections allowed Romans to use FELICITAS in their discourse to describe the effects of chance on their life, to conceive their moral and social code, to display their position in Roman society, to communicate the military victory of their army. FELICITAS was not only connected with important Roman civic and public rituals, such as triumphs or elections, and public and private prayers, such as the prayers to the domestic *Lar*, but also it also defined how Romans perceived the effectiveness of those rituals and prayers. FELICITAS is then a constitutive element of the worldview created and internalised by Romans taking part in those rituals, and is thus integral to Roman social and political ideology.

The wide range of sources in which the word *felicitas* and its cognates *felix* and *feliciter* are mentioned - from senatorial decrees to public and private

⁶⁹ For examples of FELICITAS in Seneca's writing see, for instance, Sen. *Vit. Beat.* 16.1; *Epist.* 73.13, 90.4, 19.7, 90.34, 98.1, 118.6, 121.4, 123.10; *Prov.* 6.5; *Trang.* 15.1, 7.3; *Curt.* 8.14, 43.

prayers passing by inscriptions in Pompeii, speeches, proverbs, ethical and philosophical treatises, poetry and plays performed in Rome - shows that the various meanings of the words had an all-encompassing reach within Roman society. Latin speakers in Rome and in the provinces from both genders and all social classes would presumably have known, understood and used FELICITAS to represent the productivity of an individual (or an object).

How they ascribed FELICITAS followed a specific logical process. The best example available to explore the way Romans determined whether an individual (or an object) had FELICITAS is the use of the divine quality to categorise the sacred trees used in Roman religious rituals.

1.2 Thinking with FELICITAS: *arbor FELIX*

Sacred trees used in Roman religious practices were divided into two groups: FELICES and INFELICES *arbores*. These categories defined the way and the rituals in which those trees were used.

In a commentary on to Virgil's *Aeneid*, the fourth century CE Roman writer Servius reports that in old times, statues of the gods were made out of FELICES trees.⁷⁰ Aulus Gellius reports that the *flaminica Dialis*, the high priestess of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, wore "a twig of the FELIX tree in her head-dress" (*rica surculum de arbore FELICI habet*).⁷¹ This branch was likely in the form of a crown, tied in with woollen ties, and used to support the vessels that the *flaminica Dialis* carried on her head to public sacrifices, functioning much like a cushion that basket bearers employed to support their burdens as they marched in religious processions.⁷² As priestess of the chief deity in Roman religion, the role of the *flaminica Dialis* was vital in Roman religion, the *surculum* ensured that the *flaminica* could perform her religious duties, and the FELIX tree carried the weight of the vessels and ensured the ritual was not vitiated.⁷³

⁷⁰ Serv. *Ad Aen.* 2.225. On arboreal statues, Hunt 2016, 255-65.

⁷¹ Gell. *NA* 10.15.28.

⁷² Serv. *Ad. Aen.* 4. 137; Festus 15 (L); DiLuzio 2016, 26.

⁷³ On orthopraxy in Roman religion, see Ando 2003; Scheid 1990, 341; Scheid 2005.

FELICES trees were used by the Vestal Virgins to rekindle the fire on the hearth of the temple of Vesta. The hearth of the temple of Vesta was the physical and symbolic heart of the city and its eternal flame was thought to guarantee the eternity and inviolability of the city of Rome.⁷⁴ When the fire extinguished itself out of neglect, the Vestals would obtain “new flames by drilling a board of FELIX wood” (*quibus mos erat tabulam FELICIS materiae tambiu terebrare*).⁷⁵ The only time it was permissible for the flame to be extinguished and rekindled was during the religious celebrations of the New Year on the first of March.⁷⁶ The renewal of the fire using the FELIX tree was highly symbolic in Rome, and ensured that the city would continue to flourish and gain strength in the new year. The importance of FELICES trees in key rituals of the Roman community meant that those trees were legally protected as early as the fifth century BCE.⁷⁷

INFELICES trees were used in apotropaic ritual. Since they were consecrated to the gods of the underworld, they were used in rituals to appease those gods and expiate the divine displeasure.⁷⁸ Livy and Cicero both report that an INFELIX tree was used in the punishment for *perduellio*, high treason. The victim was “hanged on an INFELIX tree and scourged” (*INFELICI arbori reste suspendito verberatoque*).⁷⁹ The Digest of Roman Law reports that the old punishment for parricide involved the victim being flogged by an INFELIX tree before being sewn up in a sack with a dog, a dunghill cock, a viper, and a monkey which was then thrown into the sea.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.64.5; Plut. *Num.* 9.5. On the Vestal flame as guarantor of the eternity and inviolability of Rome, see Ov. *Fast.* 6.297; Livy 5.54.7.

⁷⁵ Festus 94 (L). DiLuzio 2016, 190-200 with bibliographical references.

⁷⁶ Ov. *Fast.* 1.149–151; 3.143–144; Macrob. *Sat.* 1.12.6; Festus (Paullus) 94(L). Feeney 2007, 204-5.

⁷⁷ Gaius reports that vine, a *FELIX arbor*, was legally protected by the Twelve Tables, see Gaius, 4.11 cf. Front. *Epis. ad amic.* 2.7.14; Dig. 47.7.2.

⁷⁸ Macr. *Sat.* 3.20.3.

⁷⁹ Livy 1.26.6; Cic. *Rab.* 4.13; Sen. *Epist.* 101.14.

⁸⁰ Dig. 48.9.9.

In a recent study, Alisa Hunt noted that sacred trees lay at the intersection between Roman thought and practice.⁸¹ Their sacrality is defined “as the way in which the object (the tree) is more than the mere sum of its parts and points to something beyond itself.”⁸² In other words, the tree is sacred not only in itself but also because of its relationship with its environment.⁸³ Since the classification as FELICES or INFELICES defines the way and the rituals in which sacred trees were used, the categories are thus constitutive of what makes a tree sacred, raising the question of how this distinction was made.

The ritualistic use of trees and the necessity to distinguish between sacred and non-sacred trees means that lists recording which trees were suitable for the rituals existed. Fortunately for us, three sets of lists which trees were FELICES and INFELICES remain.⁸⁴

1. The Roman set quoted from the writer Veranius but based on Roman pontifices’ writings, defines FELICES trees as follows: “Among trees of good omen are reckoned the oak, durmast, holm oak, cork oak, beech, hazel, service tree, white fig, pear, apple, vine, plum, cornel, and nettle” (*arbores putantur esse quercus aesculus ilex suberies fagus corylus sorbus, ficus alba, pirus malus vitis prunus cornus lotus*).⁸⁵
2. The Etruscan set quoted from Tarquitiu Priscus’ *Portents derived from Trees*, presents INFELICES trees as follows: “They call “ill-omened” the trees that are under the protection of the gods of the underworld and apotropaic powers: buckthorn, red cornel, fern, black fig, those that bear a black berry and black fruit, similarly holly, woodland pear, butcher’s-broom, briar, and the brambles with which one should order evil portents and prodigies to be burnt” (*arbores, quae inferum deorum*

⁸¹ Hunt 2016, 3, 72-120. Because the categories FELIX and INFELIX refer to the sacrality of a tree, I use the convention of small capitals in this section to denote a tree’s status as a divine object.

⁸² Bell 1992, 157.

⁸³ Smith 1982, 55.

⁸⁴ Here I follow André’s classification as it best makes sense of the incoherence and contradiction present in the list of trees outlined, see André 1964, 37-46.

⁸⁵ Macr. *Sat.* 3.20.2.

avertentiumque in tutela sunt, eas INFELICES nominant: alternum sanguinem filicem, ficum atram, quaeque bacam nigram nigrosque fructus ferunt, itemque acrifolium, pirum silvaticum, pruscum rubum sentesque quibus portenta prodigiaque mala comburi iubere oportet).⁸⁶

3. The final definition, recorded in a speech of Cato the Elder, stems from Roman popular culture and broadly defines FELICES and INFELICES trees as “FELICES trees were those which brought fruit, INFELICES those which did not” (*FELICES arbores quae fructum ferunt, INFELICES, quae non ferunt*).⁸⁷

These lists are most likely incomplete.⁸⁸ The Etruscan list of INFELICES trees most probably influenced Roman religious practices since the *Etrusca disciplina*, the corpus of texts describing Etruscan religious practices, was an integral part of Roman religion in the first century BCE, particularly in the field of divination, where Etruscan haruspices were consulted for public and private matters since the second century BCE.⁸⁹ In a seminal study on FELICES trees, Jacques André has highlighted the differences and inconsistencies between the trees in the sets.⁹⁰ For instance, unlike the Etruscan list of INFELICES trees, which includes trees producing with black fruits and thorns, the Roman list of FELICES trees includes trees producing black and red fruits and thorns, denoting that the two lists were drawn up independently.⁹¹ Both Roman and Etruscan lists also include trees which would be considered INFELICES according to Cato’s definition.⁹² What the definitions reveal is rather the general assumptions underpinning the categorisation of sacred trees as FELICES and INFELICES, according to religious and popular Roman culture. Analysing these assumptions will then allow us to understand how the quality is ascribed.

⁸⁶ Macr. *Sat.* 3.20.3.

⁸⁷ Cato apud Festus 81 (L); see also, Plin. *HN* 16.108.

⁸⁸ André 1964, 36.

⁸⁹ Santangelo 2013, 84–114 with references.

⁹⁰ André 1964, 37-43.

⁹¹ André 1964, 42-43.

⁹² André 1964, 40.

Examining INFELICES trees, the first assumption uncovered is that the classification as INFELIX or FELIX denotes a positive contribution to rituals. Indeed, INFELICES trees are not just trees which do have fruits since some of the trees enumerated in the Etruscan list do bear fruits.⁹³ For instance, trees producing black bay or fruits should be considered FELICES trees *stricto sensu* according to Cato's definition, yet they are classified as INFELICES trees. This classification is due the colour of their fruits and its meaning in Roman religion. Because black is the colour associated with the underworld gods, trees bearing black berries or fruits are used to appease the gods because their fruits are pleasing to them.⁹⁴ The classification of those trees as INFELIX then designates their ability to positively contribute to the ritual performed, namely to appease the underworld gods. Following this logic then, FELICES trees were trees which not only bear fruits but also contribute positively to the rituals in which they are used.

Another important assumption found in the lists is that the characterisation as FELIX is done *ex post-facto* based on the outcome of religious rituals. To understand this point, it is necessary to carefully consider Cato's definition and its logic. The focus on outcome is fundamental to the way Cato construes FELICES trees: indeed, for him, FELICES trees are those which bear fruits. Therefore, the presence or absence of fruits determined the classification, which can only be done after the tree has fruits. This logic has three important implications:

1. To determine whether a tree is FELIX, an assessment was made comparing the outcome *expected* and the outcome *obtained*.
2. The outcome of the action must have been considered as FELIX - that is conformed to what was expected - by an external observer for the performer of the action to be qualified as FELIX.
3. As a direct consequence of the assessment, the characterisation as FELIX was, ultimately, a matter of both perspective and perception;

⁹³ André 1964, 40-1; Wagenvoort 1954, 78-9.

⁹⁴ Val. Max. 2.4.5.

perspective because an external observer needs to see the fruit, and perception because this observer needs to understand he is seeing a fruit before he could make his assessment.

Generally, the categorisation as FELIX was ascribed from an external perspective and perception. However, nothing prevented individuals claiming to be FELIX from their own point of view.⁹⁵ Servius provides an explicit confirmation of the logic outlined in Cato's definition. The Roman writer remarks in the margin of a dialogue between Venus and her son Aeneas that "one is said to be FELIX if one has FELICITAS and does something which is FELIX" (*FELIX enim dicitur et qui habet FELICITATEM et qui facit esse FELICEM*).⁹⁶ His comment explicitly indicates that the characterisation of someone (or something) as FELIX is done *ex post-facto* based on the outcome of an action, which itself must be considered as FELIX. His use of the verb *dicere*, "to say" attests to the importance of an external perception and perspective in the process.

Going back to the FELICES trees, it is possible to apply this logic to Roman and Etruscan lists of FELICES and INFELICES trees. Indeed, the classification of sacred trees and the establishment of exact lists of trees to be used presupposes a system for evaluating the tree's ability to benefit a ritual. To do so, it was necessary to look at the outcome of the ritual, to compare the desired and obtained outcomes of the ritual, and to set out the desired outcomes for the ritual beforehand. Here again, the example of the trees producing black fruits is quite revealing. Despite being *stricto sensu* FELIX according to Cato's definition, the tree is classified as INFELIX because the outcome of the ritual is to placate the underworld gods and it is able to do so because of the colour of its fruits.

Interestingly, the lists allow us also to understand the conceptual relationship between FELIX and FELICITAS; indeed, it seems that the

⁹⁵ This is one of Cicero's criticisms against Sulla's claim to be FELIX, see Cic. *Leg. Man.* 47 with discussion in Chapter Five.

⁹⁶ Serv. *Ad Aen.* 1.330.

characterisation of the trees as FELICES denotes their possession of FELICITAS. This point is explicitly made by Servius' comment above, where he declares that "one is said to be FELIX if one has FELICITAS and does something which is FELIX."⁹⁷ To be FELIX is then to have FELICITAS, or in other words, to be considered as FELIX is the external manifestation of the inner quality, FELICITAS. Sacred trees are able to be FELICES, that is they contribute positively to the ritual, because of their FELICITAS.

This conceptual relationship strongly suggests that FELICITAS denotes a state while FELIX denotes the "work" performed by this state. This insight is confirmed by the definition Isidore of Seville gives of FELICITAS in his etymological dictionary, in which he writes that "One/something is said to be FELIX who/which gives FELICITAS. One/something is said to be FELIX who/which accepts FELICITAS. One/something is said to be FELIX through what FELICITAS is given, hence a FELIX time, or a FELIX place" (*FELIX dicitur qui FELICITATEM dat; FELIX, qui accipit; FELIX, per quem datur FELICITAS, ut FELIX tempus, FELIX locus*).⁹⁸ The definition not only connects to be FELIX with the action done by or with FELICITAS, but also clearly states that to be FELIX is the characterisation of the outcome of the work done by FELICITAS. In doing so, it also indicates that FELICITAS denotes an ability. Isidore's use of the verb *dicere* in the passive form, translating to "to be said to" highlights once again how fundamental the issue of perception/perspective is when ascribing to the quality and how deeply subjective FELICITAS is by nature. In the case of sacred trees then, their FELICITAS denotes both the state of *being able to* make a positive contribution to rituals as well as enacting the ability to *carry out* this positive contribution.⁹⁹ The FELICITAS of the trees then designates their agency in the ritual.

A logical consequence would be that, since to be FELIX denotes the possession of FELICITAS, then to be INFELIX denotes the absence of FELICITAS. However, to be classified as INFELIX does not necessarily denote the absence of FELICITAS, as the example of the INFELICES trees demonstrates. Since the

⁹⁷ Serv. *Ad Aen.* 1.330.

⁹⁸ Isod. *Etym.* 10.97.

⁹⁹ On arboreal agency in Roman religion see Hunt 2016, 173-198.

expected outcome of rituals using the INFELICES trees was to placate the underworld gods or other apotropaic powers, then those sacred trees very much act like FELICES trees and possess FELICITAS as they contribute positively to the ritual. What this example strongly points out is the importance of the desired and experienced outcomes upon which hinges the assessment of whether someone (or something) is FELIX or INFELIX, and thus possesses FELICITAS.

Therefore, to determine whether someone (or something) could be INFELIX yet still possess FELICITAS, it is necessary to explore the assumptions that condition the divine quality in the first place. Since those assumptions must be shared by both the qualified and qualifying individuals, this means then that they are intrinsically based on social context. There is therefore a specificity to FELICITAS depending on the context in which it is used.

Last but not least, when taking into consideration the nature of the sources, the logic used to ascribe FELICITAS outlined above was most probably known to and used by all members of the Roman community. In Rome, most of the priesthoods were held by members of the Roman elite whether patrician or plebeian.¹⁰⁰ The fact that Veranius based his definition of FELICES trees on the writing of Roman pontifices indicates that Roman priests codified their religious practices and that learned members of Roman society would engage with this codification.¹⁰¹ Discussing the classification of sacred trees between FELICES and INFELICES presupposes that priests and intellectuals understood and used the logic implicit in ascribing the divine quality. Similarly, when using the definition of FELICES and INFELICES trees in a speech, Cato assumed that his audience would recognise this logic since it is central to understand the argument he is making when giving his definition. Despite the unknown context of the fragment, it seems fair to imagine that it was delivered either before the

¹⁰⁰ Cic. *Dom.* 1.1. cf. Goldberg 2015.

¹⁰¹ On the process of writing and codifying Roman religion, see for instance, Rüpke 2012, 82-93; MacRae 2016, 28-52.

Senate, at a *contio*, or in even the courts.¹⁰² The two latter settings would mean that their audience would be composed of Romans from all social classes.

Consequently, analysing how Romans categorised the sacred trees used in religious rituals as FELICES or INFELICES has revealed the process and conditions used to qualify someone (or something) as FELIX. This characterisation involves an assessment done *ex post facto* by comparing the obtained outcome of an action with the outcome expected to be classified as FELIX. To be declared FELIX is thus inherently a matter of perception and perceptive; someone needs to acknowledge the outcome of the action to make his assessment. Thus, central to the characterisation as FELIX are the conditions or assumptions, which define FELICITAS in a particular context. This set (or sets) of conditions are inherently social since they are shared by both the qualified and qualifying individuals.

Applying this assessment process to FELICES trees has also highlighted that FELICITAS denotes (1) a state of being able to *bring about* positive action as well as (2) an enacted ability to *carry out* a positive action, and (3) the outcomes the action has created. This is consistent with the way the characteristics of the word FELICITAS were conceived as we have seen above. While context can provide indications as to which of those three aspects of FELICITAS is discussed in our sources, it is necessary to think with and about those different aspects of FELICITAS simultaneously to understand fully what Romans described using the divine quality. Romans seemed to have been well aware of what FELICITAS denoted and how it was ascribed.

¹⁰² The thematic similarity between Cato's definition of FELICES trees and his comment that censors established FELIX *lustrum* if storehouses were full of crops, vintage abundant, and olive oil liberally flowing from the groves strongly suggests that those two quotes are probably part of the same speech, see *ORF*⁴ 135. This speech presumably would be Cato's defence against Thermus' accusation that the *lustrum* Cato performed as censor in 184 BCE was *infelix*. For a detailed discussion of the trial, see Chapter Two.

1.3 FELICITAS and the Roman good life

Analysing the sacred trees used in religious rituals has outlined the conditions which determine the divine quality FELICITAS in a particular social context. In the Late Roman Republic, the divine quality FELICITAS was not only used in a religious context; it also played an important role in ethics epitomising what Romans understood as ‘the good life’.

The role of FELICITAS in Roman ethics has already been hinted at several times in our discussion so far: firstly, in the connection between the words FELICITAS and VIRTUS found in proverbs and philosophical works and secondly, in the logic used to ascribe the divine quality. Indeed, to be recognised as FELIX by others, an individual needed to act (or be seen to act) according to the social norms that defined FELICITAS.

A good illustration of how this process was used in a political context can be found in Cicero’s speech in favour of a legislative proposal granting extraordinary power to Pompey to fight against Mithridates VI. Discussing the FELICITAS of Roman generals, the Roman orator declares that “no one can claim by himself to have it, only the Roman people may remember and record it in the case of another” (*quam praestare de se ipso nemo potest, meminisse et commemorare de altero possumus*).¹⁰³ For Cicero then, ascribing FELICITAS to someone has two main features: an audience which will determine whether there is FELICITAS, and a social process, described by both verbs, *meminisse*, to remember, and *commemorare*, to recall and/or to place on record.

Interestingly, Matthew Roller has recently identified these two elements as important features of the ‘exemplary’ discourse in Roman culture, a discourse that connects actions, audiences, values and memory.¹⁰⁴ For him, this discourse has four main components:

(1) a spectacular action with consequences for the Roman community, and admitting ethical categorisation - embodying crucial social values,

¹⁰³ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 47. For a detailed discussion of this passage, Chapter Five.

¹⁰⁴ Roller 2004, cf. also Langlands 2008, 2011 and 2018, and Roller 2018.

(2) an audience to witness the action, place it in a suitable ethical category (for instance VIRTUS or PIETAS), and provide a moral judgement,

(3) a commemoration of the action, of the consequence for the community and the judgement given by the audience that observed it, and finally,

(4) the imitation of the action as spectator as enjoined to replicate or surpass the deeds themselves to gain social capital.¹⁰⁵

This process allows the creation of new *exempla*, which are indeterminate in their interpretation and ethically ambiguous.¹⁰⁶ It also provides tools to analyse the impact of the existing *exempla* in Roman culture.¹⁰⁷

The similarities between the processes by which *exempla* are used in Roman discourse and by which FELICITAS is ascribed to an individual suggest that the divine quality FELICITAS may have been considered as an ethical category. FELICITAS was, it seems, an integral part of the “exemplary” discourse in Rome. This assumption has three main consequences: first, determining whether a Roman has FELICITAS creates *exempla*, which in turn enable us to determine whether another Roman has FELICITAS. Second, if FELICITAS is considered an ethical category, then *exempla* created by the actions of FELICES individuals embody crucial Roman social values. Those social values constitute both a single set of conditions as well as multiple ways to achieve FELICITAS.¹⁰⁸ A direct consequence of the two previous statements is that to be FELIX would require to have good morals.

In the Late Roman Republic, particularly during the first century BCE, FELICITAS was used as an ethical category to represent ‘the good life’ for Romans. Several *exempla* of what Romans considered a FELIX life at the time are preserved in the ethical manual of the first century CE writer Valerius Maximus. He dedicates the first chapter of the seventh book of his *Memorable*

¹⁰⁵ Roller 2004, 4-6.

¹⁰⁶ On the indeterminacy of *exempla* see Langlands 2018, 141-65. On the creation of *exempla*, see Maslakov 1984.

¹⁰⁷ Roller 2004, 7-10, see also 10-28 for a good example of the use of this process on the *exempla* of Horatius Cocles.

¹⁰⁸ Langlands 2018, 112-127.

Deeds and Sayings to presenting examples of FELICITAS.¹⁰⁹ In his introduction to the subject, he discusses and contrasts the life of a Roman, Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus with the story of the Greek Gyges and the god Apollo.¹¹⁰

The material the imperial writer presents reflects the conception and the use of FELICITAS as an ethical category in the first century BCE. In his *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero uses Macedonicus' life as an example of a life untouched by the vicissitude of *fortuna*.¹¹¹ Interestingly, Cicero describes Macedonicus' good fortune using similar language to Valerius' description of FELICITAS as the steady flow of good fortune.¹¹² For both authors, FELICITAS represents the enduring blessings of *fortuna* an individual enjoys in his life.

Both Cicero and Valerius Maximus also use Greek examples to outline the morality of their *exempla*. Cicero contrasts Macedonicus' death amongst his children and grandchildren with Priam's, the legendary king of Troy, who died at the hands of the Achaeans far from his fifty children, to highlight how fortunate Macedonicus really was. Valerius Maximus uses his Greek example in a slightly different way than Cicero: he juxtaposes a lesser-known Greek example and a well-known Roman example to convey to his readers that both ways to conceive FELICITAS are valid and worth emulating in Rome. The use by both author of Roman and Greek examples to define FELICITAS implies that the Roman social ideals embodied by the divine quality were negotiated between the two cultures.¹¹³

The similarities between Cicero's and Valerius Maximus' discussion of the life of Macedonicus indicate that Valerius Maximus' writing reflects the way Romans wrote and thought about ethics in the first century BCE. Thus,

¹⁰⁹ On Valerius Maximus and ethics, see Maslakov 1984; Skidmore 1996, 53-82, Langlands 2008; Langlands 2011.

¹¹⁰ Val. Max. 7.1.1-2.

¹¹¹ Cic. *Tusc.* 1.35.85

¹¹² Compare Cicero's portrayal of Macedonicus' life "as untouched by *fortuna*" (*nullum a fortuna vulnus*) with Valerius Maximus' description of "the steady favour of *fortuna*" (*fortunae [...] constanter propitiae admodum*) which allows Macedonicus "to never cease to enjoy the highest consumption of the good life" (*numquam cessante indulgentia ad summum beatæ vitæ cumulum*) cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 1.35.85; Val. Max. 7.1. præf.

¹¹³ On Valerius Maximus' use of dichotomy between Greek and Roman examples, see Weileder 1998, 80-4 with bibliography.

analysing the examples of FELICITAS given by the imperial writer provides us with insights into the ideals embodied by the divine quality at the time.

Focusing on the life of Macedonicus, in line with the etymology of the word, FELICITAS refers to the fertility of a Roman citizen; literally his capacity to have children, and more broadly, to perpetuate his family. For Valerius Maximus, Macedonicus is FELIX because he has four sons and three married daughters, who have children of their own.¹¹⁴ Children are the external manifestation of Macedonicus' FELICITAS, a display of his fertility.¹¹⁵ Macedonicus' FELICITAS also designates the perpetuation of his family, both in terms of offspring and social standing. Valerius Maximus insists both on his large number of children and the number of political offices his sons held.¹¹⁶ This impressive list, which included two of the highest political offices in Rome (the consulship and the censorship) gives an idea of the social and political capital of the family. His sons' political success demonstrates that the family's legacy will continue. Valerius' comment that Macedonicus saw "so many births, so many cradles, so many manly gowns, so many marriage torches, superabundance of offices, commands," provides a good overview of the connection of FELICITAS to both the abundance of offspring and the perpetuation of the family's legacy.¹¹⁷

As David Thurmond notes in his study of public rituals of fertility in ancient Rome, FELICITAS refers to the fundamental function of the Roman family: its own perpetuation through marriage and procreation since offspring are necessary to pass down wealth, perform religious rites for the living and the dead, and perform the civic and military duties on which the family's social standing depends.¹¹⁸ The harsh reality of pre-modern society plagued by infertility and in which parturition and malnutrition led to a high risk of death meant that having children was difficult.¹¹⁹ So Roman men and women turned

¹¹⁴ Val. Max. 7.1.1.

¹¹⁵ Val. Max. 4.4.

¹¹⁶ Val. Max. 7.1.1. cf. Plin. *HN* 7.142.

¹¹⁷ Val. Max. 7.1.1.

¹¹⁸ Thurmond 1992, 3.

¹¹⁹ Thurmond 1992, 4.

to a great variety of magical practices, private religious rituals, and public rites, such as the Lupercalia, to increase their fertility.¹²⁰ If to be FELIX is to have children, then to have FELICITAS in ancient Rome is to have a certain fertility and fecundity, brought about and enhanced by the divine through fertilisation rituals.

FELICITAS also designates the ability to be successful in politics and in warfare. Valerius Maximus portrays Macedonicus as both a successful general who celebrated a triumph, and a successful politician who was elected to one of the highest elected offices of the *res publica*, the consulship.¹²¹ This description would suggest that high political offices and triumphs are markers of a Roman's FELICITAS. It implies that FELICITAS manifests itself by success both on the battlefield and in the political arena. Since in Republican Rome, the consul was primarily a general, then FELICITAS lies at the intersection between political and military success.

Macedonicus' FELICITAS finally lies in the exceptionality of his career. In his own account of Macedonicus' life, Pliny remarks on the careers of the sons that "few men have obtained even one of those offices."¹²² His comment puts Macedonicus' success into perspective and serves as a stark reminder of the fierce competition in Rome between members of the Roman nobility to achieve the kind of political and military success Macedonicus and his sons achieved. Competition is at the heart of the *nobilitas* which shared power in Republican Rome. As Hölkeskamp puts it, the competition for *honores*, public offices, was at the same time competition for 'status', for individual membership and for an outstanding rank in the group competing for *honores*, with the Roman people as the ultimate source of *honores* constitutive for this rank.¹²³ Reaching all those offices attests Macedonicus' ability to both outperform his competitors

¹²⁰ For a good study of ritual of fertility in Rome, see Thurmond 1992.

¹²¹ Val. Max. 7.1.1. Macedonicus was consul in 143 BCE see Liv. *Oxy.* 52.153-5. He celebrated a triumph in 146 BCE for his victory against the Achean League, see Paus. 7.16; Plut. *Crass.* 36.2. He was elected to the censorship in 131 BCE, see Plin. *HN* 7.142.

¹²² Plin. *HN.* 7.142.

¹²³ Hölkeskamp 1993, 38, cf. Rosentein 1993. On the connection between FELICITAS and political offices, see Chapter Six.

and to gain the trust of the Roman people to get elected to political offices. His FELICITAS then epitomises the tension between the Roman elite's desire for political and military success and the reality of an intense aristocratic competition.

With the story of Gyges and the god Apollo, Valerius Maximus outlines a different set of ideals attached to FELICITAS, presented through a series of conceptual oppositions. The first antinomy is between satisfaction and discontentment. The idea of satisfaction is central to the character of Aglaus of Psophis who is described as having never left his little farm and being content with the produce of his land.¹²⁴ This satisfaction makes him the most FELIX man in the eyes of the god Apollo.¹²⁵ This life of contentment, without worry, free from fear, anxiety and other desires constitutes the real good life. The glorification of Aglaus' state of mind by the god Apollo reveals that FELICITAS can denote an emotional state. To be FELIX is to be satisfied, to feel content with what one has and to desire no more than what is given. The example then shows that to observe certain emotions (or freedom from certain emotions) are valid conditions to determine whether someone is FELIX and has FELICITAS. In the way the god Apollo articulates it, in Roman culture, to be FELIX is also to live in a state of inner satisfaction. This constitutes another form of good life in Rome.

The second opposition presented in the story is between wealth and poverty. Gyges believes that he is "more FELIX than any mortal man", (*an aliquis mortalium se esset FELICIOR*), because as king of Lydia he was wealthy and powerful, the lands of Lydia being rich, his army and cavalry strong, and his treasure chamber full.¹²⁶ By contrast, Aglaus, whom the god Apollo declares as *FELICIOR* than Gyges, is the poorest man in Arcadia.¹²⁷ Apollo declares that he prefers a secure hut over a palace, a little piece of land over the rich land in Lydia, two yokes of oxen rather than army and cavalry, and a

¹²⁴ Val. Max. 7.1.2.

¹²⁵ Val. Max. 7.1.2.

¹²⁶ Val. Max. 7.1.2.

¹²⁷ Val. Max. 7.1.2.

little storehouse over treasure chambers.¹²⁸ This opposition between wealth and poverty reveals that FELICITAS can denote a material state. Whether one is called FELIX because he is rich or poor depends on the ideals of the person making the judgement. In this case, the god Apollo does not deny that Gyges is FELIX but he declares Aglaus to be more FELIX because he holds poverty in higher regard than wealth. This example highlights the importance of the external observer that judges whether one is FELIX since the assessment depends on his values and/or social ideals.

Analysing the examples of FELICITAS from the first century BCE, as recorded by Valerius Maximus, has connected the divine quality with the following social ideals: fertility, military and political success, wealth, poverty and contentment. Those values constituted what Romans understood as the good life. They were also the constituents of FELICITAS. Both *exempla* were models not only to compare and evaluate whether someone had FELICITAS but also to emulate, to imitate and to think about what FELICITAS is.¹²⁹ Those models were addressed and opened to all Romans. Exemplary stories like the life of Macedonicus were an integral part of Roman cultural heritage and allowed Romans to talk about virtue and act ethically, independently of their social class and within their own personal limitations.¹³⁰ To be FELIX, to live a good Roman life, was thus available to all to achieve.

1.4 Conclusion

Analysing the meanings of the words *felicitas*, *felix* and *feliciter* has allowed us to understand the meanings, use, and prevalence of FELICITAS in the Roman social discourse of the second and first centuries BCE.

For Romans, FELICITAS describes four characteristics of an individual (1) to be fertile/fecund, (2) to be lucky, (3) to be successful, and (4) to be happy. These characteristics are conceptualised along similar lines as either (1) a state of being able to *bring about* positive action, or (2) an enacted ability to

¹²⁸ Val. Max. 7.1.2.

¹²⁹ Langlands 2018, 87-111.

¹³⁰ Langlands 2018, 128-140.

carry out a positive action, or (3) the positive outcome the action has created. For instance, FELICITAS represents the state resulting from the action of *fortuna* as well as the potential for *fortuna* to continue acting. This conception of FELICITAS was the way Romans understood and conceived FELICITAS of a Roman general.

Romans ascribed FELICITAS to an individual using a specific logical pattern. To be recognised as having FELICITAS, it is necessary to do an *ex post facto* assessment of the obtained outcome of an action with the outcome expected to be classified as FELIX. This means that to be declared FELIX is inherently a matter of perception and perspective. That is to say that someone needs to acknowledge the outcome of the action to make their assessment. In the case of the Roman generals claiming FELICITAS, this role, as we shall see, was performed by the Senate and the Roman people.

The conditions that define the divine quality in a particular context are therefore central in ascribing FELICITAS. This set (or sets) of conditions are inherently social since they are shared by both the qualified and qualifying individuals. One such set of conditions is found, for instance, in Roman ethical discourse, where the divine quality is associated with the social values/ideals: fertility, military and political success, wealth and contentment. Those social values constitute what Romans understood as the good life and form the constituents for the condition described by FELICITAS. Determining and analysing the sets of conditions for Roman generals to claim FELICITAS will allow us to explore the changes in the way the divine quality was conceived over the course of the Late Roman Republic.

Romans used FELICITAS in their religious, social, and political discourses. Its connection with important Roman concepts such as *fortuna*, VIRTUS, *dignitas* or *imperium* in sources shows that the quality was used to describe the effects of chance on their life, to conceive their moral and social code, to display their position in Roman society and to communicate the military victory of their army. The divine quality also played an important role in Roman religious public and private rituals, such as the prayer to the *Lares*, and public civic rituals such as the triumph. FELICITAS was thus an important

component of the way Romans viewed the world. Analysing the conceptual connection of FELICITAS with those ideas, the places of the divine quality in those various discourses, and civic and religious rituals provides a window into the role of FELICITAS in both the political culture of the late Republic and the political and social changes taking place at the time.

Finally, the variety of the sources in which the word *felicitas* and its cognate *felix* and *feliciter* are mentioned - from Senate's decrees to public and private prayers used by both men and woman, passing by epigraphical inscriptions in Pompeii, speeches, proverbs in ethics literature, and plays performed in Rome - suggests that the meanings of the divine quality, the logic behind the ascription of FELICITAS, and the contexts in which the divine quality was meant to be used, was part of culture shared by Romans from members of the Roman elite to freedmen and women.

FELICITAS not only enabled Romans to talk about themselves, their place in society, their effect on the world around them, and the effect of the divine on their life, it was also an integral part of their communal identity.

2 FELICITAS *Romana* and The Roman Community

For Romans in the Late Republic, to be part of the Roman community meant to enjoy the benefits of a special relationship with the gods for the safety and prosperity of the *res publica*, the FELICITAS *Romana*. In this chapter, I explore the role of FELICITAS in the formation and expression of Roman communal identity as evident in two public rituals, the *lustrum* and the triumph.

My analysis of the *lustrum* and the triumph has three aims. In the first place, I show how the prayers of the *lustrum* define the FELICITAS *Romana* as the symbolic partnership between the Romans and the gods and the benefits of this partnership. I then highlight how the FELICITAS *Romana* plays an integral part in the formation of the Roman community as the prayers of the *lustrum* symbolically integrate the military and political unit of the Roman community into a religious unit which benefits from the benevolence of the gods. Finally, I illustrate how the triumph represents the achievement of the FELICITAS *Romana* as the good state of the *res publica* following military victory and conquest as well as the Roman general, his army, and the gods working together for the good of the Roman community.

To do so, I use the anthropological framework of ‘ritualisation’ which takes rituals as texts with potent social and cultural meanings. Its spatial and linguistic tools will allow us to deconstruct both the symbolically constructed spatial, temporal, and linguistic environment that forms the Roman community, and the process by which Romans internalized this identity.¹ Indeed, the spatial temporal system of a ritual, in a complex arrangement of binary opposition, defines sets of relationships which both differentiate and integrate social components such as gods, sacred place, and communities, amongst others.² Three important sets of oppositions are particularly important in the process of ‘ritualisation’: firstly, the vertical opposition of superior and inferior, producing hierarchical structures; secondly, the horizontal opposition of here

¹ On ritualisation, see Introduction.

² Bell 1992, 125.

and there, us and them, creating lateral or relatively egalitarian relationships; and finally, the opposition internal/external.³ The language of ritual also defines the relationship between ritual participants; prayers or orders, for instance, are an order of 'performative' utterance, i.e. speech acts, which establishes and defines moral and social expectations within and between participants.⁴ These two complementary tools then enable us to investigate the dynamic interactions between the environment of the *lustrum*, on one hand, and of the triumph, on the other hand, and their participants, the Roman community, which leads to the creation of a symbolic structure for the world internalised by Romans.

Through this conceptual lens, the prayers of the *lustrum*, by their content and their context, shed light on both the set of relations between the gods and the Romans as well as between the Romans themselves. For its part, the ceremony of the triumph, by its constative elements, namely its parade of wealth, of the triumphant general and of the Roman army, highlights the relationships between the Romans and the victorious general. Ritualisation helps to outline the role of FELICITAS in those different relationships.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part looks at the nature of the FELICITAS *Romana*. I first reconstruct the ceremony of the *lustrum*. Then using the framework of 'ritualisation', I explore the role of FELICITAS in the *lustrum* by paying close attention to the contents of its prayers. Subsequently, I highlight the importance of the benefit of FELICITAS *Romana* for the community by exploring the discourse of a judiciary dispute in the second century BCE about the performance of the *lustrum*. The second part of the chapter analyses the role of the *lustrum* in the formation of the Roman community. I first briefly discuss the census to show how it created a political and military unit for the Roman community. Further, by exploring the relationship between the census and the *lustrum*, I show how the prayers of the *lustrum* integrate those two units into a religious unit working in partnership with the gods, namely FELICITAS *Romana*. Finally, the last part of the chapter

³ Bell 1992, 125.

⁴ Rappaport 1979, 175.

explores how *FELICITAS Romana* is enacted in the spectacle of wealth, conquest, and military victory organised by the Roman general. I first reconstruct the ritual of the triumph, and then, using the framework of ritualisation, I demonstrate how this spectacle symbolically reinforces the Roman community.

2.1 Reconstructing the *lustrum*

Unfortunately, the exact details of the ceremony of the *lustrum* have not come down to us. Several, mostly literary, sources, however, allow us to reconstruct part of the procedure of the ritual and its prayers.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus writing at the turn of the century reports that, after completing the census, the king Servius Tullius assembled all citizens in the Campus Martius. The king then performed the expiatory sacrifice for them with a bull, a ram and a boar, which he then sacrificed to the god Mars.⁵ Livy provides a similar account of the ceremony and emphasises that it was called *conditum lustrum* because the *lustratio* was performed upon completion of the census.⁶

Varro's discussion of the *inlicium*, the call for citizens to assemble in Rome, offers the most detailed account of the ritual, even reporting some of the prayers.⁷ The discussion was based on several ancient commentaries named by Varro on Roman rituals: the records of the censors (*censori tabulae*), the commentaries of the consuls (*commentarii consulares*), and the old commentary of M. Sergius (*commentarium vetus acquisitionis M. Sergius*).⁸ Little is known of the records of the censors. Pliny's assertion that all the pasture lands were named in the *censoria tabulae* as they once constituted the only revenue for the state suggests that the records were a collection of

⁵ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.22

⁶ Livy 1. 44.

⁷ Varro, *Ling.* 6.86-95. I here follow Albanese's interpretation that the prayer marks the start of both the census and the *lustrum*, see Albanese 1995, 67-102. For other interpretations, see Mommsen *Röm. Straatsr.* I³ 81 n. 2 and Linderski 1986a, 2189 n.197.

⁸ See Rüpke 2012 on the rationalisation of the Roman religion.

the censors' work.⁹ As such, they may have been included with the official lists of citizens drawn by the censors also called *publicae tabulae* and kept in various places, including the temple of the Nymphs.¹⁰ Varro's mention of the records also suggests that they contained the procedure to perform the purification ritual.¹¹

Valerius Maximus' discussion of the change in ritual prayers made by Scipio Aemilianus in 142 BCE brings to light another important prayer of the ritual. The anecdote runs as follows: as a censor, Scipio Aemilianus was winding up the census and sacrificing the *suovetaurilia*, and the scribe was reciting from the public tablets the prayers which "asked the immortal gods to make the *res publica* better and greater for the Roman people." Instead of repeating the prayers, Scipio said "It is good and great enough. So I shall pray to the gods to keep it safe in perpetuity."¹²

The veracity and the authenticity of the anecdote has been doubted, so it is necessary to say a few words on the topic before going any further.¹³ In a study of the anecdote, Fridericus Marx argued the anecdote was unhistorical.¹⁴ His arguments can be summed up in three points. First, a passage in Cicero's *On the Orator* proves that the *lustrum* was performed by Mummius.¹⁵ Second, according to him, any change in solemn and sacred prayers was a grave offence. Finally, the political circumstances at the time and Scipio's own attitude to conquest discredit Scipio's words.¹⁶ André Aymard furthered Marx's analysis and argues that Valerius Maximus, writing under the emperor

⁹ Plin. *HN* 18. 3.11. cf, Cic. *De or.* 46.146.

¹⁰ On the various locations for the *publicae tabulae* see, Cic. *Mil.* 73, Livy 43.16.13; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.45.5. For a discussion of the records see Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.* 2³.361; Suolahti 1963, 33-34; Nicolet 1980, 62-64; Albanese 1995, 67-69; Purcell 1993, 140-2, 146.

¹¹ Varro, *Ling.* 6.86.

¹² Val. Max. 4.1.10a.

¹³ Marx, Astin and Aymard reject the anecdote see Marx 1884, 65; Aymard 1948, 101; Astin 1967, 325-31. Blitz and Scullard accept the authenticity of the anecdote see Blitz 1935, 42; Scullard 1960, 68 n.38. Blitz, however, rejects the details but considers the prayer to be authentic.

¹⁴ Marx 1884, 65.

¹⁵ Cic. *De or.* 2.268.

¹⁶ Astin 1967, 328-31.

Tiberius, wrote the anecdote to support the non-expansionist imperial politics of the time.¹⁷

A brief re-examination of the material will show that Scipio Aemilianus did not perform the *lustrum* and that, although the authenticity of the anecdote may be doubtful, the prayers are in fact authentic. The argument that Scipio Aemilianus did not perform the *lustrum* is mainly based on an anecdote reported by Cicero. In his account, when the tribune of the plebs Assellus taunted Scipio Aemilianus that his lustrum was *infelix*, inauspicious, the former censor replied: “Don’t be so surprised! For he who delivered you from disfranchisement completed the purification by sacrificing the bull.”¹⁸

A passage from Gellius attests that, during his censorship, Scipio attempted to deprive Asellus of his horse.¹⁹ According to another passage from Dio, Mummius stopped some of Scipio’s disciplinary actions.²⁰ Consequently, Cicero’s passage would then clearly imply that it was Mummius who rescued Asellus and performed the lustrum, rather than Scipio as Valerius Maximus’ anecdote claims. The authenticity of Valerius Maximus’ account may be doubted and Aymard may be right to argue that the account was created to support Tiberius’ non-expansionist policies.²¹

However, not all details of the story must be disregarded as an invention. The primary purpose of the anecdote, for Valerius Maximus, is to educate its readers on morals and ethics. *Exempla* are usually understood as historical narrative stripped bare of almost all historical context in order to make a specific moral point.²² Nonetheless, according to the Romans, the ideal *exemplum* would strive for realism; clarity and vividness of details are then essential features.²³ In this case, the realism of the anecdote lies in its representation of a real *lustrum*, and thus it may be surmised that elements of

¹⁷ Aymard 1948, 119.

¹⁸ Cic. *De or.* 2.268.

¹⁹ Gell. *NA* 3.4.1

²⁰ Dio *frag.* 76.1

²¹ Aymard 1948, 119. Harris 1979, 118-20. Maslakov 1984, 485 n.90.

²² Langlands 2008, 161. On the process of transformation of historical narrative into exemplary material see Maslakov 1984, Roller 2004, Langlands 2018.

²³ *Ad Her.* 4.49.62.

the anecdote reflect part of a real ceremony. In fact, the dictation of prayers to magistrates was a feature of Roman rituals and the public records mentioned are known from other sources.²⁴ Consequently, it is fair to assume the veracity of the prayer dictated by the scribe as part of the *carmen*, the ritual prayer, which had to be recited without modification or omission by the magistrate for the ritual to be viable.²⁵

Bringing all the material from these sources together allows us to reconstruct the main stages of the ceremony of purification as follows:

1. The *lustrum* started with “the censor [taking] the auspices by night in a sacred precinct.” (*ubi noctu in templum censor auspicaverit*)²⁶
2. Then the censor would pray for the success of the ritual: “May this be good, fortunate, happy, and salutary to the Roman people — the Quirites — and to the *res publica* of the Roman people — the Quirites — and to me and my colleague, to our honesty and our office,” (*quod BONUM fortunatum FELIX salutareque siet populo Romano Quiritibus reique publicae populi Romani Quiritium mihique collegaeque meo, fidei magistratuique nostro.*)
3. He would then command the herald to invite the population to assemble: “All the citizen soldiers under arms and private citizens as spokesmen of all the tribes, call hither to me with an *inlicium* ‘invitation,’” (*omnes Quirites pedites armatos, privatosque, curatores omnium tribuum, (...) voca inlicium huc ad me.*)²⁷
4. The herald would then “invite (the people) to assemble first from the sacred precinct, the *templum*, then from the walls of the city,” (*in templo primum vocat, postea de moeris item vocat.*) This process was called the *inlicium*, the invitation or the enticement.²⁸

²⁴ Plin. *HN* 28. 11. See Scheid 1990, 277-91, 340-2 for a discussion of the dictation of prayer in the ceremonies of the Aul Brothers. On *carmen*, Guittard 2007 and 2015.

²⁵ Aymard 1948, 110. Scheid 1990, 341.

²⁶ Varro, *Ling.* 6.86.

²⁷ Varro, *Ling.* 6.86; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.22; Livy 40.46.7.

²⁸ Varro, *Ling.* 6.86.

5. At dawn, “the censors, the scribes, and the magistrates were anointed with mirth and ointments” (*censores scribae magistratus murra unguentisque unguentur.*)²⁹
6. Once the people assembled, “the censors decided by lot who would lead the ceremony,” (*censores inter se sortiuntur, uter lustrum faciat.*)³⁰
7. The presiding magistrate would then order the army into centuries and squadrons.³¹
8. The three sacrificial animals, a bull, a ram and a boar, a *suovetaurilia*, would be led in a circular procession three times around the assembly by “men with names of good omen,” (*bonis nominibus, qui hostias ducerent, eligebantur.*)³²
9. The presiding magistrate would then sacrifice the animals and would pray to the gods for the greatness of the Romans: “the immortal gods were asked to make the state of the Roman people better and greater,” (*quod di immortales ut populi Romani res meliores amplioresque facerent rogabantur.*)³³
10. At the end of the ceremony, the magistrates would “lead the assembly back to the city in a procession,” (*cum lustrare et in urbem ad vexillum ducere debet.*)³⁴

With the ritual reconstructed, the role and nature of FELICITAS of the Romans can be analysed by exploring the content and the context of the prayers through the framework of ‘ritualisation’.

2.2 The FELICITAS Romana

The prayers of the *lustrum* define two roles for FELICITAS in the ceremony. It symbolises the efficiency of the ritual in bringing about Roman desires for the

²⁹ Varro, *Ling.* 6.86.

³⁰ Varro, *Ling.* 6.86.

³¹ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.22. Livy, 1.44. Both accounts attest the presence of the *equites*, the knights.

³² Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.22. Cic. *Div.* 1.102.

³³ Val. Max. 4.1.10a.

³⁴ Varro, *Ling.* 6.93.

state of the *res publica* while epitomising the partnership between the gods and the Romans.

The first role of FELICITAS is related to the effectiveness of the ritual. The prayer, “May this be good, fortunate, happy, and salutary to the Roman people — the Quirites — and to the *res publica* of the Roman people — the Quirites — and to me and my colleague, to our honesty and our office,” focuses on the results of the ritual.³⁵ It expresses the hope that the outcome of the ritual may be FELIX for the Roman community. For the ritual to be FELIX, it must give FELICITAS to the Roman community, which in turn is a proof that the ritual itself has FELICITAS. The prayer displays the same logic as Cato’s definition of FELICES sacred trees.³⁶ What determines the FELICITAS of the ritual is defined by the content of the second prayers as discussed below, and by the institutional role of the prayer itself in Roman religious and civic rituals.

In a discussion of the practices of divination in Rome, Cicero claims that, when trying to predict the future, the *maiores*, ancestors, listened not only to the voices of the gods but also to the utterance of men. For this reason, they started public and private business with the formulaic prayer “May this be prosperous, propitious, fortunate and FELIX,” (*quod BONUM, faustum, FELIX fortunatumque esset*).³⁷ The utterances of men are indications for the future, for the outcome of actions. To support his point, Cicero gives the example of L. Aemilius Paullus who one night found his daughter crying over the death of her little dog Persa.³⁸ Paullus took the dog’s death as an omen of his future success against king Perseus of Macedonia.

The prayer of the ceremony of purification is a variation of the prayer quoted by Cicero, and thus its role is to establish the outcome of the ceremony as an omen for the future of the community. A ritual correctly performed is a good omen for the future of the *res publica* and vice versa, a good future for the *res publica* is then a measure of the effectiveness of the ritual, of its

³⁵ Varro, *Ling.* 6.86.

³⁶ For a detailed discussion of the logic used to ascribed FELICITAS, see Chapter One.

³⁷ Cic. *Div.* 1.102. For a definition of divination see Cic. *Div.* 1.1. For a discussion of the practice of divination in Rome, see Santangelo 2013 and bibliography.

³⁸ Cic. *Div.* 1.102.

FELICITAS. What this good future looks like according to the Romans is articulated in the following prayer of the ceremony.

The prayer, “that the immortal gods were asked to make the *res publica* of the Roman people better and greater,” (*quo di immortales ut populi Romani res meliores amplioresque facerent rogabantur*) asks for the benevolence of the gods toward the Romans to bring about a better, *melior*, and bigger, *amplior*, *res publica*. The phrase “the *res publica* of the Roman people better and greater” (*res meliores amplioresque*) describes the Romans’ desired condition for the *res publica*. The use of the comparatives, *melior* and *amplior*, to describe this condition implies a direct comparison with the present state of the community. This comparison therefore defines the desired condition as an ongoing process of improvement from the present in an undetermined future. Central to this process is the idea of conservation; indeed, for the *res publica* to be judged to be *amplior* and *melior*, its present condition must be not only maintained but also improved on.³⁹

The FELICITAS of the ritual can then be defined as its efficiency in bringing about this desired condition for *res publica*, which benefits from a good relationship between the gods and the Romans. This desired future condition given by the FELICITAS of the ritual is then the FELICITAS of the Romans, FELICITAS *Romana*.

The second role of FELICITAS is related to the ability of the Romans to bring about the FELICITAS *Romana*. The prayer, “that the immortal gods make the *res publica* of the Roman people better and greater,” establishes the Romans’ demands to the gods. By asking the gods to help them bring about this new condition, the Romans define the gods as partners in their undertaking. It thus defines the FELICITAS of the Romans, namely their ability to bring about the FELICITAS *Romana*, as the successful relationship between the Romans and the gods.

FELICITAS *Romana* thus informs the ritual of the *lustrum*. The prayers of the ceremony define the FELICITAS of the Romans as the partnership between

³⁹ On FELICITAS and the protection of the *res publica*, see Chapter Five and Six.

the gods and the Romans to bring about *res meliores amplioresque*. In addition, the prayers further define the FELICITAS of the ceremony as the effectiveness of the ritual in achieving this desired state.

2.3 *Res Melior and Amplior*

The significance of FELICITAS *Romana* for the Roman community is manifested through the importance and the interpretation given to the prayers of the *lustrum* as exemplified by the trial of Cato the Elder, censor in 184 BCE, for *infelix lustrum*.

The judicial dispute was brought about by L. Minucius Thermus, to avenge the political humiliation of his father Q. Minucius Thermus in 190 BCE. In *Q. Minucium Thermum de falsis pugnis* and *Q. Minucium Thermum de decem hominibus*, Cato vehemently accused the then-consul of seeking a triumph on false pretences and of having abused his power over allies by executing ten men without trial.⁴⁰ It was a *sponsio*, a judicial wager, whereby the litigants mutually stipulated that should the case come to trial, the loser would pay the winner a certain sum of money, as suggested by a fragment of Cato's defence speech(es) identified by Plinio Fraccaro.⁴¹ The date of the trial is unknown but an agricultural reference in Cato's defence speech would suggest that at least one harvest happened after the conclusion of the *lustrum*.

⁴⁰ For the title of the speech, see *ORF*⁴ 8.58. For the content of the speeches, see *ORF*⁴ 8.9 and 8.60-3. with Astin 1978, 63. Opinion diverges on whether the fragments transmitted under different titles belongs to the same speech or, as the separate title suggests, to another speech made during the deliberations about Thermus' consulship and request for a triumph. see Reay 2005, 332 n.2; Scullard 1970, 133–34, 258; Astin 1978, 59, esp. n.27, 63, 73, 327–8.

⁴¹ *ORF*⁴ 8.133 with Fraccaro 1911, 45; Reay 2005, 332 n.5. Opinion on the categorisation of Cato's speech(es) after his censorship is generally divergent. Scullard sees the speeches *De lustris sui FELICITATE*, *In Thermum post censorem*, and *De suis virtibus contra Thermum* as one speech delivered in a judiciary dispute between Cato and L. Minucius Thermus. Fraccaro argues that *De suis FELICITATE* and *De Thermo post censorem* are the same speech named *Adversus Q. Minucium Thermum de lustris sui FELICITATE*. Finally, Stark asserts, rather unconvincingly, that *de lustris sui FELICITATE* is not the title of a speech of Cato but only a fourth-century CE reference in a codex *contra* Fraccaro 1911, 458 n.191.

The date could then fall between late 183 and early 182 BCE and the next censorship in 179/8 BCE.⁴²

Thermus' main accusation was that the *lustrum* Cato performed as censor was *infelix*; the outcome of the ceremony did not bring FELICITAS.⁴³ The reference in Cato's speech to the sacred pig sacrificed at the end of the *lustrum* hints at an alleged technical problem during the performance of the ceremony.⁴⁴ To support his claim, Thermus probably introduced as evidence a series of prodigies that happened between the years 183 and 180 BCE.⁴⁵ In 183 BCE, violent storms and blood rains prompted the *decemviri*, a board of ten priests in charge of the Roman sacred books, to expiate the prodigies through supplications. In 182 BCE, there were violent storms, a mule with three feet was reported and a temple was struck by lightning. In 181 BCE, blood rains on the temple of Vulcan and Concordia and an epidemic outbreak led the *decemviri* to consult the sacred books to expiate the prodigies. Finally, in 180 BCE, as the pestilence lasted, the Senate asked the *decemviri* to consult the Sibylline books to appease the wrath of the gods. These prodigies were predictive of the future of the *res publica* and indicative of the relationship between the gods; they were interpreted as bad omens and expiated accordingly.⁴⁶

In response, as a fragment reported by a fourth-century CE panegyrist suggests, Cato adduced agricultural productivity as a proof of FELICITAS of his *lustrum*. The censors, Cato declared, "established a FELIX *lustrum*, if the crops had filled up the storehouses, if the vintage had been abundant, if the olive oil had flowed liberally from the groves," (*lustrum FELIX condidissent, si horrea messis implesset, si vindemia redundasset, si oliveta large fluxissent*.)⁴⁷

⁴² Astin 1978, 106.

⁴³ The accusation can be inferred from the title of a speech of Cato given after his censorship, see *ORF*⁴ 8.135.

⁴⁴ *ORF*⁴ 8.134. Fraccaro 1911, 458 accurately identifies this fragment and another, *ORF*⁴ 8.133, both classified as *De Thermo post censorem* as thematically referring to the same speech, named *Adversus Q. Minus Thermum de lustrum sui FELICITATE*.

⁴⁵ Reay 2005, 332.

⁴⁶ Livy 39.46.3 (183 BCE); Livy 40.2.1. (182 BCE); Livy 40.36.14-37.3 (181-180 BCE).

⁴⁷ *ORF*⁴ 8.135.

The discourse of both Cato and Thermus demonstrates that the effect of the ritual centres on the state of the *res publica*. On Thermus' part, the use of prodigies as bad omens which were expiated to appease the gods to substantiate accusations of the lack of FELICITAS of the ritual and, conversely, Cato's description of the agricultural benefits which emanated from his *lustrum* to demonstrate the FELICITAS of the ritual both connect physical manifestations of the state of the *res publica* with the success of the ritual.⁴⁸

Both Cato and Thermus then provide examples of what the FELICITAS *Romana* means for the community. For Cato, *res amplior and melior* denotes agricultural productivity: for Thermus, the lack of pestilence. For Scipio Aemilianus, according to Valerius Maximus, the ideal of *amplior* was associated with the territorial expansion of the *res publica* and *melior*, with its conservation.⁴⁹ Cicero relays the same interpretation as Scipio Aemilianus when, in his defence of Milo, he connects the FELICITAS of the Romans to the vastness of the Roman empire and its protection.⁵⁰ Finally, Aemilius Paullus also refers to his victory against King Perses and his conquest of Macedonia as the FELICITAS of the Romans.⁵¹ Victory, conquest, agricultural productivity and wellness of the community are thus examples of the manifestations of the FELICITAS *Romana*.

⁴⁸ On the predictive nature of prodigies see Fest. 254 (L); Cic. *Phil.* 4.10; Cic. *Div.* 1.18.35, 1.16.29. For a good discussion of prodigies and their role in the *res publica*, see Santangelo 2013, esp. 37-9.

⁴⁹ Val. Max. 4.1.10a.

⁵⁰ Cic. *Mil.* 83 : *Sed huius benefici gratiam, iudices, fortuna populi Romani et vestra FELICITAS et di immortales sibi deberi putant. Nec vero quisquam aliter arbitrari potest, nisi qui nullam vim esse ducit numenve divinum; quem neque imperi nostri magnitudo (...)* (But for this blessing, gentlemen, the fortune of the Roman people, your own FELICITAS, and the immortal gods claim your gratitude. Nor indeed can any man think otherwise, unless there be any who thinks that there is no such thing as divine power and control, who is not stirred by the greatness of our empire (...)).

⁵¹ Val. Max. 5.10.2 : *cum in maximo prouentu FELICITATIS nostrae, Quirites, timerem ne quid mali fortuna moliretur, louem optimum maximum lunonemque reginam et Mineruam precatus sum ut, si quid aduersi populo Romano inmineret, totum in meam domum conuerteretur* (in the great harvest of our FELICITAS, citizens, I feared that Fortuna may have something bad for us. So I prayed Jupiter Best and Greatest, Queen Juno and Minerva that if any adversity threatened the people Rome it might all be turned against my house).

FELICITAS *Romana* is therefore significant for the community. Concern for the success of the ritual, as testified by the trial of Cato the Elder, reveals the importance of the prayers of the *lustrum* for the community, as it is through these prayers that the future of the community is defined and ultimately assessed. *Res amplior* and *melior* was manifested through the victory, the conquest and the agricultural productivity provided by both a good ritual and a good relationship with the gods.

2.4 The census and the *lustrum*

To understand the role of FELICITAS *Romana* in the symbolic creation of the Roman community, the prayers of the *lustratio* must be set in their socio-political environment. It is therefore necessary to understand how the census and the *lustrum* form the Roman community and then to explore the relationship between the two rituals.

The Roman community is symbolically and juridically formed by two complementary processes: the census as a process of identification and hierarchisation, and the *lustrum* as a process of creation. The census assesses the citizenship claim of an individual, then, based on his wealth and morals, determines his *ratio*, his social position in the Roman community. This social position delimitates the individual's financial and political participation in the Roman community.⁵²

Censuses were traditionally thought to be held every five years.⁵³ Studies of the *Fasti Capitolini* and other evidence have shown that, in practice, censuses were held irregularly.⁵⁴ The census was held in the Campus Martius, a vast training ground outside of Rome's wall, before moving to the *Villa*

⁵² Nicolet 1980, 49.

⁵³ The word *lustrum* comes to designate the period of time between two censuses, see Varro, *Ling.* 4.11; Fest. 107 (L).

⁵⁴ On the irregularity of the *lustrum*, see Leuze 1912, 1-57; Liou-Gille 2001; and for a focus on the first century BCE, Wiseman 1969 and Astin 1985. There is only one period of fifty-years between 209-154 BCE. in which the census was held every five years. Interestingly this period corresponds to a time of heavy military engagement for Rome with the end of the Second Punic War and the beginning of Mithridatic Wars. This suggests that the need for men for warfare was the primarily concern in performing the census regularly.

Publica.⁵⁵ In the early Republic, several magistrates were in charge of the census before the office of censor was created in 443 BCE.⁵⁶ The primary tasks of the censors were to be in charge of the *regimen morum*, the moral of the state, and to perform the *census populi*, the regular enumeration of the *populus Romanus* and their arrangement into social classes and voting-tribes.⁵⁷ The censors were in charge of a number of administrative and embellishment tasks such as allocating building contracts for temples and tax-farming contracts, or delimitating public land for instance.⁵⁸

During the process of the census, all male citizens who were *sui iuris* were obliged under oath to declare themselves (age, full name, tribe and filiation), their family and their possessions before the censors.⁵⁹ Declarations would be verified and assessed. Assessment of the wealth and moral behaviour of citizens would determine their *ratio*, social class, according to the five property classes.⁶⁰ The *ratio* of a citizen would define his participation in the community. It would delineate his political voting rights in the *comitia centuriata*, the assembly that elected higher magistracies such as praetors and consuls and passed legislation.⁶¹ The census, in a sense, defines the *civitas* of the Roman citizen.⁶² It would also determine the tax, *tributum*, paid to the treasury, the *aerarium*, until the tax was abolished in 167 BCE.⁶³ Finally, it

⁵⁵ Livy 4.22.

⁵⁶ Varro, *Ling* 6. 93 mentions in passing that dictators and consuls held censuses. On the creation of the censorship, see Livy 4.8.2.

⁵⁷ Livy 4.8.2. On the *regimen morum*, see for instance Astin 1988; Lo Cascio 2001; Coudry 2012; Clemente 2016.

⁵⁸ For a good study of the census see Pieri 1968; Suolahti 1963; Wiseman 1969; Astin 1985; Clemente 2022.

⁵⁹ For the oath see Gell. *NA* 17.21.44; For the declaration, see Tab Her. 146-7; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.15.6. and Cic. *Leg.* 3.7.

⁶⁰ For the role of the censors as moral assessors see Pseud. Ascon. I. 89 St., commenting on Cic. *Div. Caec.* 8.

⁶¹ Cic. *Leg.* 3.11.44; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.59.9. The composition of the *comitia centuria* of 193 centuries is thought to mimic the *exercitus centuriatus* but the connection remains tenuous. For a good bibliography on the reform of the *comitia centuriata* see Grieve 1985, 278 n.1. For a discussion of the Livy's and Dionysius Halicarnassus' reconstruction of *comitia centuriata*, see Taylor 1990, 85-106; Lintott 1999, 55-61; Cornell 2000; Cornell 2022, 223-6.

⁶² Clemente 2016, 450.

⁶³ On the process of the evaluation of the *tributum* during the census, Northwood 2008. On the tax abolition, see Cic. *Off.* 2.76; Plin. *HN* 33.17.

would define the military obligation of citizens and position in the *exercitus centuriatus*, the Roman citizen army, until Marius reformed the recruitment of the army in 107 BCE.

Upon the promulgation of the so-called '*plebiscitum Ovinium de senatus lectione*' in the fourth century BCE, the censors were also entrusted with the revision of the *album senatorium* (senatorial list, or roll), the *lectio senatus*.⁶⁴ Censors also carried out the *recognitio equitum*, a review of the knight rolls, ensuring that members conformed to the *dignitas*, the dignity, of their social position.⁶⁵ By performing the *lectio senatus*, the *recognitio equitum* and the *census populi*, the census shaped the community. The census created a status for the individual, investing him with a set of duties and privileges. The census thus defines the political and military unit of the community by placing the individual at the centre of a web of reciprocal relationships between Roman citizens.⁶⁶

While the census shaped the community, the creation of the community, i.e. the coming into being of the community, was achieved through the *lustrum*. In other words, the *lustrum* provided judicial and symbolic validation for the census, as further discussed below.

The relationship between the census and the *lustrum* was already a matter of debate in the Late Roman Republic. In the first century BCE, Cicero questioned whether the validity of the censors' work stemmed from the ritual of the *lustrum* or the act of writing the *tabulae*: "might there not be controversy, when it is asked whether a slave is free when by the wish of his master he has been enrolled in the census, or when the *lustrum* has been completed."⁶⁷ The debate arose when the procedure of the *lustrum* and the census were considerably separated in time as Rome grew, and when the *lustrum* failed to be performed despite the censors' completion of the *census populi* as was the

⁶⁴ On the *plebiscitum Ovinium*, see Cornell 2000.

⁶⁵ For discussion of *dignitas* in Rome, see Chapter Six.

⁶⁶ Nicolet 1980, 51.

⁶⁷ Cic. *de Or.* 1.183.

case in the failed censuses of 60-61, 55-54, 50-49 BCE.⁶⁸ The debate was politically significant as it would allow the use of the censors' work to determine the composition of the *comitia centuriata*, the voting tribes, and thus to shape the balance of power within Rome.

Overall, it seems that the performance of the *lustrum* provided a certain juridical validity to the work of the censors.⁶⁹ A jurist of the fourth century CE reports that “the *lustrum* confirmed all the work done during the census” and that when the ceremony was not performed, men would revert to their social class according to the previous census.⁷⁰ This unique text is ambiguous and seems to indicate that all the acts of the censors were validated juridically by the performance of the *lustrum*. The validity of the *lectio senatus* and the *recognitio equitum* were, however, both independent from the performance for the *lustratio* as both reviews of the membership of those classes were historically carried out at different times than the *census populi*.⁷¹ The performance of the *lustrum* would then validate juridically the *census populi*.⁷²

This juridical validity is in essence a symbolic validation that happens with the performance of the ritual. The participation of the *equites* and the senators in the *lustrum* suggests that this symbolic validation also applied to work of the censors done on the *lectio senatus* and the *recognitio equitum*.⁷³ The modern debate around how the religious ceremony would confer legal validation on the *census populi* was centred around the interpretation of the phrase *lustrum condere*, to close the *lustrum*. Livy states that it is “the close of the *lustrum* that marks the end of the census.”⁷⁴ While most scholars such as

⁶⁸ Moore 2013, 122-125 for a good discussion of the censuses. see also Astin 1985, 184-186.

⁶⁹ Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr* 2³.419-420; Wiseman 1969, 62-65; Linderski 1986a, 2187-2188.

⁷⁰ *Dos. frag.* 17

⁷¹ Moore 2013, 91. Clemente 2016, 453. It was not until *plesbicitum Ovinium* that the responsibility to review the membership of the senate was transferred to the censors.

⁷² Brunt argued that by the first century BCE the *lustrum* has lost any juridical relevance to the *census populi*. The acts of the censors were valid of their own, see Brunt 1971, 105, 700-1. Astin 1985, 185 admits that whether the *lustrum* was legally necessary for the census is a controversial issue by the first century BCE.

⁷³ On the presence of the *equites* in the *lustrum*, see note 31 above.

⁷⁴ Livy, 1.44.

Oscar Leuze, Friedrich Otto or Georges Pieri, interpreted *lustrum condere* to designate the ritual as a whole, Robert Ogilvie argued that it is just an element of the ritual.⁷⁵ For him, both Varro's quote from the public records and Cicero's anecdote about Scipio Aemilianus' reply to Asellus described *lustrum condere* as a stage in the ceremonial action.⁷⁶ He then derived the root of *lustrum* to mean 'a purifying agent' and connected it with the purifying fire of the Umbrian ceremony of purification of the Iguvine tribe.⁷⁷ Ogilvie's interpretation, however, is untenable in the face of the overwhelming number of sources whereby *lustrum condere* or its variant *lustrum facere* refers to the act of purification as a whole, a fact that he himself acknowledged.⁷⁸

Taking *lustrum condere* to refer to the ritual, other scholars have proposed several interpretations of the purification and the census working together based on the etymology of the word *lustrum*. Oscar Leuze explained the role of the *lustrum* by arguing that the closing ceremony of the census was in fact composed of two parts, one profane, the other religious.⁷⁹ The first part was the presentation of the actions of the censors, which, through juridical fiction, were condensed into one day and validated by a purification ceremony. The word *lustrum*, which first signified the religious part of the ceremony came to designate the whole ceremony. Later, Walter Otto slightly modified Leuze's interpretation. Otto connected the etymology of *lustrum* to the Indo-European root leuk, from which comes *lustrare*. He points out that *lustrare* has two separate yet related groups of meanings, 'to illuminate', 'to see', 'to inspect', on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 'to go round', 'to traverse', 'to proceed around', originating from the notion of a review, an inspection.⁸⁰ The *lustrum* would thus originally designate the military review of the classes and centuries

⁷⁵ See Leuze 1912, Otto 1916, Pieri 1968, *contra* Ogilvie 1961.

⁷⁶ Ogilvie 1961, 32.

⁷⁷ Ogilvie 1961, 35-37.

⁷⁸ For instance, see Cat. *Agri.* 141; Livy 3.3.9, 3.24.10, 10.9.14, 10.47.2, 27.36.6, 29.37.5, 35.9.2.

⁷⁹ Leuze 1912, 65.

