C.G. JUNG'S PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES:

A HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

by

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I, Anna Dadaian, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated.

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ABSTRACT

C.G Jung's Psychological Types: A History and Philosophy of Psychology provides an in-depth historical and philosophical examination of the work of Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) titled *Psychological Types*, originally published in 1921. Subsequently, when referring to this work, Jung emphasised the fact that the psychological typology he provided in the book was not a 'characterology'—an attempt to provide a systematic description of personalities. Rather, for Jung, his project in *Psychological Types* was intended to be used as a 'critical apparatus', a 'conceptual scheme' in order to 'classify empirical material'—in other words, as an *epistemological* tool. As such, on the one hand, his work provides *a philosophy of psychology*. Being profoundly interested in the nature of psychology as a science and, hence, its 'scientific method', Jung expands on the works of his contemporary philosophers—William James and Henri Bergson—incorporating his reading of the philosophers from previous eras, who also happened to be the heroes of his childhood and student years—namely, Friedrich Nietzsche, Arthur Schopenhauer, Immanuel Kant, as well as various classical and medieval philosophers. As a result, Jung produces an epistemological framework for psychology that incorporates the subjective nature of psychological knowledge, as well as the recognition of the limitations of the intellect, whilst also formulating his own concepts, such as 'individuation', 'fantasy', and the very notion of a 'psychological type'. Based on this framework, Jung offers his psychological typology as an epistemological method, or a reformulation of the *scientific method*: what it means to achieve 'objectivity' in psychology, to begin with, and, consequently, in science in general. This project, then, explores in detail Jung's conceptualisation of his psychological typology as an epistemological tool by examining his reading of the above-mentioned philosophers. It also shows the historical layer of Jung's work: for Jung, the history of philosophy—and for that matter, of science—was in effect a *history of psychology*.

IMPACT STATEMENT

This work will be equally of interest to readers of Carl Gustav Jung's psychology in general, and his theory of psychological types in particular, and to those interested in philosophy—and especially, in the thought of William James, Henri Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche, Arthur Schopenhauer, Immanuel Kant, as well as classical and medieval philosophy. As an integrated history and philosophy of psychology project, this thesis is fundamentally interdisciplinary: it contributes to a multitude of areas of scholarship, including, but not limited to, Jung studies, the history of psychology, the history of science, the philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of science, and the history of philosophy, as well as the areas of philosophy specialising in the study of individual philosophers that are dealt with in this thesis—for instance, the philosophy of William James. With its direct focus on Jung's *Psychological Types*, this thesis provides much needed analysis of Jung's conception of his theory of psychological types, with the aim to explore how Jung himself understood his theory of psychological types—as, primarily, an epistemological method. This thesis further elucidates this underexplored view by offering a perspective according to which, with his psychological typology, Jung also provides a reformulation of the 'scientific method', thus offering a 'philosophy of science'. In it, Jung grants psychology a pivotal role—as the science of the 'personal equation'—effectively redefining what it means for 'science' to be objective, thus rejecting both the classical empiricist notion of 'tabula rasa' and what has been described as the 'mechanical objectivity' of the nineteenth-century. This thesis then demonstrates the manner in which Jung conceptualised his psychological typology as an epistemological tool. This is achieved by looking at how he utilises his reading of certain philosophical works by incorporating them into his thought. This thesis, thus, covers a wide range of philosophical topics, spanning different traditions and historical contexts—from the 'problem of universals' to the notions of 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity'—demonstrating the importance of Jung's work in *Psychological Types* as a case study in the history and philosophy of science, as well as the history of philosophy.

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INTRODUCTION

The central aim of this doctoral thesis is to provide a historical and philosophical framework for understanding Carl Gustav Jung's theory of psychological types by looking closely at his work titled *Psychological Types*, originally published in 1921.[1] With the rise in popularity of various typologies that claim to be based at their core on Jung's typology in popular culture, as well as recruitment—such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)—and in light of the increased scholarly interest in Jung's psychology and its relationship with science and philosophy, this study is particularly timely.[2] Underpinning this project is my interest in the philosophy of psychology: the notions of 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' and the question of the scientific method in psychology. Jung's typology provides an important case study for this broader project, since, as we shall see throughout this thesis, these topics are at the heart of Jung's work in *Psychological Types*.

Historically, Jung's psychological typology was partly a response to his disagreement with Sigmund Freud regarding the methodology, and epistemology more generally, of psychology.[3] We shall see that, in *Psychological Types,* Jung provides an analysis of both Sigmund Freud's and Alfred Adler's psychological theories, showing that they were both ultimately reflections of the personalities of their authors that were misleadingly used as generalisations, or universal psychological laws. Jung's goal was then to provide a psychology that would not be committing the same error, by acknowledging the subjective nature of psychology in the first place. His psychological typology would serve this purpose: Freud's psychoanalysis was described as having an 'extraverted' bias, whilst Adler's individual psychology had an 'introverted' bias. However, this thesis will show that there was more to Jung's

[1] This work was originally published in German as *Psychologische Typen*. The English translation of the work titled *Psychological Types: or The Psychology of Individuation* (by H. Goodwin Baynes) appeared for the first time in 1923. The book subsequently became volume 6 of *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung* in 1971 (edited and translated by Gerhard Adler and R. F.C. Hull). My justification for using the 1923 translation of the book, rather than the version published as part of the *Collected Works*, is that it is closer to the original German version.

[2] On the use of MBTI in recruitment, see, for instance, Coppin (2017).
For an example of a recent discussion of Jung's relation to science, see, for instance, Jones (2014).

[3] Thus, in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung subsequently states that his *Psychological Types* 'sprang originally from [his] need to define the way in which [his] outlook differed from Freud's and Adler's (Jung 1962/1989:207).

project in *Psychological Types* than just the recognition of the subjective factor in psychology with his typology. While Jung was critical of the idea of 'objective psychology'—as it was commonly understood at the time—seeing it as an unachievable ideal, his *Psychological Types* was fundamentally concerned with the *problem of subjectivity* in psychology and was attempting to provide a solution to it. We shall see that, for Jung, his psychological typology itself was an epistemological tool that provided a method for solving this problem.

As a number of scholars have noted, Jung had a difficult relationship with philosophy. On the one hand, as James Jarrett points out, Jung was quick to respond that he considered himself an 'empiricist' rather than a 'philosopher', being aware of the irony of this statement (Jarrett 1981:191). Nevertheless, as Jarrett points out,

> Early Jung came to see that nothing is more dangerous to a psychologist than being grounded in a wrongheaded philosophy, but the corrective movement is not in eschewing philosophy, becoming a non- or anti-philosopher, for this is to give over criticizing one's own assumptions, one's "personal psychic premises", the great philosophical tasks. A psychologist *is* a philosopher, consciously or unconsciously—but here as everywhere, the influences that remain dark are potentially full of mischief. (Jarrett 1981:194).

Indeed, as a psychologist at the beginning of the twentieth century, and someone who was evidently interested in the methodological and epistemological questions concerning the nature of psychology as a science, Jung was inevitably engaging with philosophical questions. As we shall see, philosophical references permeated Jung's *Psychological Types*.

This thesis will show that Jung's project in *Psychological Types* is *multi-layered*. Firstly, as expected, Jung's work offers a psychological typology, a *psychological theory* that, as Jung himself claims, is based on strictly empirical research, making it nothing else but scientific. However, it also offers a *philosophy of psychology*: it aims to provide insight into what psychology itself *is* or *should be*, offering *epistemological* and *methodological* perspectives for psychology as a science. More than that, this inevitably leads Jung to a discussion of the nature and role of science more generally, thereby, in a way, also providing a general *philosophy of science*—namely, an epistemology and methodology for science.

Methodologically, this thesis is both a historical and philosophical study: it includes historical research exploring the origins of Jung's typology that is complemented by a philosophical analysis investigating how Jung *conceptualised* his typology in *Psychological Types*. Throughout this thesis, I also provide a history of the evolution of Jung's theory of psychological types *leading up to* the publication of *Psychological Types* in 1921, by looking at key sources such as Jung's *Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido* (1912), Jung's paper 'A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types' presented at the Munich Psychoanalytical Congress in 1913, the Jung-Schmid correspondence between 1915 and 1916, among others.[4] This thesis, then, seeks to contribute to the established discipline of integrated history and philosophy of science, as well as to what could be termed 'integrated history and philosophy of psychology' more specifically. Finally, by providing an account of how Jung conceptualised his psychological typology in his *Psychological Types* through his reading of philosophical works across centuries—from the Classical and Medieval thought to the early 20-century philosophies of William James and Henri Bergson—this thesis also locates Jung's work in the history of philosophy more broadly.

When it comes to the academic study of Jung's psychology, this thesis also aims to contribute to the intellectual history of Jung. Sonu Shamdasani's work in *Jung and The Making of Modern Psychology* provides a comprehensive guide to the historical context of Jung's work, as well as to the figures from the preceding centuries that came to play an important part in Jung's psychology (Shamdasani 2003). Central to it is the discussion of psychology emerging as a 'science' at the beginning of the twentieth century and the place of Jung's psychology in these events. This work also offers insights into the philosophical basis of Jung's psychology, looking at the figures that are also the subject of this thesis—namely, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, and William James. With regard to the latter philosopher, Shamdasani's work has been fundamental in terms of establishing James' pragmatism as a key element of Jung's epistemological framework for his psychology. While this thesis follows on from Shamdasani's argument, I further show that Jung believed he did not simply adopt James' pragmatism but expanded it. It was the starting point of Jung's epistemology in

[4] A discussion of Jung's *later* work on typology, as well as his later views on science, will be in the 'Conclusion'.

Psychological Types, a basic framework, which he combined with his reading of Bergson's philosophy, as well as the works of the other philosophers tackled in this thesis. In addition to this, I show the interconnections between these philosophies themselves: the trajectory of development of these ideas in the history of philosophy and how they were then taken up by Jung. Furthermore, by developing his own epistemology through his synthesis of these philosophies, this thesis demonstrates that Jung effectively put forward a philosophy of psychology and a philosophy of science in general: one that redefined the notion of objectivity by incorporating the 'personal equation' and Jung's 'problem of opposites'.

Another Jung scholar whose work has been of special importance to the current study is Martin Liebscher—in particular, concerning the relationship between Jung's psychology and the philosophies of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche.[5] An earlier contribution to the study of the relationship between Jung and Nietzsche was made by Paul Bishop—whose work has also included the study of Jung's reception of Immanuel Kant—and, a more recent one has been made by Gaia Domenici in her *Jung's Nietzsche*.[6]

In 1970, Henri Ellenberger provided a historiography of Jung's work, dividing it into distinct periods: his Zofingia lectures as a student at the University of Basel; his work at the Burghölzli Hospital; the 'psychoanalytic period' (between 1909 and 1913); the 'intermediate period' between his break with Freud and publication of *Psychological* Types; and, finally, Jung's 'analytic psychology' after the publication of *Psychological Types* (Ellenberger 1970:657). Hence, this historiography already emphasised the role of *Psychological Types* in the evolution of Jung's psychology. However, in light of the recent publication of the *Red Book* and the *Black Books,* it is now clear that what Ellenberger regarded as an 'intermediate period' was actually a fundamentally important period in the history of Jung's work. As we shall see, during this time Jung engaged in self-experimentation and produced conceptual work that determined the later development of his psychology.[7] From this perspective, the publication of Jung's *Psychological Types* in 1921 was the immediate product of this creative period and,

[5] See Liebscher (2006, 2010, 2012, 2014a, 2014b).
[6] See Bishop (1995, 1996,2000), Domenici (2019).
[7] The *Red Book* and *The Black Books* were published by Shamdasani in 2009 and 2020 respectively.

as such, examining this work provides unique insight into the conceptualisation of Jung's psychology in general.

Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Psychology, and Jung

One could provide a definition of 'philosophy of science', incorporating the distinction between general philosophy of science and philosophies of the individual sciences. Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd define general philosophy of science as the subject that 'deals with philosophical and foundational problems that arise within science' and 'strives to understand science as a cognitive activity that is uniquely capable of yielding justified beliefs about the world' (Psillos and Curd 2008: xix). General philosophers of science ask questions concerning the aims and methods of science, as well as clarify what science itself *is* to begin with, and how it can be distinguished from 'non-science' or 'pseudoscience' (Psillos and Curd 2008: xix). The latter problem has been known in the philosophy of science as the 'problem of demarcation'.[8] Another important question in the philosophy of science deals with the nature of scientific theories and their relation to the world: 'How do theoretical concepts get their meaning and how are they related to observation?' (Psillos and Curd 2008: xix). As we shall see, these two questions—especially the former—will be at the heart of the discussion in this thesis.

The philosophies of the individual sciences, on the other hand, focus on dealing with the special philosophical issues within a particular science (Psillos and Curd 2008: xix). Some of the issues that they deal with 'concern the basic conceptual structure of particular sciences'—Psillos and Curd include 'the nature of psychological and sociological explanation' among their examples (Psillos and Curd 2008: xix). Other questions 'relate to the commitments that flow from the individual science'. One could ask, for instance, '[a]re there laws in the special sciences' (Psillos and Curd 2008: xix)? We will see that Jung's discussion in *Psychological Types*—what could be termed his 'philosophy of psychology'—offered a peculiar take on these questions as well.

[8] For a general discussion of the problem of demarcation, see, for instance, Hansson (2011).

Historically, an influential contribution to the problem of demarcation in the philosophy of science was made by Karl Popper in his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, where he put forward his notion of 'falsifiability' as his suggested scientific method—arguing against the 'verifiability' criterion of the Vienna Circle, or the *logical positivists* (later called *logical empiricists*) (Popper 1959).[9] In his *Conjectures and Refutations*, Popper famously argued that Freudian psychoanalysis, alongside the Marxist theory of history and Adler's individual psychology, was pseudo-scientific since it did not meet the falsifiability criteria: in other words, it was not possible to conceive of a test that could disprove, or falsify, Freudian psychoanalysis (Popper 1963). In addition to this, Popper was sceptical of the status of psychology and sociology as scientific disciplines in general, stating that they 'had in fact more in common with primitive myths than with science' (Popper 1963/2002:34). It is important to point out, however, that in his criticism of psychoanalysis, Popper's work *did not* address Jung's psychology in particular.

Rudolf Carnap, another prominent philosopher of science and proponent of logical positivism, provided a criticism of the nineteenth-century German-speaking philosophical culture due to its emphasis on metaphysics (Carnap 1966/1998:678). According to him, this culture received disapproval from contemporary German-speaking physicists such as Ernst Mach and resulted in them arguing that science should not ask the question "Why?"—only "How?". Carnap explains further in his 'The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction':

> The background was the German philosophical atmosphere of the time, which was dominated by idealism in the tradition of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. They wanted a fuller understanding, which they believed could be obtained only by finding metaphysical causes that were behind phenomena and not accessible to the scientific method. Physicists reacted to this point of view by saying: "Leave us alone with your why-questions. There is no answer beyond that given by the empirical laws." They objected to why-questions because they were usually metaphysical questions. (Carnap 1966/1998:678).

As a result, some of Carnap's early work—as a young member of the Vienna Circle in the 1920s—was written 'as a reaction to the philosophical climate of German

[9] This was originally published in German in 1936 as *Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft*.

idealism' (1966/1998:679). As an example, he writes of a notable contemporary biologist and philosopher Hans Driesch, who postulated an entity that he referred to as 'entelechy' in order to explain certain biological phenomena such as regeneration and reproduction.[10] His work was met with criticism from the logical positivists due to its lack of *scientific laws*:

> Driesch did not give laws. He did not specify how the entelechy of an oak tree differs from the entelechy of a goat or a giraffe. He did not classify the entelechies. He merely classified organisms and said that each organism had its own entelechy. (1966/1998:679).

Carnap's criticism of 'entelechy' is notable for the relationship between the philosophy of science and the reception of Jung's psychology, since Jung has been linked with Driesch—namely, in the context of the debates surrounding vitalism—as well as the culture of German idealism in some of the secondary literature on Jung's psychology.[11] However, as we shall see in this thesis, Jung himself was careful to disassociate himself from metaphysics and considered himself to be first and foremost an empiricist—even though he ended up with a unique take on what it means to be an empiricist, a scientist, and a psychologist, to begin with.

Another figure relevant to this discussion was Carl Hempel, a key representative of logical empiricism, who provided a formulation of what has been termed 'logical behaviourism' (or philosophical behaviourism) in the philosophy of mind in his essay titled 'The Logical Analysis of Psychology', published in 1935.[12] In it, he argues that '[*a*]*ll psychological statements which are meaningful, that is to say, which are in principle verifiable, are translatable into statements which do not involve*

[10] As Marilyn Nagy points out, Driesch named his entity 'entelechy' after Aristotle's use of the term: 'For Aristotle, entelechy (*entelecheia*) is a term practically synonymous with actuality (*energeia*), and it has to do with the final stage in a sequence of development described by the Four Causes, in which potential has been realized, form has been actualized, and optimal functioning is taking place. Driesch meant by his use of the term entelechy to indicate the existence of a specific non-material substance which is responsible for, and enables life to exist' (Nagy 1991:248).

[11] Nagy, for instance, argued that 'the immediate philosophical source for Jung's theory of individuation and the self is in vitalism' and that 'it is fruitful to consider Jung's constantly reiterated insistence on the "autonomy of the psyche" in the light of the vitalist hypotheses' (Nagy 1991:250). For the relationship between Jung's psychology and German idealism, see, for instance, Bishop (2012).
[12] The original 1935 version of the paper was published in French. In the 1977 prefatory note, Hempel states that by the time this paper appeared in English, he had abandoned the 'narrow translationist form of physicalism' (Hempel 2013:14).

psychological concepts, but only the concepts of physics' (Hempel 2013:18).[13] Since, from the logical empiricist perspective, the statements about the unobservable mind were effectively metaphysical statements, the discussion of mental states was considered to be meaningless. When it comes to behaviourism in psychology in particular, as Laurence D. Smith pointed out, '[a] similar sort of antimetaphysical bent characterised behaviourism even before it came into contact with logical positivism' (Smith 1986:3).[14] John B. Watson, an American psychologist, already formulated the key tenets of behaviourism in 1913, with its emphasis on the concrete, rather than the speculative—which manifested itself in the behaviourists' decision to study behaviour, as opposed to psychological states (Smith 1986:3). Indeed, as Smith noted, '[i]n both behaviourism and logical positivism, the antimetaphysical attitude was tied to empiricism in the form of explicit and implicit principle of verifiability' (Smith 1986:3). Watson is significant for our purposes as he wrote a review of Jung's *Psychological Types* for *The New Republic*, which painted Jung's work in a negative light, criticising it on the basis of its lack of verifiability, as well as viewing it as outdated:

> According to Jung, objective psychology can go only a little way towards giving an adequate picture of the nature of the human "soul." Very few of the complex factors of human psychology can be witnessed and observed as measurable facts. That some of them can be so measured Jung tells us is shown by his Association Studies. If the reviewer may be allowed to break in upon the author's introverted thinking chain at this point, he would like to point out that considerable work on the conditioned reflex —glandular, muscular and emotional—demonstrates this still more clearly, but for Jung to take account of this work would seriously complicate his theory of the unconscious, both collective (phylogenetic) and individual (ontogenetic). Hence nearly all twentieth century psychology is ignored. (Watson 1923:287).

Watson then proceeds to compare Jung's work with that of a 'religious mystic', concluding that Jung's *Psychological Types* does not 'aid the science of psychology', but rather 'confuses it by unjustifiable, and unsupported assumptions' (Watson

[13] This can be understood as an 'analytic reduction', rather than an 'ontological reduction'—since the idea behind Hempel's claim is not that mental states *are* fundamentally physical states, but that the *statements* about mental phenomena are the same as the statements about behavioural dispositions, that the *meaning* of the statements is the same (Todd and Morris 1995:76).
[14] There was a historically popular account, according to which logical positivism and behaviourism were in an alliance. However, Smith argued that this claim was an overstatement (Smith 1986).

1923:289). This criticism of Jung's *Psychological Types* ultimately came to be 'the dominant attitude towards [Jung's] work in academic psychology' (Shamdasani 2003:83).

However, what is both interesting and surprising is that, as Shamdasani points out, 'there are few modern psychologists who have reflected on issues concerning the scientific status of psychology as much as Jung' and that '[h]is reflections on this issue played a critical role in how he developed and reformulated his psychology' (Shamdasani 2003:30). The philosophy of psychology has treated psychology as a disjointed field, an umbrella term for a number of different disciplines, with each having its own goals and methodologies. Richard Samuels, for instance, provides the following account of the philosophy of psychology:

> The philosophy of psychology is concerned with issues that span work in the philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and empirical psychology. Psychology is not a unified field but a diverse confederation of subfields and research programs, any of which could form a focal point for philosophical attention; and indeed many have, including psychoanalysis, social psychology, and abnormal psychology. But it is cognitive psychology – and the field of cognitive science, of which it is a central part – that has dominated research in the philosophy of psychology; and it is this research that I focus on here. (Samuels 2008:581).

Whilst the division of psychology into different fields with distinct goals is not inherently different from the natural process of branching out in other sciences, a more general discussion of what exactly we mean by *psychology as a science* has been lacking. It will be shown in this thesis that Jung's work in *Psychological Types* serves as a historical example of someone who engaged with the question of what it means for psychology to be a science and have a scientific method—my goal is then to analyse this discussion and make sense of Jung's take on the topic.

We will see that pragmatism—specifically, William James' philosophy—played an important role in the philosophical basis of Jung's psychology and his theory of psychological types in particular. Pragmatism has been increasingly influential in the philosophy of science and social studies of science—in particular, the associated doctrine of pluralism.[15] Hence, this thesis can serve as a case study in the history of

[15] According to Frank Miedema, for instance, '[t]o rethink the relation between science and society and its current problems authoritative scholars in the US and Europe, but also around the globe, have

applied pragmatism. With regard to pluralism in particular, important work has been carried out by Hasok Chang, who defines his position as 'active normative epistemic pluralism' (Chang 2012:253). He defines pluralism in science as 'the doctrine advocating the cultivation of multiple systems of practice in any given field of science' (Chang 2012:260). He further defines 'a system of practice' as 'a coherent and interacting set of epistemic activities performed with a view to achieve certain aims' (Chang 2012:260). For Chang, these different systems of practice should be 'developing in productive interaction with each other' (Chang 2012:260). Interestingly, in Jung scholarship, Armelle Line Peltier has recently provided an account of Jung's views on science, based on his *Liber Novus,* or the *Red Book,* that strongly resembles Chang's epistemology. She states that, according to Jung:

> (1) science is not a single entity but an assembly of different fields and disciplines; (2) these different fields have to work together and to establish a dialectic in order to build the most efficient ways of knowing; (3) there does not exist a single or a better way of knowing the world, contrary to claims made by logical positivists and presented in their models of physics; (4) the goal of science is not to find the truth but to build knowledge of an object of study; and (5) progress in science must be understood in terms of increase of knowledge. (Peltier 2019:69).

In her work, Peltier refers to Paul Feyerabend—an important figure in the twentieth-century philosophy of science, who is notable for his criticism of '"rationalist"' attempts to lay down or discover rules of scientific method' (Preston 2020).[16] Peltier connects Feyerabend's philosophy with Jung's psychology: 'Feyerabend explains that scientific progress (increase of knowledge) is a result of a removal of reason and arguably this is also the case of Jung, as the *Red Book* experience appearance to attest' (Peltier 2019:72). However, in this thesis, we will see that while Jung was critical of the domination of rationality (in a more Bergsonian vein), he was not critical of rationality *per se* and did not give up on the scientific method altogether in a Feyerabendian vein—rather, (in a pragmatist vein), he subscribed to the view, 'many things go', rather than 'anything goes'—as Chang puts it (Chang 2012:261).

since 1980 implicitly and increasingly explicitly gone back to the ideas of American pragmatism' (Miedema 2022:109).

[16] For more, see Feyerabend (1975).

Defining Scientific Objectivity

Classical empiricism historically played a crucial role in establishing a method of arriving at scientific objectivity (*the quality of being based on evidence and data*) by, firstly, putting forward *inductive reasoning* as the basis of the scientific method—moving from concrete facts to a general theory—and, secondly, by establishing *sense experience* as the primary source of knowledge—meaning that every scientific claim had to originate from observation and experimentation (Mumford 2008:27).[17] As Stephen Mumford points out, '[t]this led, some centuries later, to an overall condemnation of metaphysics in logical positivism [empiricism], particularly as described by Ayer' (Mumford 2008:27).[18] In *Objectivity*, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison distinguish several different notions of objectivity. They argue that 'mechanical objectivity' was a distinct phenomenon that originated in the mid-nineteenth century in the context of the availability of the newly invented photographic techniques, which allowed to record data *mechanically* for the first time, replacing what they call 'truth-to-nature' (Daston and Galison 2007).[19] In this thesis, scientific objectivity is defined more broadly to include the aspirations of classical empiricism—in fact, we will see that, in *Psychological Types*, Jung addressed both the empiricist notion of 'tabula rasa'—the view that the mind is a blank slate and there is no innate knowledge (since knowledge is derived from experience)—as well as the 'mechanisation' of science in his critique of what he calls 'objective psychology'.

Daston and Galison contextualise the emergence of mechanical objectivity in the mid-nineteenth century by stating that the scientists of this time 'began to fret openly about a new kind of obstacle to knowledge: *themselves'*, worried that 'the subjective self was prone to prettify, idealize, and, in the worst case, regularize observations to fit theoretical expectations: *to see what it hoped to see'* (Daston and Galison 2007:34; italics added). By the 1860s, scientists were concerned with 'effacing their

[17] The former was formulated in Francis Bacon's *The Novum Organum* (1620), whilst the latter—in John Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689).
[18] In his *Language, Truth and Logic*, A.J. Ayer famously outlines the logical empiricists' 'principle of verifiability' (Ayer 1936).
[19] It is also interesting to note that the term 'scientist' had just been coined by William Whewell (Snyder 2017).

own personalities' and inventing 'techniques that left as little as possible to the discretion of either artist or scientist, in order to obtain an "objective view"' (Daston and Galison 2007:35). Daston and Galison point out further that '[i]f knowledge were independent of the knower, then it would indeed be puzzling to encounter admonitions, reproaches, and confessions pertaining to the character of the investigator strewn among descriptions of the character of the investigation' (Daston and Galison 2008:39). As we shall see, Jung starts his discussion of psychology as a science in *Psychological Types* exactly with the problem of the subjectivity of the scientist who carries out an experiment—or the so-called 'personal equation'. However, Jung's take on the problem is that it is actually impossible to remove a scientist's personality from the act of observation—however, one can do their best to understand oneself, one's psychology, and achieve a balanced psychological state, the 'Self'.

The following definition of objectivity by Daston and Galison is, then, the starting point of Jung's discussion in his *Psychological Types*—he anticipated the view of *the study of objectivity through the study of subjectivity*—namely, *through psychology*:

> First and foremost, objectivity is the suppression of some aspect of the self, the countering of subjectivity. Objectivity and subjectivity define each other, like left and right or up and down. One cannot be understood, even conceived, without the other. If objectivity was summoned into existence to negate subjectivity, then the emergence of objectivity must tally with the emergence of a certain kind of wilful self, one perceived as endangering scientific knowledge. The history of objectivity becomes, *ipso facto*, part of the history of the self. (Daston and Galison 2008:36-37).

We shall also see that central to Jung's psychology, echoing the quote above, is the idea that there is no object without the subject—or, in Jung's terms, one is in the 'unconscious' of the other.

Furthermore, Daston and Galison's conception of the mid-nineteenth-century opposition between the 'scientific self' and the 'artistic self' is reminiscent of Jung's dichotomy of the 'rational' and the 'irrational' in *Psychological Types* (Daston and Galison 2008:37). Interestingly, the term 'rationality' has been used to connote another important aspect of science in the philosophy of science. Objectivity and rationality used to be seen as '"neutral" epistemic values' and 'essential components of the scientific method'—a view that has been challenged recently (Baghramian

2008:237). For instance, Gerald Doppelt has argued that '[a]n adequate philosophy of science will need new conceptions of rationality, objectivity, and progress to show how [...] normative shifts in values can exhibit these classical ideals' (Doppelt 2008:303). We will see that Jung's work in *Psychological Types* was a historical predecessor of this view—albeit with a peculiar take on it.

In this thesis, I argue that with his work in his *Psychological Types*, Jung effectively redefines scientific objectivity by stating that scientific objectivity should incorporate the notion of the 'personal equation'. His psychological typology, then, provides a 'classification' of different kinds of the 'personal equation'. This thesis will show that, in *Psychological Types*, Jung clarifies a) and rejects b):

a) Objectivity: the quality of being based on facts and evidence and not being influenced by beliefs or feelings
b) Empiricism: facts can be derived from objects directly, as mind is a blank slate

I show that with his psychological typology as an epistemological method, Jung re-imagines what it means for psychology to be a science: one needs to, first, incorporate the 'the personal equation', the psychological bias, or one's *psychological type*, and then *overcome* it (by resolving what he refers to as the 'problem of opposites'—the problem of psychological 'one-sidedness'). This revised notion of objectivity in psychology could then be termed 'untyping': one overcomes one's *subjectivity* by transcending one's psychological type and achieves 'objectivity' in a new sense as a result—as the balanced 'Self'.

However, for Jung, this revision of objectivity has implications beyond just psychology. In *Psychological Types,* Jung argues that science is *only* one psychological attitude among many—it is a product of the psychological function of what he terms 'thinking', or the 'rational' more broadly. Hence, in order to achieve objectivity in science in general, one needs to achieve objectivity in psychology first:

> Premise 1. Untyping is a necessary condition of objectivity in psychology
> Premise 2. Objectivity in psychology is a necessary condition of objectivity in science.
> Conclusion. Untyping is a necessary condition of objectivity in science.

This means, then, that a psychological typology becomes an epistemological method for both psychology and science in general. In order to have a better understanding of Jung's epistemological project in *Psychological Types*, it is helpful to provide a brief history of the emergence of psychology as a *scientific* discipline—which we will look at in the following section of this introduction.

Psychology before Jung

When it comes to the beginnings of psychology as a science at the turn of the century, the philosophical debates surrounding the scientific status of psychology played a crucial role in this process and were critical for the establishment of the 'new' science of psychology (Daston 1982). What is interesting, however, is that these debates inevitably resulted in a renewed discussion of the nature of science itself and its 'scientific method'. As Lorraine Daston puts it, [t]he late nineteenth-century controversy over the prospects for "science of mind" in Britain and the United States challenged not only the aspiring science of psychology, but also the philosophical framework for science that had been the legacy of the Scientific Revolution' (Daston 1982:90). In particular, she argues that 'psychological subjects, particularly the theory of volition, also undermined contemporary treatments of scientific explanation by John Herschel, John Stuart Mill, William Whewell, and William Stanley Jevons', which meant that '[a]t stake was not only the possibility of a science of psychology, but the conception of science itself' (Daston 1982:90). Hence, the relationship between psychology and the philosophy of science has been a historically important one. However, as Daston points out, '[p]hilosophers and historians of science interested in the development and application of views on scientific method and explanation have generally confined their studies to the natural sciences', which is still largely the case (Daston 1982:89).

According to Gary Hatfield, during the eighteenth century, the realm of psychology was covered by three different fields: metaphysics (regarding the relationship between mind and body), epistemology (regarding the capacity of the mind) and, finally, what might be called 'empirical and theoretical psychology' (regarding explanations of psychological phenomena) (Hatfield 2012:241). According to

Mitchell Ash, '[a]n often-told scientific success story leads from Johann Heinrich Herbart's program for the measurement of sensations (in response to Kant's claim that mental events, lacking the attribute of space, could not be measured), by way of Hermann Helmholtz's measurement of the speed of nervous impulses and Gustav Theodor Fechner's psychophysics (the measurement of relations between external stimuli and just-noticeable differences in sensation), to Wilhelm Wundt's (1832–1920) "physiological psychology."' (Ash 2003:255). As he points out, however, the history of nineteenth-century psychology was much more complex than this, with numerous different groups of psychologists pursuing different research programmes with varying approaches (Ash 2003:255-256). Shamdasani provides a long list of subject areas that the late-nineteenth-century psychologists believed the new field of scientific psychology needed to be clearly distinguished from, namely: 'philosophy, theology, biology, anthropology, literature, medicine, and neurology' (Shamdasani 2003:4). In nineteenth-century Germany, philosophy, natural science, as well as 'sensory physiology' were brought together in order to create 'the new, quantitative experimental psychology' (Hatfield 2012:241). These 'new' experimental psychologists adopted the experimental method of other sciences of this time—such as physics and physiology—with the aim to gain scientific status. In this process, they re-imagined the object of their inquiry in physical terms, effectively transforming the abstract mental states into concrete physical states that could be subject to measurement (Daston 1982).

Psychological typologies already existed before Jung—there had been theories of types by Jean-Martin Charcot, Alfred Binet, and William Stern (Shamdasani 2003). The very idea of a psychological typology is intertwined with important philosophical questions concerning the nature of science. A psychological typology, by definition, provides a *classification* of psychological attitudes—which then relates it to the discussion of the problem of 'natural kinds' in the philosophy of science and the 'problem of universals' in philosophy more generally. It was a step away from the individual psychology of the late-nineteenth century (associated with Alfred Binet and Victor Henri), the proponents of which, instead of studying the 'general processes of psychic processes', aimed to study the individual *differences* in psychological processes (Shamdasani 2003:41). As we shall see, Jung believed this view to be equivalent to a renunciation, giving up on the idea of studying psychology *scientifically*, since science, by definition, dealt with generalities. Typology then

offered a middle-ground between individual psychology and the new 'objective' psychology that strived to put forward universal psychological concepts—the latter was described by Jung as an 'intolerable tyranny, belonging to the pseudoscientific principle of the normal man' in *Psychological Types* (Jung 1923:56).

Reception of Jung's *Psychological Types*

The appearance of the English translation of Jung's *Psychological Types* in 1923 was met with great positive reaction in the English-speaking world, receiving positive reviews from *The New York Times* and *Times Literary Supplement* (Shamdasani 2003:83). In 1924, Henrich Klüver remarked on the increased importance of typologies, stating that both the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, entitled 'The Mental Differences between Individuals', and the German Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie were concerned with 'classifications of mental types' (Klüver 1924:456). He also remarked on the widespread use of typologies across different branches of psychology and beyond:

> Classifications of types have been worked out in psychiatry, pedagogy, and psychoanalysis, on the basis of Dilthey's *'Struktur'* psychology and from the point of view of a 'phenomenological psychology.' There should be mentioned in this connection beside Jung's *'Psychological Types*,' Ernst Kretschmer's *'Körperbau und Ckarakter, Untersuchungen zum Konstitutionsproblem und zur Lehre von den Temperamenten,*' H. Rorschach's *'Psychodiagnostik*,' E. Spranger's 'Lebensformen' K. Jasper's *'Psychologie der Weltanschaungen*', R. Müller-Freienfels' *'Persönlichkeit und Weltanschauung*' and finally the experimental investigations of the Marburg school (E. R. Jaensch and W. Jaensch) on '*Eidetiker*'. (Klüver 1924:456).

However, we shall see throughout this thesis that Jung viewed his work in *Psychological Types* as primarily an *epistemological* project: one that put forward a distinct perspective on the nature of psychology as a science—as well as, as will become evident, the nature of science itself. But when it comes to the reception of Jung's typology as an epistemological project, rather than simply a psychological typology, it has been largely unsuccessful in the realm of academic psychology. As Shamdasani has pointed out, 'Jung's typology, as an epistemological attempt to halt

the infinite regress threatened by the personal equation, through the establishment of a psychology of psychologies, did not meet with any general acceptance' (Shamdasani 2003:83). Among the reasons for this was the fact the psychologists did not like the idea of their psychological theories losing their 'objective' validity as a result of them being explained away as mere products of certain psychological attitudes *(*Shamdasani 2003:83).

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that when it comes to its reception in academic psychology, Jung's theory of psychological types happened to be the 'one aspect of Jung's work that found its way on to the agenda of academic psychology', and 'the only aspect of his work that was accorded any serious and not purely dismissive attention by psychologists' (Shamdasani 2003:84). However, in the process of this engagement, Jung's typology was 'transformed beyond all recognition', which meant that effectively all that was left of Jung's original theory was only the key terms—namely, 'introversion' and 'extraversion'—while his 'historical, clinical, cultural concerns were left to one side and were replaced by the experimental and statistical methods that held sway in psychology' (Shamdasani 2003:84-85). This was because in the 1920s—the immediate context of the reception of Jung's *Psychological Types*—the use of experimentation and statistical methods became the hallmark of scientific psychology (Shamdasani 2003:29-31). For example, June Etta Downey, an American psychologist, compared Jung's theoretical work in *Psychological Types* with the experimental method of her The Will-Temperament Test—a contemporary test that evaluated personality traits:

> In studying certain patterns of profile obtained from will-temperament testing I have frequently been impressed with the possibility of describing the subjects giving them as introverted or extraverted. Other investigators have remarked the same possibility. It seems, therefore, worth while reviewing certain passages in Jung's "Psychological Types" in order to determine the extent to which such a parallelism holds. The approach in Jung is theoretical; that in will-temperament testing experimental; a comparison of conclusions would, therefore, be particularly instructive. (Downey 1924).

Even Beatrice Hinkle, a medical doctor and Jung's chief supporter in the United States, had already singled out Jung's typology from the rest of his psychology in 1919, before the publication of Jung's *Psychological Types*, and put it in an

experimental context, comparing it with the contemporary medical work in an article published in a psychological journal:

> Perhaps Dr. Jung's most important contribution for the understanding of human personality, however, is the differentiation and study of the psychologic [sic] types. The advantage of the classification of mankind into distinct psychologic types whose reactions to stimuli are different and distinct and can fairly adequately be postulated in advance is as valuable for the medical psychologist as is Dr. Joel Goldthwaite anatomical and physiological classification for the internist. (Hinkle 1919:177).[20]

Outside of the use of analytical psychology in therapy, Jung's work has had the greatest impact on the social sciences and humanities.[21] A newspaper article in *Gloucestershire Echo* was already discussing the application of Jung's theory of psychological types to teaching methods in education in 1923:

> The mental tests of Binet and his followers do not take into account sufficiently the variability due to these differing types. The introverts do not enjoy them and do not do themselves justice. In the Montessori method, where only guidance is necessary, the internal impulse gets opportunity for expression, and the deep well of natural power is liberated. The Dalton plan also gives greater scope for the psychological variety of types, because it is more flexible and allows the child freedom to learn at his own pace. There is no restriction of the methods of learning suited to each type, which there must be under the class system where the teacher attempts to lead the class along a line of thought conforming to his own type. (1923).[22]

Furthermore, through Katharine Cook Briggs's and her daughter Isabel's interpretation of Jung's work, used as the basis for the 'Myers-Briggs Type Indicator', Jung's psychological typology had a significant cultural impact, which continues to this day.[23]

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[20] It is interesting to point out that Beatrice Hinkle went on to develop her own version of the theory of psychological types in her paper titled 'A Study of Psychological Types', published in 1922 (Shamdasani 2003:81).

[21] On the history of the reception of Jung's typology in anthropology, see Shamdasani (2003:328). For the use of Jung's typology in gender studies, see, for instance, Mosher (1987). On the use in literature, see, for instance, Tucker (2010).
For a more general survey of Jung's impact on the humanities, see, for instance, Rowland (2010).

[22] The newspaper article was reporting on the lecture delivered by Taylor, a pupil of Jung, at the Cheltenham Froebel Society.

[23] For instance, on the use in education, see Provost and Anchors (1987), Fairhurst and Fairhust (1995), Cross (2009), Kise (2014).

What is peculiar is that the fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Jung's work in *Psychological Types*—namely, the view that the book provided a description of characters, while Jung himself stated that this was not the case—was what caused the popularity of Jung's typology in the first place (Shamdasani 2003:84-85). In a letter to Hans Schäffer, dated 27 October 1933, Jung contrasts his own approach with that of Schäffer, distinguishing his typology from a 'characterology':

> Your attempt is essentially characterological, which I cannot assert of my own typology. Nor was it ever my intention to characterize personalities, for which reason I did not put my description of the types at the beginning of the book. (Jung 1933/2015:129).

In the letter, Jung further states that the use of his typology as a characterology 'would be much too general and therefore much too scanty'. He believed that the reason for this misconception was the fact that 'the layman can form absolutely no conception of the peculiar material the psychotherapist is confronted with'. Jung writes that he was instead aiming to create a 'clear conceptual scheme based on empirically demonstrable factors', one that would aim at 'classifying empirical material'—meaning 'elucidating conceptually the empirical psychological material presented by any one individual thus subordinating it to general points of view'—rather than merely 'characterizing personalities' (Jung 1933/2015:130). In a different letter, dated 18 February 1935 and addressed to G.A. Farer, he again highlights the misconception that his typology was first and foremost a description of different personalities, writing that his readers were 'first of all led into the temptation of classifying everything typologically, which in itself is a pretty sterile undertaking' (Jung 1935/2015:186). However, Jung writes: 'it is not the case at all that I begin by classifying my patients into types and then give them the corresponding advice' (Jung 2015:186). Rather he generally used his typology with his patients only when he had to explain to them 'the one-sidedness of their behaviour' (Jung 1935/2015:186).

In the letter to G. A. Farner, Jung states that that there were two sides to his *Psychological Types*. On the one hand, he explains that he 'always use[d] typology in the stricter sense as a critical apparatus', adding that just 'the idea of a psychological

typology is really an attempt at a critical psychology' (Jung 1935/2015:186).[24] On the other hand, the book 'deals with the problem of opposites arising out of such criticism' (Jung 1935/2015:186). I would argue that the 'critical' aspect of *Psychological Types* is Jung's proposed *epistemology* for psychology—namely, his general view on the nature of psychological knowledge, or the notion of the 'personal equation'—whereas the problem of opposites, and its solution, is Jung's proposed *methodology* in light of his epistemology.

This thesis, then, seeks to contribute to the reception of Jung's *Psychological Types* as an *epistemological* project in the history and philosophy of science, and the history and philosophy of psychology in particular. It aims to show that this work of Jung, in addition to being a work of psychology, also provided a *philosophy of science* through a *philosophy of psychology*, and as such, constitutes an important case study in the field of the integrated history and philosophy of science.

Review of Arguments in Secondary Literature

When it comes to the discussion of Jung's position on science, a common view in Jung scholarship has been to say that, for Jung, science is fundamentally one-sided and therefore, limited—hence, psychology—in order to do justice to psychological phenomena—should not become a 'science' but move beyond it. Ellenberger established the tradition of contrasting Freud's positivism with Jung's 'pure' romanticism and arguing that Jung rejected the former, with its scientism. He argued that 'Jung's analytic of psychology, like Freud's psychoanalysis, is a late offshoot of Romanticism, but psychoanalysis is also the heir of positivism, scientism, and Darwinism, whereas analytic psychology rejects that heritage and returns to the unaltered sources of psychiatric Romanticism and philosophy of nature' (Ellenberger 1970:657). Marylin Nagy, in her *Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C.G. Jung*, argued that 'the conceptual structure of Jung's psychology is based on philosophical postulates which express an idealist and a metaphysical view of reality' and that it is

[24] Jung had expressed this view earlier, in June 1934, in a lecture given at ETH Zurich. There he said that 'psychological types are not meant to serve the purpose of labelling individuals [...], but they are a critical apparatus for the discovery of empirical psychological materials' (Jung 1934/2022:65).

a ‘position-taking on philosophical issues of the nineteenth century’ (Nagy 1991:263). Hence, she took Jung to mean that psychology should *not* become ‘too much of a science’, since, for Jung, ‘science is always "an affair of the intellect," and must not be allowed to overstep its proper boundaries and interfere with the practical living of life’ (Nagy 1991:78).[25] Roderick Main has argued that Jung’s own notion of synchronicity was instrumental in his reconceptualization of science and its relationship with religion (Main 2000). More recently, Peltier, for instance, has stated that, for Jung, ‘science needed to be larger than a defined paradigm’ (Peltier 2019:69). Part of this argument is also the view that, for Jung, science—specifically, Western science—fundamentally belongs to the realm of the ‘intellect’, or ‘rationality’. Mark Saban has described this as follows:

> In the case of science, [Jung] diagnoses western culture as suffering from a one-sided overevaluation of analytical intellect while more synthetic approaches supported by psychic functions such as intuition or feeling are undervalued and ignored. What, according to Jung, is necessary for the individuation of the western culture is a critical reappraisal of these ‘shadow’ factors, aiming toward their assimilation. (Saban 2014:36).

Jung’s work has been linked with the philosophy of the German idealists—as well as the scientists associated with the German Romanticism tradition—relating Jung’s plea for the recognition of the ‘irrational’ to the German idealists’ strive for holism. Joe Cambray has argued that Jung was ‘significantly influenced by various key figures [of German Romanticism] and their scientific approaches’, namely ‘their efforts to include aesthetic and holistic perspectives in scientific thought’ (Cambray 2014 30; 27).[26] Saban has argued that the dichotomy of ‘science vs art’ is fundamental to Jung’s psychology and that ‘it is Jung’s repeated emphasis upon the importance of, first the awareness of such tensions and subsequently the attempt to hold and transcend them, that characterizes Jung’s project in psychology’ (Saban 2014:35). This, then, results in ‘Jung’s refusal to choose between science and its

[25] As for Jung’s *Psychological Types* in particular, Nagy identifies the psychological view specifically with the introverted view, symbolised by the ‘soul’ and subjectivity, and contrasts it with the extraverted view, symbolised by empiricism and objectivity (Nagy 1991:78). However, as we shall see, for Jung, objectivity, in a revised sense, would mean to transcend one’s psychological type—be it extraverted or introverted—by integrating one’s unconscious, which would contain the opposite of one’s type.

[26] Cambray acknowledges that Jung ‘did not refer to the scientific work of the German Romantics, preferring to orient to the philosophical aspect of this tradition’ (Cambray 2014:30).

other, or rather, his insistence on choosing both' (Saban 2014:35). Saban adds that 'Jung is not opposed to science as such' but is rather against 'the exclusiveness of science: its claims to offer the only explanation of every aspect of human life' (Saban 2014:36). Finally, Ernst Falzeder has argued that 'Jung did not undergo a lasting "conversion" to an empiricist-scientific stance when he chose psychiatry as his vocation', but that his 'very choice of profession was in itself an attempt to come to terms with his inner dichotomy' (Falzeder 2016:21). Moreover, he also argues that 'we could view his entire work and theory as an attempt to find a superior standpoint with which to reconcile these two extreme poles' (Falzeder 2016:21). He then concludes that Jung's work could be described as a 'philosophical enterprise' (Falzeder 2016:26).

The argument in this thesis will build upon these views and further clarify Jung's position on science, and psychology as a science. We will see that Jung was critical of the dominance of the intellect, or rationality, in Western thought and indeed identified science to be its product. However, I will argue that Jung's criticism of science, his statement that science is not 'the *summa* of life', was specifically a criticism of 'rational' science rather than of the idea of science *per se*—of the view that science is a special way of gaining knowledge. Instead of refusing to choose between science and art—the rational and the irrational—*science itself needs to be reformulated to include the irrational.* Jung's work is then a criticism of the contemporary scientific method, rather than the scientific method itself. We will also see that Jung's project in his *Psychological Types*—with the psychological types understood as typical manifestations of the 'personal equation' that stand in the way of scientific objectivity—inevitably provided a re-imagining of the scientific method. Saban has described Jung's project in *Psychological Types* as follows: 'The whole point of Jung's *Psychological Types* was to attempt to address, and (as much as possible) overcome the aspect of the personal equation as perceived in the psychologies of Freud and Adler' (Saban in Jones 2014:153). He adds that '[i]t therefore attempts to transcend this problem by allowing for the different possible combinations of typological functions which can occur in individuals' (Saban in Jones 2014:153). Jung indeed intended his psychological types to be used to acknowledge the 'personal equation'—in this sense, typology could be seen as a 'metalanguage' for scientists, as Shamdasani has put it (Shamdasani 2003:69). However, we shall see that this was only the starting point for Jung, a description of

the *status quo*. The new scientific method lay in solving the *psychological* problem of one-sidedness—the 'problem of opposites'—that causes one to have a psychological type in the first place. The other ingredient in Jung's re-imagined scientific method was Jung's notion of 'individuation'—integration of the elements of the unconscious to achieve a balanced self, which, in the case of psychological types, could be termed 'untyping'—*through the integration of the opposite psychological type located in the unconscious, resulting in the removal of the one-sided perspective, or bias.* Furthermore, while Saban has talked of 'the individuation of the Western culture' through the acknowledgement of the repressed elements due to the domination of science—as we have seen in an earlier quote—one could also say that, for Jung, what was needed was the individuation of the *Western science* itself. From Jung's perspective, then, by solving the problem of opposites through individuation one could arrive at *objectivity* in a revised sense. Jung's take on the scientific method, then, firstly, acknowledges the personal equation, or the bias of the scientist—and, secondly, aims to help the scientist to arrive at a balanced psychological perspective—which is the new meaning of 'objective' for Jung. As Falzeder points out, '[i]mplicitly, he [...] claimed to have found, with his typology, an Archimedean point, with which he could move the world of psychology — even if he so often explicitly stated that this prospect was impossible' (Falzeder 2016:23). Hence, I follow on from Shamdasani's argument:

> The possibility of an objective scientific psychology hinged not only upon the recognition of the significance of the personal equation, but of finding a means of evading the infinite regress and relativity that it potentially led to. If all knowledge, if all psychology, is determined by one's personal equation, what chance is there of any objectivity, of any means of adjudicating between the claims of rival theories, or any possibility of a unified science of psychology? Jung's attempted solution was to provide a theory of the subjective determinants of the personal equation [in his *Psychological Types*]. Not only would this secure the scientific and objective status of psychology, psychology itself would be a superordinate science, as it alone could provide an explanation of the subjective determinants of all knowledge. Its success or failure hinged upon whether, in its own terms, it could provide a theory of the personal equation that attained to a level of objectivity. (Shamdasani 2003:75).

Since psychology was the science of subjectivity—the only science that was capable of studying the personal equation—Jung's revised 'scientific method' turned psychology

into the 'fundamental scientific discipline, upon which other disciplines should henceforth be based' (Shamdasani 2003:15). This meant, then, that 'for Jung, psychology was the discipline to unite the circle of the sciences' (Shamdasani 2003:18). Hence, whilst Jung's epistemology starts with a disunified psychology, and thus science, with a multitude of psychological attitudes, its objective *is* to reach a certain 'unity of science' through his proposed method in *Psychological Types*.[27] Instead of saying that Jung claimed to have 'annexed to science a realm of the human soul intermediate between religion and psychology', as Ellenberger put it, one could say that Jung strived to create a union between science and the realm of the human soul, thereby expanding the boundaries of science itself (Ellenberger 1970:657).

When it comes to the nature of the solution to this psychological 'problem of opposites'—namely, the process of individuation itself, we will see that Jung assigns a central role to *religion*. Nagy, for instance, recognises the importance of religion for Jung, arguing that Jung's psychological work was primarily concerned with 'experience of a religious nature' (Nagy 1991:17). She also clarifies that '[w]hat this means can probably best be indicated by referring to the original, etymological sense of the term, which means to bind back (into one's ethic or inner faith)' (Nagy 1991:17). Part of her argument is also based on her allusion to Jung's biography—namely, to Jung's childhood and his relationship with his father, who was a pastor (Nagy 1991:17). Nagy linked the centrality of religion for Jung with the limitations of the rational perspective by pointing out that '[n]o rational or formulaic expression, that is, no dogmatic formula, will suffice to achieve the goal of a religious point of view' (Nagy 1991:17). We will see that Jung believed the solution to the problem of opposites—and as a consequence, to the problem of the subjectivity, or the 'personal equation'—to be what he described as 'religious'. Hence, in *Psychological Types*, Jung talked of the 'reconciling symbol'—that which was capable of bringing the psychological opposites together and, as a result, resolving the problem of the 'personal equation'.

[27] For a general discussion on the unity and disunity of science, see Dupré (1993), Galison and Stump (1996), Cat (2017). For the discussion of unity and disunity in psychology in particular, see Viney (1996), Gaj (2016).

Jung's *Psychological Types* and *Liber Novus*

Jung's work in *Psychological Types* was fundamentally linked with another project that happened in parallel with it: in fact, his formulation of the 'new' scientific method was the result of a self-experimentation that Jung undertook from 1913 to 1930. This self-experimentation was subsequently referred to as his 'confrontation to the soul', or the 'confrontation with the unconscious' in his biography *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*.[28] It was concerned with the exploration of what Jung called the 'visionary imagination', or 'active imagination', the details of which were recorded in the so-called *Black Books*. Based on these records, he wrote the draft of *Liber Novus*, or the *Red Book* between 1913 and 1916 (Shamdasani 2009).[29] For Jung, his *Psychological Types* was a translation of his *Liber Novus* experience into abstract concepts: describing the way to the self through the process of individuation, as the result of the confrontation with the unconscious, which led to the 'new' science.

