

**US Interventionism in Greece during the early Cold War, 1947-1974: a  
consequentialist interpretation**

by

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**Declaration**

I, Agisilaos Papageorgiou, confirm that the work presented in my thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Signature:

## **Abstract**

This thesis covers Greco-American relations from 1947 to 1974, starting with American interventionism in the Third Phase of the Greek Civil War and ending with the collapse of the Greek military regime. Through an extensive study of diplomatic and intelligence documents, this thesis thoroughly explores the two countries' bilateral relations—which do not figure prominently within Cold War scholarship—and elaborates deeply on American purposes in Greece and US foreign policymakers' consistently deep level of interventionism, starting with the Truman and ending with the Nixon presidencies. This thesis adopts a revisionist perspective, suggesting that the conventional interpretation of Cold War American interventionism as unethical is unidimensional and inherently limited, as is the argument that in the early Cold War, the US undermined its own long-term position in Greece. This thesis' findings suggest instead that American interventionism in Greece was not only consistently ethical throughout the period in question, but also highly effective in geopolitical terms as well.

To do so, this thesis explores American interventionism in Greece during the early Cold War from a consequentialist perspective. By exploring American foreign policymaking through a consequentialist set of ethics, this thesis challenges the predominant deontological interpretation of American interventionism and proposes a wider alternative interpretation of ethical foreign policymaking. To achieve this goal, this thesis introduces its own theoretical framework, through which it explores the influence of American Exceptionalism in the conceptualization of American foreign policy in the context of the Cold War—and superpower competition with the Soviet Union, and world communism more broadly. The fundamental principle that this thesis proposes is that Cold War American administrations operated with a consequentialist mindset, in which containing and defeating the Soviet sphere of influence was

not only a strategic and geopolitical interest in realist terms, but also a moral imperative, in existential terms.

## Impact Statement

This thesis challenges the conventional narrative regarding American interventionism in Greece during the early Cold War. It particularly shows how Greek popular resentment towards the US—which remains prominent to this day—is informed by the historical memory of Greco-American relations from 1947 to 1974, in which certain ethical interpretations were established and promoted primarily by Andreas Papandreou and PASOK. This thesis does not dismiss the merit of such deontological interpretations of American interventionism but suggests instead that American interventionism in Greece can be far better interpreted through consequentialist lenses. In other words, this argues shows that the conventional view of American interventionism is limited because it fails to consider how the US' competition with the USSR in both a geopolitical and—most importantly—teleological level, in which prevailing over the USSR was considered a moral imperative and the greater good, in utilitarian terms, for which every deontological misstep was nonetheless considered ethically justifiable.

Also, this thesis sheds light on Greece's rather obscure place within Cold War historiography. Possibly because of its NATO and later EEC member-state status, Greece is usually viewed as another Western European ally of the US' even during the Cold War. Yet this thesis reveals that Greece's place within the West was never a given and showcases the lengths to which Washington went to ensure that Greece would remain within the American sphere of influence. The study of American interventionism in Greece during the early Cold War is essentially absent within Cold War academic literature, while even the few—and mostly Greek—scholars who have worked on Greco-American relations focus on either the Greek Civil War, or the Junta years; more particularly, the intermediate years largely remain a no man's land for relevant analyses. Notably, every study on American interventionism in Greece adopts the conventional deontological approach, in which the US is viewed as an immoral actor, due to its violation of Greek self-determination.

This thesis' findings inform policymaking as well. In Greece, the term “deontology” is predominant in multiple settings, and especially in politics and journalism, while consequentialism is always presented in a negative light. This thesis extends an invitation to both sectors to acknowledge that deontology and consequentialism are two equally valid ethical approaches in policymaking, consider how the latter can be useful in certain instances, and—crucially—recognize where it has been actually adopted with success. A most unique example concerns the rapid bilateral rapprochement between Greece and Saudi Arabia post-2019, with the latter being a theocratic authoritarian regime, yet also a major geopolitical ally. This thesis also extends an invitation to policymakers, journalists, and commentators to consider whether Greece would have really acted differently to the US had it been competing with another superpower which proposed a different social system, based on another—and competing—teleological vision. This is a philosophical argument which extends beyond Greco-centric analyses, as this thesis proposes that consequentialism is not only equally valid to deontology, but sometimes leads to more optimal results, in geopolitical settings—and beyond.

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**Table of Contents**

Chapter One: The historical memory of American unfairness	13
Chapter Two: The consequentialist foreign policy framework	46
Chapter Three: The Greek Civil War (1947-1949)	87
Chapter Four: The systemization of American interventionism (1949-1956)	151
Chapter Five: Cyprus, the rise of the Left, and the road to instability (1957-1965)	200
Chapter Six: The Junta (1967-1974)	250
Chapter Seven: Andreas Papandreou's revenge and the loss of Greece	311
Chapter Eight: Consequentialism Revisited	329
Bibliography	346



**Abbreviations**

AKEL	Progressive Party of Working People
AMAG	American Mission to Aid Greece
ASPIDA	Officers Save Fatherland Ideals Democracy Meritocracy
CU	Centrists Union
DSE	Democratic Army of Greece
DU	Democratic Union
EA	United Left
EAM	National Liberation Front
EDA	United Democratic Left
EDES	National Republican League
EEC	European Economic Community
ELAS	Greek People's Liberation Army
Enosis	Union of Greece and Cyprus
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EPEK	National Progressive Civil Union
ERE	National Radical Union
ERP	European Recovery Program
IDEA	Sacred Bond of Greek Officers
Junta	Greek military regime (1967-1974)

KF	Liberal Party
KKE	Greek Communist Party
KYP	Greek Intelligence Agency
ND	New Democracy
PAK	Panhellenic Liberation Movement
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PEEA	Political Committee of National Liberation
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

## **Dramatis Personae**

Archbishop Makarios	First President of Cyprus (1960-1974)
Averoff-Tositsa, Evangelos	Foreign Minister with ERE (1956-1963)
Diomidis, Alexandros	Prime Minister with KF (1949-1950)
Karamanlis, Konstantinos	Founder of ERE and ND, Prime Minister (1955-1963 with ERE & 1974-1980 with ND). Minister in Papagos' cabinet and his successor in party leadership
King Constantine II	Final Greek monarch (1964-1973) and leader of the 1967 countercoup
Maximos, Dimitrios	Prime Minister with PP (1947)
Papadopoulos, Georgios	Colonel, leader of the 1967 coup, and Junta Prime Minister (1967-1973)
Papagos, Alexandros	Founder of ES and Prime Minister (1952-1955), Commander-In-Chief of the Hellenic Army during the Civil War.
Papandreou, Andreas	Founder of PASOK, leader of the opposition (1977-1981) and Prime Minister (1981-1989 & (1993-1996), Georgios Papandreou's son and senior minister in his father's cabinet
Papandreou, Georgios	Founder of CU and Prime Minister (1963-1965), national unity Prime Minister in-exile (1944-1945)

Pattakos, Stylianos	Brigadier, conspirator of the 1967 coup, and Junta Deputy Prime Minister (1967-1973)
Plastiras, Nikolaos	Prime Minister with EPEK (1950 & 1951-1952)
Sofoulis, Themistoklis	Prime Minister with KF (1947-1949)
Tsaldaris, Konstantinos	Prime Minister with PP (1946-1947)
Venizelos, Sofoklis	Prime Minister with KF (1950-1951)

## Chapter One:

### The historical memory of American unfairness

*“Our homeland is under occupation. And the occupation is American.”*

Andreas Papandreou, 1974

In late 1973, six years after Greece’s military regime had established itself, Andreas Papandreou delivered a speech to the annual youth conference of Germany’s Social Democratic Party. The former prominent minister with the moderately left-wing CU (Centrists Union)—the party founded and led by his father and former Prime Minister, Georgios Papandreou—fervently condemned the Greek dictators’ “brute and cynical force” calling them “mercenaries of NATO and the US.” Elaborating on the Junta, Andreas, as he is still being referred to in Greece, added that other than Georgios Papadopoulos—the leader of the 1967 military coup and Greece’s first dictator during the early Cold War—the Greek people will “never forget” that “the greatest responsibility” for the Junta “lies on the shoulders of Greeks’ American occupiers.” According to Andreas, the US was both “morally and politically” responsible for Greece’s democratic backsliding. Hence, he argued that his and his followers’ struggle against the Junta was not just “socialist” but also “national-liberating” against an “American imperialism” which had chained Greece for decades.<sup>1</sup>

A year later, the Junta was no more. Once Dimitris Ioannidis—who had deposed Papadopoulos—failed to unilaterally unite Greece with Cyprus, which led to Turkey’s invasion

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<sup>1</sup> Andreas Papandreou, *Apo to PAK sto PASOK* (Athens: Ladia, 1976), 9-11, 24-27

and annexation of half of the island, the Junta collapsed in August 1974, after seven dark years in Modern Greek history. Konstantinos Karamanlis, the former Greek conservative statesman and PM with center-right ERE (National Radical Union) returned to Athens to form a government of national unity enjoying overwhelming popular support, inheriting simultaneously the seemingly formidable task of re-democratizing Greece. But in contrast with his first administrations in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Karamanlis and his newly established center-right ND (New Democracy) would now face a most formidable challenger, who would eventually capitalize on Greeks' historical memory of Washington's interventionism in Greece since the Greek Civil War. On September 3, 1974, less than a month after the Junta's collapse, Andreas Papandreou established his own party PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) arguing that it was high time an "independent" Greece liberated herself from American "control and interventionism" and NATO's "ruthless expansionism."<sup>2</sup>

Andreas' rhetoric was polemical, radical, irreconcilable, and increasingly appealing to the Greek masses. A few months later, in the elections of November 17, 1974, Andreas successfully led PASOK to third place in the first national elections in ten years, while in the 1977 elections, PASOK emerged as Greece's official opposition, establishing itself as a new major pole within the Greek political system—and the radical Andreas as a PM in-waiting. Doubling down on his condemnation of the "American factor's" influence in Greece—and elsewhere—Andreas achieved what seemed inconceivable during the early Cold War, leading the socialists to an overwhelming—and first for a socialist party—victory in 1981, while defeating simultaneously the center-right ND, which was the successor party of the pre-Junta—and Washington's preferred—conservative parties, ES (Greek Rally) and ERE. Above all else, in 1981 Andreas had finally defeated a far bigger opponent: the United States of America.

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<sup>2</sup> Papandreou, 1976, 78-84

A fundamental element in Andreas' rise to power is that his renunciation of America—which mirrored those of the KKE (Greek Communist Party)—was informed by ethics. Andreas condemned America on an economic, political, and military level, but above all else, his main—and compelling—argument was that the US was an evil power, one which had disregarded Greek sovereignty and self-determination; as he put it, the US had placed Greek “democracy in front of the firing squad” as Greece’s “occupation is American.”<sup>3</sup> Andreas and his followers believed that the US had treated Greece unfairly for decades and that the country should sever its ties with an immoral geopolitical actor who had intervened consistently in Greek politics. From siding with the Greek State against the communists in the Greek Civil War to supporting the post-Civil War conservative governments, and from blocking Greece’s union with Cyprus to supporting the Junta, Andreas argued that the US had consistently been from 1947 to 1974 a significantly disruptive factor within Greek politics. As he had argued in the mid-1970s, the US “had butchered Greece’s democratic institutions to serve American interests” in perfect unity with “the governments of the right” which had dominated Greek politics from the Civil War to the Junta.<sup>4</sup>

Andreas' moral case against the US was *deontological*. This school of ethical philosophy suggests that the right thing to do depends solely on the virtue of an act itself, irrespective of the consequences it produces. The Greek statesman and PM for 13 years argued that Washington's interventionism proved that the US did not care about the values that it preached and supposedly protected during the Cold War, showing a remarkable willingness to betray them. To further build his case, Andreas referred in many of his speeches during the 1970s to several other American interventions around the globe during the Cold War, in which the US acted—seemingly—immorally, such as in Chile. As historian James Miller suggests,

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<sup>3</sup> See his book Andreas Papandreou, *I Dimokratia sto Apospasma* (Athens: Karanasi, 1974)

<sup>4</sup> Papandreou, 1976, 276-279

throughout the 1970s and until his historic win in 1981—but also during PASOK’s era of undisputed power in the 1980s—Andreas “wrote a version of the history of his times that [...] successfully coincided with deeply held Greek beliefs.” Miller comments that even competing political leaders “felt compelled to accept” Andreas’ narrative, concluding that Andreas had an exceptional and unrivaled ability to use “myth and symbols” on his quest for political power.<sup>5</sup>

### **The question of morality: an alternative interpretation**

Judged by normative standards, Andreas had a point. American endeavors in Greece could be considered ethically dubious, while the same applies to the interventions that he referred to—as well as many others, which will be briefly mentioned later in this thesis. Arguably, installing and supporting dictators in authoritarian states, meddling with domestic politics to favor specific actors and parties, and refraining from condemning atrocities committed by geopolitically important allies seems entirely immoral; and it is, but only through a unidimensional deontological lens. That is, Cold War American foreign policy can certainly be summarized by the word “hypocrisy” quite easily, if one uses Andreas’ deontological level of analysis; if the “right thing to do”<sup>6</sup> is to act virtuously irrespective of the consequences, adopting a values-based Kantian perspective, then Andreas was right. The US did indeed treat Greece—and much of the world—unfairly, betraying its own principles in the process, in its quest to contain and defeat global communism during the Cold War, and there are numerous case studies which may be highlighted—and have been highlighted—to support this point.

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<sup>5</sup> James Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 211-212

<sup>6</sup> Michael Sandel, *Justice: what’s the right thing to do?* (New York: FSG, 2009). See chapters 2 and 5 for an introduction to these ethical concepts in moral dilemmas, on which this thesis’ second chapter will elaborate.



But there is another set of ethics through which we may interpret Cold War American interventionism in Greece—and beyond—very differently. In contrast to deontological ethics, *consequentialism* suggests that the right thing to do does not depend on the virtue of an act itself, but on the consequences that it produces. Consequentialism is a branch of Benthamite utilitarian ethics, in which the moral value of an action depends on the extent to which it contributes to the greater good. With the consequentialist distinction in mind, one can explore Cold War interventionism in Greece—and Cold War American foreign policy in general—from a different angle and argue that every American interference in other nations’ internal politics aimed at producing a “greater good” in utilitarian terms, which the US interpreted as the containment of global communism. Just as a classic liberal and a Marxist would interpret the concept of homeownership in competing yet equally valid philosophical ways, so do deontological and consequentialist ethics apply in assessing foreign interventionism. Chapter two will elaborate on the clash between deontology and consequentialism and will particularly explore how they inform the debate surrounding ethical foreign policy analysis.

Yet this presupposition alone does not suffice to explain why the US considered very controversial interventions as the right thing to do. In other words, how could a country that professes in its national anthem that it is the “home of the free” reject other countries’ right to freely decide their future course—hence geopolitical allegiance—on their own? It seems entirely paradoxical, and this exact paradox is at the core of most interpretations of the US as a hypocritical power. This thesis, however, suggests that there is an answer; specifically, it argues that American foreign policymakers’ conceptualization of the “greater good” stemmed from the deeply rooted influence that American exceptionalism has had on the formulation of American foreign policy since the earliest years of the American Republic. Throughout the history of American foreign policy, the US always saw itself as an exceptional nation, and this thesis argues—and elaborates on this argument in the second chapter—that the influence of

American Exceptionalism on Cold War American foreign policymaking turned the great power competition between the US and the USSR into a profoundly existential showdown between two radically different and opposing teleological visions. If the world had to be made safe for democracy as Woodrow Wilson famously put it, then certain interventions such as the ones the US implemented in Greece during the early Cold War were not only necessary but morally justified as well.

### **Research Scope**

This study explores American interventionism towards Greece from 1947 to 1974. It reexamines the scope, motives, and end goals of American foreign policymakers, and assesses Washington's interference in Greek politics from a consequentialist perspective. More specifically, this study aims to challenge conventional wisdom on the ethics of American interventionism during the period in question. In chronological terms, it explores the Third Phase of the Greek Civil War (1947-1949), the post-Civil War years of Greek conservative rule (1949-1956), the turbulent years that preceded the Junta (1957-1965) and the Greek Junta years (1967-1974); these periods will be explored in four analytical chapters. The thesis will then provide an analysis of how the post-1974 Greek historical memory of American interventionism was shaped. This thesis sheds light on the neglected study of Greco-American relations, while simultaneously proposing an alternative ethical interpretation of American interventionism in the early Cold War.

Despite the two countries' long partnership within Western multilateral alliances, Cold War Greco-American relations have been surprisingly understudied. Apart from some highlights such as the Truman Doctrine, Greece is rarely considered a distinctive case study within broader American foreign policy assessments—while most works touching on Greco-

American relations focus on the Greek Civil War and largely omit the Junta era. The study of American interventionism in Greece in the intermediate years between these historical episodes is particularly shallow. Several Greek academics—and a renowned investigative journalist whose works have defined Greeks' perception of American interventionism—have explored Cold War Greco-American relations. However, they mostly focus on the Civil War and the Junta, while their Greco-centric lens cannot elaborate on several crucial details of American foreign policymaking. Thus, this thesis aims to partially fill a long-existing gap regarding American interventionism in Greece in the early Cold War.

Above all, this study challenges the commonly held view on the ethics of Cold War American interventionism. In this introductory chapter, this thesis provides a literature review on Greco-American relations during the early Cold War to highlight the wide consensus regarding the controversial, if not entirely immoral, nature of American interventionism. But after elaborating on its proposed consequentialist interpretation in chapter two, this thesis will reassess the actions and decisions of American foreign policymakers during the years of interest and will reveal that the conventional wisdom regarding the ethics of Cold War American interventionism both in Greece and beyond, although credible to an extent, is at its core one-sided. Most importantly, this thesis will argue that the deontological argument is largely ignorant of the elements that have always informed the ethos and psyche of American foreign policymaking, particularly in the post-WWII international political order.

To sum up, this study will (a) propose a moral foreign policy framework through which it argues that Cold War American interventionism can be best interpreted, (b) explore the specifics of American interventionism in Greece throughout the years in question using this framework, (c) assess for each specific period both the results of American interventionism from Washington's perspective, as well as the impact of American interventionism in Greece, (d) explain how in the immediate post-Junta years Andreas Papandreou made a strong and

appealing moral case against American interventionism, and (e) provide its own assessment on the ethics of Cold War American interventionism in Greece—and beyond. Above all, the main research question that this study explores is whether American interventionism in Greece was truly unethical, as it still is widely believed.

## **Methodology**

This is an interdisciplinary study that blends history with international relations theory and philosophy to interpret the nature of American interventionism during the Cold War through the case study of Greece. As this is partially a historical project, the use of primary sources from the American side is paramount, while emphasis is given to declassified diplomatic documents, intergovernmental correspondence, and intelligence reports throughout the years of interest. Declassified documents from the State Department and the CIA are most useful for decoding the aims and intentions of American foreign policymakers, while they provide useful historical context regarding the broader geopolitical realities that Washington prioritized. A fundamental axiom within this study is that American interventionism in Greece was defined by the end goal of Cold War American foreign policy: containing communism. Through consulting such declassified documents, this study seeks to reveal how American foreign policymakers always prioritized containment in each intervention.

On the Greek side, emphasis is placed on documents that explore how American interventionism was interpreted within Greece. Throughout all its analytical chapters, this study uses several Greek sources to show how Greeks became increasingly resentful of American interference in Greek politics, as well as how they shaped their moral case against American interventionism. It should be noted that although Greek diplomatic archives are impossible to access, the American sources that this thesis consults provide essential insights into the Greek

perspective during all the chronological periods explored in this thesis. Moreover, this thesis uses material from Andreas Papandreou's speeches from the mid and late 1970s, which remain incredibly hard to find, but are indispensable to comprehend the rise of post-1974 anti-American narratives and its strong ethical dimension.

This thesis also consults several secondary sources. The works of several scholars are relevant to this study's aims, although no one has yet approached American interventionism in Greece through the ethical framework that this study proposes. This thesis considers relevant bibliography on Cold War and Greek history, including both general and specialist studies, either monographs or edited volumes. The former allow us to comprehend the deep and consistent level of American interference in Greek affairs during the early Cold War while also serving as historical companions, and the latter shed light on crucial details of key moments of American interventionism that this study interprets from an alternative ethical viewpoint. Also, as this project reflects on the policies, and initiatives of several administrations—which include those of Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon—several works on these presidencies are consulted in relevant chapters.

But most importantly, all the above are interpreted through this study's theoretical framework, which merges realism with American exceptionalism. The next chapter provides two literature reviews, bringing together the two to formulate its theoretical standpoint on the consequentialist ethics of Cold War American foreign policy. In methodological terms, the former is indispensable for comprehending the extent to which American exceptionalism is deeply rooted within American political identity and foreign policymaking, while the latter provides this study with a comprehensive analysis of how American foreign policy was shaped by the geopolitical imperatives of containing world communism. By merging American exceptionalism and realism, this study proposes a moral foreign policy framework—which it defines as *consequentialist* foreign policy—and contends that it did not solely apply to the case

of the seemingly unethical American interventionism in Greece, but to the broader conceptualization of Cold War American interventionism on a global scale.

At this point, we must note how American foreign policymaking towards Greece was designed and conducted. From the outset of the Cold War, maintaining Greece within the American sphere of influence was considered a matter of “great importance” and “utmost urgency” in Washington’s effort “to redress the balance of power and thereby to restrain the USSR.”<sup>7</sup> Given that its intervention in the Greek Civil War was the US’ first test to contain communism abroad, American foreign policy towards Greece was formulated by the higher levels of the executive government. This pattern began with Harry Truman and his Secretaries of State, George Marshall and Dean Acheson, making key decisions regarding American interventionism in Greece, with the American ambassadors and the CIA agents playing a crucial role in providing the administration with insights into the situation on the ground. Therefore, given the country’s geopolitical importance, American interventionism required a close liaison between the leaders of the executive branch and the American personnel in Greece.

This pattern persisted throughout the Cold War. As this thesis shows, American Presidents had a key role in formulating American foreign policy towards Greece, often taking key initiatives, and responding to crises themselves. Likewise, all of Marshall’s and Acheson’s successors operated very closely with American personnel in Greece, but also with Greek officials, to ensure that American goals were met. The significance of stationing experienced and reliable ambassadors in Athens is manifested by their background, which is explained briefly in each chapter. All except one ambassador in Greece during the early Cold War were career diplomats—often with regional expertise—or had participated in major American

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<sup>7</sup> Review of World Situation as it Relates to Security of the United States, January 12, 1948. CIA-RDP67-00059A000500070014-4

interventions in another capacity before assuming their role in Athens, while the single exception had a rich experience in nation building in the United Nations. The fact that consecutive administrations were represented by seasoned diplomats highlights the importance that Washington placed on ensuring that its interests in Greece would be secured, and that Greece would contribute to the wider goal of containment. This thesis will show that all ambassadors worked closely with their Secretaries of State, and frequently participated in key NSC meetings, providing Washington with valuable insights into monitoring and implementing future policy towards Greece.

Finally, intelligence agents were instrumental in the conduct of policy towards Greece. Other than updating Washington on key events or incidents in Greek politics, the CIA also defined to a significant extent how the Greek State structured its own intelligence agency, the KYP. As chapter three shows, the KYP practically mirrored the CIA's operations, while Greek agents were trained by their CIA peers—who ensured in turn that the intelligence gathered would be fervently anti-communist, as this thesis will show. The level of the CIA's interference in Greek politics—and the fact that the leader of the coup, Georgios Papadopoulos, had worked as a CIA liaison—has given American personnel in Athens an infamous image within Greeks' historical memory of American interventionism.<sup>8</sup> Still, although this thesis shows that the CIA was not as competent as many Greeks believed, and still believe—as its agents' confusion on the night of the coup reveals—it nonetheless remained instrumental in keeping Washington updated on crucial matters regarding Greek politics and imminent threats to American interests.

### **Cold War Greco-American relations: a tale of interventionism**

Despite the deep level of American interventionism in Greece during the early Cold War, very few studies—and most of them general in style—have focused on the American

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<sup>8</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, *Katastrofes kai Thriamvoi* (Athens: Papadopoulos, 2015), 195-198

perspective. Still, the macroscopic works of Roderick Beaton, Richard Clogg, Thomas Gallant, and Stathis Kalyvas, allow us to comprehend the long-term level—and the subsequent impact—of American interventionism. Beaton argues that from the Greek Civil War and until the collapse of the Junta, Washington intervened deeply and consistently virtually on all levels, influencing Greek politics, modernizing the Greek economy, and strengthening the Greek military. Regarding the years between the Civil War and until Junta collapsed, Beaton suggests that Greece became Uncle Sam’s “protégé,” noting how Washington was preoccupied with suppressing Greek communism. Beaton also notes how Washington persistently blocked several Greek administrations’ efforts to unite Greece with Cyprus, maintaining instead a persistent and balanced policy between Greece and Turkey.

Crucially for the purposes of this thesis, Beaton proposes a dichotomy in modern Greek history, placing the starting point of the new era in 1974. After the Junta’s collapse and the loss of Northern Cyprus to Turkey, he argues that Greece changed dramatically compared to the early Cold War. Beaton suggests that America’s delegitimization in Greeks’ eyes and the meteoric rise of Andreas Papandreou and his PASOK—which proposed a neutralist foreign policy to sever the long-established ties between Athens and Washington—dramatically reshaped Greco-American relations and Greeks’ geopolitical perspective. Beaton adds that in contrast to the early Cold War Papandreou’s overwhelming victory in 1981 was the first election in which Washington had not interfered.<sup>9</sup>

Thomas Gallant’s work on contemporary Greek history also stands out. Gallant provides a detailed overview of the Greek state’s evolution in a study that serves as the cornerstone for comprehending the *longue durée* of modern Greek history, and in which he

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<sup>9</sup> Roderick Beaton, *Greece: biography of a Modern Nation* (London: Penguin, 2019), see chapters 9-11. Other Beaton’s works include *The Greeks: a global history* (London: Faber & Faber, 2014), *The Greek Revolution and its Global Significance* (Athens: Aiora, 2021) and *Byron’s War: Romantic Rebellion, Greek revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)



considers the significance of American interventionism. Concerning the Civil War Gallant emphasizes that containment was first tested in the Balkans, elaborating on how the Truman administration saw the Civil War as Washington's litmus test to contain communism on a global level. But Gallant also suggests that post-Civil War American interventionism in Greece deepened to such an extent that the term *americanocracy* was coined and widely used. And like most of his peers, Gallant further argues that Washington's post-Civil War preoccupation with Greek economic recovery aimed at containing Greek—hence regional—communism.

But Gallant makes another interesting point. He argues that Washington's pressure on the Greek government to provide Greece's military with increased autonomy in the 1950s paved the road for the military coup in 1967. Likewise, he suggests that consistent US support to the conservative and pro-American ES and ERE parties led to serious democratic backsliding, such as changing electoral laws according to Washington's orders. Gallant elaborates on how US influence played an ambivalent role in the Cyprus question, while he is extremely critical of Washington's support to the Junta, especially during the Nixon presidency. Gallant asserts that once the Junta collapsed, Greeks became overwhelmingly resentful of the US and Greece's place within NATO, suggesting simultaneously that Andreas and his PASOK "captured the tone of the time" which explains his rapid rise to power in the early 1980s.<sup>10</sup>

Clogg's study is important as it showcases the long-term influence of the American factor on Greek politics. Apart from arguing as that the US intervened in the Greek Civil War to keep Greece within the American sphere of influence, he comments that post-Civil War Greece "scarcely constituted a model of democracy" the conservative governments of the

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<sup>10</sup> Thomas Gallant, *Modern Greece, From the War of Independence to the Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 274-311. Other Gallant's works include *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1768 to 1913: the long nineteenth century* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015) and *Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity, and Power in the British Mediterranean* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002)

1950s and the 1960s imposed strict measures against leftwing Greeks, with Washington's blessing. Clogg also discusses how many Greeks viewed Washington's role in Cyprus as a betrayal and suggests that President Lyndon Johnson played a profoundly negative role in how the situation unfolded.<sup>11</sup>

Among Greek scholars, Stathis Kalyvas has written extensively on contemporary Greek history—and America's influence in shaping it. Kalyvas also agrees that Washington only intervened in the Civil War out of pure geopolitical interests and suggests that this intervention signified the first instance of the infamous *domino theory*. On the immediate post-Civil War years, Kalyvas argues that Greece became an “anticommunist” and “Cold War democracy” in which leftwing citizens were marginalized and frequently prosecuted by the American-backed conservative administrations. Kalyvas firmly concludes that once the Greek communists were defeated, Greece became an American economic client-state, as American foreign policymakers believed that Greek economic growth would reduce chances of another communist insurrection.<sup>12</sup>

With co-author, Nikos Marantzidis, Kalyvas published a specialist work on the Greek Civil War in which they emphasize the rationale for American support. Elaborating on the Truman Doctrine, they argue that Washington did not limit aid to economic support or military supplies, but initiated an era of deep, radical, and profound sociopolitical intervention. Although they agree that American support was instrumental in defeating the communists and modernizing Greece's economy, they argue that Greece's post-Civil War political institutions were “cachectic”, as Greek conservative administrations became entirely dependent on US support. Significantly, they discuss how Greeks' historical memory of American

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<sup>11</sup> Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 157-169. Other works from Clogg are *Parties and Elections in Greece* (London: Hurst and Co, 1987), *Movement for Greek Independence* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976), *Greece in the 80's* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993)

<sup>12</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, *Katastrofes kai Thriamvoi* (Athens: Papadopoulos, 2015), 166-174

interventionism in the Greek Civil War was compounded by the experience of American support to the Junta, leading to the post-1974 sharp rise of Greek anti-Americanism, and the ethical delegitimization of the US in Greece.<sup>13</sup>

From their perspective, Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, and Foteini Bellou reaffirm that the era of American interventionism started after the newly elected British Labour government informed Washington that Britain was unwilling to maintain the Greek State's defense against domestic communist insurgents, after 1945. Expanding on this point, they acutely note that the Truman administration became immediately—and immensely—concerned with the prospect of losing Greece to communism and suggest that both Truman and his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson believed that if the KKE won the Civil War, then the USSR would gain access to a geopolitically strategic location, enjoying immediate access to three continents: Africa, Asia, and Europe. Hence, they suggest that Truman's decision to intervene in the Greek Civil War was not informed by his benevolent desire to support the Greek state, but by an urge to assure that a geopolitically crucial country would not fall in the hands of Joseph Stalin.<sup>14</sup>

Christopher Woodhouse has also studied extensively the Greek Civil War. He assesses the influence of American interventionism in the Third Phase of the conflict, which he considers one of the most crucial within Cold War historiography, arguing that the Truman Doctrine set a precedent on how the US would respond to the challenges of global communism. Woodhouse suggests that it was during the Civil War when a substantial number of leftwing Greeks first turned anti-American, arguing that the rebels and their sympathizers almost immediately referred to Washington's support of the Greek State as "Anglo-American

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<sup>13</sup> Stathis Kalyvas and Nikos Marantzidis, *Emfyliia Pathi: 23 Erotiseis kai Apantiseis gia ton Emfylio* (Athens: Metaihmio, 2015), 377-381, 594-505

<sup>14</sup> Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou, *Greece in the Twentieth Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 76-78

imperialism.” Finally, although—correctly—Woodhouse does not attribute the rebels’ defeat to US interventionism alone, he nonetheless argues that the increasing support that Washington provided Athens with was instrumental in turning the momentum in favor of the Greek Army.<sup>15</sup>

Truman’s geopolitical concerns around the Civil War have been explored by others. David Close, for instance, suggests that the Truman administration mobilized so quickly because Washington had already been preparing to allocate funds to defend several critical countries in the region: Greece, Turkey, and Iran were considered vital as they facilitated American access to Middle Eastern Oil. Close also asserts that Americans intervened in the Greek Civil War to serve their geopolitical interests and merely clothed their intervention with an anti-communist rhetoric. Close is very critical of American indifference towards the Greek government’s repressive measures against Greek leftwing citizens, particularly as they did not distinguish between communists and leftwing sympathizers.<sup>16</sup> As Spyridon Plakoudas suggests, Washington complemented the Greek State’s repressive attitude against both leftwing and communist Greeks<sup>17</sup> both during and after the Civil War.

Despite not focusing on American interventionism in Greece per se, John Iatrides’ work provides us with two crucial points. First, Iatrides concurs that without American political and economic interventionism in favor of the Greek State, the conflict could have continued indefinitely, as the Greek forces were unable to defeat the rebels. Iatrides asserts that Washington feared how the USSR could seize the opportunity of a prolonged conflict, and dispatch troops to take over Greece. Although he argues that the efficiency of the rebels’ guerilla tactics partially neutralized American military advisors’ technocratic advice, he nonetheless affirms that Washington’s interventionism in political terms was instrumental in

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<sup>15</sup> Christopher Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece 1941-1949* (London: Hurst and Company, 2018), 347-348, 406-407, 484-485

<sup>16</sup> David Close, *The Origins of the Greek Civil War* (London: Pearson, 1995), 203-204

<sup>17</sup> Spyridon Plakoudas, *The Greek Civil War: strategy, counterinsurgency, and the monarchy* (London: IB Tauris, 2017), 122

the outcome of the war. Second—and far more significantly—Iatrides suggests that American interventionism in the Civil War was also a core reason why reaching a peace settlement with the rebels was “ruled out.”<sup>18</sup>

Couloumbis, Kariotis, and Bellou expand beyond the Civil War and explore both the 1960s and the Junta years—while also criticizing Washington’s attitude towards the Cyprus question. Retaining the conventional interpretation of Cold War Greco-American relations, they argue that Washington’s persistent effort to maintain a working balance of power between Greece and Turkey, instead of supporting Greeks’ calls for *enosis* (Greece’s union with Cyprus), engendered anti-American sentiments. They suggest that due to the force of Greeks’ resentment, the conservative governments of Konstantinos Karamanlis in the 1970s only kept Greece allied with the US from fear that Turkey would profit from a complete breakdown in Greco-American relations. Finally, they argue that throughout the 1970s, Andreas Papandreou built an anti-American momentum in calling for Greece to adopt a neutralist foreign policy and cut itself loose from America’s control, which led to his overwhelming 1981 electoral victory.<sup>19</sup>

In an earlier work along with John Petropoulos and Harry Psomiades, Couloumbis explored the years between the Civil War and the Junta in more detail. After emphasizing again how the US considered Greece too valuable to lose to communism, they examine how Washington consolidated its influence in Greece after the Civil War and describe this era as the “apogee of American interference” as American foreign policymakers aimed to ensure “pro-Western stability” in a country that was only nearly saved from communism. Despite America’s symbiotic relationship with Greece’s conservative governments, they contend that its refusal to support *enosis* disillusioned many Greeks. They also assert that Washington’s

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<sup>18</sup> John Iatrides, “Civil War, 1945-1949” in John Iatrides (ed.) *Greece in the 1940s: a nation in crisis* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981), 216-219

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, 97-98

prioritization of regional security led American foreign policymakers to ignore Greek democratic backsliding and the increasing influence of the Greek military. As such, they argue that by the mid-1960s Greece had become a “praetorian state.”<sup>20</sup>

Christos Kassimeris offers a parallel analysis of American interventionism in the post-Civil War era. Kassimeris refers to America as Greece’s “patron” arguing that the American factor neither hesitated nor delayed intervening in Greek politics once the Civil War had ended. Kassimeris discusses several instances of American interventionism which will be discussed by this thesis, emphasizing Washington’s pressure on the Greek political system to ensure the political viability of the political actors and administrations that Washington favored, as well as the containment of domestic communism. Kassimeris is adamant that Washington’s deep and consistent interventionism in Greek affairs attributed to the Greek right a staunch anti-communist ideological character. He argues that although the Greek conservative governments of the 1950s and the 1960s were legitimate, their American-inspired anti-communist ethos informed the success of the 1967 coup. And like all his peers, Kassimeris concludes that Greeks’ historical memory of Washington’s long-term interventionism led to the collapse of Greco-American relations post-1974 and the renunciation of the US.<sup>21</sup>

Expanding on this point, Andre Gerolymatos suggests that American interventionism in the Greek Civil War was a turning point for both Cold War American foreign policymaking as well as for Greek political development. He argues that the Truman administration saw regional conflicts such as the Greek Civil War and the Korean War through the prism of global competition with the USSR and that American interventionism in the Greek Civil War was later used as a blueprint for several American interventions in other countries’ domestic

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<sup>20</sup> Theodore Coulombis, John Petropoulos, Harry Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek politics: an historical perspective* (New York: Pella, 1976), 117-126, 133-144

<sup>21</sup> Christos Kassimeris, *Greece and the American Embrace: Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, the US, and the Western Alliance* (London: IB Tauris, 2009), 49-50, 112-113

affairs—always in the name of containment. But above everything else, Gerolymatos reaffirms that in the aftermath of the Civil War Washington built a symbiotic relationship with the Greek conservative governments of the 1950s and the 1960s to suppress domestic leftwing and communist political activity.<sup>22</sup> Gerolymatos reaffirms that the US' interference in the Greek Civil War soon adopted a long-term perspective, with Washington seeking to ensure that Greece would remain within the Western sphere of influence.

As already noted, the Civil War and the Junta have mostly overshadowed the intermediate years. But Ioannis Stefanidis' work on this era highlights how Washington consistently supported the conservative ES and its successor party, ERE, and suggests that the Eisenhower administration established strong bonds with the two Greek leaders, Alexandros Papagos and Konstantinos Karamanlis respectively—while considering the Greek military as a pillar of stability in case of an emergency. Regarding Cyprus, Stefanidis argues that despite American support for Greece's conservative administrations, Washington never took any initiatives that would allow the union between Greece and Cyprus to materialize from fear of alienating Turkey. Stefanidis adds that the overwhelming support that Washington offered to Greek conservatism to keep Greece within its sphere of influence turned Greece into a client state, undermining Greek political development.<sup>23</sup>

And in another work, Stefanidis makes two insightful observations regarding American interference in Greek politics. First, he argues that because Greeks saw the union between Greece and Cyprus as morally righteous—given the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots compared to Turkish Cypriots—they perceived Washington's refusal to greenlight enosis as a highly immoral stance, which manifested the hypocrisy and inconsistency between values and

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<sup>22</sup> Andre Gerolymatos, *An international civil war: Greece, 1943-1949* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 296-297

<sup>23</sup> Ioannis Stefanidis, *Assimetroi Etteroi: oi Inomenes Politeies kai h Ellada ston Psychro Polemo, 1953-1961*, (Athens: Pataki, 2013), 341-349

actual American foreign policymaking. Second, Stefanidis suggests that Washington's opposition to enosis and the eventual unfortunate—from the Greek perspective—development of the Cyprus question gave rise to a peculiar type of Greek nationalism, which expanded beyond the usual boundaries of the hard right and became dominant within left and far-left rhetoric as well. Within it, NATO became a most reviled institution in the minds of the Greek electorate.<sup>24</sup>

Like Stefanidis, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou has also explored the years between the Civil War and the Junta. In his analysis, he suggests that once the Civil War ended, Greece became highly dependent on the US, on both political and military terms—and especially upon Greece's entry to NATO—adding however Greek interests were often disregarded by American administrations. However, Hatzivassiliou also emphasizes that despite Athens' symbiotic relationship with Washington, Greco-American relations during the 1950s-1960s were not always harmonious, particularly because of the two countries' crucial disagreement regarding Cyprus. By extension, Hatzivassiliou, who characterizes Washington's eventual support to the Junta “humiliating”, concludes that during the early Cold War, Greece often clashed with the US when its “national priority” was disregarded by the White House.<sup>25</sup> As this thesis will show, what Hatzivassiliou fails to identify is that the tension between the two countries regarding Cyprus was informed by a clash of ethics, which explains Washington's approach towards Cyprus and its consistent prioritization of regional stability.

Likewise, Thanos Veremis and Ioannis Kolliopoulos acknowledge that the “American factor” was overwhelmingly influential in the early Cold War, informing Greeks' historical memory of Washington's interventionism once the Junta collapsed. Like their peers, they argue

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<sup>24</sup> Ioannis Stefanidis, *En Onomati tou Ethnous* (Thessaloniki: Epikentro, 2010), 411-416

<sup>25</sup> Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War: frontline state, 1952-1967* (London: Routledge, 2006), 186-187



that American support in the Civil War facilitated the Greek State's victory against the rebels, but also highlight that in the immediate post-Civil War era the US remained deeply involved in Greek politics. Their work emphasizes Washington's determination to transform Greece into a NATO member-state so that the Eastern Mediterranean would become a barrier against Soviet expansionism. Veremis and Kolliopoulos are critical of the US insistence that the Greek Army should remain as independent from Greek politics as possible and emphasize how this policy allowed Greece's future dictator and leader of the 1967 coup, Georgios Papadopoulos, to build an underground network which would facilitate his rise to power.

On the Junta, Veremis and Kolliopoulos make another insightful observation. They suggest that the coup's success, as well as its orchestrators' certainty that they would receive American support in a potential moment of crisis, stemmed from the Greek army's long-term independence from political control, which Washington encouraged fervently in the post-Civil War era. This thesis will elaborate on Washington's leniency towards the Greek military apparatus once the Civil War had ended, especially in the 1950s. Finally, concerning post-Junta Greek political development, they argue that Greeks' resentment of the US was so significant that even the pro-American Karamanlis chose to withdraw Greece from NATO's military command structure. And on Andreas Papandreou's subsequent rapid rise to power, Veremis and Kolliopoulos comment that he successfully constructed a politically invincible rhetoric, which capitalized on Greeks' resentment at how the US treated Greece from the Civil War until the Junta's collapse.<sup>26</sup>

Stathis Kalyvas has also elaborated on the Junta. He—rightly—dismisses the myth that Washington imposed the dictatorship but argues—again rightly—that Washington soon decided to support the colonels' regime. Especially relevant in relation to this thesis, Kalyvas

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<sup>26</sup> Thanos Veremis and Ioannis Kolliopoulos, *Moderni Ellada* (Athens: Pataki, 2013), 252-269, 283, 300-301, 314-328

suggests that the increasingly profound American support for the Junta informed the subsequent rise of widespread anti-American sentiments once it collapsed in 1974. According to his analysis, the memory of American support to the colonels' regime is the reason America was delegitimized in the eyes of most Greeks, with a large part of the electorate taking a sharp leftwing turn throughout the 1970s, which would seem inconceivable in the aftermath of the Greek Civil War. Kalyvas elaborates on the ability of Andreas Papandreou to politically capitalize on this anti-American momentum, by adopting a strong leftwing, anti-American, and anti-Western narrative, which led to PASOK's historic victory in 1981.<sup>27</sup>

Aristotelia Pelsoni has also worked extensively on the Junta. Like her peers, she argues that the US adopted an overly realist foreign policy towards both Greece and Cyprus which only aimed at serving Washington's geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, adding that its support for the junta was the continuation of its urge to replace the UK in protecting the region. Pelsoni criticizes Richard Nixon's embrace of the Junta, suggesting that he prioritized American presence and influence in strategic geopolitical locations over ethics. Significantly, Pelsoni proposes two key conclusions, arguing that American interventionism during the Junta era—but also the early Cold War in general—was “unethical” and that Washington's deep, consistent, and immoral interventionism hurt American interests in the long run, once the Junta collapsed.<sup>28</sup> This thesis will show that both these conclusions—which reflect how scholars have interpreted American interventionism in Greece during the early Cold War—are inaccurate, at best.

Clogg also condemns US interventionism during the Junta. He comments that Washington soon transformed into the regime's “patron” and suggests that as long as Greece

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<sup>27</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 210-211

<sup>28</sup> Aristotelia Pelsoni, *Ideologia kata realismou: I amerikaniki politiki apenanti stin Ellada* (Athens: Polis, 2010), 21, 117, 150-151, 191

would remain within NATO, the US was unwilling to challenge the new—convenient—status quo. But crucially for the purposes of this thesis, Clogg is adamant that the historical memory of American interventionism in Greece from the Civil War onwards, and particularly during the seven-year dictatorship, paved the way for a dramatic rise in anti-American, anti-NATO, and anti-Western sentiments as soon as the Junta collapsed in 1974. Moreover, Clogg considers Andreas Papandreou as the figure who amplified these sentiments by transforming them into an increasingly appealing political narrative, in which socialism blended with nationalism, contributing to PASOK's historic victory in 1981.<sup>29</sup> Clogg considers Andreas' rise to power inevitable, as he had succeeded in synchronizing his message with the Greek electorate's sentiments, in stark contrast with the ailing—after the late 1970s—ND.

Similarly, Zinovia Laliouti has researched thoroughly how Greeks gradually resented the US during the Cold War—and how American support to the Junta was instrumental in shaping this attitude. Starting from the Civil War, Laliouti discusses how the leftwing press interpreted the Truman Doctrine as Washington's attempt to take over Greece, arguing that this view of American interventionism remained constant within the Greek left in the 1950s and 1960s. Laliouti also shows how Washington's influence was increasingly viewed more negatively by centrist and conservative voters after it became evident that despite their support to the Greek State in the Civil War, Americans were unwilling to provide similar support to Greeks' existential purpose to unite Greece and Cyprus. And regarding the post-Junta years, Laliouti argues that most Greeks became rapidly disillusioned with the US and suggests that Andreas capitalized on the Greek electorate's calls for a neutralist foreign policy, which was synonymous with disentanglement from the American factor's influence in Greek affairs.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Clogg, 175-191

<sup>30</sup> Zinovia Laliouti, *O anti Amerikanismos stin Ellada, 1947-1989* (Athens: Asini, 2016), 144-146, and chapter 4

Tasos Giannitsis, a renowned Greek academic and deputy foreign minister of foreign affairs, has also discussed the impact of American interventionism on Greek political development. Giannitsis argues that post-Civil War Greece was both weak and overly dependent on the US, adding that the Greek State was systemically unfair towards leftwing citizens, implementing repressive policies on a political, economic, social, and institutional level. Giannitsis suggests that the historical memory of the 1950s and the 1960s—in which he emphasizes the “paranoid” events in Cyprus—influenced many Greeks’ turn towards the left once the Junta collapsed. He adds that PASOK’s 1981 victory was the culminating effect of Greeks’ unprecedented ability to seek political and social changes that were impossible in the early Cold War and ended an era of Greek dependency on the US which started after the Civil War ended. Despite noting Greece’s systemic weaknesses on multiple levels, he nonetheless concludes that Greece was only able to develop as a modern Western European state once the Junta collapsed in 1974.<sup>31</sup>

Morgens Pelt also highlights the geopolitical significance that the US assigned to Greece—as well as the implications of American interventionism in post-Junta Greece. Pelt argues that from 1947 onwards, Washington feared that losing Greece to communism would give the USSR an incomparable strategic advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean, which would shift the regional balance of power. Therefore, he suggests that from the Truman Doctrine onwards, Washington kept increasing its commitments to Athens, as Greece’s geopolitical position was becoming invaluable as the Cold War was unfolding. Pelt notes the consistency of US support throughout the early Cold War and asserts that American foreign policymakers’ fear of losing Greece led to deep political interventions, aiming to “position” a pro-Western government which pledged to contain domestic communism. Pelt concludes that American

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<sup>31</sup> Tasos Giannitsis, *I Ellada kai to Mellon* (Athens: Polis, 2007), 58-59 & 314-316

interventionism since 1947 which led to the eventual embrace of the Junta caused a severe “popular reaction against the US” in post-Junta Greece.<sup>32</sup>

Yet the most renowned researcher of Cold War Greco-American relations is not a trained academic, but a Greek investigative journalist. The US-educated Alexis Papachelas, who started his career as a foreign correspondent in the US for leftwing *Avgi*—which was suppressed during the early Cold War under American orders—and who now serves as the director of Greece’s major centrist newspaper, *Kathimerini*, has written extensively on Cold War Greco-American relations and is the only author who has thoroughly explored American primary sources, as this thesis does. In his first book, Papachelas argues that the US interfered as deeply and consistently as it could once the Civil War had ended, monitoring virtually all aspects of Greek politics, and attempting to sustain Washington’s favored Greek political actors in power. Papachelas emphasizes that the US prevented enosis multiple times from fear of losing Turkey and affirms that although the Junta was not imposed by Washington, the Johnson administration eventually gave the colonels its support.<sup>33</sup> Papachelas’ conclusive argument is that the “rape of Greek democracy” resulted not from Johnson’s subtle support for the Junta, but from the prolonged American interference in Greek politics in post-Civil War Greece.

In his second book on Greco-American relations, Papachelas explores the Junta era. His analysis focuses heavily on the two Turkish invasions of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and the events that preceded them, while it criticizes Washington’s inability to both prevent the crisis, as well as to restrain Greece’s second dictator Dimitris Ioannidis, who in the autumn of 1973 had deposed the original leader of the Junta, Georgios Papadopoulos. Papachelas criticizes Henry Kissinger’s intentions and decision-making and concludes that Kissinger’s

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<sup>32</sup> Morgens Pelt, *Tying Greece to the West* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press-University of Copenhagen, 2006), 355-363

<sup>33</sup> See Alexis Papachelas, *O viasmos tis Ellinikis dimokratias: o Amerikanikos paragon, 1947-1967* (Athens: Estia, 2017)

agency was instrumental in how Northern Cyprus was lost for Hellenism. Papachelas suggests that the influence of the American factor both before and especially during the Junta legitimized a behind-the-scenes attitude of servitude to American interests.<sup>34</sup> Papachelas concludes that key patterns of Cold War American foreign policymaking towards Greece remain relevant to this day, undermining the prospects of regional stability.

Finally, James Miller's study of American interventionism in Greece after WWII is essential. In his detailed historical work, Miller provides certain valuable insights especially regarding Andreas' ability to express the public anti-American sentiment, which had been molded during the early Cold War. Miller heavily criticizes the symbiotic relationship between the US and the Greek conservative governments of the 1950s and the 1960s—which he calls the “era of the right”—arguing that Washington saw in Papagos' and Karamanlis' post-Civil War administrations a ticket to domestic stability. Miller elaborates that the US believed that through Papagos and Karamanlis, Greece would remain safe within the American sphere of influence, offering Washington a much sought-after stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Significantly, Miller affirms that the US prioritized the eradication of Greek communism as a potential future threat, encouraging—primarily Papagos' but also Karamanlis'—policies to place Greece “in a political straitjacket.”<sup>35</sup>

Miller discusses Washington's Cypriot policy and embrace of the Junta as well. Regarding Cyprus, he argues that the US prioritized NATO's cohesion over Greece's demands for enosis, disregarding entirely the fact that Greece's union with Cyprus was one of the very few political visions that virtually united all Greeks and Greek political parties. Miller suggests that Washington's indifference towards Greeks' demands to unite Hellenism was considered

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<sup>34</sup> Alexis Papachelas, *Ena Skoteino Domatio, 1967-1974* (Athens: Metaihmio, 2021), see chapters 5-10

<sup>35</sup> James Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 67-84

wildly unethical by the Greek electorate, paving the road for a sharp rise in anti-American sentiments. On the Junta, Miller criticizes the Nixon administration's decision to gradually formalize Washington's relationship with the colonels' regime to serve American regional geopolitical interests. Miller notes that Washington embraced the Junta despite opposition from some NATO allies such as Sweden, negative press comments, as well as the Greek political opposition to the regime.<sup>36</sup> This opposition included Greek statesmen that the US had been working and interacting with for years, such as Karamanlis and Georgios Papandreou, a former PM in the 1940s and the mid-1960s, and—above all else—Andreas' father.

Crucially for the purposes of this thesis, Miller makes another argument regarding the historical memory of American interventionism in the early Cold War. Miller argues that the fixed aims of American interventionism to ensure regional stability and suppress domestic leftwing and communist activity contributed to Andreas Papandreou's rise once the Junta had collapsed. Miller elaborates that Washington's fixation with regional security only made Andreas' anti-NATO, neutralist, and sympathetic towards the radical regimes of the Third World agenda appeal more to the Greek masses. Miller suggests that for Andreas' emergence as a dominant political figure in Greek politics "American officials had no one to blame but themselves."<sup>37</sup> And in his assessment, Miller asserts that the deep, consistent, and politically unidimensional level of interventionism in Greek affairs was a root cause of several Greek national "humiliations" which gradually turned Greeks against the US, while he concludes that Andreas' persistent references to the US committed injustices against Greece was a defining element in his rise to power.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Miller, chapter 7

<sup>37</sup> Miller, 157

<sup>38</sup> Miller, 210

### **A common thread and a loose end**

These works, irrespective of whether they are macroscopic or specialist, are indispensable for two reasons: first, despite their different approaches, they all argue that the US always intervened in Greece to serve its own geopolitical interests in the early Cold War. Second, they emphasize how for the sake of doing so, consecutive American Cold War administrations violated Greek democracy and self-determination. And if some seem understanding of America's urge to help the Greek state win the Civil War, they all argue that America's influence in the post-Civil War era—and especially during the Junta—was morally unacceptable. In particular, these works which—like this thesis does—explore Greek history throughout the early Cold War instead of focusing just on a single event, suggest that the US overplayed its hand and eventually harmed its long-term interests in Greece, leading to the post-1974 sharp increase of anti-American sentiments across the political spectrum, which Andreas Papandreu fueled and used as a vehicle for political power and change, adopting a highly values-based rhetoric that Greeks collectively embraced. As Konstantina Botsiou suggests, the experience of the Junta was the final straw for most Greeks, with Greco-American relations entering a prolonged period of instability, in which the US was considered a villain within Greek history.<sup>39</sup>

Most importantly, all these works agree on how Greeks' sentiment towards the US has been molded since 1974. In a landmark study on anti-Americanism and global attitudes towards the US, Robert Keohane and Peter Katzenstein distinguish a unique category of anti-American attitude which they call *legacy anti-Americanism*. Keohane and Katzenstein elaborate that the injustices committed by the US in its foreign interventions towards a given country define

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<sup>39</sup> Konstantina Botsiou, "The interface between politics and culture in Greece" in *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and anti-Americanism after 1945*, ed. Alexander Stephan (Oxford: Berghahn, 2005), 278-279



*legacy anti-Americanism*. The two authors argue that of all countries where the US has historically intervened, Greece stands out as a most profound case study, as the historical memory of American interference in Greece during the early Cold War has redefined how Greeks see the US to this day.<sup>40</sup> There is an overwhelming consensus within the academic, journalistic, and even political community—both within Greek and foreign sources—that the US has indeed “wronged” Greece in the early Cold War, in a series of interventions which in time hurt Washington’s political capital in Athens, compromised American interests in the long run, and undermined Greco-American relations.

In other words, all these works adopt the same ethical perspective. By sharing a strong and consistent deontological standpoint, they argue that the US treated Greece unfairly in the early Cold War, as Keohane and Katzenstein put it. Even if some seem sympathetic to Washington’s relentless efforts to shift the global balance of power with the USSR, they nonetheless suggest that most—if not all—endeavors were unethical. Despite not using this exact terminology, the conventional interpretation of American interventionism in Greece during the early Cold War is essentially a deontological one, which suggests that the US willingly and consistently trespassed all ethical boundaries in the name of containment. And there are good reasons why all these studies reach the same conclusions, at least concerning the ethics of American interventionism. From a deontological perspective, throwing napalm bombs on Greek communists, meddling with electoral laws, covertly supporting preferred parties, consistently undermining certain political actors’ political prospects, and—above all—supporting the Junta, are all indeed utterly reprehensible and unjustifiable.

After all, the historical memory of American interventionism in the Greek Civil War continues to impact Greek politics—and how Greeks see the US to this day. An examination

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<sup>40</sup> Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 11-12, 37

of comparative studies of popular opinion towards the US, the American Presidency, or NATO, indicates that Greece has today one of the least—if not the least—favorable opinion towards the US among its Western European allies. Likewise, renowned research organizations such as the Pew Research Center, and international bodies such as the European Commission and the European Parliament have provided relevant findings throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century, while the same patterns are easily traceable in the findings of prominent Greek research institutions.<sup>41</sup> Although this is not a study on the specifics of the Greek anti-American phenomenon—which deserves extensive research in its own merit—these findings supplement all these scholars’ ethical interpretations of early Cold War American interventionism in Greece, and essentially support Keohane’s and Katzenstein’s main point, that Greeks feel—and most importantly, remember—that the US has wronged them.

This thesis departs from this deontological analysis and suggests an entirely different one. Specifically, it argues that this interpretation of American interventionism in Greece is at best, unidimensional and hence incomplete, as all these scholars have interpreted the influence of the American factor largely through a Greek perspective. They conceive of American foreign policymaking as shrewdly pragmatic and inherently hypocritical, as all argue how most—if not all—of these interventions were vastly immoral and antithetical to the principles that the US supposedly supported and protected since Woodrow Wilson’s era. Yet this thesis argues that we cannot ethically interpret Cold War American interventionism in Greece without looking in far greater detail at the ideological—or better, teleological—worldview of Cold War American foreign policymaking. In other words, these works cannot understand how the

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<sup>41</sup> See for instance Pew Research Center’s Global Indicators Database on Greece or their 2022 study entitled “International Attitudes Toward the US, NATO, and Russia in a time of crisis.” An additional study from the European Commission entitled “EU’s response to the war in Ukraine: Greece” is also enlightening on this issue. Other indicative metrics are provided by *diaNEOsis* recent annual reports (2017-2020).

teleological clash between the US and the USSR informed the ethical perspective of American foreign policymakers.

That is not to say that the argument on Washington's overly realist foreign policy is invalid; quite the contrary. But as chapter two will discuss, to understand the existential elements within Cold War American foreign policymaking, we need to explore the—perhaps unholy—marriage of realism as the school of thought that best explains superpower competition since the Peloponnesian war, and the overwhelming influence of American exceptionalism on the conceptualization of American foreign policymaking since George Washington's presidency and the early days of the republic. One should also acknowledge the mighty force of America's challenger; just like the US, so did the USSR propose a teleological narrative on the future—if not destiny—of mankind, which possibly informed its own interventions just as much American Exceptionalism did for Washington's ones. In other words, this thesis firmly believes that beyond the geopolitical struggle for superiority, the proxy wars, and each superpower's interventions, the Cold War was above all a teleological clash, which sustained it for nearly half a century. And in this clash, the set of ethics that defined these superpowers' foreign policies adapted to their competition.

Of course, there is a limitation to this study's proposed consequentialist framework. As influential as American Exceptionalism has been in the conceptualization of American foreign policy since Woodrow Wilson's days, it would be a stretch to argue that we can explain every foreign policy endeavor both during and after the Cold War through its subconscious influence on American foreign policymaking. For example, we cannot interpret Washington's support for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community—which later transformed into the EEC and the EU—through consequentialism, as the US did not proceed to any direct military or political intervention to either enforce or shape European functionalism. This aspect of Cold War American foreign policymaking may be interpreted through a realist lens—instead

of the usual liberal internationalist one—but the absence of morally questionable means and decisions renders the consequentialist foreign policy framework unusable, which is also the case for several other American foreign policy endeavors.

Likewise, on the Greek domestic level, one must acknowledge that Greek political development is a multidimensional phenomenon—as is the case with all countries. Despite the overwhelming and continuously increasing level of US interventionism in Greek affairs during the early Cold War, the “American factor” was not—and could not logically have been—the only one that determined how Greek history and politics evolved during the early Cold War, as well as post-1974. Although there is substantial evidence that the historical memory of American interventionism in Greece still impacts Greek politics to this day, there are several other factors—such as domestic idiosyncrasies, the Greek State’s peculiar state-building process since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the specifics of Greece’s geographic characteristics—which have also influenced how Greek history has unfolded in the post-Cold War era. Equally, this thesis does not suggest that the US still approaches Greco-American relations with the same Cold War mentality, intervening in Greek affairs through a relentlessly consistent consequentialist manner, as it did in the early Cold War.

This thesis does not suggest that consequentialist ethics are omnipotent in the conceptualization of American foreign policy. Instead, it argues that the proposed consequentialist foreign policy framework can be a most useful tool to ethically interpret morally dubious or convoluted interventions across the globe in the context of global competition against another superpower—as was the USSR in the Cold War. Again, chapter two will introduce several case studies of Cold War American interventionism which can be interpreted through this study’s proposed consequentialist framework, yet it is worth noting that Andreas himself, unknowingly, placed Greece as a most profound one among them. In that same speech delivered at SPD’s youth conference, Andreas referred to other infamous Cold

War American interventions such as those in Chile, Vietnam, Laos, Congo, “and many more other similar cases” to solidify his moral case against the “violent course of America’s modern imperialism.”<sup>42</sup> Hence, to Andreas’ deontological condemnation of Cold War American interventionism in Greece—and beyond—this thesis responds with a consequentialist interpretation, arguing that the influence of American exceptionalism on the conceptualization of American foreign policymaking informed the ethical standards according to which Washington operated during the Cold War.

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<sup>42</sup> Papandreou, 1976, 26

## Chapter Two:

### The consequentialist foreign policy framework

*“I think there are lot of snowflakes out there that don’t understand  
what you need to do to protect the United States.”*

John Bolton, July 2022

### American Exceptionalism

American exceptionalism has defined American political development. Memorably conceptualized by Alexis de Tocqueville, its fundamental premise is that America is intrinsically and culturally different, compared to other nations, mainly due to its socio-political value system.<sup>43</sup> American exceptionalism is a byproduct of Puritan idealism, but has been redefined in multiple ways throughout American history—and remains a constant, albeit divisive concept, within academic and political discourse. Some consider American exceptionalism impractical with little actual significance, while others consider it indispensable for a deep conceptualization of American political history and policymaking. The absence of a concrete phenomenological definition fuels scholars’ disagreement; despite being a constant, American exceptionalism is a dynamic phenomenon. And it is this dual nature that makes the consideration of American exceptionalism imperative in foreign policy analyses.

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<sup>43</sup> Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Langley, 1845), 37-38

Glenn Hastedt has explored the influence of exceptionalism on American foreign policy. He argues that exceptionalism's force stems from Americans' "faith in the power of democracy" which is a merger of liberalism and religiosity. He also proposes four axioms through which American exceptionalism has assigned to American foreign policymaking a teleological element: first, that America is God's "chosen nation", second, that America's mission is to transform the world in its sociopolitical image, third, that America's mission is to fight "evil" on the international level and, fourth, that "evil" must be "decisively and permanently defeated."<sup>44</sup> Hastedt concludes that these axioms are valid in both "isolationist" and "internationalist" policymaking. Therefore, before exploring the wider influence of exceptionalism in Cold War American foreign policy, we must first assess the dichotomy between exemplary and missionary exceptionalism.<sup>45</sup>

### **Exemplary Exceptionalism**

Exemplary exceptionalism dominated the conceptualization of American foreign policy until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Its foundational assumption was that America should serve as a socially and politically virtuous example for other countries to follow, but without interfering in their affairs or disputes. Exemplary exceptionalism is first traced in George Washington's farewell address, in which he invited Americans to "give to mankind" their "magnanimous and too novel example" but refrain from engaging with "Europe's interests to which the US have none."<sup>46</sup> Washington's warnings to avoid "permanent alliances" and Thomas Jefferson's

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<sup>44</sup> Glenn Hastedt, *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 73-77

<sup>45</sup> Nicola Nymalm and Johannes Plagemann, "Comparative Exceptionalism: Universality and Particularity in Foreign Policy Discourses", *International Studies Review*, 21:1 (2019), 13-14, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy008>. See also Trevor McCrisken, *American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 14

<sup>46</sup> George Washington, *Farewell Address*. Washington, September 19, 1796, American Presidency Project. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/farewell-address>

similar dismissal of “entangling alliances” made American exceptionalism synonymous with an isolationist worldview.<sup>47</sup>

Washington’s 19<sup>th</sup> century successors followed his rhetorical lead. John Quincy Adams argued that the US “goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy” and despite being a “well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all” it remains “the champion and vindicator only of her own.”<sup>48</sup> Likewise, James Monroe argued that America should “leave the parties to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same course”<sup>49</sup> in a renewed non-interventionist tradition—at least towards Europe—known as the Monroe Doctrine. Robert Patman argues that such exemplary interpretations solidified isolationism, establishing the US as a distant “political model for emulation.”<sup>50</sup> George Herring elaborates on the pragmatic motives of exemplary exceptionalism, arguing that early American statesmen understood their country’s inherent vulnerabilities, believing that foreign interventions could be catastrophic.<sup>51</sup> It must be noted that “the others” within American “self-consciousness” were always the Europeans.<sup>52</sup>

Isolationism survived its first challenge in the aftermath of WWI. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican Chair of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee from 1919 to 1924 echoed 19<sup>th</sup> century’s exceptionalism, arguing that America was “the world’s best hope”,

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<sup>47</sup> Thomas Jefferson, *First Inaugural Address*. Washington, March 4, 1801. Papers of Thomas Jefferson. <https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/first-inaugural-address>. For an extensive study of American isolationism, see: Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction* (New York: Free Press, 1957)

<sup>48</sup> John Quincy Adams, *Speech to the US House of Representatives on Foreign Policy*, US House of Representatives, July 4, 1821, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-4-1821-speech-us-house-representatives-foreign-policy>

<sup>49</sup> James Monroe, *Annual Message to the Congress*. U.S. Congress, Washington, December 2, 1823, American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/seventh-annual-message-1>

<sup>50</sup> Robert Patman, “Globalization, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror”, *Third World Quarterly*, 27:6 (2006), 964-966, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4017735>

<sup>51</sup> George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 615-616

<sup>52</sup> Daniel Rodgers, “American Exceptionalism Revisited”, *Raritan*, 24:2 (September 2004), 44-47, <https://web.p.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=2bd4c8ee-000e-4481-baf5-a1a1bc5dc24d%40redis>



cautioning Woodrow Wilson to not “tangle her” in European affairs<sup>53</sup> in an obvious reference to George Washington. Lodge personified Republican opposition to Wilson’s post-war internationalist plans but was not even a fervent isolationist like other Republican *irreconcilables*. Still, in the debate about whether America should join the League of Nations that Wilson had conceived as an international institution which would maintain post-WWI peace, Lodge’s philosophical approach was that America’s engagement in WWI should be a parenthesis. America could still serve the world better as an example.

### **Missionary Exceptionalism**

Even before WWI, the increasingly integrated world of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century had forced America to begin reconsidering its worldview.<sup>54</sup> But by arguing that “the world must be made safe for Democracy” and that Americans would intervene as “champions of the rights of mankind.”<sup>55</sup> In his request for a war declaration on the Central Powers, Wilson projected a radically different, engaged, and highly idealistic foreign policy vision, which challenged isolationism from a values-based perspective for the first time in American history. His later calls for the establishment of a “general association of nations” to preserve democracy and self-determination are indicative of his new foreign policy conceptualization.<sup>56</sup> In Wilson’s

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<sup>53</sup> Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., *Speech at the US Senate*, U.S. Senate, Washington, August 2, 1919. Digital Public Library of America, <https://dp.la/primary-source-sets/treaty-of-versailles-and-the-end-of-world-war-i/sources/1891>

<sup>54</sup> Walter McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 4

<sup>55</sup> Woodrow Wilson, *Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany*, US Congress, Washington, April 2, 1917, American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-joint-session-congress-requesting-declaration-war-against-germany>

<sup>56</sup> Woodrow Wilson, *Fourteen Points*, U.S. Congress, Washington, January 8, 1918, American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-joint-session-congress-the-conditions-peace-the-fourteen-points>

historicist mind<sup>57</sup> America's moral mission was not to lead from afar anymore, but by leading the world into a new era.

Wilson's missionary vision emphasized particularly the long-term influence that the US would have on the international level. In an address to the US Naval Academy much before America entered WWI, he had spoken about the US' obligation to elevate "the spirit of the human race" because that is "the only distinction that America has."<sup>58</sup> Arthur Link, one of the first scholars who elaborated on Wilson's missionary beliefs, suggested that Wilson intended unconditionally to transform America into a constructive peacekeeping force<sup>59</sup> in what David Steigerwald describes as a "global democratic revolution."<sup>60</sup> And despite failing to convince congress to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, his philosophical impact on re-imagining American foreign policy survived him, as he had set an ideological precedent.

Wilson's personal defeat led to an apparent return to isolationism. Warren Harding, Wilson's immediate successor, was an isolationist, while Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover who succeeded Harding also espoused a non-interventionist foreign policy.<sup>61</sup> Yet, we should be cautious in drawing bold parallel lines between 19<sup>th</sup> century isolationism and the interwar era. As Brooke Blower suggests, the term isolationism is often used to describe US foreign policy in the interwar years because the US possessed the economic and military might to influence world affairs but did not do so, in contrast with other neutral—and weaker—powers which could not influence global politics.<sup>62</sup> But the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt—a

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<sup>57</sup> Ronald Pestritto, *Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 34-40

<sup>58</sup> Uri Friedman, "Anthropology of an Idea: American Exceptionalism." *Foreign Policy*, 194 (July-August 2012), 22-23, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23242774>

<sup>59</sup> Arthur Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era: 1910-1917* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), 81-84

<sup>60</sup> David Steigerwald, *Wilsonian Idealism in America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 32-36

<sup>61</sup> John Callaghan, Brendon O'Connor, and Mark Phythian, *Ideologies of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 40-41

<sup>62</sup> Brooke Blower, "From Isolationism to Neutrality: A New Framework for Understanding American Political Culture, 1919–1941", *Diplomatic History*, 38:2 (2014), 363, <https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dht091>

Wilsonian internationalist<sup>63</sup>—in 1933 reveals that Wilson’s missionary ideals were still alive. Once Roosevelt secured his third term in 1940, as the war was raging in Europe, he was able to act on his internationalist ideas<sup>64</sup>, despite keeping the US officially neutral.

Wilsonianism was more influential than Wilson himself. Wilsonianism recognized two fundamental elements within international relations: first, that democratic nations tend to value and preserve peace and, second, that they rarely engage in aggressive acts against each other.<sup>65</sup> There is a wide consensus on how Wilsonian internationalism and missionary American exceptionalism informed the ideological foundations of the post-WWII liberal world order— influencing America’s internationalist foreign policy in the second half of the century.<sup>66</sup> Likewise, Roosevelt’s post-WWII plans for European restoration and the promotion of liberal democracy were Wilsonian in spirit.<sup>67</sup> Even NATO, despite being envisioned as a military alliance—which it remains to this day—has liberal founding principles “at heart” exactly because post-WWII America had both the “power and the vision” to develop the liberal world order that Wilson had first advocated for.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Callaghan, O’Connor, and Phythian, 41-43

<sup>64</sup> Julian Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: the politics of national security from WWII* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), xii-xiii

<sup>65</sup> Walter Russel Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 132-173

<sup>66</sup> See the following: Stanley Hoffman, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism.” *Foreign Policy*, 98:8 (Spring 1995), 163-164, [https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A16723764/ITOF?u=ucl\\_ttda&sid=bookmark-ITOF&xid=5b94fbc0](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A16723764/ITOF?u=ucl_ttda&sid=bookmark-ITOF&xid=5b94fbc0), Michael Ignatieff, “Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights”, in *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, ed. Michael Ignatieff (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 13, John Ikenberry, “Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Administration, and the Future of Liberal Internationalism”, in *The Crisis of American Foreign Policy, Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century* eds. John Ikenberry, Thomas Knock, Tony Smith and Anne-Marie Slaughter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 9-13, Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present* (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 152-153, Paul Miller, *American Power and Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2018), 82-84

<sup>67</sup> John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 117-162

<sup>68</sup> John Ikenberry, “The end of liberal international order?” *International Affairs*, 94:1 (January 2018), 9-13, <https://web.p.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=f5f6c510-ff64-4d90-ad16-c8a4af3c2610%40redis>

That is why within the study of international relations, Wilsonianism has become a synonym for liberal internationalism. Tony Smith argues that Wilson, guided by his firm belief in America's mission to lead the post-WWI international order, interpreted American interests as parallel to European ones. Smith also affirms that Franklin Roosevelt's universalist "Four Freedoms" as expressed amidst WWII, as well as his signing of the Atlantic Charter along with Winston Churchill, were of Wilsonian origins.<sup>69</sup> Geir Lundestad elaborates that America's belief that its exceptional principles were "in the interests of the whole world" found a practical application, as after WWII America "would participate in an entirely different way than previously" in world affairs.<sup>70</sup> And as Daniel Deudney and Jeffrey Meisner argue, the shift in Americans' understanding of their country's duty to actively promote liberal principles placed the concept of "constitutional democracy" at the core of American foreign policymaking.<sup>71</sup>

In retrospect, the shift that missionary exceptionalism brought in American foreign policymaking could not have been more profound. Henry Kissinger, one of the most prominent realist foreign policy thinkers and practitioners, admits that "some of the finest acts of twentieth-century diplomacy had their roots in the idealism of Woodrow Wilson: the Marshall Plan, the brave commitment to containing communism, defense of the freedom of Western Europe, and even the ill-fated League of Nations and its later incarnation, the United Nations."<sup>72</sup> Kissinger elaborates that "the genius of Woodrow Wilson has been its ability to harness American idealism in the service of great foreign policy undertakings."<sup>73</sup> Essentially, the Wilsonian-led shift from exemplary to missionary exceptionalism provided American

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<sup>69</sup> Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 27-30

<sup>70</sup> Geir Lundestad, *International Relations Since 1945: East, West, North, South* (London: Sage, 2018), 15-16

<sup>71</sup> Daniel Deudney and Jefferey Meisner, "American Exceptionalism", in *US Foreign Policy*, eds. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 21-34

<sup>72</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 911-812

<sup>73</sup> Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (New York; Penguin Books, 2014), 256-268

foreign policymakers with an axis to reshape the post-WWII international order that even a staunch realist like Kissinger acknowledges.