⁸⁰ For the meaning of "to process" see Varro *Ling.* 6, 32; Columella 10, 362. For the meaning of "to inspect, to see" cf. Prop. 2.22.3; Verg. *Aen.* 8.153.

on the Campus Martius, which confers juridical validity on the census. He identified the review with Leuze's profane ceremony.⁸¹

Greatly critical of both interpretations, Georges Pieri noted the functionality of both approaches (the *lustrum* is seen as just an extra step of the census) and the lack of focus on the religious character of the ceremony of the *lustrum*.⁸² The oldest sources about the *lustrum* treat the ceremony essentially as a religious act.⁸³ For Pieri, the primary role of the census was originally the creation of the *exercitus centuriatus*. The army was organised by the census but its actual creation, its coming-into-being, was only achieved through the religious ceremony of purification, the *lustrum*. As a parallel, he noted that Festus reports that "the ritual books of the Etruscans (...) treated the creation of the army as a ritual."⁸⁴ The *lustrum* then is the equivalent of the *dies lustricus*, the *lustratio* ceremony on the ninth or eighth day after birth which bestowed the name upon a new-born.⁸⁵ The ceremony marks the entry, the symbolic birth, of the child into the Roman community. Consequently, at each census a new community is founded through the *lustrum*.⁸⁶ It is the symbolic nature of the ritual that gives the legal validity to the *census populi*. While Pieri's interpretation rightly emphasises the highly symbolic nature of the *lustrum*, it does not explain the mechanisms by which the ceremony of purification marks the coming into being of the community as it does not engage with the elements of the ritual itself.

The Roman community is symbolically formed by the integration of the Romans into a religious unit in three stages. The first stage of the formation is the assembly of all Roman citizens according to their classes. The opening prayer of the ritual after the augury invites the Romans to come together: "All the citizen soldiers under arms and private citizens as spokesmen of all the tribes, call hither to me with an *inlicium* "invitation" (*omnes Quirites pedites*

⁸¹ Otto 1916, 38.

⁸² Pieri 1968, 85.

⁸³ Cat. *de agr.* 141.

⁸⁴ Fest. 358 (L).

⁸⁵ Macrob. *Sat.* 1.16.36.

⁸⁶ Versnel 1975; Rüpke 2019, 146-9.

armatos, privatosque, curatores omnium tribuum (...) voca inlicium huc ad me). *Omnes Quirites* is a common expression which refers to all Roman citizens.⁸⁷ Then, the leading magistrates order the citizens to assemble according to their position in the *exercitus centuriatus*, with the horses in their squadrons and the rest of the men in their centuries. The second stage of the formation is the physical delimitation of the community. The sacrificial animals are led around the assembly three times by men with auspicious names. The circular procession of the sacrificial victims around the assembly creates a spatial opposition between the Romans and the rest of the world, and physically marks off the Romans as a unit.

The third and final stage is the communion with the gods. The assembly takes place in a liminal space, a *templum*.⁸⁸ Varro identifies three types of *templum*, in the sky, on the earth, and under the earth.⁸⁹ The *templum* on the earth is a defined space used for auspices and auguries.⁹⁰ It is a space of observation and interpretation of the manifestations of the divine; in sum, it is a place of communication, a meeting place, between the gods and the Romans. Within this space, prayers are part of the dialogue with the gods and articulate the demands of the Romans to the gods, namely “that the immortal gods may make the state of the Roman people better and greater.”⁹¹ The physical delimitation of the Romans as a unit in a *templum* constitutes the creation of a religious community in the eyes of the gods. With the prayer, this religious community establishes a partnership with the gods to create a better future for the *res publica*, as discussed above, but is also marked off as the beneficiary of the benevolence of the gods. The creation of this partnership within a public ritual involving Romans and magistrates of the *res publica* sets this relationship as part of the official *religio*.⁹² The *FELICITAS Romana* therefore

⁸⁷ On *Quirites* in discourse, see Hölkeskamp 2013, 11-28.

⁸⁸ Varro, *Ling.* 6.87.

⁸⁹ Varro, *Ling.* 7.6.

⁹⁰ Varro, *Ling.* 7.8.

⁹¹ Val. Max. 5.10.2.

⁹² Scheid 2016, 56-95.

informs the religious community of the Romans and is based on the relationship between the gods and the Roman people.

Since the assembly in the *templum* represents the political and military unit of the Roman community, namely the *comitia centuriata* and the *exercitus centuriatus*, the ceremony of purification symbolically integrates and merges the political and military unit into a religious unit which works with the gods for the *FELICITAS Romana*. The *FELICITAS Romana* informs then the Roman community in its most fundamental expression.

Consequently, *FELICITAS Romana* influences the relationship between Roman citizens themselves at the most basic level. Indeed, a fundamental characteristic of prayers in a ritual is that they are as much auto-communicative as they are allo-communicative.⁹³ The transmitter of the messages is also amongst its receivers and is often its most significant receiver. The magistrate acting in the name of and in front of the Roman community is addressing the gods. The receivers of the message are the gods but also the magistrate himself and the Roman community.⁹⁴ The demand then, “to make the *res publica* better and greater for the Roman people,” which defines the *FELICITAS Romana*, constitutes a partnership between the Roman citizens themselves. Romans are to work together to realise their desires for the future of their *res publica*.

2.5 The Roman Republican Triumph: *FELICITAS Romana* enacted

One of the main endeavours in which the Romans and the gods worked together for the future of the *res publica* was warfare. Military victory and territorial expansion, as discussed above, were seen by Romans as manifestations of *FELICITAS Romana*.⁹⁵ Throughout the Late Roman Republic, eighty-four triumphs were celebrated.⁹⁶ As the ceremony given in honour of a

⁹³ Wallace 1966, 233; Rappaport 1979, 178.

⁹⁴ On priests and magistrates as representatives of Roman community to the gods, see Cic. *Har. Rep.* 12. cf. Scheid 2016, 133.

⁹⁵ Val. Max. 4.1.10a, 5.10.2.; Cic. *Mil.* 83.

⁹⁶ Rich 2014, 207, 227, 231-240. I deduce this number by adding the numbers Rich provides for the period going from 129-91 BCE, 90-50 BCE, and 49-19 BCE. Rich's

military victory by a Roman general and his army, the triumph constitutes one of the main and most explicit ritualistic representations of the *FELICITAS Romana* experienced by the Roman community at the time.⁹⁷ Reconstructing the ceremony of the triumph, using the tools of 'ritualisation', will highlight three points: how the parade of the triumph provides a representation of the ideals of *res melior* and *amplior*, how a Roman general plays a central role in creating this representation and embodying the human and divine agency that brought about the *FELICITAS Romana*, and finally, how the ritual reinforces the Roman community.

It is possible to reconstruct the ceremony of the triumph in the Late Roman Republic from a wealth of sources. For instance, the account of the triumph of Titus and Vespasian in 71 CE by the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus, a witness to the event, constitutes one of the best available pieces of evidence to understand what the structure and the route of the triumph throughout the city of Rome might have looked during the second and first century BCE.⁹⁸ Accounts of Pompey's triple triumph for his victory against Mithridates VI by a large number of literary sources, and in particular by Plutarch and Appian, provide extensive descriptions of the various elements constitutive of a triumph, such as the display of wealth, arms or captives, and their layout in the procession.⁹⁹ Finally, poems written at the turn of the century

numbers are drawn up from the *Fasti Triumphales* and other literary sources. For his methodology, see Rich 2014, 199-206.

⁹⁷ On the connection between *FELICITAS* and the attribution of a triumph, see Chapter Three.

⁹⁸ Joseph. *B.J.* 7.3-6, see Frilingos 2017. The triumphal road (and the use of Josephus as a source for it) is a matter of scholarly debate. Coarelli 1968, Bonfante Warren 1970, 54-5; Favro 1994, 151-64; Isager 1997, 107-35; and Bastien 2007, 316-324; all defend the standard view that all parades throughout Roman times circled around the Palatine Hill down through the Forum and ending up on the Capitoline Hill contra Beard 2007, 92-106. Östenberg 2010 maintained that Republican triumphs did not circle around the Palatine Hill and took advantage of the space and visibility of Circus Maximus for exposure and returned to the Forum through the Velabrum. Popkin 2016, 24-45 provides a good overview of the debate and the elements of variation and continuity in the triumphal road.

⁹⁹ App. *Mithr.* 116-117; Plut. *Pomp.* 45.1-46.2; Dio Cass. 37.21.1-2, 42.5.5-6; Plin. *HN* 7.97-98, 12.111, 33.151, 37.11-18; Diod. Sic. 40.4. On Pompey's third triumph, see Beard 2007, 7-41; Östenberg 2009, 55-6, 100-2, 147-50, 163-6, 184-8, 284-9.

by Ovid, for instance, provide valuable insights into how Romans understood the ceremony and its symbolic dynamics.¹⁰⁰

Each Roman triumph was different and unique to the occasion for which it was celebrated. Their singularity, and in particular the role the general played in creating a representation of his victory, is revealing of the agency and the relationships at the heart of the FELICITAS of the Romans.

Symbolically, through the parading of the profit of conquests, of defeated enemies, and of representations of the territory conquered and the battle fought, the triumph illustrates to its participants how the *res publica* was made *amplior* and *melior* by the victory of the Roman general and his army.¹⁰¹ The themes of representation and mimesis are one of the main ideas at the heart of the triumph during the second and first century BCE. In his analysis of the Roman political system, Polybius describes the “triumph as a procession, in which generals bring the actual spectacle of their achievement before the eyes of their fellow citizens.”¹⁰² His description highlights the role of the triumph as not only a re-presentation but also a re-creation of the general’s achievement to the Roman people. Generals took great pride in creating the best spectacle of their battles, victories and conquest. For instance, after his victory against the Teutones and Ambrons in 102 BCE, Marius selected the best weapons and armours to be used in his triumph.¹⁰³ In 61 BCE, Pompey is also said to have obtained on a couple of notorious pirate chiefs in the hope of featuring them in his own triumphal parade.¹⁰⁴ By presenting those weapons, those captives, both generals hoped to convey to their audience, the Roman people, not only the magnitude but also the emotions of their achievements.

¹⁰⁰ Ov. *Ars Arm.* 1.217–22; *Am.* 1.2.9–52; Hor. *Carm.* 3.30; Prop. 3.1.9-12.

¹⁰¹ Östenberg 2009, 262-92.

¹⁰² Polyb. 6.15.8 cf. Walbank *HCP*, 1.689. On Polybius and the Roman political culture, see Carsana 2022, 107-24.

¹⁰³ Plut. *Mar.* 22.1.

¹⁰⁴ Dio Cass. 36.19.

Doing so then, victorious Roman generals display how the *res publica* was expanded by their battles and conquest.¹⁰⁵ In 167 BCE, Aemilius Paullus apparently aimed to convey the brutality of the fighting in his celebration of a three-day triumph over King Perseus of Macedon. Plutarch reports that the second day of the procession saw impressive wagonloads of enemy weapons. Helmets, breast-plates, greaves, Cretan shields, Thracian body armours, quivers, swords and bridles were “carefully and artfully arranged to look exactly as though they had been piled together in heaps and at random.” They made harsh and dreadful sounds as they clanked along and, Plutarch emphasises, their sight was enough to inspire terror in the audience.¹⁰⁶

In his triumph in 61 BCE, Pompey aimed to convey the size of lands added under the control of the *res publica*. Indeed, according to Plutarch, placards in Pompey’s triumph blazoned the name of all the nations which had been conquered, the number of fortresses, cities and ships he had captured and the new cities founded.¹⁰⁷ Appian apparently quotes such a placard saying: “Eight hundred bronze-beaked ships were captured; eight towns were founded in Cappadocia, twenty in Cilicia and Coele Syria, and in Palestine (...) the town now called Seleucis; the Kings defeated were Tigranes of Armenia, Atoces of Iberia, Oroezes of Albania, Darius of Media, Aretas of Nabataea, Antiochus of Commagene.”¹⁰⁸ Those placards communicated not only the magnitude of Pompey’s achievements but also of the lands added into the *res publica*.

The display of the triumphant general’s achievement drew attention to how the *res publica* was made *melior* through the profit of their conquest. The triumphal route was one of the major routes through which both coins and artistic tradition were brought to Roman audiences.¹⁰⁹ Roman triumphal written tradition pays particular attention to the vast sums of money paraded through

¹⁰⁵ Hardie 2002, 310; Murphy 2004, 155, 160; Östenberg 2009, 189-261. Triumphs were also given for lands which were recovered. On this point, see Dart and Vervaeet 2014.

¹⁰⁶ Plut. *Aem.* 32-33. On the staging of war scene, Östenberg 2009, 245-61.

¹⁰⁷ Plut. *Pomp.* 45.2.

¹⁰⁸ App. *Mith.* 117.

¹⁰⁹ On the use and preparation of art work in the triumph, Cadario 2014.

the streets. In 46 BCE it is estimated that Caesar carried 600 million sesterces in his quadruple triumph – equivalent to the minimum subsistence of more than a million families for a year.¹¹⁰ In 61 BCE Pompey is said to have paraded 75,1 million drachmae of silver coins – more than the annual tax revenue of the whole Roman world at the time.¹¹¹ Vast amounts of arts and artworks were also paraded during the procession. In 189 BCE L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, celebrating in a triumph for his victory against Antiochus III, exhibited 1,400 pounds of chased silverware and 1,500 pounds of golden vessels.¹¹² In 145 BCE L. Mummius Archaius exhibited Corinthian bronzes, marble statues and paintings during his triumph against the Achaean League.¹¹³ Most of those statues ended up decorating Rome and other cities in Italy and eastern Greece.¹¹⁴ Bronze statues of the Muses originating from the Greek city of Thespieae in Helicon decorated the temple of goddess FELICITAS built by Lucullus in Rome at that time.¹¹⁵

Admittedly not every triumph celebrated during the second and first centuries BCE presented such a display of wealth or territorial expansion. Some triumphs were in fact celebrated without any spoils or any army, like that of Lucius Furius Purpureo who is said to have triumphed with no soldiers, no spoils, no captives.¹¹⁶ Florus' report that a triumph was aborted in 245 BCE because all the booty had been lost at sea indicates that the display of wealth and territorial expansion were already seen as important constitutive elements of the ceremony in the mid-third century BCE.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁰ Vell. Pat. 2.56.2.

¹¹¹ App. *Mith.* 117.

¹¹² Plin. *HN.* 33.148.

¹¹³ Livy *Per.* 52; Plin. *HN* 37.12; Tac. *Ann.* 14.21.

¹¹⁴ For mentions of Mummius' beautification of Rome, cf. Plin. *HN* 37.12, Cic. *Verr.* 4.4. For epigraphical evidence of Mummius' dedication of Corinthian artwork to different cities in Italy and Greece, see for instance, *CIL* VI 331, *CIL* I² 629 (Parma), *CIL* I² 628 (Nursia), *CIL* I² 627 A & B (Trebula Mutuesca), *CIL* I² 631 (Cures). For a good discussion of Mummius' use of statues for foreign policy, see Yarrow 2006.

¹¹⁵ Cic. *Verr.* 4.4. For a more detailed discussion of the role of the statues in Lucullus' temple, see Chapter Four.

¹¹⁶ Livy 31.49.3, cf. 40.38.9.

¹¹⁷ Flor. *Epit.* 1.18.

Through the parade of the varied profits from conquests and the representation of battle including the enemies, weapons and captives, illustrating how these profits were obtained, the triumph then presents a microcosm of the processes of imperial expansion.¹¹⁸ The foreignness of spoils coupled with the various representation of conquests displayed during the ceremony delineated a new image of the *res publica*.¹¹⁹ Spectators at the triumph may not have understood what they saw during the procession but they appropriated this image of the expanding and wealthier *res publica*.

Writing at the turn of the century, in his *The Art of Love*, Ovid presents the triumphal procession as a good place to flirt with a girl and explains to the learning-lover how to impress girls with pseudo-erudition.¹²⁰ In his effort to seduce a girl, the learning-lover is pretending to be a know-it-all to help her make sense of what she sees. Through his humoristic portrayal, Ovid describes the process by which Roman spectators most likely appropriated the spectacle. Using their imagination, they attempted to comprehend the vision of places, mountains, streams, foreign kings passing by them. In so doing, spectators include those new foreign, previously unknown elements, into their imaginary representation of what the *res publica* now includes.¹²¹

The ritual also provides its participants with a clear representation of the human and divine agency that brought about this new state of the *res publica*. The parade of the triumphant Roman general and the Roman army symbolically defines in the eyes of the spectators those actors as responsible for bringing *FELICITAS Romana*. The role of the gods is visually intimated in the attire the triumphant Roman general wears during the procession.

The divine connotation of the triumphant general is indeed displayed on his body, in his dress, and in his insignia. His face and his body were painted in red as an echo to the terracotta cult status of Jupiter Optimus Maximus in

¹¹⁸ Beard 2007, 160-161.

¹¹⁹ On the materiality of the *res publica*, see Moatti 2018, 299-346.

¹²⁰ *Ov. Ars Arm.* 1.217–22. On the publication of the *The Art of Love*, see Gibson 2009.

¹²¹ Beard 2007, 160-2.

the temple of the Capitoline.¹²² He wore a tunic embroidered with palm branches (*tunica palmata*), under a luxurious toga originally purple (*tunica purpurea*) then later decorated with stars, with a laurel crown on his head.¹²³ In one hand, he held an ivory sceptre and in the other hand, a branch of laurel. Livy refers to this entire attire as the “clothes of Jupiter Optimus Maximus.”¹²⁴ The connection between the triumphant general and the god Jupiter does not stop there. The *quadriga*, in which the victorious general parades, was thought by Romans to be the counterpart of Jupiter’s own four-horse carriage.¹²⁵ In his description of Camillus’ triumph, Livy explicitly connects the *currus triumphalis* with the quadriga of Jupiter, as he describes that “Camillus rode into the city on a chariot drawn by white horses (...) [which] made the dictator equal to Jupiter and the sun-god.”¹²⁶

In keeping with ideas of representation and mimesis at the heart of the ceremony, the similarity between the clothing of the triumphant general and of the cult statue of Jupiter Optimus Maximus then suggests that symbolically the general ‘represents’ or ‘embodies’ the god. By wearing the triumphal insignia, the Roman general ‘becomes’ a god – a process called deification – and assume a double nature as both ‘human’ and ‘divine’.¹²⁷ Perhaps the best evidence of the double nature of the Roman general as ‘divine human’ in our sources is Plautus’ comedy *Amphitryon*, performed in the second century BCE in the context of a triumph, in which the god Jupiter takes the identity of a triumphant Theban general to seduce his wife. The humour of the comedy is

¹²² Plin. *HN* 33.111; Serv. *Ecl.* 6.22; 10.27; Isid. *Orig.* 18.2-6. Tzetzes, *Epist.* 97. For the statue, see Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 98. For a modern interpretation of the red paint, see Rüpke 2006a, 260-1; Versnel 2006, 304-306; Beard 2007, 225-33.

¹²³ On the *tunica palmata*, App. *Pun.* 66. On the *tunica purpurea*, Fest. 228(L); Livy 27.4.8, 31.11.11.

¹²⁴ Livy 10.7.9-10, cf. Suet. *Aug.* 94.6; Servius *Ecl.* 10.27.

¹²⁵ Plin. *HN* 35.157; Fest. 340(L); Plaut. *Trin.* 83.

¹²⁶ Livy 5.23.5; Plut. *Cam.* 7. For a modern discussion on the *quadriga*, see Versnel 1970, 72-8; Versnel 2006, 303-4; Beard 2007, 233-7.

¹²⁷ On the divination of the triumphant general, Versnel 1970, 66-93; Bonafante Warren 1970, 65; Beard 2007, 237-8. Rüpke 2006a, 260-8 argues that the triumphant general represents an honorific statue similar to those given to members of the Roman aristocracy during the fourth and third century BCE. In response, Versnel 2006, in particular 316-20, argues that evidence of such honorific statues is too scarce to suggest a connection with the figure of the triumphant general.

based on an inversion of the role between the gods and the general, highlighting the deep connection between the general and its divine statue in the ceremony.¹²⁸

This connection remains constant over the centuries and finds its most explicit expression in the Roman triumphal material culture of the first century CE. In the vault of the passageway of the Arch of Titus, built to celebrate the triumph of Titus and Vespasian in 71 CE a sculpture represents the eagle of Jupiter carrying over his “shoulder” the head of Titus looking down to the earth. The sculpture can be construed as a representation of the process of deification itself - Titus is taking his place amongst the ranks of the gods. Particularly striking, however, as Beard judiciously remarks, is the juxtaposition of this image of deification and panels representing scenes from the triumphal procession of 71 CE: it underlines the structural connection between the ritual and the divine status of the general.¹²⁹

Visually then, the triumphant general, dressed as the god Jupiter Optimus Maximus, testifies to the role of the divine in achieving *FELICITAS Romana*. It also visually implies that the role of the divine is mediated through the Roman general. Consequently, the parading of the Roman general/god Jupiter and of the Roman army illustrates to the Roman people the relationships constitutive of *FELICITAS Romana*: by working together and with the gods Romans have created a better future for the *res publica*.

While the *lustrum* symbolically forms the Roman communal identity, the triumph reinforces it. The idea that the spoils of war are to be enjoyed by all Roman citizens is an important tenet of Roman triumphal culture in the second and first centuries BCE. This sentiment appears in Plautus’ comedy, *Amphitryon*. At the beginning of the play, Amphitryon’s slave, Sosia, laments his condition by comparing his fate with the fate of Theban citizens. He declares that “his master’s victory has enriched his countrymen with booty, land, fame and secured a kingship for the king of Thebes.”¹³⁰ For Sosia to

¹²⁸ On reversal in *Amphitryon*, O’Neill 2003, Beard 2003.

¹²⁹ Beard 2007, 237-8.

¹³⁰ Plaut. *Amph.* 193-4.

obtain the pity he desires from the audience, his comment about the enrichment of citizens must have made sense to his Roman audience on two ways. Both ideas that the profit of conquest was beneficial to Roman citizens, and that as a slave he was not entitled to any of those profits, reserved to Roman citizens, must have been part of Roman culture.¹³¹

Several practices associated with the triumph ensured that Roman citizens enjoyed the benefits of war. Roman generals commonly deposited part of the war booty into the Roman treasury.¹³² In 167 BCE, Aemilius Paullus' contribution of Macedonian booty to the treasury was so great that it led to the abolition of the *tributum*, the citizen's contribution to the treasury.¹³³ Public finances were then dependant on the profits of war and on the taxes paid by conquered cities and provinces. This money was used, for instance, to finance roads, viaducts, temples, public religious rituals, and the distribution of free grain.¹³⁴ The profits of Roman warfare were therefore for the benefit of Roman citizens, thus reinforcing Roman communal identity.

2.6 Conclusion

The *FELICITAS Romana* is an integral part of the Roman communal identity. An analysis of the prayers of the ceremony of the *lustrum* has defined two roles for *FELICITAS* in the purification ceremony. On the one hand, the *FELICITAS* of the Romans epitomises the partnership between the gods and the Romans to bring about a better future for the *res publica, melior* and *amplior*. On the other hand, the *FELICITAS* of the *lustrum*, its ability to predict the future, helps bring about this relationship. The prayers of the *lustrum* are significant for the success of the ritual and important for the Roman community, as the trial of Cato the Elder attests.

¹³¹ On the idea of that all Roman citizens should enjoy the profits of the *res publica*, see Asmis 2004 and Arena 2012, 120-7.

¹³² Cic. *Att.* 7.15.3; Plut. *Publ.* 12.2-3; *Quaest. Rom.* 42.1 cf. Östenberg 2009, 61-8 with reference to previous literature.

¹³³ On the tax abolition, see Cic. *Off.* 2.76; Plin. *HN* 33.17.

¹³⁴ On the use of tax, see for instance, Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.6.1, *Leg. Man.* 32; *Leg. agr.* 1.7.21; Naco Del Hoyo 2003, 2010 and 2019. On the management of treasury funds, see Kondratieff 2022, 291-3.

The notions of *melior* and *amplior* are a means to judge and assess the state of the *res publica*, present and future, and are connected with victory, conquest, or agricultural productivity. Because of the *lustrum*'s role in the formation of the Roman community, FELICITAS *Romana* informs this process. Through a series of stages, the ritual establishes Roman citizens as a unit for the gods to favour and for whom to bring about a good future, i.e. FELICITAS *Romana*. These three units, political, military and religious, are symbolically created and complement one another to bring about a better future for the *res publica* in cooperation with the gods. To be part of the Roman community then is not only to have a special connection with the gods but also to enjoy the benefits of this connection.

Those ideals found their most representative ritualistic enactment in the ceremony given in honour of a military victory by a Roman general and his army, the triumph. An analysis of elements of the triumph as performed in the Late Roman Republic has shown the ritual to be a representation of the FELICITAS *Romana* in two ways. The parade of the Roman general, dressed as the god Jupiter, and of the Roman army illustrates to the Roman spectators the divine and human agency at heart of FELICITAS *Romana*. Through its display of wealth and of conquered foreign lands and enemies, the ceremony visually presents to the Roman people the benefits of this special relationship with the gods: how the *res publica* has been made *amplior* and *melior* by the victory of the Roman army, the Roman general and the gods working together. Roman citizens' enjoyment of the profits from conquest through the construction of temples, roads, and other public infrastructure and events, reinforces the Roman communal identity.

Central to this representation of FELICITAS *Romana* is the victorious Roman general. The triumph is celebrated in his honour. Roman generals from the second century BCE onwards have endeavoured to organise the most effective re-presentation/re-creation of their achievements to the Roman people by carefully selecting elements to include in the parade. During the ceremony, through his clothes, his *insignia*, his red-painted body and face, the triumphant Roman general 'represents' or 'embodies' the god Jupiter Optimus

Maximus. He symbolises at the same time the human and divine agency which have achieved the FELICITAS of the Romans.

The figure of the triumphant general, dressed as the god Jupiter Optimus Maximus, visually suggests that the role of gods in the Roman military victory is mediated by the Roman general. It raises the question of how Romans conceived and understood this special connection between the Roman general and the gods to bring about FELICITAS for the Roman community. The analysis of this relationship and of its various representations in the Late Roman Republic constitutes the subject of the next three chapters.

3 FELICITAS *Imperatoria* and The Roman Triumph

In the Late Roman Republic, Romans had two synchronistic conceptions of FELICITAS *imperatoria*, the partnership between a Roman general and the gods to make the *res publica amplior* and *melior*. One conception, which will be explored in this chapter, holds that FELICITAS was a transient quality of the general emanating from the relationship of the Roman people with the gods. It was the most prevalent way of thinking about the divine quality in the second century BCE. The other conception, which will be developed in the next chapters (Chapter Four and Five), has FELICITAS as a permanent quality of the general stemming from his own personal relationship with the divine and was more prevalent in the first century BCE onward.¹

In this chapter, I explore the figure of triumphant general, which, as we have seen in Chapter Two, symbolises both the human and divine agency that brings about the FELICITAS of the Roman community, and its various representations in the second century BCE. My analysis shows three points. First, I argue that the FELICITAS of a Roman general symbolises the transient ability of the general to access divine knowledge using the relationship between the Roman people and the gods. Second, the triumph is the honour given by the Roman Senate to a Roman general on account of his FELICITAS, his successful partnership with the gods to achieve military victory. The debate of the Roman Senate on the merit of a triumph constitutes the official process by which the divine quality was ascribed in Rome. Finally, I highlight how this way of conceptualising the divine quality was prevalent in the popular culture of the second century BCE.

My analysis explores different representations of the triumphant victorious general from three sources. The first source under consideration is the inscription that celebrates the triumph of L. Aemilius Regillus for his victory against the fleet of Antiochus III using the official language of the *res publica*.

¹ Those two conceptions of FELICITAS *imperatoria* are based on the well-established distinction in modern scholarship between the way the divine quality was conceived in ancient sources before and after Sulla, see Introduction.

The inscription reflects not only the political debate between the Senate and the victorious general on the merit of the triumph, but also the relationship between a Roman general and the gods within the context of the institutions of the *res publica*. The second source analysed is Plautus' play, *Amphitryon*, which explores the dynamics of the relationship between the triumphant general and the god Jupiter in a theatrical context. The final source is Livy's narrative of the history of Rome, which interprets the figure of the triumphant general within the wider context of Roman imperialism.

Those three sources, which will be analysed in each section of this chapter, present a uniform conception of *FELICITAS imperatoria*. While exploring the language of Regillus' inscription enables me to elucidate how *FELICITAS* was conceived and mediated by the institutionalised forms of religious and military authorities in the *res publica*, analysing Plautus' play and Livy's historical narrative will outline how elements of this official conception of *FELICITAS* was taken up by and transmitted in popular culture. In my analysis of each source, I will particularly focus on the conditions in which Roman generals experienced *FELICITAS*, on the length of, and on the divine agents behind this experience.

3.1 Attributing a triumph: *FELICITAS*, *auspicium*, and *imperium*

The language used in senatorial decrees to communicate to the Roman people the grant of a triumph to victorious Roman general was one of the most widely available representations of *FELICITAS imperatoria* in Rome.² A good example of the official terminology used can be found in the inscription, reported by Livy, commemorating the naval victory of L. Aemilius Regillus against the fleet of Antiochus III for which the Roman general celebrated a triumph in 189 BCE. The inscription, which reads as follows, was placed in the temple of the *Lares permarini* in the Campus Martius visible to all members of Roman society:³

² In the period between 200-91 BCE, 64 triumphs were celebrated in Rome more than in the third century BCE (60 triumphs) and in the first century BCE (53 triumphs). For those numbers, see Rich 2014, 208, table 3.

³ On Regillus' vow of the temple, see Livy 37.26; Enn. *Ann.* 372-376; Polyb. 21.12.1, 13.1, 24.16; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 55. On the temple, see Flower 2017, 91-102.

“To Lucius Aemilius, son of Marcus Aemilius... this battle as he left... for finishing a great war and subjugating kings... the source of obtaining peace. Under his auspices and command, and through his good fortune and leadership, (*auspicio imperio FELICITATE ductuque eius*), the erstwhile undefeated fleet of King Antiochus was scattered, smashed and routed between Ephesus and the islands of Samos and Chios, while Antiochus himself, and all his army, cavalry and elephants looked on. And there, on that day, forty-two war ships were captured with their entire crews. When that battle had been fought King Antiochus and his realm.... For that engagement he made a vow of a temple to the Lares of the sea.”⁴

Henk Versnel has argued that the phrase ‘*auspiciū imperium FELICITAS ductusque*’ found in the inscription represented the criteria by which triumphs were awarded to victorious Roman generals.⁵ His argument is based on two points. He first noted the similarities between the language of Regillus’ inscription as reported by Livy and the inscription found in Rome honouring the triumph given to Lucius Mummius Achaëus for his victory against the Achaean League in 145 BCE on account of “his leadership, auspices, and command,” (*ductus, auspiciū, imperiumque*).⁶ He also highlighted the frequency with which the triumph is said to be given by various expressions such as “command and auspices” (*imperium auspiciūque*), “personal (as in physical) leadership and auspices” (*ductus auspiciūque*), “leadership, auspices and command” (*ductum auspicio imperioque*), and “leadership” (*imperium*) in literary sources.⁷ For Versnel, these two elements show that the terms *ductus*, *auspiciū*, *imperium* and FELICITAS were part of the official language of the *res*

⁴ Livy 40. 52. 5–7; *Insc. It.* 13.1 553.

⁵ Versnel 1970, 176-9; 356-71.

⁶ *CIL* VI 331 = *CIL* I² 626 = *ILLRP* 122 cf. Palmer 2019, 81-82.

⁷ For *imperium auspiciūque*, see Livy. 41. 28.8, 22.30.4, 28.27.4, 28.26.5, 29.27.4, 27.44.4; for *ductus auspiciūque*, see Livy 3.1.4, 3.17.2, 3.42.2, 5.46.6, 8.12, 28.16.14, 28.12.12, 31.4.1, 41.17.3; Plaut. *Amph.* 657; for *ductus auspiciū imperiumque*, see Plaut. *Amph.* 196; and for *imperium*, Livy 29.27.2.

publica and describe the four oldest qualities Romans thought were necessary for a general to win a battle.⁸

The language by which triumphs were attributed in Rome then represents the divine and human agency at play in a military victory. It also summarises the process of attribution of the honour. Its analysis, therefore, shows three points. Firstly, the FELICITAS of Roman generals was seen as the relationship between the Roman general and the gods based on the Roman people's relationship with the gods. The general communicated with the gods on behalf of the Roman people through the public auspices, *auspicia publica*.⁹ Secondly, the benefits arising from this relationship – namely military victory and conquest - constituted one of the criteria used to award a triumph. Finally, because of the role of FELICITAS in the process, the attribution of a triumph by the Senate was the 'official' procedure by which the divine quality FELICITAS was ascribed to a Roman general in Rome.

In Rome, the grant of a triumph to a victorious general was a political process, which involved the general and his allies, the Roman Senate, and in some rare cases, the Roman people.¹⁰ To be given the most prestigious honour bestowed by the *res publica*, a Roman general must win a battle or a war while holding his own command (*suum imperium*) and his own auspices (*suum auspicium*) within the administrative and military sphere of action (*provincia*) designated by the Senate or the Roman people.¹¹ His army could

⁸ Followed by Pittenbergh 2008, 25-31.

⁹ For the phrase, *auspicia publica*, see Livy 4.2.5. It is also called in sources *auspicia populi Romani*, see Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.11, *Dom.* 38.

¹⁰ In sources, the Senate was predominantly the official institution which granted triumphs, see Lundgreen 2014, 26-7. For triumphs voted by the Roman people, see for instance, Auliard 2001, 160-67 with reference to ancient sources; Beard 2007, 199-205.

¹¹ For *imperium auspiciumque* as the *sine qua non* condition for the full *triumphus publicus*, see Vervaeke 2014, 78-93; Lundgreen 2011, 198-216. The *imperium militiae* in Rome was always given in conjunction with a *provincia*, namely a "commission" or "task", see Vervaeke 2014, 55-66; Drogula 2015, 131-81. On *provincia* as a "task" and "commission," see for instance, Plaut. *Stich.* 698-700, *Capt.* 156-8, *Phorm.* 71-73; Cic. *Att.* 12.26.2; *Fin* 1.20; Richardson 2008, 564-68; Rafferty 2019, 22-24; Fernández 2021, 41-65.

proclaim him *imperator* in an event called the *salutatio imperatoria*.¹² Returning to Rome, the Roman general would meet with the Senate in a temple outside of the *pomerium* to request a triumph for himself, his army, and the gods on account of his actions.¹³ Senators would debate the merit of the request using several criteria, such as the possession of the necessary and proper *imperium* and *auspicium* during the battle, or the magnitude of the military success, before holding a vote.¹⁴ Triumphant generals were those who managed to secure the support of a majority of senators.¹⁵ Generals unable to command a majority in the Senate could request a triumph from the Roman people.¹⁶ Once the honour was bestowed, the victorious general and his army would parade in Rome. Attributing the triumph then meant for the Roman community, through its institutional components, predominantly the Senate and in some rare cases the Roman people, to debate and to assess whether a Roman general was worthy of such an honour.

¹² See for instance, the *salutatio imperatoria* or *imperator appelari* of Cicero by his army after his victory in Cilicia, see Cic. *Fam.* 2.16.2, *Att.* 5.20.4, 8.3.5. More generally on the *imperator appelari*, Assenmaker 2012.

¹³ For the formula to request a triumph, see for instance, Livy 28.9.7, 38.48.13-6. I follow Vervaet 2014, 85-6 who defended the view that victorious imperators had to retain the auspices he had taken in the field as military commander, his *auspicia militaria*, until the day of his triumph and that magistrates were able to carry their *auspicia militaria* in Rome for the day of the triumph thanks to a *senatus consultum* while pro-magistrates received this authorisation from the law in accordance with the Senate (*ex senatus consulto*) that granted them *imperium intra pomerium* for the day of the triumph, cf. Mommsen *Röm. Staatsr.* I. 99 n.5, 127 n.2. For another interpretation, see Versnel 1970, 191-5; Richardson 1975, 59-60; Brennan 1996, 316; Pittenbergh 2008, 36 n.2; Lundgreen 2011, 198-203. On meetings outside the *pomerium*, see Bonnefond-Coudry 1989, 143-5 for a list.

¹⁴ The *ius triumphalis*, the criteria by which triumphs were awarded is a matter of scholarly debate. Aulard 2001, Richardson 1975, and Brennan 1996 have argued rather unconvincingly for a clear set of rules to grant a triumph. Beard 2007, 206-9 and Gruen 1990, 131-3 have concluded that the whole decision-making process was *ad hoc* in nature. Recently, however, Lundgreen 2014, 17-28 has proposed a new approach based on non-decisive principles debated and weighted by the various actors of the decision- process, the Senate or the Roman people, to explain not only the attribution criteria but also the politics of granting triumphs in Rome.

¹⁵ The Senate could also decree an ovation, which was seen as a lesser triumph, see Plut. *Marc.* 22; Dion. Hal. 5.47.2-4; Plin. *HN* 15.19; Plaut. *Bacch.* 1068-1075. On this, see Vervaet 2014, 72 n.7.

¹⁶ See above note 10.

The official language displayed in Regillus' inscription is thus the result a dialogue between the Roman general and the rest of the Roman community. To understand what it tells us about the relationship between the Roman general and the gods, it is necessary to investigate examples of such debates. Fortunately for us, in his narrative of the history of Rome, Livy reports 'triumphal debates' in which generals and the Senate discussed whether their military achievements merited a triumph.¹⁷

3.1.1 FELICITAS and *the public auspices*

One of the best illustrations of the dynamics between a victorious Roman general and the gods is Livy's description of the debate concerning the award of a triumph for Cn. Manlius Vulso in 187 BCE for his victory against the Galatians in 189 BCE.¹⁸ Because of the length of the passage, I provide a summary of the arguments below with the relevant Latin passages.

Returning to Rome, Vulso addressed the Senate at a meeting in the temple of the goddess Bellona, and after giving an account of his achievements, "demanded (...) that the immortal gods be appropriately honoured and that he be permitted to ride in triumph into the city."¹⁹

Following his request, ten of the commissioners who were with him to negotiate a peace treaty with Antiochus III contested his account.²⁰ L. Furius Purpureo and L. Aemilius Paullus moved to refuse him a triumph. They claimed that Vulso's campaign against the Galatians was not only reckless, as it jeopardised the peace treaty between Rome and the Seleucid Empire, but also illegal.²¹ The proper Roman processes to declare war, they noted, were not followed since neither the Senate nor the *fetiales* priests nor the Roman people

¹⁷ For a list of those debates, see Introduction.

¹⁸ Livy 38.44.9-50.3. For a modern analysis of the passage, see Erkell 1952, 56-7; Wistrand 1987, 22-23; Pittenger 2008, 213-230. On Vulso's campaign in Asia Minor, see Grainger 1995 and Iliev 2019.

¹⁹ Livy 38.44.10.

²⁰ Livy 38.45-47.

²¹ On the treaty of Apamea, Polyb. 21.41.6-43.3, Livy 38.37.11-39.5, App. Syr, 39, see also Dumitru 2021 with reference to previous scholarship.

were consulted as was conventional.²² Vulso, they maintained, was so reckless that he fought two battles on unfavourable grounds, making the Roman army vulnerable to the enemies' attacks and leading to the death of a legate Q. Minucius Thermus who was beloved by the army.²³ They concluded that, while the gods should be honoured as they saved the Roman army from disaster, Vulso's recklessness should not be condoned by the bestowal of a triumph.²⁴

These attacks prompted a vigorous defence from Vulso. He emphasised that he had fought many pitched battles facing hundreds of thousands of enemy soldiers, had captured or killed more than forty thousand Galatians, and had stormed two of the enemy camps to obtain ultimately their total surrender.²⁵ Vulso argued that his war was perfectly legal since the Senate's authorisation to take actions against Antiochus III gave the right to act against the Gauls, which were an integral part of Antiochus' army.²⁶

His conduct in war, he maintained, was no ground to refuse him a triumph. Indeed, in the past, triumphs had been awarded for victories gained on unfavourable ground. He reminded his audience that less than five years earlier M. Acilius Glabrio was permitted to triumph for his victory against Antiochus III fought in the hills and pass of Thermopylae.²⁷ His supposedly reckless actions were actually divinely sanctioned. In Rome, he pointed out "the gods were involved into the commencement and execution of all enterprises for the very reason that actions that have received divine approval may not be subject to man's vilification," (*ideo omnibus rebus incipiendis gerendisque deos adhibet, quia nullius calumniae subicit ea, quae dii comprobauerunt*).²⁸ The successful conduct of a divinely sanctioned war,

²² Livy 38.46.12-3. On the *fetiales* priest and their role in the declaration of war, see for instance Santangelo 2008 with a good overview of the previous scholarship; Rich 1976 and 2011; Ravizza 2014; Salerno 2018; Rüpke 2019, 99-126.

²³ Livy 38.46.3-7.

²⁴ Livy 38.45.11.

²⁵ Livy 38.47.7.

²⁶ Livy 38.46.9-11.

²⁷ Livy 38.46.1-6, cf. Livy 37.46.2; *Inscr. It.* 553.

²⁸ Livy 38.48.12.

Vulso added, was transcribed in “the decrees awarding a triumph and a supplication by the formulaic expression ‘in as much as he has well and FELICITER administrated *the res publica*,’” (*in sollemnibus verbis habet, cum supplicationem aut triumphum decernit, ‘quod BENE ac FELICITER rem publicam administrarit.’*)²⁹ He concluded that, even if the Senate thought his conduct in war inappropriate, “due honour should be paid to the gods, for [his] own FELICITAS and that of [his] army because they have defeated a great tribe with no loss of soldiers,” (*pro FELICITATE mea exercitusque mei, quod tantam nationem sine ulla militum iactura devicimus, postularem, ut diis immortalibus honos haberetur*).³⁰

Following the speeches, the Senate adjourned. At a session the next day, Vulso was voted a triumph thanks to his friends and relatives, and to the authority of senior senators who highlighted that there was no precedent for a general being refused triumphal honours after defeating an enemy, fulfilling his assignment, and safely bringing home his army.³¹

In this rich and complex debate, Livy describes what he considers to be an old conception of the divine quality FELICITAS and its relationship with the triumph. Indeed, the Roman historian introduces Vulso’s reply to L. Aemilius Paullus with the phrase “Manlius, I have gathered, replied much as follows.”³² This phrase has been construed by modern scholars in two ways: as a means of signalling to the audience that Livy’s reconstruction of Vulso’s speech is as fair and as close to his sources as he could manage, or as a rhetorical device Livy used to give the impression that his reconstruction was close to the historical reality.³³ In either of these cases, it is clear that Livy intended to present Vulso’s assumption as ancient; outdated in terms of ideas compared

²⁹ Livy 38.48.15. On ‘*quod BENE ac FELICITER*’ as the formula to grant the triumph and the supplication, see Chapter One.

³⁰ Livy 38.48.15.

³¹ Livy 38.50.2-3.

³² Livy 38.47.1.

³³ Walsh 1993, 180 contended that Livy has not reproduced *verbatim* the content of his sources but remodelled its structure to emphasise the characters of the speakers and the issues discussed. By contrast, Briscoe, *Comm.* 38-40, 164 argued that the phrase is just a *variatio*, which does not say anything about the way Livy treated the material found in his sources.

with current thinking of the time in which he is writing, namely in the first century BCE, yet representative of the thinking of the time he is writing about, that is the second century BCE.

For Livy, FELICITAS represents a general's capacity to carry out divinely sanctioned actions. Central to Vulso's defence against the charge of recklessness is the idea that his actions during the campaign were approved by the gods.³⁴ To act with FELICITAS, to administer the *res publica BENE ac FELICITER*, meant for Vulso, to act in accordance with divine will. This alignment between human actions and divine will is possible because, as Vulso states, the gods are involved from the beginning to the end of all military actions. His statement alludes to both the auspices taken by Roman generals at the start of their command (*suum auspicium*), and the *ius auspicandi*, a prerogative which gave them the right to consult the gods in the name of the Roman people before taking any important decisions by taking the auspices.³⁵ Consequently, if to act FELICITER is to execute divinely sanctioned action and if Roman generals needed to take the auspices to consult the gods, this then means that the *ius auspicandi* is central to the FELICITAS *imperatoria*, as represented in the official language of the *res publica*.³⁶

As holder of the *ius auspicandi*, Roman generals took the public auspices related to the military (*auspicia publica militae*). In Rome, public auspices were thought to emanate from the god Jupiter and were signs pertaining to the approval of a specific action proposed at a specific point in time undertaken by representatives of the *res publica*.³⁷ Signs were either sent spontaneously (*auspicia oblativa*) or solicited through rituals (*auspicia impetrativa*).³⁸ As magistrates administering the *res publica*, Roman generals consulted the divine to determine the best course of action; the signs then

³⁴ Livy 38.48.12.

³⁵ Cic. *Leg.* 2.32-33; *Div.* 2.75. A general could only be said to be *suum auspicium* if he had right to take public auspices cf. Dalla Rossa 2003, 186.

³⁶ Wistrand 1987, 11-5.

³⁷ Cic. *Div.* 2.72, 78; Cic. *Leg.* 2.20; Livy 1.12.4-7; Linderski 1986a, 2226 and n. 312; Driediger-Murphy 2019, 3-6.

³⁸ Serv. *Aen.* 6.190 cf. Linderski 1985, 227-30. For examples of spontaneous signs given to Roman generals, see Plut. *Mar.* 17.3; *Sull.* 6-7.

emanated from the relationship between the gods and the Roman people to ensure the safety and well-being of the *res publica*.³⁹ Roman generals were expected to consult the gods every time they crossed the *pomerium*, every time their army crossed a river, and every time they contemplated engaging enemies into battles.⁴⁰ To do so, Roman generals chiefly solicited signs either “from the sacred chickens” (*ex tripudiis*) or “from the birds” (*ex avibus*).⁴¹

The ritual of *auspicium ex tripudiis* was concerned with feeding the sacred chickens, *pulli*, kept in cage by “the keepers of chicken” (*pullarius*). When the occasion demanded, the chickens were released from their cage and offered grain or corn. As Cicero explains, a “*tripudium* results, [in the chicken’s eagerness to eat,] if some food falls on the ground.”⁴² Observing this sign, the *pullarius*, called a *tripudium solistinum* to the ritual celebrant, the augur or the Roman general, who interpreted it as a favourable omen. If the chickens refused to eat, or simply displayed odd behaviour, it was considered a bad omen.⁴³ The ritual of *auspicium ex avibus* was concerned with watching the flight of bird in a liminal space. Varro explains that auspices were taken in a demarcated square in a sky or on earth, a *templum*, in which the birds could be observed and inspected.⁴⁴ The augur or the Roman general would divide

³⁹ As *magistratus populi Romani* conducting the public affairs of the Roman people, Roman generals took the *auspicia publica*, see Non. 468 (L). The *auspicia publica* is thought to originate from the auspices of the patricians (*patriciorum auspicia*), which was extended to the plebians after the Licinio-Sextian reforms in the middle of fourth century BCE. On the history of the *auspicium publica* see, Catalano 1960; Magdelain 1990; Dalla Rosa 2003; Vervaeet 2014, 324-331; Hum 2015; Berthelet 2015.

⁴⁰ Cic. *Leg.* 2.31; *Div.* 1.3, 28; overview in Vervaeet 2014, 314–15. For a range of modern views on how this may have worked, see for instance Magdelain 1968, 54; Giovannini 1983, 42–3, 77; Hurlet 2001, 160; Dalla Rosa 2003; Hurlet 2006, 164–77; Dalla Rosa 2011; Drogula 2015, 79; Tarpin 2015; Berthelet 2015, 157–68.

⁴¹ There were at least five different ways to solicit auspices: from the sky through thunder or lightning (*ex caelo*), from birds through their songs and flight (*ex avibus*), from sacred chicken through the eagerness with which they ate (*ex tripudiis*), from four-footed animals (*ex quadrupedibus*), and from direly unfavorable occurrences [*dirae*] (*ex diris*), see Fest. 316–7(L). On these signs, see Regell 1893; Konrad 2022, 39-43.

⁴² Cic. *Div.* 15. 28.

⁴³ For a description of the ritual, see Cic. *Div.* 2.34.72 with Driediger-Murphy 2019, 109-122.

⁴⁴ On the different types of *templum*, see Chapter Two.

the *templum* into quarters and assign one to be the entry point for the birds.⁴⁵ The borders of the *templum* were absolute, and the general (or the augur) was expected to maintain strong focus in discerning these borders. From those, he would consequently determine which direction would be favourable for the birds to fly to or from.⁴⁶

In both rituals, the procedure was important; any errors leading to the ritual or the answer from the gods being vitiated had severe consequences for the Romans.⁴⁷ Most famously, as Cicero reports, P. Claudius Pulcher suffered a terrible naval defeat in 249 BCE after throwing the sacred chickens in water so, he shouted, they could drink when they refused to eat. For this serious religious violation, he was later tried and judged by the Roman people.⁴⁸ Pulcher's actions highlight an important characteristic of augury in Rome: the decision whether to follow the answer of gods ultimately remains with Roman generals.⁴⁹

Ignoring an unfavourable *auspicium* is portrayed in our sources as having dire consequences for the Roman army. For instance, C. Flaminius ignored a *tripudium* before the Battle of Lake Trasimene, as well as the advice of the *pullarius* that the battle should be postponed because the chicken would not eat, and led the Roman army to one of its worst defeats by Hannibal in 217 BCE.⁵⁰ In 53 BCE M. Licinius Crassus is said to have ignored the unfavourable auspices and was killed by the Parthians during the Battle of Carrhae.⁵¹ However, recorded examples of victories achieved with unfavourable auspices, and defeats preceded by favourable auspices, such as the defeat of L. Aemilius Paullus at Cannae in 216 BCE, indicate that, while a favourable

⁴⁵ On the birds used for this type of auspice, see Plin. *HN* 7.1-75.

⁴⁶ This direction was not pre-set, see Cic. *Div.* 1.39.85, cf. Linderski 1986b.

⁴⁷ On the vitiation procedure, see Driediger-Murphy 2019, 139-43 with good overview of previous scholarship.

⁴⁸ Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.7; *Div.* 1.29; 2.71. Flor. *Epit.* 2.18.29.

⁴⁹ For a good discussion of the freedom of magistrates when performing the auspices, see Driediger-Murphy 2019, 51-7; 64-9; 90-3 with reference to previous scholarship.

⁵⁰ Cic. *Div.* 1.77.

⁵¹ Cic. *Div.* 1.29.

auspicium signalled the gods' approval, it did not provide any indication on the success of the action to be undertaken.⁵²

Roman generals were given the *ius auspicandi* alongside their *imperium militiae* through a *lex curiata de imperio* voted by the *comitia curiata*.⁵³ Only an official who held both *imperium legitimum* and *auspicium publicum*, was capable of commanding *suum imperium* and *suum auspicium*.⁵⁴ Both prerogatives, the *imperium militiae* and the *ius auspicandi* ended when the Roman general became a private citizen either by crossing the *pomerium* or at the end of his triumph, if he was a pro-magistrate.⁵⁵ What ended on the day of the triumph for magisterial *triumphatores* was their right to exercise their *imperium* in the military sphere, and not their *ius imperii*, which they needed for civic rituals such as holding elections.⁵⁶ The end of *ius auspicandi* of a Roman general also marks the end of his *FELICITAS imperatoria*, his relationship of the Roman general with the gods to bring about military victory

⁵² For a discussion of the auspice received by L. Aemilius Paullus, see Cic. *Div.* 2.33.71. On this episode, see Driediger-Murphy 2019, 180-5.

⁵³ I here follow Vervaeet 2014, 300-51 and Rüpke 2019, 48-59. The scope of the *lex curiata de imperio* is a matter of scholarly debate. Some scholars have argued that the *lex curiata* was necessary to validate the election of magistrates and give those magistrates their *imperium* and *auspicium*, see Magdelain 1968, 12, 16. Others have maintained that a *lex curiata* give magistrates their *auspicium*, see Humm 2012. Van Haepere had defended the view that a *lex curiata* was necessary to make all magistracies *iustum* meaning elected by the people and confirmed by the gods, see Van Haepere 2012, 72-3 for a good summary of the debate. Vervaeet 2014, 300-351 has argued that the scope of a *lex curiata de imperio* is limited to giving upper magistrates, like consuls or praetors, their *ius auspicandi* for their *imperium militiae*.

⁵⁴ On the connection between *auspicium* and *imperium*, see Vervaeet 2014, 17-28.

⁵⁵ Under the Republic, pro-magistrates who were decreed public triumphs were granted a new *imperium* valid within the city of Rome for the day of the triumphal procession by virtue of a *lex comitalis* as their original *imperium* automatically lapsed when they crossed the *pomerium*, see Livy 26.21.5, 45.35.4; Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.77.

⁵⁶ In Rome, *imperium* was exerted in two spheres: *domi*, comprising essentially all functions pertaining to or carried out in or near the city, and *militiae*, comprising all functions outside of the city, especially those of a military nature, with the *pomerium* forming the dividing line between those two spheres, see Gell. *NA* 13.14.1; Varro, *Ling.* 5.143 with Mommsen *Röm. Staatsr.* 1³.61–63, 70–71; Magdelain 1968, 40; Dalla Rosa 2003; Vervaeet 2014, 21-2. Against this interpretation of the *imperium* see Drogula 2007 and 2015, 56-127 who argued rather unconvincingly that the *imperium* existed exclusively in the sphere *militiae*. For him, all the consul's civil and judicial functions were covered by *consularis potestas*. For a good critique of Drogula's theory, see for instance Konrad 2022, 32-37.

and prosperity for Rome, since he can no longer consult the gods on behalf of the Roman people.

Ancient sources offer some examples of the connection between the FELICITAS of a Roman general and the *ius auspicandi*.⁵⁷ The most illustrative instance is Livy's treatment of the controversy between C. Flaminius, consul in 217 BCE, and Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator. Flaminius was infamous for his contempt for rituals and auspices.⁵⁸ Following the defeat at Lake Trasimene, where Flaminius was killed by Hannibal's army, Fabius Maximus Cunctator, dictator for the second time, explained to the Senate that since Flaminius' mistake was due to his disregard of religious rituals and the auspices, and not his recklessness and incompetence, the Sibylline books should be consulted to understand how to appease the gods.⁵⁹ In 216 BCE L. Aemilius Paullus described C. Flaminius' failure as *infelix* in a comment to his co-consul Terentius Varro before the battle of Cannae. L. Aemilius Paullus declares to his colleague that "a policy of caution and prudence might prove successful [since] recklessness was intrinsically foolish and up to that point had also proved *infelicem*" (*ut quae caute ac consulte gesta essent satis prospere evenirent; temeritatem, praeterquam quod stulta sit, infelicem*).⁶⁰

The similarity of language between the two passages has led Wistrand to interpret Paullus' phrase as an allusion to Flaminius' behaviour.⁶¹ He concluded that Livy's emphasis on Flaminius' religious indifference was meant to illustrate his reckless personality rather than provide an explanation for Rome's military misfortune. His view is supported by the fact that Fabius redressed the balance of the war through prudent and rational conduct of the war rather than religious rituals. Closer examination of Fabius' actions and

⁵⁷ For instance, Appius Claudius Crassus' defence of the patricians' exclusive right to the consulship, see Livy 7.6.8-1 cf. Wistrand 1987, 19; or the Senate's response to the controversy between L. Verginius and M.' Sergius Fidenas, see Livy 5.8.1-12.1, esp. 5.9.1-2, cf. Wistrand 1987, 19-21.

⁵⁸ C. Flaminius left Rome without the usual sacrifices and auspices, Livy 21.63.5-6. On the auspices of entry to office, see Linderski 1986a, 2256 – 2296; Ziolkowski 2011; Van Haepere 2012; Konrad 2022, 45-7.

⁵⁹ Livy 22.9.7.

⁶⁰ Livy 22.38.12.

⁶¹ Wistrand 1987, 22.

words shows that Wistrand's conclusion only partially stands. While he may be correct in suggesting that Livy aimed to portray Flaminius as reckless, Wistrand did not properly acknowledge the importance of Fabius' religious acts in restoring Rome's position in the war in Livy's narrative. Since, according to Fabius, the military disaster was primarily due to Flaminius' neglect of religious matters, logically then the first thing to do to address the situation is to appease the gods – exactly what Fabius did by consulting the Sybilline books. Fabius' proper regard for divine matters and his careful conduct in warfare are the two important elements that, according to Livy, allowed him to redress the situation.⁶²

The implied logic behind Paullus' allusion is that Flaminius' disregard for the auspices before the battle of Lake Trasimene has led to an *infelix* outcome, a military defeat. Therefore, if disregarding the auspices led to being *infelix*, then proper regard to auspices will lead to being FELIX and to win a military victory. This victory is an outcome desired by both the gods who sanctioned the action and the Roman general who has followed divine will. This is the alignment between human actions and divine will to which Vulso is referring in his defence of his actions during his military campaign.

The connection between the divine quality FELICITAS and the auspices means that in Livy's reconstruction of what he deemed to be the prevalent thinking in the *res publica* in the second century BCE, FELICITAS *imperatoria*, the communication between the gods and the Roman general to achieve military victory for Rome, was achieved through the means of the auspices. It further implies that this partnership was based on the relationship between the Roman people and the gods for the benefit of the Roman people. Since the *ius auspiciandi* of a Roman general ended with his tenure, the relationship between the general and the gods was then limited in time.

⁶² On Livy's use of religious material in Roman imperialism, see Davies 2005, 22; Levene 1993, 241-8.

3.1.2 FELICITAS as criteria for the triumph

Livy's account of the debate around Vulso's triumph reveals another important point about the FELICITAS of a Roman general. Since the triumph was an honour given by the Roman Senate to a general in recognition of his ability to work with the divine to make the *res publica amplior* and *melior*, granting a triumph then required assessing whether a general possessed FELICITAS. In Livy's debate, Vulso describes this process when he declares that the divinely sanctioned conduct of warfare is transcribed in the decrees that "award a triumph or a supplication by the expression 'in as much as he has well and FELICITER performed public business'" (*cum supplicationem aut triumphum decernit, 'quod BENE ac FELICITER rem publicam administravit'*).⁶³

This phrase implies that the honour of a triumph was given after evaluating the *res gestae* of a Roman general. This is essentially the thrust of the debate Livy describes: after Vulso narrates his campaign, Aemilius attacks his achievements to prove that Vulso is undeserving of a triumph. The phrase also suggests that one of the criteria to evaluate the *res gestae* is whether the general acted FELICITER. How this evaluation is done is revealed by the arguments developed by Aemilius and Vulso. While Aemilius focuses on Vulso's failure to consult with the Senate and with the gods before declaring war and on the death of a legate, Vulso's reply centres on the divine approval of his action, the number of enemies killed, and the total surrender of the tribe.

To determine whether a Roman general had administered the *res publica* FELICITER meant then to examine the outcome of war or battle, including the number of enemy and Roman casualties, to look at how divine matters were handled, including whether the Roman general had received divine approval to start the war and for his actions in warfare, and finally to reflect as to whether the Senate had been properly involved and its instructions implemented. Those arguments reveal a common way for the Romans to evaluate the FELICITAS of a Roman general: to act FELICITER meant to act as

⁶³ Livy 38.48.12.

much in alignment with divine will as with approval of the Roman community - in Vulso's example, the Roman Senate.

These practices find confirmation in Livy's description of the debate about the triumph of M. Fulvius Nobilior in 187 BCE.⁶⁴ Returning to Rome from Aetolia, Fulvius met with the Senate at the temple of Apollo. After recounting his exploits in Aetolia and Cephallani, he "requested of the members that they judge it appropriate for the gods to be honoured because he had managed well and FELICITER the *res publica's* interests, and that they grant him a triumph" (*petit a patribus, ut si aequum censerent, ob rem publicam BENE ac FELICITER gestam et diis immortalibus honorem haberi iuberent et sibi triumphum decernerent*).⁶⁵ The tribune of the plebs, M. Aburius, objected to the triumphal decree to give a chance to the consul, M. Aemilius Lepidus, gone to his province, to take part in the debate.⁶⁶ Fulvius replied that the delay was unjustified. His well-known rivalry with Lepidus meant that the absent consul would likely object to his triumph, and it was inappropriate for a Roman general "who had conducted a superb campaign, and his victorious army to be kept standing before the city gates with their plunder and prisoners of war."⁶⁷ He concluded by refuting accusations that he had pillaged the temples of Ambracia and criticizing the unfair decision that he should hand over his booty over to the pontiffs.⁶⁸

Fulvius' speech follows a similar pattern to Vulso's defence. To defend his achievements, proving that he acted FELICITER, the Roman general focuses on the outcomes of his victory and his attention to divine matters. His campaign generated plenty of prisoners and booty, part of which was eventually displayed in his lavish triumphal parade.⁶⁹ During the siege of Ambracia, his army had killed more than three thousand enemy troops and

⁶⁴ For a full account of the debate, Livy 39.4.1-5.10 cf. Pittenger 2008, 196-212. On the triumph of M. Fulvius Nobilior, see *Inscr. It.* 13.1.8, 554.

⁶⁵ Livy 39.4.2

⁶⁶ Livy 39.4.3.

⁶⁷ Livy 39.4.6-9.

⁶⁸ Livy 39.4.10.

⁶⁹ For an account of Nobilior's triumph, see for instance Livy 39.5.11-7, *Sil. Pun.* 17.625-54.

respected the gods of his enemy by not pillaging their temples. His argument confirms that in the process of granting a triumph, the Senate evaluated whether a general was FELIX by evaluating his conduct, the magnitude of his victory in terms of booty, prisoners, and enemies killed, and his handling of divine matters.⁷⁰

The assessment Livy describes in the debate around Vulso's and Fulvius' triumph exhibits the logic used to ascribe FELICITAS to sacred trees used in Roman religious rituals.⁷¹ The Roman Senate *ex post facto* acknowledges a military victory and evaluates whether its outcomes are beneficial for the Roman people to determine whether a Roman general is FELIX. The factors examined by senators, such as the number of Roman and enemy casualties, the size of the war booty, or the involvement of the Senate, represent the defining conditions of FELICITAS of Roman general.

Since the Roman Senate predominantly dealt with the requests for triumphs, senators played an important role in ascribing the divine quality to Roman generals. Senatorial attribution of FELICITAS can be as construed as a sort of official process in comparison to the more informal process of Roman public opinion, evident in elections and trials.⁷² Since both the divine quality FELICITAS and the triumph was granted through the same process, the triumph can be construed as a social marker of the FELICITAS of a Roman general.

The disputes of Vulso, Fulvius and their detractors over the proper involvement of the Senate or the gods, the number of casualties, or the size of the booty, indicate that senators also played an important role in defining what behaviours and outcomes of battle constitute to act FELICITER. Since FELICITAS denoted at the same time a state, a proven ability, and the outcome engendered from the use of this ability, by sanctioning what they thought was

⁷⁰ Similarly, in an inscription dedicated to the god Jupiter in the temple of Mater Matuta, to celebrate his triumph for his victory in Sardinia in 174 BCE, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus associates "his successful management of the *res publica*" (*re publica felicissime gesta*) with the liberation of Rome's allies, the restoration of Roman revenues, the return of the army safe and secure and enriched with booty, cf. Livy 41.28.8–10; Galli 1987-8, 137. For a discussion of this example, see Chapter One.

⁷¹ For a discussion of the sacred trees, see Chapter One.

⁷² On the role of FELICITAS in an election, see the example of Murena in Chapter Six.

good military leadership and battle outcomes, senators effectively defined two out of three aspects of FELICITAS. Through the assessment of a general's claim to the triumph, the Roman Senate constantly reformulated what it meant for a Roman general to be FELIX.

3.1.3 Summary

In the official language of the *res publica* connected to the triumph, as reported in Livy's reconstruction of the 'triumphal debate' in the second century BCE, FELICITAS *imperatoria*, the relationship between the gods and the Roman general to achieve victory for Rome, was achieved by means of the auspices. As magistrates of the *res publica*, Roman generals consulted the gods on behalf of the Roman people to achieve victory for the Roman community. This access to divine will, using the relationship between the Roman people and the gods, was limited in time, ending with the general's tenure of his *imperium* and *ius auspicandi*. In this context, the FELICITAS of a Roman general represented his capacity to carry out divinely sanctioned military actions, and the successful outcomes of those particular actions, namely military victory and conquest. This victory was the basis for the victorious general to be granted a triumph by the Senate.

In the decision-making process to award the triumph, the success of the relationship between the general and the gods was assessed and judged using various criteria such as the number of enemy casualties, the size of the booty and the way the Roman general handled divine matter. The general was deemed to have acted FELICITER when senators, satisfied that the *res publica* had been well administered, voted the award of a triumph. To act with FELICITAS meant to act or to have acted with the community's approval. The triumph is thus an honour given to a FELIX general and a social marker of the general's FELICITAS.

The presence of this official language in public decrees attests that Roman citizens in the second century BCE were very likely aware of this representation of FELICITAS as the ability of the Roman general to win battles with the approval of gods, obtained using the public auspices. Elements of this

official representation of this relationship between Roman general and the gods found its way in the popular culture of the time, in particular in Plautus' play *Amphitryon*.

3.2 Plautus' divine mimesis: triumph and *FELICITAS imperatoria*

Amphitryon tells the story of the eponymous Theban general coming home victorious from his campaign against the Teleboans. While he was away, Jupiter, disguised himself as Amphitryon, has been making love to his wife, Alcmena.⁷³ The return of the real Amphitryon led to confusion, compounded by the presence of the god Mercury who had been acting as Jupiter's slave, disguised as Amphitryon's slave, Sosia. The comedy ends with the real Amphitryon regaining his place by his wife's side, Alcmena bearing twins – Hercules, son of Jupiter and Iphicles, son of the cuckolded Amphitryon – and the god Jupiter blessing the couple.

Plautus' comedy is engineered around a clever inversion of roles: if during the triumph, the Roman general is seen as godlike for a day, the gods are presented here as human-like for the time of the play.⁷⁴ Exploring this inversion allows us to analyse in-depth not only the figure of the general and its relationship to the divine but also to understand how the 'divine human' presented in the Roman triumph was understood by Romans.

Like many of Plautus' works, the *Amphitryon* is likely based on a Greek precedent adapted to the Roman culture of the second century BCE.⁷⁵ The play incorporates several features of Roman triumphal culture and religious practices, which makes it uniquely Roman. For instance, Sosia's role as an envoy to describe to Alcmena Amphitryon's successful campaign is strongly

⁷³ In his plays, Plautus uses the noun *felicitas* once to describe the contentment of a character, see Plaut. *Stich.* 629, and the adjective *infelix* twice to describe the misery experienced by a character, see Plaut. *Asin.* 292; *Cist.* 685. He frequently uses the verb *infelicare* to describe the gods' negative impact on a character's life, see Plaut. *Cas.* 788; *Epid.* 13; *Merc.* 436; *Poen.* 449; *Rud.* 885, 1225. I focus here on the use of *FELICITAS* in his play *Amphitryon* as it is reflective of Plautus' wider use of the verb *infelicare* to describe divine intervention.

⁷⁴ On reversal in *Amphitryon*, O' Neill 2003; Beard 2003. On the grotesque of the play, Christenson 2001.

⁷⁵ On the Greek original of *Amphitryon*, see Streidle 1979.

reminiscent of the laurelled letters sent to Rome by Roman generals to announce their victory.⁷⁶ The command of the disguised Jupiter to Alcmena to prepare all he needs for him to fulfil his *votum* to himself also echoes the imperative for Roman generals to fulfil the *votum* taken before leaving for war.⁷⁷ Finally, in his description of Amphitryon's victory, Sosia mimics the official language of the Senate noting that the Theban general won through "his leadership, his command, and his auspices."⁷⁸ These distinctive elements have led to speculation that the play was first performed during the triumph either of Nobilior in 187 BCE or of Scipio Asiaticus in 189 BCE.⁷⁹

It is not possible to analyse directly the relationship between the god and the general in the context of the triumph and military victory in Rome because many of the scenes between the god Jupiter and the general Amphitryon are lost. It is nevertheless possible to get a glimpse of that relationship by looking at the relationship between Sosia and the god Mercury because of the symbiosis between the master, Amphitryon, and his slave, Sosia. In his encounter with the disguised Jupiter, thinking he is talking to his (human) master, Sosia declares that a decent slave should be "just as his masters are, so he too should be himself; he should model his expression on theirs."⁸⁰ The slave ought to mimic the master in expression and emotion: "he should be unhappy if his masters are unhappy and he should be cheerful if they are happy."⁸¹ Sosia's description of how a good slave should act defines a slave as both an emotional and behavioural mirror to his master. Since Sosia is a reflection of his master, analysing the slave's relationship with his double the god Mercury can shed some light on the dynamics of the relationship

⁷⁶ Plaut. *Amph.* 186-245. For examples of laurelled letters, see Livy 27.50.1-51.10 with Pittenger 2008, 161-5; Livy 40.28.8-9, 45.1.6. For a modern discussion of the practice, see Halkin 1953, 80-4; Rüpke 2019, 221-2; García Riaza 2019.

⁷⁷ Plaut. *Amph.* 946-49. On the need to fulfil *votum* when coming back from war, see for instance the example of Scipio Africanus who quickly expiated the vows taken as a praetor in his previous war to leave for war as a consul 205 BCE cf. Livy 36.36.1-2.

⁷⁸ Plaut. *Amph.* 195. cf. Livy 41.28.8-10; 40.52.5-7.

⁷⁹ For the various dates proposed for the performance of the play, for Lucius Scipio, see Galinsky 1966; for Fulvius Nobilior, see Harvey 1981; Harvey 1986.

⁸⁰ Plaut. *Amph.* 960.

⁸¹ Plaut. *Amph.* 961.

between Jupiter and Amphitryon. This exploration shows that a triumphant general was given access to divine knowledge to win a battle or a war if he showed proper respect to the gods.