In a previous work *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, published in 1912, Jung had distinguished between two different kinds of thinking— 'directed thinking' and 'fantasy thinking'—which echo his dichotomy of the 'rational' and the 'irrational' in *Psychological Types* (Jung 1912/1916). This book was 'an extended study of fantasy thinking, and of the continued presence of mythological themes in the dreams and fantasies of contemporary individuals' (Shamdasani 2009:13). This work 'had revealed to Jung his mythlessness', which then resulted in his self-experimentation documented in the *Black Books* and described in *Liber Novus* in a narrative form, whose goal was to 'know his myth, his "personal equation"' (Shamdasani 2009:15). What was also significant in this self-experimentation for Jung was his engagement with what he famously termed the 'collective unconscious'—as he came to believe that his fantasies were not merely *personal*, but also *collective*. During this time, Jung was also revisiting Friedrich Nietzsche's *Thus*

[28] When it comes to Jung's *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Shamdasani has demonstrated in his 'Memories, Dreams, Omissions' that '[w]hat was indeed a remarkable biography has been mistakenly read as an autobiography' (Shamdasani 1999b:47). Having located a typed manuscript of *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* at the Countway Library of Medicine at Harvard, Shamdasani 'found not only whole chapters that were not published—such as an account of Jung's travels in London and Paris, and a chapter on William James—but also significant editing on almost every page' (Shamdasani 1999b:39).

[29] For a detailed outline and analysis of Jung's work in *Liber Novus*, see Shamdasani's 'Introduction' to the *Red Book,* published in 2009.

Spoke Zarathustra—which, as we shall see in this thesis, played a crucial role in Jung's formulation of the method for his new 'science' (Shamdasani 2009:30). Jung understood Nietzche's work to be important for what he saw as the recognition of the irrational and the foreshadowing of the process of individuation with his concept of 'creation of one's own values'.

Jung's *Liber Novus*, then, was concerned with these goals, which were part of his 'new' scientific method. The work contains a number of references to science, for instance '[s]cience has taken from us the capacity to believe'—alluding to the importance of religion that was suppressed by rationalistic science (Jung 2009:282). Here is a quote from Jung's dialogue with an imaginal figure from the 'unconscious', Izdubar:

> I: "Unfortunately our science has still not yet succeeded in finding a method against death."
>
> Iz: "Who then taught you such arts?"
>
> I: "In the course of the centuries men have made many discoveries through precise observation and the science of the outer things."
>
> Iz: "But this science is the awful magic that has lamed me. How can it be that you are still alive even though you drink from this poison every day?"
>
> I: "We've grown accustomed to this over time, because men get used to everything. But we're still somewhat lamed. On the other hand, science also has great advantages, as you've seen. What we've lost in terms of force, we've discovered many times through mastering the force of nature." (Jung 2009:281).

In the quote above, we can see a contrast between a view that was critical of science and regarded it as 'poison' and one that focused on the advantages and achievements of science. I am going to argue that, for Jung, the reconciliation of these two sides, that was at the heart of *Psychological Types*, did not simply equate to renunciation of science as an important way of gaining knowledge; rather it meant that science itself needed to be redefined to include the irrational, alongside the rational—in order to resolve the problem of the 'personal equation' and arrive at an 'objective' view, in a re-imagined sense.

We shall see throughout this thesis that the experience that Jung describes in *Liber Novus* was an important *lens* through which Jung understood the works of the

various authors that we will be looking at. Hence, *Psychological Types* is a result of the fusion of his reading with his psychological experience. Thus, Jung was trying to make sense of the different philosophical and literary texts by *mapping* the terms that he 'derived' from his experience *on to* these works. In that sense, there is a *subjective* level to *Psychological Types* that is of key importance: ultimately, it provides a description of Jung's *own* method of resolving the problem of the personal equation and the problem of opposites *through his psychological typology*.

The question at the heart of this thesis, then, concerns Jung's conceptualisation of his revised scientific method in terms of its philosophical basis. As we have seen, Jung himself emphasised the epistemological aspect of *Psychological Types,* which has been generally overlooked. In order to understand his proposed epistemology and locate it in the history of ideas, it is helpful to identify the different philosophical elements that underlie his epistemology, see how they relate to each other and how he put them all together.

Summary of The Argument

The central argument in this doctoral thesis, then, is as follows: with his theory of psychological types, Jung effectively redefines what 'science' should be, making his typology, in effect, his proposed new 'scientific method'—one that, he would argue, accounts for the way that people interact with the world. This method—presented by Jung as a development from the 'traditional' conception of the scientific method—still lies in overcoming subjectivity and achieving 'objectivity'; however, it is evident that what is meant by objectivity is radically different from the way it is generally conceptualised in scientific circles. In *Psychological Types*, this problem of achieving objectivity is presented, as expected, as a *psychological* problem—the 'problem of opposites'. Subjectivity, understood as the 'personal equation', is the result of a psychological 'involuntary one-sidedness', of *having* a *psychological type*. For Jung, to achieve 'objectivity', one needs to overcome one's one-sidedness by integrating the 'unconscious' side of one's psyche—one's psychological opposite. To do this is to solve the problem of opposites—the outline of this *solution* is then the central subject of Jung's *Psychological Types*. The dichotomy that is at the centre of Jung's

Psychological Types, as we shall see, is, according to Jung, that of the 'rational'—which has dominated Western thought and science—and the 'irrational', that has been suppressed by the former in the West. This thesis then follows Shamdasani in his argument in the introduction to *the Red Book* that an important goal of Jung was to 'acknowledge irrationality as a historical necessity' (Shamdasani 2009). As he points out:

> Jung argued that the era of reason and skepticism inaugurated by the French Revolution had had the effect that religion and irrationalism had been repressed. This had serious consequences, which had led to the outbreak of irrationalism represented by the world war. It was thus a historical necessity to acknowledge the irrational as a psychological factor. The acceptance of the irrational forms one of the central themes of *Liber Novus*. (Shamdasani 2009:56).

Now, Jung's solution to the problem of opposites—as well as his conceptualisation of psychological types to begin with and his general philosophy of psychology—is complex and bears on a number of different sources. The chapters of this focus on the key philosophers that Jung cites in *Psychological Types*. This thesis, being partly a historical study, is generally structured in *reverse chronological order*: it starts by looking at William James' pragmatist philosophy—the subject matter of Chapter VIII of Jung's *Psychological Types* titled 'The Problem of Types in Modern Philosophy' and ends with the discussion of different philosophical topics addressed by Jung in Chapter I titled 'The Problem of Types in the History of Classical and Medieval Thought'. The idea behind this structure is to create a useful framework for understanding Jung's typology by, first of all, locating Jung's ideas within their immediate historical context and then tracing them back to preceding centuries, illustrating how he utilised ideas from different schools of thought. Moreover, in this, there is also a *philosophical* justification for this structural choice: by starting with the work of James, I show that Jung takes up from him a problem that had been tackled by the philosophers of the preceding centuries, in different shapes and forms. In addition to this, my justification for writing this thesis in this order is precisely the fact that, as we shall see, Jung himself generally outlines his theory writing sequentially, as he goes along, without necessarily going back and changing what he wrote. And this is one of the central challenges of this thesis, the fact that Jung's exposition of his theory in *Psychological Types* is not consistent: his terminology evolves throughout his book, eventually arriving at the one he uses in Chapter X,

titled ‘General Description of the Types’. In a sense, then, among the key aims of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding Jung’s *Psychological Types*.

This thesis looks at five individual philosophers in separate chapters: William James, Henri Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Immanuel Kant. The rationale behind the choice of these authors was that together they provide a comprehensive account of the philosophical basis of Jung’s psychological types. This thesis shows how each philosopher contributed to a particular element of Jung’s thought. What is interesting about this list of philosophers is that, as we shall see, they formed a chain of thought together that was then continued by Jung. Indeed, apart from general parallels, there were direct links between the philosophers: Schopenhauer responded to Kant, Nietzsche responded to Schopenhauer, and James responded to Bergson. In this process, the answers were changed, as the questions themselves were often reformulated. A popular theme discussed by these philosophers was the criticism of reason overstepping its boundaries—which then implied a redefinition of science that would not be subject to this problem. This problem then is taken up by Jung. What is more, however, this thesis will show that in Jung’s reading of these philosophical works, some of the ideas were expanded, some were re-imagined, and some were completely reformulated.

Chapter I of this thesis examines the similarities between Jung’s and James’ epistemologies. It illustrates that Jung shared James’ view of science as an *instrument*, as well as his vision of psychology as a fundamentally *subjective* discipline, with the notion of the ‘personal equation’. The chapter then compares James’ and Jung’s typologies and shows that Jung appears to have taken it upon himself to work on the problem set out by James’ in *Pragmatism,* Lecture I titled ‘The Present Dilemma in Philosophy’: provide a typology that would help make sense of the differences, or conflicts, between various philosophical positions by viewing them as fundamentally *psychological*. In so doing, Jung also adopts Jamesian *pluralism*, providing in effect a *pluralistic philosophy of psychology* with his typology. However, it will be shown that this pluralism is only an *intermediate stage* before achieving objectivity in Jung’s sense: it is only a description of the status quo, an acknowledgment of the reality of a number of subjective, or *biased*, perspectives. For Jung, one needs to *overcome* one’s subjectivity, rather than merely acknowledge

it. The *reconciliation* of conflicting perspectives is key, and that is something that, for Jung, is absent in James' pragmatism. Nevertheless, I argue that James' philosophy played a central role in Jung's *Psychological Types*: most importantly, with the idea of a psychological typology as an *epistemological method*—or what could be called a new 'scientific method' for achieving objectivity in a revised sense.

Chapter II looks closely at the relationship between Jung's psychology and the philosophy of Bergson, whose work *Creative Evolution* was admired by both Jung and James. It shows that Jung adopts a Bergsonian critique of the dominating role of the intellect and a plea for the inclusion of the realm that is not covered by it—what Bergson refers to as the instinct and intuition. Whilst we shall see that Jung did not directly borrow from Bergson his notion of intuition—rather, he further elaborated on Maria Moltzer's reconceptualization of Bergson's intuition as a *psychological* notion—Bergson's importance for Jung's typology lies in his conceptualisation of two opposites—the 'rational' (exemplified by Bergson's 'intellect') and the 'irrational' (exemplified by Bergson's 'instinct' and 'intuition'). These, as previously stated, are key for Jung's *philosophy of science*: the acknowledgement that science (and Western thought in general) hitherto has been dominated by the rational, excluding almost entirely the irrational. However, Jung's criticism of Bergson was precisely that—that despite of his talk of instinct and intuition and his 'intuitive method', his work was nevertheless the product of the intellect, the rational, and, hence, was still one-sided. I argue that Bergson's particular importance for Jung's theory of psychological types, is as follows: with his typology, Jung *expands* Bergson's critique of the intellect by *reframing it in psychological terms*. In other words, for Jung, it was psychology, and not philosophy, that was capable of gaining knowledge of that which is beyond the realm of the 'rational'.

In his discussion of James' pragmatism, as well as of Bergson's philosophy, Jung states that it was Nietzsche who actually made good use of the 'intuitive method', thereby effectively introducing the irrational into Western philosophy, which Jung considers to be a key step towards the resolution of the conflict of opposites. In so doing, Jung also praises Nietzsche for his 'creativeness'—something that James and Bergson seemed to lack. Chapter III of this thesis, then, examines Jung's reading of two of Nietzsche's works—the *Birth of Tragedy* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*—in order to understand the impact of Nietzsche's philosophy on Jung's theory of

psychological types. It shows that, for Jung, apart from meaningfully engaging with the irrational, Nietzsche's work (in particular, his idea of the 'overman' in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*) provides insight into the act of self-creation, which Jung read as a foreshadowing of the 'individuation' process, a process of psychological integration. As such, Jung regards Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* in particular as effectively the *only* good example of a 'visionary' work in philosophy—a work that displays access into the 'collective unconscious'. To explore further the notion of visionary works in more detail, Chapter III of this thesis also looks at two other 'visionary' authors (literary authors, rather than philosophers) whose work Jung engages with in *Psychological Types*—namely, Carl Spitteler and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. As stated previously, despite Jung's debt to pragmatism, Jung criticised it for its lack of a solution to the 'problem of opposites'—which Jung understood to be fundamentally a psychological conflict within an individual, rather than just a conflict of opposing perspectives, or 'personal equations', between different people. To resolve the problem of opposites one needs to integrate one's 'unconscious' and the 'collective unconscious'. Jung's own proposed solution to the problem of opposites—the notion of the 'reconciling symbol'—is 'religious' and is outlined in Chapter V of his *Psychological Types* titled 'The Problem of Types in Poetry', where Jung uses Spitteler's prose epic *Prometheus and Epimetheus* to frame his discussion. The chapter also examines Jung's reading of Goethe's *Faust* (with *Faust, Part Two* being another example of a 'visionary' work), as well as his *Prometheus Fragment* and *Pandora*, in the context of the problem of opposites.

Chapter IV looks at the relationship between Jung's psychological typology and Schopenhauer's philosophy, showing that the latter, namely the notion of the 'will', was important for providing a philosophical basis for Jung's notions of the 'unconscious', the 'libido' and 'primordial image', or 'archetypes'. The chapter examines the parallel between Jung's four 'functions' and Schopenhauer's four types of the 'principle of sufficient reason' (related to Schopenhauer's 'principium individuationis') as described in his *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.* Finally, I show that Jung used Schopenhauer's philosophy to conceptualise his *rational* pair of opposites— 'thinking' and 'feeling'.

Chapter V of this thesis evaluates the significance of Kant's philosophy—primarily, his *Critique of Pure Reason*— for Jung's psychological typology. Kant's thought

provides an important philosophical basis for Jung's theory of types: firstly, by stating that reality is knowable only indirectly rather than directly, and, secondly, by redefining objectivity to be limited by the very conditions of possibility of knowledge. I argue that Jung believes he is *expanding* Kant's thought by *re-imagining* his philosophy in psychological terms. In particular, Jung *re-imagines* Kant's categories as his psychological types, which then means that, for Jung, the path to objectivity lies in the resolution of the *psychological* problem of opposites.

Finally, Chapter VI explores Jung's discussion in Chapter I of *Psychological Types*, titled 'The Problem of Types in the History of Classical and Medieval Thought'. It examines the broad philosophical, as well as theological, topics he addresses, such as the realism and nominalism debate, and explores the ways in which he uses them to conceptualise his types and how they relate to his epistemology. Firstly, we shall see that it is in this discussion where he first outlines the notion of psychological one-sidedness, relating it to numerous theological and philosophical debates in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and then introduces the notion of 'fantasy'—a special psychological activity that is capable of reconciling the opposites. Secondly, I argue that, for Jung, the significance of the realism and nominalism debate (or the 'problem of universals') does not only present itself as another example of the psychological conflict of opposites, but also serves as an epistemological basis for his typology itself. In particular, Jung effectively applies Peter Abelard's solution to the problem of universals to his own typology by conceptualising his types as 'abstractions' or 'generalisations' that are not 'real' (in the strictly realist sense)—and so, it is impossible to provide a precise, complete description of the types themselves—but that, nevertheless, constitute *observable similarities* between individuals. This makes typology then, from a pragmatist perspective, a useful tool. Hence, we can see how the ancient and medieval problem of universals and twentieth-century pragmatism are brought together in Jung's conceptualisation of his psychological typology.

Glossary: Jung's General Description of Types

Before we proceed to examine Jung's conceptualisation of this typology through his reading of philosophical works, it is helpful to provide some key definitions that are given in the last chapter of *Psychological Types*—Chapter XI, titled 'Definitions'—as well as a general outline of Jung's psychological types, as described in the penultimate chapter of the book, titled 'General Description of the Types'.

First of all, Jung differentiates between two 'function attitudes', denoting his most famous typological dichotomy: that of 'extraversion' and 'introversion'. The former is used to describe a psychological orientation towards the *object*, or, in other words, 'an outward-turning of the libido' (Jung 1923:542). He describes it further:

> With this concept I denote a manifest relatedness of subject to object in the sense of a positive movement of subjective interest towards the object. Everyone in the state of extraversion thinks, feels, and acts in relation to the object, and moreover in a direct and clearly observable fashion, so that no doubt can exist about his positive dependence upon the object. In a sense, therefore, extraversion is an outgoing transference of interest from the subject to the object. (Jung 1923:542).

'Introversion', on the other hand, is used to denote a psychological orientation towards the *subject*, or, in other words, 'a turning inward of the libido, whereby a negative relation of object to subject is expressed' (Jung 1923:567). He describes it further:

> Interest does not move towards the object, but recedes towards the subject. Everyone whose attitude is introverted thinks, feels, and acts in a way that clearly demonstrates that the subject is the chief factor of motivation while the object at most receives only a secondary value. (Jung 1923:567).

Secondly, Jung identifies 'psychological functions', which denote certain forms of psychological activity that are responsible for a particular way of interacting with reality. He further describes them as follows:

> By psychological function I understand a certain form of psychic activity that remains theoretically the same under varying circumstances. From the energic standpoint a function is a phenomenal form of libido (q.v.) which theoretically remains constant, in

> much the same way as physical force can be considered as the form or momentary manifestation of physical energy. (Jung 1923:547).

Thirdly, Jung then distinguishes between four different psychological functions: 'thinking', 'feeling', 'sensation', and 'intuition'. These functions, Jung, clarifies, are 'neither mutually relatable nor mutually reducible' (Jung 1923:547). *Thinking,* the opposite of *feeling*, is defined as a psychological process that builds concepts: 'Thinking is that psychological function which, in accordance with its own laws, brings given presentations into conceptual connection' (Jung 1923:611). *Feeling*, on the other hand, is described as 'a process that takes place between the ego and a given content' and 'imparts to the content a definite *value* in the sense of acceptance or rejection ('like' or 'dislike')', and 'can also appear, isolated in in the form of "mood"' (Jung 1923:543). *Sensation*, the opposite of *intuition*, denotes the psychological process of perception, or the use of the five senses: 'Sensation, or sensing, is that psychological function which transmits a physical stimulus to perception. It is, therefore, identical with perception' (Jung 1923:585). Finally, *intuition* is used to describe 'that psychological function which transmits perception in an *unconscious way*', through which 'any content is presented as a complete whole, without our being able to explain or discover in what way this content has been arrived at' (Jung 1923:568). It is interesting that Jung also defines intuition *negatively*, meaning as that which it is *not*—namely, thinking, feeling or sensation: 'Everything, whether outer or inner objects or their associations, can be the object of this perception. Intuition has this peculiar quality: it is neither sensation, nor feeling, nor intellectual conclusion, although it may appear in any of these forms' (Jung 1923:568).

Fourthly, Jung distinguishes between 'rational' and 'irrational' functions. Both thinking and feeling, are seen as *rational* functions, meaning that they constitute forms of *judgment*. He further describes the rational as follows:

> The rational is the reasonable, that which accords with reason. I conceive reason as an attitude whose principle is to shape thought, feeling, and action in accordance with objective values. Objective values are established by the average experience of external facts on the one hand, and of inner psychological facts on the other. Such experiences, however, could represent no objective 'value', if 'valued' as such by the subject; for this would already amount to an act of reason. (Jung 1923:583).

Sensation and intuition, on the other hand, as different types of *perception*, constitute what Jung calls *irrational* functions: 'Both *intuition* and *sensation* are psychological functions which achieve their functional fulfilment in the *absolute perception* of occurrences in general', which means that 'in accordance with their nature, their attitude must be set towards every possibility and what is absolutely accidental; they must, therefore, entirely forgo rational direction' (Jung 1923:570-571). Jung clarifies, however, that the term 'irrational' does not 'denote something contrary to *reason*, but something outside the province of reason, whose essence, therefore, is not established by reason' (Jung 1923:569).

Finally, each function can have either an *introverted* or *extraverted* orientation. Hence, there are eight *psychological types* in Jung's *Psychological Types*: 'extraverted thinking' and 'introverted thinking', 'extraverted feeling' and 'introverted feeling', 'extraverted sensation' and 'introverted sensation', and 'extraverted intuition' and 'introverted intuition'. In 'General Description of the Types', Jung provides detailed descriptions of these.

Extraverted thinking is a type of thinking that is conditioned by 'objective data', or concrete external facts.[30] This psychological type paints a picture of a person whose aim is to 'bring his total life-activities into relation with intellectual conclusions, which in the last resort are always orientated by objective data, whether objective facts or generally valid ideas' (Jung 1923:435). This type 'gives the deciding voice—not merely for himself alone but also on behalf of his entourage—either to the actual objective reality or to its objectively orientated, intellectual formula' (Jung 1923:435). *Introverted thinking*, on the other hand, is a type of thinking that is 'primarily orientated by the subjective factor' (Jung 1923:480). As a result, this psychological type 'formulates questions and creates theories', 'opens up prospects and yields insight', but 'in the presence of facts it exhibits a reserved demeanour' (Jung 1923:480-481). For this psychological type what is of 'absolutely paramount importance is the development and presentation of the subjective idea, that primordial symbolical image standing more or less darkly before the inner vision' (Jung 1923:481). In this description, Jung shows the one-sidedness of both extraverted thinking and introverted thinking: 'For, as in the former case the purely

[30] According to Jung, this orientation towards the object could also manifest itself in borrowing of ideas 'from without', for instance, through tradition or education (Jung 1923:428).

empirical heaping together of facts paralyses thought and smothers their meaning, so in the latter case introverted thinking shows a dangerous tendency to coerce facts into the shape of its image, or by ignoring them altogether, to unfold its phantasy image in freedom' (Jung 1923:481-482).[31]

Extraverted feeling is a type of feeling that is 'orientated by objective data', which means that it 'agrees with objective values', and 'generally valid standards'. For example, 'I may feel constrained, for instance, to use the predicate 'beautiful' or 'good', not because I find the object 'beautiful' or 'good' from my own subjective feeling, but because it is *fitting* and politic so to do so; and fitting it certainly is, inasmuch as a contrary opinion would disturb the general feeling situation' (Jung 1923:446). *Introverted feeling*, on the contrary, is a type of feeling that is 'determined principally by the 'subjective factor', which means that 'this feeling appears much less upon the surface and is, as a rule misunderstood' (Jung 923:489-490). This type of feeling 'strives after an inner intensity' and its depth 'can only be divined—they can never be clearly comprehended' (Jung 1923:490).

Extraverted sensation is a type of sensation that has a 'preferential objective determination', which results in a 'pronounced sensuous hold to the object' (Jung 1923:457). This type is 'equipped with the potentest vital instinct', which means that '[n]o other human type can equal the extraverted sensation type in realism' (Jung 1923:457).[32] *Introverted sensation*, on the other hand, has a 'subjective factor' and is 'based upon the subjective portion of perception', which is best illustrated in the process of creation of artworks: 'When, for instance, several painters undertake to paint one and the same landscape, with a sincere attempt to reproduce it faithfully, each painting will none the less differ from the rest, not merely by virtue of a more or less developed ability, but chiefly because of a different vision; there will even appear in some of the paintings a decided psychic variation, both in general mood and in treatment of colour and form' (Jung 1923:498).

Extraverted intuition is 'wholly directed upon outer objects', which means that this type 'is never to be found among the generally recognized reality values, but he is always present where possibilities exist' (Jung 1923:461;464). This psychological

[31] The first chapter of this thesis will show that Jung relates his dichotomy of extraverted thinking and introverted thinking to James' 'tough-minded' and 'tender-minded' types of temperament.
[32] In Chapter III of this thesis, we shall see that Jung relates Nietzsche's description of the Dionysian art-tendency to his extraverted sensation psychological type.

type ‘has a keen nose for things in the bud pregnant with future promise’ and ‘can never exist in stable, long-established condition of generally acknowledged though limited value: because his eye is constantly ranging for new possibilities, stable conditions have an air of impending suffocation’ (Jung 1923:464). Finally, the *introverted intuition* psychological type, has an orientation towards the subject, which results in an ‘extraordinary aloofness of the individual from tangible reality’ (Jung 1923:508). This type ‘produces a peculiar type of man, viz. the mystical dreamer and seer on the one hand, or the fantastical crank and artist on the other’ (Jung 1923:508). If the person of this type is an artist, the type ‘reveals extraordinary, remote things in his art, which in iridescent profusion embrace both the significant and the banal, the lovely and the grotesque, the whimsical and the sublime’ (Jung 1923:509). If not, then ‘he is frequently an unappreciated genius, a great man 'gone wrong ', a sort of wise simpleton, a figure for 'psychological' novels’ (Jung 1923:509).[33]

[33] As we shall see in Chapter III of this thesis, Jung relates Nietzsche’s description of the Apollonian art-tendency to his introverted intuition psychological type. Furthermore, Jung also used Nietzsche himself as an example of this type.

Chronology

Below is a timeline of critical events in regard to Jung's epistemological project in *Psychological Types*, including the history of philosophical ideas that were taken up by Jung, as well as the evolution of Jung's theory prior to the publication of the book.

ca. 469–399	Socrates.
ca. 445 – ca. 365 BC	Antisthenes, a pupil of Socrates, founds Cynic philosophy, characterised by nominalism.
ca. 435 – ca. 365 BC	Euclid of Megara, a pupil of Socrates, founds the Megarian school, synthesising Socrates' ethical principle with the idea of 'The One' of the Eleatics (a pre-Socratic school). Among his pupils is Eubulides, famous for his logical paradoxes, such as the Masked Man and the Horns paradoxes.
ca. 428 – ca. 347 BC	Plato formulates his theory of Forms or Ideas in his Socratic dialogues, including the *Republic* (ca. 375 BC), where he provides the allegory of the cave. According to Plato, the concrete physical world is only an imitation of the perfect Forms or Ideas—the abstract essences of all things—which provide true knowledge accessible through reason. Plato's theory thus offers a realist solution to the problem of universals.

384 – 322 BC	Aristotle formulates his solution to the problem of universals, according to which forms only exist in individual objects, which are a combination of form and matter. In the *Categories*, Aristotle provides a classification of what can be a subject or a predicate in a proposition, enumerating the basic categories of reality itself. Aristotle's philosophy emphasises the role of experience in the acquisition of knowledge.
ca. 155 – ca. 220 AD	Tertullian.
ca. 185 – ca. 254 AD	Origen.
ca. 1033 – 1109	St Anselm, a Platonic realist, formulates the ontological argument for the existence of God in the *Proslogion* (1077–1078).
ca. 1050 – ca. 1125	Roscellinus, a French philosopher, advances his nominalist thesis as a solution to the problem of universals, challenging the prevailing realist view. According to Roscellinus, only individual things exist—the universals are nothing but words.
ca. 1079 – 1142	Peter Abelard, a student of Roscellinus, offers his account of nominalism that acknowledges the relations of similarity between individual objects, whilst stating that they are nothing beyond that.

1620	Francis Bacon suggests the inductive reasoning as the basis of the scientific method in *The Novum Organum*.
1641	René Descartes describes his rationalist philosophy in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, where he provides his version of the ontological argument for the existence of God and outlines his substance dualism.
1689	John Locke argues that sense experience is the primary source of knowledge in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.
1773	Goethe publishes *Prometheus Fragment*.
1781	Kant publishes *The Critique of Pure Reason*, where he outlines his transcendental idealism, offering an alternative to empiricism and rationalism. Kant distinguishes between our experience of reality and the thing in itself—the latter being unknowable. Our experience of reality is conditioned by the 'categories of the understanding', which are knowable and universal.
1786	Kant publishes *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, where he argues that psychology cannot be a true science since it is impossible to apply mathematics to it.
1788	Kant publishes *The Critique of Practical Reason,* where he argues that we must postulate the existence of God and immortality for us to be moral and aspire towards the highest good.

1808	Goethe publishes *Faust, Part One*.
1810	Goethe publishes *Pandora*.
1813	Schopenhauer completes his doctoral dissertation *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,* reworking Kant's categories of the understanding into four classes of objects.
1818	Schopenhauer publishes *The World as Will and Presentation*, where he argues that the thing in itself is knowable and it is 'will', a blind, perpetually striving force behind all nature, which manifests itself as manifold 'presentations' to a subject.
1832	Goethe publishes *Faust, Part Two*.
1869	Von Hartman publishes his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, in which he reformulates Schopenhauer's notion of blind will as 'unconscious' will.
1872	Nietzsche publishes *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, where he provides a description of two art tendencies, the Apollonian and the Dionysian, the union of which gave birth to the Greek tragedy.

1881	Spitteler publishes *Prometheus and Epimetheus: A Prose Epic*.
1883	Nietzsche publishes *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*.
1890	James publishes *The Principles of Psychology*, where he argues that the personal equation is fundamental to the science of psychology.
ca. 1890 – 1894	Jung reads religious literature, Goethe's *Faust*, classical and medieval philosophy, Schopenhauer's and Kant's works for the first time in his school years.
1896 – 1899	Jung delivers lectures at the Zofingia Society during his student years at the University of Basel. During this time, he engages in an in-depth reading of von Hartman's, Schopenhauer's, and Kant's works.
1897	Jung's copy of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Presentation* is dated 1897.
ca. 1898	Jung reads Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* for the first time.
1902	James publishes *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.
1902	

	Jung completes his dissertation titled *On The Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena,* where he cites James' *The Principles of Psychology*.
1907	Bergson publishes *Creative Evolution*, where he provides a critique of the intellect and an account of instinct and intuition. Here, he describes his notion of élan vital, a vital impetus, to explain evolution with his 'intuitive method', as opposed to the intellectual method of science.
1907	James publishes *Pragmatism, A New Way for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, where he provides a description of two types of temperament in philosophy—the tender-minded and the tough-minded—whilst outlining his version of pragmatism.
1909	James publishes *A Pluralistic Universe*.
September 1909	Jung meets James at the Clark Conference. Here, Jung introduces the term 'introversion'.
1911	Théodore Flournoy publishes *The Philosophy of William James* (after James dies in 1910).
1912	James' *Essays in Radical Empiricism* are published posthumously.

1912	Jung's copy of Bergson's *Creative Evolution* is the 1912 German translation.
1912	Jung's copy of James's *Pragmatism* is dated 1912.
1912	Jung publishes *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, in which he distinguishes between directed thinking and fantasy thinking. Here, he also refers to Spitteler's *Imago*.
August 1913	Jung delivers a paper titled 'On Psychoanalysis' before the 17th International Medical Congress in London, where he refers to Bergson's *élan vital* in the context of his discussion of his notion of the libido.
September 1913	Jung delivers a lecture titled 'A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types' at the Psychoanalytical Congress in Munich, where he distinguishes between extraversion and introversion, as two opposite movements of the libido, referring to James' 'tender-minded' and 'tough-minded' types, as well as Nietzsche's contrast between the Apollonian and the Dionysian. Jung establishes the type problem: the need for psychology to accommodate both types.
1913 – 1916	Jung writes the draft of *Liber Novus*.
November 1914	Jung re-reads Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

July 1914	Jung delivers a lecture before Psycho-Medical Society in London, published later under the title 'On Psychological Understanding', where Jung provides a critique of the causal principle of contemporary science in psychology, using the example of Goethe's *Faust*.
1915 – 1916	Jung engages in detailed correspondence with Hans Schmid-Guisan regarding the question of psychological types, where he associates introversion with thinking and extraversion with feeling and defines irrational as the opposite of anyone's given type.
1916	Jung delivers a lecture before the Association for Analytical Psychology, which he publishes under the title 'La Structure de l'inconscient' in Flournoy's journal, *Archives de Psychologie*. Here, he distinguishes between 'personal' and 'impersonal' unconscious and outlines his notion of individuation. Here, Jung also credits Bergson for the recognition of the irrational.
1916	Maria Moltzer delivers two papers at the Psychological Club in Zurich—one titled 'The Conception of the Libido and its Psychic Manifestations' and another titled 'On the Conception of the Unconscious'—in which she formulates the notion of intuition as a psychological type, which Jung then reworks.
1917	Jung publishes a book titled *The Psychology of The Unconscious Processes: Being a Survey of the Modern Theory and Method of Analytical Psychology*, where he still equates extraversion with feeling and introversion with thinking. Here, Jung provides a

	dynamic view of his typology: one can overcome one's psychological type by developing the unconscious opposite type, which results in individuation.
1921	Jung publishes *Psychological Types* in German. In the book, he develops the notion of 'function attitudes' (introversion and extraversion) and 'psychological functions' (thinking, feeling, intuition, sensation), which results in eight different psychological types. In addition to this, the thinking and feeling types are rational, whereas the intuitive and sensation types are irrational.
1923	Jung publishes *Psychological Types* in English.

CHAPTER I. JUNG AND WILLIAM JAMES: PRAGMATISM, THE PERSONAL EQUATION, AND TYPOLOGY AS AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL METHOD

Introduction

When it comes to the discussion of the relationship between Carl Gustav Jung's psychology and philosophy, Marilyn Nagy argued in her *Philosophical Issues in The Psychology of C.G. Jung* (1991) that, for Jung, '[r]eal knowledge is based on real experience, and that means experience in which the individual is moved by numinously felt inner feelings which convince him/her of the reality of the mental/psychic/spiritual sphere' (Nagy 1991:17). We shall see that this view of the nature of psychological experience in Jung's work echoes specifically the philosophy of William James (1842-1910), the American philosopher and psychologist.

The first chapter of this thesis looks closely at the relationship between Jung's typology, as outlined in *Psychological Types*, and the philosophy of James. In this chapter, I am going to argue that James' philosophy played a crucial part in Jung's project in *Psychological Types*. Firstly, Jung shared James' goal to account for the 'personal equation', which effectively resulted in a reformulation of scientific objectivity itself. Secondly, Jung borrowed from James the very idea of a psychological typology as an *epistemological method*, which would ensure this objectivity.

The chapter begins by looking at James' pragmatist philosophy of science and shows that Jung shared James' view of scientific theories as 'instruments' in *Psychological Types*. After that, it looks at the notion of the 'personal equation' in psychology, as described by James, and shows that it was one of the tenets of Jung's psychology and (what I refer to as) his philosophy of psychology. Furthermore, this chapter illustrates that Jung's philosophy of psychology also shared James' pluralism—namely, the idea that there were *many* psychological principles that were irreducible to one another—as a starting point. After that, it shows that Jung's motivation behind his typology was partly inspired by that of James': Jung shared the idea that

philosophical (and, hence, epistemological) positions fundamentally constituted certain psychological attitudes, which meant that a psychological typology could be used to account for the 'personal equations' of individuals (psychologists in particular, as well as scientists and philosophers in general). The last section of this chapter shows that James' and Jung's epistemologies were similar in that they both referred to themselves as 'empiricists'—as a 'radical empiricist' for James—without sharing the tenets of classical empiricism. The chapter looks more closely at James' radical empiricism and his idea of 'pure experience' and argues that James effectively redefined the concept of scientific objectivity by expanding the notion of 'experience' as a source of knowledge to include not just sense experience, but also the realm of the mental—hence, the realm of psychology. This also provided a basis for the inclusion of 'religious experience', as a *psychological experience*, in the redefined realm of science—which, as we shall see throughout this thesis, was of central importance to Jung.

Review of Arguments in Secondary Literature

The scholarship on the relationship between Jung's work and James' philosophy has been historically important in the context of the criticism of the Freudocentric account of Jung's psychology.[34] In 1945, Grace Foster drew parallels between Jung's and James' interest in religion and the Eastern thought, writing that '[i]n a general way James and Jung also agree in their theories on why is that religious experiences may bring mental healing' and '[b]oth James and Jung believed that the Western world could learn much about psychotherapy from the experience of Oriental mystics' (Foster 1945:302-303). She adds that '[a]nother area of agreement between James and Jung lies in their general approach to the understanding of personality', stating that '[b]oth believed in a psychology that was functional and dynamic' (Foster 1945:304). However, following A.A. Roback, the paper goes on to draw similarities between James and Freud as well, arguing that 'they were both radical empiricists;

[34] For a detailed discussion as to why a Freudocentric account of Jung's psychology 'amounts to nothing less than the mislocation of Jung's work in the intellectual history of the twentieth century', see Shamdasani (1998b, 1999a, 1999b).

outspoken anti-tradionalists; they were both unceremonious in their "dethronement of the normal"' (Foster 1945:306).

In 1961, Avis Mary Dry argued that 'the writer with whom Jung probably had most in common is William James' (Dry 1961:209). She writes that they both had 'the same quest for reconciliation of the old religious beliefs and the new scientific theories, the same turning to Christian sources in a universalistic rather than dogmatic spirit, and the same stress on the therapeutic value of religion' (Dry 1961:209). Furthermore, she already notes that Jung borrowed James' view of science as an instrument: 'Theories, as Jung himself has quoted from William James, are instruments' (Dry 1961:109).

In 1970, Henri Ellenberger drew a parallel between Jung's concept of the archetype and James' experience described in his biographical piece 'On Some Mental Effects of the Earthquake', published posthumously as part of *Memories and Studies* in 1911 (James 1911/2018). He quotes James' experience of an earthquake in San-Francisco, in which he had no fear but felt 'pure delight and welcome' and 'personified the earthquake as a permanent individual entity' (Ellenberger 1970:706). James' wrote that: 'I realise now better than ever how inevitable were men's earlier mythologic versions of such catastrophes, and how artificial and against the grain of our spontaneous perceiving are the later habits into which sciences educates us' (James in Ellenberger 1970:706). Ellenberger then describes James' account as a 'wonderful picture of how a man experiences the emergence of an archetypal image' (Ellenberger 1970:706).

Eugene Taylor's work in his essay 'Jung and William James', published in 1980, was historically important for locating Jung's psychology in the context of James' pragmatism. In the essay, he argued that Jung's reading of James played an important role in formulating Jung's position with regard to science. As he points out, 'Jung is fond of quoting "nichts als", James' famous "nothing but" phase, which James had used in *Pragmatism* to contrast the spectacular rise of positivistic science with the decline in personal meaning and value' (Taylor 1980:165). According to Taylor, Jung took James' phrase to mean 'the habit of explaining something unknown by reducing it to something apparently known and thereby devaluing it, a consistent tendency of both the extraverted scientific temperament, and the more orthodox institutions of rational Christianity' (Taylor 1980:165). He adds that 'James

saw science pursued with the passion of a religion, an analogy which intrigued Jung immensely, hence he often quoted James's "Our scientific temper is devout"' (Taylor 1980:165). This chapter, then, seeks to expand on Taylor's argument that James' philosophy of science was instrumental for Jung's psychology.

In addition to this, Taylor's essay also provides a summary of James' general contribution to Jung's typology. He argues that Jung followed on from James' typological project—in particular, 'James' discussion of analytic versus constructive kinds of thinking in the *Principles*, and James' discussion in *Pragmatism* of "tender-" and "tough-minded" types of character'—and 'cited James in numerous papers and addresses delivered between 1913 and 1917, culminating in Jung's volume on *Psychological Types* published in 1920' (Taylor 1980:163). According to Taylor, Jung's 'conclusion was that while James was a true pioneer, being the first to point out this most important distinction between inward versus outward orientation of psychic energy, his classification was too simple, for the one type too easily shaded into the other' (Taylor 1980:163). Hence, '[a] more precise, multi-dimensional conceptualization was needed, which Jung then presented as his introversion-extraversion model with the attendant functions of thinking, feeling, sensing, and intuiting' (Taylor 1980:163). This chapter will look more closely at Jung's discussion of James' typology in *Psychological Types*, exploring its significance for Jung's conceptualisation of his own typology in more detail.

Sonu Shamdasani has firmly located Jung's psychology in the context of James' work, by arguing that 'Jung's psychology was far more closely allied and indebted to the work of William James and Théodore Flournoy …' (Shamdasani 1999:540). In this chapter, I follow on from Shamdasani's contention that James' pragmatism formed an important part of Jung's *epistemology*—and was particularly important in the context of Jung's diversion from Sigmund Freud:

> … Jung had adopted James' pragmatism as a critical part of his methodology, as well as acknowledging pluralism as a basic necessity for psychology. In both of these respects, James' epistemology provided theoretical ground for some of the issues at stake in Jung's conflict with Freud, and the basis for his own radically different methodology. (Shamdasani 2003:66).[35]

[35] Links have also been drawn between Jung's psychology and the work of other American pragmatists and psychologists—John Dewey and Charles Peirce. See Dunlap (2013) and Maddalena (2017).

This chapter also contributes to Matei Iagher's recent argument that James' notion of 'conversion' outlined in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* formed an important part of Jung's conceptualisation of the process of 'individuation' during the time in which he was working on his *Psychological Types* (Iagher 2018).

Jung Reads James

William James was born in 1842 in New York to Henry James and Mary Walsh. He spends several years in Europe, studying in Geneva, Paris, and Boulogne-sur-Mer as a teenager, which sets a pattern for James, as he subsequently makes numerous European journeys throughout his life. In Europe, he develops an interest in both science and painting. Torn between the two as a choice of profession, he ultimately decides to enter Lawrence Scientific School at Harvard, commencing his medical studies at Harvard in 1864 (Goodman 2021). Interestingly, this reminds us of Jung's own dilemma, his inability to choose between the sciences and the humanities. In 1872, James begins to teach comparative physiology to undergraduate students and in 1874 he begins teaching psychology, establishing the first psychology laboratory in America. In 1880 he is appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Harvard and subsequently teaches both psychology and philosophy (Goodman 2021). Thus, his work was fundamentally interdisciplinary, combining physiology, psychology, and philosophy. His first major work, *The Principles of Psychology*, originally published in 1890, contained 'seeds of pragmatism and phenomenology, and influenced generations of thinkers in Europe and America, including Edmund Husserl, Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, and Ludwig Wittgenstein' (Goodman 2021). As Russell Goodman points out, James made his most important philosophical contributions in the last years of his life, writing between 1904-1905 what came to be known as *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (which were collected and published posthumously in 1912) and publishing his *Pragmatism, A New Way for Some Old Ways of Thinking* and *A Pluralistic Universe* in 1907 and 1909 respectively.

In this chapter, then, we will explore the significance of James' psychological and philosophical work for Jung's project in *Psychological Types*. Jung already cites James in the introduction of his dissertation titled *On The Psychology and*

Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena for his medical degree in 1902, which dealt with 'certain rare states of consciousness', observations on which 'crop up sporadically in the literature on narcolepsy, lethargy, *autamatisme ambulatoire*, periodic amnesia, double consciousness, somnambulism, pathological dreaminess, pathological lying, etc.' (Jung 1902/1970:3).[36] In it, Jung cites James' *The Principles of Psychology*, where James 'describes a case of an "ambulatory sort"', as well as refers to the case of Mary Reynolds (Jung 1902/1970:11, 61). As for James' *Pragmatism*, as Shamdasani has noted, 'Jung's copy of James' *Pragmatism* is inscribed "New York Oct 1912" (Shamdasani 2003:61). In his *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido,* Jung uses James' work to help conceptualise two types of thinking: 'directed thinking' and 'dream or phantasy thinking' (Jung 1912/1916:21-22). In his paper titled 'A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types', delivered at the Psychoanalytical Congress in Munich in 1913, Jung already refers to James' typology in his *Pragmatism*, stating that 'we owe the best observations on this subject to the philosophy of William James', and then provides a description of James' 'tender-minded' and 'tough-minded' types of temperament (Jung 1913/1920a). This paper was historically significant: here Jung, having proposed his dichotomy of 'extroversion' and 'introversion', denoting 'two opposite directions of the libido', then goes on to classify Freud's and Adler's psychological standpoints (Jung 1913/1920a).[37] According to Jung, psychology as a science had to face the 'difficult task of elaborating a psychology which should pay equal attention to the types of mentality'—which as we shall see, was a key motivation behind his project in *Psychological Types* (Jung 1913/1920a). In an essay 'On Psychological Understanding', Jung again refers to 'an excellent description of the two types in Philosophy in his book on "Pragmatism," (Jung 1914/1915:397).[38] Here, he also refers to James in his criticism of what he calls the 'analytic' or 'reductive method', which 'tries to replace the religious and philosophical needs of mankind by a more

[36] Jung's dissertation was translated (by M.D. Eder) and published in *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* in 1916.
[37] Prior to this, Jung had made a distinction between predicate and definition types through his association studies. The types were discussed in Jung's paper at Clark University in 1909 (Jung 1910).
[38] This paper was originally delivered in English before Psycho-Medical Society in London in July 1914, revised and published in German later in 1914. It was then translated and published in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology* in 1915 under the title 'On Psychological Understanding'. A different version of the paper was later published in the second edition of *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* as Part II of 'The Content of Psychoses' in 1917 (1914/1920d). 'On Psychological Understanding' subsequently appeared in *The Collected Works by C.G. Jung*, Volume 3 (Jung 1914/1982).

elementary viewpoint, following the principle of the "nothing-but," as *James* nicely says' (Jung 1914/1915:397).[39] Jung cites James' types again in his work titled *The Psychology of The Unconscious Processes: Being a Survey of the Modern Theory and Method of Analytical Psychology,* published in 1917 (Jung 1917:1920f).

Subsequently, in a letter he wrote to Virginia Payne, dated 23 July 1949, Jung recalls his meeting James for the first time—making him one of the two people he met at the Clark Conference in 1909 that 'made a lasting impact' on Jung—the other one being Stanley Hall (Jung 2015:531). Jung notes that he was interested in the relationship between these two figures since he 'gathered from some remarks of President Hall that James was not taken quite seriously on account of his interest in Mrs. Piper and her extra-sensory perceptions' (Jung 2015:531). Jung also recalls the following anecdote:

> Stanley Hall had prepared us that he had asked James to discuss some of his results with Mrs. Piper and to bring some of his material. So when James came (there was Stanley Hall, Professor Freud, one or two other men and myself) he said to Hall: "I've brought you some papers in which you might be interested." And he put his hand to his breastpocket and drew out a parcel which to our delight proved to be a wad of dollar bills. Considering Stanley Hall's great services for the increase and the welfare of Clark University and his rather critical remarks as to James' pursuits, it looked to us a particularly happy rejoinder. James excused himself profusely. Then he produced the real papers from the other pocket. (Jung 2015:531).

Jung further writes that the two evenings he spent in the company of James alone were 'delightful' and that he 'was tremendously impressed by the clearness of his mind and the complete absence of intellectual prejudices' (Jung 2015:531).

In a letter to Kurt Wolff, dated 17 June 1958, Jung further clarifies that he 'saw William James only twice and talked with him for a little over an hour, but there was no correspondence between [them]' (Jung 2015:452). Jung writes that James

[39] Furthermore, the German manuscript from which the paper 'The Conception of the Unconscious' that appeared in 1917 in the second edition of *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* was translated (originally published as a French paper titled 'La Structure de l'inconscient' in 1916) was rediscovered in 1961, containing an added sentence in which Jung states that 'we owe a great deal to the pioneer work of William James' with regard to the recognition of the plurality of principles in psychology. This new translation of the paper titled 'The Structure of the Unconscious' is the version published in *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, Volume 7—in addition to the later revised and edited version of the paper titled 'The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious' published in 1928—which does not contain that sentence (Jung 1916/1920e; 1916/1972; 1928/1972).

produced a positive impression on him—and that he was an important source of inspiration for his work. He writes that they 'talked mostly about [James'] experiments with Mrs. Piper' and 'did not speak of his philosophy at all' (Jung 2015:452). Jung was particularly interested in James' views on 'occult phenomena' (Jung 2015:452). He writes:

> I admired his European culture and the openness of his nature. He was a distinguished personality and conversation with him was extremely pleasant. He was quite naturally without affectation and pomposity and answered my questions and interjections as though speaking to an equal. Unfortunately, he was already ailing at the time so I could not press him too hard. (Jung 2015:452).[40]

Jung writes that if he were 'to write an appreciation of James from [his] present standpoint it would require an essay in itself, since it is impossible to sketch a figure of such stature in a few words' and that it 'would be an unpardonable exercise in superficiality if [he] presumed to do so' (Jung 2015:452).

In the letter, Jung also writes of Théodore Flournoy, who was a mutual acquaintance of James and Jung and a fellow psychologist. He states that he considered James, 'aside from Théodore Flournoy, … the only outstanding mind with whom [he] could conduct an uncomplicated conversation' (Jung 2015:452). In addition to this, he also wrote of both Flournoy and James: 'I owe it mainly to these two investigators that I learnt to understand the nature of psychic disturbances within the setting of the human psyche as a whole' (Jung 2015:452). In this chapter, I will also draw on Flournoy's (1854-1920) account of James' philosophy in his work titled *The Philosophy of William James*, originally published in 1911. In addition to being of value as a contemporary source, it is among the works cited in *Psychological Types*, evidently contributing to his understanding of James' philosophy—especially beyond *The Principles of Psychology* and *Pragmatism* (Jung 1923:375).

[40] As Shamdasani points out, there was a whole chapter on James in the editorial transcript of Jung's biography, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, which was omitted from the published version (Shamdasani 1999b:39). In it, Jung, again wrote positively of James—both of his character and work (Shamdasani 1999b:41-42).

Philosophy of Science: Theories as Instruments

I shall begin this chapter by looking at James' and Jung's views on the nature of science in general—hence, what could be described as their 'philosophies of science'. Before we proceed, however, it is essential to note that one would not characterise Jung's approach as systematic in his writings. This holds true of his *Psychological Types* in particular—we shall see that this work is internally inconsistent. Interestingly, this feature has also been considered to be characteristic of James' work. In the introduction to *The Philosophy of William James*, Théodore Flournoy admits that describing James' philosophy is a difficult task since 'James has nowhere left us a systematic and complete exposition of his ideas' (Flournoy 1917:40). He further writes of James: 'although absolutely certain of his general design, he had a mind that was too intent on progress, too constantly in quest of new facts, too instinctively averse to anything like a fixed and final structure, in a word too intensely alive, to commit itself willingly to that kind of architectural monument which delights the professional philosopher' (Flournoy 1917:40). According to Flournoy, '[n]o one was less likely than James to write a didactic treatise on philosophy' (Flournoy 1917:40-41). The difficulty of summarising James' philosophy, then, manifests itself in that 'when one attempts to put the very varied contents of his essays and lecturers into precise and well-arranged formulae, one runs the risk of gravely misrepresenting him' (Flournoy 1917:41).

As is evident from Flournoy's description of James above, the very idea of having a clear-cut, logically deduced ontology of nature was completely foreign to James' approach to philosophy. In fact, as we shall see, much of the discussion in his *Pragmatism* stems from his opposition to 'rationalism'—also referred to as 'naturalism', 'materialism', and 'intellectualism'—and admiration of 'empiricism':

> [I]f you are the lovers of facts I have supposed you to be, you find the trail of the serpent of rationalism, of intellectualism, over everything that lies on that side of the line. You escape indeed the materialism that goes with the reigning empiricism; but you pay for your escape by losing contact with the concrete parts of life. The more absolutistic philosophers dwell on so high a level of abstraction that they never even try to come down. The absolute mind which they offer us, the mind that makes our universe by thinking it, might, for aught they show us to the contrary, have made any

> one of a million other universes just as well as this. You can deduce no single actual particular from the notion of it. It is compatible with any state of things whatever being true here below. (James 1907:19).

According to James, the view provided by the rationalists cannot satisfy 'the lovers of facts' as it is purely abstract and descriptive, rather than concrete and prescriptive, and hence, not 'useful'. In relation to science in particular, James argues that scientific theories do not provide 'absolute truths', but are 'instruments' to manipulate immediately experienced facts and achieve concrete ends, which constitutes the core of James' pragmatism:

> You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your experience. It appears less as a solution then, than as a program for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be changed. *Theories thus become instruments*, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. We don't lie back on them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid. (James 1907:53, italics added).

In other words, as Flournoy puts it, 'we do not live to think, as the intellectualists proclaim, but we think in order to live' (Flournoy 1917:54). James' philosophy then in a sense brings the 'scientific method' into philosophy. Indeed, James writes that his fellow pragmatists, 'in reaching this general conception of all truth, have only followed the example of geologists, biologists and philologists' (James 1907:58). According to James, '[i]n the establishment of these other sciences, the successful stroke was always to take some simple process actually observable in operation—as denudation by weather, say, or variation from parental type, or change of dialect by incorporation of new words and pronunciations—then to generalize it, making it apply to all times, and produce great results by summating its effects through the ages' (James 1907:58). Philosophy then, for James, needs to follow the example of these successful sciences, in order to be 'useful' and grounded in reality.

Neither did Jung seem to support the 'rationalist' perspective outlined above. He referred to himself as 'first and foremost an empiricist' numerous times throughout his life. For instance, he does so in his letter to Pastor Ernst Jahn in 1935, where he also adds that 'he was led to the questions of Western and European mysticism only for empirical reasons' (Jung 1958:195). In the introduction to *Psychological Types*, he emphasises the strictly 'empirical' (in particular, *inductive*, as opposed to

deductive) nature of his work: 'From sheer necessity, therefore, I must confine myself to a presentation of principles which I have abstracted from an abundance of observed facts' (Jung 1923:10). Jung adds, however, that '[i]n this there is no question of *deductio a priori*, as it might well appear: it is rather a deductive presentation of empirically gained understanding' (Jung 1923:11). Jung's view of scientific theories as instruments, as outlined in *Psychological Types* in particular, can be summarised in the following quote: 'Although science has already led us to recognise the disproportions and disorders of the psyche, thus deserving our profound respect for her intrinsic intellectual gifts, it is nevertheless a grave mistake to concede her an absolute aim which would incapacitate her metier as an *instrument of life'* (Jung 1923:76, italics added).

Hence, Jung as well was critical of the notion of 'absolute truth' and appears to have subscribed to an 'instrumentalist' point of view, similar to the one proposed by James as part of his pragmatist philosophy. In the following section of this chapter, we shall look more closely at James and Jung in relation to their views on (what could be described as) 'philosophy of psychology'. In particular, we will examine their use of the notion of the 'personal equation' in psychology.

