

The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of the Middle East

Armando Salvatore (ed.) et al.

https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190087470.001.0001

Published: 2020 **Online ISBN:** 9780190087487 **Print ISBN:** 9780190087470

CHAPTER

22 Iran's Islamic Revolution: The Return of the Hunchbacked Dwarf

Fatemeh Sadeghi

https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190087470.013.10 Pages C22–444

Published: 10 November 2020

Abstract

The Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran was decisive in reshaping and reframing both Iranian politics and the Middle East as we know it. This chapter investigates the historical framing of the Islamic revolution as a result of the politicization of the religious discourse in Iran from the early 1940s through the late 1970s and the steady emergence of the idea of an Islamic government as an alternative to the oppressive structure of Western modernity. The Islamic revolution marked the re-enchantment and re-mystification of politics in an allegedly disenchanted world. The chapter reveals two versions of revolutionary Islam, the clerical and the messianic, and their role in the framing of revolutionary politics. Whereas in clerical Islam the modern state was seen not as substantially corrupt but as an indispensable instrument for the establishment of the Islamic government, in messianic Islam the contemplation and reconstruction of history aimed at building a new past, hence a quite different future.

Keywords: Islamic revolution, Islamic government, velayat-e faqih, messianic Islam, clerical Islam

Subject: Social Theory, Political Sociology, Sociology

Series: Oxford Handbooks

Collection: Oxford Handbooks Online

WHEN talking about the Cuban, Algerian, and Vietnamese revolutions, Arendt (2017) declared that "all these revolutions no matter how violently anti-Western their rhetoric may be, stand under the sign of traditional Western revolutions." She could not possibly imagine that a few years later than she declared this (in 1966–1967), a religious revolution was to take place that would pose a threat to hegemonic Western modernity. The powerful mass movement and its success in rapidly bringing down a seemingly stable regime bore no resemblance to revolutionary guerrilla movements. More perplexing, however, was the religious character that made it utterly unique and inexplicable.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution, which soon became known by the epithet "Islamic," took the entire world by complete surprise. No sooner had US President Jimmy Carter called Iran "an island of stability" in December 1977 than the protests broke out in major cities in January 1978 and quickly spread across the country. The regime had made every effort, including the imposition of martial law, to suppress the popular movement; but this only served to intensify the scale and scope of the movement, culminating in large strikes by oil workers in the autumn of 1978 and a complete shutdown of Iranian oil exports that paralyzed the country's economy. Within a year, Shah Mohammad Reza (r. 1941–1979) was deposed and exiled, and 2,500 years of monarchy were put to rest and replaced with a new Islamic Republic in February 1979.

The significance of this historic event cannot be overstated. Not only did the revolution demonstrate the political character of religion, but it also heightened regional tensions, resulting in the destructive eight-year war with neighboring Iraq that lasted from 1980 to 1988.

The event spread fears of an Islamic resurgence among authoritarian regimes across the region, while simultaneously serving as an ideological inspiration for both Islamic and un-Islamic revolutionary
p. 428 movements throughout the world. Concerning Iran's ↳ internal dynamics, the revolution changed society dramatically, albeit with some unintended consequences, which will be briefly explored at the end of this chapter.

The Iranian Revolution has been explained through various approaches, including political economy and cultural explanations. Whereas the political economy approach underlines class struggle, uneven development (Halliday 1979 ; Abrahamian 1982 ; Bashiriyeh 1984), and rapid modernization (Parsa 1989), the cultural perspective predominantly emphasizes the ideological and religious aspects (Akhavi 1982 ; Skocpol 1982 ; Algar 2001 ; Keddie 1983 ; Mottahedeh 1985 ; Dabashi 2006 ; Moaddel 1992 ; Shomali 2019). [1]

Similar to other major social and political events, the Iranian Revolution was a multifaceted phenomenon. This chapter is mainly focused on the framing of the Islamic discourse that helped inform, animate, and dominate it. This by no means implies that Islam was the main ideology and primary force shaping the revolutionary movement. In fact, the Iranian left, particularly the Fada'iyan-e K̲alq and Mojahidin-e K̲alq as the two main leftist organizations, were active in Iran between 1971 and 1979 and sought to topple the regime. They were not successful, but they contributed enormously toward destabilizing and delegitimizing the state and laying the ground for future change (Abrahamian 1982). Despite having played a determining role in the revolutionary struggle, the left was nevertheless quickly marginalized by the newly born Islamic Republic.

Questions as to how an Islamic revolution was possible in a supposedly "demystified" and "disenchanted" world have engrossed the minds of scholars ever since its inception. It is seen as essentially antagonistic to modernity, on the one hand, and as an unthinkable (Kurzman 2004), unique (Ahmad 1980 , 6), and post-Enlightenment phenomenon (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016), on the other. Despite an abundance of literature, the event still seems to be suffering from major misunderstandings, particularly when its framing is taken into account. [2] As shall be argued, the revolution was primarily a political movement constructed through the reconfiguration of Islam in a colonial/postcolonial context. More specifically, this chapter puts the event in the colonial context of the historical momentum of the post-caliphate complex, with its destabilizing consequences and perplexities for the Muslim world. For many of its own subjects, the Ottoman Empire, the last Islamic caliphate, was nothing more than a corrupt and inept despotic rule. For other Muslims, however, the caliphate was viewed as a cornerstone of Islam. As a consequence, its abolishment in 1924 by Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) (the founder and first president of the Republic of Turkey) and the establishment of a republic at the heart of the Islamic caliphate was perceived as a major threat, which created an identity crisis. The "Islamic government," as one of the fundamental concepts of the revolutionaries, was initially framed as a response to this crisis. Nonetheless, as shall be seen, over the decades the idea and its realization on the ground were transfigured into an entirely different apparatus with little resemblance to the initial revivalist cause.