Access to divine knowledge is only possible within the context of a shared identity and fluid boundaries between divine and human. Just as the triumphant general wore the clothes of Jupiter Optimus Maximus during the ceremony of the triumph, Jupiter and Amphitryon, Sosia and Mercury share the same qualities, physical appearance, and social conditions. The god Mercury best articulates his relationship with his human counterpart when he devises a plan to prevent Sosia from entering Amphitryon's house in the middle of the night.⁸²

Mercury's relationship with Sosia pivots around three points.⁸³ First, they have the same appearance and physical attributes. Mercury notes that he is the image of Sosia because "[he] took his [i.e. Sosia's] looks and dress." This shared appearance is confirmed by Sosia when he sees the god Mercury up close. The confused slave exclaims that Mercury (in disguise) is extremely similar to him as the god Mercury has the same hat and clothes than him.⁸⁴ The horrified slave goes on, noting that they have the same physical attribute – leg, foot, height, haircut, eyes, nose, lips cheeks, chin, and beard.⁸⁵ The similarity between the two is so great that it leads Sosia to declare that "he [i.e. the god Mercury] is as similar to me as I am."⁸⁶ As Mercury explains in the prologue of the play, the only difference between him and Sosia, the only way for the Roman audience to identify him as a god is "a small pair of wings," (*pinnulae*), placed on the top of his hat.⁸⁷ Similarly Jupiter and Amphitryon wear the same clothes and have the same physical attributes with only a small

⁸² Plaut. *Amph.* 263-70.

⁸³ On the magical transformation of the god Mercury to the slave Sosia, see Bettini and Short 2011, 171-199.

⁸⁴ Plaut. *Amph.* 442-3.

⁸⁵ Plaut. *Amph.* 445- 6.

⁸⁶ Plaut. *Amph.* 444.

⁸⁷ Plaut. *Amph.* 144.

golden ring under Jupiter's hat marking them out as distinct from one another to the audience.⁸⁸

Beside their appearance, Mercury and Sosia also share the same social position. Mercury describes his similarity in terms of appearance and condition when he says "I took on his looks and dress," (*formam cepi huius in med et statum*).⁸⁹ Here, the word *status* refers as much to Mercury being *dressed as a slave* as to *his position as a slave*.⁹⁰ Mercury's new social status is confirmed by the god Jupiter who introduces Mercury to the audience, declaring that he "has a slave Sosia who becomes Mercury when it is convenient."⁹¹ Sharing Sosia's condition as a slave is a source of resentment for Mercury who comments "I am the one who should complain like that about being a slave: even though I was free this very day, my father enslaved me," when he hears Sosia moan about his situation.⁹² Similarly to Mercury, Jupiter enjoys the same social status as Amphitryon. He is recognised as the master of the house – his order to a house slave to do the necessary preparations for the *votum* is listened to – and as the husband of Alcmena, who spends the night with him.⁹³

The mimicry between Mercury and Sosis extends to their mannerisms. To make a fool of Sosia, Mercury declares that in addition to taking the appearance of the slave, he should have "the similar ways and habits."⁹⁴ He adds that, like Sosia, he should be "very malicious, sly and tricky, and would drive Sosia away from his master's house with Sosia's own weapon, malice."⁹⁵ Interestingly, the very qualities which he supposedly takes from Sosia are the same ones Mercury exhibits as a god. After his encounter with Sosia, Mercury declares that to allow his father to spend the night with Alcmena, "he is going to fill both of them [Amphitryon and Sosia] and Amphitryon's entire household

⁸⁸ Plaut. *Amph.* 145.

⁸⁹ Plaut. *Amph.* 267.

⁹⁰ For instances of *status* to refer to clothes see Suet. *Tib.* 13; of *status* as social position, see Plaut. *Poen.* 268; Cic. *Bal.* 7.18; *Leg.* 1.7.23.

⁹¹ Plaut. *Amph.* 861-2.

⁹² Plaut. *Amph.* 176-9.

⁹³ For the order of the *votum*, Plaut. *Amph.* 946-49. For the night spent together, Plaut. *Amph.* 289-90.

⁹⁴ Plaut. *Amph.* 267.

⁹⁵ Plaut. *Amph.* 268-9.

with misunderstanding and madness.”⁹⁶ This statement implies that this misunderstanding and madness are the results of Mercury’s own trickiness and malice as a god. Therefore, Mercury does not so much take on Sosia’s qualities as that he already possesses them.

Mercury and Sosia’s shared qualities, physical appearance and social condition blur the identity lines between them. Sosia’s declaration that Mercury is as similar to him as he is to himself echoes this sentiment and attests to their shared ‘divine-human’ identity. Amphitryon and the god Jupiter then also share this same double nature.

The relationship between the general Amphitryon and the god Jupiter is mediated by several factors. Context and outcome play important roles in defining when and how this connection between divine and human take place. An episode of the play involving the god Mercury and the slave Sosia illustrates perfectly this point. As Sosia is walking to his master’s house, Mercury starts shouting threats that anyone approaching the house will be beaten up.⁹⁷ This is followed by a dialogue in which both characters speak directly to the audience until the god Mercury declares that “he has heard a voice.”⁹⁸ Horrified that his presence has been revealed, Sosia declares that “[he] really was an *infelix* fellow — [he] didn’t depilate [his] wings; now [he] has a voice that flies to another’s ears” (*ne ego homo infelix fui, qui non alas intervelli: volucrem vocem gestito*).⁹⁹

Sosia’s use of the word *infelix* is revealing. Sosia judges himself as *infelix* because, contrary to his desire to remain unnoticed, his presence has been discovered since his winged voice has travelled to Mercury’s ears. As mentioned above, in the play, small wings are the only physical attributes that separate Mercury from Sosia.¹⁰⁰ In light of the fluid identity boundaries between Sosia and Mercury, it is not surprising to see the slave taking up and using a characteristic of the god. Sosia’s self-description as *infelix*, because of

⁹⁶ Plaut. *Amph.* 470-1.

⁹⁷ Plaut. *Amph.* 296-340.

⁹⁸ Plaut. *Amph.* 325.

⁹⁹ Plaut. *Amph.* 325-6.

¹⁰⁰ Plaut. *Amph.* 144.

his use of the divine attribute to obtain an unwanted outcome, implies that, conversely, to be FELIX is then to use the divine attribute to obtain a wanted outcome. Just like Cato's definition of FELICES trees, Sosia ascribes FELICITAS based on the outcome of an action.¹⁰¹

The slave's self-description as *infelix* implies that the Romans used the divine quality FELICITAS to think about the interaction between humans and the divine. Sosia's judgement of himself as *infelix* would have been understood *only if* the Roman audience were familiar with such reasoning. Indeed, in Plautus' plays, the verb *infelicare* is used several times to describe the influence of the gods on characters' life.¹⁰² One of the best examples is found in the *Poenulus* when, not seeing the captain he trusted to buy a slave for him, the pimp Lycus curses him by asking the gods to make him *infelix*, just like the goddess Venus has made him *infelix* by refusing his sacrifice.¹⁰³ Plautus' use of the word *infelix* and the verb *infelicare* to describe the goddess' influence on Lycus indicates that Romans may have commonly used FELICITAS to think about divine intervention in their life.

Sosia's use of the word *infelix* to qualify a situation in which the use of a divine attribute did not necessarily lead to Sosia's desired outcome strongly suggests that other elements mediated the 'divine human' identity. Proper context and timing are important factors when humans connect with the gods. Jupiter explains as much in his own introduction to the audience at the beginning of the third act.¹⁰⁴ The god Jupiter reminds the audience of the shared identity between himself and the general by presenting himself as the Amphitryon who lives above. Within this context of fluid identity boundaries, he notes that his slave Sosia becomes the god Mercury when convenient.¹⁰⁵ Convenience or, to put differently, the right context and timing, is key for the transformation of the human Sosia into the god Mercury. Jupiter's comment that he transforms himself from Amphitryon to the god Jupiter when he wants

¹⁰¹ For a detailed discussion, see Chapter One.

¹⁰² For references, see above note 74.

¹⁰³ Plaut. *Poen.* 449-54.

¹⁰⁴ Plaut. *Amph.* 861-4.

¹⁰⁵ Plaut. *Amph.* 861-2.

reveals that the context and timing for the process of deification to happen reflect divine will.

In the metamorphosis Jupiter describes, humans only assume a 'divine human' nature under the proper circumstances; a defined moment in time, which is ordained by the god(s). Taking into account Sosia's use of FELICITAS suggests that Sosia was *infelix* in his use of Mercury's divine attribute because it was the gods' will for him not to do so. Conversely, to be FELIX, Sosia would have had to obtain his desired outcome and that outcome would have had to be what the gods wanted for Sosia at that particular time and in that specific context.

The divinely desired outcome is achieved by giving men access to divine knowledge. Indeed, a consequence of the blurred identity between the god Mercury and Sosia is that the slave gets an insight into the gods' plan. While walking toward his master's house, the slave notices that the night is unusually long. Sosia notes that the stars are not moving in the sky.¹⁰⁶ The slave also is certain that the god Nocturnus has fallen asleep drunk and that the god Sol is fast asleep after some heavy drinking at dinner.¹⁰⁷ Sosia's description is unusual in two ways. He presents his description of what happening with the gods and the stars as sure facts. He starts his report by declaring that "if there is anything [he] believes or knows for sure," he certainly knows that the god Nocturnus has fallen asleep drunk.¹⁰⁸ For him, there is no doubt that his interpretation of what is happening is true. Mercury eventually confirms Sosia's insight when he compliments the god Nocturnus for doing "an excellent job for an excellent god [i.e. Jupiter] in an excellent way."¹⁰⁹ Mercury's confirmation infers that Sosia has indeed access to some form of divine knowledge.

This impression is reinforced by the language of the description, which implies a certain familiarity between the slave and the gods. His comment that

¹⁰⁶ Plaut. *Amph.* 271-5.

¹⁰⁷ Plaut. *Amph.* 279-83.

¹⁰⁸ Plaut. *Amph.* 271-2.

¹⁰⁹ Plaut. *Amph.* 277-8.

“it would be strange if he [i.e. the god Sol] hasn’t drunk his own health a bit much at dinner” gives the impression that he knows the god personally.¹¹⁰ Such a familiarity with the divine would be expected from the god Mercury, who rightly presents the god Jupiter as his father.¹¹¹ Mercury actually takes offence at Sosia’s casual description of the gods and he wants to punish the slave accordingly.¹¹² Interestingly, Mercury is offended not so much by what Sosia says about the gods, but by how the slave portrays the gods as humans-like. This implies that Sosia’s description is accurate. For Mercury, this familiar language shows a lack of respect from the slave to the gods. Mercury promptly ends the connection between the two characters. He proceeds to beat the slave to prevent him from entering Amphitryon’s house, thus re-establishing the boundary and hierarchy between humans and gods.¹¹³

This exchange between Sosia and Mercury reveals several aspects of the relationship between the Roman general and the gods as represented in the ceremony of the triumph. Within the context of the shared identity and fluid boundaries between divine and human nature, the Roman general was given knowledge only known to the gods. This exchange of knowledge happened at the time and place willed by the gods, and on the condition that a Roman general showed proper respect to the gods. Failure to do so led the gods to stop the communication with potentially disastrous consequences for a Roman general.

Consequently, the exploration of the relationship between the god Jupiter and the Theban general Amphitryon, mirrored by the relationship between the god Mercury and the slave Sosia has revealed Plautus’ interpretation of *FELICITAS imperatoria*. The play represents the relationship between a triumphant Roman general and the gods by incorporating many elements of Roman triumphal culture. Since, the play was likely performed for the first time as part of the celebration of the triumph of a Roman general, the

¹¹⁰ Plaut. *Amph.* 284.

¹¹¹ Plaut. *Amph.* 135-6.

¹¹² Plaut. *Amph.* 285.

¹¹³ Plaut. *Amph.* 373-96.

audience would probably have made the connection between the parade seen during the day, the figure of the triumphant general, and the characters of Amphitryon and Jupiter in the play.

Just like the god Jupiter successfully spent two nights with Alcemena by taking up the appearance, the qualities and the social position of her husband Amphitryon, the Roman general achieves military victory by channelling divine will and accessing knowledge only known to the gods. In the context of this fluidity between divinity and humanity, FELICITAS represents three things: first, the state of accessing divine knowledge at a specific moment in time and in a specific context. Second, the ability of the general to communicate with the gods as long as he shows proper respect. Finally, the outcome both wanted by the gods and men. In another word, the general's relationship with the divine constitutes a potential for the outcome desired by himself and the gods, namely military victory.

Plautus' play thus provides a representation of the FELICITAS of the Roman general, an interpretation of the figure of the triumphant Roman general, available to the all members of Roman society who attended its performances in the Late Roman Republic. It provides us with a window on the way Romans conceptualised the relationship between the gods and a Roman general to make *res publica amplior et melior*.

3.3 Of Gods and men: Livy's FELICITAS *imperatoria*

Writing at the turn of the century, Livy's historical narrative of Rome offers us another window into the dynamics of the relationship between a Roman general and the gods as he interprets the figure of the triumphant general within the wider context of Roman imperialism.

For Livy, Roman military success is consistently connected with piety and good relations with the gods.¹¹⁴ Impiety leads to (temporary) setbacks, inevitably followed by religious and military recovery.¹¹⁵ Gods and men both

¹¹⁴ Davies 2005, 22.

¹¹⁵ Davies 2005, 22. Levene 1993, 241-8.

inexorably shape the historical events Livy describes.¹¹⁶ The organisation and treatment of religious material in his narrative of the history of Rome, therefore, aims to demonstrate the power of the gods and its effects on human affairs.¹¹⁷ Throughout his work, Livy outlines not only the different spheres for divine action but also the different levels of divinity at work.¹¹⁸ It is within this multi-layered, multi-agent religious scheme that Livy articulates a framework for the relationship between Roman generals and the gods centred around FELICITAS.¹¹⁹

The most illustrative example of the different ways the gods affect ancient warfare is Livy's description of the peace negotiation on the eve of the battle of Zama between Scipio Africanus and Hannibal in 202 BCE.¹²⁰ The Roman writer uses the speeches of Hannibal and Scipio to discuss the role of FELICITAS, *fortuna*, and the gods in warfare. The episode, particularly the generals' speeches, is heavily indebted to Polybius' account.¹²¹ The similarities between the two narratives become evident when comparing Polybius and Livy's version of Hannibal's comment on Roman and Carthage's ambition:

¹¹⁶ This shared responsibility between human and divine is called 'causal overdetermination,' see Levene 1993, 27-30 and Davies 2005, 87-8.

¹¹⁷ Levene 1993, 242.

¹¹⁸ Davies calls this 'multiple over-determination' see Davies 2005, 88-96.

¹¹⁹ On FELICITAS in Livy, see Kajanto 1957, 72-5, Davies 2005, 105 n.44, 136-8.

¹²⁰ Livy 30.30-31 cf. Polyb. 15.6.3-14; Flor. 1.22.58; Nepos *Hann.* 6.3; App. *Pun.* 39; Zonaras, 9.14. For the sources and veracity of Polybius' account of this meeting, see Walbank *HCP*, 2.451-2; Billot 2014, 63-4 with references.

¹²¹ Polyb. 15.6.3-14. On Livy's use of Polybius, see for instance, Nissen 1863; Tränkle 1977; Walsh 1958; Erdkamp 2006; Levene 2010, 126-63; Briscoe 2013, 117-24; Baron 2018. More generally on Livy's use of sources, see still Klotz 1967, 217-23; Wiehemeyer 1967, 224-36; Hellmann 1967, 237-48; Luce 1977, 139-84; Northwood 2000; Erdkamp 2006, 525-63; Oakley 2010, 118-38.

Polybius

δεξιωσάμενος δὲ πρῶτος Ἄννίβας ἤρξατο λέγειν ὡς ἐβούλετο μὲν ἂν μήτε Ῥωμαίους ἐπιθυμῆσαι μηδέποτε μηδενὸς τῶν ἐκτὸς Ἰταλίας μήτε Καρχηδονίους τῶν ἐκτὸς Λιβύης: ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ εἶναι ταύτας καὶ καλλίστας δυναστείας καὶ συλλήβδην ὡς ἂν εἰ περιωρισμένας ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως.¹²²

Would that neither the Romans had ever coveted any possessions outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians any outside Africa; for both these were very fine empires and empires of which it might be said on the whole that Nature herself had fixed their limits.

In Livy's account, Hannibal uses almost the same language as Polybius, which strongly suggests that Livy may have simply translated Polybius' Greek directly into Latin.¹²⁴ The pre-eminent role of the gods over Nature as the limiting (divine) agents who influence human action in Livy's account highlights not only the licence the Roman writer takes from his source material to create his own version of Hannibal's speech but also his adaption

Livy

*optimum quidem fuerat eam patribus nostris mentem datam ab dis esse ut et uos Italiae et nos Africae imperio contenti essemus*¹²³

It would indeed have been best if the gods had given our fathers the disposition to be contented, you with rule over Italy and us in turn with ruling Africa.

¹²² Polyb. 15.4-5.

¹²³ Livy 30.30.6.

¹²⁴ For other examples, compare for instance, Polyb. 15.7.1 with Livy 30.30.11 and Polyb. 15.7.3 with Livy 30.30.10-12. For a good discussion of Livy's technique to translate Polybius, see Irwin 2016.

of Polybius' view on human and divine action into a new framework of his own. Livy's conceptual framework reflects Roman conceptions of *fortuna*, FELICITAS and the gods at the time the historian is writing in the first century BCE. But, since he is using material from Polybius, Livy is developing conceptual associations already present in the literature of the second century BCE and available to members of the Roman elite, who spoke and read Greek.¹²⁵

In Hannibal's speech, Livy outlines three different spheres for the gods to affect warfare. The first sphere of action is *fortuna*. As Livy presents it, Hannibal's strategy to force Scipio to agree to a peace treaty, is to caution the Roman general against the fickleness of fortune and to advise him to prefer reason over fortune. To do so, Hannibal presents himself as an older, more mature version of Scipio. He declares that "the passage of time as well as the ups and downs of [his] career have taught [him] to prefer the path of reason rather than chance" and that "[he] fears that [Scipio's] youth and continuing FELICITAS [makes him] more impulsive than what is needed for negotiating peace," (*adulescentiam et perpetuam FELICITATEM, ferociora utraque quam quietis opus est consiliis, metuo*) because he too once was as successful as Scipio after his victory in Trasimene and Cannae.¹²⁶ Hannibal goes on, arguing "that the greatest fortune should not be the least trusted."¹²⁷ For the Carthaginian general, Scipio should "not risk FELICITAS enjoyed over many years to the test of a single hour (...) [because] the fortune of such an hour can destroy past and future glory" (*ne tot annorum FELICITATEM in unius horae dederis discrimen (...) simul parta ac sperata decora unius horae fortuna euertere potest.*)¹²⁸

¹²⁵ For Livy's reworking of Polybius' account of this meeting, see Levene 2010, 286–7 who noted that Livy has expanded on the theme of fortune in Hannibal's speech to Scipio but ultimately disagreed with the role Polybius gave to *tyche* in the battle itself. On the role of *tyche* in Polybius' account, Grethlein 2013, 255; Moore 2020, 62-67.

¹²⁶ Livy 30.30.10. On the parallelism between the lives of Hannibal and Scipio in Livy's work, see Rossi 2004 with references.

¹²⁷ Livy 30.30.18. On the belief that *fortuna* should not be trusted, see discussion Chapter Four.

¹²⁸ Livy 30.30.19-21.

By choosing to fight, “[Scipio] must bear the fate that the gods may give [him]”.¹²⁹ As an example of the fickleness of fortune, Hannibal reminds Scipio of the fate of M. Atilius Regulus, which would have been a great example of “FELICITAS and VIRTUS if in his hour of victory [i.e. at the battle of Asps and Adys during the first Punic War], he had granted the peace that [the Carthaginians] wanted” (*FELICITATIS VIRTUTISQUE exempla M. Atilius quondam (...) fuisset, si uictor pacem petentibus dedisset patribus nostris*).¹³⁰ In Hannibal’s eyes, by “refusing to limit his FELICITAS or place controls on the good fortune he was experiencing,” (*sed non statuendo FELICITATI modum nec cohibendo efferentem se fortunam*) Atilius set himself up for his defeat, capture and death.¹³¹

Throughout the speech, Livy uses two different yet connected aspects of FELICITAS to outline the relationships between the gods, *fortuna* and generals in warfare. FELICITAS represents a state: it denotes the good fortune experienced by a general at and for a particular moment in time. Since as Hannibal affirms, FELICITAS enjoyed by the general for many years can be destroyed by *fortuna* of a single hour, it is then the accumulation of the good fortune experienced every single hour that creates FELICITAS enjoyed for many years. For Livy, *fortuna*, whether good or bad, can both create and destroy FELICITAS, and as we have seen in Chapter One in Cicero’s discussion of Lucullus’ FELICITAS, to ensure that FELICITAS represents the results of good fortune, Livy construes *fortuna* and FELICITAS on different temporalities.¹³² Whether the general experiences good or bad fortune depends on divine will as transpires in Hannibal’s declaration that by choosing to fight, Scipio must bear the fate that the gods may give him.¹³³ Since FELICITAS is a reflection of the will of the gods, the FELICITAS of a general experienced at a particular moment is not something to be taken for granted. The example of Marcus

¹²⁹ Livy 30.30.22.

¹³⁰ Livy 30.30.23. On Marcus Atilius Regulus as an historical and ethical example, see Mix 1970; Leach 2014; Langlands 2018, 218-224; 267 – 290.

¹³¹ Livy 30.30.23.

¹³² See Cicero’s treatment of Lucullus’ FELICITAS in Chapter One.

¹³³ Livy 30.30.22.

Atilius exemplifies perfectly this point: by continuing the war, the Roman general tempted his good fortune and as *fortuna* turned against him, he lost everything, even the honours which could have been his had he returned to Rome a victorious general with a peace treaty.

FELICITAS also denotes the outcomes of the action of *fortuna*, namely the honours a general earned through military victories or conquest. In his exhortation, Hannibal warns Scipio that he may lose all his “past and future glory [because] of the fortune of an hour.” Since both “past and future glory” (*parta ac sperata decora*) and FELICITAS can be lost to the *fortuna* of a single hour, this implies that for Livy there is a conceptual connection between the two ideas. The term *decora*, which can refer to both the physical decorative honours, and the deeds through which the general earns those honours, effectively defines FELICITAS through its physical commemoration.¹³⁴ In other words, the FELICITAS of a general leads to deeds and honours, which in turn are themselves markers of a general’s status as FELIX for others.

Another way for the gods to affect warfare, and to bring victory to Roman generals, is to affect the outcome of battles. After Scipio and Hannibal end their peace negotiations, Livy writes that the two generals went back to their camp, reporting to their soldiers that discussion has been fruitless and that “the issue must be decided in battle, and whatever fortune the gods granted must be accepted.”¹³⁵ With this statement, Livy gives the gods jurisdiction over the outcome of the war, since the battle is going to be decided by arms and whatever fortune they sent.

Aemilius Paullus confirms the gods’, soldiers’, and generals’ responsibility in deciding the outcome of battles in a speech given to his unruly soldiers ahead of his confrontation with King Perseus of Macedonia in 168 BCE. For Aemilius Paullus, “a soldier should attend to three things: his body, to keep strength and agility as much as possible, the good condition of his weapons, and the readiness of provisions, in case of a sudden order.”¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Oughton 2016, 169-70. The triumph is one of those honours.

¹³⁵ Livy 30.31.10.

¹³⁶ Livy 44.30.2.

Everything else related to the soldier is “under the care of the general and the gods.”¹³⁷ Aemilius Paullus adds that “his duty as a general is to create a good opportunity for battle.”¹³⁸ He leaves the rest, in particular the uncertain aspect of the outcome of the upcoming battle, to the gods. To win, it is not sufficient to be physically strong, to have good weapons and to fight at the right time, the gods must also orchestrate the events. For Aemilius Paullus, victory is the result of a partnership between the general, the army, and the gods to which each contributes to its own strength. This indicates that, for Romans, victory resulted from both the physical qualities of humans, soldiers and general, and the divine action of the gods.

The final way for the gods to act in warfare, according to Livy, is by influencing human behaviour and thinking. As seen previously, Hannibal laments that “the gods had [not] given [Roman and Carthaginian] ancestors the disposition of mind so that they were satisfied with the scope of their existing empires.”¹³⁹ Hannibal’s comment indicates that, for Livy, the gods can affect the mental faculty of humans.¹⁴⁰

Throughout his work, Livy provides numerous examples of how the gods affect the behaviour of soldiers and generals.¹⁴¹ A good illustration of divine effect on human disposition can be found in Scipio’s defence against accusations of bribery brought against him in 187 BCE.¹⁴² Livy tell us that on the day of trial, the anniversary of his victory at Zama, Scipio invited the Roman people to pray to the gods to thank them for “giving him on that particular day

¹³⁷ Livy 44.30.2.

¹³⁸ Livy 44.30.4. Davies 2005, 104.

¹³⁹ Livy 30.30.6.

¹⁴⁰ *TLL* s.v. *mens* 8.711.60-736.76. *Mens* as a mental faculty see, Isid. *Etym.* 11.1.12: *Nam mentem vocari, ut sciat: animum, ut velit. mens vocata in anima vel quod meninit.* (The mind is so called in that it knows; the will, in that it desires. The mind is so called because it is eminent in the soul, or because it remembers.)

¹⁴¹ See for instance, the episode of dispute between L. Verginius and M.’ Sergius, Livy 5.8.1-12.1, cf. Wistrand 1987, 19-21; Erckell 1952, 60-61; Davies 2005, 103.

¹⁴² Plut. *Mor.* 196f-197; App. *Syr.* 40; Aul. Gell. 4.18.3-6; Aur. Vic. *Vir. Ill.* 49.17. For the narrative of the trial see Livy 38.50.4-60, Aul. Gell. 6.19.8. On the so-called ‘Scipionic trials,’ see for instance Earl 1961, 114; Scullard 1970, 216-24; Gruen 1995, 72-86; Jaeger 1997, 132-37; Briscoe *Comm.* 38-40, 171; *FRHist* 1.293-304, esp. 302 on the trials of the Scipios; Kleinman 2018, 55-64.

the purpose and the capacity to render a conspicuous service to the *res publica*” (*hoc ipso die et saepe alias egregie gerendae rei publicae mentem facultatemque dederunt.*)¹⁴³ He added that the two dispositions given by the gods allowed him “to fight a tight battle well and FELICITER against Hannibal and the Carthaginian army” (*Hannibale et Carthaginensibus signis collatis in Africa BENE ac FELICITER pugnavi*).¹⁴⁴ Interestingly, Scipio’s speech associates to act FELICITER with the *mens* and *facultatem* given by the gods on that particular day. This suggests that for Livy the FELICITAS of the general represents the particular mental disposition and capacity given by the gods during the battle to achieve victory.

Livy’s representation of the relationship between a Roman general and the gods seems to have been well-known in Rome. His framework is based on the conceptual association between fortune and military victory, which was attested in Rome since the second century BCE in various media such as Polybius’ historical narrative, Ennius’ poetry, or Plautus’ plays.¹⁴⁵ Since Livy’s narrative was meant to be read in public in Rome for the Roman people, members of Roman society would attend those readings, and be exposed to Livy’s conception of the divine quality.¹⁴⁶ Some elements of the way Livy describes FELICITAS must have been familiar for his audience to understand his point about the role of the divine in Roman military success; other elements may have seemed outdated as Livy attempted to reconstruct old ways of thinking. Ultimately, his representation of FELICITAS *imperatoria* was not only a reflection of the way Romans thought about the figure of the victorious Roman general but also influenced the way Romans perceived and understood FELICES generals.

¹⁴³ Livy 38.51.9.

¹⁴⁴ Livy 38.51.7.

¹⁴⁵ On the role of fortune in Roman imperialism, see Polyb. 1.4.1; 1.63.9, with Hau 2011; Brouwer 2011; and Walbank 2007 for bibliographical references; Enn. *Ann.* 186-9, with Champeaux 1982-7, 2.172-3; 202-13; and Plaut. *Pseud.*, 669-87 with Miano 2018, 183-88. For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter Four.

¹⁴⁶ On the large-scale recitation of histories in Rome, see Dalzell 1955; Wiseman 1987, 253-6; 2015, 129-31. On the definition of the ancient audience of classical historiography in general terms, see for instance, Momigliano 1978; Harris 1989; Marincola 2009; Wiseman 2015; and Pausch 2022.

In his historical narrative of Rome, Livy articulates another representation of the dynamics of *FELICITAS imperatoria*, the relationship between a Roman general and the divine to ensure the well-being of the *res publica*. In the speeches of Hannibal and Scipio before the battle of Zama, the Roman historian outlines three main ways for the gods to influence warfare: first, by sending good fortune to a Roman general, second, by orchestrating events to impact the outcome of a battle, and finally by influencing the behaviour of men involved in the fighting. Central to the Livian conception of *FELICITAS imperatoria* is the idea of partnership. As Aemilius Paullus clearly explains to his soldiers, victory for Rome is achieved when the soldiers, the general, and the gods each play their part. The general defines the best conditions for the battle, the gods determine the outcome of the battle, according to their will, and the people, namely the soldiers or knights, keep their arms and bodies ready for battle. Finally, for Livy, the state represented by *FELICITAS imperatoria* is transitory. In his speech, Hannibal warns Scipio against the fickleness of *fortuna* and presents the state represented by *FELICITAS* as the good fortune experienced during a particular battle, at a particular moment in time. It is not to be taken for granted since, at any point in time, this divine good fortune may turn and lead to a Roman general's downfall.

3.4 Conclusion

The three representations of the triumphant general found in the social and political discourse of the second century BCE outline a common conception of *FELICITAS imperatoria*.

The *FELICITAS* of a Roman general was the partnership between men and gods to bring about the benefits of *FELICITAS Romana* for the Roman people. Each side contributed through different spheres of action to the goal of military victory. Roman generals were seen as acting in accordance with divine will either by accessing divine knowledge or by using divine attributes. *FELICITAS imperatoria* was the transitory state of the communion between the gods and a Roman general at a particular moment in time and context ordained

by the gods. This partnership was based on the relationship between the Roman people and the gods.

In Plautus' play *Amphitryon*, which subverts the triumphal codes and conventions for comic purposes, this partnership is achieved the blurring of identity between a Roman general and the god Jupiter, which enables the general to access divine knowledge. This idea that the gods share information with Roman generals is expressed in the official language used by the Senate to announce the award of a triumph to the Roman people by the expression '*auspicium imperium FELICITAS ductusque*'. The association of FELICITAS with *auspicium* signals that the victory of a Roman general and his army was achieved through the alignment between human actions and divine through the means of the auspices. The general obtained divine approval for his actions through signs which emanated from the relationship of the Roman people and the gods for the safety and well-fare of the *res publica*. In Livy's historical narrative of Rome, divine approval was just one of the ways in which the gods contributed to the victory of Roman armies; while the general created the opportunities for victory, the soldiers and knights were ready to fight, and the gods orchestrated the events by sending good fortune or affecting the behaviour of those fighting to lead Roman armies to victory.

For a Roman general, this military victory represented his good administration of the *res publica*, denoted by the phrase '*BENE ac FELICITER rem publicam administravit*'. It was the basis on which he would be given the highest honours in the *res publica*, a triumph, by the Roman Senate, in a majority of cases, and by the Roman people, on rare occasions. This decision process involved an evaluation and judgement as to whether the general has acted *feliciter* by examining various criteria, such as the number of enemy casualties, the size of the booty, and the way the Roman general handled divine matters. By accepting or refusing a triumph to a general, by accepting or rejecting certain leadership behaviours and the outcomes of a battle or war, since FELICITAS is attributed according a series of criteria, which defined what constitute the state, the proven ability and the outcome represented by the divine quality, senators effectively constantly reformulated how to be as FELIX

for a Roman general. To act FELICITER meant not just to act in accordance with divine will but also in accordance with the ethical code defined by members of the Roman elites; the triumph is the social marker that the Roman general has met those criteria.

The variety of the sources, from plays to inscriptions dedicated in temples passing by historical narratives, attests that the conceptualisation of FELICITAS *imperatoria* as the transient partnership of a Roman general with gods based on the relationship between Roman people and the gods, was the prevalent way for Romans to think about victorious generals in the second century BCE. The fact that the Senate still used the terminology ‘*BENE ac FELICITER*’ to justify the award of triumph in the first century BCE shows that this conception of FELICITAS *imperatoria* was still present throughout the Late Roman Republic.¹⁴⁷ This conception of FELICITAS *imperatoria* will be challenged in the middle of the second century with the arrival in Rome of the goddess FELICITAS.

¹⁴⁷ See, for instance, Cic. *Phil.* 14.35-8.

4 Lucullus, the goddess FELICITAS, and FELICITAS *imperatoria*

The goddess FELICITAS entered the Roman pantheon with the construction of the first known temple to the deity in the Velabrum by Lucullus, cos. 151 BCE, in Rome in 145-142 BCE following his victorious campaign in Spain.¹ Over the course of the Late Roman Republic, ancient sources report the construction of several other places of worship to FELICITAS built in Rome by Roman generals as part of the commemoration of their military victory.² In the 80s BCE Sulla very likely built a temple located on the Capitoline Hill to the goddess Fausta FELICITAS and Venus Victrix.³ Following in Sulla's footsteps, Pompey built a shrine to the goddess FELICITAS in his theatre-complex on the Campus Martius alongside his temple to the goddess Venus Victrix in 55 BCE.⁴ As part of the honours granted to him by the Senate following his victory against Pompey and his allies, Caesar started the construction of the temple to the goddess FELICITAS, which was dedicated by his lieutenant M. Aemilius Lepidus in 45-

¹ On Lucullus' campaign in Spain, Dio Cass. 22.76.2, 43.21.1; Strabo 8.6.23.

² There were two other temples to the goddess FELICITAS built in Italy in the Late Roman Republic. The first temple one is attested by an inscription in Tibur, see *CIL* I², 1481; Clark 2007, 196. The second temple dedicated to the goddess *Victoria et FELICITAS Caesaris* was set up in Ameria, an Umbrian settlement of Augustus' veterans, at the end of the first century BCE after the battle of Actium. The temple is attested by the *Fasti Amerini* dating from between 25 BCE and 1 CE. It records the celebration of annual games to the deity in November, see *CIL* XI, 4346, Zuddas 2017, 143. On the goddess *Victoria et FELICITAS Caesaris*, see Murphy 1986, 309; Weinstock 1971, 232.

³ The temple of Fausta FELICITAS is attested in the *Fasti Fratrum Arvalium* under the reference 'Genius Publicus Fausta FELICITAS VENUS Victrix in Capitolio; Apollo in Palatio' (*Inscr. It.* 13.2, 37, 195, 518) and in the *Fasti Antiates Minores* under 'FELICITAS in Capitolio' (*Inscr. It.* 13.2, 209, 475). For the identification of Sulla as the builder, see *LTUR* s.v. Faustus felicitas 2.242; Welch 2011, 187-9 contra Mommsen *CIL* I² 331. On the temple of Apollo on the Palatine, see Flory 1992, 288; Arya 2002, 313.

⁴ Pompey's FELICITAS shrine is attested in the *Fasti Amiternini* on the 12 August under 'Veneri Victrici, HON(ORI), VIRTVT(I), FELICITATI in teatro marmoreo' (*CIL* I² 244) and in the *Fasti Allifani* which gives 'V V H V V FELICITA', which is plausibly reconstructed as 'V(eneri) V(ictrici) H(ONORI) V(IRTUTI) V[?] FELICITA(TI in teatro Pompei)' (*CIL* I² 217) On the temple, Weinstock 1971, 91 n.7, 93, 232; Wistrand 1987, 41, Clark 2007, 225-243, Russell 2016, 153-86.

44 BCE.⁵ Those constructions testify to the growing place of the deity in the Roman religious landscape and the competition between members of Roman elite for her favours.

As the first known place of worship built to the deity in Rome, Lucullus' temple stood apart from the others as it provided Romans with the first representation of the new deity and her agency. As such then, it made a lasting impression on the way Romans understood the goddess FELICITAS and her impact on their life and dominion of the world. In this chapter, I explore Lucullus' representation of the deity to understand its impact on the way Romans conceived the relationship between a Roman general and the divine for the well-being and prosperity of the *res publica*.

My analysis argues three points. First, I show that, since the temple was built as a personal victory monument, Lucullus' representation of the goddess FELICITAS can be construed as his own personal vision of the deity and her agency. Second, I defend the view that Lucullus' depiction of his relationship with the goddess FELICITAS in the temple transformed the prevalent conception of FELICITAS *imperatoria* as a transitory ability emanating from the relationship between the Roman people and the gods to a quasi-permanent ability of a Roman general based on his personal relationship with divine. The goddess FELICITAS entered Roman *religio* in the midst of a Greek and Roman debate about the role of *tyche/fortuna* in Roman military successes. By contrast to the goddesses *Tyche* and *Fortuna*, which were perceived as fickle by Greeks and Romans, the goddess FELICITAS was understood as the divine agency which provided good fortune more predictably and more personally because she grants her favours on account of her worshipper's VIRTUS and actions. Finally, I maintain that visitors of Lucullus' temple and members of the Roman society at large would understand Lucullus' new conception of FELICITAS *imperatoria* because it was elaborated in reaction and conjunction to the religious and intellectual discourse on *fortuna* at the time.

⁵ Dio Cass. 44.5.2 reports that M. Aemilius Lepidus completed the shrine as he was *magister equitum* (master of horse) on the site of the former Sullan *curia Hostilia*. On the temple, see Clark 2007, 225-243; Welch 2008, 203-4.

This chapter is thus divided in three parts. I reconstruct Lucullus' temple to the goddess FELICITAS to highlight how the temple displayed his own personal understanding of the deity. In the second part of the chapter, I analyse the divine agency of the goddess FELICITAS. Since the temple was Lucullus' contribution to the Roman discourse on military victory, I discuss one of the main debates of the time, which centred around the role of *fortuna*, as a deity and a divine agent, in Roman imperialism. Then, I contrast Varro's description of the goddess FELICITAS in his *Antiquities of Divine Things* as transmitted in Augustine's *City of God* with Plautus' discussion of the goddess Fortuna in his play, *Pseudolus*, first performed in 191 BCE to define the divine agency of the deity. In the final section of the chapter, I examine Lucullus' relationship with the goddess FELICITAS by exploring the symbolism of the statues displayed in the temple.

4.1 Reconstructing Lucullus' temple

Unfortunately, sources about Lucullus' temple to the goddess FELICITAS are scarce. It is, however, possible to reconstruct it using the available material in conjunction with recent analysis of how new temples were built in the third and second centuries BCE.⁶ In his study of temples' construction in Rome in the second century BCE, Eric Orlin has outlined the four main steps Roman generals would usually follow: the vow, the finance, the construction, and the dedication.⁷ The following overview of the different steps shows that because the temple was built as a personal victory monument, privately funded, and personally decorated, Lucullus' representation of the goddess FELICITAS can be construed as his own personal vision of the deity and her agency.

4.1.1 The Vow

Before or during battle, the commander would vow to the deity of his choice that he would build a temple if they would help him to victory. As Orlin

⁶ On mid-Republican victory monuments in general, see Pietilä-Castrén 1987; Ziolkowski 1992, Aberson 1994; Favro 1994; Orlin 1997; Itgenshorst 2005, 89-147; Bastien 2008; Russell 2016, 115-120.

⁷ Orlin 1997, 6-9, see also Russell 2016, 114-20.

put it, those vows were motivated by “the desire to please the gods and served to maintain the [peace of the gods] *pax deorum*,” the peace between the Romans and the gods.⁸ Vows were thus a means for Romans to seek the favour of the gods.⁹ Examples of vows in ancient sources suggest that Roman generals customarily vowed a new temple to the gods on two major occasions: when leaving for their provinces and during their military campaign.¹⁰ Unfortunately for us, no sources report that Lucullus had vowed a temple to the goddess FELICITAS, but since it was customary for temples constructed at that time, it has been generally assumed by scholars that Lucullus had made a vow.¹¹

The vows were formulated, and thus understood, as conditional, almost contractual binding agreements; they were personal contracts between the Roman general and the deities.¹² Roman generals were expected to fulfil their side of the agreement, i.e. to build a temple to the deity, when and if they returned victorious to Rome. However, the victory was also a success for the Roman army as a whole, and throughout the process the general was acting as the official representative of the *res publica* as well as in his own right. Therefore, when came the time for the general to fulfil his vow and build his temple, the Senate took an interest in making sure it was done properly.¹³

⁸ Orlin 1997, 16-17 cf. more largely 11-34 for a good discussion of the situation which led to the vow of temples in Rome in the third and second centuries BCE.

⁹ On the role of priests in seeking the *pax deorum*, see Santangelo 2011 with reference to previous scholarship; Champion 2017, 71-2 discuss the role of the consuls as *curatores* of the *pax deorum*;

¹⁰ For examples of vows made when setting to a province, see Livy 45.39.12, 22.1.6, 38.48.16, 42.49.1; Cic. *Verr.* 5.34; Caes. *BC.* 1.6. For examples of vows made during battles, for instance, Livy 5.23.8.11, 45.39.12. cf. Orlin 1997, 45-66.

¹¹ See for instance, Aberson 1994, 41-2; Orlin 1997, 130-1.

¹² For instance, Appius Claudius Caecus vowed a temple to the goddess Bellona during the battle against the Etruscan and the Samnites in 296 BCE by declaring “Bellona, if today you grant victory to us, then I vow to you a temple” (*Bellona, si hodie nobis victoriam duis, ast ego tibi templum voveo*) cf. Livy 10.19. For modern discussion of the contractual nature of vow, see Wissowa 1912, 319-20; Mommsen *Röm. Staatsr.* 1³ 243-246; Ziolkowski 1992, 195- 203; Orlin 1997, 28-29, 48-49.

¹³ Ziolkowski 1992, 195-203; Orlin 1997, 45-66; Russell 2016, 115.

4.1.2 The Finance

Roman generals had two options to finance the construction of their votive victory temples: either public funds from the Treasury with the approval of the Senate or their own private money.¹⁴ Asking senators for their approval for a votive temple gave the vowing magistrate more prestige since he could advertise the Senate's endorsement. However, once senators got involved, they took over much of the procedure: they provided the money, determined the location, issued the construction contracts, and claimed the authority over the dedication, thus diminishing the original magistrate's involvement.¹⁵ The temple would be public and its rituals were part of the official *religio* of the *res publica* as defined by the *Fasti*.

The second option was to build alone. In modern scholarship, it has been traditionally understood that Roman generals used a particular category of booty under the generals' own control, *manubiae*, to finance their temple. The status of the *manubiae* is the subject of an ongoing scholarly debate; some scholars hold that they were the private property of a general while others maintained that they were public property available for a general's use.¹⁶ Whatever their legal status, *manubiae* were strongly connected with the general and treated more or less as private. A monument funded from *manubiae* would be strongly connected to its founder, providing him with all the prestige. The temple would however be private, not part of the official *religio*, thus less prestigious and less visited. Temples financed from *manubiae*

¹⁴ For the use of public money to finance temple, see Orlin 1997, 139-158; Russell 2016, 115-6.

¹⁵ On the prestige involved in temple building in Rome, see Aberson 1994, 154-5; Orlin 1997; Celani 1998, 57; Russel 2016, 116.

¹⁶ For the use of private funds for temple construction, and *manubiae* of general see Zioleswki 1992 and Pietilä-Castrén 1987. On the status of the *manubiae*, Shatzman 1972; Pape 1975; Orlin 1997, 117-27; Tarpin 2009; and Coudry 2009, 44-52 all see *manubiae* as essentially private property. Mommsen *Röm. Forsch.* 443; Bradford Churchill 1999 joined by Berrendonner 2007, 210-2 found that *manubiae* were still public property but made available to the general. Beard 2007, 165-7 examined the *manubiae* in connection to the triumph sidestepping the issue of the status altogether.

were rarer than had been previously assumed and our sources suggest that Lucullus' temple to the goddess FELICITAS may have been one of them.¹⁷

Dio Cassius reports that Lucullus built his temple “ἐκ τοῦ Ἰβηρικοῦ πολέμου”.¹⁸ Interpreting the phrase as a causal clause, meaning “out of money from the Iberian war,” Orlin had identified the temple of FELICITAS as one of only five temples financed during the Republic by *manubiae*.¹⁹ According to him, Dio's phrasing is reminiscent of Cicero's use of “from Corsica” to refer to the spoils of war when describing Cn. Papirius Maso's dedication of a shrine to the god Fons in the third century BCE.²⁰ The absence of reference to the *dies natalis* of the temple from the *Fasti* seems to confirm Orlin's interpretation.²¹ Publicly-funded temples were part of the official cult and their *dies natali* were included in the *Fasti* displayed in Rome. Under July 1st, the *Fasti Antiates Maiores* reports the *dies natalis* for a temple to the goddess FELICITAS built on the Capitoline.²² Suetonius and Dio Cassius, however, report that the axe of Julius Caesar' triumphal chariot broke in front of the temple of Lucullus on the path of the triumph in the Velabrum.²³ The temple of the goddess FELICITAS mentioned by the *Fasti Antiates Maiores* therefore cannot be Lucullus' temple. The absence of *dies natalis* on *fasti* would then suggest that Lucullus' temple to the goddess FELICITAS was not included in Roman public religion. This non-inclusion could be explained by the fact that Lucullus' temple was a private temple likely financed by the *manubiae* taken from his campaign in Spain.²⁴

¹⁷ Orlin 1997, 127-39.

¹⁸ Dio Cass. frag 76.

¹⁹ Orlin 1997, 131 *contra* Pietilä-Castrén 1987, 126 n.15 who defended a temporal reading of Dio Cassius' phrase, namely 'after the Iberian war', thus removing Lucullus' temple to the goddess FELICITAS from the list of temples built out of *manubiae*. Orlin 1997, 131 n.52 himself conceded that “as Dio wrote in Greek, we obviously cannot be sure that Lucullus used *manubiae*.”

²⁰ Cic. *Nat. D.* 3.52.

²¹ Orlin 1997, 135 cf. *Inscr. It.* 13.520.

²² De Sanctis, *Stor. Rom.* 4/2-3, 292-293 n.747.

²³ Suet. *Caes.* 37; Dio Cass. 43.21.1.

²⁴ On the limitation of the *Fasti* as a proxy for Roman public *religio*, see Rüpke 2011b, 21-22.

4.1.3 The Construction

The construction of a temple consisted of four steps: (1) finding the site (*locatio*) for the temple, (2) acquiring the land, (3) contracting out the building works and (4) decorating the temple. Since the temple to the goddess FELICITAS was most likely built from private funds, Lucullus carried out all those steps himself. However, evidence remains for only two of those steps: the location and the decoration.

An anecdote from Caesar's triumph reported by Suetonius tells us that Lucullus built his temple in the Velabrum, the area between the Roman Forum and Forum Boarium, on the path of the procession.²⁵ Lucullus did not choose this location by chance. As John Muccigrosso has rightly argued, temple builders in Rome placed their building primarily for the best political effects.²⁶ Temples were indeed an effective advertisement of Roman aristocrats' achievements; well-placed temples would be visible to voters, men who would be in the city and visiting its area of public business regularly or only during elections.²⁷ Given the importance for publicity, since the third century BCE, temples were built in and around heavily-trafficked areas of the Forum and circuses, along major access roads to the city and on hills visible from those areas.²⁸

As Muccigrosso pointed out, temples' locations in Rome also allowed Roman aristocrats to convey particular political messages.²⁹ A good example of that is Clodius' shrine to the goddess *Libertas* built on the site of Cicero's house.³⁰ As Valentina Arena has convincingly shown, the shrine was part of Clodius' wider strategy to present the killing of the Catilinarian conspirators

²⁵ Suet. *Caes.* 37; Dio Cass. 43.21.11. cf. Orlin 1997, 151-2. Beard 2007, 102-3 has recently suggested that Caesar may have used short cut from the traditional path of the triumph, implying that the temple may not have been on the traditional part of the triumph. On the path of the triumph, see Chapter Two.

²⁶ Muccigrosso 2006, in particular 186-194.

²⁷ Muccigrosso 2006, 187.

²⁸ Muccigrosso 2006, 187-191.

²⁹ Muccigrosso 2006, 195-206.

³⁰ On the connection between the *domus* and public/private religion, see Wallace-Hadrill 1994, 4-37; Treggiari 1998; Hales 2003; Muccigrosso 2006, 183-6; and Beck 2009.

without any trial as an action against the liberty of Roman citizens and to convey his message as clearly and widely as possible.³¹ After Cicero's legal banishment from Rome, his properties were confiscated and sold at an auction and his house on the Palatine demolished. The treatment of Cicero's properties, in line with the punishment traditionally reserved to would-be tyrants such as Spurius Cassius or Manlius Capitolinus, would have symbolically defined the Roman orator as an aspiring tyrant.³² The complex Clodius built included a portico with a peristyle, an actual shrine with a cult statue of the goddess, an honorific statue of Clodius erected by one of his clients, and an inscription that displayed the tribune's name on the façade overlooking the Forum.³³ The shrine, which was connected to Clodius' own house, was a celebration of the goddess *Libertas* and of Clodius himself, her defender. Building the new religious complex on Cicero's house in the Palatine symbolically enabled Clodius to celebrate his political victory against Cicero, his achievements in defence of liberty, to vindicate the Catilinarians and to frame Cicero's actions as those of a would-be tyrant.³⁴

The location of Lucullus' temple to the goddess FELICITAS in the Velabrum answers to the two political imperatives outlined by Muccigrosso. Connecting the Roman Forum to the Forum Boarium, and the Capitoline Hill to the Western side of Palatine, the Velabrum was an important traffic point in Rome; merchants arriving from the Tiber would disembark at the Forum Bovarium before heading to Forum, and Roman aristocrats living on the Western side of Palatine Hill would cross the area on their way to the Capitoline

³¹ Arena 2012, 212-4. On Clodius' accusation against Cicero, see Cic. *Att.* 1.16.10, *Fam.* 7.24.1, *Dom.* 7, *Har. resp.* 17, *Sest.* 109, *Vat.* 23, *Mil.* 12.

³² See Smith 2006, 49-52 on Cassius, 52-4 on Maelius, and 54-5 on Manlius.

³³ This description of Clodius' complex is pieced together from Cic. *Dom.* 51, 100, 102-3, 116, 121, 137. On the temple's visibility, see Cic. *Dom.* 100, 142. On Clodius' statues, see Cic. *Dom.* 81. On the architecture of the monument, see *LTUR* s.v. *Libertas* (1), 3.188-9; Krause 2001, 186-91; Stroh 2004, 319-21. The location of Cicero's house has received much scholarly debate. For a good overview, see Arena 2012, 213 n. 231 and n. 234 with references to previous scholarship.

³⁴ Arena 2012, 214. See Roller 2018, 233-64 on the use of 'aspiring-tyrant' examples on the debate around Cicero's house.

or the Campus Martius.³⁵ The presence of the *ficus Ruminalis*, the wild fig tree which marked the spot where the cradle of Romulus and Remus landed on the bank of the Tiber river, and the vicinity of the Lupercalia cave, situated on the northern side of the Palatine Hill, meant that the Velabrum was also an important religious place in Rome.³⁶ The traffic in the area would then mean that Lucullus' temple would have been visible to various members of Roman society. Its location on the path of the triumph would ensure that during the procession, attendees would gather on the steps of the temple to get a glimpse of the parade.³⁷ The temple would thus be a good advertisement of Lucullus' achievements.

The temple can also be interpreted as Lucullus' claim to a triumph. None of our available ancient sources reports that Lucullus celebrated a triumph for his victory in Spain.³⁸ Differences in the way our two main accounts for Lucullus' campaign in Spain, namely Appian's *Hiberian War* and the fragments of Book thirty-five of Polybius' *Histories*, portray the Roman general's actions in Spain suggest that Lucullus was perhaps at the centre of a bitter political debate at his return in Rome.³⁹ The different vision Appian and Polybius have of Lucullus' handling of the Spanish campaign most likely reflect different sides of this debate, which seems to have centred around the legality of war Lucullus waged against Vaccaei and the general's conduct during the war. In the end it

³⁵ On the name *Velabrum*, Varro *Ling.* 5.43-4. On the development of the Velabrum, see *LTUR* s.v. *Velabrum*, 5.101-2; Filippi 2005, 93-116; Wiseman 2019, 48-64, esp. 59-61; and Brock, Motta, & Terrenato 2021 with references to previous scholarship and extensive archaeological evidence.

³⁶ On the location of the *ficus Ruminalis* in the Velabrum, see for instance Varro, *Ling.* 5.54; Ov. *Fast.* 2.411-2, 421-2; Livy 1.4.4-6. For an analysis of the *ficus Ruminalis*, see Hunt 2016, 98-112. The bibliography on the Lupercalia festival is extensive, see for instance, Wissowa 1912, 172-4, 483-4; Dumézil 1970, 348-50; Wiseman 1995, 77-88; North 2008; Alonso Fernández 2016; and recently Vuković 2022 with an extensive bibliography.

³⁷ For a good discussion of the crowd during the triumph, see Popkin 2016, 125-33 who studies the crowd experience of the triumph during the Early Principate.

³⁸ Based on the remains of the *Fasti triumphalis*, Itgenshort 2005, no 208a unconvincingly supposes that Lucullus celebrated a triumph.

³⁹ App. *Hisp.* 49-55 cf. Richardson 2000, 146-50; Polyb. 35.1-4; see also Livy *Per.* 48.16; Flor. 1.33.11.

would seem that this bitter political debate prevented Lucullus from being awarded a triumph.

In his account, Appian depicts Lucullus' character and actions negatively. He presents Lucullus' war against the Vaccaei as 'unjust'; for him, the Roman general acting out of greed for fame and need for money, pursuit a war not declared by the Senate against opponents who had never attacked the Romans nor offended Lucullus himself.⁴⁰ He even concludes his narrative of Lucullus' campaign by stating that the general had waged war without the authority of the Roman people but was never called to account for it.⁴¹ Appian also depicts Lucullus as a perfidious man. In a telling episode, he narrates how after establishing a friendly relationship with the Caucaei, a Celtiberian tribe, through the exchange of oaths and hostages, Lucullus ordered his men to sack the Caucaei's city and to kill all adult males.⁴² After this, so great was the distrust of the Celtiberian tribes against Lucullus that, according to Appian, when seeking peace with the Romans, the citizens of the city of Intercalia preferred to negotiate with Scipio Aemilianus, Lucullus' legate.⁴³

By contrast, Polybius' narrative portrays Lucullus in a more positive manner. The extant fragments seem to imply that Lucullus had the support of the Senate to wage war against the enemies of Rome's allies in Spain. The extant narrative focuses on the difficulties the consuls faced to recruit soldiers for the war and on the reception of Marcellus' embassies sent to Rome in 152 BCE to end the war with Celtiberians. According to Polybius, after hearing both allies, which included the Belli and the Tithi, and enemies, a majority of senators supported continuing the war, and to send a new general in Spain, one of the consuls elected, because it was in Rome's and its allies' advantage.⁴⁴ In that context, it seems very likely that the Senate would have given Lucullus a mandate to defend allied tribes from attacks. Such a mandate

⁴⁰ App. *Hisp.* 51. On Appian's bias against Lucullus, see Bane 1976, 419-20; Clark 2014, 151-3.

⁴¹ App. *Hisp.* 55.

⁴² App. *Hisp.* 52.

⁴³ App. *Hisp.* 54.

⁴⁴ Polyb. 35.3.4-8.

could then explain why Lucullus came to attack the Vaccaeii in defence of the Carpetani, presumably an ally of Rome too.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, the loss of his account prevents us from detailing how Polybius depicted Lucullus' actions during the campaign itself.

The divergence of the narrative between Appian and Polybius, as John Richardson noted, would suggest the existence of two different historical traditions about Lucullus' campaign in Spain.⁴⁶ Arguing against Richardson, John Rich has recently convincingly defended the view that, when dealing with the events of the periods 200-146 BCE, Appian used Polybius as his main source.⁴⁷ He maintained that Appian's departures from Polybius are just slips arising from carelessness caused by Appian's methods of composition. Comparing Appian's and Polybius' account of the Roman war with Antiochus III, Rich has shown that Appian presents most events in the order in which Polybius narrated them. However, Appian takes liberties with his source, freely rearranging Polybius' material to improve the flow of the narrative, at times creating chronological distortions, and at other times, misdating events.⁴⁸ Rich has postulated that Appian would have worked through Polybius' narrative in his first note-taking phase, and then written up his own account based on those notes.⁴⁹ Such working methods would then imply that Appian's narrative of Lucullus' campaign in Spain is broadly reflective of Polybius' account.

Rich maintained that the differences between Appian's account and Polybius' narrative of the Celtiberian embassies to Rome in 152-151 BCE can be explained by the same mixture of fallibility and interpretative freedom observed in his account of the war with Antiochus. The two accounts diverge on the Belli and Tithi: while in Polybius, these were loyal to Rome, in Appian they were associated with the hostile Arevaci tribe.⁵⁰ This divergence is key for the narrative of war since, as mentioned above, in Polybius' account, it was

⁴⁵ App. *Hisp.* 51.

⁴⁶ Richardson 1987, 197.

⁴⁷ Rich 2015, 112. More generally on Appian's sources, see *ANRW* 2.34.1.339-554; Schwartz 1896, Schnegg 2010.

⁴⁸ Rich 2015, 110-1 with ancient sources references.

⁴⁹ Rich 2015, 69-72.

⁵⁰ App. *Hisp.* 49; Polyb. 35.2.3-3.8.

upon the recommendation of those allies that Rome decided to continue the war in Spain. It seems unlikely that this divergence is simply due to mistakes from Appian as Rich has suggested since it fits well with Appian's consistent questioning of the legality of Lucullus' war. Richardson, in fact, has rightly concluded that, on this matter the accounts of Appian and Polybius are 'inconsistent and irreconcilable.'⁵¹ The two writers had fundamentally different pictures of the outbreak of the war and of its conduct.

Those different visions may have reflected the different sides in a political debate about Lucullus' handling of the war in Spain. One episode, involving the general recruiting his armies in Rome, exemplifies well how controversial his methods were seen by his contemporaries. In 151 BCE, army recruitment was difficult. Polybius reports that the losses suffered by Roman armies, the succession of pitched battles, and the reported valour of the Celtiberians had created fear and panic amongst young Romans, in particular members of the Roman elite.⁵² Reacting to the situation, Livy reports that the consuls, Lucullus and Albinus, recruited their army with great strictness and favoured no one with exemption, resulting in their imprisonment by the tribune of the plebs as they were unable to obtain dispensation for their allies.⁵³ While obstruction of the levy by tribunes was not uncommon, it is the first time consuls were imprisoned by tribunes.⁵⁴ This unprecedented move by the tribunes then suggests that the consuls' methods were seen by members of the Roman elite as controversial.

⁵¹ Richardson 1986, 197, more broadly 194-8. It follows then as Richardson notes that Appian may have used another ancient source which portrays Lucullus negatively. My analysis does not invalidate the fact Appian used Polybius as his source for the event after the Second Punic War as advanced by Nissen 1863, 113-7. It lends credit to the view that Appian may have drawn on Polybius through an intermediary as suggested by Schwartz 1896, 217-22. For a good summary of the debate on Appian's use of Polybius, see Rich 2015 with reference to previous scholarship.

⁵² Polyb. 35.4.2-7.

⁵³ Liv. *Per.* 48.16.

⁵⁴ For other examples of threats made to the consuls by plebeian tribunes, see for instance Dion. Hal. 9.48, 10.34; Livy 4.26.9, 5.9.4. Consuls were imprisoned by the plebeian tribune in 138 BCE. Livy *Per.* 55, Cic. *Leg.* 3.19-22, in 91 BCE, Val. Max. 9.5.2, and in 60 BCE, cf. Cic, *Att.*, 11.1.8. On those events, see Taylor 1962 and Yakobson 2018, 29.

While the veracity of the consuls' imprisonment is unclear, the political debate around Lucullus' and Albinus' actions as consuls did take place. In his account, Appian does not mention the imprisonment of consuls.⁵⁵ Appian's omission of the consuls' imprisonment is surprising since the event would fit adequately in his negative portrayal of Lucullus' character, thus raising doubt about the veracity of the event. Cicero also seems unaware of Lucullus' and Albinus' imprisonment when, in a discussion about the tribunate of the plebs in *On the laws*, he writes that the imprisonment of consuls by the tribunes in 138 BCE was without precedent.⁵⁶ The loss of Polybius not helping, it is then unclear whether the consuls in 151 BCE were actually imprisoned. What seems more certain is that Lucullus' and Albinus' method of recruitment led to a political debate and a response from other members of the Roman elite. Like Livy, Appian hints at an issue with exemptions declaring that the enlistment used a random draft for a first time. Many men, Appian explains, had complained that the consuls were conducting the levy unfairly as some men were sent to easier theatres of war.⁵⁷ The heart of the dispute between the consuls and the tribunes of the plebs seems to have been the grant of exemptions, and the random draft was instituted as a compromise between the two parties. The whole episode indicates that Lucullus' methods were perceived by some members of the Roman elite as controversial and grounds enough to elicit a political response, perhaps in the form of his imprisonment.

In this context, therefore, in view of the political opposition Lucullus faced when recruiting his army, the questionable legality of his war against the Vaccaeii, and the cruelty and greed Lucullus apparently displayed in his dealing with Spanish tribes could have been seen as further justifications to deny him a triumph. The Roman praetor Ser. Sulpicius Galba, who campaigned alongside Lucullus in 150 BCE, faced prosecution and (perhaps even) trial for killing eight thousand Spanish Lusitanians after establishing a peace treaty

⁵⁵ App. *Hisp.* 49.

⁵⁶ Cic. *Leg.* 3. 20.

⁵⁷ App. *Hisp.* 49.

with them.⁵⁸ While sources do not mention that Lucullus was brought to trial, it seems very unlikely that, in light of Galba's prosecution, Lucullus would command enough vote in the Senate to be awarded a triumph for his victory.⁵⁹ Locating his temple to the goddess FELICITAS on the path of the triumphal parade could then be construed as Lucullus' symbolic claim to such an honour.

The other step of the construction for which details have come down to us is the decoration. Dio Cassius reports that Lucullus asked his friend L. Mummius Archaius to lend him some statues for the consecration of the temple and promised to return them. However, after the dedication, Lucullus came back on his promise claiming that the statues were now consecrated to the goddess.⁶⁰ Amongst those statues, Cicero reports, were the *Thespiadas*, bronze statues of the Muses, and a bronze statue of Aphrodite, both made by the fourth-century BCE Greek sculptor Praxiteles.⁶¹ The statues originated from the Greek city of Thespieae in Helicon and were taken away by Mummius in 146 BCE during his campaign against the Achaean league. Those statues, Pliny reports, were placed before the temple, most likely in the portico.⁶²

Just like the location of the temple was chosen for its political effects, the decoration of the temple was almost certainly carefully chosen by Lucullus. Since Roman temples are the ritual place in which the conceptions of the gods were created for worshippers, the statues of the Muses displayed in and around the temple of the goddess FELICITAS participate in the visual representation of both the divinity and the manifestations of her divine agency

⁵⁸ Galba's massacre of the Lusitanians is well attested in ancient sources, see for instance, App. *Hisp.* 59-61; Livy *Oxy. Per.* 49, *Per.* 49.17-20; Val. Max. 8.1.2. Cic. *Brut.* 89-90; *De Or.* 1.227-228. On the prosecution, for Galba's defence, Livy *Per.* 49 and for Cato's response, *ORF*⁴ 8.197. There is confusion in the sources over whether Galba was actually prosecuted: see Astin 1972, 111-113, who believed there was a trial; Richardson 1986, 138-139, who denied Galba was tried; Gruen 1968, 12-13 and Brennan 2000, 174-176, who argued that the purpose of one *rogatio* was to institute a trial. On the episode and its political and judicial consequences, see for instance Burton 2011, 323 and Kleinman 2018, 123-44.

⁵⁹ On the process to award the triumph, see Chapter Three.

⁶⁰ Dio Cass. frag. 76; Strabo 8.6.23.

⁶¹ Cic. *Verr.* 2. 4.4., 4.4.126.

⁶² Strabo 8.6.23. Plin. *HN* 36.35.

in the world.⁶³ This representation reflects Lucullus' own understanding of the deity and her effect of her worshippers' life since he took an active part in the decoration of the temple.

It can be safely surmised that visitors of the temple would have made the connection between the Muses and the goddess FELICITAS: just like the Muses were known to inspire poets by giving them access to divine knowledge, so did the goddess FELICITAS to her worshippers according to Lucullus.⁶⁴ It was not uncommon, particularly in the Late Roman Republic, for individuals building temples in Rome to place particular statues in the religious complex to create specific associations in visitors' minds. For instance, Caesar placed an image of Cleopatra next to the cult image of Venus Genetrix because he wanted to assimilate his mistress to the goddess.⁶⁵ In the same vein, he placed a statue of himself in the temple of Quirinus, with the inscription "to the invincible gods."⁶⁶ Caesar would not have set those statues in such a way if he did not think that visitors to his temples would have not understood the messages he wanted to convey. Similarly, Lucullus would have not gone to such great length to get the statues of the Muses and place them in his temple, if he was not confident that visitors would have understood the messages he was trying to convey about the goddess FELICITAS.

4.1.4 The Dedication

The last stage of construction was the dedication of the temple. The official dedication constituted not only the fulfilment of the general's vow but also the community's acceptance of the divinity. Whether the temple was publicly or privately financed, the dedication of a new temple in Rome must have been legally approved by the Senate or a majority of the plebeian tribunes on behalf of the Roman people.⁶⁷ Lucullus would have had to go through this

⁶³ Russell 2016, 105-6; Lipka 2009, 13-5.

⁶⁴ On the Muses and divine knowledge, see Spentzou 2002, 3.

⁶⁵ App. *BC.* 2.102.

⁶⁶ Dio 43.45.3.

⁶⁷ Cic. *Dom.* 49.127, *Att.* 4.2.3; Livy 9.46.6-7. For a good discussion of all the laws, see Orlin 1997, 163-72.

process. The laws regulating the dedication of new temples in Rome allowed the general to dedicate his temple when he next attained office, otherwise two magistrates in charge of the dedication were appointed, the *duumviri aedi dedicandae*.⁶⁸ Since our sources do not mention that Lucullus reached any other public offices after his consulship, the temple of the goddess FELICITAS was most likely dedicated by the *duumviri*.

It is generally accepted that the temple was dedicated in 142 BCE. Friedrich Münzer proposed this date based on Dio Cassius' report of the disagreement between Lucullus and Mummius about the statues dedicated in the temple of the goddess FELICITAS.⁶⁹ Dio uses this anecdote to illustrate the amiable character of Mummius and to contrast it with Scipio Africanus' during a discussion of Mummius' and Africanus' censorship in 142 BCE.⁷⁰ While the structure of the fragment implies a connection between the two events, between the censorship of Mummius and the dedication of the temple, in reality it may have not been the case.⁷¹ The use of statues from Mummius' Achaean campaign would suggest that the dedication could have happened at any time after Mummius' return to Rome, namely between 145-142 BCE.⁷²

From the reconstruction of Lucullus' temple to the goddess FELICITAS, three main points stand out. The votive victory temple was a personal project for the Roman general. Its financing from *manubiae* suggests that the Senate's involvement in the construction may have been limited to the dedication. This private construction ensured that the temple was strongly connected to Lucullus and his family, providing them with much prestige.⁷³

⁶⁸ Orlin 1997, 172-8.

⁶⁹ Münzer, *RE*, 13.375.

⁷⁰ Dio Cass. Fr. 76.

⁷¹ Pietila-Castrén 1987, 127.

⁷² Pietila-Castrén 1987, 127.

⁷³ On the association between the goddess FELICITAS and the Licinii Luculli, see Cic. *Leg. Man.* 10 and Plin. *HN* 35.155-6 who reports that the Greek sculptor Arcesilaus was commanded to make a new statue of the goddess for a grandson of Lucullus but the work was never completed because of the deaths of the artist and the patron. For a discussion of the episode with modern references, see Chapter Five. Coarelli suggests that Pompey chose to put the goddess FELICITAS in his theatre to expropriate the cult from the Licinii Luculli, Coarelli 1997, 450.

The temple was a monument to Lucullus' victory in Spain. Its location in the Velabrum, a place of commercial and religious importance at the time, at the crossing between the Forum and Rome's port, and the Capitoline and the Palatine hill, ensured that the temple would be seen and visited by all members of Roman society. Its position on the path of the triumph conveys the clear message that through he was not awarded a triumph, he deserved one for his achievements in what was seen as a difficult war for the Romans.⁷⁴

Finally, the temple displays Lucullus' own representation of this new deity the goddess FELICITAS. By placing the statues of the Muses in the vicinity of the temple, Lucullus not only implies a connection between the goddess and the Muses but also provides a visual representation of how the goddess manifests her divine agency. Through the dedication of the temple, the goddess FELICITAS as portrayed by Lucullus enters Roman *religio*.

With the temple reconstructed, it is now possible to use Rüpke's analytical definition of religion, which posits that new divinities are created by individuals and accepted by their wider community on two conditions; first, all other divinities are not suitable to solve the problem for which this new deity is invoked, and second, this new deity is plausible in the social and religious context of the time.⁷⁵ Placing the temple in its cultural context will then allow me to show not only that the goddess FELICITAS was introduced in Rome in reaction to the threat the goddess Fortuna posed to Roman dominion but also that Lucullus and his peers likely understood the goddess FELICITAS as a reliable source of good fortune for Roman generals to win battles for the glory and prosperity of Rome.

4.2 Fortuna and Roman imperialism

As a monument to his victory, the temple and its new deity, the goddess FELICITAS, represented Lucullus' contribution to the discourse on Roman

⁷⁴ On the difficulty of the war, see Polyb. 35.1.1-6 cf. Diod. 31.40. Polybius coins the term 'fiery war' to describe the continuous nature of its engagement. For a modern discussion, Walbank *HCP*, 3.640-1; Richardson 1986, 151-2; Clark 2014, 151-4.