But a concrete interpretation remains indispensable. We should understand missionary exceptionalism as the value system that brings the promotion and protection of liberal democracy to the forefront of American foreign policymaking, initiated by Wilson, and resuscitated—in more pragmatic terms—by Roosevelt. But if missionary exceptionalism establishes America’s moral mission to promote and protect its own foundational liberal ideals of freedom, democracy, and self-determination, then it cannot but contain within it the mission to lead the struggle against authoritarian regimes which directly oppose them, be it the Central Powers and the Axis during the two world wars, or world communism during the Cold War. The emergence of the USSR as the US’ geopolitical and ideological foe ingrained to American foreign policymakers the conviction that there was no alternative to making a world “safe for democracy” according to the Wilsonian principles of missionary American exceptionalism.<sup>74</sup>

The Cold War merged two crucial dynamics into one. From the outset of the geopolitical clash with the USSR, the US’ emphasis on promoting the values that had defined its political development since the 18<sup>th</sup> century merged with its prioritization to maintain its national security—and by extension its sphere of influence. And as Andrew Preston suggests, the glue that bound this merger together was the fear that world communism instilled in American foreign policymakers, which defined the attitude of Cold War administrations towards the communist world.<sup>75</sup> Containing communism became both a geopolitical and moral imperative and served as the basis for several interventions in which Americans seemingly crossed numerous ethical lines, as was the case with Greece.

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<sup>74</sup> Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 131-165

<sup>75</sup> Andrew Preston, “Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security”, *Diplomatic History*, 38:3 (2014), 479-480

## Selected Criticisms

Many scholars have criticized American exceptionalism, whose counterarguments range from mild skepticism<sup>76</sup> to full rejections.<sup>77</sup> For example, James Ceaser considers exceptionalism an indeterminate concept which does not contribute to constructive foreign policy assessments. Ceaser dismisses the missionary element as an overused “self-righteous dogmatic” narrative, suggesting that moralistic rhetoric is incompatible with effective foreign policymaking.<sup>78</sup> Similarly, David Ericson believes that exceptionalism is not invalid per se but today is becoming less relevant as most nations have gradually liberalized, outmoding thus the indispensability of interventionism.<sup>79</sup> These lenses are different from each other, but summarize well how some scholars see exceptionalism as either a valueless concept in foreign policy analyses, or merely an outdated one.

Very frequently, criticism of American exceptionalism focuses on the antithesis between rhetoric and practice. Jeffrey Legro argues that American exceptionalism provides a symbolic framework that Washington exploits to assign an ideological narrative to contestable interventions.<sup>80</sup> Likewise, David Hughes adds that both neoconservative Presidents such as George W. Bush and liberals like Barack Obama have rationalized questionable foreign policy decisions through American exceptionalism<sup>81</sup> concluding that the only thing truly exceptional about the US is its sheer power. Jeane Kirkpatrick, a frequently cited neoconservative, and

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<sup>76</sup> Harold Hongju Koh, “On American Exceptionalism”, *Stanford Law Review*, 55:5 (2003), 1479-1527, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1229556>

<sup>77</sup> Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: a Reconsideration”, *American Quarterly*, 45:1 (1993), 29-31, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2713051>. Also, see: Michael Zuckerman, “The Dodo and the Phoenix: a Fable of American Exceptionalism” in *American Exceptionalism? US Working Class Formation in an International Context*, eds. Rick Halperin and Jonathan Morris (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 20-21

<sup>78</sup> James Ceaser, “The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism” *American Political Thought*, 1:1 (Spring 2012), 10-12, <https://doi.org/10.1086/664595>

<sup>79</sup> David Ericson, “Liberalism and American Political Development” in *The Oxford Handbook of American Political Development*, eds. Richard Valelly, Suzanne Mettler, and Robert Lieberman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 10-11

<sup>80</sup> Jeffrey Legro, *Rethinking the World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 80-81

<sup>81</sup> David Hughes, “Unmaking an exception: A critical genealogy of US exceptionalism”, *Review of International Studies*, 41:3 (July 2015), 527-531, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24564342>

former ambassador to the UN in the 1980s appointed by Ronald Reagan, adds that despite America's commitment to protecting liberal democracy, several administrations have supported authoritarian regimes only because they were anticommunist. Crucially, although Kirkpatrick argues that the US may deprioritize democratization when states are under revolutionary/communist pressure she still considers such interventions unethical; Kirkpatrick notes that Washington should ideally push authoritarian states to democratize and promote other nations' self-determination.<sup>82</sup> From a more realist perspective, Mearsheimer suggests that America's values-based attempts to democratize other nations is highly impractical.<sup>83</sup>

These critiques suggest that foreign policymakers' inconsistent interpretation—if not abuses—of exceptionalism deprive it of its analytical value. As Steven Hook and John Spanier argue, American leaders have relied heavily on American exceptionalism to first, exaggerate the occasional threats that other powers personified, and second, promote aggressive policies that would help America maintain its status as a global superpower.<sup>84</sup> David Campbell adds that this was especially true during the Cold War when the Soviet threat was routinely used in this context.<sup>85</sup> Extending this argument, Stephen Walt concludes that Americans' fixation with the “myth of American Exceptionalism” does not allow them to understand why other nations believe that America's behavior is hypocritical<sup>86</sup> which again has been a frequent accusation of Cold War American foreign policy. Noam Chomsky summarizes this cognitive dissonance between values and actual policymaking, arguing that “there is nothing exceptional about

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<sup>82</sup> Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards.” *Commentary*, 68 (November 1979).

<sup>83</sup> John Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 159

<sup>84</sup> Steven Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since WWII* (London: Sage Publications 2019), 18-19

<sup>85</sup> David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 34

<sup>86</sup> Stephen Walt, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism.” *Foreign Policy*, November 10, 2011. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/the-myth-of-american-exceptionalism/>

American Exceptionalism” because exceptional ideals such as democracy and freedom have been proclaimed rhetorically only to be betrayed in practice.<sup>87</sup>

To build his case, Chomsky explores several instances where the US disrespected human rights in its foreign interventions. However, he does not believe that exceptionalism is an invalid concept per se—like Ceaser and Hughes do—but argues instead that it may become relevant again only if its principles are respected in practice. Within Chomsky’s criticism, the practice of American foreign policy nullifies the ethos of American exceptionalism. This is an inherently deontological criticism, which however fails to consider that American exceptionalism is not necessarily synonymous with deontological ethics, as this chapter will later explain.

### **Exceptionalism as an existential national conviction**

There is another school of thought which interprets American exceptionalism’s influence on foreign policymaking from a more psychodynamic lens. The premise within this worldview is that exceptionalism’s appeal and influence depend on Americans’ deep belief that their nation is unique<sup>88</sup>; a belief may be unfalsifiable, but that does not mean that it cannot have practical implications, as is the case with religion. Through this lens, America’s promotion of freedom, democracy, and liberal principles has informed its foreign policy not just as an “idealist preoccupation” but as a “national security orientation” as well. American

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<sup>87</sup> Noam Chomsky, “American Exceptionalism: Some Current Case Studies”, *Raritan*, 35:4 (Spring 2016), 5-6, <https://web.p.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=697a42ad-9dc6-467b-9d77-0dead200394b%40redis>

<sup>88</sup> See Stephen Fender, “The American Difference”, in *Modern American Culture: an Introduction*, ed. Mickey Gidley (London: Longman 1993), 20, Dale Carter, “American Exceptionalism: An Idea That Will Not Die”, *American Studies in Scandinavia*, 29:2 (1997), 76-83, <https://doi.org/10.22439/asca.v29i2.1466>, Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “American Exceptionalism or Western Civilization?” in *The End of the West: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order*, eds. Jeffrey Anderson, John Ikenberry and Thomas Risse (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 249, Robert Tomes, “American Exceptionalism in the Twenty-First Century.” *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 56:1 (2014), 36-37, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2014.882150>



exceptionalism, therefore, provides a “huge domestic constituency for democracy promotion”<sup>89</sup> that is bipartisan and consistently relevant in foreign policymaking. In other words, exceptionalism does not presuppose a specific policy mix but informs instead both Republican and Democratic administrations’ foreign policies.

Nikolas Gvosdev, Jessica Blankshain, and David Cooper provide a coherent explanation of how American exceptionalism has defined American policymaking in psychodynamic terms. They argue that “Americans as a people take this exceptionalism to heart as a core defining national trait” adding that exceptionalism is a “pervasive belief within the American psyche that influences how Americans think about the role of their country in ways that differ.” They also explore how exceptionalism has informed conflicting and contradictory foreign policy approaches, from the isolationist Monroe and Trump doctrines to Kennedy’s and Reagan’s highly interventionist ones, arguing that because of exceptionalism’s influence, the US can never espouse a truly “realpolitik” foreign policy.<sup>90</sup> In other words, Gvosdev, Blankshain, and Cooper showcase how American exceptionalism and American foreign policy are intertwined by definition.

To highlight this observation, they consider Barack Obama’s initially reluctant embrace of American exceptionalism. In 2009, Obama said that he believed in American exceptionalism “just as the British believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks in Greek exceptionalism” in a statement that was widely criticized.<sup>91</sup> Gvosdev, Blankshain, and Cooper, argue that this fierce criticism stemmed from Americans’ firm belief in exceptionalism, and note that Obama afterwards made every possible effort to reassure Americans that he was too a devoted

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<sup>89</sup> Michael Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, “American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts”, *Oxford Scholarship Online*, (November 2000), 2-3, <https://doi.org/10.1093/0199240973.001.0001>

<sup>90</sup> Nikolas Gvosdev, Jessica Blankshain, and David Cooper, *Decision Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 332-336

<sup>91</sup> James Fallows, “Obama on Exceptionalism.” *The Atlantic*, April 4, 2009, <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2009/04/obama-on-exceptionalism/9874/Obama>

proponent of American exceptionalism. The premise of this argument is that exceptionalism is so deeply rooted within the American national identity that has become an omnipotent force within American politics. This resonates with Joshua Kertzer's, Kathleen Powers', Brian Rathbun's, and Ravi Iyer's argument, who—borrowing from Seymour Lipset's interpretation of American Exceptionalism—suggest that moral narratives are deeply embedded in Americans' understanding of American foreign policy, irrespective of their political worldviews.<sup>92</sup>

We can fully comprehend the durability of American exceptionalism as an institution by observing the Donald Trump era. In his final foreign trip as President, Obama delivered a highly ideological address in Athens, which resonated heavily with Wilsonian and Rooseveltian values-based internationalism.<sup>93</sup> Obama delivered this speech as a lame duck President, as Donald Trump had already won the 2016 election on the basis of an “America First” neo-isolationist rhetoric. But as Hilde Restad points out, Trump's political messaging also contained a strong, albeit different, notion of American exceptionalism.<sup>94</sup> This shows that although exceptionalism may be used by opposing ideological sides, it remains equally attractive because of its widespread appeal to Americans in understanding themselves. Trump's victory did not mean that the American people had abandoned postwar internationalism<sup>95</sup> but

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<sup>92</sup> Joshua Kertzer, Kathleen E. Powers, Brian C. Rathbun and Ravi Iyer, “Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes”, *The Journal of Politics*, 76:3 (June, 2014), 826-827, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381614000073>

<sup>93</sup> Barack Obama, *Remarks Made by President Obama at Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center in Athens*, Greece, Athens, Greece, November 16, 2016. Obama White House, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/11/16/remarks-president-obama-stavros-niarchos-foundation-cultural-center>

<sup>94</sup> Hilde Eliassen Restad, “Donald Trump's calls to “Make America great again” show that American Exceptionalism is still a powerful idea” *LSE Phelan US Centre*, March 4, 2016, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2016/03/04/donald-trumps-calls-to-make-america-great-again-show-that-american-exceptionalism-is-still-a-powerful-idea/>

<sup>95</sup> Kyle Dodson and Clem Brooks, “All by Himself? Trump, Isolationism, and the American Electorate”, *The Sociological Quarterly*, 63:40 (2022), 795-796

it suggested that exceptionalism remains a most powerful—and flexible—idea which informs the conceptualization of American foreign policymaking by very different schools of thought.

And as Restad also points out, Americans' perennial belief in "American uniqueness" has solidified the notion of America's mission.<sup>96</sup> However, Restad rejects the dichotomy between exemplary and missionary exceptionalism, arguing that American foreign policy had always been interventionist ever since America's westward expansion began. Contrary to Restad, this study suggests that this dichotomy is indispensable, as the values which defined Wilsonian missionary exceptionalism eventually informed the belief that America could not remain neutral towards the challenge that the USSR posed. But also contrary to the standard interpretations of missionary exceptionalism, which emphasize mostly how it intersects with liberal internationalism, this study believes that it is highly compatible with realism—especially in the context of Cold War foreign policymaking.

## **Realism**

Realism is one of the most prominent schools of thought in international relations. Although it has many derivative interpretations, its main premises are that there is no authority to regulate international anarchy, and that state behavior is defined by competition, power, and self-interest. According to John Mearsheimer, certain fundamental elements of realism are: first, that international institutions are of secondary importance due to their limited ability to enforce rules; second, that states—and especially great powers—use their military capabilities as leverage; third, that states can never trust rivals' intentions; fourth, that all states prioritize their survival, territorial security, and national sovereignty; fifth, that states are rational actors,

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<sup>96</sup> Hilde Eliassen Restad, "Old Paradigms in History Die Hard in Political Science: US Foreign Policy and American Exceptionalism", *American Political Thought*, 1:1 (May 2012), 71-72, <https://doi.org/10.1086/664586>

in the sense that they strategize to project and accumulate as much power as possible compared to their rivals.<sup>97</sup>

Realism focuses on the state as a level of analysis. Since the ancient city-states, the concept of *balance of power*—the settings in which two states balance each other’s power so that neither can become dominant and rise as a hegemon<sup>98</sup>—has become fundamental in understanding international conflict.<sup>99</sup> Naturally, Wilsonian idealism, as previously analyzed, could not seem further from this interpretation of state behavior, as the realist quest for power is synonymous with self-preservation<sup>100</sup> and prioritizing national, instead of collective, interests.<sup>101</sup> Both *offensive realism*, which emphasizes attaining power, and *defensive realism*, which emphasizes on security, share the same set of realist presuppositions concerning state behavior within international anarchy.<sup>102</sup>

Thucydides is considered the father of realism. Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War between democratic Athens and authoritarian Sparta highlighted how the two city-states’ opposing value systems defined their conflict.<sup>103</sup> Because of this feature, Thucydides’ work became increasingly popular during the Cold War, as the clash between the US and the USSR, two great powers with radically different value systems mirrored the one between Athens and Sparta.<sup>104</sup> In modern times, Nicolo Machiavelli’s *Prince* and Thomas

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<sup>97</sup> John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 30-33

<sup>98</sup> Kissinger, (1994), 23-24

<sup>99</sup> Markus Fischer, “Feudal Europe 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices”, *International Organization*, 46:2 (Spring 1992), 427, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027776>

<sup>100</sup> Robert Goodin, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199604456-e-001?rskey=yehmGg&result=1>

<sup>101</sup> James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey* (London: Pearson, 1997), 57

<sup>102</sup> Brian Schmidt, “Theories of US Foreign Policy” in *US Foreign Policy*, eds. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 11-14

<sup>103</sup> Robert Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), xix

<sup>104</sup> Jeffrey Rusten, *Thucydides* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 434-435

Hobbes' *Leviathan* are considered as landmark realist works, in philosophical terms. Interestingly, American foreign policy has often been defined as *Machiavellian*<sup>105</sup> as Machiavelli's *Prince* emphasizes how sheer power can both inspire fear in enemies and admiration in allies.<sup>106</sup> The term "Machiavellian" has predominantly negative connotations and is associated with immorality.

Several prominent realists have explored the notion of morality within realism. In his *Twenty Years Crisis*, a landmark work, Edward Carr considers liberal internationalism utopian, impractical, naïve, and inapplicable, using the Wilsonian-inspired League of Nations' collapse to support his case. Carr then argues that realism can far better express international relations within international anarchy because of its thorough consideration of power and state competition.<sup>107</sup> However, despite his emphasis on these elements, Carr believes that ethics should not be overlooked, and that power should be supplemented by morality. However, Carr emphasizes that international moral standards can only be a product of hegemonic power. Adopting a Hobbesian narrative, Carr concludes that morality can be prioritized only when a nation achieves a hegemonic status and the subsequent consent of others.

Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics* is another essential present-day realist work. Like Carr, Niebuhr also criticizes the League of Nations' inefficiency to argue that forming an international community, albeit well-intentioned, is not sufficient to restrict rogue nations. And again, like Carr, although Niebuhr does not discredit the significance of morality in international politics, he nonetheless believes that international treaties and covenants are too simplistic and superficial—thus potentially dangerous—to regulate state behavior within international anarchy. Niebuhr based his analysis

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<sup>105</sup> Garret Ward Sheldon, *The History of Political Theory: Ancient Greece to Modern America* (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 69-78

<sup>106</sup> Mearsheimer, (2018), 146

<sup>107</sup> See Edward Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1962), especially chapter 9.

on his perception of human nature, arguing that personal interests cannot but generate conflicts with those of others.<sup>108</sup> The subsequent rise of Nazi Germany was interpreted as a vindication of Niebuhr's warnings about the dangers of supranationalism.<sup>109</sup>

After WWII, Hans Morgenthau emerged as another prominent realist thinker. In his seminal work *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau reaffirms the core realist principle of *balance of power* as a classic conceptualization of state competition, foreseeing that it would define the future, just as it had defined the past. Morgenthau does not exclude the influence of morality in politics either but warns that individuals' luxury to act according to their moral code is not applicable on the state level. Elaborating on American foreign policy, Morgenthau argues that America's interests as a superpower inevitably conflict with the promotion and protection of human rights, using Washington's interventions in Cambodia and Vietnam as an example.<sup>110</sup> In practice, Morgenthau suggests that state competition within international anarchy makes moral axioms largely inapplicable or obsolete.

As Mearsheimer suggests "great powers are logically inclined to act according to balance of power logic" and that one cannot expect that "a potential rival will hew to liberal dictates during a serious dispute." Mearsheimer concludes that surviving can mean "pursuing ruthless policies" and although this is an uncomfortable reality, there is no other alternative within international anarchy.<sup>111</sup> To that end, Kenneth Waltz, another prominent realist, argues that the Cold War "has its origins in the anarchic ordering of the international arena."<sup>112</sup> Waltz's assumption is based on the observation that on the international level, states must be constantly

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<sup>108</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and the Immoral Society: a study in ethics and politics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), 83-112, but particularly 106-112

<sup>109</sup> Gary Dorrien, *The Making of American Liberal Theology: Idealism, Realism, and Modernity, 1900-1950* (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox, 2003), 469-477

<sup>110</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 7th ed. Revised by Kenneth Thompson and David Clinton (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005), 235-269

<sup>111</sup> Mearsheimer, (2018), 216

<sup>112</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18:4 (1988), 620, <https://doi.org/10.2307/204817>

ready to counterforce an opponent state's demonstration of power—or succumb to it.<sup>113</sup> In short, from Thucydides to Waltz, realists agree that international anarchy inevitably limits the applicability of good intentions and compromises ethical state behavior—as it is conventionally understood, mainly by liberal internationalists.

### **Cold War interventionism and the realist presupposition**

The Cold War began in the aftermath of WWII, and was the widest conflict in human history, spanning across all continents and lasting for almost fifty years.<sup>114</sup> Interestingly, in its earliest stages, the US was led by a President with shallow foreign policy knowledge. As Kissinger argues, when Harry Truman unexpectedly succeeded Franklin Roosevelt after his passing on April 12, 1945, he simultaneously inherited the responsibility to end WWII and shape American leadership in the post-WWII international arena. Kissinger asserts that Truman assumed the Presidency unprepared, but with Wilsonian principles in mind as he was an internationalist, just like Roosevelt. He adds that the US and the USSR were rapidly transforming into two powerful polar opposites, hence Soviet expansionism quickly alarmed American foreign policymakers. Under the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, the Eastern Bloc was forcefully created, while Moscow sought to infiltrate Western European nations and weaken America's influence. Crucially, Kissinger argues that Stalin encouraged “a guerilla war” in Greece to that end.<sup>115</sup>

In his famous “Long Telegram” George Kennan, an American diplomat stationed in Moscow, argued that the Soviet understanding of the evolution of history was at odds with the

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<sup>113</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 160

<sup>114</sup> Ronald Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), ix

<sup>115</sup> Kissinger, (1994), 45

American one, making thus the two superpowers' coexistence impossible.<sup>116</sup> A year later, in 1947, Kennan suggested a “policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.”<sup>117</sup> *Containment*, which eventually became Washington's core strategic doctrine almost until the end of the Cold War, aimed at isolating the USSR, and at preventing communism from spreading.<sup>118</sup> Kennan's story is well-known, but revisiting it allows us to comprehend the paradigm shift in the conceptualization of American foreign policymaking during the Truman administration—which this thesis will later highlight. The Truman Doctrine was the first actualization of containment, as the following chapter will show, as Greece—and Turkey, to a lesser extent—faced strong domestic communist insurrections that the USSR could capitalize on.<sup>119</sup>

But more broadly, the Truman Doctrine set a realist precedent. Washington interpreted the world through the *domino theory*, which suggested that if a nation fell to communism, then its neighbors would as well and eventually bandwagon behind the USSR, shifting thus the international balance of power.<sup>120</sup> This explains why intervening in Greece to keep it within the American sphere of influence became an imperative for Washington, as did other numerous interventions which were aimed at preventing the dominos from falling. In these interventions, Washington would actively support pro-American or anti-Soviet actors and parties, often overlooking their occasionally poor democratic integrity, while in cases like Vietnam, full

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<sup>116</sup> “George Kennan's 'Long Telegram',” February 22, 1946, *History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive*, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945-1949. Wilson Center, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178.pdf>

<sup>117</sup> George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct>

<sup>118</sup> Powaski, 70

<sup>119</sup> George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 614-617

<sup>120</sup> Jerome Slater, “The Domino Theory and International Politics: The Case of Vietnam”, *Security Studies*, 3:2 (Winter 1994), 186-224, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419309347547>



military interventions were implemented.<sup>121</sup> Such interventions fall well within realist assertions on great power competition, while they seem entirely unethical—and radically opposite to the moral axioms of missionary American exceptionalism. This study will argue that this is not the case.

### **A proposed moral foreign policy framework: consequentialism versus deontology**

Deontology offers a first interpretation of ethical foreign policymaking. In normative ethics, it emphasizes the nature of an action and assesses whether it falls within the thresholds of universal ethical conduct, irrespective of the consequences it may bring<sup>122</sup>; the means matter and not the ends, so to speak. From a distance, deontology and American exceptionalism seem to be in tune. If America professes to be a moral superpower in the service of freedom and democracy, then its interventions must be consistent with the principles of missionary exceptionalism. In other words, this philosophical argument suggests that American interventionism is bound by certain deontological standards, outside of which interventions are not justifiable; respecting the intervened nation's democratic integrity and self-determination is imperative.

This deontological narrative informs the frequent criticism that American foreign policy is hypocritical, as it exposes the “gap” between America's professed ideals and actual foreign policymaking.<sup>123</sup> As Stephen Huggins argues, the “enduring sense” that America is morally superior is an outcome of the established deep belief in American exceptionalism which has provided Washington with the moral justification to intervene abroad. Huggins

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<sup>121</sup> Mearsheimer, (2018), 224

<sup>122</sup> Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, “Deontological Ethics”, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (2020), <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/>

<sup>123</sup> Samuel Huntington, “American Ideals versus American Institutions” in *American Foreign Policy*, eds. John Ikenberry and Peter Turbowitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 297

elaborates on this conventional criticism of American interventionism—shared by most skeptics of American exceptionalism—arguing that America’s missionary motives are challenged by ethically questionable interventions such as “the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”<sup>124</sup> Based on Huggins’ reasoning, we could easily list many more examples when American interventionism did not meet the standards of missionary exceptionalism. Yet, this interpretation would be terribly one-sided, because of the shallow interpretative limits of deontology.

The second interpretation is that of consequentialism, which informs the core of this study’s proposed framework. In contrast to deontological ethics, consequentialism suggests that the morality of an action stems from the outcomes that it produces; the ends matter more than the means in this case. Consequentialism largely falls within classic Benthamite utilitarianism, according to which moral actions are considered those which produce more overall net good<sup>125</sup> and in which disrespecting others’ rights is permissible—which is unacceptable in deontology.<sup>126</sup> From a consequentialist perspective, the morality of American foreign policymaking depends on whether US interventions contribute to the wider good, irrespective of the harm that they might cause in the process. In consequentialist terms, thus, the US’ mission to contain and defeat the USSR, which proposes a rivaling value system to the world, is prioritized before any deontological objections. In other words, containing and defeating communism on a global level is the only imperative—and hence became the US existential mission.

Michael Sandel, one of the world’s leading political philosophers, offers an example that allows us to comprehend how utilitarian ethics apply in practice. Sandel argues that

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<sup>124</sup> Stephen Huggins, *America’s Use of Terror: From Colonial Times to the A-Bomb* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2019), 29-32

<sup>125</sup> Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Consequentialism”, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2019), <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/>

<sup>126</sup> Kimberly Hutchings, *Global Ethics: an Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 28-31, 38-42

utilitarian ethics mainly work on the assumption that committing a seemingly immoral act—the kind that deontologists would never condone—rests on another assumption, that not doing so would lead to undesirable consequences.<sup>127</sup> Exploring this point in the context of the Cold War allows us to comprehend why the US proceeded with ethically questionable interventions: if Washington did not intervene in countries like Greece, Cyprus, Vietnam, Chile, Iran, and so on, then it would be only a matter of time before the USSR took advantage of the power vacuum left by the US in each country.

Exactly because defining morality is next to impossible, these two schools offer two directly opposite worldviews to ethically assess any nation's foreign policy in general.<sup>128</sup> However, as Felix Oppenheim remarks in his study of international ethics, although deontology and consequentialism are indeed the two major rival moral codes in ethical foreign policy analysis, the West has largely accepted that the deontological worldview—in which acting in ways that benefit the interests of others as well—by far exceeds the consequentialist one in terms of public appreciation.<sup>129</sup> This thesis extends Oppenheim's argument to discuss a fundamental problem in appreciating consequentialist ethics: exactly because values such as democracy and self-determination carry significant moral—or more accurately, deontological—weight within the West, any act that violates them is seen as immoral. Interventions which violate these moral axioms *feel wrong* despite their potential geopolitical successes.

Naturally, thus, liberal internationalism seems like a more ethical school of thought than realism, as its prioritization of values aligns far better with deontological ethics. Robert McElroy, a scholar who has worked extensively on the ethics of American foreign policy and

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<sup>127</sup> Michael Sandel, *Justice: what's the right thing to do* (New York: FSG, 2009), 38-39

<sup>128</sup> Chris Brown, "Ethics, interests, and foreign policy" in *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, eds. Karen Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 19-22

<sup>129</sup> Felix Oppenheim, *The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: Lexington, 1991), 18-21

who is overly critical of realist interpretations of morality, argues that the international system can only be derived by a set of moral norms. McElroy suggests that the two “maxims” are first, that moral norms can be identified by their universalizability and second, that these norms are distinctive because they force a state to take others’ interests and points of view into account.<sup>130</sup> At its core, this is a highly deontological interpretation, in which ethical foreign policy is one that considers and respects the interests of other nations as well. Through this lens, most Cold War American interventions—and particularly those towards Greece—are unreservedly unethical.

Several other scholars of international ethics espouse McElroy’s view. As Manfred Halpern suggests “there is no obvious synthesis between morality and intervention”<sup>131</sup> in a phrase that perfectly summarizes the backlash that the US faced whenever it intervened in other nations’ affairs. And through this deontological lens, the US has faced moral scrutiny in what concerned its multiple—and multifaceted—interventions around the world, which have defined Cold War foreign policymaking since 1947.<sup>132</sup> As Jeffrey Sachs argues in his—highly deontological—interpretation of Cold War American interventionism, the US has engineered ethically questionable interventions to stir other nations away from Soviet influence, often irrespective of whether there was a credible threat of losing them to world communism. Through this argument, Sachs suggests that the balance of power politics that defined the conceptualization of Cold War foreign policymaking are inherently immoral.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Robert McElroy, *Morality and American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 23-24, 30-34

<sup>131</sup> Manfred Halpern, “The morality of politics and intervention” in *Moral Dimensions of American Foreign Policy*, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1984), 78-82

<sup>132</sup> Lock Johnson, “Reflections on the ethics and effectiveness of America’s ‘third option’: covert action and U.S. foreign policy” *Intelligence and National Security*, 35:5 (2020), 673-757, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1739479>

<sup>133</sup> Jeffrey Sachs, *A New Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 29-31

Similarly, as John Gans—an academic and former Pentagon speechwriter—put it in 2019, people “must appreciate that [the] US national security process is designed to drain decisions of their morality.”<sup>134</sup> This is another deontological assessment which suggests that American foreign policymaking is immoral by definition, as too often Washington’s foreign policy endeavors rely on questionable means to serve geopolitical purposes. Such deontological assessments are reasonable—but they are far from the only credible ones; in his study of the history of ethical systems, Kennan Malik concludes that there is no external authority that defines what is ethical and what is not, irrespective of our social conventions.<sup>135</sup> Extending this argument—and considering Oppenheim’s suggestion that deontological ethics feel more inherent to the West—this thesis emphasizes that despite its appeal, deontology should not be considered as *the* optimal worldview to assess ethical foreign policy, but just *a* worldview. This thesis argues that consequentialist ethics are just as valid as deontological ones.

And just as liberal internationalism is compatible with deontology due to its emphasis on values, so is realism with consequentialism due to its emphasis on survival. As Ronald Stupak and Peter Leitner argue in their ethical interpretation of realism, “realists must be prepared to acknowledge that noble goals are always realized with imperfect means and methods.”<sup>136</sup> At its core, this is an entirely consequentialist argument, which suggests the use of questionable means is permitted if it serves higher “noble” goals. Similarly, John Bew suggests that Machiavellianism influenced the conceptualization of Cold War American interventionism, giving a new meaning to ideas expressed by great foreign policy thinkers,

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<sup>134</sup> John Gans, “‘The More Essential Ones?’ ethics and national security” *SAIS Review*, 39:1 (Winter/Spring 2019), 97-98, <https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2019.0008>

<sup>135</sup> Kenan Malik, *The Quest for a Moral Compass* (London: Atlantic, 2014), 344

<sup>136</sup> Ronald Stupak and Peter Leitner, “Realism Revisited: Philosophical Assumptions, Power Patterns, and American Foreign Policy” *Journal of Power and Ethics*, 2:1 (2001), 4.  
[https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A76735943/AONE?u=ucl\\_ttda&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=31005b52](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A76735943/AONE?u=ucl_ttda&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=31005b52)

often from competing schools, such as Wilson, Carr, or Niebuhr.<sup>137</sup> This thesis believes that the moral value of consequentialism as expressed through “Machiavellian” foreign policy decisions has been largely neglected—especially in what concerns Cold War American interventionism.

Frances Harbour acutely observes that even the staunchest of realists “do not usually talk about ‘consequentialism’” despite their entirely utilitarian interpretation of states’ urge to prioritize their national interests. Harbour also suggests that prioritizing one’s survival is by definition a moral choice, even if other nations’ interests may be disregarded or disrespected in the process, and adds that states must often decide whether they will respect what are considered moral conventions and perish, or violate them and survive.<sup>138</sup> And in the context of the Cold War, Harbour’s assessment aligns with Waltz’s defense of Machiavellian foreign policy in the face of deontological criticisms.<sup>139</sup> Consequentialism, thus, has received less attention than it really merits—despite allowing us to comprehend better the moral reasoning behind what seem like entirely unethical decisions.

This study argues that consequentialism is particularly applicable to Cold War American foreign policy. Specifically, it suggests that all Cold War American administrations, from Harry Truman’s to Ronald Reagan’s, orchestrated and implemented ethically dubious interventions for the sake of the broader goal within Cold War American foreign policymaking, which was to contain world communism. And if leaders have a “special ethical responsibility” to protect their countries’ interests as Jack Donnelly argues<sup>140</sup> then we can comprehend how these administrations embraced consequentialism. This thesis suggests that the reason why

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<sup>137</sup> John Bew, *Realpolitik* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 198-201

<sup>138</sup> Frances Harbour, *Thinking About International Ethics* (New York: John Mason University Press, 1999), 77-81

<sup>139</sup> Waltz, 207-208

<sup>140</sup> Jack Donnelly, “The Ethics of Realism” in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Christian Reus-Smit, and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 155-156

Washington considered these—often viewed as unethical, from a deontological worldview—interventions as ethical is the profound influence of missionary exceptionalism on Cold War foreign policymaking: containing communism—and everything it stood for, geopolitically, socio-politically, culturally, and even religiously—was elevated as America’s fundamental mission.

The origins of Washington’s consequentialist foreign policymaking have been hiding in plain sight. That is because Woodrow Wilson, who secured re-election capitalizing on his promise to keep the US out of the war, essentially made a consequentialist argument when he asked Congress to declare war on the Central Powers—which would end or destroy the lives of many American soldiers—because the US needed to “make the world safe for democracy.” Wilson knew that by joining the war he was forcing American soldiers as individuals, and the US as a country, to disregard every deontological principle that wartime requires because the higher end he had identified justified both. He even said so, acknowledging the “profound sense of solemn and even tragical character of the step” he was taking. But crucially, he also said that “we are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government [...] we can never have a friend” and that without confronting and defeating the Central Powers, “there can be no assured security for the democratic Governments of the world.”<sup>141</sup> This was Washington’s first *telos*.

Liberal internationalists have claimed Wilson—and the ideals found within missionary American exceptionalism and Wilsonianism, and even morality in international relations more broadly—as their own. Arguably, Wilson’s radical envisioning of the League of Nations and his internationalist philosophy that inspired Franklin Roosevelt, whose vision in turn reshaped post-WWII international politics, indicates that they are right to do so; yet, only in peacetime

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<sup>141</sup> Woodrow Wilson, *Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany*, US Congress, Washington, April 2, 1917.

or in peace-building settings. In times of crisis—or as was the case during the Cold War, of great power competition—Wilson’s missionary exceptionalism, as indicated in this speech, provided both the operational and ideological axis for all future American consequentialist foreign policymaking and interventionism. In other words, we may have been reading Wilson wrongly for almost a century: what Wilson effectively said in his war declaration request was that to make the world “safe for democracy” several deontological lines must be crossed, and that there was no alternative to that, exactly because it was the moral and existential duty of the US to achieve a higher end. This is the essence of consequentialism, and it is what the Cold War was all about.

### **Indicative case studies**

To comprehend how the proposed consequentialist foreign policy framework can be invoked, we need to explore a few case studies. After all, Cold War American interventionism has been marked by controversy, exactly because many interventions are considered entirely inconsistent with America’s professed idealism. As a practical introduction to consequentialist reasoning, we should twist Huggins’ reasoning on the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Truman’s two objectives were to diminish the number of American casualties and end the war with an unyielding Japan.<sup>142</sup> Although in deontological terms the instant—and extremely violent—murder of thousands is clearly unjustifiable, the bombings were entirely justified from a consequentialist perspective, as they helped the Truman administration achieve what it viewed as higher purposes. This thought exercise encapsulates the consequentialist ethos.

We should note though that the proposed consequentialist foreign policy framework emphasizes the decision-making process regarding an intervention. It explains the rationale

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<sup>142</sup> Joyce Kaufman, *A Concise History of US Foreign Policy* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 82-83



behind ethically contestable interventions, which were nonetheless considered indispensable by the administration which engineered them, as they were considered indispensable to the strategic imperative of containing communism. In other words, violating its own principles in the short-term was expected to facilitate a long-term success for both the US and its allies. However, that has not always been the case, as several interventions have backfired, causing long-term complications for Washington; interventions such as those in Vietnam, or Iran, may have been informed by this consequentialist mindset, but they proved to be strategically unwise in the long-term.

Thus, consequentialist interventions have often led to entirely unwanted consequences for Washington. As the violation of deontological norms and practices is essentially a prerequisite to consequentialist interventionism, the rise of anti-American political actors and popular sentiments is entirely to be expected, especially if such interventions fail to achieve their long-term purpose. Additionally, as the first chapter showed, scholars generally believe that America's *wrongdoings* in Greece during the early Cold War alienated Greeks and distilled a powerful and systemic anti-American dynamic within Greek politics once the Junta collapsed in 1974 and throughout the decades that followed. This thesis will provide its own conclusions on that aspect, but there is no denying that interventions such as those in Iran or Cuba have not only failed strategically, but also caused long-term consequences for the US. Therefore, we should interpret consequentialist foreign policy as an interventionist ethos that prioritized American security and the US teleological struggle against communism, rather than an infallible strategic doctrine.

#### I. The Eisenhower administration

Truman's immediate successor provides us with several questionable interventions, such as the overthrow of the Iranian Mossadegh government. Mohammad Mossadegh was perceived as a potential threat, as his increasingly warmer relationships with the USSR in the

early 1950s could potentially block American access to Iranian oil. Thus, Eisenhower cleared *Operation Ajax*, which led to the return of the monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and the selection of Fazlollah Zahedi as Prime Minister.<sup>143</sup> The operation succeeded in imposing a strong pro-American Iranian government that supplied oil to the West on favorable terms, while serving Washington as a significant American ally, and that while bordering the USSR. In deontological terms, Iranian self-determination was unquestionably violated, as Mossadegh had been democratically elected; yet, in consequentialist terms, the coup was entirely justifiable, as it—briefly, as it turned out—maintained Iran within the American sphere of influence.

The same reasoning can apply to the 1954 Guatemalan coup. The Eisenhower administration believed that Jacobo Árbenz, who was supported by Guatemalan communists, personified the threat of losing Guatemala to communism.<sup>144</sup> To prevent this, Eisenhower permitted the overthrow of the Árbenz government, which alarmed the Soviets who in their turn decided to ship arms in defense of Árbenz. In response, a rapid Senate resolution initiated by future President, Lyndon Johnson—and which passed with a margin of 69 to 1—reaffirmed America’s opposition to Soviet interference in Latin America. As a result, the Árbenz government was overthrown and replaced by US-backed and CIA-trained dictator, Carlos Castillo, in another deontologically reprehensible yet entirely justifiable—from a consequentialist perspective—intervention.

## II. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations

We can also interpret the 1963 overthrow of the Vietnamese Diem administration through the proposed framework. John Kennedy’s belief that President Ngo Diem was

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<sup>143</sup> Powaski, 104

<sup>144</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know, rethinking Cold War history* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 100

incompetent in combating Northern Vietnamese communists caused significant tensions between the two leaders, with Kennedy deciding not to block a military coup against him, which led to his assassination.<sup>145</sup> In deontological terms, permitting a coup against a democratically elected president is impermissible, yet can be justified through a consequentialist lens because the higher purpose was to prevent Vietnam from falling to communism. This was an extreme manifestation of a broader pattern of consequentialist interventionism aimed at promoting and supporting pro-American actors in regions contested by the two superpowers.<sup>146</sup>

Likewise, we cannot but include the escalation of the Vietnam War by the Johnson administration in these examples. As Eric Goldman argues, despite Johnson's shallow foreign policy knowledge, he was as adamant as Kennedy that communism had to be contained. After the North Vietnamese attacked two US warships, Johnson pursued a congressional resolution to dispatch American troops in the region, which was approved with 416 to 0 votes in Congress and 81 to 2 in the Senate.<sup>147</sup> The gargantuan margins in favor of Johnson's Vietnam resolution—which mirror those of Eisenhower's Guatemalan one—show the bipartisanship that such foreign policy endeavors enjoyed. It was the Johnson administration that escalated the Vietnam War, making it an American conflict<sup>148</sup>—and unreservedly a must-win.

### III. The Nixon administration

Another indicative case study concerns Richard Nixon's opening to China. Sino-American relations had generally been bad since the communist revolutionaries' victory in 1949 in the Chinese Civil War, with America choosing to recognize Taiwan and the Republic

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<sup>145</sup> Powaski, 149

<sup>146</sup> Dov Levin, "When the Great Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results", *International Studies Quarterly*, 60:2 (June 2016), 192-200, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43869066>

<sup>147</sup> Eric Goldman, *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968), 378

<sup>148</sup> John Dumbrell, *President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 91

of China diplomatically, instead of Beijing and the People's Republic of China. Yet, in an astonishing move, Nixon capitalized on the Sino-Soviet split and successfully pursued an opening to China in 1969, famously declaring America's pledge to defend the Chinese against a potential Soviet attack.<sup>149</sup> Nixon's visits to China and the signing of several bilateral trade agreements demonstrate the merits of consequentialist interventionism. Although Maoist China was a polar opposite of the US on political and sociocultural levels, working with the Chinese communist regime was morally justifiable exactly because its outcome would be the further isolation of America's arch enemy—the USSR.

In an even more profound case, Nixon's intervention in Cambodia exposes once more his consequentialist approach. In 1970, the geopolitically neutral administration of Prince Norodom Sihanouk was deposed by a successful coup led by the right-wing general, Lon Nol, who established a military dictatorship. As a result of Nol's success, the North Vietnamese intervened in Laos, which mobilized the Nixon administration to support the Cambodian dictator. As Nixon put it, America's failure to support Nol would make her look like a "pitiful, helpless giant" and would allow "the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy [...] threaten free nations and institutions."<sup>150</sup> For Nixon's consequentialist policy, supporting a right-wing dictator was morally permissible, exactly because it would keep Cambodia safe from communism.

Finally, the Nixon administration provides us with another similar consequentialist intervention. When it seemed that the election of Salvador Allende as President of Chile was inevitable, Nixon decided first, to strangle the Chilean economy and second, allowed the CIA

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<sup>149</sup> Kissinger, (2014), 302-308

<sup>150</sup> Richard Nixon, *Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia*. Washington, April 30, 1970, American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-the-situation-southeast-asia-1>

to explore how Allende's electoral victory could be neutralized.<sup>151</sup> Allende was elected President in 1970 and governed until 1973 when General Augusto Pinochet proceeded with a successful coup against him, which also resulted in Allende's murder. Although the Nixon administration initially denied any participation in the coup and any provision of support towards Pinochet's authoritarian regime<sup>152</sup> later evidence suggests otherwise.<sup>153</sup> In another instance, thus, for the sake of containing communism in Latin America, Nixon justified the violent overthrow of a democratically elected government. The deontological alternative—respecting Chilean self-determination—would undermine America's Cold War end goal.

#### IV. The Carter administration

If Nixon is widely regarded as an immoral political agent due to the Watergate scandal that cost him the Presidency, the same does not apply to Jimmy Carter, as throughout American political history, no President has entered the White House with stronger deontological convictions. Carter regarded Washington's frequent political compromises as "morally wrong"<sup>154</sup> while he was a liberal internationalist who interpreted America's foreign policy through Wilsonian lenses<sup>155</sup> and resented the possibility of permitting American casualties abroad for the sake of political gains.<sup>156</sup> The force of Carter's deontological convictions was particularly manifested by his emphasis on protecting and promoting human rights during his Presidency, but also by his post-presidential career and his work at the Carter Center—for

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<sup>151</sup> Michael Genovese, *The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times* (Westport: Praeger, 1990), 150

<sup>152</sup> Kristian Gustafson, *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2007), 12

<sup>153</sup> Peter Winn, "Furies of the Andes" in *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America's Long Cold War*, eds. Gilbert M. Joseph and Greg Grandin (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 270

<sup>154</sup> Fred Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to George W. Bush* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 103

<sup>155</sup> Joseph Nye, *Do Morals Matter: Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 103-105

<sup>156</sup> Hendrik Hertzberg, "Jimmy Carter" in *Character Above All*, ed. Robert Wilson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 189

which he earned a Nobel Peace Prize in 2002. There is little doubt that Carter had a profound deontological disposition regarding American foreign policy—and politics in general.

Still, even Carter, the zealot moralist among the Cold War occupants of the White House, proceeded with consequentialist interventions in the name of containment. First, Carter intervened in Zaire, which had become increasingly susceptible to communist infiltration by Angolan rebels, by providing financial and military support to the authoritarian—but pro-Western—regime of Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko; as reprehensible as Mobutu's murderous reign probably seemed to Carter, he nonetheless supported it for the greater cause of Cold War American foreign policy. The Zaire situation shifted Carter's African policy from promoting racial justice to pursuing containment, just like his predecessors had done too.<sup>157</sup> In other words, Carter's deontological principles were compromised as he also espoused consequentialism to contain communism abroad.

But Carter's embrace of consequentialism did not end at Zaire. In the name of the new Sino-American entente—under the leadership of Mao's reformist successor, Deng Xiaoping—Carter proceeded in what was considered an unthinkable move up to that point, succumbing to Deng Xiaoping's pressure to recognize the People's Republic of China as the legitimate Chinese government. This meant that the US would terminate their longstanding diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, where the republican defeated side of the Chinese Civil War had escaped; in the words of Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, America and China should “cooperate again in the face of a common threat.”<sup>158</sup> Washington's abandonment of Taipei was entirely consequentialist, as Carter followed Nixon's lead and withdrew US support towards a long-term anti-Maoist and democratic ally to support communist China,

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<sup>157</sup> Powaski, 210

<sup>158</sup> Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill & Wang 1986), 88

exactly because this shift would serve the end goal of Cold War foreign policy: to isolate, weaken, and eventually defeat the USSR.

Finally, like his predecessors, Carter embraced consequentialism towards Iran. Since Eisenhower's time, the US provided unconditional support to Iran due to its proximity to the USSR for the sake of maintaining a crucial geopolitical advantage. To that end, and despite Pahlavi's poor human rights record, Carter provided him with all the military equipment that he had requested. In a remarkable statement during his 1977 visit to Tehran, Carter noted that under Pahlavi's "great leadership" Iran had become "an island of stability in one of the more troubled eras of the world."<sup>159</sup> Pahlavi's regime would be ousted two years later by the Islamic—and anti-American—regime of Ruhollah Khomeini. Still, Carter's support of Pahlavi—with whom he could not have been more incompatible in terms of moral principles—was another deviation from his deontological integrity—and another manifestation of consequentialist interventionism.

## V. The Reagan administration

Ronald Reagan's Iran-Contra affair is another profound indicative case that fits this study's proposed consequentialist framework. To overthrow the Nicaraguan Sandinistas' communist government, the Reagan administration backed their domestic opponents—the Contras—whose operations were funded by funds generated from American weapon sales to Ruhollah Khomeini's authoritarian regime in Iran. The key point is that Reagan had previously excluded the possibility of even discussing with Khomeini<sup>160</sup> urging Western Europeans to join the US embargo on Tehran.<sup>161</sup> With the Iran-Contra affair, Reagan crossed numerous deontological lines single-handedly, yet as David Houghton suggests, he viewed this initiative

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<sup>159</sup> Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 473

<sup>160</sup> George Herring, *The American Century and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 559-561

<sup>161</sup> Peter Kornbluh, and Malcolm Byrne, *The Iran–Contra Scandal: The Declassified History* (New York: New Press, 2003), 211-213

as entirely ethical, exactly because the end goal was to help the Contras defeat the Marxist administration of the Sandinistas.<sup>162</sup> Another aspect of this operation is that it disregarded Congress' right to control arms sales abroad.<sup>163</sup> The Iran-Contra affair could not reveal Reagan's consequentialism more.

The Reagan administration proceeded with more consequentialist interventions. After the Grenadian communist PM, Maurice Bishop, was murdered by his deputy, Bernard Coard, Reagan allowed an operation in which almost two thousand American soldiers invaded Grenada to depose the new Marxist government. Reagan's intervention was immediately condemned by both the United Nations and by Reagan's transatlantic ideological ally—and personal friend—British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, as a clear violation of international law and Grenada's sovereignty.<sup>164</sup> There is no question that Reagan's initiative disrespected Grenadian self-determination, but as his own words indicate, he justified it in consequentialist terms; America “had no choice but to act strongly” against “a brutal gang of leftist thugs.”<sup>165</sup> The Reagan administration also proceeded in similar covert interventions—mostly in terms of military and financial support—in Angola and Afghanistan, where pro-American forces rebelled against the respective communist governments.<sup>166</sup>

Reagan is frequently credited with “winning” the Cold War. Although typically the conflict ended during the George HW Bush administration, the clash between the US and the USSR practically ended in Reagan's time. The extent to which Reagan should be credited with this victory highly debated<sup>167</sup> but this is not the crucial element here. Instead, we should

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<sup>162</sup> David Patrick Houghton, *The Decision Point: Six Cases in US Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 49-50

<sup>163</sup> John Dumbrell, *American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton* (London: Macmillan, 1997), 120-121

<sup>164</sup> Maurice Walters, “The Invasion of Grenada and the Collapse of Legal Norms”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 23:3 (1986), 234-235, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/423822>. See also: Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 331

<sup>165</sup> “News Summary.” *The New York Times*, October 26, 1983, <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/26/nyregion/wednesday-october-26-1983-invasion-of-grenada.html>

<sup>166</sup> Powaski, 234

<sup>167</sup> Powaski, 260-261



emphasize how in his farewell address, the staunchest anti-communist occupant of the White House, and the one who had engineered these most questionable interventions for the sake of containment, summarized in just three words why his—and his predecessors’—interventions were justified: “America is freedom.”<sup>168</sup>

### **Cold War American Foreign Policy: a consequentialist worldview**

Peter Greys suggests that Republicans and Democrats have a different moral outlook on American foreign policy, because their political ideologies contain different values.<sup>169</sup> But as Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall correctly point out, all Cold War Presidents, from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan operated on the same set of assumptions regarding containment.<sup>170</sup> What these case studies indicate is that both Republican and Democrat administrations implemented ethically questionable interventions—from a deontological perspective at least—throughout the Cold War, because these served Washington’s wider goal of containment. More importantly, this thesis will show that the US consequentialist interventionism in Greece during the early Cold War was consistent across five different administrations, of which three were Republican and two were Democrat.

These indicative case studies reveal three fundamental points about Cold War American foreign policy. First, there has been no administration that has not proceeded with an ethically questionable intervention for the sake of containing communism; the examples from the Truman and Carter presidencies, who were self-proclaimed Wilsonians, clearly manifest this pattern. Second, even most realist Presidents, such as Nixon and Reagan, shared either directly

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<sup>168</sup> Ronald Reagan, *Farewell Address to the Nation*, Washington, January 11, 1989, American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/farewell-address-the-nation>

<sup>169</sup> Peter Grays, *The Politics of American Foreign Policy: how ideology divides Liberals and Conservatives over foreign affairs* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 97-98

<sup>170</sup> Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America’s Cold War: the politics of insecurity* (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2020), 352-353

or indirectly an affinity for the Wilsonian interpretation of international politics; as President, Nixon had a portrait of Wilson in his office<sup>171</sup> while Reagan “stood at the edge of Wilsonian moralism” according to Kissinger.<sup>172</sup> Walter Mead specifically uses Nixon as an ideal example to argue that realists like him had a deep conviction in the moral rightness of their actions, because they interpreted them as indispensable in the struggle against global communism and Soviet influence.<sup>173</sup> Evidently, the Wilsonian interpretation of America’s mission was a profound dynamic throughout Cold War American foreign policymaking—even during Nixon’s or Reagan’s time.

Third, these case studies indicate that this study’s proposed framework offers a new way to a series of controversial American interventions during the Cold War. The fact that consequentialism is not as easily digestible as deontology does not mean that it is a less credible ethical theory, as unsettling and disturbing as it may conceptually appear to be. And, in a way, consequentialism could not but inform the moral axis of Cold War American foreign policymaking. According to Arthur Schlesinger, the immense ideological conflict between America and the Soviet Union made the Cold War inevitable, making the containment of communism indispensable for Washington.<sup>174</sup> Robert Powaski concurs with Schlesinger and argues that “there was no alternative” to the Cold War because the competition between the two superpowers was incredibly profound and multidimensional.<sup>175</sup> As Powaski argues, the key element in the inevitability of the Cold War was the incompatibility of the two superpowers’ competing “manifest destinies.”

In other words, America had no alternative to emerging victorious from the Cold War. No matter how long—and what—it would take, failing to do so would signify that its value

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<sup>171</sup> Nye, (2020), 6

<sup>172</sup> Kissinger, (2014), 313-314

<sup>173</sup> Mead, 72-73

<sup>174</sup> Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. “Origins of the Cold War”, *Foreign Affairs*, 46 (1967), 147

<sup>175</sup> Powaski, 306-307

system would be replaced by that of the USSR; America would have failed in its mission. Powaski correctly points out that if this mission was based on Wilsonian idealism, so was the case with the Soviet Union and Vladimir Lenin's vision about the eventual victory of socialism.<sup>176</sup> The clash between these two contrasting teleological visions could not have been greater, while the two countries' geopolitical influence amplified it to a colossal extent. And at least in what concerns America, foreign interventionism was a precondition, if it was going to live up to her self-assigned role to serve the rest of the world through its principles.<sup>177</sup>

This is exactly the point where American exceptionalism and realism meet. Although they may seem incompatible, this study suggests that consequentialist foreign policy was the realist expression of missionary American exceptionalism within the realities of the Cold War. Francis Fukuyama, a skeptic of realism, admits that during the Cold War "realism was an appropriate framework for understanding international politics [...] because the world operated according to realist premises" yet "not so much because realist principles reflected timeless truths, but because the world was sharply divided between states of radically differing and mutually hostile ideologies."<sup>178</sup> In a way, this framework resonates with what Charles Krauthammer defines as "democratic realism" which explains America's urge to intervene in regions where the "defense or advancement of freedom is critical to success in the larger war against an existential element" which was the USSR.<sup>179</sup>

However, despite Krauthammer's acute observation, his definition is not entirely satisfactory. First, it would be problematic to associate some of the aforementioned interventions with the notions of "defense" and "advancement" of freedom as this can easily be dismissed as an attempt to sugarcoat extremely contestable foreign interventions. Instead,

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<sup>176</sup> Powaski, 296-298

<sup>177</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: the deals, the spies, the lies, the truth* (London: Penguin, 2007), 14

<sup>178</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 241

<sup>179</sup> Charles Krauthammer, "In Defense of Democratic Realism", *The National Interest*, September 1, 2004, <https://nationalinterest.org/article/in-defense-of-democratic-realism-699>

the consequentialist framework that this study proposes sees such interventions for what many—if not most—of them were: deontologically reprehensible and unsettling interventions that too often violated the intervened nations’ rights of self-determination, undermined their democratic governance, disrespected their citizens’ dignity and human rights, and left thousands, if not millions, suffering. But they can be nonetheless justified from a consequentialist viewpoint because they contributed to the containment of communism—the *telos* of America’s Cold War mission.

This study will show that American interventionism in Greece rarely defended or advanced Greeks’ freedom or self-determination. America’s support to the legitimate Greek government in the Greek Civil War, as well as its political interventionism during the 1950s and the 1960s, may have maintained Greece in the West but was only possible often through appalling means, violation of principles, and disrespect for Greeks’—and Greek-Cypriots’—rights. Likewise, America’s support for the Greek military Junta can never be interpreted as an American attempt to “defend and advance freedom” as Krauthammer puts it, since the Junta had nothing democratic in it and was a fully authoritarian, neo-fascist, regime, as chapter six will show. Thus, the case of Greece is one of the most appropriate ones to assess the impact of Cold War consequentialist interventionism, as it allows us to observe the specifics of highly controversial interventions, as well as the reason why they were consistently justified.

Finally, it is crucial to define how the proposed consequentialist foreign policy framework differs from standard realist premises. The essential difference is that, in realism, policymakers and academics accept that ethically dubious and unjustifiable policies are often necessary because of the bigger picture, which is the ugly and anarchic state of international politics. In other words, they believe that within international anarchy, there may be no alternative to the occasional use of questionable interventions like the indicative case studies above. Most realists still see such interventions as unethical, but suggest that morality, as

defined by liberal internationalists, cannot be prioritized; this is summarized by Mearsheimer's observations on "offensive realism" which characterizes great power interventionism as a fundamental mechanism to achieve international hegemony.<sup>180</sup> The proposed framework, however, argues that because of the influence of American exceptionalism in Cold War foreign policymaking, these questionable—and frequently reprehensible—interventions that America pursued on a global scale were not considered evil albeit mandatory, so to speak, but as the right thing to do because of the imperative to contain communism.

This detail is crucial in fully comprehending why what were horrendous interventions, from a deontological standpoint, were nonetheless justified by Washington. The proposed framework shows how assisting coups, supporting dictatorships, selling arms to authoritarian anti-communist regimes, or violating other nations' rights to self-determination were not considered unfortunate but necessary, as many realists would suggest, but instead as the only moral option available—either consciously or subconsciously—exactly because of the higher moral end that they served. But before this study embarks with its exploration of consequentialist interventionism in Greece, it must clarify its own ethical position. This study remains neutral towards the consequentialist approach; it recognizes its structure and ambitions, assesses its implementation on the Greek case, but does not side with consequentialism, or suggests that it was the morally right approach to take.

This chapter began with a quote by former National Security advisor, US ambassador to the UN, and CIA director, John Bolton. This thesis believes that, unknowingly, Bolton summarizes to an exceptionally good extent the consequentialist philosophy of Cold War American foreign policymaking—and this is not an arbitrary suggestion. In fact, Bolton himself has advocated that his foreign policy worldview is shaped by "a merger of Dean

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<sup>180</sup> Mearsheimer, (2014), 5-8

Acheson and John Foster Dulles.”<sup>181</sup> As the next chapters will show, the foreign policies of the administrations in which these two men served—but also these of their successors—encapsulate the essence of consequentialist foreign policy. And due to America’s almost thirty-year-long interventionism during the early Cold War, Greece is a most unique case study to observe its applications.

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<sup>181</sup> John Bolton, *The Room Where it Happened* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), 5

### **Chapter Three:**

#### **The Greek Civil War (1947-1949)**

*“The US is here to stay.”*

General James Van Fleet, late 1949

During the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, America and Greece fought together in both World Wars. The two countries first worked closely in the post-WWI peace talks in Versailles; in a rarely remembered moment, Woodrow Wilson met with the Greek liberal statesman, Eleftherios Venizelos, to discuss Greece’s post-WWI territorial claims in Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor.<sup>182</sup> Interestingly, Wilson believed that Venizelos was the most skilful European leader among all others in Versailles.<sup>183</sup> However, both were soon out of office and the interwar period saw little bilateral cooperation, as Washington re-embraced neutrality while Greece entered a period of interchanging short-lived democratic governments and dictatorships, with the last one before WWII being that of General Ioannis Metaxas, imposed in 1936. Metaxas would lead Greece’s initial resistance against the Axis powers.

#### **Greco-American relations and Franklin Roosevelt**

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<sup>182</sup> John Milton Cooper Jr., *Woodrow Wilson: a biography* (New York: Vintage, 2009), 491

<sup>183</sup> Samuel Chester, *Life of Venizelos, with a letter from His Excellency M. Venizelos* (London: Constable, 1921), 6-7

America neither opposed nor endorsed Metaxas' coup, remaining an observatory power, in a neutralist attitude typical of the interwar era.<sup>184</sup> However, Franklin Roosevelt was instrumental in gradually raising American awareness concerning the importance of foreign affairs; Roosevelt believed that the state of European politics was fundamental for global stability. Having served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the Wilson Presidency, Roosevelt shared Wilson's internationalist views regarding the formation of an international democratic world order—yet Wilson's political defeat convinced Roosevelt to maintain a more cautious approach concerning his internationalist approach and rhetoric.<sup>185</sup> Still, when Pearl Harbor was attacked, Roosevelt mobilized America swiftly and decisively, attributing to it the global democratic leadership status that it had rejected after WWI.<sup>186</sup> Roosevelt's renewed engagement with world affairs and wartime leadership laid the foundations for America's post-WWII hegemonic status in the West.

But in the interwar years, we can easily explain the Roosevelt administration's apparent indifference to Greece's democratic backsliding under Metaxas. That is because Roosevelt's pre-WWII presidency was restricted by the resurfaced non-interventionism of the interwar period. For non-interventionists, the US should remain neutral regarding foreign conflicts and affairs<sup>187</sup> and only by recognising this context can one understand Washington's indifference to Metaxas' regime. Ironically, however, Roosevelt was personally critical of non-interventionism and self-identified as an internationalist, but one who was not a proponent of direct interventionism—a position that he maintained until 1941.<sup>188</sup> Roosevelt's own foreign policy conceptualization clashed with the predominant isolationist sentiments in the US of the

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<sup>184</sup> Morgens Pelt, "The Establishment and Development of the Metaxas Regime in the Context of Nazi Fascism, 1936-41" *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 2:3 (2001), 143-172

<sup>185</sup> Ronald Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 36

<sup>186</sup> Herring, George, *The American Century and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 239

<sup>187</sup> Iwan Morgan, *FDR: Transforming the Presidency and Renewing America* (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), 187

<sup>188</sup> Tony McCulloch, *Tacit Alliance: Franklin Roosevelt and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' before Churchill, 1933-1940* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2022), 6



1930s<sup>189</sup> and with Greece being an insignificant geopolitical player in that political time, his administration's attitude towards Metaxas seems entirely reasonable.

Nothing highlights the Roosevelt administration's neutrality towards Metaxas' regime more than the state of Greco-American relations from 1936 to late October 1940, when Greece joined WWII. During this time, Washington was interested in establishing commercial and trade agreements with Athens<sup>190</sup> and did not consider the authoritarian character of Metaxas' regime as an impediment. Upon Greece's entry into the war, the Roosevelt administration paid closer attention to the Greco-Italian conflict of 1940-1941—while trying to navigate the increasingly tense debate between isolationists and interventionists—but could not intervene in favor of Greece. In an indicative example, Roosevelt did not respond to King George's II plea for “moral and material assistance” to the Greek cause, in which the King referred to the US as “guardians across the seas of the ideals for which throughout the centuries Greeks lived and died.”<sup>191</sup> Washington notified Athens in late 1940 that Roosevelt had given his personal “most sympathetic consideration” to Greeks' appeal for “financial assistance” but it remained “impracticable to act favorably on [Metaxas'] appeal at this time.”<sup>192</sup>

Greece's successful resistance to the Italian invasion was instead heavily supported by the UK, with PM Winston Churchill prioritizing this Anglo-Greek partnership. The British government supplied Greeks with military equipment in their effort to resist the subsequent Nazi invasion—and even sent British and Commonwealth troops to fight in mainland Greece to that end—while it secured the Greek government and King a safe escape to Egypt when the Greek resistance collapsed. Primarily due to Greece falling within the British sphere of

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<sup>189</sup> Ronald Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 41-42

<sup>190</sup> See indicatively FRUS/II(1937):308-323, or FRUS/II(1939):552-561

<sup>191</sup> King George II to Roosevelt, December 3, 1940. FRUS/III:473

<sup>192</sup> Hull to MacVeagh, December 18, 1940. FRUS/III:517

influence during WWII's early stages, American support towards Greece was limited.<sup>193</sup> Metaxas died in late January 1941 amidst the Nazi invasion, and constitutional mayhem followed; despite British support, the German troops eventually prevailed, entering Athens in late April and—with Crete falling soon after—a four-year Nazi occupation began.<sup>194</sup> With the newly-formed legitimate Greek government led by Emmanouil Tsouderos in-exile, the Nazis quickly installed a puppet government, appointing collaborationist General Georgios Tsolakoglou as PM.<sup>195</sup>

But Greece's 1940s nightmare had only started, as it was during the Nazi occupation that the groundwork for the Greek Civil War that tormented Greece throughout the decade was laid. At a time when Greek political entities were virtually non-existent, the—outlawed under Metaxas—KKE (Greek Communist Party) formed EAM (National Liberation Front), whose alleged purpose was to liberate Greece from fascism; EAM became rapidly popular among Greeks.<sup>196</sup> Most, however, could not identify KKE's hidden agenda, which was to control Greece once the Nazis were ousted.<sup>197</sup> Due to EAM's rise in popularity, support for—the largely marginalized since its foundation in 1918—KKE rose in unprecedented numbers, as it was the only political group that effectively countered the Nazi occupation.<sup>198</sup> KKE clashed with the Greek government in the Greek Civil War (1941-1949). This chapter will briefly explore how the two first phases of the Greek Civil War unfolded and will then focus on American interventionism during the Third Phase—when America's commitment to contain communism was first tested on the international level.

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<sup>193</sup> Theodore Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou, *Greece in the Twentieth Century* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 72

<sup>194</sup> Christopher Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949* (London: Hurst & Co., 2018), 63-64

<sup>195</sup> Thomas Gallant, *Modern Greece, from the War of Independence to the Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 249-250

<sup>196</sup> Stathis Kalyvas and Nikos Marantzidis, *Emfylio Pathi: 23 Erotiseis kai Apantiseis gia ton Emfylio* (Athens: Metaihmio, 2015), 145

<sup>197</sup> Gallant, 260-262

<sup>198</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, *Katastrofes kai Thriamvoi* (Athens: Papadopoulos, 2015), 152-154

### **First Phase (1941-1943)**

During the First Phase, KKE grew from a marginalized party to an indisputable force within Greek politics. Indicatively, in the interwar years, KKE's best electoral performance was 4.97% back in 1932; by 1943, KKE was confident that EAM's popularity during the occupation opened the road for a communist takeover. KKE's experience in covert operations, along with its strong ideological footprint, provided an alternative to the old clientelist and persistently unstable Greek political system.<sup>199</sup> But the increasing attacks of KKE's newly established paramilitary unit ELAS (Greek People's Liberation Army) on non-communist resistance groups exposed its ambition to take over Greece, when both the British and the American governments had formally aligned with the Greek State and its monarch, King George II.<sup>200</sup> By mid-1943 battles between EAM/ELAS and pro-monarchist EDES (National Republican League) became so frequent that, in October, the British Government terminated all military support to EAM/ELAS.

By March 1944, EAM/ELAS established the PEEA (Political Committee of National Liberation) as a parallel Greek government, exercising control over the countryside.<sup>201</sup> A few months prior, the first American intelligence regarding Greek communism was produced. American agents analyzed KKE's complex structure and highlighted its increasing influence in the Greek mountains, concluding that "it would be desirable [...] to root out communism in Greece."<sup>202</sup> Soon after, Lieutenant Colonel Florimond Duke wondered "what are we going to do about it?" suggesting that America should "organize" the non-communist Greek majority

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<sup>199</sup> David Brewer, *The Marshall Plan: Greece, the Decade of War: Occupation, Resistance and Civil War* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 67-71

<sup>200</sup> Woodhouse, 84-86 & 122-123

<sup>201</sup> Gallant, 259-261

<sup>202</sup> Inside Greece, November 26, 1943. CIA-RDP13X00001R000100400001-9

to “maintain a democratic government” and prevent leaving “the fate of the Balkans entirely up to Russia.”<sup>203</sup>

There are thus a few things to decipher from the First Phase of the Greek Civil War. First, KKE effectively transformed into a dominant political force while EAM/ELAS’ successes increased KKE’s influence even more. Second, the violent clashes between EAM/ELAS and EDES made reconciliation difficult. Third, its rule over the Greek countryside forced Washington to focus on Greek affairs for the first time. Fourth, America’s preliminary goal remained to unite Greeks against the Nazis; despite the British describing the situation as a “Civil War started by EAM/ELAS.”<sup>204</sup> Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote to the Greek ambassador that “Greek resistance groups” should “no longer dissipate their strength in internal quarrels” and support the “struggle against our common enemy.”<sup>205</sup> In principle, thus, Washington remained neutral.

## **Second Phase**

It briefly seemed like Washington’s wish would come true. In May 1944, the moderate Greek PM Georgios Papandreou invited Greece’s political groups in Lebanon—where the official Greek government was in exile—to form a government of national unity while both the UK and the US were represented through their ambassadors. The conference resulted in an agreement that re-organized the Greek forces and secured an armistice between the communist and monarchist paramilitary organizations. Yet, KKE retracted its confidence in the agreement, asking for revised terms and greater representation in Papandreou’s cabinet; concurrently, EAM/ELAS had gained increasingly more territory in rural Greece by summer 1944, as the

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<sup>203</sup> Interoffice Memo: Greek Mission, January 14, 1944. CIA-RDP13X00001R000100400001-9

<sup>204</sup> British Embassy (Athens) to State, December 22, 1943. FRUS/IV:172

<sup>205</sup> Hull to MacVeagh, December 23, 1943. FRUS/IV:176

Nazis were withdrawing.<sup>206</sup> Thus, the Greek balance of power remained unstable, while KKE's ambitions increased.

In June 1944, Churchill informed Roosevelt that he had reached an agreement with the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, to keep Greece within the Western sphere of influence. Churchill told Roosevelt that the Russians were "ready to let us take the lead in Greek business."<sup>207</sup> Roosevelt responded that he was largely "in agreement" with the British PM's proposal, yet cautioning him against appearing to establish "any post-war spheres of influence."<sup>208</sup> But Churchill then warned Roosevelt that once the Germans left, EAM/ELAS could easily take Athens, and by extension the entire country.<sup>209</sup> Churchill's tone convinced Roosevelt, who endorsed the British PM's "preparations to have in readiness a sufficient British Force to preserve order in Greece" allowing him to use American transport airplanes in the process.<sup>210</sup> Churchill soon formalized his agreement with Stalin at the Tolstoy Conference of 1944, with an infamous handwritten deal that sealed great power influence in Southeastern Europe. Britain would have a 90% influence over Greece to the USSR's 10%, handing Stalin control of Romania and Bulgaria.<sup>211</sup>

Churchill now expected that in the event of a communist insurrection in Greece, Stalin would not interfere. The merits of Churchill's preemptive thinking were demonstrated in December 1944, during the Battle of Athens; refusing to obey Papandreou's demands to give up their arms, EAM/ELAS organized a massive rally in Athens on December 3.<sup>212</sup> Violence erupted between EAM/ELAS and EDES members, with shootings occurring across the city.