The Islamic resurgence was by no means exclusive to Iran. At the same time, radical Islam was on the rise in postcolonial/post-caliphate Muslim contexts such as Pakistan and Egypt (Enayat 1982 ; Ahmad 2009). The relationship between these different contexts was synergetic and multilateral. A constant flow of ideas
p. 429 about the Islamic ↳ government inspired Muslims across the globe and created a political imagination based on Islam as a "master signifier" (Sayyid 1997). These ideas created a constellation wherein every individual and collective remembrance and interpretation led to the fundamental (re)assessment of the history of Islam and its reconstruction. In such a constellation, Islam was seen as both the origin and the original event. It was understood as an incomplete and unclosed event that needed to be revealed in the course of action.

Although it might seem that the revolution occurred when hardly anybody had been expecting it,the events that prepared for it had unfolded over a rather long period of time. Despite being unthinkable, as Kurzman put it (2004), the framing of the revolutionary movement was enormously indebted to the politicization, modernization, and organization of the religious discourse against the authoritarian, pro-Western Pahlavi dynasty/regime (1925–1979) and its triumphalist account of history. In retrospect, we can see a long theological lineage that goes back to 1940 and the fall of the first Pahlavi regime. This movement was fostered by the increasing breach between the government and society that intensified after the 1953 coup,

the violent incidents of 1963, and the guerrilla movements of the 1970s. From then on, Shi'a Islam [3] was transformed into a theology of revolution capable of overthrowing the existing regime and establishing an Islamic polity via seizing state power. This is by no means to say that Islam was understood homogenously and unanimously by the revolutionaries. As shall be seen in this paper, the revolution has become Islamic only during its making. Furthermore, discrepancies of what Islam truly is and whether it contains a ready-made agenda for government, existed from the beginning and continue till today even among the leading ulema.

This Iranian Revolution was neither exceptional nor outside of the course of history. By reconnecting religion and politics, it was in fact stressing the importance of religious myths (Chehabi 2010), imagination, and enchantment for an otherwise "disenchanted" world. In doing so, it did challenge the hegemony of the secular constellations while simultaneously acknowledging the profound interdependency of the secular and the sacred.

The character of Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–1989) proved to be a determining factor in the success of the revolution. Born into a religious family, he studied Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) in Arak and Qom seminaries under the supervision of the prominent *marja*s (religious sources of emulation) of his time, including Hossein Borujerdi. Khomeini replaced Borujerdi after the latter's death and became the main source of emulation, but, unlike Borujerdi, he was very political. This brought him into direct confrontation with the regime. As a result, Khomeini spent more than 15 years in exile. In 1979, he returned to Iran victoriously as the leader of the revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic.

Khomeini is widely acknowledged as having been a dogmatic leader. Yet, as his positions on numerous occasions demonstrate that, despite being adamant, he was also highly pragmatic. This enabled him to modify his stances when necessary. Furthermore, unlike his orthodox predecessors, for whom the state was inherently corrupt, he was cognizant of the importance of the modern state, viewing it as a necessary
p. 430 apparatus for the construction of the Islamic community. More importantly, he was perhaps the first ↳ religious leader in the history of Shi'a Islam that put aside *taqiyya* (religious dissimulation) and explicitly called for a popular uprising against the established rule. It is also important to emphasize that the establishment of the Islamic government, as gradually conceptualized by Khomeini and his adherents, was not simply a revival of the caliphate. As the conceptual foundation of the Iranian Revolution, it was gradually constructed over decades of discussions, contemplations, and debates between the 1940s and the 1970s. The belief that Islam is the key to all sociopolitical malaises became hegemonic as a consequence of the spatial and discursive expansion of seminaries, religious groups, and propaganda during this time. This period can be dubbed the era of "religious awakening," in which the establishment of the Qom theological seminary in the 1920s and the public propagation of religious ideas consequently resulted in the hegemony of the religious discourse.

Moreover, the Islamist discourse was by no means monolithic. At least two distinctive interpretations of Islam competed against each other: I shall refer to these as the "clerical" and the "messianic." Such categorization does not intend to deny the mutual influence and constant exchange of ideas between them. Nevertheless, they were profoundly different in their approaches to religion and politics. Whereas clerical Islam viewed revolution as an instrument for the establishment of the Islamic government as an end in itself, messianic Islam perceived it as the repetition of the very past that is to be redeemed via revolution. In messianic Islam, therefore, remembrance and reinterpretation of the past as an incomplete and unclosed entity give birth to an alternative history of the downtrodden, which had been silenced by the narratives of the victors. In fact, the messianic was responsible for popularizing the revolutionary discourse, particularly among educated youth.

Religious Awakening

The 1920s saw a historic moment throughout the Muslim world. The abolishment of the caliphate in 1924 and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as the last great Muslim empire and the preserver of the "pivot of Islam" resulted in an apocalyptic perplexity for the Muslim world. The incident signaled the removal of the central point of reference for Muslims, an immense threat against Islam and Muslims, and the domination of the colonial powers over Muslim lands and culture (Imarah [1972] 2003 , 20). Khomeini described the trauma as such:

> The colonial powers [4] and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers have divided the Islamic homeland. They have separated the various segments of the Islamic *umma* from each other and artificially created separate nations. There once existed the great Ottoman State, and that, too, the imperialists divided. Russia, Britain, Austria, and other imperialist powers united, and through wars against the Ottomans, each came to occupy, or absorb into its sphere of influence, part of the
> p. 431 Ottoman realm. It is true ↳ that most of the Ottoman rulers were incompetent, that some of them were corrupt, and that they followed the monarchical system. Nonetheless, the existence of the Ottoman State represented a threat to the imperialists. It was always possible that righteous individuals might rise up among the people and, with their assistance, seize control of the state, thus putting an end to imperialism by mobilizing the unified resources of the nation....In order to assure the unity of the Islamic *umma*, in order to liberate the Islamic homeland from occupation and penetration by the imperialists and their puppet governments, it is imperative that we establish a government. In order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government of justice that will be in the service of the people. (Khomeini 1969 , 24)

The confusion and anger intensified among religious groups with the rise of the secular Pahlavi state in Iran in 1925 and its will to abolish the traditional way of life. With the occupation of Iran by allied forces, the dethronement of Reza Shah (r. 1925–1941) in 1941, and the rise of the second Pahlavi, who held a more tolerant attitude toward religion, the situation changed dramatically. The young shah, who felt weak and threatened, especially in front of the rising tide of communism both within and outside of Iran, started to invest in the religious discourse and considered the clerical establishment as—at least temporarily—a natural ally. A major step was taken by the government when Ayatollah Hussein Tabatabaei Qomi (1865–1947), a prominent *mujtahid* (a learned religious scholar with the authority of lawmaking) who lived in exile as a result of his insubordination and fierce resistance against Reza Shah, was invited to Iran from Atabat, the heart of Shi'ite scholarship in present-day Iraq. The government complied with the Ayatollah's urgent request to terminate Reza Shah's anti-veiling campaign. Religious organizations seized upon the relative political freedom and used it to propagate their own cause. The relatively free intellectual atmosphere resulted in a flourishing of numerous social and intellectual debates on religion.