⁷⁵ Rüpke 2015, 347-9; 351-2. For a more detailed discussion, see Introduction.

military victories. In the second century BCE, as Miano has convincingly shown, the discourse on Roman imperialism was marked by the increasing role of *fortuna*, as both a concept and a deity, to explain the victories of Roman armies.⁷⁶ The association between *fortuna* and Roman imperialism most probably originated in the Greek world in a debate which connected Roman imperialism and the goddess Tyche. Some traces of this debate can be found in Polybius' *Histories*. Indeed, in a key passage at the beginning of his work, Polybius gives credence to the idea that Roman domination is the result of power of *tyche* as he declares that "*tyche* has made all the affairs of the world incline in one direction and forced to converge upon one and the same point," i.e. the Roman domination of the Greek world.⁷⁷ This idea was shared amongst Greeks, in particular members of the elite, for which the connection between the goddess Tyche and imperialism was a well-established commonplace in classical historiography.⁷⁸ However, unlike some of his contemporaries who believed that Roman supremacy was solely due to the action of Tyche, Polybius defended a more nuanced position, namely that Roman domination was favoured by Tyche but that other factors such as their boldness or their political institutions played a role in the expansion of the Roman empire.⁷⁹

It is quite plausible, as Miano postulated, that the translation of the goddess Tyche to the goddess Fortuna meant that, in a Roman context, the argument, namely that Roman domination is the result of the favours of Tyche, became connected with the goddess Fortuna.⁸⁰ In several remains of early

⁷⁶ I am deeply indebted to Daniele Miano and Jacqueline Champeaux for this section, see Miano 2018, 117-8 and Champeaux 1982-7, 2.171-213.

⁷⁷ Polyb. 1.4.1 cf. 1,63, 9. The topic of *tyche* in Polybius has been well studied, see in particular Walbank 2007 with reference to previous scholarship; Hau 2011; Brouwer 2011.

⁷⁸ See for instance the Melian dialogue in Thucydides in which Tyche plays a significant role in the dispute between Melians and Athenians, cf. Th. 5.85-116 or the story of the ruin of Croesus and the Persian conquest of Lydia in Herodotus, cf. Hdt. 1.126.

⁷⁹ Polyb. 18.24.4-5. Hau 2011, 192-193 argues that in the *Histories* Polybius has created a narrative in which Rome acquires world domination because Tyche and Rome want it and the Romans work hard for it.

⁸⁰ Miano 2018, 118-9. On the translation of the goddess Tyche and *fortuna*, see Chapter One.

Latin literature, *fortuna* is in fact connected with Roman imperialism. A good example of this association can be found in the history of the Second Punic War, written by L. Coelius Antipater in the second century BCE.⁸¹ In a fragment, the Roman historian uses the expression *fortuna rei publicae* in a speech, whose context and meaning are unclear.⁸² When using this expression, Coelius Antipater might have been influenced by debate on the role of *fortuna* in Roman success, and it is quite possible that the expression *fortuna rei publicae* may have been used by a Carthaginian to express a Greek view on the subject.⁸³ What is certain, however, is that *fortuna rei publicae* must have referred to Rome, and as Miano rightly noted, is most probably a translation of Tyche, the creator of empire.⁸⁴ The expression then denotes the role of *fortuna* over the territorial expansion of *res publica*.

As Jacqueline Champeaux remarked, in the *Annals*, the poet Ennius uses *fortuna* several times in connection with *regnum* with regard to Roman and foreign kings, but does not relate the two words to the *res publica*, at least in the extant fragments.⁸⁵ One such instance is in a speech of Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, in which the king refused a ransom to free Roman soldiers captured during the battle of Heraclea in 280 BCE.⁸⁶ There, as Champeaux rightly argued, Ennius develops a new ‘theology of victory’ which connects together the ideas of *fortuna*, VIRTUS, and *regnum*.⁸⁷ For Ennius, *fortuna* – referred to as *Fors* - grants victory and determines whom of the Romans or their enemies get to rule.⁸⁸ Her favours are not given hazardously but, according to the VIRTUS, displayed by both parties in warfare.

Her *modus operandi* is perfectly exemplified by the fate of the captured Roman soldiers. As Pyrrhus explains, it is their VIRTUS on the battlefield which

⁸¹ *FRHist* 15 F 45.

⁸² Miano 2018, 119.

⁸³ Miano 2018, 119.

⁸⁴ Miano 2018, 119.

⁸⁵ Champeaux 1982-7, 2.172-84 with reference to ancient sources.

⁸⁶ *Enn. Ann.* 186-9 (Skutsch) cf. *Cic. Off.* 1.38. On this passage, see Skutsch 1985, 87; Fantham 2006, 559-60; Spielberg 2020, 153-7.

⁸⁷ Champeaux 1982-7, 2.172-3; 202-13.

⁸⁸ On the connection between *Fors* and *fortuna*, see Miano 2018, 91-95, 101-4.

has led *fortuna* to spare their lives. The *fortuna* Ennius presents is a divine agency, reflecting the will of the great gods, which has dominion over the empire and the life of man. While the connection between *fortuna* and VIRTUS was well-known in the early second century BCE, the portrayal of *fortuna* as ruling over all things is new.⁸⁹ This image is synchronistic, as Champeaux noted, with the double vow made by Q. Fulvius Flaccus in 180 BCE in Spain to hold for game for Jupiter and to build a temple for the goddess *Fortuna Esquestris*.⁹⁰ Through both the vow and Ennius' poetry, the goddess Fortuna is placed on the same level as the god Jupiter All-Powerful, ruler of men and dominions.⁹¹

The central role of the goddess Fortuna in Roman military victories can be seen in the votive victory temples built for the deity in Rome during the third and second century BCE. For instance, the temple of *Fors Fortuna* was built, following a vow by the consul Sp. Carvilius made during his victorious campaign against the Samnites in 293 BCE.⁹² The temple of *Fortuna Primigenia* dedicated in 194 BCE was vowed, Livy reports, by the consul P. Sempronius Tuditanus in 204 BCE at the beginning of a battle between the Romans and the Carthaginians.⁹³ The temple of *Fortuna Equestris* was vowed in 180 BCE by the praetor Q. Fulvius Flaccus during a battle in Spain against

⁸⁹ On the novelty of the image, see Champeaux 1982-7, 2.178-9.

⁹⁰ Champeaux 1982-7, 2.178. On the vow of the temple of Fulvius Flaccus, Livy 40.39-40, with Champeaux 1982-7, 2.132-54; Briscoe *Comm.* 38-40, 508-13, Poulle 2014; Miano 2018, 107-10. On Fulvius Nobilior's patronage of Ennius, Cic. *Tusc.* 1.3; Enn. *Ann.* 268-86 (Skutsch), see also Rossi and Breed 2006, 402-6 with references to previous scholarship; Goldberg 2006, 429-30.

⁹¹ For reference to the omnipotence of Jupiter in Ennius works, see Enn. *Ann.* 458, 541 (Skutsch). On the relationship between Fortuna and Jupiter, see the scholarly debate about the epitaph *primigenia* and the lineage 'daughter of Jupiter' attested in several inscriptions in Praeneste *CIL* I² 60 = *ILLRP* 101, *CIL* I² 2863, 3051, *CIL* XIV 2862, 2868, *CIL* I² 3071. *Primigenia* has been translated either as 'primordial' by Brelich 2010, 45-59; Dumézil 1956, 71-98; Champeaux 1982-7, 1.24-40 or as 'first born' by Pérez 2011. Miano 2018, 22-33 defended the argument that *primigenia* refers to both.

⁹² Livy 10.38-46, cf. Miano 2018, 101-5; Champeaux 1982-7, 2.69-73; Orlin 1997, 35, 123-4, 135.

⁹³ Livy 29.26.4-9 with Miano 2018, 105-108.

the Celtiberians.⁹⁴ The construction of those temples changed the religious and physical landscape of Rome, and would have made it quite clear to any inhabitants and visitors that Roman military successes and its empire was due to the favour of *fortuna*.

Interestingly, the association of *fortuna*, as both concept and deity, with Roman military successes defines a particular relationship between Roman generals and the divine. Indeed, in the ‘theology of victory’ developed by Ennius and his contemporaries, the victory of a Roman general is due to the goodwill of *fortuna*, an all-powerful divine agency, equal to Jupiter All-Mighty. The attitude of Roman generals to *fortuna* is perfectly illustrated by Pyrrhus’ speech in Ennius’ *Annales*, already discussed above. As Pyrrhus explains, *fortuna* provides victory to Roman generals on account of the VIRTUS displayed on the battlefield; therefore, Roman generals must place their trust in *fortuna*. They must therefore learn to respect her judgement; Pyrrhus’ release of Roman prisoners because they have been spared by *fortuna* is a prime example of this respect. This representation of the relationship between Roman generals and the divine seems to have been well-known in Rome at the time. Victorious votive temples signal to all members of Roman society, from slaves to citizens, that battles were won because a general trusted in the goddess Fortuna. Ennius’ poetry was performed in Roman elite’s banquets and in public performances in the second and first century BCE.⁹⁵ This conception of the relationship between Roman generals and the divine was thus available and propagated to all Romans.

As seen in Chapter One, during the process of the translation of *tyche* to *fortuna* in the second century BCE, the negative meanings associated with *tyche* by the Greeks also came to be connected to *fortuna* by the Romans.⁹⁶ As the goddess Fortuna came to be seen as “uncertain” or “inconstant,” her reliability as a divine agency to help win battles came to be doubted by Roman

⁹⁴ Livy 40.39–40; Champeaux 1982-7, 2.132–54; Orlin 1997, 29-30, 155-6; Miano 2018, 107-10.

⁹⁵ On the performance of Ennius, Suet. *Gramm.* 2.3-4; Cic. *Tus.* 1.3. For a modern discussion, see Rüpke 2000, 44-6; Goldberg 2006; Goldschmidt 2013, 17-28.

⁹⁶ For a discussion of this process, see Chapter One.

generals. The uneasiness created by negative meanings attached to *fortuna* is best exemplified in Rome by a discussion of the goddess Fortuna in Plautus' play *Pseudolus*, first performed in 191 BCE.⁹⁷ The cunning slave Pseudolus, the main character, has just intercepted a letter from Harpax, a messenger of the Macedonian official to whom the girl Phoenicium had been sold by her owner Ballio. Pseudolus is overjoyed by this stroke of luck, which he sees as an opportunity to seize Phoenicium for his master's son Calidorus. Despite the length of the passage, because of its importance for my argument, I have quoted the speech in full below:

Opportunity herself could not have made a more opportune appearance than his opportune arrival with this letter. Here I've been presented a cornucopia containing all my heart's desire; everything is wrapped up in here—all the schemes and tricks and dodges I could need, the money, and my loving master's loving mistress! Now I can crow and puff my chest out! (*atque ego nunc me ut gloriosum faciam et copi pectore*) Of course I had it all worked out before—how I was going to set about getting the girl out of the pimp's hands (*quo modo quicque agerem, ut lenoni surruperem mulierculam*); I had everything prepared and provided, just as I wanted it to be; I'd thought of everything and planned it all out...but you know how it is...and always will be (*iam instituta ornata cuncta in ordine, animo ut volueram, / certa deformata habebam; sed profecto hoc sic erit*). The best laid plans of a hundred skilled men can be knocked sideways by one single goddess, Fortuna (*centum doctum hominum consilia sola haec devincit dea, / Fortuna*). It's a fact; it's only being on good terms with Fortuna that makes a man successful and gives him the reputation of being a clever fellow (*ita praecellet atque exinde sapere eum omnes dicimus*); and we, as soon as we hear of someone striking it lucky, admire his shrewdness, and laugh at the

⁹⁷ On the date of play, see Buck 1940, 1.

folly of the poor devil who's having a run of bad luck (*bene ubi quoi scimus consilium accidisse, hominem catum / eum esse declaramus, stultum autem illum quoi vortit male*). For that matter, we're all fools though we don't know it, for running so hard after this or that, as if we could possibly tell for ourselves what's good for us and what isn't. We lose the certainties while seeking for uncertainties; and so we go on, in toil and trouble, until death creeps up on us...but enough of this philosophizing (*certa mittimus, dum incerta petimus; atque hoc evenit / in labore atque in dolore, ut mors obrepat interim. / sed iam satis est philosophatum*).⁹⁸

A joyful Pseudolus monologizes on the theme of opportunity and luck and presents two diametrically opposite images of the goddess Fortuna. On the one hand, the goddess is presented as a benevolent and helpful deity: indeed, under the disguise of Opportunity, Fortuna favours Pseudolus' plan. As Miano notes, Opportunity here is personalised and is connected with the goddess Fortuna, since she delivers to Pseudolus a cornucopia, a characteristic of the iconography of Tyche.⁹⁹ She provides everything the slave could need, "all the schemes and tricks and dodges (he) could need, the money" to help the plans "he had all worked before," "he had thought of and planned out" to get the mistress of his master's son. The goddess' benevolence is complementary to his plans.

Interestingly, her action increases the reputation of her favourite. As Pseudolus explains, "it is only being on good terms with Fortuna that makes a man successful and gives him the reputation of being a clever fellow." A man who is able to strike his luck, the slave adds, is admired by others for being "shrewd" (*catus*). Since Fortuna's action is complementary to the plans of the man she favours, Pseudolus' statement suggests that lucky men are considered as shrewd or clever because their plans have turned out for the

⁹⁸ Plaut. *Pseud.*, 669-87.

⁹⁹ Miano 2018, 183.

best: in other words, those men are considered or assessed by others based on their abilities.

On the other hand, Pseudolus presents Fortuna as a terrifying force to fear. Indeed, Pseudolus doubted the success of his plans because as he declares “the best laid plans of a hundred skilled men can be knocked sideways by the goddess, Fortuna.” Whomever she does not favour is seen by others as a fool. Pseudolus closes his speech with the statement “but enough of this philosophizing.” This injunction makes it clear that, his previous statements, the negative meanings he attached to the goddess were some kinds of philosophizing parody. As Miano rightly noted, the injunction creates a distance between the character and his philosophizing, diminishing its importance.¹⁰⁰ This distancing aims to confine those sentiments about the uncertainty of *fortuna* to philosophical circles. But the presence of such thinking in a play performed in front of an audience composed of all members of Roman society suggests that those negative meanings were widely-known.

The audience would have undoubtedly recognised Pseudolus’ uneasiness about trusting the goddess Fortuna. As Miano noted, the moral question in the background of the speech is whether humans should put too much trust in Fortuna, and give up what is certain for what is uncertain, since the goddess Fortuna is able either to make a man be successful and seen as clever or to overcome the best laid plans and destroy a man’s reputation.¹⁰¹ That is why Pseudolus doubted his plans, not knowing whether the goddess Fortuna will favour them or not. It is also the reason why when struck with good luck, the slave feels so confident of his success that he can “can crow and puff my chest out.”

The fickleness of the goddess Pseudolus describes posed a threat to Roman imperial ideology because it meant Romans could lose their empire one day.¹⁰² This threat was well understood by Greeks and is epitomised by Polybius’ discussion of the goddess Tyche in the context of Macedonian

¹⁰⁰ Miano 2018, 184.

¹⁰¹ Miano 2018, 183.

¹⁰² Miano 2018, 186-88.

imperialism when he reflects on the defeat of Perseus and the fall of Macedonia. He quotes a passage from the lost work by Demetrius of Phaleron, *On fortune*, in which the Greek philosopher warns that one day Tyche, who helped Alexander the Great and the Macedonians to overthrow the Persian empire, may take back her favours from Macedonia.¹⁰³ With the quote, Polybius highlights the potential danger of Tyche for the Romans; just like she took back the empire she gave to the Persian and the Macedonian, so might she do to the Romans. A similar sentiment can be found in the ninth book of the *Annals*, in which Hannibal warns Scipio Africanus about the fickleness of *fortuna* in their meeting before the battle of Zama, declaring that “Fortune on a sudden whim casts down the highest mortal from the height of his sway to the lowliest thrall” (*mortalem summum fortuna repente/ Reddidit, e summo regno ut famul infimus esset.*)¹⁰⁴ Quite tellingly the use of the word ‘*regnum*’ to describe the position of man suggests the warning applies as much to Scipio as to Rome. Romans were thus warned about and aware of the threat the goddess Fortuna posed to their military hegemony.

4.2.1 Varro, Augustine, and the goddess FELICITAS

Interestingly, the new deity to whom Lucullus built a temple in Rome, the goddess FELICITAS seems to provide a definitely Roman answer to the instability of the goddess Fortuna and her threat to Roman imperialism. Indeed, Pseudolus’ description of the good side of the goddess Fortuna echoes semantically and conceptually our best available description of the goddess FELICITAS found in Augustine’s *The City of God*. In the fourth book of the work, the bishop of Hippo argues over seven chapters that the goddess FELICITAS was not a deity but rather a gift of the Christian God.¹⁰⁵ It is generally assumed – and there is no reason to doubt this - that Augustine’ discussion was informed by Varro’s description of the goddess FELICITAS in his work *Antiquities of Human and Divine things* written in the first century BCE. Indeed,

¹⁰³ Polyb. 29.21, see Richardson 1979, 9-10; Miano 2018, 118; Wiater 2021.

¹⁰⁴ Enn. *Ann.* 312 (Skutsch) Champeaux 1982-7, 2.173-4.

¹⁰⁵ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.18-24.

Augustine relies extensively on Varro in his attempt to undermine the views of the followers of the traditional Roman cult in the fifth century CE, for whom Varro's *Divine Things* was the most authoritative book on Roman religion.¹⁰⁶

The comparison between Plautus' description of the goddess Fortuna and Varro's description of the goddess FELICITAS is possible because of the antiquarian's work methods. In *Antiquities of Divine Things*, Varro offered a unique systematic classification of Roman gods, cult places and rituals for which he also drew on earlier works.¹⁰⁷ The author offered an historical approach to Roman *religio* by compiling information about the history of cults – such as the date of temple foundations or the introduction of new deities into the Roman pantheon – and the major political events which shaped Roman religion.¹⁰⁸ Varro researched temple archives, which contained information relating to cult practices over several centuries.¹⁰⁹ For example, he relates that the gods Terminus, Mars and Iuventus were worshipped on the Capitoline earlier than the god Jupiter based on obscure signs he had observed in the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus.¹¹⁰ Varro, it seems, also used the same antiquarian approach to inform his description of the cult to the goddess FELICITAS, since, Augustine reports, he recorded the construction of the FELICITAS temple by Lucullus in the second century BCE.¹¹¹ Varro's antiquarian approach to his material, regrouping different explanations on his subject matter, suggests that his description of the goddess FELICITAS likely contained some information about the way the deity was conceived at the time Lucullus built his temple, the time Plautus wrote his play too.

To compare the two passages, it is first necessary to reconstruct Varro's definition of the goddess FELICITAS. One passage in which Augustine

¹⁰⁶ Burns 2001, 39 n.37. See Appendix One.

¹⁰⁷ The *Antiquitates Divinarum* is commonly understood to have been published in 40's BCE either in 47 BCE see Cardauns 1976, 132-3; or in 46 BCE, see Tarver 1997, 135; Nuffelen 2010, 162; Rüpke 2014, 253.

¹⁰⁸ Rüpke 2014, 253-259.

¹⁰⁹ MacRae 2018, 149.

¹¹⁰ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.29.

¹¹¹ Varr. *Ant. frag* 44 (Cardauns). See also Rüpke 2014, 258-259 for a discussion of Varro's listing of the temple foundation in the *Antiquities of Divine Things*.

compares the goddesses Fortuna and FELICITAS to determine to whom the Romans owe their empire, is particularly instructive on the divine agency of the goddess. Despite its length, for the purpose of my argument, I have quoted it in full below:

What of the fact that FELICITAS also is a goddess? She received a temple, she obtained an altar, and appropriate rites were performed Then, she alone ought to have been worshipped. (*Quid, quod et FELICITAS dea est? Aedem accepit, aram meruit, sacra congrua persoluta sunt. Ipsa ergo sola coleretur*). For where she was, what good thing could be lacking? But how does it make sense that Fortuna also is regarded as a goddess and worshipped? Is FELICITAS one thing and fortune another? (*An aliud est FELICITAS, aliud fortuna?*) Yes, we are told, fortune can be bad as well as good, while if FELICITAS is bad, it will not be FELICITAS (*Quia fortuna potest esse et mala; FELICITAS autem si mala fuerit, FELICITAS non erit*). Surely, we ought to regard all gods of both sexes (if they have sex, too) as never anything but good. This is what Plato says, and the other philosophers, and the distinguished rulers of our state and of all nations. Then how is the goddess Fortuna sometimes good, sometimes bad? Or do you suppose, perchance, that when she is bad she is no longer a goddess, but is suddenly changed into a malignant demon? Then how many such goddesses are there? Surely there are as many as there are fortunate men, that is, men with good fortune. There are also simultaneously, that is, at the same time, very many others with bad fortune. Well, if she is the same, is she at once both good and bad, one thing for some and another for others? Or, being a goddess, is she always good? In that case, she is the same as FELICITAS. Why are different names employed? But this can be overlooked, for it is common enough to have a single thing called by two names. Why the different temples, different altars, different rites? The reason, they say, is that FELICITAS is what good men have earned by their good works, while the fortune that is called good happens by luck both to good men

and to bad men, without any scrutiny of their deeds, and is in fact called Fortuna for that reason (*Est causa, inquiunt, quia FELICITAS illa est, quam boni habent praecedentibus meritis; fortuna uero, quae dicitur bona, sine ullo examine meritorum fortuito accidit hominibus et bonis et malis, unde etiam Fortuna nominatur*). Then how is she really good, if she comes both to good men and bad with no consideration of justice? Moreover, why do men worship her, if she is blind, and runs into people at random, no matter who, so that she commonly passes by those who worship her and attaches herself to those who scorn her? Or if her worshippers do accomplish anything, so as to be seen and loved by her, then she is taking account of their merits, and does not come by accident. Now where is the definition of Fortuna? How is it that she has even got her name from fortuitous events? For it is no good worshipping her if she is mere luck (fortuna), but if she singles out her worshippers to help them, she is not mere luck, or Fortuna. Or does Jupiter send her, too, where he pleases? Then let him alone be worshipped, since Fortuna cannot oppose him when he gives orders and sends her where he pleases. Or at least, if any are to worship her, let it be bad men who refuse to possess the merit by which the favour of the goddess FELICITAS might be won (*Aut certe istam mali colant, qui nolunt habere merita, quibus dea possit FELICITAS inuitari*).¹¹²

In his edition of Varro's *Antiquities of Divine Thing*, Burkhard Cardauns has identified two fragments of Varro's work in the Augustinian discussion – underlined in the text above.¹¹³ He claims that those fragments are instances where Augustine directly quoted Varro's lost text.¹¹⁴ Upon closer inspection, however, his claim that those fragments are direct quotation does not hold; in the first fragment, there is no marker of direct quotation whereas in the second fragment, the verb *inquiam* does not remove the possibility of Augustine

¹¹² Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.18.

¹¹³ Varr. *Ant.* frag 190, frag 191 (Cardauns).

¹¹⁴ Cardauns 1978, 4.

paraphrasing Varro. More generally, Cardauns' editorial methodology has been called into question, most acutely by Henry Jocelyn, who has argued that the objectivity Cardauns claims to have when identifying fragment is a mere 'mirage' since it is difficult to separate Varro's ideas from Augustine's because most references to Varro's work are indirect quotations in *The City of God*.¹¹⁵ Augustine most likely, Jocelyn rightly has concluded, paraphrases Varro.

Therefore, before analysing the fragments to uncover what they tell us about the goddess FELICITAS, it is necessary to ascertain their veracity and reliability as Varro's ideas, by exploring Augustine's reception of the antiquarian. Those questions are dealt with in Appendix I and I summarise the main findings here. Overall, it can be securely concluded that two fragments are instances in which the bishop of Hippo uses Varro as one of his sources. Over the course of his discussion about the divinity of the goddess FELICITAS, Augustine makes twenty-two references to the deity.¹¹⁶ While most references aim to develop a series of arguments against the goddess based on Augustine's Christian understanding of FELICITAS, only those two passages, identified as fragments by Cardauns, ascertain FELICITAS' status as a deity. Those references constitute the views against which Augustine argues, and thus the bedrock of his argument. It can also be cautiously concluded the two fragments are from Varro and are representative of Varro's ideas because the strength of Augustine's overall argument in the *City of God*, namely that the fundamental beliefs of Roman traditional religion are compatible with Christianity, rests on Varro's status as an authority on traditional Roman religion in the fourth and fifth centuries CE.¹¹⁷ Non-Christian readers of the *City of God* would have had to recognise Varro's ideas to understand not only

¹¹⁵ Jocelyn 1980, 111-3. For a good and recent discussion of how pre-conceived notions of the editors can lead to a transformation of Varro's writing, see De Melo 2017.

¹¹⁶ Burns 2001, 39 n. 37 with ancient references.

¹¹⁷ Burns 2001, 48; O'Daily 1994, 69. Augustine acknowledges Varro's status on religious matters praising him as "the most learned man and the most important authority," (*vir doctissimus apud eos Varro et gravissimae auctoritatis*) on traditional Roman religion, see Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.31 cf. Aug. *De civ. D.* 7.9, 7.28, 7.30. For a good discussion of Augustine's praise of Varro, see Hadas 2017, 80-81.

Augustine's point about the divinity of the goddess FELICITAS but also his open invitation to convert to Christianity. The fragments, thus it seems, paraphrase information Augustine deemed important for the readers to know from Varro's description of the goddess FELICITAS.¹¹⁸

4.2.2 Dialoguing with *Fortuna*, the goddess FELICITAS

Focusing on the fragments, it seems that Varro may have described the goddess FELICITAS as the good fortune given to good men because of their merits. Indeed, to explain what pagan Romans perceived to be the difference between the two divinities, Augustine contrasts the deities based on their divine agencies: the goddess FELICITAS provides FELICITAS and the goddess Fortuna, *fortuna*. This approach to the divinity of deities, which focuses on their function likely originates from Varro's writings. As Augustine later explains in his refutation of the divinity of the goddess FELICITAS, in Roman traditional religion, deities were often named after the divine blessing they provided.¹¹⁹ To justify his point, he paraphrases a remark by Q. Lucilius Balbus found in Cicero's *On the nature of the Gods*, in which Balbus defends the point of view that, in Stoic philosophy, divinities are named after the effects they have on their worshippers.¹²⁰ Balbus' remark indicates that, in the Late Roman Republic, defining a divinity based on its divine agency, a principle which emanates from Stoic philosophy, was a tool available to discuss the nature of the gods.¹²¹ Since, as Peter Nuffelen has convincingly shown, Greek Stoic philosophy informs and shapes Varro's *Antiquities of Divine Things*, it does not seem unlikely that Varro may have described deities and explained their function based on their effects on their worshippers.¹²²

If the goddess FELICITAS provides FELICITAS, then what is FELICITAS according to Varro? According to Augustine, "FELICITAS is what is given to good

¹¹⁸ Hadas 2017, 83-87. For detailed discussion of Augustine's use of Varro, see Appendix One.

¹¹⁹ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.24.

¹²⁰ Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.60, see Wynne 2019, 143-9 with references to previous scholarship.

¹²¹ Wynne 2019, 143-9; Algra 2003, 158; Algra 2009, 228-30.

¹²² Nuffelen 2010.

men because of their previous merits” (*quia FELICITAS illa est, quam boni habent praecedentibus meritis.*) The fact that Augustine gives this definition in the midst of comparison between the goddesses Fortuna and FELICITAS to highlight the difference between the two deities suggests a certain conflation of their divine agencies. In other words, the goddess FELICITAS, just like the goddess Fortuna, would also provide good fortune to a man. However, there are no indications that Varro connected the two divinities in his work. Taking into consideration Augustine’s overall aim in the passage, namely to determine to which divinity the Romans owed their empire, it is likely that Augustine equated the divine agencies of the goddesses for the purpose of his argument. He would have only been able to do because Varro’s definition of the agency of the goddess FELICITAS would allowed him to do so. If one admits that the phrase “FELICITAS *illa est, quam boni habent praecedentibus meritis*” is reflective of Varro’s ideas, then one of the possible manifestations of the goddess FELICITAS’ agency Varro describes is good fortune. In fact, if Varro had not described the goddess FELICITAS as providing good fortune, the strength of Augustine’s overall argument would be weakened, and the comparison between the two deities would be futile in the eyes of learned readers with knowledge of Varro’s work, Augustine’s main audience.¹²³

For Varro, however, the goddess FELICITAS can provide good fortune to her worshippers in a way the goddess Fortuna cannot. Indeed, worshippers to whom FELICITAS is given by the goddess FELICITAS must be *boni*, good men, “because of their previous merits” (*praecedentibus meritis*). The use of the past participle *meritus* implies that there is a contract between the goddess FELICITAS and her worshipper. In fact, the verb *merere* belongs to the lexicon of contractual language and expressed both what is expected or due to someone according to agreement, hinting at a sort of social agreement between the goddess FELICITAS and her worshipper.¹²⁴ This contract could be

¹²³ This would then mean in turn, as a direct consequence of this interpretation, that Varro’s definition of the goddess FELICITAS might have been potentially broader than just good fortune.

¹²⁴ De Vaan 2008, 374-5; *TLL* s.v. *meritus*, 8.812-24.

construed as the “social duties” (*munera*) of the goddess toward her fellow Roman citizens, meaning that the deity was seen as implicated in a network of social obligations, “both actions and products of action performed by citizens for their state, and catachrestically by social superior for their inferior,” according to Clifford Ando’s definition of divine *munera*.¹²⁵ It would then involve both sides working together in a partnership to bring about FELICITAS. The goddess would provide FELICITAS to the worshipper who has earned it by acting in worthwhile manner. By contrast, the goddess Fortuna does have not such a relationship with her worshippers, since “fortune that is called good happens by luck both to good men and to bad men without any scrutiny of their deeds.”¹²⁶ If the goddess FELICITAS provided good fortune by being contractually bonded to her worshipper, she became more predictable, more reliable than her alter ego the goddess Fortuna.

The ability of the goddess FELICITAS to discriminate between good and bad men raises the question of how, in the sense of by what standards, her evaluation was carried out. The use of the word *bonus* to qualify a beneficiary of FELICITAS’ favours suggest that this worshipper has lived or is living following principles of what is considered ‘good.’ It is unclear whether those principles are either philosophical or moral/ethical in nature, or even both. Whatever their nature, the implied evaluation process carried out by the goddess FELICITAS – namely to measure the morality of a man based on his actions to grant him a divine reward – is not without recalling the evaluation done by the Senate of a victorious general’s claim to a triumph based on his conduct in warfare.¹²⁷ Just like senators or the Roman people ensured that a Roman general acted in a way they considered to be good Roman military conduct, the goddess FELICITAS could have been construed as ensuring that her worshippers followed what is good Roman social and moral values before granting her favours. This then casts the goddess FELICITAS as a sort of divine incentive for Romans to follow a moral/ethical conduct. Consequently then, the remains of

¹²⁵ Ando 2003, 144. cf. Cic. *Off.* 2.69 with Dyck 1998, 458.

¹²⁶ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.18.

¹²⁷ On the assessment process, see Chapter Three.

Varro's definition of the goddess FELICITAS as transmitted by Augustine, suggests that the deity is the divine agency which works in partnership with her worshipper a man defined as good (*BONUS vir*) by the goddess or the community to bring about FELICITAS, which can manifest itself as good fortune.

With Varro's description of the goddess FELICITAS established, it is now possible to compare it with Pseudolus' definition of the goddess Fortuna. As seen above Pseudolus describes the action of the goddess Fortuna as follows: "it's a fact; it's only being on good terms with Fortuna that makes a man successful and gives him the reputation of being a clever fellow; and we, as soon as we hear of someone striking it lucky, admire his shrewdness, and laugh at the folly of the poor devil who's having a run of bad luck."¹²⁸

Plautus' description of the relationship between the goddess Fortuna and her worshipper resembles Varro's portrayal of the partnership between the goddess FELICITAS and her worshipper. Indeed, Plautus writes "it is only by being on good terms with Fortuna that a man can succeed and gain the reputation of being a clever fellow" (*proinde ut quisque Fortuna utitur, / ita praecellet atque exinde sapere eum omnes dicimus*). The verb *utor* implies that the goddess Fortuna works for the good fortune of her worshipper and echoes the verb *merere* used in the Augustinian/Varronian definition to describe the relationship between the goddess FELICITAS and her worshipper. The good fortune provided by the goddess Fortuna also has the same effect on the worshipper as the favour of the goddess FELICITAS. The verb *praecellere*, which means 'to rise above, to excel, to distinguish oneself,' belongs to the same semantic field as the word *felix*.¹²⁹ Central to both words is the idea of the growth: the social status, the business of the person favoured by the goddess Fortuna develops just like the ones of the worshipper who obtained FELICITAS from the goddess FELICITAS.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Plaut. *Pseud.* 669-87.

¹²⁹ De Vaan 2008, 105 with bibliography. *TLL* s.v. *praecellere*, 10.407-10.

¹³⁰ Interestingly, the language used by both Varro and Plautus echoes the three aspects of productivity FELICITAS represents as seen in Chapter One. The verb *merere* describes the state of being able to *bring about* a positive action with divine support through a partnership between the goddess FELICITAS and her worshipper. The verb *utor* for its part denotes the ability to use the goddess Fortuna to achieve

The similarities between the two passages do not stop there. Plautus' description of how the person favoured by the goddess Fortuna is perceived by others mirrors Varro's definition of the worshiper of the goddess FELICITAS. The good fortune given to a man by the goddess Fortuna, Plautus writes, leads to his recognition by the community as "clever" (*sapere*) or "shrew" (*caetus*). Interestingly, the word "clever" (*sapere*) and the expression "good policy/decision/judgement" (*BENE consilium*) are generally used to describe characteristics of a good man (*vir BONUS*), the worshiper whom the goddess FELICITAS favours according to Varro's definition. In the *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero for instance defines "good men as men equipped with and distinguished by all virtues, being wise as well as good," (*ombinibus VIRTUTIBUS instructos et ornatos tum sapientes tum viros BONOS dicimus.*)¹³¹ If one admits that Varro uses the word *boni* in his definition – which is not necessarily given – Varro may have defined *vir BONUS* in a similar way to Cicero as the few references to the expression found in the Varronian corpus suggest.¹³² Most tellingly, in a passage of *On Agriculture*, Varro reports that Quintus Hortentius was the first one to serve peafowls at the banquet for his inauguration as aedile and that "the innovation was more praised at the time by the luxurious than by those who were strict and virtuous."¹³³ In the phrase, Varro conceptually opposes *BONI viri* to *luxuriosi viri*, implying that men who value luxury cannot be called *BONI*. Since the third century BCE, luxury was seen by Roman nobility as contravening with their ideal of Roman VIRTUS.¹³⁴ The incompatibility between *luxuria* and *bonus* suggests that Varro, like Cicero, understood that only a man with VIRTUS can be called *BONUS vir*.¹³⁵ Therefore, then just like FELICITAS is only given to good men, the good fortune provided by the goddess Fortuna is

something positive. Finally, the verb *praecellere* with its semantic proximity to the word *felix*, characterizes the outcome of the actions of the worshiper and the goddess, namely growth.

¹³¹ Cic. *Tus.* 5.10.28. For the descriptive *sapientem et BONUM virum* see also Cic. *Rab. Post.* 29, *Red. sen.* 9, *Sest.* 137, *Pis.* 33, *Rep.* 2.51, *Tusc.* 5.54, 109, *Nat. D.* 2.34; *Fam.* 4, 7, 2. On VIRTUS, see Chapter One.

¹³² Varro, *Ling.* 9.17.2, *Rust.* 3.6.6.3.

¹³³ Varro, *Rust.* 3.6.6.3.

¹³⁴ McDonnell 2006, 55, 273; Balmaceda 2017, 33-4.

¹³⁵ On *BONUS virum* in Cicero's writing, see Lepore 1954, 171-98.

only given to men who are considered as *BONI* by the rest of the community *ex post facto*.

The semantic and conceptual similarities between the Plautian and Augustinian passages imply that the conception of the goddess FELICITAS Augustine presents, based on Varro's writing, was already present in Rome by the second century BCE. They also suggest that the goddess FELICITAS may have been seen by Romans as good fortune working for her worshipper to help him 'grow', to be FELIX. Finally, they indicate that the goddess FELICITAS may have been seen by Romans as the good fortune given to men with VIRTUS. Those two latter elements show that the agency of the goddess FELICITAS was perceived by Romans as similar to yet different from that of the goddess Fortuna: on the one hand, just like the goddess Fortuna, the goddess FELICITAS provides good fortune to her worshipper, on the other hand, because she favours only man with VIRTUS, the goddess FELICITAS is more stable, more reliable than the goddess Fortuna. A direct consequence of the conceptions of the goddess FELICITAS as working for her worshipper and favouring only men with VIRTUS is that the deity provides more personal and reliable good fortune than the goddess Fortuna.

Taking into account the intellectual and religious context of the second century BCE, namely the connection of the goddess Fortuna to Roman imperialism and Lucullus' temple to the goddess FELICITAS, it is possible to qualify further the deity which Lucullus invokes. Since Lucullus built a votive temple to goddess FELICITAS, and since the goddess FELICITAS was seen as the good fortune working for her worshipper to achieve FELICITAS, then the goddess FELICITAS most likely was perceived as the divine agency which provided good fortune to Roman generals to help win battles. As such, the goddess contributed to and delivered FELICITAS *imperatoria*: carrying her favour constituted a potential for Roman generals while demonstrating their ability to receive divine blessing to make the *res publica amplior* and *melior* in the words of the prayers of the *lustrum* as seen in Chapter Two.¹³⁶ Since the

¹³⁶ On the prayers, see Chapter Two.

goddess FELICITAS worked with Roman generals by sending them good fortune to complement their VIRTUS, the goddess FELICITAS provided the Roman people with FELICITAS *Romana*, i.e. military victory, peace, prosperity and the well-being of the *res publica*. The goddess FELICITAS can be seen as Lucullus' contribution to the Greek and Roman debate about the role of *fortuna* in Roman imperialism. She represents a new deity to which Roman generals could turn in order to ensure good fortune to help them on the battlefield. The fickleness of goddess Fortuna, her threat to Roman military hegemony, is countered by this new deity which provides good fortune reliability and personally to Roman generals on account of their VIRTUS.

4.3 Lucullus' Muse

Since the goddess FELICITAS was a deity that helped bring about FELICITAS *Romana* for the Roman community, the relationship between the deity and the Roman general was of central importance to the divine agency of the goddess. As seen previously, the goddess FELICITAS partnered with the Roman general to bring about the victory of Roman armies. To elucidate better this partnership and how the goddess acted toward the general, it is necessary to engage with Lucullus' representation of the goddess FELICITAS by looking at the decoration of the temple.

Roman temples were the ritual places in which the conceptions of the gods were created for worshippers. Statues displayed in and around the temple played a unique role as they participated in the visual representation not only of the divinity but also its earthly manifestations.¹³⁷ In the case of the temple of the goddess FELICITAS, as previously mentioned, the statues decorating the temple were personally chosen by Lucullus, and thus, reflected how he conceptualised and understood his relationship to the goddess.¹³⁸ By exploring their meaning, it is possible to uncover the message Lucullus sought to convey about his relationship with the goddess FELICITAS.

¹³⁷ Russell 2016, 105-106. Lipka 2009, 13-5.

¹³⁸ Dio Cass. frag 76; Strabo 8.6.23.

The decoration of the temple of the goddess FELICITAS included the *Thespiadas*, bronze statues of the Muses, and a bronze statue of Aphrodite, both made by the fourth century BCE Greek sculptor Praxiteles. As they were placed before the aedes, most likely in the portico or in front of the temple, they presumably surrounded the altar where rituals to the goddess FELICITAS were performed.¹³⁹ The visual association of the Greek Muses with the goddess FELICITAS, I argue, suggests that Lucullus viewed the goddess FELICITAS as a source of inspiration and conceived his relationship to the goddess as akin to that of a poet to the Muses.¹⁴⁰ To understanding this analogy, it is necessary to understand the place of Greek Muses in Roman culture and the relationship of Greek Muses to Roman poets.

By the second century BCE, the Greek Muses were associated with wars in both Roman poetry and religion. In Rome, since the end of the third century BCE, poetry and theatrical performances took place during public games associated with certain deities, with some of those games held at the beginning of specific wars.¹⁴¹ This particularly Roman nexus of war, literature, and religion shines through Livy's brief comment that the *Ludi Iuventatis* were celebrated for the first time in 191 BCE with particular religious fervour due to the imminence of the war with Antiochus III.¹⁴² Livy also reports that following the defeat at the battle of Cannae, in response to the utterance of the *vates* Marcius, the *Ludi Apollinares*, with their literary performances, were established to appease the gods.¹⁴³ The close connection between war and poetry is finally evident in the story of Livius Andronicus being awarded the right to hold meetings of poets on the Aventine, after the Roman armies fared

¹³⁹ Plin. *HN* 34.69.

¹⁴⁰ Bravi sees the presence of the Muses in the temple as a representation of the memory of Roman victories by the Roman aristocracy, cf. Bravi 2012, 44.

¹⁴¹ On the connection between literary and theatrical performance, war, and religious rituals, see Welsh 2011, 45.

¹⁴² Livy 36.37.3-4.

¹⁴³ Livy 25.12.

well against the Carthaginians, following the performance of his hymn to Juno in 207 BCE.¹⁴⁴

It is in this context that the Greek Muses entered Roman poetry. A fragment of the lost poem of Porcius Licinus about the history of Latin literature declares that “the warlike Muses came to the Romans during the Second Punic War.”¹⁴⁵ Incantations to the Muses are found in the work of the early Roman poets narrating Roman conquests. In the opening of his *Punic War*, Naevius invokes a Muse-like figure to narrate the events of the first Punic War to him.¹⁴⁶ Ennius invokes the dancing Muses of Mount Olympus at the start of the *Annales*, as he embarks in an epic narration of the history of Rome from its foundation until 179 BCE, the year of the construction of the temple of Hercules of the Muses built by his patron Fulvius Nobilior.¹⁴⁷ The victory monument housed the cult statues of Hercules Musagetes (“Leader of the Muses”) and of nine Muses, brought back by Fulvius from his Ambracian campaign in 186 BCE.¹⁴⁸

In the second century BCE, the relationship between the Muses and Roman poets was akin to the relationship between the Muses and their Greek counterparts. In Greek literature, the poet was characteristically submitted to the Muses’ authority. They act as divine inspiration for the poet, granting him access to omniscient divine knowledge. The poet was thus a mere transcriber

¹⁴⁴ Fest. 446 (L) cf. Livy 27.36. On the significance of the award, see Goldberg 1995, 28-31.

¹⁴⁵ Gell. *Noct.* 17.21.44. For a good discussion of the *Musa Bellicosa*, see Skutsch 1970, 120-1; Welsh 2011, 42-45. For a good discussion of the connection of Latin poetry and Roman imperialism see also Habinek 1998, 35; Burton 2013.

¹⁴⁶ Naev. *frag* 1.B: For discussion of the passage, see Hardie 2016, 72-4 and its bibliography. Before the Greek Muses, Roman poets invoked the *Carmenae* for divine inspiration, see Livius, *Andr.* 1.1. On the displacement of the *Carmenae* by the Muses, see Meunier 2014 and Hardie 2016.

¹⁴⁷ Enn. *Ann.* 1.1 (Skutsch). On the structure of the *Annales*, see Elliot 2013 and its bibliography. On the temple, see *LTUR* s.v. *Hercules Musarum aedes* 3.17.

¹⁴⁸ The history of temple is still a matter of debate. One view championed by Coarelli holds that Fulvius created the temple in its entirety to house the Greek cult of *Heracles Musagetes*, and dedicated it to *Hercules Musarum*, see Coarelli 1997, 452-4. The other view argued that Fulvius did not vow or dedicate a new temple, but made additions to an existing temple of Hercules in the Circus Flaminius and housed the Muse-statuary in this new space, see Aberson 1994, 199–216; Rüpke 2006b, and Rüpke 2011b, 87–95. For a good summary of the debate, see Hardie 2016, 75-77.

of the song of the Muses.¹⁴⁹ The communication was based on the personal connection of the Muses to the poet and started with a prayer, the invocation. When the Muses transliterated from Greek to Roman poetry, so did their relationship with poets.

Ennius starts his epic narrative of Rome by invoking the “Muses, you who beat great Olympus with your feet” with a prayer greatly reminiscent of Homer’s at the start of *The Iliad*, “Tell me now, Muses who live in Olympus.”¹⁵⁰ While the rest of Ennius’ sentence is lost to us, its similarity with the Homeric invocation strongly suggests that Ennius is calling on the Homeric Muses to be his inspiration, to give him access to their divine knowledge. Ennius’ appeal to the daughters of Zeus is made more explicit at the start of Book Ten as the Roman writer asks the divinities to “Continue (*insece*), Muses, what by might and main the Roman’s every commander achieved in war with king Philippus.”¹⁵¹ With this injunction, Ennius defines his relationship to the Muses: he is their follower, a faithful transcriber of their divine knowledge, who awaits the continuation of their song to keep writing his poem. The prayer is thus the premise for the establishment the divine communication between Ennius and the Muses.¹⁵² The poem is the result of the constant interaction with the divinities since Ennius feels that he cannot continue with their support.

Visitors to the temple and worshippers would have most likely made the analogy between Lucullus’ relationship to the goddess FELICITAS and the relationship of a poet to the Muses: they would have presumably understood the goddess FELICITAS as a source of inspiration for Lucullus. Just as the Muses instructed the poet with their divine omniscient knowledge, the goddess FELICITAS instructed Lucullus and he acted under her command. And just like the poem is the outcome of the constant interaction between the poet and the

¹⁴⁹ Spentzou 2002, 3. The Muses are connected not only with the understanding and acquisition of knowledge but also with the praise of and communication to the divine.

¹⁵⁰ Enn. *Ann.* 1.1 (Skutsch) cf. Hom. *Il.* 2.484. On Ennius’ presentation as another Homer, see for instance Hor. *Ep.* 2.1.50-62; Gouvea 2019, 45-60; Nethercut 2020, 17-44.

¹⁵¹ Enn. *Ann.* 322-23 (Skutsch)

¹⁵² On Ennius’ theology, see Farrell 2020. On prayers, Hahn 2007; Scheid 2016, 121-151.

Muses, Lucullus' military victory is the result of his partnership with the goddess FELICITAS. This working relationship, in which the goddess FELICITAS contributed to Roman victory by imparting divine knowledge to the Roman general, echoes the connection between the Theban general Amphitryon and the god Jupiter in Plautus' play *Amphitryon*.¹⁵³ Just as the poet's personal connection with the Muses was essential for the writing of poetry so was Lucullus' connection with the goddess FELICITAS for military victory.

Through the decoration of the temple, Lucullus then suggests that his FELICITAS *imperatoria*, his relationship with the divine to make the *res publica amplior* and *melior*, was based on his personal relationship with the deity as opposed to the relationship between the Roman people and the gods. Lucullus' intentional use of the statues of the Muses to decorate the temple of the goddess FELICITAS highlights his conviction that Romans who visited his temple to worship the goddess FELICITAS would have most likely understood his association of his personal relationship with the deity with his military victory in Spain.

4.4 Conclusion

The analysis of Lucullus' temple to the goddess FELICITAS dedicated in 145-142 BCE in conjunction with the religious and intellectual context of the time has shown that Lucullus' representation of the deity marks an important conceptual shift in the relationship between Roman generals and the gods for the well-being and prosperity of the *res publica*.

The cult to the goddess FELICITAS was introduced in Rome at the time when *fortuna*, as a concept and deity, played an important role in the Greek and Roman discourse on Roman imperialism. The goddess Fortuna was seen as one of the deities which helped Roman generals to win battles and increase Roman dominion over the known-world. The association of negative meanings to the goddess Fortuna due to the translation of *tyche* to *fortuna* meant that the deity was also seen as a divine agency that could bring bad luck. Her

¹⁵³ For a discussion of the play, see Chapter Three.

fecklessness made her unreliable, unpredictable, thus threatening Roman rule; while Roman generals respected her, they feared her.

Lucullus' conception of goddess FELICITAS, as transmitted through two important sources, Plautus' description of the goddess Fortuna in his play *Pseudolus* and Varro's definition of the goddess FELICITAS in his *Antiquities of Ancient Things*, indicate that the new deity was seen as a definitively Roman answer to the threats posed by *fortuna*. Contrasting Plautus with Varro has shown that the goddess FELICITAS was conceptualised as the good fortune given to Roman generals on account of his VIRTUS. Because the goddess FELICITAS favoured men on account of their previous merits, she was understood as providing good fortune in a more reliable, predictable, and personal way than her fickle counterpart, the goddess Fortuna.

The goddess FELICITAS' unique relationship with her worshipper was represented in the temple through the decoration Lucullus personally chose. The display of the statues of the Muses of Thespieae gifted by L. Mummius, would have certainly evoked to visitors or worshippers that Lucullus' relationship with the goddess FELICITAS was akin to the relationship of a poet to the Muses. This relationship rested on his personal connection with the goddess, just like the poet established a connection with the Muses through a personal prayer. For Lucullus then, his military victory was like a poem: the results of his constant interaction with the divine giving him access to divine knowledge upon which he acted, leading him to military victory and conquest in Spain on behalf of the Roman people.

Lucullus' relationship with the goddess FELICITAS as represented in his temple suggests that FELICITAS of the Roman general then is no longer a transient ability based on the relationship between the Roman people and the gods, as we seen in the previous chapter, but a quasi-permanent ability of the Roman general based on his personal connection to the divine. As long as the goddess favours him, Lucullus can work with her to bring about military victory and prosperity for Rome. This representation of the relationship between the general and the divine emphasizes the role of the Roman general in the military success of the Romans diminishing the role of the army and the wider

community as the general is seen as the primary mediator and executor of the divine will on account of his personal connection with the gods.

The echoes to Lucullus' conception of FELICITAS found in Roman plays and poetry written at the time suggest that Lucullus may have taken advantage of commonly available conceptions of FELICITAS and *fortuna* to formulate a new representation of FELICITAS *imperatoria* accessible to all Romans. In the first century BCE, Roman generals would elaborate on this new conception of FELICITAS *imperatoria* as they sought to legitimise their claim to receive extraordinary power from the Roman people to address the crises the *res publica* faced at the time.

5 **FELIX SUM: Legitimacy in Time of Crises**

The political and military crises of the first century BCE led Roman generals to adopt and expand on Lucullus' new conception of *FELICITAS imperatoria* to advance their political career. In this chapter, I explore how Roman generals (and their allies) used their claim to be *FELIX* either to receive a military command against an external enemy of Rome or to legitimise their military engagement in civil wars.

My discussion proves three points. Firstly, Roman generals developed new ways to represent their ability to partner with the gods either by using means of divine communication not traditionally associated with the administration of the *res publica*, such as epiphanic dreams, or by presenting themselves as being favoured by gods. *FELICITAS* was thus seen by Romans as a permanent quality of Roman generals based on their private and special relationship with the gods. Secondly, this new conception of *FELICITAS* enabled the Roman generals who claimed the divine quality to articulate a series of political and religious arguments to present themselves as the most apt to deal with the military crises the *res publica* faced because of their divine support. Claiming *FELICITAS* gave them an advantage over other members of the Roman elite competing for the same honours. Finally, this new conception of *FELICITAS* of Roman generals was available to and understood by all Romans, and was the most prevalent way of conceiving the relationship between Roman generals and the gods for the well-being and prosperity of the *res publica* in the first century BCE.

To do so, I examine how Sulla, Pompey and Caesar responded to particular military and political crises the *res publica* faced during their lifetime.¹ Although their responses portray their relationship with the divine differently, they outlined a uniform way to conceive *FELICITAS imperatoria* and to use it for political gain. Laid out in his *Autobiography*, Sulla's justification for his unprecedented march on Rome in 88 BCE, to reclaim the command against

¹ On Marius' use of *FELICITAS* to further his career, see Assenmaker 2013, 98-111.

Mithridates VI of Pontus, from Marius' forces on account of an epiphanic dream resulting from his FELICITAS, created a template for other Roman generals to spurn or emulate. Cicero's speech in favour of Pompey's extraordinary command against the king of Pontus in 63 BCE demonstrates the ambiguity with which Romans dealt with Sulla's *exemplum*: while negating that Sulla was ever FELIX on account of the violence the Roman dictator unleashed on Rome, Cicero still adopted Sulla's conception of FELICITAS as the personal relationship between the Roman general and the gods to portray Pompey as both favoured and sent by the gods to protect the *res publica*. Emulating both Sulla and Cicero, in the first book of the *Gallic Wars*, Caesar justified the start of his campaign in 58 BCE, by presenting himself as chosen by the gods to conquer Gaul for the Roman people on account of his personal relationship with the gods in order to avoid prosecution over his actions as consul in 58 BCE.

Each case study is explored in a section of this chapter with a particular focus on the way Roman generals (and/or their allies) represented their experience of the divine for political gains.

5.1 Sulla, dreams, and the crisis of 88 BCE

Sulla's own justification for his unprecedented decision to march on Rome with his army in 88 BCE laid out in his *Autobiography* constitutes one of the earliest examples of the use of FELICITAS to articulate a response to a political and military crisis in Rome.²

Unfortunately for us, Sulla's memoirs only remain through fragments gathered from a wide range of authors including Cicero, Gellius, Aurelius, Priscian, Pliny the Elder, and most importantly, Plutarch.³ Analysis of those fragments has revealed that Sulla's memoirs were composed of about twenty-two books compiled from administrative notes, dispatches, correspondence

²For this section, I am deeply indebted to Noble 2014.

³ For a collection of the fragments, see *FRHist* 22.F1-27 with reference to previous editions.

and speeches given by the Roman general.⁴ The work, written by the Roman dictator after abdication of power in 80 BCE after his second consulship, focused exclusively on his rise to power ending most likely with his triumph over Mithridates V in 82 BCE, and on his death and funeral in 78 BCE in an *addendum* written by his freedman Epicadus.⁵ It thus certainly contained Sulla's own account of the events of 88 BCE.

Sulla's narration of the episode will have most likely supported the political and religious aims of the *Autobiography*, namely, as Geoffrey Lewis neatly summarised it, "the story of effort and achievement that had taken him [i.e. Sulla] from "decent poverty" to supreme power and FELICITAS."⁶ Therefore while recounting the events of 88 BCE Sulla would have undoubtedly advanced arguments of a political and religious nature to justify his actions while supporting his claim to be FELIX. It is possible to reconstruct those reasons by analysing the remaining fragments of the *Autobiography* in conjunction with other historical narratives of the events of that year.

As consul that year, Sulla and his colleague Q. Pompeius Rufus faced a domestic political crisis triggered by the legislative proposal of the tribune of the plebs, P. Sulpicius, to allocate the new Roman citizens and freedmen following the grant of Roman citizenship to all Italian allies, as part of the settlement of the Social War to all existing tribes.⁷ In exchange for Marius' political support, Sulpicius advanced another legislative proposal transferring to the then-retired general the *provincia* of Asia, and with it the command of the war against Mithridates VI, which had previously been allotted by the Senate to Sulla.⁸

⁴ On Sulla's source for the composition, see Lewis 1991, 511-2.

⁵ Suetonius reports that the book was finished by Sulla's freedman Epicadus, Suet. *Gramm.* 12. For a good discussion of the scope of Sulla's *Autobiography*, see Lewis 1991; Smith 2009, 73-74; and Thein 2009, 91.

⁶ Lewis 1991, 514.

⁷ Sulla's election to the consulship, see Diod. 37.25.1; Livy, *Per.* 75; Vell. Pat. 2.17.3; App. *B Civ.* 1.51. On Sulpicius' legislative agenda and its connection to Roman citizenship, Kendall 2013, 431-9.

⁸ Vell. Pat. 2.18, App. *B. Civ.* 1.55-6; Plut. *Mar.* 35; *Sull.* 8; Livy, *Per.* 77.1. Lange and Vervaeke 2019, 20-2. On the partnership between Marius and Sulpicius, Kendall 2013, 440-1; Steel 2013, 92.

Sulpicius' law on the command against Mithridates was unprecedented. While both the popular bestowal and removal of *imperium* did have precedents, usually in response to failure, and with generals whose *imperium* has been prorogued, as in the case of Servilius Caepio after his defeat at Arausio 105 BCE, there was no parallel for ending the command of a general before it had even begun.⁹ In response to this challenge, under the threat of violence, Sulla left Rome in the hands of Sulpicius and Marius, and returned to the army he commanded the previous year encamped at Nola and persuaded his troops to march on Rome to support his position as consul.¹⁰

Our sources suggest that in his own narrative of the events, Sulla may have a political and a religious argument to motivate his men. Plutarch, in fact, reports that the night before his march on Rome, the goddess Bellona appeared in Sulla's dream.¹¹ The deity "as Sulla fancied, stood by his side and put into his hand a thunder-bolt, and naming his enemies one by one, urged him to strike them with it; and they were all smitten, and fell, and vanished away." Sulla, emboldened by the vision, shared it with his colleague and at dawn marched on towards Rome.¹²

It is unclear from the way Plutarch reports the dreams whether it was taken from Sulla's memoirs since the Greek writer simply tell us that "it said to have happened" (λέγεται). Scholarly opinions have varied widely on whether the dream was recounted in the *Autobiography*.¹³ Recently, Fiona Noble rightly defended the idea that, despite the absence of definite citation, it is reasonable to assume that the dream originated from Sulla's memoirs. As she noted,

⁹ On recall of Caepio, Livy *Per.* 67; Asc. *Corn.* 78, see also Steel 2013, 92-3.

¹⁰ For a good discussion of the events, see Keaveney 2005, 45-53; Vervaet 2006, 642-9; Steel 2013, 87-97; Kendall 2013, 452-61.

¹¹ The identity of the deity is unclear. In the text, Plutarch names her as Semele, or Athene or Bellona. Some scholars have argued that she was Cybele, see Perrin 1916, 352. Kragelund 2001, 92 and Noble 2014, 103 have defended that the goddess was Ma-Bellona: the combination of the attributes of those goddesses strongly suggest that it was Ma-Bellona who appeared in Sulla's dream.

¹² Plut. *Sull.* 9.1-4.

¹³ Kragelund 2001, 92-3 argued that there is no way to tell the origin of the story. Harris 2009, 179-80 has maintained that the story is not only authentic but also that Sulla himself spoke of it and included it in his memoirs. Vitelli 1898, 369 and Valgiglio 1975, 267 argue that the story came directly from the *Autobiography*.

Plutarch's use of the word λέγεται to cite a specific text - as in the case of his citation of Q. Lutatius Catulus' autobiography in his *Life of Marius* - shows that the word need not necessarily imply that Sulla was not the source of the story here.¹⁴ She also pointed out that the probability of dreams originating from Sulla's memoirs is greatly increased by the preceding story of the prophetic declaration of the haruspex Postumius, known to have featured in the *Autobiography*.¹⁵

For Sulla, this epiphanic dream was a clear manifestation of his FELICITAS.¹⁶ As Noble has convincingly argued, dreams played an important role in the way Sulla presents his relationship with the divine in his memoirs.¹⁷ The best evidence available to understand the connection Sulla made in his writing between his dreams and FELICITAS are several fragments from Sulla's *Autobiography* found in Plutarch's discussion of Sulla's attitude to the divine.¹⁸ The presence of the fragments indicates that the Greek writer likely based his description on the dictator's own writing.¹⁹ As Plutarch paraphrased Sulla's Latin text into Greek, the passage can be taken as a faithful representation of Sulla's writing, and as Noble rightly notes, the variety of terms Plutarch used to describe Sulla's relationship with the divine probably reflects Sulla's own terminology used to explain the role of the gods and chance in his life.²⁰

The importance of dreams for the Roman general is evident in a fragment identified at the end of Plutarch's discussion of Sulla's views on the gods, in which the Roman general "advises him [i.e. Lucullus] to deem nothing

¹⁴ Noble 2014, 104 with ιστοροῦσι in Plut. *Mar.* 25.6 and λέγουσι in Plut. *Mar.* 26.5

¹⁵ *FRHist* 22. F17 (= Cic. *Div.* 1.72) see Noble 2014, 124-30.

¹⁶ I follow Harris' classification of dreams in Greek and Roman culture in which an epiphanic dream involves a divine being (a god, a supernatural being or a human acting in a supernatural capacity) imparting a message to an individual, see Harris 2009, 23-90. For other ancient dream classifications: see Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* 1.3.2; Artemidorus 1.2.

¹⁷ Noble 2014, 117-8.

¹⁸ Plut. *Sull.* 6.3-13 = *FRHist* 22. F11-15. On Plutarch's use of dreams in his *Lives*, Brenk 1975; Brenk 1977, 214-35;

¹⁹ Lewis 1991, 515-7 and Noble 2014, 54-6 maintained that Sulla discussed his FELICITAS in the opening of his *Autobiography*.

²⁰ Noble 2014, 87.

so secure as what the divine power enjoins upon him in his dreams.”²¹ Paying close attention to Plutarch’s vocabulary in order to reconstruct the way Sulla presented his relationship with the divine, Noble astutely remarked that the term Plutarch uses to designate the divine messenger of dreams, τὸ δαιμόνιον is etymologically connected with ὁ δαίμων, a term the Greek author frequently uses in his writing as an equivalent to or a personification of Tyche.²² This would then suggest, as Noble has concluded, that Plutarch presented *tyche* as playing a role of imparting the divine message to Sulla. Assuming Plutarch’s language reflects a particular relationship Sulla developed in his memoirs, this would in turn imply that Sulla presented his dreams as the result of his *fortuna*.

For the Roman dictator, this *fortuna* was the agency behind his FELICITAS.²³ In the identified fragments of the dictator’s memoirs, when discussing the role of fate, luck, and the gods in Sulla’s life, as Noble points out, Plutarch does not simply stick to τύχη “fortune” but also discusses εὐτυχία “good fortune” with the expression εὐτυχίαν τινὰ θεῖαν, “good fortune from the gods.”²⁴ Since the variety of terms used by Plutarch reflected themes and arguments outlined in Sulla’s own writing, in his discussion of his FELICITAS Sulla probably connected the divine quality with other concepts, such as *fortuna*, translated here by Plutarch by τύχη. Plutarch’s use of εὐτυχία is more unusual, and it is possible that Plutarch used this word in order to capture in Greek the meaning of FELICITAS in the *Autobiography*.²⁵ If the association of terms τύχη and εὐτυχία found in the passage is reflective of a connection in Sulla’s writing, then Sulla may have seen his FELICITAS as a result of his *fortuna*. The use of the unconventional combination εὐτυχίαν τινὰ

²¹ *FRHist* 22.F14 (= Plut. *Sull.* 6.10) see also Plut. *Luc.* 23.6.

²² Noble 2014, 88-9. Brenk 1977, 145-183. The best example of this may be *De tranq. anim.* 15 (Mor. 474b-c), in which Plutarch compares a comment by Menander on τύχη with one by Empedocles on δαίμονες.

²³ On Sulla’s connection with the goddess Fortuna, see Plin. *HN* 36.6.45 who mentions that Sulla rebuilt the temple to the deity in Praeneste. See Balsdon 1951, 8 n.89; Keaveny 2005, 157 n.4.

²⁴ For τύχη see *FRHist* 22.F11 (=Plut. *Sull.* 6.7-8) and F12 (= Plut. *Sull.* 6.9); for εὐτυχίαν τινὰ θεῖαν, see *FRHist* 22.F13 (= Plut. *Sull.* 6.9).

²⁵ Plut. *Sull.* 34.

θείων, for its part, as Noble has highlighted, implies that one of the main arguments Sulla defended was that his FELICITAS stemmed from the gods and from his personal relationship to them. This would in turn suggest that Sulla presented his *fortuna* and his dreams as sent by the gods because of his relationship with them.

Sulla was able to maintain that the messages enjoined in his dreams were secure because he presented his connection with the gods as secure. Indeed, one of the fragments states that “of those actions of his [i.e Sulla] that men thought had been well planned, it was those that he had not thought through, but which he had boldly risked on the ‘spur of the moment’, that had fallen out for the best.” The phrasing of the sentence is quite revealing. As Noble rightly noted, “rather than simply saying that the action and the decision he took πρὸς καιρὸν turned out for the better, he [Sulla] refers to the way other people perceived him by taking into account only τῶν καλῶς αὐτῷ βεβουλευῆσθαι δοκούντων.”²⁶ Sulla discusses not matters which actually turned out for the best, but only those which people thought had done so. While Noble saw this statement as a reminder of the central role of public perception in Sulla’s concern, its placement in Plutarch’s portrayal of Sulla’s attitude toward the gods suggests that Sulla may have been describing his FELICITAS.²⁷ As seen when discussing the sacred trees used in Roman rituals, perception by others is a key component in attributing the divine quality to an individual, since others must *ex post facto* assess whether the outcome of the action matches with what was initially desired or planned.²⁸ For Sulla then, the moments which made other people consider him as FELIX were the moments he acted πρὸς καιρὸν. In other words, Sulla’s FELICITAS then stems from his καιρὸς, which usually translates in English to “on the spur of the moment.”

There is no straightforward way to translate καιρὸς in Latin and to understand the religious notion Sulla was referring to. Various suggestions have been proposed. Holden has suggested that πρὸς καιρὸν was a

²⁶ Noble 2014, 92 transcribed with her own emphasis.

²⁷ Noble 2014, 93.

²⁸ On the logic to ascribed FELICITAS, see Chapter One.

translation of a Latin expression such as *ex tempore, pro ut tempus ferebat*, or *raptim* rather than *opportune* or *tempestive*.²⁹ Giardina has argued for a translation with the term *occasio* as he views this passage as coming from Sulla's discussion of the role of occasion in his life.³⁰ Recently, Noble, however, has rightly noted that, while Giardina's suggestion may be attractive, there is no evidence of other instances in which Sulla used this term.³¹ Miano has recently translated πρὸς καιρὸν with *ex parvo momento*, an expression used by Caesar to signify moments resulting in great changes, which the Roman dictator connects with *fortuna*.³² However, his interpretation does not take into account the connection Sulla suggested between καιρὸς and his relationship with the gods.

The inclusion of πρὸς καιρὸν in Plutarch's discussion of Sulla's attitude to the divine suggests that the Greek writer considered the term to be an important element of Roman general's relationship with the gods. Giardina rightly proposes that Sulla's attitude to πρὸς καιρὸν or *occasio* was connected with his 'piety'.³³ If πρὸς καιρὸν denotes Sulla's 'piety' then καιρὸς represents an aspect of Sulla's *pietas*, his devotion and obedience to the gods.³⁴ This means that Sulla presented his FELICITAS as the result of his personal relationship with the gods. It was only through his FELICITAS that he could trust in καιρός, since the gods were guiding his actions and could ensure that his deeds turned out for the best.³⁵ For Sulla then, FELICITAS was a secure quality because he could take action on account of his relationship with the gods and could be confident that those actions would turn out well.

Since Sulla presented his dreams as the result of his *fortuna*, which is itself sent by the gods on account of Sulla's good relationship with them

²⁹ Holden 1886, 76 n. 39.

³⁰ Giardina 2009, 71 n. 30.

³¹ Noble 2014, 94.

³² Miano 2018, 135. *Caes. BC.* 3.68.

³³ Giardina 2009, 71.

³⁴ For a definition of *pietas*, see *Cic. Nat. D.* 1.116; *Cic. Inv. Rhet.* 2.66. On *pietas*, see Wagenvoort 1980, Zaman 2009, Natali 2014. On Sulla's representation as pious man, see Ramage 1991; Balsdon 1951, 7-8; Keaveney 2005, 156-8.

³⁵ Noble 2014, 95.

maintained by his piety, then for him, dreams were both the result and the manifestation of his FELICITAS. If Plutarch's association reflects a connection found in Sulla's *Autobiography*, then Sulla claimed, as Noble has rightly concluded, that "he receives special favour and information due to a close personal relationship with the gods (expressed through his FELICITAS) but also that the messages and information might stem from his FELICITAS."³⁶ The reception of divine guidance and knowledge through dreams, as Sulla presents it, was as an integral and defining aspect of his FELICITAS. The dream of the goddess Bellona appearing to struck his enemies is such an occasion.³⁷

The timing of the dream, namely the night before his march on Rome, suggests that Sulla recounted his vision of the goddess Bellona to justify his decision to march on Rome and to present himself as FELIX. The political and religious message conveyed by the dream is indeed quite clear. The men struck with the thunderbolt of the goddess, despite being defined as enemies, were Roman citizens, namely Marius, Sulpicius and their followers.³⁸ The dream both foretells of Sulla's success in his upcoming march and, by depicting Sulla as killing Roman citizens with the goddess' thunderbolt, casts Sulla's actions as directly ordained and guided by the gods. With this dream Sulla presents himself as an instrument of divine justice, a role given to him because of his FELICITAS, his close and direct relationship with gods; by marching on Rome, he is saving the city from the Romans the gods have designated as her enemies.³⁹

³⁶ Noble 2014, 89

³⁷ The other occasions in the *Autobiography* where Sulla received messages from the divine in his sleep are as follows: the goddess Bellona appears to Sulla the night before his march on Rome, see Plut. *Sull.* 9.4; the night before the battle of Sacriportus, Sulla dreams of the elder Marius telling his son to beware the next day, see Plut. *Sull.* 28.4; before going to Italy to fight out Marius and Cinna, the goddess Aphrodite appears to fight his enemies alongside him, see App. *B. Civ.* 1.97; finally, days before his death, Sulla dreams of his deceased son foretelling him of his death, see Plut. *Sull.* 37.1-2; App. *B. Civ.* 1.105.

³⁸ On the role of Sulla in developing the concept of *bellum civile*, see Lange and Vervaet 2019, 19-27.

³⁹ It is not hard to imagine Sulla recounting his dream in a speech to his men before setting out to Rome since Plutarch does tell us that Sulla shared the dreams with others, see Plut. *Sull.* 9.1-4. Harris 2009, 179-80 maintained that Sulla most probably spoke of it to some of his troops and sees the dream as the origin for real and imitation

Such use of dreams to justify military or political actions had some rare precedents in Roman tradition. For instance, in 211 BCE, Lucius Marcius, elected as commander of Lucius' and Gnaeus Scipio's army in Spain after the two generals had fallen in battle, soothed his soldiers' grief and exhorted them to continue fighting by recounting how the fallen Scipios repeatedly woke him up at night by urging him to avenge their death.⁴⁰ Similarly, in 209 BCE, prior to the capture of New Carthage, Scipio Africanus, Polybius reports, told his soldiers of a dream in which the god Neptune had revealed how the Romans could capture the city and had promised to send a sign once the battle has begun.⁴¹ Closer to 88 BCE, Gaius Gracchus, while candidate to the quaestorship, shared a dream in which his brother Tiberius told him that he could not avert his own death.⁴² By using his vision to justify a political and military action, Sulla placed himself in the lineage of Roman generals and politicians who had previously used their dreams to administer the *res publica*.