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<sup>206</sup> Woodhouse, 160-170

<sup>207</sup> Churchill to Roosevelt, June 11, 1944. FRUS/V:121

<sup>208</sup> Roosevelt to Churchill, State to British Embassy, June 12, 1944. FRUS/V:123

<sup>209</sup> Churchill to Roosevelt, August 17, 1944. FRUS/V:137

<sup>210</sup> Roosevelt to Churchill, August 26, 1944. FRUS/V:139

<sup>211</sup> Albert Resis, "The Churchill-Stalin Secret 'Percentages' Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944," *American Historical Review*, 83 (1978), 372

<sup>212</sup> Gallant, 267-270

Churchill ordered the British forces stationed in Greece to defend the capital; the American ambassador, Lincoln MacVeagh, expressed the Roosevelt administration's displeasure with the deep British interference in Greek affairs.<sup>213</sup> Concurrently, MacVeagh informed the State Department that Churchill had advised the British General, Ronald Scobie, to "act as if he were in a conquered city where a local rebellion were in progress," assuring him that he would support him "on all action taken."<sup>214</sup> MacVeagh was familiar with Greek affairs, as he had served in Greece again from 1933 to 1941, during an uneventful era for Greco-American relations as already noted.<sup>215</sup>

The Roosevelt administration remained neutral—just like it had done during Metaxas—despite the initial communist gains. After MacVeagh reported that Scobie would probably lose the Battle of Athens, the State Department argued that "the US government will continue to refrain from interference in the affairs of other countries"<sup>216</sup> emphasizing the bigger picture of "resistance movements" contribution against Nazi Germany.<sup>217</sup> Roosevelt himself informed Churchill that Washington would not "take a stand [...] in the present course of events in Greece." Churchill expressed his disappointment at Roosevelt's stance, predicting that, if the British forces left, "a frightful massacre and an extreme left-wing regime" would rise, expressing his disappointment in Roosevelt's stance.<sup>218</sup> By mid-December, it became certain that a potential communist victory in Athens would seal Greece's fate, per Churchill's warnings, as "four-fifths of the mainland is controlled by ELAS" anyway.<sup>219</sup>

However, the arrival of additional British troops balanced the power between the two sides. Churchill even decided to travel to Athens and chair a conference to which all Greek

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<sup>213</sup> MacVeagh to State, December 5, 1944. FRUS/V:149

<sup>214</sup> Kirk to State, December 5, 1944. FRUS/V:150

<sup>215</sup> FRUS, "Lincoln MacVeagh"

<sup>216</sup> MacVeagh to State, December 11, 1944. FRUS/V:153

<sup>217</sup> Stettinius to MacVeagh, December 12, 1944. FRUS/V:156

<sup>218</sup> Roosevelt to Churchill, December 13, 1944. FRUS/V:159

<sup>219</sup> Kirk to State, December 18, 1944. FRUS/V:171

political leaders were invited, including the communists; although it was agreed that King George II would not return to Greece. Churchill left Athens without terminating the conflict.<sup>220</sup> Fighting restarted almost immediately, but under the leadership of John Hawkesworth the Greek Army gained access to the crucial port of Piraeus and started pushing the communists back. For fear of losing all their units, they decided to retreat to the countryside.<sup>221</sup> With British support, the Battle of Athens was decided in favor of the Greek government, while Roosevelt urged the new PM, Nikolaos Plastiras, to refrain from “reprisals” and secure “free democratic processes.”<sup>222</sup>

The Second Phase of the Greek Civil War leads us to a few more key observations. First, KKE’s defeat in the Battle of Athens was twofold; not only did the rebels miss a historic opportunity to emerge victorious, but their atrocities hindered their political legitimacy in the eyes of many moderates, both in Greece and abroad.<sup>223</sup> Second, this battle created unbridgeable division between the opposing sides, traumatizing Greeks’ perception of the other side’s motivations, with hatred taking over the country.<sup>224</sup> Third—and most important—Washington remained neutral.<sup>225</sup> Despite Churchill’s fervent support of the Greek government—and constant pressure on Roosevelt—America never picked a side in a liberated nation’s domestic affairs, prioritizing instead the final push against the Nazis, even at the expense of a victorious EAM/ELAS. Yet Roosevelt’s successor could not have taken a more different approach during the Third Phase.

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<sup>220</sup> Gallant, 237-239

<sup>221</sup> Woodhouse, 269

<sup>222</sup> Grew to MacVeagh, January 15, 1945. FRUS/VIII:57

<sup>223</sup> Thanos Veremis and Ioannis Kolliopoulos, *Moderni Ellada* (Athens: Pataki, 2013), 240-241

<sup>224</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 157-161

<sup>225</sup> John Iatrides, *Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist Second Round, 1944-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 282-283

## The failed reconciliation of 1945 - 1946

In February 1945, the two sides signed the Varkiza agreement, according to which communists would disarm and receive amnesty.<sup>226</sup> MacVeagh initially argued “the two delegations may have found a workable solution”<sup>227</sup> but the agreement was violated almost immediately by both sides as there was a vengeful attitude towards leftwing citizens by several state officials. Extreme-right paramilitary groups still engaged in violent acts against communists<sup>228</sup> while many rebels refused to give up their arms.<sup>229</sup> An indicative intelligence brief from March 1945 reported that although the agreement had “ended actual Civil War, political opinion in Greece remains widely diverse,” adding that the British “cannot afford a recurrence of violence”<sup>230</sup> without mentioning possible American interference. Roosevelt himself was rather cautious in the Yalta Conference of February 1945, opting to solidify the Grand Alliance between the US, the UK, and the USSR, instead of making post-war demands in Eastern Europe.<sup>231</sup>

However, only a few days later, Roosevelt died of a stroke and was succeeded by his Vice-President, Harry Truman. Roosevelt’s successor agreed that America should oversee—along with the rest of Yalta powers—future elections in Greece which were held in March 1946.<sup>232</sup> Crucially, KKE boycotted the elections, arguing that a plebiscite on the future of monarchy should precede them, protesting against the violence that Greek communists suffered—naming it as the “White Terror”—and arguing that elections would be unfair.<sup>233</sup> Hence, the right-wing Popular Party received 206 out of 354 seats, while the new PM

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<sup>226</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 161

<sup>227</sup> February 15, 1945. FRUS/VIII:65

<sup>228</sup> Gallant, 271-272

<sup>229</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 162-164

<sup>230</sup> Current Intelligence Study (8), “Balance of Political Forces in Greece”, April 6, 1945. CIA-DOC\_0000709434

<sup>231</sup> Ronald Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 62

<sup>232</sup> Byrnes to Truman, July 4, 1945. FRUS/VIII:82

<sup>233</sup> Kalyvas and Marantzidis, 311-312



Konstantinos Tsaldaris, a fervent anticommunist, proceeded with the plebiscite in September 1946, which reaffirmed King George II's return with 68%.<sup>234</sup> In December 1946, after months of small-scale conflicts, KKE formed its new military branch, DSE (Democratic Army of Greece), intending to revolt against the Greek government—enjoying the USSR's and Yugoslavia's covert support.<sup>235</sup>

### **The Third Phase (1947-1949)**

In early 1947, the CIA focused heavily on Greece. In January, the CIA reported that “well-organized hostilities” and “killings in Athens [...] is an important factor in weakening the Government's position,”<sup>236</sup> highlighting the Greek Army's poor morale due to the British “refusal to supply additional arms.”<sup>237</sup> The rebels soon started capitalizing on their access to Yugoslavia and other Soviet satellite-states, which gave them a crucial strategic advantage.<sup>238</sup> KKE's collaboration with Greece's northern communist countries profoundly alarmed MacVeagh regarding the course of the conflict.<sup>239</sup> Worse still, Churchill's successor, Labour PM Clement Atlee, departed from his predecessor's strong position and informed Washington about his intention to end Britain's commitments in Greece,<sup>240</sup> with the British Embassy urging Washington to take over Greece's defense as soon as April 1.<sup>241</sup>

But the Truman administration immediately reversed Roosevelt's neutral approach. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson suggested that Washington should unite Greek

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<sup>234</sup> Veremis and Koliopoulos, 248

<sup>235</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 165-166

<sup>236</sup> Intelligence Report: Attempts to form a Coalition Government, January 13, 1947. CIA-RDP82-00457R000200600002-5

<sup>237</sup> Intelligence Report: Lack of Greek Army Material, January 13, 1947. CIA-RDP82-00457R000200600013-3

<sup>238</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 161-163

<sup>239</sup> MacVeagh to State, February 7, 1947. FRUS/V:13

<sup>240</sup> Peter Boyle, “The British Foreign Office and American Foreign Policy, 1947-48,” *Journal of American Studies*, 16:3 (1982), 373-378, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27554198>

<sup>241</sup> British Embassy to State, February 21, 1947. FRUS/V:25

democratic parties against KKE, provide direct loans to Greece, and supply the Greek army with significant aid.<sup>242</sup> Secretary of State George Marshall also suggested that the Truman administration should prepare appropriate legislation which would permit the US to assume the protection of Greece—and Turkey—against their internal communist threats.<sup>243</sup> Soon, Acheson elaborated that, without American aid, Greek and Turkish “independence” will “not survive,” arguing that their collapse could mean that “the rest of the Middle East will fall under Russian control.”<sup>244</sup> This is one of the first signs of Americans’ belief in *domino theory*, which the previous chapter analyzed and which informed to a massive extent the conceptualization of Cold War American foreign policymaking. The State Department concluded that without Britain there was “only this choice” as otherwise America would “face the consequences of a widespread collapse of resistance to Soviet pressure.”<sup>245</sup>

Thus, less than ten days after the British government expressed its intention to leave, Truman was about to make a historic decision. Marshall advised the President that “the situation in Greece is desperate” and that its collapse “would create a situation threatening to the security of the US”; thus “immediate steps” were required to “extend all possible aid to Greece and, on a lesser scale, to Turkey.”<sup>246</sup> Marshall added that although similar interventions could be required in other areas that were “now” being studied by the Department, the “time factor for Greece” required “immediate action.” Marshall also noted that “interest in Greece is by no means restricted to humanitarian or friendly impulses” because if the Civil War went badly, then Greece could probably “emerge as a communist state under Soviet control.”<sup>247</sup> This was a very early manifestation of America’s consequentialist foreign policy.

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<sup>242</sup> Acheson to State, February 21, 1947. FRUS/V:23

<sup>243</sup> Memorandum, February 24, 1947. FRUS/V:28

<sup>244</sup> Memorandum, February 24, 1947. FRUS/V:31

<sup>245</sup> Memorandum, undated, 1947. FRUS/V:33

<sup>246</sup> Marshall to Truman, February 26, 1947. FRUS/V:36

<sup>247</sup> Marshall to Truman, February 27, 1947. FRUS/V:37

Marshall's words of warning reveal how Washington already feared the potential expansion of communism in Western Europe. Marshall noted that "the effect" of losing Greece to communism "upon Hungary, Austria, Italy and France cannot be overestimated" and that Greece was evidently "the first crisis of a series which might extend Soviet domination to Europe," warning simultaneously that there was "no assurance" that the situation could be saved "without American assistance." Marshall concluded that "the choice is between acting with energy or losing by default." Truman was so convinced, as he noted in his memoirs, that upon reading the State Department's memos, he decided to extend aid to both Greece and Turkey, urging Congress to act fast.<sup>248</sup>

On February 27, Truman invited Congressional leaders to explain the significance of keeping Greece within the Western sphere of influence. Although some were not enthusiastic about the prospect of allocating millions for Greece's—and Turkey's—defense, Truman managed to convince them to support his initiative.<sup>249</sup> According to Henry Kissinger, Marshall's and Acheson's personal interventions were instrumental, because they emphasized how Washington's potential failure to defend Greece would allow the Soviet sphere of influence to gain an immense advantage in a crucial geopolitical location.<sup>250</sup> That was a turning point for American foreign policy as, of all places, the Greek countryside would transform into the first test of Washington's ability to contain communism and achieve what would become its imperative. The Cold War—and the era of consequentialist interventionism—was about to begin.

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<sup>248</sup> Harry Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1952* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956), 103

<sup>249</sup> Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (London: Penguin, 2011), 90-92

<sup>250</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 455-460

## The Truman Doctrine

On March 12, 1947, Truman delivered a highly ideological speech before Congress which defined the scope of Cold War American foreign policymaking. The President argued that “it must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” and “assist free peoples to work out their own destinies.” Truman noted that all nations stood before two “alternative ways of life”: one was “based upon the will of the majority and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression”; the second was “based upon the will of the minority forcibly imposed [...] relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.”<sup>251</sup>

Truman’s conclusion reveals both his ideological and geopolitical rationale. In his words, “should [America] fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour [...] the effects will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East” hence “immediate and resolute action” was indispensable. The domino theory resonates in these lines, while Truman embraced Acheson’s fears that a loss of Greece to communism could cause a rise of communist movements in other neighboring nations in Europe and the Middle East. Through the Truman Doctrine, the US formally took over Greece’s protection from the UK, as otherwise, the country would inevitably fall to communism.<sup>252</sup> The Truman Doctrine was a turning point in American history and foreign policymaking because it demonstrated both how the US viewed its role as the leader of the free world, and the USSR as its menacing threat.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>251</sup> David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 547

<sup>252</sup> Geir Lundestad, *International Relations since 1945: East, West, North, South* (London: SAGE, 2018), 31

<sup>253</sup> Jefferey Frank, *The Trials of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), 116-117

Undoubtedly, Truman's speech was not addressed solely to the Greek and Turkish sides but sent a message across Europe. The Truman Doctrine was America's announcement that from that point onwards Washington would commit its forces to the defense of foreign nations against communism.<sup>254</sup> Moreover, it established the USSR and Soviet satellite-states as the US' ideological and geopolitical enemies, making American national security synonymous with the containment of communism on a global scale.<sup>255</sup> The Truman Doctrine was America's first of many interventions to defend Western Europe against communist infiltration, in either economic or military terms, emphasizing the importance of suppressing national communist movements before they threatened the geopolitical balance that favored Washington's struggle against communism in the region.<sup>256</sup> The Truman Doctrine is one of the most representative examples of how Americans understood themselves as the promoters and protectors of freedom at the macro level and which has defined the conceptualization of American foreign policy<sup>257</sup> while its principles enjoyed strong bipartisan support.<sup>258</sup>

Thus, the strong Wilsonian influence on Truman's speech added ideological legitimacy to the US' emergence as the protector of freedom and democracy on the world stage against Soviet authoritarianism. This should not come as a surprise, as Truman manifested his strong Wilsonian convictions; as Joseph Nye argues, although Truman was not charismatic, cosmopolitan, or rhetorically gifted, he was very ideological in what concerned America's role towards the world. Nye adds that Truman had a genuinely Wilsonian view of American exceptionalism, which allowed him to portray the situation in Greece in ideological terms to

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<sup>254</sup> John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 218-220

<sup>255</sup> Steven Hook and John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II* (London: SAGE Publications, 2019), 36-38. See also: Glenn Hastedt, *American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future* (Lanham, ML: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 32-33

<sup>256</sup> Richard Saull, "American Foreign Policy during the Cold War" in *American Foreign Policy*, eds. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 84

<sup>257</sup> John Callaghan, with Brendon O'Connor and Mark Phythian, *Ideologies of American Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2019), 21-23

<sup>258</sup> Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, *Ethical Realism: A Vision for America's Role in the World* (New York: Pantheon, 2006), 11

inspire the American people.<sup>259</sup> In other words, Truman used the necessity to aid Greece and Turkey to make a wider point about American foreign policy against communism; Truman placed Soviet authoritarianism as the ideational and existential foe of American liberalism—much like Wilson had done with the Central Powers. Thus, the Truman Doctrine should be interpreted as a contemporary expression of missionary exceptionalism, which explains why this highly interventionist turn in American foreign policy was well-received.

However, several scholars have highlighted what they see as the shallow morality of the Truman Doctrine. George Herring for instance suggests that this doctrine was solely an ambitious geopolitically initiative that paid little attention to the poor democratic integrity of the Greek government and mainly focused on helping it defeat a domestic communist insurrection.<sup>260</sup> According to Herring, the fear of a European *bandwagon* effect behind the USSR was the real locomotive of the Truman Doctrine, instead of any serious ideological concerns about the democratic future of Greece and Turkey. Michael Schafer agrees and suggests that the fear of a communist takeover in Greece led Truman to disregard the fact that the legitimate Greek government was not the epitome of democratic integrity.<sup>261</sup> Likewise, Kissinger affirms that the line of domestic criticism of Truman's initiative was that his administration pledged to support states which were not exactly considered beacons of democratic integrity<sup>262</sup> was far from inaccurate.

There is no doubt that this realist geopolitical component was extraordinarily strong—and perhaps the defining variable of the Truman Doctrine. After all, despite his Wilsonian tendencies, Truman had already shown his consequentialist thinking as a Senator during WWII

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<sup>259</sup> Joseph Nye, *Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 54-55

<sup>260</sup> George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Policy Relations Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 613-618

<sup>261</sup> Michael Schafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 174-179

<sup>262</sup> Kissinger, (1994), 455-457

when he had said that “if we see that Germany is winning, we have to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible.”<sup>263</sup> In that sense, the Truman Doctrine redefined the scope of American foreign policy during the Cold War; per Ronald Powaski, the Truman Doctrine “proved to be the first step in a global ideological crusade against communism.”<sup>264</sup> The two-dimensional worldview between the two ways of life that Truman spoke about, set a precedent for how American foreign policymakers would conceptualize the struggle against communism throughout the Cold War, becoming a blueprint for future American interventions in the name of containment.<sup>265</sup>

In hindsight, the Truman Doctrine was both an ideological and a geopolitical endeavor. Undoubtedly, maintaining Greece—and Turkey—within the American sphere of influence would keep the entire Eastern Mediterranean under Washington’s control, while Americans’ access to the Middle East would remain safe. But by relying on a strong Wilsonian narrative, Truman attributed noble and strongly ideational elements to what was otherwise a realist foreign policy vision, which transformed the Cold War from a purely geopolitical contest against communism into a “moral crusade for the free world” as Kissinger puts it.<sup>266</sup> The struggle between the USSR’s radically different sociopolitical system compared to that of the US and Western Europe was reflected in the Greek conflict, and thus keeping Greece in the West was both a geopolitical and a moral imperative. These are the two foundations of the Cold War consequentialist foreign policy that Truman and his successors pursued, while Washington’s consequentialist interventionism started with the Truman Doctrine.

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<sup>263</sup> Raymond Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 108

<sup>264</sup> Powaski, 72

<sup>265</sup> John Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 352. See also: Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America’s Cold War: the politics of insecurity* (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2020), 110-112

<sup>266</sup> Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (London: Penguin Books, 2014), 287-288

## Implementing the Truman Doctrine

The Greek government's reaction to Truman's initiative was overwhelmingly positive. The PM of the rightwing coalition government, Dimitrios Maximos, and the liberal leader of the official opposition, Themistoklis Sophoulis, wrote to Truman to express Greeks' gratitude for American aid<sup>267</sup> while only a few days later, the Greek Army submitted its first formal request for American military equipment.<sup>268</sup> By April, the American Economic Mission to Greece estimated that a military aid of \$181 million would be required until June 1948, while another \$335 million would be allocated towards a five-year reconstruction program.<sup>269</sup> Throughout this time, Greek governments were expected to proceed with certain reforms in the public sector, and facilitate industrial and agricultural activities, under the guidance of American technocrats.

This indicates Washington's long-term plans for Greece. Saving Greece from communism may have been at the forefront of Truman's agenda, yet the administration realized that the Greek government should concurrently implement reforms that would secure long-term recovery and economic prosperity which would function as a barrier against another insurrection. The Maximos government recognized this parameter as well and thus requested that American aid would not be limited solely to military supplies, but that it would expand to the provision of expertise to reorganize the Greek economy and public sector.<sup>270</sup> This is essential for our understanding of the American objectives in helping Greece, as American aid was not restricted solely to funding a military campaign against the rebels but aimed instead at reforming the Greek State in social and economic terms, which would ensure long-term

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<sup>267</sup> Wilson to State, March 14, 1947. FRUS/V:82

<sup>268</sup> Keeley to State, March 18, 1947. FRUS/V:90

<sup>269</sup> Memorandum, April 3, 1947. FRUS/V:101

<sup>270</sup> Wilson to Embassy (Turkey), April 4, 1947. FRUS/V:103



political stability and a higher standard of living.<sup>271</sup> In that sense, communism would be rooted out of Greece through both military and institutional means.

Unsurprisingly, implementing the Truman Doctrine had international implications. Warren Austin, the American representative to the United Nations, delivered a speech in April, arguing that American military and financial aid aimed at securing the principles of “equal rights and self-determination” of the peoples, aligned with UN’s principles.<sup>272</sup> Austin added that American aid did not constitute interference with either Greek or Turkish affairs, noting that both would pledge to proceed to “reasonable undertakings [...] which provide the US with proper safeguards against the improper utilization of assistance furnished.” A tense internal debate concerning whether America should bring the matter to the UN preceded Austin’s careful UN statement. Interestingly, one of the main arguments that the Truman administration considered against making a statement was that it would imply a “guilty conscience” about American interference in both countries.<sup>273</sup>

In the meantime, the rebels were ready to wage a full-out war against the government. In early April, American intelligence informed that KKE’s leader, Nikos Zachariadis, had excluded any conciliatory approach. The CIA reported that moderate rebels were gradually pushed out—suggesting that some were murdered by their comrades—since rebel leaders believed that a surrender to the Greek Army as a gesture of good faith could bring them before governmental firing squads.<sup>274</sup> Interestingly, the report concluded that a moderate Greek government that would guarantee the safety and security of surrendered rebels could potentially convince many rebels to distance themselves from Zachariadis’ hardline attitude.

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<sup>271</sup> Evanthis Hatzivasileiou, “Anamesa ston mytho kai tis (ekaterothen) emmones: Ellada kai IPA ston psihro polemo,” in *O Psihros Polemos*, ed. Theodoros Karvounarakis (Athens: Sideris, 2012), 239-261

<sup>272</sup> Statement by US representative at UN, April 10, 1947. FRUS/V:105

<sup>273</sup> Rusk to Acheson, March 18, 1947. FRUS/V:89

<sup>274</sup> Intelligence Report: Schism in Greek Leftist Forces, April 3, 1947. CIA-RDP82-00457R000400740001-9

Moreover, Truman's initiative turned Washington into an arch enemy of the rebels. Up to that point, Greek communists considered the British as their main foe and called for Greek independence against "English and neo-fascist slavery."<sup>275</sup> The embrace of American aid by both government and opposition immediately fueled anti-American sentiments within the Greek left; in a very short time, KKE and its sympathizers were openly calling American aid a "changing of the guards" of foreign occupation.<sup>276</sup> Zachariadis himself rejected entirely the Truman Doctrine, accusing it as a projection of "north-American imperialism" and "monarcho-fascism" while KKE called Americans as "conquerors" and attacked the government's "American-driven" initiative to restrict communist activity.<sup>277</sup>

However, in the first weeks of America's first intervention in Greece, Washington tried to discourage excessive violence towards captured rebels. Marshall ordered the American embassy in Athens to advise the government that "the US government has long favored an effective amnesty"<sup>278</sup> while two days later he argued that no increase of violent "anti-bandit operations" was to be encouraged at that time.<sup>279</sup> Although in the spring of 1947 the State Department considered the "weakening of the guerilla movement" as an ultimate aim, the Greek government was advised to "take exceptional measures to win general sympathy."<sup>280</sup> In hindsight, we can see that American aid to Greece did not initially aim at annihilating all Greek communist forces, but favored the suppression of rebel activity as a key requirement for Greek stability and recovery. In 1947, the Civil War seemed winnable relatively easily.

But by late May the rebels had organized militarily, establishing simultaneously a robust support network with Greece's communist neighbors. American intelligence reported

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<sup>275</sup> Intelligence Report: Radio Broadcasts of the Democratic Army of Greece, May 1, 1947. CIA-RDP82-00457R000500640003-7

<sup>276</sup> Zinovia Laliouti, *O Antiamerikanismos stin Ellada 1947-1989* (Athens: Asini Press, 2016), 72-73

<sup>277</sup> Ibid, 78-81

<sup>278</sup> Marshall to Embassy (Greece), May 5, 1947. FRUS/V:126

<sup>279</sup> Marshall to Embassy (Greece), May 7, 1947. FRUS/V:127

<sup>280</sup> Marshall to Embassy (Greece), May 14, 1947. FRUS/V:134

that an “International Brigade” was being formed and awaited directions from KKE’s “Democratic Government” while the approximately 17.500 rebels had reportedly received “a substantial amount of arms” from Albania.<sup>281</sup> To that end, the Greek embassy in Washington attempted to steer the State Department towards providing further military support, noting that Greece was in a “veritable state of war” as the rebels “aimed at the suppression of Greece’s independence.”<sup>282</sup> Soon, MacVeagh confirmed Greeks’ concerns, reporting that “seriousness of the situation [is] not exaggerated” and arguing that “important military decisions [will be] likely necessary in opening stages of American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG).”<sup>283</sup>

The Greek government kept pushing Washington for supplemental military support as well. MacVeagh and Marshall reflected on the situation and concluded that the State Department’s initial military aid would give “virtually no advantage” to the Greek army while noting that due to the urgency of the situation the “Greek government should be at liberty [...] to suppress the communists’ activities in Greece” asking for relevant instructions to the American embassy in Athens.<sup>284</sup> Gradually, MacVeagh moved closer to the Greek government’s position, arguing that parliamentary political parties should proceed with uniting statements as “communist menace [is] now clearly threatening [the] integrity of the country.”<sup>285</sup>

Marshall was convinced. The Secretary of State argued that the administration “should not interpose” with the Greek government’s “conclusion that arrest of communist leaders is necessary.” However, he added that the Greek government should also “exercise particular care to ensure that the persons arrested are in fact leaders of [the] communist party,” cautioning against political arrests as “these leaders are not being arrested for their thoughts or ideas but

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<sup>281</sup> Intelligence Report: KKE Military Information, May 21, 1947. CIA-RDP82-0057R000600190003-6

<sup>282</sup> Memorandum, June 13, 1947. FRUS/V:157

<sup>283</sup> MacVeagh to Marshall, June 18, 1947. FRUS/V:162

<sup>284</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, June 21, 1947. FRUS/V:165

<sup>285</sup> MacVeagh to Marshall, July 2, 1947. FRUS/V:169

for individual illegal acts.”<sup>286</sup> Following Marshall’s lead, MacVeagh told the Greek government that it had become evident how “EAM maneuver cannot be considered apart from general communist campaign against Greece’s territorial integrity” arguing again that “all national-minded Greek leaders” should engage in a “patriotic ideal of unity at a time of crisis.” Still, MacVeagh characterized a “broad collaboration among jealous Greek politicians” as a “miracle.”<sup>287</sup> The prospect of a moderate Greek government seemed increasingly improbable.

While political instability tormented Athens, the rebels’ attacks were becoming increasingly effective in the countryside. Soon, Marshall informed Truman that “the Greek situation has taken a serious turn in the last three days” and provided the President with a synopsis of the rebels’ latest activity in Northern Greece, while noting that “the likelihood of Civil War is considerable.”<sup>288</sup> Within the following two weeks, American intelligence reported twice that the rebels’ operations were assisted by Albanians and Bulgarians.<sup>289</sup> The latter report commented that the Greek Army was inefficient in countering the rebels’ tactics as its units were not able to “conduct simultaneous operations against the guerillas in western and eastern Greece.”<sup>290</sup>

By the end of July, the question of providing Greece with additional military assistance became more relevant than ever. Indicatively, the CIA seconded the State Department’s intention to estimate whether “the size of the Greek army forces is adequate to put down increasingly grave guerilla threats.”<sup>291</sup> After noting that “AMAG had previously refused to support any increase in the permanent size of the Greek army,” the CIA argued that “more

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<sup>286</sup> Marshall to Embassy (Greece), July 3, 1947. FRUS/V:171

<sup>287</sup> MacVeagh to Marshall, July 7, 1947. FRUS/V:173

<sup>288</sup> Marshall to Truman, July 16, 1947. FRUS/V:187

<sup>289</sup> Critical Situations, Main Guerrilla effort may be in Macedonia, July 19, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900010003-0

<sup>290</sup> Critical Situations, Bulgarian Aid to Guerrillas reportedly increased, July 23, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900010003-0

<sup>291</sup> Critical Situations, US Considering advisability of increasing Greek Army, July 29, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900010003-0

recently” American officials judged that “increases should be permitted to enable the Army to contain the communist forces.” The CIA concluded that “political leaders in Athens [are] convinced that Greece will be saved by US aid or not at all.” In a previous memo, the CIA had reported that there was significant “public resentment against the indiscriminate political arrest [...] carried out by the Greek government” but also that northern Greeks who were subject to guerilla activities appeared “increasingly to assume that US aid will improve the military and economic situation.”<sup>292</sup>

Washington had identified itself with the interests of the Greek State, hence the State Department produced a detailed memo entitled “The Greek Situation,” exploring further actions. This memo confirmed that “the situation in Greece has deteriorated seriously” and that “the Greek Communists have openly proclaimed their aim to establish a revolutionary government in areas held by the Greek rebels and armed attacks of considerable strength have been made.”<sup>293</sup> After noting that the UN was incapable of protecting “Greek independence” the memo discussed the international implications of an “extremely explosive situation [...] which may easily become the precursor of what the communists would term a Greek Civil War” and which would bring “hostilities between the Soviet-dominated Balkan States and Greece.” The memo also raised the possibility that “Greek independence and territorial integrity can no longer be maintained.”

Marshall had already reflected on the Greek situation to optimize subsequent American aid. Marshall believed that “the situation in Greece today should be viewed against the background of a world-wide Communist effort to subvert governments and institutions not already subservient to the Soviet Union,” adding that the end goal of the communist activity

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<sup>292</sup> Critical Situations, Public Resentment against indiscriminate political arrests, July 28, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900010003-0

<sup>293</sup> Griswold to Marshall, July 17, 1947. FRUS/V:188

was “1) to set up in Greece a Communist-controlled government which would force Greece into a Soviet-dominated Balkan bloc; and 2) to separate Macedonia from the remainder of Greece in order to make Grecian Macedonia part of a Yugoslav or Balkan Federation.”<sup>294</sup> Marshall added that “there is a possibility that organized Communist groups are now being made ready in other countries to go to Greece to furnish direct military support to the guerrillas.”

Again, Marshall’s position reveals the war’s significance for Washington’s containment strategy. Marshall argued that those were the “maintenance of the independence and integrity of Greece, specifically to keep Greece from falling into the Soviet orbit” and the “development of the economy of Greece on a self-sustaining basis as soon as possible” noting that America desired “to see in Greece a government whose members are firmly united in their loyalty to Greece and who are primarily interested in keeping their country from falling under Communist control or Soviet domination.” Although Marshall commented on a “tendency on the part of certain elements in the Greek Government to employ strong measures” he argued that America “cannot afford to intervene in Greek political affairs to the extent of imposing a government of our own choice.” Containing Greek communism had become a priority compared to preserving Greece’s democratic and institutional integrity.

By early August, the tone of American officials largely echoed Marshall. For instance, MacVeagh informed Marshall that he shared his support for using “every non-interventional influence at disposal” suggesting however that the State Department should perhaps “consider whether it can afford to make [the] decision to send troops contingent on [the] prior agreement of Greek politicians to broaden Government.”<sup>295</sup> Soon after, MacVeagh reported that “guerrillas [are] now terrorizing more extensive areas than ever, despite repeated sweeps of

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<sup>294</sup> Marshall to Griswold, July 11, 1947. FRUS/V:179

<sup>295</sup> MacVeagh to Marshall, August 5, 1947. FRUS/V:228

Greek Army,” urging Marshall to “consider whether AMAG [...] can be expected provide all necessary answers to present and future problems involving Greek national security and Greek sector of security of Near and Middle East.” MacVeagh concluded that first, the “deterioration may proceed too rapidly to allow time for reformation in [the] Greek Army” and, second, that “recruitment and increased armament may be provided to guerrillas from outside Greece.”<sup>296</sup>

By the end of the month, the administration realized that Greece’s independence was under serious threat. To that end, MacVeagh invited Tsaldaris and Sophoulis—the leaders of the Popular and the Liberal parties respectively—and told them how Washington hoped “that Greek political leaders may get together to form an effective government with broad national support” in “a very critical moment for Greece.”<sup>297</sup> On August 29, PM Maximos resigned and by September 10 Tsaldaris and Sophoulis reached an agreement. Simultaneously, the termination of formal diplomatic relations between Greece and its northern communist neighbors—to which the rebels had access—impacted the morale of the Greek armed forces.<sup>298</sup> Thus, by the time Maximos resigned, the domestic balance of power seemed to shift towards the rebels’ side—a prospect that undoubtedly alarmed the US.

### **An assessment of American aid in the early Third Phase**

There are a couple of things to decipher concerning the conceptualization and the initial implementation of the Truman Doctrine. First, the Truman administration was not ambivalent as to whether it should support the defense of the Greek State, which was a significant deviation from Roosevelt’s neutral approach. As soon as the British Labour administration notified the Americans that it could no longer support Greece’s defense, the Truman administration

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<sup>296</sup> MacVeagh to Marshall, August 21, 1947. FRUS/V:245

<sup>297</sup> MacVeagh to Marshall, August 26, 1947. FRUS/V:258

<sup>298</sup> Woodhouse, 370-372

reflected on which would be the optimal way for America to take over Britain's role—but never doubted whether it should do so in the first place. Second, although the Truman Doctrine was an unquestionably bold geopolitical endeavor—and one dressed in highly ideological Wilsonian rhetoric—it primarily aimed at providing Greece and Turkey with financial aid to defeat communism in the long run. In other words, military aid to Greece was designed to be indirect; Truman himself initially argued that “help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.”<sup>299</sup>

The earliest declassified documents that followed Truman's speech demonstrate that he was sincere in this belief. Although the rebels' activity was a constant problem, Washington initially believed first, that through financial aid the Greek political system would unite against the rebels and second, that the Greek Army would be able to contain communist activity with modest military supplies. The administration's initial reluctance to allow the Greek government to increase its military personnel as well as to provide Greeks with additional military aid is indicative of America's initially cautious approach. By summer, however, the rebels' resilience and the Greek Army's inefficiency proved that further military assistance would be indispensable. A crucial element during the period in question was the belief that KKE's Democratic Army was practically winning, taking full advantage of its advanced guerilla tactics, which nullified the Greek Army's numerical advantage, causing its morale to drop significantly.<sup>300</sup>

Third—and most important—the Greek situation was gradually becoming a critical geopolitical matter for Washington. By the summer of 1947, American officials had become overly concerned about the rebels' support networks with Greece's northern communist countries, which could eventually give KKE's Democratic Army an unparalleled tactical

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<sup>299</sup> McCullough, 547

<sup>300</sup> Woodhouse, 363-365



advantage against the Greek Army, as they could strategically cross the border to retreat and recover. American concerns materialized, as by mid-1947 and until 1948 the rebels' support networks became vital for their operations.<sup>301</sup> This crucial aspect of the Greek situation convinced the administration that to keep Greece within the West, it should provide it with additional aid. The rebels' increased mobilization through their support networks was a fearful juxtaposition with the largely divided Greek political system and the Greek Army's inefficiency, making the prospect of Greece collapsing to communism in due time increasingly more probable.

### **The rebels' momentum**

By autumn, the rebels had proved beyond any doubt that the American concerns were entirely reasonable. In September, KKE's central committee implemented the plan "Lakes" according to which a military unit of 60.000 men would be formed to take over the region of Macedonia in Northern Greece and establish a provisional capital in Thessaloniki.<sup>302</sup> To that end, the rebels drafted almost any person that they found in the rural regions that they controlled; according to Markos Vafiadis, one of the rebel leaders, voluntary enlistments in KKE's Democratic Army did not even account for 10% of its total strength."<sup>303</sup> Concurrently, from the summer onwards, KKE relocated thousands of children from Northern Greece to Soviet satellite states with the pretext of protection. However, this is a highly disputed claim as, although many of the children were born to parents fighting in KKE's ranks, the forced enlistment of the majority practically nullified the rebel leaders' reasoning.<sup>304</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> Kalyvas and Marantzidis, 433-434

<sup>302</sup> Nikos Marantzidis, *Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas. 1946-1949* (Alexandria: Athens, 2010), 68

<sup>303</sup> Kalyvas and Marantzidis, 419

<sup>304</sup> Kalyvas and Marantzidis, 443-445

By late September, the situation had become extremely dire for Washington. The CIA reported that French and Italian communists—along with their comrades north of Greece—were ready to support the “Free Greek Government, whenever it can be established on Greek soil by guerilla action.”<sup>305</sup> Soon after, the CIA added that “the general situation in Greek Thrace has become so bad that [the] whole area may fall under the control of the guerillas” and noted how Lieutenant Hames Miller who was stationed in Thessaloniki believed that local civilians should be armed and organized and allow the Greek Army to pursue the rebels, because otherwise Thrace would fall to communism and effectively allow a “Bulgarian annexation of the area.”<sup>306</sup> Such was the momentum of the rebels that American intelligence reported soon after that they were conducting “a successful recruiting campaign, despite the new amnesty offered by the Greek government.”<sup>307</sup>

The following report manifested how strong this momentum had become. The CIA commented that “unless [the] guerilla situation can be promptly liquidated, AMAG will fail to achieve its objectives.”<sup>308</sup> Dwight Griswold, the Chief of AMAG, recommended that first, “a temporary increase of 20.000 men” in the Greek Army was required by early 1948, second, that “a permanent increase of 10.000 men” should be permitted and third—and most important—that “the US promptly dispatch 125 to 200 Army Officers” to Greece. Griswold’s first two proposals were immediately approved by the State Department yet the third remained unanswered.<sup>309</sup> The CIA also revealed the rebels’ confident plans to establish “an independent

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<sup>305</sup> Critical Situations, On the new amnesty of the Greek government, September 9, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900010001-2

<sup>306</sup> Critical Situations, Guerilla control of Thrace feared imminent, September 12, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900010001-2

<sup>307</sup> Critical Situations, On guerilla operations, September 15, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900010001-2

<sup>308</sup> Critical Situations, AMAG objectives endangered by guerilla action, September 16, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900010001-2

<sup>309</sup> Critical Situations, On Chief Griswold’s recommendations, September 18, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900010001-2

Aegean Macedonia with Salonika as capital” was to be established before winter.<sup>310</sup> The CIA concluded that danger was “imminent” as “control of Macedonia has long been one of the stated objectives of the Yugoslav-Bulgar effort in Greece,” noting that the rebels’ plan could materialize, with proper help. This was indicative of KKE’s strength at that point of the war.

### **The perplexing issue of dispatching military personnel**

The Truman administration believed that dispatching military personnel to Greece was a significant escalation of its interventionism. But Griswold kept pressuring the State Department to permit the dispatch of military personnel; in a letter to Marshall, he considered “US operational advice essential” to “expedite offensive and speedy termination [of] bandit activity.”<sup>311</sup> Interestingly, Griswold affirmed the Truman Doctrine’s emphasis on providing support with financial assistance, noting however that “military and economic fronts are of equal importance” and that “failure on either front will result [to] communism.” Griswold elaborated that the US should provide “operational advice only” so that it would not be considered a provocation, noting that he would oppose the use of “even a single American officer or soldier against Greek bandits.” Griswold added that “operational advisory work” was essential for the “survival of Greece as [a] free and independent nation.”

Griswold’s careful but urgent tone convinced the administration to consider his proposals. The Deputy Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey, Walter Wilds, prepared a comprehensive memo in which he noted that although US combat forces could not be sent to Greece legally “25 or 30 could be quietly fed in” with an observatory role.<sup>312</sup> This was

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<sup>310</sup> Critical Situations, Satellite support guerilla action in Macedonia feared imminent, September 26, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900010001-2

<sup>311</sup> Eisenhower to Marshall, October 9, 1947. FRUS/V:299

<sup>312</sup> Memorandum, October 15, 1947. FRUS/V:304

immediately followed by two additional alarming intelligence reports; the first informed the State Department that the rebels' successes in Eastern Macedonia had made conditions "nearly as bad as those in Thrace" and that "friction in the Greek government over reorganizing the Army high command is delaying the military campaign against the guerillas."<sup>313</sup> The second confirmed that "guerilla action had made road and rail communication in Thrace and Macedonia almost impossible."<sup>314</sup> This report also concluded that unless something changed, the Greek Army would soon "have to withdraw from Eastern Greece" a prospect which led Miller to repeat his own "urgent plea that US tactical officers be made available for giving operational advice."

Dispatching US military personnel through an advisory role immediately became a top priority in Washington. Major General Stephen Chamberlin wrote a memo addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Dwight Eisenhower, and proposed the immediate establishment of a "US Advisory and Planning Group" whose task would be to coordinate the Greek State's military effort and furnish "high level military advice." The same applied to a dispatch of "U.S. Army Observers with the duties of energizing operational action, restoring the offensive spirit and advising on planning and operations."<sup>315</sup> Only a few days later, Griswold telegraphed Marshall again, noting that Washington should not try to "represent to world opinion that AMAG does not have great power or that it is not involved in Greek internal affairs" especially as the Greek government had made several requests concerning procedures which are "normally regarded as internal matter."

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<sup>313</sup> Critical Situation, On stepped-up guerilla campaign, October 16, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900020003-9

<sup>314</sup> Critical Situations, On Greek Army's potential withdrawal, October 20, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900020003-9. See also an extended report from that day entitled The Current Situation in Greece, October 20, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A003000140001-2

<sup>315</sup> Chamberlin to Eisenhower, October 20, 1947. FRUS/V:310

Griswold elaborated further on the dilemma concerning the ethical implications of dispatching troops. Griswold argued that it was not a matter of “involvement or non-involvement” in Greece but “whether involvement would result in serving selfish special interest or aid Greek rehabilitation in line with request of Greek Government; whether crudely carried out and creating internal adverse reaction as threat Greek sovereignty or sufficiently diplomatic and on cooperative friendly basis to have Greek people and other free peoples of world realize and support objectives sought as in best interests of Greek independence and sovereignty.”<sup>316</sup> We can see in this statement the fine line between the provision of aid to the Greek government and the possibility of this being considered a violation of Greek self-determination. Griswold was adamant that increased interference in Greek affairs was indispensable if Greece would remain safe from falling to communism.

By the end of October, the rebels’ momentum grew more. American intelligence reported that “the guerillas have returned to the offensive after a period of comparative quiet during which they regrouped” and notified the administration of a “strong attack by 3.000 guerillas on the key town of Metsovo” which if successful would threaten “the Government’s east-west line of communication in Central Greece.”<sup>317</sup> A following intelligence report provided Washington with a detailed description of the gruesome aftereffects of rebel activity in Northern Greece, noting that approximately 300.000 Greeks had been forcibly displaced. The report concluded with Griswold’s estimation that “the Greek government was unable to provide adequate relief funds” and that “failure to provide relief for the refugees will not only cause human disaster but will also have serious ideological effects.”<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>316</sup> Griswold to Marshall, October 24, 1947. FRUS/V:313

<sup>317</sup> Critical Situations, On Guerrillas offensive, October 23, 1947. CIA-RDP78-01617A005900020003-9

<sup>318</sup> Intelligence Report, Seriousness of refugee problem in northern area, October 27, 1947. CIA-RDP82-00457R001000430011-5

On the same day, John Jernegan, the Acting Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, addressed the Greek situation in a detailed memo that elaborated on General Chamberlin's suggestions. Jernegan noted that the Greek Army lacked "offensive spirit" and was susceptible to "political interference" while stressing that the rebels "sufficient strength" to "occupy sufficiently strong positions to maintain themselves through the coming winter and seriously to harass the Greek army and civil population." Jernegan left the question of dispatching American military personnel open, suggesting an "establishment of a joint military planning staff" which would join the Greek Army "down to division level to instill [an] offensive spirit." In an alarming tone, he concluded that "to be effective the U.S. military observers [...] would be obliged to enter areas of active combat and would be subjected to the possibility of being killed or captured" with their presence however being "essential."<sup>319</sup>

However, MacVeagh's following telegram was the one that convinced the State Department that there was no viable alternative to dispatching officers to Greece. Commenting on Chamberlin's prior points concerning the matter, MacVeagh wrote firmly "I agree with General Chamberlin."<sup>320</sup> The American ambassador then discussed the specifics of this military mission, noting that it should report directly to the War Department as Chamberlin had suggested, adding that American military officials' operations "must include not only the giving of operational advice to the Greek Army [...] but also forward planning to take care of possible developments of which no account was taken" and that they "should be free to concern itself with suggestions as to future policy on the highest level." MacVeagh's agreement with Chamberlin's and Griswold's proposals reveals that the concerns over rebel activities and the intelligence reports from Greece had made military American presence in Greece mandatory, instead of optional, even if this was an escalated intervention in Greek affairs.

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<sup>319</sup> Memorandum, October 27, 1947. FRUS/V:315

<sup>320</sup> Memorandum, undated, 1947. FRUS/V:316

Thus, on October 30, 1947, Truman's National Security Council (NSC) formally greenlighted the plan. In a report prepared by Admiral Sidney Souers, the NSC adopted Chamberlin's proposals arguing that "approximately 90 additional U.S. officers and a slightly lower number of enlisted men" would be required "to provide high staff advice to the Greek forces."<sup>321</sup> The report also noted that this measure was indispensable due to the "deteriorating military situation in Greece" and the Greek Army's failure "to defeat the guerillas in the summer months." Moreover, it affirmed that the formation of this advisory military unit served the Truman Doctrine's spirit "to maintain free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes." Four days later, Truman approved all NSC proposals, casting aside any raised deontological concerns regarding the escalation of American interventionism in Greek affairs.

The Truman administration had to choose between two paths. It could either hope for a revitalization of the Greek Army or send in American personnel who could help bring this result, in an endeavor which many could perceive as a profoundly deep interference in Greek affairs—and a serious deontological misstep. Marshall himself wrote that "American influence be exercised as discreetly as possible" otherwise it could be used as "evidence in support of charges we have 'taken over' Greece."<sup>322</sup> The fact that the Truman administration went for the second option demonstrates the merits of consequentialist interventionism, which are reflected in this decision.

Washington's initial uneasiness concerning the dispatching of American troops highlights that the administration recognized how such a move was indeed a deontological overreach. Yet, preventing Greece from falling to communism was far more important than maintaining such deontological thresholds, thus the Truman administration focused on the

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<sup>321</sup> Memorandum, October 30, 1947. FRUS/V:321

<sup>322</sup> Marshall to AMAG, November 4, 1947. FRUS/V:324

bigger picture and chose to intervene militarily in the Greek Civil War for the sake of containing communism and preserving Western geopolitical advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean. With the momentum on the rebels' side, and with the Greek Army being incapable of living up to their challenge, deontological concerns could no longer match the consequentialist justification for keeping Greece in the West. If dispatching military personnel would help prevent the spread of communism and contribute to containment—which by 1947 had become the existential imperative of Cold War American foreign policy—then it was ethically justified.

### **The Greek Civil War becomes global**

Despite furnishing significant additional aid, the Truman administration did not expect an easy resolution to the Greek situation anymore. In contrast, Marshall was informed that “the insurrection is intensifying” and that “military observers do not foresee the containing of the rebels until the end of 1948.”<sup>323</sup> The embassy's estimations were so dire that Marshall was urged to consider the situation “not in relation to Greece alone but in relation to the world problem” suggesting that it was almost certain that the outcome of the Greek Civil War would be exceedingly important for global American leadership and therefore “whatever is required should be given.” Undoubtedly, the Greek Civil War had become a crucial test for Washington's ability to contain communism—and one it could not fail.

And the language used in this specific report manifests this element. For the first time, the administration considered “how far we are willing to go [...] to prevent one more democratic country from undeservedly and irretrievably falling behind the Iron Curtain” while the first proposed additional measure was to engage in an aggressive “political and psychological”

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<sup>323</sup> Keeley to Marshall, December 8, 1948. FRUS/V:360



campaign which would globally prove that “the US has assumed a determination to see this through” and “stop apologizing” for it. Indicatively, although the State Department admitted that the Greek government “falls short of ideal democracy” the administration should “overlook occasional deviations” and “many weaknesses” as there was “no immediate alternative.” Thus, Washington knowingly opted to support a democratically imperfect government to contain Greek—and more broadly European—communism; consequentialism in all its might.

Moreover, this report highlighted the significance of American propaganda. First, it commented on the immense strength of Soviet propaganda against the Truman Doctrine and suggested that the administration had neglected the “value of propaganda as a weapon of war and politics” leaving Soviet accusations largely unanswered. Second, the report suggested that such a campaign was indispensable to “arouse the people within Greece and break the rebels’ morale” and “counteract the Soviet campaign of lies and vilification around the world, and to stimulate resistance in the Soviet satellite countries.” The report concluded that “Greek affairs should receive more extensive and more positive treatment.” Evidently, the outcome of the Civil War had become paramount for the US and its prestige around the world, hence the Truman administration realized that it should double all efforts to defeat the rebels.

In that sense, the Greek balance of power between the Greek Government and the rebels had acquired global significance on both the military and diplomatic levels. Another departmental memo addressed to Marshall argued that “in case international communism responds by sending even stronger forces to combat us in Greece, then we shall know that the Soviet Union prefers war to the abandonment of its aggressive policies, and we can take the appropriate measures on a world-wide scale.” The memo noted that a potential dispatch of American troops to Greece “would be a political gesture made for the purpose of showing that

we are so determined that we will, if necessary, resort to force to meet aggression.”<sup>324</sup> Such was the urgency of the situation, that the memo proposed “that if it should become clear that Greece will be lost unless troops are sent” the administration should proceed “even though their dispatch might necessitate drastic changes in the size and organization of our whole military establishment.”

On the diplomatic dimension, the memo advised the administration to take whichever measure was needed if Greece’s northern neighbors recognized an unofficial rebel government. In that scenario, the memo suggested that the administration should give those countries an ultimatum of ten days to revert their position and in case they did not, then it would require “member states of the UN [...] to render to Greece all requisite assistance, including, in case of need, the dispatch of troops to assist in defending the integrity of that country.” Indicatively, the report concluded that the US “should be prepared [...] to send troops under the conditions set forth in paragraphs numbered 3 or 4 [of the UN Charter] even though other powers should not consider themselves to be in a position also to send troops.” 1947 ended with the Truman administration permitting a substantial increase in the Greek Army personnel and in funding for the Greek military, while a provision for special equipment such as “mountain artillery and machine guns” was made for early 1948.<sup>325</sup>

The conflict’s outcome had gradually acquired an existential significance for Washington. A potential loss of Greece to communism not only would force America to manage the loss of an ally in an immensely important geopolitical position but would also signify a colossal ideological defeat against the Soviet sphere of influence, as losing Greece would prove that America was incapable of containing communism in Europe. In that scenario, American soft power—understood a nation’s ability to influence and attract third states or

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<sup>324</sup> Draft Memorandum, December 22, 1947. FRUS/V:370

<sup>325</sup> Lovett to AMAG, December 30, 1948. FRUS/V:388

allies<sup>326</sup>—would be weakened to a tremendous extent. Such a turnout of events was simply unacceptable, thus defeating the Greek rebels had become an imperative for America, as much as it was for the Greek government—despite the latter being an incredibly flawed democracy; this parameter did not matter anymore for Washington.

### **The full-scale clash of 1948**

By January 1948, the Greek Civil War had entered its most tense period. KKE's Democratic Army had acquired manpower of 26.000, most of whom operated in Northern Greece; in Southern Greece, however, the Democratic Army numbered only 4.000-4.500 troops stationed in the Peloponnese and the islands.<sup>327</sup> It was thus evident first, that the rebels' forces were substantial, and second, that their strength in Northern Greece remained undisputed, mostly due to their support networks with Yugoslavia and the Soviet satellite-states. Addressing this issue, the CIA reported that “the insurgents are strong enough to make dangerous local attacks” and that “there are increased central direction and coordination of activities on both sides of the border.”<sup>328</sup> However, this report confirmed that the USSR was “unlikely to grant formal recognition” to the rebels' unofficial government so that it will not engage in “direct conflict with the US.”

There is no doubt that American support throughout 1947 had established America as Greece's de facto protector power. However, it is important to note that the Truman administration could not focus solely on Greek affairs, as the containment of communism was gradually acquiring a global scope. According to the CIA, the State Department had clarified

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<sup>326</sup> Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 3-4

<sup>327</sup> Woodhouse, 390-391

<sup>328</sup> Review of World Situation as it Relates to Security of the United States, January 12, 1948. CIA-RDP67-00059A000500070014-4

that the administration would not provide large enough military aid so that Greece could “seal northern borders” since “military aid furnished to Greece will be evaluated in relation to the requirements of other countries which are united with the US in resisting communist expansion.”<sup>329</sup> In any case, the administration reaffirmed the supply of appropriate military aid to “prevent the domination of Greece by communist elements.”

These guarantees towards Greece had been ratified by the NSC. After admitting that the Greek government could not “withstand communist pressure” without significant American support, Truman was advised to declare that taking “a firm stand in Greece is based on overall political and strategical considerations.”<sup>330</sup> The geopolitical implications of losing Greece to communism were again highlighted, while the administration was advised to “make full use of its political, economic, and if necessary, military power” to prevent such an outcome from occurring. Soon after, the NSC briefed Truman that “the security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East would be jeopardized if the Soviet Union should succeed in its efforts to obtain control of any one of the following countries: Italy, Greece, Turkey, or Iran.”<sup>331</sup>

This memo also advised Truman on the potential approaches he could take in Greek affairs. First and foremost, it warned him that ending all military aid to Greece would unquestionably serve the Soviet “objective for worldwide domination” and would result in Iran succumbing to “external Russian pressure” which would also be the case for Turkey, while it could also spark the rise of French and Italian communist parties. To that end, the NSC advised Truman to maintain the strongest possible level of American engagement in political, economic, and military terms “in such [a] manner as may be found most effective to prevent

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<sup>329</sup> US Policy concerning aid to Greece, February 7, 1948. CIA-RDP78-01617A006000030021-5

<sup>330</sup> Draft Report, January 10, 1948. FRUS/IV:10

<sup>331</sup> NSC to Truman, February 12, 1948. FRUS/IV:28

Greece from falling under the domination of the USSR.” According to the State Department’s notes, Truman approved the memo’s proposed policies and called for their immediate implementation. By the end of February, the Truman administration had requested the allocation of an additional \$200 million military aid package for Greece.<sup>332</sup>

Among the components of the renewed American aid was the dispatch of General James Van Fleet. He was considered by the State Department as one of “the outstanding aggressive fighting corps commanders of the campaign in Europe” and was given full control of the “tactical situation” in what concerned the Greek Army’s military operations.<sup>333</sup> Van Fleet was indeed a charismatic military man and helped reform the Greek Army in their struggle against the rebels.<sup>334</sup> According to rebel sources of the time, Van Fleet was welcomed as a hero by the Greek authorities, with the minister of defense telling him that the American General was “at home” and that “[the Greek Army] is your army.”<sup>335</sup> The Greek authorities were overjoyed to receive Van Fleet as an informal commander of the Greek Army, as he was expected to provide the Greek Army with indispensable know-how on the battlefield. There is no doubt that Van Fleet’s arrival in Greece was a clear statement of intentions from the Truman administration. Crucially, Andreas Papandreou used Van Fleet’s warm welcome by the Greek authorities in his future ethical renunciation of American interventionism since the Greek Civil War, as this thesis will show.

However, we must note that the State Department also tried to monitor the Greek Government’s retaliation against captured rebels. In an indicative memo addressed to the embassy in Athens, Marshall argued that executions of long-imprisoned communists—whose sentences could be changed into life imprisonment—were bad publicity for both the Greek and

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<sup>332</sup> Marshall to AMAG, February 26, 1948. FRUS/IV:36

<sup>333</sup> Marshall to AMAG, January 26, 1948. FRUS/IV:22

<sup>334</sup> Woodhouse, 410-411

<sup>335</sup> KKE, *Dokimio Istorias tou KKE, A' Tomos, 1918-1949* (Athens: Sighroni Epohi, 2008), 586

the American governments which could cause both “US and world opinion [...] draw political parallel, however unjustified, between Greek executions and those in Iron Curtain countries.”<sup>336</sup> Marshall affirmed that the Truman administration “fully understands [the] necessity for firm policy towards communists” but urged the embassy to advise the Greek government that it should be prepared to “offer explanation for [a] decision which will satisfy world public opinion.”

### **The European Recovery Program and Greece**

In March 1948, the Truman administration proceeded with the implementation of the ERP (European Recovery Program), widely known as the Marshall Plan. In a famous speech at Harvard University a year earlier, Marshall had publicly explained the program’s reasoning. Marshall argued that “it is logical that the US should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health to the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace” adding that “any government that is willing to assist in recovery will find full co-operation on the part of the US.”<sup>337</sup> The ERP would facilitate Western European economic recovery, solidify European democratic integrity, establish America as the closest European ally, and ostracize communism from European affairs, as much as possible. As Truman argued “this measure is America's answer to the challenge facing the free world today” as “its purpose is to assist in the preservation of conditions under which free institutions can survive in the world.”<sup>338</sup>

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<sup>336</sup> Marshall to Embassy (Greece), March 9, 1948. FRUS/IV:41

<sup>337</sup> Jussi Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 122

<sup>338</sup> Harry Truman, *Statement by the President Upon Signing the Foreign Assistance Act*, April 3, 1948, Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/64/statement-president-upon-signing-foreign-assistance-act>

Like the Truman Doctrine, the ERP aimed at containing communism in Western Europe. This was the fundamental reason why both the USSR and its satellite states rejected it, although Washington had originally invited them to participate.<sup>339</sup> John Lewis Gaddis argues that the Truman Doctrine was the first public US initiative that signaled Washington's imminent pursuit of containment on a global level and suggests that the Marshall Plan was heavily influenced by Truman's vague, rhetorically—but incredibly specific, strategically—intention to extend the scope of Washington's protection to Western Europe. Gaddis argues that the Marshall Plan aimed at elevating living standards in Western Europe so that the conditions on which communist political narratives and movements could rise would be eradicated—or at least weakened. Gaddis adds that Washington actually expected Moscow to forbid the Warsaw Pact countries from participating in the Marshall Plan—which was proven to be an accurate prediction—so that the US could claim the moral higher ground afterward.<sup>340</sup> Without realizing it, Gaddis highlights the consequentialist reasoning behind Washington's initiative, as extending a helping hand to Warsaw Pact countries while knowing that they could not reach for it seems undoubtedly vile—but incredibly effective, geopolitically.

The ERP's implementation coincided with encouraging news from Athens. At the end of March, Griswold noted that “internal military situation in Greece” was “improving” and that the Greek Army “has become far more aggressive [...] and has won important local operations” in Northern Greece, leading to the diminishment of “forcible recruitment by bandits.” However, Griswold warned Marshall that this unprecedented pressure by the Greek Army could cause a rise in “foreign aid” by neighboring communist forces to KKE but concluded that although “only 10 percent of population [...] desire communist victory” many Greeks

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<sup>339</sup> Powaski, 73

<sup>340</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: The Deals. The Spies. The Lies. The Truth.* (London: Penguin, 2005), 32-33

refused to pick sides “fearing possible ultimate Communist domination country.”<sup>341</sup> Thus, although the Greek Army had initiated a promising counter-offensive, Greek citizens did not expect the rebels to collapse and the war to end soon.

Therefore, American aid to Greece increased more through Greece’s ERP participation. Washington decided to maintain prior American aid to Greece “at least during the first quarter’s operation of the ERP” to “avoid any break in continuity in overall [...] Greek assistance.”<sup>342</sup> According to Acting Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, the State Department’s focus in Greece was “the success of the military campaign against the guerillas” and thus Greece’s participation in the Marshall Plan could potentially require “special arrangements.” Following Lovett’s report, Marshall informed the Greek government that the State Department did not object to an imminent cabinet reshuffle but would “regret [an] open crisis at this time” especially because this would “counteract good effects of current and anticipated military victories” and “delay [the] establishment of ERP machinery in Greece.”<sup>343</sup>

Still, the ERP helped the weak Greek economy industrialize to a significant extent.<sup>344</sup> Domestic industrial production grew by 88% up to 1951, which was the third highest rate in Western Europe, while Greece profited significantly from not having been a main WWII battlefield.<sup>345</sup> American technocrat support reshaped the structurally weak, non-industrialized, and susceptible to the pressure of domestic interest groups Greek economy<sup>346</sup> and by 1952

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<sup>341</sup> Griswold to Marshall, March 26, 1948. FRUS/IV:48

<sup>342</sup> Lovett to Hoffman, April 12, 1948. FRUS/IV:55

<sup>343</sup> Marshall to Embassy (Greece), May 4, 1948. FRUS/IV:60

<sup>344</sup> Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “Greek Reformism and its Models: The Impact of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan”, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 28 (2010), 15-17, <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/greek-reformism-models-impact-truman-doctrine/docview/761187343/se-2>

<sup>345</sup> Barry Eichengreen and Marc Uzan, “The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications for Eastern Europe and the Former USSR”, *Economic Policy*, 7:14 (1992), 17-18, <https://web-p-ebsohost-com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=7554279c-0781-475d-9568-c05abb97d7d2%40redis>

<sup>346</sup> Dimitri Sotiropoulos and Rachel Gisselquist, “International Aid to Southern Europe in the Early Postwar Period: The Cases of Greece and Italy”, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 656 (2014), 37-39, <https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/anamacp0656&i=17>



Greece had become self-supporting and saw its economy growing by 6% per year,<sup>347</sup> laying the foundations of Greece's 1960's economic "miracle."<sup>348</sup> Moreover, Greece gradually integrated with Western Europe while the precedent of American economic aid influenced many Greeks' macroeconomic worldview throughout the 1950s and beyond.<sup>349</sup> The foundations of the modern Greek economy, as well as of its continuous growth until the early 1970s, are found in Washington's interventions during the Civil War.

### **The escalation of military operations**

Still, in 1948, the rebels maintained the momentum. In April 1948 the CIA warned Washington that "with covert Soviet and satellite support, the guerillas have grown in strength" sabotaging both Greek economic recovery and political stability, adding that despite "a preponderance of numerical strength in the order of 5 to 1" the Greek Army had failed to defeat the rebels.<sup>350</sup> Lovett was briefed "that it is not possible clearly to delineate between political, military and economic aspects" of American aid<sup>351</sup> but after a thorough exploration of the available options, the administration decided against dispatching fighting units, noting however that if "the situation in Greece should deteriorate [...] the Security Council should reconsider the problem."<sup>352</sup> The NSC noted that dispatching troops to Greece "should be made in the light of the over-all world situation and not primarily as a contribution to the solution of the problem in Greece" reaffirming the strategy of containment—and the fear of the falling dominos.

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<sup>347</sup> Konstantina Botsiou, "New Policies, Old Politics: American Concepts of Reform in Marshall Plan Greece." *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 27 (2009), 231-232, <https://www-proquest-com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/scholarly-journals/new-policies-old-politics-american-concepts/docview/215545697/se-2>

<sup>348</sup> Sotiropoulos, 37-39

<sup>349</sup> Apostolos Vetsopoulos, "The Economic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan in Greece, 1947-1952: The Origins of the Greek Economic Miracle," PhD Dissertation, (London: UCL, 2002), 348-353

<sup>350</sup> Consequences of Certain Courses of Action with Respect to Greece, April 5, 1948. CIA-RDP78-01617A003100050001-1

<sup>351</sup> Memorandum, May 19, 1948. FRUS/IV:65

<sup>352</sup> NSC Report, May 25, 1948. FRUS:/IV:67

Concurrently, the rebels had initiated a full-scale rhetorical campaign against the US, using terms such as “foreign interference” and “Anglo-American masters.”<sup>353</sup> Washington considered this mere propaganda, adding that an “amnesty offer” would only be on the table when “Greek national forces on [the] point of finally crushing rebellion” and “not before.” From its end, the CIA argued that KKE sought “a formula for ending hostilities without prejudicing the ultimate communist objective in Greece,” warning however that “if communist leaders are able to obtain political concessions [...] before the army has achieved an absolute victory, public morale will be impaired, and the hard core of the Greek communist party will be left intact.” The report concluded that “such a situation would eventually expose an unstable Greece to the familiar, dreary round of communist political obstruction, blackmail and economic strangulation, resulting finally in a total communist victory.”<sup>354</sup> This report reveals that by that stage of the Civil War, there was no viable alternative than annihilating the rebels and defeating communism in Greece for good.

Griswold’s analysis affirmed this approach. The AMAG chief argued that the rebels’ guerilla tactics made their final defeat imperative as “even [the] annihilation of major concentrations will not prevent [the] escape and circulation [of] individuals and small groups of bandits who because of incredible terrain can pass almost anywhere.”<sup>355</sup> He also warned the administration that its potential failure to end the war soon would cause Greek people to be “seized with despair which psychologically would destroy home economic recovery” while obliging Greece to “increase its army [...] which simply it cannot afford” during the following months. Griswold reported that in the upcoming operation in the mountain of Grammos—a communist stronghold in northern Greece—“there will be used modern military weapons, such

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<sup>353</sup> Rankin to Marshall, June 4, 1948. FRUS:/IV:75

<sup>354</sup> Intelligence Summary, Guerillas seeking peace? June 2, 1948. CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010005-4

<sup>355</sup> Griswold to Marshall, June 8, 1948. FRUS:/IV:77

as firebomb (Napalm) [...] not used in operations against bandits.”<sup>356</sup> The Greek Civil War was evidently a turning point for the military aspect of American interventionism, as the use of such weapons on foreign soil was considered for the first time.

However, by the late summer of 1948, the rebels still stood their ground. As the CIA reported, “the guerilla-held territory in the Grammos area has now been reduced to a pocket along the Albanian border [...] but the forces remaining in this pocket continue to resist the Greek Army attacks.”<sup>357</sup> The report added that the rebels’ supply routes with northern communist states remained active, at least in the form of “passive aid.” There is little doubt that the rebels showed remarkable resilience, while their supply routes were instrumental in preventing their collapse. As a response, the Greek government considered firing at Albanian soil, but the Truman administration urged Greeks to “avoid any precipitate action which might compromise [the] previous excellent record of Greek forbearance” and damage Greece’s diplomatic capital in the UN.<sup>358</sup>

Thus, all efforts to defeat the rebels by the end of the summer failed. The new American ambassador, Henry Grady, concurred with Van Fleet’s assessment that any reduction in the Greek armed forces should be excluded as foreign communist support to the rebels highlighted the “international aspects” of the “Greek question.”<sup>359</sup> Grady argued that Van Fleet foresaw a possible reduction in the spring of 1949 but argued that “external factors probably will be more decisive than internal” and thus America “should not count on ending military aid to Greece [...] until it becomes evident that threat of external aggression, direct or indirect, has been

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<sup>356</sup> Rankin to Marshall, June 16, 1948. FRUS/IV:79

<sup>357</sup> Intelligence Summary, The guerilla-held territory in the Grammos area, August 25, 1948. CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010017-1

<sup>358</sup> Intelligence Report, US observer says effective satellite aid is continuing, August 26, 1948. CIA-RDP78-01617A006000040032-3

<sup>359</sup> Grady to State, August 28, 1948. FRUS/IV:105

largely removed.” Grady was a seasoned career diplomat, who had also served as Assistant Secretary of State in the Roosevelt administration.<sup>360</sup>

The lifeline that the rebels found in their northern communist comrades convinced Washington that the outcome of the war also depended on resolving this issue. However, by mid-1948, KKE became involved in the deterioration of relations between Joseph Stalin and Yugoslavian PM, Josip Broz Tito. KKE’s leadership was ambivalent concerning the party’s allegiance, which resulted in its gradual isolation in terms of receiving military support from Yugoslavia.<sup>361</sup> Still, in late September 1948, American intelligence reported that “in the Vitsi area north of Grammos” the rebels had formed “a strength of 6.000-7.500” mainly consisting of “replacements from training camps in Yugoslavia, by forced recruitments in Greece and by remnants from Grammos” which meant that it remained impossible “to reduce the size of the Greek armed forces.”<sup>362</sup>

In the autumn of 1948, the Greek balance of power had not yet shifted. According to the CIA “the much-publicized Grammos campaign [...] did not fundamentally change the situation in Greece” as “the Grammos guerillas withdrew to satellite territory, repaired their losses in men and materiel, and reappeared in the Vitsi area where they are again stubbornly resisting army attacks.” The report suggested that since “unneutral satellite aid which can be expected to continue” the rebels’ defeat was improbable. The CIA also estimated that failure to defeat the rebels could result in the collapse of Greek democratic rule, and the replacement of the Greek government with “an authoritarian regime of the right” which “could not survive without aid from abroad” and “hardly prevent the strengthening of the communists” and thus “the eventual outcome would probably be a communist Greece.”<sup>363</sup>

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<sup>360</sup> FRUS, “Henry Francis Grady”

<sup>361</sup> Woodhouse, 449-455

<sup>362</sup> General Report, September 22, 1948. CIA-RDP78-01617A006000040010-7

<sup>363</sup> Current Situation in Greece, October 3, 1948. DOC\_0000258345

Indicatively, a few weeks later, the CIA brought to the surface a paramilitary group's intentions to take over the Greek Government. Several Greek military men had formed the IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers) movement during the occupation years as a non-political, anti-communist entity, which had however acquired dictatorial political ambitions. According to the CIA "IDEA [...] will support or even bring about a totalitarian form of government in the event that the Greek situation should reach an impasse."<sup>364</sup> This leads us to two key observations: first, although Washington was devoted to defeating the rebels, it was also monitoring the danger of a military coup which would perplex further the situation. Second, further prolongation of the conflict could have catastrophic repercussions for Greece's democratic future, which made its resolution imperative.

Marshall highlighted this aspect upon returning to Washington after visiting Athens in the fall of 1948. Marshall argued that he met "a rather depreciated state of morale" as the Greek forces "are very tired, particularly as they do not see any conclusion in sight so long as the UN permits the rebels to utilize Albania and Yugoslavia for retreat."<sup>365</sup> Grady commented that a significant improvement in the "leadership and fighting spirit of the army" was required.<sup>366</sup> Grady then advised Marshall to remind the Greek government of "their individual responsibility [...] to devote themselves wholeheartedly in meeting [the] situation" and urge for a reshuffle and increased political support towards military leadership "yet maintain present structure based on democratic parliamentary system." Thus, by the end of 1948, the Truman administration not only had failed to help the Greek government defeat the rebels but also struggled to preserve Greek parliamentary rule and the Greek Army's morale.

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<sup>364</sup> Information Report, IDEA ("Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon" or Sacred Bond of Greek Officers) November 8, 1948. CIA-RDP82-00457R002000420001-6

<sup>365</sup> Memorandum, October 20, 1948. FRUS/IV:120

<sup>366</sup> Grady to Marshall, October 22, 1948. FRUS/IV:124

### 1949: the Greek Army bounces back

In late autumn 1948, Grady informed Marshall that Sophoulis “had finally decided to appoint General Alexandros Papagos as Commander-in-Chief of [the] Greek Army.”<sup>367</sup> Grady initially feared the “political implications of having Commander-in-Chief with very wide powers and unfortunate repercussions in US and elsewhere if it appeared that any sort of dictator [was] being set up.” The CIA reported that Papagos would only accept the position if he was “not subjected to political pressure and is granted increased powers to both prosecute anti-guerrilla war to suppress subversive elements in general.”<sup>368</sup> The report elaborated on Grady’s concerns and argued that “although the authoritarian character of the Commander-in-Chief” could provoke “the usual communist propaganda barrage, Papagos himself has denied having any dictatorial aspirations.” Van Fleet, who had the final say, approved Papagos’ appointment after considering his decisive leadership in the 1941 Albanian campaign against the Italian invasion and most Greeks’ wide appreciation of him.<sup>369</sup>

It soon became clear that 1949 would be decisive for the conflict. Both sides had realized this and thus used the final weeks of 1948 preparing for a showdown on which Greece’s future would be decided.<sup>370</sup> Papagos formally assumed the office of Commander-in-Chief on January 19 and decided to first eradicate communist forces in the south to isolate the remaining rebels in the northern mountains and then unleash all the might of the Greek Army. Simultaneously, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report suggesting that Greece remained “in a dangerous state of war [...] despite almost two years of extensive US military and economic aid.” The report reaffirmed all the usual components of the Greek situation, such as the “precarious” political leadership and the rebels’ satellite aid but concluded that “if assured that

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<sup>367</sup> Grady to Marshall, October 26, 1948. FRUS/IV:128

<sup>368</sup> Intelligence Summary, The threat to the Greek coalition government, November 3, 1948. CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010027-0

<sup>369</sup> Brewer, 275

<sup>370</sup> Woodhouse, 444-445

US aid will not be withdrawn [...] and provided competent leadership becomes available”<sup>371</sup> the war could be won.

Grady’s evaluation was bleaker. He noted that “the Greek situation during the past year or more has degenerated” and that “continuation of the present trend may bring defeat,” adding that “politically, the situation has deteriorated” and that “psychologically, the position is dangerous.” Grady also suggested that “the eyes of the people” were on the new Sophoulis government, as “another failure [...] will almost surely bring about a solution outside the parliamentary framework.”<sup>372</sup> Hence Grady concluded that although Americans “should continue to encourage democratic and parliamentary solutions of the Greek political situation, we should not oppose an extra-parliamentary solution as a last resort and as a natural evolution” as long as it prevents “such a government from developing into a dictatorship and from taking actions which will weaken or discredit Greece.” Unknowingly thus, Grady summarized a consequentialist pattern of Cold War American interventionism that many of the case studies mentioned in the second chapter highlight.

