Cultural Diplomacy in the UK and Germany: Two Models from the 21st Century

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Declaration

I, Firdevs Bulut, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Abstract

This research is about the concept of cultural diplomacy (CD). The questions asked in this project are the following: How has CD become such an important field in creating ties between states and 'bridges' in international relations? What was the impact of government approaches on the development of CD in the 21st century? Besides, what was the impact of concepts such as soft power and instrumentalization of arts and culture on the conceptualization of CD? On a theoretical basis, this Ph.D. project will try to find answers to these questions. On a methodological basis, UK's British Council, and Germany's Goethe Institute as the leading CD institutions will be the focus of this research.

The thesis will analyse the changes in these two institutions' activities and their approach to the concepts of soft power and cultural diplomacy in the 21st century by looking at their practices, cultural programs, the government advice they receive while creating these programs, and cultural relations policies. It will also analyse the discrepancies and challenges between cultural practitioners and CD policymakers. The thesis will serve as a contemporary analysis of the CD as a concept and field of practice.

Impact Statement

Cultural diplomacy (CD) is a course of actions based on exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity. It aims to strengthen relationships, enhance sociocultural cooperation or promote national interests. CD can be practiced by either the public sector, private sector or civil society. This research sheds light on the relationship between states and cultural institutions that are operating in the name of these states. The specific examples this research is looking at are the UK, Germany, the British Council and the Goethe Institute. The research analyses the government advice that are provided to these two cultural institutions by these two countries. It also lays out the directions which the practice of CD has taken in the 21st century under the influence of governments. CD is a field that is constantly changing, because the actors and recipients of CD projects differ all around the world, and all these need specific analyses of their own.

For these reasons, this research will be useful for international relations and diplomacy researchers in terms of theorizing the field of CD. It will be a good resource in understanding the new diplomacies in the 21st century, both with the new challenges and opportunities. Secondly, it will be a good resource for researches who wish to pursue the specific field of CD. Because of the UK and Germany focus, the research is a novel contribution to the study of CD and in general, public diplomacy of these two countries. Therefore, in understanding these two countries' CD approaches, culture and values promotion, the research offers a practical guide. In addition, considering the lack of contemporary theorizing about the concept of CD, the research is an informative guide for those who wish to understand the concept and the shifts that it has gone under, especially in the West.

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I dedicate this thesis to my mother and my father.

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Introduction

1. Research Context

This research explores the development of the concept of cultural diplomacy (CD) in the 21st century. The thesis will focus on the UK and Germany's governmental perspectives on the concept of CD and compare and contrast them to the practitioner perspectives represented in the thesis by the British Council (BC) and the Goethe Institute (GI). I will track this development through the concept's emergence, implementation, and policy implications within the broader framework of international cultural relations. I first came across CD in 2015 when researching the internationalization processes of non-governmental organizations in Turkey. Then to understand the origins and context of the term in international relations and diplomacy studies, I started reading the literature in the field. As I continued, I realized that there are many gaps in and around the concept of the CD itself. Areas such as international history[1] and cultural studies[2] have utilized and recreated the concept within their relevant framework, contributing to the term's development in academic circles. In addition, there are cultural institutions that the government partially supports such as non-governmental institutions, all of which we can see dealing with, participating in, organizing, and project developing with references to this concept. Institutions such as the British Council, Goethe Institute, and Alliance Français represent the values and cultures of their states while at the same time creating bridges between their nations and other parts of the world. They are related to CD in the broad literature and extensively refer to this concept in their internal reports.

CD as an emerging and then receding phenomenon in international cultural relations is at the core of the research. It will discuss the concept's meaning, interpretations, and related practices, using international relations, politics, and cultural studies literature. The overall discrepancy between CD in practice and as a concept in international relations will be the central question explored in this research. The study will examine the policies and projects of two cultural institutions, in their framework, which are the largest and most successful in maintaining international cultural work in line with the national interests of their countries: the BC and the GI). The complicated relationship between CD and soft power will direct this

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[1] McMurry, R.E & Lee, Muna. (1947). *The Cultural Approach; Another Way in International Relations*. Chapel Hill: UNC Press; Gienow-Hecht, J. C. E & Schumacher, F. (2003). *Culture and International History*. Berghan Books; Riordan, S. (2003) *The New Diplomacy* (London: Polity), especially chapter 9; Cull, N. J., Culbert, D & David Welch, (2003) *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia*, 1500 to the Present (Oxford and Santa Barbara CA: ABC-Clio),

[2]Lewis, J. (2002). *Critical Cultural Policy Studies: A Reader*. John Wiley & Sons.

discussion, taking both criticisms and the points of commonality into consideration. In addition, I will consider how these institutions interpret, utilize, and contrast the concept of CD in their internal discussions.

In contemporary art, arts and culture are closely related to freedom of expression, freedom to criticize, and openness. Like culture, art is rather difficult to define and classify. And indeed, most of what CD promotes is classified as arts and culture. In 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,' Morris Weitz suggests that arts are not successfully defined, and it is impossible since any definition of arts based on their internal qualities (as in independently of the artwork) cannot survive in an always-changing world of art.[3] Therefore, while practicing CD of a specific country or a group, there has to be a specified agenda, and it should relate to the dominant reference frames of this country. To put this need in context, I have chosen to look at specific models in the UK and Germany, where CD has been practised for quite a long time (differing from one context to another). It took some time and systematic classifications (mostly contained and carried out within US foreign policy) for the concept to settle down within the IR context of the UK and Germany, based on similar and differing motives concerning different national interests.

Globalization and its communicative developments have impacted the understanding of CD to a great extent. Many cultural institutions took place in developing CD as a concept, and the role of globalization in this process is also essential. I will do a specific discussion on globalization and CD and how the countries' understanding of it has changed with globalization. In the context of growing global challenges to culture, i.e., rising racist and populist ideologies in states that they run, how to convince more people that art can still bring about positive change in states' relations to one another? I believe that CD can still change the relationship between culture, arts, and foreign policy. And by looking at the UK, Germany, and the EU, I will try to show the discrepancies that occur while endeavouring to realize this, what goes wrong, and the efforts to make them right. In the first substantive consideration of the research, I will analyse the policymaking of the UK and Germany regarding CD. I will consider the CD as a field within each national context and the conscious choice to resort to it to create cultural relations. Different authorities such as governments, leading cultural institutions, and

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[3] Weitz, M. (1956). 'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics'. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 15 (1): 27–35.

non-governmental organizations participating in artistic work policymaking will be the primary sources to be applied.

There are differences between public diplomacy (PD), international cultural relations, and CD. In light of these concepts and their meanings, CD as a distinct phenomenon came into being, and various institutions in the field availed themselves of it. Concepts such as PD and international cultural relations have a broader context and history. CD has partly managed to stand on its own – along with the controversies and problems it has invoked. It is essential to remember that measuring CD's impact and reaching concrete conclusions are extremely difficult because CD sometimes happens by plan and project, and sometimes it occurs arbitrarily, outside the aegis of an institution or project. One project CD made in the past could still have an impact to this day, and it might be influencing new people independently of those who realized it in the first place. For entities such as states, the CD is both an end goal and a process. This research is not seeking complete solutions to the confusion over the term itself. The overarching motivation and aim of this research are to make this process and mechanisms of CD visible and to illustrate how the CD as a concept relates to cultural and creative change. In light of the research questions, I will discuss the historical, contextual, and linguistic reasons that have prepared the grounds for this conclusion.

2. Culture and Diplomacy – Research Background

Bringing culture and diplomacy together is inherently a political statement because there is a purpose and defined political aims that the actors aim to achieve at the end of this process. Globalization, primarily cultural and economic globalization, made this process easier and faster worldwide. Nevertheless, policymakers and practitioners defined the concept of CD in a rather vague way. One of the main reasons for this definition was to mask the political aims that CD institutions aim to achieve. The primary goal of cultural dissemination is undoubtedly political, and the coming together of the concepts of culture and diplomacy is an innately political phenomenon.[4] However, the deliberate terminological underpinning of culture within the concept of CD also paved the way to euphemize the purpose of influencing Others.[5] CD

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[4] Chaubet, F. (2022). International Cultural Relations, Historiographic Sketch, and New Conceptual Issues. In Carbo-Catalan, E. & Roig, D. *Culture as Soft Power: Bridging Cultural Relations, Intellectual Cooperation, and Cultural Diplomacy*, 22.

[5] Ibid, 22.

actors attempt to mask this political finality by choice of the action method and the various creative forms of cultural exchange, and they depoliticize it as much as possible.[6] This depoliticization attempt by the practitioners is no surprise given the work of the BC and the GI, on the surface, is to disseminate cultural products and hope to create a two-way street between countries. However, the influence over others and the Euro-Western tropism of CD do not always allow this. In this thesis, I aim to flash these points out within the context of the BC and the GI.

Culture is about a specific group or society's way of life, values, and traditions. Within the domain of culture, there are mostly 'expressive' forms of human conduct, such as arts, music, and literature. In the last half-century, the meaning of culture has changed tremendously, from a more elitist sphere to culture with a lowercase 'c,' which is a construct including a wide range of political, sociological, artistic, and religious practices within a creative framework.[7] These practices are significant elements essential to characterizing national identities and practices of specific communities. A person who is a member of a society in which a group of people is about one another through common values, or a large social group sharing the same geographical area, would be more or less subject to the same political authority and similar dominant cultural expectations. This encounter creates a collective cultural understanding and makes people relate to the semantic baggage that the word "culture" brings forth. Nevertheless, Mahadev Apte summarizes the situation of culture in the *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* as follows: "Despite a century of efforts to define culture adequately, there was in the early 1990s still no agreement among anthropologists regarding its nature." [8]

Countries like Germany and the UK oriented their cultural policies more towards promoting their own cultures, films, music, and literature, and the emphasis on their unique products became stronger. Cultural policymakers aim to fit cultural elements and values into policies and execute them in the field in other countries. I will discuss how these two countries have done this, specifically in the contemporary era. But first, I will give some background and literature about culture and diplomacy as two separate concepts and their survey up until the formation of cultural diplomacy. Especially in anthropology, there have been several attempts to define culture. Various authors attempted to describe and analyse the term, focusing on the

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[6] Ibid, 22.

[7] Arnold, M. (2009). *Culture and Anarchy*. Oxford University Press, Reissue Edition.

[8] Apte, M. (1994) Language in sociocultural context. In: R. E. Asher (Ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*. *Vol.4* (pp. 2000-2010). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

meaning and interpretation of the word in different conceptual or semantic environments. None of the definitions of culture I cite here is right or wrong, and it is not possible to designate a single best definition of culture. However, it is possible to extract a working definition of culture, which would be more concerning the ultimate subject of CD.

The 19th-century definitions of culture primarily focused on the dilemma between "high culture" and "popular (or folk) culture" after Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy*.[9] According to this definition, only one small and elite social group has dominion over culture, while the rest is sources of anarchy. This idea also resonates with Antonio Gramsci's theory of discursive hegemony, which suggests that hegemony is the ruling class's power to persuade other classes that their interests are the interests of the general public. And hegemony is implemented by more subtle methods relating to the economy and other state initiatives such as education and culture.[10] Following this definition, Edward Tylor defined culture "as a quality possessed by all people in all social groups, who nevertheless could be arrayed on a development continuum from savagery through barbarism to civilization."[11] One might argue that Tylor's understanding of culture is still relevant in terms of Western and European versions of culture and 'cultured' human beings. I will go into this discussion in the later chapters. These examples of the social-evolutionary definition of a culture focused on the universal character of one culture in different societies. They argued that this culture arrayed from savage to civilized in each of these societies.[12] This definition is said to be at the heart of studies on culture in anthropology, for it brings up the dichotomy of savage vs. civilization. In the 20th century, partly in reaction to these previous understandings of culture, Franz Boas emphasized the uniqueness of the many and varied cultures of different peoples and societies. For Boas, "there should be no distinction between high and low culture, and cultures should not be evaluated as savage or civilized."[13] These three main usages of the word culture have been deconstructed and redefined. They can be related to various ideological and political agendas that we can still see in today's discussions around the same topics. And CD is one of these.

More recent classifications of culture include Kroeber and Kluckhorn's definition, which relates culture to actions, patterns, behaviours, traditional ideas, and their attached

[9] Arnold, M. (2009). *Culture and Anarchy*. Oxford University Press, Reissue Edition.

[10] Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. and Tiffin, H. (2013). *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*. Routledge. (p.134).

[11] Tylor, E. (2010) *Primitive Culture*. Cambridge University Press. Vol 1&2.

[12] Spencer-Oatey, H. (2012) What is Culture? A compilation of quotations. GlobalPAD Core Concepts. Available at GlobalPAD Open House.

[13] Stocking, G. W. Jr. (1966). "Franz Boas and the Culture Concept in Historical Perspective." *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 68, No. 4 (pp. 867-882). Wiley Publications.

values.[14] For Geert Hofstede, culture amounts to a collective programming of the mind that distinguishes members of a particular group or category of people from another.[15] In this understanding, one could suggest that culture is an element of ontological security for certain groups of people. These two definitions are more action-based and refer to the results of people's interaction with culture. This definition also gives one a certain feeling of security, the ontological security that comes with belonging to a group of people. Matsumoto defines culture as "the set of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviours shared by a group of people, but different for each individual, communicated from one generation to the next."[16] When we evaluate culture in this context, along with Spencer-Oatey's definition, "culture is a set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that a group of people shares, and that influence each other's behaviour and his/her interpretations of the meaning of other people's behaviour," we see that culture focuses on shared values and beliefs, thus creating a commonly shared meaning by a group of people. [17] Creating relations between groups of people with and through culture is a significant point for the scope of this research. Therefore, we can suggest that these main definitions of culture will be taken as the main ones when talking about the culture within the CD context.

As for culture, I would argue that culture is a mixture of two: a set of available knowledge and resources that one makes use of and human-to-human interactions. Culture is not given, but it is socially constructed with life experiences, social interactions, family teachings, and other factors involved in human life. Taking any specific culture for granted would create a set of barriers for one to interact with the other. We will see examples of this particular problem in this thesis within the CD context. We will see how setting clear definitions for culture initially becomes useful but then leads to hegemony and discrimination towards people who use this culture. And this is mainly done in elite political spheres, which have always been influential in making/defining culture and diplomacy.

Diplomacy is the formal process of communication between states. Diplomats act on behalf of governments. In the traditional definitions of diplomacy, these diplomats try to converse with and convince the other party about issues concerning territory, trade rights, or

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[14] Kroeber, A.L. and Kluckhohn, C. (1952) *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*. Peabody Museum, Cambridge, MA, p. 181.

[15] Hofstede, G. (1994) *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*. London: HarperCollins Business. (p. 5).

[16] Matsumoto, D. (1996) *Culture and Psychology*. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole

[17] Spencer-Oatey, H. (2008) *Culturally Speaking. Culture, Communication and Politeness Theory*. 2nd edition. London: Continuum. (p. 3).

any other matter connected to state interests. Diplomats are negotiators. There are clear rules for diplomacy and also for the rights and duties of diplomatic missions and embassies. The most widely known regulations for diplomacy were first laid out in the Vienna Congress of 1815. And the rules for diplomacy have been updated many times since then. The following main change in diplomacy in the modern era occurred with the UN Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities and was first implemented in 1964.[18] The relations between governments dominated the traditional meaning of diplomacy, but in the past 50 years, especially after globalization of culture and politics, we have started to see accounts of the changing nature of diplomacy. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and many of the new nations formerly behind the Iron Curtain endeavouring to develop a relationship with the rest of the world, debates on diplomacy focused on the fact that traditional bilateral diplomacy could no longer be enough to contain the challenges of the world. In a changing world, diplomacy needed new approaches and methods. This statement does not posit that there was no effective bilateral diplomacy before or during the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead, the changing and globalizing world systems required this renewal, especially from then on. Foreign policy, too, would have to adapt to these new circumstances.[19] Diplomats had to broaden their target groups to appeal to public and non-governmental organizations, media, and private companies, which are also interested in improving national interests to some extent. By definition, a diplomat is still a person in the diplomatic service of a Foreign Ministry. Depending on the agenda of the government in question, a diplomat could try to negotiate peace or cease-fire, meaning the mission of a diplomat can be both peaceful and adverse. A diplomat had always had the role of protecting the interests and promoting the image of their country, even before the discussions around nation branding started and changing nature of diplomacy took its place in academic discussions and foreign policy spheres. Branding, as a concept rooted in economics, was in use for a long time before nation branding became popular, which started gaining pace in the literature around the mid-1990s.[20]

Before the two concepts of culture and diplomacy came together for the first time, culture, propaganda, and national branding were in use in the literature and international relations practices. In the past, practitioners of CD tried to bring together state-to-state relations

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[18] See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1964). United Nations Treaty Collection.

[19] Plummer, B.G. (2005) "The Changing Face of Diplomatic History: A Literature Review". *The History Teacher*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 385-400; Chanda, Nayan & Froetschel, Susan (eds) (2012). *A World Connected: Globalization in the 21st Century*. Yale University Press.

[20] Moor, L. (2007) *The Rise of Brands*. Oxford: Berg Publishers, p. 3; Keller, K. L. (2002) "Branding and Brand Equity," in Handbook of Marketing, ed. Barton Weitz and Robin Wensley London: Sage Publication Ltd., 151.

(traditional diplomacy), state-to-people relations (public diplomacy), and people-to-people relations (cultural relations/and diplomacy, as the literature, uses them interchangeably).[21] Cultural propaganda and promoting the image of a country have always been visible or invisible within the agenda of states and formal organizations.[22] Ambassadors and cultural attachés acting following their countries' interests in different parts of the world did not define the nature of the work through reference to the concept of CD for a long time. Culture has been an part of international relations. It has been a means for countries to show their influence and build trust-based relationships. In foreign policy, stakeholders do not see culture and cultural exchange as essential. The CD has various and somewhat controversial definitions in the prevalent literature about the subject. It is helpful to start with one of the most widely accepted definitions of CD to introduce the debates. CD is "a domain of diplomacy concerned with establishing, developing, and sustaining relations with foreign states by way of culture, art, and education. It is also a proactive process of projection in which a nation's institutions, value system, and unique cultural personality are promoted at a bilateral and multilateral level."[23] According to this definition, CD includes a nation's expressive life and the exchange of values and ideas. We can theorize the contemporary understanding of CD in the literature and the practices of groups undertaking cultural and diplomatic acts per this definition. Following this definition, this research aims to contextualize the CD concept with an emphasis on methods and ongoing debates.

I will also discuss cultural institutions and their institutional anthropologies within this framework. Based on the literature review about the concept, I have observed that there is still confusion about the work cultural institutions such as the British Council or the Goethe Institute are doing. This confusion results from the governmental spheres' interference in the cultural institutions' work, their clashing interests, and concerns about their image. So this research aims to seek out the agreement and disagreement points between cultural institutions and the CD concept. CD is a significant concept that has gained meaning through practice. However, in various times and contexts in the post-1990 world, especially in the case of the UK and Germany, the term has faced a lot of confusion around the following: Are culture and diplomacy compatible/similar concepts? Is CD a feasible concept for the political and cultural

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[21] Rose, M. (2017). *A New Cultural Diplomacy: The Integration of Cultural Relations and Diplomacy*. Ifa Input / 3.

[22] Pajtinka, E. (2014). *Cultural Diplomacy in Theory and Practice of Contemporary International Relations* Politicke vedy. 4, pp. 95-108.

[23] Lucas, S. '"Total Culture" and the State-Private Network, A Commentary', in J.C.E. Gienow- Hecht and F. Schumacher (eds.) 2003. *Culture and International History*. New York: Berghahn Books, p. 207.

atmosphere of the 21ˢᵗ century? With nationalist and populist politics taking more and more space all around the world, does connect people with a culture still have resonance today? Does the term still have a story to tell the public?

To track the historical development of the concept and answer these questions, I will draw a timeline of various institutions' usage of CD. I will attempt to detect discrepancies and continuities and investigate their political and social causes and justifications.

3. Key Terms and Definitions

As an emerging trend in academic research, CD encompasses various fields, from international relations to cultural studies. It is hard to draw rigid limits to the CD field, but the most common definition is that CD is how countries promote their cultural and political values to other countries and peoples.[24] With the support of government funds and other cultural stakeholders, channels such as the arts, literature, sports, and other branches carry out this promotion. These fields should be beyond the explicit political agenda of the countries. The aim of a government or institution offering CDs to others is for them to understand that country or institution better. One of the most compact definitions of the term is that of Kishore Chakraborty: "CD may best be described as a course of actions, which are based on and utilize the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interests; CD can be practiced by either the public sector, private sector or civil society."[25] According to some, the CD is entirely different from PD; its main aim is to create a platform where people can trust each other through actual works of culture.[26] This provides a platform for the governments to build their political, economic, and military agreements. However, others define it as a sub-component of PD; and for that reason, without CD, PD would be a more arduous process to maintain for governments.[27] I think CD should be considered separately from PD; rather than being a sub-component of PD, it is a practice on its own, and people, institutions, states, and all sorts of actors could practice it. It could be arbitrary or planned, based on a project, or just an interaction

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[24] Hullburt, H. F. & Ivey, B. (2008). *Cultural Diplomacy and The National Interest: In Search of a 21st-Century Perspective*. Art Industries Public Forum, The Curb Center at Vanderbilt.

[25] Chakraborty, K. (Ed.) (2013). *Cultural Diplomacy Dictionary*. The Academy for Cultural Diplomacy. (p. 30),

[26] Szondi, G. (2008). *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.

U.S. Department of State. (2005). Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Diplomacy. *Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy*. U.S. Department of State. (p. 13); Gilboa, E. (2008). Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. *Vol 616*, Issue 1, (pp. 55-77).

between two interested parties in a culture or artwork. PD and CD can complement and support one another, but they can also exist without one another.

Culture in politics situates culture within government policy and strengthens national interests, values, belief systems, and national identity.[28] Culture in PD is the effort of an international actor to promote national culture, to create influence on public opinions of peer actors, and to reach a level of credibility through cultural exchange. Culture in PD, therefore, talks about culture and arts events, exhibitions, and international festivals.[29] However, according to what I have experienced and learned in my study of the two, I would suggest that the actor practicing PD mostly has a unidirectional approach. The receiver of the PD does not have a say in the interaction that happens following the PD experience. This is also one of the differences between CD and PD. It is a two-way street that allows the receiver to shape its CD practice and hear its feedback.

Although lacking strictly defined boundaries and having several contested definitions in itself, in carrying out cultural policy, it is possible to talk about two approaches in the literature on CD: conceptual and structural. This division depends on the critical time and location variables in cultural policies. The conceptual approach deals with the motivations for making cultural policies: what do states, policymakers, governments, and citizens desire to achieve by familiarizing others with their culture? On the other hand, the structural approach addresses the setup of CD: who are the responsible agents of CD, and how do they correlate with state interest?[30] The term CD has recently been established and taken up by scholars. Still, we should remember that the concept has been present even before nation-states and modern political institutions regarding practices and the long-term goals that CD actors hope to achieve.[31]

Although other countries also started to emphasize the concept, much of the US-centred literature follows the premise that CD was a fundamental instrument of US foreign policy

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[28] Belanger, L. (1999). *Redefining Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Security and Foreign Policy in Canada*, Political Psychology, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 677-699.
[29] Hong, K. W. (2011). *Cultural Diplomacy form a Cultural Policy Perspective – Some Contestable Issues*, Korea Association of Arts Management.
[30] Gienow-Hecht, J. C. E. &. Donfried, M.C. (eds). (2010). *Searching for a cultural diplomacy / edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried*. New York: Berghahn. (pp 17-18).
[31] Bound, K., Briggs, R., Holden, J., and Jones, S., (2007). *Cultural diplomacy – culture is a central component of international relations. It's time to unlock its full potential*. London: DEMOS.

designed to contain the Soviet Union.[32] CD was, on occasion, equivalent to the propagandistic diplomacy of the United States just after the fall of the Soviet Bloc.[33] Because of this, CD gained a one-dimensional meaning, which later became controversial as new actors started to actively engage in the field with their claims to 'culture' –language, art, music, movies, etc. While the term referred to mutual understanding, trust, and dialogue, on the one hand, it meant political manipulation and repression or the exercise of power on the other. When we think about the beginning of CD efforts of world powers, which are nearly all about propaganda, and sometimes in a coercive way, we can understand this phenomenon. On a vast scale, the CD aimed to support one government's foreign policy goals, diplomacy, or both. Traditionally, high culture constituted the cultural side of diplomacy, which only concerned a particular group of people in a society. With the boom of US CD, the 'cultural' side of diplomacy started to evolve into what we call 'popular culture' and any kind of cultural activity that attracts individual people.

The motivation to interact with other people by creating bonds through cultural elements did not start with the efforts of the United States in the twentieth century, or globalization. We can trace it back to antiquity; since then, the states and rulers have initiated strategies to sell a positive image abroad or to engage in dialogue with other communities. In his seminal work about US CD as a model of the development of institutional CD practices in the US, Richard Arndt discusses that the urge to know other people and to be known can be traced back to antiquity.[34] Besides, we have striking examples of this urge in early modern and modern history.[35] However, the methods of engaging in cultural and diplomatic practice differed significantly from the 20th-century model. In the 20th century, we faced various CD models with the spread of imperialism. The British in India and the Middle East, the Germans in Africa, and the French in Indo-China all exported and promoted their cultures abroad as a powerful method to cement their commercial and political influences.[36] Recruiting intellectuals who belonged to the elite segments of society was necessary to realize states' purposes

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[32] Gienow-Hecht, J. C. E. &. Donfried, M.C. (eds). (2010). *Searching for a cultural diplomacy / edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried*. New York: Berghahn. (p.15).

[33] Ibid, p. 16.

[34] Arndt, R. T. (2005). *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*. Potomac Books, Inc. (pp. 1-23).

[35] Ibid.

[36] Gienow-Hecht, J. C. E. &. Donfried, M.C. (eds). (2010). *Searching for a cultural diplomacy / edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried*. New York: Berghahn. (pp. 26-29).

abroad.[37] Besides, analyses of governmental and private efforts to conduct CD in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries show that the significant difference between the contemporary era and these times is the difference and diversification of actors engaging in CD.[38] Coming through the end of the 20th century, the global community experienced new forms of diplomacy in which ambassadors' identities, methods, and tools changed.[39] In my view, this approach, focusing on the changing techniques of diplomacy, mainly referred to the increased use of communicative tools of globalization and new forms of media coming to the 21st century.

Although it is helpful to keep these differences in mind to follow the development of new trends in CD, we can suggest that CD generally remained an informal endeavour until World War I. The examples above, which trace CD back in history, are a part of what then constituted nineteenth-century cultural expansionism in Europe and beyond, which was mostly (in official terms) under the control of private and non-governmental groups. Before that period, institutions such as the GI, BC, or USIA that would constitute a platform for engaging in CD had not yet come into being. Still, other entities were performing similar works of promotion. (USIA was a U.S. PD branch that was dissolved in 1999 and transformed into the office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs).[40] Therefore, most administrations of foreign relations in London, Paris, or Berlin thought that cultural interaction and promotion were significant, although it was not their official and institutional task.[41] This kind of informality resulted in these cultural institutions carrying out their work independently of a structured theoretical framework. And as the field was integrated more into academic spheres, specifically after the end of the Cold War, terms gained more clarification. As a result, CD actors contextualized it as a separate topic in a way that fits their institutions' agenda.

Unlike the United States, which (in its CD) mainly aimed to give a more "accurate" image of itself worldwide,[42] many countries in the 20th century endeavoured to create a vision

[37] Ibid, pp. 26-29.

[38] Ibid, pp 8-10.

[39] Cooper, A.F. & Canadian Institute of International Affairs. & Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism (Waterloo, Ont.). (1985). *Canadian culture: international dimensions*. [Waterloo]: Toronto, Canada: Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, University of Waterloo/Wilfrid Laurier University; Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

[40] Gienow-Hecht, J. C. E. &. Donfried, M.C (eds). (2010). *Searching for a cultural diplomacy / edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried*. New York: Berghahn. (p. 45).

[41] Ibid, p. 18.

[42] Albro, R. (2015) The disjunction of image and word in US and Chinese soft power projection, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 21:4, 382-399.

for themselves for the first time. The American model of CD was more or less decisive in structuring these two approaches. Besides, while the conceptual approach in the study of CD presents many deviations from the American model, the structural system has yielded just as wide varieties. Therefore, employing these two approaches in the study of CD in any context is essential because they provide us with myriad functions, actions, and interpretations of CD aims and how to accomplish them.

The central questions of CD, especially after the two World Wars, relate to the setup and organization of the practice. The question of agency, funding, and relations to states are of central importance in locating the function of CD. Much of the existing literature in the field illustrates American CD as mainly state-run and attributes a secondary role to civil society and private enterprises.[43] Let's think about these examples of practices of different countries together. Although there are significant similarities in their approaches to CD (such as artistic and educational exchanges, cultural centres, language enterprises, etc.), we can also trace many differences. The following provides a very general classification found in the literature about different countries' focuses on CD: There is an emphasis on spreading the language in the French and German cases, during the British focus on education more.[44] Even though we cannot say that the German language became a lingua franca at any point in history, that was one of the main aims. In their methods of organizing CD, French governments have traditionally attributed a "civilizing mission" to France's cultural diplomacy.[45] In this sense, we are also dealing with different understandings of civilization when tackling CD. Britain kept the practice at arm's length and created the British Council for this task.[46] Germany, due to its federal structure, utilizes a combination of both.[47] While I will make an elaborate discussion relating to the details of the practices of these institutions later, this illustration is vital to have a better grasp of the two approaches to CD. Understanding the structural and conceptual variables in the practice and structuring of CD enables us to portray what cultural diplomacy

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[43] Ibid, 20.

[44] Donaldson, F. L. (1984). *The British Council: The First Fifty Years*. Jonathan Cape: The University of California; Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK's International Priorities. (2006). Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs; British Council Trennial Review (2014) Foreign and Commonwealth Office. (p. 4).

[45] Gienow-Hecht, J.C.E. &. Donfried, M.C. (eds). (2010). *Searching for a cultural diplomacy / edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried*. New York: Berghahn. (p. 22); Mulcahy, K. V. (2017). Exporting Civilization: French Cultural Diplomacy. In: *Public Culture, Cultural Identity, Cultural Policy*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. (pp. 33-63).

[46] Fisher, A. (2009). *A Story of engagement: the British Council 1934-2009*. British Council (p. 17).

[47] Gienow-Hecht, J.C.E. &. Donfried, M.C. (eds). (2010). *Searching for a cultural diplomacy / edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried*. New York: Berghahn. (p. 22).

is supposed to achieve. Tracing the development of these different approaches in respect of various practical examples from other countries helps us see the functionality of CD when specific states or institutions are in question. The structural method relates to the purpose of this research, for here we are dealing with agents of CD, who hold the state interest as one of the most significant purposes of their activities.

3.1. Globalization and Cultural Diplomacy

Another aspect that has a significant influence on the development and establishment of CD in international relations is globalization. The term globalization is a product of the interwar era, and in the 1990s, it started to be used commonly.[48] Globalization concerns the economic connections and the permeability of commercial markets, which we can define as a 'new commercial reality.'[49] Technology was one of the biggest reasons behind this new reality.[50] While some thinkers advocated this as a development, globalization was about standardization, and some criticized it and pointed out internal and possibly forthcoming problems. In my thesis, I will focus more on the cultural aspect of globalization and discuss it as a process in which CD actors could better disseminate their cultural projects. For example, according to cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, the complex nature of the globalising economy had close connections with specific discrepancies between politics, culture, and economy.[51] The field of global history mainly conceptualized and debated globalization because this field was believed to provide the best approach to the term, adding a further level of analysis. Global history was developing as a field that endeavours to comprehend history as a series of relations between peoples and countries, not only from the perspective of politics and economics but also from culture."[52] And in practice, political actors conceptualized globalization in a parallel vein to the development of global history as a field, which generally objected to the Eurocentric readings of history.[53] This Eurocentric reading also led to similar debates in international relations as a discipline.

The emergence of different practices of CD, as briefly sketched above, can be read in a parallel relationship to the process of globalization and the development of agency in civil society.

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[48] Robertson, R. (1992). *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage; James, P and Steger, M. B. (2014). 'A genealogy of "globalization": the career of a concept', *Globalizations*, 11, (417-34).

[49] Levitt, T. (1983). 'The globalization of markets', *Harvard Business Review*, 61, 92-102 .

[50] Ibid, 96.

[51] Appadurai, A. (1990). 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy', *Theory, Culture, Society*, 7, 294-6.

[52] Osterhammel, J. and Petersson, N. P. (2009). *Globalization: A Short History*. Princeton University Press.

[53] Ibid.

Especially after the 1990s, civil society became more mobile, and the actors' cooperation with governments increased. This period corresponds to the revival and development of CD as a field in international relations. Therefore, the discussions and practices, which fall under the heading of "globalization," have a close connection with the development process of CD and international cultural relations.[54] In the practical field, cultural actors fostered this increase through the cooperation of organizations in countries dealing with education, charity work, and cultural exchange. I argue that CD contributes to the understanding of various cultures, and I view this as a positive thing for the 21st century states and peoples, all of whom are affected by divisive ideologies such as ultra-nationalism, populism and far-rightism.[55]

Globalization and its policy implications for education, the regulation of intellectual accumulation and monopolies, and new financial enterprises are interconnected.[56] This connectedness goes back to nation-states moving away from the bipolar world system of the Cold War to a global approach.[57] Integration of markets, nation-states, and improvements in technologies to a tremendously effective degree have triggered worldwide growth, prompting incomes to rise, especially in some parts of the world. However, there has been a backlash against this process because some local, regional or national cultures are overlooked or pressured to comply with the mainstream cultural agenda. This process, first of all, brings to mind the relationship between US CD and globalization, and most notably, the example of Hollywood.[58] CD has a mutual relationship with cultures' globalization processes, and it has to adapt to the changes resulting from these processes. CD makes a qualitative difference in relations between nations and peoples,[59] so these factors are crucial when evaluating CD's impacts.

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[54] For main literature linking globalization to cultural diplomacy, see Featherstone, M. (1990). Global culture: an introduction. *Theory, Culture & Society*, *7*(2-3), 1-14; L'Etang, J. (2009). Public relations and diplomacy in a globalized world: An issue of public communication. *American Behavioral Scientist*, *53*(4), 607-626.; Fosler-Lussier, D. (2010). Cultural diplomacy as cultural globalization: The university of Michigan jazz band in Latin America. *Journal of the Society for American Music*, *4*(1), 59-93.; Fosler-Lussier, D. (2012). Music pushed, music pulled: Cultural diplomacy, globalization, and imperialism. *Diplomatic History*, *36*(1), 53-64.

[55] Fosler-Lussier, D. (2010). Cultural diplomacy as cultural globalization: The university of Michigan jazz band in Latin America. *Journal of the Society for American Music*, *4*(1), 59-93.; Fosler-Lussier, D. (2012). Music pushed, music pulled: Cultural diplomacy, globalization, and imperialism. *Diplomatic History*, *36*(1), 53-64.

[56] Kotz, D. M. (2000). "Globalization and Neoliberalism". In *Rethinking Marxism*, Volume 12, Number 2, Summer 2002, pp. 64-79.

[57] Robertson, R. (1992). *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage; Xuetong, Y. (2001). *From An Unipolar System to a Bipolar Super System: The Future of the Global Power Dynamic*. Global Times.

[58] Feigenbaum, H. B. (2001). *Globalization and cultural diplomacy*. Center for Arts and Culture.

[59] Schneider, C. P. (2006). "Cultural Diplomacy: Hard to Define, but You'd Know It If You Saw It." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 13 (1): 191–203, (here 196).

What we have faced with globalization in economic terms is, as Margaret Wyszomirski points out, a process "through which business expands into markets around the world, and the increasing integration of world markets and the parceling out of different stages of production to areas with the most obvious competitive advantage."[60] In technological terms, globalization brought the internationalization of media, rapid distribution of information, and web-based technologies that enable products to be managed and marketed globally. Although it comprises a significant portion, there is more to globalization than finance. The "New Economy," with the globalization of markets, is not only a recently constructed market bubble. It refers to a significant transformation of economic activity into a modern professional work environment in which intellectual and creative work is a priority. The new economy is knowledge-based, a culture that shapes the institutions in which knowledge is acquired in a certain way.[61] Therefore, all nations had to prepare a creative ground for improvements and innovations in all areas of knowledge, including arts and culture. And for CD, the challenge is balancing economic gain and human interactions created by CD projects and actions. What motivation is uppermost in CD? Is it gaining economic benefits for one's country or institution, or is it creating a genuine understanding between societies, thus helping the image and credibility of one's own country? This is one of the critical questions with states' cultural institutions, which they should be held accountable for, but it is not always the case. I argue that the UK and the government policies about the CD more openly emphasize the economic benefit aspect of the CD compared to Germany's policies. There are various reasons for this state of affairs, ranging from historical connotations of propaganda and the promoting of cultures to the respective government decisions shaping CD actions in the field. I will break this down in my chapters on government debates on CD and the cultural institutions themselves.

The globalization of national branding techniques and cultural dissemination efforts by various countries mistakenly separates CD and creative and content industries. It also puts the primary emphasis on projecting an appealing image of the nation. Ideally, the innovative and content industries and CD should be together, but the political underpinning of the concept does not allow this.[62] Globalization of nation branding to increase the international image has paved the way for the institutionalization of global platforms where a one-way street of national

[60] Wyszomirski, M. 2000. "Negotiating the Global Maze Artfully," *Going Global: Proceedings of the 2000 Barnett Arts and Public Policy Symposium*. Ohio Arts Council and Ohio State University, Columbus, OH.
[61] Drozdiak, W. (2001). "Old World, New Economy," The Washington Post, 18 February 2001, p. H-1, H-5.
[62] Iwabuchi, K. (2015). Pop-culture diplomacy in Japan: Soft power, nation branding and the question of 'international cultural exchange'. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 21(4), 419-432.

cultures took place and competed.[63] With the impact of internationally mediated spectacles and cultural events, such an impact expanded, but the differentiation between cultural and creative industries vs. CD practitioners continued.[64] The intensification of cultural power over other countries created a rivalry between governments and the globalized practice of nation branding.[65]

Changing factors in the economy impact other aspects of society, such as political and social structures, the organization of non-governmental associations, consumption habits, and changing cultural forms and means of expression. With communication technologies spreading the components of globalization and shaping cultural differences, even the most striking features of societies and their unique cultural forms of expression are subject to enormous change. The specific subject under the heading "communicative globalization" results from this change. And communicative globalization has helped CD to become a more widespread practice, solidifying its place within international relations. The mass media, cultural industries, information technologies, and communication have become significant factors in the creation and circulation of cultural activity.[66] Therefore, access to resources that enable communication is a primary constituent of the policy issues, which constitute the development of civil society as an essential actor in globalization. Communication is another means of describing – or term for – the space between economic and cultural globalization.[67] Due to the importance of communication in the globalization process, communicative policies significantly impact a range of related questions to culture and the emerging global framework in general.[68] Even if globalization's rules change and it is not a static situation that we are in, that does not mean there is a need to regulate it in a specific way. The neoliberal approaches to globalization are politically conscious choices rather than logical ones.[69] Therefore, taking communicative

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[63] Ibid, 420.

[64] Ibid, 421.

[65] Holden, J., 2013. *Influence and attraction: Culture and the race for soft power in the 21st century*. London: British Council.

[66] Chomsky, N. (2004). *Language and politics*. AK Press.

[67] Raboy, M. (2002). "Communication and Globalization – A Challenge for Public Policy". In Janice Gross Stein and David Cameron, eds. *Street Protests and Fantasy Parks: Globalization, Culture, and the State*. Vancouver: UBC Press: 109-140.

[68] Raboy, M. (1999). "Communication Policy and Globalization as a Social Project." In Andrew Calabrese and Jean-Claude Burgelman, eds. *Communication, Citizenship, and Social Policy: Re-thinking the Limits of the Welfare State*. Totowa (NJ): Rowman and Littlefield.

[69] Thomas, D. A., & Kamari Clarke, M. (2013). Globalization and race: Structures of inequality, new sovereignties, and citizenship in a neoliberal era. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 42*, 305-325.

approaches at the center of globalization better enables the expression of particular social and cultural values, which is an issue CD places at the center of its definition.[70] Using communicative technologies better and integrating them into the rationale of CD can yield better results for cultural interaction and attract less suspicion about the propagandistic motives of the CD institutions.

I argue that CD contributes to the understanding of global culture, and I deem this a positive thing for 21st-century states and peoples, all of whom are affected by divisive ideologies such as ultra-nationalism, populism, and far-rightism. Culture is where many clichés, generic arguments, or phrases have situated themselves in discourse. Yet, everywhere in the world, it is possible to see people talking about global culture. With the help of rapid communicative technologies, global culture has become too global and sometimes transformed into something homogeneous. As Featherstone argues, if we solely think in terms of national borders, it would be tough to talk about global culture, but if we enlarge our horizons, it is possible to speak of culture in a global sense.[71] Theodor Adorno's theory of the culture industry is very relevant here. The discussions surrounding this theory even created a different definition: cultural globalization.[72] And the word industry is used here to refer to the standardization of the "thing" itself (every phenomenon we can classify as a cultural element) and the rationalization of this standardization.[73] Besides, the globalization of culture leads to a standardization of culture integrated into daily life, socialization, language, etc. Concerning some aspects of culture and politics, the academic literature suggests that globalization promotes standardization across boundaries.[74] This approach constitutes the basis for the strongest criticisms against the globalization thesis.

In the thesis, I argue that countries like Germany and the UK oriented their cultural policies more towards the target of promoting their own cultures, films, music, and literature, and the emphasis on their unique products became stronger.[75] Standardization of culture and

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[70] Demont-Heinrich, C. (2011). Cultural Imperialism Versus Globalization of Culture: Riding the Structure-Agency Dialectic in Global Communication and Media Studies. *Sociology Compass, 5*(8), 666-678.

[71] Featherstone, M. (1990) Global Culture, An Introduction. In (ed. Mark Featherstone) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity*. Sage Publications. (pp. 1-2).

[72] Adorno, T. & Horkheimer, M. (2007). The culture industry: enlightenment as mass deception. In S. Redmond & S. Holmes *Stardom and celebrity: A reader* (pp. 34-43). London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

[73] Adorno, T. (1991). "Culture industry reconsidered". *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*. London: Routledge.

[74] Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis (pp. 27-48).

[75] For the British example, see Donaldson, F. (1984). *The British Council: The First Fifty Years*. London: Jonathan Cape Ltd; Lucas, S. (2003). '"Total Culture" and the State-Private Network, A Commentary', in J.C.E. Gienow-

the problem of Americanization were also significant issues for both countries. In conceptualizing cultural promotion, they wanted to go beyond the standard, focusing more and more on what is "their own." Criticisms provided by anthropologists such as Arjun Appadurai and Jan Nederveen Pieterse[76] can be related to the issue of Americanization: for many Europeans, Latin Americans, and the Muslim world, globalization, meant Americanization.[77] An international orientation towards the consumption of American cultural products was at the center of these criticisms. Thus, while the US approach on CD mainly emphasized recounting the success story of American cultural accomplishments and economic procedures to the world, this was a bit different in the other parts of the world. American cultural expansionism found an echo in many countries (developed or developing), and some movements of national protectionism started to emerge in the face of this.[78] For instance, there were some regulations to subsidize film production in the UK, while in Germany, there was an effort to strengthen independent publishers by enforcing tax levies on commercial publishers.[79] In general, the biggest concern of major European countries by the early 1990s was "the collapse of local movie industries and the rise of American imports."[80] These efforts have also found their place in these countries' CD practices, and it was challenging to maintain their own cultures in the face of dominant American cultural products. The UK and Germany confronted this challenge through the continuing promotion of their cultures and by adopting their CD methods.

Hecht and F. Schumacher (eds). *Culture and International History*. New York: Berghahn Books, p. 207; Leonard, M., Small, A. & Rose, M. (2005). "British Public Diplomacy 'in the Age of Schisms.'" Foreign Policy Centre Publications. (p. 6). For promotion of German cultural elements and cultural diplomacy, see Aguilar, M. (1996). *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. German– American Relations, 1955-1968*. New York, NY: Lang; Paulmann, J. (2005) "Auswärtige Repräsentationen nach 1945: Zur Geschichte der deutschen Selbstdarstellung im Ausland." *Auswärtige Repräsentationen: Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945*. Ed. Johannes Paulmann. Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, p. 1; Grolig, W and Schlageter, R. E. (2007). "Auswärtige Kultur und Bildungspolitik und Public Diplomacy." *Deutsche Außenpolitik. Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen und Normen*. Ed. Jäger, T, Höse, A and Oppermann, K.: Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), p. 549.

[76] Pieterse, J. N. (1995). "Globalisation as Hybridisation", in M. Featherstone, S. Lash, & R. Robertson (Eds.), *Global Modernities*, pp 45-68, Sage, London.; Pieterse, J. N. (1996). "Globalisation and Culture: Three Paradigms", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 31 (23):1389-1393; Pieterse, J. N. (2004). *Globalization and Culture*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham. MD.

[77] For definitions and main criticisms of Americanization, see Kroes, Rob. (1996) *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture*. Urbana: Illinois UP; Blakley, J. (2001). "Entertainment Goes Global: Mass Culture in Transforming World", *The Norman Lear Center Publications*, pp. 13-17; Gienow-Hecht, J. (2006) "A European Considers the Influence of American Culture", *The Challenges of Globalization*, pp. 30-33; Legrain, P. (2003). "Cultural Globalization Is Not Americanization", *The Chronicle Review*, pp. 1-5.

[78] Sheffield, J, Korotayev, A & Grinin, L. (2013). Globalization: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. *ISCE Publishing*. (pp. 138-146).

[79] Venturelli, S. "From the Information Economy to the Creative Economy: Moving Culture to the Center of International Public Policy," paper prepared for the *Center for Arts and Culture*, pp. 14,15

[80] Frances Cairncross, 1997. *The Death of Distance*. (Harvard Business School Press) pp. 249-51.

The more significant point here about globalization and CD relates to the means and methods of realizing the goals of CD – regardless of to which nation we refer. The development and rapid spread of media and communication technologies paved the way for many countries to engage in more international cultural relations with other countries. For example, before the contemporary development of civil society, the activities of CD mostly spoke to an 'elite culture.' However, with the development of new technologies, the CD started to move out of the local and organized framework of governments.[81] By its mere existence, the CD needed to be outside any semblance of a governmental monopoly; however, this situation differed from country to country. Such differences are still present in countries' implementation of CD and the meanings that they attribute to the concept itself. Accordingly, their CD practices on a governmental and civil society level also vary. Furthermore, a country's educational, artistic, and literary elements shape the direction of CD efforts of that country's governmental or civil society organizations. Therefore, regardless of the exact contents of CD programs of different countries, the primary purpose of being achieved is to promote and spread the cultural contents of a country, create a platform for communication with other cultures, and consequently also to interact with different cultures through this kind of a communication method.

While the impacts of globalization started to spread in the world after the 1990s, debates, and criticism about globalization also came along, especially at the beginning of the 21st century. CD has tensions in itself: the tension between "culture" and "diplomacy" as an activity carried out by governments has always been there. This tension is crucial in understanding the factors behind the various successes and failures of the CD of specific actors and in particular parts of the world. To measure a fraction of CD, one can research different countries, their cultural institutions, and their methods of carrying out the CD. In this thesis, economically and politically powerful CD actors will be under the microscope. Globalization as a concept and the communicative developments it has brought us have facilitated these entities' conduct of CD to a certain extent. For that reason, globalization is as essential as soft power when it comes to the popularization of CD.

The transition from high culture to popular culture happened mostly through films and the music industry, the art elements that are relatively 'easier' and 'quicker' to consume compared to paintings, poetry, and literature. As communicative globalization continued to sweep through the world, cultural goods focused on by CD actors have also started to change.

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[81] Bound, K., Briggs, R., Holden, J., and Jones, S., (2007). *Cultural diplomacy – culture is a central component of international relations. It's time to unlock its full potential.* London: DEMOS (pp. 22-31).

Language is the one stable element that never ceases to be a part of the successful CD, but apart from that, cultural 'values' have changed constantly. For instance, while in the past, for example, Shakespeare, Chaucer, and Jane Austen were promoted, in the millennium, this situation has transformed into Harry Potter or the music band 'Coldplay.' It is not easy to differentiate artistic elements from one another: why would Harry Potter be any different from Shakespeare's work in its dissemination and quality? The answer lies in communicative globalization. The levels of dissemination between these cultural elements depend on how they are transmitted. For instance, to promote Chaucer's works, the BC creates literature projects involving them. Indeed, there could be other more natural forms of dissemination, but at some point, it becomes necessary. However, for Harry Potter to be known worldwide and influence millions of people, the Council doesn't need to do anything. So, just like the cultural elements, the promotion methods also change over time. And the cultural institutions supported by governments choose the elements they would promote according to such change. We will see how the BC and GI do this in the following sections.

3.2. Soft Power

One concept that is considered together with CD is soft power. Before delving into the literature on soft power and my understanding of it, I'll briefly define power and its relation to CD both in the literature and as I view it.

All central international relations, political science, and sociology theories have an internal idea of power and deal with the concept to a certain extent—the realist school of IR structures the whole theory around the notion of power. Hans Morgenthau defines international politics via benefits derived from power.[82] According to Kenneth Waltz, the distribution of power was the critical element in deciding the structure of the global system.[83] However, it is not only realists who deal with power as a central concept. While liberal theorists view power in terms of soft power, Marxists deal with it in terms of capital and production. These definitions are formulaic but point to broad differences between the varying approaches.[84] And in general, in international relations, there is not one single concept of power on which the discipline agrees. For that reason, power is a concept open to interdisciplinary analysis. We

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[82] Morgenthau, H. (1978 [1948]) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th edn (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).

[83] Waltz, K. (1979) *A Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley).

[84] Forsberg T. (2011) "Power in International Relations: An Interdisciplinary Perspective". In (eds) Aalto, P., Harle, V. & Moisio, S. *International Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches*. Palgrave Macmillan. (pp. 207 – 227).

need to conduct such an analysis to conceptualize power within various approaches related to CD and soft power.