In his *Autobiography*, Sulla's vision of Bellona would have certainly supported Sulla's claim that he was marching on Rome to liberate the city from her tyrants. Indeed, at a military *contio* held shortly after his return to Nola, it seems that Sulla convinced his army to follow him to Rome by claiming to defend the soldiers' *libertas*. Indeed, Appian reports that when asked why he was marching on Rome by a senatorial envoy, Sulla replied "to deliver her from her tyrants."⁴³

Appian's reference to tyranny suggests, as Steel has astutely noted, that Sulla most likely presented the removal of his command as an attack on his soldiers' *libertas*.⁴⁴ Steel convincingly hypothesised that Sulla's argument may have run as follows: Sulla's position as consul was illegally attacked by

gems depicting Bellona bringing a torch to a sleeper mass produced in 88 BCE. On the gems, see Vollenweider 1958-9. Noble 2014, 103 has defended the argument that in view of the evidence, it is not possible to know with certainty whether the story was circulating in 88 BCE or later as part of the tradition stemming from the *Autobiography*.

⁴⁰ Livy 25.38.5, see Krageland 2001, 81-3; Harris 2009, 176.

⁴¹ Polybius 10.11.7, see Krageland 2001, 83-6; Harris 2009, 175-6.

⁴² Cic. *Div.* 1.56.

⁴³ App. *B Civ.* 1.57.

⁴⁴ On the military *contio*, Plut. *Mar.* 35.4; App. *B. Civ.* 1.57. Steel 2019, 23.

those in Rome, who sought to undermine the power of the people, who elected consuls, by bestowing *imperium* on private people.⁴⁵ This attack was thus both an injury to Sulla and a direct affront to the civil rights of Sulla's soldiers. To support this suggestion, Steel pointed to a letter of Cicero to Atticus of March 49 BCE in which the Roman orator lends legitimacy to Sulla's action to march on Rome. Reflecting on his own decision not to follow Pompey and leave Italy, Cicero draws on the history of the civil war at Rome to explain his reluctance to participate in the current conflict. Cicero writes that "it may be said that Sulla or Marius or Cinna acted rightly. Legally, perhaps; but their victorious regimes were the cruellest and most sinister episodes in our history."⁴⁶ Cicero's argument, as Steel has concluded, shows there was a possible interpretation of Sulla's action which could accept that his resort to military action was justified despite his behaviour after his victory.⁴⁷

Because of the lack of citation, the origin of the quote is unknown. Nevertheless, several elements indicate that the quote may have featured in Sulla's memoirs. It is unclear whether Appian used the *Autobiography*; however, his frequent citations of documents from Sulla's own hands, such as, for instance, the letter Sulla wrote to L. Valerius Flaccus urging the reintroduction of the dictatorship, suggest that the Greek writer drew material from them either directly or through an intermediary source.⁴⁸ Appian's reliance on Sulla's memoirs allows for the possibility that Appian took the quote from the *Autobiography*.

Moreover, the content of the quote fits well within Sulla's wider self-representation as the saviour of Rome.⁴⁹ Analysing Sulla's self-representation in his spectacles, Geoffrey Sumi has argued that the Roman dictator actively

⁴⁵ Steel 2019, 23.

⁴⁶ Cic. *Att.* 9.10.3.

⁴⁷ Steel 2019, 24. On Cicero's ambivalence toward Sulla, namely that the Roman dictator fought a good cause but was unfair in his victory, see Chapter Six.

⁴⁸ Appian never cites Sulla. Noting the similarities between the accounts of Appian and Plutarch, Badian 1964, 206-34, in particular 226, holds that much of Appian's material on Sulla comes from the *Autobiography*. On Appian's use of the *Autobiography*, see *FRHist* p. 286 for a good overview of the scholarship.

⁴⁹ On Sulla's self-representation, see Balsdon 1951; Keaveney 1983; Ramage 1991; Santangelo 2007, esp. 198-223.

sought to present himself as the personification of salvation.⁵⁰ Indeed, Sulla was called “the saviour of *res publica*” (*salus rerum*), as if the salvation of Rome came from his own person.⁵¹ This idea was visually represented in Sulla’s triumph. In his triumphal procession in 81 BCE, as Plutarch reports, prominent men, who had been exiled during Cinna’s domination, paraded with their families wearing garlands and calling Sulla their “saviour and father” (σωτήρ καί πατήρ).⁵² It was not unusual for Roman citizens rescued from enemy attacks or captivity to take part in a general’s triumph as symbols of the good work of the *triumphator* in his role as saviour.⁵³ As Sumi has noted, by displaying the restored exiles, the Roman dictator subverted triumphal codes to cast off overtly Marius, Cinna and their partisans as enemies of the *res publica*, and presented himself as the one who restores order in Rome.⁵⁴ In view of Sulla’s image as saviour and Appian’s potential indirect use of the *Autobiography*, it seems reasonable to infer that the quote may have been included in Sulla’s memoirs.

How Sulla’s contemporaries would have reacted to his claim that his decision to liberate Rome was motivated by an epiphanic dream is unclear. Romans’ attitude toward dreams in the Late Roman Republic is ambivalent, principally because the reliability of dreams depends entirely on the honesty of the dreamer. Dreams were known for their potential for dishonesty and deception, and the form of dream most susceptible to fabrication was the epiphanic dream.⁵⁵ This ambivalence is perhaps best captured by the culture of the time. For instance, in a fragment of one of Ennius’ plays, a character’s declaration that “some dreams are true but it is not necessary that all should be” attests that some people in the mid-second century BCE thought that

⁵⁰ Sumi 2002, 422-5.

⁵¹ Lucan *Phar.* 2.221. Weinstock 1971, 168 n. 5.

⁵² Plut. *Sull.* 34.2; The phrase could be Plutarch’s translation of the Latin phrase ‘*conservator et pater*’ although there is no direct evidence that Sulla confirmed itself such title. cf. Sumi 2002, 422 n.57.

⁵³ Versnel 1970, 385-9.

⁵⁴ Sumi 2002, 423.

⁵⁵ Harris 2009, 4-5. It was one of main objections to the use of dreams in public context in Rome.

sometimes dreams held some authentic divine knowledge.⁵⁶ Polybius is famously sceptical of Scipio's reported dreams - like the one before the capture of New Carthage - dismissing them as superstitions while recognising their political values.⁵⁷ In this context, Sulla's statement that the reliability of messages imparted to humans in their dreams is absolute is remarkable, as Noble has concluded, considering that his Roman audience would have not *prima facie* been receptive to the idea of dreams as the most reliable form of divine communication.⁵⁸ His use of dreams to present himself as waging a war against his political enemies with the support of the gods was thus uncommon, even novel, for the time.

Sulla's claim that the goddess Bellona supported his march on Rome may have encountered supporters in all strata of Roman society. Romans' ambivalence toward dreams has led William Harris to advance the idea that the senatorial and equestrian class would have viewed Sulla's claims with disbelief while Sulla's troops would have been more susceptible to them.⁵⁹ The cultural context of the Late Roman Republic, however, suggests that the picture was more nuanced and complex than Harris presents it. Romans from all social classes were exposed to poems and plays in which fictional and historical characters were acting on the advice of their dreams; it would thus have not seemed to them unusual for a politician and general like Sulla to represent himself as acting upon his personal dreams.⁶⁰ In this context, it seems fair to conclude that Sulla's claim about the truthfulness of his dreams, and more broadly their origin in his *FELICITAS*, would have found supporters in all parts of the Roman community from soldiers to members of the Roman elite.

⁵⁶ Cic. *Div.* 2. 127 = Enn. *Fab* 429 Vahlen cf. Harris 2009, 177.

⁵⁷ Polybius reports that Scipio dreams of his and his brother's election to the aedileship, Polyb. 10.4.5; 10.5.5-9. On the dreams of New Carthage, see note 61 above. On Polybius' scepticism of Scipio's dreams, 10.2, 10.11.7 and 12.24. Following in Polybius' steps, Livy is also sceptical of Scipio's dreams, Livy 26.19.3-7. For a good modern discussion, see Kragelund 2001, 83-6; Harris 2009, 175-6.

⁵⁸ *FRHist* 22.F14 (= Plut. *Sull.* 6.10). Noble 2014, 102.

⁵⁹ Harris 2009, 179-80.

⁶⁰ For dreams in poems see for instance, Enn. *Ann.* 1.34-50 (Skutsch); in plays, Plaut. *Curc.* 246-273; *Merc.* 225-254; *Mil.* 380-396; *Rud.* 593-612.

The crisis of 88 BCE was unprecedented in Roman history. Analysing the remains of Sulla's memoirs has shown how the Roman general uses his FELICITAS to articulate a political and religious response to legitimise his decision to march with his army on Rome. Central to the way Sulla justified his action to Romans in his memoirs is his dream of the goddess Bellona striking his political enemies the night before his march on Rome. The political and religious significance of the dream is unmissable: his decision to fight off Marius and Sulpicius over the command against Mithridates in Rome was right because the gods ordained and guided him. In the *Autobiography*, dreams are presented as the cornerstone of Sulla's relationship with the divine. They are the manifestations and the results of his FELICITAS, since Sulla presents receiving special favour and information as a consequence of his close and personal relationship with the gods. Sulla uniquely describes his FELICITAS as a secure personal quality, since he conceived his relationship with the divine as permanent and stable, and thus personal. This conception of FELICITAS, manifested through dreams, was certainly unique for the time, though not unprecedented, and could have found supporters in all strata of Roman society. Sulla's use of his close and personal relationship with the divine to legitimize his political action would become an *exemplum* for Roman generals and politicians to both emulate and spurn.

5.2 Pompey, Cicero, and Mithridates VI

Cicero's speech in support of a legislative proposal to give Pompey an extraordinary command against Mithridates VI, king of Pontus, and his ally Tigranes II of Armenia in 66 BCE provides a good example of the impact of Sulla's conception of FELICITAS and its use in politics.⁶¹ Up until then, the war against Mithridates V was successfully fought by the proconsul of Cilicia, L. Lucinius Lucullus - grandson of the Lucullus who built the temple to the goddess FELICITAS - who had managed to conquer the two kingdoms of Pontus and Armenia but had totally failed to bring the war to a decisive conclusion. In

⁶¹ On the circumstances and motivations for the speech, Gildenhard, Hodgson et al 2014, 4-15.

67 BCE, however, the mutiny of his army and the defeat of one of his legates in Pontus forced Lucullus to remain inactive while his enemies recovered their kingdoms.⁶² His command was passed on to the consul Glabio who was unsuccessful at delaying Mithridates' and Tigranes' advance. In response to the threat, the tribune of the plebs in 66 BCE C. Manilius proposed a law to grant an extraordinary command to Pompey, who was already in the Eastern provinces, completing his campaign against the pirates.

In his speech, Cicero presents FELICITAS as an important attribute of Pompey to argue not only that he is the only Roman general able to defeat Mithridates but also that he is a gift given by the gods to the Romans in their hour of need. To do so, the Roman orator defines FELICITAS as one of the four qualities a "good general, *summus imperator*, must possess alongside a good knowledge of military art, *virtus*, authority," (*in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere — scientiam rei militaris, VIRTUTEM, auctoritatem, FELICITATE*).⁶³ He then goes on to outline each of those qualities and shows that Pompey possesses them more than any other Roman general. Here is how Cicero defines the divine quality FELICITAS – for the purpose of my argument, I have quoted the text in full:

It remains for me to speak—though guardedly and briefly, as is fitting when men discuss a prerogative of the gods—on the subject of FELICITAS which no man may claim as his own, but which we may remember and record in the case of another (*reliquum est ut de FELICITATE, quam praestare de se ipso nemo potest, meminisse et commemorare de altero possumus, sicut aequum est homines de potestate deorum timide et pauca dicamus*). For in my opinion Quintus Fabius the Great, Marcellus, Scipio, Marius and other great generals were entrusted with commands and armies not only because of their merits but not infrequently because of their good

⁶² Cic. *Leg. Man.* 5, 12, 16, 26; Plut. *Luc.*35; App. *Mithr.* 88-90; Dio Cass. 36. *frag* 4-17.

⁶³ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 28.

fortune. For some great men have undoubtedly been helped to the attainment of honour, glory, and success, by a kind of divinely-sent fortune (*fuit enim profecto quibusdam summis viris quaedam ad amplitudinem et ad gloriam et ad res magnas bene gerendas divinitus adiuncta fortuna.*) And as for FELICITAS of the man whom we are now discussing, I shall speak of it with such reserve as to convey the impression that, without claiming good fortune as his prerogative, I am both mindful of the past and hopeful for the future, and to avoid appearing by what I say either to show ingratitude or to cause offence to the immortal gods (*de huius autem hominis FELICITATE, de quo nunc agimus, hac utar moderatione dicendi, non ut in illius potestate fortunam positam esse dicam, sed ut praeterita meminisse, reliqua sperare videamur, ne aut invisae dis immortalibus oratio nostra aut ingrata esse videatur.*) And so I do not intend to proclaim his great achievements in peace and war, by land and sea, nor the FELICITAS that has attended them, in that his wishes have always secured the assent of his fellow-citizens, the acceptance of his allies, the obedience of his enemies, and even the compliance of wind and weather; (*itaque non sum praedicaturus quantas ille res domi militiae, terra marique, quantaque FELICITATE gesserit; ut eius semper voluntatibus non modo cives adsenserint, socii obtemperarint, hostes obedierint, sed etiam venti tempestatesque obsecundarint*) but this I will briefly assert, that no one has ever been so presumptuous that he dared hope in his heart for such great and such constant favours from Heaven as those which Heaven has bestowed upon Gnaeus Pompeius. That this good luck may always and especially be his, gentlemen, should be, as it is, your earnest hope, both for his own sake and equally for the sake of our *res publica* and our empire (*Quod ut illi proprium ac perpetuum sit,*

*Quirites, cum communis salutis atque imperi tum ipsius hominis causa, sicuti facitis, velle et optare debetis).*⁶⁴

In this passage, Cicero ascribes FELICITAS to Pompey using the same logic of perception and assessment outlined when discussing FELICES sacred trees used in Roman rituals in Chapter One.⁶⁵ For Cicero, FELICITAS is a prerogative of the gods which has allowed great generals such Scipio Africanus or Marius to attain honour, success, and glory when commanding Roman armies.⁶⁶ By ‘remembering’ and ‘commemorating’ the actions of those men, their military success and the honours they received, it is possible for Romans to observe indirectly and to acknowledge those men’s FELICITAS.⁶⁷

Using this process of remembrance and commemoration, Cicero convinces his audience of Pompey’s possession of FELICITAS. He recalls Pompey’s “great achievements in peace and war, by land and sea” and the recognition Pompey received for them, since “his wishes have always secured the assent of his fellow-citizens, the acceptance of his allies, the obedience of his enemies, and even the compliance of wind and weather.” In keeping with his cautious approach when talking about divine matters, Cicero does not provide any explicit examples to support his claims but echoes back to his earlier descriptions of Pompey’s dealings with allies of Rome, Roman cities and the weather.⁶⁸ Those achievements, for Cicero, show that no one has experienced more FELICITAS than Pompey since, as he declares “no one has ever been so presumptuous that he dared hope in his heart for such great and such constant favours from the immortal gods as those which the immortal gods have bestowed upon Gnaeus Pompeius.” By remembering all Pompey’s

⁶⁴ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 47-48. For modern discussion of the passage see Fears 1981a, 797-800; Wistrand 1987, 35-7; Steel 2001, 130-5; Clark 2007, 245-6; Welch 2008, 190-1; Gildenhard 2011, 257-272; Cole 2014, 34-48; Miano 2018, 137-40.

⁶⁵ On sacred trees, see Chapter One.

⁶⁶ On the connection between Felicitas and honour and glory, see triumph, Chapter Three; on election Chapter Six.

⁶⁷ The verbs *meminisse* and *commemorare* are integral elements of the discourse of exemplarity in Rome, see Chapter One.

⁶⁸ On Pompey’s treatment of the allies, Cic. *Leg. Man.* 40-42; on Pompey’s delivering grain to Roman citizens, Cic. *Leg. Man.* 32; 44; on Pompey’s sailing in winter, Cic. *Leg. Man.* 31- 34.

achievements and honours, Cicero hoped that his audience would agree with his assessment that Pompey is FELIX and has enjoyed more FELICITAS than any other Roman general.

How Cicero defines the divine quality FELICITAS in this passage is unique since, as Gildenhard has shown, he intertwined two different conceptions of FELICITAS: ‘traditional FELICITAS’ and ‘Sulla’s FELICITAS’.⁶⁹ ‘Traditional FELICITAS’ is a precarious quality, of temporary duration as it is hostage to fortune and acknowledged by others. This is the FELICITAS experienced by great generals such as Scipio Africanus, Marius or M. Claudius Marcellus and the most prevalent conception in the second century BCE onwards.⁷⁰ In contrast, Sulla’s FELICITAS is a secure and permanent quality, independent of whims of *fortuna*, and boastfully self-ascribed. Cicero’s comment that “no man may claim [FELICITAS] as his own” subtly reminds his audience of Sulla’s surname as FELIX to highlight the difference between Pompey’s and Sulla’s FELICITAS: unlike Sulla’s, Pompey’s FELICITAS was not self-boasted but ascribed by others.⁷¹

Cicero is able to unify those two different conceptions, I argue, by articulating Pompey’s FELICITAS around the general’s private relationship with the divine. Indeed, since for the Roman orator FELICITAS is a prerogative of the gods, it is related to the relationship between the Roman general and the gods. For Cicero then, FELICITAS is by nature transient, since the gods’ attitude toward an individual may change, and durable, since based on the private and personal relationship between the individual and the gods.

This dual conception of FELICITAS is clearly visible in the structure and the content of the final sentence of the passage, “may this good fortune always and especially be his, gentlemen, should be, as it is, your earnest hope, both for his own sake and equally for the sake of our *res publica* and our empire.” The sentence loosely mimics the formulaic prayer with which Roman

⁶⁹ Gildenhard 2011, 268-70.

⁷⁰ On the prevalence of this conception, see Chapter Three.

⁷¹ Gildenhard 2011, 269. On Sulla’s adopting the title of FELIX, Diod 38.15.1; Vell. Pat. 2.27.5; Val. Max. 6.4.4, 9.2.1; Sen. *Dial.* 6.12.6; Plin. *HN* 7.137; Plut. *Sull.* 34.3-4; App. *B.Civ.* 1.97. see also Ericsson 1943, 77-89; Balsdon 1951, 1-10.

magistrates started official business in Rome.⁷² To pray for Pompey's continuing military success for his sake and that of the *res publica* attests to the possibility that a military defeat may be around the corner, and thus of the transient nature of FELICITAS experienced by Pompey.

The prayer itself also denotes that Pompey's FELICITAS is privately negotiated between the Roman general and the divine. According to Cicero, it represents the only way for the audience at the *contio* to help Pompey's good fortune "to always and especially be his." Cicero's statement implies that Pompey's success depends solely on his interaction with the gods. Noticeably, since the prayer does not ask the gods to help Roman armies win the war but rather communicates that they continue their considerations toward the Roman general, Cicero's prayer constitutes the clearest example of the transition of FELICITAS *imperatoria* based on the relationship of the Roman people with the gods to FELICITAS *imperatoria* based on the personal relationship of the Roman general with the divine. In Cicero's interpretation of FELICITAS, the role of Roman community is to pray to the gods for their continued attention for a particular Roman general as the safety and well-being of the *res publica* depends on it.

For Cicero, Pompey's FELICITAS manifests itself through the good fortune he experienced. The centrality of *fortuna* in Cicero's conception of FELICITAS is clearly conveyed throughout the speech. For instance, when talking about the divine help received by Scipio Africanus, Marius, or Marcellus, Cicero defines FELICITAS as a form of "a good luck sent by the divine" (*divinitus adiuncta fortuna*). Similarly, in his peroration, Cicero reformulates his definition of the four qualities that define a good general (*summus imperator*), replacing FELICITAS with "uncommon fortune" (*egregia fortuna*).⁷³ As seen throughout this thesis, FELICITAS denotes the results of the action of *fortuna* as a divine force; the two concepts can thus be used interchangeably to represent cause and effect, but remain quite distinct from

⁷² Cic. *Div.* 1.102; *Mur.* 1-2; Varro *Ling.* 6.86. On those prayers, Chapter One and Chapter Two.

⁷³ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 49.

one another.⁷⁴ Since FELICITAS is a reflection of an individual's personal relationship with the gods, then the good fortune experienced by a Roman general is the result of his relationship with the divine. It is then possible to agree partly with Kathryn Welch's conclusion that FELICITAS represents a "claim to be on the level of the gods, in control of *fortuna* and thus not in need of the help of gods".⁷⁵ While Cicero rhetorically elevates Pompey to be a god in control of men and weather, since according to the Roman orator, FELICITAS reflects the relationship between the general and the gods, Pompey achieves this divine nature only because the gods will it so.⁷⁶

Cicero's conception of FELICITAS as the quality of the Roman general based on his personal relationship with the gods, which manifested as divinely-sent good fortune in warfare, enable him to argue that Pompey is the only man able to save the *res publica*.

To do so, Cicero first undermines Lucullus, the commandant in charge of war, by emphasising his lack of FELICITAS. As seen in Chapter One, when discussing the conceptual connection between FELICITAS, VIRTUS and *fortuna*, the Roman orator rhetorically diminishes Lucullus' successes claiming they were due to the Roman general's VIRTUS, not his FELICITAS.⁷⁷ For Cicero, the ill-fortune Lucullus experienced in 67 BCE – the mutiny of his army, the defeat of his legate, and the recovery of the conquered territories by Mithridates and Tigranes - testifies to Lucullus' lack of FELICITAS. The implicit reasoning behind Cicero's argument is that if Lucullus was truly FELIX, had he had a good relationship with the divine, this bad fortune would have not happened to him. The attack of the Roman orator on Lucullus' FELICITAS was particularly astute since the Roman general's family was connected with the goddess FELICITAS.⁷⁸ This connection may have been in his audience's mind as the temple was not

⁷⁴ Welch 2008, 190-2; Miano 2018, 139-40.

⁷⁵ Welch 2008, 191.

⁷⁶ On the deification of Pompey, see Gildenhard 2011, 257-72; Cole 2013, 34-48.

⁷⁷ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 10 cf. Chapter One.

⁷⁸ It was Lucullus' great-grandfather that built the temple to the deity in the Velabrum in 145-142 BCE.

far from the *rostra* where Cicero is giving his speech.⁷⁹ Lucullus himself, according to Pliny, ordered a statue of the goddess FELICITAS by the famous Greek sculptor Arcesilaus, his friend, presumably for his grandfather's temple, but the death of both artist and patron prevented the completion of the work.⁸⁰ Cicero's denial of Lucullus' FELICITAS allows him to contrast the Roman general with Pompey who experienced more FELICITAS than anyone else.⁸¹ The implicit political message of this not-so-subtle comparison is that, since Lucullus does not have FELICITAS but VIRTUS, he should not be left in charge of the conduct of war.

The Roman orator then presents Pompey's FELICITAS as an asset for the *res publica*. Cicero was keenly aware that talking about FELICITAS in the Roman Forum next to the Curia Cornelia would remind his audience of Sulla FELIX and of the memory of the deadly violence he unleashed on Rome after his defeat of Marius and Cinna in 82 BCE.⁸² To address Sulla's memory and present Pompey's FELICITAS as different, Cicero adopts two strategies: the Roman orator stays silent about the dictator and focuses on the benevolent nature of Pompey's FELICITAS.⁸³

In an implicit contrast with Sulla, Cicero shows that Pompey's FELICITAS is at the service of the *res publica*. Since, according to Cicero, FELICITAS is evident from the military achievements and the honours given to successful generals by the Roman community, then the divine quality intrinsically denotes the ability of an individual to contribute positively to the safety and prosperity of the *res publica*. As the divine quality stems from the personal relationship between a Roman general and the divine, according to the Roman orator, FELICITAS then only represents the personal relationship between a Roman general and the gods that works for the *res publica*.

⁷⁹ On Cicero's use of topography in his speeches, see Vasaly 1993. On the construction of Lucullus' temple to the goddess FELICITAS, see Chapter Four.

⁸⁰ Plin. *HN* 35.155-56.

⁸¹ Clark 2007, 254-6.

⁸² On Sulla's prosecution, App. *B Civ.* 1.93, 95-6; Plut. *Sull.* 31.1-12; Val. Max. 9.2.1; Cic. *Ros. Am.* 6, 80-1, 93; Florus 2.9.24-5. On the impact of the proscription on Roman society, Chapter Six.

⁸³ Welch 2008, 193-4.

Cicero's definition of FELICITAS implicitly denies Sulla's claim to be FELIX, because for Cicero, Sulla's behaviour in his victory endangered the Roman community.⁸⁴ By comparison, the honours given to Pompey for his military achievements attest to the beneficial nature of Pompey's FELICITAS. His special relationship with the gods, according to Cicero, constitutes an asset that the Roman people should use. Because of Pompey's past successes, Cicero is hopeful that Pompey will prevail against Mithridates VI, hopeful as he expressed in his prayer that the gods will continue to support Pompey for the sake of the *res publica* and the Roman empire.⁸⁵

The Roman orator elaborate on the image of Pompey as an asset for the *res publica* by arguing that Pompey and his FELICITAS were sent to the Romans by the gods. As Miano has convincingly shown, throughout his speech, the Roman orator presents Pompey's presence in the East as the result of the providential action of the *fortuna publica populi Romani*.⁸⁶ Cicero highlights the role of fortune in Pompey's military career wondering rhetorically "what there of warfare is left in which the fortune of the *res publica* has not afforded him experience."⁸⁷ In this sentence *fortuna*, as Miano notes, is clearly personified and acts as the divine agency which trains Pompey.⁸⁸

Cicero continues this personification of *fortuna* and develops her role in Pompey's life when he declares later in the speech that after the battle of Pontus, "the good fortune of Rome had providentially directed Gnaeus Pompeius to the spot [i.e Asia]" (*nisi ad ipsum discrimen eius temporis divinitus Cn. Pompeium ad eas regiones fortuna populi Romani attulisset*).⁸⁹ Because of the adverb *divinitus*, Miano has rightly suggested, seeing *fortuna populi Romani*, the subject of the verb *afferre*, as a reference to the deity whose temple is on the Quirinal.⁹⁰ Rhetorically then, Cicero suggests that Roman gods have sent Pompey to Asia to save and protect the province. In the

⁸⁴ On Cicero's criticism of Sulla's claim to FELICITAS, see Chapter Six.

⁸⁵ Welch 2008, 192.

⁸⁶ Miano 2018, 137-40.

⁸⁷ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 28.

⁸⁸ Miano 2018, 138.

⁸⁹ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 45.

⁹⁰ Miano 2018, 138.

peroration of the speech, the Roman orator further conjures one last time the image of Pompey as divinely-sent saviour of Rome when he declared that the Roman general was “bestowed and conferred upon you [i.e. the Roman people] by the immortal gods” to encourage his audience to grant Pompey the command to defeat Mithridates VI once and for all.⁹¹

In his first public political speech, Cicero crafts a unique plea in favour of Pompey’s extraordinary command in the East. The Roman orator develops a conception of Pompey’s FELICITAS articulated around the personal and private relationship between the Roman general and the gods. For Cicero, FELICITAS is a secure quality of Pompey, which he experienced as transient moments of good fortune happening at particular moment in time over lasting period of time. FELICITAS is the result of the divine action of *fortuna*, and according to Cicero, past experiences of good fortune and success represent a potential for the future. This conception of the divine quality FELICITAS allows the orator to present Pompey not only as the best Roman general for the task but also as divinely sent by Roman gods to the Roman people in the hours of needs of the *res publica*. In Cicero’s eyes, Pompey will be more effective in bringing the war to a conclusion than Lucullus or any other Roman generals. Assuming that Cicero has given the speech as transmitted, to understand the orator’s political and religious arguments, the audience of Roman citizens presents at the *contio* would have recognized Cicero’s conception of FELICITAS, or at the very least, elements of it.⁹² The fact that the proposal was voted into law suggests that Cicero’s arguments and definition of FELICITAS were likely understood by his audience.

5.3 Caesar in Gaul

Fully cognisant of the potency of FELICITAS to justify military and political actions, in the *Gallic War*, his account of his nine-year campaign in Gaul, Caesar emulates both Sulla’s and Cicero’s examples: he legitimises his

⁹¹ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 49.

⁹² For other elements which explained Cicero’s success, see Introduction.

decision by claiming to have been personally chosen by the gods to conquer the eternal enemies of the *res publica* the Gauls.

One of Caesar's motivations to write the *Gallic War* commentaries lies in the events of 59 BCE.⁹³ Caesar won the consulship of that year alongside M. Calpurnius Bibulus and pushed forward a wide range of the reforms, which included most significantly a distribution of lands.⁹⁴ Caesar's proposal not only allocated lands for Pompey's soldiers but also provided more broadly for the settlement of urban poor on agricultural land.⁹⁵ The proposal was met with resistance by Bibulus, supported by Caesar's political enemy, Cato the Younger, and with some well-orchestrated violence, Caesar drove Bibulus to his house where he remained for the rest of the year claiming that all public business was illegal on account of bad omens.⁹⁶ Caesar's *lex agraria* nevertheless passed with the public support of Pompey and M. Licinius Crassus.

At risk of being put on trial after his consulship by his political rivals, Caesar obtained an extended command over the Roman provinces of Cisalpine Gaul in Northern Italy, of Illyricum on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, and of Transalpine Gaul in the South of France.⁹⁷ The potential for war in this region was high at the time because of the Helvetians' plan to march out of their homeland to settle in Gaul.⁹⁸ In 60 BCE the Senate, Cicero reports, had decreed that two consuls should be dispatched, that a levy should be held, and that legates should be sent to visit states in Gaul to ensure that Gallic tribes

⁹³ On the reason for Caesar to write the *Gallic War*, see Rosenstein 2009; Raaflaub 2017, 17-22.

⁹⁴ For Caesar's reforms with reference to ancient sources, see Gruen 2009, 32-35. On Caesar's consulship, see for instance Gelzer 1968, 71-101 (still the best account); Goldsworthy 2006, 152-81; Canfora 2007, 78-82.

⁹⁵ Dio Cass. 38.1.2-3, 38.5.2; cf. Cic. *Att.* 2.3.4; Plut. *Pomp.* 47.3, *Caes.* 14.1, *Cato*, 31.4; App. *B Civ.* 2.10.

⁹⁶ Vell. Pat. 2.44.5; Suet. *Caes.* 20.1; Plut. *Caes.* 14.6, *Pomp.* 48.4; App. *B.Civ.* 2.12; Dio 38.6.5-6; Cic. *Vat.* 22, *Fam.* 1.9.7.

⁹⁷ Suet. *Caes.* 22; Dio Cass. 38.8.5; Cic. *Vat.* 35-6, *Sest.* 135, *Prov. Cons.* 36-37, *Att.* 8.3.3. On Transalpine Gaul as a consular province, see Rafferty 2017 with references to previous scholarship, and Rafferty 2019.

⁹⁸ *Caes. B Gall.* 1.2.1-4.4.

did not join the Helvetians.⁹⁹ Romans' fears were somewhat alleviated by news that the Helvetians had delayed their plans yet the threat remained.¹⁰⁰ The prospect of war offered Caesar an opportunity both to avoid prosecution and to offset the controversial acts of his consulship by enhancing his prestige through military campaigning, ultimately potentially culminating in a triumph.¹⁰¹ In 58 BCE the Helvetians started their migration, and Caesar was in prime position to stop their advance.

In the first book of *On the Gallic War*, Caesar crafted a careful justification for his campaigns in Gaul in his account of his dealings with the Helvetians. As Josiah Osgood has noted, given how his consulship had outraged some members of the Senate, it was prudent and imperative for Caesar to provide adequate justification for his activities as proconsul as any perceived wrongdoing might be used as a pretext for terminating Caesar's governorship and bring him to court.¹⁰²

Most interestingly for us, the Roman general articulates his defence around his FELICITAS as evident in several passages of the work which allude to or discuss the conflict with the Helvetians. The first passage can be found in a speech in which Caesar quelled the panic that had spread amongst his soldiers at the thought of fighting Ariovistus and the Germans, by declaring that "on all occasions where an army has not obeyed its general, either fortune has failed because of some actual blunder, or else some crime has been discovered and a charge of greed (*avaritia*) has been brought home" (*quibuscumque exercitus dicto audiens non fuerit, aut male re gesta fortunam defuisse, aut aliquo facinore comperto avaritiam esse convictam*).¹⁰³ Caesar added that "his own blamelessness has been clearly seen throughout my life,

⁹⁹ Cic. *Att.* 1.19.2.

¹⁰⁰ Cic. *Att.* 1.20.5.

¹⁰¹ Caesar has been forced in 60 BCE to forgo a triumph after his command in Spain to stand for the consulship of 59 BCE, Suet. *Iul.* 18; Plut. *Caes.* 13.1, *Cat. Min.* 31.2–3; App. *B. Civ.* 2.8; Dio Cass. 37.54.1–2, see Gelzer 1968, 63–4; Goldsworthy 2006, 159–61.

¹⁰² Osgood 2009, 338–9 *contra* Morstein-Marx 2007 has cast doubt on the idea that Caesar's action at the start of the civil war was motivated by a fear to be prosecuted for actions carried out during his consulship or proconsulship.

¹⁰³ *Caes. B Gall.* 1.40.

his FELICITAS in the Helvetian campaign” (*suam innocentiam perpetua vita, FELICITATEM Helvetiorum bello esse perspectam*).¹⁰⁴

This passage has traditionally been read as Caesar being endowed with the qualities Cicero attributed to Pompey.¹⁰⁵ Clark, for instance, has rightly highlighted the unusual vocabulary of the speech; the word *avaritia* is used on only one more occasion in *On the Gallic War*; this is the only occurrence of *innocentia* in all of Caesar’s writing; and FELICITAS only occurs in one other occasion in the *Gallic War* where it does not refer to Caesar.¹⁰⁶ The rarity of those words then indicates, as Clark has rightly concluded, that their association is deliberate. She perceived Caesar’s opposition of *avaritia* and the loss of *fortuna* to *innocentia* and FELICITAS as an intentional echo to the oppositions set up by Cicero, who stresses Pompey’s *innocentia* in explicit contrast to the *cupiditas* and *avaritia* of others.¹⁰⁷ With this speech, Caesar as both narrator and speaker within the narrative claims the same attributes of FELICITAS and *innocentia* as Pompey.¹⁰⁸ As Clark has concluded, this speech is the opportunity for Caesar to present himself as equal to or even superior to Pompey.¹⁰⁹

Clark’s reading of the passage rightly highlights how Caesar and Pompey both competed to appear as FELIX in the eyes of the Roman people, thus demonstrating the role of the divine quality in the competition between members of the Roman elite.¹¹⁰ Her interpretation, however, does not take into consideration the political context and aim of the work. Since Caesar aims to justify his action in Gaul to avoid losing his governorship, it is intriguing that he records a speech in which he discusses the reasons why a general would lose control of his army. The function of the speech in the narrative suggests that

¹⁰⁴ Caes. *B Gall.* 1.40.

¹⁰⁵ Clark 2007, 246. cf. Welch 2008, 195-6.

¹⁰⁶ In *On the Gallic War*, for *avaritia* see Caes. *B Gall.* 7.42; for FELICITAS, see Caes. *B Gall.* 6.43 where it refers to Caesar’s armies, see Clark 2007, 246.

¹⁰⁷ For Pompey’s *innocentia*, see Cic. *Leg. Man.* 36; *cupiditas*, see Cic. *Leg. Man.* 37, 67; *avaritia*, see Cic. *Leg. Man.* 37, 39, 40.

¹⁰⁸ Clark 2007, 246.

¹⁰⁹ Clark 2007, 244.

¹¹⁰ Clark 2007, 243.

Caesar may be alluding to more than his army's disobedience. Indeed, in *On the Gallic War*, Caesar deliberately uses direct and indirect speeches to vary time and space in the narrative as well as to characterise protagonists.¹¹¹ Long indirect speeches slow down the narrative and occur in the diplomatic stage of a conflict, a stage in which the most important action is to speech and the focus of the narrative is on Caesar's thoughts and speeches.¹¹²

One of the characteristics of those speeches, as Suzanne Adema has remarked, is that they allow Caesar to present himself in control of the war by outlining and anticipating potential future courses of action.¹¹³ This particular use of speech suggests that Caesar's response to his men could be construed as the potential legal defence he would present should any legal charges be brought against him to remove him from his command. Against the charge of *avaritia*, Caesar points to his *innocentia* (blamelessness) evident from his life without crimes. This *innocentia* is intimately connected to his FELICITAS since his blamelessness can be seen throughout his life, even during his handling of the war against the Helvetians, which, according to him, also demonstrates his FELICITAS. The passage is then a *mise en abyme* in which Caesar as narrator and speaker responds to both his men and his audience against potential accusations of wrongdoing using his FELICITAS.

Going deeper, the speech is also indicative of how Caesar sought to present his FELICITAS. Indeed, since military blunders, according to Caesar, happen because of the loss of *fortuna*, by presenting his military victory against the Helvetians as proof of his FELICITAS, Caesar is making a clear connection between his FELICITAS and the *fortuna* he has experienced. As Miano has demonstrated, throughout the *Gallic War*, the Roman general presents himself as a favourite of the goddess Fortuna.¹¹⁴ Caesar never directly describes *fortuna* as goddess; however, he presents her as a supernatural power acting

¹¹¹ Adema 2016, 224, see also Bal 1997 and de Jong & Nünlist 2007.

¹¹² Adema 2016, 225-6.

¹¹³ Adema 2016, 226; Adema 2017, 111.

¹¹⁴ Miano 2018, 144. For discussion of the role of *fortuna* in Caesar's writing, see Miano 2018, 141-6; Champeaux 1982-7, 2.259-91.

of her own volition.¹¹⁵ His occasional references to the lots in connection with *fortuna*, as Miano has noted, can be seen as clear allusions to the goddess Fortuna Primigenia at Praeneste, known since the third century BCE for her oracular lot.¹¹⁶ The strong interconnection between *fortuna* as a deity and as a superhuman power present in the first century BCE has led Miano to conclude that Caesar uses the tension between the deity and the divine power to cast himself as a man using his VIRTUS to win over *fortuna* with the awareness that he could thus be seen as a favourite of the goddess Fortuna by his audience.¹¹⁷

The image of Caesar as favoured by *fortuna* on account of his VIRTUS is fully present in Caesar's reassuring speech to his soldiers. As Caesar notes, *fortuna* as a superhuman power has not failed him because he considers that no military blunders have been made thus far. This blamelessness (*innocentia*) has allowed him to achieve military victory against the Helvetians, demonstrating his FELICITAS.¹¹⁸ Through the interactions of those two concepts, Caesar is subtly depicting himself as winning over *fortuna* on account of his VIRTUS. Since *fortuna* as a deity and as a superhuman power were interconnected in the first century BCE, Caesar is ultimately claiming that his FELICITAS stems from the favour of the goddess Fortuna.

Caesar's view that his FELICITAS is the result of his special relationship with the divine is explicitly stated in another indirect speech reported as part of the peace talk that followed Caesar's victory against the Tigurini, one of the Helvetians tribes. There, the Roman general declares that "it was the will of the immortal gods to grant a temporary prosperity and a longer impunity to make men whom they purposed to punish for their crime smart the more severely from a change of fortune."¹¹⁹ The crimes to which Caesar refers here

¹¹⁵ For *fortuna* as a supernatural power, see for instance Caes. *BGall.* 1.47; 1.53; 5.58; 6.30. On those episodes, see Miano 2018, 142.

¹¹⁶ For reference to lots in connection with *fortuna*, see for instance, Caes. *BGall.* 1.57.7, Miano 2018 142. On the oracular lot of goddess Fortuna Primigenia at Praeneste, see Cic. *Div.* 2.85-7; Champeaux 1982-7, 1.55-83; Miano 2018, 23-5, 38-46.

¹¹⁷ Miano 2018, 144.

¹¹⁸ On the connection between VIRTUS and *innocentia*, see for instance Cic. *Leg. Man.* 36; *Verr.* 2.23, 102; Sall. *BJ* 85.4. cf. McDonnell 2006, 341-3, 365-6.

¹¹⁹ Caes. *BGall.* 1.14.5.

are the defeat of the consul Lucius Cassius and his army by the Helvetians, and the killing by the Tigurini of the grandfather of Caesar's father-in-law, Lucius Piso, a legate of Cassius, in 107 BCE.¹²⁰

Caesar's invocation of the gods makes his victory against the Tigurini a divinely ordained revenge both for the *res publica* and for his family, thus casting himself as an instrument of divine justice. Since his handling of the war against the Helvetians demonstrated his FELICITAS, Caesar as narrator is claiming that his FELICITAS is the result of his execution of divine will, and is at the service of the *res publica*. This characterisation of his first military victory against the Gauls then enables Caesar to justify his war: his actions were divinely ordained as he was personally chosen by the gods to avenge the *res publica* of the affront of the Gauls in 107 BCE.

The image of Caesar as chosen by the gods to defeat the Gauls was used by Cicero in his speech *On the consular provinces* to advocate for Caesar keeping his governorship of Gaul in 56 BCE. Just as in the case of Pompey, Cicero may have embraced Caesar's point of view – of which he was well-aware as a senator since he refers three times in his speeches Caesar's senatorial dispatches - to curry favours with the Roman general.¹²¹ Cicero uses the same language he developed for Pompey a decade earlier to portray Caesar as a good public servant using his FELICITAS for the good of the *res publica*.¹²² He maintains that "Gaul should be left in the guardianship of that man to whose valour, and good faith, and FELICITAS it has already been entrusted" (*quare sit in eius tutela Gallia, cuius FIDEI, VIRTUTI, FELICITATI commendata est*).¹²³

For Cicero, it is clear that Caesar's FELICITAS stems from his relationship with the divine since he describes Caesar's military victories as "magnificent gifts of the goddess Fortuna" whose favours Caesar is willing to risk often despite her well-known fickleness.¹²⁴ According to the Roman orator, the

¹²⁰ Caes. *B Gall.* 1.12.6-7.

¹²¹ Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 22, 33; cf. 25, 27. See also Dio 39.25.2.

¹²² Steel 2001, 156-7.

¹²³ Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 35.

¹²⁴ Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 35.

Senate should let him continue “to conduct the affairs of the *res publica* gloriously, nor to throw into confusion and to hinder his plans for the whole Gallic war, which are now almost matured and accomplished.”¹²⁵ Any disruption to Caesar’s *fortuna* through his recall from Gaul would be less prejudicial to Caesar’s glory since he has already deservedly earned the honour of triumph than to the *res publica* since the conquest of Gaul, and the defeat of the eternal enemy of Rome, would be left unfinished.¹²⁶

By describing Caesar’s continuous victories in Gaul as gifts of a goddess well-known for being fickle and unreliable, Cicero is presenting Caesar both as favoured by the gods and also chosen by them to conquer Gaul. This presentation of Caesar enables Cicero to achieve his main political goals, namely to prevent the senate from replacing Caesar with the not-yet-elected consuls of 55 BCE, since it implicitly dismissed all other potential candidates for the governorship of the two provinces of Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul.¹²⁷

The strength of the religious and political arguments laid out in favour of Caesar keeping his provinces rests in part on members of the Senate being aware of Caesar’s particular connection with the goddess Fortuna, and more broadly to his self-representation, as favoured by the gods.¹²⁸ Such a portrayal of Caesar would have been familiar to members of the Roman community as the Roman general went to great lengths to highlight his connection with the divine. For instance, in the funeral oration Caesar gave in 68 BCE for his aunt Iulia, wife of Marius, he highlighted his descent from the goddess Venus, by noting that his aunt descended on the maternal side since from the king of Alba Longa and on the paternal side from the goddess.¹²⁹ He later claimed that he

¹²⁵ Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 35.

¹²⁶ Cic. *Prov. Cons.* 35.

¹²⁷ On the context and the outcome of the debate, see Grillo 2015, 9-14

¹²⁸ For Caesar’s representation as favoured by the gods before his dictatorship, see Weinstock 1971, 4-34.

¹²⁹ Suet. *Caes.* 6.11. On the connection between the Iulii and the goddess Venus, see Weinstock 1971, 4-18 with reference to ancient sources; Badian 2009 11-6.

received the bloom of youth from Venus as a divine grace.¹³⁰ Finally, Caesar's Gallic commentaries, with its portrayal of the Roman general as a favourite of the goddess Fortuna, were published year by year during Caesar's time in Gaul, dispatched to be read by and to the people.¹³¹

The analysis of Caesar's first book of his Gallic War has shown how the Roman general uses his FELICITAS to legitimise his war. Central to Caesar's justification for his military campaign against the Gauls is his claim that his military victory against the Helvetian in 58 BCE was a divinely ordained revenge for the *res publica* against the Gauls. This claim allows him to present himself as chosen by the gods to conquer Gaul. This victory was the manifestation of his FELICITAS, the personal favours of the fickle goddess Fortuna, which he has won over on account of his VIRTUS. This self-portrayal as the executor of the divine will because of his personal relationship with the gods enabled Caesar to dismiss any other members of the Roman elite that would be competing to receive the honours to campaign in Gaul and to avoid being recalled to Rome where he would potentially be prosecuted for the actions he carried out as a consul in 59 BCE. Caesar's conception of FELICITAS as his special relationship with the gods seems to have been well-known by members of Roman society as his yearly accounts of the war were read in public in Rome and in the provinces.

5.4 Conclusion

Analysing how Sulla, Pompey and Caesar used their FELICITAS to justify their military and political actions has shown that the military conflicts of the first century BCE led to the development of new ways by successful Roman generals (and their allies) to represent their relationship to gods.

In his *Autobiography*, Sulla justified his decision to march on Rome to fight Marius and his allies and reclaim the command of the war against Mithridates VI by claiming that the goddess Bellona came to him in a dream to

¹³⁰ Dio Cass. 43.43.3. cf. Suet. *Caes.* 49.3; Vell. Pat. 2.41.1. For a modern discussion, see Weinstock 1971, 18; 23-26.

¹³¹ Wiseman 1998.

showed him her support. In Sulla's memoirs, dreams are presented as the cornerstone of his relationship with the divine. They are the manifestations and the results of his FELICITAS since Sulla presents receiving special favour and information as a consequence of his close and personal relationship with the gods. Sulla uniquely describes his FELICITAS as a secure personal quality since he conceived his relationship with the divine as permanent and stable, and thus personal. This conception of FELICITAS, manifested through dreams, was certainly unique for the time through not unprecedented and could have found supporters in all strata of Roman society.

Decades after Sulla, Cicero sought to present Pompey as the most apt Roman general to defeat the King of Pontus, Mithridates VI, who had been waging a bloody war against Rome for more than twenty years. As Sulla's claim to FELICITAS had left a particularly bad memory in the minds of Romans because of the cruelty he displayed when dealing with Marius and his allies, Cicero created a unique conception of Pompey's FELICITAS, centred around the personal and private relationship of the Roman general and the gods. For Cicero, FELICITAS is a personal quality of Pompey, which he experienced as transient moments of good fortune happening during and over a lasting period time. This conception of the divine quality allows him to present Pompey not only as the best Roman general for the task but also as divinely sent by the gods to the Roman people in its hour of need. Finally, it enables Cicero to place Pompey's FELICITAS within the traditional Republican conception of FELICITAS as the good fortune given to Roman general at the service of the *res publica*, while integrating Sulla's innovation of the divine quality as a permanent unique ability of an individual.

In *On the Gallic War*, Caesar draws on Sulla's and Cicero's new representations of their relationship with the gods to present his war against the Gauls as legitimate. In his first commentary, Caesar presented himself as chosen by the gods to conquer Gaul. For him, his victory against the Helvetians was the manifestation of his FELICITAS, the personal favour of the fickle goddess Fortuna, which he has won over because of his VIRTUS. Like Sulla, Caesar claims that, through his victory against the Helvetians in 59 BCE, he is

an instrument of divine justice. Just like Cicero has done for Pompey, Caesar maintains that his FELICITAS stems from his personal favour with the gods on account of his VIRTUS, in particular the goddess Fortuna, and also that his FELICITAS is fully at the service of the *res publica*.

Claiming FELICITAS gave those three Roman generals a competitive advantage against their rivals. The dream of Bellona enabled Sulla to depict himself as having divine support and to cast his political rivals, Marius and his allies, as enemies of Rome and of her gods. There was no doubt in Cicero's mind, as he presented it in the speech, that Pompey would be more effective than Lucullus to bring the long war against Mithridates VI to a victorious conclusion. Casting himself as chosen by the gods enabled Caesar to be dismiss any other members of the Roman elites that would be competing to receive the honours of campaigning in Gaul, and thus avoiding being recalled to Rome to be prosecuted potentially for actions he carried out as consul in 59 BCE.

The main motivation for Roman generals to emphasise their personal relationship with the gods was their desire to win over the Roman people. All three innovators draw on well-known religious views and practices to articulate their new conception of FELICITAS. While Sulla exploited the power of dreams to claim divine support in the eyes of his soldiers to members of Roman elite, Caesar used the association between FELICITAS and *fortuna* (as both a deity and concept) to gain the favour of members of the elite and the Roman people. The legitimacy of their victory in civil wars or their gain of a military command rested on whether the Roman community was convinced of their claim to have divine support, in other words, to be FELIX.

6 Honour and Duty: Accepting & Contesting FELICITAS In the Late Roman Republic

In order to comprehend fully why Roman generals used FELICITAS to justify their action to the Roman people, it is necessary to understand the relationship between FELICES generals and the rest of the Roman community. My analysis defends three points. First, victorious Roman generals who were considered as FELICES promoted their proven ability to make the *res publica melior* and *amplior* to gain social privileges such as impunity from Roman laws, and political honours, such as the election to a political office from the Roman people. Second, the violation of Roman social and ethical norms by Sulla and Caesar after their victory led to a redefinition of FELICITAS using Greek philosophy by members of the Roman elite to ensure that military leaders claiming to be FELICES acted in a way that ensures the well-being of the *res publica*. Finally, the Roman people played an active role in defining what the divine quality is through the process of accepting or refusing the claim of a Roman general to be FELIX, and finally in defining the honours given to and duties expected from FELICES Roman generals.

This chapter is divided in two parts. The first part explores how claiming FELICITAS allowed military leaders to gain honours from the Roman community as part of their *dignitas*. After defining the notion of *dignitas*, I investigate a particular line of defence commonly found in extortion and bribery trials involving Roman generals during the late Republic, whose arguments are based on the connection between FELICITAS and *dignitas*. The second part analyses how the abuses of power of Sulla and Caesar and their failure to act appropriately as dictators according to a part of the Roman elite led to a contestation of their claim to be FELIX. I explore how this contestation causes a redefinition of the divine quality on ethical and philosophical grounds in Cicero's and Stoics' writing at the end of the first century BCE.

As our most extensive source on the politics of the Late Republic, much of the discussion in this chapter is driven by Cicero's writings. Cicero's speeches, letters, and philosophical writing provides us with valuable

examples of how the relationship between FELICES generals and the Roman people was articulated in the political discourse of the first century BCE.¹ They reflect the Roman orator's own understanding of this relationship; as such, they pose important methodological questions as it is necessary to evaluate the originality of Cicero's ideas and their prevalence in Roman society. Those methodological questions have already been dealt in the Introduction.² The discussion there has highlighted when attempting to recover other conceptions of FELICITAS, or evaluating the novelty and uniqueness of Cicero's point of view, it is important to consider the context of Cicero's writing, namely to place Cicero's practice within wider Roman practices, to take into account the rhetorical strategies Cicero develops to present his arguments, and finally to consider the audience and, when possible, their reaction to what the Roman orator wrote and said.

6.1 Of the importance of being FELIX: FELICITAS and *Dignitas*

The Roman general's ability to ensure successfully the safety and the well-being of the *res publica* thanks to his FELICITAS makes him a valuable member of Roman society. The importance of the FELIX Roman general to, and the usefulness of his FELICITAS for the Roman community is shown in the social prestige (*dignitas*) given to the Roman general by the rest of the community.

The best evidence available of this special consideration is a particular line of defence found in extortion and bribery trials in the first century BCE involving generals claiming FELICITAS. The key arguments of this judicial plea can be found in Cicero's defence of Murena and Fonteius in 63 and 69 BCE respectively, and in fragments of speeches from other orators, such as Hortensius' defence of Gaius Verres in 70 BCE. Those judicial defences all hinge on the conceptual relationship of FELICITAS with *dignitas* and reveal how the FELICITAS of a successful military leader can help him sway an election or argue for an acquittal for crimes potentially committed.

¹ For Cicero's speeches and letters as historical events, see Lintott 2008, 4-14.

² For a more detailed discussion, see Introduction.

Before analysing those judicial pleas, it is important for our discussion to define what Romans understood as the *dignitas* of an individual and how it connects with Roman elections and with the adherence of this individual to Roman moral and ethical norms.

For Romans, *dignitas* represents both the reputation and the social standing of some members of the Roman and Italian elite: in fact, only members of the senatorial, knightly and tribunes of the treasure classes were seen as holding, or could claim to have, *dignitas*.³ The *dignitas* of an individual stems from his VIRTUS; it was by upholding Roman virtues that an individual created or increased his reputation and social standing in Roman society.⁴

Dignitas embodies a series of social exchanges between the individual and the community governed by *fides* with social obligations (*officia*) on both sides.⁵ Indeed, as Joseph Hellegouarc'h has rightly shown, the word *dignitas*, and its adjective *dignus*, derives from the Latin verb *decere*, one of whose meanings is "to be right to" or "to be suitable to" circumstances.⁶ The idea of appropriateness is central to *dignitas* and implies a particular relationship between the individual and the community. To claim to or be seen to have *dignitas*, it is necessary for the individual to act in an appropriate way toward the members of the community and, inversely, for the community to act appropriately toward this individual.⁷ This relationship then creates both duties and obligations for both parties known as *officia*.⁸ Underpinning those duties is the notion of "good faith" (*fides*), which denotes both the mutual and reciprocal trust Romans held between themselves and their allies, and the capacity of an

³ On *dignitas*, Hellegouarc'h 1963, 388-415 with reference to ancient sources; Rilinger 2007; Morstein-Marx 2009; Gnilka 2009; Jacotot 2013, 73-7, 85-91, 299-304; Badel 2014. For an anthropological approach to prestige, see Pitt-Rivers 1992 and 1997.

⁴ On the connection between VIRTUS and *dignitas*, see Hellegouarc'h 1963, 398-9 with reference to ancient sources.

⁵ Hellegouarc'h 1963, 393-9. cf. Morstein-Marx 2009, 118 n.9.

⁶ On the etymology, see Maltby 1991, 176; Hellegouarc'h 1963, 389-92; De Vaan 2008, 164.

⁷ Hellegouarc'h 1963, 391; Badel 2014, 109-10. Jacotot 2013, 85-91, 299-304 explores the connection between the concept of *dignitas* and *honor* gained from the adherence to the Roman ethical and moral code of honour.

⁸ On *dignitas* and *officia*, see for instance, Cic. *Fam.* 4.1.3, *Verr.* 1.28; Schol. Gron. 395.7.

individual to be trustworthy and act in a trustworthy manner.⁹ The idea of *fides* is at the heart of Roman society, infusing all aspects of Roman life from the relationship between a patron and his clients to the relationship between the magistrates and the Roman people, passing through friendships and the relationship between the gods and their worshippers.¹⁰

Because the *dignitas* of an individual was seen by Romans as the result of his *fides*, social prestige was at the heart of the way Romans conceived of their public life. As Robert Morstein-Marx has convincingly argued, in Roman electoral ideology, political offices were regarded as honours (*honores*) bestowed by the Roman people to individuals on account of their worthiness (*dignitas*), demonstrated by their moral qualities and their previous services to the *res publica*.¹¹ It was therefore imperative for members of the elite seeking political offices to have and to display *dignitas* during an election.¹² Quintus Cicero's long letter to his brother Marcus on how to run for the consulship, commonly known as the *Little Handbook on electioneering*, outlines the different ways the Roman orator should present himself to the Roman people to appear worthy of the consulship.¹³ He emphasises, for instance, the need for his brother to go down frequently canvassing in the Forum with as large an escort of clients as possible as this will make a great impression on the people and add greatly to his prestige.¹⁴

Inversely, since the *dignitas* of an individual is demonstrated by his moral qualities and his previous services to the *res publica*, the tenure of

⁹ On the connection between *dignitas* and *fides*, see for instance, Cic. *Font.* 32, *Cael.* 63 cf. Hellegouarc'h 1963, 393-6.

¹⁰ On *fides*, *TLL* s.v. *fides* 6.1.661.69-691.68, cf. Hellegouarc'h 1963, 23-35; Freyburger 1986; Clark 2007, 61-4, 97-104, 167-70, 213-8.

¹¹ Cic. *Leg. Man.* 1-2; *Leg. agr.* 2.2-5. On the ideology of election in Rome, cf. Morstein-Marx 1998, 265-74; 2016, 117-120; 2021, 395-8. On *honos* as public office, see for instance, Plaut. *Bac.* 438; Cic. *Pis.* 2; Varro *Ling.* 5, 73; Caes. *BCiv.* 1.32.2. For a good modern discussion, see Jacotot 2013, 82-89.

¹² The need for *dignitas* to be elected to political offices is well attested in sources, see for instance, Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 1.27; Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.39; *Balb.* 10; *Sen.* 2.; Val. Max. 2.2.8. cf. Morstein-Marx 2016, 117-22.

¹³ On the debate about the authenticity of the text, see Richardson 1971; Ramsey 1980; Morstein-Marx 1998, 260-1; Tatum 2007, 115-9; Alexander 2009, 33-7.

¹⁴ Cicero, *Comm. pet.* 36.

political offices increases the *dignitas* of their holders. The higher the political office on the *cursus honorum*, the hierarchy of political offices in Rome, the higher the gain of *dignitas*.¹⁵ This point is clearly expressed by Cicero in his speech to the Senate at his return from exile, when he thanked the Roman people for his election to various offices since “it [was] by their promotion that (he) owed (his) place in their most august assembly, on the loftiest stage of dignity.”¹⁶ As Morstein-Marx has rightly concluded, elections in Rome were thus seen as a competition between the social prestige (*contentio dignitatis*) of members of the Roman elite. The Roman people played the role of audience, judges, and arbiters of who should obtain political offices.¹⁷

Having defined the Roman idea of *dignitas*, it is now possible to analyse its relationship with FELICITAS and what it reveals about the dynamics between FELICES generals and the Roman community.

6.1.1 FELICITAS, Murena & the consulship

In 63 BCE Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, a disappointed candidate in the consular election prosecuted the consul-elect Murena for electoral bribery (*crimina ambitus*) in an attempt to disqualify his successful rival and replace him as consul in 62 BCE. Fearing for the safety of the *res publica* as L. Sergius Catilina was still a threat, Cicero defended Murena alongside Q. Hortensius and Crassus.¹⁸ In his argumentation, Cicero demonstrates how military success, proof of FELICITAS, constitutes a solid claim for political offices thanks to the *dignitas* given military leaders. As the last speaker for the defence, Cicero’s speech concentrates less on the charges of prosecution, and more on the political consequences of the case.¹⁹ To show that Murena was more deserving of winning the consulship than his rival, Cicero simulates a *contentio dignitatis*, contrasting Murena’s *dignitas* with Sulpicius’ based on their

¹⁵ *Dignitas* was conceived as having degrees as reflected by the expression *gradus dignitatis*, for instance, Cic. *Cluent.* 55, *Mur.* 18, 30, 55, *Planc.* 32, *Rep.* 1.43, *Off.* 3.99, *Lael.* 12, *Phil.* 1.14.

¹⁶ Cic. *Sen.* 2.

¹⁷ Morstein-Marx 2009, 120-2.

¹⁸ On Cicero’s reasons to take the case, Cic. *Mur.* 3-5. cf. Fantham 2013, 89-93.

¹⁹ Cic. *Mur.* 48, 54. On the charges of the prosecution, see Alexander 2002, 122-4.

ancestry, moral characters, and the merits of their previous careers.²⁰ In this section of the speech, Cicero extolls Murena's FELICITAS, explaining why it made him the better candidate.

To present Murena as a FELIX *vir*, Cicero focuses on Murena's military exploits in Asia. He highlights the role Murena played in his father's campaign against Mithridates VI for which the elder Murena was awarded a triumph in 81 BCE. As Cicero declares, "by ending his military services with his father's victory and triumph, Murena gave proof of his FELICITAS," (*finem stipendiorum patris victoriam ac triumphum fuisse FELICITATIS fuit*).²¹ Murena's military successes in Asia, for Cicero, justify that Murena not only adorn his father's triumphal chariot with the trophies of his success but also rides with his father during the triumph parade.²² His father's triumph, as Cicero presents it, was thus a celebration of the FELICITAS of Murena as well.²³ In his comparison of the merits of Sulpicius' and Murena's respective careers, Cicero emphasises the role Murena played in Lucullus' campaign against Mithridates VI in Asia. While Sulpicius was in Rome writing legal opinions, Murena led an army, conquered cities, and fought battles against Mithridates.²⁴ For his success, as Cicero highlights, "Lucullus commended Murena more highly than would any commander who sought glory for himself or grudged it to others."²⁵ Lucullus' approval and the elder Murena's triumph are undeniable proof for Cicero that Murena was a successful military commander, whose FELICITAS has been proven and recognised by others.

This depiction of the consul-elect allows the Roman orator to argue that Murena is more appropriate to be consul for a series of reasons. Murena's FELICITAS gave him the necessary *dignitas* to access the consulship. Indeed, it was military power, Cicero argues, not laws that has made "the renown of the Roman people, the eternal glory of this city, and has compelled the world

²⁰ Cic. *Mur.* 11. On the use of *contentiones dignitatis* in courts and electoral speeches, Baudry 2014 esp. 143-5 on Murena's case.

²¹ Cic. *Mur.* 12. On this passage, see Fantham 2013, 100-2.

²² Cic. *Mur.* 11.

²³ On the connection between the triumph and FELICITAS, see Chapter Three.

²⁴ Cic. *Mur.* 20.cf. Fantham 2013, 112-3.

²⁵ Cic. *Mur.* 20.

to obey [Roman] rule.”²⁶ This sentiment implicitly shared by all Romans is evident, according to the Roman orator, in the value given to military achievements by the Roman people. As Cicero notes, the most distinguished generals have the greatest *dignitas* from the people because they protect and affirm the domination of the *res publica* and have the greatest utility since the people’s enjoyment of the *res publica* and of its benefits depends on their actions.²⁷ In his work *On Duties* written two decades after the trial, Cicero clearly formulates this sentiment, declaring that “most people think that the achievements of war are more important than civic achievements.”²⁸ While this statement expresses Cicero’s perception of popular thinking, it must hold some truth since he spends the subsequent section of his philosophical treaty defending that civic achievements are greater than military one as the proper functioning of *res publica* is the foundation of the military strength of Rome.²⁹ The popular view that military achievement holds more value than civic achievements meant that Murena as a successful general had a higher social standing and reputation than Sulpicius as a legal counsellor.

Murena’s *dignitas* as a FELIX general matters to voters because the consul is fundamentally a general.³⁰ In his explanation of why Murena won the consulship over Sulpicius Rufus, the Roman orator reminds jurors “that generals, not interpreters of words, are chosen at consular elections.”³¹ This is why the goodwill of soldiers is so important during elections because not only can soldiers vote and influence their friends but also their view of a particular general can define public opinion.³² Talk such as “he saved my life when I was wounded” or “he was FELIX as well as brave” (*ipse cum fortis tum etiam FELIX*),

²⁶ Cic. *Mur.* 22.

²⁷ Cic. *Mur.* 24.

²⁸ Cic. *Off.* 1.74. Dyck 1998, 206 has pointed out that the assumption that warfare was the truest test of one’s value was widespread in Antiquity cf. Verg. *Aen.* 11. 338-9; Plutarch’s essay *On the glory of the Athenians* defends the thesis that Athens’ military glory surpassed its achievement in the cultural sphere.

²⁹ Cic. *Off.* 1.75-9 cf. Stem 2006, 217 n. 29.

³⁰ Polyb. 6.12.1-9. cf. Pina Polo 2022, 250-4 with bibliography.

³¹ Cic. *Mur.* 38.

³² Cic. *Mur.* 38. On the *populus romanus* as source of public opinion, see Russell 2019, 41-56.

Cicero adds, gave the candidate a good reputation.³³ To prove how great Murena's reputation as a successful general was during the election, Cicero points out that the consul-elect won the votes of the first centuries, usually seen as a good omen for the overall election.³⁴

Finally, Murena won the consulship on account of the usefulness of his FELICITAS to defend the *res publica* against the threat of Catiline and his army. At the conclusion of the *contentio dignitatis*, Cicero invokes the danger posed by Catiline by reminding jurors both of his threat of violence against the *res publica* and of his army of assassins, disgruntled soldiers, and colonists assembling in Northern Italy.³⁵ He plays up the personal threat against his life, recalling how he had to enter the Campus Martius with bodyguards to oversee the election, to demonstrate Catiline's threat to Roman institutions.³⁶ As consul, Murena's military experience and previous success would certainly prove useful to protect the *res publica* from Catiline's army and his radical political agenda.³⁷

Cicero's *contentio dignitatis* thus provides a clear picture of how the claim to FELICITAS of a Roman general can help sway public opinion, create support for a candidacy to a political office, and ultimately lead to his electoral victory, thanks to the *dignitas* given to successful military leaders by the Roman people. For the claim to have FELICITAS to be effective and lead to political power, the Roman people must not only recognise it but also

³³ Cic. *Mur.* 38. Fantham 2013, 139 judiciously notes that through those vivid prosopopoeia Cicero recalls that the ideal general is selfless, general, skillful and FELIX, see Cic. *Leg. Man.* 28, 47-8 and Chapter Five.

³⁴ Cic. *Mur.* 38: *Etenim, si tanta illis comitiis religio est ut adhuc semper omen valuerit praerogativum, quid mirum est in hoc FELICITATIS famam sermonemque valuisse?* (If, moreover, the religious feeling of elections has always been so strong that the votes of the first century have been regarded as an omen, there is no cause for surprise that Murena's reputation for FELICITAS and talk about it had a powerful effect.)

³⁵ Cic. *Mur.* 49. On the events of the so-called second Catilinarian conspiracy, see Plut. *Cic.* 14-22; Dio Cass. 29-49; Sall. *Cat.* 1-61; Cic. *Cat.* 1.1-4.24. For a modern discussion, see for instance Odahl 2010 with reference to previous scholarship; Galassi 2014.

³⁶ Cic. *Mur.* 52. cf. Cic. *Cat.* 1.11.

³⁷ Cic. *Mur.* 49-53. On Catiline's political agenda, see for instance, Dio Cass. 37.25.4; Cic. *Off.* 2.84; Sall. *Cat.* 21.2 see Giovanni 1995, 29-32 with reference to previous scholarship; Schietinger 2017, 174-176; Nebelin 2022, 411-13.

understand its benefits for the *res publica*, namely the peace and glory of Rome. This implies that voters, assembled in the *comitia centuriata* in centuries and squadrons, according to their position in the *exercitus centuriata*, understood the role of armies in the working of the *res publica* and were concerned about Rome's military standing in the world.³⁸ It is in this context, under the promise of military successes, that generals with a proven FELICITAS were able to access high political offices to protect the *res publica*.

6.1.2 FELICITAS, Fonteius & Acquittal

The *dignitas* given to generals with a proven FELICITAS did more than just shape public opinion for a candidate to win an election: it also allowed them to argue for acquittal in trials as part of the honours due because of their military success. This particular role of *dignitas* is evident in several cases that took place throughout the Late Roman Republic.

In 69 BCE, to argue for the acquittal of Fonteius, accused of making money from road construction and tax duties charged on wines, Cicero develops a defence strategy centred around his client's FELICITAS and *dignitas*.³⁹ Fonteius had served as governor of Transalpine Gaul for three years in the mid-seventies. During his time, the province was the theatre of a major Gallic revolt in Aquitania in 77 BCE, and later, served as an important supply base for the Roman armies fighting against Sertorius in Spain.⁴⁰ This military experience as governor, and Fonteius' previous position as legate in both the army defending Macedonia against the Tracians in 77 BCE and possibly 76 BCE, and the army that protected Hispania Ulterior from Gallic tribes in 81 BCE, allows the Roman orator to present his client as FELIX.

Fonteius' ability to conduct warfare successfully, Cicero maintains, could be of service to the *res publica* in the future, especially when the Gauls

³⁸ On the connection between the *comitia centuriata* and the *exercitus centuriatus*, see Chapter Two.

³⁹ On the charges against Fonteius, see Alexander 2002, 67-72, who notes that the outcome of the trial is unknown.

⁴⁰ On the revolt in Aquitania, see Cic. *Leg. Man.* 30; Caes. *BGall* 3.20.1. On the use of a province as supply base, see Cic. *Font.* 13. cf. Sall. *Hist.* 2.98.9M; Plut. *Sert.* 21. On Fonteius' governorship, see Rafferty 2019, 194-5 with references.

could rebel against Rome again. Throughout the speech, Cicero uses the tradition of the Gauls as the archenemies of Rome both to discredit the large number of Gallic witnesses testifying for the prosecution and to strike fear in the minds of the jurors. He reminds his audience that the Gauls “have either within our own memory (to say nothing of ancient times) waged long and bitter wars with the people of Rome.”⁴¹ They are then naturally against Fonteius and the Romans. Playing right into Cicero’s hand are the vague threats of revolts repeatedly allegedly issued by several witnesses and echoed by the prosecutors who warned the jury “to take care because the acquittal of [Fonteius] could kindle some new war in Gaul.”⁴²

Those threats of rebellion are exactly why, Cicero argues, Fonteius should be acquitted since his proven FELICITAS would be needed to defend Rome. In his final plea to jury, the Roman orator advises the jurors to “keep in its service someone whose valour, energy and FELICITAS in warfare have been proved” (*ut ex eo genere homines quorum cognita virtus, industria, FELICITAS in re militari sit diligenter vobis retinendos existimetis*).⁴³ Fonteius’ FELICITAS could be useful to defend the *res publica*, especially at a time when there were not a lot of good commanders left around, and young people were not interested in a military career.⁴⁴ By acquitting Fonteius, Cicero argues jurors will be continuing the tradition of “preserving not only the safety but also the honours” of great generals.⁴⁵ Their acquittal would be the expression of the privileges always given, according to Cicero, to FELICES generals on account of their *dignitas*.