But then the situation unexpectedly changed in favor of the Greek Army. At the end of February, Grady informed Marshall that the “new government has turned out by common consent to be the best we have had” as there had been “noticeable improvement in government efficiency and public morale.”<sup>373</sup> Grady added that “Papagos is becoming an excellent Commander-in-Chief” praising the cooperation between him and “[American] military personnel.” The improvement was so rapid that Grady noted how the “Greek Government [is] now pressing us for action instead of our pressing them.” In his closing statement, Grady concluded that the US should proceed cautiously and affirmed that “Greece more than any

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<sup>371</sup> Intelligence Memorandum, Continuing Instability in Greece, January 19, 1949. CIA-RDP78-01617A000250001-7

<sup>372</sup> Memorandum, January 27, 1949. FRUS/VI:115

<sup>373</sup> Grady to Acheson, February 21, 1949. FRUS/VI:122

other country is a test of the American capacity for leadership of the new free world.” Again, the US could not afford to lose Greece—especially after investing so much in it.

The regeneration of the Greek State coincided with a change in Yugoslavian attitude towards the rebels. Marshall informed Grady that due to the “Cominform pressure against Tito [...] Yugo aid to guerrillas more likely occur spontaneously if at all”<sup>374</sup> and estimated that Tito would “stop aid” completely. KKE’s decision to side with Stalin not only contributed to the eventual decrease of Yugoslavian aid but also deprived the rebels of a significant number of Slav-Macedonian troops who had primarily joined them to establish a communist “Aegean Macedonia.”<sup>375</sup> Thus, once Tito decided to seal Yugoslavia’s borders with Greece, the rebels would lose their invaluable tactical advantage over the Greek Army—to which they largely owed their narrow survival in 1948.

The Truman administration decided to further influence Tito’s foreign policy towards Greece—and the USSR more broadly. An NSC report affirmed that Tito was not expected to make “political concessions to the west in order to further economic relations” and suggested that the US “intends to enter into closer economic relations with Yugoslavia in an endeavor to keep Tito strong enough to continue his resistance to the Cominform as well as to employ U.S. economic bargaining power to the end that Tito will abandon his assistance to the Greek guerrillas.”<sup>376</sup> This is another example of the consequentialist reasoning that gradually prevailed in the Truman administration’s foreign policy—and persisted throughout the Cold War. Nixon’s later opening to China which aimed at isolating the USSR mirrors Truman’s opening to Tito.

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<sup>374</sup> Acheson to Grady, February 25, 1949. FRUS/VI:123

<sup>375</sup> Kalyvas and Marantzidis, 494

<sup>376</sup> NSC to Truman, March 22, 1949. FRUS/VI:133



America's international mobilization and efforts to establish a relationship with Yugoslavia came at a most inconvenient moment for the rebels. Their prolonged stay in the mountains and the harsh winter conditions had heavily impacted their morale, while the ideological component of KKE's struggle had been watered down to an irreparable extent as half of their remaining troops had been forcibly conscripted—and all that at the most inconvenient time for the communist side, as the Greek Army's morale was rising sharply.<sup>377</sup> Thus, probably for the first time since the Greek Civil War started, the momentum had shifted on the Greek State's side; the conflict that devastated post-WWII Greece would soon enter its final stages.

### **The rebels' defeat**

By early May, Papagos' operations in Southern Greece had been overwhelmingly successful. The CIA reported that "the government has virtually eliminated the guerilla menace" in Peloponnese and that "anti-guerilla operations [are] now being carried forward [...] in Central and Northern Greece."<sup>378</sup> Simultaneously, the Assistant Secretary of State for UN affairs, Dean Rusk, declared that although America "cannot relinquish its right to provide military assistance to the Greek Government" as it was "was made necessary by a situation in Greece created by foreign aid to the guerilla movement", the termination of the Civil War would bring a reduction of military presence in Greece that would "reflect the improved situation."<sup>379</sup> Rusk said that the war would end soon "if the Russians were to exercise their influence to terminate this aid."

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<sup>377</sup> Woodhouse, 457-460

<sup>378</sup> Working Paper, May 18, 1949. CIA-RDP79-01090A000100040003-4

<sup>379</sup> Editorial Note, Undated, 1949. FRUS/VI:164

From his end the Soviet foreign minister, Andrey Gromyko, started considering this option. An American intelligence brief from Bulgaria confirmed that Moscow was open to the establishment of “an international commission with full powers and freedom to verify the absence or withdrawal of foreign military assistance in Bulgaria and Albania” which constituted a “new departure in Soviet policy.”<sup>380</sup> The necessity of sealing Greece’s northern borders was reaffirmed by American intelligence which closely followed rebel supply routes and argued that although “Yugoslav support was channelized” it had “definitely not ended” while “liquidation of [the] Vitsi [and] Grammos bastion appears almost [an] insurmountable task given [the] continued all out supply and territorial backing from Albania.”<sup>381</sup> Thus, despite Papagos’ successes, final victory remained uncertain.

By the summer of 1949, the Greek Army had no alternative but to try once more and crush the rebels in the Greek mountains. Before the battle, Grady reported that “under extreme provocation, Greece has maintained essentials of democratic state” and suggested that extensive delegating concerning the borders’ issue with the USSR “would be unmistakable sign of weakness for [the] US.”<sup>382</sup> The American embassy in Yugoslavia confirmed that “material aid is not going over” anymore, commenting that “now it’s all different” compared to previous levels of Yugoslav aid.<sup>383</sup> In light of this, Van Fleet argued that American military assistance should continue as “reduction would damage Greek morale and open way [for] resumption [of] guerrilla activity.”<sup>384</sup>

Papagos was soon ready to launch his final attack. His “Operation Rocket” which aimed at clearing rebel activity from the South to the North had succeeded, and by the end of July,

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<sup>380</sup> Heath to Webb May 23, 1949. FRUS/VI:167

<sup>381</sup> Webb to Embassy (Greece), May 25, 1949. FRUS/VI:171

<sup>382</sup> Grady to Webb, June 8, 1949. FRUS/VI:178

<sup>383</sup> Cannon to Acheson, June 9, 1949. FRUS/VI:179

<sup>384</sup> Acheson to Embassy (Greece), June 23, 1949. FRUS/VI:182

the rebels were isolated in Grammos and Vitsi.<sup>385</sup> A key component in Papagos' successes was that he cooperated exceptionally with the American military officers, from the operational to the bureaucratic level.<sup>386</sup> The CIA confirmed that Yugoslavia had severed all ties with the rebels; an intelligence brief from mid-July reported that the Yugoslavian Army had seized Soviet aid sent to the rebels, that foreign volunteers who trained in the country had been "forced to the border" and had their "weapons and supplies were confiscated" and that even "wounded rebel soldiers have not been permitted to return to their respective units."<sup>387</sup>

The Truman administration mobilized immediately to help Papagos take full advantage of this shifting momentum. As "Yugoslavia was now out of the picture" and given that "Bulgarian aid to the guerillas never mattered much on account of the terrain" the only question that remained was whether the Albanian option would help the rebels secure their position once more.<sup>388</sup> Thus, "top American military men in Greece" suggested "a slashing attack in the Vitsi area" as it was estimated that "if the guerrillas were cut to pieces in the Vitsi they would have little heart to return to Greece." To that end, the administration provided Greeks with "new and very powerful weapons" and suddenly, a victory in Grammos and Vitsi seemed finally probable.

Papagos' "Operation Torch" lasted throughout August. This time the outcome of the Greek Army's offensive was so certain that American personnel in Athens even delegated with the Greek government concerning prospective "general conditions for surrender and amnesty" for Greek communists.<sup>389</sup> Without Yugoslavian aid, the rebels stood no chance and thus the military aspect of the war finally ended, as Papagos' Operation Torch was entirely

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<sup>385</sup> Woodhouse, 462-463

<sup>386</sup> Veremis and Koliopoulos, 254

<sup>387</sup> Information Report, Yugoslav aid to Greek rebels halted, July 19, 1949. CIA-RDP82-00547R003000070001-4

<sup>388</sup> Memorandum, July 27, 1949. FRUS/VI:194

<sup>389</sup> Minor to Acheson, August 16, 1949. FRUS/VI:204

successful.<sup>390</sup> Indicatively, on August 31 American intelligence reported that “the success” of the Greek Army “represents a severe setback to the rebels.”<sup>391</sup> Although the conflict was not officially over, the CIA estimated that the Greek Army could now “strike a proper balance between [its] efforts to control the Albanian border and [pursue] anti-guerilla operations” to effectively end the conflict.

By late September, the Greek government had turned its focus on the post-Civil War era. The victories in Grammos and Vitsi led to the gradual obliteration of rebels throughout northern Greece, with Truman commenting that “the present Greek Government was like any other dog who has been down in a fight and then gets on top.”<sup>392</sup> Truman then advised his Under Secretary of State James Webb to “restrain the government and take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the wholesale slaughter of prisoners” and argued that “we have some responsibility to restrain” the government’s “brutal [...] punitive measures.” It would reflect badly on the Truman administration if the Greek Civil War resulted in an overly vindictive, authoritarian government, particularly as Greek communism no longer posed an immediate threat to Greece.

On October 16, KKE’s leaders officially announced the termination of all their military operations. Acheson immediately elaborated on KKE’s announcement and declared that the Greek Civil War was over, suggesting that reductions in the size of the Greek military should follow the end of hostilities.<sup>393</sup> KKE was forced to make this decision as the government’s raids during September made any further rebel activity unsustainable. Still, KKE’s announcement declared that “the monarcho-fascists would be mistaken if they think that the

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<sup>390</sup> Gallant, 274

<sup>391</sup> Working Paper, August 31, 1949. CIA-RDP79-01090A000100050009-7

<sup>392</sup> Memorandum, October 1, 1949. FRUS/VI:230

<sup>393</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/VI:235

struggle has ended and that the Democratic Army has ceased to exist.”<sup>394</sup> However, Acheson’s estimation that the conflict was indisputably over was proven correct.

Upon KKE’s announcement, the Truman administration initially sought to decrease the Greek Army’s size and reallocate relevant funds. Grady advised PM Alexandros Diomidis—who had succeeded Sophoulis after his death in June 1949—that “the Greek Army should be sharply and progressively reduced in size” as this would allow the Greek Government to recover economically; as Grady argued, “guerrilla warfare within Greece has been practically terminated.”<sup>395</sup> The American plans for Greece’s economic recovery reveal that the Greco-American alliance was intended to evolve into a long-term asset for America. This was a strategic goal for the Truman administration at the outset of its participation in the Greek Civil War and Van Fleet reaffirmed it in his first post-conflict comprehensive assessment of the Greek situation. Van Fleet argued that Greece’s “geopolitical position and military strategic position” not only remained intact since the Truman Doctrine came into effect, but also that “strategic control of the Mediterranean area by [the] US has increased since that announcement.”

And regarding the future, Van Fleet argued that “Greece offers an important base for the collection of strategic intelligence.” He added that Greece “has demonstrated clearly that she was a good ally in World War I, World War II, and post-World War II, and will continue to be in event of World War III” noting how “no other European nation has a better record and a stouter heart against aggression and communism.” Most importantly, Van Fleet concluded that “the US is here to stay” and that in the event of a conflict with the communist world,

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<sup>394</sup> Woodhouse, 483-485

<sup>395</sup> Grady to Diomedes, October 23, 1949. FRUS/VI:242

“Greeks will fight, they are a good investment.”<sup>396</sup> The significance of Van Fleet’s assessment could not have been more profound, as the next chapters will show.

### **KKE’s interpretation of post-Civil War Greece**

The impact that the Civil War had on Greek society and historical memory was cataclysmic. In terms of casualties, the Third Phase of the conflict in which America had a very significant influence resulted in approximately 158.000 deaths, while a total number of about 550.000 lives were lost during the 1940s.<sup>397</sup> In other words, the clash between the Greek Government and KKE devastated post-WWII Greece, in a political time when the rest of Europe had already started recovering and slowly integrating through the aid of the ERP. The American officials who estimated that the Greek case was unique were right, but if we consider the length and brutality of the clash, it is safe to say that this recovery could never be complete. The conflict divided Greeks to an almost irreparable extent, tearing families and regions apart, and allowing a massive escalation of violence that spread horror among all Greeks.<sup>398</sup>

However, at this point it is important to explore the Greek communists’ views concerning the outcome of the conflict, its aftermath, and Washington’s role in it. Despite losing the Civil War and remaining outlawed for twenty-five years thereafter, KKE not only survived but remains one of the main political parties within the contemporary Greek political system, usually receiving about 6% of the vote with remarkable consistency. Within KKE’s worldview, the Third Phase of the Greek Civil War was a struggle against the “combined forces of local oligarchy and international imperialism.”<sup>399</sup> To this day, KKE affirms that the only reason why “local oligarchy” won in 1949 was that it enjoyed the support of “American imperialism, which is the source of all the pain that the Greek people endured.” Concerning

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<sup>396</sup> Van Fleet to the Department of the Army, November 7, 1949. FRUS/VI:249

<sup>397</sup> Veremis and Koliopoulos, 258

<sup>398</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 260

<sup>399</sup> Kalyvas and Marantzidis, 498-500

the post-Civil War years, KKE believes that the Greek political parties were merely Washington's pawns, leading Greece to an extended era of *americanocracy* that aimed at countering the USSR's regional influence.<sup>400</sup>

Almost seventy-five years after the Civil War ended in 1949, KKE maintains the same staunch position and condemns Greece's alliances with the US on diplomatic, political, military, and economic levels.<sup>401</sup> Perhaps most indicatively, KKE interpreted the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a reasonable counter-attack that stemmed from American imperialism<sup>402</sup> while it never expressed any condolences to the American people, when the overwhelming majority of political parties in Greece—and within the Western European political world—did. KKE's assessment is important as its narrative was instrumental in shaping Greek anti-Americanism once the Greek military regime collapsed, in ways that far exceeded the party's real popularity and later electoral performances, particularly as Andreas Papandreou's ethical renunciation of the US was inspired by KKE's post-Civil War rhetoric.

### **An assessment of America's first Cold War intervention in Greek affairs**

Undoubtedly, Van Fleet's belief that the Greeks were a good investment resonated throughout America's interventionism during the Third Phase of the Greek Civil War. Because of Greece's invaluable geopolitical location and proximity to the Eastern Bloc, and despite the perennial instability and weak institutional integrity of the Greek government, the astonishing resilience of the rebels, and the constant foreign support to KKE, the Truman administration never backed away from Greece once it had replaced the British in supporting the Greek

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<sup>400</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 166-171

<sup>401</sup> "Theseis tis kentrikis epitropis tou kommounistikou kommatos elladas gia to 19o sinedrio, 11-14 Aprili." *KKE*, December 2012, <https://www.kke.gr/article/THeseis-tis-KE-toy-KKE-sto-19o-Synedrio/>

<sup>402</sup> Christina Mavropoulou, "Ena orosimo gia to ksediroma tis imperialistikis epithetikotitas," *Rizospastis*, September 11, 2005, <https://www.rizospastis.gr/story.do?id=3010284>

government against the domestic communist insurrection. In a way, the Truman Doctrine had set the bar too high for America, while the Truman administration's domestic and international political capital would greatly diminish had Greece been lost to communism. There was no alternative, given America's unconditional support to the Greek government—and the massive financial and military aid that followed.

However, some scholars debate the extent to which American aid sealed the fate of the Communists. As Christopher Woodhouse points out, the rebels' defeat was partially decided by the split between Tito and Stalin, after which the Yugoslavian border effectively closed for the rebels. Yet Woodhouse goes a step further to suggest that KKE's faith in Stalin sealed the rebels' defeat, as the Soviet leader was never very interested in KKE's cause while he soon abandoned it completely, focusing on the USSR's security instead.<sup>403</sup> Prominent Cold War historians such as Lloyd Gardner, Arthur Schlesinger, and Hans Morgenthau have suggested that Stalin's priority was to solidify Soviet security within the geographical boundaries of traditional Russian influence—and within which Greece was never included.<sup>404</sup>

Likewise, the clash between the USSR and Yugoslavia was detrimental to KKE's ambitions and substantially contributed to the rebels' defeat. As noted, the rebels' isolation was crucial in Papagos' victory in Grammos and Vitsi in the summer of 1949. However, had it not been for the consistent American support of the previous two years, it is highly plausible that the rebels would have never found themselves in this perilous position. It was only through the constant military support that the Greek Army withstood during the stalemate of 1947 and 1948, while the decision to dispatch American military personnel to reform its operational strategies was critical in its later successes. This chapter showed that throughout the Third

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<sup>403</sup> Woodhouse, 488-490

<sup>404</sup> Lloyd Gardner, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and Hans Morgenthau, *The Origins of the Cold War* (Waltham: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), 94-95



Phase of the Civil War, American officials and diplomats shared the belief that if they reduced American aid to Greece, then the country would most probably fall to communism. To that end, Washington never considered the possibility of leaving Greece without defeating the rebels.

Likewise, the financial aid that America furnished in Greece was instrumental. First through AMAG and in the context of the Truman Doctrine, and later through Greece's participation in the Marshall Plan, Washington provided significant economic aid to the deprived Greek population, as well as indispensable capital and technocratic advice to the Greek government, through which the Greek economy gradually recovered. Again, this chapter showed how in Greece's case, the Truman administration believed that Greek economic recovery depended on both military and financial aid, with one completing the other. As Stathis Kalyvas and Nikos Marantzidis argue, although the Greek government was unable to optimally use American financial aid through the ERP, America's support helped prevent the collapse of Greece's economy and parliamentary democracy.<sup>405</sup> Yet Kalyvas and Marantzidis correctly suggest that, in the long run, America's deep interference in Greek affairs prepared the soil for the post-conflict accusations of americanocracy yet in the context of the Civil War, American financial aid was crucial in both economic and political terms.

To that end, we can conclude that although American interventionism in the Greek Civil War was not the only variable in the Greek government's victory, it certainly was the most decisive one. Through both military and financial means, the Truman administration supported the Greek government against the rebels, which allowed the Greek Army to achieve a decisive victory in the summer of 1949 when KKE ended up isolated in the Greek mountains. After all, this chapter observed how the Truman administration made a consistent effort to take

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<sup>405</sup> Kalyvas and Marantzidis, 377-380

advantage of the split between Tito and Stalin, trying to steer the former towards the West partially to help Papagos' operations crush the remaining fighting rebels. Thus, even on the international level, the Truman administration acted accordingly to establish the appropriate conditions for the Greek Army's victory—and eventually succeeded.

### **An ethical interpretation of America's first Greek intervention**

In the previous chapter, this thesis argued that in the context of the Cold War, the US pursued a consequentialist foreign policy, in which the containment of world communism became a moral imperative, apart from a purely geopolitical one. The Truman Doctrine manifested for the first time how missionary American exceptionalism would influence Cold War American interventionism. In this mission, retaining Greece within the Western sphere of influence was indispensable—and far more difficult than the Turkish case due to the strength of Greek communists. In that sense, we should consider America's increasingly deep level of interference in Greek affairs during the Civil War, unequivocal support to the Greek government, and consistent military and financial support as the elements that constituted the Truman administration's consequentialist approach. Washington's ambition was to keep Greece safe from communism and to achieve that the Truman administration intervened to an unprecedented extent—and for a prolonged amount of time—in another nation's domestic affairs.

In this respect, America's intervention in the Greek Civil War indicates the long-term implications of Cold War consequentialist foreign policy. Although the Greek State had defeated the rebels, and thus Washington prevented the spread of communism in the Eastern Mediterranean, America's political capital within Greek society was hindered in the long run. But from a short-term perspective, the US found in post-Civil War Greece an indispensable

geopolitical ally and proved that it could contain communism abroad when necessary. The leftwing Greeks who were systematically discriminated against by the post-Civil War governments in various ways are those who brought the term americanocracy into the Greek public discourse. This narrative may not have been decisive for the 1950s and the 1960s, but it influenced to an impressive extent Greek political development in the 1970s and throughout the rest of the Cold War. Ironically thus, by deciding the outcome of the Greek Civil War in its favor, America unknowingly undermined the future of Greco-American relations in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

But America's first intervention in Greece contains several of the elements that many of Washington's interventions throughout the Cold War would as well. The Truman administration intervened on the side of the—democratically flawed—Greek government to support it against a domestic insurrection that sought to align Greece with the communist world through force. And to do so, the Truman administration repeatedly crossed several deontological lines the more the conflict lasted, and interfered heavily in Greek affairs on all levels, while this consequentialist approach also led to significant externalities. America's intervention succeeded in helping the Greek government defeat Greek communism and in keeping Greece within the West, but also traumatized to an irreparable extent the US—and the Greek State's—reputation within the Greek left. KKE's fervent contemporary anti-Americanism, consistent and unconditional opposition to NATO, and the frequent violations of Harry Truman's statue in Athens affirm this point. In the following chapters, this thesis will show how the memory of the US interventionism in the Greek Civil War had a profound impact in the future rise of Greek anti-Americanism.

We must note that the Truman administration monitored potential authoritarian threats to the Greek government. Throughout the Third Phase, the CIA identified the activities of the extreme-right paramilitary IDEA to prevent a surprise coup that could jeopardize American

involvement in the Civil War. Likewise, American pressure on the Greek government to not give Papagos absolute powers indicates Washington's emphasis to preserve a sense of democratic integrity in the upper echelons of the Greek government. Finally, the administration's initial reluctance to dispatch military personnel and discomfort with dispatching American fighting units shows that Washington was interested in maintaining a relative Greek political autonomy, primarily to avoid being accused of excessive interventionism in Greek affairs. In that sense, we can conclude that although the Truman administration ignored the poor democratic integrity of the Greek government, it did not consider facilitating the rise of a convenient—albeit authoritarian—administration to win the war. No one can know, however, if it would have not done so had the Greek Army's efforts been unsuccessful again, in the summer of 1949.

Still, the Truman administration crossed several ethically dubious lines as the war unfolded, which shows how winning it became an absolute priority for Washington. Truman's consequentialism particularly manifested in the direst days of the Third Phase, as options that were initially excluded—such as providing further aid to dispatching military personnel on the ground—were embraced, and to a significant extent. Although it never happened, this chapter showed how some officials within the Truman administration considered working with an authoritarian Greek government if it emerged on its own. Moreover, the administration supplied devastating weapons to the Greek Army to annihilate the rebels on the battlefield, which was a juxtaposition with its earlier calls for clinical operations and conduct that would not cause irreparable resentment among leftwing Greeks after the Civil War; providing napalm bombs which were used on Greek citizens cannot but leave a scar on their memory of American interventionism. But the geopolitical and ideological cost of losing Greece to communism would be too big to handle and thus the fact that the Greek government was democratic, albeit

of weaker standards compared to Western Europe, was a convenient justification for intervening increasingly more in both military and political terms.

Therefore, US interventionism in the Greek Civil War not only falls within the proposed consequentialist foreign policy framework but also initiates it. As this chapter showed, despite Truman's ideological tone, the geopolitical gains of keeping Greece within the West were the primary factor that defined American interventionism, instead of a commitment to support democracy and Greek self-determination; that was only secondary, and was mainly considered as an added benefit. The key for our understanding here is that the fact that the Greek government faced a communist threat made it far easier for America to intervene in Greek affairs, as the struggle against KKE reflected that of America's against the Soviet Union. Yet this chapter showed how the Truman administration knowingly and unreservedly supported consecutive Greek administrations which were hardly perfect democracies in the name of containment—while ignoring the criticism it faced for it. In that sense, defeating Greek communism was unreservedly prioritized over ensuring that US aid would be used by a truly democratic state.

The significance of the increasingly deep US intervention in the Third Phase of the Civil War in shaping its Cold War consequentialist foreign policymaking is manifested by Harry Truman's and Richard Nixon's personal evaluations of Washington's endeavors. Referring to the imminent Korean War, Truman himself argued that "Korea is the Greece of Asia" to highlight how America's early intervention could defeat the spread of communism from the north to the south and justify military action. Likewise, Richard Nixon, one of Washington's most devoted Cold Warriors, embraced as Dwight Eisenhower's VP the legacy of American interventionism in Greece, arguing that the Mediterranean country remained on

the American side “as a result of [America’s] positive action.”<sup>406</sup> Nixon was a member of the Senate’s Herter Committee, whose task was to monitor the progress of American aid in Europe. Consequently, Nixon flew to Greece and traveled in the battle-ridden mountains, where he experienced first-hand the horrors of the Civil War—but also the rebels’ brutality towards Greeks who either would not join their ranks or would not betray their family members who remained loyal to the Greek State.<sup>407</sup>

In a way, all the morally dubious geopolitical endeavors and interventions that the previous chapter discussed had their roots in America’s interventionism in the Third Phase of the Greek Civil War. Nixon himself became the key actor in America’s next major intervention in Greece which, in contrast to Truman’s, had far fewer concerns regarding the integrity of Greek constitutional rule. When ambassador Grady suggested that the administration should support a more authoritarian Greek government if it emerged due to the prolonged military stalemate in the Civil War, he unknowingly described what the Johnson and Nixon administrations would do twenty years later with the Greek military Junta. Grady had notably said that the administration should make sure that such a government would not become a full dictatorship; no one could foresee that, in the name of containment, this is exactly the type of Greek government that America would support from 1967 to 1974. But the coup of 1967 was a product of Cold War American interventionism in the intermediate years between the Civil War and the Junta.

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<sup>406</sup> Speech by Vice-President Nixon to the CIA Orientation Course, February 10, 1953. CIA-RDP80B01086A000800030007-5

<sup>407</sup> Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Touchstone, 1990), 48-50

## **Chapter Four:**

### **The systemization of American interventionism (1949-1956)**

*“The US will seek [to] discourage [the] debate on [the] application [of] principle  
[of] self-determination.”*

John Foster Dulles, 1954

This chapter will focus on American interventionism in post-Civil War Greece. Although Greece did not face any major crisis during these intermediate years, as during the Greek civil war or under the Junta, Washington maintained a constant consequentialist mindset in its interference in Greek politics, succeeding in maintaining Greece within its sphere of influence, yet laying the soil for long-term implications. This chapter will explore how the Truman and Eisenhower administrations intervened heavily to support the pro-American ES (Greek Rally) and ERE (National Radical Union) parties and their anti-communist policies on the domestic level. However, this chapter will also show how the Eisenhower administration undermined ES' and ERE's aspirations for Cyprus' self-determination. The early to mid-1950s era has been overshadowed by scholars' emphasis on the Civil War and the Junta, but this chapter will demonstrate how they manifest the long-term ethos and scope of Washington's consequentialist interventionism in Greece.

#### **Shifting towards political interventionism**

The previous chapter showed how by November 1949, prominent US officials stationed in Greece considered American interventionism in the country as a “good investment”, as General James Van Fleet put it. The US now had to protect this investment, since Greece’s main task in the 1950s would be to safeguard the “welfare and security of the Greek people” as Harry Truman told deputy Prime Ministers Konstantinos Tsaldaris and Sofoklis Venizelos when they visited him in Washington, in mid-November 1949.<sup>408</sup> However, the first Greek administration that emerged from the Civil War was politically weak and unreliable; in response, Washington considered whether Commander-in-chief Alexandros Papagos, whose leadership was instrumental in the closing stages of the Civil War, would decide to enter politics.

This prospect worried prominent Greek political actors. First, the liberal caretaker PM Alexandros Diomidis believed that a Papagos administration would signal a “sharp wing to the right” and that he was more valuable in the army. Second, Tsaldaris argued that “Papagos is irreplaceable in military establishment and cannot be spared for politics” adding that Americans have a “right and even duty to see that [the] military establishment into which they have put so much money is provided with effective leadership”; Tsaldaris’ case was insightful, as American military aid to Greece during the Civil War was estimated at \$32 million.<sup>409</sup> Finally, even King Paul II approached Papagos to advise him to remain in the military.<sup>410</sup> The three men made it clear that Papagos scared the establishment, exactly because of his military past.

After Ioannis Theotokis replaced Diomidis as PM in January 1950, Washington addressed the question of providing further aid. Washington realized that the Greek state could

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<sup>408</sup> Editorial Note, FRUS/VI:250

<sup>409</sup> Editorial Note, FRUS/VI:256

<sup>410</sup> Minor to Acheson, December 16, 1949. FRUS/VI:259



not afford to maintain a large army, but Ambassador Henry Grady urged Washington that aid was indispensable to both “maintain internal security and repel guerilla invasions.”<sup>411</sup> Yet this puzzle could not be solved until after the Greek elections of March 5, 1950, which resulted in a hung parliament—whose balance of power however clearly had shifted to the center. Upon the result, Acting Secretary of State James Webb noted that “whether wisely or not, [the] great majority [of] Americans have welcomed this trend.”<sup>412</sup> The CIA reported that a centrist coalition government under social-democrat Nikolaos Plastiras would be more accommodating to American interference<sup>413</sup> despite his “leftist” tendencies.<sup>414</sup> These reports reveal the administration’s plans for long-term political interventionism in Greece.

After several delegations, Venizelos became PM instead of Plastiras, with Grady immediately expressing his displeasure about the political uncertainty that a hung parliament foreshadowed in Athens. Grady warned Venizelos that his administration had “responsibilities” on which the resumption of American aid depended.<sup>415</sup> He then advised the Truman administration that it “can be neither dictatorial nor *laissez-faire*” but added that “‘gentle persuasion’ does not seem to be effective with irresponsible politicians,”<sup>416</sup> suggesting that Venizelos should be removed. The State Department quickly endorsed Grady’s advice, concluding that his “American intervention” should be “backed up” while Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, personally approved Grady’s initiative.<sup>417</sup> As a result of Washington’s pressure, Plastiras replaced Venizelos on April 15.

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<sup>411</sup> Grady to Acheson, March 15, 1950. FRUS/V:136

<sup>412</sup> Webb to Embassy (Greece), March 16, 1950. FRUS/V:137

<sup>413</sup> Intelligence Report, Formation of Plastiras Government urged, March 16, 1950. CIA-RDP78-016017A006100060015-8

<sup>414</sup> Acheson to Embassy (Greece), March 24, 1950, FRUS/V:141

<sup>415</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/V:144

<sup>416</sup> Grady to Acheson, March 31, 1950. FRUS/V:145

<sup>417</sup> McGhee to Acheson, April 18, 1950. FRUS/V:151

This rapid political interference proved that the US viewed Greece as an investment indeed. And Grady's reasoning—that Plastiras would be a safer choice than Venizelos—indicates the consequentialist elements that chapter two introduced, as in Washington's eyes, the former was expected to perform better in containing Greek communism, improving the economy, and strengthening the Greek armed forces. As Webb argued, despite the Greek government's American-aided victory in the Civil War, post-Civil War economic recovery and the continuation of American aid were imperative to retain Greece within the American sphere of influence.<sup>418</sup> Hence, Washington needed a political leader it could entrust with this task. In other words, the US had effectively decided that its interference in Greek affairs remained indispensable to keep Greece safe.

### **Political instability**

Despite Grady's wishes, Greek politics remained unstable. The Plastiras administration was not politically cohesive, with Van Fleet alarming Washington about the potential threat that the new Greek PM could potentially pose to American interests. Shortly before leaving Greece, Van Fleet told Acheson that "the present Greek government is dangerous" as since its formation "the Communists and fellow travelers have gradually regained their morale and influence and many are now in important positions." Van Fleet added that "it is shocking to me that we support a government which permits red infiltration so soon after so much blood and money has been spent here to suppress Communist aggression."<sup>419</sup> Only days later, the

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<sup>418</sup> Webb to Lay, March 6, 1950. FRUS/V:135

<sup>419</sup> Acheson to Embassy (Greece), July 17, 1950. FRUS/V:162

CIA reported that Plastiras had unilaterally decided to release former rebels from prison, which was a violation of the terms that bound the coalition government.<sup>420</sup>

Consequently, the Truman administration redefined its goals. Two separate State Department reports from late July show that Washington continued to consider Greece immensely valuable in geopolitical terms—but also a potential target of Soviet expansionism. George McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, argued that failing to support Greece in the event of an attack “would undermine the confidence of the noncommunist world in the United States and tend to isolate the United States from its present and potential allies” as “it continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Greece [does] not fall under communist domination.”<sup>421</sup> As long as the US identified its interests with keeping Greece under its control, Washington’s interference in Greek affairs would continue; the Civil War was just the start.

Another departmental report reveals a crucial parameter of post-Civil War American interventionism. The report suggested that “our governing policy [...] is that during the period of ideological conflict, support should be given to a Greek military establishment which would be capable of maintaining internal security in order to prevent Communist domination of Greece” and which would ensure that the country “would be capable of causing some delay to Soviet and/or satellite state advance.” This report noted how “Greeks have proven themselves good allies in two wars” and that “the Greek army is [a] good investment.” To that end, the Chief of Joint US Military Aid Group to Greece Reuben Jenkins noted that the “application of our present policy appears to be based on idealism while today we are confronted by cold realism,” meaning that Washington’s policy should be “immediately” revised.<sup>422</sup>

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<sup>420</sup> Information Report: Greek government upset over Plastiras release of certain communists, July 10, 1950. CIA-RDP82-0047R005200550004-4

<sup>421</sup> McGhee to Matthews, July 22, 1950. FRUS/V:164

<sup>422</sup> Jenkins to Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 26, 1950. FRUS/V:166

But both Venizelos and Plastiras had so far been proven unreliable. Less than a year after defeating the rebels, Greece had already been led by four different PMs, and still had a hung parliament. Worse still for Washington, the State Department concluded that Plastiras was “fuzzy-minded, impetuous, and emotional in his traditional liberalism” which informed his leniency towards communists, and suggested that the US “should now support some stronger type of Government, presumably headed by Marshal Papagos.”<sup>423</sup> A following State Department report manifested the Truman administration’s frustration with Plastiras, as it emphasized how “the Department has developed serious reservations concerning the activities of the Plastiras Government and is presently considering alternative solutions.”<sup>424</sup> These reports demonstrate the extent to which Washington was willing to intervene in Greek politics, but also the deontological lines that it was willing to cross for the sake of containment, as it had done during the Civil War.

During the summer of 1950, most reports on Greece referred to the Korean War as well. The Truman administration no longer believed that the rebels’ defeat and the first post-Civil War parliament—which the US initially appreciated<sup>425</sup>—could keep Greece safe, while containing communism was becoming a global and continuous mission. Acheson argued that a new Plastiras administration would be “undesirable” and suggested that Washington would welcome new elections “which might provide [a] new and firmer parliamentary base for effective governmental action in uncertain times ahead.” Acheson added that American personnel in Athens should “use [the] strongest possible Embassy influence [to] secure adoption majority system.”<sup>426</sup> Washington’s political interventionism in post-Civil War Greek

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<sup>423</sup> McGhee to Peurifoy, July 31, 1950. FRUS/V:169

<sup>424</sup> Memorandum, August 4, 1950. FRUS/V:170

<sup>425</sup> Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 156-58

<sup>426</sup> Acheson to Embassy (Greece), August 19, 1950. FRUS/V:173

affairs was already profoundly deep; American insistence on changing electoral laws would continue for years.<sup>427</sup>

Acheson's telegram again reveals how Washington viewed the Greek armed forces as a security bond. Acheson commented that a "Papagos solution cannot be justified at this time," arguing that he was more useful to Washington as a military leader "at present." He then elaborated on how Papagos as a "supra-party leader" would open the road for a resurgent KKE as he would most probably govern with unrestrained power, adding that "resort to Papagos in extra-parliamentary solution would tend divorce support from liberal republican elements which may in long run represent best hope for Greece." Acheson noted that "although public opinion here and abroad might accept emergence [of a] Papagos Government more readily at this time in light present international circumstances"—in an obvious reference to the global element that the Korean War had assigned to containment—he nonetheless concluded that communist and liberal "propaganda reaction" to such a political development could be an impediment.

There is a major point to decipher here. Acheson did not object to a "Papagos solution" because of his potential repressive right-wing policies, but because he did not consider it strategically wise "at present." Acheson wanted Papagos to remain head of the Greek Army and ensure Greek territorial integrity; had there been no prospect of a liberal or communist backlash against a Papagos solution in that moment, endorsing it would certainly not be inconceivable. The previous chapter showed that the US had already decided that the Greek Armed forces provided a layer of security for American interests in Greece, and that is the reason Washington could not dispense with Papagos. The retired Commander-in-Chief's military leadership and personal prestige provided Washington with a much-desired element

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<sup>427</sup> Roderick Beaton, *Greece: biography of a Modern Nation* (London: Penguin, 2019), 306

of stability, as the formation of a strong army was one of the fundamental American goals in the 1950s for the sake of containing communism in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>428</sup>

Acheson's wish to remove Plastiras came true, as Venizelos became PM again on August 15. Plastiras' downfall was facilitated by his political opponents; the CIA reported that Venizelos met with the King to "persuade" him that "the latter must take initiative in overthrowing the present government and in giving the mandate to form another government" in which Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, a prominent center-right political figure of the time, could participate—as Papagos seemed uninterested to enter politics.<sup>429</sup> Upon Plastiras' downfall, Webb noted that "the communist internal effort in Greece" will "always be a threat in this country of abysmally low living standards" hence "the persistent problem of governmental efficiency [...] require close and continuing American attention." Webb also suggested that Washington should take steps to ensure Greece's participation in NATO's regional operations.<sup>430</sup> Defending Greece from external threats had become an immediate priority, especially given the political instability in Athens.

Venizelos' return coincided with a changing of the guards at the American Embassy. The new ambassador, John Peurifoy—another career diplomat who had served in key positions within the State Department from 1947 to 1950<sup>431</sup>—informed Venizelos of Truman's displeasure concerning "the rapid succession of so many governments in Greece since the war" and of Washington's intention to increase the Army's forces back to 120.000 men, instead of reducing them to 80.000 as was originally agreed.<sup>432</sup> A month later, Papagos informed Peurifoy that 20.000 additional men were needed to ensure Greek security against a potential communist

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<sup>428</sup> Alexis Papachelas, *O viasmós tis Ellinikis dimokratias: o Amerikanikós paragon, 1947-1967* (Athens: Estia, 2017), 18

<sup>429</sup> Information Report: Greek Political Information, September 19, 1950. CIA-RDP82-00457R005800280005-7

<sup>430</sup> Memorandum, September 19, 1950. FRUS/V:181

<sup>431</sup> FRUS, "John Emil Peurifoy"

<sup>432</sup> Memorandum, undated, 1950. FRUS/V:184

attack, stressing that this was “even more important” than Greece’s economic recovery. Peurifoy commented that “building additional defensive strength sufficient to serve as bulwark to aggression from outside or provide military assistance to other countries” would “require “broader consideration.”<sup>433</sup> Soon after, Acheson invited both Greece and Turkey to participate in the next NATO meeting on the defense of the Mediterranean.<sup>434</sup>

### **The Papagos saga**

We cannot overstate the significance of NATO within the conceptualization of Cold War American foreign policymaking. NATO was an extension of the Marshall Plan, devised to provide Europeans with an American security aegis that would both contain the USSR and further facilitate European integration.<sup>435</sup> The latter element regarding NATO’s purposes is essential, as apart from solidifying European defense in military terms, it also provided Europeans with a psychological barrier. But as Greece remained in a permanent state of political instability, Peurifoy commented that the “Papagos solution” was the “best solution for Greece” and that “he could count on [the] Embassy’s full cooperation.” Upon consulting with the King, Peurifoy advised Acheson to endorse Papagos’ candidacy<sup>436</sup> with the Secretary swiftly replying that he “would of course have no objections if he came to power,” after however the parliament adopted a “majority system at earliest possible moment.”<sup>437</sup> Papagos was too valuable for Washington to risk dispensing, so the US needed to ensure that he would enjoy a comfortable parliamentary majority.

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<sup>433</sup> Peurifoy to Acheson, October 5, 1950. FRUS/V:188

<sup>434</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/V:189

<sup>435</sup> Steven Hook with John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II* (London: Sage, 2019), 44

<sup>436</sup> Peurifoy to Acheson, November 4, 1950. FRUS/V:192

<sup>437</sup> Acheson to Embassy (Greece), November 9, 1950. FRUS/V:193

However, by January 1951 the US could see little progress. The American embassy reported that Greece's difficulties had "brought again to the fore talk of the necessity for a strong government" which implied "the possible elevation to political power of Marshall Papagos." The embassy also added that because "the strategic and political advantages to the USSR of overrunning [...] Greece are so clear as to need no elaboration" the "delivery of key military equipment" was urgent.<sup>438</sup> A month later, the NSC reemphasized the imperative of keeping Greece under the US influence, and concluded that "in view of the far-reaching consequences of a communist domination of Greece, the investment of the US in assistance to Greece has been justified although the cost has been high."<sup>439</sup> The NSC's argumentation manifests how the Truman administration continued to view American interventionism in Greek affairs as a long-term investment, beyond the Civil War. Still, this investment required strong and reliable leadership in Athens.

Simultaneously, Greek macroeconomic indicators improved significantly through the country's participation in the ERP.<sup>440</sup> However, political instability remained a major problem as by March 1951 new elections seemed unavoidable, but the Greek parliament had not yet adopted the majoritarian voting system that Washington supported. Therefore, both Peurifoy and Acheson agreed that a "Papagos solution" would be severely compromised, yet still increased aid to "check political unrest" as there was a "serious danger of growth in "leftist sentiment."<sup>441</sup> The electoral law dispute remained unresolved throughout the spring of 1951, when Peurifoy suggested that Washington should pressure the Greek government to hold-off elections "unless [the] system employed subsequently provides basis for more stable

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<sup>438</sup> Yost to State, January 4, 1951. FRUS/V:206

<sup>439</sup> NSC, February 6, 1951. FRUS/V:209

<sup>440</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, *Katastrofes kai Thriamvoi* (Athens: Papadopoulos, 2015), 176-177

<sup>441</sup> Peurifoy to State, March 9, 1951. FRUS/V:214



government” from which a Papagos candidacy would profit.<sup>442</sup> Evidently, by that point, Washington had identified its interests with Papagos to the extent that it saw no alternative.

But at the dawn of May 31, both Washington and Athens were caught off-guard. Several units of the Greek Armed Forces surrounded the parliament in an attempted coup, which was only averted when Papagos himself arrived at the scene and ordered their rapid dissolution, despite having resigned from his post a few months earlier.<sup>443</sup> Only a few hours later, Greek authorities confirmed that the coup was orchestrated by a few obscure mid-ranked officers, who were members of the paramilitary IDEA group which the CIA had identified within the Greek army since the earliest days of the Third Phase. The embassy immediately protested the government’s intentions to severely punish the conspirators, arguing that it is “of utmost importance [that] no sanctions or purges [should] be conducted in armed forces without agreement as consequences might be most serious.”<sup>444</sup> An attempted coup against an elected government was not a good enough reason to punish its orchestrators, in the Truman administration’s eyes.

Washington’s response reveals three key elements of its consequentialist foreign policy. First, it highlights that despite its decisive contribution to the Greek State’s victory against the communist rebels, Washington still considered an independent army as an axis of stability in Greece. Amidst the perennially unstable local politics, the army was the only institution that Washington could entrust with the defense of regional American interests, hence it could overlook a misstep like an unsuccessful coup. Second, and more important, it highlighted the deep level of its political interventionism, as Washington was able to exercise pressure on the government to not sanction a handful of military officers who would surely be

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<sup>442</sup> Acheson to Embassy (Greece), May 7, 1951. FRUS/V:217

<sup>443</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/V:218

<sup>444</sup> Yost to State, June 1, 1951. FRUS/V:219

charged for treason—and possibly sentenced to death; suffice to say, a severe penalty could act as a barrier against future unconstitutional endeavors. In other words, Washington’s forgiving attitude towards the coup demonstrates its intention to cross deontological lines for the sake of regional security. This leniency would be a crucial parameter in the successful coup of 1967.<sup>445</sup>

Third, this incident solidified Washington’s belief that only Papagos could ensure stability. Peurifoy personally asked Papagos to at least return to the office of Commander-in-Chief<sup>446</sup> but Acheson soon realized that neither the King nor the Greek political leaders wanted to see Papagos rise as “one most powerful political factor[s] in Greece.” Acheson then suggested that the embassy “would be justified in giving strongest encouragement” for adopting a majority system, which however still seemed improbable.<sup>447</sup> In July, the State Department concluded that as Greece’s position is “precarious, and will remain so” Washington should continue to ensure that the country will “remain acutely sensitive to international developments” and thus “vigorous US sponsorship” would hopefully result in Greece’s admission to NATO “being the most desirable form of reciprocal security arrangement.”<sup>448</sup> The administration then concluded that “it may be necessary for the US to take measures to discourage an increase of political intervention in the affairs of the Greek Armed Forces.” Washington had far more faith in the Greek armed forces than in Greek political parties, to the point that it sought to limit the extent that the latter would exercise control over the former. As was the case in the Civil War, American interventionism in Greek affairs deepened increasingly more.

By the end of July, political instability reached new heights. Upon Venizelos’ resignation and call for snap elections, Papagos announced his entry into politics, introducing

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<sup>445</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 28-29

<sup>446</sup> Peurifoy to State, June 5, 1951. FRUS/V:220

<sup>447</sup> Acheson to Embassy (Greece), June 25, 1951. FRUS/V:224

<sup>448</sup> Memorandum, July 16, 1951. FRUS/V:225

an “entirely new element into [the] political situation and upcoming electoral campaign” per Peurifoy’s words.<sup>449</sup> The ambassador informed Washington that he intended to publicly “deny rumors that Americans inspired or encouraged” Papagos, but ensured that he would “privately and discretely” facilitate his campaign. In a most disturbing—from a deontological lens—statement, Peurifoy noted that the “real disadvantage” of Papagos’ “entry into politics is long term one” as the Truman administration had so far decided to “consider him last card for use only in great emergency” suggesting that Papagos was viewed as an extra-parliamentary solution. From his end, Papagos reassured Peurifoy “could count on him to collaborate with on [the] closest possible basis.”<sup>450</sup> The CIA also approved Papagos’ political aspirations.<sup>451</sup>

However, the September 1951 elections resulted in another hung parliament. Papagos’ ES (Greek Rally) received 36.5% and 114 seats, Plastiras’ EPEK (National Progressive Civil Union) 23.5% and 74 seats, Venizelos’ KF (Liberal Party) 19% and 57 seats, and the new crypto-communist EDA (United Democratic Left) 10.5% and 10 seats. Upon Papagos’ refusal to cooperate with any other party<sup>452</sup> a new Plastiras-Venizelos minority government emerged, with Plastiras returning as PM again. In the aftermath of the election, American officials threatened the new government that they would cut-off substantial aid if it did not introduce a majoritarian electoral law at once.<sup>453</sup> Peurifoy personally told Venizelos that Washington was “losing confidence in [the] ability [of the] present government to provide necessary stability in military, economic and security fields” and suggested that Venizelos’ Liberals retracted their vote of confidence and built bridges with Papagos.<sup>454</sup> Truman himself was “glad we were

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<sup>449</sup> Peurifoy to State, July 31, 1951. FRUS/V:227

<sup>450</sup> Peurifoy to State, August 28, 1951. FRUS/V:234

<sup>451</sup> Intelligence Bulletin: Comment on Greek field Marshall Papagos entering politics, August 2, 1951. CIA-RDP79T00975A000300300001-4

<sup>452</sup> Peurifoy to State, September 15, 1951. FRUS/V:237

<sup>453</sup> Thomas Gallant, *Modern Greece, From the War of Independence to the Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 280-281

<sup>454</sup> Yost to State, February 7, 1952. FRUS/VIII:419

giving this matter close attention and asked that he be kept in touch with it.” Yet, despite Acheson’s pressure,<sup>455</sup> Papagos refused to work with Venizelos.<sup>456</sup>

Inevitably, the question of changing the electoral law became paramount again. Peurifoy had an intense argument with Venizelos about the electoral system, with the latter reassuring the ambassador that “there was never any intention of presenting proportional system draft law to parliament.” Peurifoy then argued that the US “warned all our Greek friends many times in [the] past that [the] issue of electoral system [was] so critical to effectiveness [of the] entire US aid program [and] we would be obliged to state our position publicly if need arose.”<sup>457</sup> With the political impasse persisting, Peurifoy advised Acheson that “that prompt elections are [the] only means by which our objectives can be attained.”<sup>458</sup> But these elections needed to lead to Washington’s preferred result: a convincing ES victory.

Washington’s plans materialized. Despite leftwing EDA’s efforts to prevent the change<sup>459</sup> Greece formally adopted a majoritarian system on October 3<sup>460</sup> with Peurifoy informing Acheson that American “objectives may be realized in the near future” and that “having so nearly reached this important goal it would seem desirable to continue, privately and discreetly, to exercise our influence upon the King and Government to ensure that elections will be held as soon as possible after the enactment of the electoral law now being debated in Parliament.”<sup>461</sup> In the elections of November 16, Papagos’ ES received 49.2% of the vote, with the EPEK/KF coalition receiving 34.2%; due to particularities of the American-promoted electoral law, only these two parties made it to the parliament, with the ES receiving 247 seats

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<sup>455</sup> Memorandum, February 8, 1952. FRUS/VIII:420

<sup>456</sup> Memorandum, February 23, 1952. FRUS/VIII:422

<sup>457</sup> Peurifoy to State, March 17, 1952. FRUS/VIII:425

<sup>458</sup> Peurifoy to State, August 27, 1952. FRUS/VIII:433

<sup>459</sup> Ilias Nikolakopoulos, *I Kahektiki Dimokratia: kommata kai ekloges, 1946-1967*, (Athens: Pataki, 2013), 159

<sup>460</sup> Takis Pappas, “The transformation of the Greek party system since 1951” *West European Politics*, 26:2, (2003), 103, <https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1080/01402380512331341121>

<sup>461</sup> Peurifoy to State, September 25, 1952. FRUS/VIII:434

to EPEK/KF's 51. Washington had finally given Greece's helm to the hands it trusted it most with, with Papagos confirming his pro-Americanism in his very first speech as PM.<sup>462</sup>

### **The Papagos era**

ES' election in 1952 was the first of consecutive victories that ES—and its successor party, ERE—celebrated throughout the decade. Papagos' era was synonymous with political repression of communists and sympathizers, with leftwing Greek citizens being subject to often excessive police controls, and consistent state surveillance.<sup>463</sup> Perhaps Papagos' most infamous and indicative anti-communist policies were first, the issuance of certificates denouncing communism which were required by those seeking employment within the public sector<sup>464</sup> and second, the purge of leftwing teachers from schools.<sup>465</sup> Papagos' treatment of the left was a deviation from Western European norms, while anyone who expressed any leftwing inclinations was immediately considered to be a communist.<sup>466</sup> Undoubtedly, Papagos had little regard for civil liberties when it came to containment, just like Washington.

On the international side, Papagos' era was one of strong bilateral relations between Greece and the US. Papagos provided Washington with both the internal and regional security that it sought from post-Civil War Greece. Upon Papagos' victory, the American chargé d'affaires in Greece Charles Yost argued that “past experience” with Papagos indicated that he would “re-establish [an] atmosphere of stability in Greek Armed Forces and maintain close and

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<sup>462</sup> Theodore Coulombis, *Greek political reaction to American and NATO influences* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 72-73

<sup>463</sup> Clogg, 158-159

<sup>464</sup> Stathis Kalyvas and Nikos Marantzidis, *Emfyliia Pathi: 23 Erotiseis kai Apantiseis gia ton Emfylio* (Athens: Metaihmio, 2015), 220

<sup>465</sup> Sofia Iliadou-Tachou, “Communism, anti-communism and education in Greece from the Axis occupation until the early Cold War era (1944–1967)” *History of Education*, 49:3 (2020), 376, <https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1080/0046760X.2020.1731851>

<sup>466</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 168

effective cooperation with NATO commanders.”<sup>467</sup> Papagos’ administration provided a security guarantee for Washington’s three main goals regarding Greek affairs: a) the obliteration of any communist threat, b) the transition into an era of political stability and c) Greece’s firm place within NATO and the West.<sup>468</sup> Moreover, his massive parliamentary majority and declared pro-Americanism could not have been more well-received in Washington; these were the two elements that defined how deeply the US would intervene in Greek affairs in the years to come.

In the meantime, Dwight Eisenhower succeeded Truman. The commemorated WWII veteran overwhelmingly won the 1952 election, bringing with him to the White House as Vice-President the young senator who had traveled in Greece during the Civil War and later praised American interventionism against Greek communist rebels, Richard Nixon. Eisenhower shared Truman’s belief regarding the significance of the Eastern Mediterranean; the new President considered Greece’s and Turkey’s inclusion into NATO paramount for American interests in Europe<sup>469</sup> and tried to soften the reluctance of other member-states to approve their admission to the alliance.<sup>470</sup> Moreover, the Eisenhower administration regarded aid to foreign countries and pro-American political actors as an essential tool to contain Soviet expansionism, irrespective of their democratic integrity in what is known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.<sup>471</sup> In Greece alone, the Eisenhower administration would invest more than \$400 million in the form of loans, free economic aid, and free military supplies by 1957.

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<sup>467</sup> Yost to State, November 19, 1952. FRUS/VIII:435

<sup>468</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 18-19

<sup>469</sup> Tim Sayle, *Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 22

<sup>470</sup> For instance, see: CIA-RDP79T00975A000500530001-7, CIA-RDP79T00975A000200510001-2, CIA-RDP79T00975A000300200001-5, CIA-RDP79T00975A000300390001-5, CIA-RDP79T00975A000300660001-5, CIA-RDP79T00975A000300640001-7, CIA-RDP79T00975A000400660001-4

<sup>471</sup> Powaski, 121. See also: Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America’s Cold War: the politics of insecurity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020), 177

Eisenhower's consequentialist interventionism became immediately evident. In late March 1953, only months after Papagos' election, Peurifoy complained to Papagos' minister of coordination, Spyridon Markezinis, that "in spite of the vigorously anti-Communist convictions of Marshal Papagos" he "had not in fact taken steps to correct the unsatisfactory security situation inherited from the previous Government." Peurifoy elaborated that first, Papagos' government had not re-captured previously pardoned communists despite their return to political activity, second, that it had not restricted the circulation of EDA's official newspaper, *Avgi*, third, that it had formal contact with EDA's leader Ioannis Passalidis—which, according to Peurifoy made him look like a "responsible political leader"—and, fourth, that it had not retaliated against EDA despite its connections to the KKE.<sup>472</sup> The fact that EDA was a democratically elected party operating within constitutional boundaries, did not mean much to Washington.

But Peurifoy was adamant. The American ambassador argued that Papagos' "toleration of EDA and the communists generally" would lead to "unfortunate events" such as the strengthening of the Greek communists' "underground apparatus" which could cause "serious damage at the time of some future emergency such as outbreak of war." Moreover, he argued that Papagos' overwhelming victory over the EPEK/Liberal coalition—which, again, was mainly an outcome of Washington's pressure to change the electoral law—would lead to EPEK's collapse, which in its turn would cause an influx of voters to EDA. Hence, Peurifoy suggested that more "repressive action against EDA on the part of the Government might well intimidate and discourage new recruits." Peurifoy also commented that "the elimination of 'pinks' from government service" was "desirable" for the US, while urging Markezinis to "place in custody" the released communists and "suppress the EDA newspaper."

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<sup>472</sup> Peurifoy to State, March 24, 1953. FRUS/VIII:437

We must highlight the significance of Peurifoy's post-election intervention, exactly because it reveals how much Washington would continue to interfere with Papagos' policies in the name of containment. Peurifoy acknowledged this irony himself, arguing that "Papagos and Markezinis are sincere friends of the US and firm adherents to the global policy of resistance to Communism" but still pointed out that the US has "disagreed with the current tactics of the ES Government towards the Communist front party in Greece." But aside from criticizing Papagos' initial approach towards leftwing Greeks, Peurifoy stressed how Washington should keep investing in Greece's recovery. Peurifoy noted that American aid was "a symbol of hope" for Greeks but also an imperative for Washington "in view of Greece's strategic position." Peurifoy concluded that the US should keep financing Greek recovery as "even if solutions deteriorate the bill which the US would have to pay in order to maintain its interests in this strategic country would be very considerably larger than the small amount now needed to maintain the present happy situation."<sup>473</sup> In other words, Peurifoy viewed Papagos as a guarantor of systemic change in Greek politics.

Peurifoy's early evaluation of Papagos' administration highlights three more elements. First, Washington did not believe that even a pro-American government like his could reenergize Greece's economy alone. Second, Greece's geopolitical importance remained indispensable, despite the American focus partially turning to East Asia due to the Korean War. Third, Washington was unsatisfied with Papagos' "oblivion policy" according to which the Greek State should gradually leave the Civil War behind and focus on future prosperity.<sup>474</sup> Despite Papagos' credentials, Washington believed that the former Commander-in-chief should be encouraged to adopt harsher policies towards leftwing Greeks and former rebels.<sup>475</sup>

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<sup>473</sup> Peurifoy to State, April 10, 1953. FRUS/VIII:438

<sup>474</sup> Hellenic Parliament TV, "Alexandros Papagos, o archistratigos, o stratarchis, o prothipourgos" YouTube Video, 34:55-36:23 November 10, 2014, [https://youtu.be/fitg4zt\\_3pA?t=18](https://youtu.be/fitg4zt_3pA?t=18)

<sup>475</sup> Memorandum, May 7, 1953. FRUS/VIII:439



For Washington, containing leftwing elements within Greece was a precondition for Papagos' envisioned prosperity. Washington's pressure regarding EDA's activity and broader discomfort towards Papagos' initial leniency are indicative of Washington's deepening consequentialist interventionism in Greece in the early 1950s.

From his end, Papagos was ready to capitalize on American support. He soon asked for \$253 million to implement his recovery program, exactly because Greece's budget could not meet the country's NATO commitments and pursue an expansionary fiscal policy at the same time. In response, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that the administration should provide Greece with the required funds "within the limits of Congressional action and technical feasibility."<sup>476</sup> The State Department formally informed Markezinis that the Eisenhower administration intended to support even further the Greek economy, ensuring Athens that "half the cost of each new project will be provided from funds other than United States aid."<sup>477</sup> In their next meeting, Papagos and Peurifoy reaffirmed the future course of Greco-American relations, with the Greek PM arguing that the "morale factor" depended both on "defense buildup" but also "on economic and financial factors." Soon after, Dulles formally visited Greece, in a gesture that manifested the intimacy between the two administrations.<sup>478</sup>

In early June, Eisenhower himself expressed to Papagos his gratitude at seeing him emerge as Greece's undisputed political leader. Eisenhower emphasized his "pride" that "Greeks stand resolutely at the side of the American people and face with them the problems which confront the free world today," suggesting that "Greece is fortunate to have such a leader" while commending Papagos both for his willingness to contribute to the Korean War, as well as to maintain Greece's forces "at their present strength." Eisenhower added that it was

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<sup>476</sup> Memorandum, May 7, 1953. FRUS/VIII:440

<sup>477</sup> Baxter to Peurifoy, May 12, 1953. FRUS/VIII:441

<sup>478</sup> Mutual Security Administration to Markezinis, undated, 1953. FRUS/VIII:442

“gratifying to receive this further evidence of the acute awareness of the Greek nation to the threat to the free world” by allowing America to build military bases as well as by working closely with their common “European Allies” through NATO. The President concluded that Papagos’ administration deserved the “highest praise especially when considered in the light of recent history” as “under an enlightened leadership, Greece cannot fail to play an increasingly important role in world affairs” as “a beacon of hope to all lovers of freedom.”<sup>479</sup>

Eisenhower’s political cordiality, Dulles’ engaging diplomacy, and Peurifoy’s relentless pressure, eventually led to a critical geopolitical success for the US. In mid-August 1953, Papagos informed Washington that his administration “accepted unreservedly its proposal for establishment of military bases in Greece”<sup>480</sup> through which Washington could now employ American forces at invaluable geopolitical locations in the Eastern Mediterranean, solidifying both Greece’s territorial integrity, as well as American regional hegemony. Papagos had offered Washington exactly what it sought from him. Before even completing just one year in office, Papagos had transformed the perennially unstable Greece into one of Washington’s most loyal allies. Just a few years after the US saved Greece from communism, it enjoyed the privilege of establishing military bases on Greek soil; the investment was paying off.

But Papagos sought to make the most out of Washington’s support to his administration as well. By the end of summer, Markezinis was using the Greco-American military agreement to request more American funds to allocate to Greece’s development programs. Yost said that Markezinis had been careful to “not give the impression of blackmail” while noting that irrespective of Markezinis’ political maneuvering “his basic thesis, that we could expect to receive only from Papagos–Markezinis government strong support of character now being accorded, is undoubtedly correct.” Yost elaborated that “it is definitely in [the] US interest,

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<sup>479</sup> Eisenhower to Papagos, June 5, 1953. FRUS/VIII:446

<sup>480</sup> Yost to State, August 14, 1953. FRUS/VIII:448

without openly aligning ourselves with Rally Government [...] to use means at our disposal for assisting, to reasonable degree, in meeting government's economic problems" while suggesting that "US-Greek military collaboration arising from base agreement and humanitarian appeal [...] should provide justification for such policy."<sup>481</sup> The US was fully aware that the Greek administration was taking advantage of Washington's unconditional support to it, but was willing to acquiesce to Papagos' demands exactly because he had already proved his value on multiple levels.

The establishment of US military bases was formally ratified in mid-October 1953, a little less than a year after Papagos' overwhelming American-aided victory.<sup>482</sup> After securing Greece from the outside, Washington doubled down on protecting Greece from internal threats as well, while by May 1953, the CIA inspired and facilitated the establishment of its Greek counterpart, KYP (Greek Intelligence Agency) with which it built a symbiotic relationship. Despite KYP's organizational deficiencies and incompetent personnel—especially in terms of its democratic integrity—both of which worried to some extent American officials, the Greek intelligence agency was expected to become instrumental in the struggle to suppress Greece's domestic communist threat.<sup>483</sup> Greece's future dictator Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos served as a liaison between the two agencies, from 1959 to 1964.<sup>77</sup> This thesis will later demonstrate how significant this detail was in Greeks' post-Junta moral renunciation of American interventionism.

### **From americanocracy to the Cyprus question**

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<sup>481</sup> Yost to State, August 22, 1953. FRUS/VIII:449

<sup>482</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/VIII:453 (1952-1954)

<sup>483</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 23

The magnitude of American interventionism in post-Civil War Greece was evident even before Papagos' election. Yet it was during Papagos' era when the term *americanocracy*—coined by the defeated leftists and sympathizers of the Civil War, as chapter three showed—became widely used to describe Papagos' close relationship with the US, as well as his anti-communist policies.<sup>484</sup> Those Greeks who talked of *americanocracy* viewed America as an imperial power whose prosperity and might were founded on an inhumane and unrepresentative political system.<sup>485</sup> On a similar note, and despite having been outlawed in Greece, KKE still operated within the Eastern Bloc and frequently condemned American interventionism in Greece during Papagos' time.<sup>486</sup> In Athens, EDA's newspaper *Avgi* argued continuously was synonymous with violence and propaganda; Eisenhower had suggested the suppression of this particular newspaper.<sup>487</sup>

However, by mid-1954 the CIA foreshadowed the first major turbulence for Greco-American relations during Papagos' era. American intelligence reports from Athens warned the Eisenhower administration that the Greek government's decision to elevate the question of Cyprus' political future by directly confronting the British government during the imminent United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) would inevitably implicate the US, as “both Britain and Greece have pressed for American support.” The report also warned Washington that “the Cyprus question has assumed an overriding emotional importance in Greek politics and rejection of the Greek case [...] will result in widespread resentment.”<sup>488</sup> Unknowingly, this CIA report provided a synopsis of what was to follow throughout the following years regarding

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<sup>484</sup> Emmanuel Alexakis, “The Greek Right: Structure and Ideology of the New Democracy Party” PhD Dissertation (London: LSE, 1993), 80

<sup>485</sup> Zinovia Laliouti, *O Antiamerikanismos stin Ellada, 1947-1989* (Athens: Asini, 2016), 255

<sup>486</sup> KKE, *To KKE: Episima Keimena: 1956-1961* (Athens: Sygxroni Epohi, 1981), 11-15

<sup>487</sup> Laliouti, 256-257

<sup>488</sup> Intelligence Bulletin: Cyprus Issue may impair Greek-American relations, September 9, 1954. CIA-RDP79T00975A001700630001-3

Cyprus, as the matter's emotional significance for Greek administrations and citizens would define how both would interpret US policy towards the island's future.

Although the Cyprus question remains unresolved to this day, its origins are rooted deep within the Cold War, mainly in the Papagos era. Cyprus became part of the British Empire in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century and was considered a key geopolitical asset due to its proximity to the Suez Canal. However, due to Cyprus' overwhelmingly Greek population, its union with Greece became increasingly popular among Greeks, in a movement that fell within Greece's *Megali Idea*—Greeks' ambition to unite all Hellenic territories—and which was known as *Enosis*. Both Greeks and Greek Cypriots expected the UK to be accommodating to enosis, particularly due to the British help in the Greek war of Independence.<sup>489</sup> By the early 1950s, however, the UK was expecting that its sovereignty over Cyprus would never be challenged.<sup>490</sup> But that is also when Archbishop Makarios emerged as the leader of Greek Cypriots, and immediately attempted to elevate the Cyprus question on the international level, emphasizing Cyprus' right to its self-determination. But what made Cypriot self-determination unique is that it was practically synonymous with enosis.<sup>491</sup> The unbalanced distribution of the two ethnic communities on the island would be a fundamental reason why the stalemate on the Cyprus question persisted for decades.

We must note that the Cyprus question is largely absent from most works on Cold War American foreign policy. Most relevant scholarship either ignores Cyprus' Cold War significance, or merely focuses on the events of 1974 and the Turkish invasions that followed

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<sup>489</sup> James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: What everyone needs to know*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 13-15

<sup>490</sup> Ioannis Stefanidis, *Assimetroi Eteroi: oi Inomenes Politeies kai h Ellada ston Psycho Polemo, 1953-1961*, (Athens: Pataki, 2013), 264-265

<sup>491</sup> Edward Johnson, "Keeping Cyprus off the agenda: British and American relations at the United Nations, 1954-58" *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 11:3 (2000), 226-227, <https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1080/09592290008406178>

an unsuccessful coup engineered by the Greek Junta.<sup>492</sup> Cyprus is mostly a matter of interest for Greek, Cypriot, or Turkish scholars.<sup>493</sup> This and the following chapters will shed light on the extent to which the US influenced the evolution of the Cyprus question, but will also assess how Washington's approach falls perfectly within the consequentialist framework that this study proposes. We must note that the US opposed Greek attempts for enosis from the very first moment; back in 1950, Washington had warned Plastiras' government to not pursue any irredentist positions regarding the future of Cyprus.<sup>494</sup> This was the CIA's position in 1951 as well, which had warned the Truman administration that "the matter will be pushed by Greece at every opportunity."<sup>495</sup>

But the key difference now was Papagos' confidence—which had been fostered by Washington. With Greece enjoying unprecedented political and economic stability under his leadership, Papagos had privately raised the issue with British foreign minister, Anthony Eden, whose staunch anti-enosis position infuriated the Greek PM.<sup>496</sup> Papagos then informed Washington about his plans to raise the Cyprus question at the following UNGA, asking for Washington's support. Dulles however argued that "US remains firmly opposed" as "Greek presentation of enosis" would have "deleterious effects in Aegean area" and possibly "afford the USSR [...] tailor-made opportunity" to "create dissension among members of the Western world."<sup>497</sup> Eisenhower agreed with Dulles, arguing—before a meeting with Winston Churchill—that "if Cyprus were returned to Greece, the Turks would probably raise questions and vice versa, and that a maintenance of the status quo was probably the best solution at this

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<sup>492</sup> Hook and Spanier, 125. Also, notably, Kissinger's *Diplomacy* covers the Cold War throughout thirteen chapters but does not mention Cyprus not even once.

<sup>493</sup> Greco-Cypriot politician, Takis Chatzidimitriou, has written extensively on the matter; see his work entitled *Kipros 1950-1959, to telos tou alitrotismou* (Athens: Papazisis, 2018)

<sup>494</sup> Acheson to Embassy (Greece), June 27, 1950. FRUS/V:160

<sup>495</sup> Intelligence Bulletin: Greeks about to propose union of Cyprus with Greece, May 4, 1951. CIA-RDP79T00975A000200140001-3

<sup>496</sup> Beaton, 312-313

<sup>497</sup> Dulles to Embassy (Greece), April 5, 1954. FRUS/VIII:365

time.”<sup>498</sup> Washington prioritized regional stability at the expense of Cypriots’ rights to their self-determination, dismissing Papagos’ case.

Washington’s position remained firm. By mid-summer, Washington reassured London that it continuously advised Athens “not to press their claim to Cyprus”<sup>499</sup> while warning the Greek government that it “will assume [a] grave responsibility for disruption to free-world unity.”<sup>500</sup> Dulles in particular warned Athens that raising the Cyprus question “would result in serious and undesirable consequences” especially as the UK and Turkey were also “primarily concerned with the future of Cyprus.”<sup>501</sup> But the Greek government’s position was also unbending; in late summer 1954, the new American Ambassador Cavendish Cannon—another seasoned career diplomat who had previously served in Yugoslavia and Syria as head of mission<sup>502</sup>—reported that despite Dulles’ warnings, the Greek government had “a negative response to the Secretary’s request” and “no other course” but to elevate the Cyprus question at the next UNGA.<sup>503</sup> Simultaneously, Washington attempted to convince the Turkish government to engage in substantive discussions with the Greek one, reassuring Ankara that the Eisenhower administration would “weigh with fullest sympathy the views of the Turkish Government in formulating its policy.”<sup>504</sup>

Undoubtedly, Washington’s primary concern was to prevent the escalation of the Cyprus question as it could potentially undermine NATO’s stability. But the Greek delegation projected a strong argument, at least from a deontological perspective: in mid-September, Papagos’ administration forwarded its request to the UN, citing “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the island of Cyprus.”

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<sup>498</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/VIII:369

<sup>499</sup> State to British Embassy, undated, 1954. FRUS/VIII:373

<sup>500</sup> Dulles to Embassy (Greece), July 27, 1954. FRUS/VIII:374

<sup>501</sup> Dulles to Stephanopoulos, undated, 1954. FRUS/VIII:375

<sup>502</sup> FRUS, “Cavendish Wells Cannon”

<sup>503</sup> Position Paper, September 14, 1954. FRUS/VIII:380

<sup>504</sup> Smith to Embassy (Turkey), September 6, 1954. FRUS/VIII:379

Papagos' emphasis on self-determination put the US in an impossible place as although Washington considered several options for the imminent UNGA, ranging from abstaining to tactically bypassing the Cyprus question, American officials admitted that "it would be difficult for us to deny that the Assembly has the power under Article 10 of the Charter to discuss questions such as the Cyprus problem." The report then elaborated both on how all three countries involved relied on US support regarding Cyprus, reemphasizing that the situation could "weaken the fabric of solidarity in the NATO system."<sup>505</sup>

Just a day later, the Eisenhower administration formally initiated Washington's consequentialist approach towards the Cyprus question. Dulles argued that the administration had decided that the US "will seek [to] discourage [the] debate on [the] application [of] principle [of] self-determination" and "will actively oppose any resolution."<sup>506</sup> Once again, for the sake of geopolitical stability and regional hegemony, America crossed another deontological line, dismissing Greece's values-based argument regarding Cyprus' right to self-determination. Moreover, Dulles proved that the US was willing to ignore Greece's strong deontological case—given that about 80% of Cypriots identified as Greeks<sup>507</sup>—of one of its closest allies, Papagos, whom Washington had pulled as many strings as possible to strengthen politically; this chapter will later elaborate on the significance of this detail. Crucially, in a letter to Churchill on the matter, Dulles himself admitted that the US position was against its "principles."<sup>508</sup>

The main difference now was that Greece was on the receiving end of Washington's consequentialist foreign policy. In contrast with the Greek Civil War or with the immediate post-Civil War era, in which the US intervened in Greece by crossing deontological lines to

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<sup>505</sup> Position Paper, September 14, 1954. FRUS/VIII:380

<sup>506</sup> Dulles to Embassy (Greece), September 15, 1954. FRUS/VIII:381

<sup>507</sup> Ker-Lindsay, 2-3

<sup>508</sup> Dulles to Churchill, September 21, 1954. FRUS/VIII:385



support the Greek State in ways that would serve its interests best, this time the US undermined the Greek State's position, as it prioritized regional stability over the Greek claims. Washington's consequentialist approach regarding the Cyprus question proved—and would reaffirm in the future—that consequentialist interventionism would be multifaceted, and that the imperative to contain communism could lead to decisions that seemed unthinkable for pro-American governments. The Eisenhower administration showed how manipulating allies against each other by simultaneously disregarding any deontological arguments was now in America's playbook. As this thesis will show in the following chapters, Washington's consequentialist approach on the Cyprus question was at the core of an unprecedented anti-American sentiment—that the CIA had identified from the start—which was not confined within the boundaries of the left but became widespread within post-Civil War Greece.