Steven Lukes' definition of the three dimensions of power resonates significantly with my understanding of power. I use his third dimension of power, specifically in the course of the thesis. According to Lukes, there are one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and three-dimensional forms of power.[85] In this reading, realists have a one-dimensional view in which A succeeds in affecting what B does.[86] A two-dimensional view puts forward a qualified critique of the one-dimensional view's behavioural focus, considering subjective interests and sub-political conflicts.[87] I am interested in the three-dimensional view within the framework of my thesis. This view of power allows for the consideration of stakeholders to keep potential conflict issues out of the realm of politics. It is possible to achieve this act of keeping via the operation of social forces, institutional practices, and individual decisions.[88] I would argue that the CD is essentially based on keeping power-related issues outside politics. For example, CD posits that a group of people could come together, enjoy a shared moment of art and culture, and leave the table with no hegemony of one over another. However, there is almost always an unseen addendum to this idea. In CD, there is always a level of power being exerted on the receiver of the CD. And there is an imbalance of power between the provider of a CD practice and its audience. I will conduct analyses of CD policymaking processes in this thesis, keeping this hypothesis in mind, and I will test whether the cases of the UK and Germany confirm it.

Some of these approaches have suggested that power should be rejected altogether. Instead, we should use other ideas such as 'influence.'[89] The idea behind this thinking is that power is associated with complex military uses. However, the alternatives can still create the "problems" associated with power. The approach here resonates with the concept of CD and the controversies around it: the CD has attracted quite a bit of controversy due to its implications for foreign policy and traditional state-to-state diplomacy. These views suggest that cultural relations between people should not be defined by diplomacy. These discussions of power and its definition paved the way for CD to be discussed more in line with the concept

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[85] Lukes, S. (2005). *Power, A Radical View* (second edition). Palgrave Macmillan.

[86] Ibid, p. 35.

[87] Ibid, p. 36.

[88] Ibid, p. 37.

[89] Mueller, J. (1995) *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on Recent Transformations of World Politics* (New York: Harper Collins).

of power and, eventually, soft power. However, some authors do not see a difference between hard or soft power since it all boils down to exerting influence over someone else and getting them to do what they want. I will elaborate on this now.

Both in theoretical and practical terms, soft power is, first of all, a concept that is deeply inherent to American foreign policy thinking. The fields of communications, international relations, sociology, and politics have defined and debated the term soft power since Joseph Nye first coined the term in the late 1980s.[90] The introduction of soft power into international relations literature started various debates, some of which inevitably affected the understanding of CD.[91] While the concept was utilized in multiple contexts by policymakers, practitioners, and academics, at the same time, it was severely criticized, especially by rationalist and neorealist thinkers and authors. The main argument was that foreign policy is only affected by two incentives: economic force and coercive power. The core idea at the centre of soft power, "not coercion but attraction and persuasion," has contributed much to the CD debate. For most definitions of CD, soft power is at the centre of CD in terms of purpose and practice methods. In the literature on CDs, many academics and practitioners assume that CDs cannot exist alone and that soft power should either be the means or the end of doing CDs.

CD aims to bring cultures together and thus form a softer version of diplomacy based on dialogue, which is more or less what is proposed by soft power. In other words, activities under CD are perceived as methods of creating soft power. Moreover, this soft power is supposed to bring economic benefits to the country in question in the long term. Therefore, this aspect makes it possible to establish the relationship between CD and state interests. According to Nye, the soft power of a country depends on three sources: "its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)."[92] He refers to the specific context of the US and its reservoir of soft power and talks about various cases in

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[90] Nye, Jr. Joseph. (2002) "The Paradox of America Power. Why the World's Only Superpower Go It Alone" Oxford University press pp. 8-9; Nye, J. J. (2003). The velvet hegemon: how soft power can help defeat terrorism. Foreign Policy, 136, pp. 74-75; Nye, Jr.,Joseph. (2004) "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics" *New York Public Affairs*; Nye, Jr., Joseph and Armitage, R. L. Hon. (2008). "Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform". *Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*. Second Session; Nye Jr, J. (2008). *The powers to lead*. Oxford University Press; Nye, Joseph Jr. (2011) "The Future of Power" *Public Affairs*, New York.

[91] Melissen, J. (2005) *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Palgrave Macmillan. Wilson, E. J. (2008) Hard power, soft power, smart power. *The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, 110-124.

[92] Nye, J.S.Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 5. Mattern, J. B. (2005). "Why `Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics." *Millenium*, Vol 33, Issue 3, pp. 583 – 612.

which the US used its soft power to its advantage.[93] The importance of the concept pushed scholars to use and adapt it in their work: political analysts measured and discussed the soft power of other countries, and policymakers regarded soft power as a significant aspect of international politics.[94] Therefore, soft power is closely related to CD as an "effective" tool in foreign policy. It will be debated in this research within this framework, emphasizing the meeting points and the gaps between the two concepts.

In this research, I will also focus on the question of how soft power functions outside of the US framework, and I will evaluate CD as a standalone concept in the context of the UK and Germany. There is extensive literature on this issue, which I will examine to demonstrate how European countries understand and implement soft power as a policy instrument. I will relate these policies to the cultural mission of the British Council and Goethe Institute. We can consider these two cultural institutes as the principal institutions of two major European countries that do CD. As I will discover in detail, Nye's understanding of soft power is at the core of most of the discussions about soft power and CD, making the US the dominant power in the academic field regarding CD policymaking. According to Nye, if the US represents values that others want to follow, it will be easier for them to be a leading world power. However, the concept of CD was there before Nye even structured his ideas about soft power and its importance in diplomatic action.[95] Therefore it is vital to evaluate the links between ideas and policies that have resulted in CD initiatives rather than solely evaluating CD's effectiveness within specific cases. Nevertheless, achieving the former relies partly on experimenting with the latter.

One crucial point this research focuses on is the inefficiency of the soft power discourse in CD policymaking. Like many other IR and political science concepts, soft power became

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[93] Ibid, x.

[94] There is a vast literature on each of these separate issues. To example a few: Nye, Jr., Soft Power; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power," Foreign Policy, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 153–171; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Decline of America's Soft Power," Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 3 (May/June 2004): 16–20; Keohane, R. O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1998) "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 5 (September/October): 81–94; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "US Power and Strategy After Iraq," Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4 (July/August 2003): 60–73; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no. 2 (July 2004): 255–270; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Propaganda Isn't the Way," The International Herald Tribune, January 10, 2003; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Ignoring Soft Power Has A High Cost," The Chicago Tribune, May 16, 2004; Josef Joffe, "The Perils of Soft Power," New York Times Magazine, May 14, 2006; Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon, Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (New York: Basic Books, 2006); David Edelstein and Ronald Krebs, "Washington's Troubling Obsession with Public Diplomacy," Survival, vol. 41, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 89–104; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[95] Hayden, C. (2012). The rhetoric of soft power: Public diplomacy in global contexts. Lexington Books.

very popular and influential, soon becoming a buzzword in anything related to CD. In explaining the necessity of CD practices, soft power was helpful to bring up; through CD, countries would garner the softer ability to exert in their foreign relations. Similarly, E. H. Carr and others articulated similar ideas to soft power before Nye's time. According to Carr, a persuasion is a form of art; it is an essential piece of equipment for a political leader. Discourse, which Carr words slightly differently as 'rhetoric,' has a long history in the traditions of statesmanship. However, it is still possible to suggest that propaganda is instead a modern weapon.[96] The popular view that regards propaganda as a distinctively modern weapon is, nonetheless, substantially correct in the context of CD. On the other hand, Lukes asserts that one can exercise power over others by getting them to do what they do not want. Still, one also exercises control over them by influencing and determining their wants. Other approaches dealing with power, consent, and coercion also fall under the aegis of CD. But my concern here is not the originality of the concept. We connect ideas in social sciences to one another to make sense of subjects, so I will not put forward criticism from this angle. As a researcher using social and political science methods, my issue is the connection between soft power and CD.

Some saw soft power as a result of CD, meaning when a state or institution does CD, they will acquire soft power.[97] Some see CD as an example of soft power, which can be experienced and seen in the field in the form of cultural activities.[98] None of these commentators were wrong, but as the elite policy spheres used the concept, it started losing its effectiveness. The idea of soft power is not clear to the agents or actors. For Nye, culture and the arts could be a source of soft power. However, they could also impact the democratic rule of law, and even a well-run army can be a source of inspiration and could affect other societies.[99] If we remember Nye's example of China and the US using the rule of law as an attractive soft power asset, this idea makes more sense.[100] For governments and governmental and cultural agencies, this issue of actors started to create a problem. Because these agencies are already speaking from a position of power, the differences between soft and hard power started becoming blurred. Institutions such as the BC, GI, and other government-supported

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[96] Ibid.

[97] Kim, H. (2017). "Bridging the Theoretical Gap between Public Diplomacy and Cultural Diplomacy". *The Korean Journal of International Studies* Vol.15, No.2. pp. 293-326

[98] Schneider, C. P. (2003). "Diplomacy that Works: 'Best Practices' in Cultural Diplomacy." *Center for Arts and Culture*. Accessed at http://www.americansforthearts.org/sites/default/files/Schneider.pdf

[99] Nye, Jr J. (2006) Think again: Soft Power. *Foreign Policy* 22/2. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power

[100] Ibid.

cultural agencies used soft power over and over in their policymaking schemes, repeating the same 'goals' to achieve to improve their cultural connections. However, as we proceed more into the 21st century, soft power starts to receive more criticism in making effective CD policies. As I will demonstrate here in the literature and my primary sources from the two governments, soft power had a negative resonance among CD practitioners in the field. The reason for such a negative approach was the soft power's coercive aspect. My research examines this issue, mapping out how it became a problem and offering an alternative discourse in CD policymaking.

3.3.Instrumentalization of Arts and Culture

This concept is important within the context of CD, because in the government debates about CD, we see that there is a great deal of focus and criticism against instrumentalization. Instrumentalization of arts and culture is regarded under the context of politicizing arts and culture, and such convolution of concepts create a misunderstanding about CD as well. Essentially, most of the emphasis on instrumentalization of arts and culture has emerged within the current neoliberal political climate, where the state's support for arts and culture programs are under scrutiny, and arts need to show their productivity and inherent value, rather than depending completely on public funds.[101] Therefore, instrumentalization is essentially a concept dependent on the economic aspect of issues and associated productivity issues. Besides, instrumentalization has been accentuated by the increase of evidence-based policymaking within public and private sector. Such policymaking processes, such as the ones that we will analyse in relation to CD in this thesis, focus on the knowledge economy where creating capital is replaced by human capital, and symbolic cultural products have more significance.[102] According to Belfiore and Bennett, this process is a policy attachment where a relatively weaker sector with some political influence creates connections with other policy sectors that seem more worthy to attract necessary resources to achieve its policy aims.[103] This conceptualization of instrumentalization of arts created such an extreme epistemological shift that all other possible values of cultural production started to seem redundant.[104]

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[101] Stupples, P. (2014). Creative contributions: The role of the arts and the cultural sector in development. *Progress in development studies*, *14*(2), 115-130.

[102] Belfiore E., Bennett O. 2008: *The social impact of the arts – An intellectual history*. Palgrave Macmillan.

[103] Ibid, p. 22.

[104] Stupples, P. (2014). Creative contributions: The role of the arts and the cultural sector in development. *Progress in development studies*, *14*(2), 115-130; Araeen R., Cubitt S., Sardar Z., eds. 2002: *The third text reader on art, culture and theory*. Continuum; Said E.W. 1993: *Culture and imperialism*. Vintage.

Despite this impact of the value-loaded, neoliberal economic approach to instrumentalization of arts and culture, the arts have already had a long history of being instrumentalized by public and private sectors. In terms of instrumentalization of arts, what is new is the transition of this paradigm into the neoliberal context of development and funding for arts that is highly unequal. The instrumentalization of arts has taken a form of postcolonial and liberal process that is under the influence of cultural imperialism and the politics of multiculturalism.[105] This is where CD becomes relevant to instrumentalization of arts and culture. The idea that CD is equal or a continuation of cultural imperialism is one of the reasons why cultural institutions like the BC and the GI continue to reject the term or define their work under the aegis of CD. However, instrumentalization is not a standalone concept and it takes on meaning within the definition of what is being instrumentalized. Even so, instrumentalization is a process in which benefit is sought within arts and culture, which is one of the aims of CD, as well. For that reason, the criticisms directed at CD and the instrumentalization of arts and culture have similar roots. These roots are related to the idea of cultural imperialism and cultural sovereignty. While sovereignty was an important issue for especially the governments funding these projects, they did not want to be seen as cultural imperialists, either. In this thesis, I argue that instrumentalization and CD are inherently connected and most of the criticisms addressed to instrumentalization of arts and culture within the context of CD actually criticize the neoliberal and postcolonial policies that try to influence foreign publics with the power that comes with such instrumentalization.

In this sense, instrumentalization is very closely connected to the context of development. One of the most apparent forms of instrumentalization of arts within the development context is to support arts projects in relation to development issues.[106] Connecting instrumentalization of arts to development issues is a theme that we will see quite frequently within the aims of cultural institutions such as the BC and the GI. We will also see the examples of such connections in the policymaking bodies of the governments as well. In this context, the value of arts and culture are seen in their potential to inform the public about a particular issue such as women's education, extremism, infrastructure development for "developing" countries, etc. In this thesis, I discuss examples of these specific issues where they emerge as part of the

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[105] McQuire S., Papastergiadis N., eds. 2005: *Empires, Ruins and networks - The transcultural agenda in art*. Melbourne University Press.

[106] Stupples, P. (2014). Creative contributions: The role of the arts and the cultural sector in development. *Progress in development studies*, *14*(2), 115-130.

CD processes. The UK and Germany's international cultural projects have a great deal of focus on these development issues, which place their work at the centre of CD. However, some of these projects also received criticism because they were reinscribing an image of underdevelopment to these countries and orientalise them, by focusing on the difference between the Western countries who carry out the CD, and the places where it is carried out.[107] Instrumentalization is not inherently good or bad, it is a policy direction where governments or the private sector support arts and culture for economic and national gains. CD has a similar principle at its centre, and for that reason, we need to discuss the crossovers between CD and instrumentalization of arts and culture, and demonstrate how they are wrongly targeted by the opponents of CD.

Instrumentalization of arts and culture has created positive outcomes for furthering development issues; however, many artists and practitioners of cultural projects have viewed it in negative terms because it limits the level of empowerment that they desire. The freedom of arts and artists comes into question here, just like it does within the context of CD. There is a stark contrast of opinion between the practitioners and policymakers of CD, and we can suggest that a similar conflict is present in the context of instrumentalization, as well. Arts and culture projects are left in a position where they have to prove their usefulness beyond fulfilling the social and political aims of instrumentalization.[108] Similarly, cultural practitioners of the BC and the GI often experience such conflicts and ask a similar question, because government policies impact their work to a great extent. In this thesis, I will demonstrate these impacts, and suggest that to understand the contradiction in terms of CD, we need to focus on the discourse of instrumentalization as well.

4. Theoretical Framework for Case Selection

This research revolves around the concept of CD. With the specific case studies, it is trying to find new ways to define CD, changing and deconstructing its meaning. The research has an underlying motive of questioning the very utility of the term in the first place and asking the following: is CD still applicable? What does the evidence in the field say to us about this? The cultural institutions that are the focus of my research relate to this change process in various ways because they are the main actors of CD. Since CD is a very contested term, institutions,

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[107] Escobar A. 1995: *Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton University Press.

[108] Stupples, P. (2014). Creative contributions: The role of the arts and the cultural sector in development. *Progress in development studies*, *14*(2), 115-130.

policymakers, and non-governmental circles have played a role in this process. My research will use the evidence coming from all and will try to illustrate the crossovers between culture and politics through CD. I will do this by looking at the governmental policy decisions taken in respect of CD over the past few years and their application by the cultural institutions themselves. There has always been a gap between the elite policy circles deciding the fate of cultural institutions and the actual practitioners of cultural projects in the field. I will test the applicability mentioned above in this thesis by comparing these two levels.

In the way it is practised, CD deals with mostly popular cultural elements and brings them to overseas/target audiences. A movie screening, a book fair, a poetry event, or a music concert can be classified under the heading of the CD when considered together with the purposes of CD in general. We should remember that one of the most successful and wide-reaching CD projects in the history of CD was the "American jazz ambassadors" of the US.[109] In 1956, the US State Department created the jazz ambassadors' program, hiring leading Jazz American musicians such as Louis Armstrong, Benny Goodmann, and Duke Ellington to be cultural ambassadors worldwide.[110] The impact they created and the efforts to make this impact on the public possible, constitute the theoretical framework of the thesis. Because critical cultural theory deals with the relationships between cultural elements and the social formations in which they exist, it will provide a legitimate framework to understand that CD is a concept that has stood the test of time today. Although a contested issue in terms of its meaning and compatibility, CD exists on a practical level, undertaken by institutions supported by governments and independent civil society organizations. Although I agree that CD is an existing and functional field of cultural promotion, we can argue that the methods of doing it, specifically in the last century, have steered towards propaganda. Besides, it has come increasingly under the influence of political circles. The research will map out these complicated relationships around CD and suggest solutions.

There are several reasons for the difficulty of formulating a conceptual framework and deciding which cases to examine. The first reason is the historical and political issues concerning the meanings and connotations of culture and diplomacy as separate concepts. Culture is not a stand-alone concept we can take for granted; we should deal with many cases

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[109] Gioia, D. (2006). "Interview with Dave Bruebeck on Cultural Diplomacy". *The American Interest*. Retrieved from https://www.arts.gov/NEARTS/2006v2-all-jazzed-2006-jazz-masters-awards/cool-jazz-and-cold-war, 2018-04-03.

[110] Ibid.

separately when discussing a specific culture. Countless factors can shape culture: shared values, habits, geographical territory, being subject to the same state authority, and dominant and learned social expectations are only some of them. Diplomacy, on the other hand, is a relatively more securely founded concept within political history, even though it is a changing concept. Traditional state-to-state diplomacy is seen as one of many forms of diplomacy today.[111] My understanding of diplomacy is that countries interact with one another through various mediums – their institutions, envoys and ambassadors, cultural and artistic media, and even sets of values defined as belonging to a particular country.

Many cultural practitioners and academics have challenged CD as a concept, and it has a lot of meanings and interpretations. Some critics see it as a well-placed concept within international relations.[112] Still, some politicians and critics believe that it is primarily an effort by the Western powers to contain and compensate for their colonial histories.[113] This is a prevalent opinion: it is the opinion that motivated me to undertake this research, and I argue that it is one of the reasons why cultural institutions such as the BC and GI refrain from using this concept. I will demonstrate examples of this situation in the research. What is important here is that if there is enough research and analysis of the idea in the literature, we can reduce these discrepancies. We can create sounder arguments rather than just equating CD to cultural imperialism. Of course, there are a lot of colonial implications of CD work by former colonial powers, but there is a specific need to conceptualize this as a problem better and bring to bear related evidence. This research is all about this effort.

Another reason is the regional specificity of the concept. CD activity of every country changes according to the regional and historical dynamics of the country in question. These dynamics also affect the priority regions where a government will engage in CD interactions. For example, while the UK's CD had propagandistic undertones when the government first introduced the concept, the CD of Germany started as an image-changing effort against the backdrop of the National Socialist dictatorship, the Holocaust, and the Second World War.[114]

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[111] Rozental, A & Buenrosto, A. (2013) "Bilateral Diplomacy". In Cooper, A.F, Heine, J. & Thakur, R. (eds) *Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*. Oxford University Press.

[112] Pajtinka, E. (2014). *Cultural Diplomacy in Theory and Practice of Contemporary International Relations* Politicke vedy. 4.

[113] Fosler-Lussier, D. (2012). Music pushed, music pulled: Cultural diplomacy, globalization, and imperialism. *Diplomatic History*, *36*(1), 53-64

[114] Taylor, P. M. (2008). *The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939*. 1 edition. Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press. (p. 45).

Propaganda was a very integrated facet of the public diplomatic actions of the British government, which led to the foundation of a Ministry of Information in 1918.[115] In my opinion, propaganda and "image-changing effort" are not so different from one another. Still, the way practitioners and politicians who are involved in the policymaking process define these concepts makes their work seem pretty different. Partly as a result, analyses of CD and its contributions to foreign policy remain regionally specific, complicating the fashioning of a theoretical framework for the research field. Realizing diplomatic aims depends significantly on the target region and actors involved. Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at a theoretical framework through the investigation of specific examples from policymaking, sketching a general picture of the theories and methods of CD in the European borderlands on this basis.

Since this research aims to track the development and change of the meaning and practices related to the term CD in the UK and Germany, I wanted to focus on the prominent institutions with European roots that deal with CD work. I have researched countries with the highest level of funds allocated for international cultural relations and CD work and also considered the variety of cultural and creative projects that have impacted the public. The budgets that countries allow for CD change immensely depending on their economic strength, with the most robust economies tending to spend more on cultural relations activities. However, the impact on the public is not as easy to measure: it mostly depends on the reviews and comments of the recipients of said CD activities. Therefore, we can see that the choice of institutions here not only concerns the economic factors involved. It also tracks the development and, at the same time, failures of the very concept of the CD itself. To achieve that, we should evaluate CD in a particular framework. Since CD constantly changes, it is impossible to take it for granted and treat it as a historical concept. To justify my choice of the British Council and Goethe Institute as the two prominent cases, I will shortly refer to a third European party that has created an essential example of CD for longer than the UK and Germany. This example is France, and its cultural institution, the Institut Français.

France's history of cultural propaganda goes as far back as colonization and 'civilizing mission' and even further. The French were the first to coin the concept of propaganda concerning culture.[116] Successive French governments placed a significant emphasis on language dissemination and succeeded in making the French language a lingua franca until the

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[115] Ibid.

[116] Pranaitytė. G. "The Role Of Governmental Institutions In The Context Of French Cultural Diplomacy". *Politikos mokslų almanachas, v. 15* (pp. 137-172).

mid-twentieth century. The French state and the much debated 'civilizing mission' later informed its activities in CD. Out of the countries in Europe, France was the first to engage in CD on an institutional level.[117] First founded in 1907, with more than 30 years of background before this date, the Institut Français has been primarily undertaking this job.[118] However, it is also classified under the heading "EPIC," a state-controlled public institution. Before the Institut, the French had another cultural institution called the Alliance Français, founded in 1883 to promote the French language.[119] Cultural propaganda has been present in French foreign policy, especially with the idea of the civilizing mission. France has carried out this work for much longer than the UK and Germany.[120] The British Empire also undertook its civilizing mission in South and East Asia, but one of the most common uses of the term civilizing mission goes back to the French colonies beginning in the late 15th century.[121]

Although they share a similar story with the UK concerning colonial history, CD as a concept was adopted much later in the UK than in France, and even later in the case of Germany (not the practice, the use of the idea about overseas cultural relation-building activities). Both in the history of CD in the UK and Germany, we can see that policymakers look up to the French example and make cases about how the French have been conducting cultural work for a very long time.[122] This is one of the reasons why I have chosen the UK and Germany as the two examples to examine what CD means in their framework. Comparison between the German and British cases will allow us to discover a unique understanding of the history of CD, both in respect of their differences and similarities. Another reason is that there is less literature on British and German CDs compared to the French.

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[117] Lane, P. (2013). *French Scientific and Cultural Diplomacy*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. (p.26)
[118] Ibid, pp. 46-53.
[119] Origins: a history dating back to 134 years. http://www.alliancefrancaise.org.np/about/history/. Retrieved 17 March, 2018.
[120] Pomeranz, K. (2005). Empire & 'Civilizing' Missions, Past & Present. *Daedalus, 134*(2), 34-45.
[121] Burrows, M. (1986). "'Mission civilisatrice': French Cultural Policy in the Middle East, 1860-1914". *The Historical Journal*. 29 (1): 109–135.
[122] Haigh, A. (1974) *Cultural Diplomacy in Europe*. Manhattan Publishing Co.,New York. (pp. 63-117, separate sections on France, Germany and the UK).

Chapter 1 – Methodology

This chapter lays out the methodology of this thesis, and it provides a detailed account of the process of empirical data collecting and analysis. The chapter provides the methodological principles that are followed here by providing standard literature on methods of cultural policy and IR methodology. The thesis takes a flexible approach to the methodological issues encountered during the research process. Regarding the methods it uses, this thesis is under the subject lines of cultural policy and IR. There are two primary data sets in this thesis, and they are the policy papers and documents created by the UK and German governments about the concept and practice of CD. These documents were analysed using the thematic analysis method. The second data set is the elite interviews I conducted, and I mainly used them in the chapter on CD of Germany. The former data provides most of the thesis' arguments; therefore, I have dedicated a more extended discussion to each policy document.

When I started my literature review, I immediately became aware of the significant policy papers that the governments of the UK and Germany created about CD. In the case of Germany, many of these documents have never been translated into English, and therefore, they have not been included into a new analytical framework to create new academic knowledge. Therefore, comparing them and providing translations to relevant sections creates an original piece of scholarship. I have done this in this dissertation, and document analysis sheds light on the relationship between these policy papers and CD. Document analysis is vital for the methodological definition and data triangulation of qualitative research. It has a significant value in case study research and is proven very useful as a standalone method in specific forms of qualitative research.[1] Documents can provide a context in which the researchers operate. Besides, the data from the documents suggests we need to ask further questions and observe some situations as part of the research.[2] This is why a thematic analysis of documents as my primary method in this thesis makes sense. CD research within international relations and cultural policy is a continuous field. New questions have emerged from my research, which will be another research topic in the future.

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[1] Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative research journal*.

[2] Goldstein, A. E. & Reiboldt, W. (2004). The multiple roles of low income, minority women in the family and community: A qualitative investigation. *The Qualitative Report, 9*(2), 241–265.

The first set of documents that I used for the analysis of UK governmental perspectives on CD are as follows: The UK's Know-How Fund and its impact on CD; the Chancellor's Financial Scheme; Robert Devlin's report on CD commissioned by the BC called "Achieving Impact," an internal report by the BC published in 2008; and the Appraisal Report of the British Council, published in 2016 focusing on paper records of the BC from 1934 to 2016. For this thesis, I will focus on the shifts and changes, specifically after 1990s globalisation shift, focusing on the Appraisal Report. I have analysed these documents to demonstrate the policy shifts within the governmental perspectives about CD during the 1990s and 2000s. The second set of documents I explore is the 1986 Foreign Affairs Committee Report, the Wilton and Carter reviews, and the Triennial Review of the British Council. These three sets of reports demonstrate the specific arguments created about the BC by the UK government, also showing the government's positionality toward CD. The thesis also uses the BC annual reports to provide further context about the practice of CD in the field. Lastly, I have added one elite interview I conducted with the head official of CD in the DCMS. I have added this interview to further reiterate the comparison and commonalities of CD with the government's perspectives.

In the case of Germany's CD, the reports I have analysed are Konzeption 2000, a document that defines the perspective of the German government about instrumentalising CD as a foreign policy tool. The second set of documents I have used are the Reports of the Federal Government on Foreign Cultural Policy between 2000-2013. I used the reports from 2000, 2004, and 2007-2008. In addition, I have discussed the Research Committee report of the German parliament in 2007 and 2009. Choosing these dates will show the shifts in CD from the 1990s to the 2000s. Since I discuss the importance of 2000 and its significance in CD policy in chapter 2, these reports have completed my arguments about the shifts in German CD.

Lastly, I have used two elite interviews with the GI officials and asked their opinions about the CD as a concept and the GI's work on CD. I have compared and contrasted these interviews with the governmental perspectives and demonstrated to what extent governmental advice impacts CD work in the field that the GI does. While I was researching the literature on CD of these two countries, I realized that there are not many studies in the English language about the perspectives of cultural practitioners from the CD organisations such as the GI. Therefore, I researched the theses written in the last decades. However, there was not sufficient data about the perspectives of the GI practitioners regarding the government's views on CD and how they interact, overlap, or clash. Therefore, I opted to add two significant interviews to

my chapter on German CD in the section where I specifically analyse the GI's contemporary perspectives on CD.

A method is how a theory is conceptualized and tested through evidence collection. Comparative research has three broad classes of qualitative methods: macro-historical comparison (and its three subtypes),[3] in-depth interviews and participant observation,[4] interpretivism, hermeneutics, and 'thick description.'[5] Evidence collection can include analysis of historical records, open-ended or semi-structured interviews with individuals involved in the discussed phenomenon, or construction and analysis of surveys of a sample of a specified population.[6] I have based my research on several of these: first, I have used the policy papers published by the two governments about CD policies. Secondly, I look into the internal documents published by these two governments, which show how they relate their work and history to CD. Thirdly, I have added the internal debates of the BC and the GI to the analysis. Finally, the elite interviews in this research target people directly involved in an institution's political and decision-making processes. These individuals have specific insight into the operations of politics, and by interviewing them, we can gain a deeper understanding of policy and political issues.[7] I have conducted these elite interviews with the former and current staff of the BC and GI. I chose these individuals because they were all influential in making authentic CD projects within their institution, and they had challenging opinions about the concept of CD. I have used these interviews to test the hypothesis that CD has diminished in importance, leaving a need for re-conceptualization of the term. In the research, I also test the discrepancy and imbalance between theory and practice in CD work through these materials.

In every field of study, classification is an essential component of systematic research, especially comparative research. And in comparative research like this one, making clear classifications is significant to better frame the questions. Arend Lijphart claims that comparison allows "testing hypothesized empirical relationships among variables."[8] Similarly,

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[3] Ragin, C., Berg-Schlosser, D., and de Meur, G. (1996) 'Political Methodology: Qualitative Methods', in R.E. Goodin and H. Klingemann (eds) *The New Handbook of Political Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 749–768.

[4] Devine, F. (1995) 'Qualitative Analysis', in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds) *Theories and Methods in Political Science*, London: Macmillan, 137–153

[5] Geertz, C. (1973) 'Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture', in C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York: Basic Books, 3–30

[6] Landman, T. (2008). *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: Third Edition: An Introduction* (3rd edition). Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge. (p. 16-17).

[7] Beamer, G. (2002). "The Purpose and Format of Elite Interview Research Designs." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*. Vol 2-1. (pp. 86-96).

[8] Lijphart, A. (1975). 'The Comparable Cases Strategy in Comparative Research', *Comparative Political Studies*, 8(2): (pp. 158–177).

Peter Katzenstein argues, "comparative research is a focus on analytical relationships among variables validated by social science, a focus that is modified by differences in the context in which we observe and measure those variables."[9] Comparative methods are an excellent way to arrive at conclusions about specific social sciences and humanities phenomena.[10] Comparative politics is a non-experimental or semi-experimental social science that tries to make generalizations based on the best available evidence, meaning the experiment conducted in the field could be restricted or non-existent.[11] This does not mean we cannot arrive at conclusions, just as I attempt to do in this research. The comparison takes some things as certain and allows for examining and accounting for observed differences. Comparative methods in political science do not seek definite laws. Still, they seek to clarify and explain phenomena that can reasonably certainly align with the collected evidence on the subject. This last method is something I depend on in my research: first, I examine the collected evidence about the process of change in CD as a concept both in the UK and Germany. Secondly, I analyze the British Council (BC) and Goethe Institute (GI) as actors of CD. While doing this, I use debates about public institutions to comprehensively explain these institutions' relationship to the concept of CD. This twofold analysis helps me explain CD from a unique point of view and will allow me to show how CD has become a less-favored concept by CD practitioners in cultural organizations.

Comparing documents is essential in policy research because specific people with specific purposes create them, and they make their consequences. The document, especially a government document designated to address or solve a problem, cannot create a remedy to this issue nor create meaning by itself.[12] This means that readers need to interpret and actively comment on the documents and that those who consume the documents are not passive readers. The contents and actual policies that follow these documents directly impact their lives.[13] Thematic analysis is helpful in this interpretation because we can deduct the hidden meanings behind the words and phrases. They can help us understand the shifts and policy changes in CD and why they have happened. The comparison of the governmental documents of the UK

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[9] Kohli, A., Evans, P., Katzenstein, P.J., Przeworski, A., Rudolph, S.H., Scott, J.C., and Skocpol, T. (1995) 'The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium', *World Politics*, 48: 1–49.

[10] Ragin, Charles C. *The comparative method: Moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies*. Univ of California Press, 2014.

[11] Campbell, D.T. and Stanley, J.C. (1963) Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research, Chicago: Rand McNally

[12] Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative research journal*.

[13] Mason, J. (2002). *Qualitative Researching*. London: Sage.

and Germany about CD, on the other hand, allows us to see the shifts in the CD practices in these two countries, how they are related to one another, and what kinds of implications these policies have on the people engaging with CD.

Comparing a few countries is divided primarily into two types of design: the most similar systems design (MSSD) and the most different systems design (MDSD).[14] MSSD seeks to identify the essential features that are different among similar countries and which account for the observed political outcome. On the other hand, most different systems design (MDSD) compares countries with no common qualities apart from the result and one or two of the explanatory factors that are important for that outcome.[15] Some researchers use the two methods together according to the framework of their research and the proposed hypothesis. Accordingly, we can determine the similarity and differences in terms of the defined democratic, economic, and political situations in countries in a specified time period. In a few country comparisons, there are significant and intentional choices, any one of which might restrict the inferences made possible. Regarding its comparison between the BC and the GI, we can consider this research a few-country comparison model.

There are three broad perspectives in comparative politics in theory-building in qualitative research. These are the rationalist, culturalist, and structuralist approaches. Culturalist perspectives understand political phenomena by emphasizing the holistic and shared aspects of the collectivities of individuals. We cannot understand single interests and actions in isolation, and they should be in the context of the shared understandings, relationships, and mutual orientations that render human communities possible.[16] I have used a culturalist approach because of the abundance of collectivities within the field and practice of CD. Furthermore, a culturalist perspective will enable me to justify my arguments in the best viable way. Rationalist perspectives focus on the actions and behavior of individuals who make reasoned and intentional choices based upon sets of preferences or interests. Those who utilize the rationalist perspective are "concerned with the collective processes and outcomes that follow from intentionality or the social consequences of individually rational action."[17] On the other hand, structuralists also focus on the holistic aspect of politics. However, in addition to

[14] Faure, A.M. (1994) 'Some Methodological Problems in Comparative Politics', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 6(3): 307–322

[15] Ibid, p. 311.

[16] Ibid, 246 – 247.

[17] Lichbach, M. (1997) 'Social Theory and Comparative Politics', in M. Lichbach and A. Zuckerman (eds) *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 239–276.

culturalists, structuralists also focus on interdependent relationships between collectivities or individuals.[18] In short, while rationalists deal with the interests and actions of individuals, culturalists deal with the ideas and norms of human communities. Structuralists deal with institutions and relationships that constrain and facilitate political activity.[19] My perspective is culturalist because I focus on the interdependent cultural relationship between the BC and the GI. I also assess the change process around CD as a term and practice, which is affected by various factors.

Lastly, this research has used a constructivist IR approach as a background to situate CD within a complex web of anthropology, IR, politics, and cultural studies. All of these distant areas have contributed a lot to the development and current status of the term. However, IR is a field that has extensively dealt with CD, mainly from a constructivist approach. Contrary to the classical assumptions of neoliberalism and neorealism, constructivism in IR sees the fundamental aspects of IR as socially constructed. The CD has fallen entirely outside the scope of classical realism; having been regarded as an intangible factor, it did not impact a country's hard power. In realism, a state's power wholly depends on material factors such as military power, population, and natural resources.[20] Hans Morgenthau's definition of diplomacy, one which did not consider it a constitutive aspect of IR, focuses national interest solely on power. Following this, classic realism did not consider CD a foreign policy tool.[21] Similarly, structural realism also ignores CD to a great extent because it claims that a theory of international politics does not require the existence of foreign policy.[22] Therefore, neorealists do not see the analysis of actors and interactions between them (including foreign policy and diplomatic practice) as necessary.[23] In this approach to IR, there is little to no place for mutual influences societies have on one another, in this case, cultural norms, values, and ideas.

These two approaches more or less have placed the CD in the context of constructivism in IR. Alexander Wendt defines constructivism as "structures of human association that are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and

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[18] Landman, T. (2008). *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: Third Edition: An Introduction* (3rd edition). Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge. (p. 291-93).

[19] Ibid.

[20] Mearsheimer J. (1990). "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security* / J. Mearsheimer. Vol. 15. No:1 (pp. 5-56).

[21] Morgenthau H. (1978). *Politics Among Nations* (5th ed.) New York : Knopf. (p.15).

[22] Waltz, K. (1996). "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy". *Security Studies*. Vol. 6. Issue 1. (pp. 54-57).

[23] Uminska-Woroniecka, A. (2016). "Cultural Diplomacy in IR Theories and Studies on Diplomacy". *Actual problems of international relations*. Release 127 (part II).

interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature."[24] The importance of ideas in shaping international relations is relevant to CD because the purpose of CD is firstly to create a platform for mutual or one-way influence realized by spreading ideas and cultural elements, which are also shaped mainly by ideas. A constructivist framework places CD at the center of this influence mechanism, which is relevant for both agents and actors of IR. Social constructs espoused by individuals, i.e., sets of beliefs, values, and attitudes that determine the culture of a social group, are directly linked to how actors understand one another.[25] The CD is all about actors performing it, and constructivists believe that identity is also socially constructed, and thus it is not a given characteristic. Image and perceptions are outcomes of subjective processes of the culture, norms, and values related to actors. In this context, CD reflects the identity of the people it represents, considering that CD is about representation to a great extent. Although still theoretically complex, this approach gives credit to the idea that public perception is central to shaping a state's behavior, and this process affects results in international relations.

In this thesis, I have followed a two-way interpretative analysis while examining the cases. First, I have analysed the internal and external reports of the UK and Germany about the governmental perspectives on CD. Then, I examined the activities of the British Council (BC) and Goethe Institute (GI), explicitly focusing on CD using thematic analysis. This analysis has helped us understand the trend of the development of CD as a phenomenon concerning the BC and GI as two of the leading institutions associated with cultural and diplomatic work. I have demonstrated the connecting points of the governmental debate on CD and the cultural fieldwork done by the BC and the GI. In the second phase of the research, I carried out elite interviews with the former and current practitioners of the BC and GI who, since the 1990s, worked in the regional offices of these institutions. With the support of the archival work, I sketched a framework for CD and then supported it with interviews with both BC and GI officials who have actively attended and organized the CD projects. The basis of the research is the BC and GI's role in presenting a national image abroad, the part that BC and GI play in protecting cultural sovereignty, and the role of the BC and GI in advancing national domestic objectives. In this context, cultural sovereignty means the preservation of cultural products that are created in a specific context, and not letting products from other countries take precedence

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[24] Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (p. 1).
[25] Tannenwald N. (2005). "Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Research Agenda". Eds. N. Tannenwald and W. C. Wohlforth. *The Role of Ideas and the End of the Cold War*. Special Issue of // The Journal of Cold War Studies. Vol. 7., No 2 (Spring). (p.13-42).

over them.[26] In addition, I have examined the policy connections between Germany and the UK through the BC and the GI. The shared activities and policies borrowed from one another will be subject to thematic analysis, which is, at times, apparent but non-existent at other times. Therefore, I am dealing with CD in this research, not as a statement or an approach to international relations; rather, as a form of practice and a method for brokering intercultural relations.

In the literature, CD stands as an effort for traditional world powers to renegotiate their place by changing their relationship with a handful of critical countries. Culture can play a vital role in this process, easing relations when strained, brokering them for changed times, and establishing new links in unchartered waters. However, along with these facts, I am also interested in how the connections between culture and foreign policy change in the context of growing global cultural homogeneity. I will deal with how and to what extent the concept and semantic baggage of CD contribute to this change. Given the case studies above, I will analyse the relationship between government objectives and CD and between CD and national identity.

In this research, I have focused on the BC and the GI's activities, the policy processes that create these activities, and the values and cultural elements that they promote in these activities. I have decided to look at these issues because there are various claims that there is an increasing suspicion and discontent with the concept of CD. This discontent is present in the policymaking spheres, particularly amongst practitioners of CD in the field. This is the first claim I want to test with the research. The discourses used by the policymakers have become more elitist, attributing culture and arts to specific groups of people. In addition, they have focused on the elite and privileged classes of societies who tend to accept that European, British, and German 'values and culture' portrayed by these institutions are superior and should be adopted. However, even though governmental schemes fund the arts and culture practitioners in the field, they refrain from locating themselves within the area of CD. To break down this discrepancy more, I am looking at the responses of CD practitioners to the CD activities performed by the BC and GI and analysing how the practice of CD created "others" of the CD as a practice deeply embedded in the western international relations and cultural policy practices. I have not chosen these examples as specific case analyses, such as the BC's or the GI's work in these countries. Instead, my research focuses on the elite policy circles that

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[26] Bruner, C. M. (2007). Culture, Sovereignty, and Hollywood: UNESCO and the Future of Trade in Culture Products. *NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol.*, *40*, 351.

create the assumptions underpinning the work in the field. Therefore, I cannot do justice to every CD project or activity that the BC and GI do in these countries. However, I will still examine some examples to comprehend better the CD conceptualization of these two institutions and that of the UK and Germany. In short, I am undertaking this research to test these claims.

The conceptual focus of the thesis is the CD objectives of the BC and GI, their relationship to traditional diplomacy, and the question of how their practice has contributed to the advancement of national interests in approximately 30 years. I emphasize these dates because this period includes specific milestones in the development of the practice of BC and GI and the foreign policy orientations of the UK and Germany towards the chosen case countries. Furthermore, as pointed out above, globalization made various understandings of culture available to a global public, which directly impacted the concept of CD because more cultural elements meant more to promote. Therefore, each case study will touch on one specified particular aspect, which is separately defined. Besides, as should be the case in qualitative research, the findings of this research will be transferable from one situation to another. Finally, I aim to create a CD theory to inform future conceptual debates.

1. Data Collection

The data collection process was mainly straightforward because the bulk of this thesis's primary material comprises archival research. I have searched for the roots of contemporary global CD by focusing on the governmental documents about CD in the UK and Germany. I have traveled to Germany and worked in the archives of the Foreign Office, trying to find records that pioneered the documents I have analysed in this thesis. I also went to the archives of the ifa (Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations) because it had the most comprehensive library in Germany about cultural policy and CD. This research created the basis of my understanding of German CD, which greatly comprised literature in the German language. I also visited the National Archives of the UK for the same purpose, and I evaluated many documents of the previous FCDO about CD and cultural relations abroad.

The actual data I used, the governing documents, and the internal documents of the BC and GI listed above came from the websites of the government bodies, the BC and the GI, and the websites of the parliaments of both countries. I have included the parliamentary debates on some of these documents because I believe that the discussion about a CD within these spheres, where the MPs discuss these texts and their implications, could be constructive for the

arguments of this thesis. I chose the documents where CD as a concept was specified, debated or challenged in various contexts. With that in mind, I have laid out and analysed the conceptual differences of CD between these two countries' policymaking processes.

I have formulated the three primary elite interviews I used in this research with my initiative of connecting with the people I wanted to interview and receiving their consent. In elite interviews, the interviewees are in a higher social position than the researcher, which is true in my research.[27] Besides, elite respondents usually ask what they must prepare before the interview, which has happened in all three cases I have interviewed. These interviewees consider the interview a challenge and a justification for what they do in their respective fields.[28] I think this idea fits into the context of this research. Some practitioners justify their avoidance of CD and conduct their business in a way that aligns with their institution's convictions and requirements. I contacted the interviewees and conducted one in London, one by phone in London, and one in Berlin, with the head of the GI in Berlin. I planned and thematized my interview questions with the help of my previous research, focusing on the vital points of disagreement about CD and how these interviewees saw CD as a practice. Because they have been long-term workers in the cultural policy field, I asked all three interviewees about the governmental intervention in CD and to what extent governmental policymaking affects their work in the area. These were not semi-structured interviews, and the questions I asked each interviewee differed, but the focal point of the questions was as I described in this paragraph.

2. Sampling – The Case for the British Council and Goethe Institute

One significant reason why I have chosen BC is that the English language became the lingua franca after the 1940s. The English language has been a potent tool for the conduct of CDs on the UK side; however, the CD has been about more than this. I will also address this gap by looking at other means to achieve CD.[29] There is some available research in the literature about the significance of language for CD in general. I will focus more on different aspects of culture and how it is realized in the field – contributing to the solidification and

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[27] Harvey, W. S. (2011). Strategies for conducting elite interviews. *Qualitative research*, *11*(4), 431-441.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Crystal, D. (2003). *English as a Global Language*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 86-120.

deconstruction of the term simultaneously.[30] On the other hand, in the first three decades of the 20th century, promoting the German language outside of the Third Reich was restricted to German schools and communities abroad (Auslandsdeutsche und Auslandsschulen).[31]

Despite the conflicts and historical ruptures of the twentieth century, Germany became one of the most influential European countries carrying out cultural work. And in the Cold War period, to regain their national sovereignty and reintegrate themselves into the international community, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) adopted different methods. Until unification, the Federal Republic of Germany conducted cultural work only in the specific target countries that showed an interest in it,[32] mainly financed by federal ministries but carried out by organizations such as the Goethe Institute or Institute for *Auslandsbeziehungen* (Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations).[33] In contrast with its sensitive method of communication approach towards other countries, the FRG followed a strategy of aggressive encounters with the GDR.[34] In 1990, reunifying the two German states cemented Germany's position and brought together a greater responsibility within the international community, particularly in Europe.[35] After this point, the first motive in building any kind of cultural relationship was to communicate with and in Europe. After the 2000s, the public diplomacy of Germany started to focus on "dialogue with the Islamic world." A high priority was the Arab World, which some commentators viewed as a "new paradigm" of German PD.[36] This new paradigm focused on engaging more in intercultural dialogue to understand each other better, building bridges, and eventually meeting international challenges such as terrorism and nation-building. That is why, specifically in the contemporary period,

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[30] McGinn, G. H. (2015). Foreign language, cultural diplomacy and global security. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Retrieved March 22, 2018 from https://amacad.org/multimedia/pdfs/Foreign-language-Cultural-Diplomacy-Global-Security.pdf.

[31] Michels, E. (2004). Deutsch als Weltsprache? Franz Thierfelder, the Deutsche Akademie in Munich and the Promotion of the German Language Abroad, 1923–1945. *German History*, *22*(2), 206–228. https://doi.org/10.1191/0266355403gh306oa.

[32] Michels, E. (2005). "Zwischen Zurückhaltung, Tradition und Reform: Anfänge westdeutscher Auswärtiger Kulturpolitik in den 1950er Jahren am Beispiel der Kulturinstitute." *Auswärtige Repräsentation. Deutsche Kulturdiplomatie nach 1945*. Ed. Paulmann. Köln, Weimar & Wien: Böhlau Verlag.

[33] Ibid, 23.

[34] Lindemann, Hans, and Kurt Müller. (1974) *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der DDR. Die kulturelle Abgrenzung der DDR von der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft. 5.

[35] Schmidt, S., Hellmann, G., & Wolf, R. (2007). *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik* (2013 edition). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 715.

[36] Hans J. Kleinsteuber, (2002). "Auslandsrundfunk in der Kommunikationspolitik: Zwischen globaler Kommunikation und Dialog der Kulturen" [International Broadcasting and Communication Politics: Between Global Communication and the Dialogue of Cultures], in *Grundlagentexte zur transkulturellen Kommunikation*, ed. Andreas Hepp and Martin Löffelholz (Konstanz: UVK). 350.

German CD has primarily focused on dialogue with Islam and Muslim countries. It has consisted of an effort to create and idealize a *moderate Islam*.

A similar focus on the dialogue with the Islamic world was also present in many governmental documents of the UK's CD. The BC has created many projects all over the Muslim world, and they endeavoured to build cultural bridges between these countries. These bridges were meant to be two-way streets, as is one of the core premises of the CD. However, we can see the differences between these two western countries, which both have a history of cultural and land exploitation and imperialism. In this case, comparing their approaches to the "other" can create a different theory about the development of CD during the contemporary era. We can analyse how these two countries' governmental positions on CD and the cultural practitioners of the GI and BC have evolved and positioned themselves against other cultures and countries while promoting their own culture.

In the case of Germany and other intermediary cultural institutions, the scope of the work of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Goethe Institute continued to grow.[37] After unification, the DAAD took over the East German scholarship programs; Deutsche Welle inherited the transmission facilities of Berlin International, while the Goethe Institute moved into the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.[38] Following these changes, the FRG reached a point where CD was promoted and discussed in the policymaking of leading institutions of cultural relations: in the 'Konzeption 2000' (Concept 2000) report, the foreign minister in the Social Democratic-Green coalition (1998–2005) underlined the central role of Germany's CD as "an integral element of a foreign policy that aims at the prevention of conflict and the securing of peace."[39] Foreign cultural policy is not about "the good, the beautiful, and the true" but scientific exchange and promoting civil society.[40] As a result, we can suggest that from the beginning, the aims of CD in Germany were evident, along with its boundaries. In this research, I look at the differences and similarities between the two models of CD that the UK and Germany have implemented, and I conceptualize my understanding of CD.

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[37] Antje Scholz. (2000). Verständigung als Ziel interkultureller Kommunikation: Eine kommunikationswissenschaftliche Analyse am Beispiel des Goethe-Instituts [Understanding as an Objective of Communication: An Analysis of the Goethe Institute from a Communication Perspective]. (Münster: Lit).

[38] Wood, S. (2007) 'The "Bundeskulturminister" and other stories: Observations on the politics of culture in Germany', German Politics, 8(3): 43–58.

[39] Fischer, J. (2000) 'Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen', in Forum: Zukunft der Auswärtigen Kulturpolik. Online. Available at www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/aa/ akbp_zukunft2000.pdf. Accessed 1 March 2017.

[40] Ibid.

The victor powers over Germany implemented this education program, but many people in West Germany felt the need to self-educate themselves.[41] Concepts like democratic ideals and openness would only now be debated openly, but for this to happen, there should be an atmosphere where they could be discussed. The purpose was to re-educate the German people and the imposition of democracy.[42] In the London conference of 1946, the US, the UK, and France aimed to move forward a more provisional West German state – which hopefully would pave the way for creating this atmosphere.

