UCL

DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES TO FORCED DISPLACEMENT FROM SYRIA IN LEBANON, JORDAN AND IRAQ

FULL REPORT of

A literature review of the evidence relating to onward migration, social cohesion and refugees' participation in local communities and economies

Authored by Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Aydan Greatrick and Estella Carpi, with Amal Shaiah Istanbouli

UCL
Migration Research Unit

UCL Migration Research Unit (MRU)

PUBLICATION SERIES

An evening stroll in Baddawi camp, Lebanon.
© Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh.

Front cover photo:
Early morning in Baddawi refugee camp, which is now also home to refugees from Syria.
© Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh.

UCL Migration Research Unit (MRU)

PUBLICATION SERIES

UCL
Migration Research Unit

DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES TO FORCED DISPLACEMENT FROM SYRIA IN LEBANON, JORDAN AND IRAQ

FULL REPORT of

A literature review of the evidence relating to onward migration, social cohesion and refugees' participation in local communities and economies

Authored by Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Aydan Greatrick and Estella Carpi, with Amal Shaiah Istanbouli

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND TEXT BOXES

ACRONYMS

CBI	Cash-Based Initiatives
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service
DAFI	Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GBT	Gay, Bisexual and Trans
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
HOPES	Higher and Further Education Opportunities and Perspectives
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IOM	International Organization of Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ITS	Informal Tented Settlements
KRI	Kurdish Region of Iraq
LGBTQ+	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Queer
LBT	Lesbian, Bisexual and Trans
LHSP	Lebanese Host Communities Support Programme
MOOCs	Massive Open Online Courses
MoSA	Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PRL	Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon
PRS	Palestinian Refugees from Syria
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SME	Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
SOGIESC	Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics
UASC	Unaccompanied and Separated Children
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WBG	World Bank Group
WFP	World Food Programme

INTRODUCTION

Since 2011, more than 6.6 million people have fled Syria in search of refuge and protection from ongoing conflict, violence and persecution. The vast majority of refugees from Syria – over 5.5 million people – have sought sanctuary in Syria's neighbouring countries, with approximately 92% of refugees from Syria living in rural and urban settings, and circa 5% living in camps. Over the past 10 years, humanitarian and development assistance and targeted programming have sought to support refugees from Syria, including by providing different forms of aid, and by seeking to enhance refugees' safe inclusion in employment, education and the social life of communities. However, refugees from Syria and their families continue to face severe restrictions on their ability to build and maintain safe, dignified and meaningful lives in exile, leading many to believe they have no future in host countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. As Syria remains unsafe for return due to ongoing conflict, insecurity and violence, many refugees have high aspirations for onward migration, reflecting their frustrations with their situations in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, and the fear and insecurity they face there due to ongoing discrimination, social exclusion, and precariousness. Nonetheless, despite many refugees' aspirations to leave, very few have the capacity or capabilities to undertake onward migration, and they face multiple barriers to their mobility that means they become 'stuck' in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Understanding that the vast majority of refugees from Syria remain in neighbouring countries is important for policy to adequately address their needs and uphold their rights.

Access to *de jure* rights, such as residency and employment rights, and a supportive protection environment are key for refugees to be able to safely participate in local community life. In turn, refugee-host interactions are framed by host community members' perceptions of and attitudes towards refugees from Syria. Since social tensions and animosity towards refugees are common but are not inevitable, policies and programmes have sought to enhance social cohesion in different ways. Noting that social cohesion is a concept that is inconsistently defined across academic and policy literature, priorities in this area have included strengthening service provision on a municipal level for all residents (irrespective of their nationality and legal status); and creating shared spaces for social interactions, as the literature demonstrates the importance of enhancing the frequency, nature and quality of refugees' interactions with members of host communities.

However, legal barriers and political and media discourses that scapegoat refugees, mean that refugees continue to be excluded, and often subjected to discrimination and different forms of violence on the basis of their nationality, gender, and/or religion. This also emerges as an indirect result of policies that exclude refugees based on their nationality, as focusing on *Syrian refugees* may exclude refugees *from* Syria (including Iraqis, Kurds and Palestinians). In turn, different groups of refugee women, men, girls and boys are affected in particular ways by restrictions on their mobility, harassment, and a lack of protection by virtue of their precarious legal status. In all, the absence of secure legal protections across all three countries limits refugees' abilities to safely participate in local communities and in local economies, reinforcing a sense of insecurity and precarity.

Addressing this through upholding legal protections can support refugees to build a safe and secure future for themselves in host countries. Refugees' ability to participate in the economies of host countries leads to better outcomes, especially when they can access dignified and secure work. Nevertheless, substantial barriers remain to refugees' economic participation, informed by hostile policy responses and a lack of pathways to decent employment rights. These barriers have also been exacerbated by economic crises and the Covid-19 pandemic, and assumptions in political, media and policy contexts that refugees have a negative impact on receiving economies and produce social tensions. By contrast, evidence notes that any impacts arising from the large presence of refugees can be difficult to disentangle from other interrelated economic factors. As such, policy responses addressing economic challenges in host countries should avoid assuming that such challenges are the direct result of the refugee presence *per se.*

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report presents the findings of a state-of-the-art literature review, synthesising existing knowledge on factors that are important for refugees' decisions to either stay or migrate onwards to third countries; on social cohesion and refugees' participation in host communities; and on refugees' contribution to local economies. Commissioned by the Policy and Operations Evaluation department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (IOB) as a sub-study to the IOB evaluation of Development Approaches to Forced Displacement (DAFD) in the Syria Region, the review will inform the assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of DAFD interventions funded by the Netherlands in the period 2015-2021. The report examines evidence relating to three key thematic areas relating to refugees from Syria:

1. factors that influence refugees' decisions to remain in Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq (broadly construed as countries of first asylum), or their decision to engage in onwards migration (especially to European states);
2. factors which influence 'social cohesion' between refugee and hosting communities; and
3. factors influencing refugees' participation in the host community and their contribution to national/municipal/local level economies.

Noting that these questions are informed by a number of policy assumptions regarding each of the key areas, the report traces evidence regarding the relationship between key factors and particular outcomes, recognising the internal heterogeneity of refugee communities and the importance of an intersectionalist analysis throughout.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report starts by outlining the Methodology adopted as part of this desk-based review. This includes detailing how the research questions were systematically addressed, and evidence evaluated.

Part I of the report sets out the evidence relating to onwards migration, noting that this is also implicitly linked to the literature on migrant and refugee decision-making. Here, literature relating to the difference between migration aspirations and capabilities to facilitate onward migration is examined, outlining relevant implications for policy. As a whole, the literature stresses that aspirations, decision-making, and the capability to act upon these decisions, varies according to the particular characteristics of specific individuals and groups (for instance on the basis of gender, age, class, family composition, religion, ethnicity). In turn, literature on drivers of onward migration from Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq provides evidence of context-specific factors and highlights why particular groups of people may seek onward migration from a given host country, while the majority of refugees remain in their country of first asylum. Evidence about the influence of foreign assistance on migration decisions is also assessed against evidence relating to refugee decision making, aspirations and capabilities. This evidence suggests that coordinated foreign assistance that addresses livelihoods, rights and protections have the potential to promote the conditions that enable refugees to build sustainable lives for themselves and their families in host countries.

However, further research is necessary to properly understand the impact of foreign assistance on refugee onward migration decision making.

Part II synthesises the literature on refugees' participation in local communities, with a focus on approaches adopted to enhance social cohesion between refugees and members of host communities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Promoting social cohesion is of increasing interest to diverse stakeholders, including policy-makers, donors, and humanitarian and development agencies. This is in part guided by the assumption that developing a balanced approach to supporting members of both refugee and host communities will reduce the likelihood of tensions developing between these communities (in particular, host tensions towards refugees), and will contribute to stronger forms of social cohesion. This may, in turn, enable refugees to participate in diverse areas of social life. In addition to helping meet the needs and rights of refugees as well as members of host communities, promoting social cohesion is also often viewed by policy-makers as creating conditions which may encourage refugees to remain in a host country, rather than crossing the 'onward migration threshold'. Against this backdrop, Part II synthesises evidence relating to key legal, policy and social factors which variously support or prevent refugees' local participation, including on national, municipal and community levels. Noting that social cohesion is a contested concept and that it is methodologically difficult to measure, evidence is summarised on multiscalar factors which variously undermine or potentially enhance the nature and quality of refugee-host interactions, and, thus, different forms of local participation.

Part II outlines the extent to which, within the same national context, different municipalities, towns, cities and camps will provide different opportunities or barriers for refugees to participate safely. Similarly, not all refugees are equally able to access the public sphere and engage safely in social activities and interactions with members of the host community because of their different demographic characteristics and intersecting identity markers. This means that although some refugees may be able and willing to participate in different aspects of local community life, not all people from Syria living in the same neighbourhood, camp, town or city will be able to do so, including because of both ongoing and new forms of discrimination, violence and exclusion. A range of factors variously enable or prevent the safe participation of refugees from Syria in local communities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. In light of the absence of an accepted definition of 'participation' in the context of refugees' participation in the local community, for the purposes of this report, 'local integration' is adapted as a loose framework for analysis. Integration is simultaneously a legal process (including the right to work and enjoy freedom of movement), a social process (i.e. living with/alongside hosts, as a two-way process involving both refugees and hosts), and an economic process (enabling people to establish sustainable livelihoods and to not be prevented from participation in local economies).

Finally, Part III assesses the evidence relating to refugees' participation in local economies, and how refugees' presence is related to changes in national, municipal, and local level economies. While it is often assumed – by donors, policy-makers, practitioners and host community members alike – that the arrival of refugees has a negative impact on local and national economies, the evidence highlights that these assumptions are often empirically unfounded, and that greater attention must be paid to long-standing structural dynamics and the broader impacts of conflicts and humanitarian responses to displacement. This part of the report examines the evidence relating to refugees' access to formal and informal modes of employment (as entrepreneurs and employees alike), and the diverse factors which may promote or impede safe and dignified modes of economic participation. Noting the challenge of causally linking 'the arrival and presence of refugees' to changes in national-, municipal- and city/town-level economies, growth and employment, the final part of the report synthesises evidence on the nature and impacts of policies and programmes developed and implemented since 2016 in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, including a discussion of how changes in labour laws, processes to obtain and renew residency and work permits, the establishment of special economic zones, financial crises and the impact of COVID-19, relate to refugees' economic participation in local communities.

METHODOLOGY

This report is based on a desk-based state-of-the-art literature review of over 260 sources published between 2016-2021. The review sought to identify relevant literature in order to address nine core questions. These questions each correspond to a thematic area, which is reflected in the three 'Parts' of this report (see Table 1 below).

TABLE 1: Thematic areas and questions addressed

Theme	Key questions addressed by the literature review
PART I: Onward migration decisions	1. Which factors influence Syrian refugees' decisions to either stay in Iraq, Jordan or Lebanon or to move onwards to Europe, and how and why has this changed over time? 2. What is the relevance of access to education, employment and/or refugees' safety/protection, compared to other factors, for the decision to either stay or move onwards? 3. How do gender, family composition, age, socio-economic status, culture and religion influence the relevance of factors identified under Q2? 4. What is known about the (intended or unintended) effects of foreign assistance on refugees' decisions to either stay or move onwards?
PART II: Social cohesion	5. Which factors explain the success or failure for the participation of Syrian refugees in local communities in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon? 6. What is known about the effects of the influx of substantial numbers of refugees on social cohesion, and how social cohesion can be enhanced? 7. Which factors apply differently to boys/girls and men/women?
PART III: Refugees' economic contribution	8. Which factors explain the success or failure of economic participation by refugees in local communities (be it as entrepreneur or employee)? 9. What is known about the effects of the presence of substantial numbers of Syrian refugees on national/municipal/city/town economies, in terms of (amongst others) economic growth and employment?

Identification of Sources

To address these questions, targeted searches in key databases were undertaken by using designated Boolean strings, including searches through GoogleScholar, ASSIA, IBSS Online, JSTOR, Web of Science, Scopus, ALNAP, World Bank and UN and selected INGO databases. A search for relevant Arabic language materials was undertaken through reviewing selected databases including Atharportal.net; Arabic-language journals including Insaniyat; the online portals of relevant countries' governmental/Ministerial entities; and a targeted search for reports published in Arabic by key NGOs and CSOs.

Screening of Sources and Inclusion Criteria

The team started by identifying existing systematic and rapid reviews of evidence published between 2016-2021, before developing a more targeted search to fill remaining gaps through reference to academic articles, grey literature, UN and NGO reports, etc, including reports by local organisations and groups. Further sources were then identified using indicative Boolean searches relevant to each question. This allowed the team to carry out a targeted and systematic search for literature

addressing the specific questions noted in Table 1 (see the Appendix for the indicative Boolean search strings used). Finally, additional sources were identified by drawing on the bibliographies of and citations made by the included literature.

Once materials had been identified, sources were screened for their relevance, consistency and quality. Initially, the team conducted a preliminary screening of the article/report title, abstract and executive summaries, with this information collated in a shared Excel database. Sources were also collated in a shared Zotero folder. In both instances, sources were organised in relation to specific questions. The total number of sources identified, excluded and included is noted in the flow diagram below (Table 2).

TABLE 2: Flow diagram for literature search

Identification	Sources identified through database searching Total = 714 Of which, Systematic Reviews and Rapid Reviews n = 20
Screening	Records after duplications and excluded sources removed n = 648
Included	Articles excluded based on relevance, quality, and consistency n = 387
Eligibility	Studies included n = 261

Relevance: The relevance of each source was determined by the extent to which sources addressed the relevant questions (see Table 1). Sources that focused on refugees from Syria, which were published between 2016-2021, and which focused on Lebanon, Jordan and/or Iraq were ranked as most relevant to the study. Sources which provided no relevant response to the questions, addressed a different context, or were published outside of the time period were excluded.

Quality: The quality of sources was determined through an assessment of the empirical foundation of texts. Texts which adopted a primarily theoretical or normative approach were excluded in favour of original and empirical research. Screened sources were then assessed in relation to one another, to determine the level of consistency arising in the evidence.

Consistency: Sources that were inconsistent with the larger dataset are noted as part of the analysis.

Approach

Both general and country-specific evidence was identified, reviewed and synthesised to answer each of the research questions. Keywords were used in the shared Excel database to identify whether sources were relevant to specific countries (i.e. "Jordan"), as well as other thematic areas (i.e. "Education"). This approach allowed the team to synthesise the evidence to firstly provide a 'general' response to the set questions, as well as country-specific responses (noted in the relevant country-specific sub-sections in Parts I, II and III).

Indicators and Levels of Analysis

The review identified evidence pertaining to 'objective,' 'normative' and/or 'descriptive' indicators of success and failure, in addition to 'subjective' and 'attitudinal' indicators. Evidence is identified relating to factors which influence outcomes, processes and experiences. The evidence on these different indicators; levels of analysis; and outcomes, processes and experiences, is presented in a balanced manner to answer, in particular, questions relating to 'success or failure' (Q5 and Q8). The relationship between different stakeholder's perceptions and norms (i.e. policy/industry, refugees, and members of local communities) is also addressed.

Human Rights, Including Refugee Rights and Labour Rights

In line with the TOR for the IOB DAFD Evaluation, the report synthesises the evidence through reference to international conventions, guidelines and principles regarding refugees' rights (including in the context of reception and protection) and labour rights/conditions.

Refugees from Syria

While the term 'Syrian refugees' was used in the Call for Tenders for this literature review, the research and report also focuses on 'refugees from Syria' in Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq. This is because a nationality-based frame (Syrian refugees) potentially excludes people who have been displaced from Syria and yet who may not hold Syrian nationality. This may include stateless people and minorities who were residents of Syria but did not identify with Syrian nationality (including Kurds and Yezidis), in addition to refugees who had previously sought refuge in Syria prior to the outbreak of conflict in 2011 (including Iraqis and Palestinians). As such, whilst this report uses 'Syrian refugees' to explicitly refer to Syrian nationals displaced from Syria, we also employ 'refugees from Syria' to describe and identify the diversity of refugee populations from Syria living in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. The focus on people displaced from Syria provides an inclusive framework for the literature review and is of relevance to the IOB evaluation since such people have been displaced from the same conflict and may have been included in, or been excluded from, the DAFD interventions being evaluated.

Gender and Intersectionality

Throughout the review, an intersectional lens was applied. The Search, Selection and Analysis process identified relevant evidence relating to the ways that the delineated factors influence *different* refugees' experiences, decisions and outcomes depending on identity markers including: gender, age, ethnicity, nationality, family status, class and religion. Evidence pertaining to the relevance of an intersectional approach for policy and practice is presented throughout.

Limitations

In the context of Iraq, the literature on refugees from Syria often overlaps with that on Iraqi IDPs and it is therefore difficult to assess the specific experiences, outcomes and modes of participation of refugees, as opposed to those of IDPs. Moreover, it is noteworthy that, due to the geographical overlap of the refugee and IDP response, most humanitarian coordination platforms are merged and do not distinguish the data related to IDPs from those related to refugees (3RP, 2021-22). The Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) – where more than 1 million of the 3.2 million Iraqi IDPs and an estimated 250,000 refugees, predominantly from Syria, are located - is generally discussed separately from the rest of Iraq. The grey and academic literature on both Iraq and the KRI rarely focuses on refugees exclusively. As a result, the report is limited in its assessment of the questions in relation to Iraq, suggesting that further research is necessary.

Further limitations relate to the availability and quality of Arabic language sources. Whilst targeted searches for Arabic language sources were carried out, and several sources have been identified and cited in different sections of the report, the quality of this material was often less strong than English language material. This presents a limitation in terms of this report's capacity to assess the experiences of refugees and the significance of certain factors as documented and examined in Arabic language materials.

Gaps in Knowledge and Areas for Future Research

An extensive body of literature exists relating to the experiences of refugees from Syria, and the nature and impacts of diverse policies and programmes developed in response to their displacement from Syria; however, a range of gaps in knowledge remain.

Firstly, although there are substantial and wide-ranging studies regarding refugees from Syria in the contexts of Lebanon and Jordan, there is a relative lack of research in relation to refugees from Syria in Iraq. Further research is thus needed to assess the experiences, outcomes, and modes of participation of refugees in Iraq, as opposed to IDPs who are well represented in the evidence. Future studies are also needed to fill a gap in knowledge relating to the impact of the international humanitarian presence in Iraq, which is particularly relevant in the KRI.

A second area requiring further research relates to the conceptualisation, operationalisation, measurement, and promotion of 'social cohesion' in displacement situations. The literature points to a gap in research relating to refugees' perceptions of hosts, and to both refugees' and hosts' perceptions of institutions. It is also the case that evidence on social cohesion often overlooks the importance of different refugees' perceptions of host communities and of other refugee communities. In developing a more coherent conceptualisation of social cohesion, it is therefore important that attention is given to the perceptions of diverse host and refugee communities, including minoritized host communities such as Kurdish, Yezidi, Dom and Palestinian communities.

Studies into both hosts' and refugees' perceptions should also be more attentive to intersecting identity markers and demographic characteristics such as age, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, education, and place of origin/residence. Indeed, future research is needed to identify the ways that intersecting identity markers and demographic characteristics lead to and shape people's experiences of social exclusion and inclusion; and how different people experience and are differently affected by development and humanitarian policies and programmes.

In this regard, there is also a need for further research on the relationship between foreign assistance and onward migration. As with conceptualisations of social cohesion, the relationship between foreign assistance and onward migration decisions is often inferred and assumed, and yet there is little strong evidence to demonstrate that foreign assistance either does or does not encourage refugees to stay and/or leave.

While assumptions abound relating to the 'impacts' of refugees on host countries, the literature demonstrates the methodological and empirical challenges of demonstrating a causal relationship between the arrival of refugees and 'change'. Bearing this in mind, further research is needed to better understand the complex relationships that exist between the presence of refugees and changes in socio-economic dynamics at a neighbourhood, municipal, and governorate level in host countries. The existing evidence notes that such studies should be attentive to the significance of diverse structural factors, and the ways that context matters, including with regards to changes over time.

Finally, further research is necessary to account for the short-, medium- and longer-term impacts of COVID-19 on different groups of refugees' needs and rights. It is highly likely that COVID-19

and its related economic, social and political consequences are having a substantial impact on livelihoods, protection challenges, onward migration decisions and economic participation. Intersecting with the impacts of COVID-19 since 2020, further research is required in the short, medium, and longer-term to better understand and address the impacts of Lebanon's financial collapse on refugees' lives and livelihoods too.

Syrian and Palestinian children play together while a writing workshop takes place in the Jordanian town of Jarash. © E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh.

An alleyway in the Turkish town of Ayvalik, overlooking the Aegean Sea.
© Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh.

PART I:
REFUGEES' ONWARD MIGRATION DECISIONS

- ## SECTION 1: Which factors influence Syrian refugees' decisions to either stay in Iraq, Jordan, or Lebanon or to move onwards to Europe, and how and why has this changed over time?

Decisions to leave:
- Insufficient legal protections, a lack of basic rights, poor access to education and limited employment opportunities in host countries increase aspirations for onward migration.
- Separation from family members creates situations of increased vulnerability and increases aspirations for onward migration, including through family reunification.
- High living costs in Lebanon and Jordan undermines refugees' ability to secure long-term and sustainable livelihood strategies, leading many to consider onward migration.
- Barriers to integration and situations of social tension, xenophobia, cumulative discrimination, and hostility lead refugees to seek onward migration opportunities.
- Uncertainty about the future can be exacerbated by changing policy responses to refugees at local, national, and regional levels, increasing aspirations to leave.
- Decisions, timing and patterns of migration will be strongly mediated by refugees' social ties, networks and their access to information.
- Perceptions that European countries offer better long-term reception, rights, and opportunities play a role in shaping aspirations to travel to specific European countries.

Barriers to leaving:
- Migration is seen as a costly and risky endeavour, especially for those who lack sufficient resources, including social capital, economic resources, information, language skills, qualifications, and legal documents.
- Refugees' actual capabilities to undertake onward migration are often limited by their access to such resources. Because of this, many refugees who otherwise aspire to leave will often be required to make do with staying in host countries indefinitely.

Decisions to stay:
- Access to education, employment and protection in host countries are important factors in shaping refugees' decisions to stay, especially when refugees have a sense that the situation may improve in the mid to long-term.
- The presence of strong and supportive social ties and networks in host countries, including with other refugees and hosts, help refugees to build more secure and stable lives for themselves and their families.
- Refugees' aspirations to stay are often informed by perceptions that their situation might improve in the future. Such assessments will change over time, and in response to changing policy contexts which may or may not be more welcoming toward refugees.
- Despite aspiring to migrate onward, refugees may choose to stay because of a view that the journey to Europe is expensive and dangerous.
- In the absence of other viable options, including return, refugees may find themselves stuck, neither unable to imagine a more viable life for themselves and their families.

1.1. UNDERSTANDING KEY DRIVERS OF MIGRATION

The existence of conflict in countries neighbouring Europe, compounded by an inability to "make a living or access healthcare and education" in countries like Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, acts as a key driver of onward migration (Crawley *et al.,* 2016a). Onward migration decisions also intersect with general drivers of migration, including inadequate levels of human and economic development, demographic increase, urbanization, education, and climate change (Castelli, 2018): "migration is always the result of a complex combination of macro-, meso- and micro- factors, the former acting at the society level and the latter acting at the family or even individual level. The prevalence of a factor over the other is unpredictable" (*ibid.*: 6).

Drivers of migration can affect both refugees and hosts, who differently and simultaneously face shared forms of economic and political uncertainty (Hager, 2021). However, people's responses to these shared drivers will be highly contingent and context specific. This makes it difficult to identify any single 'causal' explanation for onward migration (Crawley *et al.*, 2016b). In contexts of economic, social and political fragility, the generalised conditions that lead people to consider engaging in onward migration should be seen as intersecting with more particular circumstances shaping the capabilities and aspirations of refugees.

Several key push factors motivate onward migration, including "insufficient legal protections, lack of basic rights, non-existent public services" (Carlson *et al.*, 2018: 673). Challenges to integration in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq also act as push factors (Dankwah and Valeta, 2018), as well as situations of "protracted temporariness" (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018: 111), defined by an inability for people to secure long-term economic or social stability. Pull factors strongly evidenced in the literature include the presence of family members in other countries, and transnational ties that shape social networks (Carlson *et al.*, 2018: 673).

Whilst generalised push-pull factors are evidenced in the literature, it is important to recognise how refugees' decisions to migrate onward will not necessarily emerge through a "cost-benefit analysis" (Achilli, 2016: 7) of such factors. Refugees' decisions are often made in ways that have been described as fragmentary (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018) and unpredictable (Castelli, 2018). Onward migration thresholds – the point at which refugees decide to leave – are often highly specific to the contexts individual refugees and their families find themselves in. Multiple factors will simultaneously inform decisions to stay and/or leave, with these decisions often becoming temporary, changing in light of new information or opportunities (WFP, 2017: 40). As such, a macro analysis of push-pull factors can be limited because the prevalence of any one push/pull factor is difficult to predict, likely to change over time, and arise in response to highly specific circumstances.

Finally, refugees' decisions to stay or move onward will not necessarily be 'voluntary' or 'involuntary' (Cummings *et al.*, 2015). On the one hand, "there is always some degree of choice for all migrants even in the most constraining of situations." (*ibid.*: 25: See also Erdal and Oeppen, 2018; Havinga and Böcker, 1999). On the other hand, researchers argue that a decision can only be truly voluntary if the person is choosing between two or more viable and acceptable alternatives. In essence, it is difficult to view a decision to stay as voluntary when it is the only option in a "virtually non-existent range of options" (Erdal and Oeppen, 2018: 985).

1.2. ASPIRATIONS AND CAPABILITIES

Refugee's aspirations to migrate onward are broad, ranging from a wish, a preference, or an idea through to a concrete and implementable plan (Carling, 2019). The extent to which aspirations

determine onward migration decisions varies based on timeframes, awareness, expectations, necessity, and the resources available to refugees. Broadly speaking, the literature highlights the importance of capabilities as key in determining when and how refugees migrate onwards (see El-Ghali *et al.*, 2019; Müller-Funk and Fransen, 2020; Tiltnes *et al.*, 2019; Yassen, 2019; Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018; Alrababa'h *et al.*, 2021; Ghandour-Demiri, 2020; Haider, 2016; Achilli *et al.*, 2017)[1].

Capabilities inform the likelihood that refugees will be able to act on their aspirations to migrate and/or put in place a concrete plan. These capabilities include access to economic resources, information, social support networks, language skills and documents. Recognising the importance of capabilities explains why many refugees simultaneously aspire to migrate onward but find themselves unable to act on such aspirations: "Socio-economic resources clearly determined the means of mobility" (Kvittingen *et al.,* 2018: 116).

A 2015 systematic review by the ODI notes that a key factor shaping onward migration is having the economic means and sufficient resources to do so. However, the resources needed before refugees will consider undertaking onward migration will vary depending on a variety of demographic markers and social factors (Cummings *et al.*, 2015: 28). Generally speaking, the resources required for a single man to migrate onward may be less than those needed to support larger families, for example.

Capabilities affect patterns of migration, meaning refugees who take up onward migration may travel as far as they can before their money runs out. A systematic review by Kuschminder *et al.* (2015) notes how refugee decision making is informed by the availability of financial resources, meaning destinations that are nearer to transit countries would be prioritised by those with less resources. However, the high cost of onward migration may mean that those who aspire to reach Europe may find themselves 'stuck' in neighbouring countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. In such a situation, refugees may use this time to accrue resources, information and funds to support further onward migration (*ibid.*: 60). Holland and Peters' survey of 1,431 participants note how refugees arriving to Europe from Iraq and Syria would wait, learn and accrue information prior to migrating onwards to Europe (2020). Whilst political and economic insecurity acted as a key push factor, information, and the perception that migration at specific moments in time would be successful (i.e., in response to policy announcements by states or following information from trusted sources) played a key role in overcoming the threshold to onward migration (*ibid.*).

Given that many refugees are unable to act on their aspirations to migrate onward, including because they lack the resources or networks to facilitate this, there is an urgent need to ensure protection and rights can be secured in countries like Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. Ultimately, a closer attention to capabilities, as well as aspirations, in policy responses to onward migration is important in developing a more contextual understanding of refugee decision making.

1.3. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND INFORMATION

Social networks and information strongly shape refugees' preferences for specific destinations (Tucker, 2018). Technology, including smartphones and social media, allows refugees to stay connected to families and social networks in different countries, and enhances individual capacities to move onward. Such technology provides refugees with a better ability to organise and plan their journey in advance, helping to facilitate onward migration (Alencar *et al.*, 2019), especially when this is shared among trusted social networks (Dekker *et al.*, 2018).

---

1 Climate change, and particularly increased water insecurity, may lead to higher overall *aspirations* for onward migration in certain contexts, although further research is needed to substantiate this point (Feitelson and Tubi, 2017).

Social ties and networks play an important role in refugee survival strategies, and become a key resource for managing, negotiating and responding to the challenges they face in contexts of displacement. Where these ties are well established in countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, they may influence decisions to stay. For example, different Syrian communities in Lebanon have attempted to harness basic livelihood necessities (including water and electricity) through building and accumulating social relations, networks, and social capital (Ghandour-Demiri, 2020). The strength and proximity of these networks influences the extent to which Syrian refugees are able to sustain livelihoods in Lebanon's informal market, influencing degrees of social cohesion (see Part II) and economic participation (see Part III). Whilst there is no strong evidence linking the influence of social ties with decisions to stay, evidence highlights how such ties are crucial in building strategies that help refugees to cope and deal with life in host countries.

Refugees' social ties and networks (friendships, families, kinship groups) inform the information they have access to and what information they trust (*ibid.*). Whilst "broadcast feedback" – the information provided by states and the media – can play a role in shaping refugees' decisions to stay and/or move onward (i.e. in response to negative or positive news stories about certain countries – see Bakewell and Jolivet, 2015), the influence of this information is secondary to the "narrowcast" information shared among refugees' social networks (Fiedler, 2018).

Research on the role of information and social networks also highlights the importance of digital literacy and socio-economic background in shaping refugees' access to quality information (Merisalo and Jauhiainen, 2021). Differences in levels of digital literacy and unequal access to good information can lead to negative outcomes, such as increased risk of exploitation, danger or death during migration, especially when relying on 'bad' information (Borkerts *et al.*, 2018). This is supported by Gillespie *et al.*'s study of the information used by over 500 refugees when making onward migration decisions, highlighting how the lack of verified information often meant that decisions to migrate onward became risky or less safe than previously anticipated by refugees (Gillespie *et al.*, 2018). Such evidence also confirms how digital information strongly informed patterns of onward migration, especially when refugees believed that the information that was available to them served as the 'best' information to secure safe passage to Europe (Borkert *et al.*, 2018). This correlates with UNHCR's Connecting Refugees report (Vernon *et al.*, 2016) and other academic evidence on the relationship between digital information sharing and refugee migration decisions (Dekker *et al.*, 2018; Carlson *et al.*, 2018).

European governments play a role in using information with the aim of deterring asylum-seekers' onward migration decisions and encouraging people to decide to stay. However, there is little evidence to suggest that these are effective at reducing refugees' aspirations for onward migration (Brekke and Thorbjørnsrud, 2018; Mandić and Simpson, 2017; Fiedler, 2020; Pagogn and Sakdapolrak, 2021). An IOM review of 60 evaluations of migrant information campaigns funded by European governments found that the success of such campaigns at reducing aspirations for onward migration is limited based on available evidence (Tjaden *et al.*, 2018).

Evidence does highlight how European-funded migrant information campaigns (which are directed at diverse groups of migrants, including refugees) can have unintended consequences, leading refugees to mistrust information provided by European states (Carlson *et al.*, 2018; Mandić and Simpson, 2017). Despite a policy assumption that such information will deter onward migration (Musarò, 2019), evidence suggests that refugees are more likely to rely on and trust other forms of information shared within their networks when making migration decisions (Mandić and Simpson, 2017).

Trusted social networks, more so than European migration information campaigns, play an important role in both generating aspirations to migrate onwards to specific countries, but also the timing, route and planning made by specific refugees in response to trusted information and available capabilities (drawing on Cummings, *et al.*, 2015 and Crawley and Hagen-Zanker, 2019).

1.4. CHANGE OVER TIME

Onward migration aspirations have changed over time, especially when access to legal status or the right to work have increased for certain groups, or where policies or socio-economic contexts in host and third countries have changed. This is well evidenced for some Syrian nationals who have sought safety in Jordan, for example, where increased access to work permits has lowered aspirations for onward migration (Kvittingen *et al.,* 2018, see discussion on employment in Section 2). However, these same policies may also increase onward migration aspirations, especially for refugees excluded from securing work permits because of their nationality (Kvittingen *et al.,* 2018) or because the work available is low paid and of poor quality (Lenner and Turner, 2019).

Aspirations to migrate onward appear to increase over time, especially when refugees find themselves unable to sustain livelihoods or secure rights and status for years on end (see also Carling, 2018). Moreover, capabilities to migrate onward may increase or decrease over time depending on a diverse set of social, cultural and economic factors or the prevailing economic or political context in different countries (Kvittingen *et al.,* 2018). For some, time may act as a key factor allowing them to accrue the resources, skills and paperwork to facilitate onward migration whilst for others the high cost of living in countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq may reduce the overall levels of financial resources available to some families (Haider, 2016).

Finally, it can be inferred from the evidence that where increased levels of 'social cohesion' emerge (see Part II, Section 6), or where increased access to decent education, employment and an improved protection environment appear viable, refugees' capabilities to develop and maintain a dignified and safe life in host countries may increase (Kvittingen *et al.,* 2018; WFP, 2017). However, further research is needed to evidence a clear link between changes in social cohesion and refugees' onward migration decisions.

1.5. KEY DRIVERS OF ONWARD MIGRATION: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EVIDENCE

Lebanon

In a study involving 1,000 Syrian respondents, and 1,000 Lebanese respondents, Hager (2021) noted five key factors as shaping onward migration from Lebanon:

• push factors from Lebanon: political instability and poverty, and
• pull factors to Europe: open borders, employment opportunities and cultural openness.

However, many people found themselves 'stuck', involuntarily unable to act on their aspirations for onward migration, despite the well-evidenced presence of push factors such as political instability or economic insecurity (ibid.). This point is supported by Müller-Funk and Fransen (2020) who found that whilst aspirations to leave Lebanon were relatively high, reflecting low overall levels of life satisfaction, capabilities to act on this were limited (*ibid.*).

This picture resonates with research on refugee's decisions relating to potential or prospective return to Syria. Where refugees had family or property to return to, evidence suggests that intentions to move onward to a third country were less likely to emerge: instead, refugee families sought to 'make do' until return was possible (Durable Solutions Platform, 2019; Achilli, 2016).

This picture has likely been exacerbated by the impacts of the financial collapse in Lebanon, the port explosion in August 2020, and the impacts of COVID-19. However, there is currently a lack of robust evidence detailing the precise impacts of these intersecting crises on refugees' decision

making. Further research is therefore required in the short-, medium and longer-term in order to accurately address the impacts of the financial collapse on refugees' decision-making processes, and their abilities to act upon these decisions.

This picture appears to have been exacerbated by Lebanese government policy which often explicitly and implicitly encourages both return and/or onward migration over the integration of refugees in the country: "The Lebanese government's policies towards refugees, starting with the October 2014 policy on Syrian displacement, that led to the UNHCR suspending registration of refugees, have consistently been restrictive and focused on encouraging return to Syria" (IRC, 2020). Sanyal, based on interviews with policy makers, notes that Lebanese policy is motivated by a hope that Syrian refugees "will migrate away from Lebanon at the earliest possibility, either onwards to other countries or back to Syria" (2018: 27). How Lebanese policy has responded to refugees in light of COVID-19 and the ongoing economic and political crisis in the country requires further investigation.

Jordan

"Restrictions and lack of opportunities in Jordan" are key factors shaping onward migration from the country (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018: 115). Aspirations for onward migration were often time-sensitive, and emerged over a period of several years, as "none had come to Jordan with a view of travelling onward" (*ibid.*). Such evidence highlights how decisions to migrate onward emerged over time and in relation to specific circumstances, including diminishing prospects for return to Syria and perceptions of a worsening context of reception, protection and assistance in Jordan.

Iraqi refugees, who had arrived in Jordan after being displaced from Syria, were evidenced as having particularly strong aspirations to leave the country in comparison to Syrians. Iraqi refugees' perceived barriers to integration and reception in Jordan in 2015-16 promoted the fragmentary onward migration of Iraqi refugees (Dankwah and Valenta, 2017). This was also exacerbated by their exclusion from certain forms of assistance directed specifically toward Syrians (see discussion in Section 4; Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018).

Community tensions in Jordan appeared to encourage refugees to consider engaging in onward migration. For example, Haider notes how an exposure to social tension and backlash (see Part II, Section 6) undermined a sense of community and dignity leading refugees to perceive no safe future in the country (2016: 3). Decisions to migrate to Europe from Jordan therefore appear to be informed by the protection challenges facing refugees, diverse risks in the host country, low markers of social cohesion, and a perception that Europe would be safe and welcoming. These motivations remained, despite a growing recognition over time that Europe had restrictive asylum policies (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018).

Evidence does also suggest that refugees had a preference to stay in Jordan if they perceived that the conditions were 'right' (*ibid.*). These conditions were assessed against certain economic opportunities and the extent to which these provided routes to legal protections including the legal right to work (*ibid.*).

Iraq

A large-scale qualitative survey carried out by the IOM found that it was difficult to identify one key push factor as leading refugees from Syria to seek onward migration from Iraq. As such, all factors identified were in some way interdependent, and included a general and personal lack of security, lack of equality and social justice, and economic and political instability (IOM, 2016). The relative significance of each of these factors varied based on refugees' different geographical locations. This is supported by evidence that highlights how residency in specific localities has led to different feelings of integration, informing decisions to either stay or move onward. For example, "more refugee households in Erbil city (50%) wished to go to a third country, compared

to refugee households in Dahuk city (15%)" (Durable Solutions Platform, 2019: 43). This suggests that the local dynamics of integration in Dahuk (in KRI) informed people's aspirations to stay, in comparison to elsewhere, where refugees reported feeling less welcomed or integrated.

According to the IOM, refugees who aspired to migrate onward from Iraq saw Europe as the preferred destination because no other viable options was available in the region. The route to Europe was also seen as open during the time of data collection (2015-16) and refugees perceived European countries as being more welcoming (IOM, 2016). Significantly, refugees aspiring to leave Iraq often held optimistic perceptions of what life would be like in Europe in terms of rights, reception, and protections (*ibid.*). These perceptions remained high despite a recognition of the challenges refugees might still face in Europe: the negative experiences and testimonies of friends and family who had returned to Iraq from Europe following long wait times for asylum cases to be processed or a sense of disappointment about life in Europe appeared to have little direct impact on refugees' aspirations to leave.

Nevertheless, the evidence from Iraq on refugees' aspirations and capabilities to support onward migration is limited, with much of the literature focussing on IDPs instead. As such, there is a limited body of literature to draw on in terms of refugees' onward migration aspirations.

1.6. CONCLUSION

Factors influencing refugees' decisions to stay include pathways to rights and protections, access to services and the viability of return. Refugees have to believe that they can build a secure and dignified future for themselves and their families in the host country in order to want to stay.

Factors shaping decisions to leave include a lack of access to rights and protection, insecure livelihoods, low markers of social cohesion, and perceptions that European countries offer better long-term reception, rights, and opportunities.

However, whilst aspirations for onward migration remain high, onward migration is often impossible for refugees, who must 'make do' with staying in situations of "protracted temporariness" (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018). Uncertainty about the future, accentuated by policy changes on national and international levels, means that making concrete plans is often difficult regardless of whether refugees aspire to leave or stay.