One such historical debate took place in 1943, between Ali Akbar Hakamizadeh (?–1987) and Ruhollah Khomeini, who was known at the time as a cleric with strong political inclinations. Hakamizadeh had recently published a manuscript warning against a revival of religion in the wake of its temporary decline during the first Pahlavi rule (i.e., Reza Shah, r. 1925–1941). The publication of this manuscript created a massive debate since he challenged the vicarship (*niyaba*) of the *mujtahid*s and their claim to governance and guardianship (*velayat*) in the era of occultation, when the last imam lives in absence. In response, Khomeini published his *Kashf al-Asrar* (The Unveiling of the Secrets), in which he ferociously attacked Hakamizadeh. Khomeini accepted the credibility of the notion of the *velayat-e faqih* and the desirability of the Islamic government as the ideal state. However, he discreetly emphasizes that "there is no consensus among the *mujtahids* on the credibility of this concept and the extent to which such authority and its government applies." He then continues, "if we say that at this time the *hokumat* (governance) and the

velayat (guardianship) belong to the *faqih*s (jurisprudents), we do not mean that the *faqih* is king and
p. 432 minister and soldier and sweeper, but ↳ what could go wrong if the *majles* of this country consists of pious *faqih*s or is established under their supervision, as the law says?" (Khomeini 1943 , 185). He moved from this moderate to a more radical position a few decades later, as shall be seen.

The religious discourse experienced an unprecedented flourishing under the presidency of Ayatollah Hossein Borujerdi (1875–1961) over the Qom seminary in 1944. [5] Borujerdi replaced Qomi as the main *marja'*. Unlike Qomi, however, he was highly conservative and apolitical, preferring to return to traditional quietism, a position that, despite being criticized by the political clergy, proved crucial for the embellishment of the religious discourse. His disposition provided the best context for the strength of seminaries and the expansion and modernization of Shi'a and religious spaces. The expansion of the Qom seminary, in particular, was a major achievement under his leadership. In obvious contrast to the era of the first Pahlavi, the enrollment of religious studies students increased dramatically during the 1950s (Akhavi 1982 , 223). The seminaries and schools, their residences, and the libraries were all renovated. Two new libraries, an enormous mosque, and five additional schools were built. Moreover, new religious schools and centers were constructed not only in Qom but also in Karbala and Najaf. An Islamic center was also established in Hamburg in 1955. During this period, dozens of books and journals were published by the seminary (Manzurolajdad 2000 , 412–415), in which the emerging idea of the Islamic government was a constant subject of contemplation. At the time of Borujerdi's death, Qom had nine major printing houses, two daily newspapers (and a weekly for children), and four magazines, including the monthly *Maktab-e Eslam* that functioned as an intellectual organ of the Qom seminary (*howze-ye elmiye-ye Qom*), with a circulation of 80,000 in 1964. Qom also published two annual reviews and academic journals in English and Arabic. Moreover, the study of European languages, which was previously considered taboo, was allowed.

This growth was not restricted to the seminaries, however. Numerous journals, such as *Ayin-e Eslam*, *Donyay-e Eslam*, *Parcham-e Eslam*, and *Muslemin*, regularly published articles in defense of the *hejab* (*hijab*, veil) and the Islamic government while propagating against communism and women's suffrage. A direct achievement of the pro-Islam journals and the pressure of the Shi'a clerics for Islamizing the state was the incorporation of religious instructions into school curricula in the mid-1940s to train new religious generations. This effort had an extraordinary impact on the sociopolitical future of Iran.

Apart from particular cases, [6] mutually respectful relations between the shah and Borujerdi greatly contributed to the growth of the Qom seminary and the blooming of the religious discourse. Such relations created coordination between religious and lay authorities, which had been undermined since the Constitutional Revolution in 1911. It was partially due to such coordination that the regime was able to survive the oil nationalization crisis in 1952 and the toppling of the democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh (1882–1967) via the US- and British-backed coup in 1953. Borujerdi kept silent throughout the nationwide crisis, only to send a congratulatory telegram to the shah after the latter's victorious return to the country.

p. 433 Apparently, with the permission of Borujerdi, who was deeply concerned over the expansion of the Baha'i faith, Mahmoud Halabi founded the Hojjatieh Society (Anjoman-e Hojjatieh), whose primary goal was to fight against the Baha'i faith through the spread of traditional Shi'a Islam and occasionally violent means, such as damaging Baha'i community properties. The purpose of the society, as stated in its statute, was the propagation of Shi'a Ja'fari Islam as the official religion of the country.

The Hojjatieh Society was primarily apolitical and non-revolutionary. Yet, it indirectly played a major role in the sociopolitical developments of the post-coup era. Despite being extremely orthodox, the association was successful in the recruitment and absorption of educated youth, many of whom joined the revolutionary movement in later years. This success was partly rooted in the said society's modernized ways of propagation and recruitment.

Interregnum

The 1953 coup wreaked havoc on Iran, marking a new phase in state–society relations. Major political organizations such as the Tudeh Party (Iran's pro-Soviet communist party) and the National Front (a pro-Mosaddegh nationalist coalition) were outlawed, and their members were imprisoned or banished. Moreover, the establishment of SAVAK, the shah's brutal secret police, in 1956 created an unprecedented level of control and oppression. The main task of SAVAK was to identify and crush individuals and groups opposed to the shah's rule. The formation and development of SAVAK entirely changed the state–society relations that had been severely damaged by the coup and the suppression of nationalists and communists. The shah had already lost favor with these parties, and his relationship with the clerics and the Qom seminary was deteriorating. That hostility did not hinder the expansion of religious spaces, though. During this time, nine more seminaries were opened, with some acquiring an unprecedented number of female students.