Before December's UNGA, Eisenhower and Churchill discussed more about Cyprus. The British PM argued that “the failure of the United States to support us [...] would cause deep distress over here and add greatly to my difficulties in guiding public opinion into the right channels in much larger matters” suggesting that Cyprus would be “magnified by the enemies of the English-speaking world on both sides of the ocean.”<sup>509</sup> Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the American UN ambassador, elaborated on the British position, suggesting that “they could not admit the principle of self-determination in this case” as “self-determination would mean that Cyprus could if it wished, not only join Greece, but establish an independent Communist island” which would possibly be the outcome “if an election were held today”<sup>510</sup> referring to Makarios' unknown allegiances. On his turn, the US ambassador to Britain Winthrop Aldrich confirmed that the British “could not sit down with the Greeks.”<sup>511</sup> Papagos expressed his dismay that America “was assisting the UK” suggesting that it could lead to “serious

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<sup>509</sup> Churchill to Eisenhower, September 18, 1954. FRUS/VIII:382

<sup>510</sup> Lodge to State, September 20, 1954. FRUS/VIII:384

<sup>511</sup> Aldrich to State, October 2, 1954. FRUS/VIII:387

repercussions in Greece.”<sup>512</sup> The Cyprus question was taking gargantuan proportions. Dulles advised Eisenhower to “avoid being personally involved in this controversy”<sup>513</sup> while informing Papagos that the President “would be compelled to oppose the passage of any substantive resolution” if Greece persisted.<sup>514</sup>

But Papagos maintained the same course. By December, American officials in Athens reported that “some reassuring statement from a U.S. source to permit the quashing of rumors in Athens that the U.S. has been one of the principal ‘bad boys’ on the Resolution regarding Cyprus” was required.<sup>515</sup> George Melas, the Greek ambassador to the UN, elaborated on the Greek sentiment arguing that Washington’s decision to “oppose” the Greek resolution was “a profound shock to the Greek people, who had always looked to the United States as the leading exponent of the ideals of liberty and independence of peoples” while adding that “the cause of Cyprus is a deep national conviction on which all Greeks are united and on which they all feel elementary justice is on their side.”<sup>516</sup> Melas could not have summarized any better how Greece’s deontological claims were disregarded by the US consequentialist approach to the Cyprus question.

### **From stability to friction**

Due to the tensions surrounding the Cyprus question, Washington immediately tried to reapproach Papagos. In an early 1955 interdepartmental report, Washington acknowledged that “foreign influences still play an important part” in Greece reaffirming that “the US in particular is likely to retain its present predominant influence in Greece” although “Greek responsiveness

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<sup>512</sup> Memorandum, October 26, 1954. FRUS/VIII:390

<sup>513</sup> Memorandum, November 2, 1954. FRUS/VIII:391

<sup>514</sup> Dulles to Papagos, November 16, 1954. FRUS/VIII:396

<sup>515</sup> Memorandum, December 16, 1954. FRUS/VIII:407

<sup>516</sup> Memorandum, December 16, 1954. FRUS/VIII:408

to US advice may decline” due to “US position on enosis.”<sup>517</sup> A month later, the US decided to maintain its high levels of economic aid to the country due to the “adverse effect which the Cyprus question has had on Greek-American relations.” This report elaborated that “American prestige has declined in Greek eyes” and thus reducing aid would hurt “the friendly and cooperative relations” between the two countries.”<sup>518</sup> In other words, the US was fully aware that its position regarding Cyprus was far from well-received by many Greeks.

But Papagos still expected the US to support Greece’s position. By May 1955, ambassador Melas informed Dulles that “the main source of dissatisfaction” back in Greece “was the belief that the U.S. supported the UK” arguing that “only the US could do something constructive about Cyprus.” Dulles ambivalently responded that the US always sided “with the aspirations of those wanting self-determination” but in practice avoided Greece’s requests.<sup>519</sup> The Eisenhower administration undermined Greece’s position on a matter that should find the US as a natural ally—at least theoretically. That is why we must consider Papagos’ perspective on the situation; the Greek PM’s political ambitions enjoyed profound American support, while he was personally an advocate of Washington’s global goal to contain communism. In that sense, Papagos did not expect that Washington would completely disregard his deontological claims regarding Cyprus when both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had invested so much in having an administration like his taking over Greece’s post-Civil War fortunes.

Yet that is exactly where the Papagos interpreted Washington’s position inaccurately. Despite its objectively generous aid towards his administration, the US was primarily interested in Greece’s geopolitical position, and not in the integrity of its institutions, or the—

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<sup>517</sup> National Intelligence Estimate, January 18, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:276

<sup>518</sup> Memorandum, February 14, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:277

<sup>519</sup> Memorandum, May 25, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:117

deontological—morality of its requests. This and the previous chapters have already highlighted instances in which American interventionism prioritized the establishment of a friendly government, instead of solidifying Greece's democratic integrity; the latter was of course desirable, but the former was indispensable. That is exactly why ambassador Cannon urged Dulles to invite Papagos to the US, noting that due to "internal political factors" and "recent international developments" the administration should reaffirm Greece's "relation to Western strength in this area." Cannon elaborated that as Papagos was performing at the level Washington expected "it would seem prudent [...] to give appropriate recognition to those who have made a significant contribution thereto" given that Greece was "symbol [of the] United States post-war decision stand firm against Soviet Communist expansionism." Dulles did not extend an invitation.<sup>520</sup>

The nightmare of Greek political instability resurfaced. Papagos' health had been steadily declining throughout 1955, which coincided with a turbulent political time in Greek foreign relations; both parameters undermined his final months in office.<sup>521</sup> Papagos' weakened position alarmed American intelligence, as Dulles was briefed that "Greece has been without effective political direction" which had left an open space both for IDEA to increase their grip on the military and become influential "behind the scenes" as well as for EDA to become "more articulate and outspoken."<sup>522</sup> The CIA also noted a "rapid deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations" and "renewed outbreaks of violence in Cyprus" while predicting that "neutralism in Greece will probably gain new strength."<sup>523</sup> Amid renewed instability in Greece and increasing violence between communities in Cyprus, American officials complained that

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<sup>520</sup> Embassy (Greece) to Dulles, May 20, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:280

<sup>521</sup> Gallant, 281-282

<sup>522</sup> Memorandum, August 17, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:283

<sup>523</sup> NSC Briefing: Imminent break-up of Cyprus talks, September 1, 1955. CIA-RDP79R00890A000600040029-6

“the Greeks expect an awful lot under the best circumstances.”<sup>524</sup> Washington could not understand that Greece’s overreliance on it was of its own making.

On a positive note, Papagos’ apparent heir in ES’ leadership—who also had the King’s blessings—Konstantinos Karamanlis, was actively stepping onto the Greek political stage by mid-September. Karamanlis had been a partisan rising star who bypassed several prominent ES members to gain the party’s control.<sup>525</sup> Regarding Cyprus’ saga, the CIA reassured Dulles that Karamanlis hoped that the US would “help Greece find means for shelving the Cyprus issue “with honor.”<sup>526</sup> However, Dulles did not have the time to respond, as on October 4, 1955, Papagos passed away. On paper, it looked like Karamanlis shared several of the elements that the US sought in a Greek PM; he was genuinely conservative, politically skilled, and personally driven, while he had strong anti-communist convictions even since the Nazi occupation and then during the Civil War, when he was briefly detained by EAM.<sup>527</sup> Karamanlis would become one of the dominant Greek political figures of the 20<sup>th</sup> century<sup>528</sup> but his otherwise pro-American administrations in the 1950s and 1960s would be marked by a period of both cooperation and tension, the latter largely due to Washington’s consequentialist approach towards Cyprus.

A few days before Papagos’ death, his foreign minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos delivered a values-based speech at UNGA which not only provided a synopsis of the former Commander-in-chief’s vision for enosis but also laid the foundations for Karamanlis’ subsequent similar approach. Stephanopoulos echoed the Indian delegation’s decolonization narrative and argued that “Cyprus was inhabited by a people which belonged to no one, only

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<sup>524</sup> Embassy (Greece) to Dulles, May 20, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:280

<sup>525</sup> Laurence Stern, *The wrong horse: The politics of intervention and the failure of American diplomacy* (New York: Times Books, 1977), 17

<sup>526</sup> Memorandum, September 2, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:285

<sup>527</sup> Gallant, 281-282

<sup>528</sup> Clogg, 161-162

to itself and [...] must remain master of its own fate” and that this “human factor must be the fundamental and determining factor” as Cypriots’ “fate must depend solely on their own will.”<sup>529</sup> Stephanopoulos skillfully invoked his diplomatic skills to promote Cyprus’ right to self-determination, without actually using the term, but his approach largely summarized the case that Papagos had made. Karamanlis would be far more confrontational regarding Cypriot’s right to determine their future.

### **The Karamanlis era**

The new Greek PM had been on Washington’s radar for a few months already. As Ioannis Stefanidis points out, the Eisenhower administration regarded Karamanlis as a promising alternative to Papagos, while his political convictions, efficiency as a minister, and his intact political capital given his young age provided him with electoral advantages.<sup>530</sup> Likewise, Alexis Papachelas suggests that Karamanlis was the preferred successor of the CIA, which lobbied the King to discourage the more senior Stephanopoulos from competing.<sup>531</sup> But upon entering office, Karamanlis maintained Papagos’ pressure; Karamanlis tried to use Americans’ fixation with containment against them, arguing that “perhaps” Washington “does not recognize [the] strategic importance and reliability of Greece” referring to the friction surrounding Cyprus. Karamanlis also warned that the opposition’s calls for a Greek “neutralist foreign policy” were difficult to counterbalance as he could not ignore the “feeling of the people” even if he personally disagreed.<sup>532</sup>

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<sup>529</sup> Stephanos Stephanopoulos, “Speech at UN General Assembly” United Nations General Assembly, Tenth Session, New York, September 26, 1955, <https://daccess-ods.un.org/tmp/8901743.29280853.html>

<sup>530</sup> Stefanidis, 301

<sup>531</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 52

<sup>532</sup> Strange to Department of the Army, October 13, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:288

Within days, NATO's American representative George Perkins elaborated on these growing "neutralist sentiments." Perkins informed the State Department about how Greeks felt that the US had "let Greece down" and abandoned its democratic principles in UN vote on Cyprus.<sup>533</sup> Once again, the Eisenhower administration became aware that many Greeks considered the American position regarding Cyprus as morally inconsistent as it deviated from Washington's theoretical emphasis on self-determination. In other words, these Greeks did not become alienated because the US prevented Greece from invading Cyprus, for instance, but because Washington did not respect Cypriots' right to define their future through peaceful and democratic means. Again, what Athens could not comprehend was that regarding Cyprus, it was on the receiving end of America's consequentialist foreign policymaking, in which Washington repeatedly compromised deontological principles—manifested by Greeks' requests—for the sake of regional stability.

Still, Karamanlis was fully committed to the Greco-American partnership. He immediately tried to strengthen Greco-American relations, as well as Greece's relations with Western Europe, realizing that there was little common ground with the British.<sup>534</sup> Having already declared his intentions to call an election in early 1956, the State Department noted that the Greek PM was "anxious to subdue anti-American emotions in Greece" and thus "deserves our full support"<sup>535</sup> in a statement that was also endorsed by the American embassy.<sup>536</sup> The CIA accentuated the necessity for Greco-American rapprochement, as a December intelligence report exhibits in great detail how Greeks' resentment regarding Cyprus' impasse and antagonism against Turkey were causing turbulence within NATO.<sup>537</sup> But the pro-

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<sup>533</sup> Perkins to State, October 22, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:289

<sup>534</sup> Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "Propaganda, Internal Security and Alliance Politics: Greek Proposals to NATO in the 1950s" *Intelligence and National Security*, 30:1 (2015), 148, <https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1080/02684527.2013.846729>

<sup>535</sup> Murphy to Gray, November 25, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:292

<sup>536</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, December 15, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:293

<sup>537</sup> Intelligence Weekly Summary, December 15, 1955. OCI No. 9429/55

Americanism of both Karamanlis and Georgios Papandreou—the opposition’s main actor and former PM—realism, provided Washington with a strong safety net. This was most evident in their attitude towards US military bases, as both leaders acknowledged that although Greece had partially given up territorial sovereignty to the US, they were indispensable for Greece’s participation in NATO.<sup>538</sup>

But in stark contrast with Papagos’ election in 1952, the outcome of the 1956 election was far from certain. In an astonishing move, all Greek parties from the center and leftwards—including the crypto-communist EDA—unexpectedly merged into a political alliance under Papandreou’s leadership called DU (Democratic Union), to collectively defeat Karamanlis’ ERE (National Radical Union), as he had renamed ES. The prospect of a united leftwing opposition dethroning Karamanlis terrified Dulles, who believed that DU’s victory would potentially shift Greece towards geopolitical neutrality.<sup>539</sup> Washington knew that Cyprus would be a “central national issue of [the] Greek electorate in approaching elections” and a “genuine political and national problem of paramount importance.”<sup>540</sup> Washington’s concerns were justified, as DU won the popular vote, receiving 48% to ERE’s 47%. However, Karamanlis’ amendments to the electoral law gave ERE an absolute majority of 165 seats.<sup>541</sup> Karamanlis already had first-hand experience of how successful this tactic could be, thanks to Washington’s pressure to replace the proportional system in 1952.

Upon Karamanlis’ victory, Eisenhower’s congratulatory message set again the tone for Washington’s approach regarding Cyprus. Eisenhower argued that Greeks’ calls for Cypriot self-determination “find a ready response among Americans who have always treasured the ideals of freedom and self-rule” but added that “all the groups on the island must be respected”

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<sup>538</sup> Stefanidis, 199

<sup>539</sup> Papachelas, (2017), see chapter 2.

<sup>540</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, November 10, 1955. FRUS/XXIV:145

<sup>541</sup> Spyros Markezinis, *Synchroni Politiki Istoría tis Ellados, 1936-1975* (Athens: Papyros, 1994), 72-73



and that the situation could be “solved” only when Greece, Turkey, and the UK, “trust and understand each other.”<sup>542</sup> Dulles also insisted that the Cyprus question could only be addressed if Greece assumes “responsibility and act[s] now if it wishes [to] avert gravely adverse consequences” and accept the British offer for Cypriot “self-government” which could “eventually lead to self-determination.”<sup>543</sup> The impasse persisted, and the antithesis between American values and foreign policymaking became more visible; when in April 1956 Eisenhower made a public statement in which he argued that peace in the Middle East could be achieved only when its people could achieve their “legitimate aspirations,” ambassador Melas approached him and emphasized that these principles should “apply to Greece and Cyprus.”<sup>544</sup> But once again, the Greek side could not comprehend that Washington’s consequentialist policymaking could also disadvantage the Greek State’s position, just like it had advantaged it in the past.

Cyprus kept causing more problems for Washington. In a late June report, the CIA estimated that in “the next three or four years [...] leftist and neutralist elements will almost certainly gain strength,” noting that Cyprus was at the core of the problem. The report also estimated that “Greece will probably retain its basic pro-US and pro-Western orientation” but “the absence of a Cyprus settlement will impose serious strains” leading to Greece adopting “a more independent policy towards the US.”<sup>545</sup> And the Suez Crisis of 1956 only complicated things more; fearing that the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser would take over the control of the Suez Canal, Britain and France intervened unsuccessfully, which forced them to retreat their troops from northern Egypt.<sup>546</sup> In response, the Eisenhower administration recognized that “the British position in the Middle East has been seriously weakened and it is

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<sup>542</sup> Eisenhower to Karamanlis, February 20, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:161

<sup>543</sup> Dulles to Embassy (Greece), March 2, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:164

<sup>544</sup> Memorandum, April 5, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:171

<sup>545</sup> National Intelligence Estimate, June 26, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:297

<sup>546</sup> Powaski, 119

vitality in the interest of the West that it be salvaged and strengthened” and thus planned to reach an “early settlement [...] under the NATO aegis.”

Cyprus’ future suddenly became a paramount issue. Washington intended to “commence by discussing prospects of settlement secretly with the British, and if general agreement is found, subsequently with the Greeks and Turks” while Eisenhower considered a ten-year-long period of “self-government [...] during which time there would be no change in the international status of the Island.”<sup>547</sup> In a most consequentialist approach, and despite Greece’s persistence regarding Cypriot self-determination, Washington decided to first delegate with the British, bypassing once more the Greek government’s positions. The Eisenhower administration agreed that, in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, remaining present on Cyprus in one way or another was paramount for the UK.<sup>548</sup> Washington was in perfect tune with the British government on this aspect, hence Karamanlis’ insistence on enosis had become problematic.

### **Towards the 1956 UN General Assembly**

The US followed through with this approach. In early September 1956, Karamanlis asked for “US mediation” regarding the Cyprus question; Washington assured the Greek PM that the Eisenhower administration was “considering the Cyprus question urgently” but the American embassy was privately briefed that the administration had “no plans to accede” and that it was “not giving consideration Karamanlis request.”<sup>549</sup> In a following interdepartmental report, American officials acknowledged that “the issue of self-determination is the more difficult since the Turkish Government has taken a strong stand against it,” hence Dulles was

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<sup>547</sup> Memorandum, August 13, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:188

<sup>548</sup> Clogg, 161-163

<sup>549</sup> Hoover to Embassy (Greece), September 3, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:191

advised to pressure Turkey to accept “self-government” which would include protections for the Turkish minority on Cyprus.<sup>550</sup> Once more, the US was trying to bypass the Greco-Cypriot calls for self-determination, trying to maintain a balance between Greece and Turkey; the fear of losing Turkey by acquiescing to Greece’s claims defined Washington’s approach to the Cyprus question.<sup>551</sup>

Dulles’ meeting with Eisenhower a few days later manifests the US’ impossible position regarding Cyprus’ future. Dulles believed that Greece could accept “self-government” for the time being, arguing that Karamanlis’ government “was the best one to deal with” yet warning that “unless something could be worked out with it, it might fall and a government with considerable Communist influence take its place.”<sup>552</sup> The following months were marked by a continuous exchange of several telegrams between the three involved countries<sup>553</sup> but as no solution appeared feasible, Karamanlis decided to lead the Greek UN delegation to “undoubtedly make a speech during the general debate.”<sup>554</sup> In mid-November, Karamanlis informed Washington that he “did not know how long he could stand” as “the Cyprus situation was becoming more serious the longer it remained unsettled.”<sup>555</sup> Soon Karamanlis traveled to Washington to meet Eisenhower, telling him that if the British “wanted a settlement one could be reached.”<sup>556</sup> A cross-departmental report argued that “although the Greeks appear willing to settle for self-government now with the question of self-determination put off to the future, they would insist on some definite commitment that the principle of self-determination would be applied to Cyprus at some time.”<sup>557</sup>

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<sup>550</sup> Memorandum, September 4, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:192

<sup>551</sup> Alexander Kazamias, “The Dualism of Greek Foreign Policy: between independence and nationalism, 1952-1955.” PhD dissertation, (London: UCL, 2001), 94

<sup>552</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIV:195

<sup>553</sup> FRUS/XXIV, see documents 196-206

<sup>554</sup> Wilcox to Lodge, November 13, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:207

<sup>555</sup> Memorandum, November 15, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:208

<sup>556</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIV:210

<sup>557</sup> Memorandum, November 19, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:211

But Karamanlis' speech before the UN was far more confrontational. Adopting a highly values-based narrative, Karamanlis argued that "between the ideals of the Charter and the reality of power politics there is a vast discrepancy" and that "certain Great Powers ignore the Charter whenever it suits their immediate interests." Karamanlis then argued that Greece was fighting "for the application of self-determination for its fellow-countrymen in Cyprus" taking direct aim at Britain, while also arguing that "the Cypriot question was not raised by Greece, but by the people of Cyprus itself." And from a strong deontological perspective—that resembled the tone of Kantian imperatives—Karamanlis fervently supported that "for Greece, the Cyprus question is not an enterprise; it's a duty" adding that "the liberation of any people in bondage is the duty of every free nation."<sup>558</sup> Undoubtedly, Karamanlis' stronger tone not only reflects the significance of Cyprus' future for Greece but also the clash between deontological and consequentialist ethics that chapter two introduced.

But faced with Washington's unbending position, Karamanlis reverted to a more conciliatory approach. Upon meeting Karamanlis in mid-December 1956, Dulles told Eisenhower that he believed that the Greek PM had been "very reasonable" and appeared willing to consider both the constitution that the British would propose, as well as Turkey's plans for partition.<sup>559</sup> Simultaneously, Karamanlis' foreign minister Evangelos Averoff-Tositsa admitted that the Greek government had assumed a politically dangerous position and asked Dulles to provide "US support" in maneuvering the British towards a "reasonable" solution.<sup>560</sup> Somewhat unexpectedly, thus, it appeared that there could be a pathway solution that could satisfy the Greek government—which had taken a step back in its demands.

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<sup>558</sup> Konstantinos Karamanlis, *Speech at UN General Assembly*, United Nations General Assembly, Eleventh Session, New York, November 21, 1956, <https://daccess-ods.un.org/tmp/1739611.17863655.html>

<sup>559</sup> Memorandum, November 19, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:211

<sup>560</sup> Dulles to State, December 12, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:212

But the British proposal failed, as Karamanlis found it appalling. Upon reading that the proposed “Radcliffe Constitution” did not acknowledge the overwhelming majority that Greek-Cypriots enjoyed in Cyprus and placed all real authority to a British Governor, Averoff-Tositsa told Dulles that the British proposal was “totally unacceptable” adding that he would “like US support” yet acknowledging that “it would be difficult” for the US “to oppose the UK.”<sup>561</sup> In turn, Dulles told Ambassador Melas that he “had hoped that the Greek Government would not feel it necessary to reject” the British proposal, trying to maneuver Karamanlis’ administration to accept it “to get a foot in the door of independence.” Dulles also referred “to the British Government’s present difficult situation which must be recognized as a fact that did not provide a good climate for a Cyprus solution.”<sup>562</sup> Once again—and despite having appreciated Greece’s adoption of a more moderate position—the US chose to not challenge the British position at all, prioritizing the geopolitical dimension of the Cyprus question, leaving Greeks’ deontological one aside. After all, the British proposal guaranteed a strong British presence on the island, which was essential for Washington.

Washington’s decision to officially support the British proposal despite Greece’s fervent disapproval of it highlights again Washington’s consequentialist approach. Karamanlis was informed that the “US Government felt obliged to [...] take [an] important step in [the] direction of self-government and eventual peaceful and satisfactory solution [of the] Cyprus problem.” A day later, the embassy reported that Karamanlis “would ‘very probably’ resign” as a result.<sup>563</sup> The US officially supported the British proposal on December 27, arguing that it was a “first step toward an eventual peaceful and generally acceptable final solution of the Cyprus problem.” Averoff-Tositsa responded in a “strong but friendly” manner that

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<sup>561</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIV:214

<sup>562</sup> Memorandum, December 21, 1956. FRUS/XXIV:215

<sup>563</sup> Ibid

Washington “had taken sides with Turkey and the United Kingdom.”<sup>564</sup> In response to the crisis, the new American ambassador George Allen—another seasoned diplomat who had also served as Assistant Secretary of State before serving in Yugoslavia<sup>565</sup>—commented that “if we did not support [the] Greek position 100 percent, local press and politicians would construe this as hostile.”<sup>566</sup> Allen’s insight would turn out to be prophetic.

And the road towards the imminent UNGA session only became steeper due to increasing violence in Cyprus. By early February, pro-enosis Greek Cypriots had embarked on a fervent campaign advocating for enosis, which resulted in the deaths of “a hundred UK citizens” and “a large number of Cypriots” according to the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd. As a result of the recurring violence, the UK warned the US that “Greek support for terrorism” and the tensions regarding “the forthcoming debate on Cyprus” could have an “effect upon Anglo-American relations.” Lloyd then told Dulles that “if the US vote[s] against a Resolution calling for the cessation of Greek activities, it will be regarded as an unfriendly act and will cause [a] most unfavorable comment.”<sup>567</sup> Cyprus was causing friction between the Anglo-American alliance as well by that point.

These uprisings were a continuation of the Greek-Cypriot EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) terror campaign, which had started in April 1955, and was led by prominent nationalist Colonel Georgios Grivas. EOKA had been a constant source of instability both in Cyprus, but also in Turkey, as its activities had ignited Turkish hostility towards Greek communities in Turkish cities.<sup>568</sup> According to the CIA, Karamanlis had decided to “increase moral [...] support to resistance group”<sup>569</sup> although he did not endorse

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<sup>564</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIV:216

<sup>565</sup> FRUS, “George Venable Allen”

<sup>566</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, January 28, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:217

<sup>567</sup> Yost to State, June 1, 1951. FRUS/V:219

<sup>568</sup> Ker-Lindsay, 292-293

<sup>569</sup> NSC Briefing, Middle-East update, March 20, 1956. CIA-RDP79R00890A00700030022-3

EOKA's use of violence. The key element here is that for Karamanlis, Greek Cypriots' right to their self-determination was more than anything else a moral imperative, hence despite his willingness to compromise, he still expected Washington and London to acknowledge Greeks Cypriots' overwhelming population on the island. But the more he failed, the more turbulence he faced at home; Washington's ambivalence on the Cyprus question not only sabotaged Papagos' and Karamanlis' efforts to achieve enosis but partially compromised their domestic political capital as well.<sup>570</sup>

Dulles' response to the British ultimatum was that the US aimed at abstaining, having failed to facilitate a "constructive" resolution.<sup>571</sup> EOKA's campaigns compromised Karamanlis' cause, as the British government used them to pressure Washington to not undermine the British position regarding Cyprus' fate. As a result, the Eisenhower administration attempted to persuade the Greek delegation "to accept amendments to its self-determination resolution that will rephrase it to include the need for the restoration of peaceful conditions."<sup>572</sup> The February 1957 UNGA committee did not result in anything substantial, but merely in a mutually agreed statement that argued that the UN assembly "expresses the earnest desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN, and the hope that negotiations will be resumed and conditioned to this end."<sup>573</sup> Dulles subsequently noted that "as a result of the Cyprus debate in the UN, the chances of the survival of this government were very poor."<sup>574</sup>

As a result, less than a year and a half after succeeding Papagos, Karamanlis' term seemed to be approaching a premature end. The Greek PM—who was only able to retain the

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<sup>570</sup> James Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 59-61

<sup>571</sup> Yost to State, June 1, 1951. FRUS/V:219

<sup>572</sup> Acheson to Embassy (Greece), June 25, 1951. FRUS/V:224

<sup>573</sup> United Nations, Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly from 12 November 1956 to 8 March 1957 during its Eleventh Session, (1957), 4

<sup>574</sup> Peurifoy to State, July 28, 1951. FRUS/V:226

office he had inherited through a complex manipulation of the Greek electoral law—had faced the rigidity of America’s consequentialist foreign policy, in which Greece was expected to operate as a loyal—if not obedient—pawn on Washington’s geopolitical chessboard. Karamanlis’ pro-Americanism and willingness to accommodate NATO’s interests by moderating his position eventually did not count for much, as the Eisenhower administration decided to support the British proposal, which it saw as a guarantee for regional stability. The UK’s realization that, in the post-Suez Crisis era, its interests could only be served through its presence in Cyprus<sup>575</sup> was an indispensable parameter in Washington’s approach. Despite the tensions that Cyprus had brought on Greco-American relations, the US maintained the same consequentialist approach in the years that followed. As the next chapter will show, the question of regional hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the possibility of facing a regional communist challenge remained the main axis through which the US approached Cyprus, leading to short-term successes, but long-term implications. Cyprus became a tale of American consequentialism as well.

### **An assessment of American interventionism in post-Civil War Greece**

Washington’s interventionism in Greece not only did not end after KKE’s defeat but only increased—albeit in diverse ways—during Greece’s reconstruction. Among the scholars who have commented on the Greek 1950s, Beaton makes the most acute observation, arguing—in a chapter eloquently entitled “Uncle Sam’s protégé”—that “the Americans were the new Bavarians” since Washington interfered heavily in Greece both in political, but also in economic terms, in a manner that resembled that of the Bavarians in post-Revolutionary Greece. Beaton suggests that American interventionism in the 1950s was not cultural, but

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<sup>575</sup> Clogg, 162-163



entirely political and aligned with the premises of *realpolitik*.<sup>576</sup> And just like the Civil War, the objective of Washington's interventionism was the same: to ensure that the Greek left would remain as far away from power as possible, by supporting simultaneously the pro-American and non-communist ES and ERE parties.<sup>577</sup>

Naturally, this strategy was not unique to Greece but was indispensable for Washington's imperative to contain communism in the Balkans, as a natural extension of the Truman Doctrine's philosophy.<sup>578</sup> After all, the Truman Doctrine's contribution to containment was so influential that it paved the road to the formation of NATO, CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) in the 1950s, all of which manifested the US commitment to contain communism on all geopolitical fronts of the world, while foreign aid to "key governments" was considered fundamental.<sup>579</sup> Moreover, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 only strengthened American foreign policymakers' belief that the US should contain world communism to ensure American security. In a foreign policy approach that began with Harry Truman, but which was unreservedly espoused by Dwight Eisenhower as well, containment became so influential in American foreign policymaking, that Congress became increasingly eager to endorse American military interventionism abroad.<sup>580</sup>

American interventionism in Greece during the 1950s displayed this strategic and philosophical orientation from the beginning. This chapter showed that as soon as KKE was defeated, Washington intervened heavily in Greek political life, opposing the policies of the moderate KF and the EPEEK parties, and trying to mitigate Greek political instability.

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<sup>576</sup> Beaton, 306-308

<sup>577</sup> Laurence Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949: A Study in Counterrevolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 106

<sup>578</sup> Christos Kassimeris, "United States Intervention in Post-War Greek Elections: From Civil War to Dictatorship" *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 20:4 (2009), 679, <https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1080/09592290903455790>

<sup>579</sup> Glenn Hastedt, *American Foreign Policy, Past, Present, and Future* (Lanham: James Madison University Press, 2015), 32-33

<sup>580</sup> Stefanidis, 28-29

Likewise, the US insisted on the presence of a strong military axis, promoted Greece's entry into NATO, and actively supported the conservative ES and ERE administrations in their struggle for domestic power against the left. In other words, American interventionism in post-Civil War Greece falls entirely within Washington's foreign policy playbook of that political time.

In what concerns Cyprus, however, America's approach initially appears somewhat divergent from its respective one towards Greece. One could argue that the American reluctance to support Greek self-determination contradicts its unconditional support to Papagos' and Karamanlis' loyal administrations. But American interventionism in the 1950s showed that the Eisenhower administration—and the President himself—was barely interested in Cypriots' self-determination, had no specific formula to propose, was mostly annoyed by the instability that Greco-Turkish competition of the matter was causing in the Eastern Mediterranean, and—above all—ignored both Papagos' and Karamanlis' constant pressure for American initiative towards resolution.<sup>581</sup> American neutrality towards Cyprus not only was not an antithesis to the US broader approach towards Greek affairs but was instead entirely consistent with the principles of consequentialism.

### **An ethical interpretation of American interventionism in the 1950s**

If the US initiated an era of consequentialist interventionism during the Greek Civil War, it systemized it entirely in the 1950s. Although the 1950s do not provide us with a major case study to assess—like the Civil War or the Junta—they do nonetheless permit us to observe several manifestations of Washington's consequentialist interventionism in the early Cold War.

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<sup>581</sup> James Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 61

American foreign policymakers had a paternalistic attitude towards post-Civil War Greek affairs, to the extent that the representatives of Greece's democratic institutions developed an almost symbiotic relationship with the "American factor."<sup>582</sup> Washington's interference in the politically unstable years of Venizelos' and Plastiras' administrations, and its pressure to adopt a different electoral law to ensure political stability—while supporting the candidacy of the pro-American Papagos who they knew would serve American interests best—is only the first instance of American consequentialism in the 1950s.

Of course, another piece of evidence of America's consequentialist approach concerns the US appeasement of the IDEA officers who engineered the coup of 1951. Washington consciously prioritized the formation of a strong military establishment in Greece to the extent that the coup's orchestrators should not be punished severely. Moreover, Americans' initial reluctance to endorse Papagos' political ambitions, whom they considered as a choice for a time of crisis due to his strong military presence and widespread popular acclaim, indicates that between the integrity of Greek democracy and the security of Greece's position within the American sphere of influence, only the latter was indispensable. The sixth chapter of this thesis will elaborate on this point, as well as on the significant externalities of Washington's insistence that the Greek Army should be as autonomous as possible.

Washington's policymaking towards pro-Americans Papagos and Karamanlis also demonstrates its consequentialist interventionism during the 1950s. Despite pulling all the strings it could to help him secure his overwhelming victory in 1952—again by pushing for the adoption of a convenient electoral law despite some popular backlash<sup>583</sup>—the US immediately pressured Papagos to implement harsher policies against former rebels, communists, and sympathizers, even if their consistent persecution and exclusion from Greek social life and

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<sup>582</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 17-18

<sup>583</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 36-37

employment opportunities could never be deontologically excused. Likewise, we must highlight Washington's hostility against EDA; the curtailment of a democratically elected party, albeit leftwing, can never be justified from a deontological perspective, but it was entirely permissible for Washington due to EDA's crypto-communist ideological convictions.

At this point, however, we should point out that America's consequentialist foreign policy towards Greece was hardly a deviation from the emerging norms of American interventionism in that political time. First, this thesis has already shown how American interventionism in the Greek Civil War was used as a blueprint for future interventions as well, a case made by Truman regarding the Korean war, as previously stated. The fact that the US Congress only pressured Truman to adopt a more interventionist foreign policy in East Asia following his European example<sup>584</sup> highlights the fact that containment quickly became a fixation not just for the executive office, but for the legislative as well. And from an ethical standpoint, containment was morally justified in the American public conscience exactly because it targeted communist "aggression and tyranny" and "implied concession" to the Soviet sphere.<sup>585</sup> In other words, it would be unthinkable for the US to not act in whichever way possible to ensure that its value system would not emerge victorious in this ideological clash with communism.

But the Eisenhower administration inherited Truman's consequentialist approach—and doubled down on it. It was during Eisenhower's time when terms such as rollback<sup>586</sup> and the domino theory<sup>587</sup> became prominent, while Eisenhower was personally weary of the potential expansion of communism both in Eastern Europe and Asia. In that spirit, he permitted the overthrow of Iranian and Marxist-leaning PM Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953, as well as the

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<sup>584</sup> Stephen Ambrose with Douglas Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism, American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (London: Penguin, 2011), 134-136

<sup>585</sup> Jerald Combs, *History of American Foreign Policy, Vol.2, From 1895* (London: Routledge, 2008), 251-252

<sup>586</sup> Powaski, 100

<sup>587</sup> Combs, 315-316

overthrow of the leftist Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz.<sup>588</sup> These case studies are covered in more detail in chapter two, but it is crucial to mention them again to emphasize that American consequentialist foreign policy towards Greece was not a standalone case, but one that fit the ethos of American foreign policymaking in countries where communism could potentially rise. Eisenhower's increasingly deep consequentialist approach towards Greece only pales in comparison to those towards Iran and Guatemala—which, in the long run, were proven strategically unwise.

Also, regarding Cyprus, the pro-American Greek governments suddenly found themselves on the receiving end of American consequentialism. In what concerned Cyprus, the US deviated from almost a decade of supporting Greek governments militarily and economically against domestic communism by frequently crossing deontological lines, to antagonizing Greece's deontological case regarding Cypriot self-determination. This apparent antithesis was manifested during Papagos' era, as Washington ignored his deontological calls for Cypriot self-determination—which he had personally elevated as his political mission statement and could not imagine that the US would not support Greece's claims.<sup>589</sup> Ironically, Washington had interfered in the Greek political system in almost any way imaginable to ensure a strong Papagos victory, which permitted him to adopt a more confident Greek foreign policy regarding Cyprus.

Likewise, despite Karamanlis' declared pro-American sentiments, unconditional devotion to NATO, fervent anti-communism, and loyalty to Papagos' legacy, Washington dismissed his deontological calls on Cypriot self-determination because of the greater—geopolitical—good: to find a compromise that would satisfy all involved countries, and not disturb NATO's cohesion in the process. But in doing so, Washington completely opposed

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<sup>588</sup> Powaski, 104-106. Also see, John Bew, *Realpolitik* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 240-241

<sup>589</sup> Hellenic Parliament TV, *ibid*, 41:14-41:52

enosis, one of the few things that united all Greeks from the left to the right. Just like Papagos and Karamanlis, so did Georgios Papandreou and even EDA's leaders insist that Cyprus was being deprived of its right to determine its own future by the two great powers—the US and the UK.<sup>590</sup> This would be a key reason anti-American sentiments would later become widespread across the Greek political spectrum.

But as chapter two emphasized, consequentialist interventionism primarily applied to immediate circumstances. Washington's consequentialist policy towards Cyprus gave rise to the first anti-American feelings within the Greek population, which were for the first time not contained within the narrow boundaries of the Greek left.<sup>591</sup> Washington was fully aware of a growing sense of anti-Americanism within Greece, but remained on its neutralist path in this policy of equal distances between Greece and Turkey to ensure that the cohesion of NATO's eastern flank would be secured. Yet, by largely ignoring Greek calls for Cypriot self-determination, irrespective of their apparent impact on the Greek electorate, Washington compromised its future influence on Greece. In the following chapters, this thesis will show how Washington underappreciated the significance of Greek anti-American sentiments.

Ironically, it was Washington's consequentialist interventionism that played into Papagos' and Karamanlis' hands. Acheson was right when he warned Plastiras that Greece was not able to pursue his adventurist foreign policy towards Cyprus, given that the country had just emerged from a draining and most violent Civil War; yet it was America's consequentialism that nurtured this adventurism in the first place. Washington's relentless support in the Greek Civil War on an apparent values-based narrative—given the profound impact that the Truman Doctrine had in Greece—as well as American persistent support of

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<sup>590</sup> Ioannis Stefanidis, *En Onomati tou Ethnous* (Athens: Epikentro, 2010), 157-164

<sup>591</sup> Peter Siani-Davies, and Stefanos Katsikas, "National Reconciliation After Civil War: The Case of Greece" *Journal of Peace Research*, 46:4 (2009), 566, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25654436>

Greek governments on the sole basis of anti-communism, implied that the US would always support Greek pro-American administrations. Washington's political interference to facilitate Papagos' and Karamanlis' administrations' rise to power only indicated that they could count on American support in return for the security that they offered.

Essentially, in the early to mid-1950s, Washington manifested all the elements of consequentialist interventionism in Greece. On the one hand, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations ensured that Greece would be led by pro-American conservative administrations which would ensure that Greek communism and leftwing activity would be contained, and that Greece would fully integrate within the wider US strategy through NATO. On the other hand, Washington also ensured that these very administrations' deontological claims on Cypriots' self-determination would be suppressed, exactly because they challenged the cohesion of the US alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean. But both Alexandros Papagos and Konstantinos Karamanlis were wrong to identify this as an antithesis between values and actual policymaking. For Washington's consequentialist foreign policy, containing communism was the only imperative, and Greece's otherwise pro-American administrations could either profit or suffer because of it.

## Chapter Five:

### Cyprus, the rise of the left, and the road to instability (1957-1965)

*“Fuck your Parliament and your Constitution.*

*America is an elephant. Greece is a flea.”*

Lyndon Johnson, 1964

Like the previous chapter, this too will focus on the intermediate years between the Civil War and the Junta. Specifically, this chapter will assess Washington’s persistent consequentialist interventionism in the late 1950s and until the mid-1960s, in a political time that was marked by increasing political instability for Greece. On the international level, the Cyprus question caused severe turbulence in Washington and Athens, while the domestic level was marked by a dramatic rebalancing of power in Greek politics. This chapter will explore how the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations intervened in Greek affairs for the sake of containing communism on both levels, maintaining the pattern of consequentialist interventionism in Greece since the Civil War.

#### **The Cyprus saga in 1957**

As the previous chapter showed, the Greek PM Konstantinos Karamanlis warned Washington that he could not but hold a snap election after another disappointing UNGA



meeting. His intentions troubled Washington, as the Eisenhower administration still expected Greece to collaborate with Turkey and the UK to reach a working compromise. As a result of the increasing instability in mid-February 1957, the State Department noted that “major issues of preserving NATO solidarity and forestalling communist penetration of [the] Mediterranean are being subordinated to lesser issue of Cyprus.” The State Department added that unless the three countries recognize “the magnitude of peril involved” in the continuation of the Cyprus dispute “US efforts toward finding [a] solution will continue [to] be frustrated.” Regarding Karamanlis’ plans, the State Department concluded that “while we wish [to] be as helpful as possible to Karamanlis Government, [the] situation is such that we cannot at this juncture give assurances which they have requested.”<sup>592</sup>

There is a major point to decipher here, which highlights the consistency of Eisenhower’s Cypriot policy. Washington’s only concern about Cyprus was whether the persistent stalemate would weaken American hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean by potentially causing a breakdown of relations between the three involved countries—all of which were NATO allies. This was highlighted by the administration’s persistent efforts to maintain a policy of equal distances, as Washington sought to find a mutually agreed compromise that would satisfy—or at least refrain from harming severely—their interests; this was proven impossible. Through this lens, emphasizing Cypriots’ right to their self-determination, which would almost certainly lead to enosis as the previous chapter explained, was practically never considered, as both the UK and Turkey vehemently opposed such an outcome. Given the consistency of Washington’s balanced policy, we can only expect that it would have adopted the same approach, had the Turkish population outbalanced the Greek instead.

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<sup>592</sup> State to UN Mission, February 12, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:222

But Washington's persistent approach towards Cyprus was becoming increasingly problematic, as Secretary John Foster Dulles admitted. Once the 1957 UNGA session was over, Dulles argued that "as a result of the Cyprus debate in the UN, the chances of the survival of [Karamanlis'] government were very poor."<sup>593</sup> This was the CIA's estimation as well, as intelligence from Athens reported that "Karamanlis' government may not long survive after UN discussion of the Cyprus issue" citing as the main reason that "the Greek PM has laid on a major campaign to gain American support" which he had ultimately failed to receive. The CIA elaborated on the potential electoral outcome, suggesting that "no political group in Greece [is] strong enough to win except a budding left-center coalition which would have communist-front support" obviously referring to the DU alliance which had already won the popular vote once, despite Karamanlis' ERE winning the election due to the particularities of the electoral law. The CIA also warned that Greece's second-largest city, Thessaloniki, had recently elected a "communist mayor" who had won 32% of the vote in the first round and defeated the "Karamanlis candidate" after other "non-communist leaders" supported him.<sup>594</sup>

But Karamanlis' dead-end was American made. That is because Washington's refusal to support his deontological argument on Cypriot self-determination had weakened him politically, as Greeks were becoming increasingly resentful of the stalemate. Attempting to change the narrative, Karamanlis and his foreign minister, Evangelos Averoff-Tositsa, suggested to Ambassador George Allen that Athens and Washington should work towards a Cypriot "independence" and briefly postpone the question of Cypriot self-determination, as they had concluded that EOKA's violent campaigns in Cyprus were ultimately weakening both Washington's and Athens' position.<sup>595</sup> Allen was "still not happy about independence" and

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<sup>593</sup> State to Embassy (Greece) March 2, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:227

<sup>594</sup> NSC Briefing: Karamanlis Government, February 20, 1957. CIA-RDP79R00890A000800040028-5

<sup>595</sup> Alexis Heraclides, "Greece and the Cyprus peace process: perceptions and misperceptions" in *Cyprus and the Roadmap for Peace*, eds. Michális Michael and Yücel Vural (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2018), 101

believed “that Soviets would start intriguing in Cyprus at first possible opportunity.”<sup>596</sup> Again, Allen’s argument reveals the terror of communist expansionism.

But the sudden probability of Cypriot independence had a merit that no one could ignore. Independence would theoretically provide Cyprus’ two ethnic communities with an unprecedented opportunity to construct a unique national identity as “Cypriots”<sup>597</sup> in an experiment that, if proved successful, would resolve the Cyprus question that had tormented NATO’s cohesion. Conveniently, in late March 1957, the British PM Harold Macmillan admitted to Eisenhower that Cyprus’ geopolitical importance was slowly diminishing for Britain, as the increasing range of military aircrafts made its position less indispensable and thus doubted whether maintaining his predecessor Anthony Eden’s hardline approach “was worth the risks.”<sup>598</sup> Macmillan’s foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, also reaffirmed to Eisenhower that Cyprus’ importance was diminishing for the UK, although both agreed that it was “still useful to have a base there.”<sup>599</sup> Macmillan’s more accommodating position only improved the odds of a resolution, after several failures.

Eisenhower immediately recognized the opportunity in front of him. The President urged Macmillan to release the *de facto* Greek-Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios—who had been exiled by the British in Seychelles—arguing that this would add credibility to the British initiative to find a resolution, and maintain a military presence on the island.<sup>600</sup> In mid-April, Makarios was released by the British, with Macmillan warning Eisenhower that Makarios could still cause trouble, and briefing him that although “it’s not easy to find the right thing to do” he was “hopeful that shall be able to have a definite plan” soon. Eisenhower responded that Makarios “is far from a statesman and can probably stir up quite a bit of

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<sup>596</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, March 13, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:228

<sup>597</sup> Roderick Beaton, *Greece: biography of a Modern Nation* (London: Penguin, 2019), 318

<sup>598</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIV:231

<sup>599</sup> Memorandum, March 21, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:232

<sup>600</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIV:233

mischief’ but applauded Macmillan as his decision to release the Archbishop strengthened the British position.<sup>601</sup> Immediately after Makarios’ release, the Eisenhower administration concluded that both “enosis and partition”—each supported by Greece and Turkey respectively—were inferior solutions to Cypriot independence, noting however that “any solution” should guarantee British sovereignty over British bases.<sup>602</sup>

### **A Greco-Turkish stalemate and Washington’s response**

As willing as Eisenhower was to facilitate Cyprus’ independence, Greco-Turkish disputes derailed the process. From the Turkish perspective, Cyprus’ independence would only be considered if Cyprus remained “within the British Commonwealth”<sup>603</sup> which the Greek argument categorically rejected, arguing instead that Cypriots’ right “to determine their future” cannot wait “forever.” Averoff-Tositsa made this remark to Dulles himself when the latter argued that “Turks are opposed to independence because they fear it will lead to ultimate enosis.”<sup>604</sup> The opening that Eisenhower had identified in early spring had narrowed considerably by summer, with the State Department acknowledging that it “would be very difficult for the US to prevail upon Greece to participate [...] without assurances of support that we were not in a position to give because of the interests of our Turkish ally.”<sup>605</sup> Once more thus, Washington opted for a policy of equal distances to appease the Turkish side, prioritizing NATO’s cohesion—disregarding the Greek side’s arguments.

Soon, a summative report on American policy towards Greece evaluated the impact of Cyprus on Greco-American relations. Although the report acknowledged that “Greek-

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<sup>601</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIV:240

<sup>602</sup> State to Embassy (UK), April 16, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:241

<sup>603</sup> Embassy (Turkey) to State, April 24, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:243

<sup>604</sup> State to Embassy (Turkey), April 25, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:244

<sup>605</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State Department, April 26, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:245

American relations are on a firm and friendly basis and our important base rights in Greece are secure” as “Greece has given clear public endorsement to the American Doctrine” the question of Cyprus was nonetheless “affecting nearly all aspects of our relations with Greece.” The report noted that “the continuation of the present political stability in Greece is in large part dependent on progress toward a peaceful settlement of this question.”<sup>606</sup> And a following NSC report only highlighted Cyprus’ importance for Greco-American relations, noting that “the Greeks look to the US for leadership in world affairs and for political support, notably on the Cyprus question.” To that end, the NSC stressed the importance of reaching a “settlement to the Cyprus dispute” which would also help the objectives of “improving Greek-Turkish relations” and lessening “Greek irredentism” which had “led to serious inter-allied tensions” in Cyprus.<sup>607</sup>

This report considered a correlation between the Cyprus stalemate and the potential future rise of communism in Greece. The NSC argued that “by Greek standards there has been unusual political stability under fairly strong conservative governments since 1952” noting how communism no longer posed an immediate threat. But the NSC cautioned that “the Cyprus question and a Soviet friendship campaign in Greece have assisted Communist efforts to legitimize (KKE) and have contributed to some neutralist tendencies in Greek public opinion and politics.” To that end, the NSC concluded that “the extremely difficult Cyprus problem poses the most immediate threat to Greek political stability” in what proved to be an almost prophetic statement. The impasse regarding Cyprus’ future would indeed shake the Greek political system and cause severe political instability both domestically, but also on Greco-American relations.

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<sup>606</sup> Memorandum, July 30, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:307

<sup>607</sup> National Country Report, August 5, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:308

With that information in mind, the Eisenhower administration soon redefined its policy towards Cyprus. The first objective was to “support [the] concept of the attainment by the Cypriots of a government of their own choice in a manner that will protect the legitimate interests of our allies.” The second objective stated that Washington should “pursue policies designed to preserve NATO unity” and the third that it should “support efforts to retain continued access to NATO members and continued denial to the Soviet Bloc of the strategically important bases on Cyprus.” Significantly, the NSC argued among other things that “some form of direct negotiations” between the three countries should be promoted, but also stressed the importance that Washington attached to preserving its “maneuverability by not freezing our position for the present in favor of any specific formula.” For the sake of strengthening “NATO interests in the Mediterranean” the NSC suggested that “serious consideration to participating in arrangements guaranteeing the interim or eventual status of Cyprus” should be maintained.<sup>608</sup>

Soon Dulles himself admitted that the “tempers of interested parties leave serious doubt that agreement on ultimate status now possible.” In a letter to the American embassy in London, he stressed that irrespective of whichever solution the parties involved came up with, Washington’s criteria were “(a) retention of essential military facilities under British sovereignty; (b) protection of island from Communist infiltration; (c) establishment peace and tranquility in island as a whole” noting how Greece’s and Turkey’s refusals to participate in a conference on Cyprus’ future as proposed by the British government only added to the stalemate.<sup>609</sup> But Washington’s wish to see substantial improvement on the Cyprus question remained unfulfilled as the Greek government was not willing to compromise its position any further, while the Turkish one believed that the greatly unbalanced population percentages in

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<sup>608</sup> NSC Report, August 5, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:256

<sup>609</sup> State to Embassy (UK), September 5, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:259

Cyprus would in due time open the road for enosis—which would inevitably lead to Turkish Cypriots’ expulsion from Cyprus.

Still, the Eisenhower and Macmillan administrations held a series of exploratory talks on Cyprus’ future in London, in September 1957. This was the first time since the Cold War began that the two countries delegated on the matter in such an immediate and intensive manner.<sup>610</sup> Although both self-government and NATO trusteeship were discussed, the British delegation suggested that “the best solution to the problem might be a condominium in which the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey would share responsibility for that part of the island not retained for British military installations” arguing “that Cyprus would be administered by a governor selected by the three governments concerned.” The American delegation accepted this as the most reasonable solution.<sup>611</sup> The administration’s decision to bypass Greece and Turkey and consult directly with the UK on Cyprus is indicative of the emphasis that it gave on the matter’s resolution, rushing to secure Cyprus’ place within the American sphere of influence. In an important detail, the unconditional support for British sovereignty over its Cypriot military bases displays Washington’s ambition to use them as a geopolitical security bond in case of emergency, while it also shows that an independent Cyprus would ironically not exercise full sovereignty over its territory.

But Washington’s and Athens’ positions on Cyprus remained far apart. During the London talks, Dulles said that “the Greek-Turkey thing is in a mess” arguing that Greece would harden its stance if Washington did not support Athens’ side, with Eisenhower responding that Cyprus “never belonged to Greece” in the first place.<sup>612</sup> In historical terms, Eisenhower was right, but his response indicates that although he understood how guaranteeing Cypriot self-

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<sup>610</sup> Andreas Constantinos, “Britain, America and the Sovereign Base Areas from 1960-1978” *Cyprus Review*, 21:2 (2009), 15, <https://www-proquest-com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/scholarly-journals/britain-america-sovereign-base-areas-1960-1978/docview/233182697/se-2>

<sup>611</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIV:260

<sup>612</sup> Eisenhower to Dulles, September 17, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:263

determination could very probably lead to enosis, he remained unable to evaluate the emotional weight that Cyprus' future carried for most Greeks. The size of the Greek population in Cyprus remained a constant variable that loaded the Cyprus question, and although enosis was not certain, it informed both Greece's position, Turkey's fears, and Washington's consistent efforts to maintain a fine balance between the two.

And worse for Washington, Allen's reports from Athens were becoming increasingly bleak. In mid-September 1957, Allen reported how he observed a "change in the climate of Greek Government, press and public opinion" which had arisen due to "western and, particularly, US failure to support the Greek position on Cyprus and from the almost unanimous feeling here that US and western policy is inimical to Greece's real or fancied position." To mitigate this worrying trend, Allen suggested a significant rise of American aid towards Greek military expenses for 1958<sup>613</sup> and soon ordered a detailed study on the matter. In November 1957 he was handed a comprehensive report on "Greece's disengagement from US policy" which argued that this disengagement was of major importance to United States and Western interests in this part of the world."<sup>614</sup> In other words, to maintain a balance of power between Greece and Turkey in Cyprus, the US had estranged a significant number of Greeks—and Washington knew it well, by that point.

Allen's analysis emphasized this issue. The ambassador concluded that "we have failed in Greek eyes to support the Greek position, and to the Greeks there is no more important problem in this decade" to emphasize the importance of the situation. Allen predicted that "Greece will find herself ultimately in the neutral bloc or in a 'non-bloc' alignment where, we have reason to fear, a growing number of Greeks today already feel themselves psychologically." Allen warned Washington that DU's leader, Georgios Papandreou, was

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<sup>613</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, September 13, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:310

<sup>614</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State Department, November 4, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:312



attempting to construct a narrative advocating for Greece's "psychological dis-association" from America. Moreover, although Allen concluded that "no one deplores this drift more than Constantine Karamanlis" he emphasized that the Cyprus question had brought "a new stage in Greek-American relations in which many of our decade-old assumptions and rules-of-thumb are no longer valid" and every American move has "double importance." As this and the next chapter will later show, Allen's report was the closest he could get to a prophecy.

The stalemate persisted. Despite promising signs early in that year, December's UNGA session was approaching with all four countries having little—if anything—to show on the matter. From his end, Averoff-Tositsa argued in early December that although the British government had become friendlier towards a "quite logical solution to the problem" Turkey's reservations obstructed any resolution. But Washington decided once again to remain neutral towards Greece's proposed UNGA resolution, despite Karamanlis' persistent expressed concerns.<sup>615</sup> Instead, Washington attempted to find some common ground between Greece and Turkey at the very last minute. In Eisenhower's own words to British ex-field marshal, WWII veteran, and senior NATO officer, Bernard Montgomery, "some way" had "to be found to bring the Greeks and Turks closer together" as their "bitter debate" would "interfere" with NATO.<sup>616</sup>

However, the US and the UK failed again. On the following day, Greece's proposed resolution on "the importance of having the principle of self-determination applied in the case of Cyprus" was put to vote, with a result of 33 to 20, with 25 abstentions—among which was the US—while in the plenary session that followed, the resolution failed to gain ultimate UN approval, with the vote resulting in a 31 to 24, with 24 abstentions—with the US again

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<sup>615</sup> Memorandum, December 2, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:268

<sup>616</sup> Eisenhower to Montgomery, December 11, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:272

abstaining.<sup>617</sup> Once more in the mid-1950s, the US voted against its principles as the Eisenhower administration had acknowledged itself a few years prior, opting for a consequentialist approach that countered Greece's deontological claims on Cypriots' future. Averoff-Tositsa, who led the Greek 1957 UNGA delegation, had argued in his speech that "the Greek people feel such concern and even anguish over the question of Cyprus as they have rarely felt before" while adding that Cyprus' "right to self-determination [...] is disregarded."<sup>618</sup> Evidently, Averoff-Tositsa was right.

### **The implications of Washington's Cypriot policy**

Upon another disappointing UNGA for Greece, Karamanlis confronted US officials. The Greek PM argued that "the solution was simple" and that "Cyprus should be independent" with his administration guaranteeing protections for the Turkish minority, telling Eisenhower that "Greece had a moral obligation to support the Greeks on Cyprus" highlighting again the deontological force of the Greek position. He also elaborated on "an anti-Western feeling" which "was being built up in Greece because of Cyprus" and which he could not easily manage despite his devoted pro-Western positions, as Greeks believed that "the West was against Greece on Cyprus"; in an abrupt manner Karamanlis said that "you all vote against us in the UN." The impact of Washington's consequentialist policy towards Cyprus was causing increasingly more turbulence in Greece, and Karamanlis himself urged Eisenhower to realize it.

Karamanlis also urged Eisenhower to personally engage with the resolution efforts. When the President asked the Greek PM whether bilateral talks with Turkey would be possible

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<sup>617</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIV:273

<sup>618</sup> Evangelos Averoff-Tositsa, *Speech at UN Assembly*, UN General Assembly, Twelfth Session, New York, September 26, 1957, <https://daccess-ods.un.org/tmp/7800610.06546021.html>

in presence of a neutral negotiator, Karamanlis suggested that this could only be the American President himself. However, Eisenhower merely responded that the US “had not espoused any particular Cyprus solution” refraining from responding to Karamanlis’ point that the Turkish-proposed partition was unreasonable as “82 percent of the population is Greek.” Instead, Eisenhower argued that his administration’s priority was “to keep strong the alliance against Communism” and hence believed that it was “better to abstain in votes on these problems and thus maintain our influence and ability to play a useful role.”<sup>619</sup>

Undoubtedly, this exchange between Eisenhower and Karamanlis manifests a pattern that the previous chapter identified. From the Greek perspective, the US was the undisputed leader of the Western alliance and hence was considered responsible for contributing to the resolution of the Cyprus question. America’s supposed emphasis on values such as self-determination and freedom only made it more natural for the Greek side to request American support on a matter whose resolution seemed self-evident through this deontological lens. The vast discrepancy between Cyprus’ ethnic population distribution made Cyprus overwhelmingly Greek, and since Washington considered self-determination a fundamental axiom of the Free World, then it should support enosis—in Greeks’ eyes. Extending this argument, Washington’s deep interventionism in Greek affairs which reshaped the post-Civil War Greek political landscape by strengthening Alexandros Papagos’ and Konstantinos Karamanlis’ conservative governments, was also theoretically aiming to preserve Greece’s self-determination.

But Eisenhower’s responses to Karamanlis reveal again how Washington placed containment above everything else. As Dulles subsequently put it to Karamanlis, Washington was unwilling “to coerce another friendly country” and “had no mandate to settle the Cyprus problem.”<sup>620</sup> Karamanlis’ next communication with Eisenhower is indicative of the two sides’

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<sup>619</sup> Memorandum, December 18, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:274

<sup>620</sup> Memorandum, December 19, 1957. FRUS/XXIV:275

estrangement about Cyprus. In early January 1958 and after reaffirming Greece's commitment to the "Free World" Karamanlis told Eisenhower in a highly deontological tone that "the invincible might of the ideals which guide today the fortunes of Mankind, is bound to bring sometime freedom to Cyprus" urging the President to consider "the difficulties" that the stalemate was causing to the Greek administration.<sup>621</sup> A series of diplomatic exchanges on the issue followed but on March 2, Karamanlis resigned after failing to pass a new electoral system.<sup>622</sup> Having failed to achieve enosis, or at least show some progress on Cyprus, Karamanlis' political future looked again uncertain—just like Washington's interests in Greece.

### **The elections of 1958**

The imminent May elections concerned the Eisenhower administration. Dulles was so worried that he considered the manipulation of the result an immediate priority and thus ordered the allocation of emergency funds to stir the outcome to Washington's liking; to this day it is not certain who the recipients were.<sup>623</sup> Undoubtedly, this highly consequentialist interference demonstrated again the pattern of American interventionism in Greek politics since the Civil War. In the end, Karamanlis was able to secure re-election, with ERE receiving about 41% of the vote, suffering a 6% drop since 1956. A significant parameter in these elections was that Georgios Papandreou had failed to capitalize on DU's 1956 momentum, hence the crypto-communist EDA competed without forming another alliance with other

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<sup>621</sup> Karamanlis to Eisenhower, January 17, 1958. FRUS/X(1):174

<sup>622</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, June 17, 1958. FRUS/X(1):234

<sup>623</sup> Alexis Papachelas, *O viasmós tis Ellinikis dimokratias* (Athens: Estia, 2017), 60-61

parties. In an astonishing result, EDA finished second, receiving 24% and becoming Greece's official opposition<sup>624</sup> only seven years after the Civil War had ended.

Karamanlis' renewed absolute majority relieved Washington<sup>625</sup> but EDA's rise manifested Greeks' wider disappointment regarding NATO's inability to support Greek-Cypriots' cause.<sup>626</sup> Dulles expressed his great concerns to the CIA, stressing its inability to predict EDA's performance<sup>627</sup> while the new American Ambassador James Riddleberger—a seasoned diplomat who had served in Germany and Yugoslavia before becoming Assistant Secretary of State for European and Asian affairs<sup>628</sup>—met immediately with Karamanlis to discuss Cyprus.<sup>629</sup> An immediate American evaluation argued that Cyprus had turned into a “rallying cause on which further left-wing successes will be scored” while noting that despite Karamanlis' allegiance to the US “there has been a gradual decline over the past two years in popular support for NATO” mainly due to Cyprus' situation, on which EDA capitalized.<sup>630</sup> In other words, this evaluation proved that Karamanlis' warnings on the impact that American neutrality could have in Greece were accurate. Washington's persistent consequentialist approach towards Cyprus had an increasingly profound impact on the Greek electorate.

In response, the State Department acknowledged that the “Cyprus question has permeated virtually all aspects of Greek politics and foreign policy” but argued that America “does not intend to assume direct responsibility for any particular solution.” The State Department also suggested that Washington should not solely identify with Karamanlis but cultivate instead “friendly relations as feasible with all responsible leaders” to “counteract local

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<sup>624</sup> Editorial Note, FRUS/X(2):238

<sup>625</sup> Ioannis Stefanidis, *Assimetroi Eteroi* (Athens: Pataki, 2013), 314

<sup>626</sup> Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 162

<sup>627</sup> Memorandum, May 14, 1958. FRUS/X(2):239

<sup>628</sup> FRUS, “James Williams Riddleberger”

<sup>629</sup> Memorandum, undated, 1958. FRUS/X(2):242

<sup>630</sup> Operations Report, May 14, 1958. FRUS/X(1):240

communist influence” and ensure that Greek communism would be contained.<sup>631</sup> But the CIA warned the administration that business could not continue as usual: a late May intelligence report noted how Karamanlis’ mandate only relied on 41% of the vote and estimated that EDA would soften its socialist narrative to make more political gains by emphasizing Cyprus and criticizing NATO. The report concluded that Karamanlis’ ERE had become the “champion of Western alignment” and EDA the “champion of neutralistic nationalism” suggesting that “both parties” will compete for “what remains of political center.”<sup>632</sup>

And upon the failure of the British “Macmillan Plan” which proposed a trilateral trusteeship, the stalemate only worsened.<sup>633</sup> In September, the State Department suggested that the “elements composing ERE might disintegrate” and that “political polarization between the right and the extreme left appears likely to continue.” It also argued that an “[the] EDA bid for power would almost certainly be blocked through establishment of a Palace-backed anti-Communist coalition, or possibly by [the] creation of an authoritarian regime based on military support” without however commenting on how—or whether—Washington would react in that case. Regarding Cyprus, the State Department concluded that there is “little chance that the Cyprus issue will be settled.”<sup>634</sup> Compromise remained elusive throughout 1958, and a following mid-December report on Greece noted that “the Cyprus issue remained unresolved and there was a somewhat less favorable attitude toward the U.S. because of a popular feeling in Greece that its NATO allies, especially the U.S., have let Greece down on this crucial issue.” This report also estimated a “weakening in NATO ties” and a “declining support for US policies” for Greece, mainly due to the Cyprus stalemate.<sup>635</sup>

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<sup>631</sup> Operations Plan, May 21, 1958. FRUS/X(1):241

<sup>632</sup> NSC Briefing, Greek elections, May 27, 1958. CIA-RDP79R00890A001000010018-6

<sup>633</sup> James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: what everyone needs to know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 24

<sup>634</sup> National Intelligence Estimate, September 23, 1958. FRUS/X(1):243

<sup>635</sup> Operations Coordinating Board Report, December 17, 1958. FRUS/X(2):251

Washington's Cypriot policy had backfired. Washington's consequentialist rejection of Cypriots' rights to self-determination—that both Papagos and Karamanlis fervently supported on a highly deontological narrative, both in public but also in private—increasingly alienated a sizeable proportion of the Greek electorate, to the extent that the US was estimating whether Greece's place within its sphere of influence would soon be under threat. Worse still, since the summer of 1958 several American officials feared that the USSR would use the Cyprus stalemate to stir Greece towards geopolitical neutrality.<sup>636</sup> Ironically, it was the devoted westerner Karamanlis who in late November 1958 warned once more the State Department that as the “Soviet bloc would probably support self-determination in UNGA” Greece could be forced to “alter its present policy of advocating UK and NATO bases in Cyprus unless steps were taken to reach final solution.”<sup>637</sup> In other words, the US negligence of Cypriots' self-determination reached the point where the nightmare of a neutralist Greece seemed probable. Having Athens and Ankara negotiate became an immediate priority for Washington.

### **The Zurich and London agreements**

In early 1959, Averoff-Tositsa's reaffirmation that Archbishop Makarios would settle for independence—instead of enosis—helped Turkey abandon its proposals for a Cypriot partition.<sup>638</sup> The Turkish side welcomed the prospect of independence—with guarantees for Turkish Cypriots—and during the following UNGA Macmillan urged Dulles to capitalize on the Greco-Turkish rapprochement.<sup>639</sup> Dulles encouraged Macmillan to supervise Greco-Turkish discussions, refraining however from committing the Eisenhower administration to

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<sup>636</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 66

<sup>637</sup> Memorandum, May 4, 1960. FRUS/X(V.I):292

<sup>638</sup> Heraclides, 2018, *ibid*

<sup>639</sup> Macmillan to Dulles, January 17, 1959. FRUS/X(1):301

any specific option.<sup>640</sup> Under Macmillan's lead, Karamanlis and Turkish PM Adnan Menderes met in early February in Zurich with the Greek PM commenting the improvement in Greco-Turkish relations, applauding Turkey for softening its stance<sup>641</sup> despite being personally displeased with the concessions that he had accepted to make.<sup>642</sup> After all, Karamanlis had been advocating Cyprus' self-determination on a staunch deontological narrative, hence sharing power with Turkey when Turkish Cypriots accounted for 1/5 of the population was a significant compromise.

The two delegations' meeting resulted in a breakthrough regarding the Cyprus question. Greece and Turkey agreed to the establishment of an independent Cyprus, in which governing power would be shared between the two ethnic communities, with Greek Cypriots enjoying more power due to their overrepresentation.<sup>643</sup> Macmillan rushed to seal the accord as quickly as possible, inviting Makarios and high profile representatives from Athens and Ankara to London<sup>644</sup> with Eisenhower expressing his relief and gratitude.<sup>645</sup> After Makarios' momentary rejection of independence was turned around by the Greek delegation's pressure, the London agreement was ratified in mid-February 1959, according to which the Republic of Cyprus would be established, with Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain acting as guarantor powers.<sup>646</sup> In the aftermath of the London-Zurich agreements, Washington was relieved to observe from a distance what seemed like a final resolution to a situation that had undermined NATO's cohesion which could potentially escalate into a disaster for the US.<sup>647</sup>

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<sup>640</sup> Dulles to Macmillan, January 21, 1959. FRUS/X(1):302

<sup>641</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, January 31, 1959. FRUS/X(1):306

<sup>642</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 67

<sup>643</sup> Ker-Lindsay, 25

<sup>644</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS:X(1):307

<sup>645</sup> Eisenhower to Macmillan, February 12, 1959. FRUS/X(1):308

<sup>646</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS:X(1):311

<sup>647</sup> Van Coufoudakis, "US Foreign Policy and the Cyprus question: an interpretation" *Journal of International Studies*, 5:3, (1976), 245, <https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1177/03058298760050030201>



Despite being a turning point in Greco-Cypriot history, the London-Zurich agreements are not of this thesis' immediate interest, mainly because Washington acted mostly as London's encourager. This chapter has already shown that Washington prioritized British sovereignty over its military bases, with the sole other imperative being to prevent a conflict between Greece and Turkey by preventing enosis. Of course, despite disregarding Cypriots' right to self-determination, Washington established connections with independent Cyprus to maintain the island within its sphere of influence. Still, as this thesis cannot—and does not intend to—substitute for an encyclopedia on the historiography of Greco-American relations regarding Cyprus, it extends an invitation for further research on US-Cypriot relations through the lens of the proposed consequentialist framework. Even the first telegrams between the two countries demonstrates a pattern of political interventionism aiming at manipulating crucial parameters to contain Cypriot communism.<sup>648</sup>

### **Return to stability**

With the Cyprus question seemingly resolved, Greco-American relations entered a period of stability that resembled Papagos' era. Throughout the winter and spring of 1959, Washington pushed for Greco-American rapprochement in virtually any sector of Greek public life from the arts to education. In strictly foreign policy terms, a bilateral treaty was signed which entailed the exchange of nuclear information and the American-supervised training of Greek troops on specific weapons. The Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, was so furious with the agreement that he even threatened to bomb Greece, yet Karamanlis swiftly called his bluff and publicly disregarded the Soviet threats.<sup>649</sup> Better still for Washington, its newest ambassador, Ellis Briggs—a career diplomat who had served as head of mission in six

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<sup>648</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 68

<sup>649</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS:X(2)/258

countries, including Czechoslovakia and South Korea<sup>650</sup>—was noticeably fond of Karamanlis and considered him strong, honest, and devoted to the Greco-American alliance. Briggs argued that Washington should continue supporting Karamanlis<sup>651</sup> especially after the CIA reported in the spring that the liberal political leader and former PM, Sophoklis Venizelos, would potentially cooperate with EDA.<sup>652</sup>

In direct contrast with the previous tormented years, 1959 was uneventful for Greco-American relations. Karamanlis enjoyed a comfortable parliamentary majority and remained Washington's preferred Greek political leader. The Greek electorate had not reacted overwhelmingly positively to the London-Zurich agreements, seeing them as a substantial concession from the Greek side.<sup>653</sup> However, despite the opposition's accusations that he had sold Cyprus to NATO and the Americans, Karamanlis was able to govern far more effectively than ever before.<sup>654</sup> The only minor turbulence came in the autumn of 1959 when Karamanlis asked Eisenhower to support the largely indebted and declining Greek economy. Briggs convinced the State Department to concede to Karamanlis' requests, just like his predecessors had done in the past whenever Greece required further American aid.<sup>655</sup>

Most importantly for the Eisenhower administration, it looked like EDA's rise to official opposition in 1958 had failed to generate strong momentum. The NSC reported that "the Greek public attitude was currently very unfavorable to the communists" emphasizing how Khrushchev's threats alienated the electorate<sup>656</sup> while the CIA reported that Greco-Soviet relations had been at their lowest point since the Civil War ended.<sup>657</sup> To publicly cement this

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<sup>650</sup> FRUS, "Ellis Ormsbee Briggs"

<sup>651</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 69

<sup>652</sup> Intelligence Bulletin, Greece, March 31, 1959. CIA-RDP79T00975A004400150001-6

<sup>653</sup> Clogg, 162-163

<sup>654</sup> Gallant, 293-294

<sup>655</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, November 21, 1959. FRUS/X(2):274

<sup>656</sup> NSC meeting, December 10, 1959. FRUS/X(2):275

<sup>657</sup> NSC Briefing: Greece, December 9, 1959. CIA-RDP79R00890A001100120006-1

rapid bilateral rapprochement after the Cyprus turmoil, Eisenhower visited Greece during his 11-country trip in late 1959 and had a cordial meeting with Karamanlis, reassuring him that whoever succeeded him in 1960 would maintain America's firm commitment to Greece. A fervent anti-communist to the end, Eisenhower was particularly interested to know whether any prominent Greeks had joined the Greek left.<sup>658</sup>

This tranquility persisted in early winter 1960, despite Karamanlis' concerns that Greece's declining economy could potentially reenergize EDA.<sup>659</sup> Throughout the spring of 1960, Karamanlis pressured Washington for more economic aid to the extent that in June even the friendly Briggs admitted that "Greeks have again become sticky about debt matter."<sup>660</sup> But as pressing as Karamanlis' requests were, nothing could outshine one of the most important moments in post-Civil War Greek history: on July 29, 1960, the British Parliament granted independence to Cyprus, and on the same day the UK, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, ratified the Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus; the US formally recognized Cyprus on August 16.<sup>661</sup> It looked like the Cypriot nightmare was finally over for the US.