The relative significance of different factors influencing refugees' decisions in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq is difficult to predict, will change over time, and will be determined by refugees' perceptions of their current and future situation. Where the political or economic situation in the host country appears to be either improving or deteriorating, aspirations to stay appear to respectively increase or decrease. Individual and familial circumstances will likewise change as refugees acquire greater levels of social or economic resources – or find themselves increasingly isolated or affected by precarious situations and poverty. This will inform the extent to which they are able to develop and implement plans to migrate onward. In most instances, onward migration remains impossible, despite high aspirations (wishes, ideas and hopes) to leave.

Nevertheless, given the available evidence it remains difficult to thoroughly account how refugees' migration decisions have changed over time and in response to which factors. Often the evidence is granular, and whilst this does reveal some trends highlighted above, identifying key causal factors and their influence over time is limited by the available evidence.

SECTION 2: What is the relevance of access to education, employment and/or refugees' safety/protection, compared to other factors, for the decision to either stay or move onwards?

Significance of Education:
- Prior levels of educational attainment appear to increase aspirations to migrate onward to Europe, or to seek educational opportunities in other countries such as Turkey. This is because prior educational attainment acts as a form of social capital, contributing to migration capabilities through increased skills, training and qualifications.
- Higher levels of educational attainment may increase refugees' capabilities to migrate onward, especially if this is seen to increase access to skilled employment opportunities once in Europe.
- Increased access to quality education in host countries can encourage refugees to stay. This is especially well evidenced among families with school-aged children or individuals seeking higher education opportunities.
- Primary, secondary and tertiary educational opportunities in host countries can contribute to decisions to stay when such qualifications are seen to lead to meaningful employment and a secure legal status.
- (including through online courses) increases aspirations to stay in the short-term. However, the viability of educational opportunities will be assessed against the wider protection environment and employment opportunities.
- Opportunities for higher education in Europe increases aspirations for onward migration, but these opportunities are often seen as very limited and difficult to access. Higher education scholarships are ultimately an 'elite pathway' and not viable for the vast majority of refugees.
- The significance of education as a factor in decision making is informed by the relative value of different educational opportunities as being beneficial to the building of long-term and sustainable futures for refugees' and their children. Because of this, the significance of education is mixed, as demonstrated by country-specific evidence.

Significance of Employment:
- The availability of good, legal and secure employment can increase aspirations to stay in host countries, especially when this employment meets livelihood needs and supports refugees to build a future in the country.
- A lack of employment opportunities contributes to refugees' onward migration aspirations, especially when people feel unable to provide for their families in the long-term.
- The existence of family members in third countries contributes to a desire to move onward because such ties are thought to help facilitate access to work and legal rights in the long-term.
- Decisions to stay will also be shaped by an assessment of work opportunities for wider social groups, such as families, both in the present and in the future (i.e. prospective job opportunities for refugee children currently in school or training).
- Income and economic resources may increase refugees' capabilities to migrate onward, though it is unclear whether having greater resources necessarily increases aspirations to leave. It does, however, play a role in increasing refugees' capabilities to migrate onward.

Significance of Protection:
- Gaps in protection strongly inform onward migration aspirations. A lack of protection undermines the safety and dignity of refugees, and their access to services, all of which contribute to onward migration aspirations.
- Protection gaps may also make it more difficult for people to move or find protection solutions through onward migration. Whilst refugees may aspire to migrate onwards to escape situations of insecurity and persecution, access to formal migration remains limited.
- Protection cuts across many of the factors that shape refugees' onward migration aspirations; whilst the provision of educational opportunities and access to employment contributes to refugees' decisions to stay or leave, the absence of secure and long-term legal protections for many means that staying will often be precarious or difficult.

Overlapping Factors:
- Multiple factors overlap in shaping refugees' aspirations and capabilities to stay or move onward. Because of this, policymakers should combine initiatives in complementary ways, prioritising education, employment, and protection environments together, to improve people's living conditions and rights in their host countries.
- Refugees' aspirations to either stay or move onward will not be informed by any one factor over another. Rather, multiple factors become equally important in shaping refugee decision making.

2.1. EDUCATION AND REFUGEES' MIGRATION CAPABILITIES

Prior levels of educational attainment are seen to influence refugees' aspirations to migrate onward, with those who are better educated more likely to view onward migration as a preferred option to staying. Müller-Funk and Fransen, based on their comprehensive survey of 757 Syrian refugees living in Turkey and Lebanon, found that those with higher levels of educational attainment were more pessimistic about the long-term stability of Syria, and were more likely to consider onward migration to Europe (2020: 15). Likewise, strong evidence from Jordan, building on a large-scale household survey of Syrian refugee families living inside and outside of camps found that "the inclination to resettle in Europe increases with higher education" (Tiltnes *et al.*, 2019: 20). Nevertheless, as Tiltnes *et al.*'s household survey notes, actually putting a plan for onward migration into place remained difficult because of a variety of economic limitations, and the absence of safe or regular routes.

However, prior levels of educational attainment may play an important role in actually facilitating onward migration and in overcoming barriers to mobility. Evidence strongly suggests that education acts as a key form of social capital that refugees can use to navigate and facilitate onward migration. According to IOM and Gallup World Poll data sets, those "who are educated to primary and secondary level are more likely to choose destination countries where asylum applications are considered faster and where work permit applications, once asylum has been granted, take less time to process" (Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2019: 27). Higher prior levels of educational attainment also seem to improve refugees' individual 'capabilities' to move onward. Van Heelsum, building on interviews with refugees from Syria and Ethiopia exploring their migration aspirations, strongly demonstrates how prior levels of education act as a proxy for determining social status, which goes a long way in determining the different capabilities that refugees have to actually put in place a plan for onward migration: "wealthier Syrians [are seen to] have the capability to find sponsors or manage to save money", and "can raise the sum to travel" (*ibid.*: 1308).

Access to higher education in other countries strongly shapes onward migration aspirations for some refugees. Nevertheless, access to higher education in Europe and elsewhere remains extremely limited. Whilst assisted migration through limited scholarships has played an important role in facilitating higher educational opportunities for some, such scholarships have a limited capacity, and, according to a literature review for UNHCR, "remain a largely elite pathway accessible only to those who excel, can demonstrate compliance with entry requirements, and – in many cases – possess significant private resources" (Collett *et al.*, 2016: 10). As such, educational scholarships or pathways to international educational opportunities are not viable for most refugees from Syria.

By contrast, whilst there is some evidence suggesting that higher educational provision in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (including through online courses) encourages refugees to stay in the short term, other factors – such as employment and safety – appear to be more significant. Efforts to make higher education accessible to refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq through Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are seen as "one way of providing access to education while minimising the costs to both provider and refugee" in turn "reducing the stakes for refugees making these investments" (*ibid.*: 13-14), including by allowing them to access educational opportunities in the first country of asylum that otherwise would not be accessible.

2.1.1. EDUCATION AS A FACTOR: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EVIDENCE

Lebanon

The availability of educational opportunities in Lebanon has a mixed impact on refugees' aspirations to stay or move onward. Lebanon's extensive national refugee education framework has greatly expanded refugee children's access to education in the country in line with international conventions on the right of the child (Buckner *et al.*, 2017: 444). However, take up and perceptions of these opportunities by different groups of refugees has not been uniform, reflecting different social and cultural attitudes and economic barriers facing different refugees. Gaps in access to education remain high, both because of limits within Lebanon's policy response (i.e., high cost of travel for refugee families sending children to schools), generalised experiences of xenophobia facing Syrian children in the school system, as well as the preferences of some Syrian families for informal Syrian-led education over Lebanese public school provision (*ibid.*).

Overall, there is a lack of evidence directly addressing the influence of education on refugees' onward migration decisions in Lebanon. Nevertheless, literature highlighting the relationship between education and social cohesion (Part II) demonstrates the considerable challenges refugees face in terms of participating in Lebanese educational systems and exclusions experienced by refugee children in the school system. Evidence tracing the link between such experiences and onward migration decisions would help address this gap.

Jordan

The provision of education in Jordan has a mixed impact on refugees' decisions to stay or move onward. The overall enrolment of refugees in the Jordanian school system is "significantly high" (UNICEF, 2020). However, as with Lebanon, evidence suggests that gaps in the provision of education remain. Yet, unlike Lebanon, there is a stronger overall evidence base linking these gaps to onward migration intentions. For example, barriers to education were evidenced in a systematic review for DFID as a key driver of onward migration for some refugees from Syria: "40% of Syrian children in Jordan do not have access to formal education" (Haider, 2016: 3) whilst those in formal education are likely to face instances of bullying, violence and social stigma. Lack of educational opportunities were also cited as a key driver for onward migration in part because of its link to other issues, including poverty, which may require withdrawing a child from school to support with informal livelihood strategies (*ibid.*; UNICEF, 2020).

Iraq

Education informs onward migration decisions in mixed ways, and in relation to other factors such as economic opportunities and protection. Whilst being able to access higher education, many university students in the Kurdistan region, including Syrians, were motivated to migrate onward to Europe "because of the fragility of the political and economic situation. […] Many Syrian refugee students in the region have quite a number of friends who left local colleges and went to Europe to live and continue their study." (El-Ghali *et al.*, 2017: 30). As such, refugees' educational aspirations will also be informed by the relative safety of pursuing education in different contexts

Similarly, this evidence suggests that both aspirations for better education prospects, as well as the social networks that are built between different groups of refugees in educational contexts, in addition to the wider protection environment, serve as complementary factors in shaping aspirations for onward migration.

Where access to higher education is supported inside host countries by scholarships, including

DAAD, HOPES and DAFI, evidence does suggest that refugees will be more motivated to stay, but that this is often temporary. When scholarships are made available to support refugee students studying at universities in KRI, they will be more inclined to stay in the country and not seek onward migration to Europe (*ibid.*: 35). However, when such financial support is not available, or where funding is withdrawn, refugees may have to drop out of higher education to consider onward migration instead. This was especially the case when work policies to provide skilled job opportunities for refugee graduates in Iraq were absent.

2.2. EMPLOYMENT AND REFUGEES' MIGRATION CAPABILITIES

The prospect of employment in Europe increases aspirations to migrate onward because it is seen as an important route to legal status and residency, in contrast to experiences in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, where employment may be precarious, with no clear route to legal residency for many (Hager, 2021). The relative significance of employment to onward migration aspirations is difficult to disentangle from other factors, including protection: often the two go hand-in-hand, with access to secure employment prized both because of the economic benefits this would entail and because of the regularised legal status and routes to residency employment promises in Europe: "few Syrian refugees, as our own qualitative interviews regarding the drivers of emigration in Northern Lebanon demonstrated, migrate primarily for economic reasons" (*ibid.*: 933). This evidence is consistent with evidence from Jordan (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018).

A lack of employment opportunities shapes refugees' onward migration aspirations, especially when people feel unable to provide for their families in the long-term (Yassen, 2019; Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018). This is supported by evidence on the role of social networks, where family members in third countries contribute to a desire to move onward (Ghandour-Demiri, 2020) because such ties are seen to help facilitate access to work and legal rights in the long-term.

Decisions to stay will also be shaped by an assessment of work opportunities for wider social groups, such as families, in countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (Durable Solutions Platform, 2019). Such evidence is also consistent with policy assumptions that enabling access to secure employment will reduce onward migration aspirations by meeting needs and creating the conditions for sustainable livelihoods in the first country of asylum.

Refugees' existing skills and prior employment histories plays an important role in facilitating onward migration because they are seen to increase refugees' migration capabilities and long-term prospects in Europe (Hager, 2021). By contrast, those with lower levels of education or low-skilled workers were less likely to pursue onward migration because of a perception that they would be unlikely to find secure employment in more skilled economies (*Ibid.*: 944-5; Achilli *et al.*, 2016): "urban, educated, English-speaking Syrians" are more likely to put in place a plan to migrate to Europe in contrast to "poorer Syrians from rural areas" who may be more inclined to return to Syria in the long run (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018: 116). A perception among more skilled refugees that they would find it easier to adapt to labour markets in Europe were seen to lower the risks involved with onward migration to Europe.

Aspirations for onward mobility will be shaped not only by the possible employment opportunities available in different countries, but also an assessment of the prevailing economic situation in these countries (both in the short- to long- term) as well as the extent to which individual refugees will be able to access and/or meet the standards of different labour markets in terms of skills and qualifications (Alrababa'h *et al.*, 2021). Economic prospects in Lebanon and Jordan are not positively correlated with a desire to stay in those countries because of a perception that these job prospects are and will remain poor. Job prospects are seen as poor both because of the rate of pay, but also because of a perception that employment in these countries will not guarantee

longer-term residency or legal status, in comparison with perceptions of employment in Europe. This highlights the importance of legal status and pathways to regularisation in shaping refugees' perceptions of and aspirations for different employment opportunities when making migration decisions.

2.2.1. EMPLOYMENT AS A FACTOR: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EVIDENCE

Lebanon

Refugees who felt they were able to set up a new business in the country and become entrepreneurs reported higher aspirations to stay in Lebanon (Alexandre *et al.*, 2019: 1147). However, this evidence is limited as it mostly relies on young and self-selecting participants. It is also unclear whether an intention to set up a business or become an entrepreneur is indicative of a motivation to stay, or if it is also seen as an avenue for acquiring social and economic capital through which onward migration may be possible. Further research is vital to fully assess the role of entrepeneurialism in shaping refugees decisions to stay and/or leave Lebanon.

It must also be noted that such aspirations coexist with narrow economic inclusion in Lebanon, which has been made narrower by an interest amongst policy makers to protect Lebanese citizens from the supposed effects of the prolonged presence of refugees from Syria on the economy (see Part III). This has been further compounded by preliminary evidence about the impacts of Lebanon's financial crisis, one of the top three economic crises since the 19th Century according to the World Bank (2021), which means employment prospects are further weakened, the cost of living has risen dramatically, and the value of the Lira has plummeted. As such, whilst evidence indicates a link between economic aspirations and decisions to build a future in Lebanon, options to pursue this are likely highly limited and decreasing overall.

Jordan

Evidence suggests that employment opportunities in Jordan inform refugees' aspirations to stay or migrate onward in direct relationship with the wider economic context. Where employment opportunities were available and allowed refugees to meet the high cost of living in the country, refugees will be more inclined to stay (Haider, 2016): "those managing to access decent work opportunities and lead stable lives in Jordan were less inclined to travel to Europe" (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018: 116).

However, the extent to which refugees are broadly able to meet the high cost of living in Jordan is very limited. Overall, 80% Syrians were living below poverty line in 2016, with this figure thought to be higher for those living outside of camps (Haider, 2016). High rates of poverty have worsened in recent years, especially following the impacts of COVID-19, where evidence from ECHO estimates that in 2021 86% of Syrian refugees outside of camps live below the poverty line (2021). Poverty is evidenced as arising both because of a lack of decent and secure employment opportunities in the country, but also because high rents and costs of living mean that financial insecurity is common even for those in work.

Refugee's aspirations to stay or migrate onward from Jordan are closely informed by the extent to which the work available in the country is secure, legal, safe, and dignified. Where work is less secure, evidence suggest that refugees will be more likely to aspire to onward migration. Because of this, and despite efforts to improve access to legal work permits, including through the Jordan Compact, evidence suggests that "a major grievance and motivator for leaving amongst both Syrian and Iraqis in Jordan is the lack of access to decent legal employment […] including a fair wage, workplace safety and security prospects for personal development and social protection"

(Kvittingen *et al.,* 2018: 112). These challenges are particularly well-evidenced for Iraqi refugees (*ibid.*) who have not received the same level of attention or prioritisation as Syrians, including through international assistance. As such, Iraqi refugees are more likely than Syrian refugees to lack valid residency or bail-out papers, shutting them off from formal work opportunities. This echoes evidence discussed in Section 8 about the challenges of addressing economic exclusions and participation in Jordan (see also Gordon, 2019: Lenner and Turner, 2019).

Iraq

There is a lack of available evidence exploring the significance of employment as a factor in refugees' migration decision-making in Iraq. Further research is needed to fill this gap.

2.3. PROTECTION, SAFETY AND REFUGEES MIGRATION DECISION-MAKING

Gaps in protection directly undermine safety, dignity and access to services, all of which are cited as reasons for people wanting to leave host countries (Alrababa'h *et al.,* 2021; Kvittingen *et al.,* 2018). However, protection gaps may also make it more difficult for people to move or find protection solutions through onward migration, something that is compounded by declining protection pathways, including resettlement and family reunification (Collet, 2016). Any form of onward mobility for those facing acute protection needs may become a 'desperate choice' (NRC, 2016) requiring those who do decide to migrate onwards because of a lack of safety to take risky, irregular and unsafe routes.

Where refugees who are otherwise marginalised because of their cultural or religious identity, for example, are able to tap into strong social networks and ties, protection risks and aspirations for onward migration may simultaneously decrease. For example, qualitative research with the Bani Khalid Bedouin tribe found that tribal networks play a crucial role as informal adaptive mechanisms for refugees (Miettunen and Shunnaq, 2018). These can support refugees to secure protection and support from shared tribal networks, including in cross border regions such as Mafraq in Jordan and the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. These tribal ties play important roles in building dependency, kinship and hospitality for displaced Syrians which informs decisions to stay, often because such ties facilitate some form of security and stability.

However, such examples are highly specific. It cannot be assumed that all refugees will have access to such social ties. Indeed, protection gaps appear to be most significant when such ties are severed, in turn limiting refugees' opportunities to facilitate onward migration or secure livelihoods in host countries.

2.3.1. PROTECTION AS A FACTOR: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EVIDENCE

Lebanon

Lebanese policies toward refugees have generated significant protection gaps which have increased refugees' aspirations to seek onward migration, though prevailing economic and legal precarity means many lack the capabilities to leave the country. As Janmyr observes, the vast majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon lack basic legal protections, trapping many in a "deeply precarious legal position" (2018: 58). Protection gaps have actively been encouraged by the Lebanese government, which asked UNHCR in 2018 to stop registering newly arriving Syrians. Expensive permit schemes also prevented many refugees from renewing their residency permits (Kikano *et al.,* 2021).

31

Evidence detailing refugee decisions in light of these protection gaps suggests that many refugees reluctantly stay in Lebanon and "accept exploitation" (Janmyr, 2018: 58) or make plans for onward migration or return (Hager, 2021). However, Syrian refugees in Lebanon who face key protection issues are also less able to act on onward migration aspirations because of severe economic and political barriers that prevent onward migration, including a lack of access to visas, documents or safe onward routes. These challenges are compounded by Lebanese policies which are differently and inconsistently enforced in different parts of the country, creating a patchwork of regulations and decisions (Sanyal, 2018: 67).

Jordan

Refugees who are unable to access specific avenues for international protection, such as Iraqis, are likely to aspire to onward migration as a result. Many refugees interviewed by Kvittingen *et al.* (2018) began considering onward migration over land only after their application for international resettlement had been rejected, feeling that this was the only means available to them to ensure they could keep themselves and their families safe. Similarly, 50% of the refugees surveyed by the Norwegian Refugee Council said they were intending to leave because of the protection situation in Jordan (2016). Protection challenges cited by refugees included limits to their internal mobility within Jordan. The registration of non-camp Syrians through the Ministry of Interior Service Card led to greater regulation of refugees' movements, undermining livelihood strategies, and exposing Syrians to fines, especially those without ID cards (*ibid.*). Such measures place Syrian refugees at increased risk of scrutiny by security officials and expose them to threats and forced detention, contributing to a general sense of insecurity (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018; Haider, 2016; Gordon, 2019; NRC, 2016).

Iraq

The overall level of security in Iraq appears to inform refugees' onward migration decisions though the evidence here is weaker than in Jordan or Lebanon and is largely focused on return aspirations (Constantini and Palani, 2018). Overall, further evidence is required addressing how protection informs refugees' onward migration decisions in Iraq, noting that the available evidence is currently limited or tangential (focusing on IDPs or return).

2.4. CONCLUSION

Education, employment, and protection are all relevant factors in shaping refugees' onward migration decisions. Where decent education, secure and dignified employment, and pathways to rights, safety and residency exist, refugees will be more likely to see a future for themselves and their families in host countries. Where obstacles remain to access educational opportunities, secure employment, or safety, aspirations to migrate onward may increase. However, there is an absence of both detailed macro-level analyses and granular country-specific examples from which more concrete conclusions can be drawn regarding the relevance of any one factor over another. It can be inferred from the existing evidence that pathways to rights and residency strongly inform refugees aspirations, which in turn informs perceptions of different factors, including education, employment, access to services, the possibility of return and/or a sense that the situation in the host country will improve. For example, when educational opportunities in host countries are seen to lead to secure, legal employment opportunities (through skills and training), then aspirations to stay may increase.

Where opportunities for employment offer pathways to legal residency, refugees' aspirations to stay may increase, as is the case for the proportionally small number of Syrian refugees who have benefitted from the Jordan Compact. It is also this perception that makes onward migration to Europe an attractive proposition from both an employment and protection standpoint. Protection appears to cut across many of the factors that shape refugees' onward migration aspirations.

A lack of safety and experiences of social exclusion, stigma and discrimination means work or educational opportunities can be risky for refugees. Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq are often exposed to harassment and scrutiny by state officials, undermining their ability to build livelihood strategies. In educational settings, refugee children may face social stigma and exclusions because of their nationality (see Part II). Whilst opportunities in education and employment may encourage refugees to stay, the extent to which these opportunities are safe, secure, and inclusive will strongly influence the relevance of these factors.

The footprints of Ain Dara Temple in North Syria.
© E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2006.

SECTION 3: How do Gender, Family Composition, Age, Socio-Economic Status, Culture and Religion Influence the Relevance of Factors Identified under Q2?

Different Refugees, Different Decisions:
- Refugee decision making, aspirations and capabilities vis-à-vis onward migration is complex. Decisions to stay or leave will be informed by the specific circumstances, backgrounds, and identities of different refugees.
- Gender, family composition, age, socio-economic status, culture, and religion inform and mediate individual aspirations to either stay or move onward.
- Factors that inform onward migration decisions, such as educational opportunities, employment, or protection, will be responded to in relation to the specific gendered, racial, generational, and religious experiences of displacement.
- Family composition and socio-economic status will differently shape the decisions refugees make regarding their future. These can be difficult to predict, but some general trends emerge, particularly with regard to family composition and protection.

3.1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS, CHARACTERISTICS AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Refugees' aspirations for onward migration are informed by a diverse set of factors and backgrounds. Key among these factors are the role of family and kinship ties, social networks and access to information. These factors generate both *aspirations* for onward migration but also the capabilities of refugees to leave through the sharing of information and the provision of financial and other resources (see Section 1; Kuschminder *et al.*, 2015: 57; Cummings *et al.*, 2015: 29).

Social ties and networks also play an important role in refugee survival strategies, and become a key resource for managing, negotiating and responding to the challenges they face in contexts of displacement. Where these ties are well established in countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, they may influence decisions to stay. As a result, social networks, information and social backgrounds are seen to play a vital role in both shaping refugees' aspirations to stay or move onward, but also in contributing to the conditions and capabilities that make such decisions viable.

Attention to diverse social factors is helpful in addressing how aspirations and capabilities to migrate onward will be different for different groups of refugees (Haider, 2016: 3). Refugees from Syria are heterogenous and will experience displacement differently – and will be treated differently by various policies or interventions – amongst groups as diverse as Christians and Sunni Muslims, single mothers, children and adolescents, Palestinians and Iraqis from Syria and former combatants (*ibid.*). These categories will overlap and be further shaped by a refugees' place of departure in Syria, generating various regional dynamics that shape social ties, networks and the decisions refugees make in neighbouring countries.

A consistent feature in the evidence is how harassment by police shapes general aspirations for onward migration, but also how this harassment affects groups differently, becoming more acute for some because of their nationality, or presenting a more severe protection risk because of their gender (Carlson *et al.*, 2018: 673). These same diverse and overlapping factors shape experiences in education, access to employment (the availability of work permits for Syrians but not for Iraqis in Jordan) or protection (pathways to international resettlement for some groups over others). As such, they can be seen to influence the relevance of certain factors like education, employment and/or protection in shaping different aspirations, but direct evidence for this is often less clear in comparison to evidence highlighting how factors like gender and age shape experiences of and

everyday responses to displacement (dynamics explored in more detail in Part II, Section 7).

3.2. THE INFLUENCE OF REFUGEES' SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS ON EDUCATION AS A FACTOR

There is strong evidence arising from several systematic reviews of the literature indicating that family composition strongly determines the influence of education on decisions to stay or move onward. Syrian families with school-aged children place a high value on educational opportunities (WFP, 2017; Collett, 2016). For example, a review by the WFP notes the influence of education on decisions: refugees would go anywhere "as long as we can send our children to school, and there is a future" (2017: 40). Refugee families who can access education in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq will prefer to stay in the country, especially when educational opportunities are seen to lead to longer-term opportunities such as employment or regularised legal status (*ibid.*).

Access to education is not uniform, with different families facing different barriers linked to their socio-economic status, culture, language, and prior educational attainment. Because of this, evidence suggests that access to education will not lead to uniform aspirations to stay (El-Ghali *et al.*, 2019). Moreover, economic barriers to accessing education remain prevalent: "Some schools' tuitions fees, even if minimal, coupled with other educational expenses such as textbooks or transportation, become an obstacle" (*ibid.*: 21). As such, refugee families in situations of acute or generalised poverty may prioritise economic opportunities over educational ones when it comes to their aspirations to stay or move onward.

Gender informs the relative significance of education as a factor in onward migration aspirations, with women being more likely than men to want to seek opportunities in other countries (Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2019). However, choice of destination is often also influenced by cultural and religious preferences, with girls and their families preferring to pursue opportunities in other Muslim-majority countries such as Turkey (also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015). As such, whilst gender appears to influence women and girls' aspirations more so than men and boys', the latter are more likely to want to pursue educational opportunities outside of the region due to prevailing gender and cultural norms. Younger refugees are also more likely to place a greater level of significance on education than older refugees. However, experiences of bullying in school can discourage refugee youth from participating in formal education and may also contribute to onward migration aspirations among refugee youth and families with school-aged children due to a perceived and actual inability to safely access educational opportunities (Haider, 2016: 7).

3.2.1. SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS AND EDUCATION: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EVIDENCE

Lebanon

Some Syrian refugees' cultural backgrounds lead "many refugee families [to] not want to send their children to Lebanese public schools" (Buckner *et al.*, 2017: 456) because of a preference for informal Syrian-led education. Such evidence indicates the preference some families have for culturally specific education, and how this may lead them to take their children out of the formal Lebanese education system. This may indicate a stronger overall preference for education that is locally available and reflect greater overall aspirations to stay for some families, although the evidence for this is weak suggesting further research is required.

Jordan

Socio-economic status, poverty and protection inform how refugees differently respond to educational opportunities (Tobin *et al.*, 2017), yet the provision of education alone does not mean that such families' aspirations will be met. Rather, families weigh up the provision of education against a set of other factors and priorities, including the prospect of long-term employment for their children or the overarching protection environment. Where these are seen to be less secure or unlikely, onward migration aspirations may increase (Haider, 2016).

Nationality and the differential treatment of different groups of refugees from Syria also informs the influence of educational opportunities on refugees' decision making. This is particularly stark in the case of Iraqi refugees displaced from Syria, who are often overlooked by interventions directed specifically toward the education of Syrian nationals (Dankwah and Valenta, 2018: 263).

Iraq

There is an absence of evidence noting how refugees' social backgrounds inform the relevance of education as a factor in shaping refugees' onward migration decisions in Iraq. Further research is recommended to add nuance and clarity to the existing literature.

3.3. THE INFLUENCE OF REFUGEES' SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS ON EMPLOYMENT AS A FACTOR

Gender shapes the relative significance of employment in determining refugees' aspirations for onward migration, though this is likely less significant a factor than might be assumed. Whilst it is generally the view that male refugees are more likely to pursue onward migration because of employment, a comprehensive working paper drawing on unique datasets from the IOM and Gallup World Polls finds that both male and female migrants from major conflict countries are positively self-selected in terms of their predicted income, and that aspirations for secure employment equally inform aspirations for onward migration among male and female refugees (Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2019). As such, gender differences are not seen to have any strong causal impact on the significance of employment on aspirations in general, though opportunities for employment will be gendered in nature, especially where women are excluded from local job markets because of patriarchal norms. These gendered experiences of employment are most notable where different groups of refugees are excluded from labour markets in countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq because of social stigma. In this instance, refugees may be unable to build sustainable livelihoods, with discrimination in employment reflecting wider gaps in protection. This is well evidenced for LGBTQ+ refugees who face routine persecution in the job market because of gendered taboos (Myrttinen *et al.*, 2017).

Younger refugees, including children, appear to prioritise employment opportunities when considering their prospects, with some indication that this affects aspirations to either stay or move onward (Kivelä and Tajima-Simpson, 2021). When children believed that they could acquire the necessary skills and opportunities in host countries, they were less likely to aspire to onward migration. However, their actual ability to acquire these skills was limited, leading to feelings of frustration and wasted potential (*ibid.*). Overall, one quarter of the young refugees surveyed hoped that they would "be living elsewhere, though not their place of origin" in two years (*ibid.*: 18). Such evidence reflects the many challenges facing younger refugees, including the gendered nature of childhood in contexts of displacement (Chatty, 2007, 2010; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015; Dafa and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2021).

Children's assessments of employment opportunities will not be uniform. Age intersects with other factors such as gender and family composition, meaning that adolescent boys who are also older siblings will likely be expected to take on more responsibilities than younger children. Moreover, opportunities for employment available to adolescent girls may be curtailed by the fact that they are more likely to face risks related to early marriage. Whilst evidence highlights how younger refugees' aspirations to stay or move onward are informed by their perceptions of future employment prospects (Kivelä and Tajima-Simpson, 2021), any individual assessment will inevitably be shaped by the wider social context young refugees find themselves in, leading to different expectations, opportunities and forms of exploitation based on age and intersecting factors such as family composition and gender.

For displaced children, the 'rupture' experienced by young refugees also affects their capacities and aspirations for the future, including with regards to employment aspirations (Blerk *et al.*, 2021). Traumatic past border crossing experiences lead to lower expectations and a lack of hope for the future. This is also the case for the trauma of being 'stuck', particularly in urban Palestinian refugee camps, which "impacts all transition pathways" to adulthood (*ibid.*). In terms of onward migration aspirations and employment, lower levels of self-esteem may limit the overall hope and aspiration younger refugees have for resettlement or onward migration, whereby growing up in contexts of protracted temporariness postpones decision making indefinitely (*ibid.*). Here, age intersects with nationality, whereby the 'rupture' experienced by Palestinian refugee youth from Syria appears to have a far greater effect than is the case for Syrian refugee youth in Lebanon and Jordan. This is because Palestinian children and youth are more frequently shut out of other long-term solutions, including employment, because of their legal status and nationality, in contrast to Syrian children who might find it easier to imagine a future because of the possibility of long-term and secure employment in the country (see Part III). In the absence of such solutions, young non-Syrian refugees may resort to risky decisions: "The cost of temporariness can lead to frustration for young people and high-risk decision making, such as illegal working or onward migration" (Blerk *et al.*, 2021: n.p.).

For refugees of retirement age, opportunities for future employment are seen to be limited, with their age also determining the degree to which they feel comfortable 'adapting' to a new country, including by learning a new language or of integrating into a new economy (Maleku *et al.*, 2021). Older refugees, in anticipating such barriers, are more likely to want to stay in countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, where they can take advantage of social networks and familial livelihood strategies, particularly when they are unable to work or are retired.

Family composition also influences the relative significance of employment in shaping refugees' aspirations for onward migration. Evidence suggests that employment in Europe is perceived as a way of securing a 'better life' for individual refugees who migrate, but also of supporting the family unit more broadly, including through remittances and routes to family reunification (Mallett and Hagen-Zanker, 2018).

3.3.1. SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS AND EMPLOYMENT: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EVIDENCE

Lebanon

There is an absence of solid evidence noting how refugees' social backgrounds inform the relevance of employment as a factor in shaping refugees' onward migration decisions in Lebanon. Whilst there is a significant amount of evidence linking refugees' social backgrounds to experiences of social inclusion and economic participation more broadly (see Parts II and III), the relevance of these factors to onward migration is under-explored in the literature. Further research here is recommended to address this gap.

Jordan

Evidence from Jordan suggests that family composition strongly informs the importance of employment in shaping onward migration decisions. Many families may rely on savings to meet the high cost of living in Jordan, with employment pursued as an immediate goal to shore up finances, particularly for larger families living in rented accommodation (Haider, 2016). In situations where families are unable to meet their needs, including through employment, they may rely on savings or other resources, which will deplete over time. As livelihood strategies begin to look more unsustainable, onward migration decisions may be put into place, either for one member of the family or the entire family unit (*ibid.*). This is especially evident in situations where families have contacts, relatives or networks in third countries who can offer them support and information (*ibid.*: 10). As such, evidence suggests that whilst preferences to stay may persist where families are able to meet their livelihood needs, such assessments will change over time. Where it seems less likely that parents will be able to provide a secure future for their children in Jordan, onward migration aspirations may increase (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018).

The extent to which such decisions are informed by gendered dynamics remains under-explored, presenting a key gap that should be addressed through further research. Whilst many women have become income providers during displacement, including as heads of households, their access to legal work permits is highly restricted. Only 5% of work permits issued to refugees in Jordan were granted to women between January 2016 to December 2020 (Syrian Refugee Unit Jordan, 2021). This raises questions about the relationship between women headed households and onward migration decisions made within family units as discussed above.

Iraq

Family composition and gendered dynamics within households determine the relevance of employment as a factor in onward migration aspirations and decision making. Whilst household decision making is split equally between men and women, often 'the breadwinner' had the main weight or responsibility over economic decisions, including employment (Durable Solutions Platform, 2019: 41). Nevertheless, employment-related decisions about onward migration were "made jointly with all members of the household" and "that decisions were discussed within the household, and everyone agreed with the decision" (*ibid.*: 41). Family units therefore appear to weigh up the relative benefits of onward migration based on a collective assessment of needs. Evidence on how decisions are made within women-headed households would be helpful in adding further nuance to this picture.

3.4. THE INFLUENCE OF REFUGEES' SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS ON PROTECTION AS A FACTOR

Protection needs that arise relating to gendered forms of persecution strongly influence onward migration aspirations, whilst simultaneously reducing capabilities to migrate onward because of heightened risks of targeted violence and gendered discrimination (Aksoy and Poutvaara 2019: 12). Evidence suggests that women will be less likely to consider onward migration if this involves travelling alone, because of a fear that the journey may expose them to generalised forms of gender and sex-based violence and exploitation. However, these risks are not limited to the journey, and women may continue to face harassment and discrimination in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, meaning that onward migration may become the only viable opportunity to escape situations of gender-based violence.

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ+) refugees from Syria often face continued

persecution and discrimination in host countries (as discussed in Part II, Section 7). In response, many aspire to onward migration to Europe because of the LGBTQ+ rights protections that exist in most countries (Myrttinen *et al.*, 2017; Alessi *et al.*, 2018). LGBTQ+ refugees aspire to onward migration in order to find safety from gender and sexuality-based persecution, and to seek mental health support for high levels of PTSD (Myrttinen *et al.*, 2017; Odlum, 2019; Nasser-Eddin *et al.*, 2018). LGBTQ+ refugees also face ongoing fear in host countries, a lack of state protection and a lack of familial or social support, increasing onward migration aspirations and a preference for assisted protection pathways including international resettlement (Fisher *et al.*, 2019).

Younger refugees face heightened protection risks linked to their gender, leading to higher aspirations to migrate onward. For example, younger men consider onward migration because of the harassment, violence and potential detention and refoulement they face by officials (NRC, 2016). Girl survivors of GBV also reported considering onward migration in light of age and gender-specific protection issues (*ibid.*). However, capabilities for younger refugees to take up onward migration will be limited and potentially expose them to further discrimination and exploitation (Achilli *et al.*, 2019). In both Lebanon and Jordan, many Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Children (UASCs) may rely on transactional sex work to support their livelihoods, with this sort of work acting as a means of financing onward journeys and of escaping acute situations of poverty and 'rightslessness' (*ibid.*).

As such, in order for these children to act on their aspirations to seek protection in third countries, evidence strongly indicates that many face extreme forms of exploitation, including on the migration journey. Such evidence calls for action, including upholding the four core principles of the CRC – non-discrimination (Art. 2); the best interest of the child (Art. 3); the right to life, survival and development (Art. 6); and the right to be heard (Art. 12): "These four principles should ideally form the linchpin of any state or community-based policy on UASC." (*ibid.*: 9).

3.4.1. FAMILY SEPARATION: A KEY PROTECTION ISSUE

Separated families face substantial protection gaps which increase aspirations for onward migration: "the availability of family reunification is critical and has a strong influence on group decisions regarding livelihood development. Family unity is a fundamental human right, enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and one that extends to refugee populations" (Collett, 2016: 14). However, despite an assumption by European governments that limiting family reunification will deter larger families from following successful asylum claimants, evidence suggests that "this has not deterred new arrivals" (*ibid.*: 15). As such, the evidence presents a troubling picture, where "the current political climate has decreased states' willingness to resettle or reunify separated refugee families" (McNatt *et al.*, 2018: 5).

Rather than developing a policy response that may actively be keeping families separated, leading to longer-term protection risks, the evidence maintains that European governments should seek to uphold family reunification as "a simple way of offering greater protection to refugee groups in moments of crisis, without designing new channels of entry" (*ibid.*: 15).

Further evidence highlights how different groups of refugees are motivated to seek onward migration because of a desire to both secure family reunification, and to ensure safe passage for entire family groups (Tucker, 2018; Carlson *et al.*, 2018). This is because family separation had negatively affected families' ability to secure long-term protection, safety and livelihoods in countries bordering Syria. Evidence therefore indicates how refugees seek to address protection issues through unification (a point well recognised under international human rights principles of family reunification).

The onward migration of individual family members also creates protection issues for those left behind, increasing aspirations for onward migration whilst limiting capacities to actually facilitate onward mobility. For example, the Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement (2021: 43) notes that:

> *"[Whilst] there may be positive consequences for those left behind if just one individual departs who faces a higher risk due to their age, gender, religion, occupation or political affiliation (e.g. young men approaching the age of military recruitment) […] in other cases family separation may create multiple challenges such as:*
>
> *(a) restricted access to livelihoods or reduced household income if the person who left was the main earner;*
>
> *(b) restricted access to basic services due to lack of funds to pay for transport, lack of a male chaperone, limited financial resources to pay for consultations, medicine and school books;*
>
> *(c) increased vulnerability and insecurity for women and children when an adult male leaves; (d) changing roles and responsibilities within the family, especially when the main earner or head of family leaves; and (e) psychological effects of family separation on health."*

Older refugees, especially those above retirement age, faced increased protection risks, especially if they lacked access to social networks or were separated from their families (Chemali *et al.*, 2018). Whilst evidence on older refugees does not indicate a strong overall link between separation and onward migration aspirations, it does highlight how age affects the ability of older refugees to find security, especially in contexts of family separation. Moreover, their more limited mobility may prevent onward migration opportunities available to younger refugees, suggesting that other routes to safety, including family reunification or the provision of secure visas, will be important in providing protection to this group.

A failure to recognise non-traditional nuclear families, particularly in resettlement and family reunification schemes, can also increase protection risks whilst decreasing refugees' capabilities to pursue onward migration. Emerging evidence about how this disadvantages LGBTQ+ refugees in particular, for whom family ties may have been severed as a consequence of social stigma, is particularly strong (Ritholtz and Buxton, 2021). As such, evidence recommends that family reunification should be more sensitive to the different meanings that refugees might give to family, so that additional pathways to protection and onward migration are available to those at risk. This also resonates with evidence on the barriers faced by family units that fail to meet normative Western standards of the 'nuclear family' (Welfens and Bonjour, 2021).