Philosophy of Psychology: The Personal Equation

As a psychologist, James also wrote specifically on *psychology as a science,* outlining what could be called his *philosophy of psychology*. In his *Psychology: Briefer Course*, originally published 1892, James wrote on the state of psychology as a science: 'When, then, we talk of "psychology as a natural science" we must not assume that means a sort of psychology that stands at last on solid ground' (James c1920:467). He clarifies further that '[i]t means just the reverse; it means a psychology particularly fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint' (James c1920:467). He believed that 'psychology [was] in the condition of physics before Galileo and the laws of motion, of chemistry before Lavoisier and the notion that mass is preserved in all reactions' (James c1920:468). Yet, psychology, as the 'science of subjectivity', was inherently different from other sciences, which raised the question of the very possibility of it ever becoming

'scientific' (Shamdasani 2003:37). The 'personal equation' of the psychologist, as James argued in *The Principles of Psychology*, was fundamental to the science of psychology and constituted a major obstacle to achieving *objectivity*. He argued that '[t]he interpretation of the 'psychoses' of animals, savages and infants is necessarily wild work, in which the personal equation of the investigator has things very much its own way' (James 1890:194). Hence, '[a]savage will be reported to have no moral or religious feeling if his actions shock the observer unduly' (James 1890:194).

As Simon Schaffer notes, the term 'personal equation' has its origins in the history of astronomy: it came to be used at the beginning of the nineteenth century 'as a label for the worrying fact that astronomers seemed to differ from each other in the times they recorded for transits' (Schaffer 1988:116). Furthermore, '[t]he difference varied with time and with the type of observation: for example, personal equations might differ for lunar as opposed to stellar transits' (Schaffer 1988:116). The person credited with the first use of the term in this sense was Friedrich Bessel, a German astronomer (Schaffer 1988:116). As Shamdasani points out, the notion of the personal equation subsequently 'became the hallmark of the attempt to develop an objective experimental science of psychology, and then conversely, an epistemological abyss that delimited the selfsame project' (Shamdasani 2003:30).

With regard to James' particular use of the term, Shamdasani notes that '[u]nder the rubric of the personal equation, [James] included the psychologist's theoretical preconceptions, the nature of their personal acquaintance with the subjects being investigated and their "will to believe"' (Shamdasani 2003:37). The different approaches to psychology that had been put forward, then, 'all shared the same weakness: none of them provided an objective standpoint that resolved the problem posed by the subjective variations of different psychologists' (Shamdasani 2003:34). As Shamdasani points out, 'the personal equation, far from being heralded as denoting a quantifiably ascertainable factor, designated the manner in which investigators manage only to see what they are led to expect by their own preconceptions' (Shamdasani 2003:34). Hence, '[t]he problem was that most psychologists made their own personal peculiarities into universal rules', which meant that what was fundamentally *subjective* was mispresented as *objective* (Shamdasani 2003:34).

As we shall see throughout this thesis, the problem of the 'personal equation' is of central importance to Jung's work. In *Psychological Types,* Jung remarks that '[t]he operation of the personal equation has already begun in the act of observation'—'[*o]ne sees what one can best see from oneself*' (Jung 1923:16). What is notable is that, in *Psychological Types*, Jung explicitly *extends this claim to science* in general—scientists in general, not just psychologists, were constrained by their personal equations, or their *psychologies*: 'But the ideal and the purpose of science do not consist in giving the most exact possible description of facts—science cannot yet compete with kinematographic and phonographic records—it can fulfil its aim only in the establishment of law, which is merely an abbreviated expression for manifold and yet correlated processes' (Jung 1923:16).[41] Jung adds that '[t]his purpose transcends the purely experimental by means of the concept, which, in spite of general and proved validity, will always be a product of the subjective psychological constellation of the investigator' (Jung 1923:16).[42] As James himself put it in *The Principles of Psychology*, the solution to this problem was to 'use as much sagacity as you possess, and to be as candid as you can' (James 1890:194). In order to be able to achieve objectivity—in a revised sense—psychologists needed to recognise their personal biases and preconceptions: 'The recognition and taking to heart of the subjective determination of knowledge in general, and of psychological knowledge in particular, is a basic condition for the scientific and accurate estimation of a psyche differing from that of the observing subject' (Jung 1923:17). Jung follows James' strategy by proposing the following solution: 'This condition is fulfilled only when the observer is adequately informed concerning the compass and nature of his own personality' (Jung 1923:17).

Hence, as Shamdasani has argued, Jung borrowed James' notion of the personal equation in psychology (Shamdasani 2003:37). I further argue that, with it, Jung's epistemology also incorporated James' understanding of what it means to have objective knowledge in psychology, whilst also explicitly extending it to the realm of general science. In the following sections of this chapter, I am going to show that Jung also adopted James' approach—namely, the idea of a *psychological typology*—

[41] Here, Jung effectively provides a criticism of what Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison refer to as 'mechanical objectivity' in science (Daston and Galison 2007).
[42] And here, Jung is critical of the classical empiricist conception of objectivity—the notion of 'pure observation', or *tabula rasa,* which was rendered impossible by the 'personal equation'. We will come back to this quote in Chapter V of this thesis—on Jung and Kant.

as part of his method of achieving objectivity in a revised sense. Nevertheless, it is important to note here that Jung also emphasises the fact that his typology is one of many possible approaches, as it is also a product of his own 'subjective psychological constellation', or personal equation, in the conclusion of *Psychological Types*.[43] Hence, Jung's notion of the personal equation formed one of the cornerstones of his epistemology.

Pluralistic Philosophy of Psychology: Typology

James' criticism of rationalism, apart from his aversion to its glorification of logically deduced systems of nature, also has another aspect to it, which stems from James' definition of rationalism and empiricism in his *A Pluralistic Universe*. According to James, the former 'means the habit of explaining parts by wholes', while the latter 'means the habit of explaining wholes by parts' (James 1909:7). It follows, then, that '[r]ationalism [. . .] preserves affinities with monism, since wholeness goes with union, while empiricism inclines to pluralistic views' (James 1909:8). Hence, what is also particularly characteristic of James' philosophy is its opposition to 'monism', monistic philosophies—or, in other words, to the tendency to *unify* things by reducing everything to *one* particular account:

> For monism the world is no collection, but one great all-inclusive fact outside of which is nothing—nothing is its only alternative. When the monism is idealistic, this all-enveloping fact is represented as an absolute mind that makes the partial facts by thinking them, just as we make objects in a dream by dreaming them, or personages in a story by imagining them. To be, on this scheme, is, on the part of a finite thing, to be an object for the absolute; and on the part of the absolute it is to be the thinker of that assemblage of objects. If we use the word 'content' here, we see that the absolute and the world have an identical content. The absolute is nothing but the knowledge of those objects; the objects are nothing but what the absolute knows. The world and the all-thinker thus compenetrate and soak each other up without residuum. (James 1909:36).

[43] We will look at these remarks in the conclusion of this thesis.

James' alternative, then, is 'pluralism', which, he argues, does justice to reality as it naturally accommodates all its possible aspects by allowing the coexistence of different perspectives without reducing them to one another. He describes his pluralism as follows:

> Pragmatically interpreted, pluralism or the doctrine that it is many means only that the sundry parts of reality may be externally related. Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 'external' environment of some sort or amount. Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or dominates over everything. The word 'and' trails along after every sentence. Something always escapes. 'Ever not quite' has to be said of the best attempts made anywhere in the universe at attaining all–inclusiveness. The pluralistic world is thus more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom. However much may be collected, however much may report itself as present at any effective centre of consciousness or action, something else is self–governed and absent and unreduced to unity. (James 1909:321).

For James, '[t]here is no really inherent order, but it is we who project order into the world by selecting objects and tracing relations so as to gratify our intellectual interests'. According to James, '[w]e carve out order by leaving the disorderly parts out' (James 1909:9). As we shall see, pluralism also constitutes an important part of Jung's *philosophy of psychology* and his theory of psychological types.

As Shamdasani writes, '[i]n 1890, James noted that it had been generally supposed by philosophers that there was a typical mind of which all individual minds were like' (Shamdasani 2003:40). However, as Shamdasani further notes, 'the fallaciousness of this axiom had been demonstrated by a series of studies that had begun to demonstrate the range and extent of differences between individual minds' (Shamdasani 2003:40). Jung also subscribed to this view—the idea that there was no *one* typical mind that everyone shared. Jung appeals to a pragmatic philosophy of psychology by stating that reality is 'that which works in a human soul and not that which certain people assume to be operative, and about which prejudiced generalisations are wont to be made' (Jung 1923:56). In *Psychological Types*, he expresses his pluralistic standpoint in psychology as follows: 'The assumption that there exists only one psychology or only one fundamental psychological principle is an intolerable tyranny, belonging to the pseudoscientific prejudice of the normal man' (Jung 1923:56). With this statement, he alludes to James: 'People are always

speaking of *the* man and of "psychology", which is invariably traced back to the "nothing else but"' (Jung 1923:56).

At the same time, Jung also commented on the conflicting approach that regarded psychology as a fundamentally *individualistic* discipline, which meant that everyone simply had their own psychology that had to be studied separately. In his 1916 paper, Jung points out that this 'individual psychology' cannot claim to be 'scientific' by virtue of it not being *generalisable*:

> But with regard to individual psychology science must waive its claims. For to speak of a scientific individual psychology is in itself a *contradictio in adjecto*. It is necessarily always only the collective part of an individual psychology that can be the subject of scientific study, for the individual is—according to definition—something unique and incomparable. A "scientific" individual psychology is a denial of individual psychology. It may justly be suspected that individual psychology is indeed a projection of the psychology of him who defines it. Every individual psychology must have its own text-book, for the universal text-book only contains collective psychology. (Jung 1916/1920e).[44]

While Jung believed that, as Shamdasani puts it, 'due to the limitless variation of individuals, there was much that could not be circumscribed by science', he also believed that there were certain collective, generalisable, *typical* parts of the psyche that could be 'subject to science' (Shamdasani 2003:66). This, then, forms the pluralistic basis of Jung's theory of psychological types: Jung's typology provides a number of distinct approaches—distinct *types*, or 'kinds of truth' as Ernst Falzeder calls them—in psychology (Falzeder 2016). A characteristic slogan for this would be, as Hasok Chang puts it, 'many things go' rather than 'anything goes' (Chang 2012:261). More generally, the criterion of demarcation in psychology for Jung appears to be that of James' pragmatism: whatever approach is shown to have value for life—as opposed to relativism, which, as Chang points out, 'involves a renunciation of judgment and commitment at least to a degree' (Chang 2012:261).

[44] This is the English version of the 1916 French paper titled 'La Structure de l'inconscient' published in the second edition of the *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* under the title 'The Conception of the Unconscious' in 1917.

In the following section of this chapter, we will explore further the notion of typology as an epistemological method, as well as look at Jung's critique of James' typology in *Psychological Types*.

The Problem of Types in Philosophy: Typology as an Epistemological Method

In Chapter VIII of *Psychological Types* titled 'The Problem of Types in Modern Philosophy', Jung provides a description of James' own typology—the 'tough-minded' and 'tender-minded' types—whilst outlining James' contribution to his line of thought. Jung states that it was James who linked the differences in philosophical positions with differences in psychological attitudes: 'James was the first to indicate, with a certain distinctness, the extraordinary importance of temperament in the shaping of philosophical thinking, and for this great credit is due' (Jung 1923:397). He then adds that 'the aim of his [James'] pragmatic conception was to reconcile the antagonisms of philosophical views resulting from temperamental differences' (Jung 1923:397).

Indeed, James begins his *Pragmatism,* as well as his *A Pluralistic Universe* two years later, with a discussion of temperamental differences and their impact on philosophical thinking. In his *Pragmatism*—Lecture I titled 'The Present Dilemma in Philosophy'—James states that '[t]he history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of human temperaments' (James 1907:6). Perhaps already anticipating the charge of (what came to be termed) 'psychologism', he adds: 'Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good many of the divergencies of philosophers by it' (James 1906:6-7).[45] He then summarises his position as follows:

[45] The term 'psychologism', denoting the tendency to explain philosophical arguments through psychology—for instance, by equating logical laws with psychological laws—was first used in English as a translation of the German term 'Psychologismus' coined by Johann Eduard Edmann in 1870 (Kusch 2020).
On pragmatism and the charge of psychologism, see, for instance, Calcaterra and Dreon (2017) and Cristalli (2017).

> Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He *trusts* his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any presentation of the universe that does suit it. He feels men of opposite temper to be out of key with the world's character, and in his heart considers them incompetent and 'not in it' in the philosophic business, even though they may far excel him in dialectical ability. (James 1907:67).

James also clarifies what he means exactly by this claim by providing the following caveat: namely, that he was 'talking here of very positively marked men, men of radical idiosyncrasy, who have set their stamp and likeness on philosophy and figure in its history', referring to Plato, John Locke, and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as examples of such philosophers (James 1907:8). James states that '[m]ost of us have, of course, no very definite intellectual temperament, we are a mixture of opposite ingredients, each one present very moderately' and that '[w]e hardly know our own preferences in abstract matters; some of us are easily talked out of them, and end by following the fashion or taking up with the beliefs of the most impressive philosopher in our neighbourhood, whoever he may be' (James 1907:8). However, according to James, 'the one thing that has *counted* so far in philosophy is that a man should *see* things, see them straight in his own peculiar way, and be dissatisfied with any opposite way of seeing them' (James 1907:8-9). For James, there was 'no reason to suppose that this strong temperamental vision is from now onward to count no longer in the history of man's belief' (James 1907:9).

As we have seen in the first section of this chapter, much of James' discussion of philosophy of science appears to be framed in terms of his opposition to what he refers to as 'rationalism'—or 'intellectualism', 'materialism', and 'naturalism'. In fact, in *Pragmatism*, James argues that the conflict between rationalism and its rival, empiricism—as two ways of thinking in philosophy—is a temperamental, or a *psychological* one. These temperamental differences are not unique to philosophy either—there are analogous polarities in other spheres, such as art and politics:

> Now the particular difference of temperament that I have in mind in making these remarks is one that has counted in literature, art, government, and manners as well as in philosophy. In manners we find formalists and free-and-easy persons. In government, authoritarians and anarchists. In literature, purists or academicals, and realists. In art, classics and romantics. You recognize these contrasts as familiar; well, in philosophy we have a very similar contrast expressed in the pair of terms 'rationalist' and 'empiricist', 'empiricist' meaning your lover of facts in all their crude variety, 'rationalist' meaning your devotee to abstract and eternal principles. (James 1907:9).

James then argues that rationalism has its roots in what he calls the 'tender-minded' temperament, whilst empiricism is grounded in the 'tough-minded' temperament. He then provides a list of 'traits' associated with each:

> Historically we find the terms 'intellectualism' and 'sensationalism' used as synonyms of 'rationalism' and 'empiricism.' Well, nature seems to combine most frequently with intellectualism an idealistic and optimistic tendency. Empiricists on the other hand are not uncommonly materialistic, and their optimism is apt to be decidedly conditional and tremulous. Rationalism is always monistic. It starts from wholes and universals, and makes much of the unity of things. Empiricism starts from the parts, and makes of the whole a collection – is not averse therefore to calling itself pluralistic. Rationalism usually considers itself more religious than empiricism, but there is much to say about this claim, so I merely mention it. It is a true claim when the individual rationalist is what is called a man of feeling, and when the individual empiricist prides himself on being hard-headed. In that case the rationalist will usually also be in favour of what is called free-will, and the empiricist will be a fatalist – I use the terms most popularly current. The rationalist finally will be of dogmatic temper in his affirmations, while the empiricist may be more sceptical and open to discussion. (James 1907:10-11).

With his criticism of rationalism, James does appear to side with empiricism—or the 'tough-minded' temperament, as opposed to the 'tender-minded' one: 'In point of fact it is far less an account of this actual world than a clear addition built upon it, a classic sanctuary in which the rationalist fancy may take refuge from the intolerably confused and gothic character which mere facts present' (James 1907:22). He adds that '[i]t is no explanation of our concrete universe, it is another thing altogether, a substitute for it, a remedy, a way to escape' (James 1907:22). He writes that scientists in general lean towards the 'tough-minded' temperament, since 'a philosophy that breathes out nothing but refinement will never satisfy the empiricist temper of mind' (James 1907:23). Such a philosophy 'will seem rather a monument of artificiality' to

them (James 1907:23). Hence, James writes that 'we find men of science preferring to turn their backs on metaphysics as on something altogether cloistered and spectral, and practical men shaking philosophy's dust off their feet and following the call of the wild' (James 1907:23).

At the same time, however, James states that empiricism is inferior to rationalism in its one particular aspect—what he refers to as 'irreligiousness': 'And this is then your dilemma: you find empiricism with inhumanism and irreligion; or else you find a rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself religious, but that keeps out of all definite touch with concrete facts and joys and sorrows' (James 1907:20). Thus, he offers his own solution to this dilemma—his philosophy of 'pragmatism': 'I offer the oddly-named thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of demand' (James 1907:33). He explains that pragmatism 'can remain religious like the rationalists, but at the same time, like the empiricists, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts' (James 1907:33). Pragmatism, therefore, according to James, 'may be a happy harmonizer of empiricist ways of thinking with the more religious demands of human beings' (James 1907:69).

What is crucial here, however, is that James explicitly acknowledges the fact that he 'select[s] types of combination that nature offers very frequently, but by no means uniformly' and he 'select[s] them solely for their convenience in helping [him] to [his] *ulterior purpose of characterizing pragmatism*' (James 1907:9, italics added). Hence, James' purpose in providing his typology is to help conceptualise his own *epistemology*. Jung, as we shall see, adopts James' notion of a psychological typology as an *epistemological method,* but makes it his goal to describe all the *different* standpoints that he could observe in his practice. Typology, then, serves as a tool to account for personal equations of individuals—philosophers, scientists, and psychologists in particular. Hence, Jung uses his typology to expose the biased perspectives of both Freudian and Adlerian psychologies in *Psychological Types*:

> Freud would vouchsafe the instincts an unfettered excursion towards their objects. But Adler would break through the inimical spell of the object, in order to deliver the ego from suffocation in its own defensive armour. The former view must therefore be essentially extraverted, while the latter is introverted. The extraverted theory holds good for the extraverted type, while the introverted theory is valid only for the introverted type. (Jung 1923:81).

I would argue that in Chapter VIII of *Psychological Types*, Jung also reveals his goals with regard to his typology—what he was trying to achieve with it. Despite crediting James as the first philosopher who linked the differences in philosophical positions to the differences in psychological attitudes, Jung was generally critical of James' types since, as he points out, 'taken individually, James' expressions are too broad: only in their totality do they give an approximate picture of the typical contrast, without thereby bringing it to a simple formula' (Jung 1923:397). In *Psychological Types*, Jung was critical of James' usage of the term rationalism, explaining that both empiricism and rationalism were 'rational', as both were two different types of thinking: 'I have avoided the expression "rationalism", because concrete, empirical thinking is just as "rational" as active, ideological thinking [since] [t]he *ratio* governs both forms' (Jung 1923:382).

Hence, Jung provides his own pair of opposites analogous to that of James and calls them 'extraverted thinking', which corresponds to empiricism and the tough-minded temperament, and 'introverted thinking', which corresponds to rationalism and the tender-minded temperament. According to Jung, 'The one says "Est, ergo est"; the other says "Cogito, ergo cogito"' (Jung 1923:483). Jung explains that '[i]ntroverted thinking carried to extremes arrives at the evidence of its own subjective existence, and extraverted thinking at the evidence of its complete identity with the objective fact' (Jung 1923:483). Hence, '[j]ust as the latter abnegates itself by evaporating into the object, the former empties itself of each and every content and has to be satisfied with merely existing' (Jung 1923:483).

Allan Carlsson argued in 1973 that 'Jung is not interested in a world-view classification scheme for the sake of the typology itself, but simply for the study of the human personality' (Carlsson 1973:118). I agree with the first part of the argument—that Jung's goal was not to create the ultimate psychological system that would explain all the philosophical conflicts. This would be a fundamentally 'rationalistic' goal: as James puts it, 'the actual universe is a thing wide open, but rationalism makes systems, and systems must be closed' (James 1907:27). Indeed, Jung does not provide a single, coherent *system* in his *Psychological Types*. However, I would argue that with his typology, Jung was aiming to continue the work of James, which transcended one of merely providing descriptions of different types of personality. Firstly, Jung was trying to find the 'simple formula' that would

account for the different perspectives in philosophy, science, psychology and so on. Most importantly, as I show in this thesis, Jung adopts James' idea of a psychological typology as an epistemological method for acknowledging one's personal equation and achieving a revised notion of objectivity. From this perspective, typology effectively served as a 'metalanguage' for scientists, as Shamdasani has put it—one that would help describe and communicate their biases (Shamdasani 2003:69). For Jung, psychology, as the science of the personal equation, was thus 'the fundamental scientific discipline, upon which other disciplines should henceforth be based' (Shamdasani 2003:15).

At the same time, we shall see in the following chapters that, for Jung, pragmatism constituted an *initial* step towards the solution of the problem of achieving objectivity. According to Jung, it was not enough to merely acknowledge and communicate the personal equation of the scientist, but it was necessary to *overcome* it—namely, to *overcome subjectivity*. Hence, in *Psychological Types*, Jung criticised James' pragmatism for its lack of 'creativeness', which meant that pragmatism was a *necessary* but *insufficient* condition for achieving a satisfying notion of objectivity. According to Jung, James' notion of objectivity only acknowledged the 'personal equation' but did not overcome it. This was because, for Jung, James' pragmatism did not resolve the 'problem of opposites': the opposites that were present in philosophy (including James' own 'tough-minded' and 'tender-minded' temperaments) were not united in a 'higher third principle' that would ensure a higher order of objectivity.[46]

Radical Empiricism, 'Pure Experience', The 'Divided Self', and The Special Role of Religion

In the following section, I am going to look at some philosophical ideas of James that Jung did not directly engage with—in particular, his notions of 'radical empiricism' and 'pure experience'. However, as we shall see, aside from helping to understand James' philosophy, these ideas highlight further parallels between James' and Jung's

[46] Jung's criticism of James' pragmatism and of Bergson's philosophy is discussed in detail in Chapter III (Part I) of this thesis—on Jung and Nietzsche.

thought and the shared goals. In addition to his notion of the 'personal equation' in psychology, James' concepts of radical empiricism and pure experience formed further layers of his critique of the classical scientific method.

As we have seen so far, James' epistemology appears to share explicitly one particular premise of classical empiricism—namely, its preference for *facts*, as opposed to *truth,* or induction, as opposed to deduction. This forms the core of his 'radical empiricism', his 'Weltanschauung': in his *A World of Pure Experience*, James writes that '[his] description of things, accordingly, starts with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order' (James 1904:534). In the preface to *The Meaning of Truth*, James provides a logical formulation of radical empiricism, according to which it consists of 1) a 'postulate', 2) a 'statement of fact', and 3) a 'generalized conclusion'. The postulate is 'that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience' (James 1909/1914: xii). The statement of fact is 'that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves' (James 1909/1914: xii). And finally, the generalized conclusion is 'that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience' (James 1909/1914: xii).

James outlines his views on this in great detail in his *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, published posthumously in 1912, where he asks the question 'To begin with, are thought and thing as heterogenous as it is commonly said?' (James 1912:28). James expresses his criticism of Cartesian dualism by stating 'no one denies that [thought and thing] have some categories in common' (James 1912.:29). In particular, he points out that 'their relations to time are identical', and that both 'may have parts [...] and both may be complex or simple' (James 1912.:29). James then goes on to criticise the very criteria that philosophers since Descartes have used to distinguish between 'mind' and 'body', what is *mental* and what is *physical*—such as the idea that physical substances are 'spatially extended', whereas mental substances are not. In fact, James argues that this cannot be the distinguishing criterion between a given physical object and a mental image of that object since '[o]f every extended object the adequate mental picture must have all the extension of the object itself' (James 1912:30). According to James, then, the difference between the two worlds is not

determined by 'the presence or absence of extension', but by what James calls 'the relations of the extensions which in both worlds exist' (James 1912:31). He explains this further by giving the following examples:

> Mental fire is what won't burn real sticks; mental water is what won't necessarily . . . put out even a mental fire. Mental knives may be sharp, but they won't cut real wood. With 'real' objects, on the contrary, consequences always accrue; and thus the real experiences get sifted from the mental ones, the things from our thoughts of them, fanciful or true, and precipitated together as the stable part of the whole experience-chaos, under the name of the physical world. Of this our perceptual experiences are the nucleus, they being originally *strong* experiences. We add a lot of conceptual experiences to them, making these strong also in imagination, and building out the remoter parts of the physical world by their means; and around this core of reality the world of laxly connected fancies and mere rhapsodical objects floats like a bank of clouds. In the clouds, all sorts of rules are violated which in the core are kept. Extensions there can be indefinitely located; motion there obeys no Newton's laws. (James 1912:33).

To go back to the discussion of the second premise of classical (or 'ordinary', as James calls it) empiricism—the idea that sense experience is the primary source of knowledge—I show that James' philosophy explicitly denies this notion. What he seems to argue instead is not simply that 'sense experience is *not* the only source of knowledge', but that 'experience' should not be understood in terms of the dichotomy of 'mental versus physical' at all. According to James, '*[e]xperience, I believe, has no such inner duplicity; and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes, not by way of subtraction, but by way of addition*' (James 1912:9). As Russell Goodman puts it, 'mind and matter are both aspects of, or structures formed from, a more fundamental stuff', which is 'neither mental nor physical' (Goodman 2021). This 'fundamental stuff' is what James calls 'pure experience', meaning 'the only [. . .] primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed':

> The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the 'pure' experience. It is only virtually or potentially either object or subject as yet. For the time being, it is plain, unqualified actuality, or existence, as simple as that. (James 1912:4, 23).

James, then, argues against the notion of 'consciousness' as being a criterion used for distinguishing between the mental and the physical: for him, '[c]onsciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and does not denote a special stuff or way of

being.' (James 1912.:25). According to James, the 'conscious quality' of our experiences '*is better explained by their relations—these relations themselves being experiences—to one another*' (James 1912:25). Finally, James provides a description of his philosophy, distinguishing his 'radical empiricism' from classical empiricism: 'To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced' (James 1912:42). He then adds that '[*f]or such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system'* (James 1912:42).

Hence, James' empiricism does not have the notion of 'sense experience as the primary source of knowledge' that is central to classical empiricism, since, for James, 'experience' goes *beyond* the dualistic categories of the 'mental' and the 'physical'. He also points out that '*[r]adical empiricism* [. . .] *does full justice to conjunctive relations*, without, however, treating them as rationalism always tends to treat them, as being true in some supernal way' (James 1912:44). I follow Flournoy in his argument that James *extends* the notion of 'immediate experience' from sensations to *include the mental*, since, for James, 'our inner life is far richer, more varied and profound than most philosophers, whether empiricist or rationalist have realized' (Flournoy 1917:76). According to Flournoy, '[i]f one applies oneself, as James did, and as contemporary psychology is doing more and more, to a consideration of these fleeting elements in our mental life, it becomes evident that the domain of what is directly experienced and lived extends far beyond the gross sensations which were all that had struck earlier observers' (Flournoy 1917:79). He then adds that '[i]n the end this realm is found to be so far-reaching as to include everything, even the mental categories, so that in this continuous network constituted by the data of actual experience, there remains no gap through which to introduce elements of another order, such as the a priori principles of the rationalists' (Flournoy 1917:79) Hence, I argue that James, with his radical empiricism and the notion of 'pure experience', effectively redefines the concept of the scientific method by expanding the source of knowledge to include the realm of the mental, and, hence, the realm of psychology.

Jung's typology in particular has a 'sensation' versus 'intuition' dichotomy which appears to encompass this distinction: the former is 'that psychological function

which transmits a physical stimulus to perception' and is, therefore, 'identical with perception', whereas the latter is that 'psychological function with transmits perceptions *in an unconscious way*' (Jung 1923:585; 567). Jung writes about the conflict between the two: 'Sensation disturbs intuition's dear, unbiassed, naive awareness with its importunate sensuous stimuli; for these direct the glance upon the physical superficies, hence upon the very things round and beyond which intuition tries to peer' (Jung 1923:462).

The above discussion of James' radical empiricism and the redefinition of the sources of scientific knowledge to include the realm of the mental relates to another key work of James that I have not yet discussed in this thesis—his *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, originally published in 1902.[47] In it, James describes his notion of the 'divided self', which, as Matei Iagher puts it, he used to designate a 'constitutional imbalance or existential rift' (Iagher 2018:70). Together with Flournoy, James was one of the founders of the tradition of the psychology of religion and believed that an important way in which the divided self could be healed was through religion (Iagher 2018:70). The special term that James and other psychologists of religion used to characterise the process of the acquisition of religion by the moderns was 'conversion' (Iagher 2018:69). As Iagher points out, 'conversion for the American psychologists was not so much about adopting a different 'religion' as it was about the psychological development of a new centre of personality' (Iagher 2018:69). The result of conversion was the unification of the divided self. James describes this in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*: 'To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to experience religion, to gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities' (James 1902:189). He adds that '[t]his at least is what conversion signifies in general terms, whether or not we believe that a direct divine operation is needed to bring such a moral change about' (James 1902:189). Psychologists of religion wanted to understand the experience of religion as a *psychological experience*. Hence, James' doctrines of radical empiricism and pure experience that we previously looked at relate to his

[47] For a detailed discussion of Jung's reception of James' *The Varieties of the Religious Experience*, see Iagher 2018 and Melo and Pedro 2020.

ambition to bring the religious experience into the realm of science, as he understood it.

As Iagher points out, Jung 'was familiar with at least some of the debates around conversion from William James' *Varieties'* (Iagher 1902:69).[48] As we shall see throughout this thesis, the central problem in *Psychological Types* was 'the problem of opposites': a psychological conflict, an *inner* conflict within an individual, reminiscent of James' divided self, the solution to which was also fundamentally *religious*, in the form of what Jung describes as the 'reconciling symbol'.

Conclusion

To sum up, the first chapter of this thesis has examined Jung's reception of James' philosophy as part of his epistemology with regard to his stance on psychology as well as science in general, in *Psychological Types*. I have argued that Jung shared several elements of James' thought—his pragmatism, pluralism, and typology. Following Shamdasani, this chapter has shown that Jung adopted James' understanding of the personal equation, which meant that psychology was a fundamentally *subjective* discipline, which presented an obstacle to achieving objectivity in psychology in the traditional sense. Most notably, I have looked at Jung's critique of James' typology and have argued that Jung took up James' task of trying to formulate *an epistemological method* with a *psychological typology* for accounting for the personal equation and achieving *objectivity* in a revised sense. Finally, it has been shown in this chapter that James also had a notion of a 'divided self' that could be unified through religion. This idea of a 'religious solution', as we shall see, is central to Jung's work in *Psychological Types*.

In this thesis, I aim to show that with his proposed psychological typology, Jung *expands on* the pragmatist approach of reconciling antagonistic views of different individuals as a psychological problem within one individual, 'the problem of opposites', the resolution of which would result not just in the *acknowledgment* of one's bias, but in *overcoming* it. On the one hand, this meant that, for Jung,

[48] For instance, Jung refers to James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience* in his work titled 'The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious', published in 1928 (Jung 1928/1972).

pragmatism as an epistemological framework was *incomplete*. However, what is significant for James scholarship is that, while Jung expands James' pragmatism by *synthesising* it with other philosophical elements into one epistemology—as we shall see in the following chapters of this thesis—this results in him effectively bringing together *all* of the discussed elements of James' thought: not just his pragmatism, pluralism, and typology, but also his radical empiricism, the notion of a divided self and the importance of religion. While Jung does not explicitly discuss the latter three notions from James' work in his *Psychological Types*, as we shall see, they appear to account for the missing elements in pragmatism that Jung borrows from his reading of the other philosophers discussed in this thesis.

To relate these concluding remarks to the broader themes discussed earlier in this thesis, the fact that Jung draws on James' pragmatism as a starting point of his epistemology is significant both for Jung scholarship and the history and philosophy of science. When it comes to the former, this chapter contributes to the rejection of the Freudocentric account of Jung's psychology—by demonstrating that Jung's project in *Psychological Types* was in many ways a continuation of James' project in *Pragmatism*. Hence, Jung's work provides a case study for the history of pragmatism—namely, an example of an early use of pragmatism as a philosophy of science and psychology. Jung adopts James' view, according to which achieving objectivity in psychology *implied* the acknowledgement of the fundamentally subjective nature of psychological knowledge, as well as extends it *to the nature of science in general*. Hence, Jung's work in *Psychological Types* offered a *philosophy of psychology*, as well as a *philosophy of science* that regarded the acknowledgement of subjectivity of knowledge as an important milestone in the achievement of scientific objectivity as he saw it. Hence, through his discussion of the problem of the personal equation in psychology, Jung's work brought it back to the realm of general science. Whilst the logical positivists believed physics to be the fundamental science—arguing that the languages of all the sciences could be translated into the physicalist language, resulting in a 'unity of science'—Jung believed that it was psychology that was the 'mediatory science'. As the science of the personal equation, psychology was able to, firstly, provide a *language* that would convey the biases of scientists to begin with, as well as a *method* of resolving the problem of the personal equation itself.

Jung's project in *Psychological Types* also serves as a case study for the interconnections between the histories of philosophy, psychology, and science. Jung felt the need to go back to philosophical thought in order to help understand what it meant for psychology to be a science to begin with. What is more, Jung's exploration of the nature of psychology as a science had implications for his conception of the very nature of science, as well as of philosophy itself: Jung was in accord with James that philosophical positions were fundamentally manifestations of psychological attitudes. As we shall see in the following chapters of this thesis, Jung's interpretation of philosophical concepts in psychological terms is among the key characteristics of his work in *Psychological Types*.

CHAPTER II. JUNG AND BERGSON: A CRITIQUE OF INTELLECTUALISM AND A PLEA FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THE IRRATIONAL

Introduction

The second chapter of this thesis traces the evolution of Jung's reception of the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) from 1912 to 1921 in order to identify the impact of his thought on Jung's theory of types as described in his *Psychological Types*. I am going to argue that Jung, firstly, adopts a Bergsonian critique of the scientific method—stating that science is only a product of the intellect and therefore is incapable of comprehending life in its fullness—and, secondly, *expands* it, viewing intellect itself as a manifestation of a *psychological* principle. With his typology, then, Jung re-framed Bergson's project: whilst, for Bergson, it was philosophy (his 'intuitive method') that was capable of gaining knowledge that was inaccessible to intellectualistic science, for Jung, it was psychology.

Review of Arguments in Secondary Literature

As Ann Addison points out, 'by his own admission Jung acknowledged the influence of Bergson on his notion of libido, his synthetic method and his typology' (Addison 2016:572). Pete Gunter's paper titled 'Bergson and Jung', published in 1982, gives a detailed account of the connections between the two thinkers, providing a survey of Bergson's key ideas through his main philosophical works and then linking them with the ideas of Jung. He summarises his argument in the paper as follows:

> During the period 1913-20 Jung specifically equates Bergson's ideas with his own concepts of instinct, intuition, the (limited) function of the human intellect, reaction-formation, and introversion-extraversion. Nor can it be purely a matter of accident that Jung includes the intuitive personality among his four basic psychological types and, like Bergson, connects intuition with future-oriented speculation. There can be no

> question, then, that the philosophy of creative evolution had by 1913 become an integral part of Jung's reflections. One can easily imagine that it played a role in the development of such Jungian concepts as the archetypes, individuation, the collective unconscious, and intuition. I shall argue that this likelihood becomes increasingly strong as one moves from the first of these concepts (the archetypes) to the last (intuition). (Gunter 1982:640).

Whilst there are parallels between Bergson's and Jung's thought due to them being fundamentally interested in the same topics and debates, it is helpful to distinguish between those ideas of Bergson that Jung actually *drew on*—meaning, the one's that Jung read about and incorporated in his work—and the ones that are similar to Jung's due to the general intellectual affinity between the thinkers. More specifically, the parallels between Bergson's ideas and Jung's notions of the 'archetypes', the 'collective unconscious', and 'individuation' should be regarded as examples of the latter rather than the former.[49] In this chapter, I will be focusing on the importance of Jung's reading of Bergson's work for the conceptualisation of his epistemology and philosophy of science in general.

This chapter draws on Sonu Shamdasani's argument that Bergson's philosophy provided a conceptual basis for Jung's critique of intellectualism, his understanding of the relationship between two opposite psychological functions, his distinction between the 'rational' and the 'irrational' and, finally, the notion of 'intuition':

> What is not realized is the fact that for Jung, the concept of the irrational derived its philosophical justification in the Bergsonian delimitation of the provenance of the intellect, and the recognition that life exceeded representational consciousness. Using Jung's terminology seen from a Bergsonian perspective, the key task was one of not subsuming the irrational into the rational. The discussions of Bergson's work in the correspondence between Jung and Schmid indicate that Bergson's work played an important role in informing Jung's understanding of the relation and opposition

[49] With regard to Bergson's thought and Jung's collective unconscious in particular, there are two conflicting perspectives. On the one hand, Shamdasani, states that Bergson's criticism of platonic Forms might mean that his thought is incompatible with Jung's archetypes (the latter being similar to platonic Forms) (Shamdasani 2003:230). On the other hand, Gunter has argued that '[t]here is room in Jung's thought during this period for a static, Kantian rendering of the archetypes as sheer a priori determinants of thought and behavior as well as for a dynamic, process-oriented explanation of the archetypes as specific tendencies toward development' (Gunter 1982:651). Nevertheless, he points out that 'the second, more Bergsonian tendency in Jung's thought provides a more fruitful, and hopeful, beginning' (Gunter 1982:651). Addison has also argued that 'Bergson's descriptions of instinct and intuition also lend themselves to comparison with Jung's descriptions of the same, and point towards Jung's accounts of the archetypes and thence of his psychoid unconscious' (Addison 2016:572).

> between a pair of psychological functions, in addition to providing the basis for his distinction between the rational and the irrational, and his notion of intuition as a cognitive faculty. (Shamdasani 2003:229).

Hence, this chapter further explores the connections between Bergson's 'intellect versus instinct' dichotomy and Jung's 'rational versus irrational' dichotomy. It shows that Bergson's critique of intellectualism became the basis for Jung's critique of 'reductionism' in psychology: no two psychological principles should be reduced to one another, and in particular, the idea that the irrational type is not subordinate to the rational type. In addition to this, this chapter follows Shamdasani in his argument that Bergson's philosophical concept of 'intuition' (as an element of 'instinct') indirectly—through Maria Moltzer's work—provided a basis for Jung's notion of 'intuition' as a psychological type (Shamdasani 1998).

Jung Reads Bergson

Henri Bergson was one of the most influential French philosophers at the turn of the century (Lawlor 2021). Originally trained in mathematics—having won the first prize in mathematics for the competition 'Concours Général' and then publishing his solution to a problem formulated by Pascal in 1877—he ultimately chose to specialise in the humanities (which is somewhat reminiscent of the difficulty that Jung himself faced when choosing his career due to his interest in both the sciences and the humanities). He graduated from the École Normale in 1881, publishing his first scholarly essay titled 'On Unconscious Simulation in States of Hypnosis' in 1886 (Lawlor 2021). In 1889 he published his doctoral thesis under the title *Time and Free Will*, and in 1896, his second book titled *Matter and Memory* (Lawlor 2021). It was his *Creative Evolution*, published in 1907, that 'was not only the source of the "Bergson legend," as well as of numerous, lively academic and public controversies centering on his philosophy and his role as an intellectual' (Lawlor 2021). As Leonard Lawlor has noted, '[a]lthough his international fame reached cult-like heights during his lifetime, his influence decreased notably after the second World War', which was subsequently revived by Gilles Deleuze in his *Bergsonism*, published in 1988 (Lawlor 2021).

As has been pointed out, Henri Bergson gained international recognition—and not just in academic circles, but with the general public—with the with the publication of his *Creative Evolution* in 1907, the same year that William James published his *Pragmatism* (Shamdasani 2003) (Midgley 2011). His work was also widely read in German-speaking countries and, as Shamdasani notes, those involved in psychoanalysis became immediately interested in it (Shamdasani 2003:227). As Shamdasani further points out, it was the German translation of Bergson's work, published in 1912, that Jung had in his library (Shamdasani 2003:227).[50] However, it is interesting to note that Jung uses Bergson's term, 'élan vital', rather than the German 'Lebensschwungkraf' in *Psychological Types* (Jung 1921/1937:454). As David Midgley notes, 'the reliable and highly readable' analysis of Bergson's philosophy was produced by Adolf Keller in 1913 (Midgley 2011:293). And, as Shamdasani points out, Keller was part of Jung's 'committee' that helped Jung with the terminology in his *Psychological Types* (Shamdasani 2003:69).

As we shall see, Bergson's philosophy was also concerned with psychology. In his *Matter and Memory*, published in 1896, Bergson provides an antireductionist conception of the mind, whilst, as Pete Gunter puts it, 'renaming and partially reconceiving' his notion of 'duration' as 'memory' (Bergson 1896) (Gunter 1982:636). According to Gunter, in the book Bergson also 'develops a theory of the unconscious and of mental pathology which was to have a significant effect on subsequent dynamic psychiatry' (Gunter 1982:636). I would argue that Bergson *makes use of* the ideas from *psychology* of his time (for instance, about consciousness) to help conceptualise his *philosophical* ideas, such as his notion of 'élan vital'—as well as formulate his 'intuitive method' in philosophy. However, Bergson was not, like Jung, uniquely interested in psychology *per se*: and, in *Creative Evolution* in particular, he viewed psychology in parallel with biology—as the two *life* sciences (Bergson 1907/1911).

Regarding the distinction between biology and psychology, it is interesting that Jung subsequently referred to Bergson in the context of the discussion of the philosophy of

[50] Bergson's work was translated into German by Getrud Kantorowisz and was published in 1912 as *Schöpferische Entwicklung* (Midgley 2011:291).

mind—namely the mind-body problem.[51] In a letter to Alice Eckstein, dated 16 September 1930, Jung writes that he found the problem interesting and states that, 'everyday experience tells us that consciousness and brain are in an indispensable connection'—meaning that 'destruction of the latter results in an equal destruction of the former' (Jung 2015:76). However, Jung argues that Bergson was 'quite right when he [thought] of the possibility of a relatively loose connection between the brain and consciousness, because despite our ordinary experience the connection might be less tight than we suppose' (Jung 2015:76). He further adds that 'there is no reason why one shouldn't suppose that consciousness could exist detached from a brain' (Jung 2015:76). However, proving this would be so difficult that '[i]t would amount to the hitherto unproven fact of an evidence that there are ghosts' and Jung believed it to be 'the most difficult thing in the world to produce evidence in that respect entirely satisfactory from a scientific point of view' and 'the hardest thing [he] could imagine' (Jung 2015:76).

Henri Bergson and William James

James famously admired Bergson's philosophy: in his *A Pluralistic Universe*, he devotes an entire lecture (Lecture VI) to Bergson's critique of 'intellectualism', stating that the latter had killed intellectualism 'definitely and without hope of recovery' (James 1909). He summaries Bergson's critique as follows:

> Professor Bergson thus inverts the traditional platonic doctrine absolutely. Instead of intellectual knowledge being the profounder, he calls it the more superficial. Instead of being the only adequate knowledge, it is grossly inadequate, and its only superiority is the practical one of enabling us to make short cuts through experience and thereby to save time. The one thing it cannot do is to reveal the nature of things—which last remark, if not clear already, will become clearer as I proceed. Dive back into the flux itself, then, Bergson tells us, if you wish to know reality, that flux which Platonism, in its strange belief that only the immutable is excellent, has always spurned; turn your

[51] In 1947, Jung writes that he differentiated psychological phenomena from biological ones as follows: 'I call those biological phenomena "psychic" which show at least traces of a *will that interferes with the regular and automatic functioning of instincts*' (Jung 1947/2015:457).

> face toward sensation, that flesh-bound thing which rationalism has always loaded with abuse. (James 1909).

In so doing, James evidently also draws parallels with his pragmatism and its emphasis on *active* engagement with reality:

> When you have broken the reality into concepts you never can reconstruct it in its wholeness. Out of no amount of discreteness can you manufacture the concrete. But place yourself at a bound, or *d'emblée,* as M. Bergson says, inside of the living, moving, active thickness of the real, and all the abstractions and distinctions are given into your hand: you can now make the intellectualist substitutions to your heart's content. (James 1909).

In contemporary secondary literature, however, scholars were *contrasting* the philosophies of pragmatists on the one hand and of Bergson on the other already during the time in which Jung was working on his theory of types.[52] I would argue that James, as a result of his pragmatist reading of Bergson's philosophy, appears to have viewed Bergson's critique of intellectualism too narrowly: he appears to have regarded it as a critique of what he terms 'rationalism', which for Bergson would only be a particular manifestation of the hegemony of the 'intellect'.[53]

When it comes to the nature of philosophical positions themselves, James and Bergson also provide somewhat different accounts. We have seen previously that James—being also a psychologist—*reduces* philosophical positions to manifestations of temperament, or *psychology*. Bergson's philosophy lacks this step and focuses on the critique of the intellect itself—and hence, of intellectual philosophy—implying that the history of philosophy is predominantly merely a manifestation of the intellectual process of categorisation. In the following section, we will look at the central dichotomy in Bergson's philosophy in more detail: that of 'intellect', on the one hand, and 'intuition', on the other. In his philosophy, Bergson describes what he refers to as his 'intuitive method': it is through intuition that it is possible to go beyond the categorisations of the intellect and understand life 'from within'.

[52] See, for instance, Moore 1912 and Kallen 1914.
[53] For a detailed discussion of the opposition between Bergson and pragmatism see, for instance, Allen 2013.

Bergson's philosophy: Intuition and Élan Vital

In *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics,* his final published work—where he provides, in a sense, an autobiography of his own method in philosophy—Bergson describes intuition as 'sympathy' and contrasts it with the intellectual 'analysis':

> It follows that an absolute can only be given in an *intuition*, while all the rest has to do with *analysis*. We call intuition here the *sympathy* by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. Analysis, on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, common to that object and to others. Analyzing then consists in expressing a thing in terms of what is not it. (Bergson 1934/1946).

As Lawlor puts it, 'Bergsonian intuition then consists in entering into the thing, rather than going around it from the outside'—the latter being the characteristic of the intellect (Lawlor 2020). It is then this special capacity of intuition that allows it to gain *absolute* knowledge. As we shall see, with his criticism of the intellect—with its 'analysis' and then 'synthesis' of the different perspectives into a comprehensive account—Bergson provides his critique of the *scientific method* itself. He defines synthesis as follows: '[Synthesis] is less a special operation than a certain power of thought, the capacity for penetrating into the interior of a fact whose significance one has divined and in which one will find the explanation of an indefinite number of facts' (Bergson 934/946). He adds that, '[i]n a word, the spirit of synthesis is only the spirit of analysis raised to a higher power' (Bergson 1934/1946).

For Bergson, one thing that we all experience through intuition and not through intellectual analysis is *ourselves*: we have a sense of self, our *consciousness*, that moves through *time*: 'There is at least one reality which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis' (Bergson 1934/1946). He explains further: 'It is our own person in its flowing through time, the self which endures' (Bergson 1934/1946). According to Bergson, '[w]ith no other thing can we sympathise intellectually, or if you like spiritually' (Bergson 1934/1946). He adds: 'But one thing is sure: we sympathise with ourselves' (Bergson 1934/1946).

This idea of 'indivisible continuity' goes back to Bergson's doctoral thesis, first published in 1889 (one year before James' *Principles*), titled *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, and specifically, to his notion of 'duration' ('la durée')—Bergson's theory of time and consciousness. In this work, Bergson describes duration as follows:

> Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states. For this purpose it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on the contrary, it would no longer *endure*. Nor need it forget its former states: it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another. (Bergson 1889/1950:99).

However, our ordinary thought, our 'intellect', breaks up this organic whole, this continuity into mere fragments. And it is here where Bergson begins his criticism of the scientific method—with the notion of time: it impossible to *measure time* as it is mobile and incomplete. And it is also here where he introduces the notion of 'intuition': duration, impossible to capture in words, can only be grasped through intuition (Bergson 1889/1950).

In *Creative Evolution*, originally published in 1907—a book that, as we shall see, is of great importance for Jung's theory of psychological types—Bergson further developed his ideas, whilst introducing another key concept of his philosophy: 'élan vital'. Élan vital, meaning a vital impetus, is a concept that is intended to explain evolution in a way that science, with its intellect, is not able to. He describes it in his book as follows:

> So we come back, by a somewhat roundabout way, to the idea we started from, that of an *original impetus of life*, passing from one generation of germs to the following generation of germs through the developed organisms which bridge the interval between the generations. This impetus, sustained right along the lines of evolution among which it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of variations, at least of those that are regularly passed on, that accumulate and create new species. In general, when species have begun to diverge from a common stock, they accentuate their divergence as they progress in their evolution. Yet, in certain definite points, they may evolve

> identically; in fact, they must do so if the hypothesis of a common impetus be accepted. (Bergson 1907/1911).

On the one hand, Bergson contrasts his theory with what he calls a 'mechanistic account': 'A mechanistic theory is one which means to show us the gradual building-up of the machine under the influence of external circumstances intervening either directly by action on the tissues or indirectly by the selection of better-adapted ones' (Bergson 1907/1911). He adds: 'But, whatever form this theory may take, supposing it avails at all to explain the detail of the parts, it throws no light on their correlation' (Bergson 1907/1911). On the other hand, he also contrasts it with what he calls 'finalism': 'Then comes the doctrine of finality, which says that the parts have been brought together on a preconceived plan with a view to a certain end' (Bergson 1907/191). He adds: 'In this it likens the labor of nature to that of the workman, who also proceeds by the assemblage of parts with a view to the realization of an idea or the imitation of a model' (Bergson 1907/1911). For Bergson, both theories are products of the 'intellect', which, as we have seen before, is incapable to understand the true nature of life. Bergson then contrasts the intellect with the 'instinct', stating that they are fundamentally *opposite* and *complementary*:

> It is because intelligence and instinct, having originally been interpenetrating, retain something of their common origin. Neither is ever found in a pure state... There is no intelligence in which some traces of instinct are not to be discovered, more especially no instinct that is not surrounded with a fringe of intelligence. It is this fringe of intelligence that has been the cause of so many misunderstandings. From the fact that instinct is always more or less intelligent, it has been concluded that instinct and intelligence are things of the same kind, that there is only a difference of complexity or perfection between them, and, above all, that one of the two is expressible in terms of the other. In reality, they accompany each other only because they are complementary, and they are complementary only because they are different, what is instinctive in instinct being opposite to what is intelligent in intelligence. (Bergson 1907/1911).

Bergson then proceeds to describe the differences between the two, the essential difference between them being the following: 'instinct perfected is a faculty of using and even of *constructing organized instruments*; intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and *using unorganized instruments*' (Bergson 1907/1911). He explains that the former mean 'natural' instruments and the latter mean 'artificial' instruments: 'If instinct is, above all, the faculty of using an organized natural

instrument, it must involve innate knowledge (potential or unconscious, it is true), both of this instrument and of the object to which it is applied' (Bergson 1907/1911). He adds: 'Instinct is therefore innate knowledge of a *thing*' (Bergson 1907/1911). Intelligence, on the other hand, according to Bergson, 'is the faculty of constructing unorganized—that is to say artificial—instruments' (Bergson 1907/1911). It is ultimately because of this that, for Bergson, '*[t]he intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life'*.

Bergson proceeds to contrasts the intellect with the instinct:

> Instinct, on the contrary, is molded on the very form of life. While intelligence treats everything mechanically, instinct proceeds, so to speak, organically. If the consciousness that slumbers in it should awake, if it were wound up into knowledge instead of being wound off into action, if we could ask and it could reply, it would give up to us the most intimate secrets of life. For it only carries out further the work by which life organizes matter—so that we cannot say, as has often been shown, where organization ends and where instinct begins. When the little chick is breaking its shell with a peck of its beak, it is acting by instinct, and yet it does but carry on the movement which has borne it through embryonic life. Inversely, in the course of embryonic life itself (especially when the embryo lives freely in the form of a larva), many of the acts accomplished must be referred to instinct. The most essential of the primary instincts are really, therefore, vital processes. (Bergson 1907/1911).

Finally, 'intuition' is a variation of the instinct: 'instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely' (Bergson 1907/1911). And it is through intuition alone that we are able to grasp the flow of duration 'from within' and thus gain knowledge of life itself, which, according to Bergson, should be the goal of philosophy:

> These fleeting intuitions, which light up their object only at distant intervals, philosophy ought to seize, first to sustain them, then to expand them and so unite them together. The more it advances in this work, the more will it perceive that intuition is mind itself, and, in a certain sense, life itself: the intellect has been cut out of it by a process resembling that which has generated matter. Thus is revealed the unity of the spiritual life. We recognize it only when we place ourselves in intuition in order to go from intuition to the intellect, for from the intellect we shall never pass to intuition. (Bergson 1907/1911).

Having provided a brief overview of Bergson's key ideas, in the following section of this chapter, I am going to look Jung's reception of these ideas—most notably, drawing a parallel between Bergson's 'élan vital' and Jung's conception of the 'libido'.

Jung's Reception of Bergson's Philosophy: Élan Vital and Libido

As mentioned previously, Bergson and Jung were interested in the same general intellectual discussions and themes and, broadly speaking, shared the same fundamental outlook on them. In particular, they have both been associated with neovitalism in one way or another, even though both thinkers rejected this association in their writings. Bergson was subsequently characterised as a vitalist by certain scholars, despite having criticised them in *Creative Evolution* for their finalism and individualism: 'the position of vitalism is rendered very difficult by the fact that, in nature, there is neither purely internal finality nor absolutely distinct individuality' (Bergson 1907/1911). Raya Jones, for instance, has argued that Jung put Bergson's 'élan vital' at the bottom of the list of the concepts that he regarded to be similar to his 'libido' in 1928 due to Bergson's associations with vitalism (Jones 2018). Furthermore, Ann Addison, for instance, uses the term vitalism (and neo-vitalism) to describe both Jung and Bergson's interests (Addison 2016:567-571).