Following unification, and more importantly, the embedding of the GDR's cultural elements into the Republic, the government justified the continued funding from the central government using Article 35 of the Unification Treaty, which stated the following:

> Art and culture … have an indispensable contribution to make in their own right as the Germans cement their unity in a single state on the path to European unification. The status and prestige of a united Germany are predicated not only on its political weight and economic strength but equally on its role as a cultural state.[43]

Culture, economy, and making Germany a cultural state was always at the heart of the foreign cultural policymaking discourse. Emphasis on the politics of culture and the long-term economic benefits of FCP was more pronounced. This discourse is present in the work of institutions like the GI. In addition, the regions and geographical destinations chosen for the GI to operate and spread its work also changed according to these political debates in the governmental spheres.

The BC and GI started their projects in varying circumstances and with different goals. Although they might have differing motivations, these institutions' primary aim has been to contribute to learning the languages by citizens of other countries. They have also fostered international cultural cooperation with other countries.[44] Both in the literature on public diplomacy and CD and the practical field, we recognize these institutions as 'cultural

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[41] Ulrich Herbert, "Liberalisierung als Lernprozess: Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte - eine Skizze," in Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945-1980, ed., Ulrich Herbert (Göttingen, 2002), 7-49.

[42] Roberts, G. (2016). *German Politics Today* (3rd edition edition). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Historical information on the Goethe Institute, see Michels, E. (2005). *Von der Deutschen Akademie zum Goethe-Institut Sprach- und auswärtige Kulturpolitik 1923-1960*. Oldenbourg Verlag, München**;** Aguilar, M. *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. German– American Relations, 1955-1968*. New York, NY: Lang, 1996; Grolig, W and Schlageter, R. E. (2007). "Auswärtige Kultur und Bildungspolitik und Public Diplomacy." *Deutsche Außenpolitik. Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Institutionen und Normen*. Ed. Jäger, T, Höse, A and Oppermann, K.: Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), p. 549**;** Michels, E. (2013) 'Goethe-Institut', in Historisches Lexikon Bayerns. Online. Available at www.historischeslexikon-bayerns.de/artikel/artikel_44721 (accessed 1 March 2017).

diplomatic branches' of the countries in question.[45] They introduce various aspects of their culture to other parts of the world. Especially in the countries with which they also have historical, economic, and political relations, we can see that the efforts of cultural diplomacy increase on a parallel scale.

As two of the largest countries in Europe with a specific agenda on CD since the beginning of the twentieth century and with successful programs worldwide, the UK and Germany are case studies through which I can test my hypotheses about CD and develop my arguments. In the 21st century, the fundamental purpose of CD strategies developed by leading CD organizations, which are the main actors in the field, is to strengthen the democratic structure of the country in question. Through such a strategy, these countries' policies of soft power, which play a leading role in the practice of CD on a global scale, become all the more perceptible.

3. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of four main chapters including the methodology. Chapter 1 lays out the methodology, data collection and analysis process. I provide a basis for the core concepts that I use such as instrumentalization of arts and culture and CD to demonstrate the methods of analysis I have used. Chapter Two looks at the British CD policies from the late 1990s to the present, along with the BC's implementation and understanding of these policies. In this chapter, I use policy papers, white papers, speeches about CD, policy suggestions that the British Parliament makes about CD, and debates around the concept within the Parliament. In short, the elite policymaking bodies of the British government, the foreign office branches responsible for public and CD, and their statements are my primary resources here. Second, I analyse these resources concerning BC's internal policies and CD activities. Third, I demonstrate the shift in CD approaches within the British government and the changing outlooks on the concept used by British cultural organizations, especially the BC. Finally, I evaluate the CD process in the 21st century through the main issues: the Council's shifting approach to CD and the question of national interests. The chapter uses the Triennial Review of the British Council, some practitioners' accounts, and interviews I conducted personally.

Chapter Three conducts a similar analysis but for German CD policies. In a similar timeframe to Chapter One, this chapter gives an overview of CD approaches from German

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[45] Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht & Mark C. Donfried (eds). (2010). *Searching for a cultural diplomacy / edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried.* New York: Berghahn. (pp 17-35).

government spheres, politicians' speeches, policy papers, German Bundestag debates, and white papers. Based on the discussions about intercultural dialogue, which have swept through the country's cultural relations and public diplomacy debates in the 21st century, the chapter asks: what kind of shifts in CD have occurred in Germany, and who was responsible for these shifts? The chapter uses 'Konzeption 2000', a German government document about the new approach to public diplomacy, and reports of the Federal Government. It focuses on 'foreign cultural policy' as a concept used interchangeably with CD in the German case. In this chapter, I have examined the idea of a "paradigm shift" in German foreign policy and its impact on CD. Similar to the previous chapter, the chapter compares and analyses these government perspectives with the practitioner's views from the GI, which I detailed with additional archival material from the GI and two elite interviews with GI practitioners. This chapter uses policy debates on CD, the instrumentalization of arts and culture (which is sometimes equated to CD by practitioners of German CD), politicians' statements about CD, and an interview I conducted personally. I will demonstrate how the GI's understanding and practice of cultural relations are different from that of the BC,

Chapter Four provides an in-depth analysis of the primary material discussed in the previous two chapters and a thematic comparison between the UK and Germany's government perspectives on CD and the practices of the BC and the GI. This comparison demonstrates the extent to which the two countries and institutions are at peace with the concept of CD. While CD is an inherently political practice, some cultural practitioners -understandably- do not focus on this aspect and deny the practice, or even association, of CD with their institutions. Via these comparisons, I demonstrate the reason why this is the case and why these practitioners do not feel at ease in focusing on CD and all the practical possibilities that it provides.

Chapter 2 - The UK's Cultural Diplomacy and the British Council

1. Cultural Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and UK Debates

This is a chapter about CD as it was structured and carried out by the UK government. Several international cultural relations institutions have used this concept in various discussions and contexts. As the first chapter of the thesis, this section lays out and analyses policy changes in the UK's international cultural relations and CD. First, I will discuss the governmental and non-governmental actors (pioneering politicians, practitioners, and institutions) that have effectively shaped the policymaking of CD. Then, I will focus on the cultural policy changes that have occurred with subsequent governments and will bring forward the reasons why CD has become a controversial topic. As primary sources, I will analyse the 1986 Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Public Diplomacy and the Reviews on Public Diplomacy commissioned by the UK government in 2002 and 2004.

Parallel to the political shifts that occurred in the period between 1990 and 2015, this chapter will examine the concept of CD from the point of view of an institution: the British Council (referred to as the BC). Some critical turning points in the British Council's policy and decision-making have influenced how cultural diplomacy (CD) is understood. These turning points have influenced the decision-making processes and therefore changed the CD narrative of the UK. This changing narrative does not always manifest in the cultural projects happening in various branches worldwide, which are *lost in translation*. However, when we look closely at the ideas uttered and ideologies that become apparent around CD, we can see a particular pattern as to the direction CD has been taking – especially in the 21st century.

The policy papers I examine here are the UK's Know-How Fund and its impact on CD, the Chancellor's Financial Scheme, and Robert Devlin's report on CD commissioned by the BC, "Achieving Impact." Following these, I examine an internal report by the BC published in 2008 and the Appraisal Report of the British Council published by BC in 2016, focusing on paper records of the BC from 1934 to 2016. For this chapter, I will focus on the shifts and changes, specifically after 1990, regarding the Appraisal Report. The last paper I will analyse is the Triennial Review of the British Council.

First, I discuss the significant events and actors (in the governmental sphere) that shaped the conceptual changes in the meaning of PD, CD, and cultural relations. Secondly, I

investigate how governmental actors understood, reflected, and acted upon the concept of CD. Third, I introduce the decisions underpinning these policy changes in cultural policymaking and examine the strategic coordination methods used to institutionalize these policies. Finally, in the case of CD, I place this knowledge in the framework of social relations and institutional structures. Certain practices emerge at specific points and times in history as a part of a struggle over power and meaning.[1] CD will be treated as the core practice according to this argument, along with international cultural relations and PD.

In its policymaking about CD, the UK has made use of the concept of soft power more than any other European country. Traditionally, actions of governments abroad are classified under foreign affairs or diplomacy. Still, as it has been laid out in the introduction, diplomacy's nature is changing, affecting soft power. I have tried to demonstrate some of the criticism against soft power in terms of how it is simply not enough to define the cultural attraction and the feeling that, for instance, an art piece evokes in human beings. According to Gary Rawnsley, who has written extensively on soft power, the problem in the UK is that successive British governments, motivated by the British Council's initiatives, had the assumption that "soft power is synonymous with attraction and familiarity." However, while evaluating the impact of cultural and public diplomacy practices, the focus should be on the "behaviour of the British government."[2] I agree with this statement, and I intend to take it one step further: soft power could be a helpful tool in evaluating the impact of work abroad, but it should not be at the centre of CD, or it should not be one of the main motivations behind the CD. Instead, if the purpose is to achieve an effective CD, concepts like accountability, transparency, and creating human-to-human connections should be on the priority list of governments and institutions such as the BC. I aim to show the reasons for this hypothesis in this chapter by giving examples from precisely this: the behaviour of the British government in dealing with CD.

First, it is helpful to remember that a uniform policy on the cultural work of the UK overseas is not present. International cultural policy has never been the sole responsibility of one specific body in the UK, making it even more complicated. Several ministries, non-departmental public bodies, and non-governmental organizations are all involved in the

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[1] Toth, E.L. (2009). The Case for Pluralistic Studies of Public Relations: Rhetorical, Critical and Excellence Perspectives. In *Rhetorical and Critical Approaches to Public Relations II* eds. R.L. Heath, E.L. Toth, and D. Waymer, 76–91. New York: Routledge; Everett, J.A., and K.A. Johnston. 2012. Toward an Ethnographic Imperative in Public Relations Research. *Public Relations Review*, 38: 522–528. .

[2] Rawnsley, G (2018). *Understanding the UK's soft power: more than Shakespeare and the Royal Family*. LSE Blog. Retrieved from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/soft-power-british-government-actions/

process. No single body can be defined as the sole arbiter in the UK's foreign cultural policy. These institutions include the FCO, the British Council, the DCMS, Arts Councils for related parts of the UK, and the UKTI. In the governmental spheres, this diversity is portrayed as a strength, which is valid to some extent, especially in terms of creativity and diversity. However, at some point, the UK's overall public and CD policymaking and practices became untidy partly because of this diversity. In the case of the UK, this situation can be connected to two reasons: the first one is the changing nature of diplomacy itself and what it means in the period after globalization. There is extensive literature on this topic, some of which is quite relevant in developing CD as a single-standing concept, and I bring up this material in the discussion. The second is the interchangeable utilization of concepts such as PD, CD, and international cultural relations in defining institutions dealing with cultural work and describing culture itself. These three concepts have definitions of culture, which are conveniently utilized in line with their cultural projects and agendas. Therefore, this section addresses these two issues through a close look at the policymaking of cultural institutions with economic ties and responsibilities to the government. The chapter deals with how the concept of culture within PD, CD, and international cultural relations is referred to and debated. I will analyse the repercussions of these discussions on the story of CD.

Although the concept of the CD has been in use for a long time, the first discussions leading to the controversial nature of the CD in the UK go back to the late 1980s. One continuous and essential point to note is that the government's foreign policy has had many attempts to create a new agenda for public diplomacy as a separate branch. Joseph Nye's conceptualization of soft power met with a significant response from the British government. The government included debated and reflected upon his ideas in the government briefs and reports on PD, especially from the 2000s. And the government invited him to several Select Committee meetings on 'soft power' between 2010 and 2012.[3] Soft power as an individual concept has been and still is on the agenda of the UK public and CD policymaking. Both governmental and non-state stakeholders have criticized and discussed over the years from many angles. However, the unchallenged centrality of soft power to CD is also related to the varying and changing definitions of the CD itself. In the following sections of this chapter, I explain the pioneering actors and moments in the governmental sphere and formal decisions about PD, CD, and soft power, after an assessment of the position of CD.

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[3] House of Lords (2014*). Soft Power and the UK's Influence Committee Oral and Written Evidence*. Vols. 1-2 A-G

2. Public Diplomacy and Cultural Relations

In the 21st century, with the influence of fast-spreading and upgraded means of communication and globalization, extensive debates have happened about the changing nature of diplomacy and whether there is a need to change it. One of the main motivations behind this need was the necessity to keep up with the developing technology and the resultant changing forms of communication. As a result, diplomacy was redefined, and many thinkers and analysts in the field have posited that it is impossible to conduct diplomacy from behind the closed doors of foreign offices anymore. However, the emergence of concepts such as PD and CD has not provided alternatives to traditional diplomacy. As seen above, states and institutions have been conducting these forms of diplomacy for a long time. However, it is possible to state that these efforts have contributed to bringing traditional state-to-state diplomacy closer to the public. This section will discuss such steps, placing PD and CD within the discourse of restructuring diplomacy within the context of the UK and analysing the outcomes of this process.

Apart from PD and CD, there are more types of diplomacy in our world now. Digital diplomacy, music diplomacy, and network diplomacy are some of them.[4] Though for some, a term such as music diplomacy should be under the heading of CD, others would argue that it is a standalone concept on its own. Moreover, Digital diplomacy is a very recent concept, and its borders are still unknown even to specialist authors and policymakers, meaning that the idea has encountered suspicion and criticism. Interestingly, even digital diplomacy has "often" been regarded as an equivalent of PD because of the digital and communicative methods they both use.[5] However, it is possible to infer from the existing literature that the level of criticism and scepticism levelled at digital diplomacy has been less pronounced than that directed at CD.

Regarding realistic outcomes of diplomatic actions, what does digital diplomacy offer that CD does not? Efforts to clarify the meaning of digital diplomacy have already started in the literature, but this does not mean we see tangible outcomes. If, say, the fact embassy of the US in Jakarta has 600,000 likes on Facebook should this change the way we understand the effectiveness of diplomacy? First, arguably, we should approach the much more complex idea

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[4] For digital diplomacy, see Bjola, C., & Holmes, M. (2015). *Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (1 edition). London ; New York: Routledge; Fletcher, T. (2017). *The Naked Diplomat*. William Collins; Sandre, A. (2015). *Digital Diplomacy: Conversations on Innovation in Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. For network diplomacy, see Metzl, J. (2001). Network Diplomacy. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2*(1), 77-87; Heine, J. (2013). "From Club to Network Diplomacy". In Cooper, A.F. Heine, J and Thakur, R. (2013) *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*. Oxford University Press.

[5] Hocking, B., and J. Melissen. (2015). *Diplomacy in the Digital Age*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. (p. 5).

of culture with less prejudice. We should do this because CD is a contested term that has existed and been practiced long before digital diplomacy, and it deserves more clarification.

Traditional, bilateral diplomatic history encompasses political relations between states. There are changes in how we view traditional diplomacy. The fact that different kinds of diplomacy have emerged in recent years also connects to a change in the bigger picture. From many perspectives, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the 9/11 events are considered turning points in history. However, one common thing about them was that they opened up debates about the encounters of politics and diplomacy with civilians and with the cultural sphere. Historians increasingly called this encounter 'the cultural space.'[6] Cultural space is where politicians share a space with the public. It is interesting to note that most of this literature compares politics to culture and people together, sometimes nearly interchangeably. Culture is taken for granted as being within the aegis of 'the public.' This argument can be plausibly related to the idea of the democratization of culture. However, this argument also relates to one of the motivations why states had to focus more on their PD and CD agendas.

Diplomacy is a practice that develops over time and in history but is also a categorical analysis unit. The study of diplomacy has traditionally been prone to categorization. This is one reason there is not one universally agreed-on definition with which we can theorize about the change in diplomatic processes. To study and analyse diplomacy, we need to develop analytical categories that offer clarity, which the concept of diplomacy cannot do.[7] For that reason, it has become necessary to deal with changes in diplomatic practices by adding a qualifier, such as NGO diplomacy, business diplomacy, PD and CD, and so on. For instance, the vast literature about "the new diplomacy" or the "new public diplomacy" accepts that there is tension with the old one. The new version usually presents new actors operating in the diplomatic sphere.[8] In addition to NGOs, some authors identify civilians as diplomats.

In the context of the aftermath of the Cold War, Robert Griffith has defined the encounters between politics, culture, and the public mentioned above, as "the cultural turn."[9]

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[6] Plummer, B. G. (2005). *The Changing Face of Diplomatic History: A Literature Review*. The History Teacher, Vol. 38, No. 3. Published by: Society for History Education.
[7] McKercher, B. C. J. (2012). *Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft*. Routledge.
[8] Cooper, A. F., English, J. and Thakur, R. C. eds. (2002) *Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy*. New York: United Nations University Press; Riordan, S. (2003), *The New Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Polity; Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, eds., (2008). *Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Andrew F. Cooper (2008). *Celebrity Diplomacy*. Boulder: Paradigm
[9] Griffith, R. (2001). "The Cultural Turn in Cold War Studies". *Reviews in American History*, Volume 29, Number 1, March 2001, pp. 150-157.

This concept is mainly related to Americanization and how every single aspect of American culture shaped our understanding of the Cold War and vice versa. However, the cultural turn can also be related to a significant phenomenon in the diplomatic history of the 21st century, which is the introduction of various intellectual strands of thought from other subjects of history or diplomacy per se. These strands include colonial and postcolonial studies, anthropology, cultural studies, feminist theory, and theories of ethnicity. These fields, in general, constitute an attempt to bring the experiences of "the public" or "civilians" into the mainstream scholarly account of world history. They have endeavoured, and continue to this day, to offer a better grasp of the problems of states and their role in restructuring cultural practices and power dynamics in line with civil societies.[10] The part of the culture in creating relationships with other nations has also become a widely debated issue.

Nevertheless, culture existed in history before these currents of thought started discussing it. In its relationship to diplomatic history, culture stands as a distant concept. We should accept that cultural studies brought a new turn to diplomatic history, "focusing on the variety, flexibility, and fluidity of how culture is created, and also the agency (rather than passivity) of audiences in cultural production."[11] This idea regards culture as a dynamic process. This view of history affects the relationship between culture and diplomacy by bringing closer the formal (political) sphere and societal (public) contexts in which it operates. CD is one of the results of this process, and how different actors develop and understand it depends on these states' relationship to culture and their unique diplomatic history. These intersections between culture and diplomacy also connect to the widespread urge to "restructure" diplomacy in the recent century, which was also valid for the UK.

3. Shifting Government Debates about the Restructuring of PD and CD

This section lays out the foreign policy framework which has transformed the concepts of PD and CD in the case of the UK. The period here, as has been mentioned, is post-globalisation (1990) and roughly until the present (2016). Here are the main ideas that shaped the UK's foreign policy and the connecting points to the CD and PD. In the next section, I give examples of actual policy changes in PD and CD and debate the foreign policy shift that influenced the current state of CD as a concept.

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[10] Plummer, B. G. (2005). *The Changing Face of Diplomatic History: A Literature Review*. The History Teacher, Vol. 38, No. 3. Published by: Society for History Education.

[11] Rosenberg, E. (1994). "Foreign Affairs After World War II: Connecting Sexual and International Politics," *Diplomatic History 18*: 69.

In the UK from the 1990s on, there was a particular effort to "restructure British diplomacy."[12] The time that has witnessed these debates on restructuring diplomacy and the conduct of foreign policy is roughly the same period that this research takes as its basic time frame. This period is from the mid-1990s till 2010, shaped mainly by the policies of the New Labour government under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The idea of globalisation predominantly shaped New Labour's philosophy and policy management, and this discourse was quite visible in the words of the politicians as well. They were mostly following the "New Times" discourse, which refers to the new global situation after the end of the Cold War and the effects of globalisation.[13] These "new times" required further actions and a process of adaptation, which led to the "Third Way" program of New Labour.[14] This program was explained by Blair as a modernized social democracy, passionate in its commitment to the goals of the centre-left, but flexible, innovative, and forward-looking in the means to achieve them".[15] And at the centre of this new times discourse was globalisation. Of course, we recognize globalisation as a constructed sphere of meaning, and it is possible to contextualize it from different aspects. However, New Labour discourse described globalisation as an "unstoppable force to which governments had to adapt."[16] Practices such as PD and CD are very closely related to globalisation due to the nature of their work; they aim to go out in the world and reach communities to create a positive impact for the UK (in the case of the UK). Therefore, the fact that practices such as PD and CD became very important and found a wide range of theoretical discussions in the government does not come as a surprise.

New Labour's internationalism and policymaking impacted the connections between PD and CD. The core idea was that states are a part of an international community.[17] Due to this, "each state has a responsibility towards the common good of the international system, to work in the international interest."[18] This kind of internationalism reflects the context in which

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[12] Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and Digital Disruption*. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 7.

[13] Atkins, J. (2013). "A Renewed Social Democracy for the Age of Internationalism: An Interpretivist Account of New Labour's Foreign Policy". The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Vol 15, pp. 175-191 (175).

[14] Martin, P. (1999). *New Labour, New Welfare State?: The "third Way" in British Social Policy*. Policy Press. (pp. 1-29).

[15] Blair, T. (1998) *The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century* (London: Fabian Society).

[16] Blair, T. (2010) *A Journey* (London: Hutchinson). p. 689.

[17] Atkins, J. (2013). "A Renewed Social Democracy for the Age of Internationalism: An Interpretivist Account of New Labour's Foreign Policy". The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Vol 15, p. 175-191 (177).

[18] Vickers, R. (2004) *The Labour Party and the World, Volume 1: The Evolution of Labour's Foreign Policy 1900–1951* Manchester: Manchester University Press. (p. 194).

the Labour Party developed; and, at the same time, its "tendency to have a missionary zeal to reform and shape the world in its likeness, which sometimes has been at odds with its commitment to work through international institutions."[19] The idea of shaping the world invokes colonial implications. But, at the same time, this idea reflects the CD of Britain and its practices. Classical CD conveys cultural elements to other parts of the world with the motivation that they will reap concrete and reciprocal benefits in the long term. That is why it is a "successful" CD if the groups or communities that have encountered CD start adopting the cultural elements or values into their daily life structures. And that, again, is one of the reasons why the New Labour atmosphere, with its constant emphasis on globalisation and internationalism, created a convenient backdrop for PD and CD to flourish within the governmental debates of the UK.

The FCO also debated globalisation as a specific issue. In a series of reforms within the same scheme as the broader debate on restructuring diplomacy efforts, the FCO underwent some policy changes in response to globalisation. The FCO, naturally, was the department that New Labour policies influenced the most.[20] For some, this was an apparent decline in the FCO's status as a foreign policymaking body. This decline was related to the New Labour's excessive activism and the marginalisation of the department under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.[21] Some diplomats in this period complained that the FCO would soon "become a Ministry of Consular Affairs, rescuing distressed travellers and tourists."

Nevertheless, it has been suggested extensively in the literature that the New Labour did not consider the FCO fit for democratizing its relationships with overseas partners. Besides, the pioneering government figures and non-governmental organisations expressed their concerns about the FCO's "old fashioned culture, elitism and its inability to change."[22] This situation explains FCO's discussions about PD and CD's agency. The first prominent change

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[19] Ibid, p. 197.

[20] Williams, P. D. (2004) 'Who's making UK foreign policy?', *International Affairs*, 80:5, 909–929., Steven, D. (2007) 'Foreign and Commonwealth Office', in C. Talbot and M. Baker (eds), *The Alternative Comprehensive Spending Review 2007* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 2–13., Korski, D. (2009) 'Diplomatic faux pas', *The Spectator*, 27 August. Available online at: http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/5291421/diplomatic-faux-pas.thtml , Marshall, P. et al. (2011) "The Role of the FCO in UK Government" Unprinted written evidence to Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 26 January 2011. Available online at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/fcogov/m25.htm

[21] Blair, T. (2010). *A Journey* (London: Hutchinson).

[22] Theakston, K. (2000) 'New Labour and the Foreign Office', in R. Little and M. Wickham-Jones (eds), *New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 112–127.; Briggs, R. (2009) 'The transformation of foreign policy', *Renewal: A Journal of Labour Politics*, vol 17, pp 5-9.

came in May 1997, with the removal of responsibility for aid from the FCO to DFID.[23] Gordon Brown significantly expanded a great deal of effort into the proliferation of this work.[24] He channelled a considerable amount of funds to DFID, which became more prominent in funds than the FCO.[25] In this way, while the government restricted the agency of the FCO in multilateral issues, it created a new department that would have a say in these issues.

Two publications by the FCO allow us to see the changes in the understanding of diplomacy. This change will then be related to CD: to what extent was the restructuring of traditional diplomacy tied to CD's popularity and later neglect? The 20-year period between the 1995 Fundamental Expenditure Review (referred to as FER) and "Diplomatic Excellence" (2015) published by the FCO comprised a series of remarkable endeavours to reform the FCO. FER can be considered the first step in which this reconstruction took place. The review had a clear objective: to situate the FCO as a service provider in diplomacy with clearly communicated aims in light of the changing demands of a globalizing world.[26] The emphasis on 'communicated' and 'changing demands' is significant here: first, the policymakers admit the need to change how diplomacy works. Second, because of the nature of diplomacy, the difficulty of setting clear aims is manifest. This confusion helps to explain why diplomacy needs to come together with words such as 'cultural.' Third, it describes why PD and CD became very much debated areas of diplomacy. After the Fundamental Expenditure Review, investments in PD also clearly rose, and collaborations with NGOs gained importance.

The FER was also the first time the FCO publicly discussed PD. For the first time in this review, FCO brought PD together with culture and information under the same heading.[27] PD was in circulation for a long time, but the emphasis on culture was new. The publication of the review corresponded to the year the FCO launched its website. It is likely that because this government believed that this new digital step by the FCO represented the future of information and culture in the digital era, the use of the term PD was fitting.

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[23] Honeyman, V. (2009) 'Gordon Brown and international policy', *Policy Studies*, 30:1, 85–100. (95); HM Treasury (2009) *Budget 2009: Building Britain's future*. Available online at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407010852/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bud09_completereport_2520.pdf (p. 241)

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid, p. 243.

[26] Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and Digital Disruption*. Palgrave Macmillan (p. 27).

[27] FCO. (1995). Foreign & Commonwealth Office (Diplomatic Wing) Fundamental Expenditure Review. London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

In chronological order, the second significant policy paper in restructuring diplomacy with an influence on PD and CD was Robin Cook's (1997) "Mission Statement." This statement has a lot of indications of the then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's emphasis on an ethical dimension to foreign policy, preserving peace and making British foreign policy a more moral one compared to the previous Conservative governments. His ideas about taking diplomacy out of the aegis of foreign offices and politicians and making people actors in diplomacy were novel ideas for diplomacy. He favored promoting British altruistic values worldwide and made this clear in many speeches.[28] Under Cook's patronage, New Labour founded a think tank called The Foreign Policy Centre. This think-tank aimed to bring new foreign policy challenges together with national identity and take them both to a more legitimate place for the FCO. This think-tank worked on diplomacy in the digital age and created reports in collaboration with the BC and BBC World Service (BBCWS).[29]

One distinctive phrase from the "Mission Statement" report, which was the definitive report of what Cook proposed to do in his foreign service, was the idea of "people's diplomacy." People's diplomacy was an instrument to increase respect and understanding for Britain.[30] When the government asked what Cook meant by this phrase, he gave an answer that simultaneously defined the premises of PD and CD. He described it as creating goodwill and understanding on a people-to-people basis, not just on a governmental level. Furthermore, he said it was necessary to "make sure that the work of the BC does project British culture, British values and also opportunities for British business."[31] So, the idea was based on a solid identity and projecting it to the world. People's diplomacy is one aspect of conceptualizing a national image based on this solid identity. Although Cook was not a defender of nation branding and he criticized the whole idea on several occasions, the idea of projecting a national identity based on the facts of Britain was still present.[32] For example, in response to the creation of the Britain Abroad Task Force, he said: "This is not an exercise in rebranding or creating an image. It is

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[28] FCO. (1998). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report*. London: The Stationary Office.

[29] Some examples are: Leonard, M. (2002). *Re-ordering the World*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.; Leonard, M., Stead, C. and Smewing, C. (2002). *Public Diplomacy*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.; Leonard, M., and V. Alakeson. (2000). *Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Society*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

[30] Cook, R. (1997). Mission Statement. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy.

[31] FCO. (1998). House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, *Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report*. London: The Stationary Office.

[32] Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and Digital Disruption*. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 173.

about projecting our identity, the reality of Britain today".[33] Therefore, we can infer that his idea of PD was to project British identity, but not an identity based on myth, an identity that brings culture and actual people onto the stage.

Another significant step in conceptualising PD and CD in the UK was the 'Foresight' report, which Robin Cook commissioned for the FCO in 2000. The report offered solutions for what the FCO should look like in ten years. The report regarded PD as a core activity through which the FCO could actively engage in "two-way flows of information and ideas" with the outer world.[34] Foresight offered an overall change in "working culture" to create the background for the FCO to be more integrated into public debates. Two of its recommendations are specifically significant. The first stated, "The FCO needs stronger ties with those outside government, e.g., businesses and NGOs."[35] The emphasis on collaborating with NGOs, and the importance of business, implied the classic 'business as usual' premise. As we have seen in the literature, many critics criticized this approach to CD.[36] Although there is no denying that CD and PD projects bring economic benefits to their countries, it is also a reductive argument that portrays PD and CD efforts only as another way to gain financial benefits overseas. The second important recommendation was, "Commercial work will be increasingly broad going well beyond trade promotion."[37] In all of the reviews of this report, there is no explicit reference to what "going beyond trade promotion" meant. It was an effort to draw attention away from the economic benefits associated with CD and PD.

In the three years between the Mission Statement and Foresight, NGOs and institutions like the BC organized several workshops and committee meetings. They also created publications addressing the issue of bringing the diplomatic practice to the people. These efforts had a considerable influence and impacted how the FCO and its partners in overseas promotion - the British Council and BBCWS - understood their roles.[38] Nevertheless, there was still confusion around using the word "cultural."

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[33] FAC. (1999). Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report (Cm 4209). London: FCO.
[34] FAC (2000): Foresight Report (unpublished). pp 80 – 83.
[35] Ibid, pp. 4-6.

[36] Leonard, M., Small, A. & Rose, M. (2005). "British Public Diplomacy 'in the Age of Schisms.'" Foreign Policy Centre Publications. (p. 6).; Aguilar, M. (1996). *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. German– American Relations, 1955-1968*. New York, NY.; J.C.E. Gienow- Hecht and F. Schumacher (eds). *Culture and International History*. New York: Berghahn Books.

[37] Ibid, pp. 4-6.
[38] Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and Digital Disruption*. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 4

The next wave of reforms came with David Miliband's efforts to restructure the Communication Directorate to "ensure genuine engagement. We need to bring thinking and ideas from outside the FCO into our policymaking processes to create joint solutions and to work with others to deliver these solutions".[39] The highly relevant part of this the scope of this research is Miliband's reforms in the use of technology and the promotion of a kind of digital diplomacy. The famous FCO blogs started due to his effort, which hoped to evolve into a long-term tool in policymaking. Blogs did not impact policymaking about cultural exchange, but they enabled looking closely into the diplomatic sphere of the country to create accountability in the eyes of the public.

Following the inquiry into PD in 2005-6, the Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that it would take a sympathetic approach to the Government's initiatives. It supported endeavours closely to associate the PD strategy with state policy priorities. It emphasized the importance of the independence of the BC and BBC World Service.[40] The Committee also called for an independent report on the BC's work in the framework of the next Spending Review. Nevertheless, the government rejected the proposal to start an independent review.[41]

Shortly before Brown's prime ministership, the FCO merged its PD with that of a Communications Directorate. There were clear signs that PD work would change in this period. Then David Miliband, in his speech in 2008, gave apparent hints as to what would happen:

> We need to rethink the role of public diplomacy. In a world where power is more dispersed between media, businesses, and NGOs, and leaders are more fettered by external influence, we need to look outwards. Our global network and London need to focus not just on government relations but on business, media, and citizen relations. Sometimes we need to use public diplomacy to shape a debate and build consensus. At other times it may have a more disruptive role in challenging conventional relations.[42]

This approach also resonates with the changing nature of diplomacy and diplomats. The growing focus on non-governmental spheres in general and changing the reference points in PD strikes out as the changes in this era. It is helpful to remember that the idea of humanitarian diplomacy was also coined and debated extensively in the literature in the years before 2010. Though it is beyond the scope of this research, the discussion of humanitarian diplomacy was indicative of the restructuring effort within the government.

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[39] FCO (2008). *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2007–31 March 2008: Better World, Better Britain* (Cm 7398). London: FCO.
[40] Foreign Affairs Committee (2005-2006). *Public Diplomacy*, HC903, Session 2005-6, paras 18, 31-34, 45-51
[41] *Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Public Diplomacy* (2006). Cm 6840, June 2006, para 16.
[42] House of Commons (2008). *British Foreign Policy since 1997*, Research Paper 08/56, 23 June 2008.

In this period, there was a clear transition to CD discourse. Gordon Brown proposed a new cultural effort on the scale of the cultural Cold War of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.[43] The discourse was intensified after the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, as policymakers sought to build trust around the world for Britain through the use of soft power. As for the changes to the strategic operation of public diplomacy, the 2006 White Paper set three strategic priorities: supporting UK business, climate security, and sustainable development.[44] It was unclear, however, what the implications of the new strategic Framework would be for them. Then again, it was inevitable that the BC's strategic objectives, which emphasized climate change, the creative economy, and intercultural dialogue, were intermeshed with the new Strategic Framework.[45] This merge happened because of the advice the Government was taking about BC's place as an actor of CD. Another reason was the internal criticisms within the institution.

After the Communications Directorate took over the responsibility of PD policymaking in 2006, Miliband stated that all PD activities would be separate projects within themselves while keeping the communications aspect central.[46] This approach is relevant if we consider the constant effort to define and categorise CD and PD under an overarching heading. Moreover, the strategy hints at the possibility that by dealing with separate projects on their terms and focusing on the creative and communicative results, these projects can create even more benefits for the country.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Jack Straw demanded that "all our Posts see PD as a central task"[47] and convened the Wilton and Carter reviews. These reviews would investigate how the FCO, BC, and other PD organisations sought to influence foreign citizens in line with the government's foreign policy aims. With this step, PD and CD debates, especially within the BC, gained strength. As a result, the government created Public Diplomacy Strategy Board (PDSB) to oversee how PD could be instrumental across the diplomatic network, only to realize that it could not resolve institutional differences. Partly as a result of this realisation, by 2006, the role of the FCO was redefined as "supporting the UK's priorities through communication, advocacy, and engagement with targeted audiences, including key individuals, civil society

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[43] Ibid.

[44] Foreign Affairs Committee (2006-2007). *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2006-7*, paras 219-222.

[45] FCO (2007-8) *Departmental Report*, pp. 98-99.

[46] Miliband, D. (2008). *Hansard 23 Jan 2008: Column 52 WS*. Available at http://www.publications. parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080123/wmstext/80123m0001.htm#08012347000076

[47] FCO (2003) Departmental Report 2003 (Cm 5913). London: FCO. p 51

and community groups, and the media."[48] The development of new techniques with this critical public and private groups was vital. This necessity found support from the new Public Diplomacy Board (founded after the PDSB disbanded) and a series of programs to change how the FCO ran its diplomatic campaigns.

The FCO's new approach to PD, shaped by the Carter review, was debated extensively, especially in the second term of Tony Blair. This term coincided with 9/11 and changed the focus of PD from Europe to the Middle East, and on the thematic level, from image projection to articulating PD with the concept of influence. The Wilton review was the first to contextualize all promotional activity within the framework of PD explicitly. It argued that any definition of PD should encompass image, values, achievement, and policies.[49] Although the governmental approach used the term PD as if it was a unique concept bringing together the conduct of British diplomacy in a coherent frame, it was a re-expression of the work carried out by individual cultural programs such as New Images. Apart from within the government, think tanks and non-governmental organizations also took part and provided advice on the matter. While debating the meaning and value of PD, the trajectory of British intervention in the Middle East undermined the values associated with the tenets of cultural exchange.

Reports of the Foreign Policy Centre, a think-tank established when Robin Cook was Foreign Secretary, referred to this controversy in 2003: "How can you talk about a 'public diplomacy strategy for the middle east' when carrier battle groups are sailing, troops are assembling, and soon the bombs will begin to fly?"[50] Others raised similar concerns, one of them being the British Council. Although the "arm's length policy" of the BC includes both, the stronger inclination was to emphasize the distance rather than the association with the government. Naturally, this inclination strengthened after the war in Iraq. On the other hand, counterpoint, a think tank founded under the aegis of the British Council, issued a report in 2005 suggesting that the BC has a role to play in influencing Britain's opposing views after the Iraq invasion. According to the report, besides representing government policies, the BC should also voice other non-governmental approaches from Britain. There are two significant issues with this Counterpoint report. First, research in this report quoted a respondent who is an

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[48] FCO (2006). *Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK's International Priorities* (Cm 6762). London: Crown Copyright.

[49] Wilton, C.; Griffin, J. and Fotheringham, A. (2002). *Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy (The Wilton Review)*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

[50] Leonard, M. and Smewing, C. (2002). *Public Diplomacy*. London: The Foreign Policy Centre. p. 3

example of the overwhelming criticism of this subject. "Why can't the British Council give us the Britain that put a million anti-war marchers on the streets of London in February 2003?"[51] The response shows the typical and rarely resolved problem of PD in the case of the UK in this era. In addition, the writers described the respondent's comment negatively, as "this is, after all, the democracy we speak of implanting in the Middle East."[52] This comment is problematic and is an example of the internal tensions that existed both in the definition and practice of PD.

While these developments were happening within the PD and CD spheres, debates about Britain's image abroad were preparing a new branch of IR literature defined as *nation branding*. By 1995, there were claims that "Britain's image" had become a dated concept and nothing more than a fictionalised fantasy of heritage rather than focusing on the actual creative industries and cultural diversity.[53] New Labour think-tank Demos published Phillip Dodd's *The Battle Over Britain* in 1995, which discussed the new century's opportunities to restructure British identity. In 1994, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd fashioned the *New Images* campaign, the first contemporary PD campaign. This campaign also provided an important bridge between the two governments, as the first cultural activities of the program started in 1997, and Labour would come to power in May of that year. This timing made it a helpful tool to explore the extent of the late-Conservative and early Labour handover, inspired by the FER and the shift to PD-oriented organisational structures.[54] It is also worth remembering that the Know-How Fund, which started in the early 1990s and aimed at the former Soviet Union, can also be considered an essential thread in the emergence of PD.[55]

The New Images campaign began as a BC anniversary celebration. Still, it transformed into a one-year program to influence and improve perceptions of Britain's image and relevance to the defined audience of the bilateral relationship.[56] A small BC team developed its cultural program, and most events targeted improving desirable business and political markets. Therefore, it became the first collaborative British diplomatic influence campaign of the contemporary era, also helping contextualize the preferred use of the term public diplomacy.

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[51] Leonard, M., Small, A. & Rose, M. (2005). *Public Diplomacy in the 'Age of Schisms'*. Foreign Policy Centre and Counterpoint, p. 50

[52] Ibid.

[53] For critical discussions, see Elwes, A. 1994. *Nations for Sale*. London: DBB Needham.; Richards, S. 1994. *UK PLC: Trapped in a Time Warp?* The Sunday Times, 30 October.; Wright, P. 1994. Wrapped in the Tatters of the Flag. *The Guardian*, 31 December.

[54] Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and Digital Disruption*. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 34.

[55] Hamilton, K. (2013). *Transformational Diplomacy After the Cold War: Britain's Know How Fund in Post-Communist Europe, 1989–2003*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

[56] Environmetrics (1998): p. 6.

We can argue that, like all identities, British identity was also socially-constructed. The lack of clarity over identities resulted in the overseas institutions' inability to focus on their ideas and create a coherent framework for objectives and activities. Also, the emphasized link between creative industries and business directed the context of PD to a theory of change. Mark Leonard, a policymaker in PD, argued that "few have linked the political and cultural aspects of identity and their economic significance – the 'identity premium' that flows to businesses when the national identity is being managed well."[57] This line of thinking caught the attention of world media. It helped to strengthen New Labour's agenda, which was in the direction of modernising projections out of diplomatic and cultural relations spheres.

Within the debates around PD, then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook proposed the term "people's diplomacy" along with the much-debated "ethical dimension" to foreign policy. The concept of people's diplomacy also required clarification, to which he replied with several suggestions that imply an emerging idea of PD unique to the UK. There was one striking suggestion: "Making sure that we get a proper message through the local press and media, for instance, making sure that the work of the BC does project British culture, values and also opportunities for British business."[58] The logic connected to this was simple: British business would benefit if Britain had a strong image.

By the end of Labour's period in office in 2010, the government had institutionalized the proposed changes with a focus on communication in the diplomatic apparatus. This institutionalization created the internal FCO program, "Making Communication Mainstream[59]." This program required diplomats to use public and digital communication in their strategic campaigns, so by this time, the main activities of diplomacy came together with PD with a digital aspect.[60] The program followed the "Strategic Framework for the FCO" prepared by Miliband for the FCO, which would constitute a background for the program to be implemented. The overarching argument of the Framework was to "create a global network" in which the FCO could better serve the British government and the public.[61] For some commentators, the Strategic Framework represented "Miliband's efforts to reaffirm the

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[57] Leonard, M. (1997). Britain™: *Renewing Our Identity*. London: Demos. p. 60.

[58] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (1998). *Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Report 1998*. London: The Stationary Office.: Ev 145.

[59] FCO (2008), Making Communication Mainstream.

[60] Ibid.

[61] FCO (2008). *Foreign & Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 1 April 2007–31 March 2008: Better World, Better Britain* (Cm 7398). London: FCO.

relevance of the FCO as a player in Whitehall, when other factors might indicate its marginalization."[62] PD began to be a method of engaging with different publics overseas while simultaneously cutting down the costs to a minimum with the continuing global economic crisis. Therefore, working with outside actors for effective diplomacy not only has the purpose of engaging with the public better; there was a convenient financial reason as well. If we remember that Gordon Brown was in favour of channelling more of the government budget into PD work, we can understand this point better.

Other significant reviews and policy papers in PD are "International Priorities" (FCO 2003) and "Active Diplomacy for a Changing World" (FCO 2006). Again, some of these policy recommendations tried to make the FCO more diverse regarding employees' backgrounds.[63] Other policy recommendations about the general context of "new institutionalism" or "new public management" sought to contextualize management practices within civil service.[64] The urge to create responses to these new techniques in foreign policymaking can be related to theories of globalization. In addition, the general reforms within the FCO about diplomacy and building global networks are closely related to globalisation and its impacts on the understanding of diplomacy. Due to the "public" aspect of this type of diplomacy, supporters of FCO reforms believed that changing FCO into a more globally networked and less hierarchical organisation would benefit the country within the context of recent shifts in international relations. Again, this kind of transformation was necessary due to globalization, specifically globalization theories.

The Coalition Government changed the terminology from public diplomacy to soft power upon taking office in 2010. Still, the focus on restructuring diplomacy with an emphasis on communication remained the same, along with a focus on defining PD regarding people in a highly networked world.[65] In a keynote speech at the beginning of his career as the Foreign Secretary, William Hague emphasised soft power and the significance of using the term in policymaking to create new forms of engagement.[66] Then in 2011, William Hague's 'Structural

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[62] Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and Digital Disruption*. Palgrave Macmillan. (p. 132).

[63] Hall, I. (2013). "Building the Global Network? The Reform of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under New Labour". *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 15(2): 228–245.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2012). "Defining Strategic Publics" in a Networked World: Public Diplomacy's Challenge at Home and Abroad. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7*(4) (p. 435)

[66] Hague, W. (2010). *Speech on 'Britain's Foreign Policy in a Networked World*. *Foreign and Commonwealth Office* (1 July 2010); cited in House of Lords Library Notice, Debate on 28 April: Co-ordination Between

Reform Plan' involved using soft power directly "as a tool of UK foreign policy."[67] The decision to switch to using soft power did not happen overnight. Joseph Nye visited David Miliband and exchanged opinions about soft power, but the coalition government decided to use soft power formally.[68] However, the reconceptualization of soft power was not justified. The random use of the term complicated the definitions of overseas communications more. While PD had been the preferred term for overseas relations for the previous 15 years, this changed to soft power, and to this day, there is no clarification of this usage. However, the field of IR recognizes that soft power is a concept that comes with its problems. As many critics have conceptualized it, the "attraction" soft power creates is a socio-linguistically constructed form of power and, therefore, a continuation of hard power – maybe not physically, but still coercive.[69] In his works, Nye explicitly states that soft power is an area of action, an action that can actualize through PD and the dissemination of 'universal values.'[70] However, he does not specify the meaning behind values and what makes them universal, and in this sense, the switch of the UK government from PD to soft power is not very different. Amidst the confusion around soft power and PD, one important note is that by this time, the CD is still "one of the ways to create soft power" in governmental policy documents. In addition, institutions such as the BC and BBCWS are an active part or are encouraged to be an active part of that process.[71]

Definitions of PD concepts in the literature vary within a wide range. Concepts like image, identity, and influence are about projecting a modern identity and efforts to change foreign perceptions utilizing this projection. The concept of engagement, for instance, has become an identifying aspect of the new PD efforts in the 21st century. It is about creating a dialogue with experts and stakeholders from domains out of the FCO.[72] These dialogues aimed to gain greater accountability on global issues.

On the other hand, strategic campaigns aim at better communication as an integrated tool of diplomacy. As part of these strategic campaigns and the effort to devise definitions that

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Government Departments on the Use of Soft Power (14 April 2011, LLN 2011/014).

[67] FCO Business Plan 2011–2015. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office. p. 2.

[68] Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and Digital Disruption*. Palgrave Macmillan. (p. 188).

[69] Bleiker, R. (2004) *Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[70] Nye, J. S. Jr. (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

[71] House of Lords (2013) *Unrevised transcript of evidence taken before "The Select Committee on Soft Power and the UK's Influence", inquiry on Soft Power and the UK's Influence* (Ev. Ses. no 1., Heard in Public, Questions 1-22); House of Lords (2014) *Soft Power and the UK's Influence Committee – Oral and Written Evidence* (Vols. 1&2);

[72] Murphy, J. (2008). "Engagement". In *Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World*, eds. J. Welsh and D. Fearn, 6–16. London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

can be alternatives to CD, the policymakers and authors created the term 'targeted national promotion' to effectively use marketing and branding.[73] The concept included promoting high-profile events in the UK, such as the Olympics and royal weddings, whose marketing efforts have explicitly increased due to the developing technology[74]. And last but not least, soft power is one of these alternatives to CD: it creates leverage, influencing economic and security outcomes. Finally, the concept of cultural relations, which has increasingly become the preferred concept by the BC itself, is about non-governmental relations and promotes mutual understanding. Nevertheless, we should add that cultural relations are a legitimate and distinct phenomenon, which is something that government inquiries over the years have tenaciously failed to give credit.

From the example of the UK, we can suggest that the line is a very blurred one. For this reason, we should create parallels to challenging concepts such as propaganda and national branding.[75] Both of these concepts have long histories in the case of the UK. CD, although contested, still has a lot in common with the idea of national branding. The fact that the term "targeted national promotion" has been used interchangeably with CD for quite some time confirms this idea.[76] And for this reason, the CD has been and most probably will continue to be a concept that does not work well in respect of institutions, especially those with relationships with the state. Nevertheless, to solve the internal problem of CD, current CD practices should be compared and contrasted to what we already know from the UK's historical baggage of propaganda and branding to detect differences and similarities. We can then analyse how an institution such as the BC has contributed to creating this difference. This idea is discussed extensively in the next section of this chapter, where I focus on the BC and the problems it has encountered in the CD framework.

The common point in all these efforts is that the FCO can no longer continue conducting diplomacy from the ivory towers of FCO offices and its overseas posts. On the way to achieving this aim, concepts such as PD, CD, and soft power have been brought into the domain of the

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[73] Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and Digital Disruption.* Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 159-160).

[74] Ibid.

[75] Murphy, J. (2008). "Engagement". In *Engagement: Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World*, eds. J. Welsh and D. Fearn, 6–16. London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

[76] Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and Digital Disruption.* Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 159-160).

government without full justification, but still creating concrete solutions in terms of projects in the actual field. From various perspectives, we can summarize this as a reaction to broader demands from the institution of diplomacy in the early 21st century: from multilateral organizations, pressure groups, and non-governmental bodies whose expertise has become increasingly relevant to diplomatic objectives, also from major compelling crises brought about by globalisation, discussions on borderlessness and hyper-connectivity. For that reason, it is essential to evaluate the role of NGOs and civil society organisations, which have also participated in the policymaking processes and created projects that are or can be, under the umbrella of CD.

3.1. The 1986-7 Foreign Affairs Committee Report

In the relationship between the government and CD, the most crucial turning point in the post-1990 period is the 1986 Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) report on the role of CD.[77] The FAC's role is to examine the expenditure, administration, and policies of the FCO and other bodies associated with the FCO and the Committee's remit, including the BC.[78] Its inquiry sessions may include ministers, officials from FCO, academics, researchers, interest groups, representatives from international organisations, and journalists, depending on the nature of the inquiry.[79] This report is the last one of the FAC reports that mention the term CD and discusses it at length, simultaneously questioning its role in the general foreign policy sphere of the government.[80] This report primarily asked the FCO for a statement about cultural policy and what they make of it and received the following list of goals in return:

1. "To convey the image of Britain as a creative well-integrated, and forward-looking society based on liberal values – a social and cultural model to be emulated and trusted;
2. To inspire respect and understanding for the people of Britain and their achievements;
3. To correct wrong and counter unfavourable impressions of Britain
4. To explain British policies and interests to decision-makers and opinion formers overseas;
5. To promote British economic interests overseas, including the export of British goods and services."[81]

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[77] Foreign Affairs Committee. (1986). *Cultural Diplomacy*. London: The Stationary Office: v.

[78] Foreign Affairs Committee. (n.d.) *Committees*. Retrieved on 03 June 2018. https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/role/

[79] Ibid.