The exclusion of polygamous families from reunification schemes, including through the provisions of the EU-Turkey Agreement, means it may have become more difficult for UNHCR and other agencies to address the vulnerabilities of different groups, including young girls who are forced to marry into polygamous arrangements.

Further research exploring the link between such protection gaps and the onward migration decisions of polygamous or non-traditional family units would be important in developing a stronger evidentiary base for understanding how best to respond to and support those in "complex or unclear" family profiles (*ibid.*).

3.4.2. SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS AND PROTECTION: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EVIDENCE

Lebanon

Protection of children plays a key role in shaping refugees' onward migration aspirations in Lebanon. Evidence suggests that the protection of their children played the most significant role in shaping Syrian refugees' decision making (Akesson and Sousa, 2019). Where refugee families felt Lebanon would be an un-safe place for their children, and that the situation would not improve with time, aspirations for onward migration and/or resettlement, would increase, despite recognition that such opportunities were severely limited.

Jordan

Similar to Iraqi refugees, Palestinian refugees from Syria living in Jordan face disadvantageous levels of protection because of their nationality and their marginalised socio-economic status, leading many to aspire to onward migration (Salemi *et al.*, 2018: 28). Palestinians in Jordan face additional scrutiny from state officials and are often denied pathways to long-term legal status, leading to both increased aspirations for onward migration and limited capabilities to carry this out (*ibid.*).

UASCs in Jordan also face difficult and long waits for family reunification whilst living in specialised centres in the vicinity of camps. As a result, "children being held in specialised centres in the camp's vicinity often opt to escape the centre at night, with all the dangers this journey poses, running the risk of becoming migrants with an irregular status" (Achilli *et al.* 2019: 14).

Iraq

Members of religious minorities in Iraq were likely to aspire to onward migration if they felt that they were at risk of religiously motivated persecution or discrimination (Basci, 2016). Yazidi refugees in Iraq were likely to aspire to migrate onward because of religious persecution, more so than economic conditions (*ibid.*). Moreover, aspirations to arrive in certain countries are also shaped by cultural codes informing where they might feel safest, presenting strong evidence linking religious identity with both motivations to leave when protection is not possible, and the selection of destination countries that are seen to be the safest (*ibid.*).

3.5. THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS ON MULTIPLE FACTORS

Assessing the evidence on social backgrounds and their influence on education, employment and protection as factors demonstrates a granual view of refugees' onward migration decision-making. Protection needs are a significant factor for refugees who experience cumulative discrimination and/or persecution in host countries because of their identity, religion, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality (Carlson *et al.*, 2018; Alrababa'h *et al.*, 2021; Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018; Collett *et al.*, 2016) – also Section 7). Education is a more influential factor for families with children, or for refugees from certain socio-economic backgrounds hoping to pursue higher education in Europe (WFP, 2017; Collett *et al.* 2016; El-Ghali *et al.*, 2017). Socio-economic factors also shape the relevance of employment for refugees' decision making, with evidence suggesting that lower-skilled refugees may be more inclined to stay because of a perception that they will struggle to fit into the demands of the European labour market (Hager, 2021). The strength and proximity of refugees' social networks influences the extent to which refugees can sustain livelihoods in a host

country's informal market. Social ties (measured in terms of family composition, socio-economic status, cultural and religious ties) therefore inform the relevance of employment and protection as they shape refugees' access to livelihoods in host countries.

3.6. CONCLUSION

Gender, family composition, age, socio-economic status, culture, and religion variously influence the relevance of education, employment and/or refugees' safety/protection for the decision to stay or move onwards. Nevertheless, the available evidence presents a highly granular picture that captures how overlapping identities and contexts interact to inform decision making in highly subjective and non-uniform ways. Whilst some trends can be identified, the influence of refugees' social backgrounds and characteristics on the relevance of different factors can be unpredictable.

Nevertheless, some trends emerge. Gender, family composition, age, socio-economic status, culture, and religion play a role in informing individual aspirations to either stay or move onward. Different educational or employment opportunities will be perceived differently depending on different social factors. Higher levels of educational attainment may make educational opportunities in Europe more attractive to some refugees in the long-run – or make opportunities in host countries more desireable in the short- to mid-term. Likewise, social factors play an important role in contributing to overall levels of safety in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq – especially if different groups face heightened levels of persecution and/or generalised discrimination. Furthermore, family composition and socio-economic status will differently shape the decisions refugees make regarding their future both as individuals and as part of wider social groups/networks. Ultimately, whilst the influence of social backgrounds on different factors can be difficult to predict, appreciating the influence of diverse social backgrounds on decisions to stay and/or leave highlights the granularity of decision making.

Two women from Syria participating in a writing workshop in the Jordanian town of Irbid.
© E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh.

SECTION 4: What is known about the (intended or unintended) effects of foreign assistance on refugees' decisions to either stay or move onwards?

The Indirect Influence of Foreign Assistance on Refugees' Decisions to Stay:
- Foreign assistance that aims to enhance 'social cohesion' and/or reduce or mitigate 'social tensions' (see Sections 5-7) between different groups of refugees and host communities may play a role in improving the nature of social relations, increasing the strength and quality of refugees' social ties which, in turn, inform decisions to stay.
- Creating inclusive and sustainable social protection systems will encourage and optimise the integration, security, and wellbeing of displaced populations in host countries (UNDG, 2016).
- Policies and programmes that directly address the absence of sustainable livelihood strategies, including cash-based assistance, may reduce onward migration aspirations by promoting refugees' economic security in host countries (Carlson *et al.*, 2018).

The Indirect Influence of Foreign Assistance on Refugees' Decisions to Leave:
- Shortfalls in aid may increase refugees' aspirations for onward migration, particularly when livelihood strategies become dependent on foreign assistance, including Cash-Based Initiatives (Haider, 2016; Fallah *et al.*, 2021; see Section 8).
- Refugees that are excluded from foreign assistance (including because of their nationality) may be more inclined to pursue onward migration. A nationality-based focus on Syrians in programmes and policies, rather than on 'refugees from Syria' (including Palestinians, Iraqis, and Kurds from Syria) leads to hierarchies and tensions between members of different refugee communities that can be avoided through area-based approaches which may also foster greater levels of cohesion (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020a, 2020b; Carpi, 2020).

4.1. THE KNOWN EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ON FACTORS THAT SHAPE DECISIONS TO STAY

Foreign assistance that aims to enhance 'social cohesion' and/or reduce or mitigate 'social tensions' (see Part II on social cohesion) between different groups of refugees and host communities *may* improve the nature of social relations, increasing refugees' aspirations to stay. One example includes efforts to address gaps in the quality of public education for both refugees and Lebanese students (Kelley, 2017). Similarly, creating inclusive and sustainable social protection systems will encourage and optimise the integration, security, and wellbeing of displaced populations in host countries (UNDG, 2016). This may lead refugees to feel they and their families can build more sustainable and safe lives in host communities.

Likewise, whilst meeting general population needs will likely not significantly impact refugees' aspirations or capabilities to migrate onward, forms of cash-based assistance are evidenced to strongly support refugees' livelihoods and generate economic security for refugee households (WFP, 2018). Given that the literature notes that the absence of sustainable livelihood strategies can prompt onward migration (Carlson *et al.*, 2018), policies and programmes that directly address such needs may reduce onward migration aspirations. However, further evidence is needed to substantiate this point which has largely been inferred from the available evidence.

4.2. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Foreign assistance can generate unintended consequences, especially when it excludes certain groups of refugees, in turn shaping onward migration aspirations. Evidence highlights how Iraqi refugees cited their exclusion from humanitarian assistance directed at Syrians as reasons for wanting to migrate onward to Europe (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018; Dankwah and Valenta, 2018).

Moreover, following the arrival of refugees from Syria, foreign assistance in Lebanon and Jordan began prioritising Syrian nationals over other refugees, including Iraqis and Palestinians. The nationality-based focus on Syrians in programmes and policies, rather than on 'refugees from Syria' (including Palestinians from Syria and Iraqi refugees displaced by the Syrian conflict), has been identified in the literature as creating diverse hierarchies and tensions between members of different refugee communities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020a). An area-based approach has been widely proposed as a means of avoiding exclusionary and discriminatory practices and policies, whether focusing on 'people displaced from Syria' to encompass diverse nationalities, and/or to focus on providing assistance to 'refugees in Lebanon' or 'refugees in Jordan', irrespective of their nationality (see Part II). Further evidence about the possible impacts of such an approach, and feelings of social inclusion in general, on refugees' decisions to stay, would be crucial in addressing this key gap in policy and academic literature.

Shortfalls in aid are also evidenced as increasing refugees' aspirations for onward migration (Haider, 2016: 2). When the WFP was hit by funding shortages in 2015, almost 4,000 refugees departed Jordan in August, coinciding with cuts to food assistance (*ibid.*: 6). Moreover, in response to a reduction in cash assistance by the WFP, combined with existing low earnings, many Syrian families had to "resort to unsustainable coping strategies" (Kvittingen, 2018: 112), such as informal employment, increased child labour and reduced food intake. Whilst indirectly related to foreign assistance, the high dependency on aid in Jordan (Fallah *et al.*, 2021) means that any shortfalls in assistance will have knock-on consequences for already precarious livelihood strategies. This contributed to a sense of insecurity, not only relating to livelihoods, but also feelings of dignity for refugees and their families, motivating many to consider onward migration (Kvittingen, *et al.*, 2018: 112; Achilli, 2016; IRC, 2019; Haider, 2016: 3; Salemi *et al.*, 2018).

Finally, refugees' perceptions that they may be eligible for international resettlement can inform short-term decisions to stay. However, if their application for resettlement is rejected or their livelihoods situation worsens as a result of waiting and/or changes in the host context, refugees' perceptions of such foreign assistance may become more negative, leading to increased aspirations for onward informal migration (Kvittingen *et al.*, 2018; McNatt *et al.*, 2018; Carlson *et al.*, 2018). In light of this evidence, humanitarian agencies and donors should consider the effects of their work on refugees' perceptions, and how they might manage the sharing of information

4.3. CONCLUSION

Aspirations for onward migration remain high despite the significant contributions of foreign assistance directed at improving conditions for refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. Despite the widespread belief that effective foreign assistance can contain refugees' movements (Duffield, 2010), there is no sound evidence that it can reduce refugees' migration to third countries in the short term (Dreher *et al.*, 2019).

Nevertheless, several indirect consequences of foreign assistance can be inferred from the available evidence. Foreign assistance that promotes equitable access to protection, with a coordinated focus on educational provision and secure, legal, and sustainable livelihoods is helpful

in supporting refugees to build more secure lives in host countries. By contrast, foreign assistance that unintentionally excludes different groups of refugees may contribute to onward migration aspirations, particularly if it prioritises certain nationalities over others.

Effective foreign assistance plays a vital role in supporting livelihoods and addressing protection gaps in host countries, irrespective of whether it does or does not influence people's onward migration decisions. Foreign assistance should seek to uphold international legal and humanitarian principles to ensure that people who continue to face discrimination and persecution in host countries – many of whom lack the capabilities to undertake onward migration directly – can access and secure protection through resettlement, family reunification and humanitarian corridors.

Archival photographs of the city act as prompts during writing workshops involving refugees and citizens based in Beirut (Lebanon). © E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh.

Ayvalik (Turkey) in the evening, overlooking the Greek island of Lesbos.
© Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh.

PART II:
SOCIAL COHESION AND REFUGEES' PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES

- ## SECTION 5: Which factors explain the success or failure for the participation of Syrian refugees in local communities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq?

Factors Influencing Refugees' Abilities to Safely Participate in Local Communities:

- Factors which enable or restrict safe forms of social interaction and participation in local communities include: historical relations, geographical and socio-economic factors; national and municipal policies, discourses and actions; residing within spaces which may facilitate or prevent people's freedom of movement and social interaction; the nature of local-level dynamics; and inter-personal and inter-communal relationships in local communities.
- Positive outcomes are more likely to arise when key structural and legal barriers to participation and integration are removed and when refugees are simultaneously provided with positive forms of support.
- Refugees' participation in local communities is enabled by access to de jure rights and a supportive protection environment.
- In the same host state, different municipalities, towns, cities and camps provide different opportunities or barriers for refugees to participate safely.
- Municipal authorities may be supportive and provide *de facto* rights and *de facto* protection, in addition to access to services and support for wellbeing; at the same time, municipal authorities can directly and indirectly undermine refugee's rights and wellbeing, contributing to situations of precariousness and a sense of uncertainty about the future.
- The relative significance of different factors on national, municipal and local levels varies according to the context and the particular characteristics of the members of refugee and local host communities.
- Local participation takes place within and across diverse communities and neighbourhoods which each have their own complex historical, political and socio-economic dynamics.
- The nature of social interactions and the capacity for refugees to participate in local communities varies according to settlement policies and types, including across closed or open camps, or in the context of cohabitation in towns, cities and rural areas.
- People's experiences and outcomes related to participation and integration will vary depending on refugees' intersecting identity markers (real and imputed) and demographic identifiers.

Key Legal, Social and Economic Factors of Success [2]:

- Access to legal rights: positive *de jure* and *de facto* rights and regulatory frameworks.
- A welcoming political and media discourse, policy and practice.
- Access to the labour market, safe and dignified forms of employment, fair income.
- Inclusive settlement policies, safe and dignified housing, and safe spaces for interaction.
- Access to education.

---

[2] Adapted from Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2016).

- Access to services supporting health and wellbeing.
- Positive markers of 'Social Cohesion' (including):
    - Positive nature and degree of social interactions between refugees and hosts.
    - Positive host perceptions of refugees and the presumed 'impacts' of refugees.
    - Positive refugee perceptions of hosts.
    - Positive host and refugee perceptions of diverse institutions.
    - Positive perceptions of belonging to and being safe in host community and country.
    - Safety and stability.

5.1. DEFINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE

The literature notes that many refugees from Syria in Lebanon and Jordan aspire for not only a higher standard of living, employment, housing and education, but also higher degrees of community participation (i.e. see Sullivan and Simpson, 2017:6, discussed in Te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 52). However, the literature also notes that not all refugees may wish to have frequent interactions with members of local communities (i.e. see Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 12, drawing on Empatika and UNDP 2019). As such, 'participation' is not always desired *per se.*

Indeed, measuring the success and failure of refugees' participation and integration is highly complex, not only due to limitations of data, and different levels of analysis (individual, household, community), but also because of the difference between goals, experiences and outcomes.

For instance, if an individual aims to participate in a community-based activity in a neighbouring area, but their participation ultimately increases their exposure to abuse and discrimination at a checkpoint and when meeting with members of the community who reject the presence of refugees, the goal (increasing participation), experience (of discrimination, social exclusion and decreased well-being) and outcome (increased vulnerability to violence) are distinct.

While integration and cohabitation may be seen as indicators of success, and may be identified as such by policy-makers, in some contexts, segregation, isolation and invisibility, rather than integration, participation or visibility in the public sphere, may be people's preferred option, in order to maintain their safety and dignity (i.e. see Buscher 2011: 21-22; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2020a, 2020b). This is not to say that isolation or segregation is a 'success' in such contexts, or that they are 'desired' per se by people who have experienced displacement. Instead, what is important is to identify what conditions facilitate people's ability to engage in *safe* modes of integration and participation, echoing the World Refugee Council's focus on the need for gender- and age-sensitive approaches to promote "safe integration" (WRC, 2009, 2015).

5.2. STRUCTURAL FACTORS

Historical Relations

Historical relations within and between different refugee and hosting communities (i.e. refugees from Syria, different groups of Lebanese hosts, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, etc.) influence people's perceptions of one another and the nature and quality of interactions between hosts and refugees. For instance, in Lebanon "decades long interactions with Syrian seasonal workers and other economic migrants has been instrumental in shaping how Lebanese hosts characterize Syrian refugees. Stereotypes of Syrians as either military officers or menial workers with low social standing, provide the backdrop against which Lebanese hosts hold negative perceptions of Syrian refugees" (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 11). Historical relationships and historical encounters influence the nature of contemporary interactions between different groups of hosts and refugees, as discussed in more detail in Section 6.

Geographical and Socio-Economic Factors

While common 'national histories' may inform nation-wide responses to refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, different locations and communities report different histories and levels of interaction. For instance, in border areas many people are used to having contact with each other and are connected through social, economic and family ties, and this may lead to more positive forms of social interaction and participation in local communities (i.e. Haddad *et al.*, 2018: 32). In turn, pre-displacement factors, such as pre-existing levels of poverty, resource availability/ scarcity and the degree of municipal capacity to deliver basic services all frame people's experiences of arriving in and living alongside members of local communities. Local-level economic conditions, informal employment opportunities and local capacity are pivotal to the nature of interactions and refugee-host relations, with a greater likelihood of tensions emerging in "poorer areas with less employment opportunities" and "where public services are limited or of poorer quality" (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 20, drawing on Haddad *et al.*, 2018; Aktis Strategy, 2016; Mercy Corps, 2015).

5.3. DE JURE AND DE FACTO RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL ACTORS

Access to *de jure* rights, such as residency and employment rights, are key for refugees to feel safe and able to participate in local community life. Access to these rights inform refugees' aspirations and are fundamental for building viable, secure futures in host countries (also see Sections 1-3). In Lebanon and Jordan, refugees who do not hold official documentation – in particular refugee men – fear detention and deportation at checkpoints; this may limit their movements in the public sphere, with negative effects on their well-being and that of their families (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 14; also see Khattab and Myrttinen, 2017; Promundo, 2017; JIF, 2018; also see Sections 6 and 7). Access to rights reduces refugees' vulnerability to exploitation and violence and helps enhance markers related to participation and social cohesion (Guay, 2015:27; Haddad *et al.*, 2018: 38; Al-Masri and Abla, for UNDP, 2017:12).

TABLE 3: *De jure* and *de facto* frameworks and impact on refugee participation

National-level policies and politics: *de jure* **frameworks** which can variously support or undermine refugees' safe participation in local communities	**Municipal-level policies:** *de facto* **and** *de jure* **frameworks** which can variously support or undermine refugees' safe participation in local communities
• Political discourse and orientation: the extent to which state-level actors are welcoming or hostile towards refugees (noting that different Ministries may hold/enact contradictory positions and policies). • Residency rights. • Right to freedom of movement. • Employment rights. • Access to education. • Access to health, wellbeing, social safety nets. • Access to formal justice mechanisms. • Recourse to protection from different forms of violence, discrimination and abuse (including access to legal protection mechanisms to address exploitation, domestic violence, sexual harassment, neglect). • Access to civil rights (as outlined by international refugee law). • Avenues for political representation and participation.	• Political discourse and orientation: the extent to which municipal authorities are welcoming or hostile towards refugees. • The extent to which municipal authorities implement/do not implement national-level policies and frameworks. • *De jure* and/or *de facto* access to rights and services. • Local government capacities and resources, including public goods and services (such as education, healthcare, housing, water and electricity, solid waste collection). • Local capacities to manage and resolve disputes and provide access to formal/informal justice. • Avenues for political/civic representation and participation.

De jure rights are essential but insufficient if these rights are not enacted or accessible in practice on the municipal or local level (see Table 3). Where refugees are unable to access de jure rights – including when national policies are ambivalent or hostile towards refugees, municipalities may provide access to essential de facto rights and services, in addition to promoting and providing facilities for refugee-host interactions (i.e. see te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 33-34).

The Role of Municipalities

Supportive municipalities are linked with enhanced markers of social cohesion, such as an increase in the degree, nature and quality of refugee-host social interactions and refugees' social participation with local communities (i.e. te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 33-34; also see Section 6). Refugees' participation is enhanced when municipal authorities provide access to high-quality integrated services for all residents in their municipality irrespective of their legal status, and when they provide refugees with protection from discrimination and scapegoating both by the media and by other residents in the municipality. In contrast, the ability for refugees to participate safely is undermined when municipalities are unable or unwilling to uphold refugee rights or provide access to services[3]; or when they introduce and implement discriminatory measures (such as curfews and targeting Syrian workers) or scape-goat refugees (te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018; Haddad *et al.*, 2018; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020a). Such measures have broad impacts on people's well-being, increasing social isolation and restricting people's ability to interact with members of the local community (te Lintelo and Sove, 2018; IDS 2018). Strengthening municipal actors' capacities to support refugees, including "urban planning, public spaces, housing, education, culture, access to employment, etc." (OECD, 2020: 11) is identified as being essential in efforts to promote refugees' safe and sustainable participation in communities.

Key recommendations arising in the literature include providing high-quality integrated service provision for all residents; and [e]quip[ping] civil servants (including law enforcement personnel, teachers and health care providers) to ensure migrants' adequate access to services for instance by providing intercultural awareness, anti-discrimination and human rights protection training (OECD, 2020: 13).

Although municipal- and local-level responses can lead to the 'successful' participation of refugees in a particular neighbourhood or part of a town, the literature consistently highlights the importance of host states developing national legislative frameworks and policies that prioritise and uphold refugees' rights writ large. This is both an underlying international obligation under international law, and a means of reducing peoples' vulnerabilities to exploitation and violence, helping enhance multiple markers related to participation and social cohesion (i.e. see Guay 2015: 27; Haddad *et al.*, 2018: 38; Al-Masri and Abla, for UNDP, 2017:12; Ozcurumez and Hoxha 2020: 3).

5.4. LOCAL LEVEL FACTORS

Settlement Contexts and Spaces for Interaction

Within a given state and/or municipality, different forms and spaces of settlement (such as urban, rural, camp-based) enable or prevent different degrees of cohabitation, interaction and participation with different communities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al.*, 2011; de Berry and Roberts, 2018). Patterns of settlement, for example, can impact the potential for and nature of interaction with local communities, and can influence markers related to social cohesion (see Section 6). Settlements can be characterised on a continuum from total physical separation of the displaced and host community, to different forms of rural or urban cohabitation. de Berry and Roberts' report

---

3 Even where municipalities may wish to support refugees, the literature notes that state policies may prevent municipalities from collaborating with (i.e.) NGOs to support refugees (i.e. see IRC, 2015:6) and some municipalities may be reluctant to invest in improving service provision in unauthorised settlements, especially if such activities would go against the position of the central government (te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 36).

(2018) adapts Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al.*'s matrix (2011) based on "a sliding index that depicts the degree of interaction with the host population", as follows:

TABLE 4: Displacement settlement scenario and social cohesion

Scenario of Displacement	Characteristics of the Displacement Scenario Relevant to Impact on Social Cohesion		
Closed camp	Complete separation. Camp population largely unable to move outside of camp. Access to services consist of humanitarian assistance provided by external actors.	Limited contact between displaced and host populations across economic transitions.	Lack of opportunity for social connection between internal camp populations and external 'host' populations.
Open camp	Displaced population living in camps, but able to move and trade inside and outside of the camp.	Displaced population and some members of host population living in camps. Economic relations. Movement of displaced population.	Increased opportunity for social connections. 'Border' between camp and non-camp remains evident.
Self settlement	Displaced population establishes own settlement; may or may not interact with local population.	Separate location and separate legal status, but equal economic opportunities with local population.	Opportunity for social connection. Access to services dependent upon the normative framework and capacity and availability.
Non-urban cohabitation	Displaced population lives in same village as local population.	Degree of socio-economic and political interactions will vary across the spectrum	Opportunity for social connection. Access to services dependent upon the normative framework and capacity and availability.
Urban cohabitation	Displaced population lives in the same urban context as local population.	Degree of socio-economic and political interactions will vary across the spectrum.	Opportunity for social connection. Access to services dependent upon the normative framework and capacity and availability.

Table adapted from Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. (2011) by de Berry and Roberts (2018).

Urban or rural settlement, which provides opportunities for refugees to regularly interact with members of local communities and access adequate housing (also discussed in Section 6) can positively impact refugees' wellbeing, sense of belonging and participation in local communities (Empatika and UNDP, 2019: vii; Jones *et al.,* 2019: 29; Haddad *et al.,* 2018: 8).

In turn, informal tented settlements (ITS), closed or isolated refugee camps[4], policies which restrict refugees' freedom of movement (i.e. from camps to host communities), roadblocks, checkpoints, and curfews, all prevent opportunities for refugees to interact with and participate in local communities (JIF, 2018; Simpson, 2018: 38).

---

4 Social cohesion in the context of refugee camps remains under-studied in the existing literature, including because they often contain (or are assumed to contain) refugees who share the same nationality and in-group identity markers, or because of a general emphasis on host perceptions of refugee-host relations rather than refugee-refugee relationalities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016, 2018, 2020).

51

Local Communities

Host community members' perceptions of and attitudes towards refugees from Syria play a key role in framing refugee-host interactions and the ability for refugees to safely participate in local community life. Socio-economic factors and demographic characteristics influence the nature of refugee-host relations, for instance depending on similarities and differences in religious, cultural and social norms between refugee and host communities; and the particular identities and characteristics of different groups of refugees and different groups of hosts. Refugee-host relations are primarily framed by historical relationships and context-specific structural factors – including long-standing social, political and economic inequalities –, political rhetoric and media representations (see Sections 6 and 7).

5.5. CONTEXT MATTERS

The implementation of national-level policies often varies greatly across municipalities. In Lebanon, the importance of national-level policies and frameworks varies significantly throughout the country, given that there are many cities, municipalities and refugee camps which have limited affiliations with the state, and/or "where the state has limited authority, and other actors have a greater say over public life" (te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 35). In this context - as in some areas of Jordan and Iraq - parallel institutions have emerged to fill gaps left by the state and municipalities alike, including informal mechanisms to resolve local-level disputes (*ibid.*: 56). In such areas, it can be argued that local level, *de facto*, rather than *de jure* integration is more likely and more realistic.

However, the literature also notes that when new national-level policies are introduced, these may provide enhanced access to rights for certain groups of refugees but may unintentionally exclude others. For instance, the Jordan Compact has formally increased Syrian refugees' access to work permits, and yet only a small number of Syrian refugees have been able to access safe and dignified forms of work, and non-Syrian refugees have continued to be excluded from accessing such rights (see Sections 2, 4 and 9).

Within the same country, refugees living in different regions, cities, towns and camps will perceive their ability to participate in local communities differently. Evidence from Iraq suggests that Syrian refugees living in Dahuk city, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, felt more welcomed and able to participate safely in local community life than those living in Erbil city (IOM, 2016). This informs onward migration aspirations too, suggesting that when refugees feel less able to participate in local communities, they may be more inclined to make plans to leave the country (see Section 2).

As noted above, urban contexts mean people have more opportunities to interact more frequently. However, such proximity is experienced differently depending on the context, either producing opportunities for greater participation, or greater exclusion. Urban refugees in Iraq often appear to have worse living conditions than camp dwellers; this leads many refugees to seek to enter camps and, therefore, live separately from local communities. With regards to the KRI – where a large proportion of Syrian refugees live in Iraq - the difficult educational, health, and residency conditions of Syrian refugees are identified as hampering their local integration (Yassen, 2019).

In the case of Iraq, there is a lack of evidence relating to the significance of place of residence and settlement type on local participation. The literature notes a need for further research into urban displacement in Iraq (Munoz and Shanks, 2019: 335); the impacts of rural-urban cleavages on refugees' participation in local communities (i.e. see Ground Truth Solutions, 2019); and the consequence of higher rates of poverty in rural areas and the overall marginalisation of rural inhabitants (Kaya and Luchtenberg, 2018; Haider, 2019).

The deterioration of the security, financial and political situations of Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq have limited refugees' abilities to safely participate in local communities. Some of these changes

have affected the majority of a given host country's residents (such as Lebanon's economic crisis), while others have affected particular cities, municipalities and governorates (such as the Beirut port explosion; localized terrorist attacks and military incursions, and the occupation of cities such as Mosul by ISIS). COVID-19 and state-wide policies have affected all residents of these countries, reducing the potential for social interaction and local level participation as a whole. At the same time, in their responses to COVID-19, certain municipalities have targeted refugees from Syria in ways that have restricted their freedom of movement and their ability to safely participate in local communities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020a).

5.6. CONCLUSION

Diverse factors enable or restrict different forms of social interaction and participation in local communities. These include historical relations, geographic and socio-economic factors; national and municipal policies, discourses and actions; residing in certain spaces (camps, non-camps); restrictions on movement; and inter-personal and inter-communal relationships. When key structural barriers to participation are addressed, including discrimination, unequal treatment and a lack of protection, positive outcomes in terms of social interaction are more likely.

Key findings from the literature highlight several key indicators of positive social cohesion, including the existence of safe and positive (rather than necessarily frequent) social interactions between refugees and hosts; positive perceptions of refugees and the presumed impacts of refugees; positive perceptions of hosts on the part of refugees; as well as feelings of safety and stability. Indeed, *de jure* rights, including residency and employment rights, are key for refugees to feel safe and able to participate in local community life. However, the literature also notes that *de jure* rights are important but *insufficient* in the absence of *de facto* access to essential rights and services. Improving the *de facto* treatment of refugees within local communities is therefore important to build meaningful and safe forms of participation, in addition to access to *de jure* residency, employment and other rights.

Finally, there is a need to take seriously local-level dynamics and how these shape inter-personal and community interactions. These can vary across the neighbourhood/municipal level, reflecting diverse historical relations, and changing patterns of settlement and cohabitation that uniquely shape local dynamics. Recognising that context matters is consistent with a 'situational approach', expanded on in Section 7, which recognises the relationship between different structural factors and the unique experiences of individual refugees navigating life in specific places and contexts.

SECTION 6: What is known about the effects of the arrival and presence of substantial numbers of refugees on social cohesion, and how social cohesion can be enhanced?

'Social Cohesion':
- The nature of refugee-host relations has increasingly been examined through the lens of 'social cohesion'.
- In spite of its popularity amongst policy-makers and practitioners, social cohesion is a contested concept which remains largely undefined and is methodologically difficult to measure, including in relation to programmes which aim to 'enhance' social cohesion between refugees and hosts.

Social Cohesion and Host Perceptions:
- Social cohesion literature, policies and programmes have overwhelmingly focused on documenting host perceptions of refugees and host assumptions relating to the 'impact' of refugees on hosts. This is to the detriment of a focus on refugees' perceptions of hosts and living with local communities; refugee-refugee relationality; and both hosts' and refugees' perceptions and trust of different institutions.
- The focus on host perceptions of refugees has led to a partial understanding of the nature of refugees' participation in local communities and how to best uphold the needs and rights of refugees and enhance their opportunities for safe and dignified forms of participation.
- Evidence identifies that structural factors, the frequency and nature of personal interactions and integrated municipal-level service provision variously influence the nature of host perceptions and attitudes and refugee-host interactions.
- The literature indicates that refugee-host relations are primarily framed by historical relationships and context specific structural factors – including long-standing structural inequalities -, political rhetoric and media representations.

Enhancing Social Cohesion:
- Expanding integrated service delivery and programmes, including through municipal-level and area-based approaches, is necessary but insufficient to improve refugee-host relations.
- Markers of social cohesion are more likely to be improved through policies and programmes which aim to enhance the frequency, nature and quality of social interactions between refugees and hosts.
- Spaces characterised by co-habitation and regular interaction – including schools – are identified as having the potential to facilitate positive experiences and outcomes related to markers of social cohesion and possibilities for participation in local communities. In contrast, segregated schooling negatively affects young people's abilities to safely participate in local communities, highlighting the importance of developing integrated education policies and infrastructure. (Bullying and harassment in educational settings are discussed in Section 7).

Assumptions about Refugee-Host Tensions:
- The literature demonstrates that although tensions between hosts and refugees are widespread and limit the potential for safe forms of participation in local communities, these tensions are not inevitable.
- Key drivers of tensions between refugees and hosts include empirically-unfounded perceptions that refugees negatively impact local economies and lead to higher rates of unemployment. This assumption forms part of powerful narratives reproduced and circulated by many actors, including politicians and the media.
- Recognising that these are empirically-unfounded assumptions that are often reproduced and circulated to blame refugees for pre-existing structural inequalities, points to the importance of designing and developing policies and programmes which combat discrimination and xenophobia in local communities.

6.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARRIVAL AND PRESENCE OF REFUGEES AND SOCIAL COHESION

It is often assumed that the arrival of large numbers of refugees has a direct and linear effect on conditions and dynamics in the host country and/or community. Refugees' arrival and presence may influence a host state's demography, and it may coincide with real and perceived changes in social dynamics and relations. However, the evidence notes that 'the arrival and presence of refugees' is not a causal factor influencing social cohesion (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al.*, 2011; Zetter, 2017; Finn, 2017: 23) and acknowledges that "it cannot be assumed that forced displacement upsets a prior and static configuration of social relations or state-citizen connections" (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 28). The arrival of refugees *may* coincide with real and perceived changes in social dynamics and relations, and yet it is methodologically difficult to pinpoint 'the arrival of refugees' as the *causal factor* influencing social cohesion, economy and/or welfare levels (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al.*, 2011; Zetter 2017; Khoudour and Anderson, 2017: 15-16; Finn 2017: 23) (also see Box 1).

Key variables that "can be (or must be) factored into consideration when trying to ascertain the impact of displacement" in relation to "the ecology within which social cohesion exists in displacement contexts" (Finn 2017:23, drawing on Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al.*, 2011) include:

- pre-existing stressors (including national and regional conflict dynamics, historical conflict issues).
- what constitutes the community.
- time (duration).
- location of displaced population (including camp, the type of camp, (even the political debate around whether to use camps) urban and rural settings, access to and capacity of infrastructure and services).

Thematically, this points to the importance of combining a political economy analysis of dynamics over time, with attention to the significance of settlement type and access to and capacity of infrastructure and services.

Given this, the literature recommends the development of nuanced and contextually specific approaches to understanding the relationship between social cohesion and displacement. This is important because social cohesion is often poorly defined, and there is an absence of appropriate methodologies, indicators and evaluations of programmes and policies relating to 'social cohesion'.

BOX 1: Challenges of tracing a causal link between the arrival of refugees and 'change'

- Socio-economic changes are always underway within any given community or state – these pre-existing changes are underway prior to the arrival of refugees and will continue to unfold in different ways after refugees have arrived. In turn, extrapolating from pre-displacement trends is challenging (see Zetter 2017: 12).
- Changes in a host state or local community may be related, not to the arrival of refugees, but to (i.e.) the geopolitical, economic and trade changes resulting from a neighbouring country being at war and international borders being closed (Haddad *et al.*, 2018: 2).
- Social tensions and social conflict are always present in all societies, and may exist and unravel in different ways across different parts of a given society.
- There are rarely reliable baseline studies or comparable sets of indicators documenting the situation and trends prior to displacement, rendering it complex to pinpoint 'the arrival of refugees' as the cause of any particular change.

BOX 1: Challenges of tracing a causal link between the arrival of refugees and 'change'

(continued from p55)

- There may be political barriers for donors and NGOs to acknowledge the nature of existing (pre-displacement) tensions and conflicts, especially when people are displaced into host countries which are characterised by instability and/or conflict (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 13).
- The arrival of refugees often leads to the arrival of a myriad of 'new' actors and organisations, including humanitarian workers, diplomats, journalists, volunteers, etc., all of which have their own 'effects' on national and local societies and economies.
- "Where social cohesion is identified as being constituted in community relations, social protection mechanisms, services and resources, any negative impact on any of these areas is considered a de facto negative impact on social cohesion" (Finn, 2017: 23).

Source: Adapted from Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., (2011), with insights from additional comprehensive reviews and evaluations cited above.

6.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARRIVAL AND PRESENCE OF REFUGEES AND SOCIAL COHESION

Over the past decade, there has been increasing policy interest in, and commitment to promoting, social cohesion in displacement situations (Guay 2015; Finn 2017; de Berry and Roberts, 2018). However, systematic reviews (Guay, 2015) and comprehensive reviews of the literature and evaluations of relevant programmes and projects (i.e. UNOCHA, 2017; Finn, 2017; de Berry and Roberts, 2018; WFP, 2018, 2020; World Bank, 2020), consistently demonstrate that:

1. interest in and a policy commitment to enhancing social cohesion in displacement situations is relatively recent;
2. social cohesion as a concept is not well defined in this field; and
3. this has significant impacts on operationalising and subsequently 'measuring' or 'promoting' social cohesion in relation to displacement.

This overarching conclusion does not refute that there is a relationship between the arrival and presence of large numbers of refugees and 'social cohesion,' but confirms that a more nuanced, context-specific approach is required when aiming to understand, and respond to support, the needs and rights of refugees and of the people who are hosting them. The following are a selection of critiques of recent and current applications of the social cohesion concept in relation to displacement:

- Researchers have argued that the European and North American origins of the majority of literature on social cohesion "leads to bias, such as focusing on the impact of minority groups on social majorities and the effect of integration (or lack of integration) on social cohesion" (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 8; also see Finn, 2017: 6-7).
- The increased focus on social cohesion in relation to displacement over the past decade has been critiqued as being linked to European and North American states' perception, and both discursive and political framing, of refugee movements as a 'threat' to host societies, and the assumption that the arrival and presence of 'outsiders' in a host society will inevitably lead to antagonism and tensions (i.e. Finn, 2017: 9).
- Systematic desk-based studies highlight that 'social cohesion' is often part of a discourse and policy framework guided by assumptions (rather than evidence), biases, and political or ideological aims (Guay, 2015; Finn, 2017, de Berry and Roberts, 2018).

- Such biases and aims may simultaneously reproduce the assumption that displacement inevitably leads to 'tensions' by 1) equating social cohesion with refugee-host relations and 2) focusing in particular on the negative impacts of refugees *on* hosts, as perceived *by* hosts and host states.
- By failing to recognise or "analyse positive factors" (IDS, 2018), the a *priori* negative framing of the relationship between "social cohesion" and displacement (Finn, 2017: 22) becomes self-perpetuating: certain dynamics, changes and tensions may become particularly visible or noteworthy precisely due to the interventions of political, media, humanitarian and development actors.
- There is an assumption that externally-developed and implemented policies and programmes are needed to mitigate against what are assumed to be the inevitably 'negative' impacts of refugees on host populations. This is instead of acknowledging the diverse ways that displacement interacts with structural inequalities and vulnerabilities which have long and complex historical and political roots (Finn, 2017; Guay, 2015).
- The focus on hosts' negative perceptions of refugees has been to the detriment of acknowledging the significance of the interplay between refugee-host, host-host, refugee-refugee, and/or individual-institutional relations (Mourad and Piron, 2016: 3; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020a, 2020b; Carpi 2020).

Whether 'social cohesion' is based on assumptions, or is critiqued as a nebulous concept or the result of politicised discourse, all of the literature reviewed agrees that a more nuanced understanding and operationalisation of 'social cohesion' is needed to ensure the development and implementation of integrated responses to displacement that support the needs and rights of refugees and members of host communities.

6.3. DEFINING 'SOCIAL COHESION'

'Social cohesion' is often used as a synonym for, or interchangeable with terms including: "human security, community relations, social capital, social inclusion and social protection… conflict mitigation, access to services and trust in institutions of the state" (Finn 2017: 8); "a stable peaceful relationship between host and refugee populations, effective social protection mechanisms or trust" (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 13). Conceptually close concepts include "social capital, social networks and social stability… social tensions, social instability and social fragmentation" (Guay, 2015: 9). Such wide-ranging understandings mean that 'social cohesion' is often viewed as a "quasi-concept" (Green *et al.*, 2009), one which is difficult to operationalise and measure as a result.

While social cohesion is often negatively framed, the OECD (2012: 51) views social cohesion as being associated with "social inclusion, social capital, and social mobility." Furthermore, the OECD (2016) considers social cohesion to be a key indicator of "migrant integration", with the latter evaluated through 27 indicators organised around five areas: employment, education and skills, social inclusion, civic engagement and social cohesion.