As Shamdasani notes, Théodore Flournoy compared Jung's notion of the libido, as outlined in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, to Bergson's 'élan vital' (as well as to Schopenhauer's 'will' and Ostwald's 'energy') in his review of Jung's book in 1913 (Shamdasani 2003: 225). As Shamdasani further points out, it appears that Jung read Bergson's *Creative Evolution* after he developed his notion of the libido—since he had the 1912 German translation of the book in his library (Shamdasani 2003:227). Jung himself drew a parallel specifically between Bergson's élan vital and his libido in his paper *On Psychoanalysis*, delivered before the International Medical Congress in London in 1913: 'From a broader standpoint libido can be understood as vital energy in general, or as Bergson's *élan vital*" (Jung 1913/1920b). In the same year, in his lecture 'A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types' delivered at the Psychoanalytical Congress in Munich, Jung also refers to Bergson's conceptualisation of the intellect: 'Bergson also makes use of these images of

crystallisation, solidification, etc., to illustrate the essence of intellectual abstraction' (Jung 1913/1920a).

As Shamdasani notes, in a presentation delivered in 1914, Adolf Keller looked at Bergson's philosophy in the context of Jung's notion of the libido, which Jung regarded as an important contribution to his work (Shamdasani 2003:228). In Part II of 'The Content of The Psychoses', Jung refers to Bergson's élan vital as he introduces his notion of libido whilst also making a distinction—in contrast to the more *biological* nature of the former, the latter is *psychological*:

> I postulate a hypothetical fundamental striving which I designate *libido*. In the classical use of the word, *libido* never had an exclusively sexual connotation as it has in medicine. The word *interest*, as Claparède once suggested to me, could be used in this special sense, if this expression had to-day a less extensive application. Bergson's concept, *élan vital*, would also serve if this expression were less biological and more psychological. Libido is intended to be an energising expression for *psychological values*. (Jung 1914/1920d).

He draws the parallel between the two concepts again in the same article: 'I realise that my views are parallel with those of Bergson, and that in my book the concept of the libido which I have given, is a concept parallel to that of "élan vital"; my constructive method corresponds to Bergson's "intuitive method."' (Jung 1914/1920d). However, Jung points out that he confined himself to the psychological side and to practical work, hereby also making a distinction between Bergson's concept as *philosophical* one and his own notion of libido being strictly *psychological* (Jung 1914/1920d). He adds: 'When I first read Bergson a year and a half ago I discovered to my great pleasure everything which I had worked out practically, but expressed by him in consummate language and in a wonderfully clear philosophic style' (Jung 1914/1920d).

Finally, Jung admired Bergson's *philosophy of science*—his criticism of the mechanical, 'scientific' conception of life and considered it relevant to psychology. In his letter to Dr. Loÿ in March 1913, where Jung refers to Bergson for the first time, he writes: 'The purely causal, not to say materialistic conception of the immediately preceding decades, would conceive the organic formation as the reaction of living matter, and this doubtless provides a position heuristically useful, but, as far as any real understanding goes, leads only to a more or less ingenious and *apparent*

reduction and postponement of the problem' (Jung 1913/1920c). He then says: 'Let me refer you to Bergson's excellent criticism of this conception' (Jung 1913/1920c). Jung adds that '[f]rom external forces but half the result, at most, could ensue; the other half lies within the individual disposition of the living material, without which it is obvious the specific reaction-formation could never be achieved' (Jung 1913/1920c). According to Jung, '[t]his principle must be applied also in psychology' Jung explains that '[t]he psyche does not only *react*; it also gives its own individual reply to the influences at work upon it, and at least half the resulting configuration and its existing disposition is due to this' (Jung 1913/1920c).

Having provided a brief outline of Jung's reception of Bergson in the context of his psychology in general, in the following section, I am going to look at the relevance of Bergson's philosophical ideas to Jung's theory of types in particular.

The Rational (Intellect) versus The Irrational (Instinct/Intuition)

As Shamdasani has argued in his *Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology*, Bergson's dichotomy of the 'intellect versus instinct' in *Creative Evolution* provided the basis for Jung's distinction between the 'rational' and 'irrational', as well as for the notion of intuition in particular (Shamdasani 2003:229). As we have seen, Bergson made a distinction between the intellect on the one hand and the instinct (intuition) on the other hand. In the following section of this chapter, then, I am going to explore further Jung's debt to Bergson with regard to his 'rational' (which includes the 'thinking' and 'feeling' types) versus 'irrational' (which includes the 'intuition' and 'sensation' types) dichotomy.

In his 1914 work, Keller describes Bergson's critique of the intellect as follows: 'The intellect, wanting to grasp life, always draws only separate parts out of the stream of experience, calling them perception or feeling or striving, and thus separating them from the stream in which they were embedded, flowing' (Keller 1914:9; translated from German). He adds: 'The intellect tries to build up and represent the spiritual life, the soul as a whole from those parts' (Keller 1914:9; translated from German). Keller then also describes Bergson's notion of intuition, stating that it 'grasps the entire world as an infinite, creative becoming', making Bergson's 'intuitive

philosophy' drastically different from the 'philosophies of pure, permanent being from Parmenides and Plato to Spinoza' (Keller 1914:10; translated from German).

While in his correspondence with Hans Schmid-Guisan in 1915 Jung does state that it was Bergson's philosophy that gave him the idea of the 'irrational'—it is clear that his understanding of the irrational in 1915 differs greatly from one that he uses in *Psychological Types* in 1921:

> It was Bergson who gave me the notion of the irrational. What I like is the unmistakable *hypostasization* of this notion. As a consequence we get two intimately connected, mutually dependent principles: the *rational* and the *irrational*. It gives me pleasure to think of them as hypostatic, because then I can acknowledge their existence also morally. (Jung 1915/Beebe and Falzeder 2013:41).

In 1915, Jung's 'irrational' essentially meant that which opposes the psychological stance of the beholder, there only being two main psychological stances: introversion (equated with 'thinking') and extraversion (equated with 'feeling'). Thus, in 1915 Jung writes to Schmid:

> We speak of "thinking" and "feeling," and we name the types concerned accordingly. As you know, I have introduced these types in an earlier publication, under the names of the introverted and the extraverted type. For the former, adaptation proceeds via abstraction from the object, for the latter, via feeling into the object. (Jung 1915/Beebe and Falzeder 2013: 55).

Jung described himself as a 'thinker', and therefore 'rational', and Schmid as a 'feeler', and therefore 'irrational'. However, as he explains below, this was only the case because one is constrained by their own perspective. Hence, he wrote to Schmid: 'you are as irrational to me as I am irrational to you' (Jung 1915/Beebe and Falzeder 2013:42). He explains further that both thinking and feeling are rational if they constitute one's psychological lens:

> I wrote above: you are irrational. But if I think analytically, I will say: and so am I (but I do not want to see it). For the rational is what is given in my consciousness, and what is comprehensible, while the irrational is what is present in my unconscious, and what is incomprehensible. Insofar as you, in accordance with your character, represent the feeling standpoint, while I call your standpoint irrational, I am actually projecting a judgement, which holds true only for me. You regard your feeling standpoint as rational; I regard my thinking standpoint as rational. But as I hold the thinking

> standpoint, I am not at the same time consciously holding the feeling standpoint, which for me, as a consequence, does not fall into the category of the rational but is of necessity irrational. For the same reasons, for you the thinking standpoint falls into the category of the irrational, because for you rationality is tied to the feeling standpoint. As is easily imaginable, the greatest misunderstandings may arise out of this situation, and, as you know, they actually did arise, and how! (Jung 1915/Beebe and Falzeder 2013:45).

Indeed, in his correspondence with Schmid, he referred to Bergson himself as a representative of the feeling type and therefore an irrational—as similar to Schmid—precisely due to Jung own self-identification with the thinking type:

> A man of your kind, however, who is as much devoted to feeling as I am to the intellect, comes to the help, not of the intellect, but of the feeling in the other. And that is *why* it is to a thinker who probably belongs to your type— namely, the romantic, as Ostwald called him — to whom I owe a notion that freed me from that certain staleness of pragmatism. It was *Bergson* who gave me the notion of the *irrational*. (Jung 1915/Beebe and Falzeder 2013:41).

As John Beebe and Ernst Falzeder note, however, the fact that Jung does acknowledge that feeling is rational from the perspective of the feeler—just as thinking is from the perspective of the thinker—foreshadows the idea that thinking and feeling are both 'rational': 'The terms "rational" and "irrational" are not yet being used here as they would be in Jung's later typology, although his acknowledgement later in the letter that the feeling standpoint is also rational from the feeling person's perspective is a step toward his eventual view that both thinking and feeling are "rational" functions (and sensation and intuition "irrational" ones)' (Beebe and Falzeder 2013:42).

In *Psychological Types*, Jung attributes the creation of the concept of the intuitive type to Maria Moltzer, his assistant: 'The merit of having discovered the existence of this type is due to Miss. M. Moltzer' (Jung 1923:570). In her paper 'The Conception of the Libido and its Psychic Manifestations', delivered before the Psychological Club in Zurich in 1916, she stated:

> The tendency of individualisation also contains a collective element which arises in the half conscious, half unconscious function which we call intuition. Intuition [. . .] contains elements of feelings as well as of thoughts, and tries to solve a given problem

> and create an adaptation in bringing together these half conscious and half unconscious elements. This adaptation coincides with neither the extraversion nor the introversion tendency— it contains elements of both. Therefore, I am inclined to accept a third type which uses mainly this intuitive function in its adaptation to life. (Moltzer in Shamdasani 1998:109).

In her other paper 'On the conception of the unconscious', she regarded intuition as the oldest psychological function and, echoing Bergson, believed that it had developed from instinct: 'I consider intuition to be the differentiation and the conscious function of instinct' (Moltzer in Shamdasani 1998:117).[54]

As we have seen previously, whilst drawing the parallels between his and Bergson's thought (in particular, between his 'libido' and Bergson's 'élan vital'), Jung was careful to distinguish between the two: Bergson's work was philosophical while his was psychological. The same appears to be true about the notion of intuition: previously, Jung appears to have treated it as a philosophical notion and it was Moltzer who turned it into a *psychological* notion. In 1919, three years after Moltzer presented her account, Jung delivered a paper titled *Instinct and the Unconscious* at the Joint Meeting of the British Psychological Society, the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association in London. There Jung stated the following:

> Bergson's philosophy suggests another way of explanation, where the factor of 'intuition' comes in. Intuition, as a psychological function, is also an unconscious process. Just as instinct is the intrusion of an unconsciously motivated impulse into conscious action, so intuition is the intrusion of an unconscious content of an 'image' into conscious apperception. Intuition is a process of unconscious perception, either of subjective unconscious contents, or of objective but subliminal facts. Thus colloquial language speaks of intuition as instinctive apprehension (Erfassung). The mechanism of intuition is analogous to that of instinct, with this difference that whereas instinct means a teleological impulse towards a highly complicated action, intuition means an unconscious teleological apprehension of a highly complicated situation. In a way intuition is a counterpart of instinct, not more and not less incomprehensible and astounding than instinct itself. (Jung 1919:18).

[54] On Molzter, see Shamdasani's *Cult Fictions* (1998a) and 'The Lost Contributions of Maria Moltzer' (1998c).

Hence, it is clear that by 1919 Jung had developed a psychological conception of intuition—namely, of intuition as a *psychological function*—which he then further elaborated on in *Psychological Types* in 1921.

Bergson's Critique of Intellectualism: Jung's Philosophy of Science and Psychology

In a lecture given before the Zurich School for Analytical Psychology, Jung acknowledged the contribution of Bergson's work to psychology in his criticism of intellectualism and relates it to pluralism in psychology:

> Special thanks are due to Bergson for having broken a lance for the right of the irrational to exist. Psychology will probably be obliged to acknowledge and to submit to a plurality of principles, in spite of the fact that this does not suit the scientific mind. Only so can psychology be saved from ship-wreck. (Jung 1916/1920).[55]

In the previous chapter, we looked at Jung's connections with James' view of scientific theories as 'instruments', providing a quote from *Psychological Types*, where Jung refers to science as a mere 'instrument for life'. However, if we look at the continuation of that quote, the connection with Bergson's critique of intellectualism becomes apparent as well. Here, Jung specifically states the limitations of the intellect in its capability to understand *life in its fullness*:

> For when we approach the province of actual living with the intellect and its science, we realize at once we are in a confined space that shuts us out from other, equally real provinces of life. We are, therefore, compelled to acknowledge the universality of our ideal as a limitation, and to look around us for a spiritus rector which from the standpoint and claims of a complete life, can offer us a greater guarantee of psychological universality than the intellect alone can compass. (Jung 1923:76).

[55] As explained earlier, this was then published in French in a paper titled 'La Structure de l'inconscient' and came to be known as 'The Conception of The Unconscious' in the second edition of the *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*—and, subsequently, as the 'Structure of the Unconscious' in the *Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, volume 7. There are no references to Bergson in the revised and expanded version of the paper titled 'The Relations Between The Ego and The Unconscious' (Jung 1928/1972).

Furthermore, Jung's idea that psychological principles (*types*) should not be reduced to one another (and more specifically, the irrational to the rational) echoes Bergson's criticism of intellectualism—or reducing everything (and in particular, that which pertains to the real of the instinct) to the intellect: 'I differentiate these functions from one another, because they are neither mutually relatable nor mutually reducible' (Jung 1923:547). Hence, '[t]he principle of thinking, for instance, is absolutely different from the principle of feeling, and so forth' (Jung 1923:547).

As Shamdasani points out, it is important to understand that Jung uses the word 'irrational' in the sense of 'outside reason' [Außervernünftigen] rather than 'against reason' [Widervernünftigen] (Shamdasani 2003, 229). Echoing Bergson, Jung was not against the intellect *per se*, but against intellectualism. However, Jung also views Bergson's ideas through a psychological lens, seeing his philosophical dichotomy of 'intellect' and 'instinct' as a fundamentally psychological one: of the rational on the one hand, and the irrational, on the other. Hence, I argue that Jung's critique of science in *Psychological Types* is a reformulation of Bergson's critique of the intellect in psychological terms—as a critique of the rational. This means that whilst, for Bergson, it was intuitive *philosophy* that was capable of providing knowledge of that which the intellect was unable to grasp, for Jung, it was *psychology*—and, more specifically, the irrational.

What is more, with this, Jung effectively also provides a critique of Bergson's approach, since, for Jung, Bergson—as someone who was engaged with the problem on the purely *philosophical* level—was still predominantly working from the rational perspective. Hence, in *Psychological Types*, Jung states that, despite Bergson's description of his own method as 'intuitive', his method was still only 'intellectual':

> Bergson certainly has pointed to intuition and the possibility of an intuitive method. But it admittedly remains merely an indication. A proof of the method is lacking and will not be so easily forthcoming, although Bergson may point to his concepts of "élan vital" and "durée creatrice" as the results of intuition. Apart from this intuitively conceived basic view, which derives its psychological justification from the fact that, even in antiquity, particularly with neo-platonism, it was already a thoroughly familiar combination of ideas, the Bergson method is intellectual and not intuitive.[56]

[56] As Shamdasani points out, '[i]n actual fact, Bergson had explicitly dealt with a form of this critique in *Creative Evolution*. To the argument that any attempt to go beyond intelligence remained within it,

Jung writes the above in the context of his discussion of James' philosophy in Chapter VIII, titled 'The Problem of Types in Modern Philosophy'—where Jung provides a critique of pragmatism, stating that, on its own, pragmatism was insufficient to solve the fundamental psychological problem at stake. Interestingly, with this Jung echoes the contemporary scholars who argued that Bergson's and James' philosophies provided conflicting perspectives. For example, Günther Jacoby wrote in 1912 that Bergson's philosophy required one to *move beyond pragmatism:*

> [Bergson] leaves to pragmatism the realm of science and common sense, but in *philosophy he protests against it*. To Bergson's mind *philosophy begins where pragmatism ceases* […] A Bergsonian philosopher is a thinker freed from all pragmatism. He no longer looks for the practical use of things, but looks to things for their own sake. His mind no longer works to make headway for life, but it turns itself round and looks at life itself as it goes on within him. (Jacoby 1912:598).[57]

Jung, then, as we can see above, on the one hand, praises Bergson for *indicating* the possibility of the intuitive method, or the 'irrational' method in Jung's own terms, whilst one the other hand, dismisses his philosophy as ultimately intellectual, or 'rational'.

As Emily Herring has argued, although Bergson conceded that science and philosophy used different methods and provided different forms of knowledge, he also believed that they *complemented* each other. According to Herring, 'Bergson was pursuing a theoretical ambition he had held dear since his youth: to produce a synthesis between metaphysics and science that would account for the complementarity and profound differences between the two forms of knowledge' (Herring 2019). Thus, whilst Bergson was aiming to bridge the gap between metaphysics and science with his *philosophy*, from Jung's perspective, the two being fundamentally *psychological*, could be truly united only through psychology.

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he replied that this vicious circle, which had nevertheless constrained other philosophies, was only apparent' (Shamdasani 2003:230).

[57] More recently, Barry Allen has argued along the similar lines:

[E]arly critics were right to see in Bergson the antithesis of pragmatism. Unfolding this antithesis is a convenient way to study important concepts and innovations in Bergson's philosophy. I concentrate on his ideas of duration and intuition, and show how they prove the necessity of going beyond pragmatism. The reason is because knowledge itself goes beyond the utilitarian limitations in which pragmatism confines it. (Allen 2013:37).

Hence, I would argue that Bergson and Jung shared the goal of *expanding* the boundaries of science by including methods other than the intellect, but they disagreed as to how this was to be achieved. For Bergson, it was through his intuitive philosophical method, whilst for Jung, through the acknowledgement of the irrational as a psychological factor.[58] For Jung, then, Bergson's philosophy was one step forward from pragmatism, yet one step away from the actual use of 'intuitive method', found in German philosophy, and—as we shall see in the following chapter—specifically, Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy (Jung 1923:400).

Conclusion

To sum up, the second chapter of this thesis has examined the impact of Bergson's thought on Jung's theory of psychological types as outlined in his *Psychological Types*. I have argued that Jung's project in *Psychological Types* was partly an expansion of Bergson's philosophical project. Having adopted Bergson's critique of intellectualistic science as an initial *epistemological* standpoint, Jung builds upon Bergson's conceptualisation of the dichotomy of the intellect and intuition, reframing it as a *psychological* one—as that of the 'rational' on the one hand and the 'irrational' on the other. It follows then, for Jung, in order to provide the most comprehensive picture of reality, science needed to acknowledge the limitations of the rational and accept the possibility of the irrational knowledge.

The first part of the chapter provided an outline of Bergson's philosophical account, referring to his *Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory*, and, crucially, to his *Creative Evolution*. It then gave an account of Jung's reception of Bergson's thought between 1912 and 1921 and showed that Jung himself drew parallels between their ideas, and more specifically, between Bergson's 'élan vital' and his 'libido'. After that, the chapter looked at Jung's distinction between the 'rational' and 'irrational' in more detail, showing that it was Bergson's distinction between the 'intellect' and 'intuition' that provided the basis for this dichotomy. Drawing on Shamdasani, it has been noted that it was Moltzer's work that became the link between Bergson's

[58] Interestingly, in 1927 Herman Hausheer published an article titled 'Bergson's Critique of Scientific Psychology', echoing Jung's project in *Psychological Types*.

philosophical notion of intuition and Jung's *psychological* one: she reformulated Bergon's idea of intuition as a *psychological* function, or a psychological type. Finally, it has been shown in the chapter that Bergson's importance for Jung's typology, as an *epistemological method* in particular, resides in the idea that the rational should not dominate the irrational and, more generally, that no two types, or psychological principles, should be reduced to one another. This position then forms one of the cornerstones of Jung's epistemology, relating to the criticism of rationalism and monism by James discussed in the first chapter.

Along with James' pragmatism, Bergson's philosophy was a part of the immediate intellectual context within which Jung was working on *Psychological Types*. As such, Bergson's philosophy of science complemented James' work with its criticism of intellectualism. When it comes to the importance of these two philosophers for Jung's typological project in particular, while James' dichotomy of tough-minded and tender-minded temperaments informed Jung's conception of two different kinds of 'thinking'— 'extraverted thinking' and 'introverted thinking'—Bergson's distinction between the intellect and intuition provided the basis for a *higher-order* dichotomy of the 'rational' and 'irrational'. Hence, Bergson's philosophy was instrumental in enabling Jung to move the discussion beyond thinking, or the rational, and help conceptualise the nature of psychology as well that of science itself. What is also significant for Bergson scholarship is that Bergson's philosophy of science also effectively *redefined what it meant to do science by redefining the meaning of objectivity*: the scientific method needed to incorporate the intuitive philosophical method in order to provide a comprehensive account of reality. Thus, Bergson's philosophy provided another important component for Jung's conception of science and objectivity. From James, Jung took the importance of recognising the subjective nature of knowledge, or the 'personal equation', while Bergson's philosophy informed Jung's understanding of the importance of going beyond the realm of the rational. When it comes to Jung scholarship, the importance of Bergson's thought for Jung is precisely in that it provided a criticism of intellectualism rather than of the intellect: Jung, following Bergson, *was critical of intellectualistic science rather than of science itself*. Both Jung's and Bergson's projects thus serve as case studies in the history of the critique of rationalism—alongside figures such as Paul Feyerabend in the history of the philosophy of science.

For Jung, then, rationality and irrationality constituted a *psychological dichotomy* that needed to be reconciled in science. However, to achieve this is to solve a fundamental psychological problem—the 'problem of opposites'. Hence, in the next chapter, we shall look at Jung's proposed solution to the problem through his discussion of what he would later refer to as 'visionary' works.

CHAPTER III. PHILOSOPHY MEETS ART: 'VISIONARY' WORKS AND THE PROBLEM OF OPPOSITES

This chapter is divided into three parts: the first one is devoted to Jung and Friedrich Nietzsche, the second one to Jung and Carl Spitteler and the last one to Jung and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. This chapter looks at Jung's reading of particular works—namely, Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Spitteler's *Epimetheus and Prometheus*, and Goethe's *Faust*—exploring their significance for Jung's conceptualisation of his psychological typology in *Psychological Types*. These works are among the key examples in the book of what Jung later refers to as 'visionary' works.[59] Hence, in this chapter we take a step away from pragmatism and what Jung regards as rationalistic philosophy and take a look at these works of art.[60] For Jung, these works are explorations of the *deepest* levels of the inner workings of the psyche—namely, of the 'collective unconscious'. According to Jung, in order to resolve the problem of the personal equation in science, the inherent *subjectivity* of the scientist in general and the psychologist in particular, one needs to overcome one's one-sidedness by resolving a fundamental inner conflict in psychology—what Jung refers to as the 'problem of opposites'. The resolution of the problem, thus, results in the integration of one's opposite in the 'unconscious', including the 'collective unconscious'. We shall see, then, that the significance of these visionary works for Jung's project in *Psychological Types* lies primarily in his illustration of the *resolution* of the problem of opposites through these works—and, as a result, of the personal equation itself. For Jung, this solution is 'religious' and manifests itself in what he refers to as the 'reconciling symbol'.

[59] Jung does not use this term in *Psychological Types*, but he still groups these works together, highlighting their importance. The term 'visionary' work is used in Jung's essay titled 'Psychology and Literature' published in 1950—an early version of which had been first published in 1930 (Jung 1950/1971).
[60] Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is evidently a philosophical work, but as we shall see, for Jung in has a special significance—as also a work of artistic creation.

Part I. Jung and Nietzsche: Self-creation

Introduction

The first part of this chapter, devoted to what Jung subsequently refers to as 'visionary' works, explores the connections between the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Carl Gustav Jung's *Psychological Types*. It focuses on two of his works—*The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* (1872) and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None* (1883)—since they are the ones that Jung addresses explicitly in *Psychological Types*. In particular, this chapter looks at Nietzsche's notion of 'creativity' in *Thus Spoke Zarathus*tra and explores what it means for Jung in *Psychological Types*. On the one hand, in Chapter III, Jung dismisses what he refers to as Nietzsche's 'aesthetic' formulation of the conflict between the Apollonian and the Dionysian in *The Birth of Tragedy* as two distinct artistic drives and argues in favour of a 'religious' one instead. On the other hand, Jung praises Nietzsche's 'intuitionism' and 'creativeness' in Chapter VIII and recognises it as an important step towards solving the problem of opposites. As we shall see, in Chapter III, Jung uses the dichotomy of the Apollonian and the Dionysian to conceptualise two of his psychological types—'introverted intuitive' type and 'extraverted sensation' type. Moreover, Jung also describes Nietzsche himself as an example of the former.

In this chapter, I argue that the importance of Nietzsche's philosophy for Jung's typology is twofold. On the one hand, by Nietzsche's 'intuitionism' in Chapter VIII, Jung really means 'irrationality', which he believes was effectively suppressed by rationality in the history of Western philosophy prior to Nietzsche. Earlier, in Chapter III, Jung criticises Nietzsche's 'aesthetic' solution in *The Birth of Tragedy* for being one-sided—Nietzsche had not yet accessed the 'collective unconscious', according to Jung. The correct, 'religious' solution (of which, as Jung points out, there was, nevertheless, an indication in Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*) is one that actually unites the opposites—the conscious and the unconscious; introversion and extraversion—and the roots of this approach, according to Jung, are found in Eastern religions. Jung praises Nietzsche's fascination with Greece for this reason—

seeing Greece as the Middle point between the East and West. By contrasting Nietzsche with other philosophers in Chapter VIII—whose approach was logico-intellectual, or 'rational' in his terms—Jung establishes that the West was, in effect, dominated by 'rationality'. But in order to solve the problem of opposites one needs both the 'rational' and the 'irrational'. According to Jung, Nietzsche effectively introduces the irrational into the Western thought, serving as a missing ingredient for Jung's solution to the problem. On the other hand, as we shall see, Jung subsequently describes Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* an example of a 'visionary' work—as displaying the capacity to access to the 'collective unconscious'. I show that the importance for Jung in this lies in what he describes as 'creativeness' in *Psychological Types*. According to Jung, Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* was able to provide insight into the solution to the problem of opposites—as an act of *creation* [Schöpfung] that resulted in 'becoming who one is', which Jung read through the lens of his own *Liber Novus* experience and saw as an act of 'individuation', or the achievement of a balanced 'Self' through the integration of the unconscious elements.[61] In *Psychological Types*, then, Jung effectively *reformulates* Nietzsche's concept of the 'creation of one's own values' as his own notion of 'individuation', as part of his epistemological method that aimed to resolve the problem of the personal equation and achieve 'objectivity' in a revised sense.

Review of Arguments in Secondary Literature

Scholarly work on Jung and Nietzsche was carried out by Paul Bishop in his *The Dionysian Self: C.G. Jung's Reception of Friedrich Nietzsche*, published in 1995, which provided a comprehensive account of Jung's reception of Nietzsche throughout his life, as well as in his *Psychological Types* in particular (Bishop 1995). In it, he argued that 'the reconciliation of the opposites is essentially a non-rational or irrational matter' (Bishop 1995:148). In this thesis, I emphasise that, for Jung, the importance of the irrational for the problem of opposites is accidental: since the

[61] Subsequently, in his seminars on Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, held between 1934 and 1939, Jung explains that Nietzsche's project was destined to fail since in order to 'become who one is' through the 'creation of one's values', one needed to integrate the inferior, more primitive, or collective aspects of oneself. Hence, in her *Jung's Nietzsche*, Gaia Domenici has argued that Jung read Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* as a demonstration of a 'failed individuation' (Domenici 2019:148). See also footnote 72.

Western thought had been dominated by the rational, it is important to introduce the irrational, as one needs both.

An important contribution to the topic has been made by Martin Liebscher—most notably, in his book titled *Libido Und Wille Zur Macht: C.G. Jungs Auseinandersetzung Mit Nietzsche* (Liebscher 2012). The work provides a systematic account of Jung's reception of Nietzsche throughout his career, as well as a detailed comparison of the ideas of the two thinkers. In particular, Liebscher explores the parallel between Nietzsche's concept of the 'transvaluation of values' and Jung's notion of 'individuation' (Liebscher 2012:155).[62] In the book, he also points out that the value of Nietzsche for Jung in *Psychological Types* lies in Jung's conceptualisation of the two *irrational* types, intuition and sensation, based on Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian in *The Birth of Tragedy*, rather than merely providing another historical example of introversion and extraversion (Liebscher 2012:51). This chapter, then, seeks to expand on this argument and show that the importance of Nietzsche for Jung's work in *Psychological Types* partly lies in the conceptualisation of Jung's rational and irrationality dichotomy.

Lucy Huskinson has written on Jung and Nietzsche specifically in the context of the problem of opposites in her book titled *Nietzsche and Jung: The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites* (Huskinson 2004). In it, she argues that 'for Nietzsche and Jung, the goal or height of human health and potential is the realization of the whole self, which they refer to as the 'Übermensch' and 'Self' respectively' (Huskinson 2004:3). She further adds that 'the whole self comprises the dynamic syntheses of Apollinian and Dionysian impulses in the Nietzschean Übermensch, and consciousness and the unconscious in the Jungian Self' (Huskinson 2004:3). However, in this chapter, following the Nietzsche scholars that have argued for the distinction between the early and late works of Nietzsche, I view Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as distinct texts that cover different topics and vary in their goals—the Apollonian and Dionysian dichotomy in the former and the notion of the 'Overman' in the latter are separate projects.[63] Thus, merging them would not do justice to the unique content of these two works.[64]

[62] Nietzsche elaborates on his notion of 'transvaluation of all values' in his *Antichrist* in 1895 (Nietzsche 1895/2007).
[63] See, for instance, Stern 2019.
[64] See also Liebscher (2006).

More recently, another contribution has been made by Gaia Domenici in her *Jung's Nietzsche*: *Zarathustra, The Red Book, and 'Visionary' Works*, where she provides an account of Jung's reformulation of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* in psychological terms by relating it to his own experiences described in *Liber Novus* (Domenici 2019). For Jung, Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* came to be understood as analogous to his *Liber Novus* (Domenici 2019). This chapter, then, follows on from this argument and locates it in the context of Jung's reception of Nietzsche's philosophy in *Psychological Types* in particular.

Jung Reads Nietzsche

Friedrich Nietzsche, a German philosopher and cultural critic, was born in 1844 in Röcken, near Leipzig. In 1849, after his father's death—who was a Lutheran pastor there—his family moved to Naumburg, where Nietzsche grew up. He originally pursued a career in classical philology and in 1869, at the age of twenty-four, he was offered a chair at the University of Basel (where Jung would study three decades later) (Anderson 2017). Nietzsche's philosophical work came to be famous for its 'uncompromising criticisms of traditional European morality and religion, as well as of conventional philosophical ideas and social and political pieties associated with modernity' (Anderson 2017). His best-known works include *The Gay Scienc*e (1882), *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883), *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), and *Twilight of the Idols* (1889).

In secondary literature, Nietzsche's philosophy has been linked with the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson, an American essayist, whom Nietzsche read enthusiastically.[65] For instance, Benedetta Zavatta has explored the relationship between Nietzsche's notion of the 'transvaluation of values' and Ralph Emerson's notion of 'self-reliance'. According to Zavatta, based on his reading of Emerson's work, Nietzsche conceptualises the three different figures that have personified his philosophical writings, namely, the 'Schopenhauer as educator' (*Untimely Meditations*), the 'free spirit' (*Human, All Too Human* and *Daybreak*), and, finally, Zarathustra, whom she sees as representing his mature philosophical thought

[65] Comparisons have also been drawn between Jung and Emerson. See, for instance, Carter (1981).

(Zavatta 2019:76). She then links these three personifications of Nietzsche's thought with the different aspects of Emerson's notion of self-reliance. Thus, the 'Schopenhauer as educator' is seen to embody 'nonconformism', meaning 'a respect and admiration for one's own distinctive individuality and a desire to defend this individuality against all external intrusions and to develop it to the fullest possible extent' (Zavatta 2019:76). The 'free spirit' symbolises 'skepticisim', or 'an openness to multiple points of view, proceeding from respect and admiration for the individuality of others in this individuality's distinctness and difference from our own' (Zavatta 2019:76). Finally, Zarathustra is seen to embody 'original expression of the self and active affirmation of one's own values, proceeding from a state of imperturbability and god-like indifference' (Zavatta 2019:76). Nietzsche wrote his *Untimely Meditations*, consisting of four works, between 1873 and 1876—after the publication of *the Birth of Tragedy* in 1872. Thus, these figures represent the evolution of Nietzsche's thought between the two works that are explored in this thesis—*The Birth of Tragedy* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883). In this chapter, we shall see how Jung perceives this evolution of Nietzsche's philosophical thought through the lens of psychology and why this is significant for his narrative in *Psychological Types*.

Jung describes his first reading of Nietzsche in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, which happened during his student years at the University of Basel (Jung 1962/1989). He recalls that as a student during the clinical semesters he had very little time to read beyond his studies, and Nietzsche was among the authors that he had wanted to read for some time (Jung 1962/1989). However, Jung hesitated to start reading his works, feeling that he was 'insufficiently prepared' for that (Jung 1962/1989). He explains: 'At that time [Nietzsche] was much discussed, mostly in adverse terms, by the allegedly competent philosophy students, from which I was able to deduce the hostility he aroused in the higher echelons' (Jung 1962/1989:101). According to Jung, this hostility towards Nietzsche was partly due to the popularity of Jakob Burckhardt, a Swiss historian of art, who had made critical remarks with regard to Nietzsche's philosophy (Jung 1962/1989:101). Jung also adds that 'there were some persons at the university who had known Nietzsche personally and were able to retail all sorts of unflattering tidbits about him' (Jung 1962/1989:101). However, '[m]ost of them had not read a word of Nietzsche and therefore dwelt at length on his outward foibles, for example, putting on airs as a gentleman, his

manner of playing the piano, his stylistic exaggerations—idiosyncrasies which got on the nerves of the good people of Basel in those days' (Jung 1962/1989:101). Jung points out, however, that he was not influenced by the negative reception of Nietzsche at the university—conversely, it made him even more interested in the philosopher and gave him 'the strongest incentive' to read his works sooner (Jung 1962/1989:101-102).

However, Jung adds that his postponing of reading Nietzsche was due to his fear that he and the philosopher might be alike—in particular, 'in regard to the "secret" which had isolated him from his environment' (Jung 1962/1989:102). Jung was specifically talking about his psychological experiences and wondering whether Nietzsche would have had them as well: 'Perhaps—who knows?—he had had inner experiences, insights which he had unfortunately attempted to talk about, and had found that no one understood him' (Jung 1962/1989:102). Nietzsche was regarded as 'eccentric', which Jung wanted to avoid at all costs. Jung then proceeds to compare himself to Nietzsche, drawing some contrasts and similarities. While Nietzsche was a professor and 'had written whole long books and so had attained unimaginable heights', he was, like Jung, 'a clergyman's son' (Jung 1962/1989:102). Nietzsche 'had been born in the great land of Germany, which reached as far as the sea, while [Jung] was only a Swiss and sprang from a modest parsonage in a small border village' (Jung 1962/1989:102). Nietzsche 'spoke a polished High German, knew Latin and Greek, possibly French, Italian, and Spanish as well, whereas the only language [Jung] commanded with any certainty was the Waggis-Basel dialect' (Jung 1962/1989:102). Finally, Jung writes: 'He, possessed of all these splendors, could well afford to be something of an eccentric, but I must not let myself find out how far I might be like him' (Jung 1962/1989:102).

Having then read Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* was a 'tremendous experience' for Jung (Jung 1962/1989:102). Jung relates Nietzsche to his 'inner dichotomy' he introduced earlier in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*—which was an expression he used to describe his personal experience of the fundamental psychological problem that, according to Jung, existed within every individual—the 'problem of opposites' (Jung 1962/1989:45). He described this dichotomy as 'personality No. 1' and personality No. 2'. Jung believed that this dichotomy was at the heart of his oscillation between the sciences and the humanities (Jung 1962/1989:75). This 'inner

dichotomy' has often been referred to in the secondary literature on Jung to argue for his reluctance to choose between science and its other. For example, Ernst Falzeder has argued that 'in Jung's psychological theory, too, this dichotomy is reflected in his oscillating stance toward a philosophical, metaphysical, even religious, approach versus a natural scientific perspective' (Falzeder 2016:20). However, throughout this thesis, we shall see that the 'problem of opposites' was *solvable,* and, fundamentally, it was the cause of the problem of the 'personal equation' *within* the individual that we have discussed previously. For Jung, to resolve the latter, which would result in the attainment of the new 'objective' view— 'objectivity' in a revised new sense—one needed to resolve the former.

Having noticed a similar dichotomy in Nietzsche, manifesting itself through his *Zarathustra*, Jung proclaims that '*Zarathustra* was Nietzsche's *Faust*, his No. 2, and my No. 2 now corresponded to *Zarathustra*—though this was rather like comparing a molehill with Mount Blanc' (Jung 1962/1989:102). However, this parallel started to haunt Jung, as he dreaded the prospects of repeating Nietzsche's fate: 'And *Zarathustra*—there could be no doubt about that—was morbid. Was my No.2 also morbid?' (Jung 1962/1989:102). As a result of his reading of *Zarathustra*, realising that he 'had nothing concrete in [his] hands', Jung felt a sudden urge to collects facts and data, finding himself drawn towards empiricism more than ever before (Jung 1962/1989:104).

As Sonu Shamdasani has noted, Jung subsequently picked up Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* again in November 1914, during his period of self-experimentation that culminated in the writing of his *Liber Novus* (Shamdasani 2003:30). Jung recalls this twenty years later in a seminar—as part of a series of seminars on Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, held at the Zurich Psychological Club between 1934-1939: 'I read *Zarathustra* for the first time with consciousness in the first year of the war, in November 1914, twenty years ago; then suddenly the spirit seized me and carried me to a desert country in which I read *Zarathustra'* (Jung 1988:259). As Shamdasani notes, this second reading of *Zarathustra* played a considerable role in shaping the structure of Jung's *Liber Novus* (Shamdasani 2009:30-31).

As we shall see in this chapter, it also played an important role in *Psychological Types*—in particular, when it comes to Jung's articulation of the solution to the

problem of opposites. Before looking at Jung's reception of *Zarathustra* in the book, this chapter will start by examining his reading of Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*.

Nietzsche and Pragmatism: 'Intuitionism' and the Irrational

Before we proceed any further, it is worthwhile to compare the thought of Nietzsche to that of William James—especially given that Jung brings up Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* in the context of his critique of James' typology in Chapter VIII of *Psychological Types*. There has been a substantial amount of secondary literature on the connections between the two philosophers—in the context of their critique of scientism, their notions of consciousness and will, among other topics.[66] The parallels that are drawn below are particularly relevant to Jung's discussion in *Psychological Types*.

In *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), Nietzsche makes a remark that is similar to the one made by James on the nature of philosophical thought in his *Pragmatism* two decades later—a remark that, as we have seen, is fundamental to Jung's theory of psychological types: 'It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of—namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious autobiography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown' (2014:502). Thus, for Nietzsche as well, the 'personal equation' was present in philosophy.

Stemming from this commonality, there are a number of other parallels between Nietzsche's and James' thought. To begin with, they are both *anti-monistic*: Nietzsche's 'perspectivism' states that there is no *one* right way of seeing, which then translates to there being no *one* right way of living. The following quote from Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morality* resonates with the pragmatist notion of 'objectivity', as acknowledgement of the multitude of perspectives: 'There is *only* a perspective seeing, *only* a perspective "knowing"; the *more* affects we allow to speak about a thing, the *more* eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the

[66] See, for instance, Rorty (1998), Yuen (2013), Karakas (2014), Gory (2016), Cristy (2018).

more complete will our "concept" of the thing, our "objectivity" be' (Nietzsche 1887/2003). And in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as well, the main character exclaims:

> This – it turns out – is my way – where is yours?" – That is how I answered those who asked me "the way." The way after all – it does not exist! (Nietzsche 1883/2006:253).

What is more, Nietzsche's philosophy has also been described as pluralistic in secondary literature.[67] Alexander Nehamas, for instance, wrote about Nietzsche's 'stylistic pluralism', stating that '[t]he connection between Nietzsche's stylistic pluralism and his perspectivism is more subtle and oblique' (Nehamas 1985:20). He explained that '[h]is many styles are part of his effort to present views without presenting them as more than views of his own and are therefore part of his effort to distinguish his practice from what he considers the practice of philosophers so far' (Nehamas 1985:21).[68]

Even though the works of James and Nietzsche generally covered different topics and had different styles, Nietzsche's criticism of the notions of truth and metaphysics somewhat resonate with that of James. In an early work, 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense', Nietzsche writes on the nature of truth in relation to the subjectivity of language:

> Only by forgetfulness can man ever come to believe that he has truth to the above-designated degree. Unless he wants to settle for truth in the form of tautology, i.e., for empty husks, he will perpetually exchange truths for illusions. What is a word? The portrayal of nerve stimuli in sounds. But to conclude from a nerve stimulus to a cause outside ourselves is already the result of a false and unjustified application of the law of causality. What would allow us, if the truth about the origin of language, the viewpoint of the certainty of terms, were alone decisive, what would allow us to say, "The stone is hard," as if "hard" were known to us otherwise than as a subjective stimulation! (Nietzsche 1873).

And here, in *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche is dismissive of metaphysics: 'For nothing could be said of the metaphysical world but that it would be a different condition, a condition inaccessible and incomprehensible to us; it would be a thing of negative qualities' (Nietzsche 1878/2014:16). He writes further in an almost

[67] For a general survey of Jung's pluralism, see Anderson (2019).
[68] More recently, Mattia Riccardi has even argued that Nietzsche's philosophy could be viewed as endorsing a pluralistic view about consciousness (Riccardi, 2016).

pragmatist fashion, stating that '[w]ere the existence of such a world ever so well proved, the fact would nevertheless remain that it would be precisely the most irrelevant of all forms of knowledge: more irrelevant than the knowledge of the chemical analysis of water to the sailor in danger in a storm' (Nietzsche 1878/2014:16).

Throughout his writings, Nietzsche was critical of dialectics and the pursuit of reason and truth for their own sake. For him, this view that emphasises the role of reason is personified by Socrates in particular. In *Twilight of The Idols*, Nietzsche regards Socrates—more specifically, the view of reason as the key virtue—as fundamentally opposed to the Greek culture and sees him as a symptom of decline of the latter. He writes: 'Not only are the acknowledged wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts indicative of decadence, but also that preponderance of the logical faculties and that malignity of the misshapen which was his special characteristic' (Nietzsche 1889/2007:13). He adds that '[n]either should we forget those aural delusions which were religiously interpreted as 'the demon of Socrates' (Nietzsche 1889/2007:13). For Nietzsche, '[e]verything in him [Socrates] is exaggerated, buffo, caricature, his nature is also full of concealment, of ulterior motives, and of underground currents' (Nietzsche 1889/2007:13). Finally, Nietzsche struggles to 'understand the idiosyncrasy from which the Socratic equation: – Reason = Virtue = Happiness, could have arisen: the weirdest equation ever seen, and one which was essentially opposed to all the instincts of the older Hellenes' (Nietzsche 1889/2007:13).

What is also interesting in this in relation to the question of psychological types in particular, is that Nietzsche starts this discussion by comparing Socrates and Plato and arguing that they must have been *similar people* in one way or another, as they had *similar views*. Thus, Nietzsche draws a connection between their *personalities* (albeit, strictly speaking, with a more 'biological' than 'psychological' take) with their *philosophical* views, a year before the publication of James' *The Principles of Psychology*:

> I recognised Socrates and Plato as symptoms of decline, as instruments in the disintegration of Hellas, as pseudo-Greek, as anti-Greek (*The Birth of Tragedy, 1872*). That *consensus sapientium*, as I perceived ever more and more clearly, did not in the least prove that they were right in the matter on which they agreed. It proved rather that these sages themselves must have been alike in some physiological particular, in

> order to assume the same negative attitude towards life – in order to be bound to assume that attitude. After all, judgements and valuations of life, whether for or against, cannot be true: their only value lies in the fact that they are symptoms; they can be considered only as symptoms – *per se* such judgments are nonsense. (Nietzsche 1889/2007:11-12).

And indeed, this relates to another point of comparison between James and Nietzsche, as well as Jung himself—that Nietzsche described himself as a 'psychologist' [Psychologe] several times in his works—in *The Genealogy of Morality*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *The Antichrist* and *Ecce Homo*. Most famously, he states in the latter: '[t]he fact that the voice which speaks in my works is that of a psychologist who has not his peer, is perhaps the first conclusion at which a good reader will arrive' (Nietzsche 1889/2007). And what is more relevant to the relationship between Nietzsche and Jung, the former has subsequently been considered a forerunner of the 'psychology of the unconscious'. Liebscher has argued that Nietzsche's early writings contained an understanding of the notion of the unconscious that was in line with the philosophical tradition spanning from the early Romantics to Schopenhauer and that, at the same time, being interested in the scientific and linguistic theories of his time, he ended up developing a 'somatic understanding of the unconscious'—subsequently abandoning the notion of the unconscious altogether in his later works (Liebscher 2010:241).[69]

To go back to the central discussion of this thesis, in the previous chapter we have seen that, despite supporting and building upon a number of ideas advocated by James, Jung still criticises James'—and, as we have seen, Henri Bergson's—philosophical approach. Already in his correspondence with Hans Schmid-Guisan in 1915, Jung writes that although he admired James, he also confesses that 'pragmatism leaves [him] with a somewhat stale feeling' and calls it 'a bit "business-like"' (Jung 1915/Beebe and Falzeder 2013:40-41). I argue that this was because, for Jung, merely *recognising* one's 'personal equation', or one's 'bias', was not enough, one needed to try and overcome it. For this, according to Jung, one needed to resolve the fundamental psychological problem *within* oneself—the 'problem of opposites'—another key element in Jung's epistemological project in *Psychological Types*.

[69] For more on Nietzsche's relationship with psychology, see Liebscher (2014).

Hence, at the end of Chapter VIII of *Psychological Types,* titled 'The Problem of Types in Modern Philosophy', Jung writes that James' pragmatism, while being a step forward, is nevertheless 'but a makeshift' and cannot be the solution: 'Pragmatism, therefore, can only be a transitional attitude that shall prepare the way for a creative act [schöpferischen Tat] by the elimination of prejudice' (Jung 1923:398). Rather, he states that a different philosophical tradition provides a key to it—a tradition that he associates with the philosophy of Nietzsche. He writes that '[t]his new way, which pragmatism prepares, and Bergson indicates, German philosophy – not, of course, the academic schools – has, in my view, already trodden: it was Nietzsche, with a violence peculiarly his own, who burst open this closed door' (1923:400; translation modified).[70]

To explain the importance of Nietzsche's thought, *as an addition to James' and Bergson's philosophies*, Jung puts forward the notion of 'creation', or 'creative act', which, for Jung, is absent in James' pragmatism and in Western philosophy in general: 'Indispensable though the pragmatic method may be, it presupposes too great a resignation, thus becoming almost unavoidably bound up with a lack of *creativeness* [schöpferischer Gestaltung]' (Jung 1923:399, italics added). He then explains that 'the solution of the conflict of the opposites can proceed neither from a logico-intellectual compromise as in conceptualism, nor from a pragmatic estimation of the practical value of logically irreconcilable views, but simply and solely from the positive *creation* [Schöpfung] or act [Tat], which receives the opposites into itself as necessary elements of co-ordination, just as a co-ordinated muscular movement always involves the innervation of antagonistic muscle groups' (Jung 1923:399; italics added and translation modified). Shamdasani has points out that 'while it is not clear from this passage what such a creative act might consist in, it is clear that Jung found the relativistic approach of pragmatism to opposed conceptions unsatisfactory' (Shamdasani 2003:77). However, Jung states that Nietzsche's philosophy *was* characterised by this 'creativeness', which made it a valuable ingredient in the history of the Western thought for the resolution of the problem of opposites. Hence, he concludes Chapter VIII of *Psychological Types* as follows: '[Nietzsche's] act leads far beyond the unsatisfying formula of the pragmatic solution,

[70] Bishop explains that 'Nietzsche forms a part of what Jung perceives to be a continuous tradition within German literature and philosophy, a kind of psychological philosophia perennis which runs through German Romanticism and German Idealism' (Bishop 1995:138).

and it has accomplished this just as fundamentally, as the pragmatic recognition of the living value of a truth transcends the arid one-sidedness of the unconscious conceptualism of the post-Abelardian philosophy—and still there are heights to be scaled' (Jung 1923:400; translation modified).

The context of Jung's discussion of this notion of creativeness in Chapter VIII is his mention of 'intuition', or 'intuitionism' as a method, as a step towards a possible solution to the problem of opposites. I argue that the term 'intuition' here is used to convey 'irrationality' in general rather than intuition as a psychological function in particular. For Jung, the history of philosophy had been dominated by the 'rational' and the solution to the problem hitherto had been rational (as an *intellectual* compromise) as well, and hence was not really a solution—as it was still fundamentally one-sided. Jung explains this in Chapter II of *Psychological Types*, in his discussion of Friedrich Schiller's work. [71] Here, Jung writes, that 'a way must be found that is not a mere rational compromise; it must also be a state or process that wholly corresponds with the living being, it must be a "semita et via sancta" …' (Jung 1923:113). Jung then states that '[i]n human affairs, what appears impossible upon the way of the intellect has very often become true upon the way of the irrational' (Jung 1923:113). For Jung then, in order to achieve great things, the 'intrinsic necessity' of the irrational needed to be recognised (Jung 1923:113). Later in the chapter, Jung states that '[o]pposites can be reconciled practically only in the form of compromise, *i.e. irrationally*, wherein a *novum* arises between them, which, though different from both, has the power to take up their energies in equal measure as an expression of both and of neither' (Jung 1923:133). Given that, on Jung's account, Western thought was dominated by the rational attitude, it is clear here that by the 'irrational' compromise, Jung means not the *opposite of the rational*, but the *addition of the irrational* to the prevailing rational attitude.

Pragmatism then, as we have seen, acknowledges the multitude of (logical) perspectives, strives to overcome one's bias and, by communicating it, achieve

[71] In *Psychological Types*, Jung devotes Chapter II (titled 'Schiller's Ideas Upon the Type Problem') to the discussion of Friedrich Schiller's work. Here, Jung states that Schiller was 'the first to have made any considerable attempt at a conscious discrimination of typical attitudes, and to have developed a fairly complete presentation of their singularities' (Jung 1923:87). In this chapter, however, Schiller is not tackled separately, since Jung does not include him among 'visionary' authors (Domenici 2019:36). In this chapter, we shall see that Jung compares Nietzsche's 'aesthetic' approach in *The Birth of Tragedy* to that of Schiller's. For a detailed discussion of Jung's reception of Schiller, see Bishop (2008b).

'objectivity' in that sense. Yet, it gives up on the idea of a solution as a reconciliation of opposites *and* does not explicitly recognise 'the irrational'. In Chapter VIII of *Psychological Types*, Jung further explains that whilst Bergson used the term 'intuition', and thereby acknowledged the realm of the irrational, the intuitive method was 'merely indicated' by him: according to Jung, Bergson's approach was actually *intellectual* and not *intuitive* (Jung 1923:399). For Jung, it was Nietzsche who actually *made good use* of the intuitive method and thereby meaningfully engaged with the *irrational* side of the dichotomy in the history of Western philosophy. Jung points out that 'Nietzsche made use of the intuitive source in an incomparably greater measure' (1923:399). As a result, Nietzsche 'was able to free himself from the purely intellectual in the shaping of his philosophical ideas', which 'led him to an artistic act [künstlerischen Tat], *i.e.* to something which, for the most part, is inaccessible to philosophical criticism' (1923:399; translation modified).

Jung then further clarifies that he is specifically referring to Nietzsche's approach in his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: 'I refer naturally to Zarathustra, and not to the collection of philosophical aphorisms, which offer themselves in the first place to philosophical criticism by very reason of their prevailingly intellectualistic method'. He adds that '[I]f, therefore, one may speak at all of an "intuitive method", Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* has, in my opinion, furnished the best example of it; moreover, it has strikingly demonstrated the possibility of a non-intellectualistic, though none the less philosophical comprehension of the problem' (1923:399).

Before we proceed to look at the significance of *Zarathustra* for Jung's theory of psychological types in more detail and what he means by this 'creativeness', we are going to look at Jung's reception of an early work of Nietzsche—*The Birth of Tragedy*. We shall see that, viewing Nietzsche's work through the lens of his own experiences described in *Liber Novus*, Jung perceived the changes in Nietzsche's thought from *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872) to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883) to be caused by a *psychological* change that ultimately manifested in the change in his approach to the problem of opposites—towards the 'correct' solution.

Nietzsche's 'The Birth of Tragedy' and The Conflict of Opposites: Aesthetism versus Religion

In the following part of this chapter, I am going to look at Nietzsche's own pair of opposites outlined in *The Birth of Tragedy*—the Apollonian and the Dionysian artistic drives—and see how they are tackled by Jung in *Psychological Types*. Firstly, in the *Birth of Tragedy*, we find a pair of opposites that are in a state of conflict, through which they mutually develop and eventually create a fraternal bond, which, Nietzsche argues, resulted in the Greek tragedy. We shall see that, for Jung, this dichotomy represents an instance of the psychological problem of opposites.