[80] Pamment, J. (2016). *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and Digital Disruption*. Palgrave Macmillan. (p. 98).

[81] FAC. (1986). *Cultural Diplomacy*. London: The Stationary Office: v.

The FAC responded that "cultural" was irrelevant to the discussion because most of the goals defined are general diplomatic objectives. The problem was in the definitions. When asked what they were trying to deliver precisely, the FCO conflated the terms *cultural diplomacy* and *cultural relations*. CD referred to activities "embracing the whole breadth of cultural and information activity," while cultural relations were about "the state of our international relations in cultural terms in parallel with our political and commercial relations."[82] Both definitions can still be considered vague and unclear. In a later report, the FAC stated these definitions seemed to position culture in very general terms and did not represent an explicit and uniform set of goals and practices. The FAC concluded, "The FCO seems to follow cultural diplomacy only as an instrument of commercial or political diplomacy."[83]

At the same time, the FAC asked the BC to define their terms and showed a more sympathetic approach to their perspective. The BC stated that "CD is the specific use of cultural relations for national, political and commercial benefit," quite similar to the FCO statement. However, later on, it claimed that its main objective was to devise cultural relations, which "aim to develop over time a greater understanding and appreciation between peoples and institutions for their mutual benefit."[84] This comment created a hierarchy of activities in which cultural relations were independent but sometimes used in the FCO's agenda. With this stance, the BC tried to provide a non-governmental perspective not found in the FCO's conceptual framework. Though it might seem like a terminological distinction, these different interpretations of cultural diplomacy and relations have been at the center of institutional strife that has lasted for a long time until today. The FAC concluded that "it is not the purpose of cultural diplomacy to promote the UK nor should it be seen as a marketing exercise."[85]

The divergence between the FCO and the term CD gained a certain pace at this point, and scepticism about the word within governmental spheres also goes back to this time. At the beginning of the 1990s, "cultural diplomacy" activities were considered by the FCO to include the interchange of people, provision of information, promotion of English, promotion of arts, and implementation of educational projects. By 1990, total funding of cultural diplomacy exceeded 200 million pounds, excluding other FCO political and commercial information services that were vaguely related to its definition but not part of its accounting.[86] Following a

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[82] Ibid, vi.
[83] Ibid, xi.
[84] Ibid, vi.
[85] Ibid, xi.
[86] Ibid, xi.

long line of questioning in the evidence sessions, the FCO replied that cultural diplomacy is a "wide-ranging term and opinions differ as to which activities (governmental and non-governmental) should be regarded as falling into this category."[87]

The final recommendations framed the scene to continue the CD story about the FCO. The FAC stated that the FCO needed to produce "a comprehensive statement of its cultural diplomacy policy emphasizing that the purpose of cultural diplomacy is cultural rather than diplomatic."[88] And this should be backed up by legal purposes related to cultural diplomacy. More importantly, the BC's unique stance as a "cultural, non-political organization" had to be preserved and not subjected to the goals of the FCO.[89] This lack of conceptual clarity, which comes with the FAC rejecting the FCO's position but still not accepting the use of cultural relations, is a significant contextual problem. Cultural relations may very well be a term to conceptualize a method of non-governmental public diplomacy that the BC uses to define its work. However, it is still not sufficiently acknowledged by its various government counterparts, which indicates controversies over the term CD itself.

The FAC reports after 1986 also occasionally talk about CD, but more about PD, while referring to the cultural work primarily carried out by the BC and other bodies in collaboration with the BC. Nevertheless, this report represents a breaking point from the traditional understanding of CD and includes a lot of suspicions about the term. Ironically after this date, the emphasis on the *cultural sphere* would increase with Labour's efforts on globalisation while at the same time blurring the meaning and purpose of CD even more.

3.2. The Wilton and Carter Reviews

It is possible to track the unstable nature of the terminology of cultural diplomacy through prominent policy papers and reports published by and discussed within the UK Government. The Wilton Review on Public Diplomacy, published in 2002, is a pivotal point in developing CD terminology.[90] The review focused mainly on the work of the BBC, the British Council, and the FCO in realizing Britain's public diplomacy. Although it addressed educational collaborations with countries and their importance in achieving the aims of public diplomacy, it was clear that the report's principal purpose was to clarify what is meant by public diplomacy

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[87] Ibid, 248.
[88] Ibid, vii.
[89] Ibid, vii.
[90] Wilton, C.; Griffin, J. and Fotheringham, A. (2002). *Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy (The Wilton Review)*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

and how it should function in a more rapidly globalizing world. The Review concluded that there was poor coordination of public diplomacy activities both on a policy and a practical level.[91] Among the recommendations was developing a unique PD strategy and creating facilities designed to carry this strategy into effect. After the report and before the end of the year, the government established another Public Diplomacy Strategy Board (PDSB) to carry out this role. The board provided a national public diplomacy strategy to promote the UK's overseas interests. The board held its first meeting in October 2002 under the presidency of the FCO. The board used to have representatives from all the institutions mentioned as having a role in realizing the public diplomacy aims of the UK. In 2003, the FCO established a Public Diplomacy Campaign Fund and a Public Diplomacy Challenge Fund for major initiatives and the possible requirements for the processes following these initiatives.[92]

Nevertheless, in a two-year process, there was a need to revise the institutional framework for PD. The PDSB intended to provide the necessary leadership and coherent framework. In December 2004, Jack Straw agreed to conduct another review of PD and invited Lord Carter of Coles to undertake this mission.[93] The review's aims were "to examine the effectiveness of the current PD activities and to take stock of progress in implementing the Wilton Review 2002 through the work of PDSB."[94] The purpose of the whole review was to bring coherency into PD work and its maintenance by its different actors. The overall conclusion from the Carter Review was that "public diplomacy partners must be able to demonstrate a greater sense of urgency and more evidence of responding and shifting resources according to priorities and changing circumstances."[95] Besides, another primary conclusion was that the FCO needed to take on a pioneering role in determining a precise and focused strategy."[96] Criticisms against this stance have created questions about the FCO gaining a hierarchical position over other bodies performing public diplomacy, especially over the BC and the BBCWS. When the House discussed the issue, Lord Carter explained that the initiative was a measure to ensure better coordination of PD resources.[97] However, when we examine the changes the Review proposes for PD, we can detect an inclination toward a foreign-policy

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[91] Ibid.
[92] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2005-2006). *Public Diplomacy, Third Report of Session 2005-2006,*, HC 903, Ev. 15.
[93] Foreign Affairs Committee (2004-2005). *Written and oral evidence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004-05*, Session 2004–05, HC 436, Ev 40.
[94] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2005-2006). *Public Diplomacy, Third Report of Session 2005-2006*, HC 903, Ev. 6.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid, Q 185.

approach to PD. The originally formulated purpose by the PDSB made explicit links between PD work and government interests.

Nevertheless, Carter recommended that PD should not only be about creating positive perspectives but should "work to inform and engage individuals and organizations overseas, to improve understanding of and influence for the United Kingdom in a manner consistent with governmental medium- and long-term goals."[98] Along with this definition, a strongly-emphasized point in the report was the independence of the BC and BBCWS. From their foundation till today, the government and non-governmental stakeholders emphasized the issue of the freedom of these two institutions. Also, controversies relating to the nature of the organizations and the job they are doing continued to emerge.[99] In this case, the point of tension in Lord Carter's new definition of PD is the direct relation of PD work to government goals. Various circles, including the relevant Lords Committee and the then BBC International Governor, criticized this definition due to this explicit linkage.[100] These criticisms shared the same concern: the definition undermines the BBC World Service's and the British Council's independent role. Though the Parliament did not agree with this criticism completely, it proposed some reforms to the BC and the BBCWS to tackle such objections from within and out.[101]

As can be seen here, the discussions around CD focused on the different institutions and stakeholders functioning within the remit of the FCO or outside it. While CD was being transferred gradually to a non-governmental sphere, the targets were still unclear, and the actors of CD were still at the center of the debates. The non-governmentalization of CD was far from realistic.

4. The British Council's Shifting Approach to Cultural Diplomacy

A generic question has been on CD's agenda for some time now: where is CD going? Which direction should it take? As we have encountered in the previous two chapters, the discussions about the nature of CD that have taken place within the governmental spheres and in the

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[98] Public Diplomacy Review (2005, 15 December). Annex F, para I, p 71.

[99] Ibid, para 70.

[100] House of Lords (2005-2006). *Select Committee on Review of the BBC Charter, Second Report of Session 2005–06, Further issues for BBC Charter Review*, HL 128–I, para 59.

[101] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2005-2006). *Public Diplomacy, Third Report of Session 2005-2006*, HC 903, Ev. 15.

specific cultural institutions more or less try to find an answer to this question, most of the time failing to do so. The 1980s and 1990s were a period of increasing interconnectedness and globalisation of means of communication for CD practices. The BC also underwent some transitions parallel to these new global phenomena. The BC underwent some institutional reorganisations, and these reorganisations were mostly initiated and facilitated by the UK government. This chapter uses internal reports by the BC and governmental reports about the BC's work, which I have defined in the introduction. I will also use some accounts from significant people who were influential in the policy changes of the BC (roughly) between 1980 and 2015.

The three issues to be kept in mind within this chapter, detailed here with discussions of policy statements, are the following: since its inauguration, the main issues for the BC have been funding (and related to that, keeping the funding bodies happy by orienting their projects in line with their purposes), keeping the balance between cultural relations and CD in their work, and ensuring their work overseas does not remain a one-way street. These three aspects and the decisions related to them are central to the changing CD discourse of the BC. And any structural reorganisation or significant change in the focus of work of the BC revolves around these three issues. However, in terms of understanding these three aspects in detail, this chapter will focus on the dilemmas created by tensions between cultural relations and CD and the BC's position in the face of these two. The chapter will demonstrate the following: BC has refrained from using CD as a method and a concept and defined its work along the lines of (inter)cultural relations. However, the BC has also evolved to become a full-fledged CD organisation with a political agenda designated by the government to a great extent.

At the end of the 1980s, BC had two significant financial and research and development supporters. These are the then two parts of the FCO (at the time), the Diplomatic Wing and the Overseas Development Administration (ODA).[102] They conveyed their concerns about how far British cultural relations overseas should be left in the hands of the private sector.[103] These concerns led to discussions on whether the BC was essential. In the 1980s, the very existence and continuation of the BC were in question. Finally, in 1980, the Prime Minister agreed to the BC's continuation – the main issue discussed at the meeting between Margaret Thatcher and the BC's Board Chairman was the prospect of cultural relations completely merging into the

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[102] Donaldson, F. (1984). *The British Council: the first fifty years*. London: Cape.

[103] Ibid, p. 34.

FCO.[104] Naturally, that would not be ideal for both parties; because the BC's arm's length policy would be in danger. The same year, Sir John Burgh appointed a new Director-General to the BC. After his appointment, the number of internal inquiries the BC had to undergo increased, all to define the Council's objectives and do activity analyses. In the contemporary period, BC carries out its activity analyses with words such as evaluation and impact.

Sir John Burgh is a prominent figure in the contemporary direction the UK's CD took with the BC. Director of the BC from 1980 to 87, he defined a clearly and meticulously structured cultural policy abroad for Britain.[105] He welcomed and facilitated the decision of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee to undertake an inquiry into the concept of CD – which I also used as a reference in the previous section of this chapter about the CD strategies of Britain. [106] Besides, Burgh's meetings with journalists and influential individuals in policymaking constituted much of the literature about the BC.[107] As an experienced civil servant who served in different ministries for over 30 years, it is no surprise that he primarily focused on policymaking and retrieving more funds for the BC. Nevertheless, because the BC underwent new cuts just before he took office, his work was also more of raising the morale of the staff and giving them hope that they were doing something meaningful. As we can recall, the Select Committee inquiry (1986) also suggested the decision to refer UK's cultural promotion abroad as CD. And after this date, the BC and the UK government used the phrase CD more frequently.[108] Burgh was one of the architects of this decision.

Directly affecting the reorganisation of the BC was the government's response to the Foreign Affairs Committee Report of 1986 - 1987 on Cultural Diplomacy, which I discussed in the previous section of the chapter.[109] The answer to this report came in the same year, followed by a House of Lords statement about CD and the BC.[110] This response was an approval of the government about giving CD more agency as a field of action, which would fend off the cultural relations aspect of what the BC was doing. Therefore, we can infer that the BC had come to terms with using CD as the reference point for what they were doing overseas after

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[104] Ibid, p. 35.

[105] Lee, J. M. (1995) "The Reorganisation of The British Council: Management Improvisation and Policy Uncertainty," *Public Administration 73*, no. 3. 339–55.

[106] Ibid, 339.

[107] Mitchell, J. M. (1986). *International cultural relations*. London: Allen and Unwin.

[108] Foreign Affairs Commitee. (1987). *Cultural Diplomacy*. (4th report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs) HC24 (1986-7) London: HMSO.

[109] Foreign Affairs Committee (1987) CM 231.

[110] House of Lords (1988) Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords 5th series, Vol 492 (1987-88) cols. 209-46 (20 Jan.)

the 1980s. And they had government support for this. So now, the BC had to persuade the public and the recipients of their work that CD, cultural relations, and PD were all concepts and activities in their own right and that doing each would benefit the UK.

The grant-in-aid from the government mainly created BC's structural organization. During the 1970s and 1980s, the ODA was the most significant financial contributor to the BC.[111] The agency fees made up 45% of the council's total income.[112] From 1991, ODA started offering yearly contracts rather than automatically granting the CD educational contracts.[113] The different working areas of the Council, such as arts, development, education, and English language, were determined based on the varying amounts of grants for each of these routes. The country directors working in overseas offices influenced the significant decisions about revenue spending. For the BC, it was always challenging to balance specific country objectives and the more comprehensive problems that emerge as consequences of foreign policy issues. For example, there were times when rising oil prices directly influenced the CD activities of the BC in the late 1980s and the late 90s: Iran and, specifically, Gulf countries started to be increasingly interested in bringing the BC over for English education.[114] This is only one example; other factors influenced BC's direction and focus in doing CD. These controversial factors should be a part of the CD narrative to reflect the scope of the CD as comprehensively as possible. And these controversial aspects, after all, are thy CD is such a disputed concept.

According to the Appraisal Report, in 1991, BC started to direct its libraries and learning centres towards the service of priority groups, such as universities and young professionals, rather than the general public.[115] The reason for that was the approaching new technologies that would soon change the face of libraries, reading, and the very essence of teaching and gaining knowledge. Soon enough, in 1996, the arrival of the internet increasingly transformed BC libraries into Knowledge and Learning Centres, which provided computer and video conference technologies. And from 2001 to 2010, BC libraries had widespread closure. Still, the critical point here is the decision to close libraries connected to the BC's regional

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[111] *Appraisal Report of the British Council* (2016). National Archives. Available at https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/draft-appraisal-report-british-council.pdf. (p. 7)

[112] Ibid, p. 7.

[113] Ibid, p. 8.
[114] British Council Annual Report, (1991).
[115] *Appraisal Report of the British Council* (2016). National Archives. Available at https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/draft-appraisal-report-british-council.pdf. (p. 9)

offices came from the individual country directors rather than a global policy decision.[116] This instance demonstrates the increasingly spontaneous nature of CD along with changes in communicative globalization. And the policymaking spheres had to oblige, regardless of the consequences.

The BC's divided its overseas networking system into three divisions:

- o Overseas A: Originally the Commonwealth States, then Africa and the Middle East
- o Overseas B: Americas, Asia, and the Pacific
- o Overseas C: Europe

In 2005, the divisions changed into 13 regions (like Africa, the Americas, Western Europe, Southeast Europe, etc.). Finally, in 2010, the regions were reduced to seven, and BC restructured them to synchronise them with BC's key business areas.[117]

The departmental structuring of the BC also demonstrates the shifting approach to implementing CD abroad. In the early 1990s, the Council has structured around three service divisions: Grant-funded services (art activities funded by government Grant-in-Aid), Educational enterprises (BC's revenue-earning activities), and Development and Training Services (management of agreements for funding bodies and private sector). In 2010, BC created three Strategic Business Units (SBUs): Arts, Education and Society, English, and Exams. The SBUs formed a platform structure with the overseas countries, attempting to coordinate policy and its delivery.[118] Within the BC practitioners, there is a certain discretion about the discrepancies between policy and its implementations. The government policies regarding the BC changed quite a lot between 1980 and the 1990s, as demonstrated by a few examples. This was one of the first times a BC report complained of a gap between policy and delivery. The post-Cold War world had many fast-changing and novel characteristics, and the BC realized that to keep up with these changes. There had to be better policy and work coordination between the council and the government. In other words, what was expected of the BC by the UK government should have been better explained and exerted.

Another significant change was the differentiation between cultural relations and the work of CD as an agent of a government. While the debates around various concepts such as

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[116] Ibid, p. 10.
[117] Ibid, p. 9 – 10.
[118] Ibid, p. 11.

CD, public diplomacy, international cultural relations, foreign cultural relations, etc., also outlined in the introduction here, continued; the BC came up with another solution in the 1990s to this. A Counterpoint report commissioned by the BC detailed this once again to end the discussion of the definitions. The name of this report was *Mutuality, Trust, and Cultural Relations,* and Counterpoint published in 2004. Here, the report divided the main activities of the BC into two: PD and cultural relations. It does not matter if the council uses the word 'public' or 'cultural' before 'diplomacy' because the real difference is here: there is one type of work that the BC does as an agent of the government, in close collaboration with the Foreign Office and various other departments of the government, and there is a second type of work that it does, which is cultural relations: the job based on the perception of our independence.[119] And this differentiation is referred to as "the two voices we use."[120] But naturally, it is more than just voices: this is a deliberate policy direction that the BC took because now it fully embraced the CD aspect of its work. The BC was not merely a cultural organisation but more of a diplomatic one. What follows in the next pages of the report also confirms this hypothesis: "It would be quite wrong to suggest that the BC has objectives that are in the smallest degree different from those of the FCO."[121] So, it is an unrefuted fact that the BC has the same objectives as the FCO. But in their view, what makes them different from the FCO is BC's 'Unique Selling Proposition' (USP),[122] which is not explained here in this document. Still, one can assume that it refers to the different methods the BC uses compared to the FCO in its efforts to promote British interests. The Appraisal Report also introduced the activities of the BC in two groups: core activity excluding agency work on behalf of the government and services as an agent of the UK government. The former category included scholarships, fellowships for overseas students, educational visits, books, library and information services, arts, commissioning new works in music, literature, drama, and film, English language teaching, promoting UK universities overseas, support for academic services, and organizing conferences. Interestingly, the latter category consists of more or less the same activities: administration of scholarships for overseas students, technical cooperation and training programs, examinations overseas, youth exchanges overseas, especially in Europe, and volunteering programs overseas.[123] How are these two different areas categorized? There was

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[119] Rose, M. & Wadham-Smith, N. (2004). *Mutuality, trust and cultural relations*. Counterpoint, British Council. (p. 5).
[120] Ibid, p. 5.
[121] Ibid, p. 6.
[122] Ibid, p. 5.
[123] Ibid, pp. 12-13.

no answer to this question, but it is not difficult to suggest that BC's income and a grant from the government have to do something with this classification. Either way, the nature of the work remains the same, mainly around the CD.

The three Strategic Business Units (SBUs) helped the BC better regionalize its activities. For example, the Arts SBU helps develop various projects in music, arts, film, literature, the creative and cultural economy, etc., which applies to all regions where the BC operates. In Education and Society SBUs, education work focuses on cooperation in higher education, schools, vocational training, etc. On the other hand, society work delivers aid and technical assistance funded through Grant-in-Aid or DfID, the EU, and donors such as the World Bank.[124] Finally, social work mainly focused on Western Europe and other western intermediaries regarding financial support. This step was a way of meaningfully regionalizing BC's work at the beginning of the 21st century.

In 1992-93, the management structure of the BC created three new activity streams. A grant-in-aid manager, an enterprises group, and a contracts group called Development and Training Services were in motion by the end of 1993.[125] These moves reflect the commercialization of BC's policies and, in a way, conform to the premise *that pays the piper calls the tune*. Cultural relations organisations such as the BC have been subject to evaluations and criticism based on this premise. These new activity areas of the BC moved the BC toward an institution more in line with the requirements of the ODA and FCO. According to the then Cultural Relations Department of the FCO, this new structure facilitated the relationships between diplomats and the staff of the BC.[126] In addition, in 1993, the FCO and the BC signed the first Memorandum of Understanding, indicating a structural change in how the BC built its relationship with the FCO. Before this time, the relationship between the two institutions was less structured and more fragmented: FCO decided to support BC ad hoc, depending on the council's demands and need for support. But with the introduction of the MoUs, government grants, the BC's relationship with the private sector, and the classification of turnovers from other contracts were considered.[127] The BC signed the MoU in 1995, and this pattern continued every 3-4 years.

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[124] Ibid, p. 17.

[125] Lee, J. M. (1995) "The Reorganisation of The British Council: Management Improvisation and Policy Uncertainty," *Public Administration* 73, no. 3. 339–55. (347)

[126] Ibid, 349

[127] Appraisal Report of the British Council (2016). National Archives. Available at https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/draft-appraisal-report-british-council.pdf (p. 43).

With the Report on Cultural Diplomacy in 1987, the Foreign Affairs Committee defined the work of the BC under five main headings: the interchange of people, libraries, promotion of books and information, promotion of English, promotion of the arts, and implementation of educational projects.[128] When we come to the 1990s, the visible emphasis was on the factors contributing to the management strategy: better management and measurement of results, better revenue earning, ensuring that professional services met business needs, improved financial performance, and development of appropriate human resources and policies.[129] BC shaped its projects based on the priorities of the FCO, among which were the transformation of the former Eastern bloc to open market societies (Know-How Fund for Eastern Europe), promoting of good governance in developing countries, advertising of British exports and Britain as a country of investment, and promoting Britain as a source of scientific and technical expertise.[130] The latter form of promotion was evident in the projects of the BC with the Gulf countries.

In the early 1990s, the collaboration between the Know-How Fund (referred to as KHF) and the BC gained a new pace. Especially in 1993, 94, and 95, the BC developed several new projects aimed at management, business skills, and the stock market and banking training. The BC directly managed some of these projects, such as the 'Training for Management Trainers' active in Slovakia and Albania or the 'accountancy training centre' in Kazakhstan.[131] The management structure of the KHF comprises professional advisers from the ODA, several ministries, British embassies and missions, and contracted advisors from the private and banking sector.[132] The BC approached embassies and missions for advice on KHF policies. The increasing focus on developing business markets and governmental issues in the Eastern European and Former Soviet Union countries pushed the Council away from pursuing cultural relations, bringing it closer to "cultural diplomacy," which, by then, was accepted as partly a governmental effort.[133] The BC and the Confederation of British Industry developed the Joint Industrial Training Unit of the BC (JICAP) under the aegis of KHF, initially developed to provide Polish business managers with experience and knowledge about British market-

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[128] Foreign Affairs Commitee. (1987). *Cultural Diplomacy*. (4th report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs) HC24 (1986-7) London: HMSO.
[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid, & *Know-How Fund Annual Report* (1993-1994). The National Archives, (BS 14/4005).

[131] *Know-How Fund Annual Report* (1993-1994). The National Archives, (BS 14/4005). (p. 13)
[132] *Know-How Fund Annual Report* (1994). The National Archives, (BS 14/4005). (p. 7)

[133] British Council Annual Report (1995-1996).

oriented organisations.[134] In addition, the UK government wanted to promote the KHF projects on several media channels too, so in 1995-96, the BBC and several Romanian TV channels produced a series of weekly channel programs, all in line with the editorial standards of the BBC. "This was the first time Romanians saw news presented in such a format, and the response was extremely positive. The KHF is indebted to the BBC for allowing the project access to its international news footage".[135] Here, the BBC promoted the KHF projects as an element of CD through media channels. This research does not explicitly focus on the media aspect of British CD, which could be the topic of another dissertation. Still, BC was in close collaboration with the KHF, and the BBC promoted KHF, demonstrating that the BC was conforming to the political promotion aspects of CD.

Similar to JICAP, another scheme managed by the BC in the 1990s and incorporated into the Know-How Fund is the Chancellor's Financial Sector Scheme, launched in 1992. The purpose was to give practical know-how to aspiring executives from the former Soviet Union countries. These future leaders would visit the financial centers of the UK, attend courses and bring back this experience to their countries, which would benefit the economic and business sectors of such countries.[136] The BC managed this scheme based on the partnership between the public and private sectors. This scheme is a prime example of the CD because it aims to bring the UK's experience to another country and shape its financial systems accordingly. Of course, an ideal CD has achieved mutuality; we cannot discuss any kind of mutuality in this case. The scheme specifically reached extensive participation and audience in Russia, which at the time was going through the rapid growth of the credit card industry. In these training, organised jointly by the KHF and the BC, the British insurance businesses taught the Russian business people about the training implemented in the British model.

Since 1997, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) has focused on the importance of creativity in the UK's economic development and its status as a cultural hub. As demonstrated in the previous section on the UK's PD and CD, the Carter and Wilton reviews also emphasized DCMS's involvement in promoting the UK. This emphasis brought another aspect to the BC's continuous efforts to define CD and to maintain the distinction between the work it does in particular regions and British foreign policy. Ali Fisher, the former representative of Counterpoint, explained: "As the emphasis shifts away from listening and

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[134] Hamilton, K. (2013) *Transformational Diplomacy after the Cold War: Britain's Know-How Fund in Post-Communist Europe, 1989-2003*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. (p. 39).

[135] *Know-How Fund Annual Report* (1995-1996). The National Archives. (BS 14/4005).

[136] Ibid

increasingly towards the promotion of a particular perspective, the CD is the act of presenting a cultural good to an audience in an attempt to engage them in the ideas which the producer perceives to be represented by it."[137] So, we could suggest that the 2000s were a period of defining and redefining BC's works concerning various activity schemes and conceptual analyses. My argument here is that all these analyses inevitably led to the concept of CD, which is generally the direction where the BC activity agenda moved. In 1998, the BC introduced new and additional strategic objectives to its schedule, including "demonstrating the UK's commitment to strengthening ties within Europe and developing European cultural and intellectual exchange." The emphasis on Europe is visible again: the report specifies no other region except Europe and British contributions to a European CD. This emphasis also led to more cooperation with European CD organizations such as the Goethe Institute.

Following the 2007-2008 economic crisis, BC's grant-in-aid underwent some substantial cuts in 2008. The art department of BC specifically suffered from the cuts. This image was dangerous for the BC: it did not want to be an institution that would cut back on arts as a first resort when there was a financial problem.[138] For that reason, BC wished to remedy the situation by taking some precautions. One of these was the critical arts report that the BC requested from Graham Devlin. Devlin is a creative artist, senior arts manager, and cultural strategist, and he also served as Deputy Secretary-General and Acting Chief Executive of the Arts Council of England. In addition, he has worked with various arts and culture organisations and theatres.[139] His report offered criticisms, insights, and suggestions about the BC's dealing with the arts and creative industry. In addition, as I will demonstrate with my analysis, it also represents another aspect of dealing with CD.

The report opens with the acceptance that the ground-breaking millennial events such as 9/11 and the economic crisis of 2007-8 have disrupted the presumed world order. Most of the existing literature on CD, which seeks to examine the relationship between the 9/11 events and CD, focuses on the US public and CD.[140] Devlin Report is one of the first reports that significantly impacted BC's approach to art and creativity, and it opens the discussion with the

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[137] Fisher, A. (2009) "Four Seasons in One Day: The Crowded House of Public Diplomacy in the UK". In Snow, N. (Ed.), Snow, N. (Ed.), Taylor, P. (Ed.). (2009). *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. New York: Routledge, (p. 253). https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203891520

[138] "Graham Devlin". Retrieved on 20.06.19 from https://www.diversecity.org.uk/team/graham-devlin/

[139] Ibid.
[140] Some examples would be: Melissen, J. New Public Diplomacy; Donfried, M. Searching for CD; Fitzpatrick, K. R. (2011). US Public Diplomacy in a Post 9/11 World: From Messaging to Mutuality. US Centre on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School.

distressing facts that directly influence CD. In the wake of 9/11 and the 2008 economic crisis, the BC did two things: first, it re-examined its overseas role. It chose to redefine itself as an *international cultural relations* organisation. Secondly, as I pointed out above, it made an effort to replace the revenues lost after the economic crisis when the government made substantial cuts to the BC grant-in-aid. One of the ways to remedy this was for the Council to "come up with good quality and appropriate content in BC programs, and the arts should be the major provider of that content."[141] However, the first efforts to do this were not very successful. The BC tried to develop an entirely new art program involving new digital technologies, re-prioritising and taking resources from the developed countries and channelling them to the developing ones (China, India, Mexico), and reducing staff in Western Europe.[142] These precautions made things worse; it resulted in a 65% decline in arts productivity in 2003-2004 and a further decline in 2007-8. According to Devlin, "the British arts sector expressed serious concern that these changes indicated that the BC did not appreciate the contribution the arts make to its mission."[143] In addition, the Devlin report advised the BC "to develop more arts-focused projects that have the potential to involve other disciplines such as good governance, science, etc."[144] It also urged the BC to define a set of global outputs through which it can evaluate and report against its arts activity.[145] This last requirement specifically shows that all art projects should have at least one solid, measurable aspect to them, which would allow the BC to arrive at concrete results concerning the effectiveness of its work. However, this requirement does not bode well with the premise of cultural relations, "letting arts grow organically, and not being sure of the results at the end of this process."[146] However, it is very well aligned with the idea of CD because although CD can develop and grow in a non-state environment as well, the end goal of it is always about the realization of short-term and long-term political interests.

The BC also recognized that the arts do not always fit into the requirements of corporate structures. Artworks, by their nature, are experimental and unpredictable; they are resistant to limitations and require an independent environment to thrive. And the artistic process should be open-ended, free from presumed negative or positive outcomes. For this reason, if the artists

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[141] Devlin, G. (2008) *Art Contents in Future British Council Programmes. Devlin Summary Report*, (p. 1)
[142] British Council Annual Report, 2007-2008.
[143] Devlin, G. (2008) *Art Contents in Future British Council Programmes. Devlin Summary Report*, (p. 1)

[144] Ibid, p.2.

[145] Ibid, p. 2.

[146] Ibid, p. 2.

sense a grander scheme set by the BC and need to create artwork that would fit into a pre-planned agenda, they react negatively. The explanation Devlin brings to this dilemma is, "however, since most artists are already deeply engaged with moral, philosophical and political issues, many will be working on material that is highly compatible with the BC's main themes."[147] This is a significant explanation because it signals the future approach of the BC on this subject, which we have continued to see until the present day. If artists are already politically engaged, and the BC has a political agenda or aims to fulfil, then the BC's work is entirely compatible with what CD means. By accepting this, the policy orientation of the BC can align with CD more than ever.

Although it focuses on the arts and how to improve the art aspect of the BC, the Devlin report also discusses the general dilemmas of cultural work overseas. The report looks at the global reach of BC's work, large-scale vs. small-scale projects, CD vs. (inter)cultural relations, and investment in the developed vs. the developing world.[148] Devlin's respondents responded to these issues with *either/or* answers as if the BC had to choose one over the other.[149] Devlin disagreed with his respondents and claimed that these are all "false polarities that should be susceptible to a both/and approach."[150] His take on CD and (inter)cultural relations is specifically interesting: "some contributors from the arts sector expressed a tension between the BC's historical model of high-status events (showcases) and its new aspiration to work as an intercultural development agency ."The report continues: "However, the two approaches should not be incompatible as both old and new models can involve the full spectrum of BC activity and still address its strategic aims."[151] There are two points to be criticised here. First, this report does not clarify what it means by "old" and "historical" models of events. Does this mean CD is a concept of the past, and (inter)cultural relations are one of the present/future? If this is the case, how is BC still using CD as a concept when it is suitable for the messages it endeavours to convey?[152] CD is inherently a political endeavour, making the politicization of every art project through the BC inevitable. Secondly, the real dilemma here is indeed an ancient one: it is the dilemma of genuinely democratizing the CD and PD efforts of the

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[147] Ibid, p.2.

[148] Ibid, p. 4.

[149] Ibid, p.5.

[150] Ibid, p. 4

[151] Ibid, p. 4

[152] The BC still refers to CD as one of its overseas aims, and an aspect of improving its soft power. The latest example would be the 2018 Report on *Cultural Value*, prepared in collaboration with the Goethe Institute. Available: https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/lit_review_short_working_paper_final_final.pdf

countries. The BC has come a very long way in achieving that. However, the reluctance in this report to make full use of CD shows that what Sir John Burgh aspired to reach nearly 30 years ago is still relevant. The third issue is the following: the report writes, "Many programs will be multidisciplinary rather than pure art projects, and this could be a benefit to arts, providing the opportunity for art-led products with the capacity to incorporate other BC disciplines ."In my opinion, this sentence openly acknowledges that pure art projects are not compatible with what the BC is trying to achieve, and by doing that, it contradicts the message that the report tries to convey: that there is no friction, an either/or situation between arts and CD. I argue that there is friction, and the ambiguity of this report in addressing this issue – one of the most extensive reports written and commissioned by the BC that deals with arts and CD in the 21st century-also demonstrates that.

Lastly, the report makes some suggestions about the policy and strategy development of the BC. According to the report, the content of art projects "must relate to the BC's strategic purposes and objectives" as detailed by its strategic development channels.[153] So let's look at the strategic purposes and objectives of BC. As defined in the corporate plans, we will see that one of them is "assisting reform and sustainable development, strengthening the UK's role in Europe, encouraging greater awareness of the UK."[154] This purpose is in line with the CD objectives of the UK, and it also proves that what the Devlin report found to be a "false" conflict is a true and very justified one. In addition, the regionalization of UK CD within Europe is also seen in this example, which suggests that the UK did have a purpose of situating itself within the European borderlands and wanted to be a central actor in Europe's CD.

The relationship between the UK government and the BC causes misunderstandings between CD and cultural relations. This relationship entails the accountability of BC to the government, thus creating friction. The debates in the Parliament around the concept of CD demonstrate these dilemmas, and here I will use some. While the BC refers to what they do as (inter)cultural relations, the government calls it CD.[155] For instance, from the 1990s onwards, the debates about BC in the UK Parliament have revolved around BC activities aligning with the UK government's priorities. In 1998-1999, "the principal areas of the BC are law and good

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[153] Devlin, G. (2008) *Art Contents in Future British Council Programmes. Devlin Summary Report*, (p. 8)
[154] British Council, British Council Corporate Plan 2000-2005, Corporate Plan (London, UK: British Council, 2005)
[155] FCO, Triennial Review of the British Council (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, July 22, 2014), Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/335494/140722_PDF_of_British_Council_Triennial_Review_with_Annexes_FINAL.pdf

governance, and its country offices are well placed to undertake activities in these areas which coincide with the Foreign Office objectives."[156] These statements show that the UK government has almost always regarded the BC as an instrument of CD. And it classified BC as a PD organisation. We can suggest that the close connection between the UK government and BC has not changed much since BC's inauguration in the 1930s.

> The purpose of operational and, indeed, the structural distance between the FCO and the Council was deliberately established by the Foreign Office in the 1930s and early 1940s and serves a two-fold purpose. First, it was designed to enable the Council to draw in a broader reach of users of its services overseas and a wider range of potential (and existing partners) amongst those who, in their own countries, may not wish to engage directly with overseas governments. Second, given the natural tendency of audiences to discount official information and activities, particularly when mounted by other governments, the structures were set up to ensure the programs and services of the Council carried credibility.[157]

This quotation from a House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in 2005 confirms that the BC is an intermediary organisation, facilitating the understanding between the UK government and societies of other governments. Being an intermediary of cultural relations aligns with the aims of CD by definition, and there is a similar logic of intermediaries in the case of Germany, as we will see further in the thesis. However, at the same time, and after that, BC officials constantly tried to drop CD from their discourse. For the BC, "PD is a governmental activity, and whatever we call what we do, it is not a governmental activity."[158] Compared to the statements of Rose and Wadham-Smith in the Mutuality report, there is a stark conflict between these two approaches. And it confirms the hypothesis that the BC has always viewed public diplomacy as equivalent to CD. The distance between the policy decisions and an art exhibition or a literature festival is not very wide, just like the arms-length policy of the BC does not represent an actual distance. The distance is there to convince people in overseas countries who, as stated above, tend not to trust words spoken directly by a government. And no amount of soft promotion of culture is going to change this. We can accept that even without the emphasis on building trust with others, the BC as a non-departmental public body is more likely to be trusted than the British government, as Rivera suggests in his

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[156] UK Parliament (1998-1999). *Non-Departmental Public Bodies*. House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs First Report, article 74. Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/100/10006.htm

[157] UK Parliament (2005-2006). "British Council Note to Foreign Affairs Committee on Accountability – Introduction". *House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence*. Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmfaff/903/5101209.htm

[158] Pamment, J. (2012) *New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century a Comparative Study of Policy and Practice*. New York: Routledge.

work on the relationship between the UK government and the BC. [159] Let's look back and remember one of the most widely used definitions of CD, which belongs to Cummings: "the exchange of values, education, knowledge, art, music, and other aspects of culture or identity among countries and people to foster understanding and strengthen relationships."[160] We can suggest that this is a definition of cultural relations because it does not ascribe a role to the government and does not specify why we need to create trust and understanding.

5. Cultural Diplomacy and National Interests

The British government's concerns with PD and CD supporting its foreign policy objectives in the 21st century – specifically in and after 2005, as stated by Rivera – reflects the diminishing reputation abroad after it participated in the Iraq War. The government's quickest and safest primary tools to deal with this problem, including the work of the BC, were PD and CD. Within the government discourse, be it the Parliament debates or the FCO debates on cultural relations, it is hard to find direct connections between these two (meaning the participation of the UK in the Iraq war and the need to redeem some things using CD). However, the dots are not very hard to connect in this case. If we remember the Carter report, discussed in the previous chapter on the UK's PD and CD, it openly referred to the BC's role in supporting the national interest.[161] With the influence of 9/11 and the Iraq War, the BC started to voice concerns about the relations between the UK and Muslim countries. Therefore, specifically in times of rising crisis, it seems clear that the BC is an organisation looking out for the country's national interests, as demonstrated in the report evidence in the previous section of the chapter. Then again, especially by the practitioners of the BC, contrary claims continue to be made until the present day. I will examine some examples here and in the next section of the chapter.

Because I mentioned the Iraq War and its implications for CD, it might be helpful to draw on the same point further due to its relationship to building 'national interests.' Following 9/11, in 2001, the BC redirected its funding to Muslim countries and launched a project called *Connecting Futures*. The sole purpose of this project was to rebuild mutual trust between young

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[159] Rivera, T. (2015). *Distinguishing Cultural Relations from Cultural diplomacy: The British Council's Relationship with Her Majesty's Government*. USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School. (p. 12)

[160] Cummings, M. C. (2009). "Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey." *Cultural Diplomacy Research Series, Americans fort he Arts*.

[161] House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2005-2006). *Public Diplomacy, Third Report of Session 2005-2006*, HC 903, Ev. 6.

people from the Arab and broader Muslim world and the UK.[162] The BC returned to Iraq in 2003 after four years of absence in Baghdad's capital. The first supplementary note on the BC in Iraq, produced as evidence for the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Commons, states, "the establishment of security is the key issue. The political situation is likely to remain brittle for the foreseeable future."[163] The BC re-started its work in this area as a fully-fledged development agency (national interests), and the main areas of operation are education, governance, and social development. Besides the academic guidance provided for the local university staff, education ministry personnel, and school teachers, BC provided training for more than 100 oil ministry staff, and a DFID-funded £3 million project for a Political Participation fund started to increase the political awareness and participation of Iraqis.[164] In addition, English language education in Iraq is referred to at this minute as "Iraq's window on the world."[165] This language, and all of these BC projects in Iraq, aiming to improve the UK's "rebuilding ties" with Iraq.[166] There is no mention of arts, or the creative sector improved because the country had just emerged from the war as the government discussed these minutes. This example shows that the BC has moved further away from doing cultural relations only, and it has taken on the role of CD and PD, together with all of the political connotations accompanying them.

Connected to this narrative, in 2005, MPs and independent commentators accused the BC of "fuelling anti-British extremism by promoting material strongly critical of the Iraq war[167]." According to an article in the *Telegraph*, some MPs were furious that the Council, which receives £180 million a year of taxpayers' money, has gone as far as to publish content that could damage the UK's image abroad.[168] The article says, "One of the pieces on the BC's website accused Britain and the US of using Iraq as a testing ground for cluster bombs, while the other article blamed Tony Blair and George Bush for killing thousands of innocents and

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[162] *Appraisal Report of the British Council* (2016). National Archives. Available at https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/draft-appraisal-report-british-council.pdf. (p. 46)

[163] House of Commons (2006). *Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence "Operating Context"* Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmfaff/903/5101215.htm

[164] Ibid "Overview – Governance"

[165] Ibid ""Sectors in which we operate"

[166] Ibid "Sectors in which we operate"

[167] "Paid for by the British Council, claim that UK tested cluster bombs on Iraqi civilians" Retrieved from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1499130/Paid-for-by-the-British-Council-claim-that-UK-tested-cluster-bombs-on-Iraqi-civilians.html.

[168] Ibid.

destroying the oldest civilisation in the world."[169] The head of BC and a former leader of the Labour Party, Neil Kinnock, apologized for some of the contributions. Consequently, BC removed all of the articles from its website. It was the BC's think-tank Counterpoint that commissioned the pieces. Criticisms were voiced by MPs as follows:

> "These sentiments sound like the views expressed by the extremists the government is trying to get out of the country.
>
> The BC is funded by the government to promote Britain overseas, not to promote extremist views.
>
> While I agree the council needs to reach out to the wider world, there are right and wrong ways of doing that."[170]

It is striking to realise that it just takes a critical article to be published for some politicians to write off BC's work entirely. By printing the views of many thinkers and artists, the Counterpoint think tank tried to create a pool of ideas about conflicting issues, whether some parties liked it or not. Therefore, government officials should not have labelled opinions that they did not like as "promoting extremism," It was wrong of the BC to take these articles off the grid because it harms its openness and integrity. Besides, if there are right and wrong ways of doing cultural relations work, it is again accepted that certain authorities decide on these right and wrong ways. And the word of these authorities is usually final about determining what the BC will produce and what it will not. This finality sets the course of CD: no matter how long the arm in the "arms-length policy" is, there is always a point where the criticisms take precedence over the practices, and the freedom of cultural and artistic expression that should come naturally vanishes.

Upon receiving these criticisms, the director of communications at the BC, Christopher Wade, said, "We accept that they should not have been published, and we are reviewing our procedures… However, publication of these views does not imply that the BC endorses them."[171] If the publication of these views does not imply that the BC endorses them, then taking them off their website certainly means something. It shows that the Council cannot be completely free and independent of its context. And precisely for that reason, this attitude would be a perfect fit for a CD organisation, not so much a cultural relations organisation. If it had been an independent cultural relations organization, it would not have anything or anyone

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[169] Ibid.

[170] Ibid.

[171] Hastings, C. (25 Sept 2005) "Paid for the British Council, claim that the UK tested cluster bombs on Iraqi civilians" *The Telegraph*. Available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/4197567/Paid-for-by-the-British-Council-claim-that-UK-tested-cluster-bombs-on-Iraqi-civilians.html

to answer. It was precisely for that reason that the Carter report strongly recommended an independent review of the BC conducted by the FCO to examine what the BC did, why it was doing it, and whether any other intermediaries could do their job better.[172] However, instead of undertaking this report and looking deeper into the essence of the BC's work, the BC was just given more funds to increase its work in the Islamic world.[173] This attitude started to create a vicious cycle: as the BC ignored the voices calling for an exhaustive review of its work, it continued spending more money on cultural relations with the Muslim world. The problems that came along due to this attitude, such as the one exemplified above, continued to reflect one of BC's most dilemmas.

In its 2011-12 spending and finances report presented to Parliament, the Foreign Affairs Committee commented, "by any criteria, the BC is a major instrument of the UK's public diplomacy and soft power." In addition, "there is an increasing global recognition of the importance of cultural relations as a means of enhancing a country's reputation and status … and therefore, indirectly, of advancing the national interest.", as stated in FCO's report on PD and Olympic and Paralympic Games of 2012.[174] However, as this example shows, the discourse of national interests and the BC has continued until very recently. Criticisms that the BC has faced because of this point urged the Council to evaluate its stance on CD and cultural relations. And the necessary preparations for the first Triennial Review of the BC have thus begun.

6. The Triennial Review of the British Council

The Devlin Report analysed in the first section of this chapter was commissioned following the economic crisis in 2008. Due to the problem, the BC decided to decrease its involvement in the arts. As a result, the BC cut the art budget and critically reduced the activity level in creative arts. The report was an initiative prompted by the intense reactions of several art institutions in the UK. After 2008, the overwhelming direction that the BC took in terms of arts programs was to focus on a small number of projects with the same amount of money. In other words, if BC divided its revenues into 50 art projects before 2008, it now divided them into 10 with the same amount of money and more focus. To better structure this new approach, the Triennial

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[172] *Appraisal Report of the British Council* (2016). National Archives. Available at https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/draft-appraisal-report-british-council.pdf. (p. 48)
[173] Ibid, p. 48.
[174] *FCO Public Diplomacy: The Olympic and Paralympic Games* (2012), Second Report of Session 2010-12, HC 581

Review of the British Council was prepared by the FCO. In this section, I will discuss how this review affected BC's CD and how it brought BC closer to CD as a practice.

Since 2011, it has been the UK government's policy to review all non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) at least once every year.[175] The BC commissioned The Triennial Review in the context of this policy: to review the BC's activities and decide on the necessary changes or improvements. The final version of the review was finalised and published for the stakeholders in 2014. However, the public consultation process was started in 2013 by a small team in the FCO, and then a paper to inform the consultation process was published in September 2013.[176] This paper stated that the review's initial primary purpose would be to consider "whether the functions of the BC remain appropriate in terms of furthering the UK's interests, whether they are efficiently provided through an NDPB."[177] The public consultation paper quotes an article from the Coalition Programme of May 2010. It takes it as a reference point: "We will work to intensify our cultural, educational, commercial and diplomatic links with many nations beyond Europe and North America to strengthen the UK's relations with the fastest-growing areas of the world economy."[178] Besides, one of the main issues in this review was "the contribution of the BC to building influence for the UK through CD or soft power."[179] In the section dedicated to CD, the paper acknowledges that the government has had extensive discussions about BC's work, then states that BC does all three of these.[180] From this statement, we get the idea that the vagueness in the definition of BC will continue. Still, we will later see in the actual Triennial Review report that the BC is a CD organisation:

> For the Review, we refer to the activities of the BC broadly as 'CD'…, which encompasses the promotion of a country's culture and values to build positive relationships and influence, thereby furthering national interests. In other words, national culture supports foreign policy and diplomacy.[181]

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[175] UK Parliament (1998-1999). *Non-Departmental Public Bodies*. House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs First Report, article 74. Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaff/100/10006.htm

[176] FCO. (2013). *British Council Triennial Review Public Consultation*, (p. 4.) Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/239395/British_Council_Review_Discussion_Paper.pdf

[177] Ibid.
[178] HM Government. (2010). *The Coalition: Our Programme for Government*. Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/coalition_programme_for_government.pdf
[179] FCO. (2013). *British Council Triennial Review Public Consultation*, (p. 5)
[180] Ibid, p. 12-13
[181] FCO. (2014). *Triennial Review of the British Council*. Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/335494/140722_PDF_of_British_Council_Triennial_Review_with_Annexes_FINAL.pdf

This statement contrasts with what BC has been trying to convey to its audiences, that it is not a diplomatic organisation. In addition, the FCO's emphasis on the BC as an actor in furthering the country's national interests is again present. Of course, it is acceptable for the FCO to mention national interests in its context, but saying it in the context of a cultural organisation still struggling to solidify its claim to operate at an effective arms-length from the government puts the BC in a controversial position.

The public consultation paper of the Triennial Review focuses on income-generating activity extensively.[182] By 2015, the government's estimated grant-in-aid was less than 20% of the BC's overall income, an achievement compared to the 40% in the early 1980s.[183] We can assume it is an achievement because less money received from the government means more freedom for the Council in its activities. As Martin Davidson, ex-chief executive of the BC (2008-2014), stated in a written interview just before his leaving office in 2014:

> A big issue for organisations like this is government money. I'm proud we have found other sources of money and have gone from relying on the government for 60 to 65 percent of income to just under 20 percent. Just because we provide a public service does not mean we must depend on the public purse.[184]

The examples in the Triennial Review demonstrate that although the Council depends less on public funds, the fact that it still uses the discourse of a governmental organisation has not changed. We can infer that the Council has not effectively turned its arms-length freedom into an opportunity to re-evaluate its discourse. On the contrary, the FCO's stance in this matter only brings the Council closer to the governmental side of the scale.

In terms of the Council's delivery methods, the paper asks if voluntary or private sectors can deliver some or all functions of the BC under contract or through privatisation or mutualisation. It also asks if it would be more feasible to provide some or all functions of the BC through a new executive agency or public corporation.[185] The reason why these issues are open for debate is to discuss the benefits, opportunities, and risks that are involved in delivering services. These questions imply that BC is looking for alternative ways of delivering its work because of the political implications. While addressing this issue, the Triennial Review

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[182] FCO. (2013). *British Council Triennial Review Public Consultation*, (p. 16)

[183] Ibid, p. 16.