In addition to conceptualising social cohesion as an indicator of migrant integration, the OECD (2012:51) also defines a 'cohesive society' as a society that: "works towards the well-being of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward social mobility."

Defining 'Social Cohesion' in Responses to Displacement from Syria

In the context of displacement from Syria, promoting 'social cohesion' has been a key aim of the Syria Regional Response Plan and the Regional Development and Protection Programme designed to support refugees from Syria in addition to members of host communities in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The literature consistently notes that a major challenge in

determining what works to enhance 'social cohesion' is that many organisations designing and implementing such programmes and projects do not explicitly define social cohesion, perhaps because doing so is "viewed as too complex a task," or is seen as unnecessary (de Berry and Roberts, 2018:16).

In the case of the Syria Regional Response Plan, 'social cohesion' remains undefined but is framed in relation to promoting self-reliance with a view to reducing tensions and promoting livelihoods (UN SRRP, 2014). de Berry and Roberts (2018: 13) go further and suggest that the Syria Regional Response Plan may have opted not to define 'social cohesion' precisely to avoid sensitive topics and dynamics which may alienate, and create tensions with, host states.

In turn, it is notable that the LCRP 2017-2020 has shifted its language around refugee-host relations from 'social cohesion' to 'social stability'. According to Haddad *et al.*, "the reason for this shift in discourse, according to an international donor, is that 'social stability' sounds 'less permanent' than 'peacebuilding' or 'social cohesion'" (2018: 26). Whether for this, or other reasons, it is notable that the concept of 'social cohesion' may be promoted, left undefined, or rejected, for reasons that are linked to political dynamics and concerns.

Although some international and multilateral agencies and NGOs operating in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq have both general and country-specific definitions of social cohesion (i.e. DRC and SFCG), recent comprehensive reviews of the literature and evaluations of programmes confirm that the majority of such organisations and policies do not.

Defining 'Social Cohesion' in the Arabic Language Literature

The English concept of 'social cohesion' as used in relation to displacement is translated into a variety of words in Arabic. In UN publications in Arabic, the most common translation for the term 'social cohesion' is *tamãsuk `ijtīmã'ī* (where *tamãsuk* is used in the sense of different social groups 'fitting into each other'), along with other terms such as *ittisaq `ijtīma'ī* ('social homogeneity') and *talãhum `ijtīmã'ī* (understood as 'social bodies close together'). In reports written in Arabic, and reflecting the various cognate concepts used in English when referring to social cohesion, other terms are used, such as *tajãnus `ijtīmã'ī* and *insijãm `ijtīma'ī* (both connoting 'social homogeneity'), *tarãbut `ijtīmã'ī* ('communities tied together') and *rawãbet `ijtīma'īyah* ('common social ties').

A search for Arabic resources discussing social cohesion within communities hosting refugees from Syria leads primarily to UN reports translated into Arabic, in addition to news items shedding light on programmes designed to enhance 'social cohesion.' The relative lack of resources on social cohesion and displacement written directly in Arabic (as opposed to UN and INGO reports translated from English into Arabic) is revealing. It suggests that, unlike in the English language literature, 'social cohesion' is not perceived as being a key concept in debates pertaining to hosting refugees in the region, or as a key way of conceptualizing and responding to the encounter and relationship between refugees and members of neighbouring host communities.

6.4. SOCIAL COHESION INDICES AND INDICATORS

Organisations and policies rarely have coherent indicators to measure the impact of forced migration, or of responses to displacement, on social cohesion (de Berry and Roberts, 2018; Danish Refugee Council, 2017; Salem and Morrice, 2019:23). Recent studies confirm that "most of the existing evidence around social cohesion is anecdotal and does not carefully probe why or how social cohesion interventions work, nor how sustainable their outcomes are" (Catholic Relief Service, 2020; also de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 16; Ozcurumez and Hoxha, 2020). In many cases this means that, irrespective of solid evidence, "effectively any broad intervention targeting

socio-economic stresses of host and displaced communities is considered as contributing to social cohesion which in turn is a foundation for future development" (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 14).

Recent comprehensive and systematic literature reviews and programme and project evaluations consistently note the importance of developing context-specific and time-sensitive indicators to "measure social cohesion and the impacts upon it by displacement (and then to derive efficient and effective interventions where there is a need and demand)" (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 8; also see Guay 2015).

Regionally-specific indices, such as Harb's index, have been proposed as being particularly appropriate in relation to evaluating the relationship between displacement and social cohesion in the Middle East (i.e. see Finn, 2017: 13).

Since 2017 in particular, country-specific indices have been developed and are being tested:

Lebanon: In the context of Lebanon, tools used to measure 'social cohesion' (categorised as related to aspects of resilience, alongside impact and sustainability) have been based on the 'Resilience Lens' developed as part of the Syrian Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in 2016 (WFP 2019: 6). As one aspect of social cohesion, Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon have been conducted in Lebanon since 2017.

Jordan: In Jordan, Mercy Corps has applied an intergroup relations index (based on three indicators - 'perceptions of outgroups', 'attitudes to violence', and 'interactions with outgroups'), combined with a cooperation over basic services index (combining measures of 'perceived tensions,' and views of 'non-violent dispute resolution'), when evaluating its social cohesion programming (Ferguson *et al.*, 2019: 13- 16). The evaluation (Ferguson *et al.*, 2019: 13-16) highlighted contradictory findings: on the one hand, "The program as a whole had a strong, positive, impact on the overall social cohesion outcome index" and yet, on the other hand, "We did not find program impacts on any of the single indicators linked to enhanced social cohesion that comprise the indices reported above. This suggests that shifts in individual indicators are too small to be captured statistically, especially in the relatively short-term period (at most 12 months) after program implementation." This suggests the complexity of 'measuring,' 'promoting' and 'evaluating' changes in social cohesion.

Turkey: In 2017, the WFP piloted social cohesion indicators and monitoring systems (WFP 2018: 34), adapting this to the context of Turkey through the Social Cohesion Index (SCI) in Turkey (WFP 2020: 37). While beyond the geographical scope of this systematic review, the SCI-Turkey is relevant in so far as it offers clear components and relative weighting of these components across the host community on the one hand and the refugee community on the other (see Table 5).

TABLE 5: The components of the Social Cohesion Index-Turkey

Host community	Maximum point	Refugee community	Maximum point
Sharing neighbourhood	5	Sharing neighbourhood	5
Sharing workplace	5	Sharing workplace	5
Children's friendship	5	Children's friendship	5
Children's intermarriage	5	Children's intermarriage	5
Equal payment for refugees	5	Rent costs	3
Vulnerability of refugees	5	Safety	5
NGO assistance for refugees	5	Stability	5
Government assistance for refugees	5	Future plans	5
Sharing the public services	3		
Cost of living	3		
Crime rates			

(Source: WFP, 2020: 37).

The analysis of the SCI-Turkey data is undertaken with attention to the broader political economy of the host country; sensitivity to changes over time; and the perspectives of both host and displaced populations. This is in line with the broader literature reviewed, which points to the value of a political economy approach by virtue of its attention to the changing relationship between the micro- (individual), meso- (community) and macro- (national and regional/transnational context) levels. The data collected and analysis of findings are also disaggregated by gender and age, which is significant for reasons discussed in Section 7.

In all, on the basis of the literature reviewed, the SCI-Turkey and the results of the longitudinal studies summarised above provide a valuable entry point to understanding the relationship between social cohesion and displacement.

Limitations of Existing Social Cohesion Indices

Many indices, including the SCI-Turkey index, focus primarily on host-refugee relations, with greater emphasis given to host members' perceptions *of* refugees and of assistance provided to refugees, and the assumed impact of refugees *on* hosts. The prioritisation of host perspectives is, as Bayaner *et al.,* note in another context, because "perceptions are at the core of tensions" (2016: 45): it is typically hosts who express concerns and tensions towards refugees, and it is thus their perceptions which are prioritised in such studies.

Like the Mercy Corps index summarised above, which also prioritises refugee-host or host-refugee relations, the SCI-Turkey index does not explicitly provide scope to document host-host, refugee-refugee or refugee-institutional relations. Indeed, in the WFP SCI-Turkey, refugees' perspectives are often relegated to the margins, or not prioritised at all (also see Barbelet *et al.*, 2018; Kelly, 2020; Aktis Strategy, 2016: 4).

On the basis of a broader analysis of the literature, these are important limitations of the SCI-Turkey and other indices, which could be redressed accordingly in future iterations and adaptations of the index.

Beyond 'Host Perceptions of Refugees'

By defining 'social cohesion' as "absence of social tension between refugees and host communities" (WFP, 2020: 5), a gap remains relating to understanding the nature of relations within refugee and host communities – noting their internal heterogeneity across vectors of gender, age, nationality, legal-status, religion, cultural background, etc., (as discussed in Section 7), and the extent to which their composition will change over time - and vertically, with the state and other institutions.

With regards to vertical tensions (i.e. the relationship between people and institutions), the broader literature reports that Syrian refugees and hosts alike often have high levels of distrust towards humanitarian organisations and states alike (e.g. Harb and Saab, 2014; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020a; see Mourad and Piron, 2016: 37-38). Such vertical relationships are rarely analysed in relation to social cohesion in displacement situations, including for reasons outlined in this Section of the Report and in Section 4.

6.5. EVALUATING SOCIAL COHESION PROGRAMMES, PROJECTS AND POLICIES

The literature also notes the challenges of evaluating programmes, projects and policies which have 'social cohesion' as one of their goals (i.e. see de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 26).

A recent independent evaluation of World Bank Group (WBG) supported projects in conflict-induced

displacement situations worldwide, including in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, notes that the majority of WBG-supported projects aimed at promoting social cohesion do not report intermediate or longer-term outcomes and instead focus on collecting monitoring data and outputs (World Bank, 2019). As such, *participation* in a programme *per se* is assumed to enhance social cohesion, as is also noted in an evaluation of WFP programmes in Lebanon (2019: 4, emphasis added).

Such evaluations often present findings based on self-perceptions following participation in programmes which aim to promote social cohesion (*ibid.*). In another case, the refugee and host community participants of an Action Contre la Faim programme in Jordan self-reported an "improved perception of well-being and self-confidence, as well as improved mutual understanding and communication, reduced isolation and the extension of social support, enhanced empathy and reduce prejudice" (Acosta and Chica, 2018).

In other cases, evaluations of programmes confirm no change in social cohesion, as in the case of a 2017-2018 WFP food for training and food for assets programme (WFP, 2019: 35). Although this is the conclusion reached by the WFP social cohesion surveys, the evidence base for such a conclusion may be weak due to the conceptual and methodological challenges outlined in this section of the report.

While noting an improvement over time, an independent evaluation reports that the World Bank's forced displacement projects "lack specific indicators to monitor and evaluate effects on displaced populations" (World Bank, 2019: xi), half of all projects between 2000-2017 fail to "disaggregate project monitoring indicators by group," and, while the majority disaggregate indicators by gender, only 14 of 42 projects planned to "disaggregate by refugee, IDP, or returnee, and gender" (*ibid.*,: xxii).

A further limitation highlighted by a WFP evaluation is that "The Programme does not disaggregate outcomes for Syrians and Lebanese participants and does not systematically analyze outcomes by gender or by Persons with Disability" (WFP, 2019: 3). This has implications on many levels, including with regards to determining which factors influence the outcomes and experiences of different people, including on the basis of gender, age, nationality, status and/or disability status (see Section 7).

The broader literature also stresses that evaluating one particular project or programme is complicated by "the multiplicity of actors and the variety and volume of their interventions (notably financial spending), projected outcomes and project timelines that occur both simultaneously but also in series. The allied problem is of attribution: that is in terms of isolating and estimating the particular contribution of each intervention" (Zetter, 2017: 18). This is relevant in broader terms, but also corresponds to one of the conclusions emerging in the literature review: that a range of interventions and policies may be *necessary* to enhance people's access to needs, services and rights, but they may, in isolation, be *insufficient*, to lead to a sustainable change in outcomes and impacts.

As a result, some of the literature suggests tracing the *relative significance* of a range of policies and programmes which interact in different ways in the same context (see Section 6.6.); this, in turn proposes the potential of long-term commitments across a range of policies and approaches, rather than something that can be achieved through short-term projects and programmes (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 28; Haider, 2019: 6).

6.6. KEY FACTORS RELATED TO 'SOCIAL COHESION'

The literature identifies that the following key factors influence social tensions (Guay, 2015:15; also see Samuels *et al.,* 2020):

61

1. "Structural vulnerabilities that pre-date the Syrian crisis, such as high levels of poverty, resource scarcity, lack of effective governing institutions (or support for institutions).
2. Differences in religious, cultural and social norms between refugee and host communities (including perceptions linked to gender) and lack of social networks.
3. Access, affordability and quality of housing.
4. Economic competition over jobs and livelihood opportunities.
5. Access to and quality of basic education (concerns of overcrowded classrooms and lack of quality or access) and basic public services (water and electricity, solid waste collection, healthcare).
6. The role of international aid (in terms of perceptions of fairness of distribution, availability and perceptions of inequity, unfairness and even corruption).
7. The role of social, local and international media and the framing of issues."

While the arrival and presence of large numbers of refugees may be *related* to social tensions, Guay's systematic review of the literature, in line with the broader literature reviewed, does not identify refugees as the 'cause' of these social tensions. Pre-existing tensions may worsen following the arrival and settlement of refugees, and yet the evidence draws attention to the particular significance of *perceptions* and *assumptions* as a driver of potential tensions (including perceptions of how aid is delivered, equity and fairness of access, targeting, distribution, etc.) *(ibid.,)*; and the *role of institutions* such as the media, humanitarian organisations and governments in potentially exacerbating tensions (Guay, 2015: 6).

By recognising that tensions *linked to refugees* per se are not inevitable, the literature does not refute that tensions exist in countries and communities hosting large numbers of refugees; instead, research highlights that programmes and policies have the *potential to work* in ways that will enhance social cohesion between members of different communities and institutions, if they are developed and implemented in ways which are nuanced and context-specific.

This broader framework also provides the potential to develop policies and approaches which will mitigate against the risk of *refugee-refugee* tensions, such as tensions between refugees from a pre-existing protracted refugee situation who may resent state and international stakeholders' real or perceived prioritisation of newly arrived refugees over people categorised as belonging to 'historical case-loads'.

6.7. ENHANCING SOCIAL COHESION AND PROMOTING SAFE PARTICIPATION: WHAT WORKS?

Different initiatives hold different degrees of significance in relation to one another. Although the evidence base of what works 'best' and with most sustainable results is weak, the literature notes the importance of combining a range of initiatives, policies and programmes which, individually, may be necessary but insufficient. As noted in the examples documented in this section of the report, these interventions include the development of high-quality integrated service provision for refugees and hosts, alongside initiatives to support and maintain positive interpersonal interactions – recognising the significance of host perceptions on issues including opportunities, services and jobs –, in conjunction with awareness raising and media campaigns which combat xenophobia and discrimination against refugees. Developing and implementing long-term commitments rather than isolated, short-term projects and programmes (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 28) may have more sustainable effects which support people's rights and needs and enable safe forms of *de facto* integration and local participation (i.e. Guay 2015; O'Driscoll, 2018; OECD 2020).

6.7.1. INTEGRATED MUNICIPAL- AND AREA-BASED RESPONSES

The literature is consistent in noting the importance of strengthening municipal actors' capacities to provide key services to all residents, irrespective of their nationality or status: greater municipal capacity is linked with reduced refugee-host tensions, and enhanced markers of social cohesion (Campbell, 2020; OECD *et al.*, 2020:18; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020b). In line with this approach, integrated service delivery via municipalities in host countries was supported by UN Agencies, NGOs and Governments from early on in the Syrian conflict (UNOCHA, 2015: 37).

However, whilst "programming with municipalities is important, […] it should not be the prime vehicle to promote social cohesion" (Mercy Corps, 2015: 4). Indeed, the literature as a whole notes that integrated programmes are *necessary*, but equally suggests that, *alone*, they are i*nsufficient* to reduce or mitigate against social tensions between refugees and hosts.

As a whole, the challenges of implementing integrated services are more extensively documented in the literature than are positive examples of such services leading to an improvement in indicators related to social cohesion. This is not to say that positive examples do not exist (i.e. see Jones *et al.*, 2019; Presler-Marshall *et al.*, 2019: 1; APA, 2012), but that evaluations of such programmes and policies do not necessarily provide strong evidence of positive outcomes and impacts. The UNDG (2016: 3) notes that there is an urgent need for more robust evidence-building and learning from social protection/assistance interventions on the "conditions under which the delivery of basic services and social protection contribute towards state legitimacy and social cohesion".

Delivering integrated services that help enhance social cohesion may be difficult due to pre-existing structural factors and operational challenges (Mansour and Haj, 2018:22). Relevant structural factors in the case of Lebanon include "economic weaknesses, political divisions and the weakness of the central state" (see Kelly, 2020: 6-7; Kabbanji and Kabbanji, 2018; Haddad *et al.*, 2018); with regards to operational challenges, a 2017 review of cash transfers for refugees (Hagen-Zanker *et al.*, 2017) reports that although "Jordanians constitute 30-50% of beneficiaries of humanitarian programmes in Jordan, […] separate eligibility criteria, transfer mechanisms and so on, mean they are effectively helped through a parallel system, and the programme has little potential to foster social cohesion."

While the evidentiary base for this overarching negative conclusion may be limited, the identification of key operational barriers provides insights into approaches which can overcome such challenges: revising the nature and application of eligibility criteria and transfer mechanisms and developing integrated systems rather than parallel ones (also see Guay, 2015: 21-22).

More broadly, relevant findings emerging in the literature include evidence that greater access to integrated services and programmes will not necessarily lead to the same perceptions (or change in perceptions) across members of both refugee and host communities (i.e. Mercy Corps, 2015: 4). Various interventions aiming to enhance social cohesion, including multi-purpose cash-based assistance in Lebanon and Jordan (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 5-6), have had ambiguous and unpredictable impacts (WFP, 2018: 39-40) (also see Sections 8-9).

It is also notable that long-standing refugee-led mutual aid support systems have been put under pressure over time and in response to various crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic and Lebanon's economic crisis (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020a). The (unintentional) exclusion of refugee-led mutual-aid systems from humanitarian assistance and programming implemented in a given location may have also contributed to tensions between different refugee groups (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020b; noting the indirect consequences of foreign assistance discussed in Section 4).

6.7.2. INCREASING THE FREQUENCY, NATURE AND QUALITY OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

Evidence suggests that markers of social cohesion are more likely to be improved through policies and programmes which enhance the *frequency, nature and quality of social interactions* between refugees and hosts, than through improving service delivery or municipal capacity alone (Mourad and Piron, 2016: 3; Mercy Corps, 2015; SFCG cited in de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 19).

As a whole, the literature confirms that personal interactions may be *related* to hosts holding more positive perspectives of refugees, and yet personal interactions *alone* are not necessarily directly correlated to more positive perceptions (Pavanello *et al.*, 2019). For example, longitudinal surveys in Lebanon find that "perceptions of refugee population pressures were more significantly dependent upon historic and structural factors and not only dependent upon personal experience or direct interactions with refugees" (ARK, 2018: ii; de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 11; also see Mercy Corps, 2015; Haider, 2019). This means that policies and programmes aiming to enhance social interactions should be attentive to context-specific structural factors.

An independent evaluation of a WFP programme for Syrian and Lebanese residents, concludes that "Whether social ties developed as a result of joint participation in Programme activities will be sustained over time remains an open question. A weak link between enhancing social interaction and its effects on broader perceptions on Syrians was found" (WFP, 2019: 4). While the evidence of the duration of changed perceptions and social ties after participation in a project remains weak, it is widely acknowledged that 'changes' in people's perceptions may be short-term, and limited to the duration of a particular programme (WFP, 2019: 37). A decentralised evaluation of WFP programmes found that "a possible link between the length of activities and the development of social ties was observed" (2019: 41).

6.7.3. HOST PERCEPTIONS V REALITIES: OPPORTUNITIES, SERVICES AND JOBS

Social relations are consistently "aggravated by perceived and/or real disparities in access to opportunities and by heightened competition over that access" (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 12). Putting such tensions in context, an ODI study confirms that tensions towards refugees from Syria may be derived from the host community's "perceptions of differential treatment between the two groups" which are exacerbated "*in a context with high inequality and poverty, a stagnant labour market and weak social service provision*" (2020: 5, emphasis added).

The literature consistently notes the discrepancy between perceptions and assumptions on the one hand, and the complex realities of socio-economic and political contexts and dynamics on the other. The evidence demonstrates that refugees are often blamed by different stakeholders – including politicians and the media – for undermining citizens' access to different services and resources, even when pressures on such services pre-date displacement.

Tensions over Employment

Tensions over employment are identified widely as being the most significant 'triggers' of social conflict between hosts and refugees. However, this is based on empirically-unfounded perceptions and representations that refugees negatively impact local economies and lead to higher rates of unemployment: the evidence stresses that "there is no obvious correlation between unemployment

rates of nationals and areas of large influx of refugees" (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2016: 5). The broader literature highlights the significance of the local, national and international context (see Haddad *et al.*, 2018: 10), as discussed further in Sections 8-9.

It is widely recognised that the reality and/or perceptions of competition for jobs, including in the informal sector, and pressure on wages felt by vulnerable groups are more complex than official unemployment levels, and it is, more broadly, recognised that macro-level data and micro-level perception are not automatically correlated. The evidence with regards to the arrival and presence of refugees from Syria points to the relative absence of direct competition for jobs, even though perceptions may persist amongst many members of host communities (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 19; Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 20-21); there is also anecdotal evidence from Jordan, regarding the bifurcarted labour market leading to lower levels of actual competition between Jordanians and Syrians (World Bank, 2019: 159-160; Cookle, 2017: 16). In turn, a recent study concludes that "actual competition for work is limited and only seems to threaten self-employed Lebanese, who are also the most vulnerable to downturns in the economy (Empatika and UNDP, 2019)" (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 20-21)

Notably, economic interactions become sources of tension because they are more prone to power dynamics and exploitation affecting both refugees and hosts (Mercy Corps, 2015). While Lebanese host members may perceive Syrians as stealing jobs and driving down wages, "Syrians complained about exploitation and poor working conditions, and occasionally not being paid for their work" (Haddad *et al.*, 2018: 10).

Programmes – including those linked to cash assistance – have sought ways to decrease refugees' exposure to exploitative work conditions, whilst also being attentive to host perceptions. The evidence suggests that MPC can lead to "improved work conditions" and "improved relations and dynamics" with members of the local community, without necessarily resulting in an increase in host perceptions that refugees are competing with locals for job (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 6). However, disengagement from these programmes was associated with negative outcomes (*ibid.*).

Changes over Time

By 2019, tensions over employment in Lebanon had "declined somewhat […] possibly because, over time, sector employment between Lebanese and Syrians has become increasingly differentiated, with Syrian employment most heavily concentrated in the sectors of construction, agriculture and manufacturing – sectors in which Lebanese are less likely to seek employment (ARK, 2019)" (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 20). Nevertheless, as is the case in Jordan following the introduction of the Jordan Compact, the extent to which this differentiation in employment may contribute to meaningful inclusion, upholding refugees' rights, and/or a sense of future, remains unclear given the available evidence (Lenner and Turner, 2019; Gordon, 2019; see Sections 2, 8 and 9).

6.7.4. SHARED SPACES AND SERVICES

It is widely acknowledged that shared spaces and services have the potential[5] to enhance the quality of refugee-host relations, and refugees' abilities to safely participate in local communities. In particular, the literature recommends that social-cohesion-sensitive policies and activities should be developed and implemented in relation to housing, and spaces of regular interaction – including schools. (i.e. OECD 2020: 14, 19-20; Guay, 2015: 20-21, 27, 53).

---

[5] It is, however, noted that the creation of shared spaces is "generally… not a solution to addressing underlying causes of tension" (Haddad et al., 2018:33).

Housing and Social Cohesion

With regards to housing, the literature recommends the implementation of conflict-sensitive infrastructure and rehabilitation projects that benefit all residents of a neighbourhood, irrespective of their legal status (Haddad, 2018: 32), and multipurpose cash programmes that increase "dynamics of trust" and reduce violence at the community level, by enabling recipients to pay landlords on time and contribute to neighbourhood economies (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 6, 18).

Education and Social Cohesion

Education is widely recognised as a key means to promote social cohesion (i.e. see UNESCO's Guidelines on Intercultural Education; Salem and Morice, 2019: 10; Guay, 2015). Structural limitations, in addition to existing social tensions can "influence access, quality and capacity issues in the education sector" and can diminish the capacity to learn (Guay, 2015: 27-28). Existing inequalities inform access to education, from the availability and cost of transportation to social stigma in the classroom and in education policy. This has been addressed through promoting integrated education as opposed to 'double shift,' or separate education for citizens and refugees.

Studies on the impact of inclusive education systems find that Syrian and Lebanese children in mixed first shift classes "had more positive perceptions of each other and stronger relationships with each other, than did Lebanese and Syrian students attending temporally separate schools (Abla and Al-Masri, 2015)" (Dryden-Peterson *et al.*, 2018: 35). In Jordan, a preliminary evaluation of the *Nashatati* integrated after-school programme found that Syrian and Jordanian students and teachers "experienced increased confidence, tolerance and openness to engaging with others of different age groups and nationalities, positive communication such as increased confidence, and an enhanced sense of community and belonging" (Salem and Morrice, 2019: 21-2)[6]. Further results and evaluations of this and other programmes and initiatives are needed (Salem and Morrice, 2019: 22). In contrast, segregated education has negative impacts on social cohesion (Salem and Morrice, 2019; ODI, 2020; see also Sections 2 and 7). For instance, in Jordan double shift models have led to increases in bullying, violence and discrimination, undermining social cohesion, or the cultivation of 'positive relationships' (Salem and Morrice, 2019).

Ongoing Challenges in Integrated Education Programmes

Refugee children may struggle in integrated education systems because of the effects of their interrupted education, especially if they lack the same level of literacy and numeracy as their peers (Crul *et al.*, 2019); they may also be discriminated against by members of host communities, undermining Syrian children's aspirations for a sense of 'connectedness' (Kivelä and Tajima-Simpson, 2021: 9). Different inequalities may disadvantage Syrian children, in turn leading to social stigma and the escalation of differences and tensions between pupils (also see Section 7). For example, a largescale assessment of needs in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (3RP, 2021) notes the difficulties that disabled Syrian children continue to face in accessing public education, leading to isolation and stigma. This has been compounded for most other children by the effects of COVID-19 and home-based learning models that are "exacerbating pre-existing inequalities" related to educational access for refugee youth (3RP, 2021: 18). Section 7 discusses educational experiences, including of bullying and harassment, amongst different groups of children and young people, all of which affect people's abilities to safely participate in local communities.

---

[6] The authors are referring to a report by the Life Skills and Citizenship Education Initiative in the Middle East and North Africa.

6.7.5. MEDIA AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS

The assumption that refugees negatively affect local economies and communities forms part of powerful narratives reproduced and circulated by the media and politicians (O'Driscoll, 2018a and 2018b; Haddad *et al.*, 2018: 15, 25; Empatika and UNDP, 2019: vii). Recognising that these are empirically unfounded assumptions points to the importance of designing and developing policies and programmes which combat discrimination and xenophobia. Social, local and international media can exacerbate tensions, especially if reporting blames or targets refugees (paraphrasing Guay, 2015: 6:) but the media also has the potential to reduce tensions through nuanced, constructive and rights-based reporting (Guay, 2015: 20-21; OECD, 2020; O'Driscoll, 2018a; Pandir, 2020: 104).

With regards to tensions over jobs, the IRC recommends that governments should "Address and challenge misconceptions, stigma and hostility among employers and the general public related to refugee employment rights through national action plans for labour market integration" (2019: 2). In turn, Save the Children (Kivelä and Tajima-Simpson, 2021:31) advocate "Coordinating media literacy and awareness programmes to educate society about the risks of misinformation, hate speech and polarisation in the community."

Importantly, the literature notes that "harrowing images of overwhelming human" movement and of "ungainly suffering", which may be presented by the media and also in pro-refugee advocacy campaigns, can have negative outcomes, as they can "appear very threatening and can irritate existing social apprehension" (de Berry and Roberts, 2018: 11). Equally, representational systems that celebrate the contributions of 'good refugees' and 'ideal refugees' can unintentionally lead to the denigration and exclusion of refugees who do not fit into the discursive frame of the 'good refugee', in turn leading to different forms of discriminatory and exclusionary practices (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014, 2016d, 2020a, 2020b). A careful balance must thus be found in media and advocacy campaigns, in order to uphold the dignity and rights of refugees.

6.8. CONCLUSION

There has been increasing policy interest in, and commitment to promoting, social cohesion in displacement situations, and yet 'social cohesion' remains poorly defined. When it is used, it is often in ways that assume that the arrival of refugees is a problem for cohesion. However, the evidence does not support this causal assumption. Instead, academic literature on social cohesion highlights that the nature and outcomes of interactions between refugees and members of host communities must be viewed in relation to pre-existing structural factors, the different responses developed and implemented on national, municipal and local levels, and the extent to which demographic characteristics and people's real or imputed identities enable or limit opportunities for safe forms of participation (also see Section 7).

The literature is consistent in noting the urgency of developing a more coherent definition of social cohesion and more nuanced approaches to avoid assumption-driven assessments in policy and practice. As studies of social cohesion often focus on host perceptions alone, further consideration is also needed vis-à-vis refugee-refugee relations and the perceptions of refugees themselves.

Overall, the following policies and programmes are recommended by the literature, and are in line with the findings presented in this chapter: see Box 2: Recommendations for policies and programmes to enhance social cohesion (p66).

BOX 2: Recommendations for policies and programmes to enhance social cohesion

- Develop integrated area-based responses that redress pre-existing structural inequalities, such as policies and programmes to address poverty and resource scarcity amongst all residents of a given neighbourhood, town or city (refugees and hosts alike).

- Strengthen national- and municipal-level capacity, including for the delivery of public goods and services to all residents, including educational services (refugees and hosts alike).

- Enhance access, affordability and quality of housing for all residents.

- Increase the quality of interactions, perceptions and attitudes between refugees and hosts.

- Address the reality and/or hosts' perceptions that competition over jobs has increased following the arrival of refugees.

- Enhance livelihoods opportunities for all residents (refugees and hosts alike).

- Mitigate against host members' perceptions that resources and support are being unfairly and unequally distributed by municipal, national and international actors.

- Support local systems to resolve disputes and reduce tensions.

- Work with the media to challenge xenophobic rhetoric that blames and scapegoats refugees.

Source: Summarised from Guay (2015) and Berry and Roberts (2018: 18).

SECTION 7: **Which factors apply differently to boys/girls and men/women?**

Different Refugees, Different Experiences and Outcomes:
- Refugees' experiences and outcomes relating to participation and 'social cohesion' vary significantly because of intersecting identity markers and demographic characteristics, including gender, age, nationality, religion, ethnicity, dis/ability status, gender identity and sexual orientation.

Particular Groups at Heightened Risk of Social Exclusion and Discrimination:
- Refugee men face a wide range of gender-specific risks, including the risk of arrest, detention and deportation if they do not hold residency status, with the concomitant restrictions on their mobility also limiting their abilities to interact with hosts and participate in local communities. Men are often excluded from or opt-out of diverse programmes and services for a range of reasons, with detrimental effects on their well-being and ability to participate in many aspects of local community life. Particular groups of men facing specific risks include: single men; gay, bisexual and transgender refugees; and male survivors of SGBV.
- Women and girl refugees face diverse kinds of sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV), which limit their abilities to safely participate in local communities. Particular groups of women facing specific risks of violence and social isolation include female-headed households; unmarried and/or recently widowed women; women with disabilities, and lesbian, transgender and bisexual refugees. A range of programmes have been developed to support women's protection needs, with varying degrees of success. These include mixed outcomes of cash transfer programmes which seek to mitigate GBV; and attempts to promote women's employment which may lead to insecurities and 'double and triple burdens' rather than a sense of empowerment.
- Children and adolescents are subjected to different forms of exclusion and violence. Male children and youth are frequently targeted by hosts due to host-refugee tensions, and children and adolescents often face different types of harassment, bullying and exclusion in neighbourhoods and schools. Adolescent ITS-dwellers; adolescent girls; married girls; adolescents with disabilities; and Palestinian children and adolescents from Syria are all at particular risk of different forms of social isolation and exclusion from policies and programmes. Emerging evidence points to the negative impacts of COVID-19 on adolescent well-being, and the importance of programmes which combat social isolation.

Challenges of Accounting for Different Factors:
- Data collection and analysis is rarely disaggregated by gender, age or status, making it difficult to determine the relative weight of factors which apply differently to refugees with diverse real and imputed identity markers and demographic characteristics. This has diverse implications for programmes and policies aiming to uphold the rights and needs of different people in displacement situations.

Toward a Situational Approach:
- Instead of an *essentialist,* category-based approach to vulnerability, a *situational* approach to vulnerability is well-suited to recognising the ways that intersecting power structures create particular risks and protection needs amongst different groups of refugees. These, in turn, have related impacts on social isolation, social interactions and participation, and other markers of social cohesion.
- Identifying the particular risks faced by particular social groups must take place in conjunction with attention to the impacts of diverse structural factors, including a lack of de jure and de facto rights and structures of inequality.

7.1. GENDERED PERCEPTIONS OF AND RESPONSES TO REFUGEES FROM SYRIA

Host members' negative perceptions of refugees are often gendered in nature, and also often lead to different forms of gender-based violence (i.e. Samuels *et al.*, 2020; Haddad *et al.*, 2018). For instance, female refugees are often viewed negatively by members of host communities due to the perception that they are engaging in unacceptable forms of mobility, marriage practices, family size, and stereotypes that Syrian women may undertake sex work and engage in different forms of transactional sex. These perceptions, in turn, are linked in the literature to different forms of violence faced by different social groups. Such experiences limit the possibility for safe forms of participation in local communities.

Perceptions and relations vary between and across towns and cities in the same country, resonating with the broader literature which points to the importance of context-specific and place-based modes of analysis (Section 6). Whilst often classified as 'social' norms, different views pertaining to gender roles and what are considered to be acceptable and unacceptable forms of behaviours must be viewed in broader context: "Underlying these views […] economic and legal vulnerabilities should be taken into account" (Haddad *et al.*, 2018: 12). The differential yet intersecting impacts of host perceptions of Syrian women and men, and how these relate to economic participation and a lack of rights, are further unpacked by Haddad *et al.*, (2018: 12-13):

> "Economic issues can have a social dimension: when it comes to early marriage, Syrian girls are often forced to marry Lebanese men out of economic necessity… [in turn] because they are viewed as a security threat, Syrian men are more likely than women to be checked and detained for their legal status. Due to these mobility restrictions, Syrian women are more likely to work to support the family, or even more likely to go to the markets and conduct everyday business… This reinforces the perception that Syrian women have freer morals, are out in public more, and are less conservative than Lebanese women. Again, this is partly driven by the vulnerabilities faced by Syrian men due to their irregular legal status. Syrian women in Wadi Khaled reported feeling judged by the host community for moving around, even though they often have no choice given the threat of detention facing Syrian men."

Such experiences and fears of GBV limit men's and boys', and women's and girls' freedom of movement in different ways (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 17; te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 81); in turn, they increase social isolation, and thereby limit interactions with members of the host community. These studies highlight the ways that gender roles and perceptions of gender are linked to broader socio-political, economic and legal structures (Yasmine and Moughalian, 2016: 31) and influence the nature of social interactions between refugee and host communities as a result (see Table 6).

TABLE 6: Factors increasing people's risks, as linked to different social groups

Non-exhaustive examples of 'Social Groups' which may face particular vulnerabilities to social exclusion and diverse forms of violence	Factors that may increase the risk of people being subjected to violence, discrimination and social exclusion
• Men without residency status are at particular risk of abuse, arrest, detention and deportation. • Single/unaccompanied men face restricted mobility and additional challenges in securing housing. • Men may be formally and informally excluded from and/or may opt-out of services and programming. • Gay, bisexual and trans men may be at particular risk of sexual and gender-based violence, may be	• Limited access to rights and protection. • Irregular residency status and limited access to formal work. • Overcrowded living spaces and unsafe shelter. • Gender-based discrimination in public and private spheres. • Family separation. • Xenophobia and discrimination. *(continued on p71)*

TABLE 6: Factors increasing people's risks, as linked to different social groups

(continued from p70)	
excluded from or opt-out of services and programming. • Female-headed households, divorced women, recently-widowed women, women with disabilities, lesbians and trans women may be at particular risk of gender-based violence. • Younger (10-13) and older (14+) adolescents face particular risks to violence and bullying, with these risks differing in nature and impact according to age, gender, ability status, nationality, amongst others. • Syrian boys may face particular risks of exploitation in the labour market. • Syrian girls may be at risk of child marriages. • Older adolescents (14+) may be excluded from educational and social programming. • Married girls may be excluded from programming for girls. • Young mothers may be excluded from mother and child activities. • ITS dwellers and people living in rural areas may face particular risks and challenges. • Real and imputed religious and ethnic identities may lead to different types of vulnerabilities and protection needs amongst people of (i.e.) different genders, ages and nationalities.	• Anti-immigrant and anti-refugee media and political discourse.

7.2. FACTORS AFFECTING INTERACTION, EXCLUSION AND COHESION AMONG DIFFERENT REFUGEES

7.2.1. FACTORS APPLYING TO REFUGEE MEN

Refugee men face a wide range of gender-specific risks, including the risk of arrest, detention and deportation if they do not hold residency status, with the concomitant restrictions on their mobility also limiting opportunities for interactions with members of local communities (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 14; also see Khattab and Myrttinen, 2017; Promundo, 2017).

Men's gender-based vulnerabilities to abuse in Lebanon are often linked to the *kafala* system, including little to no recourse to protection in cases of exploitative and unsafe work conditions, barriers in securing residency permits and regularising their situation in the country, and fears of harassment, deportation and violence at the hands of officials and security forces (te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 85-86; El-Asmar *et al.*, 2019; Samuels *et al.*, 2020:21; Khattab and Myrttinen, 2017). In Jordan, Promundo reports that "In Amman and some of the larger Jordanian cities, refugees, particularly men, are afraid of being arrested when walking in the streets because they can be viewed by police as seeking employment or going to work illegally" (2017: 8).

Men may avoid accessing the public sphere, engaging with the authorities, or seeking employment, often due to fear and past traumatic experiences involving members of the host community and/

or the police (Swan, 2017; Khattab and Myrttinen, 2017: 8, 11; Promundo, 2017: 8). In Lebanon, "two-thirds of refugee men individually surveyed reported experiencing threats to their personal safety, coming both from the national authorities and from host community members" (Promundo, 2017:11), and Syrian men are "two to three times more likely than Lebanese men to have been arrested, imprisoned, detained, or to have experienced some form of physical violence in public spaces due to tensions with the host community" (Khattab and Myrttinen, 2017: 8, 11).

Male vulnerability, including to sexual and gender-based violence, typically goes unreported, with only limited services addressing men's protection needs and rights. Men are often unable or unwilling to self-select to approach service providers and access support systems, including due to structural barriers and/or a sense of shame (Holloway *et al.*, 2019: 12; also see Khattab and Myrttinen, 2017: 32).

In Lebanon, "the UN categories for support are built on the assumption that men are better able to work. Similarly, single men, including gay men and transgender persons, are not eligible for the Emergency Social Safety Net in Turkey which is meant to assist the most vulnerable refugees through monthly cash transfers, based on the presumption that they are able to work" (Promundo, 2017: 18). In turn, the majority of Syrian men do not access institutional health care services to support their health and wellbeing, even though "[d]epression is more common among refugees in Lebanon than among the general population, with 42% of Syrian men showing depressive symptoms" (*ibid.:* 12).