This most encouraging climate persisted until the end of the year. A late September CIA report suggested that Karamanlis would hold a snap election in the "latter part of 1961" after having re-written the "electoral law to advantage." Once more, Karamanlis was going to exploit the effective American trick that Washington had introduced in Greece back in the early 1950s to establish a government of its liking. The report also noted that the Cyprus resolution had stabilized Greek foreign relations and identified as Greece's main problems first, its weak economy, and second, the inability of a non-communist party to emerge as an alternative to

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<sup>658</sup> Memorandum, December 15, 1959. FRUS/X(2):277

<sup>659</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, February 26, 1960. FRUS/X(2):284

<sup>660</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, June 9, 1960. FRUS/X(2):295

<sup>661</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS:X(1)/356

EDA.<sup>662</sup> The Eisenhower administration had already explored the possibility of supporting the establishment of a non-communist and moderately leftwing alternative to Karamanlis' ERE since the elections of 1958—in which Georgios Papandreou could emerge as a trustworthy leader. However, the inherent disunity of the Greek center-left and the American embassy's preference for Karamanlis halted the endeavor.<sup>663</sup>

Eisenhower's successor inherited a far more stable Greece than the former general had back in 1952. The Democrat John F. Kennedy, who had led a staunchly anti-Soviet campaign, defeated Eisenhower's Vice-President, staunch anti-communist, and admirer of American interventionism in Greece during the Civil War, Richard Nixon. Kennedy made a consistent effort to appear hard on communism from the outset of his presidency, in both rhetorical and military terms<sup>664</sup> pledging in his inaugural address to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”<sup>665</sup> Kennedy not only did not tone down America's values-based narrative in the clash of ideologies between the West and the communist world, but added a new element to it through his youth and charisma. And despite his brief time in office due to the tragedy of his assassination in 1963, Kennedy pursued a series of consequentialist interventions in the name of containing communism, which this chapter will later briefly examine.

Kennedy and Karamanlis quickly established a good relationship. Kennedy immediately decided to follow Truman's and Eisenhower's foreign policy approach and support Karamanlis' pro-Western ERE to secure its re-election in the snap 1961 elections, while he also agreed to raise the issue of the Greek debt once they were over.<sup>666</sup> Kennedy's

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<sup>662</sup> NSC Briefing: Greece, September 28, 1960. CIA-RDP79R00890A001200090024-9

<sup>663</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 63

<sup>664</sup> Powaski, 135. See also: Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: the politics of insecurity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020), 194-195

<sup>665</sup> Jerald Combs, *History of American Foreign Policy, Vol.2, From 1895* (London: Routledge, 2008), 328-329

<sup>666</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, March 12, 1961. FRUS/XVI:310

election foreshadowed a continuation of post-Civil War American interventionism in Greece, rather than a change of direction. Less than three months after Kennedy had assumed the Presidency, he extended an invitation to Karamanlis for an official visit to Washington. In a most cordial meeting, Kennedy arranged for Karamanlis to speak on the phone with Harry Truman “whose name has special significance for Greece” as Karamanlis commented, and whom the Greek PM invited to Greece for a personal visit—a trip that Kennedy fully endorsed.

It soon became evident that the two men were on the same page on foreign policy matters. Karamanlis argued that “everywhere democracies are faced with the problem of communism, and this calls for sacrifices to meet the challenge” and told Kennedy that “among the NATO allies Greece was the only country ready and willing to have a larger army.” Kennedy even asked for Karamanlis’ counsel on key parameters that could strengthen NATO, to which the devoted anti-communist Karamanlis argued that a firmer “policy against communism” was necessary under the guidance of the US. Unfortunately, the following part of the two leaders’ discussion was not recorded.<sup>667</sup>

Kennedy manifested his interest in Greece in a most indicative manner. Just a month after Karamanlis returned from Washington, a statue of Harry Truman was erected in central Athens, with Kennedy requesting that his personal message be read during the unveiling ceremony. In his address, Kennedy stated that “this statue is a fitting tribute to President Truman, under whose leadership” a “special relationship with Greece” was established, adding that this was an “inspiring” occasion for “free men everywhere who watched with respect and admiration heroic Greek efforts to preserve their freedom against communist aggression.” Kennedy added that “the Truman Doctrine helped provide the shield for the Free World” until NATO was established and concluded that this statue “will serve to remind us of the high

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<sup>667</sup> Memorandum, April 19, 1961. FRUS/XVI:312

priority President Truman gave the progress of Greece toward economic development and social justice in peace and freedom.”<sup>668</sup> This statue has become one of the most defiled ones in Greece since 1974.<sup>669</sup>

### **The 1961 Greek elections**

Once again, Karamanlis’ prospects looked promising. Strategically, Karamanlis had not officially announced the election date as he was in constant communication with Washington regarding the extent to which the Kennedy administration could help ERE’s electoral performance. Indicatively, in late summer 1961 Karamanlis noted that any public statements praising Greece’s economy and security within would be helpful, while the embassy once more pressured the non-communist opposition to approve yet another change in the electoral law which aimed at undermining EDA’s electoral chances.<sup>670</sup> Once more thus, the US became heavily involved in the Greek electoral process, attempting to manipulate the electoral result to ensure that Greece would remain within the American sphere of influence; Kennedy used the same tactics that Truman had first introduced.

Eventually, Karamanlis called for elections in late October. The CIA expected a convincing ERE performance combined with an underwhelming EDA performance—mainly due to Khrushchev’s recent threats against Greece. Interestingly, the CIA commended CU’s (Centrists Union) apparent rise under the leadership of Georgios Papandreou, noting how the Greek political system now included another pro-Western option, albeit not as much as ERE was. The CIA concluded that American interests would continue to be served best by

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<sup>668</sup> Telegram, May 19, 1963. Kennedy Presidential Library: Greece/General/1961-1963/39

<sup>669</sup> Matt Vasilogambros and National Journal, “The Poor, Tortured, Bombed, Painted Truman Statue in Athens”, *The Atlantic*, December 3, 2013, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/the-poor-tortured-bombed-painted-truman-statue-in-athens/437694/>

<sup>670</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 72

Karamanlis, noting that “the only danger for US security interests appear to lie in possible future instability [...] if Karamanlis fails to win absolute majority of seats” or to gain enough seats “to avoid a coalition” because otherwise the “communist-front EDA” would “exercise disproportionate power.”<sup>671</sup> Evidently—and once more since the end of the Greek Civil War—Washington had clear opponents and friends in another Greek election, attempting to undermine the former, and support the latter.

Once more, Washington’s wish came true. Karamanlis’ ERE received 51% of the vote and an overwhelming majority of 176 seats, with Papandreou’s CU finishing second with 34% and 100 seats, while EDA only received 15% and just 24 seats. Upon the result, however, CU’s Papandreou accused Karamanlis of wide corruption and Greece’s military apparatus of terrorizing voters to suppress the non-conservative vote; Papandreou publicly declared that he was embarking on a “relentless struggle” to free Greek politics from electoral fraud.<sup>672</sup> Soon after the election, the CIA admitted that Greece’s military establishment had attempted to stir the elections to Karamanlis’ side.<sup>673</sup> CU MPs’ intention to take their parliamentary oath “with reservation” to express their discomfort regarding the electoral campaign appalled Washington.<sup>674</sup> The State Department had ensured that no public statements on the imminent reduction of US aid would be made before the election, to not compromise Karamanlis’ electoral chances.<sup>675</sup> Hence, although Washington was delighted to see Karamanlis win, Papandreou’s CU proved itself less predictable than Americans expected.

Kennedy immediately congratulated Karamanlis on his reelection. For his part, a rejoicing Karamanlis expressed his gratitude to the President that the two would continue

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<sup>671</sup> Intelligence Memorandum, National elections in Greece—October 29, 1961, October 5, 1961. CIA-RDP79S00427A000500020016-6

<sup>672</sup> Gallant, 293-294

<sup>673</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 73

<sup>674</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State Department, December 4, 1961. FRUS/XVI:323

<sup>675</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State Department, October 19, 1961. FRUS/XVI:320

working together on their “mutual interests and welfare, but also those of the free world.”<sup>676</sup> However, the 1961 elections would initiate a period of escalating political turmoil during the 1960s, which in due time led to the coup of 1967.<sup>677</sup> Upon the result, the American embassy under a reluctant Briggs gradually approached Papandreou to establish a working relationship with him, through which Washington sought to ensure that a potential CU electoral victory would not disturb long-term American interests in Greece.<sup>678</sup> This preemptive thinking only shows that despite its commitments around the world, the Kennedy administration intended to remain fully invested in the Greek political system to preserve American hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean.

No one can overstate the significance of the Papandreou family in Greek political development. As this and the next chapters will show, the Papandreous played an instrumental role in the increasing political instability of the 1960s. Andreas Papandreou, who had returned from America to help his father unite the Greek center with center left, was a naturalized American citizen and a distinguished Harvard-educated economist who even chaired Berkeley University’s Department of Economics. Andreas Papandreou’s background seemed far more American than Greek. That is why in 1961 nothing indicated that Andreas would emerge as the Greek prophet of anti-Americanism in the future. Indicatively, despite Washington’s preference for the seasoned Karamanlis, the fact that Andreas—whom American officials frequently called “Andy”—stood by his father’s side was considered a security bond that American interests would be served indefinitely in Greece.<sup>679</sup> More erroneous predictions have rarely been made, and the following chapters will show how Washington’s consequentialist

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<sup>676</sup> Telegram, November 8, 1961. Kennedy Presidential Library: Greece/General/1961-1963/46

<sup>677</sup> Theodore Couloumbis, John Petropoulos, Harry Psomiades, *Foreign Interference in Greek politics* (New York: Pella, 1976), 131

<sup>678</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 74

<sup>679</sup> James Miller, “Papandreou Derangement Syndrome? The United States and the April 1967 Coup” in *The Greek Junta and the International System*, eds. Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Effie Pedaliu (New York: Routledge, 2020), 27-30



foreign policymaking was a defining parameter that fueled Andreas' post-Junta anti-Americanism.

In early 1962, everything seemed to be going according to Washington's plans. Greece was still considered a good "investment"<sup>680</sup> and the main challenge foreseen by the new American ambassador Henry Labouisse—an economic technocrat with significant nation-building experience in the United Nations<sup>681</sup>—was to evaluate the potential instability that CU was causing Karamanlis' stability.<sup>682</sup> But by late March, it had become evident that CU's "relentless struggle" against Karamanlis was not mere opposition rhetoric. Labouisse informed the State Department that CU's campaign had transformed into "a broader and more fundamental attack on several of the governing institutions of Greece" and commented that "objective examination of the evidence makes clear that much of what the opposition has been talking about is not malfeasance but nonfeasance" at least to a significant extent. Labouisse also highlighted the Army's interference in the campaign and the government's "inadequate restraints" on military leadership.

However, Labouisse reassured Washington that "danger to Karamanlis does not appear to be especially serious at the moment" as "the immediate threat was diminished as soon as it became clear that a majority of the Greek public were extremely skeptical about the most violent and politically-motivated of Papandreou's charges." Labouisse admitted that "some questionable political activities of the military and internal security forces" were "valid issues with which to attack Karamanlis" and suggested that the PM should implement some "basic reforms [...] in the way the country conducts its elections."<sup>683</sup> Yet this thesis has already shown that both two problematic components that Labouisse correctly identified were solidified by

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<sup>680</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, January 1, 1962. FRUS/XVI:325

<sup>681</sup> FRUS, "Henry Richardson Labouisse Jr."

<sup>682</sup> Embassy (Greece) to Embassy (France), March 2, 1962. FRUS/XVI:330

<sup>683</sup> Embassy in Greece to State Department, March 23, 1962. FRUS/XVI:328

Washington's consequentialist foreign policy towards Greece: meddling with electoral laws, insisting on maintaining a strong, independent, and anti-communist military establishment—even after a military coup had been averted in the last minute—had been regular tactics in Washington's playbook.

### **The end of Karamanlis' era**

In early 1963, a series of factors gradually destabilized Karamanlis' administration. The PM's relationship with the Palace gradually collapsed, he became disillusioned with the rapidly increasing influence of the military in politics, while the assassination of EDA's MP Grigorios Lambrakis by paramilitary operators in May caused a public outrage against his government, despite Karamanlis expressing his disgust about the incident.<sup>684</sup> Notably, in April 1963, retired General Vasilios Kardamakis, informed the American embassy about an imminent military coup, with its plotters fearing that CU's momentum foreshadowed a potential cooperation with communists, which the Greek military apparatus could not allow; when asked to identify the plot's leaders, Kardamakis named Georgios Papadopoulos among its leaders.<sup>685</sup> This thesis has already determined that Papadopoulos' was involved both in the IDEA movement, as well as his instrumental role as an official liaison between the CIA and the KYP.

The Kennedy administration's response to Labouisse was clear. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Philips Talbot argued that America "could not stand idly by and witness the creation of a Latin American type of totalitarian government in Greece" while emphasizing that "the use of US equipment to achieve such a 'solution' would be regarded with grave misgiving and disappointment." Talbot acknowledged

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<sup>684</sup> Gallant, 293-294

<sup>685</sup> Labouisse to Rusk, April 5, 1963. FRUS/XVI:343

that “it is impossible for Karamanlis to remain in power indefinitely” hence Washington was preparing “to cooperate with another government should it come to power through constitutional means.” Talbot also reaffirmed Kennedy’s commitment to Karamanlis, arguing that “we would not wish to do anything to compromise the effectiveness of Karamanlis’ Government as it still has considerable time to serve in office—nor can a politician of Karamanlis’ skill be discounted in the next election by any means.”<sup>686</sup>

On the surface, Talbot’s comments seem entirely deontological. Speaking for the Kennedy administration, Talbot had categorically excluded any American support to a potential coup, emphasizing the administration’s commitment to Greek democratic institutions. Yet Talbot also made a comment which demonstrated Kennedy’s consequentialist policy; while referring to a potential alternative administration to Karamanlis’ entrusted one, Talbot said that the US “would not be diffident concerning the possibility of working with such a government as long as the turnover did not involve Communists or find them represented in the cabinet.” With this phrase, Talbot established a crucial precondition regarding American foreign policymaking towards the administration that could potentially succeed Karamanlis’: Washington could only embrace an alternative to Karamanlis, “as long as” it did not contain any communist elements. As the next chapter will show, this precondition was indispensable in Washington’s consequentialist foreign policymaking towards CU’s administration—and specifically towards Andreas.

And although Kardamakis soon reassured Labouisse that the threat of an imminent coup had subdued<sup>687</sup> Karamanlis found it impossible to govern. After failing to balance the Greek budget<sup>688</sup> and in the aftermath of Lambrakis’ assassination, Karamanlis resigned in early June,

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<sup>686</sup> Talbot to Labouisse, April 22, 1963. FRUS/XVI:344

<sup>687</sup> Memorandum, June 3, 1963. FRUS/XVI:345

<sup>688</sup> Memorandum, June 6, 1963. FRUS/XVI:346

with a caretaker government succeeding him. Another reason that influenced Karamanlis' resignation was that he had failed to pass a constitutional reform that would give more power to his office.<sup>689</sup> Greece's escalating political crisis worried Washington, with Kennedy wondering "what sort of alternative cabinets could emerge from the current political crisis, and what the likely implications for U.S. interests of each might be" urging Secretary of State Dean Rusk to reflect whether there was "anything the US could do" in case Greece sank into a long-term political crisis.<sup>690</sup>

As a result, the State Department revised its policy towards Greece. Rusk identified Karamanlis' potential re-election as the most accommodating scenario for American interests but cautioned Kennedy that any public endorsement could "reduce rather than enhance" ERE's chances of victory, largely echoing Labouisse's warnings; as Rusk put it, many Greeks had become increasingly weary "of the so-called 'American Factor.'" <sup>691</sup> It is hardly surprising that an increasing number of Greeks had grown anti-American sentiments, given first, Washington's unconditional support to the Greek State in the Civil War, second, its subsequent support to Papagos' and Karamanlis' conservative and fervently pro-American administrations, and third, its role in prolonging uncertainty around Cyprus and publicly opposing its self-determination as manifested by the American abstentions at the UNGA sessions.

Rusk's report also included several insights regarding a probable future CU victory. The Secretary argued that "if for any reason [...] Karamanlis failed to obtain a majority of seats in Parliament, Greece's political stability would be substantially reduced." He also added that "even if the CU obtained a majority, conflicts within the leadership, the lack of cohesion in its

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<sup>689</sup> Clogg, 167

<sup>690</sup> NSC Memorandum, July 8, 1963. FRUS/XVI:349

<sup>691</sup> Paper prepared in State Department, July 15, 1963. FRUS/XVI:350

components, and lack of a clear policy, would result in at least a modest decline in stability” a hung parliament remained the most probable scenario. Still, Rusk reassured Kennedy that “there is no reason to fear that a CU government or a coalition government excluding EDA would, at least in the foreseeable future, represent a threat to Greece’s pro-Western foreign policy.” Clearly, Rusk’s comments showcase both Washington’s persistent appalment regarding a potential EDA rise to power, and its trust that the Papandreous would maintain Greece within the American sphere of influence.

The elections were held on November 3, leading to a historic result within Greece’s post-Civil War political development. Papandreou’s CU emerged victorious with 42% and 138 seats, with Karamanlis’ ERE finishing second with 39.4% and 132 seats, and EDA finishing third with 14.3% and 28 seats.<sup>692</sup> Rusk’s projection of a hung parliament was proven right and just a day after CU’s victory the CIA provided Kennedy with a dire intelligence report, estimating that CU’s “narrow upset victory” along with “Karamanlis’ announced retirement” foreshadowed “a period of increased political instability.” The CIA also estimated that a grand coalition between the two parties would not survive long, which made new elections highly likely, concluding in an alarming tone that “as far as Papandreou can establish national policy, it will tend to be somewhat more ‘independent’ vis-à-vis the West than was the case under Karamanlis.”<sup>693</sup>

The CIA expected Cyprus to reemerge as a major issue, arguing that Papandreou would be far less able than Karamanlis to restrain Makarios, which could cause “friction.” To better understand the significance of the CIA’s expectations, we need to point out that while instability was slowly returning to Greece, Cyprus was again in turmoil. Despite its promising

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<sup>692</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XVI:355

<sup>693</sup> Intelligence Bulletin: Greece: results of national elections will probably lead to continued instability, November 4, 1963. CIA-RDP79T00975A007300310001-6

start, Cyprus' independence was not equally well-received by the two ethnic communities because Greek Cypriots felt—like Karamanlis—that they had conceded too much to Turkey. Since 1960, Makarios, who had been elected as Cyprus' first president, even publicly argued several times that independence was an intermediate stage before enosis, despite the constitutional restraints regarding Cyprus' future union with Greece.<sup>694</sup> By mid-1961, it had become evident that independence was not working to the extent that Kennedy had asked Rusk whether “some preventive medicine” was needed “to forestall further deterioration” since Cyprus location was “of considerable importance to us.”<sup>695</sup>

In sum, the days of stability that Washington had enjoyed since—what initially seemed like—the resolution of the Cyprus question finally ended. Washington now had to deal with a less convenient government to Karamanlis' loyal one, while Cyprus was reemerging as a sharp thorn in NATO's eastern flanks. In this new political time, CU's momentum, and the hopes that it had birthed for the Greek and Cypriot people would soon be proven false<sup>696</sup> mainly due to Greek political instability and the deterioration of the situation in Cyprus. And although both Rusk and Labouisse correctly believed that the elder Papandreou was not intending to shift Greece's geopolitical allegiance, his election coincided with the return of violence in Cyprus<sup>697</sup> which complicated things. From his end, Kennedy sought comfort in Papandreou's proven anti-communist record during the Civil War in his congratulatory message, while the new Greek PM reaffirmed Greece's commitment to the West in response.<sup>698</sup>

But Papandreou's victory came a little less than three weeks before Kennedy was assassinated. Kennedy was succeeded by his Vice-President, Lyndon Johnson, a politician with an impeccable track record in domestic policy, but with little knowledge in foreign affairs—

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<sup>694</sup> Ker-Lindsay, 28-30

<sup>695</sup> NSC Memorandum No.71, August 23, 1961. FRUS/XVI:248

<sup>696</sup> Clogg, 169

<sup>697</sup> Beaton, 327

<sup>698</sup> Telegrams, November 11-15, 1963. Kennedy Presidential Library: Greece/General/1961-1963/90-93

yet who unconditionally espoused the anti-communist ethos of Cold War American foreign policy.<sup>699</sup> In his congressional and senatorial years, Johnson fully supported the Truman Doctrine and the Korean War, he persistently advocated in favor of a more interventionist, timely, and confrontational foreign policy, while he subscribed to the domino theory, based on which he had pressured Kennedy to unreservedly support South Vietnam against the communist Viet Cong.<sup>700</sup> Johnson would embrace Washington's consequentialist foreign policymaking towards Greece to an unprecedented extent.

### **A time of crisis**

Just three days after Kennedy's assassination, the Johnson administration received its first intelligence on the new Greek government. Rusk was briefed that "this government differed from Karamanlis'" as although "both opposed the communists, the previous government had depended on police measures, whereas this government intended to use the more efficient measures of social action." The State Department also discussed Papandreou's imminent focus on Cyprus, suggesting once more that Washington had no specific formula to suggest.<sup>701</sup> The CIA also warned Johnson that Papandreou's potential "acceptance of communist support" in parliament could trigger a military coup<sup>702</sup> and that Greco-Turkish relations were rapidly deteriorating due to the outburst of violence in Cyprus.<sup>703</sup> American intelligence reported that Makarios—who was proposing several amendments to the Cypriot constitution, which were however rejected by Turkish-Cypriots<sup>704</sup>—enjoyed the support of the Cypriot communist party, AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People), one of the "best

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<sup>699</sup> Powaski, 152. See also: Campbell and Logevall, 215-216

<sup>700</sup> John Callaghan, with Brendon O'Connor and Mark Phythian, *Ideologies of American Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2019), 106-109

<sup>701</sup> Memorandum, November 26, 1963. FRUS/XVI:357

<sup>702</sup> President's intelligence checklist: Greece, November 28, 1963. CIA-RDP79T00936A002100050001-8

<sup>703</sup> President's intelligence checklist: Cyprus, December 21, 1963. CIA- RDP79T00936A002100260001-5

<sup>704</sup> Ker-Lindsay, 31-34

organized and directed in the Middle East.” Finally, the CIA argued that the Cyprus situation would “present the precariously balanced Greek government with a series of difficult choices” as the “Greek public opinion has never fully accepted” Karamanlis’ concessions on Cyprus’ self-determination.<sup>705</sup>

With violence escalating in early 1964, Johnson was again informed about the gravity of the Cyprus situation. In conversation with his Under Secretary of State George Ball, Johnson said that “that there might as well not be a Britain anymore if they can't handle Cyprus”<sup>706</sup> but was also advised that Greece could face a coup if the Cyprus situation snapped out of control. Only three days later, the CIA informed Johnson that no guarantor power “shows any confidence in a peacekeeping venture unless the US is, and is seen to be, deeply involved” which also meant that “once involved, the US will almost certainly remain engaged until some settlement is reached” which would be “hard to find.”<sup>707</sup> Somewhat shockingly, this report arrived in Washington just after Johnson had suggested that “perhaps we would have to go through a bloodbath in Cyprus before we could take any US military action.”<sup>708</sup> Both Secretary of State Robert McNamara and Under Secretary George Ball were present in this meeting.

And this bloodbath was not an unrealistic prospect. The CIA soon informed the Johnson administration that “Greece and Turkey are more on edge than ever” adding that the USSR “would remain on the sidelines and hope to see the spectacle of NATO at war with itself.”<sup>709</sup> Simultaneously, Johnson was informed that Papandreou’s CU emerged victorious in the snap elections that he had called; CU received 53% and 171 seats, with ERE dropping to 35% and 107 seats, and EDA to 12% and 22 seats, in a result that—seemingly—indicated that Greece’s

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<sup>705</sup> Memorandum: Cyprus, December 23, 1963. CIA-RDP79T00429A001400020021-7

<sup>706</sup> Johnson and Ball (Telephone Conversation). January 25, 1964. FRUS/XVI:2

<sup>707</sup> Memorandum: Cyprus: the problem of keeping the peace, January 28, 1964. CIA-RDP79R00967A000900010013-8

<sup>708</sup> Memorandum of Conference with President Johnson, January 25, 1964. FRUS/XVI:3

<sup>709</sup> President’s Intelligence Checklist: Cyprus, January 31, 1964. CIA-RDP79T00936A002200370001-2



military apparatus was losing its privileged position within Greek politics.<sup>710</sup> Initially, the American embassy welcomed the result—as it promised some stability—but soon became weary of an increasingly distant Papandreou who operated in a very small circle of people, with his son Andreas being his most trusted advisor.<sup>711</sup> Still, most American officials continued to consider Andreas—who had renounced his American citizenship and had been elected in parliament—an asset towards maintaining a special relationship with Greece.<sup>712</sup>

But despite the CIA's concerns, Johnson maintained the same approach as Eisenhower on Cyprus. In his congratulatory message to Papandreou, the President referred solely to “the grave crisis which confronts the Western Alliance over Cyprus” but re-emphasized how America “has no position on terms of any final settlement” reassuring Papandreou that the US was “neither favoring Turkey at the expense of Greece nor vice versa” and was only interested in the “security and well-being of two close NATO allies.”<sup>713</sup> Papandreou however argued that Washington's neutrality was in practice supporting the Turkish position, while Labouisse himself warned Johnson about a self-evident “moral inconsistency” regarding American foreign policymaking towards Greeks and Greek Cypriots, arguing that he could “not see how the US can ultimately escape agreeing to the application of more self-determination.” Labouisse also noted that Washington's neutrality would become “increasingly embarrassing” and “spread the wrong impression about US policy around the world” instead of just in Greece. This thesis will later show how accurate Labouisse's insights were.<sup>714</sup>

Simultaneously, the CIA reported that the escalating crisis had re-energized anti-American sentiments in Greece.<sup>715</sup> But Papandreou imitated Karamanlis' prudent conciliatory

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<sup>710</sup> Gallant, 295

<sup>711</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 109

<sup>712</sup> Miller, (2020), 29

<sup>713</sup> Johnson to Prime-Minister Papandreou, February 20, 1964. FRUS/XVI:16

<sup>714</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, February 27, 1964. FRUS/XVI:20

<sup>715</sup> President's Intelligence Checklist: Cyprus, March 2, 1964. CIA-RDP79T00936A002400010001-9

strategy and told Labouisse that he would not push for enosis in the spirit of self-determination to not provoke Turkey. Still, the Greek PM urged Washington that its neutralist policy “had given Khrushchev opportunity to pose as champion of people struggling for liberty, while US and Britain were cast in light of opposing it.”<sup>716</sup> Once again—and like Karamanlis—Papandreou demonstrated that he was acutely aware of the moral inconsistency that many Greeks viewed in Washington’s Cypriot policy, while like Labouisse, he argued that the US could not escape the fact that Cyprus’ population was overwhelmingly distributed in favor of Greek Cypriots. Despite their political disagreements, Papandreou echoed Papagos’ and Karamanlis’ deontological claims, arguing that the only solution for Cyprus was “complete independence and self-determination.”<sup>717</sup>

### **The Acheson Plan and Greco-American estrangement**

Throughout the spring of 1964 the stalemate persisted. In mid-May, Secretary Ball argued that “enosis [...] would mean that a NATO government would have charge of the island” noting that this would be possible “only if some provision were made for [...] Turk-Cypriots.”<sup>718</sup> Soon, Papandreou told Labouisse that “territorial concession is out of the picture” for any Greek government, favoring population exchanges as a solution.<sup>719</sup> Along these lines, the CIA had prepared an extensive study regarding potential resolutions, some of which explored the “removal of Turkish-Cypriots”<sup>720</sup> yet Turkey’s implies of a potential military intervention to partition the island escalated tensions. Upon Labouisse’s reaffirmation that “there is no chance of Greek support partition or federation”<sup>721</sup> Johnson reassured the Turkish PM, Ismet Inonu,

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<sup>716</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State Department, April 10, 1964. FRUS/XVI:31

<sup>717</sup> President’s Intelligence Checklist: Cyprus, April 14, 1964. CIA-RDP79T00936A002500200001-7

<sup>718</sup> State to Rusk, May 10, 1964. FRUS/XVI:41

<sup>719</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, May 18, 1964. FRUS/XVI:44

<sup>720</sup> Geographic Support Study: June 1964. CIA-RDP79T01018A00060012001-2

<sup>721</sup> Embassy (Greece) to Embassy (Turkey), June 4, 1964. FRUS/XVI:52

that the US “have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community” in what he described as “one of the most complex problems on earth.”<sup>722</sup> Johnson was able to avert a Turkish invasion, but the American embassy in Cyprus argued that “we can no longer remain on sidelines, expressing hope for solution satisfactory to both sides.”<sup>723</sup> Only days later Johnson privately told Rusk “I have no solution. I can't propose anything.”<sup>724</sup>

To release the tension, Johnson invited Papandreou and Inonu to the White House. However, minimal progress was made as the Greek mission—in which Andreas participated as a minister of his father’s cabinet—refused to accept Johnson’s double enosis proposal, which suggested the union of half of Cyprus with Greece, and the other half with Turkey. Reportedly, Johnson lost his temper, shouting towards the Greek ambassador “Fuck your Parliament and your Constitution. America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If those two fleas continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant’s trunk, whacked good.”<sup>725</sup> Johnson’s words were recorded by veteran Greek-Canadian journalist—and briefly Greek Minister of Culture—Philip Deane (Philippe Gigantès) and are indicative of his “volcanic personality” as John Dumbrell has described it.<sup>726</sup> Soon after, Truman’s ex-Secretary of State and Johnson’ special advisor Dean Acheson suggested that the administration should drop “broad concepts like enosis and double-enosis” and force Greece and Turkey to reach a realistic compromise.<sup>727</sup> The two delegations never met in Washington and Johnson’s attempt to help Greece and Turkey find a compromise failed completely.

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<sup>722</sup> State to Embassy (Turkey), June 5, 1964. FRUS/XVI:54

<sup>723</sup> Embassy (Cyprus) to State, June 5, 1964. FRUS/XVI:55

<sup>724</sup> Johnson to Rusk, June 9, 1964. FRUS/XVI:59

<sup>725</sup> Philip Deane, *I Should Have Died* (New York: Atheneum, 1977), 113-114

<sup>726</sup> John Dumbrell, *President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 7

<sup>727</sup> Memorandum, June 23, 1964. FRUS/XVI:73

Faced with an imminent Greco-Turkish conflict, Washington attempted for the first time to take a strong initiative in Cyprus. In what is known as the “Acheson Plan”—named after Dean Acheson himself—Washington initially proposed a union between Greece and Cyprus where Turkish-Cypriots would maintain minority rights and sovereign territory in the form of a military base. Both Makarios and Papandreou rejected the idea<sup>728</sup> while Acheson’s revised proposal of a fifty-year base lease instead of sovereignty was rejected by all three sides. As much as Acheson tried to modify his proposals, nothing came out of them as Athens and Ankara were simply too far apart<sup>729</sup> and it soon became evident that Greece would not settle with anything less than enosis.<sup>730</sup> As Labouisse noted in mid-summer, Greeks had a “very strong and profound conviction [...] that Cypriots should have right of self-determination” to which Papandreou subscribed.<sup>731</sup>

The relevant events of the summer and autumn 1964 deserve their own tailored research on the ethics of American foreign policy towards Cyprus. In this study, it suffices to say that Washington became increasingly worried that the USSR could profit from the situation<sup>732</sup> and therefore even discussed an “instant enosis” solution suggesting that the details would “be worked out later” to quickly outmaneuver a potential Soviet involvement.<sup>733</sup> During the crisis’ highest point in mid-August, Rusk commented that the USSR’s “interjection” meant that “time is really of the essence [...] that means now” and even gave Papandreou the go-ahead to proceed with instant enosis along the plan’s guidelines, refraining however from giving strict guidance on its implementation concerning the future of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. In his reasoning,

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<sup>728</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, July 29, 1964. FRUS/XVI:94

<sup>729</sup> Ker-Lindsay, 37-38

<sup>730</sup> State to Embassy (Greece), July 30, 1964. FRUS/XVI:95

<sup>731</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, July 31, 1964. FRUS/XVI:97

<sup>732</sup> Intelligence Bulletin: Cyprus: preliminary Soviet-Cypriot negotiations may be underway in Nicosia, August 24, 1964. CIA-RDP79T00975A007800420001-9

<sup>733</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, August 18, 1964. FRUS/XVI:131

Rusk concluded that instant enosis—in which Greece would inevitably use military force—offered the only “possibility of avoiding a Communist take-over of the Island.”<sup>734</sup>

And although Cyprus’ political development does not fall within this thesis’ focus, it is essential to briefly explore Makarios’ role in 1964. Despite his original support for enosis, the perennially secretive Makarios was increasingly interested solely in securing Cyprus’ independence to maintain his hegemony over Cypriot affairs. Therefore, he opposed Acheson’s plans for enosis as he believed that this would sideline him politically. Concurrently, the USSR was opposing Acheson’s plan too, as enosis would mean that Cyprus would instantaneously transform into NATO territory—which was of course the key factor informing Washington’s sudden support for Cyprus’ union with Greece.<sup>735</sup> This is exactly where Makarios and USSR met: their interests coincided, as an independent Cyprus could remain geopolitically neutral, with Makarios holding its helm. Indicatively, in late 1964, pro-Makarios Cypriot newspapers considered countries such as the USSR and Egypt as Cyprus’ true friends.<sup>736</sup>

From his end, the indecisive Papandreou argued that any territorial provisions to Turkish-Cypriots would be unacceptable for both Greeks and Greek-Cypriots and merely committed his administration to another series of delegations, which were proven futile.<sup>737</sup> Papandreou’s reluctance juxtaposed Washington’s sudden flexibility; in another consequentialist endeavor—and in the moment when it seemed probable that Cyprus could suddenly switch to the Soviet sphere of influence—Washington was willing to reverse overnight its longstanding policy of neutrality, to ensure that Cyprus would remain within its own. Rusk reaffirmed this point, arguing that by giving Greece “95%” of what they want” Cyprus would remain within the West, urging Papandreou to act “in this decisive moment” to

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<sup>734</sup> State to Embassy in Greece, August 20, 1964. FRUS/XVI:135

<sup>735</sup> Coulombis et al., 132-133

<sup>736</sup> Intelligence Bulletin: Cyprus: disagreement between Archbishop Makarios and General Grivas becomes more serious, October 3, 1964. CIA-RDP79T00975A007900280001-4

<sup>737</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, August 21, 1964. FRUS/XVI:136

“keep the communists out” of Cyprus<sup>738</sup> as the US was “not prepared to let Cyprus become another Cuba” which would “almost certainly happen if the Makarios regime continues in control of an independent Cyprus.”<sup>739</sup> Washington’s rapid change of heart could not reveal its priorities more, as Johnson reversed his and his predecessors’ position on Cyprus in a single night.

And the following conversation between Johnson, Rusk, Acheson, McNamara, and Ball demonstrates the administration’s despair, as well as the consequentialist solutions that it considered. Acheson and Ball argued that only a Turkish invasion would trigger instant enosis, as it would provide the otherwise indecisive Papandreou with an opportunity to secure Cyprus’ union with Greece by intervening militarily, deposing Makarios in the process. Johnson seriously considered this proposal and asked for specific estimations of casualties and for projections on Turkish Cypriots’ fate, as well as whether this engineered conflict could escalate beyond Washington’s control; Rusk’s only concern was whether Makarios would seek Soviet assistance to remain in power. Johnson turned the plan down only due to the high probability of a “messy and destructive” instead of a “controlled and eventually productive” Greco-Turkish clash.<sup>740</sup> In other words, Washington considered facilitating a “controlled” massacre to get out of the impossible position it was in—and keep Cyprus within its sphere of influence.

But the stalemate persisted. Washington attempted to find a mutually acceptable solution throughout autumn, but both the Greek and Turkish administrations were reluctant to make concessions that would be unpopular within their electorates<sup>741</sup> while Makarios was

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<sup>738</sup> State to Embassy (Greece), August 20, 1964. FRUS/XVI:137

<sup>739</sup> State to Mission in Geneva, August 23, 1964. FRUS/XVI:144

<sup>740</sup> Memorandum, September 8, 1964. FRUS/XVI:155

<sup>741</sup> Claude Nicolet, “The Development of US Plans for the Resolution of the Cyprus Conflict in 1964: ‘The Limits of American Power’” *Cold War History*, 3:1 (2002), 119-120, <https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1080/713999969>

establishing personal bonds with non-Western leaders, such as Gamal Nasser and Josip Tito.<sup>742</sup> By mid-October, the CIA expected that Makarios would use his largely unrestricted domestic influence to stir Cyprus towards neutrality, enjoying the support of the “USSR and the non-aligned world internationally and the communist party locally.” The CIA commented that Makarios’ occasional public support for enosis was merely a façade, as he preferred to remain president of a “small but not unimportant nonaligned nation.”<sup>743</sup> As Alexis Heraclides points out, Makarios was inherently hostile towards the Acheson Plan and virtually every solution proposed by the US, as he was adamant that any possible outcome—from enosis to double-enosis—would end Cyprus’ short-lived independence and, above all else, terminate his undisputed influence over Cypriot affairs.<sup>744</sup>

Washington’s failure to help Greece and Turkey reach a settlement had only increased the probability of a geopolitically rogue Cyprus. Even worse for Washington, at least in what concerned Greece, the stalemate contributed to Andreas’ radicalization; the younger Papandreou, who was serving as a first minister of state in his father’s cabinet, had become noticeably more vocal in matters of Greek sovereignty while simultaneously publicly attacking the US and NATO for their long-term attitude towards Cyprus. Labouisse quickly informed Rusk about Andreas’ deviation from the official Greek line, noting that he was able to influence his father’s policies and that his views were becoming increasingly popular among Greeks.<sup>745</sup> King Constantine II implied that he would gladly see Andreas out of office, Labouisse asked whether there was an actual formula for this to happen.<sup>746</sup>

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<sup>742</sup> Şevki Kiralp, “Defending Cyprus in the Early Postcolonial Era: Makarios, NATO, USSR and the NAM (1964–1967)” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 21:4 (2019), 373-374, <https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1080/19448953.2018.1506283>

<sup>743</sup> Memorandum: The evolving “solution” in the Cyprus dispute, October 30, 1964. CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010013-4

<sup>744</sup> Alexis Heraclides, *Kypriako Provilma, 1947-2004: apo tin enosi sti dichotomisi?* (Athens: Sideris, 2006), 104-105

<sup>745</sup> Embassy (Greece) to the State, October 9, 1964. FRUS/XVI:163

<sup>746</sup> Memorandum, September 8, 1964. FRUS/XVI:155

In the end, Andreas surprisingly retired from his powerful cabinet position, after several prominent CU party members accused both him and Georgios Papandreou that the latter had designated the former as his heir-apparent in party leadership. Because of Andreas' public criticism of American foreign policymaking, several Greek press outlets suggested that his resignation had been ordered by the "American factor" claiming that the Johnson administration resented Andreas and his accusations concerning Washington's interference in Cyprus.<sup>747</sup> Labouisse's report to Rusk is enlightening of the growing tension between the US and Greece; the ambassador condemned Georgios Papandreou's reluctance to "denounce charges of US intervention in his son's resignation" which "he knew were patently false." Labouisse then suggested that the Greek PM sought to portray his son as a "victim" of "foreign pressure" despite knowing the implications for "US prestige in Greece."

Labouisse also speculated that Georgios Papandreou aimed at portraying Andreas as a "defender of Cyprus" and Greece's "independent policies." Labouisse's insights were once again accurate, as immediately after Andreas' resignation, the now established neutralist Makarios invited him to Cyprus to "foster myth" that Andreas "fell victim to 'US pressure' as result [of] his stand on Cyprus."<sup>748</sup> American officials were genuinely perplexed by Andreas' motives and even considered the probability that he had spread the rumors of the US interference in his resignation on his own, but his attitude had nonetheless convinced his father that the Johnson administration had indeed become hostile towards him.<sup>749</sup> This incident only increased the Johnson administration's distaste for the younger Papandreou and skepticism towards the elder's ability to govern Greece effectively—but at this point, Washington had no alternative.

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<sup>747</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 145

<sup>748</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, November 19, 1964. FRUS/XVI:165

<sup>749</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 145



With the Acheson plan ultimately failing, Greco-American relations broke down in late 1964. Acheson argued that the real weakness was Georgios Papandreou himself, whom he called a rhetorically pompous but politically weak leader who failed to seize the opportunity of instant enosis, which according to Acheson would have resolved the Cyprus question. In a most consequentialist statement, Acheson commented that Papandreou could have forced enosis militarily and taken out a resisting and increasingly pro-soviet Makarios.<sup>750</sup> Ultimately, Washington ruled out the possibility of enosis in late December and opted for a federation instead, aiming primarily to reestablish a working relationship with the Turkish government.<sup>751</sup> The—disruptive, in the opinion of American foreign policymakers—role that both Georgios and Andreas Papandreou had in the failure of the Acheson plan, and Washington’s subsequent detachment from CU’s administration foreshadowed a return to friction in Greco-American relations, after years of close partnership.

### **An assessment of American interventionism in Greece from 1957 to 1965**

From 1957 to 1965, the level of American interventionism in Greek affairs remained as deep as it had been throughout the post-Civil War era. The Cyprus question remained the dominant issue within Greco-American relations, which Washington considered one of the most complex on earth, as Lyndon Johnson argued. On the domestic side, and despite the persistent bilateral problems that Cyprus was causing, Washington cooperated well with Alexandros Papagos’ successor, Konstantinos Karamanlis, who had a strong personal inclination towards the West and was a genuine admirer of Washington’s diplomatic and military might, as well as its significance and influence in world affairs.<sup>752</sup> It is thus hardly

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<sup>750</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 137

<sup>751</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 152

<sup>752</sup> Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou, *Greece in the Twentieth Century* (Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 88

surprising that both Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy praised Karamanlis and worked well with him. Karamanlis was not just Papagos' successor in anti-communist conservative leadership, but also the heir of Washington's blessings, as throughout the 1950s and 1960s up until CU's election, Washington's consistent support to the two conservative Prime Ministers remained virtually unchanged<sup>753</sup>—as it had been proven remarkably effective.

Regardless, American neutrality towards Cyprus had severely alienated many Greeks' attitude towards the US.<sup>754</sup> This and the previous chapters demonstrated how the US tactically refrained from engaging in a resolution on Cyprus, to not look like it was siding with Greece over Turkey and vice versa. However, this approach was not well-received by most Greeks, who saw the “American Factor” as a disruptive force on the road to Cyprus' self-determination; arguably, it was. The rapid rise of anti-American sentiments in response to Washington's foreign policy towards Cyprus became increasingly noticeable, especially, before the London-Zurich agreements.<sup>755</sup> And although Cyprus' independence seemed promising and Cyprus' position secure within the Western sphere of influence, most Greeks were disappointed as the ultimate goal of enosis had not been achieved.<sup>756</sup> Greeks may never have had Cyprus, as Eisenhower had accurately observed, but believed deeply that they should as they had the numbers on their side—and overwhelmingly so.

### **An ethical interpretation of American interventionism in Greece from 1957 to 1965**

From a deontological standpoint, many Greeks' poor reception of the London-Zurich agreements was indeed justified. The three Greek leaders who delegated with the US regarding

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<sup>753</sup> James Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 67-68

<sup>754</sup> Ioannis Stefanidis, *En Onomati tou Ethnous* (Athens: Epikentro, 2010), 385-286

<sup>755</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 66

<sup>756</sup> Beaton, 292-293

Cyprus emphasized Greek Cypriots' right to their self-determination. Both the two pro-American conservative Prime Ministers, Papagos and Karamanlis, and the moderate left-wing Papandreou, were extremely critical of Washington's approach of equal distances and considered it unfair and unethical. All Greek governments in the 1950s and the 1960s stressed the deontological imperative that Cypriots should be allowed to decide on their future without external interference. The fact that Greek Cypriots enjoyed an overwhelming majority in Cyprus compared to Turkish Cypriots was an asset for the Greek position—as any referendum would most probably result in enosis. However, that does not make their point less credible from a deontological angle, as it would not make a similar Turkish argument, if the ethnic populations in Cyprus were distributed reversely.

And within this deontological narrative, Washington's consequentialist approach was a stark juxtaposition between the values that America idolized and the practicalities of its foreign policymaking. With self-determination theoretically informing the ideational core of American foreign policy, the post-WWII wave of decolonization brought Washington's neutralist approach before a "painful dilemma" in which the US had to balance the right of the Cypriot nation to determine its future, with the practical realities of Cold War geopolitics.<sup>757</sup> In that sense, Washington's prioritization of the UK's right to establish and exercise sovereignty over its military bases in Cyprus makes perfect sense, as the Eisenhower administration saw the future presence of British forces on the island as a guarantor that Cyprus would continue to serve NATO interests in the region. Having secured British presence, Washington's input in the London-Zurich agreements was minimal, as it was the British Macmillan administration that brought Greece, Turkey, and Makarios together, overseeing the process of drafting the accords.

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<sup>757</sup> Callaghan et al., 85-87

After all, the question of Cypriots' self-determination was never seriously considered by Washington. Despite recognizing that its approach—as expressed by the American abstentions in UNGA votes—compromised American principles, the US remained neutral towards the Cyprus question until it threatened NATO's regional cohesion in the mid-1960s, potentially providing the USSR with an opening to suddenly exercise its influence over the island. As a Turkish diplomat warned Washington, in the event of a non-aligned, crypto-soviet Cyprus led by Makarios, the island would become another Cuba “each ruled by a man with a beard” obviously referring to Fidel Castro.<sup>758</sup> In other words, the political time of the early 1960s forced Washington to break away from its neutralist policy and actively engage in securing a resolution that would ease tensions and keep Cyprus within its sphere of influence.

Washington's sudden support of enosis cannot in any way be perceived as support for Cypriots' self-determination. Although Rusk tried to sell it as such to Papandreou by arguing how instant enosis “will enable Greece at long last to achieve the historic objective of making Cyprus once and for all a part of Greece and making Athens the single capital of Hellenism”<sup>759</sup> Washington's motives were not deontological, but entirely consequentialist. In a time of unprecedented crisis, the Johnson administration was ready to provide Greece with what it desired since Plastiras' and Venizelos' days but not on the deontological basis that all Greek administrations had stressed regarding Cypriots' rights to determine their future, but on a consequentialist one, as Washington continuously insisted on how enosis would guarantee that Cyprus “would become part of NATO” through its political union with Greece.<sup>760</sup> Only then did Washington consider enosis as a solution for Cyprus.

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<sup>758</sup> Mission (Geneva) to State, August 21, 1964. FRUS/XVI:138

<sup>759</sup> State to Embassy (Greece), August 20, 1964. FRUS/XVI:137

<sup>760</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, April 9, 1965. FRUS/XVI:187

And the key element here is that Washington only emphasized this point once Cyprus seemed vulnerable to USSR's influence. Since Greece had joined NATO in 1952, enosis would bring Cyprus' within NATO's security umbrella anyway, but in Papagos' and Karamanlis' time, supporting Cyprus' rights to self-determination would provoke a staunch Turkish reaction. In other words, the 1964 Cypriot crisis shows how deeply consequentialist American foreign policymaking had become on the matter, as Washington was able to instantaneously transition from a policy of equal distances to supporting an arbitrary—and most definitely violent— instant enosis exactly because the latter suited the imperative to contain communism better. In that sense, Johnson's consideration to engineer a Greco-Turkish conflict through which Papandreou would be forced to declare instant enosis is most indicative of consequentialist lengths that Washington was willing to go to secure its geopolitical positions. Johnson argued that the autumn of 1964 was “not a good period for another war”<sup>761</sup> referring to Vietnam; given the imminent presidential election in November 1964, Johnson's dismissal of this option indicates that he was mainly concerned about the potential political cost. The Johnson administration had no deontological constraints about engineering a Greco-Turkish conflict whose outcome—and uncertain death toll—as it could grant Washington with what he wished.

The Greco-American dispute regarding Cyprus was a clash of ethics. From the Greek perspective, the question of Cyprus was always deontological, while the US adapted to the situation according to the extent to which its interests were under threat. In a most consequentialist reasoning, Acheson himself blatantly accused Papandreou of not being confident enough to impose instant enosis on Cyprus through military means. But most importantly, even if enosis had been achieved through a Greek military invasion, it would be an outcome of abrupt, forceful, and American-supported interventionism, instead of an open

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<sup>761</sup> Memorandum, September 8, 1964. FRUS/XVI:155

democratic procedure. Therefore, Washington only supported a consequentialist enosis—and that only when it served American interests most, after ignoring and opposing Greeks' calls for a deontological enosis for years. Of course, instant enosis would severely compromise Turkish Cypriots' rights on the island as well.

The US maintained its consequentialist foreign policy approach to domestic Greek politics too. First, both Eisenhower and Kennedy viewed Karamanlis and his ERE as a guarantee that the US interests would be served in Greece. This chapter showed how the Eisenhower administration interfered heavily in the 1958 elections to support Karamanlis' campaign and ensure his re-election, while the Kennedy administration pressured Karamanlis' opposition to approve a modified electoral law that was tailor-made to undermine EDA's electoral performance. Both interventions were not unprecedented, as the US maintained this deep level of consequentialist interventionism in Greek affairs since the end of the Civil War. Therefore, this chapter showed how Washington's interference and indirect manipulation of Greek elections remained constant throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

Labouisse's treatment of Andreas Papandreou in the aftermath of the 1964 Cyprus crisis also manifests Washington's consequentialist interventionism—and profoundly so. With Andreas' anti-Americanism becoming increasingly vocal, Labouisse openly discussed with the King the prospect of removing him from his father's cabinet—with Andreas eventually resigning on his own. But the fundamental element in the widening schism between the US and Andreas was the latter's open disagreement with several aspects of American foreign policy, which he considered immoral. Indicatively, in a meeting between Labouisse and Andreas in 1964, the Greek PM's son expressed his discomfort with the deep level of American interference in Greek politics after the Civil War and complained about ambassador Peurifoy's

unconditional interventionism in Greek affairs.<sup>762</sup> Peurifoy's actions under the guidance of the State Department have already been assessed in the previous chapter, but as the following chapters will show, Andreas largely built his political capital on such an anti-American narrative, which emphasized heavily on his persistent allegations regarding the lack of ethics in American foreign policymaking towards Greece—and elsewhere.

But like in the early 1950s, Washington proceeded with several consequentialist American interventions around the world as well; Greece was not an exception. Committed to the domino theory and the imperative to contain communism on a global scale, the Eisenhower administration opposed Congolese self-determination and independence from Belgium. When the first Congolese PM, Patrice Lumumba, made an opening to the USSR to receive support against a local anti-Lumumba movement, CIA director Allen Dulles argued that Lumumba's forceful removal must be "an urgent and prime objective."<sup>763</sup> Through a covert CIA operation, Lumumba was replaced by Colonel Joseph Mobutu, who would rule Congo as a dictator until the 1990s, and with whom all US administrations cooperated.<sup>764</sup> Lumumba was eventually assassinated by the Mobutu regime in 1961. The Eisenhower administration's consequentialist intervention in the Congo mirrors Washington's consequentialist intervention in Iran, which the previous chapter briefly assessed. But in contrast to Iran, US interventionism in the Congo proved strategically successful in the long-term.

Yet Kennedy lived up to the consequentialist foreign policymaking of his Cold War predecessors. In a strategy that mirrored Eisenhower's approach towards Cyprus, the Kennedy administration abstained from critical UNGA votes on Angola's self-determination against Portuguese colonial rule, focusing instead on the strategic importance of Portuguese NATO

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<sup>762</sup> Papachelas, (2017), 150

<sup>763</sup> Richard Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 41

<sup>764</sup> Powaski, 130

bases in the Azores. Similarly, the Kennedy administration refused to impose severe economic sanctions on the South African government despite its apartheid policy, mainly to ensure that US-South African trade relations would not be disturbed, to continue enjoying unrestricted American access to valuable South African minerals, but also to prevent the outbreak of a Civil War which could open the door to Soviet infiltration in the country. Kennedy was personally both in favor of Angolan independence and racial equality in South Africa<sup>765</sup> but prioritized the imperative of containing communism before any deontological concerns, like his predecessors.

Kennedy also demonstrated his embrace of consequentialist interventionism in Vietnam. Once more, despite his prior opposition to American interventionism in Vietnam as a congressman, Kennedy endorsed the need to prevent it from falling to communism, hence his administration was involved in a coup against the South Vietnamese—democratically elected—President, Ngo Dinh Diem. To this day, the extent to which the US orchestrated the coup or merely did not prevent it from happening remains debatable<sup>766</sup> but both possibilities fall within this study's proposed consequentialist framework: the US considered Diem largely ineffective in the struggle to keep Vietnam within the American sphere of influence, hence his forceful removal from office—which resulted in his assassination—was not blocked. Throughout 1963, the Kennedy administration was increasingly concerned about Vietnam, while Kennedy himself sought to appear as anti-communist as possible and increased American military spending by more than 10% since Eisenhower had left office.<sup>767</sup>

And ironically, the escalation of the Vietnam War would be in the background of Washington's extremely consequentialist interventionism in Greece in the years that followed. With the Cyprus question remaining unresolved and becoming again a source of instability

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<sup>765</sup> Powaski, 150-151

<sup>766</sup> Callaghan et al., 106-107

<sup>767</sup> Campbell and Logevall, 213-215



both within Greek politics and in Greco-American relations, and with Washington's trust in both Georgios and Andreas Papandreou almost irreparably severed, 1965 would be a critical juncture for Greek political development, but also for American interventionism in Greece. As the rest of this thesis will show, from the mid-1960s onwards, the US gradually reached its highest point of consequentialist foreign policymaking in Greek affairs, succeeding in keeping Greece within its sphere of influence, but ultimately destroying its reputation in the country for decades.

## Chapter Six:

### The Junta (1967-1974)

*“You see, look, I am the best friend they got.”*

Richard Nixon, 1972

Despite his son's rapidly deteriorating relationship with Washington, Georgios Papandreou spent the first months of 1965 trying to reapproach the Johnson administration. In mid-March Ambassador Henry Labouisse told Papandreou that the “US had no more loyal ally than Greece” and that he “regretted a series of misunderstandings.”<sup>768</sup> But when Papandreou pressured Washington to support Greece's claims on Cyprus, Secretary Dean Rusk firmly responded that enosis “at the expense of a frustrated Turkey” would not be considered.<sup>769</sup> In the meantime, Andreas Papandreou returned to his father's cabinet as coordination minister. The Johnson administration, however, distrusted Andreas, with the Embassy commenting on his “close and sympathetic relations with Archbishop Makarios”<sup>770</sup> while Andreas' return would cause even more turbulence in Greco-American relations. This chapter will first explore the political instability that preceded the colonels' coup and will then focus on Washington's response and the eventual embrace of the Junta, from 1967 to 1974.

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<sup>768</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, March 16, 1965. FRUS/XVI:180

<sup>769</sup> Rusk to Embassy (Greece), April 20, 1965. FRUS/XVI:189

<sup>770</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, June 1, 1965. FRUS/XVI:192

## The ASPIDA affair

In early June, Andreas found himself at the center of a political scandal that caused far more havoc than it merited. Andreas was accused of forming a leftwing paramilitary group called ASPIDA (Officers Save Fatherland Ideals Democracy Meritocracy, and the Greek word for shield) which was interpreted as a leftwing version of IDEA (see chapter three).<sup>771</sup> The ASPIDA affair had such an impact on Greek politics that the CIA reported how “the national political situation is becoming increasingly rancorous even by Athenian standards” while noting that the matter was “evolving in a manner beneficial to the extreme left.”<sup>772</sup> The embassy added that the Greek military apparatus, which had always been “unenthusiastic about Papandreou administration” had now become “widely disillusioned with it.” Labouisse also informed Washington that the Greek Army was “strongly opposed to Andreas Papandreou, whom it regards as a leftist sympathizer who might lead Greece out of Western camp if he ever came to power.”<sup>773</sup> Washington worried about ASPIDA as it could lead to serious implications.

The CIA followed the situation very closely.<sup>774</sup> American intelligence reported that Georgios Papandreou tried to convince King Constantine II to appoint him as minister of defense to “suppress information” about his son’s “involvement”<sup>775</sup> but prominent party members demanded Andreas’ dismissal.<sup>776</sup> The CIA also notified Washington that far-left EDA sought to exploit the crisis by supporting Georgios Papandreou’s bid to take control of the armed forces, noting that this could trigger a right-wing coup<sup>777</sup> as the Greek military was certainly expected to react. Unable to stay in power, Georgios Papandreou resigned from PM

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<sup>771</sup> Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 172

<sup>772</sup> President’s Daily Brief, see part on EDA, June 4, 1965. CIA-RDP7900936A003700260001-8

<sup>773</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, June 18, 1965. FRUS/XVI:194

<sup>774</sup> See indicatively CIA-RDP79T00975A008300440001-1 and CIA-RDP79T00975A008300490001-1

<sup>775</sup> Central Intelligence Bulletin: Prime Minister’s efforts to cover-up his son’s left-of-center activity could further inflame political passions, July 3, 1965. CIA-RDP79T00975A008400030001-5

<sup>776</sup> Weekly Summary, Political crisis embroils Greek monarchy, July 9, 1965. CIA-RDP79-00927A00490010001-9

<sup>777</sup> President’s Daily Brief: Greece, July 16, 1965. CIA-RDP79T00936A003800290001-4

on July 15; Andreas' involvement in the ASPIDA affair has not been proven to this day. Yet, as this thesis will later show, Andreas used the status he had acquired in the eyes of American foreign policymakers to build his post-1974 moral case against the US.

Absolute mayhem followed in the Greek political scene. Several short-lived administrations which recycled CU's political personnel succeeded Georgios Papandreou's, with Greece sinking deep into political instability after changing five PMs within less than two years. Indicatively, in April 1966, the CIA reported that "the ensuing prolonged deadlock" had "produced Greece's most serious political crisis since [...] 1949."<sup>778</sup> Simultaneously, Andreas had become an immense liability for American interests as according to Ambassador Philips Talbot—Labouisse's successor, a career diplomat, and deeply familiar with Greek affairs after serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs<sup>779</sup>—Andreas had transformed into a "neutralist, ambitious, amoral, and emotionally unstable" politician whose "natural ally [...] is extreme Left and Communists." Andreas' relentless emphasis on Cyprus was interpreted as "desire to avoid a position which would be offensive to Soviet Union and Communist elements" which "he seems to be looking for support."<sup>780</sup> Labouisse's criticism of Andreas' morals could not be more ironic.

Andreas capitalized on this chaos, gradually established himself as a prominent figure in Greek politics and was expected to assume the party's leadership from his 76-year-old father. In March 1967, only weeks before the scheduled May elections which the CU was sure to win, the CIA warned Washington about Andreas' "bitterly anti-American pose" warning that "Greece could be headed to major crisis."<sup>781</sup> This prospect terrified the Johnson administration, to the extent that Talbot was urged to "call on Georgios Papandreou" and "emphasize" that

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<sup>778</sup> Weekly Summary: Greek political stalemate continues, April 8, 1966. CIA-RDP7900927A005200090001-7

<sup>779</sup> FRUS, "Phillips Talbot"

<sup>780</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, September 5, 1965. FRUS/XVI:204

<sup>781</sup> President's Daily Brief: Greece, March 31, 1967. CIA-RDP79T00936A005100090001-1

Washington has a “great stake in future of Greece” due to American “investment in men, money, and matériel dating from 1947.” A few days later, the CIA briefed Lyndon Johnson that “the problem is that Andreas [...] is the only vigorous leader” left in Greece and that an ideal electoral outcome would be a CU plurality victory, instead of an absolute majority, so that “the King could then insist on a coalition government excluding the communists and keeping Andreas out of sensitive security posts.”<sup>782</sup>

Washington knew that Andreas would win and thus took an unprecedented initiative. After seeing Andreas doubling down on his anti-American rhetoric as the campaign was intensifying<sup>783</sup> Talbot was urged to invite Georgios Papandreou—who technically remained CU’s leader—and inform him that Andreas would not be arrested for his involvement in the ASPIDA affair “in return for concessions” regarding his willingness to exercise control over the military.<sup>784</sup> This direct open threat was the most consequentialist instance of American interventionism in post-Civil War Greece to date; under direct orders of the Secretary of State, the American ambassador threatened a past Greek PM with the imminent arrest of a future Greek PM, who also happened to be the former’s son. Still, this threat never materialized as, just a day later, a group of military officers seized control of Greece, right under Washington’s nose. A new era of consequentialist interventionism would begin.

## The Coup

The coup of April 21 1967, succeeded within hours, without facing serious resistance from either senior military personnel, politicians, or the King. The conspirators capitalized on

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<sup>782</sup> President’s Daily Brief: Greece, April 18, 1967. CIA-RDP79T00936A005100240001-4

<sup>783</sup> James Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 130-131

<sup>784</sup> Rusk to Embassy (Greece), April 20, 1967. FRUS/XVI:272

the element of surprise, as their preparations went largely unnoticed due to the prolonged political crisis that followed Georgios Papandreou's resignation in 1965.<sup>785</sup> Even the CIA was puzzled as its first report notified Washington that "the government [...] has been overthrown by a fast-moving and well-planned military coup, apparently under the direction of the Greek army high command" which appeared to have "previously prepared contingency plans to round up 'undesirables' and carry out a military takeover [...] to keep the Papandreous from returning to power." Interestingly, the CIA immediately reassured the Johnson administration that "the coup can be expected to continue Greece's previous firm ties to the US and NATO"<sup>786</sup> yet without being able to identify who the conspirators were.

The CIA's second report elaborated on their identity. It established that the coup was in fact engineered by "a group of middle echelon army [...] who had solid information that the communists were preparing 'to start riots, strikes and general upheaval'" and who since 1963 had become "disillusioned with the deteriorating political situation and inability of the politicians to solve Greece's problems."<sup>787</sup> This report also noted that brigadier Stylianos Pattakos emphasized the coup's "allegiance to NATO and the West" and added that there was "no reaction from the Papandreous or from the far-left." The following report added that "many political, communist, and journalistic figures have been arrested" estimating a total of 700 prisoners.<sup>788</sup> Johnson was briefed that "one of the military's first acts was to arrest left-wing leader Andreas Papandreou."<sup>789</sup>

There are a few points to decipher here. First, these reports prove that the coup was not American made, and contrary to a belief that remains prominent to this day, this is not disputed

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<sup>785</sup> Clogg, 174-174

<sup>786</sup> Intelligence Memorandum, Military Takeover in Greece, April 21, 1967. CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010072-7/Report-0

<sup>787</sup> Ibid, Report-1

<sup>788</sup> Ibid, Report-2

<sup>789</sup> President's Daily Brief: Greece, April 21, 1967. CIA-RDP79T00936A005100270001-1

by secondary literature anymore.<sup>790</sup> Still, the following chapter will elaborate on the myths of a CIA-driven coup, as well as the impact that it had on post-Junta Greek politics. Second, the US played a significant role in setting the political framework for the coup's success, which we must emphasize: the Johnson administration's resentment of Andreas, and consistent effort to block his path to the prime ministership had alarmed the colonels regarding the potential communist threat that an Andreas administration implied.<sup>791</sup> In a way, both the Johnson administration and the coup's orchestrators feared an Andreas administration and sought to prevent it, yet the latter acted far more quickly—and with remarkable secrecy.

The embassy's concerns highlight Andreas' importance to Washington. Talbot immediately attempted to determine his status<sup>792</sup> while the CIA soon confirmed that although the “elder Papandreou” would be released, “Andreas Papandreou was to remain in custody.”<sup>793</sup> Therefore, the coup presented Washington with an extremely complex puzzle: on the one hand, it clearly violated Greek constitutional rule and self-determination—and thus the values that America theoretically promoted during the Cold War—but on the other, Greece's geopolitical allegiance seemed safe, while Andreas was prevented from becoming Greece's next—and first anti-American—PM. Hence, once the twenty-seven-year-old King swore the colonels' government—forcefully so, according to his remarks<sup>794</sup>—Talbot urged the Junta to “maintain order”, “restore normal life as rapidly as possible” and “protect detainees from physical

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<sup>790</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, *Katastrofes kai Thriamvoi* (Athens: Papadopoulos), 181-184

<sup>791</sup> James Miller, “Papandreou Derangement Syndrome? The United States and the April 1967 Coup” in *The Greek Junta and the International System*, eds. Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Effie Pedaliu (New York: Routledge, 2020), 35-36

<sup>792</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, April 21, 1967. FRUS/XVI:273 and Embassy (Greece) to State, April 21, 1967. FRUS/XVI:274

<sup>793</sup> Intelligence Bulletin: New Government appears in firm control, April 22, 1967. CIA-RDP79T00975A009800260001-5

<sup>794</sup> Intelligence Memorandum: Military takeover in Greece, April 21, 1967. CIA-RDP79T00826A001800010072-7/Report-3

harm.”<sup>795</sup> Washington did not consider the option to act and prevent the conspirators from seizing control of Greece.

One day later, Washington’s position became clearer. According to Talbot, the US should “stay in touch” with the colonels and “not burn bridges by threatening cutoff of aid” as well as to “reflect a certain slowness to pass moral judgments since there remain so many gaps in our understanding of what has happened and why.”<sup>796</sup> Rusk’s response reflects the moderate approach that the US immediately adopted, as he advised Talbot to ensure a “ratio of civilian vs. military in cabinet” which could “be used as bargaining points to off-set concessions.”<sup>797</sup> Talbot’s response revealed Washington’s immediate consideration of the positive aspects of the new situation, as he argued that “if [the] military coup in this NATO country has demolished liberal political reputation of Greece, oddly enough [the] failure of [the] coup—once attempted—would have been even greater disaster.”<sup>798</sup> Andreas’ imminent electoral victory was evidently considered a far greater “disaster” than working with a military regime was.

Talbot elaborated on this position. He argued that “had [the] coup failed, carrying conservatives and moderates down with it, [the] only beneficiaries would have been far leftist segment of Greek political life” adding that “Greece would then have surely gone where rightists fear Andreas Papandreou was taking it” and that the “personality and policies of Andreas Papandreou may be prime reason Greece today is under dictatorship.” Talbot also suggested appeasing the Junta through “transitional arrangements” which would “help to justify [...] US government’s cooperation with coup government.” The State Department responded that “we entirely concur in your suggestions [...] to work with this regime.”<sup>799</sup> Thus,

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<sup>795</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, April 21, 1967. FRUS/XVI:275

<sup>796</sup> Embassy (Greece) to state, April 22, 1967. FRUS/XVI:277

<sup>797</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, April 22, 1967. FRUS/XVI:278

<sup>798</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, April 23, 1967. FRUS/XVI:279

<sup>799</sup> Katzenbach to Embassy (Greece), April 24, 1967. FRUS/XVI:280



Washington's consequentialist approach towards the Junta had been set from the start: if the conspirators kept Greece within NATO and the Papandreous away from power, the situation could be managed—and certainly provided a more welcome alternative to an Andreas-led anti-American leftwing government. But with Greece being a European country which had escaped communism through American aid, a NATO member-state, and the birthplace of democracy, Washington's preference to an authoritarian regime over a democratically elected government could not seem more antithetical to its principles.

### **An “Aprilian Revolution”**

We must briefly explore the Junta's character to fully comprehend the magnitude of Washington's consequentialism. The colonels considered themselves revolutionaries, whose purpose was to avert Greece's fall to communism, and immediately ensured that they had every means of public broadcast and military facility under their command.<sup>800</sup> They then referred to Greece's prolonged political instability to argue that the country could only be saved by their self-proclaimed deeply patriotic administration.<sup>801</sup> Finally, they immediately charged Andreas Papandreou with “high treason for his involvement in the ASPIDA affair”<sup>802</sup> which although unproven, it completely served their supposed mission to prevent a leftwing military takeover led by Andreas.

However, not everyone affiliated with the regime was ideological. Many officers joined the conspirators solely for materialistic purposes, as they feared that an Andreas administration

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<sup>800</sup> Thomas Gallant, *Modern Greece, From the War of Independence to the Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 299-301

<sup>801</sup> Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “Metapolitefsi, 1974-1975: Stratigiki, Methodologia kai Ellimata” in *I Diktatoria ton Syntagmatarchon: Anatomia mias Eptaetias*, eds. Spyros Vlachopoulos, Dimitris Kairidis, and Antonis Klapsis, (Athens: Pataki, 2018), 220-221

<sup>802</sup> Intelligence Bulletin: Tight military control preserves surface calm in Athens, April 27, 1967. CIA-RDP79T00975A009800300001-0

would obstruct their professional trajectories and long-established independence. The regime's shallow ideological footprint soon became evident as despite the colonels' overwhelming success in seizing control of the country, they could not propose a robust political plan or a consistent strategy regarding key reforms. Although the Junta overused technical macroeconomic terms such as "economic growth" and "development" for as long as it stayed in power, most of its personnel had very poor—if any—understanding of political economy.<sup>803</sup>

However, the coup's leader and PM from December 1967 to November 1973, colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, consistently tried to project a wide-ranging ethnocentric political vision for Greece. The CIA-trained Papadopoulos—who as previously stated had worked as its liaison with KYP and was an IDEA member—placed the revitalization of Greek "ethno-Christian civilization" as his administration's mission, in a populist narrative that mythologized the colonels' rural, lower-middle class, and highly unintellectual background.<sup>804</sup> Moreover, the regime was lucky enough to inherit a booming economy and was able to increase popular support through increased government spending and debt forgiveness; such populist measures appeased many Greeks' reactions.<sup>805</sup> Concurrently, Papadopoulos implemented several socially conservative policies—such as banning short skirts for women, or imposing rules regarding maximum hair length for men—while simultaneously exercising full control over the judiciary, the public sector, and schools' curriculum.<sup>806</sup> Greece had become an authoritarian state.

And as is usually the case with authoritarian states, a strong propaganda mechanism was essential. Therefore, the regime chose as its official symbol a phoenix rising from the ashes which included the armed standing soldier at the center of the banner, the inscription of the

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<sup>803</sup> Thanos Veremis and Ioannis Kolliopoulos, *Moderni Ellada* (Athens: Pataki, 2013), 291-292

<sup>804</sup> Clogg, 173-174

<sup>805</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 185-188

<sup>806</sup> Gallant, 301

coup's date, and the word *Ellas*—which is Greece's official name in Greek. Full control over the media also became a priority to brainwash the people, especially using state-regulated TV productions<sup>807</sup> while the regime also attempted to silence foreign-based Greek commentators. The Junta asked the Bavarian government to terminate Greek radio broadcasts hosted by the Bavarian Radio Broadcasting, while accusing the manager and post-Junta center-right MP, Pavlos Bakoyiannis, as a perpetrator of “anti-national” rhetoric. The Bavarian government ignored the request, and the anti-Junta radio broadcasts continued.<sup>808</sup>

The Junta took several other highly authoritarian measures to solidify its control over Greece. These frequently included imprisoning, exiling, and even torturing prominent left-wing citizens or declared dissidents of the dictatorship<sup>809</sup> while anyone who attempted to resist and fight back was punished severely.<sup>810</sup> The most remarkable example of state torture was that of Alexandros Panagoulis, a former CU member, who was subjected to severe torture after unsuccessfully attempting to assassinate Papadopoulos in 1968.<sup>811</sup> In rough numbers, it is estimated that throughout the seven-year dictatorship, more than 6.000 left-wing, communist, or socialist Greeks were exiled to camps built on remote Greek islands, while about 3.500 were held in prisons equipped with torture facilities.<sup>812</sup> Tortures were frequently horrendous, causing severe physical and mental harm.<sup>813</sup>

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<sup>807</sup> Pavlos Tsimas, *O Ferentzes kai to Pilikio* (Athens: Metaihmio, 2014), 330-334

<sup>808</sup> Nikos Papanastasiou, “The Bavarian Greek radio programme for Greek migrants and its impact on Greek - German relations, 1967-74” in *The Greek Junta and the International System: a case study of Southern European dictatorships, 1967-1974*, eds. Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Effie Pedaliu, (New York: Routledge, 2020), 70-71

<sup>809</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 185-186

<sup>810</sup> Clogg, 176. See also: Anna Papaeti, “Music, Torture, Testimony: Reopening the Case of the Greek Junta (1967–1974)” *The World of Music*, new series, 2:1, Music and Torture and Punishment (2013) 67-70, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24318197>

<sup>811</sup> “Greek Who Tried to Kill Junta Chief Dies in Car Crash.” *The New York Times*, May 2, 1976, <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/05/02/archives/greek-who-tried-to-kill-junta-chief-dies-in-car-crash.html>

<sup>812</sup> “Answering to History” *Time*, September 1, 1975, <https://web.archive.org/web/20081212222634/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,947162,00.html>

<sup>813</sup> William Blum, *Killing Hope* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2004), 218-219

In sum, standard Western civil liberties of the time were largely curtailed. Every constitutional article which established and protected freedoms such as that of expression and assembly was immediately suspended, which opened the road for innumerable farcical military trials.<sup>814</sup> More importantly, throughout its seven-year-long stay in power, the colonels' regime amended the Greek constitution twice, in 1968 and 1973 respectively, with both reforms being remarkably despotic.<sup>815</sup> To artificially legitimize its first constitutional reform, the regime implemented an entirely manipulated plebiscite, according to which more than 90 percent of the people agreed with the new provisions.<sup>816</sup>

Therefore, there is no doubt that the Junta was a full-fledged, authoritarian regime. Its shallow idealism did not prevent it from attaining immense powers and from suppressing Greeks' rights, while proceeding with the standardized techniques that characterize illiberal regimes, especially by the establishment of increasingly stronger propaganda mechanisms.<sup>817</sup> Papadopoulos had been exploring the possibility of a military coup since the immediate post-Civil War years and had been instrumental in shaping IDEA's paramilitary activities in post-Civil War Greece<sup>818</sup> while the US had received several intelligence memos since the Civil War which identified him as a potential future right-wing conspirator. The Junta satisfies all four criteria that Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblitz use to define authoritarian states, which are disrespect for the democratic process, engagement in violence, suppression of political opponents' political rights, and curtailment of civil liberties.<sup>819</sup> With that information in mind, we may begin our exploration of the US consequentialist interventionism during the Junta era.