Bishop describes the problem of opposites in Jung's *Psychological Types* as follows: 'The problem of opposites—the fundamental problem of all Jung's writing—is approached in *Psychologische Typen* through Jung's Schillerian critique of Western society, his rejection of Schiller's solution, and his proposal—over and above what Nietzsche says about Apollo and Dionysos in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* — of the reconciling symbol as the means to his own solution' (Bishop 1995:134). Needless to say, Jung reads Nietzsche's writings in a particular way. For example, as Bishop puts it, 'as far as Jung is concerned, the reconciliation of Dionysos and Apollo is a *psychological act*, an intuition of the union of the opposites and the mediation between consciousness and the Unconscious which lies at the heart of his psychological system' (Bishop 1995:151). Indeed, as we shall see throughout this chapter, the problem of opposites is centred around the dichotomy of 'conscious' and 'unconscious', which, in turn, can be 'introverted' and 'extraverted'.

As Liebscher has argued, Jung appears to have a Schopenhauerian reading of Nietzsche.[72] As has been widely discussed, a key feature of *The Birth of Tragedy*—which is also considered to be characteristic of Nietzsche's early writings in general—*is* its great reliance on Schopenhauer's philosophy.[73] Indeed, Nietzsche's Dionysian and Apollonian, in addition to being artistic drives, are fundamentally manifestations of Schopenhauer's 'will' and 'idea' respectively (Nietzsche 1872/2000). His *Birth of Tragedy*, then, can be seen as an attempt to provide a *method*—indeed, one that

[72] See Liebscher (2012).
[73] See Simmel (1907), Janaway (1997), Clark (1998), Soll (1998), Conant (2001).

could be described as a *psychological* one—of dealing with the pessimism of Schopenhauerian reality. And that method consists in the Dionysian unity of things that can be achieved through the reconciliation of the Apollonian and the Dionysian.[74] However, I am going to leave the discussion of the relevance of Schopenhauer's philosophy to Nietzsche, as Schopenhauer is going to be tackled separately—in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

In the *Birth of Tragedy* then, Nietzsche invites us to imagine two distinct physiological states—of dream and of intoxication—the former corresponding to the Apollonian and the latter to the Dionysian artistic drives, the central argument in the book being that that the reconciliation of these two artistic drives gave birth to the Greek tragedy (Nietzsche 1872/2000:19). Nietzsche writes: 'In relation to these direct artistic states of nature, every artist is an 'imitator', that is, either Apollonian dream-artist or Dionysian artist of intoxication, or finally – as for example in Greek tragedy – simultaneously artist of dream and intoxication: such as we have to imagine him as he stands alone to one side of the infatuated choruses before sinking to his knees in Dionysian drunkenness and mystical self-abandonment and as, through the effect of the Apollonian dream, his own state, that is, his unity with the innermost ground of the world, is revealed to him in an *allegorical dream-image*' (Nietzsche 1872/2000:24). Nietzsche further describes the Apollonian: 'But our image of Apollo must include that delicate and indispensable line which the dream image may not overstep if it is not to have pathological effects, otherwise appears would deceive us as clumsy reality: that measured restraint, that freedom from the wider impulses, that calm wisdom of image-creating god' (Nietzsche 1872/2000:21). He then adds that the Apollonian artistic drive can be seen as the manifestation of the 'principium individuationis', or the principle of individuation (again, taken from Schopenhauer's philosophy): 'Apollo might even be described as the magnificent divine image of the *principium individuationis*, through whose gestures and looks all the pleasure and wisdom and beauty of 'appearance' speak to us' (Nietzsche 1872/2000:21).

Having described the Apollonian art-tendency, Nietzsche turns to the Dionysian artistic drive and describes it as follows: 'Either under the influence of the narcotic drink of which all original men and peoples sing in hymns, or in the approach of

[74] See, for instance, Daniels (2019).

spring which forcefully and pleasurably courses through the whole of nature, those Dionysian impulses awaken, which in their heightened forms cause the subjective to dwindle to complete self-oblivion' (Nietzsche 1872/2000:22). He adds that '[u]nder the spell of the Dionysian it is not only the bond between man and man which is re-established: nature in its estranged, hostile, or subjugated forms also celebrates its reconciliation with its prodigal son, man' (Nietzsche 1872/2000:22).

However, whilst there is an evident conflict between these two art-tendencies, there is also an element of mutual benefit and development that occurs as a result of this conflict. For instance, the Apollonian benefits from the conflict with the Dionysian: 'But it is equally certain that in the place where the first assault was successfully resisted, the reputation and majesty of the Delphic god expressed itself in more inflexible and more threatening forms than ever before' (Nietzsche 1872/2000:31-32). Nietzsche explains this further: 'I can only explain the Doric state and Doric art as the extension of the Apollonian war camp: only in a continual struggle against the Titanic-barbarian essence of the Dionysian could such a defiantly stubborn and heavily fortified art, such a warlike and severe education, such a cruel and ruthless state, survive for any length of time' (Nietzsche 1872/2000:31-32). Furthermore, relating the Apollonian and the Dionysian types to epic and lyric poetry respectively, Nietzsche also writes of the positive influence of the former on the latter: 'He [the lyric poet] has in the first place as a Dionysian artist become entirely fused with the original Unity, with its pain and contradiction, and produced the copy of this original Unity in the form of music, assuming, that is, that it is correct to identify music as a repetition and cast of the world; but now this music becomes visible to him again, as in an allegorical dream-image, under the influence of the Apollonian dream' (Nietzsche 1875/2000:35-36). Hence, '[t]he lyrical genius feels a new world of images and allegories grow forth from that state of mystical self-abandonment and unity, a world which is completely different in colouring, causality, and tempo from that of the sculptor and epic poet' (Nietzsche 1875/2000:35-36).

Let us now turn to Jung's reception of Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* and his dichotomy of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. In his paper titled 'A Contribution to The Study of Psychological Types', delivered at the Psychoanalytical Congress in Munich in 1913, Jung uses Nietzsche's dichotomy among the many different examples—including James' 'tough-' and 'tender-minded' types—for his proposed

psychological dichotomy of 'extraversion' and 'introversion' (1913/1920a). As Bishop notes in *The Dionysian Self,* Jung's understanding of the Dionysian had been less nuanced and less detailed in his 1913 lecture than in *Psychological Types*: 'Where Jung equated the Dionysian with the striving for a multiplicity of objects, the passage from *Die Geburt der Tragödie* quoted above actually says the opposite: namely, that a mystic unity is revealed to the ecstatic reveller' (Bishop 1995: 125). Bishop adds that 'Jung failed to appreciate the polemical nature of Nietzsche's equation of Apollo with the Schopenhauerian principium individuationis' and that '[a]lthough *Die Geburt der Tragödie* can be read as a strategic inversion of Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* […], Jung does not seem to have noticed this' (Bishop 1995:125-126). However, as Bishop notes, and as we shall see below, Jung's discussion of Nietzsche's dichotomy was much more detailed in *Psychological Types*, deserving a whole chapter—Chapter III, titled 'The Apollonian and The Dionysian'.

In Chapter III of *Psychological Types*, then, Jung describes Nietzsche's approach to the Apollonian and the Dionysian conflict as 'aesthetic': he points out that 'Nietzsche, like Friedrich Schiller, has a pronounced inclination to ascribe to art the mediating and redeeming role' (Jung 1923:175).[75] On Nietzsche's relationship with *aestheticism* there have been conflicting perspectives. For instance, Nehamas has argued that aestheticism, in the form of literature in particular, permeates Nietzsche's works: 'Nietzsche, I argue, looks at the world in general as if it were a sort of artwork; in particular, he looks at it as if it were a literary text' (Nehamas 1985:3). He adds that 'he arrives at many of his views of the world and the things within it, including his views of human beings, by generalizing to them ideas and principles that apply almost intuitively to the literary situation, to the creation and interpretation of literary texts and characters' (Nehamas 1985:3). More recently, an argument defending Nietzsche's aestheticism has been outlined by Daniel Came, who has taken a broader view of aestheticism, centring on the notion of 'creativity' which he contrasts with 'morality': 'His is an 'immoralist' doctrine that proposes an outright replacement of traditional morality, seeking to devote himself exclusively, not necessarily to aesthetic goals, but to practical-existential criteria which are best

[75] Interestingly, Bishop distinguishes between 'aesthetism' and 'aestheticism': he points out that the 'tendency to ascribe priority to the artistic is termed by Jung 'Ästhetismus' or, in English, 'Aesthetism'' (Bishop 1995:146). Bishop chooses to retain this usage in order to 'avoid confusion with the notion of 'Aestheticism'' (Bishop 1995:146).

served by aesthetic devices, and to regard all conventional normative considerations as potentially matters of indifference, suspicion, or magnificent contempt' (Came 2014:132). Nietzsche's 'aesthetism' is also something that Jung is critical of here in *Psychological Types*, where he states that the problem was never meant to be an aesthetic one, but a 'religious' one instead:

> The result is that the problem remains stuck in the aesthetic—the ugly is also "beautiful", even the evil and atrocious may wear a desirable brilliance in the false glamour of the aesthetically beautiful. Both in Schiller and in Nietzsche, the artist nature, with its specific faculty for creation and expression in claiming the redeeming significance for itself. And so Nietzsche quite forgets that in this battle between Apollo and Dionysos, and in their ultimate reconciliation, the problem for the Greeks was never an aesthetic but a *religious question* [...] In adopting the view, therefore, that the conflict between Apollo and Dionysos is purely a question of antagonistic art-tendencies, the problem is shifted onto aesthetic grounds in a way that is both historically and materially unjustifiable. (Jung 1923:175-177).

Firstly, Jung is critical of Nietzsche's treatment of the Dionysian as an art-tendency and his dismissal of its religious origin: 'The cult of Dionysos had in many ways a mystical and speculative tendency, and in any case exercised a very strong religious influence' (Jung 1923:176). Jung believes that 'Aesthetism is a modern glass, through which the psychological mysteries of the cult of Dionysos are seen in a light in which they were certainly never seen or experienced by the ancients' (Jung 1923:176). Secondly, Jung also criticises Nietzsche's aesthetic approach to the conflict between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, stating that it was not possible to truly reconcile the pair of opposites in this manner:

> Nietzsche considers the reconciliation of the Delphic Apollo with Dionysos as a symbol of the reconciliation of this antagonism within the breast of the civilized Greek. But here he forgets his own compensatory formula, according to which the Gods of Olympus owe their splendour to the darkness of the Grecian soul. The reconciliation of Apollo with Dionysos would, according to this, be a "beauteous illusion", a desideratum, evoked by the need of the civilized half of the Greek in the war with his barbaric side, that very element which broke out unchecked in the Dionysian state. (Jung 1923:174).

Jung writes further on the limitations of the aesthetic approach:

> The shifting of the problem must doubtless have its psychological cause and purpose. One need not seek far for the advantages of this procedure: the aesthetic estimation immediately converts the problem into a picture which the spectator considers at his ease, admiring both its beauty and its ugliness, merely reflecting the passion of the picture, and safely removed from any actual participation in its feeling and life. The aesthetic attitude shields one from being really concerned, from being personally implicated, which the religious understanding of the problem would entail. (Jung 1923:177).

To understand the distinction that Jung makes here, it is helpful to look more closely at Jung's notion of 'religion'. While Jung does not provide a clear definition of religion in *Psychological Types*, he does so later in his 1937 work titled *Psychology and Religion*, where he defines religion as follows:

> Religion appears to me to be a peculiar attitude of mind which could be formulated in accordance with the original use of the word *religio*, which means a careful consideration and observation of certain dynamic factors that are conceived as "powers": spirits, daemons, gods, laws, ideas, ideals, or whatever name man has given to such factors in his world as he has found powerful, dangerous, or helpful enough to be taken into careful consideration, or grand, beautiful, and meaningful enough to be devoutly worshipped and loved. In colloquial speech one often says of somebody who is enthusiastically interested in a certain pursuit that he is almost "religiously devoted" to his cause; William James, for instance, remarks that a scientist often has no creed, but his "temper is devout." (Jung 1937/1969:8).

What is interesting about Jung's conception of religion, as Shamdasani has noted, is that it includes 'laws', 'ideas', and 'ideals'—concepts that have also been associated with the realm of science—in addition to 'spirits', 'daemons', and 'gods', which signify more traditional religious entities (Shamdasani 1999a:542). Thus, religion, on Jung's view, was all-encompassing in this sense, as it included both of these elements.

As we have seen so far, while Jung praises Nietzsche's 'creativeness', describing it as an important step towards the correct way of solving the conflict of opposites in Chapter VIII, he criticises Nietzsche's 'aesthetism' in his approach to the Apollonian and the Dionysian dichotomy in Chapter III. To shed some light on Jung's seemingly contradictory evaluation of Nietzsche's approach in his *Psychological Types*, I am going to explore further his reception of Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian pair of opposites in the following section.

The Apollonian and the Dionysian: Introverted Intuition and Extraverted Sensation

As Domenici points out her in *Jung's Nietzsche* '[i]n *Psychological Types* [...], Nietzsche is frequently taken as an example for an introverted type, and his *Birth of Tragedy* [...] (1872) aids Jung to define the categories of introverted intuition and extraverted sensation through the relation between Apollinian and Dionysian' (Domenici 2019:8). I argue that it is significant that Jung uses Nietzsche's dichotomy of the Apollonian and the Dionysian in the *Birth of Tragedy* as a basis for his irrational pair of opposites: intuition and sensation—given that for Jung, as we have seen previously, in Western philosophy it was first and foremost Nietzsche who made good use of the intuitive—meaning 'irrational'—method.

In Chapter III of *Psychological Types,* Jung uses these two Nietzschean artistic drives to conceptualise his own 'extraversion' and 'introversion', on the one hand, and, more fundamentally, the dichotomy of sensation versus intuition. Jung describes the Dionysian type as 'the freeing of unmeasured instinct, the breaking loose of the unbridled *dynamis* of the animal and the divine nature', as 'comparable to frenzy, which dissolves the individual into collective instincts and contents, a disruption of the secluded ego by the world' (Jung 1923:173). With regard to the Apollonian, Jung, describes it as 'introverted', on the one hand: '[T]he comparison with the dream clearly indicates the character of the Apollonian attitude: it is a state of introspection, of inner contemplation towards the dream world of eternal ideas: it is therefore a state of *introversion'*. (Jung 1923:180). On the other hand, Jung also describes it as 'intuitive': 'The Apollonian is an inner perception, an intuition of the world of ideas' (Jung 1923:180). He adds that '[t]he parallel with the dream clearly shows that Nietzsche regarded this state as a merely perceptive condition on the one hand and as a merely pictorial one on the other' (Jung 1923:180-181).

Jung provides a further description of intuition and sensation, as the fundamental psychological pair of opposites characterising Nietzsche's types, which he also describes as 'aesthetic' (as opposed to 'rational'):

> Nietzsche's ideas, therefore, lead us on to the principles of a third and a fourth psychological type, which one might term the aesthetic, as opposed to the rational

> types (thinking and feeling). These are the *intuitive* and the *sensation* types [...] [T]he intuitive raises unconscious perception to the level of a differentiated function, by which he also becomes adapted to the world. He adapts himself by means of unconscious indications, which he receives through an especially fine and sharpened perception and interpretation of faintly conscious stimuli [...] The sensation-type is in all respects a converse of the intuitive. He bases himself almost exclusively upon the element of external sensation. His psychology is oriented in respect to instinct and sensation. Hence he is wholly dependent upon actual stimulation. (Jung 1923:181-182).

At the end of Chapter III, Jung provides a psychological analysis of Nietzsche by stating that '[h]e must surely be reckoned as an intuitive type with an inclination towards the side of introversion' (Jung 1923: 182). He writes: 'As evidence of the former we have his pre-eminently intuitive, artistic manner of production, of which this very work *The Birth of Tragedy* is highly characteristic, while his master work *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is even more so' (Jung 1923:182). This, then, implies that, according to Jung, when describing the Apollonian, Nietzsche was in effect describing himself—and when describing the Dionysian, he was describing his unconscious. Jung also believes to have tracked the process of Nietzsche's development of his unconscious personality through the latter's writings—by comparing his *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Zarathustra*, as well as his *Attempt at a Self-criticism*: 'Let us compare his *Attempt at a Self-criticism*, which bears the date 1886 and prefaces *The Birth of Tragedy*: "What indeed is Dionysian? In this book there lies the answer, a 'knowing one' speaks there, the *initiate and disciple of his God*" (Jung 1923:177). Jung then states that 'that was not the Nietzsche who wrote The Birth of Tragedy; at that time he was moved aesthetically, while he became Dionysian only at the time of writing Zarathustra ...' (Jung 1923:177-178).

Hence, according to Jung, by the time Nietzsche wrote *Zarathustra*, he had *accessed his unconscious*, the Dionysian. Jung concludes the chapter by stating that this meant that Nietzsche went from one extreme to another, which, on Jung's account, resulted in Nietzsche's madness. Jung writes that Nietzsche's 'lack of rational moderation and conciseness argues for the intuitive type in general' (Jung 1923:183). He then states that '[u]nder these circumstances it is not surprising that in his initial work he [Nietzsche] unwittingly sets the facts of his own personal psychology in the foreground' (Jung 1923:183). Jung adds that '[t]his is all quite in harmony with the

intuitive attitude, which characteristically perceives the outer through the medium of the inner, sometimes even at the expense of reality' (1923:177-178). Hence, '[b]y means of this attitude he also gained deep insight into the Dionysian qualities of his unconscious, the crude forms of which, so far as we know, reached the surface of consciousness only at the outbreak of his illness, although they had already revealed their presence in various erotic forms' (Jung 1923:183).

Subsequently, as stated earlier, Jung tackles Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* in his seminar held at the Zurich Psychological Club between 1934-1939. Suffice it to say that Jung still considered Nietzsche an introverted intuitive, as evident from the following quotes:

> This is a peculiarity in Nietzsche's case which has to do with his type. He is chiefly an intuitive type with a complete neglect of the body [...] Half of the psychogenetic diseases occur where it is a matter of too much intuition, because intuition has this peculiar quality of taking people out of their ordinary reality [...] It is almost dangerous to have too much intuition; such people forget entirely that they are in the here-and-now, and not in another country in the wonderful future. That is exactly Nietzsche's case, so he is always at variance with his body. (Jung 1988:807-808).

And here:

> [U]nchecked intuition, an intuition that roams about uncontrolled and in no relation to the human individual. When intuition is entirely playful it behaves like that. So whenever Nietzsche is dealing with particularly difficult or painful subjects, he invents dancing, and then skates over the most difficult and questionable things as if he were not concerned at all. That is what unchecked intuition does. (Jung 1988:1391).

In light of this analysis of Nietzsche's personality by Jung, in the final section of this chapter, we are going to look at Jung's reception of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*.

Nietzsche's 'Creativeness' in Zarathustra and Jung's Individuation

With regards to Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* in particular, a key question is whether *Zarathustra* constitutes a special work that is fundamentally distinct from the rest of Nietzsche's works. I am inclined to side with the Nietzsche scholars that regard *Zarathustra* as simply an expression of his philosophy in a more poetic *form*. Dirk

Johnson, for instance, has argued that 'Zarathustra's importance resides not in any message or riddles that lie buried in the complex text or any new philosophical agenda or set of doctrines, including the eternal return, that it allegedly proposes, but rather in the bold and original way in which it articulates Nietzsche's already fully developed philosophical perspectives' (Johnson 2019:174). However, when it comes to this question, as we have already seen, Jung makes it clear that Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* is indeed special—as a work that displays great use of what Jung calls the 'intuitive method'. As Domenici has pointed out, for Jung, *Zarathustra* is also an example of a 'visionary' work: a work that displays the capacity to access the 'collective unconscious' (Domenici 2019). According to Jung, the contents of the collective unconscious (as opposed to those of the 'personal unconscious'), originate 'in the inherited possibility of psychic functioning in general' and constitute 'the mythological associations—those motives and images which can spring anew in every age and clime, without historical tradition or migration' (Jung 1923:615-616). As we shall see, this is also ultimately related to what Jung calls 'creativeness'—one of the reasons why Nietzsche is important for Jung's project in *Psychological Types*.

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche starts the discussion about creativeness by introducing the notion of the 'overman' (or 'Superman' in earlier translations), as 'the meaning of the earth':

> I teach you the overman. Human being is something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All creatures so far *created* [schaffen] something beyond themselves; and you want to be the ebb of this great flood and would even rather go back to animals than overcome humans? (Nietzsche 1883/2006:5; italics added).

Nietzsche then contrasts the overman with 'the most contemptible man'—the 'last man' [Letzter Mensch], who is completely devoid of creativeness:

> 'What is love? What is *creation* [Schöpfung]? What is longing? What is a star?' – thus asks the last human being, blinking. (Nietzsche 1883/2006:10; italics added).

When the crowd responds to Zarathustra by saying 'Give us this last human being, oh Zarathustra' and 'Then we will make you a gift of the overman!', Nietzsche draws a contrast between the 'herd', or the 'herdsmen', who blindly follow an accepted set of values and aspire to be 'good' and 'just', on the one hand, and the individual, who 'breaks their tablets of values, the breaker, the lawbreaker', on the other hand

(Nietzsche 1883/2006:14). The individual is the 'creator', or 'the creative one' [der Schaffende], he adds, seeks 'companions', not 'corpses, nor herds and believers': he 'seeks fellow-creators', those who 'write new values on new tablets' (Nietzsche 1883/2006:14). Zarathustra then says: 'I shall join the creators, the harvesters, the celebrators: I shall show them the rainbow and all the steps to the overman' (Nietzsche 1883/2006:15).

After the Prologue, Nietzsche provides a description of the process of this creation using a metaphor that he calls 'three metamorphoses of the spirit', or 'how the spirit becomes a camel, and the camel a lion, and finally the lion a child' (Nietzsche 1883/2006.:16). First, '[a]ll of [the] heaviest things the carrying spirit takes upon itself, like a loaded camel that hurries into the desert, thus it hurries into its desert' (Nietzsche 1883/2006:16). Then, 'in the loneliest desert [...] the spirit becomes lion, it wants to hunt down its freedom and be master in its own desert' (Nietzsche 1883/2006:16). The lion 'seeks its last master, and wants to fight him and its last god' and 'wants to battle the great dragon' (Nietzsche 1883/2006:16). The dragon is called 'Thou shalt'— '[b]ut the spirit of the lion says 'I will!'' (Nietzsche 1883/2006:17). While the lion is incapable to 'create new values', it is able to 'create freedom for itself for new creation', or 'take the right to new values' (Nietzsche 1883/2006:17). Finally, the spirit becomes a child: '[t]he child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes-saying' (Nietzsche 1883/2006:17). As a result of this metamorphosis, '[t]he spirit wants *its* will, the one lost to the world now wins *its own* world (Nietzsche 1883/2006:17). In *Zarathustra*, then, 'creativeness' refers to the ability to create one's own values, or, as Nietzsche famously put it, 'become who you are' (Nietzsche 1883/2006:192).

I argue that Jung *reformulated* Nietzsche's 'creativeness' in *Psychological Types*: for Jung, all people (the herd) are one-sided, and they need to overcome it, the 'overman' is able to overcome one-sidedness through a certain process of *creation*— an act that unites the *conscious and unconscious*, thereby solving the problem of opposites. Hence, Jung *reformulates* Nietzsche's 'creation of one's own values' and 'becoming who one is' as his process of 'individuation'.

Jung's notion of individuation in *Psychological Types* is multi-layered. On the one hand, Jung defines it as 'the process of forming and specializing the individual

nature', making it somewhat similar to the traditional philosophical understanding of (the principle of) individuation—namely, what makes a certain thing distinct from other things. However, Jung makes it clear that it is a process, rather than a static philosophical principle or criterion, and it is a psychological process: 'it is the development of the psychological individual as a differentiated being from the general, collective psychology'. On the other hand, Jung distinguishes 'individuation' from 'individualism':

> An actual conflict with the collective norm takes place only when an individual way is raised to a norm, which, moreover, is the fundamental aim of extreme individualism. Such a purpose is, of course, pathological and entirely opposed to life. It has, accordingly, nothing to do with individuation, which, though certainly concerned with the individual by-path, precisely on that account also needs the norm for its orientation towards society, and for the vitally necessary solidarity of the individual with society. Hence individuation leads to a natural appreciation of the collective norm … (Jung 1923:563).

From Jung's perspective then, individuation is a complex process that involves the recognition of the collective—or, as we shall see, the *collective unconscious*. To explain this, Jung uses the analogy of a plant: 'a plant which is to be brought to the fullest possible unfolding of its particular character must first of all be able to grow in the soil wherein it is planted' (Jung 1923:562). Hence, whilst individuation is by definition a process of differentiation from the collective, it is one that simultaneously involves integration with the collective.

Jung had previously explained the notion of individuation in detail in a paper published in 1916.[76] In it, he distinguishes between the 'personal' and the 'impersonal' unconscious. The contents of the former are 'those parts of the personality which might just as well be conscious' (Jung 1916/1920e). He then describes the 'impersonal unconscious', which, he argues, drastically distinguishes the fundamentals of his psychology from those of Freud. He states that '[w]e therefore emphatically say that the unconscious contains all that part of the psyche that is found under the threshold, including subliminal sense-perceptions, in addition to the repressed material (Jung 1916/1920e). He then adds that '[w]e also

[76] This was the paper titled 'La Structure de l'inconscient', the English version of which was published under the title 'The Conception of The Unconscious' in the second edition of *The Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* in 1917.

know—not only on account of accumulated experience, but also for theoretical reasons—that the unconscious must contain all the material that has not yet reached the level of consciousness' (Jung 1916/1920e). Jung describes this material as 'the germs of future conscious contents' (Jung 1916/1920e). Jung then mentions the notion of individuation in this context, making a point similar to the one made in *Psychological Types*: 'Upon close consideration it is astonishing to note how much of our so-called individual psychology is really collective; so much that the individual element quite disappears. Individuation, however, is an indispensable psychological requirement' (1916:1920e). He adds: 'The crushing predominance of what is collective should make us realise what peculiar care and attention must be given to the delicate plant "individuality," if it is to develop' (1916:1920e). From this perspective, then, the conscious personality, or the *persona*, as Jung puts it, is 'a more or less arbitrary excerpt of the collective psyche' (Jung 1916/Jung 1920e). He explains further that, 'as its name denotes, it is only a mask of the collective psyche; *a mask which simulates individuality*, making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whilst one is only acting a part through which the collective psyche speaks' (Jung 1916:1920e).

Now, to go back to Nietzsche's notion of 'becoming who one is', or the 'overman', one could draw a parallel between Jung's notion of individuation and the way I argue Jung read Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*. From Jung's perspective, Nietzsche's 'becoming who one is' through a process of creation should imply the process of integration of the conscious and the collective unconscious through the process of individuation. This in turn would mean that 'becoming who one is' is *not* opposed to the collective but *includes* the collective as part of what makes a complete, whole individual on Jung's account. Hence, Jung writes in *Psychological Types* that Nietzsche's Zarathustra faces his shadow, the 'ugliest man'—the one who killed God, personifying the collective sentiment of the time: 'Similarly with Nietzsche: pre-eminently his Zarathustra brings to light the contents of the collective unconscious of our time; in him, therefore, we also find the same distinguishing features: iconoclastic revolt against the conventional moral atmosphere, and the acceptance of the "ugliest man", which in Nietzsche leads to that shattering unconscious tragedy

presented in *Zarathustra'* (Jung 1923:237).[77] On Jung's account, then, Nietzsche's philosophy is 'unconsciously' about the integration of the collective, or morality—despite him claiming to be an 'immoralist', for instance, in *Ecce Homo*: 'I am the first immoralist, and in this sense I am essentially the annihilator' (1908/2007:254).

Interestingly, one can trace at least two distinct accounts of Nietzsche's immoralism in secondary literature on Nietzsche. On the one hand, some tend to view Nietzsche as an individualist in the strict sense of the word, in the sense that Jung regarded as negative—as completely separate from the collective and the notion of morality. More recently, as mentioned previously, Came has argued that Nietzsche proposed to reject morality altogether in favour of art as a life-affirming value (Came 2014). On the other hand, some view Nietzsche as not opposed to morality *per se*, but specifically to Christian morality. For instance, Tom Stern writes that Nietzsche, with his notion of 'will to power' [Wille zur Macht], is critical specifically of Christianity, viewing it as hostile to life itself:

> A second focus for the wrong thing, in the middle, and especially in the later Nietzsche, is the dominance of 'morality' or 'Christianity'... This morality is characterised by pity for others, self-denial and the corresponding love of one's neighbour at one's own expense, hostility to natural desires, an aversion to seeking power [...] This connects with both the will to power and the affirmation of life: if power-seeking (of some kind) is fundamental to all life, and 'Christian' morality at least claims to oppose it, then Christianity appears hostile to life. The *something wrong* can therefore be described in terms of this hostility to or denial of life, to which Nietzsche opposes his ideal of affirmation of life, frequently understood in terms of power. (Stern 2019:17).

Finally, to go back to the previous discussion of the *Birth of Tragedy,* Jung does say that Nietzsche already had an intuition of the real solution of the conflict of opposites in that work—of the religious solution, rather than the aesthetic (or purely 'irrational') one: 'But even at that time, in spite of the aesthetic viewpoint, Nietzsche had an intuition of the real solution of the problem; as, for instance, when he wrote

[77] Subsequently, in his seminars on Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, held between 1934 and 1939, Jung explains that Zarathustra *rejects* the 'ugliest man', his shadow, and so 'loses the connection with his body altogether' (Jung 1936/1988:960). As Jung views Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* through the lens of own *Liber Novus* experience, he believes that Nietzsche identifies with the figure of Zarathustra—what he terms 'inflation'—and rejects the 'ugliest man' because of this (Jung 1935/1988:702). From Jung's perspective, on facing the ugliest man, Nietzsche faces 'a very serious trouble and it is a serious hindrance to the creation of the Superman, because the superior thing can be created only if it is built upon the inferior' (Jung 1936:1006). Hence, as Domenici has argued, Jung read Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* as an example of a 'failed individuation' (Domenici 2019:148).

that the antagonism was not bridged by art, but by a "metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 'will'" (Jung 1923:178). He explains further that '[a] "miracle" is irrational; the act itself therefore is an unconscious happening, a shaping out of itself without the intervention of reason and conscious purpose; it just grows, like a phenomenon of creative Nature, and not as a result of the deep probing of human wits; it is the fruit of yearning expectation, faith and hope' (1923:178). But, on Jung's account, it was not until *Zarathustra* that Nietzsche, with his gaining access to the collective unconscious, was able to foresee the 'creativeness' of the religious solution, and then provide a description of the process of self-creation. Hence, in *Psychological Types*, Jung describes Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* as 'creative', constituting the missing element in the history of Western philosophy.

Conclusion

To sum up, the first part of this chapter has looked at Jung's writings on Nietzsche's philosophy in his *Psychological Types* in order to understand its significance for Jung's theory. I have shown that while Jung criticised Nietzsche's 'aesthetic', rather than 'religious', formulation of the conflict between Nietzsche's The Apollonian and The Dionysian in *The Birth of Tragedy*, he used Nietzsche's description of the pair to conceptualise two of his psychological types—namely, (introverted) 'intuition' and (extraverted) 'sensation' respectively—which he also described as 'aesthetic', as opposed to 'rational'. I have shown that Jung also used Nietzsche's own personality to further conceptualise introverted intuition. Most importantly, I argue that the importance of Nietzsche's philosophy for Jung's *Psychological Types* was twofold. Firstly, from Jung's perspective, it was able to meaningfully *engage with the 'irrational'*, which had been hitherto suppressed by the 'rational' in Western philosophy. Secondly, on Jung's account, having accessed his unconscious, Nietzsche was able to provide an account of self-creation in his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which Jung *reformulated* as his notion of the 'individuation' process. Whilst Jung offers a *psychological reading* of Nietzsche's philosophy, elements of it still relate to the current debates in Nietzsche scholarship—in particular, regarding Nietzsche's relation to immoralism and aestheticism—or even echo some of the common

practices in the field—such as, Jung's distinction between the early and late works of Nietzsche.

To go back to the discussion of Jung's conception of science and objectivity, I have shown that the significance of Jung's reading of Nietzsche's philosophy was in introducing another important component of his project: the idea of *overcoming*, that 'creative' element that allowed one to *go beyond one's subjectivity*, or the 'personal equation'. In this sense, it was an addition to James' pragmatism, which Jung saw as incomplete on its own. Thus, achieving scientific objectivity meant for Jung not simply the ability to acknowledge and convey one's subjectivity, but the ability to overcome it. James' discussion of the personal equation and Nietzsche's perspectivism thus only became descriptions of the status quo, which *needed to be resolved*, according to Jung. At the same time, Nietzsche's work was also an addition to Bergson's philosophy: whilst the latter wrote of the intuitive method, the former was actually able to make use of it, on Jung's view. Hence, from this perspective, Nietzsche's philosophy contributed to the Bergsonian element in Jung's conceptualisation of scientific objectivity as well: to provide a comprehensive account of reality, science needed to include both the 'rational' and the 'irrational' ways of knowing.

For Jung, overcoming one's subjectivity in turn implied overcoming one's one-sidedness, or solving the 'problem of opposites'. Whilst the problem of achieving objectivity in science was already a psychological problem for Jung—as psychology alone was able to account for the personal equation of the scientist—Jung's reading of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* through the lens of his *Liber Novus* experience highlights the importance of a particular *kind of psychology*, one that would account for the *'unconscious' elements of one's psyche*. From Jung's perspective, in order to be able to take a step further from pragmatism and overcome one's subjectivity, one needed to *go beyond consciousness* and access the unconscious side of one's psyche and, eventually, integrate it, which resulted in the achievement of a balanced psychological state, the 'Self'.

In the following parts of this chapter, we shall explore Jung's conceptualisation of the process of individuation as articulated in *Psychological Types* through his reading of two literary works that he also regarded as 'visionary'.

Part II. Jung and Spitteler: The Problem of Types in Poetry and Characterisation of Extraversion and Introversion

Introduction

In the previous section of this chapter, we have seen that, for Jung, Friedrich Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* was effectively the only good example of a *philosophical* 'visionary' work, as well as of one that brought the irrational into the realm of philosophy hitherto dominated by the intellect—thereby actually fulfilling Henri Bergson's project in *Creative Evolution*. To make more sense of Jung's reading of Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* as a 'visionary' work, the following parts of this chapter are going to examine two more examples of 'visionary' authors that Jung refers to in *Psychological Types*—first, Carl Spitteler and then, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe—whose works were *literary* rather than philosophical.

Part II of the chapter devoted to 'visionary' works looks at Jung's exposition of a literary work by Carl Spitteler (1845-1924) titled *Prometheus and Epimetheus*: *A Prose Epic* (1881) in the fifth chapter of Jung's *Psychological Types* titled 'The Problem of Types in Poetry'. The latter has been described as the most important chapter in *Psychological Types*, as it is here where Jung describes in detail his proposed solution to the 'problem of opposites' in the form of the 'reconciling symbol'—primarily, through the work of Spitteler (but also referring to Goethe, Dante Alighieri, Meister Eckhart, Brahmanism, and Chinese philosophy) (Shamdasani in Jung 2009:59). Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, then, forms the core structure of Jung's chapter through which Jung outlines the notion of the 'reconciling symbol' and highlights its importance in his theory of psychological types.

It will be shown that it is in 'The Problem of Types in Poetry', where Jung provides a detailed exposition of the problem of opposites in relation to his psychological types—using as examples his 'function attitudes', namely, 'extraversion' and 'introversion'—through his commentary on Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*. I am going to attempt to outline Jung's exposition of Spitteler's work in a more clear

and structured manner, fleshing out the *framework* that lays at the basis of Jung's psychological types.

As we shall see, the secondary literature on Spitteler in general, and his *Prometheus and Epimetheus* in particular, is very scarce.[78] One early piece written in English by A. H. J. Knight, starts by stating that Spitteler 'is still a comparatively unknown poet, both in Germany and England', which remains true to this day (Knight 1932:430). When it comes to the secondary literature concerning the relationship between Spitteler's works and Jung's psychology, Gaia Domenici's *Jung's Nietzsche* has looked at Spitteler's works in the context of her detailed exposition of Jung's notion of 'visionary' works, which I will draw on this in this chapter (Domenici 2019).[79]

Jung Reads Spitteler

Carl Spitteler was a German-Swiss epic and lyric poet born in Liestal, Switzerland in 1845 (Muirhead in Spitteler 1931:9). He studied law and theology and was subsequently offered a position as a pastor which he declined in order to devote himself to writing. He had worked as a tutor and a journalist before publishing *Prometheus and Epimetheus: A Prose Epic in 1881*, under the pseudonym of Carl Felix Tandem. He wrote his *Olympian Spring* between 1900 and 1905—a work that combined 'fantastic, naturalistic, religious, and mythological elements'—on account of which he was awarded a Nobel Prize for Literature (Nobel Prize 2022).[80] As James F. Muirhead points out in his prefatory note to *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, '[r]ecognition of his poetic talent was somewhat late in arriving, but he ultimately became a familiar name in Germany and Switzerland, while in France he was hailed by the French Academy and other societies, as well as by individual critics, as a poet of outstanding genius' (Muirhead in Spitteler 1931:9). According to Muirhead, 'Prometheus, as a symbolic figure, remained one of his main interests throughout his life, just as Faust was for Goethe' (Muirhead in Spitteler 1921:9). Spitteler

[78]For a discussion of Spitteler's work in the context of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century German verse epic, see Schueler (1967).
[79] See also Beebe (2021).
[80] In a seminar in 1934, Jung notes that he never analysed Spitteler's *Olympian Spring* (Jung 1934/1988:224).

subsequently revised his *Prometheus and Epimetheus* as *Prometheus the Sufferer*, which came to be his last work (Noble Prize 2022).

Jung subsequently notes in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* that Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus* 'occupied a special place' in his *Psychological Types*. Interestingly, here Jung also notes that he was 'presumptuous enough to send a copy of [*Psychological Types*] to Spitteler' (Jung 1962/1989:207). Whilst Jung did not receive an answer from Spitteler, the latter delivered a lecture shortly after in which he 'declared positively that his *Prometheus and Epimetheus* "meant" nothing, that he might just as well have sung, "Spring is come, tra-la-la-la-la."' (Jung 1962/1989:207).

As for Jung's reception of Spitteler's work before the publication of *Psychological Types* in 1921, he refers to Spitteler in his *Tranformations and Symbols of the Libido*, but to a different piece—his *Imago*, an autobiographical novel: '"Imago" has a significance similar on the one hand to the psychologically conceived creation in Spitteler's novel "Imago" and upon the other hand to the ancient religious conception of "imagines et lares"' (Jung 1912/1916).[81] After that, he also refers to Spitteler in *The Content of The Psychoses* in 1914, in which he describes Spitteler's *Imago* as 'a model of universal validity' for psychosis (Jung 1914/1920d).[82] Finally, in *The Relations Between the Ego and The Unconscious* (1935), a revised version of 'La Structure de l'inconscient' (1916), Jung refers to Spitteler's works to provide examples for his concept of the *anima*—including the example of Prometheus' soul in *Prometheus and Epimetheus* (Jung 1935/1972).

Spitteler and Nietzsche

Knight and other writers—and, as we shall see, Jung himself—have drawn parallels between Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus* and Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, but there has been a debate as to whether one work has actually influenced the other. Muirhead, the translator of Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, describes the work as 'an epic written in a rhythmical quasi-Biblical,

[81] See Spitteler (1906). Also See Rose (1998) on Freud, Jung and the notion of 'imago'.
[82] NobelPrize.com notes that '[t]he novel Imago (*1906*) influenced Jungian psychoanalysis as Jung based his use of "imago" on Spitteler's novel' (Nobel Prize 2022).

hieratic prose, somewhat resembling Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* (which, however, was not published till some years later)' (Muirhead 1930:217). As Domenici has explained, after Spitteler published his prose epic, his acquaintances wanted to send the work to Nietzsche, which Spitteler never gave permission to (Domenici 2019:62). A couple of years later, Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* was published. Whilst it is not clear whether Nietzsche had actually read Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, it is certain that he came to be interested in Spitteler a few years later, in 1887 (Domenici 2019:62). Subsequently, as Domenici has noted, Nietzsche and Spitteler 'got to know each other through a complicated correspondence, dominated by misunderstandings on both sides' (Domenici 2019:62). Furthermore, Gilbert Highet draws a number of more general parallels between Nietzsche and Spitteler:

> Yet both preached a pessimism derived from Greece, and used comparable symbols to make it clear (for instance, Apollo struggling with the subhuman forces of unreason). Both believed that life, although beautiful at times, was fundamentally bad and cruel. Both, apparently, thought the ordinary man was helpless and pitiful or contemptible, fit only to be ruled or redeemed by heroes. And both, it should be mentioned, had a profound distrust of women: recognizing the irresistible power of woman's beauty, they hated woman for her treachery and cruelty, perhaps despised her for her weakness. (Highet 1952:345-346).

As Domenici points out, however, early commentators have argued that despite general stylistic similarities, the two works had different purposes: Nietzsche's work was ultimately philosophical—it was aiming to convey philosophical concepts, using poetry as a tool—whereas Spitteler was writing poetically for its own sake (Domenici 2019:63).[83] As we shall see, however, for Jung, the two works were profoundly similar in terms of their content, as 'visionary' works.[84]

The Opposites: Extraversion and Introversion

In this chapter, I am going to examine in detail Jung's reading of Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, whilst also looking at the original story. As James F.

[83] See Meissner (1912), and Kluth (1918).
[84] In Part III of this chapter, we shall see, however, that Jung still draws a contrast between Nietzsche's (and Goethe's) work and that of Spitteler in their approaches to the religious symbol.

Muirhead points out, however, '[a]ny attempt to give a brief synopsis or explanation of the poem would be misleading and futile' (Muirhead in Spitteler 1931:9). He quotes Spitteler himself: 'If you find these scenes beautiful, you have understood them, and I have nothing to explain; if you do not find them beautiful, so much the worse for me, but I cannot give you any better explanation' (Muirhead in Spitteler 1931:10). Nevertheless, James. F. Muirhead still provides an interpretation of the story:

> If any general clue might be offered, we might say that the Soul, which Prometheus refuses to surrender, represents the Direct or Personal Inspiration, which, in our highest moments, we feel to be our paramount and imperative guide. The Conscience, which the Angel of the Lord offers in its place, represents the conventional, collective, or traditional sense of right and wrong, which serve well enough in ordinary situations, but is at a loss when faced with the exceptional or unprecedented. It must not be overlooked that Epimetheus, who accepts conscience as his guide, is really a thoroughly well-meaning character, who yields to the temptation of an Angel, not of a Devil. (Muirhead in Spitteler 1931:10).

When it comes to Jung's reading of Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus* in his *Psychological Types*, it can be summarised in the following passage:

> Spitteler's Prometheus marks a psychological turning-point: he depicts the falling asunder of the pairs of opposites which were formerly together. Prometheus the artist, the soul-server, disappears from human ken; while human society [under the reign of Epimetheus] in obedience to a soul-less moral routine is delivered over to Behemoth, the antagonistic, destructive outcome of an outlived ideal. At the right moment Pandora (the soul) creates the saving jewel in the unconscious, which, however, does not reach mankind because men fail to understand it. The change for the better takes place only through the intervention of the Promethean tendency, which by virtue of its insight and understanding brings first a few, and then many, individuals to their senses. (Jung 1923:319).

Evidently, Jung interpreted Spitteler's work in *psychological* terms. As evident from the quote above, the main concepts in Spitteler's prose epic that Jung identifies are: a pair of psychological opposites—the 'introvert' (Prometheus) and the 'extravert' (Epimetheus)—the 'soul' [die Seele], the 'unconscious' [das Unbewuste], and the 'reconciling symbol' [Das vereinigende Symbol] in the form of Pandora's jewel.

At the very beginning of the chapter 'The Problem of Types in Poetry', Jung introduces the character of Prometheus as an introvert and the character of Epimetheus as an extravert in Spitteler's story: 'I have no wish to explain at the onset that Prometheus, the forethinker, stands for the introvert, while Epimetheus, the man of action and after-thinker, signifies the extravert' (Jung 1923:207). Right after this, Jung includes an important detail that provides insight into his reading of Spitteler—namely that Prometheus and Epimetheus represent two distinct psychological attitudes *within one individual*: 'If we fuse Prometheus and Epimetheus into one personality, we should have a man outwardly Epimethean and inwardly Promethean, an individual constantly torn by both tendencies, each seeking to enlist the ego finally on its side' (Jung 1923:215).

The conflict between the two becomes then 'the battle of the introverted with the extraverted line of development in one and the same individual' (Jung 1923:207). Hence, in *Psychological Types*, Jung regards Spitteler's presentation of the story—through two distinct characters—as a *poetic* tool and provides an inherently *psychological* reading of Spitteler's work—specifically, relating to the problem of opposites, the central problem of *Psychological Types* (Jung 1923:207). As we shall see, Jung's reading of Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, as outlined in 'The Problem of Types in Poetry', forms a key part in Jung's exposition of his theory of psychological types—in particular, with regard to the characterisation of the introvert and extravert, the nature of the conflict of opposites and the notion of the 'reconciling symbol' as the solution to the problem of opposites.

Using the characteristics of Spitteler's Prometheus and plot elements of the story, Jung paints the following picture of the introvert: 'a man faithfully introverted to his inner world, true to his soul' (Jung 1923:207). Hence, as follows from this description, the key features that define an introvert are, on the one hand, an orientation to one's *inner world,* and, on the other hand, a special connection to one's 'soul'. Similarly, Jung uses the characteristics of Spitteler's Epimetheus and his story to paint the portrait of the extravert: he who 'yields himself entirely to the world', and 'realizes that his aim is the world and what the world values' (Jung 1923: 210; 212). One of the characteristic features of the extravert is, then, an orientation to the *outer world*. In addition to this, analogous to the introvert's soul, the extravert has a special connection to the 'persona', 'the relation to the external object' (Jung

1923:208). Hence, both the soul and the persona, signify *relations*, the former—the relation to the *inner world* (for the introvert), and the latter—to the *outer world* (for the extravert).

Introvert's Soul and Extravert's Persona

In Spitteler's story, Prometheus and Epimetheus are two brothers—in the Introduction, the former says to the latter,

> Up, brother! Let us be other than the many who swarm there in the common crowd. For, if we rule our life by the common example, we shall earn but a common reward, and shall experience nothing of noble happiness or travail of the soul. (Spitteler 1881/1931:17).

Hence, Prometheus is depicted as a highly individualistic character—further symbolised by his devotion to the 'soul'—at the very beginning of the story. In the first chapter, 'Decision', Prometheus is approached by the Angel of the Lord, who offers him to become the 'King of the land of men' and, in exchange, asks him to renounce his soul:

> I have marked thee now for many days, and I have well observed the strength of thy spirit, and the bountiful richness of thy nature has not escaped me. But in spite of all, though shalt be cast out in the day of glory on account of thy Soul, for she knows no god and obeys no law and nothing is sacred to her pride, either in heaven or on earth. And therefore hear my counsel and separate thyself from her, and I shall give thee a conscience in her stead that will teach thee the '*Heats'* and '*Keits'* of things, and will lead thee in the strait path. (Spitteler 1881/1931:22).

In 'The Problem of Types in Poetry', Jung quotes Prometheus' reply to the Angel:

> Yet it is not mine to judge my soul's appearance, for behold, my mistress she is, my god in joy and sorrow and whatsoever I am, I have from her alone. And so with her, will I share my glory, and if need be boldly will I renounce it. (Spitteler quoted in Jung 1923:208).

From the perspective of Jung's reading, the above passages provide a poetic portrayal of the 'introverted attitude', through the character of Prometheus, showcasing his

devotion to his soul, through which he connects with his *inner world* and his *unconscious:* 'In this act Prometheus surrenders himself unconditionally to his own soul, *i.e.* to the function of relation to the inner world. Hence the soul has also a mysterious metaphysical character, precisely on the account of its relation to the unconscious' (Jung 1923:208). Jung adds that Prometheus 'sacrifices his individual ego to the soul, to the relation with the unconscious…' and 'he thereby surrenders the Self, since he loses the counterweight of the persona, *i.e.* the relation to the external object' (Jung 1923: 208).

By contrast, when the Angel of the Lord approaches Epimetheus, the latter says:

> My Lord and my God, until now I have strayed in the paths of error, influenced by my elder brother's word and example. But now my desire is for truth and my soul lies in thy hand, if it please thee, pray give me a Conscience that I may learn the '*Heits'* and '*Keits'* and everything that is just. (Spitteler 1881/1931:24).

And so, having exchanged his soul for a 'conscience' and promised to protect the Children of God given to him by the Angel of the Lord—the significance of which we will look at later in this chapter—Epimetheus becomes King. Jung quotes Epimetheus reply above, thereby providing a description of the 'extraverted attitude': a psychological attitude that 'realizes that his aim is the world, and what the world values' (Jung 1923:212). From Jung's perspective, then, the beginning of Spitteler's prose epic depicts the formation of the conflict of opposites and the rest of the story provides a further illustration of the conflict and its subsequent resolution in a highly allegorical form—as we shall see, going far beyond the mere presentation of an inner psychological conflict through two distinct characters.

One-Sidedness and The Conflict of Opposites

In the following part of this chapter, I am specifically concerned with the notion of psychological one-sidedness, which leads to the conflict of opposites—from Jung's perspective, it is the problem of opposites that is the cause of the suffering of the characters in Spitteler's story.

When Jung talks about one-sidedness as the cause of the problem of opposites, he speaks specifically of 'involuntary' one-sidedness: he points out that 'conscious capacity for one-sidedness is a sign of the highest culture'. However, 'involuntary one-sidedness, *i.e.* inability to be anything but one-sided, is a sign of barbarism' (Jung 1923:256). He explains that '[i]dentification with one definite function at once produces a tension between the opposites' (Jung 1923:256). Hence, for Jung, '[t]he more compulsive the one-sidedness, the more untamed the libido which urges to one side, the more daemoniacal is its quality' (Jung 1923:256). The phenomenon of a *psychological type*, then, is necessitated by this phenomenon of one-sidedness: one can transcend one-sidedness by developing the other side of one's personality—the *compensating* psychological attitude.

As noted previously, the introvert's soul and the extravert's persona are 'relations'—the former is the relation through which the introvert connects with his inner world, while the latter is the relation through which the extravert connects with the outside world. Jung compares and contrasts the two: 'Since the soul, like the persona, is a function of a relationship, it must consist in a certain sense of two parts, one part belonging to the individuality and the other adhering to the object of the relationship, in this case the unconscious' (Jung 1923:209). He further contrasts the relations of the 'persona' and the 'soul' with the subject and the outer and inner object respectively, 'explaining' why the soul appears as a distinct entity in Spitteler's story: 'Whereas the persona, considered as a relation, is always conditioned by the outer object, and hence is as firmly anchored in the outer object as it is in the subject; the soul, as the relation to the inner object, is similarly represented by the inner object; in a sense, therefore, it is always distinct from the subject, and is actually perceptible as something distinct' (Jung 1923:210).

Indeed, in Spitteler's story, Prometheus, after having refused to become King—which, from Jung perspective means that 'he refuses adaptation to things as they are because his soul is demanded from him in exchange'—he encounters his soul in the shape of a woman, a Goddess (Jung 1923:211). Just like the Angel of the Lord, she warns him:

> I warned thee and told thee that I was a wayward Goddess, who would lead thee aside, in untrodden ways. Thou, however didst not hearken unto me, and so it is come to

> pass, as I foretold, that thou hast let them, on my account, rob thee of the glory of thy name and the happiness of thy life. (Spitteler 1881/1931).

In exchange for his devotion to her, and his subsequent suffering 'day after day, year after year', she promises that one day in the distant future she will come to him: 'for a single hour I shall dwell with thee, and yet for this hour all future generations shall envy thee' (Spitteler 1881/1931:40). Prometheus accepts the terms of the Goddess and proclaims his devotion to her. From Jung's perspective, '[h]e sacrifices all connection with the present, in order to create in anticipation the distant future', which characterises him as an introvert (Jung 1923:212). However, as a result, 'through the tyrannical claims of his soul, [he] is hampered in every relation to the external object and has to make the cruellest sacrifices in the service of his soul' (Jung 1923:213). In Spitteler's story, the Goddess says to Prometheus:

> I know that two animals dwell with thee in thy house and also some little ones. And these animals do not know my face, and these little ones will lead thee astray. And, therefore, when, going from hence, thou reachest thy valley-home, thou shalt slay these little ones for my sake, and afterwards the older animals will die of themselves. (Spitteler 1881/1931:41).

Prometheus then kills the children of the little dog (sparing one cub) and the lion that live in his house, which brings Prometheus tremendous suffering. In the course of the story, the reader learns that these animals are symbols—the former symbolises honour (loyalty), while the latter symbolises glory, both of which eventually die in Part I.[85] [86]In one of the last chapters of the book, the Goddess Doxa says to the Angel of the Lord: 'Remember, we have wholly destroyed for [Prometheus] what man most desires and what is deemed happiness by mortals—honour, glory and the pleasures of the flesh' (Spitteler 1881/1931:264). She adds: 'His life has been made futile, and we can never make it up to him' (Spitteler 1881/1931:264).

From Jung's perspective, as a result of Prometheus' complete devotion to his soul, he 'drops away every connection with the surrounding world, thus escaping the

[85] Knight refers to these symbols as the symbol of content and the symbol of power respectively (Knight 1932:433). In a seminar in 1936, in the context of his discussion of the animals in *Zarathustra*, Jung provides the following interpretation of the animals in *Prometheus*: 'The Lion is the will to power, and the dog is the sentimentality, the weakness, the craving for love and tenderness' (Jung 1936/1988:871).