Research notes that male-headed refugee households do not *necessarily* fare better than female-headed households (Armstrong and Jacobsen, 2015: 7; Holloway *et al.*, 2019: 10, drawing on Hammer *et al.*, 2018). However, a systematic review of social cohesion programmes in relation to education in Jordan finds that "most initiati0ves have engaged with women and youth only" (Salem and Morrice, 2019: 31) and identifies social cohesion programmes which directly or indirectly exclude men (*ibid:* 23). The review recommends that "Programmes must also involve men and the wider community for a more comprehensive approach to social cohesion" (*ibid:* 31).

It has been widely noted that political and media discourses that represent refugee men as security threats, in addition to media representations and advocacy campaigns which continue to present only women and children as *bona fide* refugees, lead to the perpetuation of assumptions that refugee men are security risks and are not eligible for compassion or support (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016c, 2016d; Turner, 2018). This increases the tendency for host community members to hold negative perspectives and attitudes towards refugee men, and to act in ways that undermine refugee men's rights. Since host perceptions are identified as being key to social cohesion (see Section 6), this has implications for political, media and advocacy campaigning and programming.

Single Men

The mobility of "refugee males who are alone" (also defined as unaccompanied men, or single men) may be particularly restricted, "as they cannot travel accompanied by female family members and face increased risk of harassment and hostility if they do move about" (Promundo, 2017: 8). In turn, this is documented as increasing their isolation.

With over 59% of men in Lebanon (including both refugees and nationals) never having sought health case ("with Syrian men having the least reported use of health services, either recently or over their lifetimes"), lone male refugees find themselves without informal support networks to support their health and well-being (Promundo, 2017: 12).

Single unaccompanied men and adolescent boys also "find it harder to access shared accommodation due to cultural limitations on having unrelated males in a household with women and girls" (*ibid.:* 9). This is a significant challenge since 45% of all Syrian refugees who rent apartments share accommodation with other families in overcrowded conditions.

Gay, Bisexual and Trans Refugees

The mobility of "refugee males who are alone" (also defined as unaccompanied men, or single men) may be particularly restricted, "as they cannot travel accompanied by female family members and face increased risk of harassment and hostility if they do move about" (Promundo, 2017: 8). In turn, this is documented as increasing their isolation.

Whilst under-researched, the literature is consistent in identifying the particular risks faced by gender non-conforming people and people with diverse sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics (SOGIESC). For instance, Syrian refugees in Lebanon have reported that "People with diverse SOGIESC may also hide their relationships and identities to avoid discrimination, harassment or violence from other displaced people or host communities (Myrttinen and Daigle, 2017)" (cited in Holloway *et al.*, 2019: 13). This is further supported by qualitative research carried out with GBT Syrian refugees in Lebanon who felt unable to disclose their sexuality and specific needs arising from this, including sexual health and psychosocial needs, for fear of discrimination, including from service providers (Myrttinen *et al.*, 2016).

Promundo finds that "The very few gay, bisexual and transgender refugees who have managed to find employment report harassment, exploitation and violence at the workplace as well as termination from their work because of their sexual orientation or gender identity" (2017: 9). With restrictions on the possibility of finding work, "some gay, bisexual and transgender refugees report resorting to sex work for lack of other options, and that they feel powerless to demand safe sex practices and are therefore at risk of sexually transmitted infections" (Promundo, 2017: 9). As noted by this report, the fear of discrimination and harassment, in addition to a lack of access to systems of justice, mean that GBT refugees experience high degrees of social isolation and exclusion (*ibid.:* 11).

In turn, International Alert (2021: 33) confirms the that "LGBTI individuals have experienced harassment (including sexual harassment), insults and violence at the hands of Syrian state forces and armed groups," by the Lebanese General Security Forces (responsible for border and immigration control), in addition to facing violence, exploitation and discrimination from family members, community members, and other refugees. This discrimination is "omnipresent", taking place across the Lebanese host community, and "even in presumed 'safe spaces' such as within the Sexual and Gender Minority (SGM) community in Beirut, where they may face discrimination for being Syrian and refugees" (*ibid.*). Indeed, "it is the intersection of diverse identity markers (here Syrian + refugee + perceived queer) [and…] a combination of xenophobia, homophobia and transphobia, and state policies which create vulnerabilities precisely by constituting Syrians as 'irregular' migrants liable to detention and deportation" (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al.*, 2020: 20).

Male Survivors of Sexual Violence

Men are subjected to different forms of sexual violence, and yet such experiences are under-reported and there continue to be few services to support male survivors of sexual violence. Published reports estimate that between 10.8% and up to 20% of Syrian men and boys are survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2017). A 2017 UNHCR study which found that "19.5% to 27% of Syrian refugee men in focus groups across Jordan, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and Lebanon reported experiencing sexual abuse; however, refugees in only two of the twenty-one focus groups could name one service for male SGBV survivors" (Bigini, 2019: 3).

7.2.2. FACTORS APPLYING TO REFUGEE WOMEN

As men's mobility is often limited due to a fear of detention and deportation, refugee women may be more likely to work to support their families; this may, in turn, increase their exposure to harassment and violence (Haddad *et al.*, 2018; Samuels *et al.*, 2020; also see Section 8). Experiences and fears of diverse forms of violence limit women's freedom of movement, and, concomitantly, their social interactions, participation in the community, and diverse markers and processes associated with social cohesion. A range of programmes have been developed to support women's protection needs, with varying degrees of success. These include mixed outcomes of cash transfer programmes which seek to mitigate GBV; and attempts to promote women's employment, which may lead to insecurities and 'double and triple burdens' rather than a sense of 'empowerment'.

Particular groups of women are identified as being at particular risk to violence, exploitation and social exclusion by "the hosting community's landlords, employers, and the police (Harvey *et al.*, 2013)" in addition to other residents (cited in te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 71; also see Rohwerder, 2017: 6; Khattab and Mytttinen, 2017). These include[7]:

- Women in female-headed households;
- Unmarried and/or recently widowed women;
- Women with disabilities;
- Lesbian, transgender and bisexual women.

In turn, experiences and fears of diverse forms of violence limit women's freedom of movement, and, concomitantly, their social interactions, participation in the community, and diverse markers and processes associated with social cohesion.

Lesbian, Transgender and Women Bisexual Refugees from Syria

The literature notes that "Lesbian, transgender and women bisexual refugees may be at a higher risk of sexual harassment, exploitation and abuse than gay and bisexual men, especially those able to 'pass' as heterosexual" (Khattab and Myrttinen 2021: 33)[8]. UN Women (2019) also notes that "Transwomen face additional SGBV due to social discrimination. Survival sex is more prevalent in this population due to limited shelter options in Lebanon for people who identify as transgender" (cited in Bigini, 2019: 6). As "there is no published SGBV data on Syrian women who identify as lesbian, bisexual, or transgender [LBT], and information on LGBTI males is mostly qualitative (UN Women, 2019; UNHCR, 2017)" (Bigini 2020: 12), the experiences, needs and rights of LBT women refugees requires further research.

7.2.3. PROGRAMMES TO SUPPORT WOMEN'S PROTECTION NEEDS

Tackling SGBV

Women and girl refugees face diverse kinds of sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV) in private and public spheres alike. Violence experienced in the private sphere ranges from child, early and forced marriage; intimate partner violence and domestic violence within marriages; and domestic violence and sexual exploitation after leaving a marriage (Roupetz *et al.*, 2020). Multiple

---

7 It is important to note that women may not identify with such terminology themselves (El-Asmar *et al.*, 2019).
8 This report draws on research by Myrttinen and Daigle (2017).

forms of harassment and different forms of assault take place in the public sphere (*ibid.*; see above and below). It is widely acknowledged that instances of SGBV are underreported and yet distressingly common and widespread.

Reducing the safety risks faced by women – such as tackling sexual violence and addressing the barriers that lead women to under-report SGBV –, and increasing psychosocial support for women, are identified as important avenues to enhance social cohesion and to promote refugee women's safe participation in society (on Iraq, see UN Women, 2018). However, further evidence is required to demonstrate precisely which strategies are effective to enhance refugee women's participation in local communities or lead to enhanced levels of social cohesion or safe forms of participation.

Cash-based Initiatives, GBV and Social Tensions

A number of studies explore the relationship between cash-based initiatives, GBV and social tensions. Evidence suggests that cash transfers have been successfully integrated into GBV programs in Jordan (Yoshikawa, 2015). However, "cash transfers without protection activities limit the potential to mitigate GB (*ibid.*: 5), and some research suggests that projects that fail to "consider the context (including relationships within communities and among household members) can end up exacerbating tensions" (Idris 2018: 8, summarising Women's Refugee Commission, IRC and Mercy Corps 2018; cf. Hammad *et al.*, 2017, as summarised by Idris 2018: 8). The literature points to the need for more nuanced analysis and evaluation of the relationship between cash-based programmes, GBV and social tensions.

Women's Employment: opportunities and risks

Women often take on and take pride in participating in employment and training practices, including those that may be perceived as challenging norms relating to what are often assumed to be 'culturally appropriate' employment practices (i.e. see WFP, 2019: 16; ILO, 2018: 52). Syrian refugee women's participation in income-generating activities and the labour market in Iraq is widely assumed to positively work towards social cohesion and women's increased representation in their respective displaced communities (Kaya and Luchtenberg, 2019: 35), including in the case of women living in camps (*ibid.*).

However, women may face different forms of pressure and increased risks of harassment, abuse and violence as a result of programmes and policies that directly or indirectly require or promote female participation in the labour market. Refugee women from Syria often do not wish to take on paid employment; instead, they do so "as a result of extreme financial necessity" and poverty (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 29; El-Asmar et al., 2019: 11). This is especially the case of women female-headed households, (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 29). Women may experience paid work as a "double burden", not an "empowering activity" (El Asmar *et al.*, 2019: 11), with women's employment in the public sphere often placing them "at increased risk of harassment by employers but also en route to workplaces" (Samuels *et al.*, 2020: 29).

In this regard, the literature points to the importance of simultaneously redressing structural barriers that prevent men and women from engaging in safe and dignified forms of employment, and of identifying means of appropriately supporting those women who wish to engage in such activities (also see Part III).

7.2.4. FACTORS APPLYING TO REFUGEE CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS

Evidence notes that refugee boys face a heightened risk of gender-based and age-based exploitation in the labour market, while the gendered nature of economic opportunities mean that girls are more at risk of child marriages (te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 82). The exact nature of these experiences is strongly informed by age. Noting that different conceptualisations of 'children', 'adolescents' and 'youth' are used throughout the literature, the literature consistently points to the significance of distinguishing between younger and older children, and younger and older adolescents. The literature notes that adolescents face different risks and exclusions to those of refugee children.

As a whole, the following groups of children and adolescents are identified as facing particular challenges and risks, including heightened exposure to violence, higher levels of social isolation, and exclusion from programmes and services (i.e. see Jones *et al.,* 2019: 4):

- Adolescents and young people;
- Adolescent ITS-dwellers;
- Adolescent girls;
- Married girls;
- Adolescents with disabilities;
- Palestinian children and adolescents.

While under-researched to date, the literature also points to the impacts of COVID-19 on different groups of refugee children and adolescents, and the need to develop appropriate responses to support their wellbeing and ability to participate safely in local community life.

Adolescents and Young People

Young refugees, and in particular male youth, are often subjected to discrimination and violence by members of local communities (ODI, 2020: 32). In Jordan, young people tend to "face the brunt of host-community resentment towards the changes brought about by the refugee crisis" (Presler-Marshall *et al.*, 2019), and "refugee adolescents tend to be the most vulnerable, though the risks that girls and boys face can be quite different" (Presler-Marshall *et al.*, 2019, cited in Jones *et al.*, 2019: 1). These gender-specific risks are also context specific: in a study conducted in Jordan, boys were reportedly more at risk of harassment and bullying than girls (46% v 38%) (Presler-Marshall *et al.*, 2019), while in the Beirut neighbourhood of "Burj Hammoud, girls complained of harassment more than boys" (International Alert, 2015: 9). As a whole, adolescent girls, especially refugees, face widespread sexual abuse (Presler-Marshall *et al.*, 2019). In turn, young people with disabilities face greater risks than those without disabilities (*ibid.*; Jones *et al.*, 2019:4) In spite of these vulnerabilities, adolescents as a whole may also be more likely to be excluded from different educational initiatives directed at children, exacerbating feelings of exclusion (Hagen-Zanker *et al.*, 2017). Overall, research notes that Syrian adolescent refugees experience a high level of anxiety and depressive symptoms, particularly amongst older adolescents (Jabbar and Zaza, 2014).

Adolescent ITS-dwellers

Echoing the importance of settlement type (ITS, camps or communities) on the frequency and nature of refugees' interactions with host members (see Section 5), in the context of Jordan, adolescents living in ITS were found to be "especially likely to exhibit distress" (40%) as compared with refugee adolescents residing in host communities (33%) or in camps (29%) (Jones *et al.*, 2019:4). One reason proposed to explain this difference is that "poverty is both more common and deeper" in ITS than in communities or in camps (*ibid.*).

Adolescent Girls

Adolescent girls' experiences and perceptions of their neighbourhood, and of host-refugee relations therein, vary according to age and nationality (Ghazarian *et al.*, 2019). In Beirut, Ghazarian *et al.* (2019) finds that:

> "Nationality, followed by age… emerged as the most significant factors shaping adolescent girls' perception of safety and sense of feeling welcome in their immediate neighbourhood. While Lebanese (87 per cent) and PRL [Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon] (100 per cent) girls reported feeling welcome in their neighbourhood, only 65 per cent of Syrian and 56 per cent of PRS [Palestinian Refugees from Syria] girls shared this feeling."

Suggesting that "while intercommunal tensions appeared to play a role in why adolescent girls felt unsafe and uncomfortable in their neighbourhoods, a more prominent theme in the FGDs [Focus Group Discussions] was the behaviour of men and their use of drugs and alcohol" (Ghazarian *et al.* 2019: 18). The report continues by highlighting how perceptions of safety in their neighbourhood change as girls grow older: nationality intersects with gender and age such that 15-19 year old Syrian girls were amongst the group which felt least welcome in their neighbourhood, and least comfortable in that space (Ghazarian *et al.*, 2019: 18).

In the context of Jordan, a social cohesion study points to the particular challenges faced by older girls, finding that "Compared to older boys, older girls are 11% more likely to exhibit emotional distress" (Jones *et al.*, 2019: 29). The research suggested that this was "linked to their greater social isolation, their anxiety about being forced to marry as children, their experiences with child marriage, and their more limited access to psychosocial support" (Jones *et al.*, 2019: 29).

A systematic review on predictors of interpersonal violence in the household in humanitarian settings suggests that addressing social isolation amongst adolescent girls, by "cultivating social support networks for adolescent girls," can lead to a reduction of their exposure to this form of violence (Rubenstein, 2020: 41). The importance of promoting safe forms of social connections, including through internet connectivity, is suggested by emerging evidence pertaining to the impacts of COVID-19 on adolescents and young people in Lebanon and Jordan (see 7.2.6.).

Married Girls and Adolescent and Young Mothers

Married girls suffer from high degrees of social isolation and are also frequently excluded from support and programmes for *girls* because their marriage status is perceived as threatening the 'purity' of unmarried girls (on Jordan, see Presler-Marshall *et al.*, 2019; Jones *et al.*, 2019:4). Adolescent mothers also face exclusions from centers offering classes for mothers, highlighting how programmes that promote social cohesion through work with mothers and their children may lead to the formal and informal exclusion of adolescents. For instance, in Jordan, a programme by Action Contre la Faim had primarily mother and child participants in activities which sought to enhance positive engagement between Syrian and Jordanian communities and improve psychosocial well-being (Acosta & Chica, 2018). An evaluation of the programme concluded that "participants gained more confidence, formed friendships and positive relationships between communities, and reported feeling less isolated and afraid (Acosta & Chica, 2018)" (Salem and Morrice, 2019:23). Sensitively extending such projects to include adolescent mothers could enhance social interactions and positive relationships between different members of the Syrian community, in addition to refugee-host relations.

Adolescents with Disabilities

Adolescents with disabilities face a wide range of physical and social barriers to access and continue in school (Jones *et al.*, 2019: 2). In addition to addressing these barriers, Jones *et al.*, recommend promoting opportunities for adolescents with disabilities – in addition to other

adolescents who are at risk of social isolation – "to have greater access to internet connectivity so as to connect with peers and access information" (*ibid.*: 53 – also see below regarding internet connectivity and COVID-19).

7.2.5. PROGRAMMING FOR ADOLESCENTS' SPECIFIC AGE- AND GENDER-RELATED NEEDS

The literature points to the need for policy-makers and programmes to address the particular needs and priorities of different groups of young people. Presler-Marshall et al's report on social protection programming concludes that programme "design in Jordan has focused predominantly on household subsistence needs, rarely addressing adolescents' specific age- and gender-related needs" (Presler-Marshall 2019: 2). Equally, Jones *et al.* (2019:5) find that while food vouchers and cash transfers are improving food security, they are not sufficiently age- and gender-tailored to meet adolescents' broader needs. Such conclusions have implications for analysing the experiences and outcomes of different people according to these and other identities and statuses, and of designing responses that uphold young people's rights, needs and priorities (i.e. see Kuhnt *et al.*, 2018; Kivelä and Tajima-Simpson, 2021: 12).

Adolescents' identities matter in the outcomes and impacts of the same programme. For instance, an evaluation of two peace-building programmes in Lebanon involving Syrian, Palestinian and Lebanese adolescents (Gercama *et al.*, 2018) reports on a number of factors and programmes that can enhance markers of social cohesion amongst male and female adolescents. The report finds that participating in the same programme has different outcomes and impacts – with regards to psychosocial well-being, voice and agency, education and employability –, on different groups of participants, subcategorised as follows:

- Adolescents;
- Lebanese girls and boys;
- Palestine-Lebanese and Palestine-Syrian refugee adolescent boys;
- Palestine-Lebanese and Palestine-Syrian refugee adolescent girls;
- Syrian boys;
- Syrian girls.

The evaluation – which differentiates between these groups according to gender, age and nationality –, notes that even when participants' perceptions and outcomes were positive following their participation, their ability to act and sustain these outcomes was dependent upon the following:

1. Their parents' and local leader's support, or lack thereof; and
2. Structural barriers: unemployment or a lack of income-generating opportunities for young people.

A key conclusion of the evaluation is to recommend investing "in a robust M&E system with adequate data disaggregation … design and rollout of an M&E system that distinguishes between the different backgrounds of participants in an integral manner (for example, in school or out-of-school, refugee status, home situation, conservatism of family, poverty levels, etc.) to more accurately track which adolescents drop out, when, and why" (Gercama *et al.*, 2018: 18).

Such findings echo the broader literature which is consistent in highlighting the importance of not only disaggregated data collection, but also of paying particular attention to intersectional modes of analysis and evaluation, and subsequent policy- and programme design (see Section 7.2.6.).

7.2.6. COVID-19 AND REFUGEE CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS' SOCIAL INCLUSION

Young people's needs and priorities for the future change as they grow older and in response to changes on local, national and international levels. Emerging literature suggests that COVID-19 is having a particular impact on refugee girls and boys, with implications on their participation and experiences of social cohesion.

Whilst evidence on the effects of COVID-19 and various policy responses to the pandemic remain incomplete, recent studies confirm that girls' sense of connection and belonging to "host communities in Palestinian and Syrian refugee camps in Jordan" has been negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic (see Baird *et al.*, 2020). By contrast, Syrian refugee boys in Jordan have often been able to continue socialising and interacting with different members of refugee and host communities (Małachowska *et al.*, 2020). These examples demonstrate both the different experiences and outcomes of girl-children and boy-children, and the importance of acknowledging changes in horizontal vectors such as the nature of refugee-refugee relations as well as refugee-citizen relations.

Experiences on the basis of gender, age and nationality also vary depending on the settlement context. In contrast with the camp-based experiences in Jordan referred to above, in the context of COVID-19 in Lebanon, Syrian boys living in collective shelters in host communities lost their source of income, became isolated in their homes, and feared being targeted by authorities (paraphrasing Youssef *et al.*, 2020: 3). The consequences of the pandemic, and policy responses to COVID-19, highlight how opportunities for, and the quality of, social interactions appear to decrease, making it more difficult for refugees, and especially refugee youth, to make plans for the future.

Further research is required to determine the effects of COVID-19 on different groups of refugees from Syria in different hosting contexts across Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.

7.2.7. OTHER RELEVANT IDENTITY MARKERS: RELIGION, ETHNICITY, NATIONALITY AND CLASS

Religious Identity

Religious identity, belief and practice are important for refugees throughout different stages of displacement, and yet this significance is often under-reported and under-analysed (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011, 2016c, 2016d; Eghdamian, 2017; de Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 35; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh *et al.*, 2020). Sensitivities relating to religious identities are common across the humanitarian sphere, with host states, UN agencies and NGOs often being reluctant to document refugees' religious identities, or to cater for needs that are variously linked to religion (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016c, 2016d). UNHCR has typically sought to "avoid or downplay religion", asserting that avoiding religion is a means of maintaining a "neutral" position "under the guise of universality" that "inadvertently favours certain religious groups over others" (Eghdamian, 2017: 455). This means that people's religious identities are typically excluded when data are collected by organisations such as UNHCR (*ibid.*). This makes it difficult to determine the precise significance of religious identity, including in relation to programmes and services seeking to increase refugees' participation in local communities and enhance social cohesion.

With regards to religious minority refugees, Syrian Christian and Druze refugees in Jordan experience specific vulnerabilities related to their real or imputed beliefs and affiliations, and yet, due to fears of reprisals, they are often reluctant to register with UNHCR, and may experience

"isolation, stigmatisation, and (perceived or real) discrimination in accessing humanitarian aid and assistance" (Eghdamian, 2015: 2).

Host members' religious identities and beliefs are also significant in different ways, variously encouraging hospitable reception practices (de Lintelo 2018: 85, cf. Tobin, 2018) or leading to evictions justified by sectarian or political dynamics (Al-Masri and Abla 2017: 19). Samuels *et al.*,(2020:12) find that religion and political affiliation can "influence host perceptions with, for instance Christians and Druze being more likely to consider relations with Syrian refugees as negative compared to Sunni Lebanese (ARK, 2018a; International Alert, 2015)" (also see International Alert, 2015: 4).

In relation to social interactions, religious occasions (as opposed to religious identity) are significant, with one study finding that social interactions between refugees and members of local host communities increased by 40% during religious occasions (Mercy Corps, 2015).

Such findings point to the importance of further research and evaluations considering the roles that religious identities – both self-ascribed and imputed – and practices have in relation to different peoples' experiences and outcomes in displacement situations, including in relation to participation and social cohesion. In particular, further research is needed into the ways that religious identity intersects with other identities and demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, nationality and educational background.

Ethnicity and Minoritized Ethnic Groups

Further evidence is required relating to factors influencing the participation and social cohesion of refugees from Syria who belong to minoritized ethnic groups – such as Kurdish, Yezidi and Dom refugees (on the economic participation of minoritized Syrian refugees in Iraq, see Sections 8 and 9). In relation to Turkey, Berry and Taban (2021: 203) find that:

> "due to their minority status combined with their refugee status, Dom refugees in Turkey have been targets of harassment, discrimination and exclusion both inside and outside of the refugee camps. As a result, some prefer to settle with autochthonous Doms/Romas in their traditional areas. However, their tents are frequently raided by Turkish government officers."

Equally, further research is required relating to the perceptions of minoritized host members in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (also including Kurdish, Yezidi and Dom) towards refugees, and which factors may be significant in relation to participation and social cohesion between members of these groups.

While under-researched, field-research-based grey and academic literature has found that Syrian refugees – who, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, are mostly of Kurdish origin – are more integrated than Arab IDPs in some Iraqi settings (Durable Solutions Platform, 2019: 8; Munoz and Shank, 2019). A review of the literature also suggests that there are only "relatively minor" social tensions between Syrian refugees, 90% of whom are Syrian Kurds, and their Iraqi Kurd host communities (ACAPS, 2016: 4).

In turn, Syrian refugees in the Anbar governorate generally share cultural customs and habits, kinship and tribal relations, with local residents, and yet they have not been found to be fully integrated (*ibid.*). Importantly, while shared ethnic belonging is often identified as facilitating local integration, a shared identity is not a sufficient driver for actual integration, with research reasserting that refugees' vulnerable legal status in Iraq and their difficult socio-economic conditions are constant barriers to integration (Durable Solutions Platform, 2019: 51).

Nationality

A shared nationality can be a significant factor in providing support between different generations of refugees. Syrian long-term inhabitants of Lebanon (LTI) have been identified as playing a key role in supporting newer arrivals from Syria in Lebanon (UNDP and Empatika 2019: vii). Indeed, refugees often integrate into communities formed by 'established', 'long-term,' or 'former' refugees of similar or different nationality/ethnic groups (i.e. Crawford *et al.*, 2015; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016a, 2016b, 2020b), and refugees are increasingly recognized as first responders and providers of different forms of assistance and protection (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020a, 2020b).

There is, however, little evidence as to the challenges and opportunities of displaced people integrating into communities which are either composed of or have large numbers of established/long-term/former refugees or IDPs. As noted in Section 6, this is because of a tendency in the literature to equate 'social cohesion' with refugee-citizen relations, to the detriment of understanding the significance of refugee-refugee relationalities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020a).

Bifurcated aid systems and access to durable solutions – including providing different forms of assistance and protection to refugees on the basis of their nationality –, can lead to the creation and accentuation of tensions between refugees (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020a, 2020b; Carpi, 2020). The literature notes that one way of avoiding the creation of such tensions is to develop area- or place-based programmes and initiatives, which can be accessed by all eligible residents, irrespective of their nationality and/or residency status. The impacts of national and international aid and support being targeted to specific nationalities (primarily Syrians) while other groups of refugees are excluded (such as Palestinians, Iraqis and Sudanese), are discussed in Section 4 (with regards to the onward migration) and Part III (with regards to economic participation).

Class

Socio-economic class intersects with other identity markers and backgrounds in significant, if different ways, including in relation to refugee experiences and host perceptions of refugees. The precise way that socio-economic class and legal status intersect with other identity markers and demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, nationality and educational background will depend on each context (i.e. see Sections 4, 6, 8 and 9).

With regards to the relationship between legal status and socio-economic status in Lebanon, "refugees with greater financial resources are able to 'buy' their legal status or circumvent legal restrictions around employment, property, and business ownership" (Haddad *et al.*, 2018: 18). In contrast, Syrians with lower socio-economic backgrounds tend to be targeted and affected by "many of the discriminatory tactics employed against 'Syrian refugees'. For example, in municipalities that enforce curfews, individuals tend to be targeted based on their appearance" (*ibid.).* With regards to hosts, Haddad *et al.* (2018:18) find that class "emerged as an important factor that affected inter- and intra-community cohesion," with land- and business-owning Lebanese in particular profiting from the presence of refugees, while "lower-economic groups have seen their conditions worsen" and often express significant resentment towards refugees from Syria (*ibid.*).

7.3. CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERENT FACTORS

The available evidence does not consistently disaggregate by gender or age, making it difficult to determine the extent to which different factors apply to refugees' experiences of social cohesion because of their gender and age. It is important for future research to address this gap with a closer analysis of gender and age, and how they shape people's experiences of social inclusion and/or exclusion.

Whilst some general points can be identified, gender must be viewed in relation to other factors. Gender will not *necessarily* shape refugees' experiences in uniform or easily predictable ways and will instead *intersect* with other identity markers, characteristics, and demographic factors to inform refugees' *particular* experiences of inclusion and/or exclusion (also see Section 3). Accounting for this will help prevent policy interventions from 'essentialising' or assuming how gender shapes refugees' experiences in a general sense, leading to more effective, sensitive and contextualized responses.

Whilst several factors apply differently to refugee men, women, boys and girls because of their gender, the particular nature of exclusion and inclusion varies significantly between different groups of refugee men, women, boys and girls because of their age, nationality, ethnicity, religion, cultural background or sexuality. Future research, policy and practice should be sensitive to the ways that intersecting identity markers and demographic characteristics lead to particular forms of exclusion and inclusion.

7.4. INTERSECTIONALITY: BEYOND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY MARKERS AND CATEGORIES

Identity markers do not exist in isolation, but rather intersect in different ways. As is increasingly recognised by policy-makers and policy-relevant research and evaluation (i.e. Mercy Corps, 2015; Presler-Marshall *et al.*, 2019; Samuels *et al.*, 2020), adopting an intersectionalist approach has significant policy implications, especially as intersecting identity markers have tangible impacts on people's specific needs, rights, experiences and outcomes.

For instance, far from there being universal and standard 'basic needs,' emergency provision must be tailored to the specificities of the person and social groups in question: a hijab may be a 'basic need' for a Muslim woman who veils, in order for her to be able to access the public sphere in dignity (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016c, 2016d, 2019). Here, gender and religious belief and practice intersect in significant ways: not all women, not all Muslims, and not all Muslim women have the same 'basic needs.'

Likewise, research on refugee adolescents with disabilities "in Jordan underscore the importance of strengthening outreach to ensure that the needs and capacities of the most vulnerable young people – *especially refugees with intersecting vulnerabilities* – are recognised and addressed through policy, services and programmes" (Presler-Marshall *et al.*, 2019, emphasis added). In this context, age, stage of life-cycle, gender and ability status are some of the identity markers and statuses which intersect in ways that accentuate different risks to violence, discrimination and social exclusion.

Another example highlights the significance of intersectionality in relation to people's risks of being subjected to gender-based violence in the public sphere, as visibly Muslim women may be targeted due to their actual or imputed religious beliefs and practices:

> *"A man stopped me in the middle of the street and asked me to remove the veil from my face and told me 'next time, I don't want to see you wearing it'. I was alone in the street, and when you walk on the street there you feel lonely, so I had to remove it, I was scared. Next time he might shoot me and my son or scare me or kidnap me. Once, they followed my sister-in-law, and they were calling her 'Daesh Daesh'. She also had to remove the veil."*
>
> *(Female Syrian FGD participant, 40, non-recipient, Baalbek (Lebanon), cited in Samuels et al., 2020: 17).*

Here, a person's risk of being subjected to violence and discrimination, and their well-founded fear of persecution, is linked to [gender + religious identity + imputed political opinion], highlighting the importance of an intersectionalist approach (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016c, 2016d). In turn, such experiences and fears limit certain people's abilities to safely participate in local communities.

With regards to responses to and impacts of programmes aiming to enhance social cohesion, Mercy Corps concludes that these "will vary not only by community, but also by age, education level, gender, and in all likelihood an array of other factors we are still unaware of the impact of, requiring tailored approaches to both the context, but also to the power and position of the people and communities involved" (Mercy Corps, 2015: 6, emphasis added).

7.5. TOWARD A MORE SITUATIONAL APPROACH

The literature notes that effective policy interventions should be based on a 'situational approach' to vulnerability. In contrast to an essentialist approach (ie. focusing on a single, fixed category such as 'refugee women'), a situational approach accounts for the particular factors that lead to specific people being able or unable to safely participate in particular situations (i.e. a disabled adolescent from a minoritized ethnic group may be vulnerable to particular forms of exploitation and discrimination in a particular setting, such as a school, whilst being safe and well supported at home) (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014, 2018).

A situational approach is well-suited to recognizing the protection needs of different groups of refugees and the particular risks they face. It acknowledges that refugee women's vulnerabilities to violence and social exclusion are not inevitable, and are also not 'due to' their being women per se. Instead, research notes that "Syrian refugee women in Lebanon face institutionalised violence rooted in sexism, classism and racism by the hosting community, governmental institutions, and within interpersonal circles…" (citing Yasmine and Moughalian in te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 70). Such an approach takes into account not only how gender and age may shape refugees' experiences, but how this is informed by context and specific institutions, systems and structures (i.e. see te Lintelo *et al.*, 2018: 85-86; El-Asmar *et al.*, 2019), and other intersecting identity markers such as religion, ethnicity and identity. These all have related impacts on social isolation, interactions and participation, and other markers of social cohesion.

7.6. CONCLUSION

Refugees' experiences and outcomes relating to participation and 'social cohesion' vary significantly because of intersecting identity markers and demographic characteristics, including gender, age, nationality, religion, ethnicity, dis/ability status, gender identity and sexual orientation.

Particular groups at heightened risk of social exclusion and discrimination include: single men; gay, bisexual and transgender refugees; and male survivors of SGBV. Men are often excluded from or opt-out of diverse programmes and services for a range of reasons, with detrimental effects on their well-being and ability to participate in many aspects of local community life. Women and girl refugees face diverse kinds of sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV), which limit their abilities to safely participate in local communities. Particular groups of women facing specific risks of violence and social isolation include female-headed households; unmarried and/or recently widowed women; women with disabilities, and lesbian, transgender and bisexual refugees.

Children and adolescents are subjected to different forms of exclusion and violence. Male children and youth are frequently targeted by hosts due to host-refugee tensions, and children and adolescents often face different types of harassment, bullying and exclusion in neighbourhoods and schools. Adolescent ITS-dwellers; adolescent girls; married girls; adolescents with disabilities; and Palestinian children and adolescents from Syria are all at particular risk of different forms of

social isolation and exclusion from policies and programmes.

Identity markers do not exist in isolation, but rather intersect in different ways, and adopting an intersectionalist approach has significant policy implications. This is especially the case as intersecting identity markers have tangible impacts on people's specific needs, rights, experiences, and outcomes.

Instead of an essentialist, category-based approach to vulnerability, a situational approach to vulnerability is well-suited to recognising the ways that intersecting power structures create particular risks and protection needs amongst different groups of refugees. These, in turn, have related impacts on social isolation, social interactions and participation, and other markers of social cohesion. Identifying the particular risks faced by particular social groups must take place in conjunction with attention to the impacts of diverse structural factors, including a lack of *de jure* and *de facto* rights and structures of inequality.

Early morning in Baddawi refugee camp, which is now also home to refugees from Syria.
© Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh.

Al-Bazerkan Market in Old Tripoli, Lebanon.
© Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh.

PART III:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REFUGEES AND LOCAL ECONOMIES

- ## SECTION 8: Which factors explain the success or failure of economic participation by refugees in local communities (be it as entrepreneur or employee)?

Key Factors of Success or Failure:

- Refugees' abilities to participate locally, and their experiences and outcomes of such participation, vary according to their identities and backgrounds, in addition to the national and local context.
- Factors of 'success' and 'failure' are contextually specific and must be assessed in relation to the legal, environmental, and political conditions in which refugees lead their lives.
- When defining success and failure in relation to refugees' participation in local communities, policymakers should consider: 1) the broader human rights framework, including the importance of eliminating people's reliance on negative coping mechanisms when they join the local market; and 2) the design and coordination of programmes (e.g., the degree and impact of standardisation, compartmentalisation, or local contextualisation), and what the assessment model is.
- Major policies such as the Global Compact on Refugees affected the relationship between Syrian refugee labour and non-Syrian (local and migrant/refugee) labour.
- Common key factors of 'success' across Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq are: refugee entrepreneurship, cash-based initiatives (CBIs), and shared language and/or identity.
- Common key factors of 'failure' across Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq are: compartmentalised/ standardised programmes, a lack of labour rights, and unresponsiveness to/ the flawed implementation of policy changes.

8.1. ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

International policies are often based on the assumption that 'refugee crises', by definition, lead host countries to economic downturns, especially in cases of protracted crisis. As a result, and in line with the priorities often held by host governments, international humanitarian actors prioritise adopting economic measures that can protect local employment and welfare. However, as discussed in Section 6, it is problematic to pinpoint 'the arrival of refugees' as the cause of economic crises, especially given the broader economic trends in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq prior to the arrival of refugees from Syria.

Researchers have advocated the development of measurement tools and modes of analysis that adopt a holistic view of refugee households (Leeson *et al.*, 2020). Following this holistic approach, scholars have pointed out that the pathways to the success or failure of refugees' economic participation in local communities depend on a range of factors, which are all context specific. The nature of these factors is multifaceted, ranging from policies and practices implemented by humanitarian actors and host governments to identity markers such as language, and to external

factors such as changes in regional geopolitics and public order that facilitate or hamper refugees' economic participation (e.g., the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2014 expansion of IS).

BOX 3: Contextual factors and the assessment of refugee economic participation

Not all refugees have the same opportunities or abilities to participate in the local economy (see Section 7). Contextual factors can limit or undermine refugees' economic participation despite the initial circumstances that may have made such forms of participation possible. For instance, Pascucci's study on Jordan and Lebanon, explains how refugees take into account the needs of the more vulnerable members of their families and communities—including aging parents and unemployed siblings—in their economic lives; these include giving up particular job opportunities in areas that are difficult to reach or that would require flexible time commitments (2019: 595). This proves that the economic agency of refugees in precarious socio-legal conditions is embedded in familial relations of care, reciprocity, and responsibility (*ibid.*). Likewise, Sahin Mencütek and Nashwan (2020) discuss the impact of gendered expectations and societal pressures on refugee women workers, which lead some women to quit their jobs, or continue working in a situation that undermines their wellbeing.

In Lebanon and Jordan, refugees' economic participation is mainly discussed in relation to the conditions and outcomes of local employment. In these two countries, large employment and wage gaps exist between refugees and locals; the gap is even larger for refugee women (Kabir and Klugman, 2019). In Iraq, the economic situation of many local citizens and IDPs seems to be similar to that of refugees, due to longstanding conflict and high levels of domestic unemployment (Kaya and Luchtenberg, 2018). In all three countries, restrictions on refugees' access to formal employment opportunities (including due to legal and financial barriers to secure and renew residency and/or work permits) mean that refugees are more likely to work in the informal labour market, than their host counterparts (Srour and Chaaban, 2017). This suggests that the economic participation of refugees is likely to take place largely within an informal work environment with its concomitant challenges.

8.2. THE GLOBAL COMPACT AND THE ENDURING FOCUS ON REFUGEE SELF-RELIANCE

The 2016 Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) is widely viewed as a watershed for policy changes on refugee labour in the region and worldwide. In general, the research notes that countries with proportionately "fewer refugees, stronger economies, and potential labour supply gaps provide better entitlements for refugees to work" (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2016: 20). Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq have none of these characteristics. Despite the formal endorsement of the Compact in the region, there has been no sustainable process of job creation in the countries receiving refugees from Syria, including because policies for refugees to secure legal residency have remained unchanged or have not matched the GCR's goals. For instance, although the GCR aims to foster formal employment and increase the number of work permits for refugees, no policies have been introduced to facilitate refugees' ownership of businesses (IRC, 2020). The implications of the GCR in Jordan have been critiqued by many scholars (e.g., Srour and Chaaban, 2017; Essex-Lettieri *et al.*, 2017; Lenner and Turner, 2019; Al-Masri, 2021), including because of evidence that the Compact risks "keeping the poor in place" (Simone, 2008: 186) by formalising cheap unskilled labour and, failing to facilitate active participation in host economies with rights and dignity. Noting these issues, policymakers and the UNHCR alike continue to see the promotion of self-reliance as the most effective strategy to guarantee refugees' economic participation and to produce a positive impact on the host society (e.g., stability and inclusion), even when academic literature

warns against simplistic 'recipes' to achieve refugee self-reliance and self-sufficiency (e.g., Crisp, 2003; Easton-Calabria and Omata, 2018; Carpi *et al.*, 2020).