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<sup>814</sup> Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe*, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 220-223

<sup>815</sup> "Constitutional History." Hellenic Parliament, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Syntagmatiki-Istoria/>

<sup>816</sup> Spyros Vlachopoulos, "To syntagma tis diktatorias" *Kathimerini*, October 16, 2017.

<sup>817</sup> Antonis Klapsis, "I propaganda tis diktatorias" in *I Diktatoria ton Syntagmatarchon: Anatomia mias Eptaetias*, eds. Spyros Vlachopoulos, Dimitris Kairidis, and Antonis Klapsis (Athens: Patakis, 2018), 32-33

<sup>818</sup> Christos Kassimeris, *Greece and the American Embrace: Greek Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, the US and the Western Alliance* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 75

<sup>819</sup> Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblitz, *How Democracies Die* (New York: Viking), 23-26

### Washington establishes a connection

We already noted Washington's immediate concerns regarding the coup's allegiance. During the following weeks, the Johnson administration tried to ensure that there would be no sudden shift in Greece's geopolitical alliances.<sup>820</sup> Hence, only a week after the coup, the now deputy PM Stylianos Pattakos met with Talbot to discuss the colonels' initial plans for Greece. Talbot informed the State Department that "Pattakos quickly expressed pro-American attitudes" adding that the brigadier had "impressed" him as a "precise and effective executive" and "alert and energetic" even though "he had been working almost without sleep for a week."<sup>821</sup> Talbot highlighted Pattakos' reassurance that the regime desired American "friendship" which demonstrates how the regime's allegiance was an immediate priority for Washington.

Talbot also asked for details regarding the number of prisoners. The key question concerned Andreas' fate, to which Pattakos recited the ASPIDA affair charges, noting that Andreas "would cause a revolution." Talbot informed Washington that Pattakos reassured him how the "regime intends to kill no-one" but warned that "saboteurs will be dealt with severely, whatever that means" restated once more the colonels' "desire to work closely with Americans" but added that "whether that possible or not, success of revolution is sure." Somewhat astonishingly, Pattakos did not try to diplomatically tone down the regime's authoritarian disposition to gain American sympathy but, in a rather overconfident manner, informed Talbot—and by extension, Johnson—that the military government would proceed with its goals, whether Washington liked it or not.

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<sup>820</sup> Aristotelia Peleri, *Ideologia kata Realismou: I amerikaniki politiki apenanti stin Ellada, 1963-1976* (Athens: Polis, 2010), 195

<sup>821</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, April 28, 1967. FRUS/XVI:282

This was already manifested by Washington's response to Talbot's telegram. The Johnson administration considered establishing a "normal relationship" with the regime" but not "without having gained anything in return."<sup>822</sup> Rusk suggested that the US should work with the Junta to draft a "definite blueprint of political steps in direction of normalcy" suggesting that "relaxation of our restrictions on military aid and the commencement of normal relations with the government" reflecting however on potential "disadvantages for the US image." Talbot replied that it would be a "risk" to establish "normal relationships" with the regime without any "assurances of concrete progress toward reestablishment of democratic government" adding however that "it would be equally foolhardy to break off all contacts when major interests are at stake." Talbot asserted that "the coup leadership is pro-US, pro-NATO, rigorously if not fanatically anti-Communist." This turned out to be the key.

The most crucial element in Talbot's telegram concerned potential implications for Greco-American relations. Talbot informed Rusk that he was "concerned about internal political implications of current situation and its impact on long term US position here." In an extremely important statement—but ultimately underappreciated by Washington, as this thesis will show, Talbot added that "a large number of Greeks believe US concurred in or tolerated coup." His closing suggestion to Rusk was that Washington should "attempt [to] create [a] situation in which coup managers will feel compelled by their own personal interests" to restore democratic rule and described their "expectation of continuing foreign assistance" as an ideal leverage of political pressure.<sup>823</sup> Hence, immediately after the coup succeeded, Washington was aware that many Greeks already believed that it had been American made in the first place.

The CIA viewed things more pragmatically. In early May 1967, it reported that although "the purging of all moderate political elements can only lead to an inevitable clash

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<sup>822</sup> Rusk to Embassy (Greece), May 2, 1967. FRUS/XVI:283

<sup>823</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, May 5, 1967. FRUS/XVI:284

between extreme rightist and extreme leftist factions” the coup had nonetheless “paralyzed” all “communist elements” because “the troublemakers have been rounded up and sent to detention centers.” It also noted that “the most prominent political detainee is CU deputy Andreas Papandreou, whom the coup leaders regard as Greece’s ‘enfant terrible’ and the man most responsible for the country’s drift to the left”; once again, the colonels and Washington held the same views about Andreas. The CIA added that “there has been a predictably strong adverse reaction to the coup around the world.”<sup>824</sup>

A few days later, Washington re-defined its strategy. Rusk argued that “our approach to [the] new Greek Government must be to walk [a] tightrope and that [the] problem is essentially how to show people in Greece and elsewhere that [the] U.S. (and King) [are] not attached to [the] new government, while at same time working with [it] to get Greece back on constitutional road.” Rusk added that the “most urgent question” concerned the “fate of political prisoners and particularly of Andreas Papandreou” urging Talbot to remind the colonels that the situation had attracted global attention regarding Andreas’ fate. Andreas remained the dominant factor that had defined both the coup’s purpose, as well as American concerns regarding the regime’s public perception in Greece and abroad. Ironically, he was the man that the US had fervently tried to prevent from attaining political power through an openly democratic procedure.<sup>825</sup>

But the colonels’ plan to re-democratize Greece was vague at best—and Washington knew it. The CIA reported how some colonels had hinted at a “small step toward restoring parliamentary government” but that any plans “are likely to take a year or eighteen months to carry out” concluding that the regime “has insufficient evidence to clearly implicate Andreas

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<sup>824</sup> Weekly Summary, Greek military regime digs in, May 5, 1967. CIA-RDP7900927A005800020001-8

<sup>825</sup> Rusk to Embassy (Greece), May 10, 1967. FRUS/XVI:288

and his father George in the ASPIDA affair.”<sup>826</sup> There can be no greater proof that Andreas’ involvement in this conspiracy was at the very least highly dubious, if not entirely baseless, as the Junta failed to find any relevant evidence. Still, the colonels were willing to use the ASPIDA allegations against Andreas, just like Washington would have done before them to block his path to power.

Andreas aside, Talbot was surprised by many Greeks’ acclimatization with the regime. Less than a month after the coup, he reported that the “rather astonishing extent of acquiescence to coup can no longer be explained just as stunned reaction” as “mood of relief has [...] spread.” Talbot estimated that this mood will last “certainly not indefinitely” as “Greeks are Greeks and will come to resist” but also noted that this “gives [to the] coup group [an] almost ideal climate in which to consolidate control” as Greeks were insulated from “European and American outcry against ‘rape in cradle of democracy.’” Talbot also noted that several Greeks believed that it was the “Papandreous, especially Andreas, who strangled democracy here.”<sup>827</sup> Arguably, this was a welcoming assessment for the Johnson administration.

Hence, Talbot refined his foreign policy suggestions. He advised Rusk that “frontal effort to break” Papadopoulos would be “without guarantee of success and if successful could well shatter Greece” arguing instead that Washington should maintain a balanced position without “giving Greeks what they most want—full aid and recognition.” A few days later, Talbot informed Rusk about a discussion that he had with appointed PM Konstantinos Kollias; after listening to Kollias’ devotion to Greece’s “American friends” Talbot noted that the Johnson administration did “not want to see government of Greece isolated from the world.”<sup>828</sup> Rusk immediately concurred with Talbot’s approach.<sup>829</sup> These communications reveal that the

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<sup>826</sup> Intelligence Report: Greece, May 11, 1967. CIA-RDP79T00827A000800110003-5

<sup>827</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, May 14, 1967. FRUS/XVI:289

<sup>828</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, May 21, 1967. FRUS/XVI:291

<sup>829</sup> Rusk to Embassy (Greece), May 31, 1967. FRUS/XVI:293



more time passed, the more willing the US was to work with a Junta imposed on a NATO member-state.

### **An assessment of America's initial reaction**

The colonels' coup caught everyone by surprise. Only a day after Washington instructed Talbot to threaten the Papandreous using Andreas' alleged involvement in the ASPIDA affair to undermine his apparent rise to political hegemony, a group of obscure military officers seized control of Greece in an incredibly efficient manner. We should stress again though that the Johnson administration was not involved in their endeavor, as diplomatic and intelligence reports from April 21 demonstrate. However, Washington found out that an increasing number of Greeks believe that the US instigated the coup, to the extent that the Johnson administration conducted an internal investigation on the matter. The investigation concluded that "the story is about as inaccurate as it could be."<sup>830</sup> Still, Greeks' belief in the story made it accurate to them.

Another major takeaway is Johnson's immediate appeasement of the Junta. Although Washington did not desire the collapse of Greek constitutionalism, Washington refrained from condemning the colonels, and only tried to convince them to gradually re-democratize, using the continuation of American aid as leverage. But due to the prolonged political stalemate that Greece had experienced, the absence of any serious resistance to the colonels<sup>831</sup> and the regime's devotion to Greece's commitments within NATO, Washington decided to let the situation unfold. The Johnson administration's decision to first, not react to the coup, and second, provide the colonels with time to solidify their control, demonstrates how keeping Greece within its control was the only non-negotiable parameter.

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<sup>830</sup> Memorandum, May 15, 1967. FRUS/XVI:290

<sup>831</sup> Weekly Summary: Greece still quiet under new regime, May 12, 1967. CIA-RDP7900927A005800030001-7

And we must note that Washington had extraordinarily strong indications of the regime's character. Both the embassy and the CIA became immediately aware of the mass political arrests and exiles of Greek citizens, as well as of Papadopoulos' political intentions. It is not coincidental that although the regime had reassured the Johnson administration that it would soon restore constitutional rule, both Talbot and the CIA doubted how quickly this could happen—if it did. These doubts were very reasonable, as the colonels' rapid and complete takeover of Greece, along with the repressive measures that they immediately implemented, only indicated that Papadopoulos and his followers were not willing to leave anytime soon. But as they ensured Greece's position within NATO, Washington was not in a hurry either—considering the alternative that the coup had averted.

But Andreas' fate remained critical for Washington. On the one hand, the regime had saved America from intervening to restrict Andreas' imminent rise to power, but on the other, his potential harm could be politically detrimental; indicatively, the CIA initially rushed to find out whether Andreas could face the death penalty.<sup>832</sup> According to two sources, however, a specific CIA Greco-American agent, Gust Avrakotos, personally advised the colonels to “shoot the motherfucker because he's going to come back to haunt you.”<sup>833</sup> Assuming that Avrakotos did indeed say that, he was wrong as to who Andreas would haunt in the future. Overall, the Johnson administration reacted moderately to the coup by taking advantage of the peaceful transition from parliamentary rule to military authoritarianism. Washington calibrated its response and expected that it could use America's might—and Greece's dependency on it—to gradually stir the colonels where it wanted them to, ensuring simultaneously that Greece would

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<sup>832</sup> President's Daily Brief: Greece, May 8, 1967. CIA-RDP79T00936A005100410001-5

<sup>833</sup> Alexis Papachelas, *Ena skoteino domatio: 1967-1974* (Athens: Metaihmio, 2021), 56-57. See also: George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 52

stay in NATO and Andreas away from power. Washington would soon focus on the question of normalizing bilateral relations.

### **A failed countercoup and further normalization**

For the next few months, Washington's approach remained consistent, while Rusk realized that many Greeks supported—or at least tolerated—the regime. That is because the Greek economy had grown substantially compared to 1966, the drachma was stable, and Greece's imports-exports balance remained promising.<sup>834</sup> The Junta soon informed Rusk that it would consider elections, adding however that “those who have taken part in conspiracy against Greek values will be deprived of [the] right to vote.” Crucially, Rusk soon saw in the Junta an opportunity for progress regarding Cyprus, arguing that “because of its character” the new Greek government “is better able than democratic Greek Government to make settlement” without requiring an American intervention.<sup>835</sup> Hence, the Johnson administration realized that the regime could be useful in several ways; the Junta was gradually proving itself as an asset. As a result, Washington would soon raise the question of terminating the suspension of heavy military material shipments.

Rusk expressed what was becoming increasingly apparent. In a memo to Johnson entitled “normalization of US-Greek relations” he argued “that certain steps in this direction have been agreed upon” arguing that the partial arms embargo that Washington had initially imposed on Greece to encourage a return to “constitutional process” was “no longer useful” and could even be proven “counterproductive.” Rusk elaborated that the American military facilities in Greece “have increased their value since the Arab-Israeli war” which had

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<sup>834</sup> Rusk to Embassy (Greece), July 7, 1967. FRUS/XVI:294

<sup>835</sup> Rusk to NATO Capitals, July 12, 1967. FRUS/XVI:295

“underlined the importance of Greece along with Turkey and Iran to US interests.” Truman’s geopolitical reasoning for intervening in the Third Phase of the Civil War echoed in Rusk’s assessment. Rusk concluded that “it is essential that we maintain Greece as an active and functioning member of NATO.”<sup>836</sup>

Rusk’s memo demonstrates that, only within months after the coup, the Johnson administration identified the merits of working with the colonels. This manifested in late summer when the King approached Talbot to discuss his intention to proceed with a counter-coup. Talbot reported that the King “seemed reasonably expectant” that “he could get adequate support to oust Junta” but would not proceed “unless US knew and approved of his purposes.”<sup>837</sup> Talbot immediately turned down the King’s request arguing that the “US should not be looked to for participation in any change in governmental arrangements.” Soon after, the King planned an official visit to Washington to meet Johnson, which alarmed Rusk—who advised the President that “we should caution him against pushing the regime” and that the US “would not wish to intervene militarily in his behalf.” Rusk concluded that although the King enjoyed the administration’s appreciation, Washington should at the same time “discourage him from moving into a confrontation with the junta.”<sup>838</sup>

Johnson followed Rusk’s advice, turning down the King’s request for American military support and arguing that “a military intervention would not be feasible.”<sup>839</sup> Johnson warned the King that even “a public statement would be studied in the light of circumstances at the time” adding that he “could not commit in advance on this question” while he also refused to substantively discuss the Cyprus question as well. Eventually, in December 1967, the King proceeded with an “amateurish counter-coup”<sup>840</sup> which resulted in his self-exile from Greece,

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<sup>836</sup> Rusk to Johnson, July 21, 1967. FRUS/XVI:296

<sup>837</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, August 7, 1967. FRUS/XVI:298

<sup>838</sup> Rusk to Johnson, September 7, 1967. FRUS/XVI:300

<sup>839</sup> Memorandum, September 11, 1967. FRUS/XVI:301

<sup>840</sup> Clogg, 176-176

as well as in the regime's appointment of general Georgios Zoitakis as King Regent. Upon the King's failure to oust the Junta, Washington knew that Papadopoulos' rule over Greece was undisputable, with Johnson making no effort to weaken the colonels until leaving the White House—other than maintaining a largely symbolic arms embargo.<sup>841</sup> Undeniably, Johnson's quick appeasement of the Junta in less than a year as well as his categorical dismissal of the King's counter coup, showcases his belief that Papadopoulos served Washington's interests.

### **Johnson's deeper embrace of consequentialism**

Johnson's disregard for the King's counter coup was only the most profound evidence of his increasingly cooperative disposition towards the Junta. After becoming aware of the King's intentions, Georgios Papandreou sent a letter to Johnson through the help of the Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian governments, in which he pleaded for American support for the King. After reaffirming his "commitment to the NATO alliance" the elder Papandreou argued that "the full backing of the US and Western European powers" will be required, and promised that once the Junta was ousted, both ERE and CU parties would embark on an unprecedented "transition of political collaboration."<sup>842</sup> Yet in response, under Secretary of State Harold Saunders told Rusk "I don't think there is any need to bother the President with it" suggesting that even showing awareness knowledge of Papandreou's message "would probably hurt us in Athens" referring to Johnson's statement that "we would stand clear of this jockeying between King and Junta."<sup>843</sup> There is no evidence that Johnson ever read Papandreou's message; the elder Papandreou passed away a year later.

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<sup>841</sup> Miller, (2020), 36

<sup>842</sup> Text of message from the former Greek Prime Minister Georg Papandreou to the Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag, Washington DC, November 24, 1967. (LBJ Library, documents on Greece, 77)

<sup>843</sup> Memorandum for WWR: Message from George Papandreou, Washington DC, December 1, 1967, (LBJ Library, documents on Greece, 75)

This is indicative of what the Johnson administration's *modus operandi* had transformed into regarding the colonels. After all, the Junta had agreed to reduce its military footprint on Cyprus following Johnson's advice, to the extent that the American ambassador in Cyprus Taylor Belcher wrote to Johnson that "you and your government are thus faced with the opportunity to go down in history as the man and the government which made the decision which preserved the peace in this area."<sup>844</sup> In a following high-profile meeting which both Vice-President Hubert Humphrey and Secretary Rusk attended, the administration concluded that "Greece could do this only under a dictatorship so we should try to get this disengagement from Cyprus before a democratically elected government comes into office in Greece."<sup>845</sup> Once again, consequentialism in all its might.

Even more indicatively, this meeting was held only days before the King's counter-coup. As authoritarian as it was, the Junta was unconditionally loyal to containment and secured American control in the Eastern Mediterranean, while it was succeeding where Greece's prior democratic governments had failed by easing tensions with Turkey in Cyprus—and thus maintaining order within NATO. Only weeks after the King's failure to depose the Junta, the administration informed Talbot that "we have decided to move in the near future to a working relationship with the regime."<sup>846</sup> Although both Georgios Papandreou and the King had provided Johnson with alternatives which, if successful, would have led to Greece's re-democratization, he never considered them—and sided with the dictators instead. American support to the King's endeavor would have been crucial in its success but, again, Papadopoulos already offered Washington the allegiance that it sought.

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<sup>844</sup> Embassy (Cyprus) to State, December 3, 1967. FRUS/XVI:340

<sup>845</sup> Meeting Notes, December 5, 1967. FRUS/XVI:342

<sup>846</sup> Katzenbach to Embassy (Greece), January 13, 1968. FRUS/XVI:356

The most unsettling aspect of the administration's approach is that only a week before this telegram, Papadopoulos had sent a personal letter to Johnson. Papadopoulos said that he wanted to clarify "certain misunderstandings as to the nature of the change that has taken place in Greece" noting that he considered them "detrimental to the interests of both nations concerned, as well as to the Free World." Papadopoulos argued that Greece's prior political establishment "had no relation whatsoever with Democracy" and "was a regime of factious debauchery, unrestrained demagogy and disintegrating corruption" while "the menacing erosion caused by communism [...] would have inevitably made a captive of Greece behind the Iron Curtain." Papadopoulos also argued that had the "Revolution of April 21<sup>st</sup>" not taken place then "only the Communist Party would have prevailed" annihilating "the eastern flank of the Atlantic Treaty."

Papadopoulos then elaborated on his vague political vision. He reassured Johnson that he did not want to impose "a permanent regime" and that the suspension of constitutional articles was "temporary", while once Greece's "democratic institutions" were "saved from the communist menace" a "free, general, and secret vote" would be called. In his closing remarks, Papadopoulos praised American leadership in the "Free World", suggested again that "communism has coveted Greece for strategic and other reasons" and expressed that his government's "sincere devotion to its allies and to the principles of the Free World will meet with due response from the Government of the United States of America."<sup>847</sup>

The Johnson White House interpreted the subtext of Papadopoulos' letter. Johnson's national security advisor, Walt Rostow, suggested that Papadopoulos' arguments were "a plea for recognition" and noted that although he "exaggerates both the communist threat and deterioration, there are elements of truth to both and sounds sincere." Rostow also proposed

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<sup>847</sup> Papadopoulos to Johnson, January 6, 1968. FRUS/XVI:352

that “soon we will regularize relations” with the Junta; this memo was drafted on January 10 and the State Department decided to formally establish a “working relationship” on January 13. Johnson could never officially recognize a military regime that had taken over the control of a NATO member-state through force, but the “regularization” of Greco-American relations was the closest status he could get to.<sup>848</sup> Papadopoulos received almost everything he had asked for.

The only question that still concerned Washington was that of Andreas’ future. In early 1968, the CIA had confirmed to Washington that “Andreas would not be executed even if he were sentenced to death” but also that the regime desired “to eliminate Andreas from [the] Greek political scene is unquestioned” and would thus “attempt to deport him.”<sup>849</sup> Andreas was deported indeed, moved to Stockholm, and soon began organizing an opposition to the regime by establishing the “Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK)” which received “financial support” from the Swedish government.<sup>850</sup> This thesis will later explore more deeply Andreas’ interpretation of American support to the Junta and will elaborate on his decisive role in establishing anti-Americanism as a dominant political narrative within a wider anti-Western ethos—on a profoundly moralistic basis.

During Johnson’s final months in office, the Junta became even more authoritarian. In September 1968, Talbot informed Washington that the Junta’s constitutional revisions should be interpreted as a “confirmation of emerging harder line of regime policies.”<sup>851</sup> Yet, in response, the administration began considering the “release [of] about 40% of the equipment we’ve held in suspense since the April 1967 coup” which included “tank ammo and heavy

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<sup>848</sup> Memorandum for the President: Private Letter from Greek Prime Minister, Washington DC, January 10, 1968, (LBJ Library, documents on Greece, 15)

<sup>849</sup> Greek Junta’s Plans for Andreas Papandreu, January 6, 1968, (LBJ Library, Case: 97-35/90)

<sup>850</sup> Intelligence Bulletin, Athens in annoyed by foreign support of its opponents, March 1, 1968. CIA-RDP79T0097A010800230001-6

<sup>851</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, September 19, 1968. FRUS/XVI:370



guns.” In a most indicative statement, the administration believed that “the time has come to separate our NATO relationship from our disapproval of domestic Greek politics.”<sup>852</sup> This memo could not reflect more clearly Johnson’s consequentialist approach, as these few words formalized what was becoming increasingly more evident since the dust from April 21 settled: the more time passed, the more Johnson loosened his restrictions towards the Junta—which had proven its strategic utility and firm loyalty towards the US—and the more authoritarian the Greek regime was turning into in response. But still, this was a small price to pay for Washington.

The most unsettling element in this memo was the administration’s attitude towards domestic disapproval of its Greek policy. The memo argued that although “a vocal group on the Hill will object to any resumption” of arms the administration “can’t let our interests suffer further.” Johnson eventually approved a partial heavy arms shipment resumption for January 1969 while from his end, Papadopoulos pushed for more arms releases, to the extent that Talbot commented that the Greek dictator felt “sufficiently secure” and thus “a little more cavalier with us”. Yet Talbot acutely observed that Papadopoulos also waited to measure the incoming Nixon administration’s approach as well; in his final report to Johnson, Talbot noted that Papadopoulos “may have decided not to take any steps” since the incoming Nixon administration could “be substantially more relaxed [...] in its attitude toward the Greek regime.”<sup>853</sup> And so it was.

## **The Nixon Era**

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<sup>852</sup> Memorandum, October 8, 1968. FRUS/XVI:371

<sup>853</sup> Talbot to Brewster, December 31, 1968. FRUS/XVI:375

As Dwight Eisenhower's Vice-President, Richard Nixon had proven himself as a devoted Cold Warrior, yet who originally intended to adopt a more lenient disposition towards the USSR as President.<sup>854</sup> Although in his inaugural address Nixon appeared willing to engage in a constructive dialogue with the communist world, his foreign policy was driven by an overtly realist desire to serve American interests in whatever way was possible. Along with his national security advisor and prominent academic, Henry Kissinger, Nixon initiated an era of shrewd realism, which has been termed as the Nixon Doctrine.<sup>855</sup> A crucial premise in it was that although containment remained indispensable, America could no longer act as the world's policeman.<sup>856</sup>

This doctrine had several implications. Nixon believed that the US would rely on a network of loyal allies who would exercise their control over their regions to serve NATO's—and thus Washington's—interests. The Nixon Doctrine was a zero-sum foreign policy approach, in which Nixon and Kissinger wanted to leave behind what they considered an inapplicable idealism of the Kennedy era, focusing instead on geopolitical calculations. Within the Nixon Doctrine, promoting democracy was not at the forefront of American foreign policy anymore, as Washington's emphasis shifted towards maintaining the balance of power between the West and the communist world through military alliances. This parameter had a profound impact on Nixon's attitude towards foreign regimes.<sup>857</sup>

Essentially, Nixon viewed global politics through the lens of superpower competition. As such, he embraced the authoritarian Iranian regime, providing the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi—whose coup had been supported by Washington—with unprecedented military and economic aid, as he considered the country indispensable in the context of the Cold War, just

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<sup>854</sup> Iwan Morgan, *Nixon* (London: Arnold, 2002), 155-160

<sup>855</sup> Powaski, 167

<sup>856</sup> John Callaghan, Brendon O' Connor, and Mark Phythian, *Ideologies of American Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2019), 14

<sup>857</sup> *Ibid*, 142-143

like his predecessors. Nixon's Iranian policy eventually backfired, as the overflow of American aid was a crucial motivator of the 1978 Iranian Revolution, which turned Iran into a strongly anti-American regime.<sup>858</sup> Thus, as chapter two argued, Cold War consequentialist foreign policy was not necessarily wise, as long-term implications often overshadowed the short-term gains that American foreign policy made. Nixon's Iranian foreign policy mirrors his Greek one, as Johnson's successor would embark on an ever-closer bilateral relationship with the Junta to maintain Greece within the American sphere of influence. As chapter three showed, Nixon had traveled to Greece as a young Senator and experienced at first hand the appeal of leftwing ideas in the country.

The Nixon Doctrine fits comfortably within this study's proposed foreign policy moral framework. Nixon greenlighted and orchestrated several interventions in which the US committed several deontologically reprehensible acts, yet which simultaneously served Washington's foreign policy goals against the communist world; this chapter will later briefly explore some of them. The most interesting aspect regarding the Nixon Doctrine is that its co-architect, Kissinger, did not consider Nixon's foreign policy approach immoral, as he had argued that "a sense of mission is clearly a legacy of American history." However, Kissinger also added that "a clearer understanding of America's interests and of the requirements of equilibrium can give perspective to our idealism and lead to humane and moderate objectives."<sup>859</sup> Kissinger could never publicly admit that within the Nixon Doctrine supporting an imposed authoritarian regime was permissible, but as this chapter will show, this is exactly what happened.

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<sup>858</sup> Morgan, 145-147

<sup>859</sup> Henry Kissinger, 'Central Issues of American Foreign Policy', originally published in 1968, reprinted in Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969), 93-94

And logically, the Eastern Mediterranean could not be excluded from Nixon's geopolitical considerations. Throughout his term, Nixon prioritized regional stability, which would guarantee Washington's control of the Mediterranean, hence Greece's contribution to containment in Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East remained paramount.<sup>860</sup> Although the question of Greek re-democratization remained unanswered, Nixon was even less concerned about it than Johnson; when the Junta asked Nixon to "speed up the delivery" of heavy arms, the State Department responded that "the question of arms supplies for Greece was under active review" as the US took "into account the position of Greece in NATO, the strategic aspects of the problem, relationships with the Greek Government, and the traditional friendship for the Greek people."<sup>861</sup> The tone of the first communication from Nixon's administration was already noticeably friendly.

Presumably, the Nixon administration would also have preferred to work with a democratically elected Greek government, instead of with an authoritarian one. After all, Greece remained a NATO member-state and the Junta's juxtaposition with the Western values that the organization was formed to protect could not be more profound. Nixon himself personally preferred a more democratic Greek government—mainly for political communication purposes—yet his emphasis on maintaining American geopolitical primacy in the Eastern Mediterranean was what defined his stance towards the Junta, as the only imperative in his Greek foreign policy was to keep Greece as a loyal pro-Western ally. Nixon's approach was also influenced by several regional events of the late sixties, such as Israel's threatened security in the aftermath of the Six Day War of 1967, Muammar Gaddafi's

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<sup>860</sup> Sarah Snyder, *From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 77

<sup>861</sup> Memorandum, March 1, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:241

successful coup in Libya, and—above everything else—the USSR’s renewed naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>862</sup>

Therefore, Greece had become even more indispensable within the US regional strategy, than it had already been since 1947. To that end, Nixon decided immediately that he was willing to work with the Junta as he considered hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean indispensable to access Africa, as well as to secure consistent oil supplies from the Middle East.<sup>863</sup> Geopolitics aside, however, two close contacts had a significant influence on Nixon’s Greek policy: the first was his Vice-President, Spiro Agnew, who was a second-generation Greek American who had strong bonds with the Greek-American business community, which provided its support to the colonels’ regime.<sup>864</sup> The second was the prominent Greek-American business tycoon, Tom Pappas, who was a Junta supporter, a generous donator to the Republican Party, and one of the people later involved in the Watergate Scandal that forced Nixon to resign the Presidency in 1974.<sup>865</sup>

Pappas was so close to Nixon that he even advised him on Greek affairs. Pappas argued that Nixon should “receive the Foreign Minister here in your office just for a few moments” in what would be “a wonderful gesture”, with Nixon replying that he would be “delighted to see the Foreign Minister.”<sup>866</sup> Only days later, Nixon and Kissinger went a step further and met with the regime’s number two, Pattakos. In their meeting, Pattakos assured Nixon—whom he had met in 1967 when the President had visited Greece during a private trip to the Eastern Mediterranean—that “Greek policy toward the US was frank and clear” adding that the two

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<sup>862</sup> Harry Papasotiriou, “Nixon and the Junta” in *The Greek Junta and the International System: a case study of Southern European dictatorships, 1967-1974*, eds. Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Effie Pedaliu (New York: Routledge, 2020), 40

<sup>863</sup> Peloni, 150

<sup>864</sup> Gallant, 301-303

<sup>865</sup> Effie Pedaliu, “A Discordant Note’: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974” *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 22:1, (2011), 108, <https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1080/09592296.2011.549745>. See also: George Lardner Jr. and Walter Pincus, “Contributor Got Oval Office Thank-You for Watergate Funds” *Washington Post*, October 30, 1997, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/nixon/103097pappas.htm>

<sup>866</sup> Memorandum, March 20, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:242

countries “would continue to be friends even if the US did nothing for them.” Pattakos also praised American military interventionism in Vietnam as “communism had to be fought.”

Pattakos could not expect a warmer reception from the new President. Nixon told him that his administration was “conducting a review of our policies and programs particularly in the field of military assistance” adding that he was “aware of the fact that Greece was a strong partner in NATO and had been helpful on Cyprus and other matters.” Pattakos seized the opportunity, responding that “the US was the Athens of modern times” and that it “must be strong in order to protect freedom” while “Greece would stand by her side.” This must have appealed to Nixon, as he asked Pattakos’ “opinion of the attitude of the Communist world today” with Pattakos responding how communism “was still seeking to conquer the world.” After firing “a blast at exiled Greek politico Andreas Papandreou” and reaffirming “Greece’s determination to fight communism and support the United States,” Pattakos’ meeting with Nixon ended.<sup>867</sup> Nixon had already established his communication channels with the Junta.

Kissinger’s follow-up meeting with Greece’s foreign minister, Panagiotis Pipinelis, is even more enlightening of the Nixon administration’s approach. Pipinelis primarily argued that it was “not productive for the US Government to continue to press [...] an early return to full constitutional Government” suggesting that “the US Government should help its NATO partner with military assistance regardless of its political system.” In a direct manner, Kissinger replied that he could “report categorically that the policy of the President is for the US not to involve itself in the political affairs of other countries” affirming that “the policy of the President is for the US to concern itself only with the foreign policy of another country.”

And Kissinger went a step further to praise the Junta’s ideological and strategic visions. In his concluding statement, Kissinger noted that “perhaps the US and Greece should exchange

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<sup>867</sup> Memorandum, March 31, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:243

political leaders” as American “leaders are pragmatists and Greece has many practical problems to be solved” while “the leaders of Greece are men who like to operate in terms of wide vision and the US could use some of that.”<sup>868</sup> Kissinger could not have provided Pipinelis with a stronger indirect legitimization for the regime he represented. This meeting cemented the Nixon administration’s foreign policy approach towards the Junta and demonstrates how Nixon and Kissinger are exceptional representatives of the consequentialist foreign policy framework that this study proposes. For the sake of preserving American hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean, Nixon’s national security advisor praised a military dictatorship, which despite having violated Greek democratic integrity and self-determination, assured nonetheless that American interests in the region would be secured.

### **Lifting the heavy arms embargo**

From the spring of 1969 onwards, the key question that the Nixon administration faced concerning Greece was the resumption of full military aid. Nixon did not consider the heavy arms embargo that he had inherited from Johnson an optimal strategy, and thus requested a cross-departmental inquiry on the matter. As Kissinger wrote to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA’s Director, “the President has requested a review of our current military aid policy toward Greece” accompanied with a study “which presents arguments pro and con on the resumption of full military assistance” as it “affects US interests.”<sup>869</sup> A small detail—but indicative of Nixon’s deep interest—was that the study should be presented to him within twenty days. From his end, the *chargé d’affaires* for Greece

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<sup>868</sup> Memorandum, April 11, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:245

<sup>869</sup> Memorandum, April 26, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:246

Roswell McClelland commented that the embargo “would be unlikely over the longer range to have any appreciable effect on the pace and nature of internal political evolution in Greece.”<sup>870</sup>

The report was delayed, but during summer Nixon was eventually briefed on the matter. Interestingly, the report initially commented that “items for the army which could be associated with political repression [...] were withheld” from the Johnson administration but added that any congressional opposition to supplying arms to “military dictators who are denying social progress to their people” can be waived if the President “determines that it would be important to the security of the US.” Nixon was then presented with three options: a) to “cut it off altogether”, b) to continue “shipping non-major items but continuing the suspension of major items” which was essentially a continuation of Johnson’s approach, and c) a “resumption of full military aid” which would satisfy the Junta’s “persistent campaign to persuade us to remove the pressure for return to constitutional government.” Kissinger signed the report and suggested that “the real choice is between options 2 and 3” with Nixon writing in the report “RN—approves option 3.”<sup>871</sup> Nixon went for the maximum.

As a result, Kissinger took more initiative. He immediately advised Agnew that the administration was close to a decision regarding the provision of military aid<sup>872</sup> while he also briefed Nixon on the state of the Greek military forces, upon the President’s request. As Kissinger put it, the State Department “feels that the army might even be more effective than before the coup, because the junta has removed some dead wood at the top” to which Nixon emphatically replied “good.”<sup>873</sup> In a following NSC Review Group, Kissinger wondered “what we are proving by withholding the \$52.6 million worth of equipment” to which Stuart Rockwell, a senior State Department official, replied “we were concerned about the possibility

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<sup>870</sup> McClelland to Brewster, April 28, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:247

<sup>871</sup> Kissinger to Nixon, June 14, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:249

<sup>872</sup> Kissinger to Agnew, July 19, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:252

<sup>873</sup> Kissinger to Nixon, September 24, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:253



that tanks marked with American flags might be paraded through the streets of Athens by what might turn out to be a fascist government” adding that the partial embargo could be used as leverage “toward a more constitutional situation.” Rockwell’s point seems reasonable, from a strategic—but also deontological—standpoint.

However, Rockwell’s arguments failed to convince Kissinger—completely. Nixon’s national security advisor argued that “we do not give military aid to support governments but because a country is important to the US” and noted how “in the Middle East Contingency Planning [...] Greece was the only possible staging site in the Mediterranean.” As the conversation continued, the originally skeptical Rockwell admitted that a full arms resumption could “be considered a sign of approval of the Greek government” but concluded that “[US] security interests outweighed this disadvantage.”<sup>874</sup> Kissinger’s consequentialist logic prevailed over Rockwell’s deontological counterarguments.

Less than a week later, Nixon was briefed again on the matter. Once again, the memo emphasized Greece’s geopolitical significance noting how “our strategic benefits from continued close association with Greece are significant.” The memo suggested that the Greek armed forces could first, defend against a Bulgarian invasion relatively easily while substituting for “US forces in a US-Soviet conflict”, second, that Greece provided a “base and staging rights to the US for the Middle East” making the American bases located in Greece indispensable for “peace-keeping or military interventions”, third, that Greece provided significant facilities for the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet, and fourth, that the Voice of America’s operations in Eastern Europe and the Arabic world depended on Greco-American cooperation.<sup>875</sup> The memo thus reaffirmed that Greece remained an invaluable geopolitical ally.

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<sup>874</sup> NSC Review, October 2, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:256

<sup>875</sup> Memorandum, October 7, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:257

Nixon's only concern was that his critics would interpret a full military aid resumption to Greece as an official endorsement of the Junta. Interestingly, the Nixon administration acknowledged how "most Greeks have always believed that there is an 'American factor' in Greek politics" but considered that "almost nothing" the administration can "say or do will change this view." Once again, the operational axis for Nixon's Greek policy was that Washington should "maintain a normal NATO military aid relationship with whatever government is in control in Athens without prejudice to its interests." It is thus no surprise that the memo concluded that "we do not want to take sides sharply in the present political dispute in Greece because that will jeopardize our position either with the present government or with future governments." The following chapter will elaborate on how this indirect endorsement of the Junta would be decisive within Greek post-Junta political development—and Greeks' attitude towards the US.

For his part, Kissinger had already decided what the optimal approach should be. He strongly recommended that Nixon should "authorize" the new American Ambassador, Henry Tasca—another career diplomat that Washington had assigned to Greece<sup>876</sup>—to "tell Papadopoulos he is prepared to discuss the resumption of normal military shipments, including suspended items" and "that movement toward a constitutional situation would ease US political problems in releasing the suspended equipment (But this linkage is not a condition)." Kissinger then advised Nixon that "the following public line would be taken: overriding US security interests were the principal factor" and that "the US will continue urging the government to move toward a constitutional situation."<sup>877</sup> In practice, this was impossible, since the Nixon administration had practically unlinked a full resumption of military aid with any exercise of

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<sup>876</sup> FRUS, "Henry Joseph Tasca"

<sup>877</sup> Memorandum, undated, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:261

pressure on the colonels to democratize. This only demonstrates that the question of Greek re-democratization only concerned Nixon and Kissinger from a press relations perspective.

Kissinger's advice transformed into actual policy. In a National Security decision memo, Kissinger emphasized Nixon's decision to resume full military shipments, while only noting that "movement toward a constitutional situation would ease US problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment."<sup>878</sup> Kissinger affirmed that "after the President's review and approval, the following public line be taken with members of the Congress and press as necessary: Overriding US security interests were the principal factor in the decision to lift the suspension. The US Government will continue urging the government to move toward a constitutional situation." Nixon did not change a single word from the memo he had received regarding the resumption of full military aid, while by the end of 1969, Kissinger briefed him again to instruct Tasca to tell Papadopoulos that the administration regards "the release of suspended equipment as unconditional."<sup>879</sup> Greek democratization was not even a concern by this point for Washington.

Nixon's full resumption of military aid could not happen overnight, but in the meantime, the administration further strengthened its relationship with the Junta. Upon meeting Papadopoulos in early 1970, Tasca assured the Greek dictator of Nixon's "firm position that [the] internal Greek political situation [was] not [an] appropriate subject for NATO debate" on which Papadopoulos "could rely." The most profound element of Tasca's position was that it essentially endorsed Papadopoulos' argument that "Greece's friends must also recognize that [the] Greek Government will not allow its NATO role to be tied in any way whatsoever to [the] Greek internal situation."<sup>880</sup> In a following report, Tasca argued that "the tenure of the present

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<sup>878</sup> Memorandum, November 14, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:262

<sup>879</sup> Memorandum, December 19, 1969. FRUS/XXIX:265

<sup>880</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, January 26, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:268

regime is not likely to be seriously challenged inside Greece for some years” and that Washington should use its “influence to strengthen [Papadopoulos’] hand against any opposition to that course from among his revolutionary colleagues.”<sup>881</sup> Evidently, Papadopoulos’ hand would be armed with American made weapons.

The administration did not reconsider the option of lifting the arms embargo even before the prospect of a long-lasting military regime in Greece. In late March, the Junta was considered as a promise of “a period of relative stability” for “the foreseeable future” while it was reaffirmed that “the US is prepared to resume full military aid shipments to Greece.” The only comment regarding the Junta’s authoritarianism was that “movement towards a constitutional situation would ease US problems in speeding the release of the suspended equipment.” But, once more, the administration did not consider this a precondition as “the considerations which led to the decision to resume arms shipments in principle are even more impressive today than they were in November” since “Greece is essential to NATO and Greek real estate is important to US interests elsewhere in the area.”<sup>882</sup>

However, Nixon faced strong criticism from northern European NATO allies. In late spring, the State Department reported that “public knowledge in Western Europe of an increase in U.S. military aid to Greece will damage NATO solidarity” as well as that “the Junta has been severely damaging to NATO’s image in Western Europe, particularly among young people.”<sup>883</sup> Therefore, Tasca was advised that “that there should be no public disclosure of the decision to resume aid until after the NATO Defense Ministers meeting.”<sup>884</sup> Tasca agreed that this maneuver could reduce criticism towards Washington without affecting the President’s commitment to resume full military aid<sup>885</sup> and soon informed the State Department about

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<sup>881</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, March 2, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:269

<sup>882</sup> Response to Memorandum, March 24, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:272

<sup>883</sup> Memorandum, April 22, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:276

<sup>884</sup> Vidgerman to Tasca, May 4, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:277

<sup>885</sup> Memorandum, May 21, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:278

Papadopoulos' impatience and threat that "he will purchase arms elsewhere."<sup>886</sup> In other words, Papadopoulos had become so confident, that he blackmailed the American ambassador regarding Washington's resumption of military supplies. In hindsight, this confidence seems entirely reasonable, given the increasingly friendlier approach towards his regime from two American administrations—one Democrat, and one Republican.

The matter remained at the forefront of Nixon's agenda. Kissinger was not concerned about domestic and international criticism<sup>887</sup> and in a private meeting with Nixon in the President's office wondered "to what extent that we continue to seek containment [...] can we afford not to have firm relations with Greece and not to look at it from a security point of view?" Nixon responded that "if we follow the Danes, the Norwegians and other Socialists, the French and Italians, we do nothing. They are weak; we've got to lead. We've got to support the Greeks. It must be made palatable. The others all know if we weren't there, they'd be terrified. We look all the more important because the Europeans can't sell security to their own people."<sup>888</sup> Nixon's position reveals his worldview regarding—and his willingness to work with the Junta to serve US' geopolitical imperatives. Apparently, he also considered the Greek authoritarian regime more efficient than Western European democratic states—and completely dismissed their deontological criticism of his support to the Junta.

By the end of summer, Nixon was at a public relations impasse. On the one hand, he had already decided to resume full military aid, but on the other, he tried to bypass the NATO member-states which favored Greece's expulsion from the organization. Tasca reaffirmed that "the retention of the arms embargo is counter-productive" as well as that "at stake are goodwill and privileged US military position in Greece upon which we now rely heavily." Tasca's

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<sup>886</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, June 14, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:281

<sup>887</sup> Kissinger to Nixon, undated, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:282

<sup>888</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIX:283

statement was almost prophetic as on the same day, Palestinian and Jordanian forces clashed, while ten days later Jordanian guerillas hijacked Western planes, holding crew and passengers as hostages.<sup>889</sup> As a result, on September 9, 1970, Kissinger wrote to Nixon that given the Middle East situation, this was “an ideal time to proceed rapidly with the announcement of resumption of U.S. military assistance to Greece.”<sup>890</sup>

This geopolitical upheaval sealed the fate of the heavy arms embargo. A day after Kissinger’s memo, Washington ordered Tasca to inform Papadopoulos that “public announcement of the resumption of deliveries of suspended military items” would be made and that “instructions” for an “expeditious delivery of the items which are now to be released” had been given. The report also noted that “Greece offers strategic advantages to the NATO alliance and to the US which are of great importance to the security of the West” which had been “sharply underlined in recent months by events in the Eastern Mediterranean.”<sup>891</sup> Thus, in a moment of crisis, any remaining deontological concerns or criticisms quickly evaporated before the geopolitical benefits of the consequentialist approach, which placed the imperative of maintaining regional hegemony through working with the Junta at the core of Nixon’s foreign policy.

### **From normalization to Agnew’s visit**

After Nixon resumed full military aid to the Junta, Greco-American relations entered a period of increased cooperation. The State Department argued that Greece and the US “have reached a new and more friction-free relationship” but noted again that “criticism [...] seems bound to arise again in serious proportions and in a way which will once again threaten the

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<sup>889</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, August 26, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:289

<sup>890</sup> Kissinger to Nixon, September 9, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:291

<sup>891</sup> State to Embassy (Greece), September 14, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:292

smooth functioning of NATO.”<sup>892</sup> From his end, Papadopoulos announced a series of superficial municipal electoral reforms, which however did not soften the regime’s authoritarianism.<sup>893</sup> As a result, in March 1971 an internal interdepartmental report admitted that “our present essentially passive policy, has assured access to facilities in Greece but has not proved effective in either satisfying our critics or in moving the Greek regime.”<sup>894</sup> Arguably, entrusting Papadopoulos to proceed with any substantial reforms while arming him to the teeth was not a strategy that applied any real pressure on the Junta to democratize.

It was only before the imminent 1972 elections that Nixon considered that the Greek situation could become an electoral liability. Thus, in late March 1971, he discussed the matter with Tom Pappas, who estimated that Papadopoulos would “start parliamentary procedures” by 1972, to which the President replied that “that would be very helpful” while telling Pappas “You see, look, I am the best friend they got.” In other words, the American President had voluntarily become the “best friend” of an authoritarian government, which had violated the democratic laws of a long-term western ally. And Nixon urged Pappas to tell the Junta’s leadership that “We understand what they have to do. Make it appear something else. See. You tell ’em strong. Take a look here, boys, we, you have American politics, you know they’ve got a very good friend here, but they’re hanging all this up.”<sup>895</sup> The Junta could be politically costly to Nixon; that was his only concern by that point.

Tasca passed Nixon’s comments to Papadopoulos in April. The ambassador “spoke directly of the delicate and difficult elections coming up in 1972 and the criticism which President Nixon faces” and “pointed to the desirability of real political progress [...] before the US elections”; Papadopoulos responded that “he hoped very much he could be helpful”<sup>896</sup> but

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<sup>892</sup> Rogers to Embassy (Greece), October 28, 1970. FRUS/XXIX:296

<sup>893</sup> Papatotiriou, 42-42

<sup>894</sup> Response to Memorandum, March 8, 1971. FRUS/XXIX:306

<sup>895</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIX:309

<sup>896</sup> Tasca to Kissinger, April 23, 1971. FRUS/XXIX:312

by June the State Department reported that Papadopoulos' regime remained "authoritarian" and called it unreservedly a "military dictatorship." The report concluded that despite its "laudatory propaganda [...] it does not appear to have acquired a mass following" and confirmed that the regime's techniques included "censorship, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without trial, and—according to its bitterest critics—police torture."<sup>897</sup> This only demonstrates that Washington knew how the Junta operated—but still saw its support to the colonels as a potential political liability, instead of an ethical one.

And the Nixon administration failed to grasp an underlying dynamic that had started growing in Greece. On a trip to Athens, the Director of the Office of Greek Affairs Walter Silva made certain key observations, which he did not report back to Washington as "facts" but as "indicators of mood and opinion." Silva argued that the "CU/Venizelist/liberals" who opposed the Junta saw violence "as the only way out of the present impasse" and "necessary because of the indifference to or complicity of the US in the situation." He added that "although it is difficult to judge how wide or deep anti-American feelings run among those people [...] without exception they blamed the US for making the situation possible." Silva elaborated that "they are disillusioned at our cynical abandonment of principle and to some extent disenchanted with us as the 'leaders of the free world.'"<sup>898</sup>

But Silva noted that those who opposed the regime "saw the future relationship between Greece and the US as quite different from that which obtained in the past." Silva commented that those Greeks believed that Greece should terminate its "overdependence on the US" as "the decisions of the US are obviously made entirely on the basis of what the US believes to be in its own interest without regard for the welfare of other countries." Silva concluded that "there was in fact wide-spread hatred of the U.S. among Greek intellectuals and cultural

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<sup>897</sup> National Intelligence Estimate, June 7, 1971. FRUS/XXIX:314

<sup>898</sup> Memorandum, June 25, 1971. FRUS/XXIX:317



leaders” but estimated that upon return to parliamentary rule, anti-American sentiments would “come around again.” However, Silva highlighted the “anti-establishment posture of [the] Greek youth” and emphasized how a Greek professor called his university “a time bomb set in the dark.” Silva’s report accurately grasped Greeks’ public sentiment, but overestimated Washington’s ability to repair its political capital when—and if—the Junta collapsed.

Silva’s report coincided with Agnew’s plans to make an official visit to Greece. Despite resuming full military aid, Nixon initially opposed Agnew’s trip as he considered it politically dangerous, and largely a manifestation of Agnew’s personal ambition to make an impression in his father’s motherland.<sup>899</sup> Nixon thus advised Tasca to tell Papadopoulos that “it would be a great thing” if they made “a symbolic gesture beforehand”<sup>900</sup> yet with Kissinger reassuring him two days later that “it was not the US policy to give the Greek government a hard time.”<sup>901</sup> Nixon never considered changing his approach to the slightest, noting angrily that “they say we should cut off aid to Greece. Why? Because Greece doesn’t have a leader democratically elected” while commenting how “in the ninety-one countries in which we provide aid there are only thirty of them today that have leaders that are there as the result of a contested, democratic election.”<sup>902</sup> Nixon’s approach towards the Junta reflected a much wider foreign policy pattern that defined American interventionism during the Cold War—and his own to an unprecedented extent.

Agnew’s trip was soon approved, and the Vice-President arrived in Athens in mid-October 1971. Naturally, the regime could not have been any more delighted, as Papadopoulos received Agnew at the airport himself.<sup>903</sup> In their meeting, Agnew reassured Papadopoulos that “he came in true friendship without slightest intention to criticize or intervene” and asked

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<sup>899</sup> Papasotiriou, 43-44

<sup>900</sup> Memorandum, August 4, 1971. FRUS/XXIX:320

<sup>901</sup> Memorandum, August 6, 1971. FRUS/XXIX:321

<sup>902</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIX:324, (1969-1976)

<sup>903</sup> Papasotiriou, 44

Papadopoulos to “explore with him [the] means of making domestic policies less vulnerable in effort to disarm critics and strengthen [the] Alliance.”<sup>904</sup> Upon returning to Washington, Agnew briefed Nixon on his visit to Athens, with Nixon commenting during their discussion “now look here, I’m not going to criticize the Greek Government. My interest is in what the government’s attitude is toward the US, not what it does in its own country.”<sup>905</sup> Once again, Nixon’s position remained unchanged; he unreservedly saw himself as the Junta’s best friend.

### **From stability to unrest**

Throughout 1972, Greco-American relations remained largely stable. Washington’s objective was to secure the “homeporting proposal” according to which about 6.000 military personnel would be permanently stationed in American bases in Greece.<sup>906</sup> In the meantime, Papadopoulos abolished the institution of King Regent, in a move that convinced Washington “that he has no intention of moving Greece toward parliamentary democracy.”<sup>907</sup> Still, although in October Tasca initially feared that Papadopoulos had “isolated himself further from his colleagues and stimulated further potential opposition within the establishment”<sup>908</sup> he reassured Nixon that “there are no likely developments [...] which would jeopardize our vital interests.” Tasca asserted how “the Nixon policy towards Greece was and remains the only valid approach to our relations with this country.”<sup>909</sup>

In contrast to this uneventful year, 1973 was turbulent. Having secured reelection by receiving 520 electoral votes to George McGovern’s 17, Nixon started his second presidential term with renewed political capital. Upon taking his second oath of office, and without needing to worry about whether his support to the Junta would be held against him, he upgraded US

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<sup>904</sup> Agnew to State, October 18, 1971. FRUS/XXIX:325

<sup>905</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXIX:326

<sup>906</sup> Kissinger to Nixon, February 8, 1972. FRUS/XXIX:329

<sup>907</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, March 2, 1972. FRUS/XXIX:333

<sup>908</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, June 14, 1972. FRUS/XXIX:336

<sup>909</sup> Tasca to Nixon, October 13, 1972. FRUS/XXIX:338

military assistance to Greece.<sup>910</sup> Papadopoulos, however, was in a far less confident position compared to Nixon's; during early 1973, the regime faced initial signs of economic recession which would be the first in decades, renewed tensions in Cyprus, large student rallies who opposed the new conscription laws, and increased criticism from hardliners who accused him of weak leadership. Tasca's evaluation of Papadopoulos' political future was rather bleak, as he noted that "his problems are substantial and that he must move decisively and constructively if he is to retain the balance in his favor."<sup>911</sup>

Papadopoulos' problems would only worsen. In late May, a small group of monarchist naval officers mutinied unsuccessfully against his regime, a move that convinced Papadopoulos to abolish the monarchy altogether. The State Department estimated that the regime showed "signs of wear and tear [...] but it still commands the essential elements of power" but cautioned that "the US has probably already experienced the best years of its relationship with the Greek junta."<sup>912</sup> Papadopoulos proceeded with an extremely dubious plebiscite, which formally deposed the monarchy, exposing his "apparent intention to replace an undetermined number of the junta members in the impending government reorganization."<sup>913</sup> Papadopoulos then—unexpectedly—imposed Papagos' former minister Spyridon Markezinis as PM in October<sup>914</sup> as a promise of re-democratization.

Still, Papadopoulos failed to keep the Athenian youth under control. Augusto Pinochet's coup in Chile in late September, which led to the assassination of Salvador Allende, sparked massive demonstrations in the streets of Athens in which university students compared the Chilean coup with the Greek one. The students openly accused Washington's deep involvement in the violation of both countries' democratic rule, shouting rhythmically

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<sup>910</sup> Kissinger to Nixon, March 30, 1973. FRUS/XXX:1

<sup>911</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, April 21, 1973. FRUS/XXX:2

<sup>912</sup> National Intelligence Estimate, July 19, 1973. FRUS/XXX:5

<sup>913</sup> Intelligence Note, August 1, 1973. FRUS/XXX:6

<sup>914</sup> Clogg, 176-177

Allende's name.<sup>915</sup> This thesis has already referred to the Chilean coup and the extent to which it manifested Washington's consequentialist interventionism in the name of containment. These anti-American demonstrations in Greece, during which students identified their experience with a Latin American coup, should be considered the first expression of a widespread feeling of resentment towards the US that was growing during the Junta—and one whose importance Washington failed to estimate accurately, as this thesis will demonstrate.

### **The Athens Polytechnic Uprising**

Just a few weeks later, hundreds of Athenian university students occupied the city's Polytechnic, in a demonstration that would lead to bloodshed and Papadopoulos' fall. The students set up pirate radio stations and transmitted anti-Junta messages while encouraging all Greek citizens to revolt against the regime; many of the banners that the students had hung on the school's fences contained strong anti-American and anti-NATO messages.<sup>916</sup> Papadopoulos reacted aggressively and sent the military to dissolve the protests, which resulted in one of the most iconic moments within Greek historical memory, and which reflected students' demands for democratization: a tank storming the Polytechnic's central gate, while students were hanging on it. During the demonstrations, several citizens lost their lives<sup>917</sup> with the number of casualties estimated at twenty-three, while hundreds more were wounded and arrested.<sup>918</sup> Since 1974 on November 17 every year, protesters have marched towards the US embassy from the Polytechnic to protest American interventionism in Greece.

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<sup>915</sup> Kostis Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship: student resistance, cultural politics, and the long 1960's in Greece* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 247-248

<sup>916</sup> Ibid, 249

<sup>917</sup> Gallant, 303-305

<sup>918</sup> Ioannis Tzortzis, "The Metapolitefsi that Never Was: a Re-evaluation of the 1973 'Markezinis Experiment'" *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 38:1 (2012), 121, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1179/0307013113Z.00000000040>

Nine days after the Polytechnic uprising ended, General Dimitris Ioannidis capitalized on Papadopoulos' weakness and engineered a successful counter coup that placed himself as the "dominant figure" in Greece, as Tasca put it.<sup>919</sup> The embassy described Ioannidis as "a hardliner [...] reputed to have been largely responsible for maltreatment of political prisoners" and "a puritan at heart and in action", urging the Nixon administration to "consider what its posture should be toward General Ioannidis." However, the Nixon administration was not able to pay any serious attention to Greek affairs anymore. Coincidentally, on the same day that the Polytechnic uprising ended in bloodshed and paved the road for Ioannidis' counter coup, Nixon famously denied any involvement in the Watergate scandal by famously saying "well, I am not a crook, I have earned everything I have got."<sup>920</sup>

As the noose around Nixon's neck was slowly tightening due to Watergate, the administration placed little emphasis on Ioannidis. The sporadic communication between the American embassy and the administration is indicative of where Nixon's attention had shifted to; simultaneously, Ioannidis made a far-right turn, reversing the slight progress Papadopoulos had made.<sup>921</sup> In February 1974, Tasca reported that Ioannidis' regime showed evidence of a chaotic administration, which had brought a sense of "deterioration" in Greek affairs. Tasca's report concluded that "the Greek Armed Forces have become a symbol of repression, tyranny, and disarray" and that "their association [...] with NATO and the U.S. remains ominous for our future security interests in Greece."<sup>922</sup> Therefore, along with Silva, Tasca was another major diplomat who now expected that Washington's support to the Junta could potentially backfire in the future.

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<sup>919</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, November 26, 1973. FRUS/XXX:8

<sup>920</sup> Richard Nixon, *Question-and-Answer Session at the Annual Convention of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, Orlando, Florida*, Orlando, November 17, 1973, American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/question-and-answer-session-the-annual-convention-the-associated-press-managing-editors>

<sup>921</sup> Gallant, 305

<sup>922</sup> Embassy (Greece) to State, February 8, 1973. FRUS/XXX:9

### **Towards a “hands-off” policy**

With Nixon fighting for his political future, and Agnew out of the picture—as he had resigned in 1973 due to a corruption scandal—Kissinger, who had become Secretary of State, was the remaining key actor in implementing the administration’s Greek foreign policy. In a paper drafted for him which explored Washington’s potential approaches, described Ioannidis’ administration as “narrowly nationalistic” and committed to the belief that “we need Greece at least as much as Greece needs us.” The report also estimated that due to Ioannidis’ nationalistic worldview, his regime would be “highly sensitive to foreign meddling in Greek affairs.” But above everything else, it highlighted an “element of anti-Americanism growing in Greece that would have been unthinkable a few years ago” which had “grown from our previous association with the Papadopoulos regime, intensified by the widespread belief that the CIA was involved in the November 25 coup and that the US favors the present regime.” On this matter, the report estimated that “this sentiment will grow as long as we are seen to be identified with unpopular rule and will erode the principal long-term force holding Greece close to the US.”

The report then elaborated on the extent to which Greek anti-American sentiments could depend on immediate foreign policy decisions. It argued that there was “an inevitable inverse relationship between the ease with which we secure Greek cooperation on security matters now and the ease with which we will be able to secure it from the kind of successor regime that is most likely and most desirable from our overall point of view.” In more specific terms, two options were presented to Kissinger: a) a “hands-off approach” which would in practice restate the administration’s firm position that it has “no business meddling in others’ politics and should deal with governments solely in terms of their usefulness to our tangible national interests” and b) “the moralist/interventionist approach” which would “assert that we have a moral duty to speak out against injustice” and “muster support at home and abroad for

our role as a leader of an alliance that shares common values.” The report excluded the moralist approach as an unreasonable option, arguing instead that “something much closer to the hands-off policy is feasible” especially as “even if some change in posture [...] is desirable, there is no compelling case for making it immediately.”<sup>923</sup> The memo was signed by the State Department’s director of policy planning, Winston Lord, whose own dismissal of the “moralist/interventionist” approach reveals once more how Washington compromised its values in Greece for the sake of the higher purpose to contain communism, even in a moment of profound crisis.

According to the State Department’s records, Kissinger read the memo but did not make any initial decision, until the matter resurfaced in a late March regional staff meeting. Tasca was the one who grasped more accurately the new underlying dynamics within Greco-American relations, advising Kissinger that the US should be more vocally open in favor of democracy as “Greece cannot be compared with any other country—because they are a nation which has a history and a cultural tradition.” Tasca elaborated that in the long run “if we don't make progress [...] we won't even be able to maintain our security relations.” Coldly, Kissinger replied “I still don't understand what you think our policy is” to which Tasca responded abruptly that the administration should be “saying publicly that we're for democracy in Greece.” This would have been a major deviation from the principles of the Nixon doctrine and the administration’s policy towards the Junta since 1969.

Kissinger, still unconvinced, asked again why foreign policy towards Greece should deviate from the norm. Kissinger wondered “why is it in the American interest to do in Greece what we apparently don't do anywhere else—of requiring them to give a commitment to the President to move to representative government?” to which Tasca again replied that “because

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<sup>923</sup> Action Memorandum, February 15, 1973. FRUS/XXX:10

Greece and the Greek people—in terms of their position and public opinion in Western Europe—are quite unique” as “they've got a position in Western Europe and the US that Brazil and Chile and these other countries don't have.” Kissinger then argued that the State Department “doesn't have a Political Science Division” but Tasca responded that US support to authoritarian regimes “may help you with other countries, but it wouldn't get you to first base as far as Greece is concerned.” Tasca elaborated that the US “are right in the internal Greek foreign institutions, whether you like it or not; we're part of their value system, part of their political process.” Tasca considered that Washington's support to the Junta would undermine its future influence in Greece.

Still, Kissinger could not see Tasca's point. After referring to the administration's similar approach in countries like Morocco, Yugoslavia, and Algeria, he asked “why should we not adopt the position that we, therefore, don't influence things?” to which Tasca responded that to the eyes of the Greeks “then you're intervening [...] in favor of Ioannides now.” But an adamant Kissinger commented that “this issue is being put in a hopelessly abstract manner because the issue isn't between democracy and non-democracy” and that “one would have to know what the likely political evolution is as between Papandreou and this fellow” referring to Ioannidis. Kissinger admitted that Papandreou may be “for democracy” but added that “it would be best to have a government that protects our security interests.”<sup>924</sup> Kissinger summarized Washington's consequentialism: after seven years of military rule, which had recently become even more authoritarian, Washington still considered that working with dictators instead of with a democratically elected—albeit leftwing—governments was preferable if that served its Cold War geopolitical imperatives best.

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<sup>924</sup> Regional Staff Meeting, March 20, 1973. FRUS/XXX:12



## The collapse of the Junta

Upon deposing Papadopoulos, Ioannidis adopted a more ambitious foreign policy, especially towards Cyprus. In mid-April, American intelligence commented that the new Greek dictator “has a special interest in the island’s fate” and “an exaggerated view of the Communist threat on Cyprus” under Archbishop Makarios’ leadership but estimated that “the danger that Greece will increase its activity in Cyprus is probably not imminent.” The report noted that “because the US is widely regarded as the moving force behind this—and any other—regime in Greece” there was “popular suspicion of US motives that can be exploited to promote anti-Americanism if the opportunity arises” while adding that “popular resentment of the US seems sure to grow.” Thus, by that point, it had become evident that anti-American sentiments had grown substantially within the Greek electorate during the last two years,

At this point, Washington stood before a dead-end. On the one hand, it acknowledged that “in the unlikely event that Andreas Papandreou (or someone of his political stripe) were to return to head a new Greek regime, he probably would use alleged US support for the Ioannidis government as a pretext for action against the US” yet on the other it realized that “efforts by the US to distance itself from the present rulers would complicate bilateral working arrangements” especially in what concerned military cooperation. A following CIA report suggested that the US should not distance itself from Ioannidis, arguing that “public characterization of the present regime as repressive” would “provoke [Ioannidis] to retaliate, without, however, convincing most critics of the regime that the US had abandoned Ioannidis.”<sup>925</sup> In other words, the US had identified with the Junta to an irreparable extent in the eyes of the average Greek citizen.

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<sup>925</sup> Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, April 18, 1973. FRUS/XXX:13

Ioannidis' foreign policy adventurism became his nemesis—but also highlighted the limitations of the US hands-off approach. In the summer of 1974, Greco-Turkish relations heated up rapidly, yet the administration expected that “Cyprus stands a reasonably good chance of escaping direct involvement in hostilities.”<sup>926</sup> However, on July 15 in a surprise move, Ioannidis engineered an unsuccessful coup against Makarios' Cypriot government on a nationalist pretext about enosis, which provided Turkey with a justification to intervene militarily using a peacekeeping pretext based on the guarantor status that it enjoyed.<sup>927</sup> The Junta had briefly imposed Nikos Sampson as Cypriot President, which opened the road for Turkey's invasion on July 20. Turkey invaded in two rounds, which made the legality of their endeavor highly controversial, as the second invasion had no legal basis and merely aimed at annexing more territory.<sup>928</sup> The US found itself in an extremely difficult situation, as according to Kissinger's admission Washington “wanted to keep both Greece and Turkey in the Alliance” and “sought to prevent unbridgeable fissures.”<sup>929</sup> Kissinger tried to persuade Turkish PM Bülent Ecevit to proceed with an as limited operation as possible<sup>930</sup> but the Turkish forces seized the power vacuum and annexed almost the entire northern part of the island.

The two invasions caused unprecedented chaos. During a Special Actions meeting about Cyprus, Kissinger hoped that he could help Greece and Turkey reach “a peaceful solution today” but Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger responded that “the larger question is NATO” and whether it would survive as “the other European countries have said that we have gone beyond the point of no return regarding Greece” and suggested supporting “a more sympathetic regime in Greece.” Schlesinger then elaborated that “we are viewed throughout

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<sup>926</sup> Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, June 21, 1973. FRUS/XXX:15

<sup>927</sup> Farid Mirbagheri, *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*, (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 83

<sup>928</sup> James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 44-46

<sup>929</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (New York: Little Brown & Co., 1982), 1190-1191

<sup>930</sup> Spyros Katsoulas, “The ‘Nixon Letter’ to Ecevit: An Untold Story of the Eve of the Turkish Invasion of Cyprus in 1974”, *The International History Review*, 2 (2021), 5-6, <https://doi-org.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/10.1080/07075332.2021.1935293>

the world as supporting the Greek regime” and “we should also be looking at the larger question of how this would impact on NATO.” The remaining part of Schlesinger’s dialogue with Kissinger remains classified, but Kissinger concluded that “we can’t settle the NATO problem today. Cyprus is our problem today. I don’t like overthrowing governments. I’m not sure the Greek government will last out the week, anyway.”<sup>931</sup> Even then, when Ioannidis was most vulnerable, Washington was not willing to withdraw American support from the Junta.

But Kissinger’s estimation was accurate, as Greek constitutionalism was restored only two days later, and as easily as it had been violated. On July 23, amidst the crisis, former PM Konstantinos Karamanlis was invited by Ioannidis’ appointed President, Phedon Gizikis, to return and take over the prime ministership. In a final manifestation of his consequentialist mindset, Kissinger protested “but Karamanlis will have to govern democratically, which means the left in Greece will have to be unleashed” predicting that “within a year there will be an active left-wing movement in Greece.” Under Secretary Joseph Sisco estimated that “the possibility of the left being unleashed in Greece to introduce a man like Papandreou is an unlikely scenario”<sup>932</sup> but Kissinger turned out to be right. Greeks welcomed Karamanlis as a hero on July 24, one who ended Greece’s nightmare that had lasted for seven and a half years; Tasca immediately met Karamanlis to congratulate him and deliver President Nixon’s best wishes.<sup>933</sup> About two weeks later, Nixon would go down in history as the only President to resign his office to this day.

### **An assessment of American interventionism until and during the Junta**

This chapter showed how both Johnson’s and Nixon’s administrations deeply believed that the US could not afford to lose Greece as an indispensable ally in the Eastern

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<sup>931</sup> Special Actions Group Meeting, July 21, 1974. FRUS/XXX:110

<sup>932</sup> Memorandum, July 23, 1974. FRUS/XXX:119

<sup>933</sup> Editorial Note. FRUS/XXX:117

Mediterranean, especially after decades of intervening in Greek affairs. American interventionism during the Junta was practically a continuation of Washington's political interference in Greek affairs that started with the Civil War and continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. As the previous two chapters showed, as soon as the Greek Army defeated the rebels, the US intervened deeply and consistently in Greek politics through several methods, with the two imperatives being the security of American interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and—by extension—the containment of Greek communism. General James Van Fleet's statement during the Civil War that Greeks are "a good investment" (see chapter three) remained the *modus operandi* of American interventionism.

Pre-Junta, Washington's rapid estrangement with an increasingly anti-American Andreas Papandreou demonstrates American foreign policymakers' fear of losing Greece. Andreas' increasingly anti-American narrative from 1963 convinced the US that if he became PM, he could be detrimental to Washington's interests.<sup>934</sup> The Johnson administration feared so much the extent to which Andreas' CU could undermine Greece's loyalty to NATO that it failed to properly assess the danger of a coup. Although Washington was considering the probability of a "possible constitutional deviation" before the 1967 elections<sup>935</sup> it tried instead to preemptively undermine Andreas' imminent rise to political power. Washington's emphasis on Andreas is indicative of its broader Cold War anti-communist fixation, given how it underestimated the paramilitary influence within the Greek military, which had proven multiple times that it contained anti-democratic elements within it. But Washington always saw the Greek left as the predominant threat.

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<sup>934</sup> John Iatrides, "The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century", in *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis, and Fotini Bellou (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 91-92

<sup>935</sup> Rusk to Embassy (Greece), April 3, 1967. FRUS/XVI:267

The particularities of that political time also strengthened the fear that Greece could shift to neutrality—or worse, fall to communism. Johnson’s attitude towards Greece was influenced by the broader urge to contain soviet expansionism which defined Washington’s interventions during his presidency, especially towards Vietnam.<sup>936</sup> The fact that Johnson, a mostly domestically-minded politician with little knowledge or prior personal interest in world affairs, embraced so fervently the strategy of containment on a global scale<sup>937</sup> highlights Washington’s commitment to the ideological, and geopolitical imperative to prevail over world communism, irrespective of who was the occupant of the White House. Johnson’s astonishing cursing towards Greece and Cyprus is only a most graphic expression of his wider consequentialist attitude towards Greece, when it caused problems to Washington.