[184] Third Sector (2015). Parting Shot: Sir Martin Davidson of the British Council. *The Third Sector*. Available at https://www.thirdsector.co.uk/parting-shot-sir-martin-davidson-british-council/management/article/1329770

[185] FCO. (2013). *British Council Triennial Review Public Consultation*, (p. 17) Available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/239395/British_Council_Review_Discussion_Paper.pdf

suggests "activities should be more consistently of high quality and that the British Council should be more open to delivery in close cooperation with other relevant UK cultural institutions."[186] The issue is that BC already has various good cooperation partners, especially in creative industries, such as the British Film Institute, Arts Council, and National Theatre. Acknowledging this, the Review continues,

> with some exceptions, the BC support to the UK creative economy is not seen as well-defined or effective. In our view, activity needs to be better focused on Charter objects and coordinated with other UK players for maximum impact: the Council should only bid commercially when there is a clear UK benefit.[187]

Bringing up the Royal Charter objects gives the impression that the FCO is clear about the BC's continued alignment with the government. We can also see the same emphasis in an interview I conducted for this chapter with a senior BC official. "We orient our work in line with the original Royal Charter; we make money with English language education, which allows us to operate as a business. Then we reinvest into the organisation with this money."[188] We can suggest that the emphasis on the original Royal Charter of the BC has increased in recent decades. CD is an activity that, at some point, requires mutuality. If there is no mutuality, we cannot discuss a successful exchange of culture. Around the same time, in 2013, the BC published a report called *Culture Means Business*, which looked at the possible opportunities for economic benefits for the UK and for the countries where the BC operates.[189] This report proves that BC has moved further from being a cultural relations organisation and has significantly aligned itself with CD methods.

The Review expresses its final verdict about aligning the BC with the government objectives. "Weighing up the arguments, we arrived at the view that the interests of the UK are still best served by CD delivered with political impartiality and expertise at arm's length from Government, but that all BC activities should demonstrably further UK interests."[190] Triennial Review is one the government worked on for months, consulting different ministries, creative industry stakeholders, and arts bodies, and it still concludes that CD methods are the best in delivering the UK's cultural promotion abroad. Besides, the previous quotation is followed by

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[186] FCO. (2014). Triennial Review of the British Council. (p. 23)

[187] FCO. (2014). Triennial Review of the British Council. (p. 24)
[188] Personal Phone interview, 2019.
[189] British Council (2013) *Culture Means Business: How international cultural relationships contribute to the increased trade and competitiveness for the UK*. Available at https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/culture-means-business-report-v2.pdf.

[190] FCO. (2014). Triennial Review of the British Council. (p. 23)

"any new arrangements should add value, not bureaucracy[191]." However, the Review also decided that "establishing a formal FCO-led coordination mechanism to discuss strategy and performance with the Council based on relevant departmental priorities" would be more effective and appropriate.[192] From what can be understood, having a formal FCO-led mechanism would probably mean more bureaucracy. It would also mean that the metaphorical "arm" between the FCO and the BC would become even shorter. The evidence examined in this chapter points in that direction.

The Triennial Review also addresses the BC approach to Europe and European issues such as integration, migration, and promoting European culture. As the annual reports of the BC demonstrate, the 21st-century strategy for the BC was to reduce funds from the Western European countries, most of whom it considers its allies. The BC directed these funds to European integration efforts, primarily to Southeast Europe.[193] The primary resource shift was from Western Europe to the Middle East, and I have already discussed the reasons for this shift. However, we could suggest that the second most crucial resource shift concerned funds channelled toward Southeast Europe. As I pointed out earlier, the BC set the EU integration process as one of its main motivations for carrying out CD in the 21st century. One example of this effort was the project "Living Together," focusing on Southeast Europe. It was an intercultural dialogue program for this region, characterised by "great ethnic and religious differences."[194] One hundred eighty politicians, policymakers, civil society, and cultural sector representatives attended the project's opening. Therefore, we could suggest that a similar policy of "tackling extremism among young people," which was among the main reasons why the BC increased funds in the Middle East, was being followed by the BC in Southeast Europe. This policy direction reiterates my earlier hypothesis: one of the hidden but most vital reasons the BC does CD is to securitize the UK's external relations and borderlands rather than to reach the people of the region and create human bonds in the first place. And although the BC endeavours to categorize its work under (international) cultural relations to keep clear of the criticism that CD has received, this is precisely why the nature of the BC's work falls under the CD category.

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[191] Ibid, p. 23.

[192] Ibid, p. 38-39.
[193] British Council Annual Report (2007-2008) (p. 1-25).
[194] Ibid, p. 18.

One interesting aspect of this Southeast European focus of the BC happened in 2007-2008, around the 2008 recession. The BC's income has decreased in Turkey due to the closure of some BC teaching centres in Istanbul (not offices). In addition, four EU contracts between the BC and the EU focusing on integration work in Turkey also ended. Nevertheless, among the Southeast European countries the BC worked with during this period, Turkey received the highest FCO grant-in-aid (£2.9 million), followed by Romania (£1.2 million) and Israel (£1 million). Turkey and Israel are also among the countries that the BC defines as "countries that reflect the ethnic and cultural diversity of southeast Europe."[195] This focus on Turkey could be explained by the UK's continued support for Turkey's EU accession but also by the possibility that, in the UK's view, Turkey might have been home to extremist ideologies among young people. Therefore, by focusing on Turkey, the BC tried to create solutions to two foreign policy issues in the UK, the EU and Turkey. This example shows that the BC acted as an institution of CD in dealing with the issues concerning Europe's borderlands.

I have given the Southeast Europe focus of the BC as an example to demonstrate the policy decision to downgrade the arts involvement of the BC after 2008, as shown in the Triennial Review. The project mentioned above, "Living Together," was mostly a soft power project aiming to address threatening issues such as security concerns and extremism.[196] Art was involved in the project, with at least eight artists from different regions of Southeast Europe showcasing their works and focusing on displacement, assimilation, exclusion, and integration. But as can be seen from the overwhelming participation of politicians in the project and the subjects showcased, it was mainly a project of diplomacy and soft power, which again creates the perfect environment for CD.

One issue that the Triennial Review mentions is very significant in terms of the direction the BC would take in the 21st century. As we have already observed, the BC has different stakeholders, financial supporters, and other organizations with whom it cooperates. These stakeholders, the review follows, want to promote national culture more. Besides, they recognise the value of mutuality and interest in other cultures, but they think the BC leans too much toward 'internationalism.' As the Triennial Review observes:

> On the whole, UK stakeholders also want more promotion of national culture. They recognise the value of the reciprocal interest in other cultures but think the British Council leans too far towards "mutuality" (or "internationalism"). And stakeholders of

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[195] Ibid, p. 20.

[196] British Council Annual Report (2007-2008) (p. 1-25).

other nationalities sense some continuing embarrassment about promoting British-ness: 'you don't make enough of it. Another longstanding challenge is reconciling the promotion of the contemporary with stakeholder preference for the traditional, while an optimal outcome would be a well-balanced, imaginative offer including the promotion of heritage through a contemporary lens.[197]

There are a few issues to be addressed here. First, promoting national culture was always motivated BC as a CD organisation. However, when FCO undermines concepts such as 'mutuality' and 'internationalism,' it threatens the freedom of BC's work. Secondly, it demonstrates a stark conflict between the elite policymaking spheres and the practitioners again; because the BC's *Mutuality* report, also discussed in this chapter, was written only a few years before the Triennial Review. But now, the FCO dismisses the concept of mutuality as an extravagance that would not make the stakeholders happy. In addition, the concept of internationalism also becomes a victim here without even explaining what is meant by it. How does the FCO view BC's internationalism, and what is wrong with it? There is a logical flaw in this statement: the report words it as if internationalism and mutuality are opposites.

Thirdly, the report does not explain why the other countries' stakeholders (one immediately thinks of the cultural institutions such as the Goethe Institute) would want the UK to promote 'Britishness.' From the tone of the Triennial Review, I infer that the FCO wants the BC to promote Britishness and advises the BC not to be ashamed of it. Fourth, from the tone of this quotation, we can infer that the stakeholders see the promoted goods or values as 'traditional.' At the same time, there is also the 'contemporary' promotion of interests and values. Therefore, the Review suggests a balance between them. This approach reinforces the idea that most elite stakeholders of the BC are holding on to the past and want to promote the 'great' history of the empire, leaving out other aspects. It is not surprising to see another piece of information revealed in the Review: only 7% of the FCO heads of mission evaluated 'arts' activities as having a high impact, while 49% thought promoting culture was ineffective.[198] Suppose the Heads of Mission of the FCO, who have a say in the policymaking of the BC, which is fundamentally an arts and culture organisation, take such a stance. How could we talk about a balance between traditional and contemporary, cultural and political, and *hard and soft power*? In accepting that the BC is fundamentally a CD organization, first of all, serving the interests of the UK, the BC can give more precise answers to these questions. However, BC

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[197] Triennial Review, (2014). p. 109.
[198] Ibid, p. 108.

wants to maintain its culture and art aspect, while policymaking bodies and stakeholders disagree.

7. Conclusion

This chapter has primarily examined the governmental debates on PD and CD while endeavouring to situate these two concepts within foreign policymaking in the UK. These two concepts were under the aegis of the government's foreign policymaking bodies, such as the FCO and DFID. But, especially after the end of the 1980s, this started to change. The change has been twofold: on the one hand, both the government and stakeholders began to question the legitimacy of CD as a reference in foreign policymaking. This problem of legitimacy emerged from the following point. While CD claimed to reach people and create people-to-people connections between societies, the word diplomacy came from the traditional history of foreign policy and revoking ideas related to the sphere of hard power. For this reason, many policymakers, politicians, and non-governmental actors criticized the use of CD in the governmental sphere.

On the other hand, with the growing emphasis on a globalizing world, the importance of non-governmental actors, and the cultural sphere, a search began to find and decide who would be more effective actors in realizing CD. Furthermore, with the advent of globalising technologies and the importance of actors in cultural relations, new definitions of CD also started to emerge, which continued to blur where total institutions stood on the matter, and how/if they can maintain a successful CD in the 21st century. From the examples discussed in this section, it appears that with the inclusion of individual social actors in the cultural transmission of values, CD as a concept has lost its ability to work well with traditionally founded institutions. And at this point, the main cultural body of the UK, the BC, comes into the debate with increased importance – surrounded by controversy.

The BC had been using the term CD while defining its activities overseas. Besides, a similar discussion also took place within the individual policymaking processes of the institution. As a result, the BC has found itself in tension with the CD concept and started a search for a better definition. In time, the preferred term to define BC's work has changed in a variety of steps: from CD to soft power, targeted national promotion, engagement, and finally to cultural relations.

Chapter 3 – The Evolution of Cultural Diplomacy in Germany and the Goethe Institute

1. Foreign Cultural Relations after the Second World War

I will first outline the process of cultural relations debate within Germany's governmental sphere. Then, I will focus on the specific instances where the government and other influential stakeholders discussed CD or *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik* (foreign cultural relations – here referred to as FCR). The purpose here is to connect the government's discourse about *Kultur* and how it can be related to foreign cultural policymaking in the FRG. In addition, I will analyse the degree to which German CD uses the concept of soft power and whether it is central or peripheral to effective CD. The purpose of this section is to show the shift in the context of foreign cultural policy/CD in the way that the governmental spheres of the Federal Republic of Germany debated it. There are a couple of reasons why I will be focusing on Germany. The first is to track the parallels between the European integration of Germany to connect the influence of the German CD's impact on the European borderlands. Secondly, in Germany, foreign cultural policy has been regarded as the 'third pillar' of foreign policy, specifically in the 2000s. I will demonstrate what this meant for German CD and the controversies around it as a practice. Lastly, the significance of the multiculturalism debate in the context of foreign policy has an impact on the understanding of CD. All these aspects connect to CD, and this section assumes that the foreign policy behaviour of the FRG reflects this connection. The section will primarily focus on the post-World War 2 period, however, to show the central importance of the *Mittlerorganisationen* in the FRG's CD and how they functioned in or out of line with the government's directions.

This chapter will bring together interviews, reports by the government and intermediary cultural organisations, including the GI, records from Bundestag (German Parliament) sittings in which CD and the GI were the main discussion topic, and material related to the GI's work in the field. With these primary sources, the aim is to follow the changing discourse of the Federal government and the GI on CD and its practices. Furthermore, the chapter will demonstrate the changing balance of culture, diplomacy, and politics by examining what the GI does and investigating how the government views what it does. Lastly, the academic literature on German foreign cultural policy is very fragmented, and there are detailed nuances

to be traced to cast light on the narrative which links these shifts. Accordingly, the original primary material I am using in this chapter will also be very diverse and bring forth views of the practitioners of the field of CD as well.

During the twentieth century, inter- and post-war experiences shaped CD and cultural promotion.[1] This statement was particularly true for Germany: having experienced defeat two times, Germany had to achieve military and political rejuvenation and social and cultural reintegration into international society. First, this integration required a domestic reconciliation with German identity and culture. People looked for reassurance that they would be known and recognized as 'normal' citizens. And specifically, in West Germany, a renewed interest in other countries was an essential element of this. As a result, the meaning of foreign cultural representation has substantially changed in Germany within the past 50 years. The road from 'German culture' to 'culture from Germany' has been shaped both by the policy changes directed by the Federal government and by the standing efforts of intermediary organisations such as the Goethe Institute (GI). In the 1970s, Ralf Dahrendorf described foreign cultural policy (FCP) as the third pillar of the policy. He also aimed to change the structure and understanding of speaking to foreign audiences. He said, "What we give is worth as much as our willingness to take. Openness to others is the precept of our FCP."[2] Openness enables many opportunities in terms of cultural understanding, but it also brings challenges. Being an organisation funded by the government and therefore accountable to the government, the GI has experienced various challenges in the process of establishing what cultural diplomacy (CD) is. Some of these challenges connected with the German government's expectations of international cultural relations and how the GI wanted to deliver them in the field.

After reunification, there was a burst of interest worldwide in everything German, which the Federal Government used to its advantage, and placed the German language at the top of overseas German cultural promotion. However, this was not enough on its own. Although not as strong as in the case of the United Kingdom, the growing emphasis on globalisation and the need to keep up with the world's cultural agenda motivated those who framed German FCP to take further steps. These steps involved increasing private funds for film and music production and promotion, more German cultural presence in the various media organs, and so on. For that reason, from the state's point of view, there was a need to dwell on

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[1] Aguilar, M. (1996) *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. German-American Relations, 1955–1968*, New York: Peter Lang.

[2] https://www.dw.com/en/goethe-institut-looks-back-on-60-years-of-cultural-exchange/a-15277312

Germany and globalisation in general and consider what globalisation can make possible to further German cultural interests worldwide. Naturally, it is hard to define and detect an issue as broad as globalisation, and these processes mainly occur in an immeasurable context. But there were still some efforts to make sense of globalisation and FCP, and this section explains one of these efforts.

The process of globalization and the increasing activity of regionalization has been important subject of international relations and economics literature. Regionalization and regional integration are seemingly contradictory units, but their end goals can be very similar. Regionalization is the growth of social integration in a specific region, including the social and economic relationships between units of this region.[3] It is a continuous process of creating regions as geopolitical units, classified into political cooperation groups of countries, and as regional bodies such as pluralistic security organizations.[4] I argue that CD creates regionalization processes both in the case of the UK and Germany, but it becomes all the more visible in the case of Germany.

Especially after reunification, Germany's CD started to steer towards promoting European and EU cultural relations rather than precisely that of Germany. Naturally, the programs to support German film and translate more German literature into other languages continued, but on a policymaking level, the focus was on Europe. Due to its crucial position in the European Union and supporting EU integration, Germany, over time, assumed the role of European leadership.[5] Germany's dedication to European integration to transform relations between states in Western Europe and beyond has been a prime motivation for the country to look for alternative ways to form ties with other countries.[6] After the 1990s, Germany slightly changed its approach to European integration. It started focusing on the supranational aspects of the European project, adopting a more intergovernmental approach.[7] This approach would rely less on specific European institutions and more on cooperation between member governments.[8] Consequently, Germany's shaped its position on CD with an intergovernmental

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[3] Whiting, Van R. 1993. "The Dynamics of Regionalization: Road Map to an Open Future?" in Peter H. Smith, ed., *The Challenge of Integration: Europe and the Americas* (Miami, FL: North-South Center), 17–49.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Maull, H. W. (2018). "Germany's Leadership in Europe: Finding its New Role." *Journal of Regional Leadership and Multipolarity in the 21st Century*. Volume 3 -1. (pp. 87-111).

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

understanding. Rather than focusing on EU institutions, German discourse on CD mainly relied on cooperation between the member and non-member governments and various cultural institutions. Apart from other cultural institutions, which were counterparts to the Goethe Institute, Germany cooperated extensively with the German Commission for UNESCO. *Kulturweit*, the German Commission's UNESCO cultural program, which gives young people from around the world a chance to be a part of Germany's foreign cultural policy, is an example of this. *Kulturweit* will likely be the subject of another research project since I do not focus on it here and cannot do it justice, but it is, just like the Goethe Institute, a CD project. And this example demonstrates the increasingly multilateral aspect of Germany's policy orientation in terms of the CD.

During the post-unification period, the German FCP was still strongly dependent on the idea that the FCP was the "third pillar" of German foreign policy. When we come to the period between 2010-12, this status of German FCP was, in a sense,' upgraded' and became an individual pillar of Germany's overall strength. This sentiment can be seen in various reports by cultural organisations, too. Cultural overseas investments brought considerable international recognition, economic benefits, and political credibility. And for this reason, classifying FCP as one part of foreign policy did not seem enough. German FCP now had its complementary pillars.[9] Academics also made this point at the beginning of the new century. The original "third pillar of foreign policy" idea implied that "the third pillar is the last, the least important, complementary one."[10] This idea was contested on the basis that in 21st century Germany, FCP should be an individual basis for everything else, which in turn suggested that German FCP should have three pillars of its own: namely, schools abroad, scholarship programs, and adaptation to networks of foreign cultural presences around the world.[11] For the discussion here, the emphasis on the third 'pillar' is more interesting. It is clearly stated in the Globalization report of the Foreign Office that to "promote German concepts around the world and to find ways to meet the challenges of the 21st century", German FCP "should go beyond the conditions of their emergence in the post-cold war period." This idea of "going beyond"

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[9] Auswärtiges Amt (2013): 16. *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2011/2012*. Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, Bundestagsdrucksache 17/12052, Bundesanzeiger-Verl.-Ges., Köln.

[10] Witte, B. (1999) "How to Present Germany as a Kulturstaat Abroad," in *The Cultural Legitimacy of the Federal Republic: Assessing the German* Kulturstaat, ed. Frank Trommler, Harry & Helen Gray Humanities Program Series, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Americn Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1999), 54, 52.

[11] Auswärtiges Amt (2013): 16. *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik 2011/2012*. Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, Bundestagsdrucksache 17/12052, Bundesanzeiger-Verl.-Ges., Köln (p. 13-14).

Germany's post-cold war CD strategies initially meant to come up with a new perspective, allowing them to interact with other cultures. But at the same time, it did not want to impose the cultural ideas of the Cold War era onto its cultural policymaking. [12]

There was considerable emphasis on Germany as a European cultural force at the beginning of the 2000s after reunification. "Strengthening Europe" was a motto that we come across very frequently in the policy papers about FCP, especially now that Germany is "surrounded only by friends for the first time in history."[13] As seen in this statement, the search for new methods is still quite cautious and conscious of Germany's place in Europe. It underpins the idea of creating others within the context of CD and treating them as an inferior culture. But on the other hand, the proposed methods are also very constructive. Apart from increasing Germany's attractiveness as a cultural state and promoting the German language within Europe, there was an effort "to explore ways to increase the number of European cultural institutes abroad to complement the existing country-specific cultural media network with a common element."[14] And this element would be Europeanness. In addition, there is a commitment to improved cooperation with European partners, e.i., within the EUNIC network (European Union National Institutes of Culture). In the global competition of ideas and cultures, "European cultural identity - also as cultural diversity - should be made clear."[15] This report mentioned European cultural identity in several instances, just like other federal government reports. However, there is not much discussion of the nature of this cultural identity.

Some later reports and analyses of German foreign cultural policy place less emphasis on the European sphere or the idea of Europeanness, and there is a more comparative approach to making policy. For instance, an interim report called *German Foreign Cultural Policy in International Comparison*, published by the Hertie School of Governance on behalf of the German Foreign Office, compares the resources, policies, and methods of the foreign cultural policymaking of several countries with Germany.[16] The report, published in 2017, states that

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[12] Auswärtiges Amt (2011). *Auswärtige Kultur und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung: Partner gewinnen, Werte vermitteln, Interessen vertreten*. Konzeption des Auswärtigen Amts vorgestellt durch den Bundesminister des Auswärtigen Dr. Guido Westerwelle, 08. September 2011.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Hertie School of Governance (2017). *Die Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik Deutschlands im internationalen Vergleich*. Einer Studie der Hertie School of Governance im Auftrag des Auswärtigen Amtes. Wissenschaftliche Leitung: Prof. Dr. Helmut K. Anheier.

the German FCP focuses on continuity. The report also shows Germany's past and present efforts to adapt to the challenges of the globalising world, such as reunification, eastern enlargement of the EU, and 9/11.[17] However, we can observe that there is more emphasis on continuity than these necessary shifts. The report compares France, the UK, the USA, China, Russia, Brazil, and Qatar.[18] It focuses on specific cultural projects and their similarities and differences with those led by Germany's intermediary cultural organisations (Mittlerorganisation).[19] While the report considers the central goals of FCP, it emphasizes each case's broader political and foreign policy contexts.[20] Moreover, it evaluates FCP following these. In the process, regional characteristics are the first necessary components that they need to take into consideration.

For German foreign cultural policy, globalisation is an inevitable framework in which every different actor operates with its methods.[21] However, all internal actors (intermediary organisations dealing with the cultural promotion of Germany) try to improve their CD. All actors try to enhance the efficiency of their FCP by upgrading to different methods or refashioning their existing models based on the practices of other actors. In the case of Germany, the general trend indicates that FCP is no longer a soft policy area.[22] On the contrary, it is an essential component of foreign policy – especially in times of increasing conflicts and crises. From the 2000s on, Germany constructed its FCP based on the need to solve disputes, showing that this is an unchanging aspect of FCP making.

Through the end of the 1980s, Germany directed its CD efforts toward Eastern Europe. This is a fundamental shift in direction because much of this success stemmed from the work of DAAD and the Goethe Institute in these regions.[23] The German language was second in demand after English, and the reasons for this were geographical proximity and shared and closed historical bonds. As a result, the government created immediate funds and translation

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Horowitz, S. (2004). "Restarting Globalisation after World War 2: Structure, Coalitions and the Cold War". *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 127-151.

[22] Varga, S. (2013) The Marketisation of Foreign Cultural Policy: The Cultural Nationalism of the Competition State. *Constellations Volume* 20, No 3. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

[23] Auswärtiges Amt (2004): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin

subsidies specifically for these regions. By the end of 2005, the GI had founded new reading rooms and German source libraries in 40 central and Eastern European cities.[24]

In terms of policymaking on foreign cultural relations, one of the significant efforts undertaken in the Brandt era was drafting the "Guidelines for Cultural Policy" (Leisætze für die Auswärtige Kulturpolitik). In 1970, the sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf, who also served as the parliamentary secretary of the Foreign Ministry, prepared this reform proposal document for the government. It dealt with the need to reform elitist understandings of 'culture,' and he proposed an "expanded notion of culture" covering the socio-political issues at the heart of Germany's transformation. Willy Brandt had already talked about foreign cultural policy as the "third pillar" of foreign policy in 1967,[25] and thus the follow-up came to this idea. Since his initiative, various practitioners of cultural policy in Germany have used the idea of the "third pillar," and Dahrendorf was no exception, planting the idea in the soil of the foreign cultural policy debates that would follow. Two decades later, Hilmar Hoffman, who became the head of the Goethe Institute in 1993, would also define the foreign cultural policy of Germany with the exact words, with an emphasis on the other two of these three pillars: security and economic policy.[26] In addition, he was a prominent filmmaker who (for the time) radically defended "culture for all"[27] and transformed this idea into policies of cultural diplomacy in Germany.

Especially in the post-1980 period, this idea of a "third pillar," together with "culture for all," was prominent in the dealings with foreign cultural policy. With unification, the German FCP focused on Europe and European culture and developed guidelines in line with EU CD. After 40 years of following a foreign policy of responsibility, which concentrated on multilateralism and caution, Germany's unification paved the way for the country to become a central power in Europe and return to its continuity policy in foreign policy.[28] While the 1970s slogan 'Kultur für alle' became the foundational principle of CD, in the 1990s, the German government also felt the responsibility to extend the outreach of CD by increasing the number of Goethe Institutes around the world. In this way, Germany would be more connected to the

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[24] Colvin, S. (Ed.). (2014). *The Routledge Handbook of German Politics & Culture* (1 edition). Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge. (p.113)

[25] Markovits, A. S., & Reich, S. (1997). *The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe*. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press. (p.183).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Hoffmann, H. (1979). *Kultur für alle. Perspektiven und Modelle*, Frankfurt/M.

[28] Lantis, J. (2002) *Strategic dilemmas and the evolution of German foreign policy since unification*, Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers.

rest of the world.[29] During the Cold War, Germany's image-making policy focused on the classical aspects of foreign cultural policy. These elements were mostly public relations, marketing, and advertising. The goal now was to transform Germany into a brand.[30]

The following dilemma very much shaped foreign policy for Germany in the 1990s. Whether Germany was going to follow the trajectory of the Bonn Republic or it was going to adopt the foreign policy patterns of other Western European powers, such as Great Britain.[31] As Helga Haftendorn described, Germany's foreign policy process until the reunification was "self-assertion through self-restraint."[32] The changing international power structures, integration of Germany in international organizations such as the EU, NATO, and OSCE, and the stability of its foreign policy culture would be a rough summary of what Germany faced in the 1990s in terms of its foreign policy.[33] The policymakers debated German interests and foreign policy in the 1990s; constructivist perspectives were dominant among these. These approaches conceptualized foreign policy formation as "transnational and societal resocialization and as foreign policy learning."[34] Resocialization was the process of learning the values and norms of a particular society again. And the government expected outstanding results from resocialization in terms of policymaking in all areas. In the case of German foreign policy, this resocialization meant conforming to the global international system. And precisely at this point, for me and this thesis, the importance of Auswärtige Kulturpolitik (foreign cultural policy) comes in.

Germany needed to improve its image worldwide, and PD and CD were the traditional ways to do this. As I have briefly demonstrated above, Germany had a long, and one might argue, very effective history of propaganda. But now, the country had to adapt this historical experience to the new world order; it was trying to find a place. Resocialization, in this context,

[29] Paschalidis, G. 'Cultural Outreach'. (2014). Colvin, S. (Ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of German Politics & Culture* (1 edition). Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.

[30] Hülsse, R. (2009) 'The Catwalk Power: Germany's new foreign image policy', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 12: 293–316.

[31] Hellmann, G. (1997) 'The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who Is Listening?', *German Politics*, 6/2, pp.29–57

[32] Haftendorn, H. (2000). The politics of German Unification: "History Will Punish Those Who Arrive Too Late" *International Studies Review*, Volume 2, Issue 1, Spring 2000, Pages 101–111

[33] Harnisch, S. (2001) 'Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy', *German Politics*, 10:1, 35-60,

[34] Ikenberry, G. J. and. Kupchan,C. A. (1990) 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', *International Organization*, 44/3, pp.283–315; Levy, J. S. (1994) 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping an Conceptual Minefield', *International Organisation*, 48/2.

is a fitting term for Germany's shifting CD approach and foreign policy. In its CD, Germany wanted to become more open yet still cautious to not upset anyone worldwide by giving an impression of imposition. For that reason, the country has been, and still is to this day, reluctant to use the term CD and public diplomacy to a certain extent.

In Germany's process of redefining its methods of foreign relations, nation-states and various international institutions were focal points for the country. Germany reshaped its identity to the extent that it was Europe who determined German interests abroad.[35] This situation often resulted in German interests being confused with European interests.[36] Because of the new rules that defined the political system, Germany mainly focused on Europe and European foreign affairs.[37] Because of the prejudices towards Germany deriving from the previous half-century, most German politicians deemed it wise not to embrace and demonstrate a particular 'German national identity' and not to openly showcase its 'national interests.'[38] The refusal to articulate a specific 'German national identity' found its way into the country's CD, too: German cultural institutions, specifically those with government support or funding, try not to use CD as a concept and do not give it credit. This approach resulted in two things for German CD: experts on German foreign cultural relations researched specific cases of German cultural influence in other countries, but they did not address CD enough for the concept to find a place for itself. Secondly, Germany's cultural policymakers and CD practitioners in the foreign cultural relations realm used European culture and broader European values while defining their work rather than 'German culture or values.' Throughout the 1990s, Germany continuously supported the European integration process, and its CD gained a European perspective.

Globalisation brought some shifts and changes in how countries interact with one another, too. In Germany, specifically after reunification, there is a debate on a paradigm shift in foreign policy. Germany has undergone a significant change in its foreign policy and directed its agenda toward a more decisive leadership role in Europe, with a focus on its national

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[35] Ibid.

[36] Witte, B. (1999) "How to Present Germany as a Kulturstaat Abroad," in *The Cultural Legitimacy of the Federal Republic: Assessing the German* Kulturstaat, ed. Frank Trommler, Harry & Helen Gray Humanities Program Series, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Americn Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1999), 54, 52.

[37] Ibid, 54.

[38] Wood, S. (2017) *Germany and East Central Europe: Political, Economic and Socio-Cultural Relations in the Era of the EU Enlargemen*t. Routledge.

security.[39] The then-German President Joachim Gauck formally introduced the idea of "responsibility" in German foreign policy engagement in 2014. This idea found resonance in all areas related to external relations that Germany has engaged in since then. German responsibility refers to the period after the Second World War, which means power and influence. It refers to doing things differently from the past while at the same time referring to an ambition to change both Germany and others.[40] The idea of doing things differently from the past adds new elements to the country's national and international objectives. This requirement is a motivation behind the previously discussed notion of including culture more in international relations and reshaping the pillars of foreign policy (re-the third pillar of foreign policy idea).

The global power shift is also why Germany reached out to novel methods of interacting with the international community. New players are entering the decisive stages of international politics, and this trend is not uniform concerning the rise of the Global South.[41] Nevertheless, the height of emerging powers such as the BRICS or Turkey created new power blocs outside of the "West." This development has led to a need for developing new strategic partnerships. In the highly networked and globalised world we live in, alternative leagues outside of simply foreign policy and economic goals are required, thus leading Germany to engage more with CD. For this reason, we can infer that the broader paradigm shift that has occurred in German foreign policy was both a reason for and a result of the way German CD developed by giving more autonomy to intermediary organisations.

We could suggest that Germany had more than just economic rejuvenation on its agenda when the Cold War ended. And these new obligations and responsibilities are classified within the European sphere. Joschka Fischer's CD agenda transformed soft power into a tool. This tool would not only contribute to Germany's cultural outreach abroad, but it would also contribute to internationalism. While soft power was first a means to facilitate crisis prevention – in a way that would prevent Germany from being seen as an assertive propagandistic country – soft power was now understood as a long-term influence creation tool.[42]

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Hanns W. Maull, "What German Responsibility means," *Security and Human Rights* 26:1 (2015): 11-24.
[41] "New Power, New Responsibility" (2013). *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and The German Marshall Fund of the United States*, Berlin.
[42] Tommler, F. (2015). *Soft Power: Its Use in German and American Cultural Diplomacy*. American Institute for Contemporary German Studies – Publications. Retrieved from https://www.aicgs.org/publication/soft-power/ on 11.12.2020.

It is possible to trace the shift through the documents published by the Federal Foreign Office. One group of records that will help demonstrate this point is the Berichte der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik (Reports of the Federal Government on Foreign Cultural Policy). These series of reports were prepared and published by the Foreign Office. German Parliament's Culture and Media Committee debated these reports as part of the policymaking process about FCP. The first of these reports was published in 2000, and the last report was published in 2016. Therefore, I will discuss the government's reports published in 2000, 2004, 2007-2008, and 2013. In addition, I will address the *Konzeption 2000* report in parallel with this set of documents – because it was very instrumental in the first place for the drafting of these following reports.

The shifts in German cultural policymaking primarily revolve around the following questions: Where is German cultural diplomacy going? Should arts and culture be instrumentalized to gain economic and political benefits? But, more importantly, is this really what Germany does while undertaking projects to spread its culture abroad? The policy reports after reunification, starting with Konzeption 2000, primarily focus on these. While at the same time, they give a well-organised overview of how Germans do cultural policy abroad and how they should do it better in the future, they also offer justifications for the gaps and conflicts in this field.

2. Konzeption 2000

It is helpful to start the discussion with *Konzeption 2000* because it is one of the signifying documents of German foreign cultural policy in the 21st century. One of the politicians expressing concern very openly was the then Foreign Affairs minister (1998-2005), Joschka Fischer. He demonstrated his enthusiasm for culture as a part of international relations,[43] which implied the politicisation of FCP suggested, in turn, by cultural *diplomacy*. But this was not regarded as a negative side of FCP. On the contrary, for Fischer and even cultural practitioners like Hilmar Hoffman, FCP *should* be political and bring political benefits. "In light of increasingly rapid technological cycles, our modern economies are based more than ever on our citizens' creativity and freedoms… Such a comprehensive "culture of freedom" is a challenge to the future of the foreign cultural policy of our democracy, which, if successful, is

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[43] Ibid.

then in the very best sense a policy of peace."[44] The Foreign Office published *Konzeption 2000* a few months after a book in honour of Hilmann published Fisher's these words. The motivation for bringing culture and international relations together, visible in these sentences, paved the way for Konzeption 2000. This report was one of the most significant attempts to strategize FCP. Fischer submitted the report to the Bundestag's committee on FCP in December 1999. The report summarized strategic aims for German FCP under four core areas: "Fostering German foreign cultural and educational political interests abroad; 2) establishing and maintaining a positive, modern image of Germany abroad; 3) furthering European integration; 4) preventing conflicts by setting up a dialogue on values".[45] This report also emphasized for the first time how Germany should aim for a successful EU enlargement because it was an end, while the FCP was the means to achieve it.

Konzeption 2000 constituted a starting point for deepening debates about German FCP. The document was a call for action and better engagement with other cultures. At the same time, it reminded the policymakers of the most significant purpose of cultural relations: furthering national interests and gaining long-term economic benefits. With its focus on democracy, establishing human rights, poverty alleviation, participation in scientific-technological progress, and protecting natural resources, *Konzeption 2000* was more of a development strategy than a guideline for FCP. It represented a continuation of the FCP agenda of Willy Brandt and Ralf Dahrendorf. What changed was the emphasis on the "new challenges of the global world," – which would be visible after 9/11 and the German FCP's immediate change of focus to the 'Muslim world.'

The document first states that crises and conflicts are challenging to solve only using cultural policy. "There is a danger of excessive instrumentalization of arts, and cultural policy should be above all economic and political concerns."[46] It also stated that the "autonomy of arts and culture should be protected, and this protective function should be underlined while utilizing them."[47] These sentences underpin the independent nature of the cultural policy.

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[44] Fischer, J. (2000) 'Ein Glückfall für Goethe'. In Wapnewski, P, Mucher (eds) *Realitæten and Visionen: Hilmar Hoffmann zu ehren.*, C. Dumont, Cologne. Quoted in (eds) Aheame, J & Bennett, O. (2013) *Intellectuals and Cultural Policy*. Routledge.

[45] Auswärtiges Amt (2000): Auswärtige Kulturpolitik – Konzeption 2000. http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/aa/akbp_konzeption2000.pdf (Accessed: 21.11.2017).

[46] Auswärtiges Amt (2000): Auswärtige Kulturpolitik – Konzeption 2000. http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/aa/akbp_konzeption2000.pdf (Accessed: 21.11.2017).

[47] Ibid.

Cultural and artistic projects should not have the shadow of the debates that take place in the government hanging over them.[48] However, when we look at the discussion around – specifically- the Islamic world and how the 'Islamic terrorism' discourse affected the shaping of German foreign policy, we can see that this is neither the actual case nor realistic.

This change of focus can be seen in the *Konzeption 2000* very clearly. The document states, "since the worldwide appearance of Islamic terrorism, the need for better dialogue with the Islamic world has increased."[49] So, Islamic terrorism is a prerogative and necessitates conducting more systematic and effective CD practices.[50] Cultural dialogue – especially with the Islamic world – has become synonymous with German CD after 9/11, which is pretty visible in *Konzeption 2000*. The emphasis on the necessity of dialogue between cultures, an overriding discourse in Germany in the early 2000s, was also visual in FCP-making. According to the document,

> The encounters between foreign influences always have their frictions. While you are trying to provide a platform for understanding, you can, at the same time, provide the breeding ground on which fundamentalism and violence can grow. Detecting such' clashes of cultures' as early as possible is the task of cultural dialogue.[51]

The main problem here is presupposing cultural relations must be used for solving conflicts and hindering possible violence and fundamentalism. This presupposition relates to the discourse about the Islamic world and how Germany should improve its communication with Muslim communities to prevent them from going into extremism. This supposition is directly against one of the purposes of this document, which is to "protect the autonomy of artistic and cultural expression." Suppose the starting point of cultural expression stipulates this autonomy in the first place. Then, how can there be total and mutual trust based on the foreignization and otherization of the target audiences?

Although there is an effort to develop a working strategy for foreign cultural policy in *Konzeption 2000*, some conflicts in the document remain unresolved, especially about the usage of the word culture. For instance, the document states, "presentation of a modern image of Germany has connected with culture and art abroad, but at the same time the country's own

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[48] Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages. (2007). *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Überblick zentraler Problemstellungen einschließlich einer Auflistung der gegenwärtig vorliegenden Reformvorschläge*. Ausarbeitung WD 10 - 053/07, Fachbereich WD 10: Kultur und Medien.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Auswärtiges Amt (2000): *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik – Konzeption 2000*. http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/ aa/akbp_konzeption2000.pdf (Accessed: 21.11.2017).
[51] Ibid.

culture and its understandings should be taken into consideration while making policy."[52] However, there is no detailed discussion about what this internal culture entails, which is interesting because debates about German culture continued for at least 30 years by 2000. This document was a substantial effort by the governing parties to develop a working FCP system, and the Leitkultur debate also started around the same time. Leitkultur was mainly about integration and identity, and it still implied that there *was* a German Leitkultur. Many critics of the term suggested that there was no such thing as Leitkultur.[53] However, some of the actual policymakers in the government who also contributed to the report believed that there was.[54] Therefore, the question remains: Were the projects aiming to represent a better image of Germany abroad representing any kind of Leitkultur? Although this question is still relevant and German foreign cultural policy and the Leitkultur debate possibly share a link, the government showed some efforts to address this potential problem. I will discuss this issue alongside the later reports of the government and selected debates from the Bundestag on foreign cultural policy after the publication of *Konzeption 2000*.

Konzeption 2000 also addressed the concept of soft power. Konzeption addresses soft power as an element of the process of institutionalization of German soft power. Promoting the German language and culture also increases the country's soft power, so there is quite a linear logic here.[55] However, the focus was not necessarily on soft power but on avoiding international conflict, ensuring human rights are realized, and building more cooperative partnerships worldwide.[56] Therefore in German CD, soft power has not been as central as in the case of the UK. In the next section, I will show the details of this difference with the Reports of the Federal Government. Nevertheless, Konzeption 2000 has informed the development of CD in Germany in the 21st century. However, it has internal discrepancies and a clear shift toward dialogue with the Muslim world.[57]

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Konzeption 2000, p. 1 (http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/aa/akbp_konzeption2000.pdf)

[57] Pamment, James. "West European public diplomacy." In *European Public Diplomacy*, pp. 13-38. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013.

3. Reports of the Federal Government on Foreign Cultural Policy (2000-2013)

Konzeption 2000 was a restarting point for foreign cultural policy in Germany after reunification. But the report left many unanswered points: how the country would balance the finances between the middle organizations and the government and what kind of a culture Germany would represent abroad. Moreover, in the continuing governmental debates, the CD was still problematic due to its connotations of propaganda and imposition of culture. For these reasons, it was the government's and the Parliament's decision that a further inquiry into CD in the government sphere was necessary during the 2000s. This is where the Reports of the Federal Government on FCP become relevant. In this section, I will analyse the Reports of the Federal Government from the following years: 2000, 2004, 2007-2008. In addition, I will discuss the Research Committee report of the German Parliament in 2007 and 2009. Choosing these dates will show the shifts in CD from the 1990s to the 2000s. These reports will be complementary to my arguments about the changes in German CD since Konzeption 2000. Finally, I will demonstrate the centrality of CD in Germany's international relations, examining the proposition that the concept of CD would bring Germany more benefit in terms of long-term cultural understanding, as opposed to the general government belief.

First, the 2000 Report outlines four overriding purposes for the FCP: "adapting the content and management of the FCP to the reality of new media and communication technologies, increased involvement of citizens, reform of institutional structures and tackling the challenges of globalisation."[58] While opening up with such big claims in terms of restructuring the FCP, the budget section in the next chapter of the report does not look very bright. The report states that the Foreign Office cut the FCP budget from 2000 to 2003, which was an unfortunate decision. But at the same time, this austerity seemed to grant "opportunities for structural changes and optimization of funds."[59] Funds allocated for scholarships and exchange programs amounted to 167 million Deutsche Marks (DM), while cultural programs and promotion of the German language came second after this, amounting to 132 million DM. Since Germany executed its FCP through intermediary organisations such as the Goethe Institute (GI) and ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, another intermediary foreign cultural policy institution in Germany), funds allocated for these institutions are also significant. In 2000-2001, 227 million DM was issued solely for the GI, while funds for other intermediaries

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[58] Auswärtiges Amt (2000): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin

[59] Ibid.

such as the DAAD or ifa amounted to 60 million DMs.[60] Thus, the GI still has the most prominent funding among the intermediaries. Besides, the GI merged with Inter Nationes on 8 January 2001, which meant joining funds as well. As a result, the total financing of the GI by the Foreign Office increased from 294.400 TDM to 312.657 TDM.[61]

ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen) is the oldest FCP institution operating in Germany. The government allocated more funds for ifa, but the merging of Inter Nationes provided the GI with more resources and connections. GI precisely needed these connections in North America, where –according to the 2000 report- the German FCP felt "comparatively weak, and the interest in learning German was relatively low."[62] The GI having the highest funds shows that the FCP interest is driven mainly by the motivation to spread the German language abroad. This situation constituted the following internal tension: at the beginning of this period, the general reason for the German FCP was to increase cultural understanding and further cultural recognition. The GI also contributed to film and music projects during this period, but the most significant investment was still in language teaching and spreading. One apparent reason for this was that the unification had just occurred, and the political transition did not allow breakthroughs overnight. However, this did not stop policymakers and practitioners from expressing concern about the issue.

The reports of the Federal Government have had a considerable influence on how Germany conducted its CD until the current day. For this reason, I will analyse the 2004 Report by the Foreign Office next by referencing the discussion above. The federal government of Germany published this report in 2004, and the Parliament debated it extensively afterward. The report emphasized specific policy agendas for FCP. Among these were the European-Islamic Cultural Dialogue, the strengthening of German cultural and educational policy presence in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continuation of advertising for Germany as a location for education and research.[63] For these, a total of 543.6 million euros were available in the budget of the Federal Foreign Office in 2004. With the acceptance that "sustainable

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[60] Fischer, J. (2000) 'Ein Glückfall für Goethe'. In Wapnewski, P, Mucher (eds) *Realitæten and Visionen: Hilmar Hoffmann zu ehren.*, C. Dumont, Cologne. Quoted in (eds) Aheame, J & Bennett, O. (2013) *Intellectuals and Cultural Policy*. Routledge.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Auswärtiges Amt (2000): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin.

[63] Auswärtiges Amt (2004): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin

international relations require a cultural background,"[64] FCP as the "third pillar" of foreign policy was reiterated, and the need for inter-societal dialogue was made clear abundantly– referring also to 9/11. In this report, the Foreign Office believes that the "FCP develops its greatest possible impact beyond its intrinsic cultural value through its close integration with the other fields of foreign policy. In the interplay of all three areas, German foreign policy pursues its overarching goal of preserving peace and stability, promoting democracy, and protecting human rights".[65] The report emphasized the balance between cultural exchange and foreign policy frequently. And this idea of promoting democracy through FCP clearly showed itself with the new projects undertaken by the Goethe Institute in the first years of the 2000s. There were many initiatives to communicate and build dialogue with Muslim countries, which had to contribute to international security and the preservation of peace. Among these initiatives is the 'Ernst Reuter Initiative for Intercultural Dialogue and Understanding,' organized jointly by the German and the Turkish governments and implemented by the Goethe Institute and ifa. In the words of Joschka Fischer, cultural policy should not be about the good, the beautiful, and the accurate. Still, about scientific exchange and promotion of civil society".[66] This idea was quite visible. Another highlight of this period is that the phrase "intercultural dialogue" came to be synonymous with dialogue with Muslim countries.

The promotion of civil society and the idea of 'intercultural dialogue' have become the two focal points of German FCP. The following report I examine here is the 2007 – 2008 report, which also demonstrates this shift. The report covered 2007 and the first half of 2008, and the government published it in 2008. The German parliament also debated it in the same year. In this report, the dialogue with the Islamic world is again one of the high-priority areas. The total budget for the FCP in 2007 was 1,191 million EUR.[67] For the twelve intermediary organisations that support the Foreign Office in FCP projects and administration, the highest budget holder is Goethe Institute (30 percent of the total FCP budget of the Foreign Office), followed by DAAD (22 percent), ifa (1 percent) and others.[68] This number increased to 1,304 million Euros in 2008, and according to the report, one of the main reasons for this increase was the "Africa

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[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Fischer, J. (2000) 'Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen', in Forum: Zukunft der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Online. Available at www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/aa/ akbp_zukunft2000.pdf (accessed 15 Jan 2017).

[67] Auswärtiges Amt (2007-2008): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin

[68] Ibid.

Action"[69] initiative implemented by the GI. Africa Action was an important initiative that also focused on improving African countries' local civil society structures.

This time, the report under the "intercultural dialogue" subsection has a goal: "strengthening mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect. At the same time, universal values such as human rights, the rule of law, and democracy in Islamic societies should be promoted."[70] According to the report, "cultural identity both creates bonds, but they are also sources of conflicts."[71] The report then focuses on "the compatibility of Islam with human rights, and the rights of women in Islam," and "to fight with stereotypes, social imbalances and unresolved crises of the region," FCP should be more active in the Muslim world. However, the report does not specify which stereotypes and "crises" are those.[72] Nevertheless, it is not hard to guess that the crises mentioned here are closely related to the stereotypes created after 9/11 and the perception of constant threats against Muslim societies in the West.

The 2007-2008 report on foreign cultural policy frequently refers to cultural identities and cultural exchange. However, these identities' definitions create the stereotypes they claim to be fighting. For example, the perceived threat against the Muslim countries following 9/11 took precedence in the governmental documents about CD above everything else. It was the most pressing issue of the period.[73] The cultural divisions created after 9/11 were significant in all areas of the international community and have naturally impacted the discourse on CD. However, this emphasis on it made very deep stereotypes that we are still dealing with today. The same thing happened in the CD context: the report saw CD as a mission to civilize the de-civilized and bring culture to the uncultured. This report focused exclusively on women's rights in Muslim countries and stated that Muslim countries do not treat women equally.[74] The aftermath of 9/11 impacted and defined these discourses.[75] A cultural strategy document calling out the rule of law and democracy in Muslim countries has different aims than creating relationships and engagement with people. Unlike a foreign relations strategy document focusing on security issues, it aims to civilize and democratize these regions. When this is the

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[69] Goethe Institute (2007-2008). *Jahrbuch (Year Book)*. Goethe Institute.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Auswärtiges Amt (2007-2008): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

case, the question remains, why do we need CDs then? In the context of the German government's stance on CD, my answer to this question is that CD is another way of exerting power on other countries. There are many ways to exercise control and secure the hierarchy between states. Western countries monopolize power and culture, and the analyses of cultural policy are moving towards a more state-centred approach.[76]

A research group of the German parliament created another report in 2007, reiterating the need for culture at all levels of government. The name of this report was Schlußbericht der Enquete-Kommission' Kultur in Deutschland', which means Final Report of the 'Culture in Germany' Working Group.'[77] Its opening sentences are: "Culture is not an ornament. It is the foundation on which our society rests and on which it builds".[78] It was made clear that representing art and culture is a responsibility of the German federal system, and the Länder is directly responsible for this. At the same time, the political nature of FCP is once more reiterated, with the claim that this does not necessarily mean that the state will impose culture from above, but it will aim to protect the interests of its citizens. However, this reiteration created another pressure on CD practices because it suggested that German foreign cultural policymaking had a top-to-bottom approach. The report indicated that it was its mission to create change from within. But, focusing on the Muslim world and the debates originating from 9/11 made this a complicated process.

The German Parliament debated some of these government reports and presented their conclusions to the public, especially to active stakeholders in the field of cultural policy. One discussion after the report of the Federal Government in 2007-2008 was the 2009 debate reported by several Parliament members in July 2009. This discussion stated that in her policy statement, German Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized culture: "Our culture is the foundation of our cohesion. Therefore, promoting culture is not a subsidy, but an investment for the government."[79] As a result, foreign cultural policy became a top priority in the Coalition, with Merkel and foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier being the most vocal representatives in creating discourse and emphasizing cultural organisations abroad, such as the Goethe

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[76] Zamorano, M.M. "Reframing Cultural Diplomacy: The Instrumentalization of Culture under the Soft Power Theory", *Culture Unbound*, Volume 8, 2016: 166–186. Published by Linköping University Electronic Press.

[77] Translation mine.

[78] Deutscher Bundestag (2007). *Schlußbericht der Enquete-Kommission 'Kultur in Deutschland'*, Cologne: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft.

[79] Bericht der Bundesregierung (2009) Debate Paper on 2007-2008 Report of the Federal Government on Cultural Policy.

Institutes.[80] It became a priority because other countries, such as the UK and France, the other two leading countries in terms of investing in and developing policies for CD in the European borderlands, have been strengthening the discourse around it. Another reason for this prioritization was that Germany's FCP was still dependent and committed to the post-war context. Therefore, a reorientation of aims and methods was necessary. However, between 1998 and 2005, the budget for foreign cultural policy was cut drastically, reaching its lowest point in 2005. Between 1998 and 2002, the foreign ministry closed 17 Goethe Institutes, while the grand Coalition opened 11 new offices.[81] The change in 2005 was primarily due to the joint motion of the Union and SPD to strengthen cultural institutes abroad. After extensive debates in the Parliament and consultations outside, the Parliament started an institutional and personnel restructuring of the Goethe Institutes. While doing this, the Parliament clearly stated that "these changes should not be harmful to the European sphere, and thus to Germany's cultural and economic environment in general."[82] This situation shows that the focus on Europe remained paramount in structuring new policies and foreign cultural missions in general.