8.3. CASH-BASED INITIATIVES AS A KEY FACTOR RELATED TO REFUGEES' ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION

The literature suggests that unconditional cash transfers are indirectly linked to successful modes of economic participation for refugees (Abu Hamad *et al.*, 2017). Through CBIs, people can better cope with financial expenses and navigate employment opportunities with less pressure to generate income (*ibid.*). They can also avoid negative coping strategies such as child labour (Hagen-Zanker *et al.*, 2017: 27). A study by Hagen-Zanker *et al.* (2017: 21) proves that cash transfers have been a powerful poverty reduction instrument that also enable refugees to focus on important aspects of everyday life and to have better social outcomes, such as enhanced social interactions and continuing education (Hagen-Zanker *et al.*, 2017: 8).

CBIs are considered an effective way of fostering refugees' economic participation in Jordan (Hagen-Zanker *et al.*, 2017; Idris, 2018). In Lebanon, CBIs have been found to be effective, especially in the long-term (Salti *et al.*, 2022), generating economic sustainability and reducing negative coping strategies (Bastagli *et al.*, 2020: 5). In Iraq, despite high levels of indebtedness among refugees (3RP, 2021), CBIs have enabled refugees to alleviate financial pressure, end negative coping mechanisms, and access social protection and food security (World Vision, 2018; 3RP, 2021: 36).

However, whilst CBIs have been relatively effective at promoting certain forms of economic participation, they have arguably remained limited in their ability to promote more meaningful, secure forms of employment. In general, cash transfers do not appear to largely improve employment or livelihoods opportunities for adults "because they cannot overcome the barriers to work faced by refugees, such as legal constraints and socio-cultural norms for women" (Idris, 2018: 3). A further factor limiting the potential impact of CBIs on refugees' livelihoods is the frequent misperception among refugees that they could lose their cash transfers if they find work (*ibid.*). In this sense, cash programmes and economic participation are mistakenly seen by refugees as mutually exclusive options, which points to the need for information campaigns highlighting that refugees do not need to remain unemployed to be able to access CBIs.

8.4. REFUGEE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT

Refugee entrepreneurship is identified as being the most important factor for refugees' economic participation and sustainability in Lebanon and Jordan, despite the social, cultural, legal, and economic barriers faced by refugees (Refai *et al.*, 2018). Refugee entrepreneurship can bring economic opportunities, positively contribute to development, as well as stimulate trade and investment (Bayram, 2019; Zighan, 2020), with the literature identifying this as the greatest achievement for programming based on refugee self-reliance. In the case of Lebanon, a range of factors hamper Syrian refugee entrepreneurship, including financial, administrative and policy issues (Harb *et al.,* 2019): in order for refugees to find self-employment, governmental policies need to change favourably towards Syrian refugees (Alexandre *et al.*, 2019). In the Jordanian context, it has been found to be increasingly widespread in the Zaatari camp and among women who start home-based enterprises (Abdel Jabbar and Zaza, 2016). In Iraq, refugee entrepreneurship is a key aim of the humanitarian system to achieve refugee resilience and sustainability and boost the local economy (3RP, 2020).

Patterns of self-employment are also informed by social backgrounds and identity markers, such as gender. For example, the findings of an 8-year longitudinal study including 129 semi-structured interviews with refugee businesswomen in the Jordanian context, suggest that refugee businesswomen deliberately choose to remain hidden as a means of meeting normative cultural expectations (Al-Dajani *et al.*, 2018). Although refugee female entrepreneurship is not widespread, this study highlights that it is likely to be under-reported for a range of reasons.

8.5. REFUGEE EDUCATION AS A FACTOR FOR REFUGEES' ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION

The literature highlights the importance of people having access to opportunities for education and training at all levels and throughout their lives - at work, in formal education, and in the local community - in order to enhance refugee economic participation at a later stage (also see Section 3). In this regard, a UNESCO report (Singh with Hegazi and Chehab, 2018), based on a review of policies and practices and a secondary review of data and statistics, emphasises the recognition, validation and accreditation (RVA) of non-formal and informal learning outcomes as key to realising educational opportunities in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Egypt. With education highlighted as an important factor for future skilled labour and smoother integration, it is notable that refugees who have remained in the countries that neighbour Syria are mostly those who have not accessed or completed higher education, especially refugee women, with the latter having lower rates of even elementary levels of education than men (Ruisi and Shteiwi, 2016: 34). This similarly supports points already made in Part I relating to the link between educational attainment and onward migration aspirations and capabilities.

8.6. FACTORS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN LEBANON

In Lebanon, factors related to the success of refugees' economic participation have mostly been identified as: refugee entrepreneurship, the coordination between policies that make multi-goal programmes viable, and the promotion of agricultural work. The literature which is attentive to refugees' human rights emphasises that these factors can only lead to success if implemented in compliance with labour rights and when contextual specificities are carefully considered. Indeed, the lack of human and labour rights for refugee workers in Lebanon remains a key factor related to the failure of refugees' economic participation in that it prevents a just and sustainable form of economic (and social) integration into the host society. Finally, even though securing livelihoods for locals and refugees has often been approached as a win-win strategy in humanitarian programming, the literature demonstrates that it fails to be a factor leading to success for refugees' economic participation.

(See Table 7).

The literature suggests that ad hoc livelihood programmes and a shared ethnic/linguistic identity can play a positive role in encouraging refugees' economic participation in the local economy in Iraq. However, ethnic/linguistic identity also needs to be recognised as potentially playing a negative role, hampering refugees' access to certain job opportunities due to their identity. In turn, the literature also finds that general livelihood programmes that are not specifically tailored to refugees and their place of settlement, and that do not offer concrete linkages with the existing job opportunities in the job market, may also be linked to failures.

TABLE 7: Factors of success and failure in Lebanon

Factors of relative success	Factors of relative failure
Highly contextualised and tailored livelihood programmes.	Standardised programmes (e.g., no skills-gap based programmes).
Shared linguistic and ethnic identity (e.g., Kurdish refugees from Syria more likely to find an employment).	Different linguistic and ethnic identity (e.g., Arabic-speaking refugees unlikely to find a job in the KRI).
(Correlated) Higher education and urban background increasing the chances to find an employment.	(Correlated) No education and rural background preventing refugees from finding an employment.
Cash-based initiatives excluded from or opt-out of services and programming. and may be excluded from or opt-out of services and programming.	Socio-cultural norms (e.g., discouraging women's labour in the public sphere).
	Insufficient welfare support (e.g., healthcare).
	Lack of information about the job market.
	Public order changes (e.g., COVID-19 pandemic, expansion of IS in 2014).

8.6.1. FACTORS OF SUCCESS IN LEBANON

Refugee Entrepreneurship

While the presence of Syrian refugee businessmen is less relevant in Lebanon than in Turkey, it has increasingly become the object of interest in the academic literature over the past few years in the Lebanese context (Bizri, 2016; Srour and Chaaban, 2017; Harb *et al.*, 2018). Whilst limited in size and scope, refugee entrepreneurship is discussed as a factor of success in Lebanon. However, only a small number of Syrian refugee-led businesses exist, and all are legally owned by Lebanese citizens due to structural reasons (Carpi and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020). Financial and administrative issues are not the only factors that hamper Syrian refugee entrepreneurship (Harb *et al.*, 2019): in order for refugees to find employment, governmental policies need to change favourably towards Syrian refugees (Alexandre *et al.*, 2019). The economic value of Syrian entrepreneurs should not be the sole indicator through which to assess their contribution. As argued by Harb *et al.*, "small-scale businesses established by refugees should be assessed through their ability to provide refugees with income, develop skills and competencies, and provide local services that benefit host communities" (Harb *et al.*, 2018: 32;). By this token, Syrian refugee entrepreneurs are viewed as both holders and vectors of social capital (Bizri, 2016).

Decompartmentalised Policies

Coordinating intersectoral policies stands out as an important factor of success in Lebanon. Specifically, the literature highlights the importance of cooperation between public, private, and civil society institutions to improve economic (e.g., labour market access, subsidy reform, competition, and market access), social (e.g., safety nets), and environmental (e.g., upgrade irrigation practices) policies (Sumpf *et al.*, 2016). For example, the failure to generate sustainable levels and forms of economic participation does not necessarily involve a failure in other parts of life, such as other forms of social participation in the receiving community. Intra and inter-group social interactions, indeed, can often emerge as a positive side effect of a 'failing' or 'failed' livelihood programmes (e.g., Carpi *et al.*, 2020).

Prioritising Agriculture

The *kafala* work sponsorship system generally deprives refugee workers of their rights, functioning as a gateway to the exploitation and bonded labour of migrant and refugee workers, who are often employed in the rural sector. Agricultural activities, however, are said to bring several assets. Large numbers of refugees from Syria either used to work in the agricultural sector inside Syria or used to lead a rural life before becoming refugees. Agricultural activities usually include organic farming, sustainable agrotourism in rural areas, such as opening guesthouses, wineries, and restaurants that can create employment opportunities and positively contribute to the local economy. A report published by the RAND Corporation suggests that policies for the responsible inclusion of rural Syrian refugees in the workforce are a priority (Kumar *et al.*, 2018). Echoing the abovementioned importance of decompartmentalising humanitarian programming, coordinated and systemic efforts in fostering the rural sector can contribute to sustainable agriculture, help to grow the economy, and enhance the wellbeing of both Lebanese and rural Syrian refugees (*Ibid.*). Another report (Turkmani and Hamade, 2020) suggests that employing refugees from Syria in the Lebanese agricultural sector is a problematic – yet quicker – way to declare refugee economic participation successful, because the Syrian presence in Lebanon is historically bounded to the local agricultural sector. Should the agricultural sector here be better able to absorb the refugee workforce in comparison to other work sectors, it also makes refugees from Syria more vulnerable to chronic exploitation and a longstanding lack of labour rights (*ibid.*).

Cash-based Initiatives

The academic and grey literature stress a positive impact of CBIs on Lebanon-based refugees from Syria, especially when these programmes are long-term. Households benefiting from long-run CBIs are found to have higher levels of total household and food expenditures, higher access to residential housing, and lower levels of child labour (Salti *et al.*, 2022). CBIs have been evaluated positively by many scholars and practitioners who note that economic participation is sustainable and possible insofar as it protects basic rights (Srour and Chaaban, 2017; Bastagli *et al.*, 2020). For example, a study carried out by the ODI-CAMALEON partnership, based on 270 interviews and FGDs in the Beqaa Valley conducted in 2018 and 2019, found that CBIs in Lebanon are effective in reducing negative coping strategies such as accepting exploitative work and resorting to early marriage (Bastagli *et al.*, 2020: 5).

8.6.2. FACTORS OF FAILURE IN LEBANON

Unaddressed Labour Rights

Lebanon's economy is largely characterised by increased levels and forms of informal and exploitative refugee labour conditions. Some Syrians and refugees from Syria work in Lebanese small and medium enterprises (SME). SME's irregular access to resources and funds may reinforce or perpetuate the poor employment conditions of Syrian refugees, of whom 16% are men and 24% are women working in services (Srour and Chaaban, 2017: 241). Overall, the lack of protection in labour rights emerges as a key factor linked to the failure of refugees' economic participation.

Economic Win-win Strategies for Refugees and Locals

As a result of the gradual worsening of the socio-economic conditions of the local residents, in 2013 the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) jointly with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), launched the Lebanese Host Communities Support Project (LHSP) as a coordinated response to Syrian refugees' presence in Lebanon and its implications on 251 vulnerable communities. Most of the initiatives supported by LHSP have reportedly achieved positive results in terms of job creation and income generation for Lebanese women in particular.

As discussed in Section 6, a key policy assumption is that if the livelihoods of Lebanese hosts in local communities improve, tensions and animosity towards refugees generally will not escalate.

However, field-based studies have often proven that there is no relationship between livelihood improvement and economic stability, as livelihood programmes rarely lead to long-term job opportunities (Mansour and Dib Haj, 2018). In this framework, the LHSP presumes that viewing economic participation as a back-route to security and stability is a potential factor of success. LHSP supported vocational training, internship, and job placement for unemployed Lebanese youths in areas affected by competition (between these youth and Syrians) for semi-skilled jobs in the construction sector and for jobs in other areas where Syrians are not formally allowed to work (*ibid.*: 17). At a later stage, only a low percentage of local and refugee youth who participated in this programme had found employment. The LHSP and its implications vis-à-vis livelihoods, hence, did not necessarily lead to positive results in terms of the economic participation of Syrian refugees.

8.7. FACTORS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN JORDAN

In Jordan, cash-based initiatives (CBIs) and welfare improvement are factors that positively contribute to refugees' economic participation. By contrast, the fact that migration labour policies that deal with work permits and sectors remained unchanged, negatively contributes to refugees' economic participation, hampering the aims of the Jordan Compact.

TABLE 8: Factors of success and failure in Jordan

Factors of relative success	Factors of relative failure
Cash-Based Initiatives	Unresponsiveness to policy changes (e.g., narrow formal work sectors for refugee labour; enduring lack of labour rights).
Refugee entrepreneurship	Syrian-centred job creation programmes impinging on non-Syrian refugees' employment and salaries.
Welfare improvement	

8.7.1. FACTORS OF SUCCESS IN JORDAN

Cash-Based Initiatives

CBIs for refugees in Jordan have been considered an effective way of fostering refugees' economic participation (Idris, 2018). A desk-review suggests CBIs have positive impacts on food security for refugees, their ability to pay for rent and utilities and their psycho-social well-being, as well as some reduction in resorting to negative coping strategies. Women's lives, in particular, are identified as having been improved after the introduction of CBIs (*ibid.*). In these circumstances, which, overall, enable better living conditions, refugees become able to take up diversified job opportunities, reach different geographic locations, and accept flexible working hours (Hagen-Zanker *et al.*, 2017; Idris, 2018).

Refugee Entrepreneurship

Both academic and grey literature points to the potential of refugee entrepreneurship to increase their economic participation in the Jordanian economy. There is a particular emphasis on the

successful contribution of Syrian refugee-led businesses to the host country's growth (Bayram, 2019; Zighan, 2020). This is also in the case of women, who mainly set up home-based businesses, as found by a study conducted by a Syrian social entrepreneur, which is based on a hundred interviews with Syrian entrepreneurs (Bayram, 2019). In turn, Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan is home to more than 4,500 refugee entrepreneurs, meaning that 12.5% of refugees in the camp are entrepreneurs, overcoming the percentage of Jordanian entrepreneurs (Bayram, 2019). Among them, as a study based on 26 interviews and a survey conducted in the Zaatari camp during 2014 and 2015 proved (Abdel Jabbar and Zaza, 2016), refugee women have increasingly set up home-based enterprises that are able to transcend the limitations of residing in a camp (such limitations include limited access to transport and the challenges of spending long working hours outside of the house). However, the literature also highlights the financial uncertainties and other barriers faced by Syrian refugee entrepreneurs (Refai *et al.*, 2018), such as constrained mobility, and proposes the importance of refugee entrepreneurs from Syria being provided with supportive regulatory policies and being granted access to funding and banking services (Bayram, 2019). The social, cultural, and economic barriers faced by refugee entrepreneurs in Jordan are so significant that some scholars talk of "entrepreneurs of necessity" in addition to entrepreneurship being an opportunity (Zighan, 2020).

Improved Welfare

Improving welfare is another factor that can be linked to success in relation to refugees' sustainable and rights-based economic participation: that means ensuring better health conditions and the presence of social support. Researchers suggest that the people who most need such services include widows and unemployed or low-income women services (Alzoubi *et al.*, 2019). Overall, in order to enhance refugees' economic participation in local communities, scholars and practitioners alike also point to the importance of improving the quality and quantity of public services in urban areas inhabited by large numbers of refugees. Indeed, impoverished welfare is believed to decrease employability (Ferris and Kirisci, 2016: 41) and reduce job opportunities.

8.7.2. FACTORS OF FAILURE IN JORDAN

Narrow Work Sectors

Economic participation cannot happen if the policies which restrict the scope of refugee work sectors remain unchanged. Despite the 2016 Jordan Compact and an increasing focus on women's economic participation, there has been no expansion in the sectors where Syrian refugees can apply for work permits (agriculture, construction, food and beverage services, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade) (IRC, 2021). Similarly, the number of Syrian refugee-owned businesses which became formalised did not increase significantly, with only 23 home-based businesses registered and licensed across Jordan during the whole of 2020 (*ibid.*). Specifically with regards to women's inclusion and economic empowerment, Jordan is reported to have not made substantial progress (IRC, 2021: 2), in spite of this being a key goal in the GCR. In quantitative terms, the percentage of work permits issued to women only slightly increased from 5.8% in 2019 to 6.8% during 2020 (Syrian Refugee Unit – Jordanian Ministry of Labour, 2021).

Negative Impacts of the Jordan Compact for Refugees

The literature also notes that increased levels of Syrian refugee labour can have a negative impact on the rate and conditions of employment of other refugee groups (also see Section 9); scholars thus posit that it is essential that the negative impacts on non-Syrian refugees be carefully taken into consideration in any policies developed to promote Syrian refugees' economic participation (Hartnett, 2018; Lenner and Turner, 2019: 85; Al-Masri, 2021).

Unchanged Employer-Employee Dynamics

Researchers have suggested that refugees' economic participation in Jordan is currently undermined by their exclusion from formalised labour opportunities; the literature suggests that employers should be encouraged by financial incentives to formalise refugee labour (Lenner and Turner, 2019: 85; Barbelet and Wake, 2017: 15). Finally, it is noted that refugees, in order to secure job opportunities, are often forced to accept exploitative conditions and low salaries (Lenner and Turner, 2019: 84); researchers, therefore, point to the importance of ensuring that refugees are able to access safe and dignified forms of labour.

8.8. FACTORS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN IRAQ

In general, due to chronic instability and political violence, the Iraqi context is unable to provide job opportunities either for locals, IDPs, migrants or refugees. Iraq and the KRI have experienced overlapping processes of displacement. Moreover, in the KRI, refugees were not formally allowed to work until 2012. However, following the introduction of work permits, refugees (especially Kurdish Syrians) have become more integrated into the formal job market (Kaya and Luchtenberg, 2018: 20; 3RP, 2019-20), especially in the private sector (e.g., working in restaurants, hotels and shops (Durable Solutions Platform, 2020: 5).

While there is a paucity of literature providing accurate data on the general economic participation of refugees in Iraq's host economy – and no studies documenting the economic participation of refugee men from Syria have been identified as part of this literature review – there is some (predominantly evidence-based) literature dealing with the economic participation of women refugees and IDPs in Iraq. In general, the literature indicates that refugee women's livelihoods needs and their access to economic opportunities largely depend on the place of origin and settlement, whether they have a rural or urban background, their level of education and literacy, occupational skills, age, and specific family circumstances (Kaya and Luchtenberg, 2018: 3). A 2019 study carried out with conflict-affected women across Iraq, including refugees from Syria, finds that, as of 2018, only 12.3% of women of working age in Iraq were either employed or looking for work (REACH, 2019).

TABLE 9: Factors of success and failure in Iraq

Factors of relative success	Factors of relative failure
Highly contextualised and tailored livelihood programmes.	Standardised programmes (e.g., no skills-gap based programmes).
Shared linguistic and ethnic identity (e.g., Kurdish refugees from Syria more likely to find an employment).	Different linguistic and ethnic identity (e.g., Arabic-speaking refugees unlikely to find a job in the KRI).
(Correlated) Higher education and urban background increasing the chances to find an employment.	(Correlated) No education and rural background preventing refugees from finding an employment.
Cash-Based Initiatives.	Socio-cultural norms (e.g., discouraging women's labour in the public sphere).
	Insufficient welfare support (e.g., healthcare).
	Lack of information about the job market.
	Public order changes (e.g., COVID-19 pandemic, expansion of IS in 2014).

The literature suggests that *ad hoc* livelihood programmes and a shared ethnic/linguistic identity can play a positive role in encouraging refugees' economic participation in the local economy in Iraq. However, ethnic/linguistic identity also needs to be recognised as potentially playing a negative role, hampering refugees' access to certain job opportunities due to their identity. In turn, the literature also finds that general livelihood programmes that are not specifically tailored to refugees and their place of settlement, and that do not offer concrete linkages with the existing job opportunities in the job market, may also be linked to failures.

Some major hurdles – namely, lack of rights, financial pressure to send remittances, and difficulties in setting up self-run businesses – prevent Iraq-based refugees from participating substantially in the local economy. As a study published in Arabic that discusses a KRI-based *Danish Refugee Council* project shows (Sood and Seferis, 2014), livelihood programmes help refugees find a job, but they are seldom able to end negative coping mechanisms. Indeed, refugees' economic participation takes place in the jobs that Iraqis do not want to undertake themselves due to exploitative conditions and extremely low salaries (*ibid.*). Moreover, another study published in Arabic has noted that many refugee men from Syria in the KRI work to send remittances to family members who still live inside Syria and are, thus, subject to great financial pressure (Yassin, 2019). In such circumstances, refugees from Syria are unlikely to become business-owners. As suggested by a study conducted by the Durable Solutions Platform (2020), refugees are faced with challenges in opening business due to the difficulties of obtaining approvals from the local authorities. Camp-based refugee businessmen and, more rarely, women report being isolated from supply chains and therefore having higher operating costs (*ibid.*: 5).

Other factors related to failure consist of unaddressed needs, insufficient wellbeing, and an absence of health interventions; refugees who have a rural background and lower education status – and, therefore, often preferring cheaper in-camp life where access to jobs is scarcer; cultural and social norms affecting women's access to different forms of employment; and the general lack of access to information about the labour market. Beyond the control of the humanitarian and development sector, the COVID-19 pandemic and the expansion of IS have played a negative role in refugees' economic participation in Iraq.

8.8.1. FACTORS OF SUCCESS IN IRAQ

Access to Contextualised Programmes

Livelihood interventions supporting Syrian refugees in Iraq have reportedly been successful when focused on sustainability and resilience building (3RP, 2018-2019). Specifically, interventions that aim to integrate refugees into the local workforce create market linkages within established value chains, and enhance skills tailored to the needs of the private sector. These *ad hoc* interventions often help refugees from Syria start their own businesses. Outside of camps, where refugees cannot start up individual businesses, partnerships can be facilitated with local residents. Refugee entrepreneurs with business management experience or financial resources can create jobs and, thereby, boost the local economy, as suggested by a strategic overview of programmes across Iraq (3RP, 2020: 98). Likewise, a UNDP report (2016) discusses how to enhance gender equality and women's economic participation in the Iraqi economy through *ad hoc* interventions: while the report does not build on concrete evidence, it presumes that such interventions are successful strategies. The Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme's (ICRRP) work on advocacy, prevention and protection is an example of such an *ad hoc* intervention.

Cash-based Initiatives

A 'Child and Protection' study conducted by World Vision in Iraq (2018) found that cash-based programmes enabled refugees to alleviate financial pressure and access basic social protection and food security. However, as a 3RP study (2021-22) reported, despite the introduction of

CBIs in Iraq since 2016, refugees' levels of indebtedness remained high and, as such, CBIs can only partially and temporarily contribute to refugees' employment. Nonetheless, grey literature emphasises how the living conditions of refugees and IDPs would be much worse with no CBIs supporting them on a temporary basis (3RP, 2021: 36). Another study based on an analysis of GIZ's cash-for-work and multi-purpose cash assistance in the KRI, has similarly pointed to the same benefits and limitations of CBIs for refugees in the KRI (Debon and Gutekunst, 2017).

Ethnic and Linguistic Identity

Refugee women's economic participation is affected by their different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. For instance, in a study conducted with both IDP and refugee women, Syrian Kurdish refugee men and women reported the feeling of being more accepted in the KRI and found it easier to find a job as compared to Arabic speaking refugees (Kaya and Luchtenberg, 2018: 21). Instead, for Arab and/or Arabic speaking refugees, this source identifies their linguistic and ethnic identity as being linked to failures in accessing job opportunities in the local market (*ibid.*).

8.8.2. FACTORS OF FAILURE IN IRAQ

Standardised Livelihood and Vocational Training Interventions

Most livelihood programmes rolled out by INGOs and UN agencies are in sectors such as sewing, hairdressing or working in beauty salons, cleaning and, more rarely, in administrative work, nursing and teaching (Kaya and Luchtenberg, 2018: 15). The lack of governmental commitment for women-focused livelihood programmes, however, constitutes a barrier (*ibid.*: 11). Another important barrier is that most livelihood programmes are not linked to the job market and therefore do not necessarily allow women to engage in income-generating activities after completing training (*ibid.*: 12).

Cultural and Social Norms

A further barrier to refugees' economic participation in Iraq's host economy pertains to social and cultural expectations and norms. In one study, several women interlocutors who do not work, especially IDPs, explained that their culture and/or community would not accept women working outside the house (*ibid.*: 17). In turn, working outside of camps proves difficult for both women and men because of the long and expensive commute, lack of transport, and, with particular reference to women, because travelling is widely considered to be unsafe and undesirable (also see Section 7). Furthermore, the absence of available childcare impinges on refugee women's access to job opportunities.

Lack of Information about the Job Market

Lack of information about the job market and potential opportunities, including awareness about laws and policies, is a factor related to failure. Most refugee and IDP women are not aware of how to apply for jobs: information about opportunities is not disseminated; and women with limited to no networks do not hear about job opportunities through word-of-mouth (Kaya and Luchtenberg, 2018: 18; REACH, 2019).

Unaddressed or Insufficient Wellbeing and Health Interventions

Psychological and physical health is another significant factor that affects refugee women's livelihoods and economic participation in the local community. In the KRI, women and girls face early marriage, domestic violence, prostitution and trafficking, and officials are said to fail to assist survivors of forced sex work (Kaya and Luchtenberg, 2018: 38). In such circumstances, women's economic participation is deprioritised or is characterised by their lack of rights, and/or sexual harassment and domestic violence.

Education and Rural Backgrounds

Education is also a factor that affects women's livelihood situation and their economic participation (*Ibid.*: 24). Most refugee women who used to live in rural areas have limited or no education. Although some women have opened shops or beauty salons inside camps, they are less likely to work than women from urban areas. The latter's economic participation is greater, as they can commute within cities and more easily find job opportunities (*ibid.*: 21). However, urban refugee women's easier access to jobs also does not guarantee safety, human dignity and labour rights.

The Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated economic hardships. As a result, many refugees have decided to relocate to camps as they have not been able to meet their basic needs and cover their main expenses outside of camps (3RP Syria, 2020: 30). Moreover, mobility restrictions, combined with the temporary closure of businesses, have had a negative effect on people's ability to meet basic needs in the KRI. This has led to an increased need for cash assistance and livelihoods programmes (3RP Syria, 2020: 30).

The Expansion of IS and Renewed Processes of Forced Displacement

Syrian refugees in Iraq often reported being able to access jobs and generate income for the household before the expansion of IS into their host areas. They are now facing more challenges, also due to increased employment restrictions determined by the pandemic and the constant wavering of the local economy, and declining levels of NGO assistance (REACH, 2019; Durable Solutions Platform, 2019).

8.9. CONCLUSION

Refugees' abilities to participate locally, and their experiences and outcomes of such participation, vary according to their own identities and backgrounds, in addition to the national and local context.

Key factors of success can be summarised as follows: Cash-based initiatives (CBIs) which economically support refugees' livelihoods and reduce or end negative coping mechanisms. However, most CBIs happen on a temporary or short-term basis and may cause dependency if not integrated with further livelihood measures. Refugee entrepreneurship is identified as being the greatest achievement for refugee self-reliance policy and practice, but needs to be supported by legal and financial frameworks which support refugees in the host countries. Investing in refugee education can strengthen skilled labour and help to uphold refugees' labour rights. Overall, the literature highlights the importance of well-targeted and highly contextualised programmes, intersectoral policies, and cooperation between public, private, and civil society institutions to improve economic, social, and environmental policies.

Key factors of failure include the compartmentalisation of programmes which are unable to build linkages between refugees, their livelihood strategies, security, and the job market. Although alleviated by some programmes (e.g., CBIs), the lack of labour rights is still tangible in the three countries and impinges on the economic potential of refugees' participation and overall sustainable growth. A lack of response to and/or the flawed implementation of policy changes stifle the process of meeting refugees' needs and rights and generate negative side effects on non-Syrian refugee/migrant labour (e.g., the Jordan Compact).

• SECTION 9: What is known about the effects of the presence of substantial numbers of Syrian refugees on national/municipal/city/town economies, in terms of (amongst others) economic growth and employment?

- In the media and in public discourse, it is commonly stated that the arrival of refugees leads to economic downturns (Sanchez 2021). However, the literature predominantly argues that common economic changes such as higher rates of local unemployment, overall economic downturns, the growth of the informal sector, and infrastructural degradation are a result of complex interrelated factors and the way actors have responded to the presence of refugees, rather than the direct result of the refugee presence *per se*. Such economic regressions are instead often associated with the prolonged nature of internal conflicts and infrastructural crisis (in Iraq and Lebanon, in particular), and changes in public order (e.g., COVID-19 pandemic).
- Increased total public expenditures (e.g., on healthcare and water) across the three countries are linked in the literature to overall degraded infrastructure; the grey literature suggests that there may be a direct link between collapsing infrastructure (e.g., water and solid waste systems) and the presence of refugees.
- Major policies (e.g., the Jordan Compact) caused negative side effects, such as higher unemployment rates and the economic exploitation of non-Syrian migrant/refugee workforce.
- Jordan and Lebanon have seen benefits of the international humanitarian presence – even though temporary and relatively low-impact – and the economic gains it brought into these host economies: these include the urban and economic benefits of the international humanitarian presence; a temporarily positive effect on the real estate sector; and the indirect benefit of the refugee presence on municipal service delivery. Benefits of the international presence are not documented in Iraq.
- Greater legitimacy and accountability of municipalities and governorates can be observed in the years following the arrival of refugees from Syria in Jordan and Lebanon, despite the scarcity of economic data on a multi-scalar level. There is no evidence of such increased legitimacy/ accountability in the case of Iraq.

9.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF REFUGEES FROM SYRIA AND HOST ECONOMIES

The overall impact of refugees from Syria on the Jordanian, Lebanese, and Iraqi economies is layered and complex, carrying both negative and positive effects. The evidence, especially on Jordan, is mixed on the effects of the presence of refugees on diverse aspects of economic and social development in the receiving countries. It is methodologically challenging to trace a causal relationship between the presence of refugees and changes in local economies (see Section 6). Indeed, as noted in Section 6, rather than providing causal evidence relating to this relationship, the academic literature, in general, places a particular emphasis on the *assumption* and *perception* that the presence of Syrian refugees leads to competition over jobs with local residents. Challenging the validity of this assumption or perception, academic research demonstrates that Syrian refugees, by constituting a cheap workforce, do not cause – or increase – local unemployment. In essence, as noted in Section 6, "there is no obvious correlation between unemployment rates of nationals and areas of large influx of refugees" (Zetter and Ruaudel, 2016: 5). More broadly, the marginal effect of refugees on GDP has even been reported as being positive in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, but more pronounced in Lebanon and Jordan (World Bank, 2020b: 162).

Nonetheless, forced migration also implies a cost for the receiving country, including with regards to public expenditures and service delivery. It is particularly noted that, depending on the context, the presence of refugees may have negative impacts on the local labour market in terms of

wages and the host population's labour force participation (Şahin Mencütek and Nashwan, 2020). Importantly, the research has instead proven that economic concerns do not necessarily generate negative attitudes towards migrants and refugees in settings where local and refugee populations face economic challenges (e.g., on Jordan, Alrababa'h *et al.*, 2021; also see Section 5, 6, and 7). As the literature on refugee entrepreneurship shows (see Section 8), refugees can and do also bring economic opportunities, positively contribute to development, as well as stimulate trade and investment. For example, foreign demand for goods and services due to the humanitarian presence has led increased economic activities on a local level and employment of skilled workforce (e.g., humanitarian practitioners, drivers, cooks, cleaners, etc.) (Ferris and Kirisci, 2016: 42-43).

While the literature does not explicitly address local economic transformation *as a result* of the refugee presence at a multiscalar level, most studies on Jordan focus on governorates rather than specific municipalities, prioritising Mafraq, Irbid and the capital Amman. In Lebanon, the literature addresses single municipalities, especially Nabaa in the Mount Lebanon governorate, Halba in Akkar, Tripoli in the North governorate, and various municipalities in the South and in the Beqaa. In turn, in Iraq, most literature focuses on the KRI and on different governorates across the whole of Iraq, especially Anbar and Duhok after the post-2014 expansion of IS. Notably, while many of these governorate- and municipal-level studies rely on field research conducted in specific areas, the findings are not necessarily framed as area- or neighbourhood-based nor, in general, are they interpreted and analysed in a contextual manner in relation to the particularities of the location in which the data was collected.

The literature reviewed for this report shows that, on the one hand, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq have faced economic losses over the last decade (especially in the infrastructural and employment sectors). On the other, field-based research emphasises there is no evidence of a direct relation between economic crisis and the presence of refugees from Syria. Unlike Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon share the (temporary) benefit of the international humanitarian presence and the economic gains it brought into these host economies. In the case of Iraq, a direct relationship between the presence of refugees from Syria and the local economy is even more unlikely, due to the protracted conflicts and the multiple displacements which characterise the country's recent history. It is noteworthy that only the economic sectors that are discussed in more than one source are here taken into analysis, rather than selecting them by subjective criteria.

9.2. EFFECTS OF THE PRESENCE OF REFUGEES FROM SYRIA ON LEBANON

The literature on the effects of the Syrian refugee presence on the host economy in Lebanon is also commonly framed around the asset-or-burden dilemma. By 2013, an ILO study on refugees' employment opportunities in Lebanon – collecting data from stakeholders, Lebanese employers and workers, and Syrian refugee households during 2013 across Lebanon - had already identified a negative effect on the labour market and on the overall economy (ILO, 2014: 9). Since then, economic growth has further slowed, with the reduction of private investments, the expansion of trade deficit, and the decline of tourism.

The overall impact of the presence of refugees from Syria on local economies emerges as worse in Lebanon than in Jordan due to the pre-existing situation (e.g., poor-quality infrastructure and services, even for local citizens), and due to the expansion of negative coping mechanisms and the lack of labour rights (Abdo and Jamil, 2020), such as the rise of refugee child labour, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, as also seen in Section 8 (Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 2020: 2). Lebanon lags in several basic areas: electricity, telecommunications, transportation, water and sanitation (Hussein *et al.*, 2020; World Bank, 2020a: 40). Infrastructure in Lebanon has always been a development challenge: transfers to *Electricite du Liban* between 1998 and 2019 accounted for 30% of the Government of Lebanon's debt in late 2019, showing,

according to grey literature, a negative effect of refugee arrivals from Syria, which is believed to have exacerbated the infrastructural bottleneck in the country (World Bank, 2020a: 41). Likewise, water services are said to have become more expensive as a result of different crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the Beirut port blast in August 2020, and the presence of significant numbers of refugees over more than a decade (World Bank, 2020a: 43; Hussein *et al.*, 2020). For example, a 2019 UNDP report mentions a yearly increase of 8-14% of wastewater due the arrival of refugees from Syria and a 15% increase in solid waste (UNDP, 2019: 13).

Higher Levels of Local Unemployment

Grey literature, drawing on quantitative data, show how refugees from Syria mainly arrived and settled in already impoverished areas where the rate of local unemployment was already high: in 2013, 86% of refugees were residing in neighbourhoods where almost 70% of Lebanese residents were living on less than $4 a day (World Bank, 2013: 2); this quickly became less than $2.4 a day (Cherri *et al.*, 2016: 4). The arrival of refugees from Syria was already expected to increase labour supply between 30% and 50% - with the largest impacts on women, youth, and unskilled workers (World Bank, 2013: 4). With the ongoing severe economic crisis, it is estimated that thousands more Lebanese have been pushed into poverty, especially unskilled young workers. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdowns are reported to have impacted the Lebanese labour market more negatively than the presence of refugees, as it caused a major loss of job opportunities, while informal workers did not even have access to social benefits (ILO, 2020: 8). A *Brookings* article suggests that the large Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon is a "crisis within a crisis" (Karasapan and Shah, 2021).

Weakening of Small-scale Businesses

As an ILO report from the earlier years of the Syrian humanitarian crisis already pointed out (ILO, 2013: 10), it has been possible to identify a growth in the informal sector alongside the weakening of small-scale local businesses (e.g., agro-food production, dairy products retail shops and bakeries that sell locally), which make up 90% of the enterprises active in the Lebanese economy (UNDP, 2020: 14). This is believed to be a consequence of Syrian informal businesses that tend to sell the same products, and which, due to livelihood programmes, often neglect small-scale businesses (*ibid.*). For instance, an ethnographic study focusing on refugee livelihoods in northern Lebanon found that refugees from Syria use the World Food Program's (WFP) vouchers and e-food cards mostly in medium and large-scale businesses that have special agreements with WFP (Carpi, 2017). Furthermore, for small enterprises, the high level of tax, especially the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), becomes unaffordable, making the cost of labour soar. This indirectly reduces the incentive to generate formal jobs, according to a study based on a survey with 414 enterprises across Lebanon (Srour and Chaaban, 2017: 12). A more recent UNDP report (2020) focusing on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) does not mention the Syrian refugee presence at all as a determinant factor in the history of SMEs in Lebanon. Instead, changes in the SME sector appear to be determined by the humanitarian policy (e.g., WFP) of incentivising sales in medium and large enterprises.

Increased Costs of Environmental Degradation

In 2011, the World Bank estimated the cost of environmental degradation in Lebanon at 3.4% of GDP; according to the UNDP, that figure rose to 4.4% in 2018 (World Bank, 2020a: 48). As reported in an assessment by UNDP and the Lebanese Ministry of Environment (2019), in financial terms, the cost of degradation amounts to US$ 0.89 billion in 2018 and is attributable to air pollution in terms of motorised vehicles, boats and planes, industries, household emissions, communal/individual power generator emissions, occasional solid waste and tire burning, dust coming from mining and construction (World Bank, 2020b). The report mentions an overall increase of 20% of emissions resulting from the "Syrian crisis" (UNDP and Lebanese Ministry of Environment, 2019: 12) but it does not unpack the factors which may contribute to pollution.

A Collapsing Banking and Finance Sector

A study based on interviews with bank professionals and refugees in the Beqaa Valley also observed that the presence of refugees from Syria had nearly no effect on the banking/finance sector (Knio and Ayoub, 2018: 1762). However, the study also emphasised that banks in Lebanon accumulated lost investment opportunities by denying the opening of bank accounts to wealthy Syrian nationals, closing branches in Syria and causing a deficit in ATM transactions. To boost the sector, Knio and Ayoub (2018) suggest that more flexibility with international and local NGOs is needed, as humanitarian actors bring economic assets to the country. Syrian capital has been believed to bring interest to Lebanese banks for years. It is notable that many news agencies during 2020 reported that Syrian businessmen are an increasingly important group of depositors in Lebanese banks. Although the Lebanese Central Bank – *Banque du Liban* (BdL) – does not offer a breakdown of non-resident deposits by nationality, estimates of the size of Syrian deposits in Lebanon are believed to constitute a significant share, varying between $20 and $42 billion, according to Reuters (al-Khalidi, 2020).

Ambiguous Trajectories in the Real Estate Sector

While an ILO report (2013) states that the real estate sector declined in 2013, an academic study based on a review of rental policies in Lebanon reported a positive effect of the Syrian presence four years after the arrivals from Syria started (Ashkar, 2015). The arrival of refugees from Syria and the need to find accommodation made the house rental market's prices soar, rendering rental properties unaffordable for local residents themselves. However, this was a consequence of the act of capitalising on the Syrian humanitarian crisis rather than of the arrival of refugees per se (*Ibid.*). Importantly, a World Bank and International Monetary Fund's financial sector assessment (2016) states that, as of September 2015, 41% of banks' lending was to real-estate related sectors, as the Lebanese economy heavily relies on this sector. The sector thereafter saw a decline, with the Byblos Bank Real Estate Demand Index dropping in the first quarter of 2020 to its lowest level on record (ILO, 2020: 7).