Consequently, for Cicero, Fonteius should be acquitted because his FELICITAS could be useful to the *res publica* against potential military threats

⁴¹ Cic. *Font.* 12.

⁴² Cic. *Font.* 33.

⁴³ Cic. *Font.* 42. see also Cic. *Font.* 43: *virum ad labores belli impigrum, ad pericula fortem, ad usum ac disciplinam peritum, ad consilia prudentem, ad casum fortunamque FELICEM domi vobis ac liberis vestris retinere* (to retain at home in the service of yourselves and your children a man so tireless in the toils of war, so valiant in the face of its perils, so skilled in its theory and its practice, so wise in its strategy, so FELIX in its accidents and its chances).

⁴⁴ Cic. *Font.* 42.

⁴⁵ Cic. *Font.* 42.

and his acquittal is part of honour and liberty given to generals who have proven their FELICITAS. His defence suggests that, in exchange for past and future services to the *res publica*, FELICES Roman generals were given some leeway vis-à-vis Roman laws, as part of the honours and respect due to them by the community.

Cicero is not the only orator in Rome to emphasise the usefulness of his FELICITAS for the *res publica* to argue for a client's acquittal. This line of defence seems to be a feature of extortion trials in the first century BCE.

In 95 BCE in the trial of Manius Aquilius for extortion as proconsul in Sicily in 100-99 BCE, M. Antonius, the lead advocate, argued that his client should be acquitted on account of his military successes.⁴⁶ Unfortunately, the speech has not come down to us. However, comments in Cicero's writing suggest that Antonius fashioned his defence plea in a similar way than Cicero's defence of Fonteius. Antonius mostly likely emphasised the military prowess of Aquilius against the slaves and the ovation held for Aquilius in recognition of his victory to demonstrate Aquilius' FELICITAS.⁴⁷ In his final plea to the jurors, the orator tore his client's toga exposing the wounds Aquilius received while fighting a slave rebellion in his province.⁴⁸ Those wounds apparently supported Antonius' argument that his client, wounded while successfully defending the *res publica*, should be treated as a hero and not be the victim of the cruelty of Roman jurors.⁴⁹ The reasoning implicit here is that, according to Antonius, Aquilius deserved to be acquitted because of his FELICITAS, evident in his military victory against the slaves in Sicily. His acquittal would be the manifestation of the respect the Roman people owed to a man who had protected the *res publica*. Antonius' use of Aquilius' FELICITAS proved successful since, despite being clearly guilty, the Roman general was acquitted.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ On Aquilius' campaign in Sicily, Diod. Sic. 36.10.1; Posidonius *FGrH* 87 F36.

⁴⁷ On Manius Aquilius' ovation, see Cic. *de Or.* 2.195.

⁴⁸ Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.3, *De or.* 2.124, 188, 194-6, *Off.* 2.50, *Brut.* 222; Liv. *Per.* 70; Quint. *Inst.* 2.15.7; see Alexander 1990, 44. On the use of scars in courts and in politics as a demonstration of military ethos, see Leigh 1995, esp. 200-5.

⁴⁹ Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.3.

⁵⁰ Cic. *Flac.* 98.

Similarly, in 70 BCE, shortly before Fonteius' trial, Cicero as prosecutor refuted Verres' attempt to use his FELICITAS to defend himself from charges of extortion during his governorship of Sicily between 73-71 BCE.⁵¹ In his *Second Oration against Verres*, Cicero attacked the argument developed by Hortensius, Verres' lead advocate, that even if Verres is guilty he should be acquitted because "he is a good, FELIX general who must be kept to save the *res publica* in time of military needs" (*sit fur (...) at est BONUS imperator, at FELIX et ad dubia rei publicae tempora reservandus*).⁵² Since the speech was published, but never given as Verres left Rome before the end of his trial, Cicero did not know exactly what Hortensius would have said.⁵³ However, he foresaw that the defence would try to present Verres as a successful general. The defence, Cicero postulated, would claim that "the province of Sicily has been defended against the revolt of the slaves and the perils of war by the exceptional courage and vigilance of Verres."⁵⁴ Hortensius would then remind jurors of the threatening military position of the *res publica*, of the shortage of good generals, and would insist that Rome should not be robbed of a great soldier based on the evidence of Sicilian witnesses and that the record of a good soldier would be destroyed by charges of avarice.⁵⁵

The arguments Cicero assumed Hortensius would use to defend Verres are very similar to the ones Cicero developed for Fonteius: essentially, Verres should be acquitted because his FELICITAS, proven by his military record, could be useful to the *res publica*. The fact that Cicero suspected that Hortensius would use such a line of defence suggests that it was potentially not uncommon at the time. The similarity between the arguments Hortensius, Cicero, and Antonius around FELICITAS and *dignitas* indicates that jurors in the first century BCE may have been receptive to the claim that the potential usefulness of FELIX man in time of crises is worth impunity for crimes

⁵¹ On Verres' trial, see Steel 2001, 22-47, Ricchieri 2020, 13-30.

⁵² Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.4.

⁵³ Cic. *Verr.* 2.1.1. On the publication of the speech, see Frazel 2004.

⁵⁴ Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.1. see Steel 2001, 24-5.

⁵⁵ Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.2. On Hortensius' speech, see Alexander 1976.

(potentially) committed, and that their acquittal is part of the honours and respect due to them on account of their military victory.

6.1.3 Conclusion

The analysis of the judicial pleas used in extortion and bribery trials involving FELICES generals in the Late Roman Republic has revealed new privileges and honours given by the Roman people to individuals who claimed to be FELIX.

Military victory not only proved a general's FELICITAS but also increased his reputation and his social standing in Rome since his successful military campaign demonstrated his VIRTUS while serving the *res publica*. FELICES generals used their *dignitas* to compete for the honours of a political office (*honores*), such as the consulship, since elections in Rome were construed as a *contentio dignitatis* between members of the Roman elite with the Roman people acting as audience, judges and arbiters. Claiming to be FELIX could help sway public opinion in favour of a general or demonstrate his particular suitability for an office.

The potential usefulness of their FELICITAS to the *res publica* in times of crises made FELICES Roman generals valuable members of Roman society. Their value, as Roman orators defending them in trials argued, was grounds to give them the privilege of impunity from Roman laws as part of the honours and respect due to them by the Roman people. This impunity, if given, placed a FELIX general above the political will of the Roman people, of which laws are the legal expression. Claiming to have FELICITAS could give Roman generals access to a particular political place in Roman society.

Roman generals were ascribed FELICITAS by Roman public opinion. As Cicero explains, talk from soldiers about the FELICITAS of Roman general were particular potent to help sway public opinion during elections because Romans were aware of the importance for military experience for the proper working of

the *res publica* and the standing of Rome in the ancient world.⁵⁶ Just like the Senate assessed the outcome of a battle or war to determine whether a Roman general was FELIX, so did the Roman people.

This process is clearly evident in the line of the defence requesting an acquittal based on an individual's FELICITAS. Indeed, its effectiveness rests on jurors, evaluating whether the general was FELIX based on his military records, acknowledging the *dignitas* his FELICITAS grants him, and awarding him the privileges indue to *dignitas* by potentially acquitting him. It demonstrates well the active and passive role played by the Roman people in negotiating the social and political value of the divine quality: an active role because the Roman people determine which military leaders were FELICES, define the *dignitas* of a FELIX military leader, and the honours that ensued; and a passive role because those honours and privileges were expected by, and due to, the victorious generals because of the duties implied by the communal *fides*.⁵⁷

This exchange of (past and future) military successes for social privileges and political power can thus be construed as a form of social contract between FELICES Roman generals and the Roman people articulated around the Roman notion of *dignitas*. Since to claim to (or to be seen to) have *dignitas* means to act in an appropriate way toward the community, FELICES generals could only access those honours and privileges by acting in accordance with Roman moral and social norms.

6.2 FELICITAS or how to act honourably

The perceived violation of those norms by Sulla and Caesar started a debate about the nature of FELICITAS amongst some members of the Roman people. Following their respective victories in their civil wars, both dictators were seen to have acted in ways incompatible with their claim to be FELIX. In 82 BCE, Sulla's victory against Marius' supporters came with an unprecedented level

⁵⁶ On the critical thinking of public opinion in Rome, see Rosillo-López 2017, Hurllet 2019. More generally on critical thinking in Rome in the Late Roman Republic, see Moatti 1997.

⁵⁷ In the context of the election, the same process happens done this time by the Roman people.

of violence and deaths as a hundred thousand men died on the battlefield, eight thousand Roman citizens were massacred in the Villa Publica in Rome, and more than four thousand men were killed during the proscriptions.⁵⁸ This deadly violence, some members of the elite thought, totally undermined Sulla's claim that his FELICITAS had made the *res publica* safe, stable, and prosperous.⁵⁹

Decades later, Caesar fared no better than Sulla as his decision to auction Pompey's and his supporters' properties in the Roman Forum in 46 BCE was construed by some in Rome as a mark of disrespect toward the gods and the Roman community.⁶⁰ For their detractors, Sulla's and Caesar's actions raised a series of ethical and theological questions about the divine quality: indeed, since to have FELICITAS is to ensure the well-being of the *res publica* with the support of the gods, how can an individual who acts against the *res publica* and its citizens claim to be FELIX? How can the gods support him?⁶¹

It is possible to reconstruct two solutions developed at the end of the first century BCE to deal with the ethical and theological issues posed by the discrepancies between Sulla's and Caesar's claim to FELICITAS and their actions. On the one hand, Cicero developed a philosophical framework, which connected FELICITAS to the Roman notion of *honestum*, and in which the gods helped morally good individuals. On the other hand, Stoic thinkers of the end of first century BCE associated FELICITAS with the Stoic idea of VIRTUS, and presented it as an important component of the Stoic good life. Both the Ciceronian and Stoic answer led to a redefinition of what the divine quality was, imbuing its conception with philosophical principles to ensure that any

⁵⁸ For the number for the Civil War, see Diod. Sic. 37.29.5 and App. *B Civ.* 1.103; for the massacre in the Villa Publica, see Strab. 5.4.11; Livy *Per.* 88; for the prosecutions, see Val. Max. 9.2.1. For a good modern discussion, see Eckert 2018, 288 n.25.

⁵⁹ Their view is evident in the literary reception of Sulla by writers in the first century CE. Both Val. Max. 9.2.1 and Sen. *De prov.* 3.27-8 argue that Sulla's cruelty against and profiteering from Roman citizens after his victory are incompatible with his claim to be FELIX, see Erckell 1957, 90; Wistrand 1987, 43; Welch 2008, 190; Eckert 2016, 65-6.

⁶⁰ Cic. *Phil.* 2.64. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see below.

⁶¹ Wistrand 1987, 41.

individual claiming to be FELIX should be seen as acting in a way that guaranteed the safety and the well-being of the *res publica*.

6.2.1 Preserve social cohesion

Cicero's redefinition of the divine quality FELICITAS is formulated through a series of ethical and political arguments he develops throughout his career to contest Sulla's and Caesar's claim to FELICITAS based on their personal and political actions.

The first ethical argument Cicero presents is that Sulla's cruelty, and the extreme violence of his proscriptions, has profoundly harmed Roman social cohesion. Cicero addresses Sulla's actions and its impact on the *res publica* in his defence of Sextus Roscius of Ameria who was accused of parricide in 80 BCE.⁶² At the time, Sulla, as consul, was still a dominant political power in Rome. Cicero's main target in his defence oration was the Sullan freedman Chrysogonus, who alongside with two relatives of Sextus Roscius, had arranged for the proscription of the Elder Sextus Roscius in order to secure legal tenure of his estates. However, the events took place months after the closure of the proscription lists on 1 June 81 BCE making the assassination illegal.⁶³ The conspirators framed the dead man's son for the murder with a false accusation of parricide, hoping their connections with Sulla would help them obtain an easy conviction.

In this context, to obtain an acquittal for his client, Cicero had to absolve Sulla from any responsibility in the death of the Elder Sextus Roscius while attacking Sulla's freedman Chrysogonus. To do so, Cicero presents Sulla as a dictator so focused on the affairs of the state that he could not possibly have known his freedman's criminal schemes.⁶⁴

This portrayal of Sulla, however, enables the Roman orator to attack Sulla's claim to FELICITAS. Cicero's defence of Sulla, in which he notes that "although he [Sulla] is FELIX as he really is, no one can have so much FELICITAS

⁶² I am deeply indebted to Alexandra Eckert for this section, in particular Eckert 2018 and Eckert 2019. On the political consequences of the speech, Steel 2017.

⁶³ On the background of the case, Dyck 2010, 1-19; Steel 2017.

⁶⁴ Cic. *Ros. Am.* 22.

as not to have some dishonest slave or freedman in a large household” (*quamuis ille FELIX sit, sicut est, tamen in tanta FELICITATE nemo potest esse, in magna familia qui neminem neque seruum neque libertum improbum habeat*), ironically highlights Sulla’s bad luck to have a man of low moral/ethics in his entourage.⁶⁵ The irony implicitly raises the question of whether Sulla is truly FELIX since such wicked men are part of his following, and presents the divine quality FELICITAS as incompatible with the notion of *improbus*, “dishonesty”.⁶⁶ By placing this comment at the end of a passage portraying Sulla as the centre of the *res publica*, Cicero makes a clear parallel between Sulla’s bad luck and the *res publica*. Just like Sulla cannot be FELIX because he has an *improbus* in his entourage, Cicero is implicitly asking his audience whether the *res publica* be truly FELIX with *improbi* men amongst its leaders.

Cicero implicitly defines Sulla as one of those *improbi* in his discussion of the impact of Sulla’s proscriptions on Roman society.⁶⁷ Eckert has convincingly shown how his portrayal of the prosecution Cicero intertwines the perspective of the individual and the Roman society as a whole to highlight its horrors.⁶⁸ The Roman orator concretises the loss of individual Romans by naming victims of the prosecutions while evoking the collective experience of the proscriptions through his allusion to the countless heads of proscribed presented to Sulla at the Servian Basin.⁶⁹ Sulla’s cruelty had made him an enemy of the *res publica*. By equating the worst defeats of the past, namely the Battle of Cannae and the Battle of Lake Trasimenus, with the Civil War and the proscriptions, Eckert has rightly noted, Cicero implicitly associates Sulla with Hannibal.⁷⁰ Sulla is then the arch-enemy of the *res publica* as his cruelty and violence has failed the public good.

⁶⁵ Cic. *Ros. Am.* 22.

⁶⁶ On *improbus*, see Hellegouarc’h 1963, 528-30 with reference to ancient sources.

⁶⁷ Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 89–90.

⁶⁸ Eckert 2018, 291-3.

⁶⁹ For the translation of the generalizing plural *Curtios, Marios, denique Memmios* (‘men like Curtius, Marius, Memmius’), see Dyck 2010, 155. For a more detailed discussion of said victims of Sulla’s proscriptions, see Hinard 1985, 347–8 (Curtius), 371–2 (Memmius), 375–7 (Marius) and 330–1 (Antistius).

⁷⁰ Val. Max. 9.2.1; Eckert 2018, 292, 297. The reference to Lake Trasimene is discussed by Stinger 1993, 36; Van der Bloom 2010, 114.

For Cicero, Sulla's wickedness stems from his failure to uphold the values at the heart of Roman society as he explains to jurors in his final plea for the acquittal of his client.⁷¹ There, Cicero calls on the jury to banish cruelty from the *res publica*. To anyone listening to Cicero's plea, it would have been clear that Sulla was responsible for the cruelty against the Roman people and the savage death of many Roman citizens. Sulla's actions eroded Roman social cohesion and the humanity of Roman society because of the continuous atrocities witnessed or reported every hour. The plight of the *res publica* stems from Sulla's failure to act with the leniency and mercifulness, for which, according to Cicero, the Roman people were renowned and which are at the heart of the *humanitas* of Roman society.⁷² By failure to act with the restraint expected of Roman generals in their hour of glory, Sulla cannot claim to be FELIX.

6.2.2 Do NOT desire power and glory

The second ethical argument Cicero outlines this time against Caesar's claim to FELICITAS is that Caesar's desire for power and glory endangers the cohesion and stability of Roman society. Cicero addresses the danger of Caesar's ambition for the *res publica* in a letter sent to his friend Cornelius Nepos, of which one fragment is preserved by Ammianus Marcellinus:

And this Tullius (Cicero) also shows in a letter to Nepos, in which he taxes Caesar with cruelty, saying: "For FELICITAS, he says, is nothing but success in good enterprises (*neque enim quicquam aliud est FELICITAS*" *inquit "nisi honestarum rerum prosperitas*); or, to define it in another way, FELICITAS is good fortune helping good policies (*Vel ut alio modo definiam: FELICITAS est fortuna adiutrix consiliorum bonorum*). He who doesn't pursue these cannot possibly be FELIX (*quibus qui non utitur, FELIX esse nullo pacto potest*). With depraved and wicked policies, such as Caesar's were, there could be no

⁷¹ Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 154.

⁷² Eckert 2020, 161-3.

FELICITAS (*Ergo in perditis impiisque consiliis, quibus Caesar usus est, nulla potuit esse FELICITAS*). In my judgement, Camillus in exile was more fortunate than Manlius at the same period, even if the latter had succeeded in making himself king, as was his ambition (*FELICIORque meo iudicio Camillus exulans quam temporibus isdem Manlius, etiam si - id quod cupierat - regnare potuisset*).⁷³

Unfortunately for us, the date of the letter is unknown.⁷⁴ However, linguistic elements suggest that it was most probably written after Caesar's assassination in 44 BCE. The past tense used in the sentence "with depraved and wicked policies, such as Caesar's were, there could be no FELICITAS" implies that Caesar either has changed his policies or is dead. The latter is further confirmed by the somewhat philosophical language of the definition, in particular the use of the concept of *honestum*, which echoes the main themes of Cicero's main philosophical work of the period *On Duties*.⁷⁵ In his exploration of social duties (*officia*) Cicero writes to his son, to whom the book is dedicated, about "what is morally good" (*honestum*).⁷⁶ Finally, dating the fragment to after 44 BCE would connect the letter with Cicero's sustained attacks on Caesar's FELICITAS in his orations against Mark Antony, the *Philippics*.⁷⁷

Cicero articulates here a new definition of FELICITAS which allies theology, politics, and ethics, by connecting the divine quality with three important notions: "what is morally good" or "the honourable," (*honestum*) "policy or personal action" (*consilium*) and "good fortune" (*fortuna*).

In Roman ethics, *honestum*, designates the moral conduit that allows an individual to increase or protect their respectability in society. It implies a

⁷³ Cic. *frag* 2.5 cf. *Amm. Mar.* 21.16.13.

⁷⁴ On the dating of letter after Caesar's death, see Geiger 1985, 265. On the correspondence between Cicero and Nepos, see Bernard 2012.

⁷⁵ From Cicero's letter to Atticus, it seems that Cicero started to conceive and write *On Duties* in July 44 BCE after Caesar's death in March of that year, see Cic. *Att.* 16.2.6. The work seems to have been completed by November 44 BCE, Cic. *Att.* 16.14.3-4, see Dyck 1998, 8-10; Long 2006, 307-334.

⁷⁶ Cic. *Off.* 1.15.

⁷⁷ Calasso 1962, 19. For the connection between Caesar's FELICITAS and the *Philippics* see discussion below.

knowledge and practice of the Roman collective social and moral norms and duties to be followed and performed according to one's standing in society, gender, and ethnicity.⁷⁸ *Honestum* is thus integrally connected to the *mos maiorum*, the unwritten Roman moral and social ancestral customs that affected private, political and military life in Rome.⁷⁹ By following this code of honour, by making the right social and moral choices, an individual becomes worthy of being honoured by others.⁸⁰ *Honestum* then refers to "what is honourable", that is praiseworthy by others because in accordance with the communal code of honour and results from an individual's adhesion to this code of honour.

In Cicero's writing, *honestum* takes on a philosophical meaning. Indeed, as Cicero 'translates' Greek philosophy into Latin, the word becomes equivalent to the Greek philosophical term "good" (καλον) and comes to refer to "what is morally good" and thus praiseworthy of itself.⁸¹ In particular in *On Duties*, Cicero proposes a new definition of the Roman idea of *honestum*, in which the norms of "what is morally good" are based on both an individual's adhesion to a personal code of conduct and his social obligations created by his position in Roman society.⁸² On one hand, *honestum* for Cicero "depends wholly upon the thought and attention given to it by the mind."⁸³ It is then an expression of an individual's VIRTUS as manifested principally through the practice of virtues such as self-control, temperance, courage and justice, which are themselves implemented as instinct of Nature and developed by reason.⁸⁴ On the other hand, *honestum* is the respect of the social norms and duties imposed by *fides* to ensure the preservation of organised society. Cicero's

⁷⁸ Sall. *Iug.* 29, 2. Jacotot 2013, 461-505.

⁷⁹ Jacotot 2013, 315-20. On the *mos maiorum*, Lind 1979, Wallace-Hadrill 2008, Bettini and Short 2011, 87-130.

⁸⁰ Jacotot 2013, 121, more generally 121-128 with reference to ancient sources.

⁸¹ For a good discussion of Cicero's use of Greek philosophy, Wynne 2019, 1-49 with review of previous scholarship. On the equivalence between *honestum* and καλον, Jacotot 2013, 158-60; Graver 2016.

⁸² Cic. *Off.* 1.15. On the connection of this definition with Stoic philosophy, see Schofield 1995; Dyck 1998, 99-101; Long 2006, 311-2; Arena 2007, 53.

⁸³ Cic. *Off.* 1.79.

⁸⁴ Cic. *Fin.* 5.58.

definition of *honestum* thus blends together Greek moral philosophy with Roman ethics, and there lies all the originality of Cicero's definition of FELICITAS.

Indeed, connecting FELICITAS with *honestum* captures the long-held notion that FELICES Roman generals must act in accordance with Roman social norms to preserve *the res publica*.⁸⁵ What Cicero's new definition of *honestum* adds to the divine quality is a moral dimension.⁸⁶ For Cicero, to claim to be FELIX an individual must act or have acted in an honourable way, namely their actions must display (or be seen as displaying) virtues such as temperance, self-control, or justice.

This moral requirement must manifest itself in the "good policy" (*bonum consilium*) the individual claiming FELICITAS takes. The Latin word *consilium* has a wide range of meaning going from "deliberation" to "strategy" passing by "judgement" and "action; it denotes both the deliberation process that leads to an action as well as the action taken after deliberation."⁸⁷ It is used to refer to both a personal action and a political policy. Connecting FELICITAS to *bonum consilium* then encapsulates the long-held expectation that an individual claiming to be FELIX acts or has acted personally and politically in a way that preserves Roman society.⁸⁸ The equivalence between *bonum consilium* and *honestum* through FELICITAS indicates that, for Cicero, a *consilium* can only be considered good if guided by reason and if fulfilling the social obligations created by one's place in Roman society.

Acting in this manner according to Cicero will attract the favour of the gods. For the Roman orator, FELICITAS is "*fortuna* helping good policies".⁸⁹ Since in the Late Roman Republic *fortuna* was conceived as what happens by chance to an individual, by connecting *fortuna* with *bonum consilium*, Cicero defines FELICITAS as a very specific type of *fortuna*. It is the good fortune which

⁸⁵ For a detailed discussion, see Chapter Three.

⁸⁶ Erckell 1957, 52 rightly notes that Cicero's definition places moral demands on the FELIX general.

⁸⁷ On *consilium*, TLL s.v. *consilium* 4.440.39-461.69; Hellegouarc'h 1963, 254-6.

⁸⁸ On those expectations, see Chapter Three.

⁸⁹ On the connection between *fortuna* and FELICITAS in Cicero's writing, see Chapter Five.

supports the implementation of good moral personal or political actions, or in other word, the enactment of the *honestum*. It is unclear from the language of the fragment whether *fortuna* refers to the concept or the deity, and thus whether the good fortune experienced by those who are FELIX comes from the goddess Fortuna or the gods in general.⁹⁰ Whichever divine power is granting this good fortune is giving its favour based on account of an individual's VIRTUS, of which *honestum* is the social recognition. Cicero's view of FELICITAS then is very much in line with the prevalent conception of FELICITAS since the mid-second century BCE and Lucullus' construction of the temple to the goddess FELICITAS.⁹¹ What is new here, however, is that the standards by which this divine agency assesses whether an individual deserves divine help for his actions are no longer defined by Roman traditional ethical norms but on a new Roman morality imbued with Greek philosophy as created by Cicero. Divine powers then only support morally good individuals acting for the preservation of Roman society.

The political expediency of Cicero's definition is visible in the comparison the Roman orator makes between the exile of M. Furius Camillus and the death of M. Manlius Capitolinus; it allows the Roman orator to refute Caesar's claim to FELICITAS by arguing that Caesar's desire for power was dangerous for the *res publica* because it was contrary to the will of the people. Understanding the connection the Roman orator makes between Caesar and the two legendary Roman heroes requires me to explore briefly their story and how Cicero uses Camillus' life and deeds in his rhetoric.

Roman tradition has it that Camillus, a Roman general from the fifth and fourth century BCE, who led the capture of the city of Veii in 396 BCE, was prosecuted by a tribune of the plebs for the embezzlement of some of the Tuscan spoils.⁹² The prosecution was motivated by Camillus' opposition to the

⁹⁰ Cicero's phrase "good fortune helping good policies" (*fortuna adiutrix consiliorum bonorum*) echoes Plautus' sentence "that fortune will come to [his] help" (*fortuna fuerit adiutrix tibi*) which refers to the goddess Fortuna, cf. Plaut. *Poen.* 973.

⁹¹ On Lucullus' temple, see Chapter Four.

⁹² Livy 5.32.6-33.1; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 13.5; Plut. *Cam.* 12.1-13.2.

redistribution of lands taken from Veii.⁹³ Rather than paying a fine, Camillus voluntarily went into exile. He later returned to Rome to save the city besieged by the Gauls in 390 BCE. During the siege of the Capitoline, Manlius Capitolinus, roused by the cackling of the sacred geese, defended the citadel against a nocturnal attack of the Gauls.⁹⁴ After saving Rome, Camillus was appointed dictator for the reconstruction of Rome. During the reconstruction, Manlius defended the plebeians against debt collectors and was prosecuted for aspiring to become king.⁹⁵ The trial assembly first met on the Capitoline and was quickly adjourned after Manlius reminded people of his heroic actions against the Gauls. Camillus move the trial outside of wall of the city, and there, Manlius was found guilty and later sentenced to death in 385 BCE. He was pushed down from the Tarpeian Rock on the south side of the Capitoline.⁹⁶

The analysis of the various accounts of the life of Camillus and of Manlius has shown the existence of different traditions. Camillus' opposition to the plebs, his prosecution, and his voluntary exile are part of a late tradition of the story which borrowed elements from Greek and Roman history from the second and first centuries BCE.⁹⁷ Camillus' trial, for instance, strongly evokes the trials of the Scipiones in 187 BCE and his title as 'dictator to reconstruct Rome' is reminiscent of Sulla's title as dictator.⁹⁸ Manlius' successful defence of the Capitoline seems to be the most widespread and popular account amongst the many traditions of the Gallic sack of Rome in 390 BCE.⁹⁹ It is not clear when the story was created. Some scholars date its origin to the middle of the fourth century BCE; many take the position that it was created as an aetiological story to explain the cognomen Capitolinus.¹⁰⁰ Despite the

⁹³ Plut. *Cam.* 8.1-2, 11.1-2.

⁹⁴ Liv. 5.47; Diod. Sic. 14.116; Plut. *Cam.* 2.7; Zon 7.2.3.

⁹⁵ Livy 6.14–19.

⁹⁶ Livy 6. 20.

⁹⁷ Gaertner 2008, 30 with relevant bibliography on the extensive analysis done on Camillus' story and its transmission.

⁹⁸ For the connection between Scipio and Camillus, see Tränkle 1998, in particular 162. For good analysis of the parallel between Camillus and Sulla, see Täubler 1912.

⁹⁹ Horsfall 1981; Lentzsch 2017, 140.

¹⁰⁰ For a good summary of the various position on the issue, see Lentzsch 2017, 140 n.70.

questionable veracity of both stories, they were part of the tradition of the Gallic invasion all Romans, including Cicero, knew.

Cicero mentions Camillus' exile as the first of a number of examples that can be used to illustrate the Roman people's ingratitude toward their great statesman and at the end of which he places his own exile, in his philosophical work *On the Commonwealth*.¹⁰¹ He develops a similar line of argument in his speech *On his House*, in which he compares his own exile and return to Camillus as they both suffered "the violence and hatred of the people roused against them."¹⁰² Cicero, it seems, used Camillus' life and deeds as a yardstick to measure and interpret his own political achievements and setbacks. This particular use of Camillus' life has led Jan Gaertner to read the reference to Camillus in the letter to Nepos as a parallel between Cicero's own exile and his political rivalry with Clodius, and Camillus' exile and his antagonism with Manlius.¹⁰³ Such a reading, however, does not take into account the general topic under discussion in the fragment, namely Caesar, and in particular, Cicero's attack on Caesar's FELICITAS.

Since the Roman orator considers Camillus' exile as due to the violence and hatred against him, it is possible to read the clause *temporibus isdem*, "at the same period," as an allusion to the ingratitude of the Roman people which both Manlius and Camillus experienced. Through his comparison of Camillus' and Manlius' fate, Cicero then presents exile as the moral action, *consilium bonum*, favoured by *fortuna* when an individual is faced with the violence and hatred of the people against him. If the letter is dated after Caesar's assassination as I maintain, the mention of Manlius can be easily understood as an allusion to Caesar's fate. For Cicero then, Caesar, just like Manlius, ruled like a king and died because of his desire for power, against the will of the people. Since *honestum* creates consideration from other people, Caesar's rule, which according to Cicero was contrary to the will of the people, cannot

¹⁰¹ Cic. *Rep.* 1.5-6, cf. Gaertner 2008, 45-8

¹⁰² Cic. *Dom.* 85-86.

¹⁰³ Gaertner 2008, 46 n. 80.

be seen as a “morally good thing” or “a thing that brings honour” (*res honestae*). For this ethical reason, Caesar cannot have had FELICITAS.

6.2.3 Do NOT act like a tyrant

Cicero developed the intellectual framework outlined in his letter to Nepos in his main philosophical work after Caesar’s death, *On Duties*, to articulate a final political argument to contest both Caesar’s and Sulla’s claim to FELICITAS.¹⁰⁴ For him, both dictators endangered the *res publica* by assuming the role of tyrant by auctioning off the property of their enemies to their allies.¹⁰⁵

In *On Duties*, the Roman orator maintains that the preservation of Roman society, from which emanates the *honestum*, is achieved by two means. The first means is justice, “the crowning glory of virtues and the bases on which men are called ‘good men’ (*BONI viri*).”¹⁰⁶ For Cicero, justice entails two main duties: firstly, that no one should harm another unless he has been provoked by injustice, and secondly, that one should treat common goods as common and private ones as one’s own goods.”¹⁰⁷

The second means to preserve organised society is for the leading men to act for the good of the people regardless of their own personal interest. As Cicero states, the “chief goal of all men should be that the interest of each individual and of the whole political body be identical.”¹⁰⁸ This principle is particularly important for the *praestantes viri*, the leading men handling the business of the *res publica*. Cicero invites them to abide by Plato’s advice: first, “to firmly keep in mind what is beneficial to the citizens (...) while forgetting their personal interest,” and secondly, “to act in the interest of the whole *res publica* not serving the interests of some one party to betray the rest.”¹⁰⁹ As

¹⁰⁴ On the writing and publication of *On Duties*, see Dyck 1998, 8-17.

¹⁰⁵ On the origin of the concept of tyranny in Rome, see Kalyvas 2007. On the use of the tyrant in Roman political discourse and Roman historiography, see Dunkle 1971; Pina Polo 2017; Roller 2018, 238-51.

¹⁰⁶ Cic. *Off.* 1.20.

¹⁰⁷ Cic. *Off.* 1.20.

¹⁰⁸ Cic. *Off.* 3.26.

¹⁰⁹ Cic. *Off.* 1.85. see also Pl. *Leg* 715b, *Resp.* 1.342e, 4.420c, 421b.

Cicero explains, the management of the *res publica* is like a guardianship, which must be conducted for the benefit of the trustee, not the guardians.¹¹⁰

One of the main duties of those guardians, Cicero declares, is “to ensure that everyone holds to what is his own and that private citizens are never deprived of their goods by public acts.”¹¹¹ This duty emanates from the fact that, according to Cicero, private propriety exists by the laws of human society and is the very reason for the creation of political community and citizenship.¹¹² To violate an individual’s private property therefore contravenes not only the principle of justice by which each individual is given what he is due, but also the *ius humanae societatis*, the fellowship of man at heart of any human society.¹¹³

In Cicero’s view, worthy leaders will ideally dedicate themselves unreservedly to his country pursuing neither wealth nor power and will protect the whole *res publica* in a way that the interest of no one is disregarded.¹¹⁴ By contrast, men enslaved to their own emotion, such as their excessive desire for glory and power, will disregard the principle of justice and forget about the common good.¹¹⁵ They will pursue policies that redistribute resources to their and their allies’ advantage, disregarding the rest of the citizen body and the *honestum*, and thus assume the role of tyrants.¹¹⁶

By confiscating private properties to auction them out to their friends and allies, Caesar and Sulla both fall into this category of leaders, tyrants. Since those auctions disregard the public interest, fail to adhere the principle of justice, as they removes to a citizen his dues, and ultimately endanger organised society, according to Cicero’s definition, neither Sulla nor Caesar can claim to be FELIX. Cicero uses the connections between tyranny,

¹¹⁰ Cic. *Off.* 1.85

¹¹¹ Cic. *Off.* 2.73.

¹¹² Cic. *Off.* 1.21 cf. Wood 1988, 111-5. Cic. *Off.* 2.73 cf. Wood 1988, 130-132; Long 2006, 335-59; Barlow 2012.

¹¹³ Cic. *Off.* 3.22. Arena 2007, 56-7.

¹¹⁴ Cic. *Off.* 1.86.

¹¹⁵ Cic. *Off.* 118

¹¹⁶ Cic. *Off.* 3.36. see Arena 2007, 53-7 who shows how Cicero develops a new definition of tyranny in Rome.

FELICITAS, and private property to contest explicitly and implicitly Caesar's and Sulla's claim to the divine quality in his political speeches.

One of the best examples of this contestation can be found in Cicero's second Philippic speech against Mark Antony, in which the Roman orator vehemently denies the dictator's claim to be FELIX after his victory against Pompey¹¹⁷ – despite its length, I have quoted the text in full because of its importance for my argument:

Caesar came back from Alexandria FELIX, as he seemed at least to himself (*Caesar Alexandria se recepit FELIX, ut sibi quidem videbatur*); but in my opinion no one can be FELIX who is *infelix* for the republic (*mea autem sententia, qui rei publicae sit infelix, FELIX esse nemo potest*). The spear was set up in front of the temple of Jupiter Stator, and the property of Cnaeus Pompeius Magnus—(miserable that I am, for even now that my tears have ceased to flow, my grief remains deeply implanted in my heart),—the property, I say, of Cnaeus Pompeius the Great was submitted to the pitiless voice of the auctioneer. On that one occasion the *res publica* forgot its slavery, and groaned aloud; and though men's minds were enslaved, as everything was kept under by fear, still the groans of the Roman people were free (*una in illa re servitutis oblita civitas ingemuit, servientibusque animis, cum omnia metu tenerentur, gemitus tamen populi Romani liber fuit*). While all men were waiting to see who would be so impious, who would be so mad, who would be so declared an enemy to gods and to men as to dare to mix himself up with that wicked auction, no one was found except Antonius, even though there were plenty of men collected round that spear who would have dared anything else (*expectantibus omnibus, quisnam esset tam impius, tam demens, tam dis hominibusque hostis, qui ad illud scelus sectionis auderet accedere, inventus est nemo praeter Antonium,*

¹¹⁷ On the connection between *On Duties* and *Philippics*, see Lepore 1954, 387; Dyck 1998, 9; Michel 2003, 640.

praesertim cum tot essent circum hastam illam, qui alia omnia auderent).¹¹⁸

Caesar's tyranny, and its compatibility with his claim to be FELIX are the central themes of this passage. With his statement that "no one can be FELIX who is *infelix* for the *res publica*," Cicero reminds his audience of the connection between the FELICITAS of a Roman general and the well-being of the *res publica*. For Cicero, the *res publica* is *infelix* because under Caesar's dictatorship, the *res publica*, and the mind of its citizens, are enslaved by fear – note Cicero's use of *servitus* twice to qualify the *res publica* and its citizens. The use of the imagery of slavery suggests that the Roman people had lost its *libertas*, its freedom, under Caesar's rule.¹¹⁹ Fear, according to Cicero, is one of the emotions that creates the condition under which men give up their own independence and put themselves under the influence of those who wish to dominate them.¹²⁰ The Roman people's fear of Caesar and his armies has made it lose its freedom and accept Caesar's domination.

Caesar's tyranny is perfectly illustrated by the scene Cicero describes in the speech, namely Caesar's sale of Pompey's property in the Roman Forum.¹²¹ For Cicero, Mark Antony's decision to participate in the auction is as "impious, mad, [and] an offence to both man and gods" as Caesar's decision to auction Pompey's property in the first place. His depiction of the auction as an offence to man can be taken as an allusion to his view that preservation of private property is essential for the preservation of the fellowship of man at the heart of Roman society. By auctioning Pompey's property, Caesar acts like a tyrant redistributing resources in the community to his allies such as Mark Antony. For Cicero, Caesar's tyranny, since it does not follow the principle of justice or the common good, and is based on the enslavement of the Roman

¹¹⁸ Cic. *Phil.* 2.64.

¹¹⁹ For Romans, *libertas* was the status of non-slavery, see Arena 2012, 14–44.

¹²⁰ Cic. *Off.* 2.22. For a good study of the connection between liberty and fear, see Arena 2007, especially 54-56.

¹²¹ On the political significance of this passage, see Cristofoli 2004, 192-5.

people through fear, makes the *res publica infelix*, and thus Caesar's claim to have FELICITAS untenable.

In this passage then, Cicero contests Caesar's claim to the divine quality over whether the *res publica* has been made *melior*. The notions of the *res amplior* and *melior*, as defined by the prayers of the ritual of *lustrum*, are integral to the way Romans conceived the future of the *res publica* and evaluated the military contribution of the Roman generals.¹²² Following his defeat of Pompey and his settlement of the dynastic dispute in Egypt, Caesar could rightly claim to be FELIX, since in his view, his military victory had protected the *res publica* and brought peace. For Cicero, however, Caesar failed to make the *res publica melior* because his victory has led to the enslavement of the *res publica* through fear and led to the redistribution of the wealth of some of its citizens to others. The Roman orator's denial of Caesar's FELICITAS because the FELICITAS of the Romans has not been achieved despite Caesar's military victory, shows that the determination of whether the *res publica* was *melior* and *amplior* was both subjective and highly political.¹²³ It also indicates that that military success was no longer the main necessary criterion to claim FELICITAS. For some members of Roman society, how a Roman general behaved after his victory toward their enemies and other Roman citizens was as important as his victory in the first place – particularly if the victory ends a civil war; for some Romans, like Cicero, the divine quality had an integral political dimension.

The Roman orator levelled the same criticism about tyrannical rule against Sulla to attack implicitly his claim to be FELIX. Just like with Caesar, it is the sale of private property to Sulla's friend and allies that make the dictator's rule a tyranny for Cicero. In *On Duties*, Cicero writes that Sulla disgraced his victory despite fighting for a righteous cause, when "he had the effrontery to announce that "he was selling his spoils" when he had planted his spear and was selling under the hammer in the [Roman] forum the property of men who

¹²² On the *lustrum* and the FELICITAS of the Romans, see Chapter Two.

¹²³ For another example, see the trial of Cato the Elder, Chapter Two.

were patriots, and men of wealth and, at least, Roman citizens.”¹²⁴ Similarly, in his second speech against the agrarian law proposal of the tribune of the plebs P. Servilius Rullus in 63 BCE, Cicero reminds his audience of Sulla’s auction in the Roman Forum to cast Rullus’ law proposal, which included some provision to establish Sullan profiteers as legal owners of plots of illegally-occupied land adjacent to estates purchased during Sulla’s prosecutions, as a continuation of Sulla’s unjust policies.¹²⁵ This redistribution of resource to Sulla’s and his allies’ advantage, for Cicero, makes Sulla a leader who disregards what is beneficial for rest of the citizen body and the principle of justice. By acting in such a way, according to Cicero’s new definition of FELICITAS, Sulla cannot claim to be FELIX.

Tying our discussion together, to contest Sulla’s and Caesar’s claim to FELICITAS, Cicero shows that the political and personal actions of two Roman dictators have failed to ensure the safety and well-being of the *res publica* on three accounts. After his victory against Marius and his forces in 82 BCE, Sulla’s cruelty unleashed an extreme violence against Roman citizens. In his defence of Sextus Roscius of Ameria, Cicero implicitly attacked Sulla’s FELICITAS by questioning whether Sulla’s victory had truly made the *res publica amplior* and *melior* when his wickedness and cruelty had led to the death of countless Roman citizens. Caesar did not act any better than Sulla in Cicero’s eyes since the dictator’s ambition for glory and power endangered the bonds at the very heart of Roman society.

To connect the preservation of Roman community with FELICITAS, Cicero formulate a new definition of the divine quality centred on the notion of *honestum*, “what is just,” which emanates from the preservation of organised society through the adherence to the principles of justice and of the common good, and from an individual’s VIRTUS as manifested through the practices of virtues such as self-control, temperance, courage and justice. FELICITAS is now

¹²⁴ Cic. *Off.* 2.27, 2.83. Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.81.

¹²⁵ For the reference to Sulla’s auction, see Cic. *Leg. agr.* 2.56. Dyck 1998, 403-4. On the provisions of Rullus’ law, Cic. *Leg. agr.* 2.69-70.

the divine help given to individuals who are morally good and act to preserve the *res publica*.

In his political and philosophical writings after Caesar's death, Cicero demonstrates how Caesar's ambition for power and glory led him to pursue political and personal policies that totally discard the *honestum*, placing his own interest above what is beneficial to the community. Comparing Caesar's death with that of the legendary Roman hero Manlius Capitolinus allows the Roman orator to maintain that the Roman dictator was not FELIX because his rule was against the will of the people.

For Cicero, by auctioning their enemies' properties, both Sulla and Caesar assume the role of the tyrant. This redistribution of private property of other Roman citizens to their and their allies' advantage not only disregards the principle of justice but also undermines the fellowship of man which underpins Roman society.

Cicero's discussion of how the two dictators failed to ensure the safety and well-being of the *res publica* places the actions of Sulla and Caesar as part of the 'exemplary discourse' in Rome as two *exempla* to spurn. His discussion of their actions allows him to outline an ideal model for how someone claiming to have FELICITAS should act. It presents a sort of moral and ethical code, with which to evaluate subsequent claims to FELICITAS, and available for anyone desirous of claiming the divine quality. Central to Cicero's moral code is the adherence to a particular notion of *honestum* "what is morally good" by respecting the principle of justice, of common good, and of private property in order to protect the social cohesion of Roman society and the political liberty of the Romans.

How well-known and widespread throughout Roman society Cicero's ideas about FELICITAS were is unclear. The acquittal of Sextus Roscius suggests that jurors were sensitive to Cicero's veiled criticism of Sulla's FELICITAS, to his description of Sulla's prosecution, and to his plea to eliminate cruelty from Roman society. Since the court jurors in the first century BCE were composed of *equites* and senators, this would then imply that some members

of the Roman elite may share Cicero's view on Sulla's claim to FELICITAS.¹²⁶ Cicero's depiction of the Rullan Agrarian law proposal as a continuation of Sulla's unfair politics of wealth redistribution may have carried some weight with the Roman people since the proposal was in the end voted down.¹²⁷ It would seem then that some members of the Roman people were aware of, and may have even agreed with the ethical and political arguments Cicero presented to critique Sulla's and Caesar's actions as dictator and to dispute their respective claim to FELICITAS.

His definition of FELICITAS seems to have circulated mainly in Roman elite circles. It was not uncommon for recipients of letters to share a particular letter with their social circle: this may well have happened with Cicero's letter to Nepos.¹²⁸ Cicero's *On Duties*, for its part, was very likely published by Atticus, and some of its passages may have been read in Atticus' dinner parties, similarly to Cicero's *About Glory* which Atticus had read at one of his dinner party at the orator's request.¹²⁹ Finally, the second Philippic, in which Cicero directly contests Caesar's FELICITAS, was most likely never delivered in the Senate, and just published as a pamphlet in early December 44 BCE. As such, Cicero's speech was thus accessible to literate and learned members of Roman society, who may not have agreed with him, but were definitively exposed to his new approach to the divine quality.

¹²⁶ The composition of court jurors varied in Late Roman Republic. With the introduction of permanent court in Rome in 149 BCE the courts were controlled by senators. In 123 BCE, Gaius Gracchus passed the control of the court to the knight (*equites*). In 106 BCE, the control of the courts was passed back to senators and a period of alternation between juries composed of knights alternated with juries composed of senators and finally in 70 BCE juries composed of members of both orders, to which was added even a third category of *tribuni aerarii* ('tribunes of the treasury', a distinct status group). For an history of court composition, see David 2022, 433-5 with references.

¹²⁷ On failure of agrarian proposal, see for instance Cic. *Pis.* 4; Plut. *Cic.* 12.1-5. On the *rogatio*, for instance, see Drummond 1995 and 2000; Arena 2012, 225.

¹²⁸ For the reading of letters in public, for instance, see Cicero's reading of the letter of the Catilinarian conspirator, cf. Cic. *Cat.* 3.4-7, 3.13. On epistolary practices, see for instance Jenkins 2006, 75-9.

¹²⁹ Cic. *Att.* 16.2, 16.3 cf. Murphy 1998, 498-501.

6.2.4 Or, simply, Live in accordance with Nature

Cicero was not the only member of the Roman elite to attempt to redefine FELICITAS ethically following the (perceived) abuse of power from Sulla and Caesar. Roman Stoic followers, it seems, formulated a new definition of the divine quality based on Stoic principles.¹³⁰ Traces of this definition of FELICITAS can be found in Cicero's philosophical treatise *On moral ends* published in 45 BCE and dedicated to Brutus.¹³¹ In the third book of his philosophical treatise, Cicero, as the narrator of and a character in the treatise, explores the principles of Stoicism in a discussion with the character of Cato the Younger, a well-known Stoic of the first century BCE.¹³² At the beginning of the book, the character of Cato describes the principles of Stoicism and ends his description by presenting the ultimate aim of Stoic life. He declares that the final aim is to live with VIRTUS, that is "to live in agreement and harmony with nature, it necessarily follows that all wise men at all times live FELICITER, perfectly and fortunately, free from all hindrance, interference or want" (*cum igitur hoc sit extremum, congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere, necessario sequitur omnes sapientes semper FELICITER, absolute, fortunate vivere, nulla re impediri, nulla prohiberi, nulla egere*).¹³³

Views on this sentence amongst modern scholars studying FELICITAS have varied. Welch has maintained that through this comment "Cicero introduced the philosophical idea that the good man is *felicior* than a criminal who [has] won."¹³⁴ She has interpreted the sentence as a celebration of the death of Cato in 46 BCE of whom Cicero extolls the virtue, the wisdom, and the suicide. For Welch, Cicero suggests that Cato, as a wise man, was better placed to judge the real meaning of FELICITAS compared to Caesar. By being free of culpability, Cato's life became an *exemplum* to determine whether an individual is FELIX. Cicero, as Welch has concluded, openly ascribes the moral dimension to the divine quality he had attached to Pompey in the *In Favour of*

¹³⁰ On Stoicism in Rome, see Sedley 2003, 24-32; Reydams-Schils 2016.

¹³¹ Cic. *Fin.* 1.1.3.6.

¹³² On Cato's stoicism, Cic. *Mur.* 60-66, see also Craig 1986, Stem 2005.

¹³³ Cic. *Fin.* 3.26.

¹³⁴ Welch 2008, 207.

the Manilian Law.¹³⁵ Welch's reading highlights the moral and ethical dimension of FELICITAS in this passage, and rightly notes that Cicero presents Cato as a model of a FELIX *vir*. It, however, does not take into account the context of the passage in Cicero's treaty, namely the introduction of the ultimate goals of Stoic philosophy, and thus fails to note that the definition of FELICITAS Cato presents - and that Cicero uses to elevate Cato's life to an *exemplum* - is Stoic.

Unlike Welch, Wistrand has noted the new context in which FELICITAS was used and has highlighted the change of meaning of the word.¹³⁶ The use of the word *feliciter* to describe the undisturbed happiness which a Stoic man achieves is unusual and unique for the time. As Wistrand rightly commented the adjective normally used in this context is *beatus* not *felix*.¹³⁷ His insight suggests that there may have been a conceptual equivalence between the two words in Stoic philosophy in the late first century BCE.¹³⁸ The use of FELICITAS to describe the undisturbed happiness that a Stoic man achieves is a hallmark of Stoic philosophy from the first century CE as developed in the writing of Seneca. Since there is only one occurrence of the word *feliciter* to describe Stoic happiness, it is hard to evaluate the prevalence of this equivalence in Stoic writings in the Late Roman Republic. Nevertheless, this substitution gives us some insights into what a Stoic definition of FELICITAS might have looked like.

In the sentence, the adverb *feliciter* denotes the condition that results from living with VIRTUS, or in other words, to live in agreement and harmony with Nature.¹³⁹ For Stoics, Nature is a complex and multivalent concept with several meanings. According to the theory of *oikeiôsis*, to live with Nature means to live in accordance with the experience of what happens by Nature.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, for Stoics, the first impulse of human beings is to protect themselves

¹³⁵ Welch 2008, 207.

¹³⁶ See definition of Felicitas as happiness in Chapter One.

¹³⁷ Wistrand 1987, 90 n.19.

¹³⁸ On the connection between FELICITAS and *beatus*, see Chapter One.

¹³⁹ On the final ends of Stoicism, see Schofield 2003, 239-46; Brennan 2005, 134-53.

¹⁴⁰ On the theory of *oikeiôsis*, see Brennan 2005, 154-168; Vogt 2008, 100-7.

since they have been made ‘familiar’ with themselves (*oikeion*) or have a sense of ‘appropriation’ (*oikeiôsis*) by nature from the start.¹⁴¹ Since all human-beings are rational beings, reason (*logos*) is at the core of this impulse. With the proper education, human beings can perfect their reason, and by understanding how VIRTUS *as reason* is the only good, can do what is appropriate or what is good – i.e justified by reason – more and more consistently. Only the sage has perfect reason and thus can live in a reasonable way by Nature. For Stoics, therefore, to live in agreement with Nature is to live in accordance with reason as a virtue and to do what is good or what is appropriate to oneself.

The same theory holds that to live in accordance with Nature means to live in agreement with all other human beings. Indeed, since human-beings are familiar with themselves, and are part of nature, being familiar with their own natures means to understand that one is familiar with, or belongs to, all of Nature. It follows then that all other human beings belong to themselves, and thus should be regarded, as themselves. Human beings should aim to have, like the sage, ‘rational feelings’ toward others (*eupatheia*), a kindly disposition, displayed through kindness, warmth, generosity, and affection.¹⁴² By nature, since human beings, gods, and sages are rational beings, they belong to same community of *reason*; the difference between humans and gods is that humans may strive for perfect reason while the gods and the sages have perfect reason.¹⁴³ Understanding that one belongs together with all other human beings in a community as part of Nature as a whole has the fundamental ethical implication that concerns of others are one’s concerns.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, to live in agreement with Nature also means to consistently act in a way that is good, namely to take the concerns of others as ones’ own.

The implication of the theory of the *oikeiôsis* for FELICITAS is clear: to live *FELICITER* means to live by consistently acting in a way that is appropriate

¹⁴¹ Brennan 2005, 51-61; Vogt 2008, 100.

¹⁴² Vogt 2008, 104 with reference to ancient sources.

¹⁴³ Vogt 2008, 105-6 with reference to ancient sources.

¹⁴⁴ Vogt 2008, 108 with reference to ancient sources.

to oneself and to others by using *reason* as VIRTUS. Since human beings have imperfect reason, the state described by FELICITAS can only be achieved through proper practice and education of one's VIRTUS; only the sage who has perfect reason by Nature can live with FELICITAS. This is why this state of happiness is described as the ultimate goal of Stoic philosophy.

Since, for Stoics, Nature also refers to the entire cosmos, to live in agreement and harmony with Nature means to live in accordance with the cosmic active principle (*logos*).¹⁴⁵ According to Stoic metaphysics, cosmic nature is a rationally organized and well-ordered system, and is coextensive with the will of the impersonal Stoic God, which represents the cosmic active principle.¹⁴⁶ All events that occur within the universe fit within a coherent, well-structured scheme that is providential.¹⁴⁷ Since there is no room for chance in this system, Stoic metaphysical determinism dictates that this cosmic Nature is identical to fate.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, the Stoic God provides equal benevolent/providential care for all component parts of the universe (the sea, air, rocks, plants and animals, and humans) in a way that no other part of the universe suffers any need.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, for Stoics, to live in agreement with Nature, to live FELICITER, means to live one's life according to the sequence of events that are fated to occur in the rationally constituted universe, as providentially willed by the Stoic God.

From this brief exposition of what a Stoic FELICITAS might have been, it is evident that his new definition constitutes a radical shift compared to the prevalent conceptions of the divine quality in the first century BCE. Indeed, FELICITAS is no longer connected to *fortuna*, "what happens by chance" but to notion of fate. While the divine quality still refers to the divine blessing from the Stoic God, those favours no longer emanate from the personal relationship of an individual with the gods since the Stoic God is impartial and equally benevolent to all parts of the cosmos. The happiness described by FELICITAS

¹⁴⁵ Brunchschwig 2003; Boeri 2009.

¹⁴⁶ Sedley 2002; Wynne 2019, 124-132.

¹⁴⁷ Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.56. Bénatouïl 2009 with other ancient reference.

¹⁴⁸ Fede 2003; Brennan 2005, 235-241; Sauv  Meyer 2009.

¹⁴⁹ Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.58 c.f Wynne 2019, 134-5.

is only experienced by the sage, who has perfect reason by Nature, and is a goal to which all human beings can strive by perfecting their reason. Finally, for the Stoic, the cosmos is the only city, the place the community of reason inhabits, different from ordinary cities because the laws of those cities are not the common law identical with reason and the Stoic God.¹⁵⁰ Since to live FELICITER means to consistently act in a way that is appropriate to oneself and to others, in the context of ordinary cities such as Rome for instance, according to Stoic philosophy, FELICITAS can be construed as the moral contribution of an individual to an ordinary community.

In his refutation of Stoic philosophy in the fourth book of the treaty, Cicero not only confirms that such a Stoic definition of FELICITAS existed but also objects to it because it implies a rejection of the traditional meanings and use of the concept. His argument confirms several points of the Stoic definition outlined earlier. Indeed, Cicero questions “whether the Senate would be able to decree a triumph to Scipio Africanus using the formula by reason of his valour’ or ‘FELICITAS’ if no one but a sage can truly be said to possess either valour or FELICITAS” (*an senatus, cum triumphum Africano decerneret, 'quod eius VIRTUTE' aut 'FELICITATE' posset dicere, si neque virtus in ullo nisi in sapiente nec FELICITAS vere dici potest?*)¹⁵¹

Scholars have rightly understood the contrast Cicero set up in this sentence but have failed to explore its wider implication. Wagenvoort has noted that Cicero’s language mimics the official language used to decree triumphs for victorious generals by the Senate.¹⁵² Erkell and Wistrand have both correctly identified the fact that Cicero in this sentence is contrasting two different meanings of the word, namely FELICITAS as denoting success and as denoting happiness.¹⁵³ Both perceived that those two different meanings of the word *felicitas* imply two different conceptual representations.¹⁵⁴ While

¹⁵⁰ Vogt 2008, 65-67 with reference to ancient sources. On the stoic city, see Schofield 1991; Wynne 2019, 126-8.

¹⁵¹ Cic. *De fin.* 4.9.22.

¹⁵² Wagenvoort 1954, 69. For a more detailed discussion of the language and its implication for FELICITAS see Chapter Three.

¹⁵³ Erkell 1952, 58; Wagenvoort 1954, 66-7.

¹⁵⁴ On modern linguistic theory, see Introduction.

Wagenvoort has highlighted that FELICITAS as happiness represents a quality which emanates from an individual, Erkell has judiciously recognized that this new conception of FELICITAS is connected to Cicero's discussion of concept of *beatitudo*.¹⁵⁵ Erkell's and Wistrand's interpretations both fail to measure the full implication of the passage because neither take into account Cicero's comment within the wider context of the philosophical treaty, namely that in the fourth book, Cicero is refuting the principles of Stoic philosophy exposed in the third book.¹⁵⁶

In that context, Cicero's use of FELICITAS echoes his definition of the ultimate goals of the Stoic life presented at the beginning of the third book, and thus should be read in conjunction with it. With this rhetorical question then, the Roman orator highlights that this Stoic definition breaks away from the traditional conception of the divine quality since FELICITAS is only truly experienced by the sage because of his perfect reason by Nature. By this definition then no human beings could ever claim to be truly FELIX since their reason is not perfect. Cicero rejects this new definition of FELICITAS because it is disconnected from Roman political reality. When the Roman orator acerbically asks "what sort of a philosophy this is, which speaks the ordinary language in public, but in its treatises employs an idiom of its own?," his remark highlights that the re-definition of a FELICITAS as an attribute of the wise man is not politically useful as it implies a radical change of conception of FELICITAS.¹⁵⁷ While this Stoic definition allows to judge ethically the actions of Caesar and Sulla as morally bad, it does not permit to articulate a political attack on their claim to have FELICITAS.

6.3 Conclusion

Cicero's association of FELICITAS with the concept of *honestum*, which both means 'what is worthy of honour' and 'what is honourable' in his new definition

¹⁵⁵ Erkell 1952, 58; Wagenvoort 1954, 69.

¹⁵⁶ On Cicero's criticism of Stoicism, see Ioppolo 2016 with reference to previous scholarship.

¹⁵⁷ Cic. *De fin.* 4.9.22. The comment also points to the fact that Stoics use everyday term to express technical concept, see Vogt 2008, 76-8; Bénatouïl 2016, 206-211.

of the divine quality encapsulates perfectly the social contract between Roman generals seen as FELICES and the rest of the Roman community, and the role of the Roman people in accepting or refuting the claim to FELICITAS of a Roman general.

Roman generals who claimed to have FELICITAS received social prestige (*dignitas*) because their ability to win battles makes them valuable members of Roman society. Their FELICITAS ensured the expansion and the protection of the *res publica*, of which the Roman people enjoyed the benefits. Their *dignitas* allowed them to access the high political offices (considered in Rome as *honores* bestowed by Roman people), their reputation as FELICES swaying the opinion of voters in their favour, as Cicero explains in his defence of the consul-elect Murena in 63 BCE. Their *dignitas* provided them in some cases with a certain form of impunity from Roman laws for crimes committed. A particular line of defence seen in extortion trials throughout the first century BCE argues for the acquittal of FELICES generals on the grounds that their FELICITAS may prove useful to protect the *res publica* from military threats. This impunity, as Cicero and other Roman orators argued at the time, was the expression of the honours and respect due to a Roman general by the Roman people because of his victory.

Those reciprocal relationships – *dignitas* given on account of the FELICITAS of a Roman general in exchange for the protection of the *res publica* and the Roman people – entails particular social duties and obligations on both sides; to be FELIX, to be given *dignitas*, Roman generals needed to act in accordance with Roman social and ethical norms to be given access to honours and privileges. The violation of those norms by Sulla and Caesar, both claiming to be FELIX, after their victory in their respective civil wars, led to a debate amongst some Romans about the nature of FELICITAS.

Extant sources report two responses to their reflection of how the gods could support individual acting against the interest of the *res publica*. On the one hand, Cicero imbued the traditional conception of FELICITAS with Greek moral philosophy, particularly the idea of acting appropriately in all circumstances, by articulating a new definition of the divine quality centred

around the notion of *honestum*, what is “honourable” or “what is morally good.” The FELICITAS of an individual, according to Cicero, manifests itself through the practices of virtues, such self-control or temperance and the implementation of personal and political policies which adhere to principle of justice and of the common good. Only individuals who act in a beneficial way for *res publica* in their victory can claim to be FELICES.

On the other hand, followers of Stoic philosophy in Rome articulated a radically new definition of the divine quality which now refers to the undisturbed happiness experienced by wise men because of their perfect reason by Nature, and to which all other human-being can strive by perfecting their reason through proper education. FELICITAS is now connected to the idea of fate, instead of *fortuna*, no longer refers to the personal relationship of an individual with the divine since the Stoic God is impartial, and represents the moral contribution of an individual to the *res publica* since living in accordance with Nature means to consistently act in a way that is good, namely that is appropriate to themselves and to others using reason as virtue.

Those two re-definitions of FELICITAS outline a new moral and ethical code by which individuals claiming the divine quality need to adhere (or at the very least appear to do so). They constituted an attempt by members of the Roman elite to redefine the criteria by which FELICITAS is ascribed to an individual. They attest that, by the end of the first century BCE, military victory was no longer the only yardstick by which the FELICITAS of Roman generals was evaluated; how those Roman generals acted toward their fellow citizens, especially following a civil war, was as important as their victory. They came out of the long and well-attested tradition of members of the Roman elites, namely senators, defining what constitute FELICITAS in their evaluation of a victorious general’s claim to triumph.¹⁵⁸

Those new criteria for FELICITAS that present and future Roman generals would need to meet to claim the divine quality in the eyes of the Roman people represents a way for the Roman elite to control the actions of

¹⁵⁸ On the Senate’s evaluation see Chapter Three.

generals, on whom the *res publica* is more and more dependent to ensure its territorial defence and its political stability, and to avoid a repeat of Sulla's violent and deadly vengeance against his political enemies in 82 BCE.¹⁵⁹ It is unclear the extent to which those new definitions of FELICITAS permeated through Roman society. The success of Cicero's defence of Sextus Roscius, by implicitly attacking Sulla's FELICITAS on account of his cruelty, indicates that members of the Roman elite, acting as jurors, understood the ethical and moral requirement implicit to the claim to FELICITAS as formulated by Cicero. Members of the Roman public attending to the trial, would be at the very least exposed to those ideas. The Stoic definition of FELICITAS found in Cicero's *On the end of the good and evil* must have circulated amongst members of the Roman elite for the Roman orator's presentation and refutation of Stoic principles to be effective and meaningful for his readers.

The bestowal of the honours and privileges to FELICES generals and the definition of the criteria of what constitute to be FELIX define a particular role for the Roman community *vis-à-vis* the divine quality. The Roman people played an active role in defining the divine quality and the honours, and privileges due to FELICES generals. The prevalence, or not, of a claim of a Roman general to FELICITAS in Roman public opinion indicates that the Roman people also played an active role in defining who was considered FELIX in Roman society. Paradoxically, those roles of the Roman people were expected by, and due to, those generals on account of the duties implied by the communal *fides*.

Analysing the honours and duties attached to FELICITAS has ultimately revealed that the divine quality epitomises a social contract between FELICES generals and the Roman community in the Late Roman Republic, not only beneficial for both sides but also with a specific role for both actors *vis-à-vis* one another. This social contract will become the model for the relationship between the emperor and its subjects under the Principate.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ This is seemingly confirmed by the fact that Cicero aims *On Duties* and his writing in general to the youth of Rome, Cic. *Div.* 2.1.cf. Dyck 1998, 29.

¹⁶⁰ Clark 2007, 271-2, 274-5.

7 Conclusion: FELICITAS and the Late Roman Republic

This thesis has explored the role of the divine quality FELICITAS in the political culture of the Late Roman Republic. It has presented a new semiotic reading of extant evidence using an original theoretical framework, namely the theory of religious capital derived from Bourdieu's work on symbolic capital in conjunction with methodological tools borrowed from social anthropology, namely Rüpke's definition of religion in Antiquity and the theory of 'ritualisation'. It has shown that, contrary to the scholarly views that FELICITAS of the Romans was an imperial invention and that FELICITAS only represents the good fortune of a Roman general on the battlefield, FELICITAS embodies the relationships between the Roman community, a Roman general, and the gods to make the *res publica melior* and *amplior* throughout the Late Roman Republic.

Answering the central question of this work, namely why victorious Roman generals/politicians of the time used FELICITAS to justify their social and political power to the Roman people, this thesis has shown that FELICITAS was a powerful and effective communication tool for three reasons. FELICITAS evoked the most basic and fundamental agreement between the Romans themselves and with the gods, that is to work together for the prosperity and well-being of the *res publica*. This agreement was made through the prayers of the ritual of the *lustrum*, the ceremony that symbolically and juridically marked the creation of the Roman community. It found its most complete ritualistic expression in the ceremony of the triumph, the parade that shows how a general's victory and conquest has made the *res publica* safer and more prosperous.

The divine quality FELICITAS also signalled to the rest of the community the ability of a victorious Roman general to work in partnership with the gods to win battles, conquer new lands, and bring back plunder to Rome. This ability unique to the general once demonstrated could be called upon again to serve the *res publica*. Finally, FELICITAS conveyed the message to the Roman people that the Roman general who claimed it has adhered to Romans' moral and

social norms. As such, a FELIX general displayed that he was worthy of receiving certain honours and privileges. While the Roman people would bestow the honours of election to high political offices, of the grant of particular military command, and the privilege of legal protection for crimes (potentially) committed, the Roman Senate would grant the honour of a triumph.

The Roman people were the principal beneficiary of the actions of a FELIX general as they enjoyed the peace and wealth his victory brought to the *res publica*. As the audience of a Roman general's claim to be FELIX, the Roman people played an important role in defining FELICITAS and its social and political value. While a Roman general could present his ability to work in partnership with the gods through his personal experience of the divine, the Roman people still had to assess his claim to have FELICITAS and to accept it before the generals could access those privileges and honours. This assessment made either by the Roman people or the Senate follows the same process. It consisted in an *ex post facto* evaluation of a general's actions while, engaged in warfare, based on three main criteria: (1) whether those actions and their outcomes were truly beneficial for Rome, (2) whether they were in accordance with Roman social and ethical norms, and (3) whether they carried divine favours. Acceptance would allow a FELIX general to receive the honours and privileges deemed appropriate for his achievement by the Roman people and/or the Senate. Through this process of assessment and recognition, the Roman people define the divine quality, its values, and who was considered FELIX in Rome. The Roman people thus acted as judges and arbiters of a Roman general's claim to FELICITAS. This constitutes a new social role for the Roman people in the political culture of the Late Roman Republic with important political consequences.

Since the divine quality encapsulated a dialogue between a Roman general and the Roman people centred around its acknowledgement, its religious experience, and its social and political values, in the context of the competition for honours and prestige in Rome, FELICITAS worked as a form of Bourdieusian symbolic 'religious capital' in the political culture of the Late Roman Republic.

By presenting a coherent picture of the mechanisms underlying the social and political use of FELICITAS based on the various ways the divine quality was conceived, this analysis constitutes in and of itself an important contribution to the study of this divine quality while deepening our understanding of the conceptualisations of FELICITAS.

A close reading of ancient sources has supported the articulation of a new conceptual framework in which FELICITAS is both the quality of a man and a gift of the divine. The conceptualisation of FELICITAS as the divinely enhanced potential and enacted ability of an individual to *bring about* positive actions for the Roman community offers a reconciliation of the two points of the views, held by Erkell and Wagenvoort (and other scholars) about the nature of divine quality.¹

Using this new conception of FELICITAS to examine extant sources has also allowed me to distinguish two different types of FELICITAS: FELICITAS *Romana*, the relationship between the Roman community and the divine and its benefits to make the *res publica amplior* and *melior*, and FELICITAS *imperatoria*, the relationship between the Roman general and the gods to bring about the benefits of FELICITAS *Romana*, namely military victory, conquest and prosperity. While FELICITAS *imperatoria* is well-known in Roman Republican modern scholarship, the notion of FELICITAS *Romana* has always been thought by scholars to be an imperial invention.² Not only were the tenets of the notion of FELICITAS *Romana* developed in Imperial Rome already present in Republican Rome but they were also constitutive of the Roman communal identity. It was rather during the Principate, with the elevation of Augustus as princeps, that the notion of FELICITAS *Romana* became more explicit as part of an effort from Augustus to renegotiate the relationship between a FELIX Roman general and the Roman people after years of bloody civil wars.

Finally, the re-reading of sources has revealed that the established conceptual distinction of FELICITAS *imperatoria* either as a transient quality of general or as a permanent quality of a Roman general is explained by different

¹ See the summary of the debate in Introduction.

² See the discussion of Wistrand's interpretation in Introduction.

types of relationships between a Roman general and the gods. In the second century BCE, *FELICITAS imperatoria* was prevalently seen as the transient quality of a victorious general based on the relationship of the Roman people with the gods. The Roman general communicated with the divine using his prerogative as a magistrate of the *res publica* to take the auspices on behalf of the Roman people. However, in the first century BCE, *FELICITAS imperatoria* was predominantly conceived as the permanent quality of a victorious Roman general based on his personal and private relationship with the divine. This transition is reflected by the greater emphasis in the Roman military discourse of the Late Roman Republic on the general's ability to carry favour from deities such as the goddess *FELICITAS* or to communicate directly with the divine through dreams for instance. This shift was motivated by the desires and/or needs of victorious Roman generals to legitimise in the eyes of the Roman people their claim to power in a civil war or to receive a military command. Conceiving *FELICITAS imperatoria* as the personal experience of a Roman general with the divine in the service of the *res publica* allowed victorious Roman generals to demarcate themselves from other competing members of the Roman elite vying for the same honours.