The last of these reports will be the one covering the period between 2012 and 2013, showing the relative decrease in the emphasis on the "Europeanness" discourse in Germany's FCP. In this period, the focus was mainly on the 'polycentric world,' which again required Germany to work more in developing countries. As a result, the focus on intermediary organisations increased, and the funding from the government increased as well. Including the GI, ifa, and DAAD, nine organisations are representing German FCP abroad. In 2012, they received 242.5 million (32.5 percent) EUR in personnel costs, equipment, operating resources, and investments. The Goethe Institute alone accounted for 201.5 million EUR of this total.

Along with German schools abroad (29.3 percent), the GI share of the distribution of the FCP budget amounted to 29.8 percent – which was the most significant share of the total.[83] I will discuss the GI's specific work in the next section of this chapter, but we can suggest that the traditional emphasis on promoting the German language was back on track. In the previous reports, German language education was given a relatively low priority, primarily because "promoting the German language" still had negative connotations stemming from the post-

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[80] Görgen, A. (2009). La nouvelle politique culturelle extérieure de l'Allemagne. *Revue internationale et stratégique*, 74(2), 114-119. doi:10.3917/ris.074.0114.

[81] ibid

[82] ibid

[83] Bericht der Bundesreigerung 2012-2013

Cold war era. Several academics and practitioners discussed this challenge[84], but this increase in the discourse and the funding levels shows the GI overcame this concern.

This report lists the core objectives of German FCP: a focus on the European integration process, contribution to crisis prevention and peace policy through intercultural dialogue, and the representation abroad of culture from Germany rather than German culture. Besides, "advertising and teaching a modern image of Germany" is also among the core objectives of the German FCP in the defined period. [85] This report focused on the presentation of "Germanness," which both referred to the German language and the image of a German person. For this reason, there was a need to emphasize the "two-way street policy" of the German FCP. Besides, for the first time in these reports, there is a long section reserved for promoting the cultural work of other countries in Germany. Also, in these years, the intercultural dialogue continued to be synonymous with dialogue with the Muslim world. In 2002, the Foreign Office appointed a Commissioner for Dialogue between Cultures. This appointment happened a year after the 9/11 attacks and a year before the German Parliament voted to send German military troops to Afghanistan to support the NATO-led security forces. It shows the importance of conflict resolution discourse in building up FCP.

The switch to intercultural dialogue from CD demonstrates that the aim of dialogue with the Muslim world preceded the purposes of Konzeption 2000 and the following documents on foreign cultural policy in Germany. We can argue that the aims of CD laid out in the Konzeption mainly focused on protecting Germany's interests abroad by bringing a cultural aspect to this process. But, there was no specific focus on creating an actual bond with people from other cultures. The GI has had this aim to this day, as demonstrated with proof in this chapter. However, the governmental purposes continued to inform the activities of GI in the field, and they also started circulating their projects around the concept of intercultural dialogue, demonstrating that they also continued the violent discourse created and perpetuated after 9/11, seeing others as a threat.[86] I argue that using intercultural dialogue instead of CD proves my point that CD has always been a political activist trying to further government interests. The cultural organisations just endeavour to make it seem as much different from this as possible. The concept of intercultural dialogue carries internal violence within it towards the

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[84] ibid

[85] ibid

[86] Phipps, A. (2014). 'They are bombing now': 'Intercultural Dialogue' in times of conflict. *Language and Intercultural Communication*, *14*(1), 108-124.

other, building on Simone Weil's idea of "giving capital letters to empty words."[87] These empty words become a rule of action within the context of CD without even really grasping what it means or should mean.[88] This is what has happened with the transition to intercultural dialogue. This transition proved the cultural organisations' dependency on and obedience to government policymaking. I argue that the GI continues using intercultural dialogue as a substitute for the CD. Intercultural dialogue provides a more debate-free area of knowledge and cultural activity production without being blamed for being a tool of the government or trying to create cultural dominance over other countries. We will exemplify this phenomenon in the following sections of the thesis with more examples from the GI's stance on CD and intercultural dialogue.

4. Debate about Culture and its Implications on Foreign Cultural Policy

In Germany, CD practices and definitions are very much attached to the debates about identity. Cultural identity, culture state, Leitkultur, and over-foreignisation are all concepts that have emerged within the German political and social context. Germany was not the first country in the world to talk about identity. Still, with the country's dark history in the first part of the 20th century, the controversies around the topic day. In every sphere of foreign affairs and international relations, these controversies emerge differently depending on the socio-political context of the period. In this section, I will outline the public debates about culture in Germany, as well as the discussions in cultural policymaking spheres. Then I will connect these debates to German foreign cultural policymaking (cultural diplomacy), asking which aspects of this "culture" Germany represents in cultural representation abroad.

At the beginning of 1970, the head of the cultural department in the German Foreign Office, Hans Georg Steltzer, advocated a definition of culture which encompasses both culture and civilization. According to him, culture and civilisation ought to be one, circled by the modern understanding of culture.[89] In Steltzer's view, the public should also be a part of this discussion when many actors debated what it means to be German and what German culture entails. Furthermore, the culture needed to be accessible to more people, especially in the context of cultural relations. In the words of the then Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, "Culture is no longer a privilege for the few but should be accessible to everyone… We must arouse interest in the burning problems of the present day, including opening up educational

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[87] Weil, S. (2005). *Simone Weil: An anthology*. London: Penguin.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Burns, Rob, and Wilfried Van der Will. "German cultural policy: An overview." *International journal of cultural policy* 9, no. 2 (2003): 133-152.

opportunities".[90] So making culture accessible was an issue, and the state was preparing to address the issue.

Along the same lines, there was increasing talk of the Federal Republic as a Kulturstaat (cultural state).[91] The FRG was aware that its image depended greatly on the ratings of its cultural activity. Therefore, the government encouraged state-sponsored cultural institutions to regard themselves as complementary pieces of the Kulturstaat.[92] It also provided them with every financial support they required. After the general elections in 1987, Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced that the government would place particular stress on improving the Kulturstaat[93] – which mostly put what the FRG wanted culture to mean into perspective.

These debates, in general, pertain to the domestic politics of Germany. The purpose was to make the culture of paramount significance in ordinary Germans' lives so that the country could transition from an industrial to a cultural society. There were initiatives to bring culture into the very lives of the public. During this time, the government opened some of the most important cultural centres of the FRG, such as the German Historical Museum and House of History of the FRG. Today museums are considered one of the most critical actors in CD. So, in the case of Germany as well, there is a gradual transition from local cultural projects to international ones. It is a fact that museums like these constitute only a tiny portion of CD in general, but this is only to show that the large amounts of government subsidy that were committed to promoting culture within Germany in this period would have an international resonance in the following decades.[94]

German state's understanding of culture and the 'right' ways to represent German culture to international audiences constituted a considerable debate in the 70s and 80s. The public discussion around culture in Germany was still going on. In this period, the government wanted to expand culture to all levels of society and create a *Kulturgesellschaft* in the context of the country's politics.[95] The German society discussed culture with reference to integrating

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[90] Ibid, 133.

[91] Fohrbeck, K. (1989). *Von der Industriegesellschaft zur Kulturgesellschaft?: Kulturpolitische Entwicklungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Munchen: C.H. Beck. (p. 78)

[92] Ibid, p. 79.

[93] Ibid, p. 80.
[94] Burns, R. (Ed.). (1995). *German Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (1 edition). New York: Oxford University Press.

[95] Ibid.

immigrants and foreigners into German society.[96] In an attempt to further improve the country's economy from the 1960s onwards, the German government had done some deals with the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and invited foreign workers. Once it was clear that most of these people were not *Gastarbeiter* anymore but an integral part of the country that would slowly change the face of society, the debate around what it means to be 'German' intensified. The government and stakeholders coined concepts such as multiculturalism, Leitkultur, and Überfremdung (over-foreignisation). The debate reached a point where it was nearly impossible to discuss a specifically German culture without referencing German identity. By now, there is no doubt that all of these discussions are political.

The terms culture, nation, and identity have always been significant and central to almost all sociological and political debates within the German context. The two main branches through which the culture debate has continued are the culture vs. civilisation debate and culture as defining German identity. While civilisation mainly referred to civil society and politics, culture was more about nurturing oneself, cultivation, and intellect.[97] This differentiation became the topic of discussion for politicians with an agenda about solidifying culture as a part of the German identity-building program. The idea of coming up with a definition of German collective identity rings many bells in terms of German history in the twentieth century; the concept of 'Germanness' in the Third Reich was based solely on making this 'culture' as white, German, and 'Aryan.' However, this debate linking being a German to traditional culture is older than the Third Reich and continues today. Even before unification under Bismarck's Prussia, when a stable nation was lacking, the concept of culture was essential for national self-definition. A common language, history, and cultural past provided the necessary material for projecting a 'national identity.'[98] For instance, according to Harold James, the history of Germany since the mid-nineteenth century can be defined as "an oscillation between cultural, political, and economic articulations of nationalism.".[99] The economic aspect of this was necessary. However, even as recent as 2017-2018, we still do not have an answer to the resurfacing of the 'collective German identity.'[100] The central importance

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[96] Ibid.

[97] Pautz, H. (2005). "The Politics of Identity in Germany: The Leitkultur debate". *Race & Class*, Institute of Race Relations 0306-3968 Vol. 46(4): 39–52; 05251710.1177/0306396805052517.

[98] Von Dirke, S. (1994). "Multikulti: the German debate on multiculturalism". *German Studies Review*, Vol. 17, No. 3 pp. 513-536.

[99] James, H. (1989). *A German Identity. 1770-1990* (New York: Routledge), p. 3.

[100] Ewing, K. P. (2008) "Germanness and the Leitkultur Controversy" from Ewing, K. P., *Stolen honor: Stigmatizing Muslim men in Berlin*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. (pp. 200-221).

of immigrants in the economic boom of the FRG in the 80s brought forward the debate about foreigners vs. Germans, which eventually led to the appearance of the concept of *Leitkultur*.

Leitkultur emerged in German political discourse in the 1990s after Bassam Tibi introduced it as a European *Leitkultur*.[101] He coined this term because governments needed a working integration policy towards immigrants in Europe. Besides, coming up with a 'culture' relevant to all Europeans was impossible.[102] The idea was to discuss integration from a secular democratic point of view without the religious aspect of conflicts. However, religious differences were at the centre of the integration problems in Germany. So, it was an unrealistic kind of reckoning with the term multiculturalism, which was failing the European democracies, according to Tibi.[103] The term transformed into a German *Leitkultur* very quickly and became the reference point of many conservatives in the German government. With the same speed, it became a term abused by right-wing populist politicians to further their agenda against immigration and even in support of the supposed supremacy of German culture above others. Although it was a term imbued with identity, it also referred to cultural elements claimed to be at the centre of 'Germanness.' Both in the media and the government, there was a backlash against and support for using the term. The years following the emergence of *Leitkultur*, as Friedrich Merz used it in 2000,[104] proved that coming up with an idea of culture that would apply to all is impossible; it just kept creating more and more fractions within political spheres as well as in public.

When the CDU/CSU politician Merz proposed the idea of Leitkultur and the notion that immigrants who want to live and work in Germany have to adapt to a German Leitkultur, he directly appealed to the concept of culture, along with the constitutional patriotism of the German people.[105] Initially, the term primarily focused on a domestic culture that should be embraced and practised by all who identify with the country. Therefore, it was mostly a domestic affairs issue, which sparked outrage for months. This word primarily targeted the Muslim Turkish population in the country. Still, it started resonating with a certain period of German history, from which many tried to distance themselves. Leitkultur quickly found its

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[101] Rindisbacher, Hans J. (2013) "Leitkultur" and Canons: Two Aspects of Contemporary Public Debate." Pacific Coast Philology, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2013), pp. 48-68

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Manz, S. (2004) "Constructing a Normative National Identity: The Leitkultur Debate in Germany, 2000/2001", *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 25:5-6, 481-496, DOI: 10.1080/01434630408668920.

[105] Ewing, K. P. (2008) "Germanness and the Leitkultur Controversy" from Ewing, K. P., *Stolen honor: Stigmatizing Muslim men in Berlin*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. (pp. 200-221).

place in the country's immigration laws, too. However, in May of 2001, the chairs of CDU and CSU, Angela Merkel and Edmund Stoiber, prepared a joint paper. This paper did not mention a German Leitkultur, referring only to the "values of western Christian culture" to which immigrants coming to the country should conform.[106] The same year in June, in the policy paper completing the one in May, German culture was defined as rooted in Europe, and again there was no mention of Leitkultur. In this way, Leitkultur was gradually erased -at least- from the discourse of the country's governing bodies. We can argue that the concept was increasingly wrong and counterproductive. The purpose of Merkel and other politicians who facilitated this shift derived from a simple discourse: setting a clear difference between "bad nationalism and good patriotism."[107]

A similar shift has happened in German foreign cultural policy, or CD. The culture or values that Germany wanted to promote abroad shifted from being German to being increasingly European and German. European values and broader cultural elements found more and more place in German CD policies, and there was a clear emphasis on Europeanness rather than Germanness in the CD of the country. This shift can be seen in the policies and projects of the Goethe Institute, for instance, as will be detailed further in the chapter. Also, debates on soft power circulated, gaining more soft control for Europe and the EU rather than Germany. Another point resonates with differentiating between bad nationalism and good patriotism. This idea posits that there is lousy nationalism, but there could be a good one. The same applies to patriotism. But German policymakers preferred the ones that would benefit them most, being less discriminatory. Because if the government discriminated against its people, which it did when it briefly adopted Leitkultur, this would lead to a deeper conflict within society. Similarly, German authorities and elite policymakers did not want to use the CD concept because it resembled traditional diplomacy to too great an extent, whatever its means were. And Germany promoting a set of values to other countries under CD seemed threatening to policymakers because it could create propaganda resonances. Therefore, the shifts in policy, even domestic policy related to culture and identity, closely resemble the country's policy direction when it comes to CD.

In 2010-11, the renewal and adaptation process of German foreign cultural policy / CD embedded its discourse in that of globalisation. The concept and project initiated by the German

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[106] Ibid.

[107] Pautz, H. (2005). "The Politics of Identity in Germany: The Leitkultur debate". *Race & Class*, Institute of Race Relations 0306-3968 Vol. 46(4): 39–52; 05251710.1177/0306396805052517.

Foreign Office, "Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy in Times of Globalization - Gaining Partners, Communicating Values, Representing Interests," started in the years 2010-11. This project brought developing countries such as India, China, Turkey, and Brazil into the focus of German foreign cultural policy. 2011 was also the year "arts and international relations" gained a specific place in the foreign cultural policy discourse.[108] The first target country where GI opened an exhibition under this theme was China. By continuing major shows in selected regions, Germany wanted to ensure the visibility of individual projects and campaigns, creating an atmosphere that Germany was in line with the trendy idea of the "global village." If the world was becoming a global village, Germany should be keeping up with it, and the most feasible way to show this was through peaceful means of communication, such as arts and culture. At the same time, regionalized targets were becoming more visible for German policymakers of CD.

The report of this project used "European cultural identity" several times.[109] The report emphasized the interconnectedness of the world and the need to work together in cultural creativity with various partners. In addition, it reiterated a shared European identity and culture: "In the global competition of ideas and cultures and intercultural dialogue, European cultural identity should – as cultural diversity – be made clear."[110] The report also declares the need to improve cooperation with European partners and "establish enhanced European cultural institutes abroad." It is unclear from the account if the latter sentiment is a suggestion for other European countries to consider or if it is a task for German foreign cultural policy to take on. But one thing is clear: German foreign cultural policy aligned with promoting European identity. Besides, German governments considered the country synonymous with the EU to further international cultural collaboration. In terms of CD works and promotion of the EU, as we have seen from policy proofs until now, Germany did consider itself synonymous with the EU, which creates a whole different dynamic of regionalization in this case.

By the requirements of its foundation and agreements with the government, the GI needs to conform to Germany's national interests. However, the discourse of the Institute's staff and policymakers and its projects have a strategic aspect. One recent example mentioned

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[108] Auswärtiges Amt (2011). *Auswärtige Kultur und Bildungspolitik in Zeiten der Globalisierung: Partner gewinnen, Werte vermitteln, Interessen vertreten*. Konzeption des Auswärtigen Amts vorgestellt durch den Bundesminister des Auswärtigen Dr. Guido Westerwelle, 08. September 2011.

[109] Ibid.

[110] ibid, 17

above (Michael Fuchs' remarks on the GI's work) has demonstrated that politics and the existence of the GI often find themselves in conflict. In this section, I will break this down further and examine cases in which the GI conflicts with the idea of furthering the national interest while simultaneously doing it.

In this section, I argue that the political interests of Germany are not separable from what the intermediary cultural organisations are doing in the field. To exemplify this, I use government reports and rulings, together with Bundestag discussions about the running and operations of intermediary organisations and their policies. CD was not a non-political aspect of foreign policy; instead, the German government treated it as an internal part of foreign policy. Besides, soft power in CD is still alive and well in policymaking. For Germany, the CD is a method of enhancing and exerting its soft power, even if this process sometimes happens by chance and sometimes with very carefully oriented projects. In facilitating the exercise of soft power, the GI is a significant channel for the government. This is the reason why the GI's approach to CD is relevant because it demonstrates how the cultural work undertaken by the institute not only builds bridges between societies and fosters understanding but also contributes to the national interest and international agenda of the country.

The orientation of FCP was discussed extensively by the grand coalition government of 2005 and its opposition. These debates found an extensive resonance in the media, not so much in academia. After the government published "Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy in Times of Globalization," the minister of state at the Foreign Office, Claudia Pieper, suggested that everything will remain the same despite the changes of the era and that there can be no mention of a paradigm shift in foreign cultural policy. The GI would continuously represent German interests.[111] This statement sparked a discussion between the government and the opposition. The then foreign minister Guido Westerwelle's understanding of national interest became a subject of a debate, and Alliance 90 / Greens MP Claudia Roth criticized it deeply: "The interests represented and prioritised by Westerwelle are not automatically interests of Germany."[112] In addition, the then Vice-president of the Bundestag, Ulla Schmidt, suggested that the GI has continuously faced funding cuts since 2008, and the saved funds are

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[111] "Mit Goethe um die Welt" Retrieved on 13.07.2019 from https://www.das-parlament.de/2013/24/EuropaWelt/45273016-323632

[112] Ibid

directed to programs that "suit the foreign minister."[113] What was meant was that the Foreign Minister was very much focused on the economic gains that the GI might bring to the country.

Die Linke (the Left) MP Lukrezia Jochimsen also criticized the paradigm shift and the direction that this shift has been taking. She said, "We need a balance between the cultural, scientific, and economic tasks,"[114] The underlying meaning here was that the economic benefit aspects should not be at the forefront. The left-wing MP said, "It should not be a priority to promote Germany as an attractive location for the economy."[115] The problem here is, by the nature of CD work, this should be a priority of Germany. Since unification and *Konzeption 2000*, the government has been striving to create a state of affairs in which, conceptually, the government will direct FCP. Similarly to the British case, the institutions and policymakers should overcome the taboo of the economic benefits of CD. This reticence about acknowledging economic benefits as one of the motivations behind CD has also been present in the British Council's case; however, when compared, the British are observed to be more open about this.

GI debated its regional focus in a context related to national interest. As observed in the previous section of the chapter, the Parliament and the government discussed the issue of reducing stress and activity where the GI is already well established. Areas with more demand for the German language took precedence. What was meant by this shift was the following: that, in time, the GI should reduce its focus on Western Europe and neighbouring countries and focus more on developing countries. However, this is not really about Western countries being Western. It is more about the long-term economic benefits that the country can garner. In an interview in 2013, Secretary General of the GI Johannes Ebert stated, "Europe is and remains first and foremost a cultural project, and here the GI is in particular demand. In the coming year, the Institute will launch a survey on the European cultural canon in twenty European countries, giving rise to a well-founded debate on common values, a common European memory, and differences."[116] The results of this survey indicated that the GI *needs* to stay in Western European countries and more so in Eastern European countries.[117] Apart from the

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[113] Ibid

[114] Ibid.

[115] Deutscher Bundestag (2013) Drucksache 17/12025 – 04.01.2013

[116] "Madrid, Mumbai, Myanmar: Neue Herausforderungen das Goethe Institut" Interview retrieved on 15.05.2019 from https://www.kultur-port.de/index.php/news/6174-madrid-mumbai-myanmar-neue-herausforderungen-fuer-das-goethe-institut.html

[117] Ibid

cultural reasons for this, the GI has been actively promoting European CDs. This required the Institute to intensify its cooperation with neighbouring countries further. Therefore, the expected change of regions from the West to the other areas did not occur as anticipated. Around the time of this interview, the GI in Brussels had just won a special status from the EU, and it would be advising a consortium in CD for the next two years.[118] This process started in 2013 and ended in 2015, and thus the GI served as the moving force behind the whole European cultural diplomacy project.

In German CD, there are increasingly dialogical cooperation projects instead of presenting predominantly national lighthouse art productions abroad as in previous years. Thus, the focus of CD has shifted significantly from representation to cultural development cooperation, and the GI established a department for cultural education in the central office of the GI in Munich.[119] This cultural education comprises teaching the know-how of cultural policy to partners and local cultural organisations. The reason for this is twofold: first, the motivation of Germany in building a European conception of CD; second, the changing face of its society, thus its culture, as a result of current immigration processes. The GI continued to discuss issues about Germany and integration extensively, but what is related to CD is a quest for a change in the discourse. For some academics, to develop a systematic and effective way of promoting one's own culture, one needs to "know and understand foreign cultural art forms, but also to adapt them, to give them a form of representation" with one's style and understanding.[120] Terkessides speaks of the need for *intercultural literacy* in the immigration society of Germany.[121] In his concept of "interculture" (rather than integration), he called upon cultural institutions to question their norm of Germanness and to change their ways through targeted diversity management in terms of personnel, programs, and structures. It is essential to identify different cultural interests and claims and integrate them into the current political-cultural discourse used by Germans and other societies with which Germany interacts through CD. CD could be a good policy area to achieve that. For that reason, the aforementioned cultural education programs have become a central part of the CD agenda of Germany, specifically in the 2010s.

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[118] Ibid.

[119] GI Jahrbücher 2012, p. 78; 2013, p. 39; 2014, p. 95; 2015, p. 45.

[120] Wolfram, G. (2012). Warum braucht das Kulturmanagement eine neue international Perspektive. – In: Ders. (Hg.), *Kulturmanagement und Europäische Kulturarbeit*. Bielefeld: transcript, 13-46.

[121] Terkessides, Mark (2010): *Interkultur*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

5. The Relationship between the Government and the GI: Is there a Paradigm Shift in Cultural Diplomacy?

The shifts in Germany's understanding of international relations have influenced the makings of CD to a certain extent. Several subjects continuously arise in the debates about how Germany should conduct cultural relations around the world: changes that globalization brought to international relations, national interest, and a need to be cautious enough not to get entangled in propagandistic discourses. Contemporary German cultural relations worldwide have achieved this quite strategically, but there is still room for contradictory issues. The government debates reveal CD and those of the practitioners of CD in the field. Today, a Ministry of State in Germany is responsible for Cultural Affairs. It was created in 1998 to place cultural policy tasks in one set of hands.[122] Although the Minister of State for Cultural Affairs mostly delivers policy on a national level concerning cultural issues at home, it is also incumbent upon it to represent Germany's cultural policy interests on a European level. Nevertheless, Germany has gone through different periods of cultural policymaking, and it took some time until this ministerial position reached its optimal level of activity. To understand these processes, I will compare and contrast the government approaches cultural and CD policymaking in Germany with the actual CD projects worldwide by the GI.

"It is the responsibility of the state to create the environment where cultural life can flourish and protect artistic freedom. The arts and culture need promoting. Our cultural heritage has been entrusted to us for safekeeping."[123] These are the opening sentences of the report by the Federal Government on culture and media policy, prepared by the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media. The report mainly deals with the internal cultural policies which serve the needs of the German public, namely promoting German culture for Germans. But the pre-suppositions that the culture and arts *need* promoting and the state's *responsibility* to promote them are also very visible in the discourse on cultural promotion abroad. Especially after the Second World War, this discourse influences the relationship between the GI and the government. These influences have affected Germany's encounters with globalisation and have led to a series of shifts in the policymaking of German CD.

How Germany responded to globalisation is relevant regarding the fast dissemination of GI's projects worldwide. The globalisations that have affected CD most are economical and

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[122] Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Kultur und Medien. (2018). *The German Federal Government's Cultural and Media Policy*. Federal Government of Germany.
[123] Ibid.

cultural globalisation. The rapid growth of technologies and resulting interconnectedness mainly causes economic globalisation.[124] Culture, and by extension, CD, have become a by-product of globalisation of financial means and communication technologies. International flows of cultural goods and services led to another strand of cultural globalisation, to which especially the liberal markets of the West have not remained immune.[125] Trends toward economic globalisation are both a threat and an opportunity in the context of post-war Germany.[126] A possibility; because the already existing technical workforce and high-quality institutions could now offer services to other countries – the first examples being Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia, meaning developing countries.[127] A threat; is that Germany could lose its competitiveness in the international market. However, when we view this from the CD point of view, we can say that Germany has managed to turn it into an opportunity. The country has always been concerned about its image abroad before and after the two world wars. This concern emerged due to Germany's place and influence within the international community. And after reunification, a whole new image was to be presented. Therefore, almost all major intermediary organisations working for foreign cultural relations abroad, together with the GI, have continued state tradition by integrating into the globalisation of cultural trade and creating a shift in cultural consumption.[128] Although the relationship between the global circulation of culture and globalisation as an ambiguous phenomenon is still under-researched,[129] embedding this state tradition in the communicative opportunities presented by globalisation was only the facilitator of this process.[130]

[124] Shangquan, G. (2000) *Economic Globalisation: Trends, Risks and Risk Prevention*. UN CDP Background Paper No. 1. & Walsh, A. (2018) "Globalisation: Why It Matters". In *Globalisation, the State and Regional Australia*. Sydney University Press.

[125] UNESCO (2016) *The Globalisation of Cultural Trade: A Shift in Consumption. International flows of cultural goods and services 2004-2013*. UNESCO Institute for Statistics

[126] Horowitz, S. (2004). "Restarting Globalisation after World War 2: Structure, Coalitions and the Cold War". *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 127-151.

[127] Roberts, G. K. (2009). *German politics today* (2nd Revised edition edition). Manchester: Manchester University Press. (p. 56).

[128] Varga, S. (2013) The Marketisation of Foreign Cultural Policy: The Cultural Nationalism of the Competition State. *Constellations Volume* 20, No 3. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

[129] Prasad, A., & Prasad, P. (2007). "Mix, Flux and Flows: The Globalization of Culture and its Implications for Management and Organizations", *The Journal of Global Business Issues*. 1 (2): pp. 11-20.

[130] More on globalisation and circulation of culture, see Ritzer, G., & Malone, E. (2001). "Globalization theory: Lessons from the exportation of McDonaldization and the new means of consumption" in G. Ritzer (Ed.), *Explorations in the sociology of consumption*, Sage Publications. (pp.160-180); Prasad, A., & Prasad, P. (2006). "Global transitions: The emerging new world order and its implications for business and management". *Business Renaissance Quarterly*, 1(3): pp. 91- 113.

5.1.Government Perspectives and the Paradigm Shift in German CD

Germany has a long history of shifting approaches toward policymaking, especially regarding foreign policy. Due to the restrictions of this thesis and research scope, I am looking at the contemporary era and focusing on the 21st-century shifts. I am positioning reunification as the beginning of the period, as many historians and academics have done before. Post-reunification, Germany's foreign policy had two paths: being more assertive and more interdependent vis-à-vis the international community. Those who have rejected the former have come up with the idea of a "civilising foreign policy" approach. According to them, interdependence will eventually make Germany adjust to the policies of other Western powers in a more natural process. For this approach, transnational relations were more important than ever, and the ultimate purpose was to achieve a "world of societies" along with a "world of states."[131] In addition, increased transnational connections between states and civil society groups reiterate the sovereignty of a state.[132] For that reason, one of the most important policy recommendations that Germany received after reunification was to increase its financial contribution to the UN and support the UN on its way to becoming a more significant actor in international politics.[133] One exciting detail linking all this to cultural relations is that, in all my archive research and secondary source readings, I have found the UN cultural activity with Germany central to the general literature on Germany's cultural relations worldwide. As a result, Germany was encouraged to invite the UN to conduct more cultural projects in the country and to participate in the UN's international cultural projects. UN and Germany's relationship in terms of cultural relations led to a cultural relations tradition in the country. Therefore, we could suggest that the policy recommendation Germany received in terms of being more active and involved in the UN shaped Germany's policies on international cultural relations.

If we take a small step back and look at the period leading to reunification, we can track the paradigm shift in CD that we observe today. Barthold Witte, who served as Under Secretary of State between 1983 and 1992, followed the Kulturstaat concept in his understanding and policymaking on CD. Yet, there was confusion about various intermediary organizations' tasks

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[131] Czempiel, O. (1993) *Kluge Macht. Außenpolitik für das 21. Jahrhundert.* C. H. Beck. (pp. 105-110).

[132] Ibid. (pp. 105-110).

[133] Statz, A. (1993) "Nationale Selbstbeschrankung – internationale Einbindung – transnationale Verflechtung Thesen zur grün-alternativen Außenpolitik", and Roth, C. (1993). "Der Pazifismus und Kampf gegen Rassismus und Völkermord (1)" in Hubert, H. (1993) *Frieden und Internationales der Grünen (eds.) Grüne Außenpolitik Aspekte einer Debatte,* Göttingen.

and relationship levels. He said, "while the British government entrusts one body – the British Council- with managing its FCP, Germany has many organisations at work. Even experts like me find it difficult to identify the right partner for a project in this complex system".[134] This mixture of organisations constitutes the overall system of CD, and the strong presence of cities and states in representing German culture makes it difficult for us to talk about German CD as an entity. CD is difficult to explain without referring to an institution, and this situation becomes truer in the German case. Before reunification, the purpose of intermediary organisations was a national reckoning with the atrocities of the past, although with a very cautious approach not to mix cultural representation with nationalism. Therefore, the question remained, who would represent German culture and interests abroad without being perceived as a propaganda agent of the government?

Partly due to the seriousness of this question and partly because of the new political and social order Germany created for itself in the post-reunification era, the German government's stance on CD at the beginning of the 21st century was ambiguous. The policymaking bodies almost always mentioned the subject of CD as a follow-up of the leading foreign policy objectives of the country. These objectives were "promoting Germany as an academic location, intensifying dialogue with countries dominated by Islam, the expansion of the EU, and the future relevance of culture as a topic."[135] There was a call for fundamental changes to the perceptions of CD in Germany in the foreign policy circles. The Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (*ifa*) did more planning and drafting to understand what kind of CD Germany should pursue. According to Kurt Jürgen Maas, the Secretary General of ifa from 1998, "it has been realised that the committee deals with such a large number of national topics that FCP is practically non-existent."[136] This comment is from a 2003 newspaper interview with Mr. Maas. Since then, German FCP has professionalised and internationalised its cultural activities. However, we can suggest that this observation is still somewhat relevant to the German FCP's current dilemma of over-politicization. In this article, Mr. Maas continues: "The Foreign Affairs committee does not feel responsible anymore and therefore does not deal with this subject. After the 1998 and 2002 elections, sixty percent of the German MPs were new to

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[134] Trommler, F. (2015) "Soft Power and Its Use in American and German Cultural Diplomacy." Retrieved on 13.05.2019 from https://www.aicgs.org/publication/soft-power/#_ednref8

[135] Maas, K. J. (2003). "The Disappearing of Foreign Cultural Policy. The major topics to be handled by German cultural politics." *Politik und Kultur*, 05 / 03.

[136] Ibid.

the Parliament and have not been confronted by the subject of FCP since."[137] At this point, the political support for this critical task of German foreign policy had significantly dwindled, and it did not look very bright for the foreseeable future. Maas's call for reinstating FCP under the umbrella of the Foreign Affairs Committee or Committee for Culture and the Media met with a positive response. In 1998, the Bundestag created the new Committee for Culture and the Media, and along with other tasks, the government assigned the overseeing German FCP work to this committee.

By the German constitution, the *Basic Law*, the responsibility for theatres, museums, and libraries lies with towns, cities, and federal states; some projects deemed of national importance require a federal level of involvement. As of 2019, the Committee comprises 17 members of the Parliament. The Committee's press report states: "anyone involved in the formulation of cultural and media policy finds themselves dealing with ideal and material values, with art for art's sake and genuine economic interests. Consequently, cultural and media policy closely relate to other fields, including economic and legal policies."[138] This statement on culture and media policy more or less sums up Germany's general approach to CD. The reason for this is that after reunification, one of the most critical issues in CD was balance. Art, for art's sake and economic benefits, supposedly do not go well hand in hand; therefore, this leads to a conflict.

Joschka Fischer laid out the new directions for FCP before preparing *Konzeption 2000*. CD was at the centre of the government's new foreign policy agenda, which consisted of conflict resolution, crisis prevention, and promoting peace. The cabinet later decreed this agenda under the *Aktionsplan Krisenprævention: Konfliktlösung und Friedensförderung 2004*.[139] In the four years between *Konzeption* and the *Aktionsplan*, the reliability and feasibility of the decrees put forward by *Konzeption* to improve German FCP were, in a way, tested in the field. Although Fischer was against the instrumentalisation of culture at the very beginning of this process[140], as *Aktionsplan* also decreed, he placed CD within the new policy agenda of crisis prevention and conflict resolution. This step would prove that Germany is more willing to be an active partner in the international arena, and culture is always one of the "softest"

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[137] Ibid.

[138] Deutscher Bundestag (2019) The Committee on Culture and Media Affairs, p. 5.

[139] Die Bundesreigerung. (2004) *Aktionsplan: Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung*. Berlin, 12 May.

[140] Körbe, S. (1998) "Um es ganz klar zu sagen: Ich halte nichts von einer mechanischen Instrumentalisierung der Auswærtigen Kulturpolitik zur Wirtschaftsförderung oder zur Standortsicherung." From Joschka Fischer, "Interview with J. Fischer by Sebastian Körbe," Zeitschrift für KulturAustausch / 4.

methods to show that. This position was to be tested by intermediary organisations such as the GI and IFA – naturally in a relatively active and diverse manner by the GI. However, Fischer did not show much interest in these institutions' usual cultural promotion methods, and soon the GI, along with the other organisations, would experience a budget cut.[141] Therefore, the government prioritised development projects rather than cultural promotion in this period. The country created its soft power (predominantly Asian and African countries) through development work and offered it to the world.[142]

The German Parliament extensively discussed the paradigm shift in CD, and the government's response laid out crucial issues about this shift. The starting point of the debate with an apparent reference to a paradigm shift in CD started in 2011 when the German Parliament debated the "Paradigm Shift in the Foreign Ministry's Foreign Cultural and Educational Policy Concept," which then turned into a reference document on the subject. The questions that the Parliament raised and the answers given by the government are the two primary sources I will be using here to demonstrate the relationship between the government and the Goethe Institute, with a broader discussion of the question of autonomy and freedom of the Institute from the government.

After the Foreign Office presented a new concept for CD, outlined by the Konzeption 2000, a paradigm shift in the basic concepts of foreign cultural policy started to take place. In this approximately ten-year process until 2011, the Foreign Office explicitly defined its foreign policy goals concerning the CD. The debate of the Parliament about this paradigm shift clearly shows that the Parliament regards "foreign cultural policy as an instrument of representation of interests in German foreign policy - in the service of diplomacy."[143] This quote indicates that the conceptual decision mechanism for CD is the Foreign Office. However, the Parliament then stated that CD is not a clear-cut process, and it will preserve its open-ended nature. At this point, the autonomy of intermediary organisations comes into question, which I discuss later in this chapter.

The founding of new strategic partnerships is also a part of this debate in Parliament. As mentioned above, the Parliament discussed new partnerships with the BRICS and the G20 countries and asked the government to use CD more to make these transitions smoother.

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[141] Deutsche Welle. (2004). "Cuts Could Hurt German Culture Abroad" Retrieved on 17.10.2019 from https://www.dw.com/en/cuts-could-hurt-german-culture-abroad/a-1150746.
[142] Varga, S. (2013) The Marketisation of Foreign Cultural Policy: The Cultural Nationalism of the Competition State. *Constellations Volume* 20, No 3. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
[143] Ibid, p. 1.

According to the parliamentary document, the regional imbalances in which Germany is involved in CD activity overseas are a vital issue. For instance, the document states that in terms of the overseas presence of the GI in the West, where Germany has more in common politically, culturally, and geographically, state support should reduce to a minimum. When asked about this, the government responded: "The state-sponsored cultural presence of Germany abroad must follow the goals of foreign policy… The Federal Foreign Office is engaged in a continuous dialogue with cultural mediators about the concrete way there, i.e., the actual implementation."[144] In terms of this actual implementation, the government does not give much detail, although asked about it. Later, when asked about the role of the intermediary organisations in the paradigm shift in CD and how they implement it, the government responds that they are trying to strengthen the Committee on Culture and Media to come up with an agenda. According to the government, this agenda would help most intermediary organisations implement the new understanding of CD. The head of the Committee on Culture and Media met various representatives from different intermediary organisations such as the GI and ifa, and it was the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle who pioneered this. In this response, we still do not have much detail about the implementations of CD, about which the Parliament asked. This means that the fundamental artistic and cultural resonances of this 'paradigm shift' remained unanswered.

The Parliament asks a particular question about cultural projects in the field. It asks the federal government about the Year of Germany and Week of Germany programs. These are programs by the GI in various regions and countries (starting with China in 2008-9, then India, Russia, and Brazil in 2013 – 2014).[145] The parliament asks the federal government whether it is planning to keep implementing, supporting, or developing those projects further.[146] And if the answer is yes, how do these projects fit into the foreign policy objectives of the Foreign Office?[147] The government deigns its right to develop these projects further (although after 2012, we do not see a systematic continuation of them)[148] , and the justification in terms of policy objectives is the following: "They are large-scale instruments that contribute to the implementation of the objectives of the FCP. The focal point of these campaigns is dialogue,

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[144] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) *Antwort der Bundesregierung - Paradigmenwechsel im Konzept zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik des Auswärtigen Amts*. 17. Wahlperiode Drucksache 17/11981 – 19.12.2012

[145] Ibid.

[146] Ibid.
[147] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Antwort der Bundesregierung (p. 8)

[148] Ibid.

exchange, and cooperation between people and cultures. Networks are being built and expanded, conveying a positive, true-to-life image of Germany."[149] The emphasis on an accurate image of Germany is essential because it also comes up when the Parliament asks to justify (still) using Kulturstaat (Cultural state) and Kulturnation (Cultural nation) as two reference points of German CD. Nevertheless, we do not truly see an answer as to how they fit in with the foreign policy objectives: what are the economic gains that Germany has achieved as a result of these projects? What further have international and political partnerships they pioneered? Unfortunately, these questions do not find an answer in the government's response.

The Parliament poses a similar question about the 'Art of Enlightenment' project, a jointly developed program by the Chinese and German museums under the aegis of the GI.[150] The question concerns the long-term impact and the project's contribution to sustainability. The government response focuses on the creation of dialogue and mutual understanding. Besides, it suggests that the curator exchange program and museum education given by the GI for the Chinese National Museum will help situate museums as a place of learning and enlightenment.[151] In fact, among the long-term impacts of this project, there is a significant cultural activity between the museums of the two countries and an economic activity between the two countries. In addition to this, another issue is the cultural hegemony visible in the project. The report suggests, "Any visitors to the exhibition and discussion forums have re-understood the museum as a place of comparison and learning, as a place of enlightenment."[152] Director of Berlin State Museums Michael Eißenhauer, the head of the project committee, stated that "the art exhibition will not feature any references to current political ideology, which he believes is a matter for the foreign ministry and not the task of art museums."[153] In addition, the head of the Directorate-General for Culture and Communication at the Federal Foreign Office, Werner Wendt, said that there is a political side to the exhibition, and the Foreign Office was aware of it, being a co-sponsor of the project.[154] However, the government mainly overlooked this aspect in its debates and responses about CD. Therefore, "being political is not

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[149] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Antwort der Bundesregierung (p. 9)

[150] Ibid, p. 9.

[151] Ibid, p. 10.
[152] Ibid, p. 10.
[153] Deutsche Welle (2010). "Major exhibition brings European Enlightenment art to Beijing" Retrieved on 13.09.2019 https://www.dw.com/en/major-exhibition-brings-european-enlightenment-art-to-beijing/a-6280697

[154] Ibid.

the task of museums" seems invalid.[155] First of all, museums are political bodies that help us make sense of the world around us; and second, they are mostly or partly state-sponsored institutions that have to comply with their national and international interests.

Apart from the projects it carries out in the field, the Parliament asked the government specific questions about its relationship - and the politics of this relationship - with the intermediary organisations. As discussed in the previous section of this chapter on Germany's governmental approach to CD, policymaking for CD in Germany was officially appointed to the Foreign Office, as explained in *Konzeption 2000*. Coordination and control of the intermediary organisations are conducted through allocating budget funds and target agreements and through a wide range of votes and discussions at home and abroad. In the case of the GI, the framework agreement that the government has with the GI stipulates coordination by the Foreign Office. The Parliament asked the government about coordinating the GI and an original CD if the government and the GI are very close[156]. The Parliament's response was as follows: "The Federal Foreign Office formulates the foreign policy objectives and guidelines of the FCP and is responsible for their political and conceptual control… The programs abroad are organized independently by the intermediary organizations."[157] The conceptual control aspect here is specifically essential. Because if there is so much conceptual control by the Foreign Office on what the GI does overseas and how it does it, the (later mentioned) independence is open to discussion. The government states that they organise the programs independently, but we do not see an explanation for this. The issue of ensuring the intermediary organisations will remain independent in the future is posed in the same context as the previous GI question. The response is the following: the Federal Government is responsible for the political conception of the FCP. Regarding their implementation, intermediary organizations specified are under private law and are essentially free in their program design, even though they have different cultural emphases and objectives.[158] Besides, the report states that foreign missions in every country regularly report back to the Foreign Office while evaluating the costs and benefits of GI projects.[159] And this reporting system would continue regardless of how well CD work works in a specific region.[160] For that reason, too, we can talk about a shift toward

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[155] Ibid.

[156] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Große Anfrage (p. 6)
[157] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Antwort der Bundesregierung (p. 12)
[158] Ibid, 13.

[159] Ibid, 13.

[160] Ibid, 14.

making the decision mechanisms of each intermediary organisation more accessible. Still, we can also suggest that the government is evading the issue of independence and gives no clear answers.

When asked about the GIs' regional presence and planned closures, the government responds that there is a continuous review between the Foreign Offices and the institute branches.[161] These reviews are per the framework agreement and the valid target agreement of the government.[162] Besides, the government further develops or reduces them under the requirements of the foreign cultural policy priorities of the government.[163] This framework agreement requires the GI to submit all relevant plans and projects to the Federal Foreign Office per the framework agreement and the agreement on objectives.[164] By the time of this debate, the GI had started developing proposals for adapting its overseas presence to the new FCP concept; but as of 2011, concrete results were not available. It is helpful to remind oneself what this new concept was: namely, that the conceptual control of FCP lay with the Foreign Office. Therefore, this new concept meant that the GIs would comply more with the government's political agenda, which they have been doing since then. And for that reason, here I would argue that the results are, in fact, available, and the GIs have been complying with the government objectives more and more as we approach the present day.

On 21 March 2012, the CDU/CSU party leader Michael Fuchs made a statement about the GI along the following lines: the 'famous Goethe-Institutes' should prefer organising language courses for young people abroad rather than 'any left-inclined poetry readings.'[165] When asked about this statement and whether the federal government shared this view, the government's response was very evasive, falling relatively short of the actual question. The government simply states that what the GI currently does aligns with the Foreign Office requirements.[166] The statement by Fuchs here is an explicit criticism of what his political fraction believed the GI was doing overseas, and he openly mocks this work in the statement. As we have seen in several instances, the government accepts that the GI must comply with the Foreign Office's rulings. Still, it also endeavours to make it known that the independent offices of the GI decide their day-to-day programs. And if a left-wing inclined poetry reading

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[161] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Antwort der Bundesregierung (p. 15)

[162] Ibid, p. 15.

[163] Ibid. p. 16.
[164] Goethe Institut (2010) Jahrbuch 2010. Goethe Institute.
[165] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Große Anfrage (p. 6)
[166] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Antwort der Bundesregierung (p. 16)

is what the cultural policymakers in specified areas deem fitting, it is what the GI will be doing. In this example, we can observe this evasive government approach and its lack of support. That the Parliament puts forward this question is, in fact, a helpful undertaking on their part because as long as these controversial areas of CD are left unattended and unanswered, it does not seem likely that both policymakers and governments will carry the field forward. When this happens, the stagnation of CD will continue. However, in the end, we see that the problem is also left unanswered.

5.2. Policy Shifts in the Goethe Institute in Connection to the Governmental Shifts in CD

The next point that the German Parliament and the government address is the instrumentalization of arts and culture and what the intermediary organisations such as the GI do about it. Instrumentalization of arts and culture was understood, first and foremost, as something negative, in keeping with the objectivity of cultural promotion. In the field of cultural policy, specifically cultural promotion abroad, there is constant anxiety and fear about this issue. It is more visible in the political debates than in the practitioners' field. "Cultural policy is not a harmless political field, but an important, perhaps even the decisive, means of power concerning our social and political order."[167] We must first ask why there is a need to think of cultural policy as something that could be harmful. Why can't we see instrumentalization as political grounds to legitimise the cultural promotion work and accept that cultural institutes do it with the support and supervision of the government? There is no specific answer to these questions that I can give. However, these questions are very clearly motivating the efforts to prove that instrumentalization is not good and is not what cultural institutions such as the GI are doing.

As previously mentioned, the Basic Law of Germany posits that foreign cultural policy is the responsibility of the Federal Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*). This means that CD automatically aligns with the foreign policy of the country. As Hilmar Hoffmann and many other cultural policymakers have suggested, instrumentalising arts as a political tool poses a

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[167] Wagner, B. (2009): *Fürstenhof und Bürgergesellschaft. Zur Entstehung, Entwicklung und Legitimation von Kulturpolitik* (Edition Umbruch, 24). Bonn: Kulturpolitische Gesellschaft (s. 253). Quoted in Hampel, A. (2017). *Fair Cooperation: A New Paradigm for Cultural Diplomacy and Arts Management* (New edition). Bruxelles: P.I.E-Peter Lang S.A., Éditions Scientifiques Internationales. (p. 56).

potential danger – be it in the service of diplomatic or economic gains.[168] It is also undeniable that the FCP is affected by policymakers' constantly changing economic and political ambitions. And the ultimate goal here is the foundation and preservation of power – be it hard or soft power.[169] The instrumentalization of arts and culture is inevitable to create this power. Many officials from the GI have made statements about how the GI is not instrumentalising culture and arts for political benefit.[170] The reflection of this approach is vividly visible within the political debates exemplified in the two sub-sections above. I will bring specific examples here and show that instrumentalization discourse is an effort by the cultural stakeholders to convince the audiences that they do not aim to use arts and culture for political gain. In contrast, the examples show that they do.

The question asked by deputies in the Bundestag points in the following direction: how can the intermediaries implement the changed understanding of CD, prescribed by a political body, without instrumentalising the artistic production?[171] The government response states that the individual intermediary organisations decide on specific arts and culture projects. However, they must still align with the targets to which the Foreign Office agreed.[172] Following this vague statement, what follows is: "Von einer Instrumentalisierung von Kunst und Kultur kann keine Rede sein" (There can be no question of instrumentalising arts and culture). There is no explanation following this bold statement and no indication of what strictly the government is basing it on. Policymakers and academics have debated the question of instrumentalising arts for the sake of foreign policy goals. I have already provided extensive examples in both of my main chapters. It is still not as comprehensive a debate as it could be. However, governments instrumentalize arts and culture when they support and impact a cultural institution's policymaking. Considering this question is evaded pretty quickly, we can suggest that the acceptance is already there.

The instrumentalization of arts and culture is a concern that the GI addresses quite frequently, relatively more so than the British Council. As we have seen specifically in the

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[168] Hoffman, H. (1994) Eine neue Offensive ist erforderlich. In: Hoffmann, H. & Maaß, K. J. (Eds) *Freund oder Fratze? Das Bild von Deutschland in der Welt un die Aufgaben der Kulturpolitik*. Frankfurt am: Campus (pp. 13-21).

[169] Hampel, A. (2017). *Fair Cooperation: A New Paradigm for Cultural Diplomacy and Arts Management* (New edition). Bruxelles: P.I.E-Peter Lang S.A., Éditions Scientifiques Internationales. (p. 50)

[170] Personal interview with Katharina v. Ruckteschell from the Goethe Institute.

[171] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Große Anfrage (p. 4)

[172] Ibid.

previous chapter on the BC, the Council does not debate instrumentalization: the discourse on cultural promotion revolves around solid outcomes and the contributions of culture and arts along the way. The GI treats culture as the entirety of values, i.e., everything German. On the other hand, arts are more related to creativity and production, such as theatre and literature, again from Germany. The biggest concern while promoting art and culture is instrumentalising it to serve a more considerable national or international benefit for Germany. GI staff has frequently suggested that the GI refrains from instrumentalising culture. Instead, it aims to differentiate between instrumentalization and its expected outcomes. Former president of the GI, Klaus Dieter Lehmann, said,

> "The GI is immune to instrumentalization. But that does not mean we do not have or represent any interests. We are committed to an open, liberal society. We lead a dialogue of responsibility without missionary zeal but with recognisable profile. As Wilhelm von Humboldt put it, "It is the nature of the human being to recognise himself in another." I am therefore convinced that foreign cultural policy, despite entering new fields and markedly strengthened in funding, will not stand in for cultural imperialism."[173]

That the GI is immune to instrumentalization is a huge claim, and there has to be tangible proof to support it. However, like other similar comments by policymakers of CD, the main motive here is to disprove the claim that CD is just an extension, a contemporary continuation of cultural imperialism. Whatever the policymakers call the work they do overseas, instrumentalization is inherent to foreign cultural policy, bringing it closer to CD. The level of instrumentalization of arts and culture may vary, but it will be there. For that reason, Lehmann's comment lacks coherence, and the fact that the GI leads a dialogue of responsibility does not automatically exclude the possibility that the GI has no interest in cultural dominance. Nevertheless, his statement answers criticisms of the GI and its efforts to create a cultural hierarchy.[174] And as we will see in the next section of this chapter, Germany does seek a cultural leader in the world through its intermediary cultural institutions.