Borujerdi's death in 1961 terminated the political abstinence and quietism of the seminary. In the meantime, the introduction of the so-called White Revolution in 1961 provided enough justification for the politicization of clerics. The White Revolution was a series of state-initiated reforms, including land reforms, industrial growth, the nationalization of forests and pastures, the promotion of literacy and health corps for rural areas, the institution of profit-sharing schemes for factory workers, and women's enfranchisement. This extensive reform program enraged the '*ulama*', who saw their influence undermined as a result. Khomeini, in particular, criticized the series of reforms and vigorously attacked the regime for the growing US influence and domination over the country's army, economy, and politics. He was detained by the regime, and as a result, massive street protests erupted in June 1963 (*15 Khordad-e 42*), in which some seminary students were killed by the police in Qom. From that moment, the country ↳ entered a new phase of direct confrontation between the state and society that lasted until 1979. The era witnessed a process of religious radicalization targeting an increasingly oppressive dictatorship.

p. 434

Later events, particularly the Siahkal incident in February 1971, intensified this confrontation and further delegitimized the regime. Siahkal was a military operation organized by the Fada'yian-e Ḵalq leftist guerrillas, who attacked a gendarmerie post on the Caspian Sea. They were quickly arrested and executed, but the event speeded up the revolutionary movement. The Siahkal incident heralded a new era that ended with the Islamic revolution.

Royal, Clerical, Messianic

The 1960s witnessed fierce competition between the advocates of two opposing discourses on religion: the royal and the revolutionary. With the gradual dominance of the religious discourse and its resurgence in the 1960s, even the regime attempted to appropriate it in order to advance its own agenda. The regime's policy was to make Shi'a Islam a royal religion. Part of this policy was the appropriation of dissident terminologies such as the "return to the self" and "westoxication" that were primarily coined by Ali Shariati (1933–1977) and Jalal Al-e-Ahmad (1923–1969), respectively, to criticize the alienating Pahlavi modernization. The celebration of the 2,500-year "Persian Empire," the formation of a royal philosophy as "Iranian Islam," and the promotion of oriental art and architecture such as the Saqqakhaneh school (Keshmirshekan 2009) based on Shi'a symbols and icons are a few examples of this policy. These attempts aimed at validating the "authenticity" of the Pahlavi monarchy and enhancing its legitimacy. It seems, however, that such appropriations somewhat paradoxically contributed to its further destabilization (Matin Asghari 2018 , 190; Mirsepassi 2019 , 58–106; 152–196).

Revolutionary Islam was not monolithic. It involved at least two major branches, as noted earlier: the clerical and the messianic. Messianic Islam was primarily the outcome of religious reformism, though it was greatly influenced by Marxism as well. It criticized *shari'a* (Islamic law) as well as orthodox beliefs and rituals, viewing them as superstitions and obstacles in the path toward salvation and political emancipation.

As an ideology, it was also implicitly and explicitly adopted by political organizations such as the Socialist Muslims, Jonbesh-e Enqelabi-ye Mardom-e Iran, Arman-e Mostaz'afin, and, most importantly, the Mojahedin-e Ḵalq (Abrahamian 1989). Ali Shariati was the most articulate representative of messianic Islam, though he passed away shortly before the revolution. Nevertheless, by that time he already had trained a new generation of passionate revolutionaries. For Shariati, Islam was not a mere religion but primarily an invitation to rise against oppression and injustice. Some of the lesser known intellectuals, such as Mostafa Sho'a'yan (1936–1975), also propagated messianic Islam.

p. 435 Clerical—also canonical—Islam, however, believed in the superiority of clerics and that salvation is to be achieved exclusively through the emulation and observation of *shari'a*. The most significant representative of revolutionary clerical Islam was Ruhollah Khomeini. Other proponents of clerical Islam and the Islamic government included Morteza Motahari (1919–1979); Hussein-Ali Montazeri (1922–2009); to a lesser extent, Nematollah Salehi Najafabadi (1923–2006); Muhammad Husayn Tabatabayi (1904–1981); Jalaleddin Farsi (b. 1933); and Mohammad Beheshti (1928–1987).

Messianic and clerical Islam viewed religion rather differently, although the difference was by no means exclusive to their views of religion. The more important and deeper difference lay in their divergent approaches toward politics. The discrepancies and intellectual debates resulted in a series of violent confrontations, which began in the pre-revolutionary era and continued well after the revolution, when messianic Islam was increasingly marginalized.

While the messianic considered revolution mainly as an end in itself, the clerical viewed revolution not as an end but rather as a means to seizing power and establishing a religious government. As for politics, the document that best exemplifies the difference between the two is a book titled *Shahid-e Javid* (The Immortal Martyr), published in 1968. According to the author of the book, Nematollah Salehi Najafabadi, Imam Hussein (the third Shi'a imam) rebelled against Umayyad rule (r. 661–774) in order to establish an Islamic government. He also argued that the imam did not have the knowledge of his final fate; that is, he could not anticipate his failure and martyrdom.

Najafabadi implied that Imam Hussein was a politician and a pragmatic leader. The thesis sounded blasphemous to many orthodox Shi'a opponents, for whom Hussein was not a politician but primarily a pious man who rose up against a corrupt government knowing that he would be martyred (Siegel 2001 , 151). Messianic Islam, on the contrary, believed that the imam's uprising was a revolutionary cause "to eliminate usurpation and restore what is right," as pointed out by Shariati (1988 , 12).

Clerical Islam: Islamic Government (*Hokumat-e Eslami*)

The Islamic government is the illustration of the political imaginary of clerical Islam. Despite being rudimentary and vague, the idea marked a major break with orthodox Shi'a. Whereas in the traditional Shi'a doctrine the establishment of the divine kingdom is possible after the Parousia (*Zuhur*, appearance) and the coming of the hidden imam, and only by him, the Islamic government implied that the government is to be established by ordinary human beings. In fact, the idea implicitly denies the Parousia altogether.