Precarious Economic Growth as a Result of the International Humanitarian Presence

Business activities and consumption by aid agencies and foreign capital led to a significant cash influx, with increased foreign consumption enlarging the wealth primarily of educated upper and middle classes in Lebanon who found employment in the skilled labour market (Ashkar, 2015). Similarly, although literature from 2019 notes that the presence of large numbers of refugees from Syria has had a negative effect on unemployment and Lebanese labour income, especially for the lowest segments of the Lebanese workforce (David *et al.*, 2019), it also finds that limited or no adverse effects are found on high-skilled native workers. Research notes that the economic effects of the presence of refugees from Syria mainly depend on the social class impact (Turner, 2019).

Likewise, another study by Barakat and ElKahlout (2021), published in Arabic and based on interviews and consultations with experts and stakeholders, points out the sizeable benefits that the international humanitarian apparatus brought into Lebanon while assisting refugees from Syria, because several local companies largely benefited from increased cash flows.

Overall, it can be argued that an increase in humanitarian aid flows allocated to investment significantly enhanced growth (David *et al.,* 2019), while the latter remains subject to the precarious presence of humanitarian organisations, economic capital, and increased foreign consumption in the country. According to scholars such as David *et al.* (2019: 107), this corroborates the suggestion that there is a need for a new partnership between governments, the aid community, and businesses (Betts and Collier, 2017).

Insufficient Economic Data on Municipal-level Effects, but Significant Changes

The effects of the prolonged crisis on local infrastructure emerge consistently in the literature (Harb and Atallah, 2015), even though the deteriorating conditions of such infrastructure pre-date the arrival of refugees from Syria due to prolonged conflicts and state corruption (Baumann, 2019). Local municipalities have also been reported to face massively increased expenditures for waste and garbage collection and other infrastructural maintenance after the arrival of refugees from Syria started (UCLG, 2013: 33). In this context, the UNDP and MoSA's LHSP (see Section 8) was effective in enhancing the capacity of municipalities in the identification and planning of priority basic services. While scholars have recommended more transparency with regards to the funds provided to the municipalities to assist refugees (Mourad and Piron, 2016: 41), little is known in this regard: indeed, the literature prioritises a political and social - rather than an economic - analysis of refugee governance at a municipal level.

Grey literature partially fills the knowledge gap by highlighting the extent to which local municipalities in Lebanon have been left by themselves implementing ad hoc responses to displacement from Syria (Boustani *et al.*, 2016; Madoré, 2016) when a systematic Crisis Response Plan was still lacking. It is also important to note that, as a result of the presence of refugees from Syria and increasing resources provided directly to local municipalities (Mourad and Piron, 2016), local people started looking to municipalities for service delivery rather than to the central state (Aktis Strategy, 2016: 42). In many areas of Lebanon, historically, local residents have not held high expectations of local municipalities, mainly owing to poor municipal performance in administrative affairs and coordination, and in effective welfare provision (*ibid.*). It has also been noted that Lebanese municipalities, after the arrival of large numbers of refugees from Syria, began to express a stronger interest in improving communication with local residents (Mourad and Piron, 2016).

9.3. EFFECTS OF THE PRESENCE OF REFUGEES FROM SYRIA ON JORDAN

The literature reviewed on Jordan reflects this burden-or-asset deadlock and warns against the generalised assumption that refugee arrivals from Syria, *per se*, *caused* economic recession in Syria's neighbouring countries. This section starts by delineating processes leading to economic losses and unemployment and, later, what the literature identities as contributing positively to the Jordanian economy. Most of the literature reviewed focuses on the consequences of the 2016 Jordan Compact on Refugees, and the effects of the Syrian presence on the local job market.

In order to read the economic data appropriately, it is important to note the following. In terms of the labour economy of Jordan – which is both a sending and receiving country for cheap and unskilled workers -, it is estimated that half of the Jordanian labour market is informal in nature (Idris, 2016; Abdo and Jamil, 2020), making statistics and predictions problematic and empirically inaccurate. After refugees from Syria started arriving in significant numbers in 2016, it has been possible to observe a shift of the local workforce from the private to the public sector (Fallah *et al.*, 2019). In this context, the arrival of refugees from Syria is not an isolated factor in determining changes at the level of Jordan's economy. Instead, it needs to be considered along with other factors and processes. For example, socio-economic processes and trade in the Mafraq governorate (North Jordan) were severely affected as a result of the conflict in both Iraq and Syria and the closure of the border between Jordan and those two countries (Alsoudi, 2020: 14), rather than as a result of the presence of refugees from Syria in Jordan per se. As a further example of the complexity of considering the effects of the presence of Syrian refugees on Jordan's economy, the World Bank estimates that the refugee crisis has cost Jordan USD 2.5 billion a year (Idris, 2016). However, as the evidence discussed below demonstrates, the country has also benefited from increased consumer demand due to the refugee population, increased international assistance and presence of aid agencies, and Syrian investment in Jordan.

The Compact's Effect on Jordan's Economy and Diverse Migrant and Refugee Groups

An extensive body of literature exists on the effects of refugees from Syria on Jordan's economy. Most of these studies are centred on the labour economy, and partially cover the experiences of the non-local and non-Syrian workforce after the adoption of the Jordan Compact. The Compact was meant to increase foreign investment, formal refugee labour, and local employment. Nevertheless, access to formal labour remains unlikely for refugees and, adopting a rights-based approach, it has been consistently noted that exploitation continues and thrives (Lenner and Turner, 2019; Rajbongshi and Deshpande, 2021), rendering 'growth talk' inappropriate.

Fieldwork-based literature proves that the Jordanian economy has been more heavily shaped by the laws and policies that host governments and global actors implemented to deal with Syrian displacement (e.g., the Jordan Compact) than by the presence of refugees from Syria *per se*. Among such policies, the Compact received criticism particularly with respect to its impact on the non-Syrian and non-Jordanian workforce. Indeed, it not only did not produce the planned positive outcomes for Syrian refugee labour (Lenner and Turner, 2019; Rajbongshi and Deshpande, 2021), but it also forwarded a nationality-based prioritisation policy which impinges on other national groups.

For example, work permits are free of charge for Syrian refugees but can cost more for Egyptians (Hartnett, 2018). Egyptians, moreover, are being forced into the informal sector by economic necessity to compete with Syrian workers (*ibid.*: 275). Likewise, other immigrant and refugee groups in Jordan began to see their working hours reduced and, therefore, lower incomes at the end of the month, as a consequence of the increasing formalisation of Syrian labour (Malaeb and Wahba, 2018: 16).

As noted by Al-Masri (2021): "by fostering the creation of nationality-based migrant labour policies that operate in parallel with each other, migrant vulnerability is exacerbated" in the Jordanian context. For instance, Egyptian workers in Jordan face more bureaucratic hurdles to access the national labour market (Al-Masri, 2021: 198). They are encouraged to work in the informal labour market because their work permit costs 500 Jordanian dinars, and they are increasingly deported if they lack a formal permit to work (Lenner and Turner, 2019: 87-88). A series of academic studies (Hartnett, 2018; Malaed and Wahba, 2018; Lenner and Turner, 2019; al-Masri, 2021; Rajbongshi and Deshpande, 2021) highlight that, on the one hand, creating work for Syrians in Jordanian-dominated sectors has turned out to be an inappropriate policy, as it has failed to generate formal labour for Syrians to the planned extent. On the other, the most effective strategy for the integration of Syrian workers into the local economy has been to employ refugees in sectors that are already dominated by other migrant groups. Therefore, the literature notes that the Jordan Compact has been effective only in catalysing work opportunities for Jordanian citizens, while keeping refugees marginalised, creating tensions between members of different nationality-based groups, and providing workers with few to no rights (Lenner and Turner, 2019). With the Compact, literature notes that policymakers risk replacing one vulnerable group with another, without addressing the structural issues that underlie the Jordanian labour market (Hartnett, 2018).

Jordanian Unemployment as a Consequence of the Presence of Refugees from Syria?

Based on data collected in Jordan's Department of Statistics, the Central Bank of Jordan, and the UNHCR, an academic study by Fakih and Ibrahim (2016) indicates that the presence of refugees from Syria has affected local job opportunities less than commonly believed, showing that refugees themselves struggle to find official employment due to their limited mobility, lack of documentation and, thus, vulnerability to work exploitation, or lack of skilled work capabilities, which are also required in Jordan's labour economy. Moreover, a high unemployment rate, especially amongst youth, had been a growing issue in Jordan prior to the arrival of refugees from Syria, being caused and aggravated by a number of factors, including the global financial crisis, a mismatch of skills and labour market needs, and the closure of borders with the neighbouring countries of Iraq and

Syria (Alsoudi, 2020: 8).

Academic literature based on an extensive analysis of the Jordan Labour Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) also shows that Jordanian workers who were more exposed to the 'refugee crisis' did not end up in worse living conditions than those who were not exposed (Fallah, *et al.*, 2019). Hence, it shows a small correlation between the Syrian presence and the worsening of Jordan's labour economy in terms of opportunities and wages (*ibid.*). Likewise, a secondary data-based systematic review highlights the increased local unemployment rate while also showing little correlation between unemployment and the Syrian refugee presence in Jordan, stating there is no strong evidence that refugees from Syria have impacted the unemployment rate (Al Shoubaki and Harris, 2018). The relatively unaffected unemployment rate, according to that study can be explained in two ways. First, refugees are working under unofficial and unrecorded work contracts. Second, the unemployment rate is a misleading indicator, because it does not reflect the number of workers who were discharged from their jobs and does not provide a number for unreported employment in the local labour market (*ibid.*: 170).

One source, based on an analysis of systematic reviews, is inconsistent with the abovementioned literature, indicating that the Syrian presence negatively affected the local unemployment rate in Jordan and average salaries (Al Dalahmeh and Dajnoki, 2021). It, however, lacks primary data that could more powerfully challenge the arguments made by the other sources cited here, which are instead based on an analysis of both primary and secondary data. However, other studies do presume a correlation between Jordan's economic downturn and the presence of Syrian refugees. For example, Ruisi and Shteiwi (2016) argue that the refugee arrivals from Syria impact on the formal labour market through competing with the Jordanian labour force, since Syrians generally replace Jordanian workers. Alsoudi (2020), whose study is based on a social survey conducted in the Mafraq governorate, offers a more complex picture. On the one hand, it affirms that the Syrian presence negatively affected Jordan's labour economy. Indeed, the study advocates for the international community to provide funding to the Jordanian government, in order for it to cope with the crisis and also support local citizens. On the other, it observes that the conflict between Jordanian and Syrian job seekers in the Mafraq governorate is weak because most Syrians accept jobs that Jordan workers normally do not (Alsoudi, 2020: 20).

More broadly, there is no agreement on this point within the grey literature itself. A trends analysis of the 2007-2014 Jordanian EUS data "does not corroborate the story that the arrival of Syrians has resulted in rising unemployment for Jordanians" (Cookle, 2017: 16), and a 2019 WFP study finds that "The impact of refugees on employment is not well understood. World Bank–UNHCR research suggests that Syrian refugees are largely concentrated in the construction sector, and there is little scope of competition with the host community" (World Bank 2019: 159-160).

Economic Losses

Jordan's total public expenditures have increased due to factors which are related to diverse extents to the presence of refugees, particularly in regions that have received larger numbers. The current public expenditure has increased at the expense of investment spending, and that is "like putting a spoke in Jordan's development wheel" (Al Shoubaki and Harris, 2018: 167). Overall, the Jordanian response to the cost of the Syrian humanitarian crisis was severe, to the extent that Jordan's public debt increased from $18.9 billion in 2011 to $35.2 billion in 2016 (*ibid.*: 168). The declining Jordanian trade balance negatively affects Jordan's balance of payments, and, consequently, Jordan's economic growth and foreign investment policy have been negatively affected. Indeed, closing the trade route with Syria has adversely impacted Jordanian food security, and, similarly, Jordan has lost its primary agricultural market in Syria. More specifically, Jordan's GDP increased steadily since 2011 to reach its peak in 2018, making 40 billion USD (Barakat and ElKahlout, 2021). Jordan's GDP growth is now at its lowest since 2005 (Al Shoubaki and Harris, 2018: 168). Furthermore, the soaring of housing rental and real estate prices due to the arrival of both refugees from Syria and humanitarian workers poses a fundamental challenge to local

residents. The healthcare economy was also negatively affected due to a shortage of medical staff, a lack of resources to pay salaries to a larger number of professionals, and the length of waiting lists (Alsoudi, 2020: 16).

Economic and Infrastructural Benefits of the International Humanitarian Presence

Jordan has received significant amounts of international aid to support its response to the Syrian refugee crisis: foreign grants and loans in 2012 totalled USD 3.1 billion (Idris, 2016: 6). One estimate put the total FDI coming into Jordan from Syria in 2013 at USD 1 billion (Carrion, 2015: 6 in Idris, 2016). In this framework, the arrival of aid agencies into the country has brought money in and created jobs for educated Jordanians. Consumer demand has increased, benefitting local suppliers, and house rents have increased bringing more income for landlords. An estimated 18% of Jordan's housing stock was vacant prior to the Syrian humanitarian crisis but is now largely rented out (SNAP, 2014: 11 in Idris, 2016). Likewise, an ethnographic study in the Amman district of al-Weibdeh, focusing on the effects of gentrification interventions and of 'intervention communities' (Thomas and Vogel, 2018: 220), highlights the urban benefits of the international humanitarian presence in Jordan at the neighbourhood level – such as the upgrading of local infrastructure – but also the various economic transactions and consumption of local and foreign products that such a presence implies on an everyday basis.

Positive Effects of the Refugee Presence at a Municipal Level

A general burden on Jordanian municipalities due to the demographic growth arising from the arrival of refugees from Syria was reported in 2013 (UCLG, 2013), but there is also evidence of positive effects. The Municipal Services and Social Resilience project launched by the World Bank in 2018 (and funded by the UKAID, USAID, Canada, and the Netherlands) was created to support Jordanian municipalities which received Syrian refugees in delivering services and employment opportunities for Jordanians and Syrians; it is said to have improved municipal services for 2.7 million direct beneficiaries, of whom 20% are Syrian refugees and, in turn, among whom 47% are female (World Bank, 2018). This is a positive impact of the presence of refugees from Syria on Jordan at a municipal level, especially at the level of basic services. The World Bank also reports that the Education Reform Support Programme (launched in 2018) expanded access to early childhood education for 107,000 Jordanian children and Syrian refugee children altogether, in addition to expanding medical staff and facilities to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there is no other literature, independent from the project, which confirms its effects.

9.4. EFFECTS OF THE PRESENCE OF REFUGEES FROM SYRIA ON IRAQ

In Iraq, protracted conflict over more than three decades has heavily determined domestic economic trends, leading to "a highly volatile economic context" (World Bank, 2020b: 155-156). Against this backdrop, the effects of the Syrian refugee presence on the Iraqi economy are predominantly mentioned in terms of 'the impact of the Syrian conflict', with no specific focus on the presence of Syrian refugees in the country (e.g., Ceylan and Tumen, 2021).

Studies on the impact of the Syrian conflict on the KRI's economy and society are available in relation to localities such as the Duhok governorate, where more extensive data became available due to the expansion of IS and the subsequent forced internal displacement of local populations, in addition to the arrival of refugees from Syria, mainly of a Syriac or Kurdish background. In addition to the large movement of displaced persons to the KRI, the Region faces a financial crisis due to the cost of the war against IS, the drop in oil prices, and the lack of budgetary transfers from the federal government (Yassen, 2019). As noted in Section 8, however, the literature mostly covers IDPs and their impact on Iraq rather than the impact of refugees, due to the far larger

number of IDPs in the country. This represents an important difference because IDPs, unlike refugees, are local citizens who, according to a 2015 World Bank report, are locally viewed as depleting a national social protection system that has already been severely damaged over the last two decades (World Bank, 2015: 88).[9]

As a further example that it is not the presence of refugees which is identified in the literature as a factor impacting the local economy (e.g., solid waste management, employment, healthcare), it is the "surge in violence" and the regional economy of war which are discussed as leading to blocked transport routes and shortages in refined petroleum products and losses of foreign investments due to domestic instability. This also led to an increase in the price of fuel— ranging from 14% in Sulaymaniyah to 15% in Erbil and 23% in Dohuk—and, similarly, electricity and transport costs (World Bank, 2015: 6). A World Bank report (2015: 8) stated that stabilising the combined effects of the Syrian refugee crisis and the arrival of IDPs in sectors related to human development, including health, education, social safety nets, and food security, would have required circa $846 million (3.5% of GDP) in 2015 (*ibid.*: 7). The multiple processes of internal displacement that Iraq has faced further worsened the economic situation. However, the Iraqi oil industry, before the costs went down, seemed to follow a different growth trajectory in the early years of the conflict In Syria (2011-2014) (World Bank, 2020b: 90). Favourable oil production boosted growth despite the Islamic State's insurgency. After a war-caused economic collapse after the 2003 US occupation, oil production increased from 2.4 million barrels to 3.4 million barrels per day between 2011 and 2014 (*ibid.*: 12).

Higher Rates of Local Unemployment

The unemployment rate in the KRI has increased almost fivefold from 3% in 2013 to 14% in 2016, and the poverty rate has also risen from 6% to 14% in the aftermath of forced displacement caused by IS. The local population, therefore, is plunging into poverty (Yassen, 2019: 6). Unemployment is particularly present among local displaced women, although primary data-based studies (Durable Solutions Platform, 2019) affirmed that data collection may also be misleading for a number of reasons. First, a large majority of females aged over 18, including 98% of female refugees and 81% of female residents, reported that their household did not have any other female members above 18. However, according to the same report, the main reason for female unemployment at the national level was that women had domestic duties (e.g., looking after children), which makes it hard for them to engage in paid employment (*ibid.*, 2019). Local unemployment heavily affected refugees themselves. In Iraq, even if refugees from Syria have been more active in the informal labour market than their Iraqi peers (see Section 8), it is reported that they are also more likely to remain unemployed (World Bank, 2020b: 18).

Large Expenditure for Rural Support and Food Assistance

It has been found that the public distribution system, agricultural budget support to farmers, and food assistance to refugees and IDPs continue to dominate government expenditures (World Bank, 2015: 8). The estimated amount needed to ensure sufficient food supplies was already $155.4 million for year 2015. This highlights the historical importance of agriculture-focused livelihood interventions and support for refugees in Iraq and the KRI in particular, as suggested by a UNHCR and DRC study conducted in the Erbil governorate with the owners of small shops and camp-based refugees (UNHCR and DRC, 2015).

---

[9] Although the years 2016-2021 are established as a timeframe for the purposes of this systematic literature review, this section of the report also draws on a 2015 World Bank report as it details the sectors where costs and losses are discussed as *arising from* the Syrian conflict (yet, not the presence of Syrians *per se*) and, by extrapolation, as being linked to the refugee presence in the region.

Collapsed Health System

It has been estimated that the health sector in Iraq needed an additional $317 million to be stabilised (World Bank, 2015: 8) after years of conflict (Dewachi, 2017). In this framework, the presence of refugees simply adds a further number of residents who need to access primary services, in a context where all economic sectors are already under pressure (*ibid.*). Hence, it is difficult to assess the direct effects of the presence of refugees from Syria on the Iraqi economy, even at a multiscale level. With the KRI's fiscal constraints and its semi-autonomous status, the total number of primary health care centres, where refugees generally access healthcare free of charge, decreased from 984 to 812 between 2013 and 2017. On the whole, Iraq lost 3,938 physicians and 6,787 nurses and midwives (due to deaths and migration), decreasing the number of physicians between 2013 and 2015. Specifically, the fiscal share of health spending decreased from 4.8 to 1.7% between 2010 and 2016 (World Bank, 2020b: 22).

Solid Waste Management under Pressure

The arrival of refugees from Syria increased the local additional population, who are said to have produced more than 1,690 tons of solid waste per day, an increase of 26% on KRI's daily per capita generated solid waste in 2014 (World Bank, 2015: 10). In terms of capacity to absorb solid waste, only Dohuk City is able to accept additional solid waste because of the construction of a new sanitary landfill, and because of its current capacity for recycling (*ibid.*). However, it has been reported that only 25% of Dohuk Governorate's solid waste goes to landfill (EU and UNDP, 2017). Since there are substantial solid waste management infrastructure needs in KRI, a European Union and UNDP report (2017) states that the projected investment in Waste Management infrastructure over the period 2013-2020 is estimated at US$ 442 million.

9.5. CONCLUSION

A key assumption guiding policy is that the presence of refugees from Syria has a significant effect on diverse aspects of economic and social development in the receiving countries, and that the presence of Syrian refugees leads to competition over jobs with local residents. However, the literature does not find evidence of a direct relationship between economic crisis and the presence of refugees from Syria. Instead, the literature demonstrates that the impact of refugees on host economies has been produced by other relevant factors: in fact, the most significant economic impacts arise from laws, policies, and actions implemented by governments and international actors since the arrival of refugees from Syria.

The Jordanian economy has been more heavily shaped by the laws and policies that the Jordanian government and global actors have implemented in response to displacement from Syria (e.g., the Jordan Compact) than by the presence of refugees from Syria *per se*. Likewise, the presence of large numbers of refugees from Syria has mostly had indirect effects on Lebanon's economy. The effects of the Syrian refugee presence on the Iraqi economy are predominantly identified in the literature in terms of 'the impact of the Syrian conflict,' rather than the impact of refugees. It is particularly difficult to assess the effects of the presence of refugees from Syria on the Iraqi economy due to prolonged multiple displacements and the large number of IDPs in Iraq. The COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdowns are reported to have impacted the Lebanese, Jordanian, and Iraqi labour markets more negatively than the presence of refugees, as it caused a major loss of job opportunities, while informal workers did not even have access to social benefits (3RP, 2021).

Agricultural workers in the fields near Bursa, Turkey.
© Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Refugees seek safety and to build secure and dignified lives for themselves and their families. Securing rights, legal protections, pathways to residency, access to services, employment and education are all important to individual refugees and their families; they are also important to wider policy and development objectives, including around the promotion of Human Rights, Refugee Rights and Labour Rights. Interventions that offer pathways to residency, protections and rights play a positive and transformative role in the lives of refugees and help to promote more inclusive and sustainable communities. They increase people's abilities to build lives and strong, safe social ties in host countries, and they tackle the structural barriers that lead to exclusion.

As demonstrated throughout this report, underlying assumptions – that refugees will undertake onward migration, that refugees' presence leads to social tensions, and that they have significant negative impacts on host economies – are not consistent with the available evidence. These assumptions, when embedded into policy and different interventions, can be counter-productive to the promotion of rights, protections and social cohesion, as they may imply that refugees are in some way to blame for the challenges that are being addressed. Working with the media and governments to raise awareness of refugees' rights and to challenge xenophobic and discriminatory rhetoric is important to promote rights and social cohesion.

Refugees can and do make significant contributions to local communities and are motivated to build dignified and safe lives for themselves and their children through access to education, employment and protection. However, refugees' aspirations and capabilities are often undermined by structural factors, including poor access to rights and residency and the negative implications of different governmental policies, media narratives and unequal access to foreign assistance. These structural factors are also exacerbated by changing socio-economic and political contexts in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq which may be worsening for both refugees and host communities, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Evidence also suggests that long-term, integrated programming offers effective ways of promoting social cohesion and participation. Combining initiatives and policies, rather than developing and implementing isolated short-term projects and programmes, may have more sustainable effects which support people's rights and needs and enable safe forms of de facto integration and local participation.

Likewise, anticipating, accounting for and recognising the diverse motivations, aspirations, experiences and exclusions facing refugees requires a situational approach. Contextual, situational and long-term interventions are effective at recognising and addressing pre-existing structural, social and historical factors that shape refugees' aspirations, refugee-host community perceptions, and economic participation.

The literature reviewed for this report provides concrete recommendations for policy and practice, in addition to pointing to areas for further research. The evidence points to the importance of long-term, integrated programming. Indeed, combining initiatives and policies, rather than developing and implementing isolated and short-term projects and programmes, may have more sustainable effects which support people's rights and needs and enable safe forms of de facto integration and local participation. In turn, studies highlight the need for situational approaches, noting that contextual, and long-term interventions are effective at recognising and addressing pre-existing structural, social and historical factors that shape refugees' aspirations, refugee-host community perceptions, and economic participation.

AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

- Further research is needed to assess the experiences, outcomes, and modes of participation of refugees in Iraq, as opposed to IDPs who are well represented in the evidence.

- Further research is needed on the impact of the international humanitarian presence in Iraq, which is particularly relevant in the KRI.

- Further research is required in the short-, medium and longer-term to better understand and address the impacts of Lebanon's financial collapse on refugees' lives and livelihoods.

- Further research is needed on the relationship between foreign assistance and onward migration.

- Further research is needed into the conceptualisation, operationalisation, measurement, and promotion of 'social cohesion' in displacement situations. This includes a need for further attention to refugees' perceptions of hosts, and to both refugees' and hosts' perceptions of institutions.

- Further research is required relating to the perceptions of minoritized host members in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq (including Kurdish, Yezidi and Dom) towards different groups of refugees.

- Further research on social cohesion is needed to determine the relative significance of different factors on men, women, boys and girls, according to *intersecting* identity markers and demographic characteristics such as age, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, education, and place of origin/residence.

- Future research is needed to identify the ways that intersecting identity markers and demographic characteristics lead to and shape people's experiences of diverse forms of social exclusion and inclusion.

- Further research is needed on the relationship between the presence of refugees and changes in socio-economic dynamics at a neighbourhood, municipal, and governorate level in host countries.

- Further research is necessary to account for the short-, medium- and longer-term impacts of COVID-19 on different groups of refugees' needs and rights.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

APPENDIX
BIBLIOGRAPHY

3RP. 2019a. '3RP Iraq 2019-20 Report'.
———. 2019b. 'Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2018-2019. In Response to the Syria Crisis'. 3RP.
———. 2021a. 'Iraq Country Chapter 2021-22'. 3RP.
———. 2021b. 'Regional Needs Overview'. 3RP.
Abdo, Nabil, and Rabih Jamil. 2020. 'Exploring the Dimensions and Factors Influencing Refugees' Participation in the Informal Economy'. Beirut: AUB.
Abu Hamad, Bassam, Nicola Jones, Fiona Samuels, Ingrid Gercama, Elizabeth Presler-Marshall, and Georgia Plank. 2017. 'A Promise of Tomorrow The Effects of UNHCR and UNICEF Cash Assistance on Syrian Refugees in Jordan'. London: ODI.
ACAPS. 2016. 'Iraq. Displacement in KRI. Thematic Report'.
Achilli, Luigi. 2016. 'Back to Syria?: Conflicting Patterns of Mobility among Syrian Refugees in Jordan'. *Orient* 57: 7–13.
Acosta, Paulina, and Nuria Chica. 2018. 'Psychosocial Support to Foster Social Cohesion between Refugee and Host Communities in Jordan'. *Intervention* 16 (2): 147.
Akesson, Bree, and Cindy Sousa. 2019. 'Parental Suffering and Resilience Among Recently Displaced Syrian Refugees in Lebanon'. *Journal of Child and Family Studies* 29 (5): 1264.
Aksoy, Cevat Giray, and Panu Poutvaara. 2019. 'Refugees' and Irregular Migrants' Self-Selection into Europe: Who Migrates Where?' SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3434837. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
Aktis Strategy. 2016a. 'Impact Evaluation Report: Lebanon Host Communities Support Programme'. Aktis Strategy.
———. 2016b. 'Lebanon Host Communities Support Project'. Aktis Strategy.
Al Dalahmeh, Main, and Krisztina Dajnoki. 2021. 'The Socio-Economic Impact Of The Syrian Refugees Influx In Jordan: A Systematic Review Analyses'. *Cross Cultural Management Journal*, no. 2: 145–56.
Al Shoubaki, Wa'ed, and Michael Harris. 2018. 'The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: A Framework for Analysis'. *Journal of International Studies* 11 (2): 154–79.
Al-Dajani, Haya, Hammad Akbar, Sara Carter, and Eleanor Shaw. 2019. 'Defying Contextual Embeddedness: Evidence from Displaced Women Entrepreneurs in Jordan'. *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development* 31 (3–4): 198–212.
Alencar, Amanda, Katerina Kondova, and Wannes Ribbens. 2019. 'The Smartphone as a Lifeline: An Exploration of Refugees' Use of Mobile Communication Technologies during Their Flight'. *Media, Culture & Society* 41 (6): 828–44.
Alessi, Edward J., Sarilee Kahn, Leah Woolner, and Rebecca Van Der Horn. 2018. 'Traumatic Stress Among Sexual and Gender Minority Refugees From the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia Who Fled to the European Union'. *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 31 (6): 805–15.
Alexandre, Laurice, Charbel Salloum, and Adel Alalam. 2019. 'An Investigation of Migrant Entrepreneurs: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon'. *International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research* 25 (5): 1147–64.
Al-Masri, M., and Z. Abla. 2017. 'The Burden of Scarce Opportunities: The Social Stability Context in Central and West Bekaa. Conflict Analysis Report'. UNDP.
Al-Masri, Shaddin. 2021. 'The Political Economy of Nationality-Based Labor Inclusion Strategies: A Case Study of the Jordan Compact'. *Middle East Critique* 30 (2): 185–203.
Alrababa'h, Andrea Dillon, Scott Williamson, Jens Hainmueller, Dominik Hangartner, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2021. 'Attitudes Toward Migrants in a Highly Impacted Economy: Evidence From the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan'.
Alsoudi, Abdelmahdi. 2020. 'The Socio-Economic Impact of Syrian Refugees on Labor in Jordan: Case Study on Local Communities in Mafraq Governorate'. *Journal of Islamic*

Thought and Civilization 10 (101): 1–23.

Alzoubi, Fatmeh Ahmad, Ahmed Mohammad Al-Smadi, and Yazeed Mohammad Gougazeh. 2019. 'Coping Strategies Used by Syrian Refugees in Jordan'. *Clinical Nursing Research* 28 (4): 396–421.

ARK. 2018a. 'Narrative Report. Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon: Wave II'. Beirut: ARK.

———. 2018b. 'Regular Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon. Wave III'. Beirut: ARK.

———. 2018c. 'Regular Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon. Wave IV'. Beirut: ARK.

———. 2019. 'Narrative Report. Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon - Wave V'. Beirut: ARK.

Armstrong, Paula, and Karen Jacobsen. 2015. 'Addressing Vulnerability? Cash Transfer Programming and Protection Outcomes for Out-of-Camp Syrian Refugees', 28.

Ashkar, Hisham. 2015. 'Benefiting from a Crisis: Lebanese Upscale Real-Estate Industry and the War in Syria'. *Confluences Mediterranee* N° 92 (1): 89–100.

Baird, Sarah, Sarah Alheiwidi, Rebecca Dutton, Khadija Mitu, Erin Oakley, Tassew Woldehanna, and Nicola Jones. 2020. 'Social Isolation and Disrupted Privacy: Impacts of COVID-19 on Adolescent Girls in Humanitarian Contexts'. *Girlhood Studies* 13 (3): 98–115.

Barakat, Sultan, and Ghassan ElKahlout. 2021. 'Returning Syrian Refugees from Neighbouring Host Countries: Lessons from Global Experiences'. Siyassat Arabiya.

Barbelet, Veronique, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, and Dina Mansour-Ille. 2018. 'Lessons Learnt and Implications for Future Refugee Compacts'. ODI.

Barbelet, Veronique, and Caitlin Wake. 2017. 'The Lives and Livelihoods of Syrian Refugees in Turkey and Jordan'. London: ODI.

Basci, Dr Emre. 2016. 'Yazidis: A Community Scattered in between Geographies and Its Current Immigration Experience' 3 (2): 13.

Bastagli, Francesca, and et al. 2020. 'World Food Programme Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance in Lebanon: Protection Outcomes for Syrian Refugees'. ODI and CAMALEON coalition.

Baumann, Hannes. 2019. 'The Causes, Nature, and Effect of the Current Crisis of Lebanese Capitalism'. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 25 (1): 61–77.

Bayaner, Ahmet, L. Bolani, Gulden Boluk, Sukru Erdem, Berta Fernandez, Eda Gemi, Roderick Pace, Francesca Ruisi, and Dimitris Skleparis. 2016. 'Migrants and Refugees: Impact and Future Policies - Cases of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Greece'. European Institute of the Mediterranean.

Bayram, Ahmad Sufian. 2019. 'Entrepreneurship in Exile: Insights into Syrian Refugee Statups in Host Countries'. Confederation of Danish Industry, UNHCR, World Bank.

Berry, Joanna de, and Andrew Roberts. 2018. 'Social Cohesion and Forced Displacement: A Desk Review to Inform Programming and Project Design'. World Bank.

Berry, Stephanie Eleanor, and Isilay Taban. 2021. 'The Right of Minority-Refugees to Preserve Their Cultural Identity: An Intersectional Analysis'. *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* 39 (3): 198–219.

Betts, Alexander, and Paul Collier. 2015. 'Help Refugees Help Themselves: Let Displaced Syrians Join the Labor Market'. *Foreign Affairs* 94 (6): 84–92.

Bigini, Evelyn. 2019. 'Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Among Syrian Refugees in Lebanon'. USA: University of Pittsburgh.

Bizri, Rima M. 2017. 'Refugee-Entrepreneurship: A Social Capital Perspective'. *Entrepreneurship & Regional Development* 29 (9–10): 847–68.

Blerk, Lorraine van, Wayne Shand, Laura Prazeres, Badru Bukenya, Aida A. Essaid, Janine Hunter, Rawan W. Ibrahim, and Rogers Kasirye. 2021. 'Youth Transitions in Protracted Crises: Conceptualising the "Rupture" of Refugees' Pathways to Adulthood in Uganda and Jordan'. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* n/a (n/a).

Bollinger, H.C., and P. Hagstrom. 2004. 'Poverty Rates of Refugees and Immigrants'. *UK Center for Policy Research*.

Borkert, Maren, Karen E. Fisher, and Eiad Yafi. 2018. 'The Best, the Worst, and the Hardest to Find: How People, Mobiles, and Social Media Connect Migrants In(to) Europe'. *Social Media + Society* 4 (1): 2056305118764428.

Boustani, Marwa, Estella Carpi, Hayat Gebara, and Yara Mourad. 2016. 'Responding to the Syrian Crisis in Lebanon: Collaboration between Aid Agencies and Local Governance structures'. International Institute for Environment and Development.

Buckner, Elizabeth, Dominique Spencer, and Jihae Cha. 2018. 'Between Policy and Practice: The Education of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 31 (4): 444–65.

Bureau of International Labor Affairs. 2020. '2020 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor'. US Government.

Buscher, Dale. 2011. 'New Approaches to Urban Refugee Livelihoods'. *Refuge* 28 (2): 17–29.

Campbell, Leah. 2020. 'One Neighbourhood: CARE's Humanitarian Response in Tripoli'. London: ALNAP.

Carling, J. 2019. 'Key Concepts in the Migration-Development Nexus'. Oslo: Peace Researcg Institute Oslo.

Carlson, Melissa, Laura Jakli, and Katerina Linos. 2018. 'Rumors and Refugees: How Government-Created Information Vacuums Undermine Effective Crisis Management'. *International Studies Quarterly* 62 (3): 671–85.

Carpi, Estella. 2017. 'Learning and Earning in Constrained Labour Markets: The Politics of Livelihoods in Lebanon's Halba'. *Making Lives: Refugee Self-Reliance and Humanitarian Action in Cities*, 11–36.

———. 2020. 'Towards a Neo-Cosmetic Humanitarianism: Refugee Self-Reliance as a Social-Cohesion Regime in Lebanon's Halba'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 31 (1): 224–44.

Carpi, Estella, and Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh. 2020. 'Keeping the Faith? Examining the Roles of Faith and Secularism in Syrian Diaspora Organizations in Lebanon'. In *Diaspora Organizations in International Affairs*, edited by Dennis Dijkzeul and Margit Fauser, 1st ed. Routledge.

Carpi, Estella, Jessica Anne Field, Sophie Isobel Dicker, and Andrea Rigon. 2020. 'From Livelihoods to Leisure and Back: Refugee "Self-Reliance" as Collective Practices in Lebanon, India and Greece'. *Third World Quarterly* 42 (2): 421–40.

Castelli, Francesco. 2018. 'Drivers of Migration: Why Do People Move?' *Journal of Travel Medicine* 25 (1).

Ceylan, Elif Semra, and Semih Tumen. n.d. 'Measuring the Economic Cost of Conflict in Afflicted Arab Countries'. ERF. Accessed 14 October 2021.

Chatty, Dawn. 2007. 'Researching Refugee Youth in the Middle East: Reflections on the Importance of Comparative Research'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20 (2): 265–80.

———. 2010. *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*. Cambridge University Press.

Chemali, Zeina, Christina P. C. Borba, Kelsey Johnson, Sama Khair, and Gregory L. Fricchione. 2018. 'Needs Assessment with Elder Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: Implications for Services and Interventions'. *Global Public Health* 13 (9): 1216–28.

Cherri, Zeynab, Pedro Arcos Gonzalez, and Rafael Castro Delgado. 2016. 'The Lebanese–Syrian Crisis: Impact of Influx of Syrian Refugees to an Already Weak State'. *Risk Management and Healthcare Policy* 9: 1–8.

Collett, Elizabeth, Clewett, and Fratzke. 2016. 'No Way Out? Making Additional Migration Channels Work for Refugees', 45.

Cookle, Mikki. 2017. 'Implications of the Syrian Refugee Influx on the Jordanian Labor Market Trends Analysis across Jordan's Twelve Governorates, 2007-2014', May.

Costantini, Irene, and Kamaran Palani. 2018. 'Displacement-Emigration-Return: Understanding Uncertainty in the Context of Iraq'. Middle East Research Institute.

Crawford, Nicholas, John Cosgrave, Simonc Haysom, and Nadine Walicki. 2015. 'Protracted Displacement: Uncertain Paths to Self-Reliance in Exile'.

Crawley, H., F. Duvell, K. Jones, and D. Skleparis. 2016. 'Understanding the Dynamics of Migration to Greece and the EU: Drivers, Decisions and Destinations'. https://Eprints.Ncl.ac.uk.

Crawley, Heaven, Franck Düvell, Katharine Jones, Simon McMahon, and Nando Sigona. 2016. 'Destination Europe? Understanding the Dynamics and Drivers of Mediterranean Migration in 2015', 84.

Crawley, Heaven, and Jessica Hagen-Zanker. 2019. 'Deciding Where to Go: Policies, People and Perceptions Shaping Destination Preferences'. *International Migration* 57 (1): 20–35.

Crisp, Jeff. 2003. 'UNHCR, Refugee Livelihoods and Self-Reliance: A Brief History'. UNHCR. CRS. 2020. 'Integrating Social Cohesion for Enhanced Outcomes'. Baltimore, USA: Catholic Relief Services.

Cummings, Clare, Julia Pacitto, Diletta Lauro, and Marta Foresti. 2015. 'Why People Move: Understanding the Drivers and Trends of Migration to Europe'. Overseas Development Institute.

Dafa, Lehdia M., and Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh. 2021. 'Care, Control and Crisis: Sahrawi Youth as Refugees and Migrants'. *In Crisis for Whom? Critical Global Perspectives on Childhood, Care and Migration*, edited by Rachel Rosen and *et al.* UCL Press.

Dankwah, Kwaku Opoku, and Marko Valenta. 2018. 'Mixed Fragmented Migrations of Iraqis and Challenges to Iraqi Refugee Integration: The Jordanian Experience'. Middle Eastern Studies 54 (2): 253–69.