[86] In a seminar in 1936, in the context of his discussion of the animals in *Zarathustra*, Jung provides the following interpretation of the animals in *Prometheus*: 'The Lion is the will to power, and the dog is the sentimentality, the weakness, the craving for love and tenderness' (Jung 1936/1988:871).

indispensable correction gained through external reality' (Jung 1923:208). According to Jung, '[b]ecause Prometheus has a one-sided orientation to his soul; every impulse towards adaptation to the outer world tends to be repressed and sink into the unconscious' (Jung 1923:208-209). However, 'this loss is irreconcilable with the nature of the world' (Jung 1923:208). Hence, by the end of Part I of Spitteler's book, Prometheus effectively vanishes from the world: 'But with the Prometheus of Spitteler everything goes to the world within and vanishes in the darkness of the soul's depths; just as he himself disappears from the world of men, even wandering from the narrow confines of his home, that he may become the more invisible' (Jung 1923:219).

As we have seen previously, Epimetheus accepts the offer of the Angel of the Lord and becomes the King of the land. Jung notes that he thus 'has become an extravert, after having lived many solitary years under the influence of his brother as an extravert *falsified* through imitation of the introvert' (Jung 1923:213). From Jung's perspective, in becoming King he *acknowledges his bias*—his extraversion: '[h]is conversion to true extraversion is, therefore, a step towards 'truth', and deservedly brings him a partial reward' (Jung 1923:213).

Jung also pays attention to the idea of a 'conscience' in Spitteler's story—as noted before, to become King, Epimetheus exchanges his soul for a conscience that shares its wisdom with him by answering 'yes' or 'no' to his questions. According to Jung, this conscience 'is based upon traditional "right ideas"; and which, therefore, possesses that not-to-be-despised treasure of inherited worldly wisdom which is employed by public opinion in much the same fashion as the judge uses the penal code' (Jung 1923:213). Hence, it is different from complete abandonment to the crowd and, therefore, 'restrains him from abandoning himself to objects in the same degree as Prometheus does to his soul' (Jung 1923:213-214). Still, however, being an extravert, Epimetheus is oriented towards the outer world, the connection with which he maintains through his 'persona'—i.e. the projection of a certain image towards the public: 'The prudent restraint of a blameless conscience sets such a bandage over Epimetheus' eyes that he must blindly live his myth, but ever with the sense of doing right, since he dwells in constant harmony with general expectation, with success ever at his side since he fulfils the wishes of all' (Jung 1923:214). Jung further explains: 'Thus men desire to see the King, and thus Epimetheus plays his

part to the inglorious end, never forsaken by the strong backing of public approval' (Jung 1923:214).

The tragedy for Epimetheus begins in Part II of Spitteler's story, when his conscience is unable to recognise or comprehend Pandora's gift, which leads to a sequence of tragic events. But, from Jung's perspective, in order to understand the story, it is necessary to look at the notion of the unconscious and its relevance to the conflict of opposites.

The Unconscious as the Manifestation of the Opposite

As established so far, the introvert is characterised by an orientation to his inner world, while the extravert is characterised by an orientation to the outer world. However, both the introvert and the extravert have an *unconscious* that manifests in their inner and the outer worlds respectively. The unconscious of the introvert is extraverted—it displays an orientation to his outer world; whilst the unconscious of the extravert is introverted—it displays an orientation to his inner world. Both the introvert and the extravert have access to their outer and the inner worlds respectively *through their unconscious*: 'Just as the unconscious world of mythological images speaks indirectly, through the experience of external things, to the man who abandons himself to the outer world, so the real world and its claims find their way indirectly to the man who has surrendered himself to the soul; for no man can escape both realities' (Jung 1923:210). Jung adds that '[i]f a man is fixed upon the outer reality, he must live his myth; if he is turned towards the inner reality, then must he dream his outer, his so-called life' (Jung 1923:210). He then describes the manifestation of the unconscious of the characters in Spitteler's story as follows:

> While the subject, *i.e.* Prometheus, is essentially human, the soul is of quite a different character. It is demonic, because the inner object, namely the supra-personal collective unconscious to which it is attached as the function of relation, gleams through it… To the one who personally surrenders himself wholly to the outer world the unconscious comes in the form of some intimate and beloved being, in whom, should his destiny lie in extreme devotion to the personal object, he will experience the duality of the world and his own nature; in like manner there comes to the other a demonic personification

> of the unconscious embodying the totality, the extreme oppositeness and duality of the world of images. (Jung 1923:211-212).

Hence, from Jung's perspective, Prometheus' soul—which we looked at in detail in the previous section—is a personification of his unconscious, which in turn is a manifestation of his opposite type—extraversion. The 'intimate and beloved being' that Jung has in mind for Epimetheus—the personification of his unconscious—must be his wife—whom the Angel of the Lord sends to Epimetheus:

> All hail, Maja, my blessing! Wing thy way to the valley of earth, there to tarry in the house of the King and to serve him day and night, so that his heart may swell and his eyes grow bright at the fulness of his happiness. (Spitteler 1881/1931:48).

As noted previously, the tragedy for Epimetheus—from Jung's perspective, as a result of his one-sidedness—begins when his conscience is unable to pass a judgement on Pandora's gift. But before we proceed to look at that, it is essential to look briefly at the 'Pandora' segment in Spitteler's story and Jung's reading of it.

In Spitteler's story, Pandora—a daughter of God—decides to give a gift (a 'jewel') to the human race and says to God:

> I have come to know the grief-stricken race of mortals, well worthy of our pity, and I have thought of a gift with which, if you graciously approve, I may do something to assuage or console their many sufferings [...] It is a thing of my own making, which I have worked at for long years in the silent nights, while solitude oppressed my spirits and thou dwelt afar-off in the fields of woe. And now, if it has any value in thy sight, I pray thee bless the work, so that I may give it to the oppressed race of mortals (Spitteler 1881/1931:114).

As Knight points out, Spitteler's Pandora is essentially the opposite of the version in the original Greek myth:

> In the myth Pandora was sent to men to be a plague to them; she typified woman, through whom all evil came. She was sent with a box, in which were all our ills, although powerless to afflict us unless the box were opened. But the box was opened, and the evils escaped among men, all except hope, which remained imprisoned. But here Pandora is the youngest daughter of God, a god ill and burdened with the guilt of a sick creation. She herself has created a lovely treasure, which she takes, with her father's consent, to earth. (Knight 1932:434).

However, when Pandora's jewel is found and then taken by a group of peasants to King Epimetheus, the latter's conscience remains silent:

> And it came to pass that no sooner had Conscience looked at the image than he sprang headlong from his shrine, scurried across the floor, and hid itself below the bed, in a state of great alarm. Just as when a crab, basking on the yellow sand of the seashore, takes flight at the approach of man, and scurries back and forth on its nimble legs, goggling wickedly and angrily brandishing its crooked claws, till it ultimately finds a safe refuge in the seaweed, so Conscience looked out from under the bed, and the nearer Epimetheus pushed the Treasure towards it, the farther Conscience shrank, with repugnant gestures. And so it sulked there silently, uttering not a word or a syllable, in spite of all the entreaties and petitions and inducements of Epimetheus (Spitteler 1881/1931:142).

And so, Epimetheus replies to the peasants:

> My dear fellows, my beloved friends, I am heartily sorry for this state of affairs, which vexes me sorely. For the first time my Conscience fails me. Always, until now, it has been a good and competent adviser, loudly and clearly pointing out my duty with a definite 'yes' or 'no'. And when it said 'yes', I have never had cause to repent, and God's blessing has rested on my work. And when it opposes me, I know that my contemplated action is wrong, and no power in heaven or in earth can induce me to go on with it. But to-day, as I suppose, its mouth is closed by sickness or by some other cause, and until it is open again, I can neither undertake nor refuse to undertake anything. (Spitteler 1881/1931:142).

On Jung's reading, the above-described episode is a manifestation of Epimetheus' one-sidedness: his 'conscience', as a reflection of his extraverted attitude, cannot possibly account for all the phenomena in the world—specifically, for the introverted phenomena. Jung writes that 'Prometheus is removed from the divine sphere and is given a soul of his own' (Jung 1923:219). However, 'his divinity and his original relation with Pandora in the myth are preserved as a cosmic counterplot, enacted independently in the celestial sphere' (Jung 1923:219). Indeed, from Jung's perspective, the Pandora segment in Spitteler's story is actually a depiction of the introvert's unconscious—that of Prometheus: 'The Pandora interlude, therefore, is a presentation of what goes on in the unconscious during the suffering of Prometheus' (Jung 1923:219). On Jung's reading, '[w]hen Prometheus vanishes from the world,

destroying every link that binds him to mankind, he sinks into the depths of himself, into his walled-in isolation—his only object himself' (Jung 1923:219).

Jung then provides a lengthy quote from the very beginning of the 'Pandora' chapter in support of his argument. The quote describes the state of God just before he is approached by Pandora—he is suffering from a 'grievous and mysterious sickness':

> For because of this sickness, he could never bring to an end the weariness of his walk, and could never find rest on the path of his feet, but continually, with equal pace, day by day and year by year, he made the round of the quiet meadow with plodding steps, bowed-down head, troubled features, and his beclouded turned always towards the centre of the circle. And on this day, as on all the other days, the inevitable curse was upon him; his head sank deeper in his pain, his steps dragged ever more from sheer weariness, and the very well-spring of his life seemed exhausted by his sleepless night. (Spitteler 1881/1931:113).

According to Jung, the above passage proves that God has the sickness of Prometheus: 'Just as Prometheus allows all his passion, his whole libido to flaw inwards to the soul, to his innermost depths, in complete dedication to this soul's service, his God also pursues his course round and round the pivot of the world, thus spending himself like Prometheus, whose whole being comes near extinction' (Jung 1923:220).

We have established so far that, on Jung's reading, the Pandora interlude—and the celestial sphere in Spitteler's story in general—is a *poetic* representation of a *psychological* notion—of the unconscious, and specifically, the introvert's unconscious. Having established earlier that the introvert's unconscious displays an 'extraverted orientation'—since the unconscious contains the opposite of the conscious attitude—Jung provides an illustration of this phenomenon, referring to Spitteler's Prometheus: 'If we translate this process into Prometheus' human sphere, it would mean that while Prometheus is suffering his 'godlike' state, his soul is preparing a work destined to alleviate the suffering of mankind' (Jung 1923:22). This means that '[h]is soul wants to get to men' (Jung 1923:22). 'Getting to men', then, implies an extraverted orientation—an orientation to the world and other people.

To go back to Epimetheus and his tragedy—after his conscience is unable to recognise and pass a judgement on Pandora's gift, the jewel gets lost. Jung quotes Spitteler's Angel of the Lord, who says angrily to Epimetheus: 'And hadst thou no

soul to prevent thee hiding thyself, like a dumb beast of the fields, before the divine glory that was revealed to thee?' (Spitteler 1881/1931:161). To this, Epimetheus reminds the Angel of the Lord that he had given his soul to him before becoming King. The loss of the jewel leads to a sequence of events—where Epimetheus finds himself making a deal with Behemoth and agrees to give the Children of God to him—during which he loses his 'intimate and beloved being' (the personification of his unconscious)—his wife Maja:

> After a time, however, an uneasy slumber overtook him, and in his sleep it seemed as if the door of his room opened softly, and in the doorway appeared the lovely form of Maja, with her face disfigured by pain and tears [...] And so she herself vanished. But in the royal garden was a pond and this pond retained her picture. And it often projected it from its dark depths towards the sun, when the shades of evening lay most invitingly on the green sward. (Spitteler 1881/1931:224).

So far, we have seen that, in 'The Problem of Types in Poetry', Jung has used the characters in Spitteler's Prometheus and Epimetheus and their struggles to provide an illustration for the following concepts: extraversion and introversion, the soul and the persona, one-sidedness, the conflict of opposites and the unconscious (as the manifestation of the opposite psychological attitude). In the following section, we are going to look at the resolution of the conflict of opposites—namely, through the notion of the 'reconciling symbol'—in Spitteler's story, from Jung's perspective.

The Resolution of the Conflict: The Reconciling Symbol

As he outlines his reading of Spitteler's plot in *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, Jung also provides a description of the psychological process of the reconciliation of opposites:

> The psychological point of departure for the god-renewal corresponds with an increasing divergence in the manner of application of psychic energy or libido. One half of the libido moves towards a Promethean, while the other towards an Epimethean, manner of application. Such an opposition is, of course, a very great hindrance not only in society but also in the individual. Hence the optimum of life recedes more and more from the opposing extremes, and seeks out a middle way, which must necessarily be

> irrational and unconscious, just because the opposites are rational and conscious. (Jung 1923:241).

The notion of the 'reconciling symbol' in Spitteler's prose epic springs up for Jung with the introduction of Pandora's jewel into the story. According to Jung, Pandora's jewel that is created in Prometheus' unconscious *is* the reconciling symbol:

> Pandora's jewel is an unconsciously mirrored image which *symbolically* represents the actual work of Prometheus' soul. The text shows unmistakably what the jewel is. It is a God-deliverer, a renewal of the sun. This longing expresses itself in the sickness of the God: he longs for rebirth, and to this end his whole life-force flows back into the centre of the self, i.e. into the depths of the unconscious, out of which life is born anew. (Jung 1923:220-221).

Jung draws parallels here between Spitteler's story and the birth of Buddha in Lalitavistara: 'Pandora lays the jewel beneath a walnut tree (just as Maya bears her child under a fig-tree)' (Jung 1923:221). Jung quotes Spitteler's Angel of the Lord referring to the jewel as 'the divine glory', provides a brief account of Buddha's story, and then introduces the notion of a 're-birth', or 'renewing'. Pandora's jewel, Jung explains, is a 'renewal of the god', or 'a new god' (Jung 1923:222). Jung writes: 'The renewed god signifies a renewed attitude, *i.e.* a renewed possibility of intense life, a recovery of life; because, psychologically, God always signifies the greatest value, hence the greatest sum of libido, the greatest intensity of life, the *optimum* of psychological activity' (Jung 1923:222). Hence, '[a]ccordingly with Spitteler the Promethean, just as much as the Epimethean, adaptation proves to be inadequate' (Jung 1923:222).

As established earlier, Jung sees the tragedy of Spitteler's character as an illustration of *psychological one-sidedness*. In addition to this, Spitteler's use of Pandora's jewel is seen as a poetic device that symbolises the idea of 'renewal', or 'rebirth', required for the reconciliation of the problem of opposites. This renewal, as we shall see, is Jung's idea of the reconciling symbol. Jung provides his psychological account through the characters as he follows Spitteler's story, linking the events that happen in Prometheus' 'unconscious'—in which the jewel is created—and what happens in the external, or Epimetheus', world. Jung writes: 'The two tendencies are dissociated: the Epimethean attitude harmonizes with the actual conditions of the world; the Promethean, on the contrary, does not, which means that the latter must work out a

renewal of life' (Jung 1923: 223). He adds that '[t]his tendency creates also a new attitude to the world (the world to which the jewel is given); but of course without the consent of Epimetheus' (Jung 1923:223).

Jung provides a detailed exposition of his reading of Spitteler's story and the role of Pandora's jewel in it using three of his psychological concepts—introversion, extraversion and the reconciling symbol in the following passage:

> When Pandora makes her gift to the world it means, psychologically, that an unconscious product of great value is on the point of reaching extraverted consciousness, *i.e.* it is seeking a relation to the real world. Although the Promethean side, *i.e.* the artist intuitively apprehends the great value of the work, his personal relations to the world are so subordinated to the tyranny of tradition that the work is merely appreciated as a work of art and not at its real significance, viz. as a symbol that promises a renewal of life. In order to convert it from a purely aesthetic interest into a living reality, it must also reach life, and be accepted and lived in the sphere of reality. But if the attitude is mainly introverted and given to abstraction, the extraverted function is inferior, and is therefore under the spell of collective restrictiveness. This restrictiveness prevents the soul-created symbol from living. Thus the jewel gets lost; but one cannot really live if "God", the highest symbolic expression of living value, cannot also become a living fact. Hence the loss of the jewel also signifies the beginning of Epimetheus downfall. (Jung 1923:228).

The significance of the jewel in the story lies in the sequence of events that it brings forth. Firstly, it leads to Epimetheus' deal with Behemoth and Leviathan, who, as Jung points out, 'are the two familiar *monsters of God* from the book of Job, 'the symbolical expression of His force and power' and '[a]s crude animal symbols they portray psychologically allied forces in human nature' (Jung 1923:333). In Spitteler's story, Behemoth and Leviathan, decide to take advantage of the Angel of the Lord's sickness by killing his heirs—the Children of God. To do this, they gain the trust of Epimetheus and convince him to establish a union between the two worlds—the world of humans and the forces of evil. As mentioned previously, after the loss of the jewel, Epimetheus agrees to Behemoth and Leviathan's offer, which, for Jung, means that the extravert's (Epimetheus') consciousness is suddenly taken over by the introvert's (Prometheus') unconscious: 'The immediate effect of the redeeming symbol is the reconciliation of the pairs of opposites: thus the ideal realm of Epimetheus becomes reconciled with the kingdom of Behemoth, i.e. moral

consciousness enters into a dangerous alliance with the unconscious contents, together with the libido belonging to, or identical with these contents. (Jung 1923:334). However, Epimetheus' agreement with Behemoth—and the loss of the jewel that preceded it—is the result of him missing a soul, without which it is impossible to understand the matters of the inner world, hence the world of men is in danger. Hence, the celestial realm—the Angel of the Lord and Doxa—decides to approach Prometheus and ask him to help save the Children of God:

> If from the standpoint now gained we glance once more at the unconscious elaboration of the problem by Spitteler, we appreciate at once that the compact with evil originates, not in the *aim* of Prometheus, but in the thoughtlessness of Epimetheus, who only possesses a collective conscience and no power of discrimination for the things of the inner world [...] Current collective values are certainly mensurable by the objective standard, but only a free and unfettered valuation—a matter of living feeling—can yield a true estimate of the thing that is newly created. But such an appreciation belongs to the man possessing a soul, and not merely relations to external objects. The downfall of Epimetheus begins with the loss of the new-born, divine image. His incontestably moral thinking, feeling, and acting in no way hinder the evil, hollow, and destructive from creeping in. This invasion of evil signifies a conversion of something previously good into something definitely harmful. (Jung 1923:234-235).

On Jung's reading of the story, Spitteler has a nuanced understanding of the good versus evil dichotomy—from the perspective of which good and evil are intertwined and are both necessary for life to exist:

> The new symbol, the bestower of life, springs from Prometheus' love for his soul, a figure pregnant with daemonic characters. One may be sure, therefore, that, interwoven in the new symbol with its living beauty, there is also the element of evil, for, if not, it would lack the glow of life as well as beauty since life and beauty are naturally indifferent to morality. For this reason, Epimethean collectivity finds no value in it. For it is quite blinded by its one-sided moral standpoint, which is identical with the " lamb ", *i.e.* the traditional Christian standpoint. (Jung 1923:236).

Jung further writes that '[t]he symbol is characterized as strange, immoral, unlawful, opposed to moral sense, antagonizing our feeling and idea of the spiritual, as well as our conception of the 'Divine'; it appeals to sensuality, is shameless and liable to become a serious danger to public morality by the stimulation of sexual phantasies' (Jung 1923:330). He adds that '[s]uch attributes define an essence which is in frank

opposition to our moral values; but it is also opposed to our aesthetic judgment, since it lacks the higher feeling-values; and finally the absence of a "guiding thought" suggests an irrationality of its intellectual content' (Jung 1923:330). Jung further explains that '[t]he verdict "opposed to God "might also be rendered 'anti-Christian ', since this history is localized neither in remote antiquity nor in China' (Jung 1923:330). He adds: 'This symbol, then, by reason of all its attributes, is a representative of the inferior function, hence of unrecognized psychic contents' (Jung 1923:330). For Jung, '[i]t is obvious that the image represents—though it is nowhere stated—a naked human figure, in fact, 'living form'' (Jung 1923:330). Jung explains that '[t]his form expresses complete freedom, which means to be just as one is—as also the duty, to be just as one is: it accordingly stands for the highest possible attainment of aesthetic as well as moral beauty' (Jung 1923:330).

On Jung's reading, the children of God, given to Epimetheus by the Angel of the Lord, that the former had sworn to protect, symbolise 'highest Goods of mankind, without which man is a mere animal' (Jung 1923:335). At the same time, they also symbolise 'conscious values [that] are exchanged for sheer impulsiveness and stupidity' when Epimetheus hands them over to Behemoth (Jung 923:335). Jung explains this through Spitteler's symbolic use of an invisible whale and the bird in the story: 'Conscious values are greedily devoured by crude and barbarous tendencies which were hitherto unconscious; thus Behemoth and Leviathan erect an *invisible whale* (the unconscious) as symbolizing their principle, while the corresponding symbol of the Epimethean kingdom is the *bird*' (Jung 1923:335). He explains that '[t]he whale, as denizen of the sea, is the universal symbol of the devouring unconscious' and that '[t]he bird, as a citizen of the luminous kingdom of the air, is a symbol of conscious thought; it also symbolizes the ideal (wings) and the Holy Spirit' (Jung 1923:335).

Finally, the reconciliation of the opposites is symbolised by the salvation of the last of the Children of God, Messias, rescued by Prometheus. This reconciliation can be summarised in the following paragraph:

> The final extinction of Good is prevented by the intervention of Prometheus [...] Messias becomes the heir to the Divine kingdom, while Prometheus and Epimetheus, the personifications of the severed opposites, become united in the seclusion of their "native valley". Both are relieved of sovereignty – Epimetheus, because he was forced

> to forgo it, and Prometheus, because he never strove for it. Which means, in psychological terms, that introversion and extraversion cease to dominate as one-sided lines of direction, and consequently the psychic dissociation also ceases. In their stead a new function appears, symbolically represented by a child named Messias, who had long lain asleep. Messias is the mediator, the symbol of the new attitude that shall reconcile the opposites. He is a child, a boy, the the 'puer aeternus' of the immemorial prototype, heralding by his youth the resurrection and rebirth of what was lost (Apokatastasis). That which Pandora brought to earth as an image, and being rejected by men became the cause of their undoing, is fulfilled in Messias. (Jung 1923:336).[87]

Spitteler himself concludes the story with a dialogue between Prometheus and Doxa, where the latter asks the former:

> Tell me, why is it thou takest so much trouble for the sake of thy brother Epimetheus, who never did thee aught but ill, and hast stolen thy well-deserved reward before thy very eyes, and has mocked thee in the time of thy worst misfortune? (Spitteler 1881/1931:318).

To which, Prometheus replies:

> Exalted Lady, this it is concerning which thou askedst me: 'What is the Soul that has brought all this about, whom thou obeyest blindly in all things, and for whom thou has willingly sacrificed the happiness and wellbeing of thy life?' And the two questions question each other. What the one wished, the other will not refuse. (Spitteler 1881/1931:318).

And Prometheus and Epimetheus, having rekindled their friendship, return to their native valley together.

Conclusion

To sum up, this section of the chapter has looked at Jung's reading of Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, consulting the original work, and examined the conceptualisation of a number of key concepts in *Psychological Types*. In particular,

[87] As we have seen before, the notion of a child as a symbol of rebirth also features in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* —namely, in the 'three metamorphoses of the spirit' section.

it has been shown that Jung used Spitteler's work to explore the 'problem of opposites', in the form of extraversion and introversion, in great detail—including the relations to the 'inner' and 'outer' worlds for each type, thus conceptualising his notions of the 'soul' and the 'persona'—and most importantly, the resolution of the problem through the notion of the 'reconciling symbol'.

The central theme in Spitteler's work, on Jung's reading, is one of the *importance of recognising one's one-sidedness*, which meant that one needed to *embrace the unconscious elements of one's psyche*, which constituted the process of individuation in Jung's terms. As we have seen in the first section of this chapter, the solution to the problem of opposites was the key to the resolution of the problem of the personal equation in psychology and science in general.

We will return to the question of the importance of Jung's reading of Spitteler's work for his project in *Psychological Types*—including its significance as a literary work rather than a philosophical work—at the end of the final section of this chapter, after having explored Jung's treatment of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's version of the characters of Prometheus and Epimetheus, as well as of Jung's reading of *Faust*, *Part Two*, which he also considered to be a 'visionary' work.

Part III. Jung and Goethe: The Problem of Types in Poetry and Characterisation of Extraversion and Introversion P.2

Introduction

In the final part of this chapter, I am going to look at the connections between Carl Gustav Jung's psychology and the work of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) in the context of Jung's *Psychological Types*. In the book, Jung mainly refers to three of Goethe's works: *Prometheus Fragment* (1773), *Pandora* (1810) and *Faust* (1808, 1832). The latter (specifically *Faust*, *Part Two*) was subsequently described as a 'visionary' work in Jung's terms—meaning that, for Jung, it displays the capacity to access the 'collective unconscious'—and is used as an important example of a literary piece that fundamentally deals with the conflict of opposites.[88] We shall see that Jung sketches the evolution of Goethe's approach towards solving the problem of opposites from his *Prometheus Fragment* to *Faust, Part Two*. In Chapter V of *Psychological Types* titled 'The Problem of Types in Poetry', Jung compares the characters from Goethe's *Prometheus Fragment* and *Pandora* with those of Carl Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, which we looked at in the previous section. Jung thus uses Goethe's characters of Prometheus and Epimetheus to further conceptualise his fundamental pair of opposites (the 'function attitudes' of extraversion and introversion*)*. Interestingly, Jung sees Goethe's own character as an example of extraversion, contrasting him with Friedrich Schiller, whom he views as an example of introversion.[89]

In this chapter, I am also going to look at some of Jung's references to Goethe (specifically, his *Faust*) in the works preceding his *Psychological Types*, such as *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* and a paper delivered in 1914, which are

[88] In *Psychological Types*, however, Jung does not explicitly make this distinction between *Faust, Part One* and *Faust, Part Two*.
[89] As stated earlier, this chapter does not explore separately Jung's discussion of Schiller's work in *Psychological Types*, since Jung does not include him among 'visionary' authors (Domenici 2019:36). In this chapter, Schiller is only considered in the context of Jung's comparison of his and Goethe's personalities. For a detailed discussion of Jung's reception of Schiller, see Bishop (2008b).

generally seen as also marking Jung's diversion from Freud and the beginning of Jung's psychology as an independent scientific field.[90]

Review of Arguments in Secondary Literature

As has been pointed out in the secondary literature on Jung and Goethe, there are many connections between Jung's psychology and Goethe's works.[91] Most notably, based on Jung's numerous references to Goethe throughout his life, Paul Bishop has argued 'that Jung's immersion in Goethe's works in general and *Faust* in particular proves to be extremely deep, so that Goethean thought can be seen to inform his psychology in many respects that have been hitherto unappreciated' (Bishop 2008:47). What is more relevant to the discussion of Jung's *Psychological Types* in particular is that, according to Bishop, 'both men adopted what might be described as a phenomenological approach to the world, not in the sense derived from Husserl, but in the sense of cultivating a particular mode of seeing' (Bishop 2000:75). Bishop calls Goethe's mode of seeing 'aesthetic perception or intuition' and Jung's—'archetypal intuition' (Bishop 2000:75). This, then, could be translated to our notion of the 'personal equation', which, as we have seen, was fundamental to Jung's *Psychological Types*. Furthermore, in addition to Jung's reception of Goethe's literary works, Goethe's scientific contributions have also been explored in this context. For instance, Mark Saban has argued that Jung adopted Goethe's approach which combined 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity', manifesting in Jung's ambivalent attitude towards science: his refusal to 'choose between science and its other' (Saban 2014:35). However, in this thesis I show that, in *Psychological Types*, Jung's conceptions of objectivity and subjectivity—or rather, the way in which he *reformulates the notion of objectivity as an overcoming of one's subjectivity (the personal equation) with the inclusion of the irrational*—were *synthesised* as a result

[90] As explained previously, this paper was originally delivered in English before Psycho-Medical Society in London in July 1914, revised and published in German later in 1914, and translated and published in 1915 under the title 'On Psychological Understanding' in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology* (1914/1915). A different version of it was published as Part II of the essay titled 'The Content of the Psychoses' in the second edition of *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* in 1917 (Jung 1914/1920d).
[91] See, for instance, Jantz (1962), Rockwood (1980), Shengold (1993), Bishop (2008), Edinger (2009), Bishop (2012).

of Jung's reading of the different *philosophical* works that are tackled in this thesis. This thesis shows that the contribution of Goethe's work to Jung's epistemology in *Psychological Types* lies in the articulation of the solution to the problem of opposites in Chapter V of the book. Thus, while numerous parallels can be drawn between the work of Goethe in general and Jung's psychology, in this thesis we look specifically at Goethe as a 'visionary' author, in Jung's terms. We shall see that, in *Psychological Types*, Goethe's work was mainly important in the context of Jung's discussion of the 'reconciling symbol' (*Faust*), as well as in Jung's characterisation of extraversion and introversion (*Prometheus Fragmen*t and *Pandora*).

Interestingly, the idea that Goethe's work symbolised a pair of opposites that needed to be reconciled—which, unsurprisingly, was also Jung's view—has also been expressed in the secondary literature on Goethe. In Goethe's *Pandora*, Herbert Lindenberger, for instance, attributes this 'reconciliatory' power to the character of Pandora: 'At the highest level, as reconciliator between the other levels and as herald of a new age, stands Pandora' (Lindenberger 1955:117). On this view, '[w]hen she first appeared on earth the human race was not yet ready to receive her in her most elevated form; the 'Gotterbilder' that issued from her box at the time represented only transitory virtues - outward splendour, power, bodily beauty - not the higher virtues that she will bring on her return' (Lindenberger 1955:117). Hence, '[t]he crowd that greeted her found the images deceptive when they pursued them, and only Epimetheus among them recognized that Pandora herself, rather than her gifts, was the more worthy goal' (Lindenberger 1955:117). On Lindenberger's reading, 'Goethe implies through his fable that mankind has first to be raised from the materialistic level to the image-making, non-practical one of Epimetheus before it can reach a point which reconciles the two' (Lindenberger 1955:117).

In this chapter, then, we shall explore Jung's take on the reconciliation of opposites in Goethe's works in *Psychological Types*.

Jung Reads Goethe

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was born in 1749 in Frankfurt am Maine and spent much of his adult life in Weimar. He studied law, first, at the University of Leipzig

(between 1765 and 1768) and then at the University of Strasbourg (between 1770 and 1771). His first successful work, *The Sorrows of Young Werther*, was published in 1774 and became 'the first German international bestseller' (Sharpe 2002:I). In 1790 he published *Faust, a Fragment*, which subsequently became *Faust, Part One* (first published in 1810, and then revised in 1828-29) and *Faust, Part Two* (published posthumously in 1832). Goethe has been described as the 'the first German writer of unquestioned European stature' (Sharpe 2002: I).

To begin with, there are certain more personal connections between Jung with Goethe that are worth mentioning, starting with the myth circulated in Jung's family that he was a descendent of Goethe. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung wrote: 'I heard that it had been bruited about that my grandfather Jung had been an illegitimate son of Goethe's' (1962/1989:234). Jung adds that '[t]his annoying story made an impression upon [him] insofar as it at once corroborated and seemed to explain my curious reactions to *Faust*' (1962/1989:234). In a letter to Max Richner, dated 28 February 1932, Jung recalls that his mother drew his attention to Goethe's *Faust* when he was around fifteen years old (Jung 2015:88).[92] At the time it was common to be deeply interested in Goethe's *Faust* and this was the case in his circle—he writes that he even 'once knew a wholesaler who always carried a pocket edition of Faust around with him' (Jung 2015:88).

Jung writes that Goethe's importance for him lay specifically in *Faust*, stating that '[a]part from a few poems, the only thing of Goethe's that [was] alive for [him] is *Faust'* (Jung 2015:88). According to Jung, '[e]verything else of Goethe's pales beside *Faust*, although something immortal glitters in the poems too' (Jung 2015:88). However, Jung points out that, for leisure, he preferred reading English novels to Goethe. He explains that he could not simply 'enjoy' Goethe, since, for him, his work

[92] Jung's original reactions to Goethe's *Faust*, to its characters and the story, are described in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* as follows:
'I regretted Faust's behavior, for to my mind he should not have been so one-sided and so easily tricked. He should have been cleverer and also more moral. How childish he was to gamble away his soul so frivolously! Faust was plainly a bit of a windbag. I had the impression that the weight of the drama and its significance lay chiefly on the side of Mephistopheles. It would not have grieved me if Faust's soul had gone to hell. He deserved it. I did not like the idea of the "cheated devil" at the end, for after all Mephistopheles had been anything but a stupid devil, and it was contrary to logic for him to be tricked by silly little angels. Mephistopheles seemed to me cheated in quite a different sense: he had not received his promised rights because Faust, that somewhat characterless fellow, had carried his swindle through right into the Hereafter. There, admittedly, his puerility came to light, but, as I saw it, he did not deserve the initiation into the great mysteries. I would have given him a taste of purgatorial fires' (Jung 1962/1989:60).

was ‘too big, too exciting, too profound’ (Jung 2015:88). He believed that there were still mysteries in *Faust*—namely in the second part of the work—that were still remaining to be solved (Jung 2015:88). He argued that Faust was the ‘most recent pillar in that bridge of the spirit which spans the morass of world history, beginning with the Gilgamesh epic, the I Ching, the Upanishads, the Tao-te Ching, the fragments of Heraclitus, and continuing in the Gospel of St. John, the letters of St. Paul, in Meister Eckhart and in Dante’ (Jung 2015:88). In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung writes: ‘*Faust* struck a chord in me and pierced me through in a way that I could not but regard as personal’ (Jung 1962/1989). The significance of Goethe’s *Faust* for Jung, then, was as follows: ‘Most of all, it awakened in me the problem of opposites, of good and evil, of mind and matter, of light and darkness’ (Jung 1962/1989:235).

Another personal connection is to do with Jung’s inner dichotomy, his ‘personalities No. 1 and No. 2’: ‘Like anyone who is capable of some introspection, I had early taken it for granted that the split in my personality was my own purely personal affair and responsibility’ (Jung 1962/1989:234). Jung read Goethe’s *Faust* trying to understand this split of his personality: ‘*Faust*, to be sure, had made the problem somewhat easier for me by confessing, "Two souls, alas, are housed within my breast"; but he had thrown no light on the cause of this dichotomy (Jung 1962/1989:234).[93]

In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections,* Jung also described Goethe as a crucial inspiration for the fundamentals of his psychology. In particular, Jung acknowledged his debt to the poet in his work on alchemy, regarding it as a ‘sign of [his] inner relationship with Goethe’ (Jung 1962/1989:206). In relation to this, Jung states that ‘Goethe’s secret was that he was in the grip of that process of archetypal transformation which has gone on through the centuries’ (Jung 1962/1989:206).

[93] Here, Jung refers to the following quote from Goethe’s *Faust, Part I*—taken from Faust’s dialogue with Wagner before his encounter with Mephistopheles:
By this one passion you are quite possessed –
You’d best admit no other to a share.
Two souls, alas, are housed within my breast,
And each will wrestle for the mastery there.
The one has passions’ craving crude for love,
And hugs a world where sweet the senses rage;
The other longs for pastures fair above,
Leaving the murk for lofty heritage.
(Goethe 1808/1965:67).

When it comes to Jung's reception of Goethe prior to *Psychological Types*, *Faust* was Jung's preferred example in his 1914 paper, where he criticised Freudian psychoanalysis as well as the contemporary understanding of the scientific method. Here, Jung brings up the idea that psychological knowledge is fundamentally *subjective*, which he will later develop in *Psychological Types*: 'But if we would approach to an understanding of psychological things we must remember the fact of the subjective conditioning of all knowledge' (Jung 1914/1920d). Hence, '[t]he world is *as we see it* and not simply objective; this holds true even more of the mind' (Jung 1914/1920d). Thus, what were regarded as 'scientific explanations' during this time were inadequate when it came to making sense of works such as Goethe's *Faust*. Jung writes: 'It is common knowledge that present-day scientific explanation rests upon the basis of the causal principle' (Jung 1914/1920d). However, '[i]f we apply this method to "Faust" it must become clear that something more is required for a true understanding' (Jung 1914/1920d). For Jung, contemporary science was unable to do justice to *Faust*, reducing its 'real' meaning to terms that it was able to understand: '[t]o interpret Faust objectively, *i.e.* from the causal standpoint, is as though a man were to consider a sculpture from the historical, technical and—last but not least—from the mineralogical standpoint. But where lurks *the real meaning* of the wondrous work?' (Jung 1914/1920d). Jung further asks: 'Where is the answer to that most important question: what aim had the artist in mind, and how are we ourselves to understand his work subjectively?' (Jung 1914/1920d). He then adds that '[t]o the scientific spirit this seems an idle question which anyhow has nothing to do with science' (Jung 1914/1920d).

Jung uses this argument to criticise Freudian psychoanalysis: while, according to Jung, Freudian psychoanalysis met the contemporary scientific criteria, it was unable to account for Goethe's work in *Faust*. Jung explains this further: 'If psychoanalysis, following Freud's orientation, should succeed in presenting an uninterrupted and conclusive connection between Goethe's infantile sexual development and his work, or, following Adler, between the infantile struggle for power and the adult Goethe and his work, an interesting proposition would have been solved—we should have learnt how a masterpiece can be reduced to the simplest thinkable elements, which are universal, and to be found working within the depths of everything and everybody' (Jung 1914/1920d). Jung then asks: 'But did Goethe construct his work to *this* end? Was it his intention that it should be thus conceived?' (Jung 1914/1920d).

For Jung, then, to truly understand the meaning of Goethe's work means something else: 'What we really want to find out is how this man has redeemed himself as an individual, and when we arrive at this comprehension then we shall also understand the symbol given by Goethe' (Jung 1914/1920d). However, Jung also states that '[i]t is true we may then fall into the error that we understand Goethe himself' (Jung 1914/1920d). He then adds: 'But let us be cautious and modest, simply saying we have thereby arrived at an understanding of ourselves' (Jung 1914/1920d). Hence, according to Jung, science *should* aspire to understand literary works such as Goethe's *Faust*, for which it has to recognise the realm of the 'personal', or the 'subjective'. Hence, in 1914, Jung already criticises the contemporary formulation of the scientific method and seeks to redefine it by acknowledging the 'personal equation'. While he points out that '[t]his understanding is, it is true, subjective, and therefore not scientific for those to whom science and explanation by the causal principle are identical', he adds that 'the validity of this identification is open to question', and especially when it comes to the science of psychology in particular (Jung 1914/1920d).

In the following section, we are going to look at Jung's reception of Goethe in the context of the two authors that we examined earlier in this chapter—Friedrich Nietzsche and Carl Spitteler.

'Visionary' Authors: Nietzsche, Spitteler, and Goethe

In the first part of this chapter, we looked at the significance of Nietzsche, specifically Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, for Jung—particularly, with regard to the *problem of opposites*. Interestingly, in Chapter III of *Psychological Types*, devoted to Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian artistic drives as outlined in *The Birth of Tragedy*, Jung remarks on the affinity of Nietzsche's work with Goethe—specifically with *Faust*. He writes that Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* 'is more nearly related to Schopenhauer and Goethe than to Schiller', also adding '[b]ut it at least appears to share aesthetism and Hellenism with Schiller, pessimism and the motive of deliverance with Schopenhauer, and unlimited points of contact with Goethe's *Faust*' (Jung 1923:170). But it is not just Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* that has parallels with

Goethe's *Faust*, according to Jung. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* it is in fact stated that '*Zarathustra* was Nietzsche's *Faust*' (1962/1989:102). In *Psychological Types* as well, there are numerous occasions where Nietzsche and Goethe, and specifically *Zarathustra* and *Faust*, are put side by side (sometimes just together, and sometimes grouped with other works by other authors). For instance, Jung compares *Zarathustra* and *Faust* with Spitteler's *Prometheus*: 'Spitteler's poem differs, in this respect, both from *Faust* and from *Zarathustra*, for in these works there is a greater conscious participation on the part of the poet in the meaning of the symbol; accordingly the mythological luxuriance in *Faust* and the intellectual exuberance in *Zarathustra* are pruned down to the advantage of the desired solution' (Jung 1923:240). This means that, while '[b]oth *Faust* and *Zarathustra* are, for this reason, far more beautiful than Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*', the latter 'as a more or less faithful image of the actual processes of the collective unconscious, has deeper truth' (Jung 1923:240). Jung explains this further here: '*Faust* and *Zarathustra* are of the very greatest assistance in the individual mastery of the problem in question; but Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus* thanks to its abundant harvest of mythological material, provides not only a more general appreciation of the problem, but also its manner of appearance in collective life' (Jung 1923:240).

In the following quote, Jung groups Nietzsche, Goethe, and Richard Wagner—the German composer—together, whilst drawing the following parallel between them: all three of these figures drew inspiration for their key works from the Middle Ages. For Jung, this meant that there had been a problem existing since those times that was never resolved—the 'problem of opposites': 'In his last and loftiest utterance Wagner took hold of the Grail legend, as Goethe selected Dante, while Nietzsche chose the image of a lordly caste and a lordly morality, an image which had found its embodiment in many a fair-haired heroic and knightly figure of the Middle Ages' (Jung 1923:298). Jung adds that '[t]he fact that three of the greatest of German minds should fasten upon early medieval psychology in their most important works, is, in my view, proof enough that there is still an unanswered problem surviving from that age' (Jung 1923:298). Jung makes a similar statement in an earlier work, in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, with reference to Goethe's *Faust* in particular: 'Just this constitutes the deep significance of Goethe's Faust, that he clothes in words a problem of modern man which has been turning in restless

slumber since the Renaissance, just as was done by the drama of Oedipus for the Hellenic sphere of culture' (1912/1916:92).[94]

As we have seen previously, Jung argued that the solution of the problem of opposites was 'religious' (not, for instance, 'aesthetic', as was the case in Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*). Jung highlights the religious nature of the problem of opposites with reference to *Zarathustra*, *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, and *Faust* (also including Schopenhauer and Wagner's *Parsifal*): 'The solution of the problem in *Faust*, in the *Parsifal* of Wagner, in Schopenhauer, even in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, is *religious*' (Jung 1923:239). Hence, '[t]hat Spitteler is also drawn towards a religious setting is therefore not to be wondered at' (Jung 1923:239). Jung explains that '[w]hen a problem is accepted as religious, it gains a psychological significance of immense importance; a value is involved which relates to the whole of man, hence also the unconscious (the realm of the gods, the other world, etc.)' (Jung 1923:239).

Hence, as we shall see, for Jung, Nietzsche, Spitteler and Goethe were what he would later call 'visionary' authors: they were able to access the 'collective unconscious' and the world of 'symbolic images', which Jung's describes as follows:

> The function of perception (the soul) apprehends the contents of the unconscious, and as a creative function brings the dynamis to birth in symbolic form. In the psychological sense the soul brings to birth images which the general rational consciousness assumes to be worthless. Such images are certainly worthless, in the sense that they cannot immediately be turned to account in the objective world. The *artistic* is the foremost possibility for their application, in so far as such a means of expression lies in one's power; a second possibility is *philosophical speculation*, a third is the *quasi-religious*, which leads to heresies and the founding of sects; there remains the fourth possibility of employing the forces contained in the images in every form of licentiousness. (Jung 1923:311-312).

In footnotes, as examples of literary application of these images, Jung includes primarily Spitteler, Goethe (specifically *Faust*), and Wagner—whilst also listing

[94] In Chapter V of *Psychological Types*, Jung emphasises the importance of the medieval element in Goethe's *Faust*, which he links with the birth of modern individualism (Jung 1923:272). We will come back to this point in Chapter VI of this thesis, devoted to Jung's reception of classical and medieval thought.

Hoffman, Meyrink, and Barlach; as an example of use of these images in philosophy, Jung only refers to Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*.

Hence, from what we have read so far, we can establish that, from Jung's perspective, Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus,* and Goethe's *Faust* can be characterised as both a) displaying the capacity to access the collective unconscious and accessing symbolic images as a result b) fundamentally dealing with the problem of opposites. As we shall see below, the former corresponds to Jung's category of 'visionary' works as described in *Psychology and Literature,* which he distinguishes from 'psychological' works. Jung writes: 'For the sake of clarity, I would like to call the one mode of artistic creation *psychological*, and the other *visionary*' (Jung 1950/1971). With regards to the former, Jung states that, '[t]he psychological mode works with materials drawn from man's conscious life – with crucial experiences, powerful emotions, suffering, passion, the stuff of human fate in general' (Jung 1950/1971:116). In the psychological mode, '[a]ll this is assimilated by the psyche of the poet, raised from the commonplace to the level of poetic experience, and expressed with a power of conviction that gives us a greater depth of human insight by making us vividly aware of those everyday happenings which we tend to evade or to overlook because we perceive them as only dully or with a feeling of discomfort' (Jung 1950/1971:116). Curiously, to explain the distinction between the 'psychological' and 'visionary' modes of creation, Jung distinguishes between *Faust, Part One* and *Faust*, *Part Two* of *Faust*, the former being an example of a psychological work and the latter of visionary: 'The gulf that separates the first from the second part of *Faust* marks the difference between the psychological and the visionary modes of artistic creation' (Jung 1950/1971:118). In the visionary mode, 'everything is reversed' (Jung 1950/1971:118). What this means is that '[t]he experience that furnishes the material for artistic expression is no longer familiar', and that '[i]t is something strange that derives its existence from the hinterland of man's mind, as if it had emerged from the abyss of prehuman ages, or from a superhuman world contrasting light and darkness' (Jung 1950/1971:118). Ultimately, Jung writes, '[i]t is a primordial experience which surpasses man's understanding and to which in his weakness he may easily succumb' (Jung 1950/1971:118).[95] Hence,

[95] Domenici provides a complete list of works that Jung described as visionary in her *Jung's Nietzsche* (2019:36).

for Jung, 'visionary' works, as opposed to merely 'psychological' ones, are works that are able to access the 'collective unconscious'.

In *Psychological Types*, Jung introduces the discussion of the notion of the 'religious symbol' in his chapter called 'Schiller's Ideas Upon the Type Problem' and uses Goethe's *Faust, Part Two*, to further illustrate its meaning—through the characters of Paris and Helen and through the main character himself:

> Goethe makes the divine images of Paris and Helen float up from the tripod of the mothers—on the one hand the rejuvenated pair, but on the other the symbol of a process of inner union which is precisely what Faust passionately craves for himself as the supreme inner atonement. This is clearly shown in the subsequent scene, and it is equally manifest in the further course of the Second Part. As we can see in this very example of Faust, the vision of the symbol is a significant indication as to the further course of life, an alluring of the libido towards a still distant aim, but which henceforth operates unquenchably within him, so that his life, kindled like a flame, moves steadily onwards to the far goal. This is the specific life-promoting significance of the symbol. This is the value and meaning of the religious symbol. I am speaking, of course, not of symbols that are dead and stiffened by dogma, but of living symbols that rise from the creative unconscious of living man. (1923:158).[96]

Hence, this quality of being a 'visionary' work becomes the way in which the problem of opposites is approached in these works. And this is what characterises Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, as well as Goethe's *Faust, Part Two*: the access to symbolic images as a result of the contact with the collective unconscious.

In the following sections of this chapter, then, we shall explore Jung's reading of Goethe's works in more detail and establish their significance for Jung's project in *Psychological Types*.

[96] On Goethe's character of Helen (a play within a play), see Curran 2000.

Goethe and the Problem of Opposites: The Evolution of Goethe's Approach

In the following sections we are going to examine Jung's reading of Goethe's works through the problem of opposites and the role it played in Jung's *Psychological Types*. I am going to look at Jung's reading of three of Goethe's works—the *Prometheus Fragment* (1773), *Pandora* (1810), *Faust, Part One* (1808; revised 1828-1829), and *Faust, Part Two* (1832). I am going to show that, for Jung, Goethe's approach to the problem of opposites constituted a gradual development, starting with his *Prometheus Fragment* and culminating in his *Faust, Part II*—in a way, analogous to the evolution of Nietzsche's treatment of the problem, from his *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872) *to Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883). According to Jung, it is in *Faust, Part II* where Goethe realises the failure of the classical and medieval, or Christian, approaches, and is able to move beyond them, by incorporating the anti-Christian element in his work. This, I would argue, is also reminiscent of Jung's reading of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra,* as well as of Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*—namely, through the lens of the 'individuation' process.

Hence, to compare Jung's reading of *Faust* with that of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, the character of Faust, just like Nietzsche's Zarathustra, recognises the importance of the integration of the *opposite* in the unconscious—of what Jung terms the 'shadow'. This parallel between Jung's reading of *Faust* and *Zarathustra* is best described in the quote below. Just as Zarathustra, who preaches anti-Christianity, discovers the 'ugliest man' and, hence, the shame of having killed God, so Faust, on the other hand, a man of the Middle Ages, discovers his unconscious, the anti-Christian side, in Mephistopheles:

> In unconscious fantasy the Self often appears as a super-ordinated or ideal personality, as *Faust* in relation to Goethe and *Zarathustra* to Nietzsche. In the effort of idealization the archaic features of the Self are represented as practically severed from the 'higher' Self, as in the figure of Mephisto with Goethe or in that of Epimetheus with Spitteler. In the Christian psychology the severance is extreme in the figures of Christ and the devil or Anti-Christ; while with Nietzsche Zarathustra discovers his shadow in the 'ugliest man'. (Jung 1923:540).

A common theme between Jung's reading of Nietzsche and that of Goethe is the notion of the 'creator', or creativeness: we have seen previously that Jung described Nietzsche's character of Zarathustra as fundamentally *creative*. In Chapter V, 'The Problem of Types in Poetry', Jung compares the two versions of Prometheus—the one in Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, on the one hand, and the one in Goethe's *Prometheus Fragment* and *Pandora*, on the other hand. Jung writes that Goethe's Prometheus in his *Prometheus Fragment* serves as an example of the 'creator'. Jung writes "In the *Prometheus Fragment* of 1773 Prometheus is the defiant, self-sufficing, godlike, god-disdaining creator and artist. His soul is Minerva, daughter of Zeus' (Jung 1923:216). Indeed, in the *Prometheus Fragment*, Prometheus tells Minerva: 'you are my Spirit' and 'your words are heavenly light to me' (Goethe 1773). Jung, then, draws a sharp contrast between Goethe's version of the character and that of Spitteler. When it comes to the former, Jung states that 'Goethe's Prometheus is a creator and artist; Minerva inspires his clay-images with life' (Jung 923:217). As for Spitteler's version of the character, however, he writes that he was not so much of a creator but a sufferer: 'Spitteler's Prometheus is suffering rather than creative; only his soul creates and her creating is secret and mysterious' (Jung 1923:217).[97] Jung uses the epithet 'creative' several times in the chapter to describe Goethe's Prometheus: 'Goethe's Prometheus is self-active; he is essentially and exclusively creative, defying the gods out of strength of his own creative power' (Jung 1923:217). Hence, Goethe's Prometheus 'creates and works outwardly in the world; he peoples space with the figures he has fashioned and his soul has animated; he fills the earth with the offspring of his creation; he is both master and educator of man', whereas with Spitteler's version of Prometheus, 'everything goes to the world within and vanishes in the darkness of the soul's depths, just as he himself disappears from the world of men, even wandering from the narrow confines of his home, that he may become the more invisible' (Jung 1923:218).

According to Jung, the characterisation of Prometheus as either the 'creator' or the 'sufferer' was in part due to the character's relationship with the figure of Pandora, who was given different roles by the two authors. He explains that '[w]ith Spitteler,

[97] Indeed, Spitteler's revised version of *Prometheus and Epimetheus*, as mentioned previously, was titled *Prometheus the Sufferer* (1924).

Pandora is a being of the other world, a duplicate of the soul of Prometheus belonging to the divine sphere; but, with Goethe, she is altogether the creature and daughter of the Titan, and therefore in absolute dependence upon him' (Jung 1923:223). As for Goethe's version, '[t]he relation of Goethe's Prometheus with Minerva puts him in the place of Vulcan, and the fact that Pandora is wholly his creature, and does not figure as a being of divine origin, make him a creative deity, thus removing him altogether from the human sphere' (Jung 1923:223).

Having described Goethe's version of Prometheus, Jung turns to the other character—Epimetheus. While Jung relies primarily on Goethe's *Prometheus Fragment* to discuss Goethe's characterisation of Prometheus, he uses Goethe's *Pandora* to look at Goethe's characterisation of Epimetheus since, as he points out, '[s]uch indications as are to be found in the *Prometheus Fragment* are too sparse to enable us to discern the character of Epimetheus' and '[i]n Goethe's *Pandora*, we are fortunate in possessing a work which conveys a far more complete portrait of Epimetheus than the fragment so far discussed' (1923:218; 224). Jung describes the character of Epimetheus as follows, whilst also outlining the story in Goethe's *Pandora*: '[h]e broods over the past, and can never free himself from Pandora, whom (according to the classical myth) he has taken to wife, *i.e.* he cannot rid himself of her imaged memory, although she herself has long since deserted him, leaving him her daughter Epimelaia (Anxiety), but taking with her Elpore (Hope)' (Jung 1923:224). He then contrasts the character of Epimetheus with Prometheus in *Pandora*, (the latter essentially remaining the same as in the *Prometheus Fragmen*t): 'While Prometheus is still the same creator and modeller, who daily rises early from his couch with the same unconquerable urgency to create and to influence the world, Epimetheus is entirely given up to phantasies, dreams, and memories, full of anxious misgivings and troubled deliberations' (Jung 1923:224).