It would take almost twenty years before a few religious students' aspirations for the Islamic government
p. 436 would be fully transformed into reality in 1979. By reading relevant ↳ documents, one can figure out that

at least since the late 1950s revolutionary clerics and their followers had moved gradually toward establishing the Islamic government as an alternative to the existing polity (Kazemi Moussavi 2005 ; Manzurolajdad 2000 ; Mottahedeh 1985). In an article written in 1959, for instance, Muhammad Husayn Tabatabayi declared that women are emotional creatures and since politics is a rational domain, their participation in politics needed to be limited by Islam (Tabatabayi 1959 , 29). Furthermore, drinking alcohol, gambling, free sexual relations, unveiling, and unlimited social freedoms were severely condemned and declared un-Islamic in other articles (Falsafi 1959 , 109, 111, 115). The journals in which these ideas were formulated were published and distributed in large numbers, attracting numerous readers.

Most significant of all, however, were Ayatollah Khomeini's interventions. In 1969, Khomeini, who at the time lived in exile in Najaf, published his lectures on the Islamic government. In his book *Velayat-e Faqih*, he defines the Islamic government as identical with the *velayat-e faqih*, or the governance by the jurisprudent. In fact, he merged the Islamic government and the *velayat-e faqih* in an innovative way. The book was a call to rebellion. His tone and manner of analysis were quite unique and unprecedented for a cleric:

> If you pay no attention to the policies of the imperialists and consider Islam to be simply the few topics you are always studying and never go beyond them, then the imperialists will leave you alone. Pray as much as you like; it is your oil they are after—why should they worry about your prayers? They are after our minerals and want to turn our country into a market for their goods. That is the reason the puppet governments they have installed prevent us from industrializing, and instead, establish only assembly plants and industry that is dependent on the outside world. (Khomeini 1969 , 17)

Unlike his contemporaries, Khomeini was not only political, but also aware of the contemporary world developments. This has been best illustrated in one of his statements on the role of propaganda:

> It is our duty to work toward the establishment of an Islamic government. The first activity we must undertake in this respect is the propagation of our case; that is how we must begin. It has always been that way, all over the world: a group of people came together, deliberated, made decisions, and then began to propagate their aims. Gradually, the number of like-minded people would increase, until finally they became powerful enough to influence a great state or even to confront and overthrow it....You have neither a country nor an army now, but propagating activity is possible for you, because the enemy has been unable to deprive you of all the required means. *You teach the people matters related to worship, of course, but more important are the political, economic, and legal aspects of Islam.* [7] These are, or should be, the focus of our concern. It is our duty to begin exerting ourselves now in order to establish a truly Islamic government. We must propagate our cause to the people, instruct them in it, and convince them of its validity. We must generate a wave of intellectual awakening, to emerge as a current throughout society, and
> p. 437 gradually, to ↳ take shape as an organized Islamic movement made up of the awakened, committed, and religious masses who will rise up and establish an Islamic government. (Khomeini 1969 , 78)

Nevertheless, even he went hardly any further than delivering ambiguous statements on the Islamic government: "The Islamic government does not correspond to any of the existing forms of government" (Khomeini 1969 , 29). In fact, apart from general discussions that the Islamic government ought to implement God's imperatives on earth, one can hardly find any clarification on this and the ways in which it is to be implemented. As a result, no details were presented on its legal structure, state apparatus, state forces, economy, taxation, army, international relations, and so forth.

Ironically enough, this ambiguity proved to be a source of strength rather than weakness. It tremendously contributed to the popularity of the idea by leaving space for imagination and filling it with all kinds of

expectations and illuminations. As a result, during the revolution, 87 percent of the graffiti and street art in Tehran were in defense of the Islamic government (Mohsenian Rad 2016 , 118). The Islamic government was envisaged by the majority of people as a community in which justice and freedom are materialized and poverty, corruption, and oppression eradicated:

> The Islamic government that is requested is the defender of the peasants, workers, toilers, and the poor people, a supporter of the downtrodden; it is against the exploitation of the human being by the human being; it consists of a classless, Unitarian and non-despotic guiding leadership; it is the government of Allah under the leadership of ʻAli, the hidden Imam and Khomeini and the adherents of the followers of other religions. This government is the origin of social justice and the most perfect form of democracy. (Mohsenian Rad 2016 , 119)

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic is the first document providing a more systematic definition of the Islamic government, though it also suffers massively from contradictions, ambiguities, and abstractions (Schirazi 1997). It is rather an incomplete manifesto than a legal document on the basis of which a state can be constituted. In practice, the content and definition of the Islamic government were continuously changed and revised in the light of political conditions and the expediency of the regime and ruling authorities. Whereas in the early years of the revolution, it was more republican in nature due to the enormous participation of people and their support, it increasingly inclined toward authoritarianism and the expediency of government in later years. A few years prior to his death, Khomeini declared that the government is a "primary statute," an obligation similar to fasting and praying (as opposed to the secondary statutes) and even superior to them (Khomeini 2000 , 170). Such an attitude toward the role of government reveals not only a strong authoritarian tendency but a secularization of the concept. In this respect, the Islamic government seems to be the embodiment of Carl Schmitt's thesis that "[a]ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts" (Schmitt [1922] 1985 , 36).

p. 438

The *Velayat-e Faqih*

It is widely believed that the *velayat-e faqih* was initiated by Khomeini. This is, however, ahistorical. Long before Khomeini refurbished this idea, it was the subject of constant debates and discussions in several treatises in either agreement or disagreement with this notion (Kadivar 2009a , 80–86, 2009b , 100–127).