David, Anda, Mohamed Ali Marouani, Charbel Nahas, and Björn Nilsson. 2019. 'The Economics of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Neighbouring Countries: The Case of Lebanon'. *Economics of Transition and Institutional Change* 28 (1): 89–109.

Deblon, Yvonne, and Patrick Gutekunst. 2017. 'Cash Transfer Programming: Lessons from Northern Iraq', 3.

De Haas, Hein. 2021. 'A Theory of Migration: The Aspirations-Capabilities Framework'. *Comparative Migration Studies* 9 (1): 8.

Dekker, Rianne, Godfried Engbersen, Jeanine Klaver, and Hanna Vonk. 2018. 'Smart Refugees: How Syrian Asylum Migrants Use Social Media Information in Migration Decision-Making'. *Social Media + Society* 4 (1): 2056305118764439.

Dewachi, Omar. 2017. U*ngovernable Life Mandatory Medicine and Statecraft in Iraq*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

DRC, Premiere Urgence International, and Mercy Corps. 2017. 'Protection Monitoring Report 3'. DRC.

Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, and Sarah Langlotz. 2019. 'The Effects of Foreign Aid on Refugee Flows'. *European Economic Review* 112 (February): 127–47.

Dryden-Peterson, Sarah, Elizabeth Adelman, Michelle J. Bellino, and Vidur Chopra. 2019. 'The Purposes of Refugee Education: Policy and Practice of Including Refugees in National Education Systems'. *Sociology of Education* 92 (4): 346–66.

Duffield, Mark. 2010. 'The Liberal Way of Development and the Development–Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide'. *Security Dialogue* 41 (1): 53–76.

Durable Solutions Platform. 2019. 'Far from Home: Future Prospects for Syrian Refugees in Iraq'. Durable Solutions Platform.

———. 2021. 'A bridge to firmer ground: learning from international experiences to support pathways to solutions in the Syrian refugee context'. Migration Policy Institute.

Easton-Calabria, Evan, and Naohiko Omata. 2018. 'Panacea for the Refugee Crisis? Rethinking the Promotion of "Self-Reliance" for Refugees'. *Third World Quarterly* 39 (8): 1458–74. ECHO. 2021. 'ECHO Factsheet - Jordan'. ECHO.

Eghdamian, K. 2017. 'Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement: An Examination into the Discursive Representations of Syrian Refugees and Their Effects on Religious Minorities Living in Jordan'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 30 (3): 447–67.

Eghdamian, Kat. 2015. 'Religious Minority Experiences of Displacement: Initial Lessons Learnt From Syrian Christian and Syrian Druze Refugees in Jordan'. London: UCL.

El Asmar, Francesca, Nour Shawaf, and Dalia Mikdashi. 2019. 'No One Asked. Amplifying the Voices of Syrian Refugee Women in Lebanon on Their Power to Decide'. Oxfam.

El-Ghali, Hana A., Aamr Ali, and Nadine Ghalayini. 2017. 'Higher Education and Syrian Refugee Students: The Case of Iraq'. UNESCO Regional Bureau for Education in the Arab States.

El-Ghali, Hana Addam, Fida Alameddine, Samar Farah, and Soraya Benchiba. 2019. 'Pathways to and Beyond Education for Refugee Youth in Jordan and Lebanon'. Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs.

Empatika, and UNDP. 2019. 'Qualitative Research on Social Tensions in Lebanon Using the Reality Check Approach - Round 2'. UNDP.

Erdal, Marta Bivand, and Ceri Oeppen. 2018. 'Forced to Leave? The Discursive and Analytical Significance of Describing Migration as Forced and Voluntary'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (6): 981–98.

Essex-Lettieri, Diane, and et al. 2017. 'Refugee Work Rights Report'. Asylum Access.

European Union, and UNDP. 2017. 'Report on Improvement Recommendations for the Waste Management Sector'. EU and UNDP.

Fakih, Ali, and May Ibrahim. 2016. 'The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Labor Market in Neighboring Countries: Empirical Evidence from Jordan'. *Defence and Peace Economics* 27 (1): 64–86.

Fallah, Belal, Rasha Istaiteyeh, and Yusuf Mansur. 2021. 'Moving beyond Humanitarian Assistance: Supporting Jordan as a Refugee-Hosting Country'. *World Refugee and Migration Council*, 59.

Ferguson, Kurtz, Hotakay, and Kazis-Taylor. 2019. 'What Works and What's next for Social Stability in Jordan? Evidence from Mercy Corps' Host-Refugee Social Cohesion Program'. USA: Mercy Corps, UK Aid.

Ferris, Elizabeth, and Kemal Kirisçi. 2016. 'Syrian Refugees: Challenges to Host Countries and the International Community'. In *The Consequences of Chaos*, 33–70. Syria's Humanitarian Crisis and the Failure to Protect. Brookings Institution Press.

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Elena. 2014. 'Gender and Forced Migration'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, edited by Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona. Oxford University Press.

———. 2015. *South-South Educational Migration, Humanitarianism and Development: Views from the Caribbean, North Africa and the Middle East*. London: Routledge.

———. 2016a. 'Refugees Hosting Refugees'. *Forced Migration Review*, 3.

———. 2016b. 'Refugee-Refugee Relations in Contexts of Overlapping Displacement'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*.

———. (Ed) 2016c. *Gender, Religion and Humanitarian Responses to Refugees: Policy Brief*. London: UCL Migration Research Unit.

———. 2016d. "The faith-gender-asylum nexus: an intersectionalist analysis of representations of the 'Refugee Crisis", in *The Refugee Crisis and Religion: Secularism, Security and Hospitality in Question*, edited by Luca Mavelli and Erin K. Wilson. Rowland and Littlefield International.

———. 2018. 'Southern-Led Responses to Displacement: Modes of South-South Cooperation?' In *Handbook of South-South Relations*, edited by Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Patricia Daley. Oxford University Press.

———. 2019. 'Looking Forward: Disasters at 40'. *Disasters* 43 (S1): S36–60.

———. 2020a. 'Responding to Precarity: Beddawi Camp in the Era of Covid-19'. J*ournal of Palestine Studies* 49 (4): 27–35.

———. 2020b. 'Shifting the gaze: Palestinian and Syrian refugees sharing, making and contesting space in Lebanon'. In *Refuge in a Moving World: Tracing refugee and migrant journeys across disciplines*, edited by Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh. UCL Press.

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Elena, Zarena Grewal, Unni Karunakara, Aydan Greatrick, Alastair Ager, Louisa Lombard, Catherine Panter-Brick, Lyndsey Stonebridge and Anna Rowlands. 2020. 'Religion and Social Justice for Refugees: Insights from Cameroon, Greece, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia and Mexico'. UCL and Yale University.

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Elena, Isabel Ruiz, Carlos Vargas-Silva, and Roger Zetter. 2012. 'Assessing the Impacts and Costs of Forced Displacement : Volume 1. A Mixed Methods Approach'. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Fiedler, Anke. 2018. 'The Gap between Here and There: Communication and Information Processes in the Migration Context of Syrian and Iraqi Refugees on Their Way to Germany'. *International Communication Gazette* 81 (4): 327–45.

Finn, Anthony. 2018. 'Social Cohesion and Displacement: Rapid Literature Review'. World Bank.

Fisher, Betsy L. 2019. 'Refugee Resettlement: A Protection Tool for LGBTI Refugees'. In *LGBTI Asylum Seekers and Refugees from a Legal and Political Perspective: Persecution, Asylum and Integration*, edited by Arzu Güler, Maryna Shevtsova, and Denise Venturi, 275–97. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Joint Data Centre for Forced Displacement. 2021. 'Forced Displacement Review 2019-21'. Joint Data Centre for Forced Displacement.

Gercama, Ingrid, and Nicola Jones. 2018. 'Building Social Cohesion in Conflict Affected Communities'. GAGE.

Ghandour-Demiri, Nada. 2020. 'Social Networks during Displacement': The Asfari Institute for Civil Society and Citizenship.

Ghazarian, Zareh, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Eleanor Gordon. 2019. 'Adolescent Girls in Crisis: Voices from Beirut'. Plan International.

Gillespie, Marie, Lawrence Ampofo, Margie Cheesman, Becky Faith, Evgenia Iliadou, Ali Issa, Souad Osseiran, and Dimitris Skleparis. 2016. 'Mapping Refugee Media Journeys: Smartphones and Social Media Networks'. The Open University / France Médias Monde.

Gillespie, Marie, Souad Osseiran, and Margie Cheesman. 2018. 'Syrian Refugees and the Digital Passage to Europe: Smartphone Infrastructures and Affordances'. *Social Media + Society* 4 (1): 2056305118764440.

Gordon, Jennifer. 2019. 'Refugees and Decent Work: Lessons Learned from Recent Refugee Jobs Compacts'. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3523247. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.

Ground Truth Solutions, and UNOPS. 2021. 'Between a Pandemic and a Hard Place: Durable Solutions Elusive for Iraq's Most Vulnerable'. UNOPS and GTS.

Guay, Joseph. 2015. 'Social Cohesion between Syrian Refugees and Urban Host Communities in Lebanon and Jordan'. World Vision.

Haddad, S., L. Aliaga, and L. Attree. 2018. 'Building Peace into Refugee Responses: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon'. Saferworld and LCPS.

Hager, Anselm. 2021. 'What Drives Migration to Europe? Survey Experimental Evidence from Lebanon'. *International Migration Review* 55 (3): 929–50.

Haider, Huma. 2016. 'Syrian Refugee Onward Migration from Jordan to Europe'. K4D.

Hammer, Joseph H., Ryon C. McDermott, Ronald F. Levant, and Daniel K. McKelvey. 2018. 'Dimensionality, Reliability, and Validity of the Gender-Role Conflict Scale–Short Form (GRCS-SF)'. *Psychology of Men & Masculinity* 19 (4): 570–83.

Harb, Charles, and Rim Saab. 2014. 'Social Cohesion and Intergroup Relations: Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Nationals in the Bekaa and Akkar'. Save the Children.

Harb, Mona, Ali Kassem, and Watfa Najdi. 2019. 'Entrepreneurial Refugees and the City: Brief Encounters in Beirut'. *Journal of Refugee Studie*s 32 (1): 23–41.

Hartnett, Allison Spencer. 2018. 'The Effect of Refugee Integration on Migrant Labor in Jordan'. *Review of Middle East Studies* 52 (2): 263–82.

Holland, Alisha C., and Margaret E. Peters. 2020. 'Explaining Migration Timing: Political Information and Opportunities'. *International Organization* 74 (3): 560–83.

Holloway, Kerrey, Maria Stavropoulou, and Megan Daigle. 2019. 'Gender in Displacement Title The State of Play'. ODI.

Hussein, Hussam, Alberto Natta, Abed Al Kareem Yehya, and Baha Hamadna. 2020. 'Syrian Refugees, Water Scarcity, and Dynamic Policies: How Do the New Refugee Discourses Impact Water Governance Debates in Lebanon and Jordan?' *Water* 12 (2): 325.

Idris, Iffat. 2018. 'Cash-Based Initiatives for Refugees in Jordan: Annotated Bibliography'. London: K4D.

IDS. 2018. 'Urban Refugees in Lebanon: Housing, Residency, and Wellbeing'. 151. Brighton, UK: IDS.

ILO. 2014. 'Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and Their Employment Profile'. 2014. ILO.

ILO. 2018. 'Lessons Learned and Emerging Good Practices of ILO's Syria Crisis Response in Jordan and Lebanon'. ILO.

International, Alert. 2015. 'Citizen's Perceptions of Security Threats Stemming from the Syrian Refugee Presence in Lebanon. Background Paper.' London: International Alert. International Alert. 2021. '"Most of the Men Want to Leave": Armed Groups, Displacement and the Gendered Webs of Vulnerability'. International Alert.

IOM. 2016. 'Migration Flows from Iraq to Europe: Reasons behind Migration'. IOM. IRC. 2019. 'Ruled out of Work: Refugee Women's Legal Right to Work'. IRC.

———. 2020. 'A Decade in Search of Work: A Review of Policy Commitments for Syrian Refugees' Livelihoods in Jordan and Lebanon'. IRC.

———. 2021. 'A Decade In Search of Work: A Review of Policy Commitments for Syrian Refugees' Livelihoods in Jordan March 2021 Update'. IRC.

Jabbar, Sinaria Abdel, and Haidar Ibrahim Zaza. 2016. 'Evaluating a Vocational Training Programme for Women Refugees at the Zaatari Camp in Jordan: Women Empowerment: A Journey and Not an Output'. *International Journal of Adolescence and Youth* 21 (3): 304–19.

Janmyr, Maja. 2018. 'UNHCR and the Syrian Refugee Response: Negotiating Status and Registration in Lebanon'. *The International Journal of Human Rights* 22 (3): 393–419.

JIF. 2018. 'Syrian Refugees in Jordan: A Protection Overview'. JIF.

Jones, N., Presler-Marshall, A. Malachowska, K Kilburn, Abu Hamad, and et al. 2019. 'Adolescent Well-Being in Jordan: Exploring Gendered Capabilities, Contexts and Change Strategies'. GAGE.

Kabbanji, L, and J Kabbanji. 2018. 'Assessing the Development-Displacement Nexus in Lebanon: Working Paper'.

Karasapan, Omer, and Shah Sajjad. 2021. 'Why Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Are a Crisis within a Crisis'. Brookings.

Kaya, Z., and K.N. Luchtenberg. 2019. 'Displacement and Women's Economic Empowerment: Voices of Displaced Women in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq'. GAPS, LSE, Women for Women International.

Kelley, Ninette. 2017. 'Responding to a Refugee Influx: Lessons from Lebanon'. *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 5 (1): 82–104.

Kelly, L. 2020. 'Evidence and Lessons on Integrated Services for Refugees and Host Citizens in Developing Countries.' K4D Helpdesk Report 804. Brighton, UK: IDS.

Khalidi, Suleiman al-. 2020. 'Syria's Assad Says Billions Locked in Troubled Lebanese Banks behind Economic Crisis'. *Reuters*, 5 November 2020.

Khattab, Lana, and Henri Myrttinen. 2017. '"Most of the Men Want to Leave" Armed Groups, Displacement and the Gendered Webs of Vulnerability in Syria'. London: International Alert.

Kikano, Faten, Gabriel Fauveaud, and Gonzalo Lizarralde. 2021. 'Policies of Exclusion: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 34 (1): 422–52.

Kivelä, Laura, and Miya Tajima-Simpson. 2021. 'Anywhere but Syria: How 10 Years of Conflict Left Syria's Displaced Children without Sense of Home'. Save the Children.

Knio, Dr. Mohammad, and M. Ayoub. 2018. 'Examining the Impact of Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Lebanese Economy: The Case of the Banking Sector'. *Account and Financial Management Journal* 03 (11).

Kuhnt, Jana, Ramona Rischke, Anda David, and Tobias Lechtenfeld. 2018. 'Social Cohesion in Times of Forced Displacement – the Case of Young People in Jordan'. 243. OECD.

Kumar, K.B., Shelly Culbertson, Louay Constant, Shanthi Nataraj, Fatih Unlu, Kathryn Bouskill, Joy Moini, Katherine Costello, Gursel Aliyev, and Fadia Afashe. 2018. 'Mutually Beneficial Opportunities for Syrians and Host Countries in Middle Eastern Labor Markets'. RAND Corporation.

Kuschminder, Katherine, Julia de Bresser, and Melissa Siegel. 2015. 'Irregular Migration Routes to Europe and Factors Influencing Migrants' Destination Choices'. UNU-MERIT.

Kvittingen, Anna, Marko Valenta, Hanan Tabbara, Dina Baslan, and Berit Berg. 2019. 'The Conditions and Migratory Aspirations of Syrian and Iraqi Refugees in Jordan'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 32 (1): 106–24.

Leeson, Kellie, Prem B Bhandari, Anna Myers, and Dale Buscher. 2020. 'Measuring the Self-Reliance of Refugees'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 33 (1): 86–106.

Lenner, Katharina, and Lewis Turner. 2019. 'Making Refugees Work? The Politics of Integrating Syrian Refugees into the Labor Market in Jordan'. *Middle East Critique* 28 (1): 65–95.

Lintelo, Dolf te, Rajith Lakshman, Wissam Mansour, Emma Soye, Teo Ficcarelli, and Will Woodward. 2018. 'Wellbeing and Protracted Urban Displacement: Refugees and Hosts in Jordan and Lebanon'. Brighton: IDS.

Madoré, Marianne. 2016. 'The Peaceful Settlement of Syrian Refugees in the Eastern Suburbs of Beirut: Understanding the Causes of Social Stability'. *Civil Society Knowledge Centre* 1 (1).

Małachowska, A., T. Al Abbadi, W. Al Amaireh, K. Banioweda, S. Al Heiwidi, and N. Jones. 2020. 'Listening to Young People's Voices under Covid-19. Exploring the Impacts of Covid-19 on Adolescents in Jordan's Refugee Camps and Host Communities.' London: Gender and Adolescence: Global Evidence.

Malaeb, Bilal, and Jackline Wahba. n.d. 'Impact of Refugees on Immigrants' Labor Market Outcomes', 24.

Maleku, Arati, Megan España, Shannon Jarrott, Sharvari Karandikar, and Rupal Parekh. 2021. 'We Are Aging Too! Exploring the Social Impact of Late-Life Migration among Older Immigrants in the United States'. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 0 (0): 1–18.

Mallett, Richard, and Jessica Hagen-Zanker. 2018. 'Forced Migration Trajectories: An Analysis of Journey- and Decision-Making among Eritrean and Syrian Arrivals to Europe'. *Migration and Development* 7 (3): 341–51.

Mansour, Antoine, and Jean Dib Haj. 2018. 'Final Evaluation Report: Lebanon Host Communities Support Project'. Knowledge Development Company.

McNatt, Zahirah, Neil G. Boothby, Hamza Al-Shannaq, Hannah Chandler, Patricia Freels, Ahmed S. Mahmoud, Noor Majdalani, and Laura Zebib. 2018. 'Impact of Separation on Refugee Families: Syrian Refugees in Jordan'. UNHCR and Columbia Global Centres – Amman.

Mercy Corps. 2015. 'Social Cohesion and Governance Programming in Lebanon – Testing Theories of Change and Impact Evaluation'. Mercy Corps

Miettunen, Paivi, and Mohammed Shunnaq. 2018. 'Tribal Networks and Informal Adaptive Mechanisms of Syrian Refugees: The Case of the Bani Khalid Tribe in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon'. Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs.

Mourad, Lama, and Laure-Hélène Piron. 2016. 'Municipal Service Delivery, Stability, Social Cohesion and Legitimacy in Lebanon'. DLP and AUB.

Müller-Funk, Lea, and Sonja Fransen. 2020. 'Return Aspirations and Coerced Return: A Case Study on Syrian Refugees in Turkey and Lebanon.' IMI Working Paper Series 162.

Munoz, Alex, and Kelsey Shanks. 2019. 'The Impact of Internal Displacement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Internally Displaced People, Interethnic Relations, and Social Cohesion in Duhok'. In *Routledge Handbook on Middle East Cities*, edited by Haim Yacobi and Mansour Nassara. London: Routledge.

Musarò, Pierluigi. 2019. 'Aware Migrants: The Role of Information Campaigns in the Management of Migration'. *European Journal of Communication* 34 (6): 629–40.

Myrttinen, Henri, Lana Khattab, and Charbel Maydaa. 2017. '"Trust No One, Beware of Everyone": Vulnerabilities of LGBTI Refugees in Lebanon'. In *A Gendered Approach to the Syrian Refugee Crisis.* Routledge.

Nasser-Eddin, Nof, Nour Abu-Assab, and Aydan Greatrick. 2018. 'Reconceptualising and Contextualising Sexual Rights in the MENA Region: Beyond LGBTQI Categories'. *Gender & Development* 26 (1): 173–89.

Norwegian Refugee Council. 2016. 'Drivers of Despair: Refugee Protection Failures in Jordan and Lebanon'. Norwegian Refugee Council.

ODI. 2020. 'World Food Programme Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance in Lebanon: Social Cohesion and Stability between Syrian Refugees and Host Communities'. London: ODI.

Odlum, Alex. 2019. 'To Stay or to Go? Decision-Making of LGBTQI Syrians in Mixed Migration Flows: Persecution, Asylum and Integration'. In *LGBTI Asylum Seekers and Refugees from a Legal and Political Perspective*, 71–93. Springer.

O'Driscoll, Dylan. 2018. 'Communication Interventions Supporting Positive Civic Action in Lebanon'. Brighton, UK: K4D.

OECD. 2012. 'Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World'.

———. 2016. 'Making Integration Work: Refugees and Others in Need of Protection'. OECD.

OECD, and *et al.* 2020. 'Local Inclusion of Migrants and Refugees. A Gateway to Existing Ideas, Resources and Capacities for Cities across the World'. OECD.

Opoku Dankwah, Kwaku, and Marko Valenta. 2017. 'Mixed Fragmented Migrations of Iraqis and Challenges to Iraqi Refugee Integration: The Jordanian Experience'. *Middle Eastern Studies.*

Ozcurumez, Saime, and Julinda Hoxha. 2020. 'Practicing Social Cohesion in the Dark: Diverse Processes and Missing Indicators in Forced Migration Contexts'. *Frontiers in Human Dynamics* 2: 10.

Pandir, Müzeyyen. 2020. 'Media Portrayals of Refugees and Their Effects on Social Conflict and Social Cohesion'. *Perceptions* XXV (1): 99–120.

Panter-Brick, Catherine, Rana Dajani, Mark Eggerman, Sabrina Hermosilla, Amelia Sancilio, and Alastair Ager. 2018. 'Insecurity, Distress and Mental Health: Experimental and Randomized Controlled Trials of a Psychosocial Intervention for Youth Affected by the Syrian Crisis'. *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* 59 (5): 523–41.

Pascucci, Elisa. 2019. 'The Local Labour Building the International Community: Precarious Work within Humanitarian Spaces'. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space* 51 (3): 743–60.

Promundo. 2017. 'Men and Boys in Displacement: Assistance and Protection Challenges for Unaccompanied Boys and Men in Refugee Contexts'. Promundu and CARE.

Rajbongshi, Jogita, and Madhumati Deshpande. 2021. 'Life of Syrian Refugees: From Syrian Civil War to the Jordan Compact – A Case Study of Zaatari Camp'. *Journal of International Relations* 15 (4): 18–35.

REACH. 2019. 'Assessment on Employment and Working Conditions of Conflict-Affected Women across Key Sectors'. REACH.

Refai, Deema, Radi Haloub, and John Lever. 2018. 'Contextualizing Entrepreneurial Identity among Syrian Refuges in Jordan: The Emergence of a Destabilized Habitus?' The *International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation* 19 (4): 250–60.

Ritholtz, Samuel, and Rebecca Buxton. 2021. 'Queer Kinship and the Rights of Refugee Families'. *Migration Studies* 9 (3): 1075–95.

Rohwerder, Brigitte. 2017. 'Women and Girls with Disabilities in Conflict and Crises'. London: DFID.

Roupetz, Sophie, Stephanie Garbern, Saja Michael, Harveen Bergquist, Heide Glaesmer, and Susan A. Bartels. 2020. 'Continuum of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Risks among Syrian Refugee Women and Girls in Lebanon'. *BMC Women's Health* 20 (1): 176.

Rubenstein, Beth L., Lily Zhi Ning Lu, Matthew MacFarlane, and Lindsay Stark. 2020. 'Predictors of Interpersonal Violence in the Household in Humanitarian Settings: A Systematic Review'. *Trauma, Violence, & Abuse* 21 (1): 31–44.

Ruisi, Francesca, and Musa M. Shteiwi. 2016. 'Economic and Social Integration of Migrants and Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon'. *IEMed.*

Şahin Mencütek, Zeynep, and Ayat J. Nashwan. 2021. 'Perceptions About the Labor Market Integration of Refugees: Evidences from Syrian Refugees in Jordan'. *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 22 (2): 615–33.

Şahin Mencütek, Zeynep, and Ayat J. Nashwan. 2020. 'Employment of Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Challenges and Opportunities'. *Journal of Ethnic & Cultural Diversity in Social Work* 0 (0): 1–23.

Salem, H., and L. Morrice. 2019. 'A Review of Social Cohesion Initiatives and Challenges with a Focus on Jordan and Education'. University of Sussex.

Salemi, Colette, Jay Bowman A., and Jennifer Compton. 2018. 'Services for Syrian Refugee Children and Youth in Jordan: Forced Displacement, Foreign Aid and Vulnerability'. Economic Research Forum.

Salti, Nisreen, Jad Chaaban, Wael Moussa, Alexandra Irani, Rima Al Mokdad, Zeina Jamaluddine, and Hala Ghattas. 2022. 'The Impact of Cash Transfers on Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: Evidence from a Multidimensional Regression Discontinuity Design'. *Journal of Development Economics* 155 (March): 102803.

Samuels, Fiona, Francesca Bastagi, Maria Stavropoulou, Nur Tukmani, Hiba Abbani, and Georgia Plank. 2020. 'Social Cohesion and Stability between Syrian Refugees and Host Communities'. ODI.

Sanchez, Daniele Garrote. 2021. *From Liability to Asset: How Syrian Refugees Can Benefit the Lebanese Economy.* The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies Policy Brief.

Sanyal, Romola. 2018. 'Managing through Ad Hoc Measures: Syrian Refugees and the Politics of Waiting in Lebanon'. *Political Geography* 66 (September): 67–75.

Simone, AbdouMaliq. 2008. 'The Politics of the Possible: Making Urban Life in Phnom Penh'. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 29 (2): 186–204.

Simpson, R. 2018. 'Peace Education and Psychosocial Support for Social Cohesion'. *Forced Migration Review* 57.

Singh, Madhu. 2018. P*athways to Empowerment: Recognizing the Competences of Syrian Refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.* UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning.

Sood, Anubha, and Louisa Seferis. 2014. 'Syrians Contributing to Kurdish Economic Growth', 3.

Srour, Ilina, and Jad Chaaban. 2017. 'Market Research Study on the Development of Viable Economic Subsectors in Lebanon'. LEADERS for Sustainable Livelihoods.

Sumpf, Denise, Vladimir Isaila, and Kristine Najjar. 2016. 'The Impact of the Syria Crisis on Lebanon'. In *Dynamics of Disasters: Key Concepts, Models, Algorithms, and Insights*, edited by Ilias S. Kotsireas, Anna Nagurney, and Panos M. Pardalos, 269–308. Springer Proceedings in Mathematics & Statistics. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Syrian Refugee Unit-Jordan's Ministry of Labour. 2021. 'Work Permits Progress Report December and Annual 2020'. Ministry of Labour-Jordan.

Tiltnes, Åge A, Huafeng Zhang, and Jon Pedersen. n.d. 'The Living Conditions of Syrian Refugees in Jordan', 174. FAFO.

Tjaden, Jasper, Sandra Morgenstern, and Frank Laczko. 2018. 'Evaluating the Impact of Information Campaigns in the Field of Migration'. Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) Thematic Report Series, IOM GDMAC. 52.

Tobin, S A, A J Knudsen, F A Momani, T Al Yakoub, and R Al-Jarrah. 2017. 'Figurations of Displacement in and beyond Jordan', TRAFIG Working Paper no. 3.

Tobin, Sarah A. 2018. 'Vernacular Politics, Sectarianism, and National Identity among Syrian Refugees in Jordan'. *Religions* 9 (7): 225.

Tucker, Jason. 2018. 'Why Here? Factors Influencing Palestinian Refugees from Syria in Choosing Germany or Sweden as Asylum Destinations'. *Comparative Migration Studies* 6 (1): 29.

Turkmani, N., and K. Hamade. 2020. 'Dynamics of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon's Agriculture Sector'. Beirut: American University of Beirut.

Turner, Lewis Edward. 2018. 'Challenging Refugee Men: Humanitarianism and Masculinities in Za'tari Refugee Camp'. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

UCLG. 2013. 'Municipalities on the Frontline'. UCLG.

UN SRRP. 2014. 'Overview: 2015 Syria Response: Plan and 2015-2016 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan'. UN SSRP.

UN Women. 2018. 'Unpacking Gendered Realities in Displacement: The Status of Syrian Refugee Women in Iraq'. Cairo, Egypt: Regional Office For Arab States UN Women.

UNDG. 2016. 'Advancing Inclusive and Sustainable Social Protection in the Response to the Syrian Crisis: Notes on Strategic Opportunities, Challenges and Way Forward'. UNDG.

UNDP. 2016. 'Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme Annual Report 2016'.

———. 2017. 'Fast Facts'. United Nations Development Program.

———. 2020. 'Lebanon SME Strategy A Roadmap To 2020'. UNDP.

UNDP, and Lebanese Ministry of Environment. 2019. 'Rapid Cost of Environmental Degradation'. UNDP.

UNHCR. 2017. 'Participatory Assessment Report Kurdistan Region of Iraq'. UNCHR.

UNHCR, and DRC. 2015. 'Syrian Refugee Camp Livelihoods Assessment - Erbil Governate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq'. UNHCR and DRC.

UNICEF. 2020. 'Geographic Multidimensional Vulnerability Analysis - Jordan'. UNICEF.

UNOCHA. 2017. 'Jordan Hunmanitarian Fund Annual Report 2018.Pdf'. UNOCHA.

Vernon, Alan, Kamel Deriche, and Samantha Eisenhauer. 2016. 'Connecting Refugees: How Internet and Mobile Connectivity Can Improve Refugee Well-Being and Transform Humanitarian Action.' UNHCR.

121

Welfens, Natalie, and Saskia Bonjour. 2021. 'Families First? The Mobilization of Family Norms in Refugee Resettlement'. *International Political Sociology* 15 (2): 212–31.

WFP. 2017. 'At the Root of Exodus: Food Security, Conflict and International Migration'. WFP.

———. 2018. 'Saving Lives, Changing Lives'. WFP.

———. 2019. 'Decentralized Evaluation: WFP Livelihoods and Resilience Activities in Lebanon'. WFP.

———. 2020a. 'Evaluation of the Gender Policy (2015-2020)'. WFP.

———. 2020b. 'Social Cohesion in Turkey: Refugees and the Host Community'. World Food Programme.

World Bank. 2020. 'Economic Opportunities for Jordanians and Syrian Refugees Program- for Results: Programme for Results'. World Bank.

World, Bank. 2020. 'The Fallout of War. The Regional Consequences of the Conflict in Syria'. World Bank.

World Bank. 2021. 'Lebanon Sinking (to the Top 3)'. World Bank Lebanon Economic Monitor.

World Bank, and IMF. 2016. 'Financial Sector Assessment: Lebanon'. Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Vision. 2018. 'Understanding Cash-Based Programming and Protection In Northern Region of Iraq'. World Vision.

WRC. 2009. 'Building Livelihoods: A Field Manual for Practitioners in Humanitarian Settings'. Women's Refugee Commission.

———. 2016. 'Mean Streets: Identifying and Responding to Urban Refugees' Risks of Gender-Based Violence'. Women's Refugee Commission.

Yasmine, Rola, and Catherine Moughalian. 2016. 'Systemic Violence against Syrian Refugee Women and the Myth of Effective Intrapersonal Interventions'. *Reproductive Health Matters* 24 (47): 27–35.

Yassen, Abdullah. 2019a. 'Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq'. MERI.

———. 2019b. 'Sustainable Solutions for Syrian refugees in Kurdistan Iraq'. MERI.

Yoshikawa, Lynn. 2015. 'Integrating Cash Transfers into Gender-Based Violence Programs in Jordan: Benefits, Risks and Challenges'. IRC-UNHCR.

Youssef, Sally, Nicola Jones, A. Malachowska, and Marcel Saleh. 2020. 'Double Crisis: Effects of a Pandemic and Economic Crisis on Lebanon's Most Vulnerable Adolescents'. GAGE.

Zetter, Roger. 2007. 'More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization'. *Journal of Refugee Studies* 20 (2): 172–92.

———. 2017. 'Impacts and Costs of Forced Displacement Phase II A Critical Evaluation of Methodological and Analytical Progress on Designing Development-Led Strategies and Interventions in Forced Displacement'. World Bank.

Zetter, Roger, and Héloïse Ruaudel. 2016. 'Refugees' Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets – An Assessment'. KNOMAD.

Zighan, Saad. 2020. 'Challenges Faced by Necessity Entrepreneurship, the Case of Syrian Refugees in Jordan'. *Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy* 15 (4): 531–47.

INDICATIVE BOOLEAN SEARCH STRINGS

SECTION 1

Question	Indicative Boolean Search String (used in conjunction with other strings as relevant, and with synonyms/alternatives for key words as relevant)
1. Which factors influence Syrian refugees' decisions to either stay in Iraq, Jordan or Lebanon or to move onwards to Europe, and how and why has this changed over time?	(Decision) AND (Migrat*) AND (Factors) AND (Refugees) AND (Syria*). (Decision) AND (Onward migration) AND (Syria* AND Refugee) AND (Jordan AND/OR Lebanon AND/OR Iraq). (Secondary migration) AND (Syria* AND Refugee) AND (Jordan AND/OR Lebanon AND/OR Iraq). + Targeted search for evidence pertaining to different regions and/or cities of origin and of hosting. + Targeted search for evidence pertaining to different periods of time between 2016-2021, including targeted search including keywords relating to 'national turning points' such as (Financial Crisis AND/OR Port Explosion AND/OR Covid).
2. What is the relevance of access to education, employment and/or refugees' safety/protection, compared to other factors, for the decision to either stay or move onwards?	Indicative Boolean Search String to be used in conjunction with the above strings. (Onward migration) AND (Syria* AND Refugee) AND (Jordan AND/OR Lebanon AND/OR Iraq) AND (Education AND/OR Employment AND/OR Shelter AND/OR Protection).
3. How do gender, family composition, age, socio-economic status, culture and religion influence the relevance of factors identified under Q2?	Targeted search of key 'factors' identified in Qs 1 and 2, with keywords such as Gender, parental status AND/OR family status, age, ethnicity, nationality, religion, class, sexuality AND/OR LGBT*, place of origin, level of education, socio-economic identifiers, Syrian AND/OR Kurdish AND/OR Yezidi AND/OR Iraqi AND/OR Palestinian AND/OR Stateless.
4. What is known about the (intended or unintended) effects of foreign assistance on refugees' decisions to either stay or move onwards?	(Foreign Aid) AND (School AND/OR Education AND/OR Employment AND/OR Protection AND/OR Safety AND/OR Security) AND (Syria* AND Refugee) AND (Jordan AND/OR Lebanon AND/OR Iraq) AND (Onward migration AND/OR Secondary migration) AND (Decision). Supplemented by a targeted search of key.

123

SECTION 2

Question	Indicative Boolean Search String (used in conjunction with other strings as relevant, and with synonyms/alternatives for key words as relevant)
5. Which factors explain the success or failure for the participation of Syrian refugees in local communities in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon?	(success AND/OR failure) AND (participation) AND (Syria*) AND (refugees) AND (Jordan AND/OR Lebanon AND/OR Iraq) AND (local community AND/OR host community). Complemented by a targeted search with keywords including (education) AND/OR (employment) AND/OR (protection). + Targeted search for evidence pertaining to different periods of time between 2016-2021, including targeted search including keywords relating to 'national turning points' such as (Financial Crisis AND/OR Port Explosion AND/OR Covid). + targeted search for evidence on different indicators; levels of analysis; and outcomes, processes and experiences.
6. What is known about the effects of the influx of substantial numbers of refugees on social cohesion, and how social cohesion can be enhanced?	(Social cohesion AND/OR Tensions) AND (evidence) AND (Syria* refugees) AND (Jordan AND/OR Lebanon AND/OR Iraq). Targeted search on (causality) AND/OR (causal mechanisms) AND (displacement) AND (refugee) AND (tensions) AND/OR (social cohesion). Targeted search on (local perceptions) AND/OR (social cohesion AND/OR Tensions) AND (Syria* refugees) AND (Jordan AND/OR Lebanon AND/OR Iraq).
7. Which factors apply differently to boys/girls and men/women?	(Social cohesion) AND (evidence) and (Syria* refugees) AND (Jordan AND/OR Lebanon AND/OR Iraq) AND (Boys AND/OR Girls AND/OR Men AND/OR Women). Supplemented by a targeted search of key 'factors' identified in Qs 1 and 2, with keywords such as Gender, parental status AND/OR family status, age, ethnicity, nationality, religion, class, sexuality AND/OR LGBT*, place of origin, level of education, socio-economic identifiers, Syrian AND/OR Kurdish AND/OR Yezidi AND/OR Iraqi AND/OR Palestinian AND/OR Stateless.

SECTION 3

Question	Indicative Boolean Search String (used in conjunction with other strings as relevant, and with synonyms/alternatives for key words as relevant)
8. Which factors explain the success or failure of economic participation by refugees in local communities (be it as entrepreneur or employee)?	(success AND/OR failure) AND (economic) AND (participation) AND (Syria*) AND (refugees) AND (Jordan AND/OR Lebanon AND/OR Iraq) AND (local community AND/OR host community). Complemented by a targeted search with keywords including (employment) AND/OR (entrepreneur) AND/OR (employee) AND/OR (women). Supplemented by a targeted search of key 'factors' identified in Qs 1 and 2, and keywords such as Gender, parental status AND/OR family status, age, ethnicity, nationality, religion, class, sexuality AND/OR LGBT*, place of origin, level of education, socio-economic identifiers, Syrian AND/OR Kurdish AND/OR Yezidi AND/OR Iraqi AND/OR Palestinian AND/OR Stateless.
9. What is known about the effects of the presence of substantial numbers of Syrian refugees on national/municipal/city/town economies, in terms of (amongst others) economic growth and employment?	(Effect) AND (Syria) AND (Refugees) AND (Econom*) AND/OR (Growth) AND/OR (Employment) AND/OR (Labour Market) AND (Jordan AND/OR Lebanon AND/OR Iraq). See above and below relating to *causality.*

Complete List of Identified Sources

For a full list of sources identified as part of the systematic review informing this literature view, follow this link:

https://liveuclac-my.sharepoint.com/:x:/g/personal/ucfarea_ucl_ac_uk/EelqWgzhQwdOjxB3gI5Kr8QBtCCBegSGszpflaTJHVWMDg?rtime=vVDQDJmy2kg

A Syrian man from the city of Daraa gently holds his wife's ring in Jordan. Displaced and separated from his family by the conflict in Syria, he was informed by phone that his wife had died in childbirth. He was unable to bury his wife, and is unable to return to Syria to meet his child. "The ring is a part of me."

© Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

Recommended citation: Fiddian-Qasmiyeh E., Greatrick A. and Carpi E. with Istanbouli, A. S. (2022) *Development Approaches to Forced Displacement from Syria in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq*: Full Report of a literature review of the evidence relating to onward migration, social cohesion and refugees' participation in local communities and economies, UCL Migration Research Unit Policy Briefing Series.

Full Report: www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/research-centres/migration-research-unit/pdfs/dafdfullreport

Summary Report: www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/research-centres/migration-research-unit/pdfs/dafdsummary

Policy Briefing Series:
• Development Approaches to Forced Displacement from Syria in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.
  www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/research-centres/migration-research-unit/pdfs/dafdbriefing

• Refugees' Onward Migration Decision Making in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.
  www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/research-centres/migration-research-unit/pdfs/dafdombriefing

• Refugees' Participation in Local Communities and Social Cohesion in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.
  www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/research/research-centres/migration-research-unit/pdfs/dafdscbriefing

UCL Migration Research Unit (MRU)
UCL Geography

www.ucl.ac.uk/mru

@UCL_MRU   @UCLgeography   @FiddianQasmiyeh

UCL Migration Research Unit (MRU)
PUBLICATION SERIES

UCL
Migration Research Unit