Just after the quotation above, in the same article, Lehmann talks about how important it is that the government has integrated its political intentions and programs into the Coalition Agreement.[175] In this way, the Federal Foreign Office and the GI would jointly carry out the

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[173] Goethe Institut. "Europe as a Continent of Solidarity" by Klaus Dieter Lehmann. Retrieved from https://www.goethe.de/de/uun/prs/int/pra/21174825.html on 23.10.2019.

[174] Ibid.

[175] Ibid.

cultural projects.[176] From here, we can infer that the political intentions of the country are very much in line with the direction that foreign cultural policy will take; both fields support and nurture one another. Representing the political does not necessarily have to be a negative aspect of CD; instead, it should contribute to making sense of cultural encounters. We will see in the statements from the interviews in the next section that there is a general tendency towards accepting that political representation of interests is an internal part of foreign cultural policy. For that reason, policymakers of CD should stop putting one realm against the other – i.e., political vs. cultural or artistic – and they should be more accepting of the instrumentalization of culture and arts. Such acceptance would reflect the true nature of the paradigm shift in CD, along with the modifications within German foreign policy.

Both GI's cultural work in the field, and the government debate on the paradigm shift in German CD, demonstrate the mutually dependent relationship between the German government and the GI. It is between deciding if what the institute is doing is, in fact, CD and also determining the limits and controversies that are faced – being a government-affiliated institution. I will provide more examples of this predicament in the following two sections.

6. The GI's Shifting Stance on CD

While it has been the government's policy to align the GI's work with Foreign Office objectives, attempting to strengthen this position even more, what is experienced in the field by practitioners might be a little different. Indeed, every project, event, or idea GI creates must comply with the German Foreign Office's rulings for FCP. Still, the practitioners sometimes feel and even do things differently. This is quite natural because we cannot expect cultural practitioners to follow the government's rules while actively in the field. However, they cannot entirely ignore the national interest and must comply with a set of rules. I have provided an explicit example of this in the case of the BC when the British MPs pressured the BC into removing some content that was critical of the UK government. This section is about the balance between practice and theory of CD and how the GI achieves this balance or not.

The intermediary organisations of Germany have the following claim in their everyday discourse about their projects. First, they argue that the country's federal structure allows more cultural freedom than other countries, and cultural promotion abroad reflects this situation.[177]

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[176] Ibid.

[177] Goethe Institute. (2011) "Goethe Institut looks back on 60 years of cultural exchange" Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/goethe-institut-looks-back-on-60-years-of-cultural-exchange/a-15277312.

They emphasize culture as opposed to politics, a dichotomy that we see less in the briefings of the BC. The descriptions of German cultural promotion are relatively vague compared to the UK discourse. This approach reflects on the GI's usage of CD as a phrase. In this section, I will test this claim by analysing the interviews I have conducted with officials from the GI. In addition, most of the secondary literature about German FCP in general and the work of the GI expressly are framed by the apologetic discourse of 9/11. They primarily describe how CD and PD were essential for Western countries to explain to the world how wrong 9/11 was and educate Islamic communities about culture. The discourse of "now we need it more than ever" is prominent and visible throughout the literature.[178] Although some criticism is available in the literature about this issue, it does not constitute extensive literature. The second issue I encountered while writing this chapter was that there is just not enough secondary literature that would enable me to trace back the GI in its historical development. There are excellent resources on the history, foundation, and institutional development of the Institute for the 20th century, but this literature faces a certain caesura after the 1980s. This section will help us understand why this is still the issue and what motivations underlie the continuation of this discourse.

The practice of CD, namely the pieces created within this act of diplomacy (the artworks, theatre pieces, literary works), is always way more critical than the discourse revolving around the CD. When we look at the government discourse and the CD practitioners' discourse on why and how CD is necessary, we can see that this discourse cannot reach the level of what CD creates. The same can be said for the academic discourse around CD as well. The academic discourse is always two steps behind the actual outcomes of the work in the field. And although it is hard and challenging to come up with general definitions and commentary on CD, this premise can be valid for all forms of CD and CD organisations around the world, operating in different parts of the world.

The following section will focus on the interviews I conducted with GI officials. I will also use written interviews I acquired in my field research and my dialogue with relevant practitioners. To support my primary resources, I will also use some online interviews that

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[178] Sources that further this discourse include, but are not limited to: Ernst, M. (2014) *Der Deutsche Dialog mit der Islamischen Welt – Diskurse deutscher Auswærtiger Kultur und Bildungspolitik in Maghreb*. Transcript Verlag. Pantea, D. & Stoica, A. (2014) The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Contemporary Crises and Conflict Reconciliation. *Studia UBB Europaea*, LIX, pp. 219-230; Richterova, P. (2004) Der Lange Weg Zum Dialog – Ein Jahrhundert deutsche Auswærtige Kulturpolitik (1912-2001) *Acta Universitatis Carolinae – Studia Territorialia VI*, pp. 13-103; Auer, C. & Srugies, A. (2013) *Public Diplomacy in Germany*. ICPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Figueroa Press.

feature the head of the GI. These interviews will give a general idea of how the GI approaches CD as a concept and where it stands in the face of its political aspect. Within the literature on German CD, no research focuses on these interviews and breaks down the CD discourse present in them. For that reason, using these online interviews makes sense and fits into the framework of my research. The purpose here is to demonstrate that the direction of the GI is leaning towards a political orientation, and it is closer to CD practice than is commonly believed by experts in the field.

6.1. Interviews – Politicians' Statements

The interviews analyzed here demonstrate the political nature of the GI's work, which is in line with the country's foreign policy objectives, and the intentional effort by GI officials to navigate their discourse around this fact. As I have shown in respect of several examples from the literature, the CD is related to cultural imperialism by some academics and sceptics of the concept.[179] For that reason, cultural institutions such as the GI and the BC – specifically the GI considering the country's historical, cultural propaganda agenda – want to wash their hands of anything that would resonate with it. Nevertheless, the CD does have multiple meanings. Sometimes, it is a way of circulating information about a specific culture. But on the other hand, it can also be about exchange and bilateral relations and training a group of people in cultural ways and values of another dominant culture (which would be in line with cultural colonialism).[180] These interviews show the effort to overcome such discourse to prove that the GI is nothing like this. But they also demonstrate that the GI's work is closer to CD than any other practice. In the previous section, I have shown this situation with Parliament debates and government papers.

I conducted the first elite interview concerning the GI in July 2017 at the Berlin headquarters of the GI. I spoke with Sabine Hentzsch, the head of the GI in Berlin. As the head of the institute in the country's capital, I first asked her what she thought of CD as a concept. Her answer to this question was one of the very definite ones: she said, "We do not like to use the concept of CD. The GI is not a diplomatic mission; thus, it would not be right to classify

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[179] For various perspectives comparing and contrasting CD and cultural imperialism, see Paschalidis, G. (2009) Exporting national culture: histories of Cultural Institutes abroad, *International Journal of Cultural Policy, 15*:3, 275-289; Topic, M & Rodin, S. (2012). *Cultural diplomacy and cultural imperialism: European perspective(s)*. Peter Lang; Kang, H. (2015) Contemporary cultural diplomacy in South Korea: explicit and implicit approaches, *International Journal of Cultural Policy, 21*:4, 433-447.

[180] Bereson, R. (2007). *Lying abroad: A Critical Study of Cultural Diplomacy*. College of Arts and Sciences: University of Buffalo. (pp. 100-101)

our work as CD."[181] It is possible to say that this is the general impression I got in my interactions with many other GI officials, many of whom I have had informal chats with and interacted with on social media. This reluctance to accept CD even as a term is pervasive among the German practitioners of CD, compared to the high level of acknowledgment on the British side. She further commented in her answer, "I think for the GI, a term such as CD should be about politically promoting culture and arts and expecting concrete results from the receiving party at the end of this exchange. We do not expect a concrete outcome due to our projects, and we do not get one sometimes. And this is fine. This makes our work different from the mainstream understanding of CD." This statement shows the discrepancy between the policymaking sphere and the practitioners regarding CD. 2017 was also the year when the GI started collaborating with the BC on the Cultural Value program, which was an attempt on both sides to define the significance of CD and what more can they do to improve their practices.

I conducted my second interview with the head of the GI in London, Ms. Katharina von Ruckteschell. I asked her about the GI's work in the field and how CD overlaps. I also asked her about post-unification Germany's practice of CD and how the government advice that the GI is receiving is impacting the Institute's decisions. She said, "The process of change that the GI has undergone from solely being a language education school to an arts and culture institute was a very positive change. Specifically, Eastern Europe policies have made the institute more accessible to the world."[182] The centrality of Eastern Europe in her answers made it clear that the government's political motivations and CD policies are very much in line. She added, "But there were also some negative developments, maybe this is something global, but it is the case for Germany. We have had to plan our money more carefully, and we have had to report on everything we do. Our whole bureaucratic system grew extensively." She mentioned that the institute gets controlled a lot. According to her, compared to other institutions in Germany, the GI is still relatively free, but it still is a development which makes it more difficult to act. She classified this as an adverse change in policymaking.

My other question was about the connection between the GI's policymaking and the socio-political changes in Germany. She thought there was an overt connection between the two. The GIs and other organisations' position in the cultural field can be much more explicit now, according to Ms. Ruckteschell. For instance, the extreme right-wing positions developed in Germany also affected this. Thus, the GI must position itself politically and take a stance on

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[181] Phone interview with Sabine Hentzsch conducted on 27.07.2017

[182] Phone interview with Ms Katharina Ruckteschell, head of GI in London, conducted on 22.02.2019

the issues that affect Germany. In the past, they had to be a neutral player in the field, being the notorious ex-Nazi country. But now it is more acceptable, and it is not a big problem for Germany to take stances on political issues. She thought this was a positive development. However, she added that "should a government change occur in Germany towards a more radical ideology, the way the institute functions could also change," but this needs to be seen with time, if ever.

When I asked about the idea of bringing culture into international relations, which was one of *Konzeption 2000's aims*, she thought it was indispensable to do this in the interconnected world that we live in right now. Then she specifically pointed out the following: "I am not a big fan of this concept of CD, culture being soft power. This might be a reason for politicians to use culture. I do not believe in using culture or arts; they should be there on their own. For instance, you cannot say that we will organise a concert and we will achieve some outcomes related to politics or the economy."[183] Therefore, according to her, cultural relations should stand there on their own as something that has to happen naturally. The outcome, for the GI, is to bring people together to talk and interact and to do things in which they are interested. This outcome is, in fact, a generic stance about CD that so many cultural institutions take up. However, as we have seen in the previous section, it does not always reflect reality. Therefore, the GI decides on the focus of regions considering the international image of Germany and their current level of achievement.

As I have pointed out earlier, one of the focus areas of the GI is cultural education. Cultural education is mainly about educating cultural organisations and actors in the field about how to be more creative, spread culture to other audiences, and which tools to use.[184] While commenting on promoting culture, Ms. Ruckteschell made a subtle criticism to the claims that CD is no different from cultural imperialism: "We need to do the same thing in cultural education as well. We should not just teach something to an audience because we believe it is right."[185] Later, she mentioned the new four-year strategy that the GI created in 2018[186] and said it aimed to reach the people with whom they do not typically connect. "For instance, it could be people here in Britain who voted for Brexit, young people who do not have access to

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[183] Phone interview, ibid (2019).

[184] Goethe Institut Yearbook (Jahrbuch) 2018.

[185] Phone interview, ibid (2019).

[186] Goethe Institut Yearbook (Jahrbuch) 2018.

multicultural environments and other kinds of surroundings."[187] The motivation behind these words is to show that the GI is trying to be as inclusive as possible, but it still has an underlying judgment and urges to teach the 'right' way of seeing culture.

Regarding the term "promoting," Ms. Ruckteschell insisted that the GI only promoted the knowledge of the German language and nothing else. The GI, according to her, does not promote *German culture*. Instead, it enables talking about politics. Related to that, "CD has connotations of influencing and manipulating. Coming from a country where culture was a tool of influence and manipulation in the Nazi era, many Germans and I would find this problematic. That is one of the reasons I would never want to use this term, although I would not object to it being used in a way it will not be very negative."[188] I have already pointed out the reluctance of German policymakers to use CD for similar reasons. But then, we cannot ignore that this also seems like a generational issue. Younger people with whom I have interacted within the GI – teachers or people who simply work in the Institute's different branches – have a more tolerant approach to a CD per se. Ms. Ruckteschell also acknowledged this, "my generation or my background would not like this term, and that is also why we are the GI and not the cultural department of the Foreign Office."[189] When discussing CDs and why Germans would be hesitant to use them, she repeatedly mentioned the need to "remember the country's history." I believe this was about the instrumentalization of culture in the Nazi era. However, as I have demonstrated before, the Foreign Office recognizes CD practice and foreign cultural policy and more or less equates the two by now. The *Mittlerorganisationen* (one of them being the GI) are responsible for carrying out this work. Here, we can observe the discrepancy between what the government thinks the *Mittlerorganisationen* are doing and what they believe they are doing in the field.

The last point in the interview was about promoting German culture and why the GI might consider it "not right." Ms. Ruckteschell said that naturally, in a subtle way, the GI does promote German culture. It invites German artists who create cultural works based on their background, being Germans. But what it does not want to do is to parade to people what Germany has and say, "look at all the great philosophers and music and literature we have."[190]

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[187] Phone interview (2019).

[188] Phone interview (2019).

[189] Ibid.

[190] Ibid.

Therefore, the GI calls this culture from Germany, not German culture. She expressed that the GI automatically carries the German cultural heritage and legacy in its work, and the Institute sometimes straightforwardly does this. Sometimes it happens by chance. So, German culture is promoted, but "not in an aggressive way." As she has referenced in the interview, the idea of promoting culture itself has immense historical baggage in Germany. Specifically, people from older generations who have experienced Germany's very significant historical ruptures would be more hesitant to use such terms. This generational gap creates the question of what *Kultur* meant in the past and what it means in the world of the 21st century.

Although there is an effort to go beyond the classical meanings of *Kultur* and an urge to prove that German culture is more than Goethe and Schiller, culture, as German institutions abroad represent it, carries the undertones of the traditional implications. We have seen the extent of the debate on the *Kultur* in Germany and how the German *Kultur* is closer to the intellectual realm rather than daily culture.[191] This approach has impacted German CD practices. The idea of culture from Germany represents an effort to overcome the historically loaded undertones of promoting culture: that German culture is not the "best." Still, it tries to represent a whole picture of Germany with its problems and flaws. We can see this endeavour in the more recent projects of the GI, specifically the ones after 2004 until today. However, the urge to reference high culture is also present, more so in the policymaking of the Institute.

As we have seen in the discourse that various cultural actors use, Germany's stance on cultural representation and 'which culture to promote' moved further away from representing a high culture. Instead, it came closer to portraying a culture that not only originated in Germany but also came to Germany later on. Mainly philosophical debates on culture, *Kultur,* and civilisation in Germany have created some definitions for these concepts that could be relevant here. The reason political spheres saw culture as high culture in Germany stems from the idea of *Geisteskultur* – the high culture representing itself in the great works of art, philosophy, and scholarship. In Germany, the concept of culture has undergone a spiritualisation, which Adorno classifies as a positive thing, simply because German music and philosophy are indebted to this process.[192] Therefore, what happened with the GI after the turn of the century can be defined as an effort to democratise foreign cultural policy more by making it about all of Germany instead of only one aspect of Germany. However, this democratisation

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[191] Adorno, T. (2009) *Kultur and culture*. Social Text 99 • Vol. 27, No. 2, Duke University Press.
[192] Ibid.

does not necessarily need to be away from the political realm. Cultural institutions and the GI are no exception here. They should be more open and embrace the fact that what they do is wholly political.

The main conclusion I have derived from the interview with Ms. Ruckteschell, the head of the GI in London, is that there is indeed confusion about CD approaches from the GI and the German government. Secondly, there is a constant effort to prove that Germany needs CD for conflict prevention. Although there are many mentions of portraying a better image of Germany, attracting people, and creating interest in German cultural products, the foreign policy spheres explain cultural promotion mainly in terms of conflict resolution rather than making cultural connections. The political discourse can never reach and transcend the critical level of artistic expression, nor does it need to do that. The academic discourse around German CD does not criticize this situation well enough and does not point to the constant parallel drawn between national security and CD. Not that this is an unimportant matter, but national security is, in a way, treated as an expected outcome of CD. However, while contributing to further states' national and economic agendas, the CD should aim to achieve more than just securitizing Germany and German culture. Especially in contemporary times where globalisation and security threats to states have become increasingly unprecedented and unpredictable, this approach does not help states and institutions develop better CD strategies, including the GI.

To further exemplify the ambiguous status of CD in the eyes of the German government and the GI, I will examine online interviews with Johannes Ebert, Secretary General of the Institute, since 2012. Ebert has a long career in German foreign cultural policy, having served in many different branches of the Institute worldwide until taking up office in Munich as secretary general. The interviews I will use here are by the Goethe Institute and a TV program on Deutsche Welle; they are on YouTube and open to public access.

The first interview I use here will be the 'German Goethe Institute – Journal Interview,' broadcast on Deutsche Welle in June 2012.[193] The first question the interviewer asks is, "what is German culture" and his reply was: "German culture is a vast field, including theatre, film, and arts… but (it is also about) the question how does a society develop, questions of politics

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[193] DW News (2012, June 24) *German Goethe Institute – Journal Interview*. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hZIVOnupySk.

and so on."[194] Here, he includes politics and social life as parts of German culture and says they are inseparable. Creative culture is essential but incomplete without referencing the problematic areas of society and politics. So, we could infer that he has a relatively more realistic understanding of how Germany represents its culture. Later in the interview, the interviewer follows up and asks about political values. "How important is it for the GI to project values such as the rule of law, democracy, and freedom of the press?"[195] Ebert replies, "These are permanent topics in our programs. They are a huge part of our programs and what the GI stands for. Of course, the western values, Germany is part of the EU and the western world. I think we stand for these values".[196] CD naturally aims to contribute to democratic processes. However, "promoting western values" is inherently problematic because it reproduces the same mistake that major western countries make while conducting CD in developing countries. They further contribute to the eastern-western dichotomy and impose Western values upon the non-Western. Usually, in CD, practitioners refrain from using such terms because it might potentially damage the prospects of building people-to-people relationships. This attitude is to stay out of the uncomfortable political discussion and focus on a harmless portrait of cultural connection. However, when he utters these words, Ebert neither shocks us nor violates what foreign cultural policy stands for. FCP has political aims, in this case, normative to western values. Besides, the ultimate objective of cultural relations building is to foster political and economic benefits in the first place.

In the following parts of the interview, the discussion about values continues: "There is also a difference of values, which is very interesting for both sides. We have (using air quotes here) conservative Islamic values, which sometimes do not reflect western values. In these circumstances, we represent Western values, argue for them, and give an offer concerning these values… but do not point fingers at anyone in a self-righteous way. This is just an offer"[197]. First of all, it is not clear why he jumps to conservative Islamic values. I directly ask the following: are traditional Islamic values the universally accepted "others," or opposites, of the western values? Is this the stance the GI adopts? This is the sort of dichotomy that the GI reproduces within the context of western values. Cultural actors need to take extra care about this issue. Then again, it also represents the political aspect of conducting cultural relations

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[194] Ibid.

[195] Ibid, (minutes 2.30 – 2.55).

[196] Ibid (minutes 2.55 – 3. 45).

[197] Ibid, (minutes 4.13 – 4.46)

with other societies, to which the GI is not immune. Political here means that it aims to gain political power and benefits for the country, in this case, Germany. By 'not immune,' I mean this: yes, the GI's conduct in international cultural relations is reasonably transparent, but the evident nature of it does not mean that the country does not have an agenda to further Germany's political interests.

The following question is very much related to the previous one, in which the interviewer asks: "When you talk about projecting your values to a layer of society, the danger is that you might only be speaking to the liberal elite and not to the broader society." Ebert answers, "We have changed our approach about it after 9/11. We tried to get in contact with wider society… There are quite a variety of people in our language courses, too. It is not true that people from other countries do not want us to interfere in their cultures. We create a platform, and people from these societies want us to have these discussions with them."[198] Many academic discussions and analyses about CD at the beginning of the 21st century focus on 9/11, and it serves as a catalyst point, a pretext for doing more CD.[199] We can see here that this discourse is continued and supported, which further helps to deepen the dichotomies between cultures. As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, the same discourse of otherizing and alienating these Muslim countries and their cultures continued in the governmental discourse.[200]The argument that cultural identities create conflicts at the same time, bonds were repeated in the report of the Foreign Office in 2007-2008, while simultaneously bringing the compatibility of Islam with human rights and the rights of women in Islam.[201] Ironically, the report also mentions that cultural exchange is necessary to 'fight stereotypes,' but the previous statements create the stereotypes they discuss. The stance of the GI, in this case, is not different from the government's approach, proving that the GI is and has always been a political institution practicing CD for the sake of increasing the national benefit, as opposed to what the practitioners of the GI have claimed in this chapter.

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[198] Ibid, (minutes 4.50 – 7.23)

[199] For a detailed discussion about how 9/11 serves as a justification point for CD, see Ariel, C. (2003). "Promoting Freedom and Democracy: Fighting the War of Ideas Against Islamic Terrorism." Comparative Strategy 22, no 3. (207-221); Finn, H. "The Case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging Foreign Audiences". *Foreign Affairs*; Bill, I. Clegget, P. & Hurlburt, H. (2008). *Cultural Diplomacy and the National Interest: In Search of a 21st Century Perspective*. Arts Industries Policy Forum. The Curb Center for Art, Enterprise and Public Policy at Vanderbilt.

[200] Auswärtiges Amt (2007-2008): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin

[201] Ibid.

The second interview is from Deutsche Welle's TV show 'Talking Germany,' aired on 14 January 2013.[202] About German culture that the GI represents abroad, Ebert says, "… We understand culture not only as the arts, but also the discourse, what is going on in society, what do we discuss in Germany, and what do we discuss in guest countries." Again, here we see that the GI aims to include in its exchanges the political and societal debates related to Germany. The GI wants to provide an actual image of Germany, focusing on all the controversies in the country. This is one aspect that makes GI's work very close to CD practice. But the people working in the field hardly accept CD as a concept. I have demonstrated that the CD is inherent to the GI's agreements with the German government. Then again, it is not very common to see these controversies of a broader German society represented in projects by the GI, as I will exemplify later.

The last of the interviews that I will discuss here is more about the GI's challenges. In a more recent interview published by the Institute in 2016, the interviewer asks Ebert about the biggest challenges that face the GI in a globalised world.[203] "In many European countries, people are getting more and more against the EU and the European integration… this is a big challenge that we face. We have just organised a conference in Brussels called *European Angst*, and we are doing an exhibition called Collecting Europe" in Victoria and Albert Museum… because we think we can stimulate a discussion through art. It is the best way to do it."[204] We can see here that preserving the European idea and identity and promoting it through the cultural exchange is of paramount importance for the GI. Germany is naturally one of the leading countries arguing for European culture and its promotion, as I will demonstrate in detail in the next and final chapter. For the sake of this chapter, it suffices to say that one of the main political goals of the GI is and specifically has been in the post-reunification period, to promote the idea of Europe.

The last point I would like to make about the GI's approach to CD is related to CD and good governance. Good governance is closely related to public reforms and mostly about relationships between nation-states, their institutions, and the public and private sectors. The Ministerial Symposium of the OECD in Paris in March 1996 also defined good governance based on these relationships; and "regarded the quality and effectiveness of governance as

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[202] DW News (2012, June 24) *Talk with Johannes Ebert from Goethe Institute – Talking Germany*. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io2LkrxOb6Q&t=303s.

[203] Goethe Institute (2016, December 12) *Die Rolle des Goethe Instituts angesichts globaler Herausforderungen*. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZQSCPUn_oA&t=110s.

[204] Ibid, minutes (0.00 – 1.23)

crucial to national prosperity."[205] The GI has undertaken some work about good governance to see how the principles of good management would better serve the interests of the Institute and then of Germany in the long run. Wolfgang Schneider from the Institute for Cultural Policies at the University of Hildesheim discusses this issue in an article commissioned by the GI.[206] In 2008, the Enquete Commission "Culture in Germany" of the German Parliament proposed the article "the state protects and promotes culture" should be included in an additional piece in the constitution. By 2012, this proposal was still in discussion, and there was no clear conclusion. The point that Schneider wanted to make is the following:

> Instead of doing everything by itself, the state should play a more active role as an initiator, moderator, and promoter of networks. CD needs good governance… In the intergovernmental area, questions are being raised in this regard concerning the economization of societies that see globalization equally as a chance and a risk and critically discuss the effects of global mediatisation. CD can therefore serve as a reference system when it comes to culture and politics in multilateral relations.[207]

This approach would be helpful for the GI in practice. International cultural relations, by its definition and specifically its working rules set by the Konzeption for post-reunification Germany, is a political activity on which the German government has considerable influence. Regardless of which intermediary organisation we consider, this is the case. CD can be a more systematic method in bringing the work and transforming it into a channel of good governance. The concrete tasks, instruments, and outcomes require a systematic cultural-political approach, and CD could provide this. Therefore, even if we could distinguish between concepts such as international cultural relations and CD, the GI should be more open about the fact that the work they are doing in the field is already, to a great extent, CD. CD's commentators and critics suggest that the abundance of committees, conferences, and reports overshadow genuine cooperation with the public. Thus, we can say that a new outlook on German CD at the beginning of the 21st century helped shape this idea. With its highly complex array of intermediary organisations, actors, and changing culture ministers, German CD has always run the risk of getting lost in a cultural bureaucracy.[208] To overcome the hindrances brought forward

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[205] Agere, S. (2000). *Promoting Good Governance: Principles, Practices and Perspectives*. Commonwealth Secretariat (p. 2).

[206] Schneider, W. (2012) *Nation Branding oder Künstlerischer Austausch*? Retrieved from https://www.goethe.de/ins/cn/de/kul/mag/20629262.html.

[207] Ibid (translated from German by me).

[208] Maier, C. (1999). "The American View: A Comment," in *The Cultural Legitimacy of the Federal Republic: Assessing the German* Kulturstaat, ed. Frank Trommler (Harry & Helen Gray Humanities Program Series, vol. 6. Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Also see Trommler, F. (2015) "Soft Power and Its Use in American and German Cultural Diplomacy." Retrieved on 13.05.2019 from https://www.aicgs.org/publication/soft-power/#_ednref8

by this cultural bureaucracy, fully adopting CD would pave the way for German cultural promotion to expand in line with the process's political, cultural, and administrative requirements.

With all the efforts of the GI to democratize CD, and because these efforts have mostly been successful, it is still necessary to remember that CD is a method of achieving soft power, and there is a level of exerting it as well. Adopting a similar approach to that of Nye, Kurt Düwell suggests that the weakening of German security policy was to be compensated first by existing economic power. If that were not enough, the creativity of Germany in arts and culture would take the stage as a secondary measure.[209] This comment contradicts the concept of cultural relations, as we have seen in the words of the GI's practitioners, quoted here in this section. The GI believes that there should not be any political motive behind the cultural activities, and even if there is, they should not say it openly. However, as I have demonstrated, this conflict is already moot in itself: it is impossible to assert that the GI does not aim to achieve any political and economic gains for Germany. GI is a German government-funded organisation, and political figures, in addition to the culture minister, debate and decide many policies of GI abroad. They have a direct or indirect impact on how GI will implement these policies. In Germany's foreign cultural policy programs, the concept of CD appears when it comes to strategic issues about the implementation of cultural projects abroad or when debates about "culture as a foreign policy *instrument*" emerge. Lastly, the CD is a task force for foreign policy arrangements.[210] Therefore, the government always mentions GI with reference to foreign policy rather than the cultural relations aspect. From what we can observe here in this chapter, we can assert that what GI does overseas is more CD than cultural relations. There are hierarchies in the international scene, more so in the field of cultural promotion, and they manifest in CD by the GI.

7. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the varying CD approaches of the governmental policymaking spheres and the practitioners in the field. Germany's multilateral approach to foreign relations, and the inclination to be more involved in supranational projects, impacted how the country

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[209] Düwell, K. (2016) "'Soft Power' und auswärtige Kulturpolitik" in: *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, Volume 98, Issue 2, pp. 439-450, ISSN Online 2194-3958 (p. 444)

[210] Der Spiegel. (2018, 19 May). "Kulturdiplomatie ist eines der wenigen Instrumente, die bleiben, wenn die klassische Diplomatie an ihre Grenzen stößt", so Michelle Müntefering im Interview mit dem Spiegel. „Kulturpolitik ist Außenpolitik", in: Der Spiegel 21, S. 125.

conducted CD. The GI's approach to CD has always been somewhat cautious due to the threat of being perceived as government propaganda. Therefore, the widespread discourse about CD delivered in Germany emerged around foreign cultural relations. But, both in terms of its contents and transforming government advice into cultural policies, GI's work is CD. And I have demonstrated that we should call it CD to synchronize better cultural exchange works with other countries. If the work is rightly and openly defined, the way, the host countries will receive it will lean towards a more positive point.

The GI practitioners' approaches to CD demonstrate a vast discrepancy between the governmental aims appointed to these intermediary organisations and their work in the field. In this chapter, I have shown these discrepancies. I argue that CD could be a better solution to organizing and defining GI's work in the field. There is no issue in describing this work as political because any cultural work that aims to impact another society is inherently political. As opposed to what the cultural practitioners "fear," CD could be a solution rather than a problem for them.

Chapter 4 - Approaches to Cultural Diplomacy: A Comparison between the UK and Germany's Policies and Practices

This chapter will compare British and German CD policymaking from the governmental and cultural institutes' perspectives. It will investigate to what extent the policymaking on CD by the two governments has affected the cultural policies pursued by the BC and the GI. Did these policies create a discrepancy between values and policies attached to CD? The chapter will use the theoretical frameworks on culture, identity, and discourse to explain the CD steps the two governments took, explain the rationales behind them, and discuss how they affect the understanding of CD as a political practice.[1]

1. Governments' Policymaking Processes and Outlooks on CD in the UK and Germany

Based on the government papers analysed on CD, there are several points of comparison between the UK and Germany's CD approaches. These points demonstrate the current trends that have transformed CD as a practice of PD but constituted it as a separate and sometimes controversial field. As discussed in Chapter 1, the debates of the British government used soft power and CD often interchangeably.[2] These interchanges are standard in an area like CD, which covers many cultural and artistic projects. However, in the context of CD, the governmental perspectives often assumed that soft power was always attractive. This approach reflected their understanding of CD, so debating CD within the context of a political and national interest became taboo. This perception also created the misunderstanding that CD can never do wrong, harm audiences, or produce negative results. Here, I focus on the confusion around the concepts partly because of this misconception that CDs could not create negative consequences for people. Like soft power, CD is a political action that aims to provide an international image and standing for the UK, whether practiced by the BC or another government-funded cultural policy organization. The conceptual engagement with issues such

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[1] Arnold, M. (2009). *Culture and Anarchy*. Oxford University Press, Reissue Edition, Chaubet, F. (2022). International Cultural Relations, Historiographic Sketch, and New Conceptual Issues. In Carbo-Catalan, E. & Roig, D. *Culture as Soft Power: Bridging Cultural Relations, Intellectual Cooperation, and Cultural Diplomacy*, 22. Also see, Culture and Diplomacy – Research Background section in Introduction of this thesis.

[2] Rawnsley, G (2018). *Understanding the UK's soft power: more than Shakespeare and the Royal Family*. LSE Blog. Retrieved from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/soft-power-british-government-actions/

as representation and identity should have more importance in the debates about CD rather than a focus on soft power.

In Germany, foreign cultural policy (or CD) has consistently been recognized as the third pillar of foreign policy, as discussed in chapter 2. Specifically, in the 2000s, the new policy orientations of the German government portrayed CD as a foreign policy effort. However, in the practices of the GI and the projects pursued by them, we hardly see the political discourse; instead, we see an emphasis on culture and what it is to shape culture in Germany. Shaping culture in a German sense had immense importance in the German cultural atmosphere, and we have seen many examples of the emphasis on German culture while creating a CD policy for the country. Based on the government papers I analyzed, I have concluded that while the German government generally agreed that Germany could offer soft power to the world through CD, cultural practitioners in the field do not seem to agree with the concept of soft power in CD. The interview I conducted with the GI official in chapter 2 refers explicitly to this issue: I am not a big fan of culture being soft power.[3] But, within the BC discourse, this discomfort is not that obvious. Compared to the centrality of the concept of soft power in the UK's CD, and specifically in the discourse of the British Council, soft power does not often come up in German cultural organizations' discourses. Indeed, when the concept was all the rage at the beginning of the century, government circles discussed it, i.e., looking to gain soft power and its benefits for the country. However, the GI rarely uses gaining soft power as one of its purposes. Compared to the UK's BC, its attitude also shows the difference between the two institutions. It proves that whether an institution applies the concept of soft power in its cultural relations discourse or not, CD can thrive and yield benefits and positive results for the institution.

2. A Comparative Discussion of Governmental Reports in Capturing the CD Policies of the UK and Germany

The UK's 1986-7 Foreign Affairs Committee Report played an essential role in shaping the CD discourse because it asked the FCO for their evaluation of cultural policy abroad, and the results that have come out of this report have had an impact on the UK's CD ever since. CD, according to the report, included explaining British interests to decision-makers in other countries and promoting the country's economic interests, along with creating a favourable

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[3] Phone interview with Katharina von Ruckteschell conducted on 22.02.2019, chapter 2.

image of the country.[4] As seen in these aims, culture is used generally and vaguely and does not represent a uniform set of goals for CD. The FAC's response to the FCO's CD aims suggested that the country only followed CD as an instrument of political diplomacy. The Committee was critical of this use of CD by the government because it stated that the purpose of CD should not promote the UK with a marketing mentality. This idea is a very contradictory statement by the FAC because if CD does not aim to bring political benefits to the source country, what is it? All of the cultural and educational projects that reach millions of people and affect their lives positively carry the aim of benefiting the UK as a state: to make the UK a successful international partner for the countries it operates in and to reap further economic and political gains from the process. The UK's approach to CD has been like this. Therefore, the FAC's opposition to this idea remains futile.

CD has never been a uniform concept in the UK due to this kind of opposition from the inside. Many FACs suggested that the government needed to produce a comprehensive idea of CD policy emphasizing the cultural aspect of CD rather than diplomacy.[5] However, the government discourse focusing on the utility of CD as a way of brokering further economic and political benefits, which is one of the central points of debate in CD, created a bias against the concept of CD.[6] This dilemma is most apparent in the statements of cultural workers in the field at the BC and the GI.[7] Their unease worsened after 9/11 and the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, by which time the role of cultural organizations was seen solely as resolving conflicts.[8] The BC's stance as a cultural and non-political organization responds to the government-created discourse that CD should only be cultural, not political.[9] After 1986-7, the FAC reports occasionally mentioned CD, but they talked more about PD, emphasizing the cultural aspect of the work done by the BC and collaborations with other cultural bodies more often than the actual concept of CD. Although these statements omitted CD from their discourse, its impact on the foreign cultural aims of the UK is still visible to this day. CD was

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[4] Foreign Affairs Committee. (1986). *Cultural Diplomacy*. London: The Stationary Office: v.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Foreign Affairs Committee. (1986). *Cultural Diplomacy*. London: The Stationary Office: v.

[7] Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages. (2007). *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Überblick zentraler Problemstellungen einschließlich einer Auflistung der gegenwärtig vorliegenden Reformvorschläge*. Ausarbeitung WD 10 - 053/07, Fachbereich WD 10: Kultur und Medien.

[8] Leonard, M., Small, A. & Rose, M. (2005). *Public Diplomacy in the 'Age of Schisms'*. Foreign Policy Centre and Counterpoint, p. 50.

[9] Foreign Affairs Committee. (1986). *Cultural Diplomacy*. London: The Stationary Office: v.

named the culprit behind the 'cultural vs. political' dichotomy. Still, this omission from the discourse did not result in a solution, just more fluidity, and confusion around the practice.

One of Germany's most definitive reports on CD, Konzeption 2000 offers a similarly significant trajectory for CD as FAC 1986. However, the approaches to cultural work abroad demonstrate specific and essential differences, along with commonalities. So, while Konzeption is also a foundational report on making CD in Germany, it has a different rationale from that of the FAC report of 1986 in the UK. In the making of CD during the early 2000s, CD was defined as a political activity, meaning that it aimed to bring political benefits that would further the national interests of Germany, and it is one of the preconditions of the activity rather than a complication.[10] Politicians like the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fisher, or renowned cultural practitioners such as Hilmar Hoffman agreed that CD should be political.[11] Germany prepared Konzeption 2000 to translate these ideas into a working CD policy for the country. The purpose was to strategize CD as a practice of German foreign policy. In comparison to this strategy-building effort, in the UK, the FCO's suggestions about CD also included promoting the economic and political interests of the UK abroad, but this faced a backlash from the FAC. Eventually, the policymaking bodies reoriented the aims of CD to align more with *the cultural rather than the political*.[12] The German government, after Konzeption 2000, did not have a similar approach. Fostering German foreign, cultural, educational, and political interests abroad was the first core area that the report focused on, furthering European integration and preventing conflicts through dialogue.[13] Besides, the German government's approach to CD was more straightforward and less apologetic in influencing different audiences, specifically in avoiding conflict and dialogue on values. CD has become an indispensable component of foreign policy in Germany and, first and foremost, a political practice. And this point seems to connect the broader points about the nature of German vs. British identity that I have discussed before. Similarly, the emphasis on European integration demonstrates how Germany would use CD as a primary political tool in pursuing the EU integration process.

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[10] Fischer, J. (2000) 'Ein Glückfall für Goethe'. In Wapnewski, P, Mucher (eds) *Realitæten and Visionen: Hilmar Hoffmann zu ehren*., C. Dumont, Cologne. Quoted in (eds) Aheame, J & Bennett, O. (2013) *Intellectuals and Cultural Policy*. Routledge.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Auswärtiges Amt (2000): Auswärtige Kulturpolitik – Konzeption 2000. http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/aa/akbp_konzeption2000.pdf (Accessed: 21.11.2017).

Following the complete report by the FAC denouncing CD as a practice of political interests, the FCO made efforts to separate cultural relations from CD on a conceptual level. CD would refer to activities about cultural and information mobility, while cultural ties would be about international relations in cultural terms in line with political and commercial relations.[14] This separation of concepts did not have any resonance later in the cultural spheres because assigning CD to cultural information mobility simply did not make sense. This separation did not contribute to actual cultural policies in the field because the practitioners of CD hardly concerned themselves with the definitions discussed in governmental spheres. Besides, the separation attributed the traits of CD to cultural relations, which could only mean that the UK government just needed to silence the controversy over the concept of CD and that it reflects a "political" activity. It seems that the political nature of this activity was solely measured through the use of the word *diplomacy*.

In the case of the German government's approach, the diplomacy discussion did not take place within Konzeption 2000 but with the Federal Government on Cultural Policy reports, which I have analysed in detail in chapter 2. The German government, by the 2000s, decided that a further inquiry into the concept of CD was necessary because of the connotations of propaganda and imposing one's culture on another.[15] Due to the country's historically negative meaning of propaganda, Germany took extra care in dealing with the concept of CD, and cultural practitioners significantly refrained from using the term CD. However, these reports mostly debated the know-how of CD from the perspective of Germany rather than debating concepts or creating a dichotomy between CD, cultural relations, or foreign cultural policy (as primarily used in the German context). Issues such as adapting CD to media technologies, increasing citizen involvement and civil society in spreading culture, and dealing with the challenges of globalization were among the four overarching aims of the Federal Government report in 2000.[16] The report also discusses the economic aspect of conducting cultural policies in the field in much more detail than the FAC report of the UK. The resemblance of CD to traditional diplomacy was a concern for policymakers.[17] But in the 21st century, many policymaking bodies situated CD within the context of conventional diplomacy, and the

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[14] Foreign Affairs Committee. (1986). *Cultural Diplomacy*. London: The Stationary Office: v.

[15] Auswärtiges Amt (2000). *Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik*. Berlin

[16] Ibid.

[17] Rose, M. (2017). *A New Cultural Diplomacy: The Integration of Cultural Relations and Diplomacy*. Ifa Input / 3.

governmental discussions about the nature of CD did not continue.[18] Any discussion of CD in German governmental spheres in the 2000s focused on why the government conducted CD and how it carried it out, but it did not focus much on the dangers of over-politicizing CD practices. This conflict was also apparent in the interviews and documentation I analysed in the section on the GI. The GI and the BC had to create CD policies through their own lenses and by using cultural products.[19] Cultural institutions often need to collaborate with policymakers and government officials to benefit from funding allocated for CD. At the same time, they try to maintain their stance about their responsibilities toward the cultural products they are disseminating.[20] This state of oscillation between accommodating the funding/policymaking bodies and remaining true to the cultural products and the people who create them continues to this day. This tendency is usually relevant for any institution receiving government funds, but it is all the more relevant for this thesis on CD specifically. Such a situation leaves us with the broader question of who is it that owns cultural practices and products. In the case of CD, cultural institutions endeavoured to transfer the ownership of cultural products to the people, but the regulation and accountability keep returning to the governmental spheres.

In the UK, the efforts to clarify the concepts of CD and PD continued after the FAC report of 1986. The Wilton and Carter Reviews and a series of recommendations for the government to explore in the field offered different explanations and rationales for CD. For example, the Wilton Review concluded that there was poor coordination of PD policymaking at the governmental level and its practice in the field.[21] However, the report did not offer any explanation as to why this was the case. The most significant aspect of the report was that it spearheaded the foundation of the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board (PDSB), a governmental body under the FCO tasked explicitly with creating strategies for PD and implementing the Wilton Review's recommendations. However, the bureaucratization of CD and PD happened by defining the concept repeatedly. PD proved inefficient in creating a pathway for the CD because, as opposed to what the policymakers believed, the connection between PD and CD

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[18] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Große Anfrage - *Paradigmenwechsel im Konzept zur Auswärtigen Kultur- und Bildungspolitik des Auswärtigen Amts*. 17. Wahlperiode – Drucksache 17/9839 – 23.05.2012

[19] Clarke, D. "Theorising the role of cultural products in cultural diplomacy from a cultural studies perspective." *International journal of cultural policy* 22, no. 2 (2016): 147-163.

[20] Nisbett, M., 2011. *New perspectives on instrumentalism: stratagems, subversion and the case of cultural diplomacy*. Thesis (PhD). Sheffield Hallam University.

[21] Wilton, C.; Griffin, J. and Fotheringham, A. (2002). *Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy (The Wilton Review)*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

was not very apparent or organic.[22] Years of policymaking activity and report writing did not change this situation. The German governments during this period did make a similar effort to create new bodies to regulate CD. Instead, they simply focused on the many cultural institutions that align with the government's aims, conceptualizing them as intermediary organizations.[23] The Hertie report, prepared on behalf of the German Foreign Office, reiterated the continuity of intermediary organizations and their roles in the national mission. The report emphasized the broader political and foreign policy contexts of each country in which these organizations operated.[24] Among the countries were China, Qatar, and Russia, and their differences from the German cultural sphere were at the centre of the report, situating them as another form of CD. The GI is only one of these intermediary organizations. While in the UK, more funds, such as the PD Campaign and PD Challenge Funds, were established to support major initiatives in the economic sense and to set the terms of varying strategies.[25]

Carter Review was much more detailed and comprehensive compared to the Wilton Review. It had the chance to build upon the developments that had happened since the inauguration of the PDSB. The review inclined toward making PD a part of foreign policy, which created questions both in the Parliament and among the practitioners of CD.[26] The UK's CD discourse never resolved the dilemma about what constitutes foreign policy or the political realm and practices such as CD and PD. Nevertheless, the confusion and timidness of the Wilton Review about making CD a part of government aims to improve the influence of the UK was not as visible in the Carter Review.[27] Most criticisms of the Carter Review focused on the threat to the independence of institutions like the BC. These objections implied that the FCO would gain a hierarchy over these bodies.[28] Lord Carter said that the initiative was simply a measure to coordinate these bodies better.[29] But, it was clear from the report that the primary

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Hertie School of Governance (2017). *Die Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik Deutschlands im internationalen Vergleich*. Einer Studie der Hertie School of Governance im Auftrag des Auswärtigen Amtes. Wissenschaftliche Leitung: Prof. Dr. Helmut K. Anheier.

[24] Ibid

[25] Public Diplomacy, Third Report of Session 2005-2006, *House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee*, HC 903, Ev. 15.

[26] Public Diplomacy Review, 15 December 2005, Executive Summary, p 58, para 9-2.

[27] Ibid.

[28] McClory, Jonathan. "The new persuaders." *Institute for Government/Monocle* (2010).

[29] Public Diplomacy Review, 15 December 2005, Executive Summary, p 58, para 9-2.

purpose was to situate CD within foreign policy aims and overseas interests. These articulations of PD took a long time to be integrated into the institutions. Having already established policies about culture and everything that PD refers to, it was challenging to fit CD into this new conceptualization of PD. Still, it would be safe to claim that this shift enabled a more outcomes-oriented PD. There was a shift to PD shaped through marketing and public relations methods, post-9/11 multilateralism, and attempts to gain influence. The governmental debates about PD policymaking did not create sustainable, well-defined policies and strategies. Instead, they drew more attention to the discourse around CD and how it could be perceived from a normative point of view. This situation led to ignorance about the actual cultural practices in the field and also to misunderstandings about CD, examples of which we have explicitly seen in the German chapter. By constantly re-creating the discourse of interdependency, CD institutions, and actors funded and connected to the UK government, the cultural exchange aspect of CD was overshadowed.

German CD created its strategy based on the idea that CD is the third pillar of foreign policy. But policy spheres treated this third pillar as the least important and complementary.[30] Although the discussion about the hierarchies of importance and conceptualization has not been as complicated as in the UK, a similar approach downgrading the significance of CD is still present. In the report on Globalization by the Foreign Office, the main idea was to go beyond the third pillar approach to tackle the issues of globalization, even if the concept remained peripheral to foreign policy. However, in the case of Germany, this situation did not create confusion over the function of CD: it was still to promote German concepts around the world, promote education, etc. In the case of the UK, the conceptual discussion preceded the actual cultural work in the field, which is a natural process. After a while, the German government left these discussions behind, focusing only on the practices. Konzeption 2000 already mentioned that cultural policy alone can never solve the world's problems, as discussed in Chapter 2. It referred to the misconception that CD could only create positive results that have nothing to do with government politics, similar to the policy that the UK has debated for a long time. CD or foreign cultural relations never aim to solve international conflicts but are a means of mutual understanding in times of conflict and peace. Both governments created

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[30] Witte, B. (1999) "How to Present Germany as a Kulturstaat Abroad," in *The Cultural Legitimacy of the Federal Republic: Assessing the German* Kulturstaat, ed. Frank Trommler, Harry & Helen Gray Humanities Program Series, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Americn Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1999), 54, 52.

misconceptions about CD, so cultural practitioners rejected the term. We see the most visible examples of this in the German case.

A significant problem for a cultural institution such as the BC was to accept that its activities contributed to governmental objectives. During the 1990s, the BC mostly used "cultural relations" to define its work, but this was not a well-enough conceptualized term. The BC did not situate cultural relations within the organization's strategic framework.[31] This also brought some problems because the BC's foremost purpose was to be recognized and work effectively on the international stage. Most of the time, BC unconsciously expressed this lack of clarity, even in its internal reports. Even today, in sessions on CD or recent publications about the relevance of CD, this confusion can be seen. One of the most recent studies on CD touches on this problem: "The use of art and culture to further CD persists despite an evidence vacuum. Neither artists nor politicians have robust empirical data to substantiate their claims that the endeavours they call soft power have the effects they attribute to them".[32] Besides, the collective effort both by the government and other actors to come up with a very comprehensive agenda for CD has obstructed this process even more.

The British Council's annual reports also provide further examples of the lack of clarity around CD and its purposes. The BC yearly report in 2002 defined its "task as promoting the UK abroad."[33] This statement was clarified in the following year's report, explaining it in the form of a mission statement. However, the definition was "winning recognition abroad and nurturing lasting relationships with other countries."[34] This lack of clarity gave the impression that the BC was an organization that did not have a clear sense of its objectives. In this process, the concept of CD seems lost in context, at least in the governmental spheres. But this does not necessarily mean that these stakeholders did not discuss CD; there were efforts to confront the idea and to the discrepancies. CD was still being used within the practical field by the cultural institutions that perform the activities. Cultural practitioners do not usually want to associate CD with the political aims of any given country. Still, CD serves political purposes in its essence, meaning that it aims to bring national and political benefits to the source country.

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[31] British Council Annual Reports 2002, 2004, 2005.

[32] Doeser, J. & Nisbett, M. (2017). *The Art of Soft Power: A Study of Cultural Diplomacy at the UN Office in Geneva*. Kings College London.

[33] British Council Annual Report, 2002, p. 38.

[34] British Council Annual Report, 2003.

Cultural relations are tools to achieve this aim.