The emergence of the idea was in fact an outcome of the triumph of the Usuli theological school over the quietist Akhbaris in the late 19th century. According to the Akhbari school—which up to that time was the orthodox version of Shiʻa—spiritual and lay authority belonged solely to the Prophet and the imams. The proponents of the *velayat-e faqih*, consisting mainly of the Usuli *mujtahid*s, extended that exclusive right to jurisprudents as the qualified successors of the Prophet and the imams. Whereas the Akhbari school viewed the idea as blasphemous with no credible reinforcement in the scripts, for the Usuli *mujtahid*s the practice of *ijtihad* allowed the clerics to interpret the scripts differently. The Usuli school and the principle of *ijtihad* revolutionized Shiʻa jurisprudence. Indeed, this is the context in which the idea of the *velayat-e faqih* emerged. [8]

There is no doubt, however, that Ayatollah Khomeini was the most significant proponent of the *velayat-e faqih* in the late 1960s. He was the one who turned it into the foundation stone of the Islamic state (Enayat 1982 ; Dabashi 2006). [9] We have already seen his position on this question in his debate with Hakamizadeh. In 1969, contrary to 1943, the political situation had dramatically changed in favor of the religious discourse, so much so that Khomeini declared the following emphatically:

> The governance of the *faqih* is a subject that in itself elicits immediate assent and has little need of demonstration, for anyone who has some general awareness of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam will unhesitatingly give his assent to the principle of the governance of the *faqih* as soon as he encounters it; he will recognize it as necessary and self-evident. If little attention is paid to this principle today, so that it has come to require demonstration, it is because of the social circumstances prevailing among the Muslims in general, and the teaching institution in particular. These circumstances, in turn, have certain historical roots to which I will now briefly refer. (Khomeini 1969 , 7)

It comes as no surprise, then, that in the summer of 1979 in a public debate around the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, a concerted movement was initiated by the adherents of the *velayat-e faqih* demanding that the constituent assembly incorporate the principle of the concept in the Constitution. Inside the assembly, Beheshti and Montazeri pursued it and successfully ratified the principle of the *velayat-e faqih*, despite robust opposition.

In fact, a double movement underlies the development of the *velayat-e faqih* and, by extension, the Islamic government: the secularization of religion, on the one hand, and the consecration of political authority, on the other.

p. 439

Messianic Revolutionaries

Messianic Islam possessed an anti-clerical disposition, as mentioned previously. The aim of the messianic revolutionaries was not primarily to establish a government, unlike their clerical counterparts. Rather, they primarily sought profound change in the intellectual, social, and political spheres. The driving force behind the messianic revolutionary tendency was to rewrite the past and thereby redeem it. For Shariati as the most articulate messianic intellectual, history is not the cumulative measure for actual shared experiences, but a radical narrative to recapture and reconstruct the past. Consequently, he sees waiting for the appearance of the imam (*entezar*) as passivity (Shariati 1971). Shariati ridicules and despises the traditional notions of history, which he considers nothing but an account of the ruling banalities fabricated by court scribes and official historians.

Shariati's critiques targeted both kings and clerics, that is, the "shadows and signs" (*sayeha va ayeha*), as he used to describe them. According to him, whereas royal and clerical Islams are despotic, "true" Islam stands for a thorough negation of money, force, and hypocrisy (*zar*, *zur*, *tazvir*). The contradiction was best articulated in one of Shariati's influential lecture-based books titled *Religion versus Religion*. Here, he clearly differentiates between the two religions: "I say to those intellectuals who always ask, 'Why do you, an intellectual, rely so much on religion?' If I speak about religion, I do not speak about a religion which had been realized in the past and which ruled society. Rather, I speak about a religion whose goals are to do away with a religion which ruled over society" (Shariati 1988 , 40). "To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it 'the way it really was.'...It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger," as pointed out by Benjamin (2006 , 391). "My reliance upon religion," Shariati indicates, "is not a return to the past but rather the continuation of the way of history" (Shariati 1988 , 41). For Shariati, the real enemy is thus the clerical religion, not atheism:

> After a great deal of anguish and struggle and even after his victory of making the One God familiar to his people in his society, Moses destroys calf worship and idolism which was one of the types of multitheism in those days. After all this, the Samaritan once again builds a calf. He takes advantage of the slightest opportunity, which was the absence of Moses, so that the people worship the calf. This person who built the calf so that people worship it instead of Yahweh, God, Allah, was not a

> godless or non-religious person. He was a believer in religion. He was a preacher and even a religious leader. (Shariati 1988 , 28)

In order to draw a clear distinction between "true" and "false" Islam, he framed two basic concepts: Alavid Shi'a and Safavid Shi'a. Alavid Shi'a was the revolutionary religion of the Shi'a imams, Ali and Hussein, in particular, while Safavid was the religion of the ↳ legitimation of tyranny, in which the king (the shadow of God on earth) and the clerics (the signs of Allah) united.

p. 440

This messianic aspect seems to have fascinated Foucault, as he writes, "The true meaning of Shi'a should not be sought in a religion that had been institutionalized since the seventeenth century, but in the sermons of social justice and equality that had already been preached by the first Imam" (Foucault 2005b , 207–208). Foucault reiterates the very distinction that Shariati made between the Safavid and Alavid Shi'a: "Of course, there have at times been proximities between the state and Shi'a religion, and shared organizations have existed. You had a Safavid Shi'a, to resurrect an Alavid Shi'a" (Foucault 2005a , 186).

Conclusion

In *The Concept of History*, Benjamin describes an automaton constructed in such a way that it could respond to every move by a chess player with a countermove that would ensure the winning of the game.

> Actually, a hunchbacked dwarf—a master at chess—sat inside and guided the puppet's hand by means of strings. One can imagine a philosophic counterpart to this apparatus. The puppet, called "historical materialism," is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is small and ugly and has to keep out of sight. (Benjamin 2006 , thesis I)

In a more general context, the Islamic revolution was the return of the "hunchbacked dwarf" to the scene, with the intention of disrupting the triumphalist and unidirectional approach of history by Western modernity.

The Islamic revolution marked the re-enchantment and re-mystification of politics. Nonetheless, the outcome of the revolution led to increasing disenchantment and demystification. As a result of the revolution and the establishment of the Islamic state, Iranian society has not become more religious. Quite the contrary, the revolution contributed to the unprecedented growth of alternative religiosities and critical attitudes toward religion, if not secularization. Interestingly, seminaries and religious schools have been greatly affected by this trend, whose strength and depth have made senior Iranian officials express their considerable concern about it in recent years. In fact, today Iran is experiencing another revolution, albeit a quiet one.