As Jung puts it, for Epimetheus, Pandora is 'a precious treasure', or 'the supreme value', which, in Jung's terms, translates to her being his 'soul image': '[S]he represents his soul; hence her divine power, her unshakable superiority' (Jung 1923:225). Jung explains that '[w]herever such attributes are conferred upon certain personalities we may with certainty conclude that such personalities are *symbol-bearers*; in other words *imagines* of projected unconscious contents' (Jung

1923:225).[98] Hence, while both Goethe's characters have a female representation of their souls—Prometheus (*Prometheus Fragment*) in Minerva and Epimetheus (*Pandora*) in Pandora—the former is creative, inspired by his soul, while the latter is not.[99] It is precisely the fact that Prometheus is in contact (has a *relationship*) with his unconscious, Minerva, that makes him creative, while Epimetheus, on the other hand, has lost contact (is *no longer in a relationship* with) with his unconscious, Pandora, and, hence, is suffering rather than being creative.

For Jung, Goethe's two characters then, again, represent a pair of psychological opposites. Jung provides the following description of Goethe's attempt to find a solution to the problem of opposites: 'In Goethe's treatment of the Prometheus and Epimetheus problem we again recognize the attempt to make some sort of reconciliation between the more highly differentiated function, corresponding with the Christian ideal of favouring the good, and the relatively undifferentiated function whose repression and non-recognition corresponds with the Christian ideal of rejecting the evil' (Jung 1923:231). Jung explains further that '[t]his law determines Goethe's choice of a symbol: Prometheus was the saviour who brought life and fire to mankind languishing in darkness' (Jung 1923:231). According to Jung, 'Goethe's deep scholarship could easily have found another saviour; the actual form of the determinant, therefore, is not sufficiently explained' (Jung 1923:231). Jung writes that '[t]he explanation must lie rather in the classical spirit, which was felt to contain an absolutely compensatory value for that particular time (the turning point of the eighteenth century); it was expressed in every possible way, in aesthetics, philosophy, morals, even politics (philhellenism)' (Jung 1923:231). According to Jung, '[i]t was the Paganism of antiquity, glorified as "freedom", "naiveté", "beauty", and so on, which responded to the yearnings of that time' (Jung 1923:231). Goethe's effort to find a solution was thus doomed to failure: as Jung puts it, 'the effort towards a regressive renaissance shared the fate of the *Prometheus Fragment* and the *Pandora*; it was still-born', since [t]he classical solution would no longer do, for the intervening centuries of Christianity, with their profound tides of spiritual

[98] Interestingly, Epimetheus himself uses the expression of the 'soul image'—'der Seele klar gespiegelt Bild'—in reference to Pandora (Goethe 1810/2016:29).
[99] In the 'Definitions' section of *Psychological Types*, Jung explains that '[a] very feminine woman has a masculine soul, and a very manly man a feminine soul' (Jung 1923:594). While Jung calls the latter the 'anima', he refers to the former as the 'animus': 'If therefore we speak of the *anima* of a man, we must logically speak of the *animus* of a woman' (Jung 1923:595).

experience, could not be denied' (Jung 1923:232). It is here where Jung brings Goethe's *Faust* into the discussion, in which, according to Jung, Goethe's attempt at a solution took development in the right direction as it recognised the medieval element. Jung draws parallels between the characters from his two poetic fragments (Prometheus and Epimetheus) and the characters from *Faust* (Faust and Mephistopheles):

> Hence the penchant for the antique had to content itself with a gradual attenuation into the medieval form. This process becomes manifest in Goethe's *Faust*, where the problem is seized by the horns. The divine wager between good and evil is accepted. Faust, the medieval Prometheus, enters the lists with Mephistopheles, the medieval Epimetheus, and makes a pact with him. And here the problem is already so well focussed that we can see that Faust and Mephisto are one and the same individual. (Jung 1923:232).

However, for Jung, the Christian treatment of the problem was ultimately also destined to fail, since it was still one-sided—the anti-Christian element needed to be integrated as well: it 'is precisely the longing for deliverance, the obstinacy and self-confidence of the heathen element, which offers the real possibility for deliverance, because the anti-christian symbol affords a possibility for the acceptance of evil' (1923:234). Goethe, according to Jung, understood this in his treatment of the problem in his *Faust*, as opposed to the other works discussed previously: 'Goethe's intuition, therefore, has apprehended the problem with enviable clarity' (Jung 1923:234). Jung writes that '[i]t is certainly characteristic that the other more superficial attempts at solution—the *Prometheus Fragment*, the *Pandora*, and the Rosicrucian compromise with its attempt at a syncretism of Dionysian joyousness with Christian self-sacrifice—remained uncompleted' (Jung 1923:234). In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* Jung recalls his reaction to the recognition of the anti-Christian element in *Faust*: '"Here at last," I thought, "is someone who takes the devil seriously and even concludes a blood pact with him with the adversary who has the power to frustrate God's plan to make a perfect world"' (1962/1989:60).

In *Psychological Types*, then, Jung describes Goethe's final attempt at a solution in *Faust, Part Two* as follows. He states that 'Faust's redemption begins with his death' and that '[h]is life sustains the Promethean divine character which only falls from him in death, *i.e.* with his re-birth' (Jung 1923:234). For Jung, '[p]sychologically, this

means that the Faust attitude must cease before the unity of the individual can be accomplished' (Jung 1923:234). Jung explains further: 'The figure which first appeared as Gretchen and then on a higher level as Helen, and finally became exalted into the Mater Gloriosa, is a symbol that I cannot now exhaust of its manifold meanings' (Jung 1923:234). Nevertheless, Jung adds: 'I will merely point out that it deals with the same archaic image with which the Gnosis was so profoundly concerned, viz. the idea of the divine harlot, Eve, Helen, Mary, and Sophia-Achamoth' (Jung 1923:234).[100]

In the following section, then, we are going to look at Jung's further characterisation of extraversion and introversion using through the works of Goethe (*Prometheus Fragment* and *Pandora*) in Chapter of *Psychological Types*, as well as through his comparison of the personalities of Goethe and Schiller earlier in the book.

The Opposites: Extraversion and Introversion

In Chapter V of *Psychological Types*, to further illustrate the differences between Goethe's characters of Prometheus and Epimetheus, Jung refers to his two function attitudes—'extraversion' and 'introversion'. The former is said to be characteristic of Prometheus, while the latter of Epimetheus, which, he contrasts with Spitteler's version of the characters, where the opposite is true. According to Jung, then, the fundamental pair of opposites in Goethe's *Prometheus Fragment* and *Pandora* that are eventually reconciled is that of extraversion (represented by Prometheus) and introversion (represented by Epimetheus).

In this chapter of *Psychological Types*, whilst describing Spitteler's and Goethe's versions of Prometheus and Epimetheus, Jung also refers to the types of the authors themselves—again, specifically the function attitudes of extraversion and

[100] In this context, it is interesting to look at the final words of Faust:
Then to the moment could I say:
Linger you now, you are so fair!
Now records of my earthly day
No flight of aeons can impair –
Foreknowledge comes, and fills me with such bliss,
I take my joy, my highest moment.
(Goethe 1832/1962:270).

introversion. He writes: ‘I believe I am justified in the conjecture that Goethe belongs more to the extraverted than the introverted type, while Spitteler would seem to belong to the latter’ (Jung 1923:215). Jung also uses these two categories to characterise Spitteler’s and Goethe’s treatment of the problem of opposites, thus drawing a causal link between their types and the solutions they arrive at—hence, again using typology as an *epistemological tool* and, in this case, in art, rather than science or philosophy. He writes: ‘This effort of Goethe to find a solution, which appears to be evolved from an extraverted psychology, brings us back to Spitteler's attempt, which we left for the time being in order to discuss Goethe's Prometheus figure’ (Jung 1923:227).

Jung makes certain remarks regarding his analysis of Goethe’s personality: that it ‘is based upon diverse impressions, which [he] will refrain from discussing owing to [his] inability to furnish sufficient explanations’ and that ‘[o]nly an exhaustive examination and analysis of Goethe’s biography could succeed in establishing the justice of this assumptions’ (Jung 1923:215-216). Earlier in the book—in Chapter II—he still describes Goethe as ‘inclining towards the extraverted side’ (and Schiller as introverted), whilst also providing a very specific typological description of Goethe: ‘I wish to be clearly understood that all my observations upon the extravert and introvert in this chapter hold valid only for the special types here dealt with, viz. the intuitive, feeling extravert represented by Goethe, and the intuitive, thinking introvert represented by Schiller’ (Jung 1923:121). This proviso, then, implies that the contrast that Jung draws between Goethe and Schiller in that chapter is not only based on the difference in their function attitudes—namely, ‘extraversion’ or ‘introversion’—but also on the type of ‘judging’ functions they use—'thinking’ or ‘feeling’.

Jung’s way of deciding between introversion and extraversion for an individual’s psychological attitude appears to be based on looking at the person in two different contexts: internal (when the person is reflecting—in touch with one’s inner world) and external (when the person is in action—in contact with the external world). For Jung, there are characteristic differences between the two types in these two different contexts: ‘This means that when the extravert thinks, things go just as autocratically as when the introvert operates externally’ (Jung 1923:121). Jung explains further: ‘[t]his formula therefore can hold good only where an almost complete stage has

already been reached; when in fact the introvert has attained a world of ideas so rich and flexible and capable of expression that the object no longer forces him upon a Procrustean bed; and the extravert such an ample knowledge of and consideration for the object that a caricature of it can no longer arise when he operates with it in his thinking' (Jung 1923:121). Jung derives this idea from Schiller's letter to Goethe—his admiration of Goethe's 'great world of ideas', which Jung quotes:

> Expect of me no great material wealth of ideas, for that is what I find in you. My need and endeavour is to make much out of little, and, if ever you should realize my poverty in all that men call acquired knowledge, you will perhaps find that in many ways my aspiration has succeeded. Because my circle of ideas is smaller I traverse it more quickly and oftener. I may therefore, even make a better use of what small ready cash I own, creating a diversity through form which the contents lack. You strive to simplify your great world of ideas, while I seek variety for my small possessions. You have a kingdom to rule, and I only a somewhat numerous family of ideas which I would fain expand to a small universe. (Schiller quoted in Jung 1923:119).

Jung then contrasts Schiller with Goethe, where the latter says: 'In every sort of activity I, on the other hand, am one might almost say completely idealistic: I ask nothing at all from objects; but instead I demand that everything shall conform to my conceptions' (Goethe quoted in Jung 1923:121).

Finally, when it comes to the dichotomy of extraversion and introversion, it is also interesting that Goethe's conception of 'systole and diastole' is also featured in the Introduction of *Psychological Types* as an analogy for Jung's pair of opposites. Jung explains that '[t]hese opposite attitudes are merely opposite mechanisms a diastolic going out and seizing of the object, and a systolic concentration and release of energy from the object seized' (Jung 1923:13). He then states that '[e]very human being possesses both mechanisms as an expression of his natural life-rhythm—that rhythm which Goethe, surely not by chance, characterized with the physiological concepts 'of cardiac activity' (Jung 1923:13).

Conclusion

The last section of this chapter has looked at Jung's reception of Goethe's works in *Psychological Types*—firstly, with regard to the resolution the problem of opposites in Goethe's *Faust*, and secondly, with regard to Jung's further conceptualisation of the dichotomy of extraversion and introversion through his comparison of Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus* and Goethe's *Prometheus Fragment* and *Pandora*. We have seen that for Jung, Goethe—similarly to Nietzsche—evolved in his approach to the problem of opposites, from his *Prometheus Fragment* to *Faust, Part Two*.

We have seen that through his discussion of these 'visionary' works, Jung illustrates the nature of the 'problem of opposites'—namely, the manifestation of psychological one-sidedness. Through these works, Jung, then, details his 'religious' solution to the problem of opposites in the form of the 'reconciling symbol'. We have also explored the *structure* of Jung's psychological types, through the 'function attitudes' of extraversion and introversion—in particular, the notions of the 'soul' and the 'persona', the notions of the 'unconscious' and the 'collective unconscious'.

This chapter also offers perspectives into the disciplinary boundaries between *science, philosophy, and art*—all of which could be united by *psychology*, on Jung's view. He lists Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* among what he considered to be 'visionary' works, alongside numerous *literary works*, whilst using his psychological typology as an explanatory tool to make sense of them all. What is more, we have seen in his criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis that, for Jung, *psychology as a science* should be able to apprehend literary works such as Goethe's *Faust* or Spitteler's *Prometheus and Epimetheus*. To enable this, *science itself needed to be redefined*: it could no longer be equated with explanations based on the 'causal principle' alone and had to account for the 'personal equation', as well as the realm of the 'irrational'.

When it comes to Jung's conceptualisation of his typology, among the key insights that can be drawn from this chapter is the peculiar fact that Jung *developed an anti-typological typology*: the goal of his typology was to help one to, as it were, 'untype' themselves, by *integrating the opposite of one's psychological opposite residing in the unconscious*. Hence, having a psychological type to begin with meant being

fundamentally psychologically one-sided. Since we established earlier that Jung, following James, believed philosophical positions to be ultimately reflections of psychological attitudes, philosophers needed to *overcome their psychological one-sidedness* to be able to arrive at unbiased philosophical perspectives. 'Untyping' was also Jung's solution to the problem of the personal equation, which, as established previously, was already a psychological problem for Jung. 'Untyping' was thus Jung's proposed scientific method: by *overcoming their psychological type* scientists were able to *overcome their personal equation*, or the problem of subjectivity in psychology and science in general. Hence, Jung's typology, as *an epistemological method,* was a further development from James' typology, rather than the numerous psychological typologies that had been developed by psychologists for the purpose of serving as characterologies. At the same time, whilst Jung's epistemological project shared the *pluralistic spirit* of James' pragmatism—with its goal to provide a fuller account of reality by incorporating multiple perspectives—it went against it in its attempt to provide a method of ultimately *unifying these perspectives* by resolving the 'problem of opposites' through this very process of 'untyping'.

In the following chapter, we are going to turn back to philosophy and look at Jung's reception of the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. We shall see that Jung's reading of Schopenhauer's philosophy helped him conceptualise some of the ideas that we have tackled in this chapter—such as, the 'unconscious' and the 'primordial images'. As we are going further back in time in the history of philosophy, from next chapter onwards the philosophies under review will be profoundly concerned with *metaphysical* issues: the ultimate nature of reality and the things that inhabit it, and the extent to which we are able to provide an answer to these questions.

CHAPTER IV. JUNG AND SCHOPENHAUER: 'MY WILL' AND 'MY PRESENTATION'

Introduction

This chapter looks at Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy (1788-1860)—primarily, as articulated in his *The World as Will and Presentation* (1818)—in the context of Jung's theory outlined in *Psychological Types*.[101] It explores the connections between Schopenhauer's philosophy and the more fundamental concepts of Jung's psychology—namely, the 'unconscious', the 'libido', or psychic energy, and 'primordial images'—whilst also showing how these relate to Jung's psychological typology in particular. Furthermore, the chapter examines the parallel that might be drawn between the four types of Schopenhauer's 'principle of sufficient ground' (related to his '*principium individuationis*') and Jung's four 'functions' (intuition, sensation, thinking and feeling), showing that Jung uses Schopenhauer's philosophy to conceptualise his notion of 'rationality' as the two 'rational' psychological types of 'thinking' and 'feeling'. Hence, we shall see that Jung *re-imagines* Schopenhauer's philosophical ideas as his own key *psychological* concepts, which then form the backdrop of his project in *Psychological Types*.

[101] In this chapter, I will be using the translation of 'Vorstellung' as 'presentation' rather than the more commonly used 'representation' (or, before that, 'idea') since I agree with the justification given by Richard Aquila, the translator of the 2008 Taylor & Francis version of the book—as it avoids misconceptions about Schopenhauer's divide between the world of appearance and the world as will: '[R]epresentation' has become - but not without exception—commonplace in connection with Kant, and also familiar in translations of Schopenhauer. But in addition to failing to bring out the dual notion of that which is "set before" a cognizant subject as its object, and the presentational activity of the subject therein engaged, it disguises the point by way of a misleading suggestion. Namely, it suggests that what is in question is some sort of internal item (a "representation"), internal to the state of the subject, and toward which its cognitive activity is in the first instance directed. Whether or not this leads to the additional supposition that such items function by representing something existing independently of that activity, it misdirects us from the main idea' (Aquilla in Schopenhauer 2008: xvi).

Review of Arguments in Secondary Literature

The connection between Schopenhauer's philosophy and psychology—and even more specifically, the notion of the 'unconscious'—has been established in secondary literature.[102] The secondary literature on Jung and Schopenhauer, however, is relatively scarce.[103] In comparison, more has been written on Freud and Schopenhauer.[104] The relationship between Schopenhauer's philosophy and Jung's theory of psychological types is especially under-researched in academic literature—hence, this chapter seeks to provide some insights on this topic.

When it comes to Jung's relationship with philosophy, in 1970, Henri Ellenberger pointed out that it was 'customary to designate these great philosophers of the unconscious—Carl Gustav Carus, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Eduard von Hartman—as Jung's predecessors' (Ellenberger 1970:729). In 1991, in her *Philosophical Issues in the Psychology of C.G. Jung,* Marylin Nagy pointed out, '[i]n Schopenhauer Jung found another subjectivist interpreter of Kant, one who hypostasized a psychic quality, the Will, as ultimate Noumeon' (Nagy 1991:74). According to Nagy, Schopenhauer's philosophy appealed to Jung because:

> 1) It could accommodate an energic view of the psyche, which seemed to coincide with clinical observations of regression, progression, and displacement of energy in psychic life. At the same time it allowed for a currently fashionable scientific view (the Mayer-Helmholtz laws of energy) to lend additional credence to a psychological theory. There *might* be, even though there *must* not be, coherence between theories of matter and theories of mind. 2) It gave man, or in any case an anthropomorphically conceived life quality, primacy in the world process. 3) It gave merely secondary rank in reality to the phenomenal, material world. (Nagy 1991:162).

She further argued that '[t]he ontological structure of Schopenhauer's philosophy stuck in his mind as peculiarly suitable and in the years between 1910 and 1920 when he was looking for a way to say that he thought the symbolic structures produced by the mind were not reducible to purely instinctive causes inside the phenomenal,

[102] On the connections between nineteenth-century German philosophy and the unconscious see Janaway (2010), Völmicke (2005). Hemecker (1991).
[103] On specifically Jung and Schopenhauer, see Braun (1965). Jarrett (1981), Liebscher (2014b).
[104] On Schopenhauer and Freud see, for example, Atzert (2011), Gödde (1999).

material world, it was Schopenhauer's solution that he adopted as his own' (Nagy 1991:162).

In this chapter, we shall see that Jung's reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy was less straightforward than described above. Firstly, Jung also read Eduard von Hartman's work—which reformulated Schopenhauer's philosophy by bringing the notion of the 'unconscious' into it—frequently citing him alongside Schopenhauer. Secondly, as Jung was working a century after the publication of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Presentation*, he believed he was *expanding* Schopenhauer's philosophical work, which meant that he was effectively *re-imagining* it in psychological terms.

Interestingly, beyond Jung's work, Schopenhauer's philosophy was also being viewed from a psychological lens by others at the beginning of the century. Carrie Logan, for instance, argued in 1902 that Schopenhauer 'without conscious intent, based his system on the bed-rock of psychology' (Logan 1902:10).[105] Curiously, she makes a point similar to the one that James would make a couple of years later in *Pragmatism*, about the relationship between philosophy and psychology: 'Man's introspective analysis of self determines his metaphysics, hence a system of metaphysics can be constructed only on the basis of psychology' (Logan 1902:10). However, this is not surprising, given that—as we have seen previously—these ideas were prevalent in the time in which Jung developed his concepts. What is more, in 1917, Margrieta Beer argued that Schopenhauer's use of the term' will' included both 'conscious' and 'unconscious' elements—which, however, as we shall see, would be inaccurate to say:

> It is important to note, that Schopenhauer's use of the world "will" is far wider than that of common usage. It includes not only conscious desire, but also unconscious instinct, and the forces of inorganic nature. He recognises will not only in the existences which resemble our own, in men and animals, but also in the force which germinates and vegetates in the plant. (Beer, 1917/2018:39).

The above suggests that psychological interpretations of philosophical ideas, and of Schopenhauer's philosophy in particular, were not uncommon at the beginning of

[105] Logan bases her understanding of psychology on Ladd 1894, who was a functionalist.

the twentieth century. In this chapter, then, we shall explore Jung's reading of Schopenhauer and establish its importance for his project in *Psychological Types*.

Jung Reads Schopenhauer

Arthur Schopenhauer was born in 1788 in Danzig. In 1809 he began his studies at the University of Göttingen, where he first studied medicine and then philosophy (which, again, is reminiscent of Jung's 'inner dichotomy'—his struggle to choose between the sciences and the humanities) (Wicks 2021). In 1813 he wrote his doctoral dissertation titled *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, from which he developed his ideas for his most famous work *The World as Will and Presentation*, first published in 1818. As Robert Wicks puts it, '[i]nspired by Plato and Kant, both of whom regarded the world as being more amenable to reason, Schopenhauer developed their philosophies into an instinct-recognizing and ultimately ascetic outlook, emphasizing that in the face of a world filled with endless strife, we ought to minimize our natural desires for the sake of achieving a more tranquil frame of mind and a disposition towards universal beneficence' (Wicks 2021).

Schopenhauer is one of the figures to whom Jung explicitly acknowledged his intellectual debt. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections,* Jung states that '[Schopenhauer] was the first to speak of the suffering of the world, which visibly and glaringly surrounds us, and of confusion, passion, evil—all those things which the others hardly seemed to notice and always tried to resolve into all-embracing harmony and comprehensibility' (Jung 1962/1989:69). Hence, Jung adds that '[h]ere at last was a philosopher who had the courage to see that all was not for the best in the fundaments of the universe' (Jung 1962/1989:69). He explains further: 'He spoke neither of the all-good and all-wise providence of a Creator, nor of the harmony of the cosmos, but stated bluntly that a fundamental flaw underlay the sorrowful course of human history and the cruelty of nature: the blindness of the world-creating Will' (Jung 1962/1989:69). Jung's own experience fit Schopenhauer's description: 'This was confirmed not only by the early observations I had made of diseased and dying fishes, of mangy foxes, frozen or starved birds, of the pitiless

tragedies concealed in a flowery meadow: earthworms tormented to death by ants, insects that tore each other apart piece by piece, and so on' (Jung 1962/1989:69).

However, Jung also notes in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* that 'Schopenhauer's somber picture of the world had [his] undivided approval, but not his solution to the problem' (Jung 1962/1989:69). He points out that he was 'sure that by "Will" he [Schopenhauer] really meant God, the creator and that he was saying that God was blind' (Jung 1962/1989:70). But he was even more disappointed when it came to Schopenhauer's 'theory that the intellect need only confront the blind Will with its image in order to cause it to reverse itself' (Jung 1962/1989:70). Jung then asks:

> How could the Will see this image at all, since it was blind? And why should it, even if it could see, thereby be persuaded to reverse itself, since the image would show it precisely what it willed? And what was the intellect? (Jung 1962/1970:700).

Jung understood Schopenhauer's intellect to be 'a function of human soul' and 'not a mirror but an infinitesimal fragment of a mirror such as a child might hold up to the sun, expecting the sun to be dazzled by it' (Jung 1962/1970:700). However, Jung was 'puzzled that Schopenhauer should ever have been satisfied with such an inadequate answer' (Jung 1962/1970:700).

As Sonu Shamdasani has noted, 'Jung's copy of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation*, bearing his name plate, is dated 1897', when Jung was a student at the University of Basel (Shamdasani 2012:215). Shamdasani further notes that '[o]n May 4, 1897, Jung took out a copy of Schopenhauer's *Parerga and Paralipomena* from the Basel University library' (Shamdasani 2012:215) As Martin Liebscher points out, Schopenhauer's *Parerga and Paralipomena* played an important role in Jung's Zofingia Lectures, which happened between 1896 and 1899 at the University of Basel (Liebscher 2014:325). As Shamdasani points out, Jung's narration in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* suggests that he read Schopenhauer in his school years (Shamdasani 20012:215).

In the following sections of this chapter, then, I am going to look at Jung's reading of Schopenhauer and how it contributed to his conceptualisation of his typology—but before that, I am going to briefly draw some parallels between Schopenhauer's thought and that of the philosophers that we have previously looked at in this thesis.

Comparisons with the Philosophers Previously Looked at

Schopenhauer's philosophy relates to a number of themes covered by the philosophers that we have previously looked at in this thesis. Friedrich Nietzsche, of course, referred to Schopenhauer as his 'educator' and his early work—including *The Birth of Tragedy*—was a reflection of his admiration of the philosophy of the latter.[106] A key similarity between the two is that both Schopenhauer and early Nietzsche were fundamentally driven by their interest in the role of art—even though they ultimately differed in their accounts of aesthetics.[107] More fundamentally, Nietzsche takes Schopenhauer's notion of the 'will to life' (der 'Wille Zum Leben') as the primal force behind nature and provides his own reformulation of it—as 'will to power' ('Wille Zur Macht'). Related to this, whilst both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche wrote on suffering as being fundamental to life, as we shall see, they radically differ in their attitudes to it—Nietzsche's 'life-affirming' approach was a response to Schopenhauer's 'life-negating' (or 'life-denying') one.[108] In his *The Will To Power*, Nietzsche famously declared 'To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities—I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished: I have no pity for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether one is worth anything or not—that one endures' (Nietzsche 1901/2016). The connections between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer in relation to Jung's psychology more specifically deserve a closer look and we will come back to it later in this chapter.

Both provided criticisms of epistemology and rationalism, which laid the foundation for the ideas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century—in particular, the philosophical movement of 'Lebensphilosophie', which formed the intellectual context of Bergson's time. Interestingly, Schopenhauer's philosophy was already being compared to those of Bergson and James at the beginning of the twentieth

[106] See also Nietzsche's 'Schopenhauer as Educator' in *Untimely Meditations* (1874/2012).
[107] For more detailed comparisons of Nietzsche's and Schopenhauer's aesthetics see, for instance, Vandenabeele 2003 and Giaculli 2017.
[108] For a more detailed discussion of Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's engagement with suffering, see for instance Gemes and Janaway 2011, Brock 2015.

century.[109] In her 1917 work on Schopenhauer, Beer, for instance, drew parallels between Schopenhauer and Bergson's notions of intuition and instinct, albeit in an unnuanced way:

> An instinctive character belongs also to the highest functions of human life, as in art and virtue. Wisdom proper, says Schopenhauer, is something intuitive, and not something pertaining to the intellect. It was this emphasis, which Schopenhauer laid on the instinctive and impulsive side in man, rather than on the conscious and deliberate, which led him to the view that man is a creature controlled and dominated by his instincts, and therefore a mere puppet in the hands of nature … There are interesting points of contact with the view of M. Bergson, who maintains that in the intuition of life we see reality as it is. (Beer, 1917/2018:78-80). [110]

More recently, Wicks has noted, 'Schopenhauer was among the first 19th century philosophers to contend that at its core, the universe is not a rational place' (Wicks 2021). Parallels have been drawn between Henri Bergson's 'élan vital' and Schopenhauer's notion of the will—and we have previously noted the connections that have been made between the former and Nietzsche's notion of the will.[111] However, it is worth noting that Bergson himself was careful to disassociate himself from Schopenhauer—as well as from others who developed similar concepts. In his final book *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion,* Bergson contrasts his *élan vital* with the notion of the will to life by regarding the latter as a purely metaphysical, and ultimately useless, concept:

> Whether you embrace the doctrine of pure mechanism or that of pure finality, in either case the creations of life are supposed to be predetermined, the future being deducible from the present by a calculation, or designed within it as an idea, time being thus unavailing. Pure experience suggests nothing of the sort. "Neither impulsion nor attraction" seems to be its motto. Now it is just something of this kind that an impetus

[109] For contemporary discussions of Schopenhauer in relation to Bergson and James, see Jacoby (1912), Antal (1914) and Bönke (1916).
[110] What is also interesting is that Beer appears to have a somewhat pragmatist reading of Schopenhauer, emphasising the practical nature of the philosophy of nature, that it deals with 'real life'—which is an oversimplification: 'Notwithstanding his marked leaning towards mysticism, he brought philosophy down to earth, and into relation with the actual facts of life. [Schopenhauer] exchanged abstractions for realities. Philosophy had always been far too much concerned, he maintained, with abstract conceptions, and the philosopher has tended too exclusively to be a mere man of books and learning. The true philosopher, on the contrary, should be a guide to fine living as well as to high thinking' (Beer, 1917/2018:9).
[111] See, for instance, Gardner 2003. For a discussion of the relationships between the philosophies of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson, see for instance François 2009.

> can suggest, whilst it can also, by the indivisibility of what is felt internally and the divisibility to infinity of what is externally perceived, give the idea of that real and effective duration which is the essential attribute of life. Such were the ideas we condensed into the image of the "vital impetus". To neglect them, as has been too often done, is to find oneself confronted by an empty concept, like that of the pure "will to live", and by a barren theory of metaphysics. By taking them into account, we have an idea full of matter, obtained empirically, capable of guiding our investigations, which will broadly sum up what we know of the vital process and will also bring out what is still unknown. (Bergson 1932).

Another key point of comparison between the two philosophers—which is especially important in the context of Jung's *Psychological Types*—is that Schopenhauer, like Bergson, believed that intellect had certain boundaries—or, more specifically, that there are *other ways of knowing*. Finally, it is also interesting to contrast Schopenhauer's nineteenth-century understanding of the subject—as something that is whole and outside of space and time—with that of Bergson at the beginning at the twentieth century—as only an illusion of unity.

Finally, it is also interesting to compare the philosophies of Schopenhauer and William James. David E. Leary, for instance, has argued that Schopenhauer's philosophy played an important role in 'shaping and intensifying the way in which James experiences [his] crisis' (Leary 2015:1). There are also some general similarities between the two philosophers—for example, they both criticised the likes of Hegel and Leibnitz. For instance, in *The World as Will and Presentation*, Schopenhauer famously criticises his contemporary philosophers, and specifically Hegel: 'Working then in this spirit, and always seeing the false and bad in universal acceptance, yea, bombast and charlatanism in the highest honour, I have long renounced the approbation of my contemporaries'. He adds: 'It is impossible that an age which for twenty years has applauded a Hegel, that intellectual Caliban, as the greatest of the philosophers, so loudly that it echoes through the whole of Europe, could make him who has looked on at that desirous of its approbation' (1819/1909). Both Schopenhauer and James criticized Leibnitz for his *optimistic* philosophy. In *Pragmatism*, James wrote on Leibnitz:

> Among other obstacles to his optimistic philosophy, it falls to Leibnitz to consider the number of the eternally damned. That it is infinitely greater, in our human case, than that of those saved, he assumes as a premise from the theologians, and then proceeds

> to argue in this way … Leibniz's feeble grasp of reality is too obvious to need comment from me. It is evident that no realistic image of the experience of a damned soul had ever approached the portals of his mind … What he gives us is a cold literary exercise, whose cheerful substance even hell-fire does not warm. (James 1907:23-27).

However, it is important to note that whilst, as we shall see, pessimism was a fundamental characteristic of Schopenhauer's philosophy, James, in his *The Will to Believe*, famously made the remark: 'Pessimism is essentially a religious disease' (James 1897/2009).

Having had a quick look at Schopenhauer's philosophy through the lens of the philosophers that we previously looked at, in the following section I am going to examine it more closely, providing a summary of Schopenhauer's ideas that will later be relevant to Jung's conceptualisation of his theory of types.

Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Presentation

Pessimism and Metaphysics of the Will

In a later work titled *On the Suffering of the World*, Schopenhauer declares that suffering is fundamental to life: 'If the immediate and direct purpose of our life is not suffering then our existence is the most ill-adapted to its purpose in the world: for it is absurd to suppose that the endless affliction of which the world is everywhere full, and which arises out of the need and distress pertaining essentially to life, should be purposeless and accidental' (Schopenhauer 950/1970). Hence, he writes that '[e]ach individual misfortune, to be sure, seems an exceptional occurrence; but misfortune in general is the rule' (Schopenhauer 1850/1970:3).

Schopenhauer ascribes to suffering a *positive* rather than negative quality, and to happiness, on the other hand, a *negative* rather than a positive one—in the sense that the former is that which is present and palpable, while the latter is merely absence of the former: 'Just as a stream flows smoothly on as long as it encounters no obstruction, so the nature of man and animal is such that we never really notice or become conscious of what is agreeable to our will; if we are to notice something, our

will has to have been thwarten, has to have experienced a shock of some kind. On the other hand, all that opposes, frustrates and resits our will, that is to say all that is unpleasant and painful, impresses itself upon us instantly, directly and with great clarity' (Schopenhauer 1850/1970:3) For Schopenhauer, [j]ust as we are conscious not of the healthiness of our whole body but only of the little place where the shoe pinches, so we think not of the totality of our successful activities but of some insignificant trifle or other which continues to vex us' (Schopenhauer 1850/1970:4)

In addition to suffering being inherent to life, Schopenhauer—following Immanuel Kant, as we shall see later—also declares our world to be ultimately an illusion, a mere appearance, a 'presentation', in his *The World as Will and Presentation*:

> "The world is a presentation to me" - this is a truth that applies to every living and cognizant being. However, the human being alone can bring it to reflective abstract consciousness; and when he actually does this, philosophy's thoughtful awareness has come to him. It is made explicit and certain to him then that he knows no sun and no earth, but always only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth, that the world that surrounds him is there only as presentation, i.e., altogether only in relation to something else, that which is engaged in presentation which is himself (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:31).

Why does the world appear to us the way it does? Because the inner essence of the world is the 'will' [der Wille], a blind, perpetually striving force behind all nature, with infinite manifestations, or degrees of 'objectification', in the world that we experience—the world of presentation: from inanimate objects, such as rocks or plants, to primitive animals and, ultimately, humans. This directionless, endless striving—also manifesting itself in the drives and desires of humankind—inevitably results in suffering: 'We find, however, that the *inner necessity* that is inseparable from adequate objectivization of will, in the sequence of the levels of its phenomena when these are taken as a whole, is also expressed by an *external necessity*, namely, that by virtue of which human beings need animals for their own maintenance, each of these in descending levels needs others and then finally plants, which in turn need earth, water, chemical elements and their compounds, the planets, the sun, rotation and revolution around the latter, the declination of the ecliptic, etc' (Schopenhauer 1818/2016:198). He further points out that '[f]undamentally, this originates from the fact that will has to feed on itself, because beyond it there is nothing and it is a

hungry will' and that '[t]hus comes pursuit, anxiety, and suffering' (Schopenhauer 1818/2016:198)

The closest one can come to escaping this ruthless reality is through *disengagement* that can be achieved via *art*: 'For that which one might otherwise call the finest part, the purest pleasures of life, just because it lifts us out of real existence and transforms us into disengaged spectators of the latter, thus the pure cognition that remains foreign to all willing, enjoyment of the beautiful, genuine pleasure in art - this, because it of course demands rare dispositions, is only granted to the very few, and even to these only as a passing dream' (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:368). In this, one achieves what Schopenhauer calls 'nullification', or 'denial' of the will—which is what he considers to be the highest good, making it effectively the central goal of his philosophy: 'If one nonetheless wishes to provide an honorary office to an old expression that, out of habit, one would not entirely dispense with, as it were as an *emeritus*, then, metaphorically and figuratively, complete self-nullification and denial of the will, true will-lessness - which alone forever stills and quiets the press of will, alone provides that contentment which can never again be disturbed, alone redeems one from the world, and of which we will soon treat at the conclusion of all of our considerations - may be called the absolute good, the *summum bonum*, and be viewed as the single radical means of salvation from the sickness against which all other goods, that is, all desires fulfilled and all happiness attained, are only palliatives, only anodynes' (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:421). As we shall see later, in this denial of the will, one achieves a state in which one is able to access the *Platonic Ideas*—which exist just before our immediate cognition, or *outside* of the principle that governs our cognition (what Schopenhauer calls the 'principle of sufficient reason').

For Schopenhauer, then, because life has *negative* value, it is better to not have been born—for him, nothingness is better than existence. Schopenhauer relates this idea of denial of the will to Buddhism (*Nirvana*) and Indian philosophy (*Brahman*), with which he also ends the book: 'And so in this manner, through a consideration of the life and ways of saints, to encounter which in our own experience is of course seldom granted us, but which their written history and – attested with the stamp of inner truth - art brings before our eyes, we have to chase off the dark impression of that nothingness, which hovers as the ultimate goal behind a virtue and saintliness and

which we fear as children do the dark, instead of avoiding it, like the Indians, through myths and meaningless words such as reabsorption in *Brahman*, or in the *Nirvana* of the Buddhists' (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:487). Schopenhauer then makes the following statement: 'Rather, we freely confess it: what remains over after complete nullification of the will, for all those who are still full of will, is indeed nothingness' (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:487) He also adds: 'But also conversely, for those in whom the will has turned and denied itself, this our so very real world with all its suns and galaxies - is nothing' (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:487).

At the very beginning of the book, Schopenhauer states that the idea of the world as presentation had long been recognised by the sages of India (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:32). In the Preface to his First Edition of the *World as Will and Presentation*, he cites the *Vedas* and *Upanishads*—along with the philosophies of Plato and Kant—among the works that one needs to read in order to understand his philosophy (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:13).[112] There he also predicts that in the course of the nineteenth century Sanskrit literature would become as influential in the West as was the revival of Ancient Greek literature in the fifteenth century—a claim that is of course particularly interesting and important to consider in the context of Jung's reception of Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:13).

Reality as a Presentation: The Principle of Sufficient Reason

As we have seen previously—and as is, of course, suggested by the title of his work—according to Schopenhauer, the world is 'will' and 'presentation'—the former being the inner essence of the world, the latter being the way in which it manifests itself, or *presents* itself, to us. In the following section I am going to provide an outline of Schopenhauer's account of how exactly this presentation occurs.

To begin with, it is important to consider Schopenhauer's notion of the *subject*, to whom the world appears as a presentation, since, for Schopenhauer, '[w]hatever belongs and can belong to the world is inexorably infected with this fact of being conditioned by the subject, and is only there for the subject' (Schopenhauer

[112] Schopenhauer's philosophy has been generally seen as being fundamentally related to the works of the following philosophers: Kant (most importantly), Plato, and Spinoza (Beer, 1917/2019:50).s

1818/2008:32). He provides a definition of the subject: 'That which is cognizant of all things and of which none is cognizant is the *subject*' (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:33). He also contrasts it with *objects*: 'It is, accordingly, the bearer of the world, the pervasive, constantly presupposed condition of all that appears, of all objects; for whatever is there, it is only there for the subject' (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:33). All objects are presentations for a subject (and all presentations are objects for a subject). Together, the subject and the object form two necessary parts of the world as we know it—the world of presentation. Schopenhauer famously declares that the body is an object—although an 'immediate object', one that we get to experience in two different ways (both externally and internally)—and therefore, also a presentation (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:34). The subject and object are mutually exclusive: where the subject starts the object ends. Hence, they have a mutual boundary: something that Schopenhauer calls 'the principle of sufficient reason' ('ground'), that is responsible for the ways in which objects present themselves to us: 'This principle does not exist before all things, with the entire world existing only as a consequence and in accordance with it, as it were as its corollary, but rather that it is nothing more than the form within which objects, always conditioned by the subject, of whatever sort they may be, are everywhere cognized insofar as the subject is a cognizant individual - only then will it be possible to enter into the method of philosophizing that is for the first time here atempted [sic.], utterly diverging from everything preceding' (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:12). In fact, before writing *The World as Will and Presentation*, Schopenhauer wrote his doctoral dissertation titled *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, published in 1813, in which he provided a detailed account of his epistemology. There, he states the fundamental importance of the principle, regarding it as the very basis of science itself:

> For *science* is organised knowledge, a system of interconnected items of knowledge; not a bare aggregate. What then is it that holds the parts of such a system together? It is the principle of sufficient reason. For the thing that distinguishes a science from a bare aggregate is precisely that its component truths follow from others as their grounds. Moreover, most sciences contain truths about causes from which effects may be determined, and likewise other truths about the necessity with which conclusions follow from reasons, as will appear in the course of this investigation. The supposition constantly made by us a priori that all things have a reason is precisely what

> justifies our asking *why* at every turn, and because of this we may call such a *why* the mother of all sciences. (Schopenhauer 1813/1997:3).

Although philosophers previously wrote on the principle (most notably, Leibniz, as the general idea that everything must have a reason or a cause), according to Schopenhauer they 'neglected properly to distinguish its fundamentally different applications' (Schopenhauer 1813/1997:2). In his doctoral thesis he set out to do just that—to *plurify* the principle, as it were: 'If I succeed in showing that the principle constituting the subject matter of this inquiry does not derive immediately from a unique form of intellect's cognition but in the first instance from *several*, it will follow that the necessity that accompanies it in virtue of its being an unalterable a priori principle will not be unique either' (Schopenhauer 1813/1997:2). He adds that '[i]t will be as multiple as the sources of the principle' (Schopenhauer 1813/1997:2). As a result, in this work Schopenhauer provides a classification that include four different types of explanation (forms, or modes, of the principle of sufficient reason), which are responsible for the cognizance of four different kinds of objects, or presentations, which I will come back to later in this chapter.

This epistemology then served as a basis for Schopenhauer's work in his *The World as Will and Presentation*. In the following sections, I will be looking at Jung's reception of Schopenhauer's ideas and how they contributed to his conceptualisation of the psychological types.

Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and The East in *Psychological Types*

As we have seen in the previous chapters of this thesis, Jung only cites one work as an example of a *philosophical* visionary work—as exemplary artistic works that display the capacity to access the 'collective unconscious'—Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. However, Jung still draws some parallels between Schopenhauer and the authors of the visionary works—and in contrast with the other authors, not specifying *one* work by Schopenhauer. For example, here Jung refers to Schopenhauer in the context of the 'problem of opposites': 'The solution of the problem in *Faust*, in the Parsifal of Wagner, in Schopenhauer, even in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, is *religious*. (Jung 1923:239)

Nevertheless, as we shall see, Schopenhauer's philosophy played an important part in Jung's psychology in general, and in his theory of psychological types more specifically. With regard to the notion of the collective unconscious, Jung does emphasise the fact Schopenhauer's philosophy *did* display the capacity to access the collective unconscious. In the following quote, he draws parallels between the philosophy of Schopenhauer and that of Nietzsche, as well as Spitteler's literary work:

> The idea of negation, therefore, is concerned with an attitude to the world, and particularly Schopenhauer's attitude to it, which on the one hand is purely intellectual and rational, while on the other it is a mystical identity with the world in his most individual feeling. This attitude is introverted; it suffers therefore from its typological antithesis. But Schopenhauer's work in many ways transcends his personality. It voices what was obscurely thought and felt by many thousands. Similarly with Nietzsche: pre-eminently his *Zarathustra* brings to light the contents of the collective unconscious of our time; in him, therefore, we also find the same distinguishing features: iconoclastic revolt against the conventional moral atmosphere, and the acceptance of the "ugliest man ", which in Nietzsche leads to that shattering unconscious tragedy presented in *Zarathustra*. (Jung 1923:237).

With regard to Nietzsche, as Liebscher has argued, Jung appears to have a Schopenhauerian reading of Nietzsche (Liebscher 2012). This shows, for example, in the following quote, where he interprets Nietzsche's use of the term 'will' in Schopenhauer's sense:

> But even at that time, in spite of the aesthetic viewpoint, Nietzsche had an intuition of the real solution of the problem; as, for instance, when he wrote that the antagonism was not bridged by art, but by a "metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 'will'". He writes "will" in inverted commas, which, considering how strongly he was at that time influenced by Schopenhauer, we might well interpret as referring to the concept of the metaphysical will. "Metaphysical" has for us the psychological significance of "unconscious". (Jung 1923:178).

Furthermore, Jung refers to Nietzsche as the "only true pupil of Schopenhauer"—in part, it would seem, due to the capability of Nietzsche to access the collective unconscious in his philosophy *as well*: 'He it was, the only true pupil of Schopenhauer, who tore through the veil of naivete and in his *Zarathustra* conjured

up from that lower region ideas that were destined to be the most vital content of the coming age' (Jung 1923:123).

In Chapter III of *Psychological Types*, Jung also points out that Nietzsche's early work, the *Birth of Tragedy*, was close to the philosophy of Schopenhauer and shared its pessimism (Jung 1923:170). Jung then draws parallels between Schopenhauer's interest in ancient Eastern Philosophy—and Nietzsche's interest in Ancient Greece, arguing that both were 'captured by the East':

> [W]e cannot leave Schopenhauer without paying tribute to the way in which he achieved reality for those dawning rays of Eastern knowledge which in Schiller only emerge as insubstantial wraiths. If we disregard the pessimism that springs from a contrast with the Christian joy in faith, and certainty of redemption, Schopenhauer's doctrine of deliverance is seen to be essentially Buddhistic. He was captured by the East [...] This pull towards the East caused Nietzsche to halt in Greece. (Jung 1923:170).

Indeed, Jung states several times in *Psychological Types* the importance of Eastern philosophy for Schopenhauer. With regard to ancient Indian philosophy—more specifically, the *Upanishads*—Jung wrote:

> The Indian religious philosophy has apprehended this problem to its very depth and has demonstrated what category of remedies is needed to render a solution of the conflict possible. For its achievement the highest moral effort, the greatest self-denial and sacrifice, the most intense religious earnestness and saintliness, are needed. Schopenhauer, with every regard for the aesthetic, has most definitely brought out just this aspect of the problem. (1923:153).

Jung brings up Schopenhauer's connections with the *Upanishads* in the context of his discussion of Friedrich Schiller in *Psychological Types:* 'In my view it is no small importance that the Latin translation of the Upanishads by Anquetil du Perron (1802) was accessible to Schopenhauer, whilst Schiller with the very sparing information of his time had at least no conscious connection with these sources' (1923:152).[113] As we have seen previously, the importance of ancient Indian

[113] Subsequently, in a letter to Subrahamanya Iyer, dated 9 January 1939, Jung notes that 'Schopenhauer was by no means in a position to have a complete insight into and understanding of the Upanishads, since in those days the Upanishads were only known in the very to have a complete insight into and an imperfect Latin rendering of A. du Perron, who brought them over in the form of the so-called Oupnekhat at the beginning of the 19th century' (Jung 2015:254).

philosophy and Buddhism for Schopenhauer relates to the fundamental conception of his philosophy—the notion of the denial of the 'will'.

In Chapter V of Psychological Types, 'The Problem of Types in Poetry', having introduced the notion of the 'reconciling symbol', Jung explains the importance of Eastern religions, and the inferiority of Western ones, when it comes to the problem of opposites. He states that '[t]o our Western forms of religion, which are still too primitive in matters of discernment or understanding, the new possibility of life appears in the figure of a God or Saviour, who, in his fatherly care and love and from his own inner resolve, puts an end to division, in his own tie and reason, for reasons we are not fitted to understand' (Jung 1923:241). For Jung, Western forms of religion are thus characterised by their 'childishness'. By contrast, Jung writes that '[t]he East has for thousands of years been familiar with this process, and has founded thereon a psychological doctrine of salvation which brings the way of deliverance within the compass of human intention' (Jung 1923:242). In his discussion of Eastern religions, Jung includes 'both the Indian and the Chinese religions, as also Buddhism which combines the spheres of both' (Jung 1923:242). All of these contained the idea of a 'redeeming middle path', characteristic of the 'reconciling symbol' (Jung 1923:242).

In the following part of this chapter then, I am going to look at the connections between Schopenhauer's philosophy and Jung's psychology in more detail. In particular, I am going to look at three fundamental concepts in Jung's psychology—the 'unconscious', the 'libido' and the 'primordial image'.

Jung's Reception of Schopenhauer: The Unconscious, the Libido and the Primordial Image

In his Zofingia Lectures, Jung described Eduard von Hartmann as Schopenhauer's 'intellectual heir'—as a result, in many of Jung's writings, Schopenhauer and von Hartmann are often mentioned together (Jung 1983:78). Von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious* in 1869 provided a new interpretation of Schopenhauer's notion of the will that affected the subsequent reading of his philosophy—as an 'unconscious' will —as a result of it being 'blind', understood as

lacking 'self-consciousness' (1869/1884).[114] Before the publication of *Psychological Types* in 1921, Jung's discussion of the libido appears to have been the main context in which Schopenhauer's philosophy was brought up. In 1912, in his *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, Jung refers to Schopenhauer multiple times, for example: 'It is not only as if the libido might be an irresistible striving forward, and endless life and will for construction, such as Schopenhauer has formulated in his world will, death and every end being some malignancy or fatality coming from without, but the libido, corresponding to the sun, also wills the destruction of its creation' (1912/1916:480). Schopenhauer's notion of the will—or more specifically, von Hartmann's later reformulation of it as 'unconscious' will—provided the basis for two of Jung's key psychological notions—of the 'unconscious' and psychic energy, or the 'libido'. Jung himself stated that he was at least partly indebted to Schopenhauer in his initial conception of his notions of the 'unconscious' in his 1925 seminar: 'My ideas of the unconscious, then, first became enlightened through Schopenhauer and Hartmann' (Jung 1925/2012:5). Jung adds that 'Hartmann, having the advantage of living in a later period than Schopenhauer, formulates the latter's ideas in a more modern way' (Jung 1925/2012:5). In the same seminar, Jung also recalls his conception of the 'libido', or psychic energy, drawing a parallel between the latter and Schopenhauer's notion of the will:

> From Schopenhauer I got a very enlightening point of view. His fundamental standpoint is that the will as a blind urge to existence is aimless; it simply "happened to the creative will to make the world". This is his position in *The World as Will and Idea*. However, in *Will in Nature* he drifts into a teleological attitude, though this is in direct opposition to this original thesis [...] In this latter work he assumes that there is direction in the creating will, and this point of view I took as mine. My first conception of the libido then was not that it was a formless stream so to speak, but that it was archetypal in character. That is to say, libido never comes up from the unconscious in a formless state, but always in images. (Jung 1925/2012:4).

As Shamdasani has noted, however, 'Schopenhauer's views on teleology in *The Will in Nature* are congruent with those set forth in *The World as Will and*

[114] For an analysis of von Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, see Gardner (2010). In 1991, Nagy also wrote on Eduard von Hartman's reformulation of Schopenhauer's philosophy in the context of Jung's psychology (Nagy 1991:234).

Representation' (Shamdasani 2003:199). As he points out, 'his perception of a change in Schopenhauer's view is significant, for it denoted his own modification of Schopenhauer's understanding of the relation between will and representation' (Shamdasani 2003:199). Shamdasani, then hypothesises that Jung's distinction between Schopenhauer's conceptions of will in the two books may be attributed to his reading of von Hartmann—a 'modern' Schopenhauerian.

When it comes to *Psychological Types*, what is important is that Jung uses Schopenhauer's notion of 'world as presentation' (or 'idea', or 'representation') to describe the psychological world:

> Stirner also joined the company after Schopenhauer had first conceived the idea of denial. He spoke of the denial of the world. Psychologically, 'the world' means how I see the world, my attitude to the world; thus the world can be regarded as 'my will' and 'my presentation.' In itself the world is indifferent. It is my Yes and No that create the differences. (Jung 1923:237).

As Shamdasani puts it, '[h]ence the psychological world was distinctly Schopenhauerian' (Shamdasani, 2003:197). This then reflects Jung's 'modern' reading of Schopenhauer: Schopenhauer spoke of the way in which reality appeared to us as a 'presentation' to a 'subject', which, from Jung's perspective, is inherently *psychological*. While Schopenhauer borrows from Kant the idea of the world as an appearance—and we will look at Jung's treatment of this idea in more detail in the next chapter—what is important is that Schopenhauer's philosophy, in contrast with that of Kant, emphasised the role of the *subject*, which from Jung's perspective would already be regarded as an improvement. One could also then further relate the above quote to Jung's reading of Nietzsche's philosophy—from Nietzsche's perspectivism, it follows that 'my will' and 'my presentation' are *different* from someone else's (in line with Nietzsche's view that every philosophy is an autobiography)—which again, could be seen as another improvement from Schopenhauer's stance, from Jung's perspective. And this is where typology comes in, which, for Jung, does not just simply classify these differences, but seeks to solve the very problem that causes having these differences—the problem of opposites.

Furthermore, as Liebscher points out, Jung uses Schopenhauer's notion of the 'Idea' (Schopenhauer's reformulation of Plato's Ideas or Forms) to conceptualise his idea of

the primordial image, or archetype (Liebscher 2014:328).[115] In his *World as Will and Presentation*, Schopenhauer calls Ideas 'archetypes' [Urbilde] and defines them, after Plato, as 'eternal Ideas, the original forms for all things' (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:214). There are important differences between Plato's and Schopenhauer's conceptions of the Idea: whilst, for the former, Ideas were the ultimate *essences* of things and hence the metaphysical basis, for the latter, they were only the immediate objectification of the will, which happens outside of the principle of sufficient ground—the ultimate essence of things and metaphysical basis then being the will itself. As Beer points out, this results in two radically different views on the role of art: whilst Plato famously criticised art for merely producing 'a copy of a copy' and taking us further away from the truth, for Schopenhauer, as we have seen, art was critically important—as a way in which one could achieve the denial, or nullification of the will (Beer, 1917/2018:58-59). As we shall see below, Schopenhauer also distinguished his notion of the Idea from that of Kant, stating that for the latter it was purely conceptual, rather than designating the original forms of things.