Still, the Johnson administration did not impose the Junta. Pattakos himself proudly reaffirmed this in an interview during the 2000s, boasting that the coup caught the CIA off-guard and that the American embassy had no idea if this was a right-wing or a left-wing movement.<sup>938</sup> Moreover, Washington’s confusion regarding the identity and motives of the coup leaves us with no doubt that this was not an American plot to transform Greece into a puppet state, as Greeks widely believed later. Instead, the coup forced Washington to consider how it could work more optimally with a government that had stirred a NATO member-state towards neo-fascism; this chapter showed that despite intending to maintain appearances, the Johnson administration sided with the Junta—almost immediately so. Johnson’s refusal to endorse the King’s counter-coup and his administration’s utter disregard for Georgios Papandreou’s request to do so could not be more indicative. Johnson’s approach may have been affected by his focus on the Vietnam War, which was annihilating his political capital, as by

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<sup>936</sup> Powaski, 300-301. See also: *Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 272-273

<sup>937</sup> Eric Goldman, *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 378

<sup>938</sup> GorillaGrodd1979, “Stylianos Pattakos – o Anthropos pou dietaxe ta tanks.”, YouTube video, 6:40-7:03, 31 May 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=igd8JG4oGwY>

early 1968 his approval rating had dropped to 26%, forcing him to rule himself out of the 1968 race.<sup>939</sup> But as long as Greece was secure under the colonels, it did not pose a problem.

Johnson's consequentialist policy paved the road for Nixon's more pronounced one. In the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine, Nixon never really considered an alternative to Papadopoulos and focused entirely on Greece's ability to defend both itself and American interests against a potential communist threat, internal or external. The political upheavals that the Eastern Mediterranean was experiencing at that political time were a contributing factor to this approach.<sup>940</sup> Nixon's proclaimed strategy of détente with the Soviet Union was aligned with the spirit of containment<sup>941</sup> hence Greece's place within Washington's wider strategy remained as instrumental as it had been since the Civil War. After all, the Junta guaranteed Athens' loyalty to Washington, when an otherwise democratically elected alternate leftwing administration led by Andreas Papandreu would not. Nixon's personal belief in the domino theory<sup>942</sup> and his broader geopolitical worldview informed his friendly disposition towards the Junta.

In sum, American interventionism in post-Civil War Greece remained largely consistent during the Junta years as well. The US was predominantly interested in keeping Greece within the West and responded accordingly to each major Greek political incident. Washington initially supported the pro-American conservative and anti-communist governments, interfering to ensure their electability. Washington then attempted to establish a bond with an anti-communist moderate leftwing alternative, but its policy towards Cyprus disillusioned the Papandreous. Afterwards, Washington focused mostly on avoiding the rise of

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<sup>939</sup> Joyce Kaufman, *A Concise History of US Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 119-120

<sup>940</sup> Papasotiriou, 47

<sup>941</sup> Paul Miller, *American Power and Liberal Order, A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2018), 112-113. See also: Glenn Hastedt, *American Foreign Policy, Past, Present, and Future* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 71-72

<sup>942</sup> Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism, American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (London: Penguin Books, 2011), 261-263

a prominent Andreas Papandreou whom it expected to undermine Greece's commitment to NATO, to the point of threatening him with arrest on false charges. Finally, Washington embraced and worked closely with an authoritarian regime, exactly because it served the geopolitical imperative of containment—just like all these prior interventions had done.

### **An ethical interpretation of American intervention during the Junta**

American interventionism towards Greece during the Junta falls entirely within this thesis' proposed consequentialist framework. As this chapter showed, Greeks widely believed that the US was deeply involved in Greek politics and thus expected from both the Johnson and Nixon administrations to use their influence as leverage to revert a profoundly immoral situation, at least in deontological terms. Although the average Greek citizen could not have a thorough grasp of how Washington conducted its foreign policy, the belief that there was indeed an American factor influencing Greek politics was correct, as this thesis has shown so far. What makes Washington's commitment to consequentialism even more profound is that both administrations—and especially Nixon's—were aware of an expectation from the Greek people that the US could use its influence towards democratization, but largely ignored it, especially in times of geopolitical crisis.

American neutrality regarding the Cyprus question since the Civil War had implied the shrewd consequentialist foreign policy that Washington would maintain in the region. Washington's efforts to not disadvantage Greece over Turkey and vice-versa, were proven detrimental in the long run at a time when Greeks viewed Cyprus' fate as an existential matter, exactly because Greek Cypriots were overrepresented in Cyprus. The imbalance between Cyprus' two ethnic populations made Washington's balanced approach unpopular in Greece. However, it was entirely justifiable from the American perspective, as no administration

wanted to disrupt the fragile geopolitical balance in the region by favoring either Greece or Turkey—two bitter rivals. But this balanced—and entirely consequentialist—approach informed Andreas Papandreou’s anti-American narrative in the 1960s, which he would later refine once the Junta collapsed, and use as a vehicle for political power throughout the 1970s<sup>943</sup>—very successfully so exactly because of the moral dimension he assigned to it, as this thesis will demonstrate.

Regarding the Junta, although both administrations recognized the contradiction between American values and Washington’s cooperation with a dictatorship, they never reversed their consequentialist course. In fairness, Johnson’s symbolic arms embargo indicated that he had a better grasp of the antithesis between the US status as the leader of the free world and its support to a military regime in Western Europe; this was not the case for Nixon and Kissinger, however. This chapter showed that as soon as Nixon won the presidency, his administration adopted a much friendlier approach towards the Junta in the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine; nothing highlights this more than Nixon’s decision to lift the heavy arms embargo. There could have been no greater proof for Nixon’s emphasis on the US imperative to contain communism, in which working with the Greek colonels—or several other undemocratic regimes around the world—was entirely justifiable from a consequentialist lens.

On a deeper level, three calculations account for Nixon's embrace of the colonels' regime. First, Nixon’s concerns regarding the Junta mostly focused on foreign criticism that he was receiving regarding American support; his manipulations to avoid criticism during NATO summits and his dismissal of Western Europeans’ concerns reflect his wider belief in America’s end to containment irrespective of the means used. Second, Nixon only actively pressured the Junta to proceed with some democratic reforms in the face of the 1972

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<sup>943</sup> James Miller, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 119



Presidential elections, as Greece's case could potentially cost him politically. Nixon never considered using his status as the Junta's "best friend"—in his own words—to help the regime make constructive steps towards liberalization but to maintain instead the consequentialist approach that he had adopted towards the Junta, from the start of his Presidency until his resignation. In other words, Nixon inherited Johnson's consequentialist approach but expanded it to an unprecedented extent.

Third, and perhaps most important, Washington disregarded all deontological counterarguments that were occasionally raised. Both two administrations—and especially Nixon's—faced credible deontological concerns and oppositions to their foreign policy towards the Junta, either from their European allies or from major American diplomats and cabinet members; yet in every single instance, consequentialism prevailed. Even when Walter Silva acutely recognized that an alarming number of Greeks felt betrayed in ideological and ethical terms by the US, the Nixon administration unconditionally maintained the same consequentialist approach. This thesis' conclusion will elaborate on how this juxtaposition between theory and practice in American foreign policymaking re-defined not only Greco-American relations but many Greeks' very own understanding of their country's place within international politics.

The element that makes American interventionism during the Junta the peak of consequentialist interventionism in the early Cold War is the largely unconditional support that Washington offered to the colonels. Instead of pushing the Junta to gradually re-democratize, it was Papadopoulos who blackmailed Washington, having acutely recognized that it could not afford to lose Greece. The fact that a man like Papadopoulos was confident enough to threaten the US that he would buy arms elsewhere, which sped up Nixon's efforts to resume full military aid, is most indicative of Nixon's priorities. Nixon, a President voted by millions of Americans, who enjoyed the confidence of millions of foreigners around the world—including Greeks'—

to promote and protect Western values, was eager to succumb to the blackmail of a group of obscure Greek military officers, which violated every principle that the US stood for— theoretically. In a way, Nixon’s consequentialist approach towards the Junta may have guaranteed the US regional hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean, but it could not have made America look any smaller in ideological terms in Greeks’ eyes, as all scholars who have explored the Junta and post-Junta years argue (see chapter one).

Another element that highlights Washington’s consequentialist interventionism during the Junta years is that the US was aware of the rising anti-American momentum. Even since 1971, Washington knew that its cooperation with the regime had started causing “anti-American resentment”<sup>944</sup> among many Greeks, while this chapter elaborated on how several diplomats frequently informed the Nixon administration that anti-American sentiments were becoming a constant within the Greek public opinion. Particularly in the aftermath of the Polytechnic uprising and during Ioannidis’ short—but excessively repressive—dictatorship, the administration was aware that anti-American sentiments had grown substantially. Still, despite the multiple memos from diplomats working on Greek affairs, and as evidenced in Kissinger’s long conversation with Tasca on Greeks’ resentment of the US support towards the Junta, Washington eventually opted for a hands-off policy, refusing to consider alternate options through which Washington could undermine Ioannidis.

The fact that Washington ignored intelligence on a surging Greek anti-American narrative reveals the extent to which it focused on the larger geopolitical picture alone. By 1974 the Nixon administration was fully aware that the US political capital had been weakened in Greece and that this could impede future Greco-American relations, and yet maintained the same consequentialist foreign that prioritized short-term interests at the expense of long-term

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<sup>944</sup> Davies to Johnson, May 7, 1971. FRUS/XXIX:313

ones. And shortly before the Cyprus debacle, the administration realized that its approach “best meets urgent short-term needs, but it does not provide well for long-term concerns”<sup>945</sup> but still maintained it despite knowing that anti-American sentiments were on the rise. This specific memorandum shows once again how consequentialist interventionism risked Washington’s long-term interests, by prioritizing short-term gains.

That is because, overall, American foreign policy towards the Junta displays Washington’s fixation with geopolitical hegemony and containment, but also exposes consequentialism’s merits and limitations. By working with the Junta, the US secured very easily Greece’s place in NATO, Athens’ loyal role in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as Washington’s interests in the region, and that without much difficulty, as the Junta never gave the US much geopolitical trouble until 1974; in the short-term, the consequentialist approach was indeed overwhelmingly successful. Upon the Junta’s collapse, however, the anti-American sentiments that the Americans’ cooperation with the regime allowed to grow would not only define post-Junta Greek political development but would also force the US to experience a long-term strenuous relationship with Greece, elements of which remain to this day. Again, Washington’s embrace of the colonels’ regime reveals that consequentialist interventionism was not always strategically wise in the long run.

But again, Greece was once more just another case of consequentialist interventionism during the Cold War. For instance, in April 1965 Johnson provided substantial military support to the Dominican military Junta—in the form of 22,000 American troops—to prevent its overthrow by pro-Castro Dominican communists. Johnson himself boasted that this intervention prevented the Dominican Republic’s fall to communism. This intervention reflected Johnson’s wider perspective on Latin American politics, as in 1964 he had offered

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<sup>945</sup> Lord to Kissinger, February 15, 1974, FRUS/XXX:10

American support to the Brazilian military in its effort to overthrow the leftwing Brazilian President, Joao Goulart. Upon the coup's success, Johnson swiftly recognized Field Marshall Castelo Branco as the legitimate Brazilian President. Johnson also supported financially the electoral campaigns of the pro-American Chilean President Eduardo Frei<sup>946</sup> a tactic that Washington had used consistently in Greece since the Civil War ended, always supporting the pro-American ES and ERE parties. Johnson considered Latin America as the US "backyard" and his interventions in countries like Chile, Panama, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic<sup>947</sup> only highlight this derogatory worldview.

Kennedy's successor also escalated the Vietnam War. Johnson's foreign policy decisions turned American involvement in the Southeast Asian country into an all-out war in the name of containing and defeating communism on a global scale.<sup>948</sup> Because Johnson firmly believed that South Vietnam would fall to the Vietcong without significant American support, he committed the US to a long-term costly war, out of which nothing substantial resulted during his term, eating away his political capital in the process.<sup>949</sup> Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War brought the use of military tactics that led to the murder of thousands of Vietnamese civilians<sup>950</sup> all of whom perished in the name of containing communism on the other side of the world from Washington. The domino theory still defined Washington's consequentialist interventionism.

Johnson passed down the Vietnam War to his own successor. Although Nixon initially stated that he would seek "peace with honor" in Vietnam, he proceeded with a complex mixture of strategies that practically re-attached Washington in the conflict.<sup>951</sup> Despite formally ending

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<sup>946</sup> Powaski, 154-155

<sup>947</sup> Powaski, 154-155

<sup>948</sup> Craig and Logevall, 234-235

<sup>949</sup> Powaski, 155-163

<sup>950</sup> Joseph Nye, *Do Morals Matter: Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 86-87

<sup>951</sup> Powaski, 176

the Vietnam War with the 1973 Peace Accords, the conflict practically ended with the fall of Saigon in 1975 in a humiliating defeat—highlighted by the relevant footage—much after Nixon had resigned the Presidency. But just like all his Cold War predecessors, Nixon pursued his very own consequentialist endeavors across the world, with Chile being another—and most infamous—one. This chapter has already referred to the overthrow of the democratically elected Marxist, Salvador Allende. Washington’s support military Junta of General Augusto Pinochet<sup>952</sup> explains the comparison that Greeks made between Greece and Chile. Nixon’s consequentialist legacy is far richer; as chapter two demonstrated, the Nixon administration engineered several consequentialist interventions in the context of the Cold War, which included Washington’s support for the Cambodian dictator Lon Nol. Also, the Nixon administration implemented the “tar baby” policy in Africa—and especially in Angola—to provide support to local white minorities, as it estimated that they would support Washington’s interests. Nixon also lifted the heavy arms embargo towards the South African apartheid regime.<sup>953</sup>

It is thus hardly surprising that Joseph Nye ranks both Johnson and Nixon among the least moral Cold War American Presidents in terms of their foreign policymaking.<sup>954</sup> But Nye’s assessment is deontological, not consequentialist—which is what both Johnson’s and Nixon’s interventions in Greece were. Washington’s persistent support towards the Greek Junta, reveals the lengths to which the US was willing to go, and the deontological boundaries it was willing to cross, to preserve American hegemony and prevail over communism. One can only wonder how Washington would have reacted, had Greece been taken over by a leftwing paramilitary group, instead of a far-right one. But most importantly, the man who was falsely accused of

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<sup>952</sup> Ibid, 197-198. See also: Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill & Wang 1986), 178-179

<sup>953</sup> Thomas Noer, “International Credibility and Political Survival: The Ford Administration’s Intervention in Angola”, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 23:4 (1993), 773

<sup>954</sup> Nye, (2020), 98, 94-95

orchestrating such a leftwing coup and whose power Washington had tried so hard to restrict before his imminent victory in the 1967 elections would indeed return to haunt his opponents, along with a re-energized Greek left and a re-legalized KKE. Andreas Papandreou would soon change Greek politics for the years to come, maximizing the political capital that America single-handedly offered him with its consistent—and unethical, in Greeks' eyes—interventionism in Greece from 1947 to 1974.

## **Chapter Seven:**

### **Andreas Papandreou's revenge and the loss of Greece**

*“Countries in which major change detrimental to key US interests*

*has at least an even chance of occurring:*

*Iran, El Salvador, Guatemala, Zaire, Greece, North Yemen.”*

CIA, 1981

This thesis has provided a thorough analysis of American interventionism in Greece from the Third Phase of the Greek Civil War in 1947 to the collapse of the Junta in 1974. It has also demonstrated how the “American factor” was dominant in Greek affairs throughout these 27 years, by intervening in all aspects of Greek politics, from nearly fixing elections to working closely with the Junta. This chapter will elaborate on the immediate legacy of American interventionism during the 1970s, a political time in which anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism rose to an unprecedented extent. This is indispensable for an ethical interpretation of American interventionism in Greece, as this chapter will highlight how Greeks’ resentment against Washington gained an unstoppable momentum, particularly through the leadership of Andreas Papandreou and the worldview he proposed to the Greek electorate.

#### **The Greek post-Junta political reshuffle**

Despite the major constitutional disruption that the Junta had caused, the restoration of democratic rule was quick. Through his “gradualist strategy” Konstantinos Karamanlis did not immediately purge the Greek state of the Junta’s civil service appointees and was thus able to avoid any major crises in the aftermath of the Turkish invasions of Cyprus. Moreover, he legalized KKE and formally abolished the Greek monarchy—the latter through a plebiscite—resolving two issues that had been dividing Greeks for decades.<sup>955</sup> Karamanlis also established ND (New Democracy) in his old ERE’s place, aiming to move Greek conservatism towards the center; the Greek PM noted that ND was “unreservedly national” but nonetheless envisioned Greece as an equal among “advanced European nations.”<sup>956</sup> In 1977, Karamanlis argued that ND’s ideology was “radical liberalism.”<sup>957</sup> Theoretically, this remains the party’s official ideological position.<sup>958</sup>

But Karamanlis’ initiatives to modernize post-Junta Greek conservatism were overshadowed by those of his emerging rival. Andreas Papandreou established PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) to challenge pre-Junta Greek conservative dominance; notably, although his late father’s CU still existed, Andreas charted his own course. In sharp contrast to Karamanlis’ efforts to approach the center, Andreas attempted to move the traditionally moderate and liberal CU voters towards the left as PASOK’s hybrid ethnocentric-Marxist ideology favored a “third road” to socialism. PASOK argued that “change” was indispensable after almost three decades of conservative rule that Greece had experienced since

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<sup>955</sup> Antonis Klapsis, “The Greek Transition to Democracy” in *The Greek Junta and the International System*, eds. Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou and Effie Pedaliu (New York: Routledge, 2020), 224-225. See also Stathis Kalyvas, *Katastrofes kai Thriamvoi*, (Athens: Papadopoulos, 2015), 190-192

<sup>956</sup> Kostas Karamanlis, “Minima K. Karamanli gia tous logous idrisis tis Neas Dimokratias, 31/10/1974.” Full Video, October 2, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5C3aH1kwI2Y>

<sup>957</sup> Nea Dimokratia, “Ayti einai I Nea Dimokratia,” YouTube Video, 6:01-6:12, December 17, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aT0C-2Qol04&t=2s>

<sup>958</sup> “Katastatiko.” Nea Dimokratia, <https://nd.gr/katastatiko>



the Civil War had ended, except for CU's brief administration.<sup>959</sup> On geopolitical matters, Andreas fervently opposed both the US and Western Europe, arguing since day one that Greece should exit NATO.<sup>960</sup>

PASOK succeeded the short-lived—but equally anti-American—PAK (Panhellenic Liberation Movement) which Andreas had founded in 1970 while abroad. In his PAK declaration, Andreas had argued that Greece was under “American occupation” referring to America as a “conqueror.” In his PASOK declaration, he argued that “the root of Greece’s calamity” is its “dependence on the imperialist establishment of the US and NATO.” Andreas stressed that Greece should “leave both the military and political branches of NATO” to achieve its “national independence” which he identified as the most important of the four aims he projected after “popular domination”, “social liberation”, and “democratic process.”<sup>961</sup> Andreas also accused Washington of instigating the 1967 coup as well as Ioannidis’ coup against Makarios in 1974.<sup>962</sup>

Akis Kalaitzidis suggests that PASOK is “a byproduct of Greece’s importance to the Cold War”<sup>963</sup> as renouncing American interventionism from 1947 to 1974 informed the party’s ideological core. Essentially, ND and PASOK projected two entirely different geopolitical worldviews for Greece: Karamanlis’ ND fervently sought to align Greece with Western Europe and gradually restore Greco-American relations, while Andreas’ PASOK projected a non-aligned geopolitical orientation, in which the US and Western Europe were considered Greece’s arch enemies.<sup>964</sup> Throughout the mid to late-1970s, PASOK succeeded in associating

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<sup>959</sup> Thomas Gallant, *Modern Greece, From the War of Independence to the Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 301-311

<sup>960</sup> PASOK, *I Appeili sto Aigaio: speeches of Andreas Papandreou, PASOK's positions* (Athens: PASOK, 1977), 80-81

<sup>961</sup> Andreas Papandreou, *Apo to PAK sto PASOK*, (Athens: Ladia, 1976a), 9-11

<sup>962</sup> Andreas Papandreou, 1976a, 78-84

<sup>963</sup> Akis Kalaitzidis, *Europe's Greece: a giant in the making* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 29

<sup>964</sup> Roderick Beaton, *Greece: biography of a Modern Nation* (London: Penguin, 2019), 345

ND with the pre-Junta Greek conservative administrations—thus neutralizing Karamanlis’ attempts to modernize Greek conservatism—while arguing simultaneously that Greece had been a victim of American imperialism since WWII had ended.<sup>965</sup>

### **The post-Junta disruption in Greco-American relations**

Once the Junta collapsed, Greco-American relations entered a period of prolonged instability, accompanied by a sharp rise in anti-Americanism. Ironically, the first major disruption came from Karamanlis, a man who proudly labeled himself as Washington’s best friend—and who had been exactly that for decades. Upon his return as PM, Karamanlis informed the Ford administration—with Gerald Ford having assumed the Presidency amidst the Cyprus crisis—that Greece would leave NATO’s military operations to protest Washington’s failure to restrain the Turkish invasions. Ambassador Henry Tasca decoded Karamanlis’ decision, noting that the Greek PM was cautious to “remain in the alliance ‘French Style’” in an obvious reference to Charles De Gaulle’s decision to take France out of NATO’s military operations while keeping it integrated within its political structure.<sup>966</sup> Tasca suggested several short- and long-term strategies to reapproach Greece and help it integrate more with the West—and primarily with Western Europe.

Tasca’s telegram contained two crucial details. First, he cautioned Ford that “Andreas Papandreou will, of course, do everything possible to exacerbate Greece’s relations with the US and the West” and expected that Greece’s neutralist “forces [...] will have their successes.” Still, Tasca believed that Washington’s consistent support to Karamanlis could mitigate the

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<sup>965</sup> Kevin Featherstone and Dimitris Papadimitriou, *The limits of Europeanization: reform capacity and policy conflict in Greece* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 42-43

<sup>966</sup> “Did you know that France did not leave NATO in 1966 but continued to play a very active role in the alliance?” *NATO*, <https://shape.nato.int/page214871012>

left's sharp anti-American and anti-Western narrative. The CIA also warned the Ford administration that "Papandreou and his colleagues in the far left have long rallied against NATO and US 'domination' of Greece" and could pose a "challenge to Greece's traditional political ties to the West."<sup>967</sup> Second, Tasca estimated that those Greeks "who are keyed into realities [...] must or will realize the most difficult dilemma which has faced our government in the development of the [Cyprus] crisis—i.e., the overriding necessity to bring our important allies together without irreparable damage in our NATO's relations with either one in the imperative interest of Western security in the Eastern Mediterranean."<sup>968</sup>

Once again, Tasca revealed what Washington's priority had been. In the aftermath of the crisis that led Greece's most pro-American political leader to take Greece outside NATO's military command structure, the ambassador summarized how the US had formulated its Cold War foreign policy towards Greece since 1947 and the Third Phase. What highlights Washington's consequentialist foreign policy regarding Cyprus is that although Turkey's first invasion was legal according to the treaties establishing Cyprus' independence the second one was outright illegal.<sup>969</sup> Still, Washington did not prevent Turkey from intervening, fearing a major NATO disruption of which the USSR could take advantage. The two invasions resulted in the arbitrary borders separating the Republic of Cyprus from the occupied territories to this day. In an entirely consequentialist narrative, Tasca reaffirmed that maintaining geopolitical superiority against the USSR was the sole imperative, even at the expense of major disruptions or the establishment of dangerous precedents.

Within a few weeks, a CIA report evaluated the post-Junta course of Greco-American relations. The report emphasized that "Karamanlis does not share the average Greek citizen's

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<sup>967</sup> Preliminary View of Greek Transition Government, July 26, 1974. CIA-RDP78S01932A000100140070-6

<sup>968</sup> Embassy to State, August 15, 1974. FRUS/XXX:20

<sup>969</sup> James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem: what everyone needs to know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 45

view about the extent of US responsibility for Greek reverses on Cyprus” but “felt obliged to make some dramatic gesture to placate public opinion.” The CIA also estimated that due to the sharp rise in anti-American sentiments, even if Greco-American relations improved, they would “be less cordial and more businesslike than they were during Karamanlis’ first term” referring to his ERE days.<sup>970</sup> The Ford administration realized that “Greeks’ bitter memories of the crisis would make it unlikely that relations with NATO could ever be restored” and proceeded with a thorough assessment of potential damage limitation scenarios, considering Greece’s new geopolitical status outside NATO’s military branch.<sup>971</sup>

### **1974-1981: the era of anti-Americanism**

The November 1974 election resulted in an overwhelming victory for Karamanlis. ND received 54.4% and 220 seats, CU received 32.2% and 60 seats, PASOK received 13.6% and 12 seats, and EA—which KKE had briefly joined—received 9.5% and 8 seats. In a pre-Junta fashion, the Ford administration rejoiced to see Karamanlis secure a comfortable absolute majority; however, Andreas’ seemingly disappointing result was Washington’s real reason to celebrate. Before the election, the CIA had characterized Andreas as “the most feared and controversial figure on the Greek political scene” who projected an ideology that was “intensely nationalist, militantly anti-American, anti-NATO, neutralist, and vaguely socialist with a large dose of expediency” while commending Karamanlis’ self-identification as “the last pro-American” in Greece.<sup>972</sup> Once more, Washington had clear preferences in Greek elections, just like it did before the Junta.

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<sup>970</sup> CIA paper, August 29, 1974. FRUS/XXX:22.

<sup>971</sup> Memorandum, October 1974. FRUS/XXX:26

<sup>972</sup> Memorandum, November 5, 1974. FRUS/XXX:28

Andreas now instilled even greater fear in Washington than he did before 1967. But PASOK's distant third place led American officials to make several overconfident predictions about his political prospects; the CIA, for instance, believed that Andreas' "reckless rhetoric" had alienated voters and that his "political future does not seem promising."<sup>973</sup> The new American ambassador Jack Kubisch—another career diplomat who had previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs<sup>974</sup>—argued that Andreas now had to sustain "his financing, his charisma, and his liver" suggesting that although "at 56" he was not too old, he did not have "very bright" political prospects. Kubisch even suggested that "after Ioannides and Papadopoulos, Andreas Papandreu is probably the most disliked Greek around" and, in a premature political obituary, he concluded that Andreas "is the ever aging politician committed to wooing the young vote" but that "the results of the November 17 election suggest that he has become a political exile in his own country."<sup>975</sup> More inaccurate predictions have rarely been made.

Despite finishing third, Andreas doubled down on his rhetoric. In his almost 600-paged 1974 book entitled "Democracy at the firing squad" Andreas argued that Greece had been under "American occupation" since 1947 and that PASOK had embarked on a "national-liberating struggle" to free Greece from "American imperialism as expressed through NATO." Andreas did not limit his analysis to the Junta years alone but argued instead that America's corrosive interference in Greek politics started with the Greek Civil War; for the first time since 1974, another party other than KKE argued that American interference in the Civil War had been entirely unethical. Post-1974, PASOK—along with KKE—gradually established an

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<sup>973</sup> President's Daily Brief: Greece, November 22, 1974. CIA-RDP79T00936A012300010052-3

<sup>974</sup> FRUS, "Jack Bloom Kubisch"

<sup>975</sup> Embassy (Athens) to State, November 20, 1974. FRUS/XXX:30

increasingly dominant leftwing narrative that suggested that the Civil War was initiated by “Anglo-Americans” urge to interfere in Greek politics to serve their selfish interests.<sup>976</sup>

This narrative was essential in turning America into an existential enemy in the eyes of Greeks. Distancing himself from his moderate, social-democratic, and anti-communist father—who had briefly served as national unity PM during the Civil War—Andreas argued that “the US government was deeply disturbed by the vision of the red flag flying over Athens’ rooftops” hence committed massive resources to annihilate Greek communists in the “first American experiment of political interventionism outside the new world.” Andreas praised the Greek rebels repeatedly and even doubted the legitimacy of the “victorious government” arguing that it had been “imposed by foreigners” to convince Greeks that “Greece was safe for democracy.”<sup>977</sup> Andreas’ irony regarding Woodrow Wilson’s legacy is clear.

Andreas did not end there. PASOK’s leader accused America of having transformed Greece into a “satellite state” during the 1950s and the 1960s through its symbiotic relationship with Alexandros Papagos’ and Karamanlis’ conservative pro-American administrations and blamed Washington for causing the persistent stalemate in Cyprus that eventually led to the two Turkish invasions. After arguing that his father’s CU administration had been sabotaged by the US, and highlighting how Washington cooperated with the colonels’ regime, Andreas concluded that Greece could only prosper if it broke its ties with the US altogether.<sup>978</sup> In other words, Andreas proved indeed that he was the “most feared” man in Greek politics—but for Washington.

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<sup>976</sup> Stathis Kalyvas and Nikos Marantzidis, *Emfylio Pathi: 23 Erotiseis kai Apantiseis gia ton Emfylio* (Athens: Metaihmio, 2015), 506-507

<sup>977</sup> Andreas Papandreou, *I Dimokratia sto Apospasma* (Athens: Karanasi, 1974), 28

<sup>978</sup> Andreas Papandreou, 1974, see chapters 4,5,7

Andreas' ability to mix nationalism, socialism, and geopolitical neutralism in his rhetoric propelled PASOK to second place in the 1977 elections.<sup>979</sup> ND dropped to 41.8% and 171 seats, while PASOK received 25.3% and 93 seats; KKE competed on its own, receiving 9.4% and 11 seats. Although Karamanlis secured once more an absolute majority, his parliamentary advantage was not as comfortable as it used to be, while Andreas had almost doubled his electoral share—and had become leader of the official opposition—by directly attacking Karamanlis and his relationship with Washington. Andreas even suggested that Karamanlis wanted to resurrect the single-party conservative dominance of the 1950s with Washington's blessings and argued that all Greek conservative leaders had been Washington's marionettes throughout the Cold War.<sup>980</sup> Andreas not only had not toned down his anti-American rhetoric but made a conscious effort to identify Karamanlis and ND as an extension of American imperialism—and a resonance of Washington's interference in Greece since 1947.

Andreas' case against American interventionism was absolute and hardline, but his views were becoming increasingly popular in post-1974 Greece, despite Washington's initial predictions. Karamanlis' decision to take Greece out of NATO's military command did little to appease many Greeks' increasing resentment towards what they considered as an American treason in Cyprus, which built on their rage for Washington's prior appeasement of the Junta. PASOK's officials implemented a grassroots campaign and capitalized on Andreas' clear-cut foreign policy ideas, compared to Karamanlis, who was cautiously trying to maintain a working balance with the US while moving Greece closer to Western Europe. The eventual rise of anti-Americanism into a major political narrative beyond the 1974 elections only demonstrates that it was turning into a systemic force within Greek politics, instead of a reactionary one.

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<sup>979</sup> Gallant, 309-311

<sup>980</sup> Papandreou, 1976a, 18

The 1977 election proved that Americans like Kubisch had rushed to write off Andreas, PASOK, and the anti-American momentum. In the aftermath of the result, the CIA—which had produced several reports on Andreas’ anti-American speeches since the Junta and especially after its collapse<sup>981</sup>—argued that “Papandreou’s emergence as the main opposition leader would likely lead to greater polarization in Greek politics” adding that now he would “doubtless [...] move for national leadership whenever Karamanlis leaves the scene” and noting how “his bid for power [...] helped provoke the military coup in 1967.”<sup>982</sup> This thesis demonstrated that this was exactly the case, as Andreas’ imminent rise to power in the 1967 elections was the key reason why the colonels implemented the coup, but also the reason why the Johnson administration tried to blackmail Andreas’ father—a sitting PM of a sovereign country. But even that was justified for the sake of containing the younger Papandreou’s power.

Unsurprisingly, Andreas’ impressive result worried the Carter administration, which had succeeded Ford’s earlier in 1977. Jimmy Carter and Karamanlis had immediately attempted to bridge the bilateral gap on matters ranging from Greece’s future within NATO to finding a settlement for Cyprus<sup>983</sup> while the White House considered Karamanlis’ potential retirement constituted a “risk” of “handling Greece to Andreas.”<sup>984</sup> Andreas’ increasingly anti-American rhetoric throughout ND’s first term—as evidenced in almost all of his speeches of that era<sup>985</sup>—was highly successful, as PASOK’s rise to official opposition foreshadowed that Andreas could eventually become PM. Only days after the 1977 elections, the CIA admitted that Andreas, who had “declared that he was the real winner” also had clear “ambitions to

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<sup>981</sup> For example, see: CIA-RDP79T00975A0119005001-4, CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120026-4, CIA-RDP79T00975A026800010026-6, RDP79T00975A026800010032-9, RDP79T00975A026800010054-5, RDP79T00936A012200010058-8, RDP79-00927A010900110001-1, among dozens of others.

<sup>982</sup> National Intelligence Cable: Greece, November 21, 1977. CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010064-3

<sup>983</sup> See for example documents 174, 179, 180 from FRUS XXI volume (1977-1980) cited in this chapter.

<sup>984</sup> Memorandum, June 2, 1978. FRUS/XXI:176

<sup>985</sup> Papandreou’s 1976 book *Apo to PAK sto PASOK* includes the most extensive archive of Andreas’ speeches and positions on these matters.



succeed Karamanlis” and would probably “play a much larger role in the post-Karamanlis era [...] since there is no politician who can match his appeal.”<sup>986</sup>

### **A European debate through American filters**

During ND’s second term, Andreas added a crucial element to his anti-American narrative. As the leader of the official opposition, Andreas argued that the EEC (European Economic Community) which Karamanlis wanted Greece to join was nothing more than “another face of NATO” hence “subject to American dominance.”<sup>987</sup> In another book published in 1976, Andreas maintained his anti-American rhetoric and renunciations of American interventionism since 1947, but also argued that PASOK would modify the Greek constitution to “cancel of international agreements [...] which bound Greece to the economic, political, and military dependence on Western monopolies and broadly Western imperialism”<sup>988</sup> By identifying the EEC with America, Andreas’ PASOK projected an even more refined neutralist foreign policy, merging anti-Americanism and Eurosepticism into a broader anti-Western narrative.

Andreas’ rhetoric gained momentum in the late 1970s. Both before and after the 1977 election, Andreas renounced the EEC arguing that “even though the US is not visible, it clearly acts as the supreme power” within it, suggesting that “the belief that Western Europe is a protector of democratic rule” is nothing but “a big misunderstanding.”<sup>989</sup> Andreas repeatedly argued that ND’s dependence on Washington in the style of the early Cold War Greek conservative administrations, as well as Karamanlis’ support for an American-driven EEC,

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<sup>986</sup> National Intelligence Daily Cable: Greece: Election Results, November 23, 1977. CIA-RPD79T00975A030400010068-9

<sup>987</sup> Andreas Papandreou, (1976a), 112-115

<sup>988</sup> Andreas Papandreou, *I Ellada stous Ellines*, (Athens: Karanasi, 1976b), 30-31

<sup>989</sup> Andreas Papandreou, (1976a), 306

constructed a form of “xenocracy.”<sup>990</sup> The similarity between Andreas’ accusations of “xenocracy” with KKE’s accusations of “americanocracy” in the early 1950s is hard to miss. PASOK even argued that the “US and the EEC” formed a “danger of another dictatorship.”<sup>991</sup>

Greece’s ascension to the EEC falls outside the scope of this thesis. Still, we should emphasize that Karamanlis deeply believed that Greece’s prosperity depended on its EEC membership. The Greek PM did not view the EEC as a substitute for the US—while despite his proven pro-American disposition, he felt personally offended by Washington’s failure to prevent the Turkish invasions.<sup>992</sup> Karamanlis believed that by joining the EEC, Greece would benefit predominantly in political terms instead of purely economic—which were also remarkably important in his mind—as the community would provide Greece with a security umbrella which would protect its democratic integrity.<sup>993</sup> Such was Karamanlis’ willingness to turn Greece into an EEC member-state that he—a publicly cold and distant person—attempted to invoke European leaders’ sentimentalism to ignore the structural weaknesses of the Greek economy and support Greece’s candidacy.<sup>994</sup>

It was Greece’s EEC membership bid that birthed two phrases that revealed Greeks’ opposing geopolitical worldviews. During a debate with Andreas in June 1977, Karamanlis argued in an unusually emotional tone for his standards—while specifically addressing Papandreou—that “Greece, politically, defensively, economically, and culturally belongs to the West” under an outburst of applause by ND’s MPs.<sup>995</sup> Karamanlis’ semantically strong and succinct phrase became a symbol for pro-Western Greeks to this day. Yet Karamanlis’ phrase

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<sup>990</sup> Andreas Papandreou, (1976b), 251-271

<sup>991</sup> PASOK, *Ellada kai Koini Agora: o antilogos* (Athens: PASOK, 1976), 48-49, 128-130

<sup>992</sup> Eirini Karamouzi, *Greece, the EEC, and the Cold War, 1974-1979: the second enlargement* (London: Palgrave, 2014), 33

<sup>993</sup> Kalyvas, (2015), 203-06

<sup>994</sup> Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 188-189

<sup>995</sup> Elliniko Imerologio-Ellinoistorin, “I Ellas anikei eis tin Dysin (K. Karamanlis 12/6/1976).” YouTube Video, full, June 11, 2015, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wi75X\\_IGWoo&t](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wi75X_IGWoo&t)

was countered by an equally strong and succinct response, with Andreas arguing back that “Greece belongs to the Greeks” in what had become Andreas’ favorite catchphrase and PASOK’s main slogan. The force of Andreas’ phrase was so appealing that he selected it as the title of his 1976 anti-American book, repeatedly used it against Karamanlis and ND until the 1981 elections and was widely espoused by PASOK supporters—and later, even by opponents as well; this phrase is today enshrined on Andreas’ tombstone. Both phrases still resonate in Greek politics whenever a debate on Greece’s geopolitical status emerges.

Karamanlis won that battle and on May 28, 1979, he signed Greece’s Treaty of Ascension to the EEC, which entered into force on January 1, 1981.<sup>996</sup> In one of his final letters as President, Carter congratulated Karamanlis, emphasizing the future importance of Greece’s ascension to the EEC.<sup>997</sup> which had also been supported by the Ford administration. By joining the EEC, Karamanlis had succeeded in providing Greece with a robust safety net in both political and economic terms, which would influence Greece’s future foreign policy decisions in ways that Washington would most probably welcome. Andreas realized this more than anyone else as on the day that Karamanlis brought the relevant treaty to the seven-party Hellenic Parliament, he and PASOK’s MPs left their seats in protest—with KKE’s MPs doing so as well.<sup>998</sup> The fact that these were the two parties that held the most polemical positions against America in the immediate years after the Junta collapsed only suggests that the EEC was indeed viewed by them—and their voters—as a manifestation of American influence in Western Europe.

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<sup>996</sup> Eirini Karamouzi, “The argument that Greece was granted EEC accession prematurely ignores the historical context in which the decision was made.” LSE blogs, November 25, 2014, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/11/25/the-argument-that-greece-was-granted-eec-accession-prematurely-ignores-the-historical-context-in-which-the-decision-was-made/>

<sup>997</sup> State to Embassy (Greece), January 3, 1981. FRUS/XXI:212

<sup>998</sup> Thanos Veremis and Ioannis Kolliopoulos, *Neoteri Ellada* (Athens: Pataki, 2018), 324

Still, Washington failed to realize that Greece's EEC membership was not enough to reverse what had gradually transformed into a systemic force. The Carter administration believed that Greece had secured both a "good agreement" but, above everything else, that "opposition leader Papandreou made an enormous mistake in opposing [the] ascension that will ultimately lose him votes."<sup>999</sup> But these estimations were inaccurate; only six months later, the CIA reported that despite Greece's successful EEC bid "the government's popularity and Karamanlis' substantial personal prestige appear to be declining" as a result of "public concern in Greece about the reliability of the allies—particularly the US" which made the ND administration "vulnerable to criticism for its pro-Western stance."<sup>1000</sup> This report forced Washington to realize how strong Greek anti-Americanism was becoming in post-Junta Greece, as well as that it was expanding into a broader anti-Western sentiment; Greeks' historical memory of American interventionism was taking political shape.

With Karamanlis soon announcing his decision to seek the office of the Hellenic Presidency, ND had to select a new leader—and PM—before the 1981 elections. Simultaneously, Andreas' more inclusive and domestic policy-oriented slogan "Change" proved to be effective in attracting a critical mass of moderate voters.<sup>1001</sup> Still, Andreas maintained his staunch anti-American and anti-European tone, arguing repeatedly that "NATO exercises complete control over Western Europe" and advocated for an "unchained Greek foreign policy" outside NATO and the EEC.<sup>1002</sup> Throughout this campaign as well, Andreas repeatedly emphasized that Karamanlis' post-Junta administration had only been a changing of the guards in the eyes of Washington's foreign policy apparatus, characterizing ND's administration as a continuation of "the State of the right" which had always been "dependent"

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<sup>999</sup> Vance to State, June 1, 1979. FRUS/XXI:189

<sup>1000</sup> The Greek Political Scene, January 6, 1980. CIA-RDP85T00287R000100300001-9

<sup>1001</sup> Gallant, 311

<sup>1002</sup> Andreas Papandreou, (1976b), 79

on US support.<sup>1003</sup> Even with victory in sight, Andreas doubled down on a strategy that had served him well throughout the 1970s—and which had disproved Washington’s predictions.

### **Andreas’ revenge**

The inevitable could not be prevented anymore—and Washington knew it. Only two months before the 1981 elections, the CIA included Greece in an extensive report on countries in which “major change detrimental to key US interests has at least an even chance of occurring” with Greece’s counterparts being Iran, El Salvador, Guatemala, Zaire, and North Yemen. Commenting on US interests in Greece, the CIA briefed the staunchly anticommunist—particularly in its early years—administration of Ronald Reagan that “US interests will probably suffer if a PASOK or a PASOK-dominated government is elected” emphasizing Andreas’ relentless opposition to the EEC as well. The CIA added that if Andreas secured an overwhelming victory, Karamanlis—as President—would be unable to restrain him, suggesting that PASOK’s leader could “follow through on much of the extreme rhetoric” he had voiced throughout the 1970s. The CIA concluded that Andreas’ imminent anti-American and anti-Western policies “would reduce Western strength and cohesion and advance Soviet objectives.”<sup>1004</sup> That is what it had always been about for Washington, from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan—and this is exactly what this thesis has demonstrated.

Andreas’ political and personal redemption came on October 18, 1981. In a stunning result, PASOK received 48.1% and 172 seats, while ND, now led by Georgios Rallis—who had succeeded Karamanlis as PM in 1980—received only 35.9% and 115 seats; KKE finished third, receiving 10.9% and the remaining 13 seats. Only a day before the election, the CIA

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<sup>1003</sup> Andreas Papandreou, *Gia mia Sosialistiki Koinonia* (Athens: Aihmi, 1979), 75

<sup>1004</sup> Political Instability and Regional Tensions, September 14, 1981. CIA-RDP84B00049R001102650016-5

briefed Reagan that although Rallis had built encouraging momentum “the socialists, nevertheless, attracted the larger crowds.”<sup>1005</sup> Andreas’ victory forced Washington to see the man that several administrations had attempted to prevent from leading Greece do so single-handedly, as there is no denying that PASOK’s victory was essentially his own. Andreas’ magnetic charisma, effective leadership, relentless cornering of the Greek right, firm and radical foreign policy vision, and personal ability to resonate with post-Junta Greek society, all were reasons why PASOK went from a minor opposition party to form a single-party socialist government in just seven short years.<sup>1006</sup>

But PASOK’s victory was historic for two more reasons. First, PASOK formed the first socialist administration in Greek history, and second—and most important—this was achieved through completely free and fair elections.<sup>1007</sup> This thesis showed how deeply Washington intervened in Greek politics in the early Cold War so that Greece would be led by a pro-American government, pushing for convenient electoral reforms, funding loyal parties, and threatening elected officials, in the most consequentialist manner. The CIA’s telegram which argued that a PASOK administration would undermine American interests and favor the USSR resonates with the intelligence and diplomatic telegrams that all of Reagan’s predecessors had received since Washington’s first intervention in Greece in 1947. From the KKE and the Plastiras/Venizelos alliance to the elder Papandreou’s CU and the younger’s PASOK, the US considered that the Greek left would weaken American influence over Greek politics, potentially costing Washington an indispensable ally at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

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<sup>1005</sup> National Intelligence Daily: Greece: Election Preview, October 17, 1981. CIA-RDP83T00296R000400030068-1

<sup>1006</sup> Clogg, 193-194

<sup>1007</sup> Gallant, 347

As this thesis emphasized throughout, Greece was just too valuable to lose to neutrality—or worse, for Washington—to the Soviet sphere of influence. But in post-Junta Greece, Washington found an unbeatable opponent in Andreas, while the formation and the rapid transformation of PASOK into a real alternative to ND was a critical juncture for Greek political development. As Ilias Nikolakopoulos points out, PASOK's continuous rise in popularity—and increasingly good electoral results on both a national and a municipal level—were due to Andreas' radical and populist rhetoric, which consistently drew references from American interventionism during the pre-Junta years. More importantly, Nikolakopoulos argues that PASOK's rise—and eventual victory in 1981—was possible because Andreas' rhetoric appealed to the majority of the youth, but also to increasingly more middle-income and centrist voters, who in the past would never vote for a party that positioned itself that far left.<sup>1008</sup> Andreas' adoption of a fervently anti-American rhetoric throughout the 1970s not only did not alienate Greeks, but also appealed to them to an extent that they made him PM in 1981, by historic margins.

And this reveals how much Greeks resented the US by this point. With Greece's anti-American prophet leading PASOK to an overwhelming victory, and Washington's original foe, the KKE, emerging as the undisputed third largest party in Greek politics squeezing ND—the successor of the long-entrusted pro-American parties of ES and ERE—it looked like Greece would leave the American sphere of influence, despite Washington doing its best to prevent this for twenty-seven years. And if one considers how Greek anti-Americanism—which still influences Greek politics as the first chapter of this thesis showed—informed this outcome, then it seems reasonable to suggest that Greeks' historical memory of America's deep and

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<sup>1008</sup> Ilias Nikolakopoulos, "Elections and Voters, 1974-2004" in Kevin Featherstone (ed.) *Politics and Policy in Greece* (London: Routledge, 2006), 42-45

persistent consequentialist interventionism in the early Cold War eventually backfired for Washington. In 1981, it seemed that the US had finally lost Greece.



## Chapter Eight:

### Consequentialism Revisited

*“Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power.”*

Thucydides, Melian Dialogue, 461 BC

On April 30, 1972, right in the heart of the Junta era and nine years before Andreas Papandreou led his socialist PASOK to the historic 1981 victory capitalizing on a relentless anti-American and anti-Western political narrative, he had given an interview in America which has now been long forgotten. Specifically, Andreas was interviewed by the conservative journalist, William F. Buckley Jr., who hosted his “Firing Line” program for more than three decades; in a most confident move, the interview was held in Washington DC, only a few blocks away from the White House and the State Department. This interview is indispensable because it reveals how Andreas interpreted American foreign policymaking towards Greece during the Cold War, expressing a firm moral position against the US—which he would later be instrumental in making mainstream across Greece.

Andreas set the tone from the beginning. Right after being introduced by Buckley—who had emphasized Andreas’ distinguished academic career in the US and his American citizenship—the future socialist PM said that he was no longer an American citizen and was “speaking as a Greek” to “plead a cause in the US” as the American government “has a decisive influence on the fate” the country. Andreas elaborated that “as a democrat” he identified “with the cause of the people and of freedom, of open society” denouncing “militarism in all its

forms” before turning to the colonels’ regime to argue that “the only source of strength of this junta [...] is not its popular appeal or its popular base, but the armed forces” which were “very much integrated into NATO, into the structure of command that has its apex at the Pentagon.” As chapter six showed, Andreas was right on this one.

Andreas added that “cutting off military aid would have a fantastic symbolic significance” as it would show that the alliance “no longer approves of what is happening in Greece.” A few moments later, Andreas first introduced the arguments he repeated throughout the 1970s, arguing how Greeks consider the Junta “to be a military occupation of Greece” instead of an “internal dictatorship” elaborating how this was “a military occupation of Greece by NATO and under the general guidance of the Pentagon.” Andreas assigned a moral responsibility to US interventionism during the Junta years, arguing that it would be the ethical thing to do for “the government of the US to say we cut off military aid because this is an oppressive regime, because these would be the grounds of course, it’s a neo-fascist regime.” Andreas also added that Greece had become “an American outpost” due to its position “in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.” This thesis presented several times how much American foreign policymakers valued Greece’s strategic position since their first intervention in 1947.

Andreas expanded the scope of his analysis beyond Washington’s cooperation with the Junta. First, he referred to the intermediate years between the Civil War and the coup of 1967, arguing that after KKE’s defeat and until the CU’s electoral victory in 1963 “we had in Greece something of a garrison state” noting that Greek communism no longer posed an immediate threat to the integrity of Greek democracy. Second, he added that his father’s CU had replaced KKE in the eyes of American foreign policymakers, noting how “we were the danger in Greece this time, and we represented 53% of the people, and that is why a dictatorship was necessary to suppress not us, but the Greek people.” Andreas exaggerated the extent to which his father

was feared in Washington compared to himself (see chapters five and six) but this exaggeration served his narrative exceptionally well. After all, this thesis showed that he was right to suggest that CU had indeed replaced KKE as Washington's source of concern in Greek politics.

Andreas expanded his analysis, going back to the Civil War and Washington's first intervention in Greece, using the phrase that defined his post-Junta career: "Greece should belong to Greeks." He commented that Greece should be "an ally but not a satellite" and that Greeks "didn't want to be Washington's Bulgaria, or even Czechoslovakia." To that end, he referred to General Van Fleet's arrival in Greece to train the Greek armed forces in the Civil War and noted how he was told "General, these are your troops" as shown in chapter three. Andreas noted how he "would have never shown the Greek troops to any general of a foreign nation, allied or not, and say to him 'here are your troops'" adding that only "Thieu would do this" in a direct reference to American interventionism in Vietnam. Andreas essentially argued that Washington's ambition had always been to turn Greece into a puppet state, disrespecting entirely Greek sovereignty.

Andreas then proceeded with a complete rejection of American interventionism in Greece in the early Cold War. He argued that the experiences of seeing Greece turning into a "garrison state" as well as Washington's support of the Junta inevitably led to the conclusion that "the Truman Doctrine, after 25 years of Cold War and intervention on a global scale looks very different today than it looked on the day when President Truman [...] announced to Congress that the US had to support the Greek government to defend its existence and its institutions, the freedom, self-determination and freedom, and democratic institutions" suggesting that the Greek experience of American interventionism had reduced the ideological component of Truman's speech into "a tiny slogan." In other words, based on the symbiotic relationship between Washington and the Greek conservative governments, as well as on NATO's intention "to keep the colonels in power" Andreas argued that whatever good

American interference in the Greek Civil War had supposedly produced—most probably referring to the economic aid packages—was not because of Washington’s adherence to its principles, but of its strategic prioritizations.

Andreas added that, above everything else, Greeks opposed American foreign policymaking and interventionism in Greece on a moral basis. As he put it, his overarching point against America and the West “is a moral point.” Andreas elaborated that “we have seen the West in the context of the NATO alliance, which was presumably established to defend self-determination, integrity and democratic institutions [...] become the instrument of oppression in Greece.” Andreas renounced US leadership within the alliance, arguing that as NATO’s “senior member” it should “respect the member nations that have joined the alliance to defend their own freedoms and their integrity” noting however, how Washington had “accepted” or “imposed” authoritarian states instead across the world. Andreas was right on that too, as all Cold War administrations had done what he was accusing them of.

Towards the end of the interview, Andreas argued that the West “should leave us alone to find our way” and then “deal with us on equal terms, morally equal terms, with the elected representatives of our people.” In his concluding remarks, he commented that “after the confirmation that NATO really tends to keep the colonels in power, we have no choice but to say we want out of that” as Greeks “want out of any military alliance that suppresses freedom.” In a final remarkable parallelism between American and Soviet foreign policymaking in the context of the Cold War, the future Greek PM commented that the Greek resentment against America “is at least as strong with respect to the Warsaw Pact, which has the Hungarys and Czechoslovakias in its history” in an obvious reference to the 1956 Hungarian and the 1968

Czech revolutions against the Soviet puppet governments imposed in both countries, which were brutally suppressed by Moscow.<sup>1009</sup>

In this interview, Andreas projected a fervently deontological condemnation of American interventionism in Greece. His eventually became the mainstream ethical interpretation of American foreign policy in post-Junta Greek society, as this thesis' chapters one and seven showed. And from a deontological perspective, it is impossible to argue against the case that he made; from 1947 to 1974, Washington did indeed cross all deontological red lines for the sake of keeping Greece within the American sphere of influence, in ways that were entirely juxtaposed to the principles of freedom, democracy, and self-determination. Through this lens, the meteoric rise of Greek anti-Americanism in post-Junta Greece, its expansion into a wider anti-Western sentiment, and the durability of both to this day could only lead one to conclude that American interventionism towards Greece during the Cold War was first, unethical, and second, unsuccessful. This thesis will now conclude that this is not the case.

### **Why American interventionism in Greece was ethical—and consistently so**

The introduction of this thesis elaborated on how Greeks' poor appreciation of the US is highly dependent on the historical memory of American interventionism in the early Cold War. The high levels of Greek resentment against the US and the outlier case of Greek anti-Americanism within Western Europe are largely attributed to the Greek belief that the US mistreated Greece throughout the Cold War. After the Junta's collapse—which was the most profound expression of a series of seemingly immoral interventions in Greece—the Greek people retaliated against the US, and by extension, the West, primarily on moral terms, as the American support to the colonels' regime was considered an entirely immoral and indefensible

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<sup>1009</sup> Andreas Papandreou, Firing Line interview, April 30, 1972. CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020008-5

act.<sup>1010</sup> In that sense, Andreas’ “moral point” against the US, and his emphasis on Washington’s *immorality* could hardly be countered, as it resonated with Greeks’ accumulated resentment against Washington since 1947. Notably, pro-American Greeks have found it very difficult to express their preference for a strong Greco-American partnership since 1974 and throughout the decades that followed the Junta’s collapse.<sup>1011</sup>

But this thesis argues that the moral narrative that birthed, fueled, and sustains Greek resentment towards America is at best limited, if not fundamentally naïve. That is because the Greek moral case against American foreign policy and interventionism is purely deontological, hence entirely one-sided. Most Greeks’ fundamental criticism of Cold War American interventionism is that the practice of foreign policymaking was often—and in the Greek case entirely—juxtaposed to the values that the US supposedly stood for, exactly like Andreas had argued. Arguably, meddling with another sovereign nation’s foreign affairs by manipulating elections hardly meets the standards of self-determination, and supporting a full-fledged military dictatorship certainly does not live up to the ideational standards of protecting and promoting freedom and democracy. This thesis exposed how the US indeed violated its own principles multiple times and in different interventions in Greece—as well as that several American foreign policymakers were aware of this, but nonetheless pursued the same course. From a deontological perspective thus, there is little doubt that the US is morally culpable.

The reason why this criticism is limited is that American foreign policymaking in the Cold War was driven by consequentialist ethics, instead of deontological ones. The second chapter of this thesis elaborated in detail on the elements that defined the practice of American foreign policy in the spirit of the Cold War, in which containing and eventually prevailing over the Soviet sphere of influence was considered both a geopolitical and an existential imperative,

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<sup>1010</sup> Stathis Kalyvas, *Katastrofes kai Thriamvoi* (Athens: Papadopoulos, 2015), 195

<sup>1011</sup> Adonis Georgiadis, “Yper Amerikis o logos”, 2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nHB7sg3xaBQ>

exactly because of the overwhelming influence of American exceptionalism in Americans' psyche. For the sake of achieving this purpose Washington's interventions in Greece—and beyond—which violated several, if not all, deontological boundaries imaginable, were nonetheless considered justifiable, exactly because they contributed to Washington's quest to achieve the greater good in the ethos of the Cold War: to prevail over world communism. As gruesome and cold as it may sound, this is exactly how consequentialist ethics work: the morality of an act depends on the consequences it leads to, not on the specifics of the act itself, as deontology dictates. The case of Greece—along with multiple other cases of American interventionism—demonstrates that a series of controversial endeavors and decisions were justified because of their contribution to containment.

Washington's consequentialist foreign policy towards Greece was also highly consistent throughout these twenty-seven years. In the Greek Civil War, the US intervened on the side of the Greek government against a communist insurgency, yet its main ambition was not to preserve the integrity of Greek constitutionalism but to ensure that Greece would remain within the American sphere of influence. The increasing level of interventionism after each disappointing year, the relentless supply of economic aid, the continuous provision of military training to the Greek Army, the meddling in the selection of key Greek personnel, the political pressures to curtail any left-wing activity, the dispatching of American generals to train the Greek forces, the consideration of dispatching American troops on the ground, the consideration of working with a right-wing authoritarian Greek regime if it emerged naturally during the Civil War—as it did later in the late 1960s—and the supply of advanced weapons which were used on Greeks by Greeks are all evidence that Washington considered the wider significance of the Civil War's outcome, instead interpreting it as a standalone event. American foreign policymakers' admission of the motives of the US' first intervention in Greek affairs only demonstrates their priorities.

Similarly, the quieter 1950s also gave us multiple evidence of consequentialist interventionism. Washington's pressure to manipulate electoral laws that served the interests of its most loyal Greek parties, its polemical stance against the moderate left-wing Plastiras/Venizelos alliance, its pressure not to punish members of a military apparatus that almost toppled a democratically elected government—which did not succeed only because Alexandros Papagos ordered its instigators to disband—and its eventual enthusiastic endorsement of Papagos' political ambitions—whose military footprint had originally established him as an American safety net in case the Greek constitution collapsed—and its political pressuring on ES' and later ERE's conservative administrations to maintain a tough position on leftwing Greeks and communist sympathizers, hardly meet the deontological standards of "self-determination"; they do however fall perfectly within the same consequentialist framework. What mattered to Washington was keeping Greece within its reach, while Greece's democratic integrity was only secondary.

This consequentialist approach remained consistent in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In a political time when Papagos' ES and Karamanlis' successor party, ERE, had consolidated their control over Greece with great aid from the US, their highly deontological positions on the question of Cyprus' self-determination were continuously ignored and countered by the US at the United Nations in a most abrupt manner. In a stark antithesis to their profound level of interventionism and engagement in domestic Greek politics, American foreign policymakers turned a blind eye towards Greek administrations' foreign policy aspirations. As most indicative evidence, the US continuously attempted to maintain a neutral and balanced position between Greece and Turkey, on a matter that was imbalanced by default, given the approximate 80% of Cypriots of Greek origin—who themselves demanded enosis back in the 1950s—compared to just 20% Cypriots of Turkish origin. The reason for this approach was that



maintaining NATO's cohesion was far more important than ignoring Greeks' claims on the island, as well as Greek Cypriots' own rights.

The significance of Washington's approach towards Cyprus is crucial for the purposes of this thesis. The fact that several Greek administrations continuously repeated their deontological argument that Cypriots were being deprived of their right to their self-determination—an argument which was nonetheless pronounced by a safe position, given the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots living on the island—showcases Washington's consequentialist approach towards Cyprus, and its disregard for one of the most important and ideational principles the US publicly stood for. After all, the US had an observatory role in the process that led to the establishment of an independent Cypriot state, but mobilized rapidly in the summer of 1964 when it appeared likely that Cyprus could shift to geopolitical neutrality and immerse itself within the Soviet sphere of influence. Washington's support for instant enosis—which would certainly turn violent—only demonstrates how the US always filtered the island's state and future through the same consequentialist lens. It is thus no wonder that the US was openly accused by Greeks both before and—particularly—after the Junta for its role in the fate of Cyprus, especially after it was invaded by Turkey in the summer of 1974.

Returning to the domestic side again, Washington's consequentialism remained consistent throughout the late 1950s and up to the coup of 1967. Washington's panic in the aftermath of the 1958 elections in which leftwing and crypto-communist EDA emerged as the official opposition, its subsequent support to Karamanlis, and exploratory talks with Georgios Papandreou's CU which was then considered as a reliable “non-communist alternative” expose Washington's consistently deep and consequentialist interventionism in Greek politics. Likewise, Washington's displeasure with CU's administration, and mainly with Andreas Papandreou—whose “American” past was initially considered as another safety net in Greco-American under the administration of a Greek non-conservative party—reveals American

foreign policymakers' profound level of interference in Greek politics. Above everything else, the American embassy's open threats against the elder Papandreou regarding his son's potential arrest on false charges, which aimed at curtailing the latter's rise to political power, is most indicative of the deontological lines Washington was willing to cross for the sake of maintaining its geopolitical hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Finally, the Johnson and Nixon administrations' cooperation with the Greek Junta, a truly neo-fascist regime, is the crown jewel of Washington's consequentialist foreign policymaking towards Greece in the early Cold War. From the initial appeasement to the gradual embrace of the colonels' regime, which included Johnson's complete disregard of the hopeless endeavor of King Constantine II to oust the dictators and of the elder Papandreou's requests to help this initiative to restore democratic rule, to Nixon's unconditional resumption of heavy arms supply, Washington fully supported the Greek dictatorship, exactly because it served the broader American goal during the Cold War. The essence of the consequentialist foreign policy framework is right there: the US cooperated with a neo-fascist regime which had toppled the democratic government of a NATO member-state, exactly because it served the geopolitical imperative of containing communism in a most significant region. The crucial detail is that American foreign policymakers were perfectly aware that this support was a profound juxtaposition with American ideals and had alienated Greeks, but nonetheless maintained the same course—as they were doing in other parts of the world, in Henry Kissinger's own words, as chapter six showed.

What the study of Washington's consequentialist interventionism in Greece during the early Cold War demonstrates is how the broader ethos of American foreign policymaking throughout the Cold War was shaped immediately after WWII ended. This thesis showed how during the first two phases of the Greek Civil War, when WWII was still being fought, the Roosevelt administration completely refrained from intervening in Greek affairs to prevent

Greece from falling to Greek communist—and by extension, the USSR's—hands exactly because this did not matter in that political time. Franklin Roosevelt's disregard for Winston Churchill's agony regarding the fate of Greece before and during the battle of Athens in 1944 only reveals how different the conceptualization and prioritization of American foreign policy was before the end of WWII. Ironically, it was the British who kept Greece within the West in the first place, and not the Americans—and KKE still holds them accountable for that.

This seemingly minor historical detail contains the essence of the consequentialist foreign policy framework that the US embraced during the Cold War. Washington's rapid shift from its indifference towards whether Greece would go communist or not, to the massive military and economic engagement it provided the Greek State with to prevent this from happening at all costs for almost 30 years—and through the morally dubious ways in the eyes of the general population that this thesis explored—can only be attributed to the change of paradigm that the Cold War brought to the conceptualization and practice of American foreign policymaking. The Cold War changed dramatically how the US saw both itself and the world around it in its fierce geopolitical and existential competition with the USSR, to the extent that a rather insignificant matter in 1944—which great power would influence an impoverished country at the edge of Eastern Europe—became a matter of existential importance in 1947 and after. The elevation of American interventionism in the Greek Civil War—and Harry Truman's and Richard Nixon's personal appreciation of the American success in keeping Greece within the West—as a blueprint for future interventions says it all about how Washington would operate on the global stage throughout the Cold War.

Finally, American interventionism in Greece was not only ethical and consistent, but also ultimately successful. At face value, the high levels of public resentment towards the US and the robustness of Greek anti-Americanism could suggest that Washington's consequentialist foreign policy towards Greece backfired, as it did elsewhere. Greece's status

as a geopolitical paradox—since Greece is a country that has long belonged to the West but still does not feel comfortable within it—can be easily considered as evidence that in the long run, Washington destroyed its future political capital in Greece by crossing all the deontological lines that this thesis demonstrated. But this is a shallow interpretation: although anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism have been—and still are—substantially influential in Greek politics, and although Greeks are still divided over whether their country truly belongs to the West, or is at best a bridge between the West and the East—with some even suggesting that Greece’s natural allies are Russia and Serbia, instead of the US and the EU—no Greek government to this day has seriously threatened Greece’s place in the geopolitical West.

This applies to both late and post-Cold War Greek administrations. This thesis showed that the anti-American and anti-Western sentiment dominated the Greek public discourse since the Junta’s collapse, as well as that Greece was eventually led by a government that was openly and vocally critical of the US, the EEC, and the West more broadly, and simultaneously very welcoming towards third, non-western, and non-aligned—if not hostile to the West—countries like Libya, Palestine, and Cuba. But although Greece had the chance to break out of the West and seek indeed a path of geopolitical neutrality just as Papandreou had imagined, the country remained “Western” in every sense of the word, as Karamanlis had argued in his 1977 debate with Papandreou. Although Greeks’ *thymos* is still influenced by strong anti-American and anti-Western sentiments, Greece is exactly where the US wants it to be now, and where the US wanted Greece to be since 1947.

In that sense, the rise of anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism in Greece seems like a small price to pay for Washington, compared to the advantage of exercising its influence over what is still today an invaluable geopolitical location. This thesis showed that the only reason why Greece remains part of the American sphere of influence is because of Washington’s consequentialist foreign policy from 1947 to 1974. We may therefore conclude that the US

consequentialist interventionism towards Greece was one of the more successful interventions that Washington orchestrated during the Cold War, as not only did the US keep Greece within its sphere of influence in the direst of times during, but it continues to enjoy the premium of considering Greece a reliable ally in the region. Greece's latest Prime Minister and ND's leader at the time of writing, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, affirmed Greece's loyalty to the US during his speech before a joint session of Congress in the spring of 2022, suggesting that Greece and the US continued to "stand together" and would do so in the future as well "whenever and wherever necessary."<sup>1012</sup>

In its second chapter, this thesis clarified its own position towards Washington's Cold War consequentialist foreign policy, noting that it does not subscribe to the rightness of consequentialism in foreign policymaking, but attempts instead to interpret its application in the Greek case. At this point, it is indispensable to conclude that this thesis does not intend to play the devil's advocate; it argues instead that the devil was not there in the first place. The influence of American Exceptionalism in Cold War American foreign policymaking led the Cold War administrations to filter everything through the imperative to compete with world communism, and even in the instances where Americans realized that they may have gone too far, they still did not stop or revert their course. This is only indicative of how deeply rooted the fear of Soviet domination was inside the Cold War American psyche, as well as how every foreign policy decision was channeled by the geopolitical and ideological clash between the two superpowers. In other words, we must note that Washington's commitment to consequentialist interventionism was not necessarily a conscious decision, but instead a subconscious—and potentially impulsive—force to ensure that the US would carry out its mission to contain and defeat communism.

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<sup>1012</sup> Primeminister.gr, "Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis' address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Congress", Washington, May 17, 2022, <https://primeminister.gr/en/2022/05/17/29339>

## Concluding Thoughts

Jonathan Haidt, one of the world's leading ethicists, has argued that culture plays a crucial role in shaping minds—hence the decision-making—of individuals.<sup>1013</sup> In the context of the Cold War, the pervasive influence of American Exceptionalism in American foreign policy, as Nikolas Gvosdev, Jessica Blankshain, and David Cooper eloquently put it (see chapter two) was combined with the geopolitical and ideological imperative to prevail over the Soviet sphere of influence; therefore, Cold War American foreign policymaking just cannot be solely interpreted in realist terms alone. Realism certainly provides the most thorough interpretation of America's endeavors beyond its shores as a superpower, but alone it fails to address how a series of deontologically reprehensible acts were nonetheless ethically justified by consecutive Cold War American administrations, consciously or subconsciously. Perhaps there is no greater point in support of this argument than the fact that at no point did any major American official express a formal apology, or at least an acknowledgment that Washington's persistent interventionism for almost thirty years was morally reprehensible. The fact that even those few minor officials who occasionally worried—mainly during the Junta, the epitome of consequentialist interventionism—whether the US had gone too far quickly dismissed their own concerns says it all.

This thesis suggests that to ethically interpret Cold War American interventionism, we must comprehend the unholy—but inevitable—marriage between the influence of American Exceptionalism in American politics and the urge to compete against the USSR: this is what set consequentialist ethics at the forefront of America's foreign policy—and the Greek Civil War was just the first of many consequentialist interventions. On several instances, this thesis emphasized that the Greek Civil War was a turning point for Washington; on the one hand, it

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<sup>1013</sup> Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion* (London: Penguin, 2021), 115

was the first test of American interventionism abroad—and by extension, of American ability to contain world communism—and, on the other, it laid the foundations for numerous American Cold War interventions on a global scale, which all shared the same purpose as the first one. Due to that reason alone, the case of Greece requires more attention than it has received from Cold War and American foreign policy scholars. After all, this thesis established that American interventionism from 1947 to 1974 truly positions Greece as a unique case study within Cold War American interventionism, as almost every method employed by the US to contain communism was implemented in Greece, in a span of almost three decades.

But this thesis believes that it is inaccurate to argue that the Greek Civil War was truly the first battle of the Cold War between the two spheres of influence. Instead, the Greek Civil War was just the first pragmatic expression of both an ideological and a geopolitical war that defined the foreign policies of the two great powers throughout the Cold War, and which was consistently fueled by their respective existential—and rivaling—belief systems. Every intervention that the US implemented either in Greece or elsewhere around the world was too an expression of the clash between two rival messianic narratives on the future of social systems, as they respectively informed the psyches of two rival superpowers; a clash that was inevitable exactly because of the incompatibility of the US and USSR's existential ideologies.<sup>1014</sup> In that sense, winning the Cold War would inevitably mean that the teleological clash between American Western and Soviet ideals would be settled once and for all.

That is why the fate of smaller countries was to a significant extent predetermined. The rights of countries like Greece—or Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the USSR's case—did not matter in the eyes of the two competing superpowers. Just as the Athenians put it to the Melians during the Peloponnesian war per Thucydides, “right, as the world goes, is only in question

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<sup>1014</sup> Ronald Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 306

between equals in power.”<sup>1015</sup> And although the USSR could not match the US in economic and military terms, the force of the Soviet teleological narrative was perfectly equal to America’s. In that sense, John Lewis Gaddis’ argument that between the US and the USSR, only the latter justified its means through its ends, which created the Cold War’s “basic ideological asymmetry” as he calls it<sup>1016</sup> is inherently inaccurate. This thesis showed in detail both how and why the US justified seemingly immoral means because of the greater ends that American foreign policymakers identified. Despite their radical ideological differences, the US and the USSR were more alike in how they ethically justified their interventions than one would expect.

This thesis also showed that for great powers, interventions and ideologies are inseparable, and this is what justifies their interference in the affairs of other countries from a consequentialist perspective. Ned Lebow argues that great powers are susceptible to “great power hubris” as their existential ideologies have historically led them to implement morally reprehensible interventions. He argues that their value systems force them to prioritize power over politics and he refers specifically to the Johnson and Nixon administrations’ interventions in Vietnam to build his case, suggesting that both refused to acknowledge their “violations of conventional morality.”<sup>1017</sup> What Lebow misses is that exactly because of the influence of their ideologies on their foreign policies, great powers see these interventions as inherently moral, not from a deontological standpoint—such as his—but from a consequentialist one. In international competition settings such as the Cold War, great power interventions are fueled by their value systems and ideologies, because these ideologies define their very existence.

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<sup>1015</sup> Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Random House, 1951), 331

<sup>1016</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: the deals, the spies, the lies, the truth* (London: Penguin, 2007), 98

<sup>1017</sup> Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: ethics, interests, and orders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 391-392



This is perhaps the most important point that this thesis makes. The fundamental weakness of moral foreign policy interpretations is that modern societies have identified morality with deontological ethics. The reasons for this are most probably extremely complex and would certainly require deep sociopolitical, if not anthropological research, but the key element is that—publicly, at least—modern societies consider an act to be moral almost exclusively through deontological terms. In that sense, when principles whose moral weight seems self-evident across the globe, like democracy, freedom, and self-determination are being violated, we are wired to believe that their violation cannot but be morally reprehensible. But this thesis argues that superpowers operate on a different set of ethics: superpowers think and act in consequentialist terms, not deontological, especially when they are competing against equally powerful opponents, in both military and ideological terms. It is not just their competing interests that inform their behavior, but the zero-sum clash between their competing messianic and teleological ideologies.

This is what American consequentialist interventionism towards Greece in the early Cold War from 1947 to 1974 demonstrates. From the Civil War to the Junta, every expression and level of American interventionism was always considered as the right thing to do, no matter how much it violated Greek self-determination, democratic integrity, and even dignity, exactly because it contributed to Washington's telos in its clash with the USSR. A telos informed by the defining influence of American Exceptionalism on Cold War American foreign policymaking—in which everything was justified if it helped the US contain and defeat communism. And, for better or for worse, the US won, both in Greece and beyond.

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