Similar contradictory effects are observable in social and cultural life, suggesting an increasing distance between the intentions of the revolutionaries and the real outcome. Among them, demands for gender equality and the incredible participation of women in public life, education, sports, artistic activities, etc., are noteworthy. Also, cinema and the fine arts have witnessed phenomenal growth in post-revolutionary Iran.

p. 441

The revolutionaries promised to eliminate injustice, corruption, discrimination, and authoritarianism. The realities of today's Iran hardly match that dream. Despite the fact that the revolution was made in the name of the oppressed (*mostaz'afin*), the regime has been increasingly leaning toward neoliberal policies targeting the most vulnerable strata (Ehsani 2009 ; Maljoo 2020). As a result, the minimum wage for the most vulnerable strata, including workers and schoolteachers, is among the lowest. Moreover, social class

has been reshuffled (Behdad and Nomani 2009), and the gap between rich and poor has been widening since 1989 (Maljoo 2020), along with other social gaps (Roozkhosh 2020). Today, Iran is also facing a serious environmental crisis, drought, and shortage of water supplies as a result of state mismanagement, monopolization, and discriminatory allocation of resources (Madani 2014). The malaises are back, without any foreseeable solution on the horizon.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Iranian society has become increasingly "disenchanted" over the years. This situation, along with the authoritarian nature of the government and its structural inability to combat corruption, unemployment, and economic crisis, has resulted in strong oppositional movements emerging in recent years, including the Green Movement in 2009 and the massive uprisings in 2017 and 2019. Whereas the Green Movement in the aftermath of the fraudulent election was largely reformist and nonviolent, the recent uprisings and protests against the dire economic situation in Iran have become increasingly radical and violent, targeting the regime itself. All of these movements have been brutally suppressed, though their demands, including free and fair elections, rule of law, equality and justice for all, and a dignified life for all Iranians regardless of gender, class, religion, and ethnicity, stand firm.

The Islamic Republic seems to have lost the loyalty of the majority of ordinary people as the main fundament of its survival amid the hardships since 1979. But the revolution unleashed a genie that seems unable to go back into its bottle. This is perhaps the most astonishing and enduring legacy of the Iranian Revolution.

Acknowledgment

I express my deep gratitude to my dear friend Dr. Mohammad Eskandari, Dr. Fabio Vicini, and Professor Armando Salvatore for their careful reading and wonderful comments on the earlier versions of this article.

Notes

1. In his book, Shomali viewed the revolution as "thoughtlessness and decadence."

2. A recent example could be Behrooz Moazami's book, in which he evaluates Khomeini's *velayat-e faqih* as being "innovative" and "closer to the Sheikhism and Babism of the nineteenth century than to the ideas underpinning the institutionalized religion of the mid-twentieth century" (Moazami 2013 , 118).

p. 442

3. Shi'a is one of the two main branches of Islam. It holds that the Islamic prophet Muhammad designated Ali ibn Abi Talib as his successor and the imam (leader) after him. As the first imam, Ali is followed by the chain of imams after him as the legitimate successors of the Prophet.

4. I have slightly changed the translation according to the original text.

5. For more details on the religious resurgence and the determining role of Borujerdi, see Akhavi 1982 , 60.

6. Particularly when sensitive issues were concerned, such as the regime's support of Bahaism and the agrarian reforms that enormously enraged Borujerdi.

7. Emphasis added.

8. Significant proponents of the *velayat-e faqih* in the 19th century included Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (1771–1829) (Naraqi 1996); Mohammad Hasan Najafi, also known as Saheb-e Jawaher (1785–1850) (Najafi n.d. , 397, 399); and Mohammad Hossein Naini (1860–1936). The modern proponents include Khomeini and his adherents, such as Hussein-Ali Montazeri, Mohammad Beheshti, and Morteza Motahhari. The critics of the idea were both clerics and laymen. Among earlier critics,

Asadollah Mamaqani (1881–1971) and Ali Akbar Hakamizadeh are worth mentioning. Later critics include Qassem Twiserkani (?–1993) and the reformist Abu al-Fadl Burqa'i (1908–1993).

9. For the trajectory of the notion in Khomeini, see Rahnema (1998, 2014).

References

Abrahamian, Ervand. 1982. *Iran between Two Revolutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Abrahamian, Ervand. 1989. *The Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin*. London: I. B. Tauris.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Ahmad, Eqbal. 1980. "The Iranian Revolution: A Landmark for the Future." In *Islamic Revolution in Iran*, edited by E. Ahmed, 3–11. Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books and Davis Road.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Ahmad, Irfan. 2009. "Genealogy of the Islamic State: Reflections on Maududi's Political Thought and Islamism." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 15 (1): 145–162.
Google Scholar WorldCat

Akhavi, Shahrough. 1982. *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy–State Relations in the Pahlavī Period*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Algar, Hamid. 2001. *Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran*. Rev. ed. Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications International.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Arendt, Hannah. 2017. "Never-before-Published Hannah Arendt on What Freedom and Revolution Really Mean." Literary Hub, June 27. Accessed May 5, 2020. https://lithub.com/never-before-published-hannah-arendt-on-what-freedom-and-revolution-really-mean/.
WorldCat

Bashiriyeh, Hossein. 1984. *The State and Revolution in Iran (1962–1982)*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Behdad, Sohrab, and Farhad Nomani. 2009. "What a Revolution! Thirty Years of Social Class Reshuffling in Iran." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 29 (1): 84–104.
Google Scholar WorldCat

Benjamin, Walter. 2006. "On the Concept of History." In *Selected Writings*. Vol. 4, *1938–1940*, edited by Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings. Translated by E. Jephcott, H. Eiland, and M. W. Jennings, 389–411. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

p. 443 Chehabi, Houshang E. 2010. Li Kull Fir'awn Musa: *The Myth of Moses and Pharaoh in the Iranian Revolution in Comparative Perspective*. Crown Paper 4. Waltham, MA: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University.