As argued in Chapter One, the exploration of how Romans used the divine quality to talk about themselves, their place in society, their effect on the world around them, and the effect of the divine on their life have uncovered a new social conception of *FELICITAS*. As a qualifier, *FELICITAS* represented four characteristics of an individual (or object), either to be fertile/fecund, to be lucky, to be successful or to be happy. Those four characteristics were conceptualised by Romans along similar lines as (1) a state of being able to *bring about* positive action, or (2) an enacted ability to *carry out* a positive action, or (3) the positive outcome the action has created. Ascribing *FELICITAS* to an individual necessitated an *ex post facto* assessment of the obtained outcome of an action with the outcome expected. This meant that to be declared *FELIX* was inherently a matter of perspective, as an external observer must be involved in the process, of perception, as the external observer had to acknowledge the action done, and finally of assessment, since the observer

had to judge whether the outcome of the action matched the conditions or assumptions which define the divine quality in a particular context. Evidence of this process and its actors are found, for instance, in the way Romans categorised the sacred trees used in their religious rituals as *FELIX* and *infelix*. This process and this conception of *FELICITAS* as representing productivity are fundamental to the way Romans approached the *FELICITAS* of a Roman general.

The conditions used to determine whether a general was *FELIX* has been outlined in Chapter Two through the exploration of the role of the divine quality in the formation and expression of Roman communal identity. The prayers of the ceremony of the *lustrum* defined the *FELICITAS* of the Romans as the contract between the gods and the Romans to bring about a better future for the *res publica*, *melior* and *amplior*. The notions of *melior* and *amplior* were a means to judge and assess the state of the *res publica*, present and future, and were connected with victory, conquest, or agricultural productivity. Through a series of stages, the ritual of the *lustrum* establishes Roman citizens as a unit for the gods to favour and for whom to bring about a good future, i.e. *FELICITAS Romana*. Those ideals found their best ritualistic enactment in the ceremony given in honour of a military victory by a Roman general and his army, the triumph. Through its display of wealth and of conquered foreign lands and enemies, the ceremony visually presented to the Roman people the benefits of this special relationship with the gods: how the *res publica* has been made *amplior* and *melior* by the victory of the Roman army, the Roman general and the gods. Central to this representation of *FELICITAS Romana* is the victorious Roman general. During the ceremony, through his clothes, his insignia, his red-painted body and face, the triumphant Roman general symbolised at the same time both human and divine agency which have achieved the *FELICITAS* of the Romans.

How Roman generals accomplished actions deemed as *FELICES* working in partnership with gods as well as the role of the Senate in the evaluation of those actions was discussed in the subsequent three chapters

by exploring the two different synchronous conceptions for FELICITAS *imperatoria* in the Late Roman Republic.

The most prevalent conception of FELICITAS *imperatoria* in the early to mid-second century BCE was defined in Chapter Three by examining representations of the figure of the triumphant general in the official language of the *res publica* and in the popular culture of the time. Those representations uniformly outlined FELICITAS *imperatoria* as the partnership between human and divine to bring about the benefits of the FELICITAS *Romana*. This partnership was seen as based on the relationship between the Roman people and the gods. Each side contributes through different spheres of action to the goal of bringing about victory for Rome. In doing so, Roman generals are represented as acting in communion with the gods, either by accessing divine knowledge or by using divine attributes, for a limited amount of time. As reward for their military victory, the Roman Senate (or the Roman people) granted the general the honours of a triumph after evaluating his actions in warfare and the benefits of his victory.

This conception of FELICITAS *imperatoria*, Chapter Four has shown, came to be challenged with the arrival in Rome of the goddess FELICITAS marked by the construction of the temple of Lucullus in 145-2 BCE. The temple was Lucullus' contribution to the then on-going Greek and Roman debate about the role of *fortuna* as both a concept and a deity in Roman imperialism. In contrast to the goddess Fortuna, as the divine agency providing good or bad fortune to man indiscriminately, the goddess FELICITAS represented the divine agency that work with Roman generals to bring the benefits of FELICITAS of the Romans, namely military victory and conquest, on account of their VIRTUS. This unique relationship between the goddess FELICITAS and her worshipper, which made her more predictable and reliable than the goddess Fortuna, was represented in the decoration of the temple. Using the statues of Muses, Lucullus presented the deity as source of divine inspiration, suggesting that his relationship is akin to that of a poet to his Muses, and that akin to a poem written under the guidance of the Muses, his military victory was the result of his constant interaction with the goddess. Through this representation of the

deity's agency, Lucullus presented his FELICITAS as a quasi-permanent ability based on this personal relationship with divine as opposed to the relationship between the Roman people and the gods.

The military and political crises the *res publica* faced in the first century BCE led Roman generals to develop Lucullus' conception of FELICITAS *imperatoria* for political gains. Roman generals and their allies, as Chapter Five has demonstrated, presented FELICITAS as a permanent ability of the Roman generals to make the *res publica amplior* and *melior* based of their personal relationship with the divine. Their divine support manifested itself either through access to divine knowledge through new means such as dreams as in the case of Sulla or through uncommonly great good fortune sent by the gods as in the case of Pompey and Caesar. This personal relationship with the gods allowed Roman generals and their allies to argue on political and religious grounds that they are the most capable to deal with external threat to the *res publica*, such as Mithridates VI of Pontus or the Gauls, as well as with what they perceived as internal threats to the stability of the *res publica*, for instance Marius and his supporters according to Sulla. Roman generals used their claim to FELICITAS to stand out in the eyes of the Roman people from political rivals competing for similar honours and power.

The use of FELICITAS in the competition between members of the Roman elites attested to the political and social value of the divine quality in Rome. How this value was negotiated was exposed in Chapter Six through the exploration of the social contract between FELICES Roman generals and the Roman people. As a reward for their ability to work with the divine and to adhere to Roman social and ethical norms, the Roman people supported a general in his political endeavours, and in some cases, granted him impunity from Roman laws. Perceived violation of Roman social and ethical norms by Sulla and Caesar following their victory in their respective civil wars in 82 BCE and 45 BCE however led some members of the Roman elite to redefine FELICITAS on philosophical and ethical grounds using Greek philosophy. Ancient sources attest to two such redefinitions: one Ciceronian and the other Stoic. Cicero proposed a definition of FELICITAS centred around the concept of

honestum, meaning “what is honourable” or “what is morally good”, and articulated around the idea of justice and common good. This new definition allowed the Roman orator to develop a series of ethical and political arguments to show how the actions of the two dictators endangered the stability of the *res publica*.

At the antipode of the Ciceronian definition, followers of Stoic philosophy in Rome developed a radically different new definition in which FELICITAS is only experienced by wise men, those who have perfect reason by Nature, and is a goal to which all human beings can strive by perfecting their reason. FELICITAS no longer refers to the personal relationship of an individual with the divine since according to Stoic metaphysic god is impartial providing benevolence and providence to all components of the cosmos equally. Those two redefinitions of FELICITAS constituted an attempt by part of the Roman people to redefine the conditions by which FELICITAS was ascribed to an individual. By the late first century BCE military victory and its profits were no longer the only requirements to claim the *res publica* has been made *amplior* and *melior*; how victorious Roman generals acted toward their fellow citizens was now deemed equality important for some people in Rome. Those redefinitions could then be seen as an effort by members of the Roman elite to control the actions of present and future Roman generals on whom the *res publica* was increasingly dependent for its territorial defence and its political stability.

By highlighting the social role of the Roman people as audience, judge and arbiter of Roman generals’ claim to have FELICITAS, and the awareness of Roman citizens of the conceptions of FELICITAS *imperatoria* and FELICITAS *Romana*, this work offers a new perspective to understand the role of the Roman people in the events that brought about the end of the Roman Republic. It shows that, in what can be considered as Roman ideology, the relationship between the Roman general, the Roman community and the gods was mutually beneficial: in achieving military victory and conquest by working with the gods, Roman generals received from the Roman people greater social prestige, which could be transformed into political power, while Romans lived

in peace and prospered. This FELICITAS was based on the relationship between the Roman people and the gods.

The military and political crises of the second and first centuries BCE profoundly impacted the relationship between the Romans and the gods. Those crises increased the dependence of the Roman community on a few victorious Roman generals claiming to be FELICES for the military protection, and economic and political well-being of the *res publica* while leading Roman generals to claim that their FELICITAS stemmed from their personal relationship with the divine for political reasons. The increasing association of the welfare of the *res publica* with a few individuals claiming personal support from the gods led to a greater concentration of power in the hands of a single individual, thus eroding the power-sharing between members of the Roman elite which characterised the Roman Republic. This erosion ultimately set the grounds for the instauration of the Principate. The willingness of the Roman people to provide greater honours and political power to Roman generals based on their claim to be FELICES suggests that the Roman people played an active role in bringing about the end of the Roman Republic because it perceived that it was in its (most immediate) interest to do so.³

³ On the fall of the Roman Republic, see Syme 1939; Münzer 1920; Gelzer 1969; Millar 1998; Hölkeskamp 2010. For a good overview of the debate, see Yakobson 2022, 93-105.

8 Appendix I: Augustine, Varro, and the goddess FELICITAS

The City of God, written in the fifth century CE by Augustine, constitutes our main literary source describing the goddess FELICITAS. In the fourth book of the work, the Christian writer extensively argues that the goddess FELICITAS is not a deity but rather a gift of the Christian God.¹ It is generally assumed – and there is no reason to doubt this – that the discussion is informed by Varro’s description of the goddess FELICITAS in his lost work, *The Antiquities of Human and Divine things* or *Antiquities of Divine Things*, written at the end of the first century BCE.² There have been two major attempts by modern scholars to recover Varro’s description of the goddess FELICITAS from Augustine’s writing: one by Erkell in his seminal study on the concept of FELICITAS, the other by Cardauns in his edition of Varro’s fragments of *Antiquities of Divine Things*.³ Their methods, however, prove unsatisfactory as they both generally do not consider Augustine’s writing within its cultural and literary context.

The purpose of this Appendix is therefore to recover the conception of the goddess FELICITAS, as described by Varro, using a new methodological approach. This approach takes into consideration not only Augustine’s own views on FELICITAS but also the role Varro plays into the rhetoric of the *The City of God*. After briefly reviewing the key methodological issues of the work of Erkell and Cardauns, I will consider Augustine’s use of Varro’s writing in the *The City of God* to evaluate the reliability of the Christian writer in providing a trustworthy account of Varro’s ideas. Then, I will outline Augustine’s own Christian vision of the concept of FELICITAS, and use it to distinguish Varro’s conception of the goddess FELICITAS in the first century BCE from Augustine’s criticism of the deity.

¹ For the full discussion, Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.

² The *Antiquities of Human and Divine Things* is commonly understood to have been published in 40 BCE see Cardauns 1976, 132-3 (47 BCE), Tarver 1997, 135; Nuffelen 2010, 162; Rüpke 2014, 253 (46 BCE). This date is contested by Jocelyn 1982, 164-77, 203-5.

³ Erkell 1952; Cardauns 1976.

8.1 Methodological issues

In his study of FELICITAS, Erhell used Augustine's discussion of the goddess FELICITAS in the *The City of God* to reconstruct how Romans might have conceived FELICITAS as a deity.⁴ While Erhell's conclusions on the goddess FELICITAS are for the most part true, his methodology is unsatisfying chiefly because the German scholar did not take into account the literary, cultural and political context of Augustine's work. Erhell failed to understand how Augustine's motivation for denying the divine status of the goddess FELICITAS and his Christian conceptions of the FELICITAS may have influenced his representation of the deity.⁵ This Appendix will address those two methodological points: it will explore Augustine's motives in discussing the goddess FELICITAS, outline Augustine's own Christian conception of FELICITAS, and assess how the bishop of Hippo uses his sources, in this case Varro, to determine the reliability of his representation.

To write *The City of God*, Augustine uses a large array of sources to argue against Roman traditional religion. One source, however, is referenced more than any others, Varro's *Antiquities of Human and Divine things*.⁶ Modern scholars have attempted to recover fragments of Varro's work from *The City of God*. In particular, Cardauns has claimed to have identified a number of direct quotations from Varro's work, and specifically two fragments about the goddesses FELICITAS:⁷

Fragment n.190: What of the fact that FELICITAS also is a goddess? (*Quid, quod et FELICITAS dea est?*) She received a temple, she obtained an altar, and appropriate rites were performed (*Aedem accepit, aram meruit, sacra congrua persoluta sunt*).⁸

⁴ Erhell 1952, 50, For a more detailed discussion, see Introduction.

⁵ Erhell 1952, 50

⁶ Varro's *Antiquities of Human and Divine Things* is referenced sixty-six times in the *City of God*, see Burns 2001, 39 n.37 with ancient references.

⁷ Cardauns 1976, 4.

⁸ Cardauns 1976, 83.

Fragment n. 191: But how does it make sense that Fortuna also is regarded as a goddess and worshipped? Is FELICITAS one thing and fortune another? (*Sed quid sibi vult, quod et Fortuna dea putatur et colitur? An aliud est felicitas, aliud fortuna?*) Yes, we are told, fortune can be bad as well as good, while if happiness is bad, it will not be FELICITAS (*Quia Fortuna potest esse et mala; FELICITAS autem si mala fuerit, FELICITAS non erit.*) [...] Why the different temples, different altars, different rites? (*Quid diversae aedes, diversae arae, diversa sacra.*) The reason, they say, is that FELICITAS is what good men have earned by their good works, while the fortune that is called good happens by luck both to good men and to bad men, without any scrutiny of their deeds, and is in fact called Fortuna for that reason (*Est causa, inquiunt, quia FELICITAS illa est, quam boni habent praecedentibus meritis; fortuna vero, quae dicitur bona, sine ullo examine meritorum fortuito accidit hominibus et bonis et malis, unde etiam Fortuna nominatur.*)⁹

Upon closer inspection, Cardauns' claim that those fragments are direct quotations of Varro does not hold because of the mode of citation Augustine uses. In neither fragment are there markers of direct quotation and the verb *inquiunt* does not remove the possibility of Augustine's paraphrasing Varro. In his criticisms of the editorial process, Jocelyn not only refuted Cardauns' claim to be able to identify stand-alone fragments of Varro's writing but also concluded that Augustine probably paraphrased Varro's ideas.¹⁰ Jocelyn praises Aghad's earlier edition of Varro's fragments as it situated Varro's writing within its context and thus acknowledged the uncertainty inherent in the identification of fragments and editorial processes.¹¹

⁹ Cardauns 1976, 84.

¹⁰ For a fuller discussion of Jocelyn's criticism of Cardauns, see Chapter Four.

¹¹ Jocelyn 1980, 111. For a good and recent discussion of how pre-conceived notions of the editors can lead to a transformation of Varro's writing, see De Melo 2017.

Therefore, in order to use the *The City of God* as a source, it is necessary to ascertain the reliability of Augustine as a source of Varro's ideas. In doing so, it is important to keep in mind two factors; in the first place, the reasons why Augustine uses the goddess FELICITAS in his discussion, and secondly his purpose and method when using Varro as a source for discussion of Roman traditional religion. In short, it is necessary to consider Augustine's reception of Varro.¹²

8.2 Augustine's use of Varro

The important role Varro plays in articulating Augustine's message in *The City of God*, and the systematic and respectful treatment of Varro by Augustine suggest that the bishop of Hippo provides a more or less faithful and trustworthy account of Varro's description of the goddess FELICITAS.

Augustine saw his work as an opening to Roman pagans.¹³ Following the events of 410 CE – namely, the fall of Rome to Alaric's forces – opponents to Christianity argued that it signed the end of the traditional Roman cult, which brought about this catastrophe on the Romans. Augustine's conviction, however, was that Rome could only regain its splendour through the worship of the Christian God. Indeed, in *The City of God*, Augustine argues that the Romans were not bestowed their empire by Roman divinities but rather through the providence of the Christian God.¹⁴ In his interpretation, true citizenship of the *civitas* of the Romans is therefore only possible through the worship of God.¹⁵ It is only by casting away pagan gods to become fellow citizens of *The City of God*, and by experiencing the remission of sins given to members of the *civitas*, that Romans can make Rome what it once was.¹⁶

The City of God was therefore written for an audience of Roman Christians or Romans interested in Christianity who, as O'Daily has noted, needed a convincing rebuttal of pagan views when they were invited to

¹² On the general reception of Varro by Augustine, see Hadas 2017 and Clark 2010.

¹³ Burns 2001, 38; O' Daily 1994, 69; 1999, 36; Hadas 2017, 80-1.

¹⁴ Aug. *De civ. D.* 1.36.

¹⁵ Aug. *De civ. D.* 1.36.

¹⁶ Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.29 and Burn 2001, 28.

become Christians.¹⁷ In two letters addressed to Firmus, a Carthaginian interested in Christianity and initial recipient of the work, Augustine states that the work's purpose is to “persuade a person to become Christian without hesitation or to remain in the City of God with perseverance.”¹⁸ To do so, the Roman writer defends the Christian religion in the first ten books by arguing against “those who maintains that the worship not of god but of demons contribute to the FELICITAS of life” (*eos est disputatum qui FELICITATI vitae huius non plane deorum sed daemoniorum cultum prodesse contendunt*) and against “those who believe that those who think that many gods, whether such gods or any whatsoever, should be worshiped through sacred rites and sacrifices on account of the life that will be after death”.¹⁹ The final twelve books, Augustine declares, will set out the origins of the city of God, its development, and its end.²⁰ The work is thus conceived at the same time as an apology and as a catechesis.²¹

The tone of *The City of God* is therefore less polemic than other writers of the apologetic genre adopted. Augustine’s dealing with the “select gods” (*selecti di*), the principal gods of Roman tradition religion according to Varro’s classification, illustrates perfectly the hortatory tone of the work. The Christian bishop criticises Tertullian’s witty criticism that “if the gods are selected like onions, certainly the rest is rejected as bad,” declaring that he understands the impulse of selection as it is natural.²² Rather, he seeks to understand why those gods are selected in order to argue against their divinity. The contrast between Augustine’s and Tertullian’s approach reflects the desire of the bishop of Hippo to not reject outrightly the traditional Roman religion but to engage with its very fundamental beliefs in order to show their compatibility with the teaching of Christianity.²³ Unlike other Christian apologetic writers, Augustine’s tone and approach constitute an invitation for Romans to join Christianity.

¹⁷ O’ Daily 1994, 69; 1999, 36.

¹⁸ Aug. *Ep.* 2.3.

¹⁹ Aug. *Ep.* 1A.1.

²⁰ Aug. *Ep.* 1A*.1.

²¹ cf. Aug. *Ep.* 2.3.

²² Tert. *Ad nat.* 2.9.4 cf. Aug. *De civ. D.* 7.1.

²³ Hadas 2017, 80-1, 87.

To argue against traditional Roman religion, Augustine bases his discussion on several sources. He disputes Cicero's critique of divine foreknowledge.²⁴ He refers to first century BCE writer Nigidius Figulus in his discussion of astrology and to Nigidius' contemporary Q. Valerius Soranus on the universality of Jupiter.²⁵ He cites the third-century CE writer Cornelius Labeo on the classification of gods and demi-gods.²⁶ He also refers to the second-century CE writer Apuleius on the origin of disaster with a quotation from the *About the World*.²⁷ Yet, Augustine relies most on Varro with about sixty-six references to the antiquarian.²⁸ Varro's work offered an historical approach to Roman *religio* by compiling information about the history of cults – such as the date of temple foundations or the introduction of new deities into the Roman pantheon – and the major political events which shaped Roman religion; it constitutes a mine of information for Augustine.²⁹ The Christian writer provides us with the only known outline of Varro's forty-one books of *The Antiquities of Human and Divine things* at the beginning of the sixth book of *The City of God* – evidence that the bishop had access to either the books themselves or, more likely, their summaries.³⁰

Varro's pre-eminence as a source is explained by his role in Augustine's hortatory message. In the late fourth- early fifth century CE Varro was seen as the authority on traditional Roman religion.³¹ Already in the second century CE Aulus Gellius notes that "records of knowledge and learning left in written form by Varro are familiar and in general use".³² Fifth-century CE writer Macrobius refers to Varro about forty times to discuss religious matters.³³ In his *Commentary on Virgil*, Servius relied on Varro more than on any other source

²⁴ Aug. *De civ. D.* 5.9.

²⁵ For Nigidius Figulus, cf. Aug. *De civ. D.* 5.6. For Q. Valerius Soranus, see Aug. *De civ. D.* 7.9, 7.11.

²⁶ Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.11, 2.14, 3.2, 8.13.

²⁷ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.2.

²⁸ Burns 2001, 39 n. 37.

²⁹ Rüpke 2014, 253-9.

³⁰ Aug. *De civ. D.* 6.3.

³¹ Burn 2001, 48; O'Daily 1994, 69.

³² Gell. *NA.* 19.14.

³³ O Daily 1994, 70 with ancient references.

as an authority on a wide range of topics beyond religious matters.³⁴ Varro's work about traditional values and ideals was influential amongst pagans and Christians alike.³⁵ In the debate that arose about the cause of Rome's fall to Alaric, Varro's antiquarian writing on Roman traditional religion appealed to educated pagans and, in this time of crisis and uncertainty, to Romans in general as a testimony of the historical roots of Roman culture.³⁶ Consequently, Augustine needed to use Varro to undermine the arguments of his adversaries, and to appeal to and redefine Roman culture.

Rhetorically, Augustine then adopts a somewhat more consensual approach to Varro: he values Varro as an authority on Roman religion and quotes him strategically to better undermine his authority. For Augustine, Varro is a credible source on the traditional Roman religion. Throughout *The City of God*, the bishop praises Varro as "the most learned man and the most important authority" on religious matters, whose knowledge is based on his experience.³⁷ He also pays tribute to the value of the antiquarian. He quotes at length Cicero's praise of Varro in *The Academy*, in which the orator claims that Varro rediscovered Roman religion through its rituals and institutions and bestowed it on generations of Romans to come.³⁸ Representing Varro as the authority on Roman traditional religion allows Augustine to give credence to Varro's ideas as the best reflection of traditional Roman religion in order to better attack those ideas.

Danial Hadas has convincingly explained that Augustine's presentation of Varro's *Antiquities of Human and Divine things* in the *City of God* plays an important role in the disappearance of the text of the former. He has shown how Augustine demonstrates that Varro's tripartite theology, which separates the mythological theology of the poets, the physical theology of the philosopher, and the civil theology of the people, failed to justify or to explain

³⁴ Burn 2001, 50 with ancient references.

³⁵ O' Daily 1994, 69.

³⁶ Liebeschuetz 1979, 307.

³⁷ Aug. *De civ. D.* 3.4. For other examples of Augustine's praise of Varro, see Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.31, 7.9, 7.28, 7.30. For a good discussion of Hadas 2017, 80-81. On the origin of Varro's knowledge, see Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.1.

³⁸ Aug. *De civ. D.* 6.2 cf. Cic. *Acad.* 1.3.9.

Roman traditional religion.³⁹ Augustine has thus refuted Varro's authority on the subject, and in so doing, he provided his Christian readers with the necessary arguments to argue against Roman pagans, and his non-Christian readers with the arguments needed to join Christianity. Christians had then no need to read Varro's *Antiquities of Human and Divine things*, leading to the loss of the work, since Augustine's *City of God* provides them with all they needed to know about Roman traditional religion.⁴⁰

Consequently, the centrality of Varro in Augustine's argumentation led the latter to use a specific type of citation. In a seminal study, Danuta Shanzer identifies four modes or strategies of citations within the Augustinian corpus: (1) the flat citation, i.e. citation for the sake of citation usually taken from a compilation corpus; (2) the programmatic citation, which establishes genre, expectation, literary lineage, homage, competition through quotation; (3) the strategic citation, which uses polemical quotation for its content and because of the author's status in the eyes of the audience; and (4) the embellishment, which uses quotation for ornament.⁴¹ Augustine quotes Varro because of his authoritative voice and its content in a strategy to refute and re-appropriate the pagan cultural tradition. Given that the strength of his argument relies on those two elements, it is crucial that his arguments reflect Varro's original thoughts and ideas. While it doesn't necessarily mean he had to use direct quotations, it does mean that he had to remain faithful to Varro's work as understood and widely known by his audience. In the context of the *City of God*, Augustine then clearly uses Varro strategically. Consequently, it can be cautiously concluded that some of the material presented in Augustine's discussion of the goddess FELICITAS is reflective of material found in Varro's work.

With the reliability of Augustine as a source for Varro's ideas ascertained, it is now necessary to outline Augustine's own Christian

³⁹ Hadas 2017, 83. Augustine's presentation of Varro's theology, see Aug. *De civ. D.* 6.5. On Varro's theology, see for instance, Pépin 1956, 276–307; Boyancé 1955, 57–84; Lehman 1997, 193–225; Ando 2010, 63–4, 74–5; Nuffelen 2010, 185–6; North 2014.

⁴⁰ Hadas 89–90.

⁴¹ Shanzer 2012, 168–171.

conception of FELICITAS to understand its influence in his discussion of the goddess FELICITAS.

8.3 Augustine's conception of FELICITAS

In the *City of God*, Augustine defines FELICITAS as the “total sum of all desirable things” (*omnium rerum optandarum plenitudinem esse FELICITATEM*).⁴² He distinguishes between two different types of FELICITAS: one that is “earthly and temporal” (*FELICITAS temporalis et terrena*) and another that is “eternal, true, and satisfying” (*FELICITAS aeterna, vera et plena*).

For him, there are two types of *FELICITAS temporalis et terrena*: one for the *res publica* and one for individuals. He equates the “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS of the *res publica* to an empire abundant in resources, glorious in victory and secure in peace, in which its citizens live a good life.⁴³ The good life, provided by *FELICITAS temporalis* of the *res publica* is a life spent enjoying the pleasures of life: prostitutes, ornate houses, lavish banquets with drinking, sports, vomiting, dissipation, dancing and theatre.⁴⁴ In this empire, the traditional Roman gods are there to be worshipped “to secure such a state of happiness and protect it from enemy, plagues, or disaster.”⁴⁵

For Augustine, personal “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS manifests itself through personal wealth, glory, high offices, a long life and children an individual may obtain during his life. To illustrate this point, Augustine discusses the life of Marius and of Macedonicus. He notes that Marius' life is an example of FELICITAS because “rarely has a man been blessed with so much abundance in health, strength, wealth, high offices, respect and long

⁴² Aug. *De civ. D.* 5 praef. see also Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.21. While I will continue not to translate FELICITAS in English for consistency, in the time Augustine is writing, FELICITAS refers predominantly to happiness.

⁴³ Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.20.

⁴⁴ Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.20.

⁴⁵ Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.20.

life.”⁴⁶ Macedonicus’ “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS resides in “his five consular sons and on being also FELIX in the goods of this world”.⁴⁷

These two forms of “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS are given by the Christian God, not the Roman gods. To deny the agency of the Roman pagan gods in granting “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS, Augustine discusses the catastrophic events in Roman history that traditional gods have allowed to happen, and concludes that, although they were worshipped fervently, the Roman gods have failed to protect the empire’s FELICITAS.⁴⁸ To prove his point, he gives the example of Marius and the goddess Marica. The story holds that, as Augustine reports it, during the Civil War against Sulla, the people of Minturnae recommended Marius to the goddess Marica so that she might grant him success, save him from desperate situations, and return him unharmed to Rome.⁴⁹ The savagery of Marius’ victory, the bloodbath in Rome, leads Augustine to conclude that the goddess failed not only to protect the empire’s FELICITAS but also to give FELICITAS to Marius. For him, it is the secret providence of the Christian God which is the agency behind “the blood-stained FELICITAS of Marius, not the goddess Marica.”⁵⁰ Indeed, for him, the Roman gods are only given their power through “a secret decree of the Almighty.”⁵¹

This shift of agency from the Roman gods to the Christian God allows Augustine to draw out three lessons about ‘earthly and temporal’ FELICITAS for Christians. The first lesson is that Christians should not value “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS as it is often given to bad men like Marius. The second lesson is that “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS can, however, still be achieved by Christians as it is given by God. The final lesson is that Christians should not worship demons in order to gain “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS but God since he is the provider of this FELICITAS.⁵²

⁴⁶ Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.23. For a discussion of the life of Q. Metellus Macedonicus as an example of FELICITAS, see Chapter One.

⁴⁷ Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.23.

⁴⁸ Aug. *De civ. D.* 3.18.

⁴⁹ Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.23.

⁵⁰ Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.23.

⁵¹ Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.23.

⁵² Aug. *De civ. D.* 2.23.

Against “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS, Augustine opposes the notion of FELICITAS “eternal, true, and satisfying” (FELICITAS *aeterna, vera et plena*). He defines it as the soul's eternal enjoyment of the happiness given by God. He first describes “eternal life as the life of FELICITAS without end” (*eam quippe uitam aeternam dicimus, ubi est sine fine FELICITAS*).⁵³ This eternal life of happiness is enjoyed by the soul “since the soul is created immortal and by nature cannot be without some kind of life.”⁵⁴ Since the soul’s death results from an alienation from the life of God, then happiness of the soul can only be found in the life of God.⁵⁵ Thus, Christians who cherish “eternal life” (*vita aeterna*) with pious affection should worship the Christian God as he is, ultimately, the giver of true happiness.⁵⁶

“Eternal, true, and satisfying FELICITAS” according to Augustine “can only be found in the eternal city of God” (*illa civitas sempiterna est (...) ibi est vera et plena FELICITAS*).⁵⁷ By the pledge of their faith (*fides*) Christians are on their journey to the eternal city and to “true, sure, and eternal” FELICITAS.⁵⁸ Not all Christians, however, will receive this FELICITAS since, according to Augustine, God only gives it to good men.⁵⁹ For him, to be a good man is to have a “blessed soul” (*animus beatus*): it is necessary condition to be part of the eternal city of God.⁶⁰ This blessedness of the soul is obtained by leading a good life (*vita beata*) which means to live well (*bene vivere*).⁶¹ For Augustine, to live well is to be virtuous since “VIRTUS is everything that a man should do.”⁶² This art of virtue is given by God himself. In his work *On the Happy Life*, Augustine states that “a man who lives well has God.”⁶³ This man “does what

⁵³ Aug. *De civ. D.* 6.12.

⁵⁴ Aug. *De civ. D.* 6.12.

⁵⁵ Aug. *De civ. D.* 6.12.

⁵⁶ Aug. *De civ. D.* 6.12.

⁵⁷ Aug. *De civ. D.* 5.16.

⁵⁸ Aug. *De civ. D.* 5.16.

⁵⁹ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4. 33.

⁶⁰ Aug. *De civ. D.* 1.15.

⁶¹ This is argument that Augustine develops throughout his book *On the Good Life* (*De Vita Beata*)

⁶² Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.21.

⁶³ Aug. *Vit. B.* 2.12.4

God says.”⁶⁴ As a consequence, he has a pure soul.⁶⁵ For Augustine then, only by following God’s teaching can a man lead a good life and his soul gain “eternal, true, and satisfying” FELICITAS in the eternal city of God.⁶⁶ This FELICITAS is the reward for leading a good life.

The discussion of Augustine’s conception of FELICITAS in the *City of God* has highlighted not only the centrality of the concept but also the deep conceptual connection between FELICITAS and VIRTUS in the Augustinian Christian message. For Augustine, FELICITAS *aeterna, vera et plena* in the afterlife constitutes the promise of the Christian God to his worshippers. It is the life enjoyed by the immortal soul after death in the city of God. Therefore, for Augustine, all worshippers should desire to obtain FELICITAS *aeterna, vera et plena* in the afterlife above the FELICITAS *temporalis et terrena* in their lifetime. Since “eternal, true, and satisfying” FELICITAS is only given to good men, Christians must aspire to a blessed mind by living virtuously following God’s teachings. Only then, for Augustine, can a Christian get his place in the city of God and obtain FELICITAS *aeterna, vera et plena*.

8.4 Augustine and the Goddess FELICITAS

Augustine’s Christian conception of FELICITAS enables me to analyse Augustine’s discussion of the goddess FELICITAS and attempt to distinguish his own ideas about the deity from what could be Varro’s.

In *The City of God*, Augustine refers to FELICITAS twenty-one times in total. For clarity, I have assigned a letter from A to Z to each passage according to their position in Augustine's discussion. Most of the occurrences (A-O) are found in the fourth book of the *City of God*, in which Augustine questions the status of FELICITAS as deity, and suggests that FELICITAS is a gift of the Christian God. Two references (P and Q) can be found in the fifth book of the *City of God*, in which Augustine discusses the reason why God granted the Romans their empire. The last four references (R–U) are found in the sixth and

⁶⁴ Aug. *Vit. B.* 2.12.6.

⁶⁵ Aug. *Vit. B.* 2.12.8-9.

⁶⁶ Aug. *De civ. D.* 22.24.

seventh book of the *City of God*, in which Augustine discusses Varro's theology to show that eternal life cannot be obtained by worshipping Roman traditional gods.⁶⁷

To sustain his claim that FELICITAS is not a goddess but a gift of the Christian God, the bishop of Hippo develops three main lines of argumentation, which I have outlined below with their rationale and the corresponding passages. As will become evident in the analysis, some passages could belong to several arguments; for the clarity of this discussion, however, I have assigned each passage to one argument only.

Argument One: The goddess FELICITAS cannot be a deity because she lacks pre-eminence amongst Roman gods.

Rationale: For Augustine, if the goddess FELICITAS was the agency which gives FELICITAS, then she would be the most important goddess of the Roman pagan pantheon because FELICITAS should be desired by all worshippers. Since Roman prayed to other traditional gods and the goddesses FELICITAS was not included among the 'select gods', then FELICITAS cannot be a goddess. Her failure as a deity, in Augustine's eyes, stems from her inability to provide "earthly and temporal" for the *res publica* and individuals.

This argument is evident from eleven passages (B, E, F, G, H, I, J, L, P, S and U). It is Augustine's main and most sustained objection to the divine status of the goddess FELICITAS. For him, the goddess FELICITAS cannot be a deity because she failed to provide "earthly and temporal" FELICITAS to individuals. He demonstrates her failure through different examples. He first claims that FELICITAS, if she were a goddess, would provide children natural abilities:

(B) It is certainly a matter of FELICITAS to be born with natural ability.
Hence, although the goddess FELICITAS could not be worshipped by

⁶⁷ On Varro's theology see Boyancé 1955, 57–84; Pépin 1956, 276–307; Lehman 1997, 193–225; Nuffelen 2010, 185-6; Ando 2010, 63–4, 74–5; and North 2014.

an unborn child so as to be won over and grant this boon, she might grant the prayer of its parents if they worshipped her, namely that children with natural wit should be born to them. What need was there for women in childbirth to invoke Lucina, since with FELICITAS at hand they would not only have easy labour, but also good children?⁶⁸

For him, if the rites and the books were true and FELICITAS was a divinity, she should have been able to confer all blessings and would be a short cut to FELICITAS:

(E) But to continue this point. If their books and their rites are true, and FELICITAS is a goddess, why was not she alone adopted as a deity to be worshipped, since she could confer all blessings, and provide a short cut to FELICITAS? For who desires anything for any other purpose than to attain FELICITAS?⁶⁹

He then moves on to show how the goddess fails to secure “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS for the *res publica*. The bishop of Hippo wonders why the civil wars occurred despite the fact that the goddess FELICITAS was worshipped in Rome.

(H) But even afterward, when FELICITAS had now been recognised and added to the roster of gods, the great disaster (*infelicitas*) of the civil wars followed. Perhaps FELICITAS was rightly indignant that she was invited so late, and invited not to be honoured, but to be insulted by being worshipped along with Priapus and Cluacina and Pallor and Pavor and Febris and the rest, who are not so much deifications of the worshipful as malefactions of the worshippers.⁷⁰

Augustine posits that if the goddess FELICITAS could grant eternal peace, then the god Mars would not be able to provide wars.

⁶⁸ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.21.

⁶⁹ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.23.

⁷⁰ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.23.

(U) So if FELICITAS were to grant perpetual peace, Mars would have nothing to do.⁷¹

Augustine then moves to question her place in Roman religious practices. He expresses his surprise that, when founding Rome, Romulus did not build a temple to the goddess:

(F) When Romulus wanted to found a FELIX city, why did he not first of all raise a temple for her, and not trouble the other gods for anything? For nothing would have been lacking if FELICITAS had been present. Nor would he himself have become first a king, then later (as they think) a god, if he had not had the favour of this goddess.⁷²

He wonders about the worship of FELICITAS during the expansion of the Roman Empire.

(G) Next, why is it that at a time when the Roman empire was growing in every direction there was still no worship of FELICITAS? Or is that why the empire was greater in size than in happiness? For how could true FELICITAS exist where there was no true piety? Piety is the true cult of the true God, not a cult of as many false gods as there are demons.⁷³

He also claims that the indignation of the goddess FELICITAS was justified because of her lack of pre-eminence amongst the gods.

(I) Accordingly, suppose the gods themselves had been consulted by augury, or by whatever means they suppose that gods can be consulted, and the question had been put whether they were willing to yield their place to FELICITAS, if it so happened that the place where a greater and more lofty temple was to be erected to FELICITAS had already been occupied by the temples and altars of other gods. Even

⁷¹ Aug. *De civ. D.* 7.14.

⁷² Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.23.

⁷³ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.23.

Jupiter himself would have yielded, so that FELICITAS, rather than he, might possess the very pinnacle of the Capitoline hill.⁷⁴

In the sixth book of *The City of God*, he notes that the goddess FELICITAS was not placed amongst the ‘select gods’ according to Varro’s classification:

(S) And still Minerva is among the select gods, while Mens is lost among the common throng. What shall I say of VIRTUS? What of FELICITAS? Of these I have already spoken at some length in the fourth book. Although the pagans regarded these as deities, they did not choose to give them a place among the select gods, where they made room for Mars and Orcus, the one a god who causes deaths, the other a god who receives the dead.⁷⁵

Those two reasons, namely her failure to provide “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS and her lack of pre-eminence in the Roman cult, led Augustine to conclude that the goddess FELICITAS cannot be a deity. As the final two passages below show, for him, FELICITAS is a gift of Christian God. It explains her lack of pre-eminence amongst the other Roman gods since the Romans have not yet discovered Christian God through they have been receiving his blessing:

(L) But if FELICITAS is not a goddess, but rather a gift of God (and this is the fact of the matter), let men seek that God who is able to grant it, and let them desert the noxious multiplicity of false gods that the foolish multitude of stupid people resorts to. They make gifts of God into gods for themselves, and offend God himself, the giver of these gifts, by the stubbornness of a proud self-will. Thus, they cannot escape *infelicitas*, when they worship FELICITAS as a goddess and desert God, the giver of FELICITAS. Just so a man cannot escape

⁷⁴ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.23.

⁷⁵ Aug. *De civ. D.* 6.12.

hunger by licking a painted loaf of bread instead of asking for a real one from a man who has it.⁷⁶

At the beginning of the fifth book of the work, the bishop of Hippo reiterates his argument:

(P) It is evident that FELICITAS is the sum total of all desirable things. It is not a goddess, but the gift of God. And no god should be worshipped by men except the one who is able to make them FELICES, hence if FELICITAS, were a goddess, it could be affirmed that she alone might properly be worshipped. Now therefore let us see for what reason God willed that the Roman empire should be so great and so lasting — God who can also grant such goods as even those men who are evil, and hence not FELICES, can possess.⁷⁷

To deny the divine status of FELICITAS, Augustine develops a second argument this time centred around the connection of the divine quality and VIRTUS.

Argument Two: The goddess FELICITAS cannot be a deity because she does not provide virtue.

Rationale: Since for Augustine, “true, sure, and eternal” FELICITAS is only given to men who live virtuously, then if the goddess FELICITAS is the giver of FELICITAS, she should provide VIRTUS to her worshippers. Since the goddess FELICITAS did not do so, she cannot be a deity. This argument is raised in two passages (C and D). In the first passage, Augustine claims that since FELICITAS could provide all blessings, it should have been unnecessary to worship any other gods and goddess:

(C) But why was it necessary to worship and invoke such a throng of gods to gain these blessings, mental, physical or external? I have not

⁷⁶ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.23.

⁷⁷ Aug. *De civ. D.* 5.praef.

mentioned them all, nor were the pagans themselves equal to the task of dividing up all human goods into tiny and separate bits and providing a tiny and separate god for each. For the one goddess FELICITAS could easily confer all blessings, and that would be a short and easy way, making it unnecessary to look for others, either to obtain blessings or to avert evils.⁷⁸

He then concludes that if FELICITAS is given as a reward of VIRTUS, it is in fact a gift of God, whereas if it were truly a goddess, it is surprising that no one would mention virtue given as a reward from FELICITAS:

(D) A final point, while we are dealing with these two goddesses VIRTUS and FELICITAS: if felicity is the reward of virtue, it is not a goddess, but the gift of God. And if she is a goddess, why does no one assert that she confers also the gift of virtue? For the attainment of virtue is also a matter of great FELICITAS.⁷⁹

To complete his refutation of the divine status of the goddess FELICITAS, the bishop of Hippo develops a final line of argumentation.

Argument Three: The goddess FELICITAS cannot be a deity because she does not provide FELICITAS *aeterna*.

Rationale: for Augustine, if the goddess FELICITAS was the giver of FELICITAS, she would provide the “true, sure, and eternal” FELICITAS (FELICITAS *aeterna, vera et plena*) since it is the most important form of FELICITAS a worshipper, either pagan or Christian, can pray for. In his view, since the goddess FELICITAS does not provide it, then FELICITAS cannot be a deity. This argument is evident from two passages (Q, and R), in which Augustine states that FELICITAS *aeterna, vera et plena* can only be found in the worship of the Christian God. In the sixth book of *The City of God*, Augustine declares that since FELICITAS

⁷⁸ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.21.

⁷⁹ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.21.

is not a goddess but rather a gift of God, worshippers should pray to God who grants the true FELICITAS.

(R) For if FELICITAS were a goddess, to whom should men consecrate themselves in order to gain eternal life except to her alone? But since it is not a goddess, but a gift of a god, to what god should we consecrate ourselves except to the giver of FELICITAS, we who with pious affection cherish eternal life, where true and complete FELICITAS exists?⁸⁰

In the fourth book of the work, Augustine declares that true FELICITAS can be only found in the City of God, only accessible to good Christians.

(Q) That city is eternal; there no one is born, because no one dies. True and perfect FELICITAS is found there, and this is no goddess, but a gift of God. We have received from it the pledge of our faith, to be with us on our journey while still we aspire to its beauty. There the sun does not rise on the good and the evil, but the Sun of righteousness protects only the good. There will be no devotion to hard work there, to enrich the public treasury while private property is scanty, for the treasury of truth is there a common property.⁸¹

Out of the twenty-one passages referencing the goddess FELICITAS, six (N, O, A, K, M, and T) do not fit within the three lines of argument presented above. In two passages, N and O, Augustine enjoins Roman pagans to pray to the Christian God:

(O) But let him who finds FELICITAS enough — for man's prayers cannot go beyond it — let him serve the one God, the giver of FELICITAS. He is not the one they call Jupiter, for if they saw in Jupiter the giver of FELICITAS they would not look for another god or goddess to confer it, calling her by the name of happiness itself, FELICITAS. Nor

⁸⁰ Aug. *De civ. D.* 6.12.

⁸¹ Aug. *De civ. D.* 5.16.

would they have supposed that Jupiter was to be worshipped by the great insults that they now inflict upon him.⁸²

In the second passage, the Christian writer supports his invitation by showing that the transition from traditional gods to the Christian God would be natural since it is the Christian God who gave the Romans FELICITAS in the first place. Indeed, Augustine concludes that Roman pagans, in their ignorance of the Christian God prayed to the goddess FELICITAS.

(N) For it is admitted that human weakness already judged that FELICITAS could be conferred only by some god, and this was the judgement of men who worshipped so many gods, including Jupiter their king himself. Since they did not know the name of the one by whom happiness was given, they therefore chose to call the deity by the name of the gift. Thus, they certified clearly enough that FELICITAS could not be obtained even from Jupiter, whom they were already worshipping, but only from that power which they thought should be worshipped under the name of FELICITAS itself.⁸³

Removing those two passages then leave four passages (A, K, M, and T) as potential instances where the bishop of Hippo strategically quotes ancient sources to support his argument. Amongst those occurrences, one passage (M) constitutes a clear example where Augustine paraphrases one of his sources:

Thus, they say, when FELICITAS is called a goddess, the word means not the FELICITAS which is given, but the deity by whom it is given (*ita, inquit, cum FELICITAS dea dicitur, non ipsa quae datur, sed numen illud adtenditur a quo FELICITAS datur*).⁸⁴

⁸² Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.25.

⁸³ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.25.

⁸⁴ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.24.

The verb *inquere* ‘to say’ indicates that Augustine is referencing an ancient source on Roman traditional religion. Interestingly, the language of the passage echoes a remark by the Stoic philosopher, Balbus found in Cicero’s *On the nature of the Gods*. Balbus claims that “divinities are named after the effects they have on worshippers” (*illud quod erat a deo natum nomine ipsius dei nuncupabant*).⁸⁵ This citation comes in a section where Augustine explains why the Romans worship as deity the divine gifts they receive.⁸⁶ Cicero’s description of Stoic thoughts on divine nature therefore serves Augustine as evidence that, in Roman traditional religion, the agency of the goddess FELICITAS was to grant FELICITAS. He relies on this information to better demonstrate both her failure as a deity since she does not provide either “true, sure, and eternal” nor “earthly and temporal” FELICITAS, and the failure of the Romans to worship the Christian God, the source of both types of FELICITAS.

The remaining references to the goddess FELICITAS in passage A, K, and M serve a similar purpose for Augustine. The three passages deal in essence with the same material. Passage A introduces the goddess FELICITAS by comparing her with the goddess Fortuna:

What of the fact that FELICITAS also is a goddess? She received a temple, she obtained an altar, and appropriate rites were performed (*Quid, quod et FELICITAS dea est? Aedem accepit, aram meruit, sacra congrua persoluta sunt*). Then she alone ought to have been worshipped (*Ipsa ergo sola coleretur*). For where she was, what good thing could be lacking? But how does it make sense that Fortuna also is regarded as a goddess and worshipped? Is FELICITAS one thing and fortune another? (*An aliud est FELICITAS, aliud fortuna?*) Yes, we are told, fortune can be bad as well as good, while if FELICITAS is bad, it will not be FELICITAS (*Quia fortuna potest esse et mala; FELICITAS autem si mala fuerit, FELICITAS non erit*). Surely we ought to regard all gods of both sexes (if they have sex, too) as never anything but good.

⁸⁵ Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.60.

⁸⁶ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.24.

This is what Plato says, and the other philosophers, and the distinguished rulers of our state and of all nations. Then how is the goddess Fortuna sometimes good, sometimes bad? Or do you suppose, perchance, that when she is bad she is no longer a goddess, but is suddenly changed into a malignant demon? Then how many such goddesses are there? Surely there are as many as there are fortunate men, that is, men with good fortune. There are also simultaneously, that is, at the same time, very many others with bad fortune. Well, if she is the same, is she at once both good and bad, one thing for some and another for others? Or, being a goddess, is she always good? In that case, she is the same as FELICITAS. Why are different names employed? But this can be overlooked, for it is common enough to have a single thing called by two names. Why the different temples, different altars, different rites? The reason, they say, is that FELICITAS is what good men have earned by their good works, while the fortune that is called good happens by luck both to good men and to bad men, without any scrutiny of their deeds, and is in fact called Fortuna for that reason (*Est causa, inquiunt, quia FELICITAS illa est, quam boni habent praecedentibus meritis; fortuna uero, quae dicitur bona, sine ullo examine meritorum fortuito accidit hominibus et bonis et malis, unde etiam Fortuna nominatur*). Then how is she really good, if she comes both to good men and bad with no consideration of justice? Moreover, why do men worship her, if she is blind, and runs into people at random, no matter who, so that she commonly passes by those who worship her and attaches herself to those who scorn her? Or if her worshippers do accomplish anything, so as to be seen and loved by her, then she is taking account of their merits, and does not come by accident. Now where is the definition of Fortuna? How is it that she has even got her name from fortuitous events? For it is no good worshipping her if she is mere luck (fortuna), but if she singles out her worshippers to help them, she is not mere luck, or Fortuna. Or does Jupiter send her, too, where he pleases? Then let him alone be

worshipped, since Fortuna cannot oppose him when he gives orders and sends her where he pleases. Or at least, if any are to worship her, let it be bad men who refuse to possess the merit by which the favour of the goddess FELICITAS might be won (*Aut certe istam mali colant, qui nolunt habere merita, quibus dea possit FELICITAS inuitari*).⁸⁷

The passage, the longest of all, starts off Augustine's denial of the divine agency of the goddess FELICITAS by showing that neither one of the goddesses Fortuna or FELICITAS could have given the Romans their empire because their function overlapped. The verb *inquere* 'to say' introduces what Augustine presents as the point of view of Roman pagans in order to support his discussion (underlined). For him, according to his sources, the goddess FELICITAS differs from the goddess Fortuna because "FELICITAS is what is given to good men because of their previous merits; but *fortuna*, which is termed good without any trial of merit, befalls both good and bad men fortuitously, whence she is also named *fortuna*."⁸⁸

Augustine uses this information again in two different instances of the discussion. In the sixth book of the *City of God*, Augustine notes that, even if FELICITAS did not have a place amongst Varro's 'select gods', because the gods got their place by chance, the goddess Fortuna should be first amongst them:

(T) Hence even Varro himself says that some father-gods and mother-goddesses, like some men, have had obscurity as their lot. So therefore, while FELICITAS perhaps had no right to a place among the select gods, since these attained their high rank not by merit but by fortune, Fortuna at least should have been given a place among them, or rather before them, for they say that this goddess confers her gifts on each one, not by any rational plan, but by blind chance. Among the select gods she ought to have held the topmost place. It is in their case especially that she showed what she could accomplish, for we see that

⁸⁷ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.18. I have underlined Cardauns' fragments.

⁸⁸ Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.18.

they have been selected not for outstanding character nor any deserved FELICITAS, but through the power of fortune, arbitrary as their worshippers believe that power to be.⁸⁹

In this passage, the Christian writer's argument is supported by the idea presented in passage A that the goddess Fortuna provides fortune blindly to good and bad men. Thus, since she represents chance, then as a deity the goddess Fortuna should have been included in the list of twenty deities which Varro presents in the sixteenth book of *Antiquities of Divine Things* as the 'select gods'.⁹⁰ Varro's failure to include the goddess Fortuna to this list of gods shows the randomness of his selection, and thus the failure of his theology.⁹¹

Similarly, in the last reference to the goddess FELICITAS, Augustine uses material presented in passage A to support his argument. Indeed, the bishop of Hippo reminds his reader that if FELICITAS was a goddess, she should be able to choose by whom she would be obeyed:

(K) And if FELICITAS has the power to choose with whom she will abide (and she has, if she is a goddess), what folly it is to ask some other god for her favour when you can obtain it from herself directly! Therefore, they should have honoured this goddess above all the gods by providing her also with a worthier abode.⁹²

The passage refers not only to the fact that, as a deity, the goddess FELICITAS has the agency to provide FELICITAS to her worshipper but also to the singularity of the deity compared to the goddess Fortuna since "she provides FELICITAS to good men because of their previous merits" (*quia FELICITAS illa est, quam boni habent praecedentibus meritis*). The arguments developed in passages above (T and K) then rely on the information Augustine provides on

⁸⁹ Aug. *De civ. D.* 7.3.

⁹⁰ According to Augustine, the select gods (*di selecti*) was seen by Varro as symbolizing elements or part of the cosmos, see Aug. *De civ. D.* 7.5-26. For a discussion of the philosophical tenets underpinning the grouping of the select gods, see Nuffelen 2010, 165-70.

⁹¹ On Varro's failed theology according to Augustine, see Hadas 2017.

⁹² Aug. *De civ. D.* 4.23.

the status of the goddess FELICITAS as a divinity and on her agency in passage A.

Considering the importance of the information for Augustine's argumentation as well as the fact that some of the material is introduced with the verb '*inquere*', to say, it is possible to construe Augustine's distinction between the goddesses FELICITAS and Fortuna in Roman traditional religion as an instance where the bishop of Hippo very likely strategically quotes Varro. In light of the role of the antiquarian's role in the rhetoric of *The City of God*, it is reasonable to conclude that the material presented by Augustine is reflective of Varro's ideas. Just like Augustine's quotation of Cicero has highlighted, the Christian writer is most likely paraphrasing the Roman antiquarian rather than reporting his exact words. Analysing the whole Augustinian discussion on the goddess has shown that this description is not altered by the writer's own arguments against the deity. On the contrary, it is the bedrock on which Augustine develops his whole refutation of the divine status of the goddess FELICITAS.

8.5 Conclusion

This analysis of Augustine's discussion of the goddess FELICITAS in his work *The City of God* has identified one instance in the discussion where the bishop of Hippo quotes Varro's *Antiquities of Human and Divine Things* by taking into account of the rhetorical and intellectual context of the discussion.

Augustine's reliability as a source for Varro is due to the important role the Roman antiquarian plays in helping the Christian writer articulate his message in the *City of God*. Augustine envisions his work as a conditional opening for Romans to join Christianity. Varro plays a central role in helping Augustine develop his hortatory message, since, by the fourth century CE, his work was widely seen as authoritative by both Christians and Roman pagans. Varro and his writing, in particular the *Antiquities of Human and Divine Things*, therefore provide Augustine with the necessary material to argue against Roman traditional religion. Thus, the bishop of Hippo uses a strategic type of citation, that is a polemical quotation selected for its content and

because of the author's status in the eyes of the audience. This type of citation's reliance on ideas already known to the audience means that Augustine's description of the goddess FELICITAS must have been recognisable by both Romans and Christians in order to be an effective rhetorical tool.

Throughout the discussion on the goddess FELICITAS, Augustine develops three arguments against the deity based on his Christian understanding of FELICITAS. He distinguishes between two notions of FELICITAS: FELICITAS *temporalis et terrena*, "earthly and temporal" FELICITAS and FELICITAS *aeterna, vera et plena*, "eternal, true, and satisfying" FELICITAS. FELICITAS *aeterna, vera et plena* constitutes the promise of the Christian God to its worshippers: it is the life enjoyed by the immortal soul after death for good Christian men, with a blessed soul acquired from living virtuously in line with God's teachings. "Earthly and temporal" FELICITAS is given to the *res publica* through peace and prosperity, and to individuals through children, wealth and high offices. It is also given by God but should not be valued by Christians. Those conceptualisations of FELICITAS are at the heart of Augustine's argument that the goddess FELICITAS cannot be a deity because she provides neither FELICITAS *temporalis et terrena* nor FELICITAS *aeterna, vera et plena*.

Analysing the twenty-one references to goddess FELICITAS using Augustine's Christian concept of FELICITAS has allowed the identification of one passage in which the bishop presents material about the goddess FELICITAS most likely taken from Varro's description of the deity in his *Antiquities of Human and Divine Things*. This passage corresponds exactly to the one in which Cardauns has identified his two fragments from Varro. This suggests that the fragments are indeed instances where Augustine paraphrases Varro's ideas for rhetorical purpose.

9 Bibliography

- Aberson, M. (1994). *Temples Votifs et Butin de Guerre Dans La Rome Républicaine*. Rome: Institut suisse de Rome.
- Adema, S. (2016). Encouraging Troops, Persuading Narratees: Pre-Battle Exhortations in Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum* as a Narrative Device. In *The Art of History: Literary Perspectives on Greek and Roman Historiography* (eds. Liotsakis, V. & Farrington, S.) pp. 219-240.
- Adema, S. (2017). *Speech and Thought in Latin War Narratives*. Leiden: Brill.
- Akar, P. (2013). *Concordia: Un Idéal de La Classe Dirigeante Romaine à La Fin de La République*. Histoire Ancienne et Médiévale 122. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.
- Albanese, B. (1995). 'Sui Frammenti Di Censoriae Tabulae'. In Varr. de l. Lat. 6, 86-87, 67–102. *Annali del Seminario Giuridico della Università di Palermo* 13. pp 67-102.
- Alexander, M. C. (1976). Hortensius' Speech in Defence of Verres. *Phoenix* 30 (1). pp 46–53.
- Alexander, M. C. (1990). *Trials in the Late Roman Republic, 149BC to 50BC*. Phoenix. Supplementary Volume 26. Toronto Buffalo London: University of Toronto Press.
- Alexander, M. C. (2002). *The Case for the Prosecution in the Ciceronian Era*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Alexander, M. C. (2009) The Commentariolum Petitionis as an Attack on Elections Campaigns. *Athenaeum* 97. pp 31-57, 369-95.
- Algra, K. (2003). Stoic Theology. In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoic* (ed. Inwood B.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 153-178.
- Algra, K. (2009). Stoic Philosophical Theology and Greco-Roman Religion. In *God and Cosmos in Stoicism* (ed. Salles, R.). pp 224-252.
- Alonso Fernández, Z. (2016). Choreography of Lupercalia, *Greek and Roman Musical Studies* 4 (2). pp. 311-332.
- Ando, C. (2003). *Roman Religion*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Ando, C. (2010). The Ontology of Religious Institutions. *History of Religions* 50 (1). pp. 54–79.

- André, J. (1964). Arbor felix, arbor infelix. In *Hommages à Jean Bayet* (eds. Renard M. and Schilling R.) Collection Latomus 70. Bruxelles: Latomus. pp. 35–46.
- Arena, V. (2007). Invocation To Liberty and Invective Of “Dominatus” at the End of the Roman Republic. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 50. pp. 49–73.
- Arena, V. (2012). *Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Armitage, D. (2012). What's the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the *Longue Durée*. *History of European Ideas* 38 (4). pp. 493-507
- Arya, D. A. (2002). *The Goddess Fortuna in Imperial Rome: Cult, Art, Text*. PhD Thesis. Austin: The University of Texas at Austin.
- Asmis, E. (2004). The State as a Partnership: Cicero’s Definition of Res Publica in His Work On the State. *History of Political Thought* 25 (4). pp. 569–98.
- Assenmaker P. (2012). Nouvelles perspectives sur le titre d’*imperator* et l’*appellatio imperatoria* sous la République. *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 90 (1). pp. 111-142.
- Assenmaker, P. (2013). *De La Victoire Au Pouvoir: Développement et Manifestations de l'idéologie Impériatoriale à l'époque de Marius et Sylla*. Brussels : Académie Royal des Sciences, Des lettres, et des Beaux Arts.
- Astin, A. (1967). *Scipio Aemilianus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Astin, A. (1978). *Cato the Censor*. Oxford University Press.
- Astin, A. (1985). Censorships in the Late Republic. *Historia* 34 (2). pp. 175–90.
- Astin, A. (1988). Regimen Morum. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 78. pp. 14–34.
- Atkins, E. (1990). *Domina et Regina Virtutum: Justice and Societas* in *De Officiis*. *Phronesis* 35 (3). pp. 258–89.
- Auliard, C. (2001). *Victoires et triomphes à Rome. Droit et réalités sous la République*. Besançon : Institut des Sciences et Techniques de l'Antiquité.

- Avery, H. (1967). Marius Felix. *Hermes* 95 (3). pp. 324–30.
- Axtell, H. (1907). *The Deification of Abstract Ideas in Roman Literature and Inscriptions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Aymard, A. (1948). Deux Anecdotes sur Scipion Emilien. *Mélanges de la Société toulousaine d'études classiques* 2. pp. 106–9.
- Badel, C. (2014). La *Dignitas* à Rome: Entre Prestige et Honneur (Fin de La République). In *Le Prestige: Autour Des Formes de Différenciation Sociale* (eds. Hurllet F., Rivoal I., and Sidéra I.) Paris: Éditions de Boccard, pp. 107–118.
- Badian, E. (1964). *Studies in Greek and Roman History*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Badian, E. (1970). *Lucius Sulla; the deadly reformer*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
- Badian, E. (2009). From the Iulii to Caesar. In *A Companion to Julius Caesar* (ed. Griffin M.) London: Blackwell. pp. 9-22.
- Baker, C. & Miles-Watson, J. (2010). Faith and Traditional Capitals: Defining the Public Scope of Spiritual and Religious Capital—A Literature Review. *Implicit Religion* 13 (1). pp. 17–69.
- Bal, M. (1997). *Narratology. Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.
- Balmaceda, C. (2017). *Virtus Romana: Politics and Morality in the Roman Historians*. University of North Carolina Press.
- Balsdon, J. P. (1951). Sulla Felix. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 41. pp. 1–10.
- Balsdon, J.P. (1960). Auctoritas, Dignitas, Otium. *The Classical Quarterly* 10 pp. 43–50.
- Bane, R. W. (1976). The development of Roman imperial attitudes and the Iberian Wars. *Emerita* 44 (2). pp. 409–20.
- Barlow, J. J. (2012). Cicero on Property and the State. In *Cicero's Practical Philosophy*. (ed. Nicgorski W.) University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 212–241.
- Baron, C. (2018). The Historian's Craft: Narrative Strategies and Historical Method in Polybius and Livy. In *Polybius and His Legacy* (eds. Miltsios N. and Tamiolak M.) Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 203-22.

- Barrandon, N. & Hurllet, F. (2021). When Magistrates Left Rome for their Provinces: Temporal, Ritual, and Institutional Methods for Assigning *provinciae* and Armies (200-167 BC). In *Provinces and Provincial Command in Republican Rome: Genesis, Development and Governance* (ed. Díaz Fernández A.) Leiden: Brill. pp. 71-87.
- Barton, C. A. (2007). The Price of Peace in Ancient Rome. In *War and peace in the ancient world* (ed. Raaflaub K. A.) Blackwell Pub. pp. 245-55.
- Bastien, J.-L. (2007). *Le Triomphe Romain et Son Utilisation Politique à Rome Aux Trois Derniers Siècles de la République.*(Collection de l'École Française de Rome 392). Rome: École Française de Rome.
- Bastien, J.-L. (2008). Les Temples Votifs de La Rome Républicaine: Monumentalisation et célébration des Cérémonies du Triomphe. In *Roma Illustrata : Représentations de La Ville* (eds. Fleury P. and Desbordes O.) Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen. pp. 29–48.
- Baudry, R. (2014). Elections et légitimité, à travers l'analyse des *contentiones dignitatis*. In *Poteri e legittimità nel mondo antico. Da Nanterre a Venezia in memoria di Pierre Carlier* (ed. De Vido S.) Venise: Edizioni Ca' Foscari. pp. 137-155.
- Beard, M. (2003). The Triumph of the Absurd: Roman Street Theatre. In *Rome the Cosmopolis* (eds. Edwards C. and Woolf G.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 21–43.
- Beard, M. (2007). *The Roman Triumph*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Beard, M., John N. & Price S. (1998). *Religions of Rome*. 2 Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Beck, H. (2009). From Poplicola to Augustus: senatorial houses in Roman political culture. *Phoenix* 63. pp. 361–87.
- Bell, C. (1992). *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Beltramini, L. & Rocco, M. (2020). Livy On Scipio Africanus. The Commander's Portrait At 26.19.3–9. *The Classical Quarterly* 70 (1). pp. 230-46.
- Bénatouïl, T. (2009). How industrious is the Stoic God? In *God and Cosmos in Stoicism* (ed. Salles, R.) Oxford University Press. Oxford University Press. pp. 23-45.

- Bénatouïl, T. (2016). Structure, standards and Stoic moral progress. In *Cicero's De Finibus: Philosophical Approaches* (eds. Annas J. and Betegh G.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-220.
- Berlinger, L. (1935). *Beitrag zur inofficiellen Titulatur der romischen Kaiser*. Diss. Breslau.
- Bernard, J-E. (2012). De l'actualité à l'histoire: Cornélius Népos et la correspondance de Cicéron. In *La présence de l'histoire dans l'épistolaire* (eds. Guillaumont F. and Laurence P.) Paris : Presses universitaires François-Rabelais. pp. 93-107.
- Berrendonner, C. (2007). Verrès, les cités, les statues, et l'argent. In *La Sicile de Cicéron : lecture des Verrines. Actes du colloque de Paris (19-20 mai 2006)*. Centre Gustave Glotz. Besançon: Institut des Sciences et Techniques de l'Antiquité. pp. 205-228.
- Berthelet, Y. (2015). *Gouverner avec les dieux: Autorité, auspices et pouvoir, sous la République romaine et sous Auguste*. Paris : Les Belles Lettres.
- Berthelet, Y. & Dalla Rosa, A. (2015a). Les auspices. Débats autour de deux apories. *Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz* 26. pp. 199-315.
- Berthelet, Y. & Dalla Rosa, A. (2015b). Summum imperium auspiciumque: Une lecture critique. *Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger (1922-)* 93 (2). pp. 267–284.
- Bettini, M. & Short, W. M. (2011). *The Ears of Hermes: Communication, Images, and Identity in the Classical World*. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.
- Billot, F. (2014). Representing the Battle of Zama to Create an Iconic Event. *Antichthon* 48. pp. 55–76.
- Blitz, K. (1935). *Die Politik des P. Cornelius Aemilianus*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.
- Boeri, M. (2009). Does cosmic nature matter? Some reflections on the cosmological aspects of stoic ethics. In *God and Cosmos in Stoicism* (ed. Salles, R.) Oxford University Press. pp. 173-200.

- Bonfante Warren, L. (1970). Roman Triumphs and Etruscan Kings: the Changing Face of the Triumph. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 60 (1). pp. 49–66.
- Bonnefond-Coudry M. (1989). *Le Sénat de la République romaine de la guerre d'Hannibal à Auguste : pratiques délibératives et prise de décision*. Rome: Ecole française de Rome.
- Bourdieu, P. (1985). The market of symbolic goods. *Poetics* 14 (1–2). pp. 13–44.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). 'The Forms of Capital'. In *Readings in Economic Sociology* (ed. Woolsey Biggart N.), trl. Nice R. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. pp. 280–91.
- Bourdieu, P. (1987). Legitimation and Structured Interests. In *Weber's Sociology of Religion* (eds. Whimster S. and Lam S.) tr. by Turner C. London: Allen and Unwin. pp 119–36.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. tr. by Nice R. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Boyancé, P. (1955). Sur la théologie de Varron. *Revue des Études Anciennes* 57 (1). pp. 57–84.
- Boyancé, P. (1972). Fulvius Nobilior et le dieu ineffable. In *Etudes sur la religion romaine*. Publications de l'École française de Rome 11. Rome : École Française de Rome. pp. 227-52.
- Bradford Churchill, J. (1999). Ex qua quod vellent facerent: Roman Magistrates' Authority over Praeda and Manubiae. *Transactions of the American Philological Association* (1974-) 129. pp. 85–116.
- Bradford Churchill, J. (2000). "Sponsio Quae in Verba Facta Est?" Two Lost Speeches and the Formula of the Roman Legal Wager. *The Classical Quarterly* 50 (1). pp. 159–69.
- Bravi, A. (2012). *Ornamenta Urbis: Opere d'arte Greche Negli Spazi Romani*. Bari: Edipuglia.
- Brenk, F. E. (1975). The Dreams of Plutarch's Lives. *Latomus* 34 (2). pp. 336–349.