Lord Carter's review confirmed that the BC operated in alliance with the aims of PD to avoid discussions about the political purposes of CD.[35] Nevertheless, efforts to position PD and cultural relations as a kind of successor to the outdated concept of CD do not seem very convincing. This is because the most significant motivation behind these efforts was to declare the BC's autonomy from the government entirely. The government contextualised this autonomy within the framework of a theory of change: the BC would still act within the remit of the FCO's mission but in a way that is separate from its short-term political purposes. Towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the BC announced its new priority areas: intercultural dialogue, supporting a creative and knowledge economy, and climate change.[36] Dialogue is also used for the first time in the context of PD and CD, revealing the continuing misconceptions of the field. Again, this is also a controlled effort to take PD and cultural relations out of the sphere of foreign policy. Such sudden changes of terms are both unusual and make it more difficult to give meaning to culture as part of CD. We can argue that CD brings about both institutional opportunities and failures in defining political aims. Taking CD as far away from the countries' political interests works to the advantage of these countries. Still, it creates losses for the cultural organisations who do not wish to be viewed as a political tool of the governments. In the case of the UK, the BC suffered from a damage to its image, because the arm's length policy was at risk. CD, in its essence, deems it appropriate to contribute to national objectives to a certain extent. However, proponents of CD do not see this as a "task" that it has to carry out, but one that it is "allowed" to carry out.

Konzeption 2000, when we look at the contents of it, is a document of development strategy rather than a guideline for CD. The German government called it a guideline, but we see that Konzeption 2000 has informed the CD of Germany until today.[37] The FCP agenda, focusing on the idea of the third pillar, continued into the 2000s. The only thing that changed in the government discourse, especially after the 9/11 events, was the immediate inclusion of focus on the 'Muslim world.'[38] In the Konzeption, 'Islamic terrorism and the related need to

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[35] Public Diplomacy Review, 15 December 2005, Executive Summary, p 58, para 9-2.

[36] FCO, Departmental Report 2007-8, pp. 98-99.

[37] Pamment, J. "West European public diplomacy." In *European Public Diplomacy*, pp. 13-38. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013.

[38] Auswärtiges Amt (2000): Auswärtige Kulturpolitik – Konzeption 2000. http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/aa/akbp_konzeption2000.pdf (Accessed: 21.11.2017).

have better dialogue with the Muslim world' dominates all other issues.[39] Such an approach creates the discourse that the need for an effective CD was due to Islamic terrorism. This is also why dialogue with different cultures immediately meant dialogue with the Islamic cultures in the German context: the government created dialogue based on this discourse. In terms of cultural encounters, I would argue that the German government's approach was always more realistic than it was in the UK. The German government accepted the cultural encounters as an area of friction, even possible conflict, and they needed to strategize them accordingly. Konzeption 2000 openly stated that the efforts to create a ground for dialogue could easily cope with conflict and fundamentalism while using the same means.[40] In the UK government reports, if we consider the Carter and Wilton Reviews as the basis for CD strategy for the 2000s, we do not see a similar discourse focusing solely on conflict within one region, and we hardly know the word dialogue. What is happening, in this case, is a weaponization and manipulation of words, as Simone Weil describes it.[41] The concept of dialogue is a form of ideological understanding of globalization and the discourse of international security. Most governments use dialogue in whichever agenda they fit to give the illusion of effectiveness and significance.[42] The concept of dialogue has an internal violent aspect that aims to dominate the subject with whom the dialogue happens. This aspect is a remnant of the colonialist ideologies that seek to teach others the ways of being, in this case, the methods of conducting cultural relations. The discourse of violence and associating violence with others, i.e., Muslims in the context of intercultural dialogue, has prevented an honest dialogue between the providers and receivers of CD. Such discourse resulted in cultural practitioners and the public seeing cultural differences and beliefs as a threat rather than a strength. We should see these differences as a strength to achieve an effective intercultural dialogue.[43] However, the prejudices that came along with 9/11 and its aftermath prevented it. Clinging to the concept of (intercultural) dialogue from the perspective of CD demonstrates that the governments and cultural institutions fail to realize most of CD's aims. CD remains very superficial in creating engagement between cultures.

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Weil, S. (2005). *Simone Weil: An anthology*. London: Penguin.

[42] Phipps, A. (2014). 'They are bombing now': 'Intercultural Dialogue' in times of conflict. *Language and Intercultural Communication*, *14*(1), 108-124.

[43] Mitias, M & Al-Jasmi, A. "Intercultural dialogue." *Dialogue and Universalism 14*, no. 3/4 (2004): 143-161.

CD practitioners are generally more aware of the problems attached to intercultural dialogue. The attractiveness of the term has faded for the practitioners in the field because they know more about the connotations and actual meanings of intercultural dialogue compared to the government's policymakers. But the government papers have continued to use these terms to perpetuate the status quo of cultural relations that Western countries created and maintained. In fact, I argue that the concept of intercultural dialogue harms the actual practice of "intercultural dialogue" that happens every day and, in turn, harms CD practices. I have explained this specifically within my chapter on Germany's CD. The concept of CD refrains from dealing with the political problems (such as national security) at the centre of these conflicts that intercultural dialogue is allegedly solving. The white papers or governmental papers on intercultural dialogue hardly focus on political and sensitive issues. Intercultural dialogue only maintains a violent system by diverting attention from the inequalities and perceptions of cultural differences while avoiding ideological problems.[44] The violent system mentioned here refers to a recreation of dichotomies between the receiver and provider of culture. This recreation thus leads us to the civilized/uncivilized and cultured/uncultured paradoxes. Especially in the accounts from the GI practitioners and the institutional reports, this awareness is more visible compared to the BC practitioners.

The 2000s marked international cultural relations being diverted towards the Middle East because of the 9/11 events, as discussed in respect of the concept of intercultural dialogue in this thesis. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK continued to include the discussion on CD in their agenda. But there was a switch to soft power instead of CD. Especially after the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, this discourse intensified, and the need for Britain to implement adequate soft power in these countries dominated the agenda.[45] After 9/11, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw called for the Wilton and Carter reviews to investigate how the UK's cultural assets and institutions could influence foreign audiences while benefiting the government's foreign policy purposes. In other words, the government wanted PD and related endeavours to become the central tasks of the government. However, there was no sudden change to the discourse of *dialogue with the Middle East* or *dialogue with the Islamic*

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[44] Phipps, A. (2014). 'They are bombing now': 'Intercultural Dialogue' in times of conflict. *Language and Intercultural Communication*, *14*(1), 108-124.

[45] Foreign Affairs Committee (2006-2007). *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2006-7*, paras 219-222.

countries[46] as there was in Germany's case. In the governmental sphere, the conceptual debates relating to CD became more complex and confusing when coupled with the issues in the Middle East and dialogue through CD. I have demonstrated this confusion in the parliamentary debates around CD. Still, the case was on the agenda, especially in the second term of Tony Blair. The process of the British invasion led to many politicians and strategists strongly criticizing the very idea of CD because the government was insisting on continuing a CD discourse while, at the same time, the invasion was happening.[47] The BC has voiced similar concerns, leading the institution to distance itself further from the government. However, the criticism from within the BC could not go further than condemnations: the BC, in this sense, never had the freedom of a non-governmental organization.[48] The Counterpoint report of the BC in 2005 suggested that the majority of opposing views about CD are the result of the invasion of Iraq.[49] Although it is internally a critical report of the BC and the lack of public opinion in the BC, the report also falls into the trap of 'bringing democracy to the Middle East discourse, which again demonstrates the implicit bigotry of certain CD discussions.[50] This bigotry, I argue, is not wholly avoidable in the context of the political challenges faced by these countries. However, it is important to point it out within the context of CD because CD's policymakers and cultural practitioners frequently mention that they want to avoid such hypocrisy as much as possible. Like the idea of intercultural dialogue, there is a problem of violence against Iraq, too, because these approaches make it seem like a place that should be saved from itself. CD can quickly become prey to these colonialist discourses, and the 21st century has seen many examples.

As part of tackling the challenges of the global world, the German government's primary purpose was to tackle international conflicts. In international disputes in the 21st century, the German governmental spheres primarily referred to the Muslim world, specifically after 9/11. The difference from the UK approaches demonstrates how the government communicated this issue to the public and overseas audiences: the German government did not hold back in

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[46] Italics mine for emphasis.

[47] Hastings, C. (25 Sept 2005). "Paid for by the British Council, claim that UK tested cluster bombs on Iraqi civilians" Retrieved from: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1499130/Paid-for-by-the-British-Council-claim-that-UK-tested-cluster-bombs-on-Iraqi-civilians.html.

[48] *Appraisal Report of the British Council* (2016). National Archives. Available at https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/draft-appraisal-report-british-council.pdf. (p. 48)

[49] Leonard, M., Small, A. & Rose, M., (2005). *Public Diplomacy in the 'Age of Schisms'*. Foreign Policy Centre and Counterpoint.

[50] Ibid.

targeting the Muslim world and people within the CD context.[51] In this sense, the CD debates within governmental circles of Germany had the undertone of a colonial mindset, imposing propaganda on Islamic countries because they deemed it necessary to ensure international security. As discussed above, the Federal Government's reports on CD and Konzeption 2000 placed conflict at the very center of the CD.[52] I agree that there is an internal conflict when two cultures come together, but this is not in terms of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations.[53] The clash of civilizations idea is a very problematic idea, which created many complex understandings of cultures and the Islamic countries in particular because there was a tendency to read the 9/11 events through this theoretical framework. However, such approaches only hurt CD as a cultural practice. Therefore, I argue that the German governmental sphere's realistic approach to culture and conflict has merit. Still, its communication to the public was so problematic that it created many prejudices even in public, not to mention its effect on the international audiences.

This idea of placing conflict at the center of cultural relations, specifically in the context of Muslim countries, is inherently related to the presupposition that Muslim communities must be taught *culture* and prevented from becoming extremists. Konzeption 2000 established the roots of this approach, and the Reports of the Federal Government in Germany continued the trend. The overarching question in the Reports is: what kind of culture will Germany promote? In the Report of 2004, the emphasis was explicitly on the European-Islamic Cultural Dialogue. The report suggested that "sustainable international relations require a cultural background," which slightly diverts attention from the overtly-realistic approach we have seen in Konzeption 2000.[54] The reason for this diversion is, I argue, the uncomfortable nature of the discussion while Western interventions were still continuing in the Middle East. Because cultural institutions or policymakers could not call out such interventions and support them, there was a diversion of attention from uncomfortable discussions. The topic of culture has always been a good fallback for that purpose, especially for politicians. The 2004 Report of the Foreign Office focused on the balance between cultural exchange and foreign policy, basing itself on

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[51] DW News (2012, June 24) *German Goethe Institute – Journal Interview*. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hZIVOnupySk.

[52] Auswärtiges Amt (2000) *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik – Konzeption 2000*. http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/aa/akbp_konzeption2000.pdf (Accessed: 21.11.2017).

[53] Huntington, S. P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49.

[54] Auswärtiges Amt (2004): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin

the idea of CD as the third pillar of foreign policy. Many initiatives started to create dialogues with the Muslim world.[55] This search for balance resembles the one we have seen in the case of the UK government, but in this case, the focus on the political aspect of CD is more visible. By this time, intercultural dialogue became synonymous with dialogue with Muslim countries, and linked to a multicultural Germany, as I have discussed earlier. According to Aman, this approach was exclusionary and constructed an us vs. them dichotomy within the dialogue. The purpose of CD with the Muslim world was not dialogue but 'dictating to.'[56] If we remember how Angela Merkel and David Cameron talked about multiculturalism as an utter failure in national and international politics, this idea makes more sense. The objective of intercultural dialogue is spreading knowledge and understanding, but it is also machinery teaching European culture to other peoples, as created and narrated by Europeans.[57] Intercultural dialogue can be a tool of exclusion and othering, because it further reiterates that some people need the cultured opinion of others. This idea brings the subject to the uncultured/cultured divide, which is exactly what happened in the case of German CD's strategies towards the Muslim world.[58]

The Federal Government report on foreign cultural policy in 2007-2008 has a separate subsection on intercultural dialogue, and it focuses on strengthening the rule of law and democracy in Islamic societies exclusively.[59] The argument that cultural identities create conflicts and connections was repeated in the report while simultaneously bringing the compatibility of Islam with human rights and women's rights in Islam.[60] Ironically, the report also mentions that cultural exchange is necessary to 'fight stereotypes,' but the previous statements create the stereotypes about which they talk. The rights of women and the rights of children are an issue that international organizations should focus more on in each region of the world. But a cultural strategy document explicitly calling out Muslim women's rights demonstrates the top-down colonialist approach that the government has while making CD policies. Such stark ironies are much more visible in Germany's presentation of intercultural dialogue as a basis for CD than in the UK government discourses. Besides, the document also

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[55] Auswärtiges Amt (2004): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin

[56] Aman, R. (2012). The EU and the recycling of colonialism: Formation of Europeans through intercultural dialogue. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, *44*(9), 1010-1023.

[57] Ibid.

[58] See the discussion on Leitkultur in Germany – chapter 2, section on Konzeption 2000.

[59] Auswärtiges Amt (2007-2008): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin

[60] Ibid.

calls for more CDs in the Middle East to solve the unresolved crises of the region.[61] In the rest of the report, the authors do not define these crises, their reasons, and how the war has created a pretext for more cultural domination in these regions. This masking feature of CD and cultural relations again resonates with Simone Weil's idea of empty words being given capital letters and creating a distorted discourse.

While these discrepancies continued in the governmental policymaking of German CD, the focus on the GI increased. The government diverted its focus toward cultural institutions rather than the ongoing political debates around the issue. The 2009 debate in the German Parliament about the 2007-2008 Federal Government report created a policy statement in which then Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that culture is the foundation of social cohesion, so cultural investments are paramount for the government.[62] In Germany, the GI was at the top of the list among the examples they adopted in CD projects. After extensive debates in the Parliament, restructuring the GIs started around 2005. After this point, we see more collaborations between the GI and the BC in CD strategy-building and field projects.

3. The British Council and the Goethe Institute in Comparison

As I have demonstrated with various examples, the BC and the GI underwent institutional reorganisations during the 2000s. The UK and German governments, predominantly their foreign affairs departments, facilitated these reorganizations. The period that I analyse in this research, from the 1990s to 2015, contains significant political and social junctures that have impacted all policymaking, including international cultural policy. The reports and interviews I analyse in this section will compare the BC and the GI in light of their governments' shifting outlook on CD. This comparison will focus on the political motivations behind the two institutions' cultural projects and ask how the government advice these two cultural institutions received affected their approach to and practices of CD. I will compare and contrast the two institutions' approaches to CD in relation to instrumentalization, funding, soft power, and the exertion of cultural influence for political benefit.

Based on the analysis in the previous chapters, we can identify three shared areas of interest and policy orientation about CD for both the BC and the GI. These are keeping a distance from the government, ensuring a mutual relationship with the regions where they are

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[61] Ibid.

[62] Bericht der Bundesregierung (2009) *Debate Paper on 2007-2008 Report of the Federal Government on Cultural Policy*. Federal Government of Germany.

actively doing CD projects, and ensuring that the funding is stable. In the case of the GI, keeping a distance from the government has been more critical than other aims because the country does not want to risk being a country of cultural imperialism and propaganda.[63] However, the governmental debates have demonstrated that the discussions that revolve around CD and the GI's missions overseas prioritize the foreign relations interests of the country, and they aim to exert political and cultural influence over the regions in which they are active. For the GI, the instrumentalization of arts and culture was one of the most pressing issues in the contemporary era.[64] However, in the case of the BC, we did not see a discourse formulating around the notion of instrumentalization. In the case of the GI, we observe a constant anxiety about the concept: the GI saw the instrumentalization of arts and culture as harmful and believed that the GI should approach cultural policy with caution. In this thesis, I have presented an analysis of the governmental and parliamentary debates discussing the roles of the BC and the GI. German parliamentary reports challenged the idea that the instrumentalization of artistic and cultural elements is detrimental for the freedom of cultural relations: especially in the context of the GI. They argued that Germany couldn't engage in international cultural relations without instrumentalizing culture.[65] But these relations should still be within the defined targets of the Foreign Office and the reports of the foreign office on CD. These discrepancies, however, were not as evident as they were in the relationship between the UK government and the BC. The relationship between the German government and the GI was more cautious, and the government did not want to dictate the GI what it should do. But we can still argue that similar conflicts between the idea of instrumentalizing culture for political gain exist in both institutions.

In the UK government reports I have analysed; we hardly see the mention of instrumentalization. Still, we see a growing emphasis on the distinction between cultural relations, CD, and PD. Compared to the German government's examples, the UK government did not focus as much on instrumentalization or the over-politicization of culture. For instance, Konzeption 2000 focused on creating CD as the third way of diplomacy. In contrast, the Carter and Wilton report on PD focused on instrumentalizing culture in any shape and form that is

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[63] Longerich, P. "Nationalsozialistische Propaganda." (1992). In Ed. Bracher, K. D., Funke, M and Jacobsen, H. A. (eds). *Deutschland 1933-1945. Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft.* (p. 312).

[64] Der Spiegel. (2018, 19 May). "Kulturdiplomatie ist eines der wenigen Instrumente, die bleiben, wenn die klassische Diplomatie an ihre Grenzen stößt", so Michelle Müntefering im Interview mit dem Spiegel. „Kulturpolitik ist Außenpolitik", in: Der Spiegel 21, S. 125.

[65] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Große Anfrage (p. 4)

suitable for the PD goals of the country.[66] The BC reflects this approach in its policymaking about CD. In the BC reports I have analysed in this thesis, there is not as much diffidence in explicitly stating that CD is a political activity that serves the national interests of the UK.[67] In many of the projects conducted by the BC, there is an emphasis on making these projects work for the UK's overseas aims and promoting arts. The two concepts almost stand alone at times: the BC statements mention promoting the aim of the country overseas, separately from promoting arts.[68] Besides, the art projects that the BC has developed have included disciplines such as good governance, science, or democracy as separate aims of CD.[69] The BC required this to measure the effectiveness and the long-term benefits of the art projects conducted within their budget and institution. The practicality assigned to CD is visible in the BC's dealing with the concept and its practices. But according to official documents, the core of intercultural relations should be promoting these relations through *art*, as seen repeatedly in policymaking documents analysed here. These contradictions did not matter anymore for the policymaking bodies of the UK government or the BC: they only focused on the outcome. They did not pay much attention to these nuances. Despite this separation of concepts, I argue that the policy structures of the BC are more consistent in keeping with promoting the national interests of the UK. There is a general acceptance that it is natural to encourage the national interests of the UK, and the BC is naturally a tool for this purpose. In the case of the German counterpart, the Goethe Institute, we do not see such explicit statements about national interests and alignment with the country's political aims.

In the case of the GI, the question of instrumentalization of arts and culture is still controversial in government discussions and the internal debates of the GI, as we have seen in the chapter on Germany's CD. At the turn of the 21st century, the policymaking agenda for CD was parallel to the conflict resolution and crisis prevention discourse.[70] Although the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fisher, criticised the instrumentalization of culture, the *Aktionsplan*, a document debating the importance of conflict resolution, placed CD at the centre

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[66] Auswärtiges Amt (2000): *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik – Konzeption 2000*, The Wilton and Carter Reports on PD (Chapter 1 & 2).

[67] Devlin, G. (2008) *Art Contents in Future British Council Programmes. Devlin Summary Report*, (p. 4)

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Die Bundesreigerung. (2004) *Aktionsplan: Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung*. Berlin, 12 May.

of crisis prevention.[71] This new route of cultural policymaking would be under the aegis of cultural institutions such as the GI and ifa, which demonstrated that Germany was taking steps toward being an active partner in the international arena while utilizing culture to promote national interests and crisis prevention. However, the controversy around the instrumentalization of arts and culture never wavered. Soon after *Aktionsplan*, a document that would set the course of crisis prevention agenda and cultural promotion, the GI experienced significant budget cuts due to the lack of interest in cultural promotion within political circles, which made it difficult to carry out the plan.[72] These details were insufficiently provided and thus created a further misconception about CD. This example demonstrates that in the case of Germany's policymaking on CD, there have been efforts to align political agendas such as crisis and conflict prevention with CD. From within the GI and the public, there was criticism against these efforts compared to the UK. We could see that these criticisms impacted the activities of the GI.[73] After all, the instrumentalization of arts and culture is negatively-connoted in Germany's cultural policymaking context. The GI has made a great effort to prove to the international community that it is not what they are doing. The question of how it would be possible to implement CD without instrumentalizing arts and culture has been posed by the German Parliament to the government and GI officials a few times.[74] The answers were vague, but they stated that intermediary organisations such as the GI should make that decision. However, they still have to follow the Foreign Office's directions,[75] putting the GI under pressure to instrumentalize arts and culture. The only difference between the discourse of the UK government and the BC is that the German counterparts use more vague language to hide behind the fact that they instrumentalize arts and culture. I would argue that governments must have a more evident acceptance of the fact that any institution that has close ties to the government and its support is, in fact, instrumentalizing arts and culture.

Another difference between the BC and the GI in instrumentalizing arts and culture was the claim that the GI was immune to instrumentalization. In many of the GI's reports, we see

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Deutsche Welle "Cuts Could Hurt German Culture Abroad" Retrieved on 17.10.2019 from https://www.dw.com/en/cuts-could-hurt-german-culture-abroad/a-1150746.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Deutscher Bundestag (2012) Große Anfrage (p. 4)

[75] Ibid.

this claim, followed by the explanation that the GI represents the government's interests.[76] "The GI is immune to instrumentalization… I am therefore convinced that foreign cultural policy will not stand in for cultural imperialism, despite entering new fields and markedly strengthened in funding,"[77] writes Klaus Dieter Lehmann, former president of the GI. In his interview that I analysed in chapter 2, Lehmann needed to justify the instrumentalization of arts and culture by referencing cultural imperialism. He explained why the GI is not doing cultural imperialism. He chose this explanation because the activity of cultural promotion has a long history of propaganda in Germany, and the country does not wish to be a country of cultural propaganda. However, relating instrumentalization to cultural imperialism is inherently self-contradictory in respect of CD, because no matter how open a dialogue is, there will be some political benefit from it. Therefore, there is a need to remove the concept of CD from the discourse of cultural imperialism if the cultural institutions hope to create authentic policies that would benefit the practice of international cultural policy. Otherwise, we are constantly facing the threat of repeatedly explaining and justifying cultural projects and trying to prove that we are not engaging in cultural imperialism. The German government and the GI place so much importance on this because they are well aware that the nature of CD is inherently rooted in exerting power over another culture. In the case of the UK, most policymakers and the BC's internal bodies seem to have accepted this fact. The subject of the GI, however, is different. Lehmann's comment, linking the GI's approach to the instrumentalization of arts and culture for the following decades, lacks coherence. The fact that the GI leads an open dialogue does not negate the fact that the GI is trying to create cultural dominance and reap long-term benefits for the country's national interests.

4. The Other of CD: Intercultural Dialogue

In both the BC and the GI's CD agenda, the discourse of intercultural dialogue became prevalent, especially after the 9/11 events. However, there are apparent differences in how these two institutions created the grounds for such dialogue. First, we need to analyse the government advice these institutions received about dialogue with the Muslim countries and how they acted. In this way, we can show that these governments used CD to subdue other societies culturally under the umbrella of dialogue and conflict resolution. In this section, I will

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[76] Goethe Institut. "Europe as a Continent of Solidarity" by Klaus Dieter Lehmann. Retrieved from https://www.goethe.de/de/uun/prs/int/pra/21174825.html on 23.10.2019.

[77] Ibid.

argue that the BC and the GI used the concept of intercultural dialogue to formulate the audience as the other of CD. Arguably, the GI has used intercultural dialogue more explicitly than the BC to otherize different cultures. On the other hand, the BC was more successful in situating the CD problem because it accepted that CD was a problem of vast networks and aimed to promote national interests compared to the cultural policy branding of the GI.

The 2007-8 Departmental Report of the FCO clearly stated that it would redefine the purposes of the BC and its strategic objectives to emphasize climate change, the creative economy, and intercultural dialogue.[78] What was the intercultural exchange that was mentioned here? After the proposition by Gordon Brown to create a cultural effort on the scale of the Cold War, the Foreign Affairs Committee, along with the House of Commons, turned to the BC to carry out the cultural efforts mentioned in this framework.[79] These government documents made it clear that the BC's primary task was to sustain intercultural dialogue, primarily with countries in the Middle East and Southeast Europe. One example from this period was a project called *Living Together*.[80] I have discussed the details of the project in chapter 2. It was an intercultural dialogue program in Southeast Europe aiming to tackle issues in the region with significant religious and ethnic differences. The project report only used intercultural dialogue in the context of conflict resolution, and it did not aim at creating a genuine dialogue that would lead to a "mutual understanding." However, mutual understanding was the motto of many documents about CD in the 2010s. Focusing on the national security of these regions was ahead of the purpose of creating an equitable atmosphere of dialogue and education because cultural education could not be separated from cultural indoctrination. Tackling extremism among young people was the sole purpose of this program, much like the other programs carried out by the BC in the Middle East. Therefore, in the context of the BC, the intercultural dialogue was a means to engage with the other, while its audience were the others of the CD.

Germany's foreign relations discourse and the GI projects had a considerably higher emphasis on the concept than the focus on intercultural dialogue within the discourse of the BC officials and projects. In the case of German governmental approaches, the focus of the intercultural dialogue was explicitly on Muslim countries. Besides, the policy documents of the GI on CD used the phrase 'Muslim countries' more frequently compared to the BC. The

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[78] FCO, Departmental Report 2007-8, pp. 98-99.

[79] House of Commons, *British Foreign Policy since 1997*, Research Paper 08/56, 23 June 2008.

[80] British Council Annual Report (2007-2008) (p. 1-25).

need for CD to ensure scientific exchange and security for countries rather than promoting "the good and the beautiful," as worded by the then foreign minister Joschka Fischer, was emphasized strongly. Promoting the rule of *law and democracy* in the Islamic world was a repeated phrase that came up in nearly all of the GI yearbooks between 2000 to 2010.[81] A similar discourse imprinted in everyone's memory, the idea of bringing democracy to the Middle East, was used by the Western countries during the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. I would argue that such phrases do not tackle "stereotypes or social imbalances in "the region." On the contrary, they simply nurture and enhance them, imprinting a second layer of discriminatory and racist discourse in people's minds. The GI reports and officials so unapologetically recreated this discourse that the purpose went beyond CD or dialogue. Still, it was a civilizing mission attempting to bring culture to the Middle East while ensuring that the region would not threaten their borders any time soon. The political discourse that the German government associated with CD justified the GI's use of "intercultural dialogue" synonymously with CD or international cultural relations.

Gradually, the concept of intercultural dialogue was used more frequently than CD or *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik* (foreign cultural policy) in the policy documents of the GI. The Institute officials often quoted, as discussed in the previous chapter, that they preferred not to use the term CD because it appoints a political purpose to the work that they are doing.[82] This instrumentalized view of CD creates most of the debates around CD as a concept. However, it also implies that a state-centric perspective is very prevalent in the discourses of these institutions and prevents a holistic approach to the positionality of CD in the creation of a multilevel system.[83] Zhu and Wyszomirski state that CD has an internally wicked problem in constituting a consensual definition. Practitioners and policymakers are constantly at odds with variable definitions of their actions.[84] I argue that this internal problem is apparent in the GI officials' disagreement with using the CD concept. The GI is the flagship CD in Germany. Although other prominent international cultural institutions conduct CD, the GI is the most active worldwide and has the highest number of engagement projects and global offices. Outside of this flagship mechanism design, CD programs could turn into a form of limited

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[81] Goethe Institute Yearbooks 2000-2010.

[82] Phone interview with Sabine Hentzsch, head of GI in Berlin, conducted on 27.07.2017.

[83] Zhu, B, and Wyszomirski. M. J. "Designing cultural diplomacy policy: structuring a flagship mechanism." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* (2022): 1-18.

[84] Ibid.

geographical targeting, such as the shift from CD to intercultural dialogue, specifically aimed at Muslim countries and Southeast Europe, in the case of Germany. Because CD is an endeavour of multiple stakeholders and diverse interests, the cultural practitioners involved might sometimes be unaware of the strategic agendas of the governments about CD. These agendas are usually about procuring the highest level of national interest possible.[85] But the issue is not that simple because if this was the sole issue here, every cultural practitioner could read the stated foreign policy documents prepared by their countries and move on. The argument that the GI does not do CD is unrealistic.[86] By arguing this, the GI has situated the intercultural dialogue as an unwanted but necessary policy area to tackle security issues, while the BC approach is more balanced.

The othering of intercultural dialogue and its audience results from the continued dominance of the European cultural agenda in international relations and society. By distancing the concept of intercultural dialogue from CD, the western CD creates a "safe space" to freely talk about cultural domination. Intercultural dialogue as a concept allows this freedom while still defining different cultures as others. This is why intercultural dialogue is used with Muslim countries or Southeast Europe, and almost always in close connection with the idea of international security. In the case of the UK and Germany, such distancing and situating intercultural dialogue with the other is present. Still, we see more examples of it in the GI discourse compared to the BC. A report by the Federal Government of Germany, also analyzed in chapter 2, suggests that the government saw it as its responsibility to create the environment for cultural and artistic life to flourish. This discourse directly influences the relationship between the government and the GI as publicly-funded bodies. The GI's discourse about its CD activities was along the lines that "we need CD now more than ever" because the situations that necessitated CD, according to the GI, were mostly conflict and security issues rather than building cooperation.[87] The BC's approach to CD was still based on instrumentalizing the cultural products, but the BC focused their need for CD less on conflict than the GI.

In the interviews that I did with GI officials, there was one common point. They did not want to talk about CD specifically and kept reiterating that the GI is not a diplomatic mission.

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[85] Ibid.

[86] Phone interview with Katharina von Ruckteshcell, 02.02.2019

[87] Ernst, M. (2014) *Der Deutsche Dialog mit der Islamischen Welt – Diskurse deutscher Auswærtiger Kultur und Bildungspolitik in Maghreb*. Transcript Verlag. Pantea, D. & Stoica, A. (2014) The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Contemporary Crises and Conflict Reconciliation. *Studia UBB Europaea*, LIX, pp. 219-230.

Therefore, they argued that we should not discuss the GI as a CD organization.[88] I argue that this reluctance to accept CD as a defining concept of their work derives from the fact that CD is closer to cultural propaganda and imperialism than cultural relations or cooperation, which are the terms the GI preferred. One GI official further suggested that the GI does not expect an outcome in all of its endeavours, which is fine, and which makes its work different from CD. Still, I argue that this is neither realistic nor reflects the actual work done by the GI, and it does not reflect the relationship of the GI to the German government. The government has demonstrated, exemplified by reports on CD and the GI and other intermediary cultural organizations in chapter 2, that the GI is a mission for the government and their job should further Germany's foreign policy interests.[89] The government and the Parliament decreed that a further inquiry into CD as a helpful concept was necessary. Such an inquiry could facilitate the government's relations with other countries and ensure that they could better deal with the security issues in Middle Eastern or Southeast European countries[90] because they were the countries that "needed" CD the most. This idea contains an inherent claim that CD is there for other countries, creating a cultural hierarchy over this country. However, I have demonstrated in this thesis that CD is there to bring political benefits and further the national interests of the countries that provide it, in this case, the UK and Germany. Therefore, although it was not as straightforward as the UK government's approach to CD, the German government issued many reports detailing CD and designating the GI as their CD envoy. I would argue that this discourse stems from the othering of specific countries which the GI operates in. The government policies about CD see these countries in need of the CD rather than as equal beneficiaries or stakeholders of it, specifically in the case of Germany.[91] One of the basic premises of CD is that the two parties are considered mutual stakeholders of CD, but in this case, there is a clear hierarchy.

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[88] Phone interviews with GI officials, chapter 2.

[89] Reports of the Federal Government on Foreign Cultural Policy; Konzeption 2000, chapter 2.

[90] Fischer, J. (2000) 'Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen', in Forum: Zukunft der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Online. Available at www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/aa/ akbp_zukunft2000.pdf (accessed 15 Jan 2017), Auswärtiges Amt (2007-2008): Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik. Berlin

[91] Gienow-Hecht, J.C.E. & Donfried, M.C. (eds). (2010). *Searching for a cultural diplomacy / edited by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried*. New York: Berghahn.

Chapter 5 - Conclusions

This dissertation has discussed the various forms of and approaches to CD in the 21st century. By focusing on examples from the UK and Germany, I have shed light on the changing nature of CD practiced by these two countries and their significant international cultural relations institutions: the British Council (BC) and the Goethe Institute (GI). I have analysed government reports on CD, internal reports by these two organizations, and ideas of practitioners of these organizations. After analysing this material, I have reached the following conclusions in this dissertation: CD is a valuable tool in the 21st century in building relations between countries and peoples, but governments should be more transparent in implementing CD. I have measured this by analysing the discourse utilized by the governments vs. cultural organizations about CD, and by demonstrating how the theoretical and conceptual debates around it often hindered the creation of a transparent CD. I argue that it is only possible to achieve such transparency if organizations are more open about the nature of the work they do overseas, that is, CD. The classifications such as PD, international cultural relations, intercultural dialogue, and even soft power (although it exists within a different theoretical framework than the previous ones) blur and create conflicts about the cultural and artistic projects they carry out in the field. By accepting that the BC and the GI are actively doing CD, these institutions can derive more benefits from the promotion of their cultures. In this way, they would pave the way for an open and honest relationship between the peoples of the receiving countries of their cultural projects. I also argue that the instrumentalization of culture and arts is more compatible with CD rather than building the aims and results of CD upon solely gaining soft power. Soft power is an essential element of the CD process. Still, it is time for these significant CD institutions to make more space for internal and external debates on the instrumentalization of arts and culture.

In the introduction, I set the framework of my thesis and the background for my case selection. In the 21st century, CD has become a prevalent practice in the western world, and I have pointed examples of this in the introduction. I explore this popularity further by focusing on the two countries with considerable influence and investment in CD in the European region. Although the UK is no longer a part of the EU as we speak, it has significantly impacted CD development. Besides, the UK has contributed to the European integration process through its cultural projects. The BC has created and realized many of these cultural projects, as I have discussed in chapter 2. In the case of Germany, the GI has also contributed to the European

integration process and facilitated its political aims. Germany is one of the leading countries in promoting European values and culture and strengthening European political influence worldwide. For that reason, focusing on the policymaking processes of Germany and the UK helps us understand the 21st-century directions CD has taken. In addition to strengthening their countries' political and cultural influence, the BC and the GI have facilitated the European integration project and promoted the EU's cultural values.

In chapter 2, I use essential policy papers, white papers, speeches about CD, policy suggestions that the British Parliament makes about CD, and the debates around the concept within the Parliament and the British government. These documents are foundational for the UK's understanding of CD in the 21st century. In short, the policymaking bodies of the British government, the foreign office branches responsible for PD and CD, and their statements are my primary resources here. Second, I have demonstrated the shift in CD approaches within the British government spheres and have outlined various approaches toward CD. Third, I have connected the debates and reservations of the BC about using CD to these governmental debates. I argue that CD policies created by the British government and adopted by the BC primarily focus on furthering Britain's interests worldwide, both politically and economically. The UK government wanted to make the BC a place of CD regardless of the term's meaning. The important thing was to make cultural relations happen while simultaneously creating a cultural hegemony and reaping benefits for the country's national aims.

Chapter 2 also provides a detailed account of the CD understanding and practices of the BC during the late 1990s to 2010s. In this chapter, I have discussed the connecting points between the governmental policymaking about CD and the diversion issues in BC's unique understanding of cultural promotion. Governmental circles questioned CD as a concept and the ideas of soft and hard power. On the other hand, the focus on non-governmental actors was increasing, and the BC gradually stopped using the term while defining their activities. However, this did not prevent them from seeking to benefit from the discourse about CD whenever it was suitable. The chapter focused on the internal debates within the Council about the concept of CD itself. It has evaluated the CD process in the 21st century through an analysis of the main issues: the Council's shifting approach to CD and the question of national interests. The chapter uses the Triennial Review of the British Council and some practitioners' accounts and interviews I conducted personally. I argue that the BC's work is in line with CD as practice, and there is little to no difference for the council to define its work as a CD rather than international cultural relations.

Chapter 3 conducts a similar analysis of the German CD policies and the Goethe Institute. In a similar timeframe to Chapter One, this chapter has provided an overview of CD approaches from German government spheres, politicians' speeches, policy papers, Bundestag debates, and white papers. Based on the discussions on intercultural dialogue, which have swept through the country's cultural relations and PD debates in the 21st century, the chapter asks the question: what kind of shifts has Germany's outlook on CD gone through, and who was responsible for these shifts? The chapter has used 'Konzeption 2000', a German government document about the new approach to public diplomacy, and reports of the Federal Government. It focuses on 'foreign cultural policy' as a concept having been used interchangeably with CD in the German case. I examine the idea of a "paradigm shift" in German foreign policy and its impact on CD in the country. In this chapter, I argue that Germany's policymaking does not openly focus on national benefit compared to the UK. Instead, it focuses on intercultural dialogue, which still constitutes a central common point with the case of the UK. I argue that Germany's *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik* is, in fact, CD, and an approach which includes CD would be in Germany's interests in terms of international cultural promotion.

The chapter continued with a discussion of how the paradigm shift in German foreign policy affected the GI's work in the field. I argue that Germany's focus on contributing more to international organizations is visible in its decision to carry out CD through middle organizations. In the case of Germany, there is more than one significant middle organization promoting Germany's interests around the world, compared to the UK's BC. Such division of labour in cultural policy abroad results from Germany's purpose of not instrumentalizing culture overtly for political benefit, but also from the efforts of such organisations to make themselves relevant. We could connect this issue to the German foreign policy shifts in the post-1990 process, which led to a division of cultural policy instrumentalization abroad. To demonstrate this connection, I have used internal policy debates on CD, and analysed the actual instrumentalization of arts and culture (sometimes equated to CD by practitioners of German CD), politicians' statements about CD, and an interview I conducted personally. I have demonstrated that the GI's understanding and practice of cultural relations differ from that of the BC, and that the GI, in general, is much more suspicious of the concept of CD. However, it is still possible to classify them under the heading of CD institutions.

In Chapter 4, I have conducted a comparative analysis of the UK and German approaches to CD. I focused on how they actualized their policies in the field through the BC

and the GI. The UK governmental debates on CD used soft power and CD interchangeably because the focus was mainly on the results rather than the conceptual discussion. Many governmental documents I have analysed, such as the Triennial Review and the reports of the Foreign Affairs Committee, demonstrate such a proclivity. In the case of Germany, however, the conceptual discussions about CD were lengthy and created much more controversy within governmental spheres. A seminal document such as Konzeption 2000 took at least three years to complete. It was subject to many governmental and parliamentary debates before it took its final shape. German governmental approaches to cultural relations saw CD as the third pillar of foreign policy. In the 2000s, the new policymaking processes of the German government portrayed the CD as a foreign policy effort. In the practices of the GI, and the conceptualization of cultural relations activities, we hardly see the political discourse; instead, we see an emphasis on culture and what it is to shape culture in Germany.

Both countries and cultural institutions contribute a significant body of scholarship to the discussion of CD in general. The detailed discussions of the German government about CD did not reach a broad audience as did the talks of the UK government, because all documents are in German, and most of them are not translated. For that reason, the practices of the GI concerning the concept of CD remained outside of the sphere of academic discussion. This thesis fills this gap. In the next section, I will outline my conclusions under several sub-headings.

1. Governmental Approaches to CD in the UK and Germany

There are several contradictions in governmental policymaking regarding CD and the "political" aspect of the practice. In the 1986-7 Foreign Affairs Committee Report, there was a continuous emphasis on promoting culture for culture's sake. The report also suggested that there should not be a coercive approach while doing this promotion, and if we remember from the discussion about power in the introduction of the thesis, this idea aligns better. This was a contradictory statement that defined the discussions about CD in the following decades because CD is inherently a political activity that aims to benefit the country in the long run.[1] Both those who oppose the use of CD and those who support it reject the use of CD from time to time. Thus, the UK has never created a uniform explanation or a defined area of practice for CD. The government discourse focusing on the usefulness of CD as a way of ensuring further economic

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[1] Leonard, M. (1997). Britain™: *Renewing Our Identity*. London: Demos. p. 60.

and political benefits, which is one of the central points of debate in CD, created a bias against the concept of CD.[2] Cultural practitioners especially started seeing CD as the culprit behind the 'cultural vs. political' dichotomy. Still, omission from the discourse did not result in a solution, just more fluidity and confusion around the actual cultural practice that touched many lives worldwide.

One of Germany's important policy documents, Konzeption 2000, has a different rationale compared to the FAC report of 1986 in the UK. In the making of CD during the early 2000s, CD was defined as a political activity, meaning that it aimed to bring political benefits that would further the national interests of the UK. It is one of the preconditions of the activity rather than a problem.[3] In Konzeption 2000, fostering German foreign, cultural, educational, and political interests abroad was the primary purpose, along with furthering European integration and preventing conflicts through dialogue.[4] These heavily political tasks that the government attached to the concept of CD ensured that the intermediary organisations would work towards the same goals. As I have demonstrated in the thesis, Germany works with many cultural intermediaries to realize the promotion of its culture abroad. The task for the GI was designated in accordance with this approach as well.

Globalization has influenced governmental approaches to CD. In the case of many European countries, including the UK and Germany, I argue that it has also led to regionalized CD. In the UK case, as we have seen in the Devlin report, the UK wanted to strengthen its role through CD and situate itself within the EU borderlands, becoming a central actor in Europe's CD. In Germany, however, the regionalization of CD was more visible. The constant emphasis on Europe while promoting German culture and values led to the domestic regionalization of CD in Germany. And the GI was one of the main actors contributing to this regionalization policy. In this way, Europe, as a culturally defined idea and a geographical entity, was integrated into Germany while making policies of CD that Germany would represent. In terms of the elite policy spheres, this situation created the ultimate regionalization for Europe and Germany in a mutual way.

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[2] Foreign Affairs Committee. (1986). *Cultural Diplomacy*. London: The Stationary Office: v.

[3] Fischer, J. (2000) 'Ein Glückfall für Goethe'. In Wapnewski, P, Mucher (eds) *Realitæten and Visionen: Hilmar Hoffmann zu ehren*., C. Dumont, Cologne. Quoted in (eds) Aheame, J & Bennett, O. (2013) *Intellectuals and Cultural Policy*. Routledge.

[4] Ibid., Konzeption 2000.

The UK and Germany's focus on intercultural dialogue demonstrates that the CD was a valuable tool for the great powers of the Western world. CD, after all, is grounds for exerting influence in various global locations. We can explain this pursuit with reference to soft or smart power, but what remains unchanged is that more CD activity means more authority and power in any given region. On the other hand, intercultural dialogue primarily focused on ethnic and religious differences in various societies and tried to find mutual ground. With intercultural dialogue, the western countries tried to securitize their relations and borderlands. We have seen the utilization of this discourse both by the UK and German policymaking bodies.

2. The British Council and the Goethe Institute

As I explained in the section above, I argue that the UK and Germany are doing CD via the BC and the GI. However, this does not mean that their mediums and approaches do not differ. In terms of making use of the benefits of economic globalization, I suggest that in the case of the UK and the British Council, the financial benefit aspect is more and more freely emphasized compared to the example of Germany and the GI. The internal papers and statements of both organizations explain the reasons for this. In the case of Germany, the government does not want the GI to act as a propaganda and economic benefit organization. In contrast, the UK does not hesitate to define the BC as a financial revenue-bringing organization and a helpful tool of UK foreign policy. In the thesis, I argue that countries like Germany and the UK oriented their cultural policies more towards promoting their own cultures, films, music, and literature. By doing this, the emphasis on their unique products became stronger.

Instead of CD, cultural institutions opted for the concept of intercultural dialogue, but the concept received a great deal of criticism because it masked the fact it aimed to compensate for the political shortcomings of the governments, rather than focusing on the actual dialogue between people.[5] However, they continued to fall back on intercultural dialogue and not attract such criticisms. We have seen examples of this mainly in the case of the UK; the government and the BC (upon the government's advice) created CD projects focusing on this sort of dialogue. Here, I argue that this is precisely why the nature of the BC's work falls under the category of CD and not any other definition: CD aims to reap long-term benefits for the nation, and intercultural dialogue was a reiterated method of doing this in the west. In the case of the GI and the BC, it is almost impossible to find a CD project or program supported by the EU

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[5] Phipps, A. (2014). 'They are bombing now': 'Intercultural Dialogue' in times of conflict. *Language and Intercultural Communication*, *14*(1), 108-124; also see Chapter 3: A Comparative Discussion.

that does not have the phrase "fostering intercultural dialogue" attached. The relationship between globalisation and intercultural dialogue suggests that globalisation is a method of neo-colonialism, which aims to promote European social and political values as normative across the world.[6] In that sense, there is not much difference between CD and intercultural dialogue because both of these practices are aiming to benefit the nation and government aims through the cultural projects they create. Therefore, masking the CD behind a complex set of concepts such as intercultural dialogue was a futile effort by the practitioners, because in the end, the cultural work continued whether it was under the umbrella of CD or intercultural dialogue.

This is one of the reasons why I placed the impacts of globalization on cultural production at the centre of this thesis. I argue that the ambiguity around CD as a concept, which I have demonstrated repeatedly in this dissertation, is also present in the discourse around intercultural dialogue. The cultural institutions supposed that whatever intercultural dialogue has to offer would support CD as well. This assumption led to the othering of countries in which the UK and Germany conducted their CD. We have seen an explicit example of this approach in the example of the othering of Muslim countries in CD policies. With the UK and Germany's government-imposed cultural policies, the GI and the BC wanted to acculturate these countries on their terms. In both governmental approaches, CD was a tool that was necessary to ensure the security and stability of the Middle East. In addition, these countries wanted to ensure that they could find solutions to the problem of radicalization in Western countries through CD. But they are not the same processes, and we have seen this discrepancy between governmental approaches and the BC and GI approaches. In the case of the GI, its cultural policy approach aligns more with othering through culture than is the case for the BC. I have provided clear examples of this issue through the interviews I analysed in chapter 3. I argue that seeing CD and intercultural dialogue as synonymous with one another does not help but harms a healthy process of CD.

3. Soft Power vs. Instrumentalization of Arts and Culture

In this thesis, I argue that soft power and CD do not necessarily exist together, and they both refer to very different conceptual and practical frameworks. One of the aims of CD is to gain soft power; according to the same logic, CD is a means to create soft power for a country.

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[6] Rao, N. (2000). 'Neocolonialism' or 'globalization'?: postcolonial theory and the demands of political economy. *Interdisciplinary Literary Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 165–84; Baraldi, C. (2006). New forms of intercultural communication in a globalized world. *International Communication Gazette*, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 53–69.

Along with popularizing the globalization debates, soft power also gained a quick reputation in international relations. Political analysts measured and discussed the soft power of other countries, and policymakers regarded soft power as a significant aspect of international politics. However, as the concept became a buzzword in elite policy spheres, it started to have less of an impact, specifically in the eyes of the CD practitioners in the field. We can see examples of this in chapters 3 and 4. Starting from the PD institutions of the US, western institutions such as the BC, the GI, and other government-supported culture agencies used soft power over and over in their policy-making schemes, only to repeat the same 'goals' to achieve to improve their cultural connections. As I have demonstrated in the literature review of the thesis and through an analysis of primary sources, cultural practitioners attached a negative meaning to soft power when used with CD, owing to its resonance with coercive power.

Soft power will always be related to CD due to its theoretical proximity to the practice. However, if we are to explain CD as a concept that would bring out the action aspect of it, that concept would be instrumentalization. In terms of CD, the instrumentalization of arts and culture starts at the policymaking level. The cultural institutions of the UK and Germany focus on the need to be cautious while instrumentalizing arts and culture excessively. They repeat this need and claim they are as far away from it as possible, but in many cases, they simply pay lip service to this issue, rightly stating that they do not wish to become a propaganda tool for the government. And in CD, the cultural and artistic values and works that cultural institutions promote result from deliberate policy choices. These policy choices stem from the experience in the field (i.e., which projects they will showcase in which countries, what are the "sensitive" subjects that need to be avoided in certain regions, etc.). And they all involve politically significant decisions. Therefore, there is no possibility of avoiding instrumentalization once and for all. In the case of the BC and the GI, the government-supported institutions representing the political interests of particular states showcase the art pieces. For this reason, I argue that connecting instrumentalization and CD firmly together in this thesis helps us demonstrate several misunderstandings that emerged due to the prejudices around the CD. These prejudices caused the concept of CD to be negatively understood, thus for arts and culture practitioners to approach it with suspicion. Even though nearly all the cultural institutions that work abroad and communicate with different publics have contributed to CD and know its benefits in the long run, they could not rid themselves of these suspicions. Therefore, creating CD projects based on arts and culture instrumentalization will help pave the way for a more practical and beneficial CD process both for the UK and Germany.

As demonstrated in the policymaking examples from the UK and Germany, soft power limits the methodological consideration of cultural instrumentalization. It legitimates such instrumentalization under the pretext of security or economic interests.[7] In addition, CD has been criticized in the academic world, suggesting that it is an intervention of nation-states through the monopolization of power and culture and a sign of state-centered analytical approaches, despite the changing landscape of cultural policies.[8] This idea is very prevalent in the broader context of criticisms against CD. The BC and the GI have continued to abstain from defining their work under the context of CD, because they were concerned about the idea that CD is equal or a continuation of cultural imperialism. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, instrumentalization is not a standalone concept and gains meaning within the definition of what is being instrumentalized. Instrumentalization is a natural process in which benefit is sought within arts and culture, and that is why CD and instrumentalization of arts contain one another. The criticisms addressed to CD and instrumentalization of arts and culture have common roots, which is the fear of being associated with cultural imperialistic aims while carrying out CD. The neoliberal idea of gaining economic and political benefits from instrumentalizing arts and culture is inherent to CD, as well, as demonstrated with specific examples in this thesis under sections discussing the BC and the GI's cultural projects. Therefore, it is essential for both analysts and cultural practitioners to refer to the instrumentalization of arts and culture transparently, focusing more on the changing context of cultural expressions, new films, artworks produced every day, and narratives around them.

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[7] Zamorano, M.M. "Reframing Cultural Diplomacy: The Instrumentalization of Culture under the Soft Power Theory", *Culture Unbound*, Volume 8, 2016: 166–186. Published by Linköping University Electronic Press.

[8] Ibid.

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