Dabashi, Hamid. 2006. *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran*. London: Routledge.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Ehsani, Kaveh. 2009. "Survival through Dispossession: Privatization of Public Goods in the Islamic Republic." *Middle East Report* 250: 26–33. Accessed May 5, 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20100620042536/http://merip.org/mer/mer250/ehsani.html.
Google Scholar WorldCat

Enayat, Hamid. 1982. *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. London: Macmillan.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Falsafi, Mohammad Taqi. 1959. "Islam and the Civilized World." *Maktab-e Tashayyu'* 1 (1): 100–133.

Google Scholar WorldCat

Foucault, Michel. 2005a. “Dialogue between Michel Foucault and Baqir Parham.” In *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seduction of Islamism*, translated and edited by J. Afary and K. Anderson, 183–188. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Foucault, Michel. 2005b. “What Are the Iranians Dreaming about?” In *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seduction of Islamism*, translated and edited by J. Afaray and K. Anderson, 203–209. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Ghamari-Tabrizi, Behrooz. 2016. *Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolution after Enlightenment*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Halliday, Fred. 1979. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. New York: Penguin Books.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Imarah, Muhammad. [1972] 2003. “Critical Introduction” to *Al-Islam va Osul al-Hukm*, by A. Abd al-Raziq. Tehran: Sarayi.

Kadivar, Mohsen. 2009a. *Nazarieh- hay-e Dowlat dar Fiqh-e Shi‘a*. Tehran: Ney.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Kadivar, Mohsen. 2009b. *Hokumat-e Welayi*. Tehran: Ney.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Kazemi Moussavi, Ahmad. 2005. *Religious Authority in Shi’ite Islam: From the Office of Mufti to the Institution of Marja’*. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Keddie, Nikkie R. 1983. *Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi‘ism from Quietism to Revolution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Keshmirshekan, Hamid. 2009. “Saqqa-khana School of Art.” In *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. Accessed May 5, 2020. https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/saqqa-kana-ii-school-of-art.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Khomeini, Ruhollah. 1943. *Kashf al-Asrar*. Unpublished.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Khomeini, Ruhollah. 1969. *Governance of the Jurist* (Vilayat-e Faqih*)*. Translated by Hamid Algar. Tehran: Institute for Compilation and Publications of Emam Khomeini’s Works.

Khomeini, Ruhollah. 2000. *Ketab al-Bey‘*. Vol. 2, *Ketab al- Bey‘*. Tehran: Mo’assese-ye Tanzim va Nashr-e Asar-e Emam Khomeini.

Kurzman, Charles. 2004. *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Madani, Kaveh. 2014. “Water Management in Iran: What Is Causing the Looming Crisis?” *Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences* 4: 315–328. Accessed May 5, 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13412-014-0182-z.
Google Scholar WorldCat

Maljoo, Mohammad. 2020. “Avamil-e Takvin va Ta‘migh-e Nabarabari-ye Thabaqati dar Iran.” In *Shekafha-ye Ejtima‘i dar Iran*, edited by M. Roozkhosh, 77–128. Tehran: Pajouheshgah-e Farhang va Honar va Ertebatat.

Manzurolajdad, Mohammad Hossein. 2000. *Marja‘iyyat dar ‘Arse-ye Ejtema‘ va Siyasat*. Tehran: Shirazeh.

Matin Asghari, Afshin. 2018. *Both Eastern and Western: An Intellectual History of Iranian Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Mirsepasi, Ali. 2019. *Iran's Quiet Revolution: The Downfall of the Pahlavi State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Moaddel, Mansoor. 1992. *Class, Politics and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Moazami, Behrooz. 2013. *State, Religion, and Revolution in Iran 1796 to the Present*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Mohsenian Rad, Mehdi. 2016. *Dar Hasrat-e Fahm-e Dorost: Revayat-e 42 Sal Pajouhesh-e Ertebati Dar Iran*. London: Handsmedia.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Montazeri, Hussein-Ali. 2000. *Memoirs*. Unpublished.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Mottahedeh, Roy. 1985. *The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Najafi, Mohammad Hassan. n.d. *Jawahir al-Kalam fi Sharh-i Sharayi' al-eslam.* Vol. 21, *Jawahir al-Kalam fi Sharh-e Sharayi' al-eslam*. Beirut: Dar al-ehya' al-Turas al-'Arabi.

Naraqi, Ahmad. 1996. *Awa'id al-Ayyam fi Bayan-i Qawa'id al-Ahkam*. Qom, Iran: Daftar-e Tabliqat-e Howze-ye Elmieh.

Parsa, Misagh. 1989. *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Rahnema, Ali. 1998. *An Islamic Utopian: A Political Bibliography of Ali Shariati*. London: I. B. Tauris.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Rahnema, Ali. 2014. "Ayatollah Khomeini's Rule of the Guardian Jurist from Theory to Practice." in *A Critical Introduction to Khomeini*, edited by A. Adib-Moghaddam, 88–114. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Roozkhosh, Mohammad. 2020. *Shekafha-ye Ejtema'i dar Iran*. Tehran: Pajouheshgah-e Farhang va Honar va Honar va Ertebatat.

Sayyid, Bobby S. 1997. *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism*. London: Zed Books.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Schirazi, Asghar. 1997. *The Constitution of Iran: Politics and State in the Islamic Republic*. London: I. B. Tauris.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Schmitt, Carl. [1922] 1985. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Translated by G. Schwab. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Shariati, Ali. 1971. *Hossein Vares-e Adam*. Tehran: Qalam.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Shariati, Ali. 1988. *Religion versus Religion*. Translated by L. Bakhtiar. Albuquerque, NM: Abjad.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Shomali, Alireza. 2019. *Thoughtlessness and Decadence in Iran: A Sojourn in Comparative Political Theory*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Siegel, Evan. 2001. "The Politics of Shahid-e Javid." In *Twelver Shia in Modern Times*, edited by R. Brunner and W. Ende, 150–178. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC

Skocpol, Theda. 1982. "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution." *Theory and Society* 11 (3): 265–283.
Google Scholar WorldCat

Tabatabai, Muhammad Husayn. 1959. "Zan dar Eslam." *Maktab-e Tashayyu'* 1 (1): 8–30.
Google Scholar WorldCat