- Brenk, F. E. (1977). *In Mist Apparelled: Religious Themes in Plutarch's Moralia and Lives*. Leiden: Brill.
- Brennan, T. (2005). *The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate*. Oxford University Press.
- Brennan T. C. (1996). Triumphus in monte Albano. In *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C.* (ed. Wallace R. W. and Harris E. M.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. pp. 315–37.
- Brennan, T. C. (2000). *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic: Volume 2: 122 to 49 BC*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Briscoe, J. (2007). *A Commentary on Livy, Books 38-40*. Oxford: the Clarendon Press.
- Briscoe, J. (2013). Some misunderstandings of Polybius in Livy. In *Polybius and his world: Essays in memory of F.W. Walbank* (eds. Gibson B. and Harrison T.). Oxford: Oxford Academic Press. pp. 117-124.
- Brock, A., Motta, L., & Terrenato, N. (2021). On the Banks of the Tiber: Opportunity and Transformation in Early Rome. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 111. pp. 1-30.
- Brouwer, R. (2011). Poybius and Stoic *tyche*. *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 51. pp. 111–132
- Brunchschwig, J. (2003). Stoic Metaphysics. In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoic* (ed. Inwood B.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 206-232.
- Brunt, P. A. (1971). *Italian Manpower 225 BC-AD 14*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Brunt, P.A. (1988). *The Fall of the Roman Republic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buck, C.H. (1940). *A chronology of the plays of Plautus*, Diss. Baltimore.
- Burns, Paul C. (2001). Augustine's Use of Varro's *Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum* in His *De Civitate Dei*. *Augustinian Studies* 32 (1). pp. 37–64.
- Burton, P. (2011). *Friendship and Empire: Roman Diplomacy and Imperialism in the Middle Republic (353–146 BC)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Burton, P. (2013). Enter the Muse: Literary Responses to Roman Imperialism (240-100 BC). In *A Companion to Roman Imperialism* (ed. Hoyos D.) History of Warfare 81. Leiden: Brill. pp. 99-112.
- Cadario, M. (2014). Preparing for Triumph. Graecae Artes as Roman Booty in L. Mummius' Campaign (146 BC). In *The Roman Republican triumph: beyond the spectacle* (eds. Hjort Lange C. and Vervaet F. J.) Roma: Edizioni Quasar. pp. 83-101.
- Calasso, G. P. (1962). Appunti sul concetto di Felicitas. *Atene e Roma* 7. pp. 15-30.
- Canfora, L. (2007). *Julius Caesar: the people's dictator*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Carcopino, J. (1931). *Sylla ou la monarchie manquée*. Paris : L'Artisan du Livre.
- Cardauns, B. (1976). *M. Terentius Varro. Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum*. 2 vols. Mainz: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur.
- Carsana, C. (2022). Polybius and Roman Political culture. In *A Companion to the Political Culture of the Roman Republic* (eds. Arena V., Prag J., and Stiles A.) Wiley Blackwell. pp. 111-24.
- Castagnetti, N. (1996). "Silla e il culto di Felicitas". *Rivista storica dell'antichità* 26, pp. 47-52.
- Catalano, P. (1960). *Contributi allo studio del diritto augurale I*. (Memorie dell'Istituto giuridico Università di Torino Serie 2. 107). Turin: Giappichelli.
- Cattaneo, C. (2011). *Salus publica populi Romani*. Forlì : Ed. Victrix.
- Celani, A. (1998). *Opere d'arte greche nella Roma di Augusto*. Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.
- Champeaux, J. (1982-7). *Fortuna: recherches sur le culte de la Fortune à Rome et dans le monde romain des origines à la mort de César*. 2 vols. Collection de l'école française de Rome. Rome: École française de Rome.
- Champion, C. B. (2017). *The Peace of the Gods: Elite Religious Practices in the Middle Roman Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Chaplin, J. D. (2000). *Livy's Exemplary History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Christenson, D. (2001). Grottesque Realism in Plautus' "Amphitruo." *The Classical Journal* 96 (3). pp. 243–260.
- Clark, A. J. (2007). *Divine Qualities: Cult and Community in Republican Rome*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clark, G. (2010). Augustine's Varro and Pagan Monotheism. In *Monotheism between Pagans and Christians in Late Antiquity* (eds. Mitchell S. and Van Nuffelen P.). Leuven: Peeters. pp. 181–202.
- Clark, J. H. (2014). *Triumph in Defeat: Military Loss and the Roman Republic*. Oxford: Oxford Academic Press.
- Clemente, G. (2016). I censore e il senato. I mores e la legge. *Athenaeum* 104 (2). pp. 446–500.
- Clemente G. (2022). The census. In *A Companion to the Political Culture of the Roman Republic* (eds. Arena V., Prag J., and Stiles A.) Wiley Blackwell. pp. 193-205.
- Coarelli, F. (1968). La porta trionfale e la via dei trionfi. *DialArch* 2. pp. 55-10
- Coarelli, F. (1997). *Il Campo Marzio: Dalle Origini Alla Fine Della Repubblica*. Rome: Edizioni Quasar.
- Codrington, R. (1891). *The Melanesians: Studies in their Anthropology and Folklore*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Cole, S. (2014). *Cicero and the Rise of Deification at Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Combès, R. (1966). *Imperator: Recherches sur l'emploi et la signification du titre d'imperator dans la Rome républicaine*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Cornell, T. (2022). Roman Political Assemblies. In *A Companion to the Political Culture of the Roman Republic* (eds. Arena V., Prag J., and Stiles A.) Wiley Blackwell. pp. 220-35.
- Cornell, Tim. (2000). The Lex Ovinia and the Emancipation of the Senate. In *The Roman Middle Republic Politics, Religion, and Historiography, c. 400 - 133 B.C.E Papers from a Conference at the Institutum Romanum*

- Finlandiae, September 11 - 12, 1998* (ed. Brun C.). Acta Instituti Romani Finlandiae 23. pp. 69–89.
- Cornwell, H. (2017). *Pax and the Politics of Peace: Republic to Principate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Coudry, M. (2009). Partage et gestion du butin dans la Rome républicaine : procédures et enjeux. In *Praeda. Butin de guerre et société dans la Rome républicaine / Kriegsbeute und Gesellschaft im republikanischen Rome* (ed. Humm M. and Coudry M.) Berlin: Franz Steiner Verlag. pp.21-79.
- Coudry, M. (2012). Lois Somptuaires et Regimen Morum. In *Leges Publicae: La Legge Nell'esperienza Giuridica Romana* (ed. Ferrary J-L.) Pubblicazioni Del Cedant 8. Pavia: IUSS Press. pp. 489–513.
- Craig, C. P. (1986). Cato's Stoicism and the Understanding of Cicero's Speech for Murena. *Transactions of the American Philological Association* (1974-) 116. pp. 229–39.
- Cristofoli, R. (2004). *Cicerone e la 2. filippica : circostanze, stile e ideologia di un'orazione mai pronunciata*. Roma : Herder.
- Culham, P. (1982). The "Lex Oppia." *Latomus* 41 (4). pp. 786–93.
- Dalla Rosa, A. (2003). *Ductu Auspicioque: Per Una Riflessione Sui Fondamenti Religiosi Del Potere Magistratuale Fino All'epoca Augustea*. *Studi Classici e Orientali* 49. pp. 185–255.
- Dalla Rosa, A. (2011). Dominating the Auspices: Augustus, Augury and the Proconsuls. In *Priests and State in the Roman World* (eds. Richardson J. H. and Santangelo F.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. pp. 243–69.
- Dalzell, A. (1955). C. Asinius Pollio And The Early History Of Public Recitation At Rome. *Hermathena* 86. pp. 20–28.
- Dart, C. J. & Vervaet F. J. (2014). Claiming Triumphs for Recovered Territories: Reflections on Valerius Maximus. In *The Roman Republican triumph: beyond the spectacle* (eds. Hjort Lange C. and Vervaet F. J.) Roma: Edizioni Quasar. pp. 53–64
- David, J-M. (2022). The Law and the Courts in Roman Political Culture. In *A Companion to the Political Culture of the Roman Republic* (eds. Arena V., Prag J., and Stiles A.) Wiley Blackwell. pp. 433-45.

- Davies, J. P. (2005). *Rome's Religious History: Livy, Tacitus, and Ammianus on Their Gods*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Davis, W. A. (2005). *Nondescriptive Meaning and Reference: An Ideational Semantics*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- De Jong, I.J.F. & Nünlist, R. (2007). *Time in Ancient Greek Literature*. Leiden: Brill.
- De Melo, W. D. C. (2017). A Typology of Errors in Varro and His Editors: A Close Look at Selected Passages in the *De Lingua Latina*. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 60 (2). pp. 108–22.
- De Vaan, M. (2008). *Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the Other Italic Languages*. Leiden: Brill.
- Depeyrot, G. (2014). *Monnaies romaines : histoire et vie d'un empire*. Lacapelle-Marival : Archéologie nouvelle.
- DiLuzio, M. J. (2016). *A Place at The Altar. Priestesses In Republican Rome*. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Douglas, M. (1966). *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. London: Routledge
- Driediger-Murphy, L. G. (2019). *Roman Republican Augury: Freedom and Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Drogula, F. K. (2007). Imperium, Potestas, and the Pomerium in the Roman Republic. *Historia* 56 (4). pp. 419–452.
- Drogula, F. K. (2015). *Commanders and Command in the Roman Republic and Early Empire*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Drummond, A. (1995). *Law, Politics and Power: Sallust and the Execution of the Catilinarian Conspirators*. *Historia*. Einzelschriften 93.
- Drummond, A. (2000). Rullus and the Sullan Possessores. *Klio* 82 (1). pp. 126–153.
- Dugan, J. (2013). Cicero and the Politics of Ambiguity: Interpreting the *Pro Marcello*. In *Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome* (eds. Steel C and van der Bloom H.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 210–226.
- Dumézil, G. (1956). *Déeses latines et mythes védiques*, Brussels: Latomus.

- Dumézil, G. (1970). *Archaic Roman Religion* (trl. Krapp P.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dumitru, A. (2021). On the Treaty of Apamea. Colonial Geopolitics and Local Cultures in the Hellenistic and Roman East (3rd century BC–3rd century AD). In *Géopolitique coloniale et cultures locales dans l'Orient hellénistique et romain (IIIe siècle av. J.-C.–IIIe siècle ap. J.-C.)* (eds Bru H., Dumitru A., Sekunda N.). pp. 35-48.
- Dunkle, J. R. (1971). The Rhetorical Tyrant in Roman Historiography: Sallust, Livy and Tacitus. *Classical World* 65. Pp. 12-20.
- Dupont F. (1998). Signification théâtrale du double dans l'*Amphitryon* de Plaute. *Vita Latina* 50. Pp. 2-12.
- Dyck A. R. (1998). *A Commentary on Cicero De Officiis*. Ann Arbor, MI.
- Dyck, A. R. (2010). *Cicero: Pro Sexto Roscio*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Earl, D. C. (1961). *The Political Thought of Sallust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eckert, A. (2016). *Lucius Cornelius Sulla in der antiken Erinnerung: Jener Mörder, der sich Felix nannte*. Millennium Studies 60. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.
- Eckert, A. (2018). Good Fortune and the Public Good: Disputing Sulla's Claim to Be Felix. In *Institutions and Ideology in Republican Rome Speech, Audience and Decision* (eds. Van der Blom H., Gray C., and Steel C.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 283–98.
- Eckert, A. (2019). Reconsidering the Sulla Myth. In *Sulla: Politics and Reception* (eds. Eckert A., and Thein A.) Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 159–72
- Elliott, J. (2013). *Ennius and the Architecture of the Annales*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eisenhut W. (1973). *Virtus romana; ihre stellung im römischen wertsystem*. PhD Thesis. W. Fink.
- Erdkamp, P. (2006). Late-annalistic Battle Scenes in Livy. *Mnemosyne* 59 (4). pp. 525-63.
- Ericsson, H. (1943). Sulla Felix. Eine Wortstudie. *Eranos* 41. pp. 77-89.

- Erkell, H. (1952). *Augustus, Felicitas, Fortuna. Lateinische Wortstudien.* Gothenburg: Göteborgs universitet.
- Fabrizi, V. (2017). Livy's antiquities: rethinking the distant past in the *Ab urbe condita*. In *Imagines Antiquitatis: Representations, Concepts, Receptions of the Past in Roman Antiquity and the Early Italian Renaissance* (eds. Rocchi S and Mussini C.). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 87-110.
- Fantham, E. (2006). "Dic si quid potes de Sexto Annali": The Literary Legacy of Ennius's Pyrrhic War. *Arethusa* 39 (3). pp. 549-568.
- Fantham, E. (2013). *A Commentary on the Pro Murena*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Farrell, J. (2020). The Gods in Ennius. In *Ennius' Annales: Poetry and History* (eds. Damon C. and Farrell J.) Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. pp. 63-88.
- Favro, D. (1994). The Street Triumphant. The Urban Impact of Roman Triumphal Parades. In *Streets. Critical Perspectives on Public Space* (eds. Çelik Z, Favro D., and Ingersoll R.). Berkeley-Los Angeles. pp. 151-64.
- Fears, J. R. (1975). The coinage of Q. Cornificius and augural symbolism on late Republican denarii. *Historia* 24. pp. 592-602.
- Fears, J. R. (1981a). The theology of victory at Rome. *ANRW*, 2.17.2, pp. 736-826.
- Fears, J. R. (1981b). The cult of virtues and Roman imperial ideology. *ANRW*, 2.17.2. pp. 828-948.
- Fede D. (2003). Stoic Determinism. In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoic* (ed. Inwood B.) Cambridge University Press. pp. 179-205.
- Feeney, D. (1998). *Literature and Religion at Rome: Cultures, Contexts, and Beliefs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Feeney, D. (2007). *Caesar's Calendar: Ancient Time and the Beginnings of History. Caesar's Calendar*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fernández, A. D. (2021). *Provinces and Provincial Command in Republican Rome: Genesis, development and Governance, Libera res publica 4*. Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza

- Ferrary, J. (2009). After The Embassy to Rome: Publication And Implementation. In *Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Roman World* (ed. Eilers C). Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. pp. 127–142.
- Filippi, D. (2005). Il Velabro e le origini del Foro. *Workshop di Archeologia Classica* 2. pp. 93-115.
- Flory, M. B. (1992). A note on Octavian's Felicitas. *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 135. pp. 283-289.
- Flower, H. I. (2017). *The Dancing Lares and the Serpent in the Garden: Religion at the Roman Street Corner*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fraccaro, P. (1911). Ricerche storiche e letterarie sulla censura del 184–183 (M. Porcio Catone L. Valerio Flacco). *Studi storici per l'Antichità Classica* 4. pp. 1–137.
- Frank, O. (1993). Demography of Fertility and Infertility. *Reproductive Health* 10. pp. 81–92.
- Frazel, T. D. (2004). The composition and circulation of Cicero's *In Verrem*. *Classical Quarterly* 54 (1). pp. 128-142.
- Freyburger, G. (1977). La supplication d'action de grâces dans la religion romaine archaïque. *Latomus* 36 (2). pp. 283–315.
- Freyburger, G. (1986). *Fides. Étude sémantique et religieuse depuis les origines jusqu'à l'époque augustéenne*. Paris, Les Belles Lettres.
- Frilingos, C. A. (2017). More than Meets the Eye: Incongruity and Observation in Josephus's Account of the Triumph of Vespasian and Titus. *History of Religions* 57 (1). pp. 50-67.
- Fugier, H. (1963). *Recherches sur L'Expression du Sacré Dans la Langue Latine*. Paris: Société d'Édition, Les Belles Lettres.
- Gabba, E. (1975). P. Cornelio Scipio Africano e la leggenda. *Athenaeum* 53. pp. 3-17.
- Gaertner, J. F. (2008). Livy's Camillus and the Political Discourse of the Late Republic. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 98. pp. 27–52.
- Gagé, J. (1933). La Théologie De La Victoire Impériale. *Revue Historique* 171. pp. 1–43.

- Gagé, J. (1969). Felicitas. *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum* 7. pp. 711-723.
- Galassi F. (2014). *Catiline, the monster of Rome*. Westholme: Yardley.
- Galinsky, G. K. (1966). Scipionic Themes in Plautus' *Amphitruo*. *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 97. pp. 203–35.
- Galli, F. (1987–8). L'iscrizione trionfale di T. Sempronio Gracco (Liv. XLI. 28). *AION(filol)* 9–10. pp. 135–8.
- García Riaza, E. (2019). Laureatae litterae. Announcing Victories and Public Opinion in the Middle Republic. In *Communicating Public Opinion in the Roman Republic* (ed. Rosillo López, C.) Historia Band 256. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. pp. 85-106.
- Geertz, H. (1975). An Anthropology of Religion and Magic, I. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 6 (1). pp. 71–89.
- Gelzer, M. (1968). *Caesar: politician and statesman*. Trans. Needham, P. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gelzer, M. (1969). *The Roman Nobility*. Trl. Seager R. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Giardina, A. (2009). Metis in Rome: A Greek Dream of Sulla. In *East and West: Papers in Ancient History presented to Glen W. Bowersock*, (eds. Brennan T.C. and Flower H.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 61-85.
- Gibson R. K. (2009). The *Ars Amatoria*. In *A Companion to Ovid* (ed Knox P. E.) Wiley Library. pp. 90-103.
- Gildenhard, I. (2006). Reckoning with Tyranny: Greek Thoughts on Caesar in Cicero's Letters to Atticus in Early 49. In *Ancient Tyranny* (ed. Lewis S.) Edinburgh University Press. pp 197–210.
- Gildenhard, I. (2011). *Creative Eloquence. The Construction of Reality in Cicero's Speeches*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gildenhard, I. & Hodgson L. (2014). *Cicero, On Pompey's Command (De Imperio), 27-49: Latin Text, Study Aids with Vocabulary, Commentary, and Translation*. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.

- Giovanni, A. (1995). Catilina et la problème des dettes. In *Leaders and Masses in the Roman World* (eds. Malkin I. and Rubinson Z. W.) Leiden: Brill. pp. 15-32.
- Gnilka, C. (2009). Dignitas. *Hermes* 137 (2). pp. 190–201.
- Goldberg, C. (2015). Priests and Politicians: Rex Sacrorum and Flamen Dialis in the Middle Republic. *Phoenix* 69 (3/4). pp. 334–54
- Goldberg, S. M. (1989). Poetry, Politics, and Ennius. *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 119. pp. 247–61.
- Goldberg, S. M. (1995). *Epic in Republican Rome*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Goldberg, S. M. (2005). *Constructing Literature in the Roman Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldberg, S. M. (2006). Ennius after the banquet. *Arethusa* 39 (3). pp. 427-47.
- Goldschmidt, N. (2013). *Shaggy Crowns: Ennius' Annales and Virgil's Aeneid*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Goldsworthy, A. K. (2006). *Caesar: life of a colossus*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gouvea, M. B. (2019). *Another Homer: The Figure of the Roman Homer from Ennius to Macrobius*. PhD Dissertation. University of Chicago.
- Grainger, J. (1995). The Campaign of Cn. Manlius Vulso in Asia Minor. *Anatolian Studies* 45. Pp. 23-42.
- Graver, M. (2016). Honor and the honorable: Cato's discourse in De Finibus 3. In *Cicero's De Finibus: Philosophical Approaches* (eds. Annas J. and Betegh G.). pp. 118-46.
- Grethlein, J. (2013). *Experience and Teleology in Ancient Historiography: Futures Past from Herodotus to Augustine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Grieve, L. J. (1985). The Reform of the "Comitia Centuriata." *Historia* 34. pp. 278–309.
- Griffin, M. (1989). Philosophy, politics, and politicians at Rome. in *Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome* (eds. Griffin M. and Barnes J.). pp. 1–37.

- Grillo L. (2015). *Cicero's De Provinciis Consularibus Oratio*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gruen, E. S. (1968). *Roman politics and the criminal courts, 149-78 B.C.* Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.
- Gruen, E. S. (1990). *Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy*. Leiden: Brill.
- Gruen, E. S. (1995). The "Fall" of the Scipios. In *Leaders and Masses in the Roman World* (eds. Malkin I. and Rubinson Z. W.) Leiden: Brill. pp. 59-90.
- Gruen, E. S. (2009). Caesar as a Politician. In *A Companion to Julius Caesar* (ed. Griffin M.) Wiley Blackwell. pp. 23-36.
- Grusendorf, S. (2016). Bourdieu's Field, Capital, and Habitus in Religion. *Journal of Sociology and Christianity* 6 (1). pp. 1–13.
- Guittard, C. (2007). *'Carmen' et Prophéties à Rome*. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers.
- Guittard, C. (2015). "Carmen" et "Carmenta": Chant, Prière et Prophétie Dans La Religion Romaine. In *Chanter Les Dieux: Musique et Religion Dans l'Antiquité Grecque et Romaine* (eds. Brulé P. and Vendries C.) Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes. pp. 173–80.
- Habinek, T. (1998). *The Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, Identity, and Empire in Ancient Rome*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Habinek, T. (2006). The Wisdom of Ennius. *Arethusa* 39 (3). pp. 471–88.
- Hadas, D. (2017). St Augustine and the Disappearance of Varro. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 60 (2). pp. 76–91.
- Hagendahl, H. (1967). *Augustine and the Latin Classics*. Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.
- Hahn, F.H. (2007). Performing the Sacred: Prayer and Hymns. In *A Companion to Roman religion* (ed Rüpke J.) Wiley Blackwell. pp. 235-248.
- Hales, S. (2003). *The Roman House and Social Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Halkin, L. (1953). *La supplication d'action de grâces chez Les Romains*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

- Hardie, A. (2007). Juno, Hercules, and the Muses at Rome. *The American Journal of Philology* 128 (4). pp. 551–92.
- Hardie, A. (2016). The Camenae in Cult, History, and Song. *Classical Antiquity* 35 (1). pp. 45–85
- Hardie, P. (2002). *Ovid's Poetics of Illusion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harris, W. (1979). *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B.C.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Harris, W. (1989). *Ancient literacy*. Harvard University Press.
- Harris, W. (2009). *Dreams and Experience in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harvey, P. (1981). Historical Allusions in Plautus and the Date of the *Amphitruo*. *Athenaeum* 59 (1). pp. 480–89.
- Harvey, P. (1986). Historical Topicality in Plautus. *The Classical World* 79 (5). pp. 297–304.
- Hau, L. (2011). Tykhe in Polybios: narrative answers to a philosophical question. *Histos* 5. pp. 183-207.
- Hellegouarc'h, J. (1963). *Le Vocabulaire Latin Des Relations et Des Partis Politiques Sous La République*. Paris: Les Belles lettres.
- Hickson-Hahn, F. (2000). Pompey's "Supplicatio Duplicata": A Novel Form of Thanksgiving. *Phoenix* 54 (3/4). pp. 244–54.
- Hinard, F. (1985). *Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine*. Rome: Publications de l'École Française de Rome.
- Hellmann, F. (1967). Das kritische Verfahren des Livius. In *Wege zu Livius* (ed. Burck E.) Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. pp. 237-48.
- Holbraad, M. (2006). The Power of Powder: Multiplicity and Motion in the Divinatory Cosmology of Cuban Ifá (or Mana, Again). In *Thinking Through Things: Theorising Artefacts Ethnographically* (eds. Henare A., Holbraad M., and Wastell S.) London: Routledge. pp. 189-225.

- Hölkeskamp, K.-J. (1993). Conquest, Competition and Consensus: Roman Expansion in Italy and the Rise of the “Nobilitas”. *Historia* 42 (1). pp. 12–39.
- Hölkeskamp, K.-J. (2006). Konsens und Konkurrenz. Die politische Kultur der römischen Republik in neuer Sicht. *Klio* 88 (2). pp. 360–96.
- Hölkeskamp, K.-J. (2010). *Reconstructing the Roman Republic: An Ancient Political Culture and Modern Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hölkeskamp, K.-J. (2013). Friends, Romans, Countrymen. Addressing the Roman People and the Rhetoric of Inclusion. In *Community and Communication: Oratory and Politics in Republican Rome* (eds. Steel C. E. W. and van der Blom C.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 11–28.
- Hölkeskamp, K.-J. (2018). Chapter 17 Memoria by Multiplication: The Cornelia Scipiones in Monumental Memory. In *Omnium Annalium Monumenta: Historical Writing and Historical Evidence in Republican Rome* (eds. Sandberg K. and Smith C.) Leiden: Brill. pp. 422–476.
- Hölscher, T. (2006). The transformation of victory into power: from event to structure. In *Representations of war in ancient Rome* (eds. Dillon S. and Welch K. E.) Cambridge. pp. 27-48
- Horsfall, N. (1981). From History to Legend: M. Manlius and the Geese. *The Classical Journal* 76 (4). pp. 298–311.
- Höschele, R. (2013). From Ecloga The Mime To Vergil’s “Eclogues” As Mimes: “Ein Gedankenspiel. *Vergilius* (1959-) 59. pp. 37–60.
- Humm, M. (2012). The Curiate Law and the Religious Nature of the Power of Roman Magistrates. In *Law and Religion in the Roman Republic* (ed. Tellegen-Couperus O.) Leiden: Brill. pp. 55–84.
- Humm, M. (2015). La Loi Curiate et Les Auspices Du Peuple Romain. *Cahiers Du Centre Gustave Glotz* 26. pp. 231–250.
- Hunt A. (2016). *Reviving roman religion: sacred trees in the roman world*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hurlet, F. (2001). Les Auspices d’Octavien/Auguste. *Cahiers Du Centre Gustave Glotz* 12. pp. 155–80.

- Hurlet, F. (2006). *Le Proconsul et le prince d'Auguste à Dioclétien*. Paris: Ausonius Éditions.
- Hurlet, F. (2015). La Suprématie auspicielle du prince en question(s). Une Nouvelle Hiérarchie des auspices. *Cahiers Du Centre Gustave Glotz* 26. pp. 298–305.
- Hurlet, F. (2019). L'öffentliche Meinung de Habermas et l'opinion publique dans la Rome antique. De la raison à l'auctoritas. In *Communicating public opinion in the Roman Republic* (ed. Rosillo López C.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. pp. 23-40.
- Iannaccone, L. R. (1990). Religious Practice: A Human Capital Approach. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 29 (3). pp. 297–314.
- Iliev, J. (2019). Gn. Manlius Vulso's March through Thrace in 188 B.C. according to Livy's manuscript tradition. *Aristonothos. Scritti per il Mediterraneo antico*. pp 209-228.
- Ioppolo A. M. (2016). Sententia explosa: Criticism of Stoic ethics in De Finibus 4. In *Cicero's De Finibus: Philosophical Approaches* (ed Annas J. and Betegh G.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 167-97.
- Irwin, D. (2016). *Livy and the Translation of Polybius*. PhD Thesis. Sydney: The University of Sydney.
- Isager J. (1997). *La rue scene et monument. La Via triumphalis dans la République romaine*. In *La rue -espace ouvert* (eds. Larsen S.E. and Ballegaard Petersen A.) Odense. pp. 107-135.
- Ilgenshorst, T. (2005). *Tota illa pompa: der Triumph in der römischen Republik*. Göttingen.
- Jacotot, M. (2013). *Question d'honneur: les notions d'honos, honestum et honestas dans la République romaine antique*. Rome: Ecole Française de Rome.
- Jaeger, M. (1993). Custodia Fidelis Memoriae: Livy's Story of M. Manlius Capitolinus. *Latomus* 52 (2). pp. 350–63.
- Jaeger, M. (1997). *Livy's Written Rome*. Ann Arbor.
- Jal, P. (1961). La propagande religieuse à Rome au cours des guerres civiles de la fin de la République. *L'antiquité classique* 30 (2). pp. 395-414.

- Janne, H. (1933). L'Amphitryon de Plaute et M. Fulvius Nobilior. *RBPh* 34. pp. 515–31.
- Jenkins, E. T. (2006). *Intercepted Letters: Epistolarity and Narrative in Greek and Roman Literature*. New York: Lexington Book.
- Jocelyn, H. D. (1980). On Editing the Remains of Varro's *Antiquitates Rerum Diuinarum*. *Rivista Di Filologia e Di Istruzione Classica* 108 (1). pp. 100–122.
- Jocelyn, H. D. (1982). Varro's *Antiquitates Rerum Diuinarum* and Religious Affairs in the Late Roman Republic. *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 65 (1). pp. 148–205.
- Kajanto, I. (1957). *God and Fate in Livy*. Turku: Turun yliopiston kustantama.
- Kajanto, I. (1981). Fortuna. *ANRW* 2.17.1. pp. 502-558.
- Kalyvas, A. (2007). The Tyranny of Dictatorship: When the Greek Tyrant meet the Roman dictator. *Political Theory* 35 (4). pp. 412-444.
- Keaveney, A. (1983). Sulla and the Gods. In *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History III* (ed. Deroux, C.). Brussels: Latomus. pp. 44-79.
- Keaveney, A. (2005). *Sulla: The Last Republican*. 2nd edition. London; Routledge.
- Keesing, R. M. (1984). Rethinking "Mana". *Journal of Anthropological Research* 40 (1). pp. 137–56.
- Kendall, S. (2013) *The Struggle for Roman Citizenship: Romans, Allies, and the Wars of 91–77 BCE*. Gorgias Press.
- Kleinman, B. H. (2018). *Scandals and Sanctions: Holding Roman Officials Accountable (202-49 B.C.)* PhD Dissertation. Princeton: Princeton University.
- Klotz, A. (1967). Die Quellen des Livius. In *Wege zu Livius* (ed. Burck E.) Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. pp. 217-23.
- Kondratieff, E. J. (2022). Other Magistrates, Officials and *Apparitores*. In *A Companion to the Political Culture of the Roman Republic* (eds V. Arena, Prag J., and Stiles A.). pp. 285-301.
- Konrad, C. F. (2022). *The Challenge to the Auspices: Studies on Magisterial Power in the Middle Roman Republic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Koselleck, R. (2004). *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*. Tr. and Intr. by Tribe K. New York.
- Kragelund, P. (2001). Dreams, Religion and Politics in Republican Rome. *Historia* 50 (1). pp. 53–95.
- Krause, C. (2001). “In conspectu totius urbis (Cic. *dom.* 100): Il tempio della Libertà e il quartiere alto del Palatino.” *Eutopia* 1. pp. 169–201.
- Kries, D. (2003). On the Intention of Cicero’s *De Officiis*. *The Review of Politics* 65 (4). pp. 375–393.
- Laffi, U. (1967). Il mito di Silla. *Athenaeum* 45. pp. 177-213, 255-277.
- Laignoux, R. (2011). L’utilisation de la religion dans la légitimation du pouvoir : quelques pistes de recherche pour les années 44-42 av. J.-C. *Cahiers Mondes anciens* 2. pp. 1-13.
- Lange, C. H. (2013). Triumph and Civil War in the Late Republic. *Papers of the British School at Rome* 81. pp. 67–90.
- Lange, C.H. & Vervaet, F.J. (2019). Sulla and the Origins of the Concept of *Bellum Civile*. In *The Historiography of Late Republican Civil War* (eds. Lange C.H. and Vervaet F.J.) Leiden: Brill. pp. 17–28.
- Langlands, R. (2008). “Reading for the Moral” in Valerius Maximus: The Case of Severitas. *The Cambridge Classical Journal* 54. pp. 160–87.
- Langlands, R. (2011). Roman Exempla and Situation Ethics: Valerius Maximus and Cicero’s *de Officiis*. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 101. pp. 100–122.
- Langlands, R. (2018). *Exemplary Ethics in Ancient Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leach, E. W. (2014). M. Atilius Regulus—Making Defeat into Victory: Diverse Values in an Ambivalent Story. In *Valuing the Past in the Greco-Roman World* (eds. Pieper C. and Ker J) Leiden: Brill. pp. 243–66
- Lehmann, Y. (1997). *Varron théologien et philosophe romain*. Bruxelles: Peeters Publishers.
- Leigh, M. (1995). Wounded and Popular Rhetoric in Rome. *BICS* 40 (1). pp. 195-215.

- Lentzsch, S. (2017). Geese and Gauls – the Capitol in the Social Memory of the “Gallic Disaster”. In *Between Memory Sites and Memory Networks* (eds. Bernbeck R., Hofmann K. P., and Sommer U.) Berlin: Edition Topoi. pp. 127–150.
- Lepore, E. (1954). *Il Princeps ciceroniano e gli ideali politica della tarda repubblica*. Naples: Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici.
- Leridon, H. (2007). Studies of Fertility and Fecundity: Comparative Approaches from Demography and Epidemiology’. *Comptes Rendus Biologies* 330 (4). pp. 339–46.
- Leuze, O. (1912). *Zur Geschichte Der Römischen Zensur*. Halle: Universität Halle.
- Levene, D. (1993). *Religion in Livy*. Leiden: Brill.
- Levene, D. (2010). *Livy on the Hannibalic War*. Oxford: Oxford Academic Press.
- Levi. A. (1938). Auspicio, imperio, ductu felicitate. *R. Istituto lombardo di scienze e lettere, Rendiconti, Classe di lettere* 71. pp. 100-118.
- Levi, A. (1980). Fortuna-Felicitas nella politica di Silla. In *Tra Grecia e Roma. Temi antichi e metodologie moderne*. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana. pp. 167- 171.
- Levick, B. M. (1982). Sulla’s March on Rome in 88 B.C. *Historia* 31. pp. 503-508.
- Lewis, R. G. (1991). ‘Sulla’s Autobiography: Scope and Economy’. *Athenaeum* 79. pp. 509–20.
- Liebeschuetz, J. H. W. G. (1979). *Continuity and Change in Roman Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lind, L. R. (1972). Concept, Action and Character: The Reasons for Rome’s Greatness. *TAPA* 103. pp. 235-283.
- Lind, L.R. (1979). The Tradition of Roman Moral Conservatism. *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 1. pp. 7–37.
- Linderski, J. (1985). The Libri Reconditi. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 89. pp. 207–34.
- Linderski, J. (1986a). The Augural Law. *ANRW*, 2.16.3. pp. 2146-2312.

- Linderski, J. (1986b). Watching the Birds: Cicero the Augur and the Augural Temple'. *Classical Philology* 81 (4). pp. 330–40.
- Linderski, J. (1996). Q. Scipio Imperator. In *Imperium Sine Fine: T. Robert S. Broughton and the Roman Republic* (ed. Broughton T. R. S.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. pp. 145-85.
- Lintott, A. (1999). *The Constitution of the Roman Republic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lintott, A. (2008). *Cicero As Evidence: A Historian's Companion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Liou-Gille, B. (2001). Le *Lustrum*: Périodicité et Durée. *Latomus* 60 (3). pp. 573–602.
- Lipka, M. (2009). *Roman Gods: A Conceptual Approach*. Leiden: Brill.
- Lo Cascio, E. (2001). 'Il Census a Roma e La Sua Evoluzione Dall'età "Serviana" Alla Prima Età Imperiale'. *MEFRA: Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome: Antiquité* 113 (2) pp. 565–603.
- Long A. A. (2003). Roman philosophy. In *The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy* (ed. Sedley D.). pp. 184–210.
- Long, A. A. (2006). *From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy* Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Luce, T. J. (1977). *Livy: The Composition of His History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lundgreen, C. (2011). *Regelkonflikte in der römischen Republik: Geltung und Gewichtung von Normen in politischen Entscheidungsprozessen*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Lundgreen, C. (2014). Rule for obtaining a triumph – the *ius triumphalis* once again in *The Roman Republican Triumph: Beyond the Spectacle* (eds. Lange C.H. & Vervaet F.J.) Rome: Edizioni Quasar. pp. 17-29.
- Lusnia, S. S. (1995). Julia Domna's Coinage and Severan Dynastic Propaganda. *Latomus* 54 (1). pp. 119–140.
- Mackay, C. S. (2000). Sulla and the Monuments: Studies in His Public Persona. *Historia* 49 (2). pp. 161–210.

- MacRae, D. (2016). *Legible Religion: Books, Gods, and Rituals in Roman Culture*. Harvard University Press.
- MacRae, D. (2018). Diligentissimus Investigator Antiquitatis? “Antiquarianism” and Historical Evidence between Republican Rome and the Early Modern Republic of Letters. In *Omnium Annalium Monumenta: Historical Writing and Historical Evidence in Republican Rome* (eds. Sandberg K. and Smith C.). Leiden, Brill. pp 137-52.
- Magdelain, A. (1964). Note sur la loi curiate et les auspices des magistrats. *RHD* 42. pp. 198–203
- Magdelain, A. (1968). *Recherches sur l'«imperium». La Loi curiate et les auspices d'investiture*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Magdelain, A. (1990). Auspicia ad patres redeunt. In: *Jus imperium auctoritas. Études de droit romain*. Rome (ed. Magdelain A.) École Française de Rome : Publications de l'École française de Rome. pp. 341-383.
- Maher, R. (1974). Koriki Chieftainship: Hereditary Status and Mana in Papua. *Ethnology* 13(3). pp. 239–246.
- Maltby, R. (1991). *A lexicon of ancient Latin etymologies*. Cairns.
- Manders, E. (2012). *Coining images of power: patterns in the representation of Roman emperors on imperial coinage, AD 193-284* Leiden: Brill.
- Mannsperger, B. (1974). Liberias–Honos–Félicitas. Zur Prägung Des Münzmeisters Palikanus. *Chiron* 4. pp. 327–42.
- Marincola, J. (2009). Ancient audiences and expectations. In *The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians* (ed. Feldherr A). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 11-23.
- Marshall, B. A. (1984). Faustus Sulla and Political Labels in the 60's and 50's B.C. *Historia* 33 (2). pp. 199–219.
- Martindale, C. (1993). *Redeeming the Text: Latin Poetry and the Hermeneutics of Reception*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marwood, M. A. (1988). *The Roman cult of Salus*. BAR International Series 465: Oxford.
- Maslakov, G. (1984). Valerius Maximus and Roman Historiography. A Study of the *exempla*, *ANRW* 2.32.1. pp. 437-96.

- Mattingly, H. (1937). The Roman "Virtues." *The Harvard Theological Review* 30 (2). pp. 103–117.
- Max. F.C. (1884). Adnimadversiones criticae in Scipionis Aemiliani historiam et C. Gracchi orationem adversus Scipionem. *Rheinisches Museum*. pp. 65-72.
- Mazzoli, G. (1977). Felicitas Sillana e Clementia Principis. *Athenaeum* 55. pp. 257-279.
- McDonnell M. A. (2006). *Roman manliness: 'virtus' and the roman republic*. Cambridge University Press.
- Meier, C. (1966). *Res Publica Amissa: Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der späten römischen Republik*. Wiesbaden.
- Meunier, D. (2014). Camenae: épopée d'une traduction manquée. *Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes* 88 (1). pp. 151–72.
- Miano, D. (2018). *Fortuna: Deity and Concept in Archaic and Republican Italy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Michel, A. (2003) *Les rapports de la rhétorique et de la philosophie dans l'oeuvre de Cicerón*. 2nd ed. Paris : Bibliotheque d'Etudes Classiques.
- Millar, F. (1998). *The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.
- Mix, E. R. (1970). *Marcus Atilius Regulus Exemplum Historicum*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Moatti, C. (1997). *La raison de Rome : naissance de l'esprit critique à la fin de la République (Ile-le siècle avant Jésus-Christ)*. Paris : Seuil.
- Moatti, C. (2018). *Res publica: Histoire romaine de la chose publique*. Fayard: Paris.
- Momigliano, A. (1978). The Historians of the Classical World and Their Audiences. *The American Scholar* 47 (2). pp. 193–204.
- Mommsen, T. (1876). *Römisches Staatsrecht*. Vol. 1–3. Leipzig: Hirzel.
- Mommsen, T. (1864-79). *Römische Forschungen*. 2 vols. Berlin.
- Montemaggi, S. F. (2010). Misunderstanding Faith: When 'Capital' does Not Fit the 'Spiritual'. *International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences* 5 (5). pp 179-191.

- Moore, D. W. (2020). *Polybius: Experience and the Lessons of History*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
- Moore, L. C. (2013). *Ex Senatu Eiecti Sunt: Expulsion from the Senate of the Roman Republic, c. 319-50 BC*. PhD Thesis. London: University College London.
- Morstein-Marx, R. (1998). Publicity, Popularity and Patronage in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*. *Classical Antiquity* 17 (2). pp. 259–288.
- Morstein-Marx, R. (2007). Caesar's Alleged Fear of Prosecution and His "Ratio Absentis" in the Approach to the Civil War. *Historia* 56 (2). pp.159–178.
- Morstein-Marx, R. (2009). Dignitas and res publica: Caesar and Republican Legitimacy. In *Eine politische Kultur (in) der Krise?* (ed. Hölkeskamp J-K.). Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg. pp. 115–140.
- Muccigrosso, J. (2006). Religion and politics: Did the Romans scruple about the placement of their temples? In *Religion in Republican Italy* (eds. Schultz C. and Harvey P.) Yale Classical Studies. pp. 181-206.
- Münzer, F. (1920). *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien*. Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag.
- Murgia, C. E. (1986). The Date of Ovid's *Ars Amatoria* 3. *The American Journal of Philology* 107 (1). pp. 74–94.
- Murphy, P. R. (1986). Caesar's Continuator and Caesar's *Felicitas*. *The Classical World* 79 (5). pp. 307–17.
- Murphy, T. (1998). Cicero's First Readers: Epistolary Evidence for the Dissemination of His Works. *The Classical Quarterly* 48 (2). pp. 492–505.
- Murphy, T. (2004). *Pliny the Elder's Natural History: The Empire in the Encyclopedia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ñaco del Hoyo, T. (2003). *Vectigal Incertum: Economía de Guerra y fiscalidad republicana en el occidente romano: su impacto histórico en el territorio (218-133 a.C.)*. BAR International Series 1158.
- Ñaco del Hoyo, T. (2010). The Republican 'War Economy' Strikes Back : a 'minimalist' approach. In *Administrer les provinces de la République romaine* (eds. Barrandon N. and Kirbihler F.) Rennes : Presses universitaires de Rennes. pp. 171-180.

- Ñaco del Hoyo, T. (2019). Rethinking *stipendiarius* as tax terminology of the Roman Republic: Political and military dimensions. *Museum Helveticum* 76 (1). pp. 70–87.
- Nebelin, K. (2022). Late Republican Local Rebellions and Marches against Rome: Agency and Initiative in the “Catilinarian Insurgency”. In *Leadership and Initiative in Late Republican and Early Imperial Rome* (ed. Frolov R. M. and Burden-Strevens C.) Leiden: Brill. pp. 409–432.
- Nethercut, J. S. (2020). *Ennius Noster: Lucretius and the Annales*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nicolet, Claude. (1980). *The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome*. Trl. by Falla P. S.. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nishimura, K. (2019). Fors and fortūna: linguistic and cultural aspects. In *Volume I Words and Sounds*. (eds. Holmes N., Ottink M., Schrickx J. and Selig M.), Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 192-205.
- Nissen, H. (1863). *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der 4. und 5. Dekade des Livius*. Berlin.
- Noble, F. M. (2014). *Sulla and the Gods: Religion, Politics and Propaganda in the Autobiography of Lucius Cornelius Sulla*. PhD Thesis, Newcastle: Newcastle University.
- Noble, F. M. (2017). Dust-Clouds, Sunlight, and the (in)Competent General: Conflicting Traditions on Marius at Vercellae. *Historia* 66 (2). pp. 173–92.
- North, J. (2008). Caesar at the Lupercalia. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 98. pp. 144-160.
- North, J. (2014). The Limits of the “Religious” in the Late Roman Republic. *History of Religions* 53 (3). pp. 225–45.
- Northwood, S. J. (2000). Livy’s Monument [Review of *Livy’s Written Rome*, by M. Jaeger]. *The Classical Review* 50(2). pp 455–457.
- Northwood, S. J (2008). Census and *Tributum*. In *People, Land, and Politics: Demographic Developments and the Transformation of Roman Italy, 300 BC-AD 14* (eds. de Ligt L. and Northwood S.) Leiden, Boston: Brill. pp. 257–70.

- Nuffelen, P V. (2010). Varro's Divine Antiquities: Roman Religion as an Image of Truth. *Classical Philology* 105 (2). pp. 162–88.
- O'Daly, G. (1996). Augustine's Critique of Varro on Roman Religion. In *Religion and Superstition in Latin Literature* (ed.. Sommerstein A. H.) Bari: Levante. pp. 65–75.
- O'Daly, G. (2020). *Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- O'Neill, P. (2003). Triumph Songs, Reversal and Plautus' Amphitruo. *Ramus* 32 (1). pp. 1–38.
- Oakley, S. P. (2010). Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy on the Horatii and the Curiatii. in *Ancient Historiography and its Contexts: Studies in Honour of A. J. Woodman* (eds. Kraus, C., Marincola, J. and Pelling, C.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 118- 38.
- Odahl, C. (2010). *Cicero and the Catilinarian Conspiracy*. New Haven, Conn: Routledge.
- Ogilvie, R. M. (1961). *Lustrum Condere*. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 51. pp. 31–39.
- Oort, J. (1993). Augustine's Letters to Firmus (1A* and 2*) and the Purpose of the De Civitate Dei. In *Studia Patristica Vol. XXVII* (ed. Livingstone E. A.) Studia Patristica 27. Leuven: Peeters Publishers. pp. 417–23.
- Orlin, E. M. (1997). *Temples, Religion, and Politics in the Roman Republic*. Boston: Brill.
- Osgood, J. (2009) The Pen and the Sword: Writing and Conquest in Caesar's Gaul. *Classical Antiquity* 28 (2). pp. 328–358.
- Östenberg, I. (2010). Circum Metas Fertur: An Alternative Reading Of The Triumphal Route. *Historia* 59 (3). pp. 303–320.
- Östenberg. (2009). *Staging the World: Spoils, Captives, and Representations in the Roman Triumphal Procession*. Oxford University Press.
- Otto, W. F. (1916). *Lustrum*. *Rheinisches Museum Für Philologie* 71. pp. 17–40.

- Oughton, C. W. (2016). *Opsis and Exemplarity in the Hannibalic War: Narrators, Intertext, and Tradition in Polybius and Livy*. PhD Thesis. Austin: The University of Texas at Austin.
- Palmer, M. (2019). Inscriptional Intermediality in Livy. *Trends in Classics* 11 (1). pp. 74-95
- Panayotakis, C. (2008). Virgil on the Popular Stage. In *New Directions in Ancient Pantomime* (eds Hall E. and Wyles R.) Oxford: Oxford Academic. pp. 185-97.
- Pape, M. (1975). *Griechische Kunstwerke aus Kriegsbeute und ihre öffentliche Aufstellung in Rom: Von der Eroberung von Syrakus bis in augusteische Zeit*. PhD Dissertation. Hamburg.
- Passerini, A. (1935). 'Il concetto antico di Fortuna'. *A Philologus*. pp. 90-7.
- Pausch, D. (2022). Livy, the Reader Involved, and the Audience of Roman Historiography. In *Reading History in the Roman Empire* (eds Baumann, M. and Liotsakis, V.) Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 59-78.
- Pépin, J. (1956). La Théologie Tripartite de Varron. Essai de Reconstitution et Recherche Des Sources. *Revue d'Etudes Augustiniennes et Patristiques* 2 (3-4). pp. 265-94.
- Perrin, B. (1916). *Plutarch: Lives - Alcibiades and Coriolanus, Lysander and Sulla*. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.
- Peruzzi, E. (1976). La formula augurale di Varrone LL VII 8. In *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi Varroniani, Rieti, Settembre 1974* (Rieti) pp. 449-56.
- Picard, G. C. (1957). *Les trophées romains. Contributions à l'histoire de la religion et de l'art triomphal de Rome*. Paris : Edition de Boccard.
- Pieri, G. (1968). *L'histoire Du Cens Jusqu'à La Fin de La République Romaine*. Paris : Publications de l'Institut de droit romain de l'Université de Paris 25.
- Pietilä-Castrén, L. (1987). *Magnificentia publica. The Victory Monuments of the Roman Generals in the Era of the Punic Wars*. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.

- Pilar Rivero, M. G. (2006). *Imperator Populi Romani: Una aproximación al poder republicano*. Zaragoza: Institución: Fernando el Católico.
- Pina Polo, F. (2017). The 'Tyranny' of the Gracchi and the Concordia of the Optimates: An Ideological Construct, in *Costruire la memoria: uso e abuso della storia fra tarda Repubblica e primo Principato: Venezia, 14–15 gennaio 2016* (eds. Cristofoli E., Galimberti A. and Rohr Vio F.) Rome. pp. 5–33.
- Pina Polo, F. (2022). The Consul as the Highest Magistrate of the Republic. in *A Companion to the political culture of the Roman Republic* (ed. Arena V., Prag J., and Stiltes A.) London: Blackwell. pp. 248-259.
- Pitt-Rivers J. A. (1992). Postscript: the place of grace in anthropology. In *Honor and Grace in Anthropology* (ed. Peristiany J.G and Pitt-Rivers J). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 215–246.
- Pitt-Rivers J. A. (1997). *Anthropologie de l'honneur : la mésaventure de Sichem*. Paris, Hachette.
- Pittenger M. R. P. (2008). *Contested triumphs politics pageantry and performance in Livy's republican rome*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Polt, C. (2013). The Humour and Thematic Centrality of the Patera in Plautus' *Amphitryon*. *Greece & Rome* 60 (2). pp. 232-45.
- Popkin. (2016). *The Architecture of the Roman Triumph: Monuments, Memory, and Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Purcell, N. (1993). Atrium Libertatis. *Papers of the British School at Rome* 61. pp. 125–155.
- Raaflaub, K. (2017). Caesar, Literature, and Politics at the End of the Republic. In *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar* (eds. Grillo L. and Krebs C.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 13-28.
- Rafferty, D. (2017). Cisalpine Gaul as a Consular Province in the Late Republic. *Historia* 66 (2). pp. 147-172.
- Rafferty, D. (2019). *Provincial allocations in Rome 123-52 BCE*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Ramage, E. (1991). Sulla's Propaganda. *Klio* 73. pp. 93-121.

- Ramsey, J. T. (1980). A Reconstruction of Q. Gallius' Trial for "Ambitus": One Less Reason for Doubting the Authenticity of the *Commentariolum Petitionis*. *Historia* 29 (4). pp. 402–421.
- Rappaport, R. A. (1979). *Ecology, Meaning, and Religion*. Richmond, California: North Atlantic Books.
- Rasmussen, S. W. (2003). *Public Portents in Republican Rome*. Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider.
- Ravizza, M. (2014). Aspetti giuridico-sacrali del rituale feziale nell'antica Roma. *Jura Gentium* 11 (2). pp. 27-44.
- Reay, B. (2005). Agriculture, Writing, and Cato's Aristocratic Self-Fashioning. *Classical Antiquity* 24 (2). pp. 331–61.
- Regell, P. (1893). *Commentarii in librorum auguralium fragmenta specimen*. Hirschberg: Königliches Gymnasium zu Hirschberg.
- Reydams-Schils, G. (2017). Stoicism in Rome. In *The Routledge Handbook on the Stoic Tradition* (ed. Sellars J.) London: Routledge. pp. 17-28.
- Ricchieri, T. (2020). *Prima della Sicilia : Cicerone, Verrine 2,1 (De praetura urbana), 1-102*. Pisa : Edizioni ETS.
- Rich J. (1976). *Declaring war in the Roman Republic in the period of transmarine expansion*. Brussels: Collection Latomus 149.
- Rich, J. (2011). The fetiales and Roman international relations. In *Priests and State in the Roman World* (eds. Richardson J.H. and Santangelo F.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. pp. 185-240.
- Rich, J. (2014). The Triumph in the Roman Republic: Frequency, Fluctuation and Policy. In *The Roman Republican triumph: beyond the spectacle* (eds. Hjort Lange C. and Vervaeke F. J.). Roma: Edizioni Quasar. Pp. 197-258.
- Rich, J. (2015). Appian, Polybius and the Romans' War with Antiochus the Great: A Study of Appian's Sources and Methods. In *Appian's Roman History: Empire and Civil War* (ed. Welch K.). The Classic Press Wales. pp. 65-123.
- Richardson, J. S. (1971). The "Commentariolum Petitionis." *Historia* 20 (4). pp.436–442.

- Richardson, J. S. (1975). The Triumph, the Praetors and the Senate in the Early Second Century B.C. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 65. pp. 50-63.
- Richardson, J. S. (1986). *Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism, 218–82 BC*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Richardson, J. S. (2000). *Appian: Wars of the Romans in Iberia*. Liverpool University Press.
- Richardson, J. S. (2008). *The Language of Empire: Rome and the Idea of Empire from the Third Century BC to the Second Century AD*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rilinger, R. (2007). *Ordo und dignitas: Beiträge zur römischen Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Roller, M. (2004). Exemplarity in Roman Culture: The Cases of Horatius Cocles and Cloelia. *Classical Philology* 99 (1). pp. 1–56.
- Roller, M. (2018). *Models from the Past in Roman Culture: A World of Exempla*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, J. H. (1948). *Ancient Roman Religion*. London: Hutchinson University Library.
- Rosenstein N. (2009). General and Imperialist. In *A Companion to Julius Caesar* (ed. Griffin M.) Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 85-99.
- Rosenstein, N. (1993). Competition and Crisis in Mid-Republican Rome. *Phoenix* 47 (4). pp. 313–38.
- Rosillo-López, C. (2017). *Public Opinion and Politics in the Late Roman Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rossi A. & Breed B. W. (2006). Ennius and the Traditions of Epic. *Arethusa* 39 (3). pp. 397-425
- Rossi, A. (2004). Parallel Lives: Hannibal and Scipio in Livy's Third Decade. *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 134 (2). pp. 359–81.
- Rubin, Z. E. (1977). The felicitas and the concordia of the Severan house. *Scripta Classica Israelica* 3. pp. 153-172.
- Rumsey, A. (2016). Mana, Power and 'Pawa' in the Pacific and Beyond. *NEW MANA*. pp. 131-54.

- Rüpke, J. (2005). Varro's *Tria Genera Theologiae*: Religious Thinking in the Late Republic. *Ordia Prima* 4. pp. 107–29.
- Rüpke, J. (2006a). Triumphator and Ancestor Rituals between Symbolic Anthropology and Magic. *Numen* 53 (3). pp. 251–89.
- Rüpke, J. (2006b). Ennius's *Fasti* in Fulvius's Temple: Greek Rationality and Roman Tradition. *Arethusa* 39 (3). pp. 489-512.
- Rüpke, J. (2011a). Different Colleges – Never mind. In *Priests and State in the Roman World* (Ed. Richardson J.H. and Santangelo F.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. pp. 25-38.
- Rüpke, J. (2011b). *The Roman Calendar from Numa to Constantine: Time, History, and the Fasti*. Trl. Richardson, D. M. B. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Rüpke, J. (2012). *Religion in Republican Rome: Rationalization and Ritual Change*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Rüpke, J. (2014). Historicizing Religion: Varro's *Antiquitates* and History of Religion in the Late Roman Republic. *History of Religions* 53 (3). pp. 246–68.
- Rüpke, J. (2015). Religious Agency, Identity, and Communication: Reflections on History and Theory of Religion. *Religion* 45 (3). pp. 344–66.
- Rüpke, J. (2017). Priesthoods, Gods, and Stars. *The Cambridge Companion to the Writings of Julius Caesar* (eds. Grillo L. and Krebs C.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 58-67.
- Rüpke, J. (2019). *Peace and War in Rome: A Religious Construction of Warfare*. Trl. Richardson D. M. B. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Russell, A. (2016). *The Politics of Public Space in Republican Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Russell, A. (2019). The *populus Romanus* as the source of public opinion. In *Communicating public opinion in the Roman Republic* (ed. Rosillo-Lopez. C). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. pp. 41-56.
- Salerno, E. (2018). Rituals of War. The *fetiales* and Augustus' legitimisation of the civil conflict. *Conflicts in Antiquity: Textual and Material Perspectives* (eds van Diemen D.; van Dokkum D. ; van Leuken A.; Nijenhuis A.M.; van der Sande F.A.). Amsterdam. pp. 143-160.

- De Sanctis G. (1953-64). *Storia dei Romani*. 4 vols. Firenze : La nuova Italia.
- Santangelo, F. (2007). *Sulla, the Elites and the Empire*. Leiden: Brill.
- Santangelo, F. (2008). The Fetials and their “Ius”, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 51. pp. 63-93.
- Santangelo, F. (2011). Pax Deorum and Pontiffs. In *Priests and State in the Roman World* (Ed. Richardson J.H. and Santangelo F.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. pp. 161-180.
- Santangelo, F. (2013). *Divination, Prediction and the End of the Roman Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sarsila, J. (2006). *Being a Man: The Roman Virtus as a Contribution to Moral Philosophy*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Satterfield, S. (2015). Prodigies, the Pax Deum and the Ira Deum. *The Classical Journal* 110 (4). pp. 431–45
- Sauvé Meyer, S. (2009). Chain of Causes: What is Stoic Fate? In *God and Cosmos in Stoicism* (ed. Salles R.) Oxford University Press: Oxford. pp. 71-90.
- Scheid, J. (1990). *Le collège des Frères Arvales: étude prosopographique du recrutement (69-304)*. Rome: ‘L’Erma’ di Bretschneider.
- Scheid, J. (2001). *Religion et piété à Rome*. Albin Michel : Paris.
- Scheid, J. (2005). *Quand faire c’est croire. Les rites sacrificiels des Romains*. Collection historique. Paris: Aubier.
- Scheid, J. (2016). *The Gods, the state and the individual*. Translated and forward by Ando C.. University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia
- Schietinger, G. (2017). Lucius Sergius Catilina. Karriereperspektiven und Karriere eines *homo paene novus* in der späten Römischen Republik. *Klio* 99 (1). pp. 149-191.
- Schilling, R. (1954). *La Religion Romaine de Vénus depuis les Origines jusqu’au Temps depuis les origines jusqu’au temps d’Auguste*. Paris: De Boccard.
- Schnegg, K. (2010). *Geschlechtervorstellungen und soziale Differenzierung bei Appian aus Alexandria*. Harrassowitz Verlag.

- Schofield, M. (1986). Cicero for and against Divination. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 76. pp. 47-65.
- Schofield, M. (1991). *The Stoic idea of the city*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schofield, M. (1995). Two Stoic approaches to justice. In *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy - Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum* (eds. Laks A. & Schofield M.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 191-212.
- Schofield, M. (2003). Stoic Ethics. In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoic* (ed. Inwood B.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 233-56.
- Schwartz, E. (1896). Appianus. *RE* 2. pp. 217-37.
- Scullard, H. (1960). Scipio Aemilianus and Roman Politics. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 50. pp. 59–74.
- Scullard, H. (1970). *Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Sedley, D. (2002). The Origins of Stoic God. *Traditions of Theology* 89. pp. 41-83.
- Sedley, D. (2003). The School from Zeno to Arius Didymus. In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoic* (ed. Inwood B.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp.7-32.
- Shanzer, D. (2012). Augustine and the Latin Classics. In *A Companion to Augustine*, (ed. Vessey M.) New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. pp 159–74.
- Shatzman, I. (1972). The Roman General's Authority over Booty. *Historia* 21 (2). pp. 177–205.
- Skidmore, C. (1996). *Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen: The Work of Valerius Maximus*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Skinner, Q. (2002). *Visions of Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skutsch, O. (1970). On Three Fragments of Porcius Licinus and on the Tutiline Gate. *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 17. pp. 120–23.

- Skutsch, O. (1985). *The Annals of Quintus Ennius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, C. (2006). *Affectio regni* in the Roman Republic. In *Ancient Tyranny* (ed Lewis, S.). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp 49-64.
- Smith, C. (2009). "Sulla's Memoirs". In *The Lost Memoirs of Augustus and the Development of Roman Autobiography*, (eds. Smith C. and Powell A.) Swansea: Classical Press of Wales. pp. 65-85.
- Smith, J. (1982). The bare facts of ritual. In *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (ed. Smith J.Z.) Chicago: Chicago University Press. pp. 53–65.
- Smith, J. (2002). Manna, Mana Everywhere and *𐤇𐤃𐤃𐤃*. In *Radical Interpretation in Religion* (ed. Frankenberry N. K.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 188–212.
- Spentzou, Efrossini, and Don Fowler, eds. (2002). *Cultivating the Muse: Struggles for Power and Inspiration in Classical Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Spielberg, L. (2020). Ennius' Annals as Source and Model for Historical Speech. In *Ennius' Annals: Poetry and History* (eds Damon C. and Farrell J.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 147-166.
- Sprey, K. (1954). Review of *Augustus, Felicitas, Fortuna*, by H. Erckell. *Mnemosyne* 7 (4). pp. 342-4.
- Stark, R. (1953). Catos Rede de Lustris Sui Felicitate. *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 96 (2), pp. 184–87.
- Starr, R. J. (1987). The Circulation of Literary Texts in the Roman World. *The Classical Quarterly* 37(1), pp. 213–223.
- Steel, C. (2001). *Cicero, rhetoric, and empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Steel, C. (2013). *The End of the Roman Republic 146 to 44 BC: Conquest and Crisis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Steel, C. (2017). Cicero's defence of Sextus Roscius and the Sullan Res Publica. *Lampas* 50 (4). pp. 453-462.
- Steel, C. (2019). Sulla the Orator. In *Sulla: Politics and Reception* (eds. Eckert A. and Thein A.) Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 19-32.

- Steidle, W. (1979). Plautus' *Amphitruo* und sein griechisches Original. *Rheinisches Museum Für Philologie* 122. pp. 34-48.
- Stem, R. (2004). The First Word of Cicero's "Pro Murena". *Latomus* 63 (2). pp. 304–9.
- Stem, R. (2005). The First Eloquent Stoic: Cicero on Cato the Younger. *The Classical Journal* 101 (1). pp. 37–49.
- Stem, R. (2006). Cicero as Orator and Philosopher: The Value of the Pro Murena for Ciceronian Political Thought. *The Review of Politics* 68 (2). pp. 206–31.
- Stevens, C. E. (1952). The *Bellum Gallicum* as a Work of Propaganda. *Latomus* 11 (1). pp. 3–18.
- Stewart, Z. (1960). The God Nocturnus in Plautus' *Amphitruo*. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 50 (1–2). pp. 37–43
- Stinger, P. (1993). *The Use of Historical Example as a Rhetorical Device in Cicero's Orations*. PhD thesis, State University of New York.
- Straumann, B. (2020). The Energy of Concepts: The Role of Concepts in Long-Term Intellectual History and Social Reality. *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 14 (2). pp. 147-182.
- Stroh, W. (2004). *De domo sua*: legal problem and structure. In *Cicero the Advocate* (eds. Powell J. and Paterson J.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 313–70.
- Sumi, G. S. (2002). Spectacles and Sulla's Public Image. *Historia* 51 (4). pp. 414-32.
- Suolahti, J. (1963). *The Roman Censors: A Study on Social Structure*. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia.
- Syme, R. (1939). *The Roman Revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Taeger, F (1933). Review of Haywood, R.M. *Studies on Scipio Africanus*. *Philologische Wochenschrift* 53.
- Tarpin, M. (2009). Les *Manubiae* dans la procédure d'appropriation du butin. In *Praeda. Butin de guerre et société dans la Rome républicaine / Kriegsbeute und Gesellschaft im republikanischen Rome* (ed. Humm M. and Coudry M.) Berlin: Franz Steiner Verlag. pp. 81-102.

- Tarpin, M. (2015). Imperium, promagistrats et triomphe au 1er siècle av. J.-C.: Quelques affaires. *Cahiers Du Centre Gustave Glotz* 26. pp. 261–88.
- Tarver, T. (1997). Varro and the Antiquarianism of Philosophy. In *Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome*, (eds Barnes J. and Griffin M.) Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 130–64.
- Tatum, W. J. (2007). *Alterum est tamen boniviri, alterum boni petitoris*: The Good Man Canvasses. *Phoenix* 61 (1/2). pp. 109–135
- Täubler, E. (1912). Camillus und Sulla: Zur Entstehung der Camilluslegende. *Klio* 12. pp. 219–33.
- Taylor, L. R. (1962). Forerunners of the Gracchi. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 52. pp. 19–27.
- Taylor, L. R. (1990). *Roman Voting Assemblies from the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Tedeschi A. (2005). *Lezione di buon governo per un dittatore: Cicerone, Pro Marcello: saggio di commento*. Edipuglia.
- Thein, A. 2009. Felicitas and the Memoirs of Sulla and Augustus. In *The Lost Memoirs of Augustus* (ed. Powell A. and Smith C.). Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales. pp. 87–109.
- Thurmond, D. L. (1992). *Felicitas: Public rites of human fecundity in ancient Rome*. PhD Thesis. The University of North Carolina.
- Tränkle, H. (1977). *Livius und polybios*. Schwabe.
- Tränkle, H. (1998). Gebet Und Schimmeltriumph Des Camillus: Einige Überlegungen Zum Fünften Buch Des Livius. *Wiener Studien* 111. pp.145–65.
- Treggiari, S. (1998). Home and Forum: Cicero between “Public” and “Private.” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 128. pp. 1–23.
- Valgiglio, E. (1975). “L’Autobiografia di Silla nelle biografie di Plutarco”. In *Atti del Convegno: gli storiografi latini tramandati in frammenti*, Urbino: Università di Urbino. pp. 245-81.
- van der Bloom, H. (2010). *Cicero’s Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer*. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

- Van Haepere, F. (2012). *Auspices D'investiture, Loi Curiate Et Légitimité Des Magistrats Romains. Cahiers Du Centre Gustave Glotz* 23. pp. 71–111.
- Van Haepere, F. (2015). *De La Nécessité D'une Loi Curiate Pour Les Magistrats Sans Imperium. Cahiers Du Centre Gustave Glotz* 26. pp. 225–30.
- Vasaly, A. (1993). *Representations; Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Versnel, H. S. (1970). *Triumphus: An Inquiry into the Origin, Development and Meaning of the Roman Triumph*. Leiden: Brill.
- Versnel, H. S. (1975). *Sacrificium Iustrale* : the death of Mettius Fufetius (Livy 1, 28). *Studies in Roman Iustration-ritual. MNIR* 37. pp. 97-115.
- Versnel, H. S. (1991). Some Reflections On the Relationship Magic-Religion. *Numen* 38 (2). pp. 177–97.
- Versnel, H.S. (2006). Red (Herring?) Comments on a New Theory Concerning the Origin of the Triumph. *Numen* 53 (3). pp. 290–326.
- Verter, B. (2003). Spiritual Capital: Theorizing Religion with Bourdieu Against Bourdieu. *Sociological Theory* 21 (2). pp. 150–74.
- Vervae, F. J. (2004). The Lex Valeria and Sulla's Empowerment as Dictator (82-79 BCE). *Cahiers Du Centre Gustave Glotz* 15. pp.37–84.
- Vervae, F. J. (2006). The scope of the Lex Sempronia concerning the assignment of the consular provinces 123BC. *Athenaeum* 44. pp. 625-654.
- Vervae, F. J. (2014). *The High Command in the Roman Republic. The Principle of the Summum Imperium Auspiciumque from 509 to 19 BCE*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Vervae, F. J. (2015). The "Lex Curiata" And the Patrician Auspices. *Cahiers Du Centre Gustave Glotz* 26. pp. 201–224.
- Vitelli, C. (1898). Note ed appunti sull'autobiografia di Lucio Cornelio Silla. *SIFC* (6). pp. 353-394.
- Vogt, K.M. (2008). *Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Vuković, K. (2022). *Wolves of Rome: The Lupercalia from Roman and Comparative Perspectives*. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter
- Wagenvoort, H. (1947). *Roman Dynamism: Studies in Ancient Roman Thought, Language and Custom*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wagenvoort, H. (1954). Felicitas Imperatoria. *Mnemosyne* 7 (1). pp. 300–322.
- Wagenvoort, H. (1980). *Pietas: Selected Studies in Roman Religion* (Studies in Greek and Roman religion I). Leiden: Brill.
- Walbank, F.W. (1949). Roman Declaration of War in the Third and Second Centuries. *Classical Philology* 44 (1). pp. 15-19.
- Walbank F.W. (1957-79). *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*. 3 vols. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Walbank, F.W. (2007). Fortuna (tyche) in Polybius, in *A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography*, vol. 2 (ed by Marincola J). Malden-Oxford-Carlton: Blackwell. pp 349– 55.
- Wallace-Hadrill, A. (1994). *Houses and Society in Pompeii and Herculaneum*. Princeton University Press.
- Wallace-Hadrill, A. (2008). *Rome's Cultural Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wallace, A. F. C. (1966). *Religion: An Anthropological View*. New York: Random House.
- Walsh, P. G. (1993). *Commentary on Livy Book XXXVII*. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.
- Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and Society*. (ed. by Roth G. and Wittich C.) Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Weileder, A. (1998). *Valerius Maximus Spiegel kaiserlicher Selbstdarstellung*. PhD Thesis. Munich: München Universität.
- Weinstock, S. (1955). Harry Erkell, *Augustus, Felicitas, Fortuna*. *Lateinische Wortstudien*. Göteborg 1952. pp. 193. Swedish. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 45(1-2). pp. 187-8.
- Weinstock, S. (1971). *Divus Julius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Welch, K. (2008). 'Nimium Felix: Caesar's Felicitas and Cicero's Philippics'. In *Cicero's Philippics: History, Rhetoric and Ideology* (ed. Wilson M. and Stevenson T.). Auckland: Polygraphia. pp. 181-213.
- Welsh, J. T. (2011). Accius, Porcius Licinus, and the Beginning of Latin Literature. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 101. pp. 31–50.
- White, P. (1997). Julius Caesar and the Publication of Acta in Late Republican Rome. *Chiron* 27. pp. 73-84.
- Wiater, N. (2021). Contemplating the End of Roman Power: Polybius' Histories in context. In *Eschatology in Antiquity: Forms and Functions, Forms and Functions* (eds. Marlow H, Pollmann K. and Van Noorden H.) New York: Routledge. pp 156-168.
- Wiedemann, T. (1986). The Fetiales: A Reconsideration. *The Classical Quarterly* 36(2) pp. 478-490.
- Wiehemeyer, W. (1967). Proben historischer Kritik aus Livius XXI-XLV. In *Wege zu Livius* (ed. Burck E.) Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. pp. 224-36.
- Williamson, C. (1987). Monuments of bronze: Roman legal documents on bronze tablets. *Classical Antiquity* 6 (1). pp. 160-183.
- Wiseman, T. P. (1998). The Publication of the De Bello Gallico. In *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter: The War Commentaries as Political Instruments* (ed. Welch K. and Powell A.) Swansea: Classical Press of Wales. pp 1-10.
- Wiseman, T. P. (1969). The Census in the First Century B.C. *The Journal of Roman Studies* 59. pp. 59–75.
- Wiseman, T. P. (1981). "Practice And Theory In Roman Historiography". *History* 66. pp. 375–393.
- Wiseman, T. P. (1987) *Roman Studies. Literary and Historical*. Liverpool.
- Wiseman, T. P. (1995). *Remus: a Roman myth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wiseman, T. P. (2007). Three Notes on the Triumphal Route. In *Res Bene Gestae. Ricerche di storia urbana su Roma antica in onore di Eva*

- Margareta Steinby* (eds. Leone A., Palombi D., and Walker S.). Rome: Edizioni Quasar. pp. 445-449.
- Wiseman, T. P. (2015). *The Roman Audience: Classical Literature as Social History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wiseman, T. P. (2019). *The House of Augustus: A Historical Detective Story*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wissowa, G. (1912). *Religion und Kultus der Römer*. Beck: Munich. 2nd edition.
- Wistrand, E. (1987). *Felicitas Imperatoria* Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.
- Wood, J. W. (1989). 'Fecundity and Natural Fertility in Humans'. *Oxford Reviews of Reproductive Biology* 11: 61–109.
- Wood, N., (1988). *Cicero's Social and Political Thought*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wynne, J. P. F. (2019). *Cicero on the Philosophy of Religion: On the Nature of the Gods and On Divination*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Yakobson, A. (2018). Aristocratic Dignity and Indignity in Republican Public Life. In *Institutions and Ideology in Republican Rome: Speech, Audience and Decision* (eds. van der Blom H, Gray C., and Steel C.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 15-34.
- Yakobson, A. (2022). The Political Culture of the Republic since Syme's *The Roman Revolution*. In *A Companion to the Political Culture of the Roman Republic* (eds Arena V, Prag J., and Stiles A.). pp. 93-106.
- Yarrow, L. (2006). Lucius Mummius and the Spoils of Corinth. *Scripta Classica Israelica* 25. pp. 57–70.
- Zieske, L. (1972). *Felicitas: eine Wortuntersuchung*. Hamburg.
- Ziolkowski, A. (1992). *The Temples of Mid-Republican Rome and their Historical and their Topographical Context*. Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider.
- Ziolkowski, A. (2011). The Capitol and the "Auspice of Departure". In *Studia Lesco Mrozewicz Ab Amicis et Discipulis Dedicata* (ed. Ruciński S, Balbuza C., and Królczyk C) Poznan: Institut Historii UAM. pp. 465–71.

Zuddas, E. (2017) *Curae municipali da Ameria e dall'Umbria*. In *Urbana Species : Vita di città nell'Italia e nell'Impero romano* (eds. Granino Cecere M. G. and Ricci C.) Rome: Edizioni Quasar. pp. 113-150.