Now, Jung defines primordial images as an image that is 'collective and is distinguished by mythological qualities' (Jung 1923:548). Jung then connects his notion of primordial images with Schopenhauer's notion of the Ideas. Jung quotes Schopenhauer's distinction between his notion of the 'idea' (Jung's 'primordial images', or Plato's Ideas, as noted earlier) and the 'concept' (or Kant's sense of the 'idea'): 'The idea is never known by the individual as such, but only by the man who is exalted above all willing and above all individuality to the pure Subject of knowledge: thus it is attainable only by the genius, or by the man who has achieved mainly through the works of genius an elevation of his pure gift of cognition into a temper akin to genius: it is, therefore, not absolutely, but only conditionally, communicable, since the idea conceived and reproduced in an artistic creation, for instance, only appeals to every man according to his intellectual powers' (Schopenhauer cited in Jung 1923:560). Jung also adds the following quote by Schopenhauer: 'The concept is like an inanimate vehicle, in which the things one deposits lie side by side, but from which no more can be taken out than was put in:

[115] Nagy also draws a parallel between Jung's notion of the archetype and Schopenhauer's notion of the will (Nagy 1991:164).

the idea, on the contrary, develops within the man who has embraced it conceptions which in relation to its homonymous concept are new: it is like a living, self-developing organism endowed with creative force, bringing forth something that was never put into it' (Schopenhauer cited in Jung 1923:560). Jung then asks the reader to simply replace the word 'idea' with his 'primordial image'—as the meaning is the same:

> With Schopenhauer, however, the idea is plastic in character, because he conceives it wholly in the sense of what I describe as primordial image; it is, however, indiscernible to the individual, revealing itself only to the "pure Subject of cognition", which is raised above will and individuality. What Schopenhauer says of the idea [...] I would prefer to apply to the primordial image, since the idea as I have elsewhere observed under ' Idea 'should not be regarded as something wholly and unconditionally a priori, but also as something derived and developed from antecedents. (Jung 1923:549-560).

Jung also formulates *his own* use of the term 'idea' in *Psychological Types* as effectively synonymous with that which is *rational* (thinking and feeling being instances of the former: 'The idea is a psychological factor which not only determines thought but, in the form of a practical idea, also conditions feeling' (Jung 1923:550). He explains that '[a]s a general rule, however, I only employ the term idea, either when I am speaking of the determination of thought in a thinking-type, or when denoting the determination of feeling in a feeling-type' (Jung1923:550).

In *Psychological Types,* Jung also uses Schopenhauer to conceptualise his notion of 'persona': 'The persona expresses the personality as it appears to oneself and one's world; but not what one is, to use the words of Schopenhauer' (1923:269). He also refers to Schopenhauer's idea of the will—as evil and as an analogy for the 'Godhead':

> The Godhead is clearly the all-pervading creative power; psychologically, it is the generating, producing instinct, that neither knows nor possesses itself, comparable with Schopenhauer's conception of the will. But God appears as issuing forth from the Godhead and the soul. The soul as creature "expresses" Him. (1923:315).

In the final section of this chapter, we are going to compare Schopenhauer's philosophy—in particular, his differentiation of the 'principle of sufficient reason'—with Jung's psychological types.

Schopenhauer and Jung's Typology: The Four Functions and Feeling versus Thinking as Rational

As stated previously, in his doctoral dissertation, *On the Fourfold Root,* Schopenhauer describes four different types of the 'principle of sufficient reason'—four different ways in which the will manifests itself. The first form of the principle is called 'becoming' [Werdens] and concerns the objects that are subject to 'the law of causality'. In Schopenhauer's words, 'they are the work of our entire sensibility and understanding, and constitute what is called the *objective, real world'* (Schopenhauer 1813/1997:16). The second mode of the principle of sufficient reason is that of 'knowing' [Erkennen] and concerns the faculty of *reason*, its objects being presentations of presentations, or 'concepts' (Schopenhauer 1813/1997:36). This mode then encompasses logical, empirical, metaphysical, and metalogical truths. The third type is called 'being' [Sein] and deals with 'a priori perceptions of space and time, the forms of outer and inner sense', incorporating arithmetic and geometry (Schopenhauer 1813/1997:43). Finally, the fourth form of the principle is 'willing' [Wollen], which 'comprises only one object, the immediate object of our inner sense' that is subject to 'the law of motivation' (Schopenhauer 1813/1997:50). These include emotions and feelings, such as 'longing, fear, hatred, anger, grief, joy and the like, each constituting an instance of an ardent want for something to happen or not to happen' (Schopenhauer 1813/1997:60).

I follow James Jarrett's in his statement that '[i]t would be disingenuous to pretend that these correspond to [Jung's] Thinking, Sensing, Intuiting, and Feeling' (Jarrett 1981:199). Nevertheless, one can still draw a parallel between the two systems due to a Kantian link—namely, Kant's categories of the understanding, which we are going to look at in detail in the next chapter:

> Still, they do constitute a modification of the Kantian categories (which derive directly from Aristotle), in being *a priori,* necessary ways of interpreting the raw data of experience. And Jung in turn accepts the Kantian (and Schopenhauerian) inbuilt forms without which there can be no movement from the chaos of the unconscious to the relative orderliness of consciousness. (Jarrett 1981: 199).

Jung uses the distinction between thinking and feeling (the two rational functions) to characterise Schopenhauer's philosophy several times in *Psychological Types*. For instance, here: 'The idea of negation, therefore, is concerned with an attitude to the world, and particularly Schopenhauer's attitude to it, which on the one hand is purely intellectual and rational, while on the other it is a mystical identity with the world in his most individual feeling'; Jung adds that '[t]his attitude is introverted; it suffers therefore from its typological antithesis' (Jung 1923:237). In the distinction between 'idea' and the 'concept' discussed in the previous part of this chapter as well, Jung states that the primordial images cannot be reached only through intellect alone, since one also needs feeling: 'Schopenhauer clearly discerned that the 'idea', i.e. the primordial image according to my definition, cannot be reached in the way that a concept or ' idea' is established ('idea' according to Kant corresponds with a "concept derived from notions"), but that there pertains to it an element quite foreign to the formulating reason, rather Schopenhauer's "temper akin to genius", which simply means a state of feeling'. For Jung, this is because 'one only reaches the primordial image from the idea because of the fact that the way leading to the idea is carried on over the summit of the idea into the counter-function, feeling' (Jung 1923:560)

More importantly, In Chapter VIII, 'The Problem of Types in Modern Philosophy', in the context of his criticism of James' typology—in particular of his 'rationalism' and 'empiricism' dichotomy—Jung uses Schopenhauer's ideas on the nature of reason to conceptualise his notion of 'rationality', which would then include not only the two different types of 'thinking' underlying William James typology, but also 'feeling':

> Schopenhauer says of the reason, that it has only *one* function, namely "the shaping of the idea; and from this unique function all those above-mentioned manifestations, which distinguish the life of man from that of the animal, are very easily and completely explained, and in the application or non-application of that function, positively everything is meant which men in all places and of all times have called reasonable or unreasonable". The "abovementioned manifestations" refer to certain properties of reason, instanced by Schopenhauer by way of example, namely "the command of affects and passions, the capacity for drawing conclusions and constructing general principles, . . . the concerted action of several individuals . . . civilization, the state; also science and the preservation of previous experience, etc." If reason, as Schopenhauer asserts, has the function of forming ideas, it must also possess the character of that psychic attitude which is fitted to shape ideas through the

> activity of thought. It is entirely in this sense of an attitude that Jerusalem also conceives the reason, namely as a *disposition of the will* which enables us, in our decisions, to make use of our reason and control our passions. Reason, therefore, is the capacity to be reasonable, a definite attitude which enables thought, feeling, and action to correspond with objective values. (Jung 1923:383).

For Jung, as we have seen previously, James' typology was incomplete (only accounting for the 'thinking' types), and also fundamentally incorrect since '[t]here exists, moreover, not merely a logical rationalism but also a feeling rationalism; for rationalism is nothing but a general psychological attitude towards reasonableness of thought and feeling' (1912:382). From Jung's perspective, Schopenhauer, like James and others, was still primarily working from the rational side of the dichotomy. Hence, in the same chapter, Jung emphasises the fact that, in philosophy, it was Nietzsche, in his *Zarathustra*, who was able to meaningfully engage with the 'irrational' side—his philosophy being characterised as fundamentally 'intuitive' ('intuition' as one of the 'irrational' functions—the other being 'sensation'), while for Schopenhauer, the irrational side of the dichotomy ranked below the rational side: 'Schopenhauer and Hegel appear to be the forerunners of the Nietzschean intuitionism, the former on account of the *feeling-intuition* which lends such a decisive colouring to his views, and the latter by virtue of the *conceptual-intuition* underlying his whole system' (Jung 1923:399). Jung clarifies that '[w]ith these two fore-runners if one may use such an expression intuition ranked below the intellect, but with Nietzsche it ranked above it' (Jung 1923:399).

Hence, while Jung evidently admired Schopenhauer's philosophical work and provided a psychological *re-imagining* of his philosophical ideas, which formed the basis of his psychological world, when it comes to the solution of the 'problem of opposites' in particular, it was his 'true pupil', Nietzsche, who was of special importance for Jung.

Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has looked at the role that Schopenhauer's philosophy played in Jung's conceptualisation of some of the central ideas in his psychology, and

more specifically, his contribution to Jung's project in his *Psychological Types*. We have seen that Jung *re-imagines* Schopenhauer's *philosophical* concepts as *psychological* ones. This chapter has shown that Schopenhauer's notion of the 'will', combined with von Hartmann's reformulation of it as an 'unconscious' will, helped Jung conceptualise the 'unconscious', the 'libido', and the 'primordial image'—all three constituting key elements of Jung's psychology. With regard to his theory of psychological types in particular, this chapter has shown that Jung uses Schopenhauer's philosophy to conceptualise his notion of 'rationality' to include 'thinking' and 'feeling', which he uses to criticise modern philosophy for its one-sidedness.

Schopenhauer's interest in Eastern philosophy was significant for Jung, as it constituted a milestone in the history of Western philosophy. According to Jung, Eastern religions were superior to the Western ones as they contained the idea of a redeeming middle path which, as we have seen, was characteristic of Jung's notion of the reconciling symbol. We have seen that ancient Indian philosophy and Buddhism were instrumental in Schopenhauer's conception of the denial, or nullification of the will, which was his 'solution' to his pessimistic picture of reality.

Schopenhauer's philosophy contributed to the line of thought that dethroned the intellect: for him, the faculty of reason, responsible for knowing, was merely *one* of the four types of the principle of sufficient reason. This echoes Jung's own conception of the intellect, or 'thinking': as *one* of many psychological attitudes. Hence, science, understood as the product of the intellect, was also fundamentally limited. Indeed, whilst for Schopenhauer, the world as it appeared to us was merely the manifestation of the will, for Jung, it was the manifestation of 'our will', of *our psychology*. As we have seen previously, whilst it was *necessary to acknowledge* the fundamentally subjective nature of knowledge, Jung regarded this view as unsatisfactory and saw it as *a problem that needed to be resolved*—namely, the 'problem of the personal equation', which in itself was an expression of the 'problem of opposites'. Jung was ultimately dissatisfied with Schopenhauer's perspective and turned to Kant in hopes to find a better solution.

In a sense, for Jung, Schopenhauer was also important as a link between Nietzsche, on the one hand, and Kant, on the other hand—as we shall see in the following chapter, where we look at Jung's reading of Kant's philosophy. As we explore Jung's

understanding of his works, we will be able to trace Schopenhauer's *reformulation* (what he saw as a 'correction') of Kant's philosophy as well, having already outlined the key ideas of Schopenhauer's philosophy in the present chapter. The examination of Jung's reading of Kant's philosophy will also help to better understand Schopenhauer's contribution to Jung's project in *Psychological Types*. In particular, Schopenhauer's shift of focus from the 'object' to the 'subject'—the way in which reality appeared as a 'presentation' to the 'subject'—was an important step towards the reframing of the philosophical discussion in psychological terms for Jung, enabling him to regard the psychological world as 'my will' and 'my presentation'.

CHAPTER V. JUNG AND KANT: THE BOUNDARIES OF REASON, OR OBJECTIVITY REDEFINED (AGAIN)

Introduction

This chapter is going to look at the relationship between Jung's theory of psychological types and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), primarily based on the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), being the most quoted work of Kant in Jung's *Psychological Types*. This chapter starts by outlining Kant's theory of knowledge, whilst referring to the extracts from Kant's works cited by Jung. There are some general parallels between Kant's and Jung's thought: whilst, in his philosophy, Kant effectively redefines what it means to do metaphysics, Jung, as I argue in this thesis, being preoccupied with the question of psychology as a science, effectively redefines what it means to do science.[116] This chapter is going to show that whilst Kant's theory of knowledge informed key parts of Jung's general epistemological framework for his theory of psychological types, Jung diverts from the philosopher in important ways. In particular, one might say that Jung *re-imagines* Kant's philosophical project in *psychological* terms, as part of his own epistemological project in *Psychological Types*.

The chapter shows that Jung adopts Kant's view that our experience of reality is structured through a certain filter as an initial standpoint. For Kant, this filter is the 'pure concept' (or 'categories of the understanding'), whilst for Jung it is the 'psychological type' itself. For Kant, the categories, being *a priori* synthetic structures, are (*philosophically* speaking) *universal*. Jung, on the other hand (echoing Schopenhauer's types of the principle of sufficient reason), takes a *pluralistic* standpoint: different *psychological* types filter empirical data in distinct ways, or, to use a more Schopenhauerian language, reality 'presents', or 'appears' to a person of *a particular type* in a particular way. For Kant, the categories are what is *objective*—the knowledge of the conditions of possibility of knowledge, the filter

[116] As Frederick C. Beiser puts it, for instance, 'Kant […] redefines the task of metaphysics itself'—namely, '[i]t should not be speculation about things transcending our sense experience, but "a science of the limits of reason"' (Beiser 1992:41).

itself, is the new meaning of 'objective'. Jung, I argue, also redefines the meaning of 'objective', but for him the type, the filter, is what stands in the way of achieving this objectivity. For him, to achieve objectivity one needs to go *beyond* the type, overcome it, as we have seen, through 'individuation'—by integrating the opposite in the unconscious and arriving at the balanced Self.

Having previously examined Schopenhauer's notions of 'will' and 'presentation', we turn to Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena in the present chapter. As we shall see, the importance of Kant for Jung lies in redefining objectivity by establishing this distinction. The structure of this chapter then aims to show how Jung re-imagines Kant's ideas in psychological terms with his theory of psychological types: the notion of 'pure concepts' ('Kant's Categories of the Understanding'), the critique of 'pure reason' ('Synthetic *A Priori* Statements'), and the resulting redefinition of objectivity ('The Psychological Type as a Filter' and 'Objectivity Redefined').

Review of Arguments in Secondary Literature

There has been an abundance of scholarship on Kant's impact on psychology in general. As Andrew Brook points out, for example, '[e]ven though Kant himself held that his view of the mind and consciousness were inessential to his main purpose, some of the ideas central to his point of view came to have an enormous influence on his successors' (Brook 2020). He points out that '[s]ome of his ideas are now central to cognitive science, for example' (Brook 2020). David Leary, for instance, has made an even stronger claim that Kant 'laid the foundation for later developments in the broad field of inquiry that had already been labelled "psychology" (Leary 1982:18). However, I would like to clarify that in this chapter I do not intend to pursue the line of argument that attempts to frame Kant's work as psychological itself rather than purely philosophical—as I am specifically interested in showing the connections between Kant's philosophy as an *epistemological* framework for Jung's ideas in *Psychological Types*.

While the different connections between Jung and Kant have been widely studied in the secondary literature, the specific connection between Jung's theory of

psychological types as outlined in his *Psychological Types* has been underexplored in comparison. Among the key contributors has been Paul Bishop (Bishop 1996, 2000). In his 1996 paper, he argued that 'whilst Kant was indeed an important influence on Analytical Psychology, that influence was a more complex and less direct one than Jung would have us believe' (Bishop 1996:132). Before that, another important work on the relationship between Jung and Kant was produced by Stephanie de Voogd (de Voogd 1977, 1984). In this she argued that despite Jung claiming to be a Kantian, Jung was 'in fact a most un-Kantian Kantian' (de Voogd 1977:176). In this chapter, I do not aim to argue that Jung was a 'true Kantian', or that his psychology does not contradict Kant's ideas. Rather, I am interested in showing *how* Jung *arrived* at his theory in *Psychological Types* through Kant, arguing that, with it, Jung aimed to provide a *psychological extension* of Kant's theory. One could still argue that although Jung was not *strictly speaking* a Kantian, that he was a Kantian in spirit—sharing his fundamental view of reality as appearances and striving to arrive at the conditions of possibility of objective knowledge.

The relationship between Kant's philosophy and Jung's psychological types has been more closely studied by Stephen Palmquist, who has argued that Kant's categories and Jung's types share a 'common logical structure' (Palmquist 2005). Whilst I still draw a comparison between Jung's notion of psychological type and Kant's categories, I am more interested in Kant's philosophy serving as an *epistemological framework* for Jung's theory of types. In this chapter, I also draw on Sonu Shamdasani's writings in his *Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology*, where he has linked Jung's 'primordial images', or archetypes, with Kant's categories (Shamdasani 2003).

Jung Reads Kant

Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia, where he studied at the University of Königsberg. There, originally interested in classics, he became interested in philosophy. Subsequently, he became a central figure in the history of philosophy. The key goal of his work was to bring together rationalism and empiricism with the position he called 'transcendental idealism', setting the

foundation for most of the philosophical debates for more than a century. His most famous work includes his three Critiques: the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* (1790).

Jung, dissatisfied with Schopenhauer, turned to Kant—in particular, the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Jung 1962/1989). In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung notes that, as a result of him reading Kant's works, most notably, his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he discovered that Schopenhauer 'had committed the deadly sin of hypostatizing a metaphysical assertion, and of endowing a mere noumenon, a *Ding an sich*, with special qualities (Jung 1962/1989:70). He adds that he 'got this from Kant's theory of knowledge, and it afforded [him] an even greater illumination, if that were possible, than Schopenhauer's "pessimistic" view of the world' (Jung 1962/1989:70). Jung notes that '[t]his philosophical development extended from [his] seventeenth year well into the period of [his] medical studies' (Jung 1962/1989:70).

As a student, in May 1897, Jung addresses Kant's philosophy in a lecture (as part of his Zofingia lectures in the context of 'Empirical Psychology', where he refers to his *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics*, in which Kant was sceptical of the idea of an empirical psychology (Jung 1897/1983). Before we proceed to Jung's discussion it is essential to point out that the question of the relation of Kant's philosophy to psychology is a complicated one, especially given that Kant's psychological thought was intertwined with his philosophical thought (Leary 1982:27). According to David Leary, two psychological traditions had already been established by the time Kant wrote the *Critique of Pure Reason*—the realms of 'empirical psychology' and 'rational psychology'—as a result of Christian Wolff's works published in 1732 and 1734 respectively (Leary 1982:19). In *the Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defined the object of psychology by stating that 'I, as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called the "soul"', whereas 'that which is an object of outer sense is called "body"' (Kant 1781/1998:412). 'Rational psychology, then, or 'rational doctrine of the soul' was supposed to be able to 'develop its entire wisdom' from the single proposition 'I think' (Kant 1781/1998:413). However, according to Kant, this was an impossible undertaking because this proposition was empirical and not rational—or *a posteriori* rather than *a priori*. This meant that it was impossible

to deduce the nature of the soul rationally and it was beyond the capacity of reason (Kant 781/1998).

In his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* published in 1786, Kant provides an evaluation of 'empirical psychology' (Kant 1786/1883). Here Kant provides his conception of science which included both empirical elements, which were responsible for bringing in the empirical data, and *a priori* elements that were responsible for interpreting the data (Kant 1786/1883:138-139). The *a priori* basis of science was rooted in mathematics: 'a pure doctrine of nature respecting *determinate* natural things is only possible by means of mathematics; and as in every natural doctrine only so much science proper is to be met with therein as there is a cognition a priori, a doctrine of nature can only contain so much science proper as there is in it of applied mathematics' (Kant 1786/1883:141). However, Kant argued that 'mathematics [was] inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense and its laws' (Kant 1786/1883:141). As Leary puts it, this was because 'its empirical data do not have spatial dimensions and therefore exist only in the single dimension of time' (Leary 1982:22). Hence, since psychology lacked the mathematical aspect, it could only be a 'natural description of the soul', but not 'a science of the soul'—meaning, it could only be 'empirical', but not truly scientific (Kant 1786/1883:141-142). In addition to this, Kant notes that it could not be an 'experimental doctrine' either (Kant 1786/1883:141). This was because 'in it the manifold of internal observation is only separated in thought but cannot be kept separate and be connected again at pleasure; still less is another thinking subject amenable to investigations of this kind, and even the *observation itself, alters and distorts the state of the object observed*' (Kant 1786/1883:141; italics added). This would mean that psychologists were limited by their *own psychologies*. Hence, what would later be termed the 'personal equation' happened to be one of Kant's criticisms as to why psychology could not be a science.[117] However, while Kant did not see the possibility of psychology ever becoming a true science, or an experimental science, he argued in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, published in 1798, that it could improve as an 'empirical science' if it adopted a different methodology, one that would be rooted in 'external' rather than 'internal' observations (Kant 1798/2006). As Leary summarises

[117] At the same time, David Leary points to the irony of Kant's criticism of psychology for its reliance on introspection given that his own work, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,* 'relied so heavily on traditional introspectionist data' (Leary 1982:24).

Kant's view, psychology 'could become more useful to humanity if it would forsake its traditional introspective method and begin to make systematic observations of men and "women in the world" as they behave and interrelate with their fellow citizens' (Leary 1982:23).

However, according to Jung, Kant was writing at a different time, at which it was impossible to conceive of psychology as a science due to a simple lack of facts. However, in his student lecture in 1897, Jung argues, since more than one hundred years has passed since Kant's writings and his dogmatic theories require modification, his fundamental epistemology that can serve as a basis for contemporary psychological theories, remains the same:

> Kant could not help but speak as he did, and from his own standpoint he was absolutely right. More than one hundred years have passed since he said these things. In this time a lot has happened to confirm his words, and to amply their meaning in unlooked-for ways. Kant's epistemology endures unaltered, but his dogmatic teachings have undergone changes as must occur with every dogmatic system. No fresh genius has appeared to supplant Kant's ideas … It was impossible for Kant to have known the facts in question, and that is why he could not have spoken otherwise than he did. Baron DePrel says—quite rightly—that if Kant were alive today, he would undoubtedly be a spiritualist. (Jung 1897/1983:33).

In this chapter, then, I will show that in *Psychological Types*, Jung strives to do just what he describes in the quote above in his Zofingia lecture—treating Kant's philosophy as a fundamental epistemological framework, whilst also *re-imagining* it in psychological terms—hence *modernising* it. As we have seen, this was also the case with Jung's reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Jung himself stated that Eduard von Hartmann had an advantage over Schopenhauer—the fact that he lived in a more modern age and was thus able to reformulate his notion of the 'will' in psychological terms.

In his 1914 paper, Jung refers to Kant in the context of his criticism of trying to read Goethe's *Faust* using Freud's scientific method (Jung 1914/1920d). As we have seen previously, here Jung already provides indications of his intent to redefine the scientific method to include the realm of the subjective—as he believed the contemporary conception of science to be inadequate.[118] As he outlines the

[118] See Part III of Chapter III—on Jung and Goethe.

disadvantages of the reductive scientific principle of his time by demonstrating its inability to discern the true meaning of Goethe's *Faust*, Jung writes on the importance of 'understanding oneself' (Jung 1914/1920d). To explain what he means by the latter, he refers to Kant: 'I am thinking here of Kant's thought-compelling definition of comprehension, as "the realisation of a thing to the extent which is sufficient for our purpose"' (Jung 1914/1920d). Having given this definition, he then makes the statement that we have already discussed, namely that '[t]his understanding is, it is true, subjective, and therefore not scientific for those to whom science and explanation by the causal principle are identical', adding that 'the validity of this identification is open to question', and especially, 'in the sphere of psychology' (Jung 1914/1920d). Hence, in 1914, Jung is already referring to Kant in the context of his critique of the scientific method and his intention to reformulate it.

While Jung does refer to Kant in other works preceding *Psychological Types*, we shall see in this chapter that it is the latter work in which he provides a detailed engagement between his psychology and Kant's philosophy.[119] It is also essential to note that, apart from reading Kant's works directly, his understanding of his philosophy was also informed by the conceptions of the individuals that comprised his intellectual circle (Shamdasani 2003). Thus, Théodore Flournoy, as a psychologist, was also deeply interested in Kant (Flournoy 1890). Furthermore, Emil Medtner—who, as Shamdasani points out, contributed to Jung's conception of intuition—was also interested in Kant (Shamdasani 2003:69).[120]

Comparisons with the Philosophers Previously Looked at

Before we proceed to look at the relationship between Jung's psychology and Kant's philosophy in *Psychological Types*, it is interesting to look at the connections that

[119] Jung refers to Kant (his 'Natural History of the Heavens') in his dissertation in 1902; in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* in 1912; in his paper 'On the Importance Of The Unconscious In Psychopathology' delivered in 1914; in his paper 'The Psychology of Dreams', also delivered in 1914; and in his preface to the second edition of the Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology in 1917.

[120] In his correspondence with Andrei Bely, in 1903, Medtner argues that while Kant maintained that it was impossible to arrive at the noumenon from the 'positivist' perspective, it was still possible to 'intuit' it, through 'intellectual intuition' (Medtner 1903/2017:187). Medtner further argues that Kant never said that intellectual [Vernuft] intuition was impossible—rather that intuitive understanding [Verstand] was impossible (Medtner 1903/2017:187).

can be drawn between Kant and the figures that we have previously looked at. To begin with, while not a direct connection, Shamdasani has noted William James' debt to neo-Kantianism through the French philosopher Renouvier, 'which convinced James of the existence of free-will, and opened the possibility of an escape from a nihilistic deterministic universe' (Shamdasani 2003:33).[121] As for James and Kant specifically, James himself denied any links with Kantianism: 'As Schiller, Dewey and I mean pragmatism, it is *toto coelo* opposed to either the original or revived Kantianism [...] [I]t is irreconcilable with anything in Kant—only the most superficial resemblance obtaining' (James quoted in Carlson 2006:363). Indeed, as Thomas Carlson points out, there are many apparent differences between the two: 'Kant was a lover of unity and systematicity, and exalted the absolute and necessary features of our experience; James had little patience with philosophical systems, thought there was much less unity to the world than often imagined, and denied there were any utterly indefeasible elements in our experience' (Carlson 2006:363). While James regarded scientific theories as instruments, as we shall see later, it would not be accurate to say that Kant subscribed to this view. However, some scholars have linked pragmatism, and specifically, James' version, with Kantianism.[122] Indeed, in *A Pluralistic Universe*, James brings up Kant in the context of his discussion of Bergson, acknowledging the contribution of Kant to the critique of intellectualism—whilst, however, also stating the limitations of that contribution: 'Others, as Kant for example, have denied intellectualism's pretensions to define reality *an sich* or in its absolute capacity; but Kant still leaves it laying down laws—and laws from which there is no appeal—to all our human experience; while what Bergson denies is that its methods give any adequate account of this human experience in its very finiteness' (James 1909:216). However, as we shall see, in this thesis, I draw connections between the philosophers *through Jung*'s project in *Psychological Types*, showing that the two formed key—and what might be deemed overlapping—elements of Jung's epistemology. Furthermore, an insightful way to look at Henri Bergson's philosophy, as Lawlor has pointed out, is to view it as an attempt to overcome Kant's transcendental idealism, specifically, the idea that the knowledge of the things in themselves (the 'noumena'), or absolute, metaphysical knowledge, is impossible (Lawlor, 2020). Among the other figures that we tackled in

[121] For more on the connections between James and Renovier, see Viney (1997).
[122] See, for instance, Murphey 1968, Carlson 2006.

this thesis, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, as Bishop points out, studied and deeply admired Kant's philosophy.[123]

In this context, most notable of the philosophers that we have previously looked at in this context is of course Schopenhauer—who fundamentally developed his philosophy as a response to that of Kant, initially believing that he was extending—and later reformulating—Kant's system. Christopher Janaway has commented on the problems that this subsequently created for Schopenhauer:

> Forcing his doctrine into this Kantian framework might in retrospect be regarded as one of Schopenhauer's most unfortunate moves – it certainly gives rise to numerous problems of consistency and intelligibility. I could not begin to rehearse them all here, but a couple of consequences are worth noting. First, it is hard for Schopenhauer consistently to separate the notion of the thing in itself considered as the world apart from all knowability on the one hand, and the notion of will as the most general form under which the world is knowable to us. In the latter sense will is the thing in itself, while in the former it is not. (Janaway 2010:149).

In addition to this, being interested in the relationship between Schopenhauer's philosophy and psychology—specifically, the notion of the 'unconscious'—Janaway also writes on the limitations of Kantian framework as a *psychological* framework for Schopenhauer: 'Working only with a notion of the thing in itself which places it outside time and space, and thus outside of individuation, makes the notion of the "in itself" aspect of the individual hard to negotiate, yet Schopenhauer's psychology requires a timeless and unchanging will to underlie all of the individual's conscious states and actions, and to be a character peculiar to that individual' (Janaway 2010:150) Schopenhauer, as we have seen, starts with the premise that our reality is fundamentally an appearance, recognising the importance of Kant in the formulation of this idea: 'Kant's doctrine produces in every mind that has grasped it a fundamental alteration so great that it can be counted as a spiritual rebirth', adding

[123] Paul Bishop summarises Goethe's engagement with Kant's philosophy as follows:
'Goethe engaged with the philosophy of Kant, not least in his short essay 'Judgment through Intuitive Perception' (1820), and he acknowledged Kant as a source of corroboration for his belief in polarity – a key notion in the works of Jung, of course. In his conversation with Johann Peter Eckermann of 11 April 1827, Goethe described Kant as 'the highest' of the new philosophers; Schiller had studied him 'with great zeal', and Goethe studied Kant too, 'and not without profit'. Kant's doctrines, Goethe claimed, 'still continue to work, and have penetrated most deeply into our German civilization' (Bishop, 2008:2-3).

that '[i]t alone, namely, is actually capable of removing the realism innate to the mind, stemming from the original function of intellect, something for which neither Berkeley nor Malebranche suffices' (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:23). However, for Schopenhauer, Kant was primarily concerned with the nature of the 'object' and how it appears to us, overlooking the nature of the 'subject'. His then fundamental disagreement with Kant was regarding the fundamental nature of reality behind the world of appearances: whilst, as we have seen, for Schopenhauer it was knowable—it was 'will'—for Kant, as we shall see, it was ultimately unknowable to us due to the very conditions of possibility of knowledge. Schopenhauer wrote in *The World as Will and Presentation*:

> It is hoped that everyone will later be certain that what we are hereby abstracting from is indeed only will, which alone constitutes the other side of the world. For as much as it is on the one hand through and through presentation, so it is on the other hand through and through will. A reality, however, that would be neither of these, but an object in itself (to which even Kant's thing in itself regrettably degenerated in his hands), is a fanciful non-thing and its assumption a will-o'-the-wisp in philosophy. (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:33).

In addition to this, Schopenhauer's version of the 'principle of sufficient reason' (ground)—of which there were four different types, responsible for the different ways in which objects appear to us—was a reformulation of Kant's notion of the 'categories', the *boundary* between the subject and the object:

> Their boundaries are in immediate contact: where the object begins, the subject ends. This common boundary shows itself precisely in the fact that, even apart from cognizance of objects themselves, one can discover and be fully cognizant of the essential and therefore general forms pertaining to all objects - time, space, and causality - by proceeding from the subject, i.e., in Kant's language, they lie *a priori* in our consciousness. To have discovered this is one of Kant's main achievements, and a very great one. I now go further in maintaining that the Principle of Sufficient Ground is the common expression for all of the object's forms of which we are conscious *a priori*, and that therefore whatever we know in a purely *a priori* way is nothing but precisely the content of that principle and what follows from it, thus voice is really given in it to the entirety of our *a priori* certain cognizance. (Schopenhauer 1818/2008:34).

It is interesting to note that, in the quote above, Schopenhauer uses the word consciousness to describe Kant's ideas, while this would not be entirely accurate. And this relates to the discussion in the previous chapter on Schopenhauer: according to Logan, for instance, Schopenhauer 'valued psychology more than Kant' (Logan 1902:19).

In the following section of this chapter, then, we are going to sketch Kant's complex theory of knowledge, after which we will explore Jung's reading of Kant's philosophy and its importance for his project in *Psychological Types*.

Kant's Theory of Knowledge

Kant's Categories of the Understanding

As we have seen in the previous chapters of this thesis, in *Psychological Types* (in the 'Definitions' section), Jung emphasises the fact that his notion of the 'primordial image' relates specifically to Schopenhauer's 'idea', rather than that of Kant, which, as Jung notes, is defined as a 'concept derived from notions' [Begriff aus Notionen], referring to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (Jung:1923:559). Indeed, in the following extract from the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant uses 'idea' as a synonym for 'concept of reason', whilst also defining other key terms, such as 'intuition' and 'pure concept'—the meanings of which we will be further investigating in this section of this chapter:

> The genus is [presentation] in general (*repraesentatio*). Under it stands the presentation with consciousness (*perceptio*). A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a sensation (*sensatio*); an objective percept is a cognition (*cognitio*). The latter is either an intuition or a concept (*intuitus vel conceptus*). The former is immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things. A concept is either an empirical or a pure concept, and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in a pure image of sensibility), is called *notio*. A concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility of experience, is an idea or a concept of reason. Anyone who has become accustomed to this distinction must find it

> unbearable to hear a [presentation] of the color red called an idea. It is not even to be called a notion (a concept of the understanding). (Kant 1781/1998:398-399, translation modified).

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, then, Kant puts forward a complex *epistemology* that produces a synthesis between rationalism (associated with analytic *a priori* statements) and empiricism (associated with synthetic *a posteriori* statements) in the form of 'transcendental idealism' (based on synthetic *a priori* statements). Similarly to the empiricists, Kant's epistemology starts with *experience*; however, in contrast with the empiricists, Kant's philosophy is not based on the idea of 'tabula rasa', or 'pure observation'. Rather, our experience is *filtered* through our senses and then reality *appears* in a particular way to us. This accumulation of sensory data as 'appearances' (or 'phenomena', as opposed to 'noumena') is called 'empirical intuition':

> The effect of an object on the capacity for [presentation], insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called empirical. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance. (Kant 1781/1998:155, modified translation).

In addition to empirical intuitions, intuitions can also be 'pure' (or *a priori*), meaning that they are independent from experience (these are *time* and *space*). These form a key element of Kant's epistemology—more specifically, in relation to the possibility of synthetic *a priori* statements: it is through 'pure intuition' that it is possible to 'amplify our cognition'. This contrasts with analytic *a priori* statements, as the truthfulness of the statement can be ascertained through the analysis of the terms alone, not through pure intuition. Kant illustrates this by using the example of '7+5=12':

> One must go beyond these concepts, seeking assistance in the intuition that corresponds to one of the two, one's five fingers, say, or (as in Segner's arithmetic) five points, and one after another add the units of the five given in the intuition to the concept of seven. For I take first the number 7, and, as take the fingers of my hand as an intuition for assistance with the concept of 5, to that image of mine I now add the units that I have previously taken together in order to constitute the number 5 one after another to the number 7, and thus see the number 12 arise. That 7 should be added to 5 I have, to be sure, thought in the concept of a sum = 7 + 5, but not that this sum is equal to the number 12. (Kant 1781/1998:144).

Kant then concludes that all arithmetical propositions are synthetic because 'it is then clear that, twist and turn our concepts as we will, without getting help from intuition we could never find the sum by means of the mere analysis of our concept' (Kant 1781/1998:144).

From the 'understanding' of intuitions then, one builds 'concepts', which, similarly, can be either 'empirical' or 'pure' (*a priori*). It is the latter that is of fundamental importance to Kant's transcendental idealism as it is pure, or *a priori*, concepts—the 'pure categories of the understanding'—that provide us with the 'conditions of possibility of knowledge':

> Hence if one wants to know how pure concepts of the understanding are possible, one must inquire what are the *a priori* conditions on which the possibility of experience depends and that ground it even if one abstracts from everything empirical in the appearances. A concept that expresses this formal and objective condition of experience universally and sufficiently would be called a pure concept of the understanding. Once I have pure concepts of the understanding, I can also think up objects that are perhaps impossible, or that are perhaps possible in themselves but cannot be given in any experience since in the connection of their concepts something may be omitted that yet necessarily belongs to the condition of a possible experience (the concept of a spirit), or perhaps pure concepts of the understanding will be extended further than experience can grasp (the concept of God). (Kant 1781/1998:227).

It is crucial to note that Kant's different terms are closely interrelated, all the way from empirical intuitions up to pure concepts: 'Thus all concepts and with them all principles, however *a priori* they may be, are nevertheless related to empirical intuitions, i.e., to data for possible experience' (Kant 1781/1998:341). According to Kant, [w]ithout this they have no objective validity at all, but are rather a mere play, whether it be with presentations of the imagination or of the understanding' (Kant 1781/1998:341).

To briefly go back to the mention of Jung's understanding of the term 'idea' in *Psychological Types* ('Definitions'), Jung also refers to Kant's critique of Plato's notion of the 'idea' [Idee]: 'In this sense Plato sees the idea [Idee] as a primordial image [Urbild de Dinge] of this, while Kant defines it as the "archetype of the use of the mind" [„Urbild des Gebrauchs des Verstandes"]; hence it is a transcendent

concept [transzendenter Begriff] which, as such, transcends the limit of experienceable things [Erfahrbarkeit]. It is a concept demanded by reason [Vernunftbegriff], "whose object can never be met with in experience [Erfahrung]"' (Jung 1923:548). Jung is referring here to the following extract from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where Kant contrasts Plato's notion of the 'idea' with his idea of categories:

> Plato made use of the expression idea in such a way that we can readily see that he understood by it something that not only could never be borrowed from the senses, but that even goes far beyond the concepts of the understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself), since nothing encountered in experience could ever be congruent to it. Ideas for him are archetypes of things themselves, and not, like the categories, merely the key to possible experiences. In his opinion they flowed from the highest reason, through which human reason partakes in them; our reason, however, now no longer finds itself in its original state, but must call back with toil the old, now very obscure ideas through a recollection (which is called philosophy). (Kant 1781/1998:395).

As we can see, Kant emphases here the fact that, in contrast to Plato, categories are as close as one can get to the 'thing-in-itself', or the noumenon—only as conditions of possibility of knowledge, only they are *objectively valid*. Our experience of reality then is 'phenomenal' (as 'appearances' rather than as 'things in themselves') based on our intuitions that are abstracted from objects, on the basis of which our concepts (understanding) are formed.[124]

To relate this back to the discussion of science more explicitly—before we proceed to look at Jung—science thus becomes the form of our experience. In other words, science describes the objects as *we* experience them, rather than what they might be in themselves. As Paul Guyer puts it,

> Kant took the fateful first step of arguing that the possibility and indeed the certainty of the spatiotemporal framework of Newtonian physics could be secured only by recognizing it to be the form of our own experience, even though this meant that the certainty of the foundations of Newtonian science could be purchased only by confining them to objects as we experience them through the senses - "appearances" or

[124] For a more detailed discussion of Kant's notion of the 'thing in themselves' (noumena), see, for instance, Oizerman 1981.

> "phenomena" - rather than those objects as they might be in themselves and known to be by a pure intellect - "noumena." (Guyer 1992:10).

Indeed, Kant's account of metaphysics has been described as an attempt to provide a philosophical basis for Newtonian physics (Wartenberg 1992:228). However, as Thomas Wartenberg points out, it is essential to note that Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena does not make him an instrumentalist: he did not claim that 'theoretical terms have a role to play in science as unifiers of concepts and laws that genuinely refer to empirical reality but that theoretical terms do not themselves refer to such reality' (Wartenberg 1992:232). Furthermore, Kant is not dismissive of the role of reason in acquisition of knowledge altogether, rather he asserts that 'reason's contribution to the framework of knowledge does not involve the actual constitution of the objects that we know' (Wartenberg 1992:238). As a result, with the introduction of the notions of phenomenal and noumenal realities, Kant in effect redefines what objectivity itself means. Instead of simply saying that knowledge is acquired directly by our senses, on the basis of which we can establish scientific facts through hypotheses and experimentation, as in classical empiricism, Kant says that that the data we gain from the objects, and subsequently call empirical facts, itself is filtered through the categories of the understanding. Achieving scientific objectivity, then, in Kant's sense, means, first, understanding these objectively valid conditions of possibility of experience, which are *universal*, and then applying them to our objects of experience. As Michael Friedman puts it, 'merely inductive or empirical regularities are transformed into something new: a law that, despite its obvious dependence on initial empirical data, depends *also* on synthetic *a priori* principles and thereby acquires a more than merely inductive status' (Friedman 1992:178-179).

Synthetic *A Priori* Statements

In Chapter I ('The Problem of Types in History') of *Psychological Types*, Jung refers to Kant's critique of the 'ontological argument', put forward by St. Anselm, Descartes and Leibniz—namely, the idea that 'the existence of God could be inferred from predicates necessarily included in the concept of God' (Guyer and Wood 1998:26). He provides the following quotes from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which Kant

argues that the concepts of 'God' and of 'unconditioned necessity' are products of 'pure reason'— 'ideas'—that go beyond the boundaries of reason itself.[125] He quotes Kant:

> [From the foregoing one easily sees that] the concept of an absolutely necessary being is a pure concept of reason [Vernunftbegriff], i.e., a mere idea [Idee], the objective reality of which is far from being proved by the fact that reason needs it, since this only points to a certain though unattainable completeness, and properly serves more to set boundaries to the understanding than to extend it toward new objects. (Kant 1781/1998:563-564).

And:

> [All the alleged examples are without exception taken only from judgments, but not from things and their existence.] The unconditioned necessity [Notwendigkeit] of judgments, however, is not an absolute necessity of things. For the absolute necessity of the judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in the judgment. (Kant 1781/1998:564).

Jung then provides lengthy quotes from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* on the discussion of triangles—namely that a triangle must have three angles—and on the absolute necessity of God (Jung 1923:59-60). Kant himself concludes his discussion of the ontological argument as follows: 'Thus the famous ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a highest being from concepts is only so much trouble and labor lost, and a human being can no more become richer in insight from mere ideas than a merchant could in resources if he wanted to improve his financial state by adding a few zeros to his cash balance' (Kant 1781/1988:569).

To put these quotes from the *Critique of Pure Reason* in context—one of the central aims of Kant's project is to argue against the idea that it is possible to arrive at truths about entities that lie outside of our experience—for example, the ideas of freedom, God, and immortality—through 'reason' alone ('pure reason'), hereby attacking the central tenet of rationalism, of which Leibniz and Descartes are key representatives (an instance of a 'paralogism of pure reason'). As seen from the quotes above, Kant argues that the fact that reason deems certain concepts *absolutely necessary* does

[125] For a detailed outline of Kant's account of reason in general see, for instance, Williams 2017.

not mean that they actually *are* absolutely necessary, since this necessity comes from *judgements* rather than the 'things' themselves.

To clarify this further, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, using the works of previous philosophers (most notably, David Hume), Kant makes several distinctions that are then used to build his own philosophical framework: on the one hand, he distinguishes between *a posteriori* and *a priori* knowledge—the former being the knowledge that one arrives at through *experience*, while the latter being the knowledge that is independent from experience. Kant puts this as follows: 'Now such universal cognitions, which at the same time have the character of inner necessity, must be clear and certain for themselves, independently of experience; hence one calls them a priori cognitions: whereas that which is merely borrowed from experience is, as it is put, cognized only *a posteriori*, or empirically' (Kant 1781/1998:127). On the other hand, he also makes the distinction between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' statements. The former is a statement the truthfulness of which can be established through the terms *within* the sentence itself (this includes tautologies like 'All bachelors are unmarried men'). Synthetic statements are ones the truthfulness of which *cannot* be established just by analysing the meaning of the terms of a sentence—one needs to go *beyond* the statement to be able to establish whether it is true or not (for example, 'All bachelors are blond men'). Kant also describes the former as a 'judgment of clarification' and the latter as a 'judgment of amplification':

> Now from this it is clear: I) that through analytic judgments our cognition is not amplified at all, but rather the concept, which I already have, is set out, and made intelligible to me; 2) that in synthetic judgments I must have in addition to the concept of the subject something else X) on which the understanding depends in cognizing a predicate that does not lie in that concept as nevertheless belonging to it. (Kant 1781/1998:130-131).

Kant then provides different combinations of these two different dichotomies. He states that '[j]udgments of experience, as such, are all synthetic' (i.e. all *a posteriori* judgments are synthetic) since analytic *a posteriori* judgements are a contradiction: 'it would be absurd to ground an analytic judgment on experience, since I do not need to go beyond my concept at all in order to formulate the judgment, and therefore need no testimony from experience for that' (Kant 1781/1998:142). Analytic

a priori statements, then, are statements that are independent from experience and the truthfulness of which is established through the analysis of the meaning of its terms. Kant then argues that mathematics and physics predominantly contain not analytic *a priori* statements, but synthetic *a priori* ones—a type of statement that had not been previously considered in philosophy. He famously discusses that the proposition of '7+5=12' is synthetic, rather than analytic:

> [I]f one considers it more closely, one finds that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing more than the unification of both numbers in a single one, through which it is not at all thought what this single number is which comprehends the two of them. The concept of twelve is by no means already thought merely by my thinking of that unification of seven and five, and no matter how long I analyze my concept of such a possible sum I will still not find twelve in it. (Kant 1781/1998:144).[126]

Kant is critical of the predominant approach to metaphysics in philosophy—as analytic *a priori* judgements—and calls it 'dogmatic'. He himself puts this as follows: 'Thus one can and must regard as undone all attempts made until now to bring about a metaphysics dogmatically; for what is analytic in one or the other of them, namely the mere analysis of the concepts that inhabit our reason a priori, is not the end at all, but only a preparation for metaphysics proper' (Kant 1781/1998:148). He writes that the nature of metaphysics demands *a priori* synthetic statements—ones that are not dependent on experience but the truthfulness of which cannot be established through the analysis of terms—hence, they 'amplify our cognition', they require us to go *beyond* the statements:

> In metaphysics, even if one regards it as a science that has thus far merely been sought but is nevertheless indispensable because of the nature of human reason, synthetic *a priori* cognitions are supposed to be contained, and it is not concerned merely with analyzing concepts that we make of things a priori and thereby clarifying them analytically, but we want to amplify our cognition *a priori*; to this end we must make use of such principles that add something to the given concepts that was not contained in them, and through synthetic *a priori* judgments go so far beyond that experience itself cannot follow us that far, e.g., in the proposition "The world must have a first beginning," and others besides, and thus metaphysics, at least as far as its end is concerned, consists of purely synthetic *a priori* propositions. (Kant 1781/1998:146).

[126] For a discussion of this particular idea of Kant, see, for instance, Castañeda 1960.

The goal of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, then, is to investigate how synthetic *a priori* judgements are possible and to build a philosophical framework based on that—what Kant calls 'transcendental philosophy'.[127] He arrives at the idea of transcendental philosophy as follows:

> Now from all of this there results the idea of a special science, which can be called the critique of pure reason. For reason is the faculty that provides the principles of cognition *a priori*. Hence pure reason is that which contains the principles for cognizing something absolutely *a priori*. An organon of pure reason would be a sum total of all those principles in accordance with which all pure *a priori* cognitions can be acquired and actually brought about. The exhaustive application of such an organon would create a system of pure reason. But since that requires a lot, and it is still an open question whether such an amplification of our knowledge is possible at all and in what cases it would be possible, we can regard a science of mere estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a thing would not be a doctrine, but must be called only a critique of pure reason, and its utility in regard to speculation would really be only negative, serving not for the amplification but only for the purification of our reason, and for keeping it free of errors, by which a great deal is already won. I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible *a priori*. A system of such concepts would be called transcendental philosophy. (Kant 1781/1998:149).

Having outlined the key ideas underlying Kant's project in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the following sections we shall see how Jung *re-imagines* it in *Psychological Types*.

The Psychological Type as a Filter

In *Psychological Types*, Jung makes a number of epistemological statements that seem to be broadly in line with Kant's ideas outlined above, but applied to psychology. To begin with, Jung also appears to believe that knowledge begins with

[127] For a more detailed discussion of Kant's transcendental philosophy, or transcendental ideal idealism, see, for instance Stang 2016.

experience and emphasises the fact that his theory of psychological types is grounded on it:

> From sheer necessity, therefore, I must confine myself to a presentation of principles which I have abstracted from an abundance of observed facts. In this there is no question of deductio a priori, as it might well appear: it is rather a deductive *presentation* of empirically gained understanding. (Jung 1923:11).[128]

Jung, similarly to Kant, is also quick to distinguish himself from classical empiricism. Hence, he is sceptical of the empiricist idea of 'tabula rasa', or pure observation: 'I misdoubt the principle of 'pure observation ' in so-called objective psychology, unless one confines oneself to the eye-pieces of the chronoscope, or to the ergograph and such-like "psychological" apparatus' (Jung 1923:16). And in the following quote, Jung appears to be arguing that all science can provide us with is mere 'appearances' rather than access to reality itself—albeit with a *psychological* twist:

> But the ideal and the purpose of science do not consist in giving the most exact possible description of facts—science cannot yet compete with kinematographic and phonographic records—it can fulfil its aim and purpose only in the establishment of law, which is merely an abbreviated expression for manifold and yet correlated processes. This purpose transcends the purely experimental by means of the *concept*, which, in spite of general and proved validity, will always be a product of the subjective psychological constellation of the investigator. (Jung 1923:16).[129]

It follows then, according to Jung that our immediate experience of reality is mediated by a filter, making it fundamentally *subjective*. However, whilst from the perspective of Kant's theory of knowledge, it is *subjective* because it is filtered by the categories (as we cannot experience reality, the object, *directly*), Jung further reformulates this notion of subjectivity in psychological terms. From Jung's perspective, it is fundamentally due to psychological differences (or the 'personal equation', as we have seen previously), that our experience of reality is subjective—we see reality differently. These psychological differences then—namely, *psychological types* themselves—are analogous to Kant's categories in a particular sense in Jung's epistemology: our experience of reality is 'phenomenal', it is merely

[128] We have looked at this quote in the context of the first chapter of this thesis—on Jung and James. We can see its significance in the context of the present chapter as well.
[129] Again, we looked at this quote in the discussion of the 'personal equation' in the first of chapter of this thesis—on Jung and James. However, we can see that it is helpful for understanding Jung's take on Kant's philosophy as well.

an appearance filtered through our psychological type. This idea is further exemplified in the following quote by Jung, which prefaces his discussion of Kant's treatment of the ontological argument:

> The ontological argument is neither argument nor proof, but merely the psychological verification of the fact that there is a class of men for whom a definite idea has efficacy and a reality which practically rivals the world of perception. The sensationalist relies upon the certainty of his 'reality', and the man of the idea adheres to his psychological reality. (Jung 1923:56).[130]

Hence, I would argue that Jung's notion of a psychological type can be seen as a result of Jung's synthesis of Kant's notion of 'categories' and the notion of the 'personal equation'—the idea that '*One sees what one can best see from oneself*' (Jung 1923:16). From this perspective, psychological types (in the Kantian sense) structure our experience of reality, making it *subjective*, whilst *themselves being subjective* (due to the element of the 'personal equation').

This makes sense in the context of Jung's statements made in the Zofingia lectures that we saw at the beginning of this chapter: Jung appears to have taken his psychology to be a modernisation of Kant's epistemology. Now, in the final section of this chapter, I am going to look at what I argue to be the common goal of Jung and Kant—namely, redefinition of objectivity—and compare Jung's solution to that of Kant.

Objectivity Redefined

As we have seen, central to Jung's theory of psychological types is not simply the recognition of the subjectivity of one's experience (although this is an important step), but the idea of overcoming it, reaching one's opposite, establishing a balance between the two and, eventually, achieving psychological *unity* and *objectivity*. In this section, I am going to explore further the connections between Jung's theory of psychological types and Kant's categories of the understanding in the context of this particular goal of achieving objectivity.

[130] In the chapter, Jung quotes Fichte's formulation of the ontological argument.

In the 'Definitions' section of *Psychological Types,* Jung uses Kant's notion of 'abstraction'—specifically referring to Kant's *Logic*, to define an 'abstracting attitude' in 'abstraction'. He writes, 'I adhere to Kant's view, which maintains that a concept [Begriff] is the more abstract, "the more it excludes the differences of things", in the sense that abstraction at its highest level is absolutely removed from the object, thereby attaining the extreme limit of unrepresentability [Unvorstellbarkeit]' (Jung 1923:522). In *Logic*, Kant puts this idea as follows:

> The word abstraction is not always used right (in German) in logic. We must say, not to abstract, but to abstract from, something. When, for instance, we think of the red colour only of scarlet cloth, we abstract from the cloth; if we abstract from the colour too and conceive of the scarlet as a substance in general, we abstract from still more determinations, and our conception is thereby become yet more abstract. For the greater the number of the differences of things left out of a conception, or the greater the number of the determinations in it abstracted from, is, the more abstract the conception. Hence should abstracting conceptions, in strict propriety, be termed abstracting ones, that is to say, conceptions, in which several abstractions occur. (Kant 1800/1819:132).

In the same section, Jung relates Kant's notion of 'abstraction' and his own notion of the 'idea': 'It is this *abstraction* which I term the *idea'* (Jung 1923:522). Jung's own notion of the idea, in turn, is related to the idea of the image, and thus, the 'primordial image' (Jung 1923:547-548). These primordial images, according to Jung, are 'the precursors of *ideas'* (Jung 1923:569).

In the following quote, Jung *provides a psychological formulation* of Kant's notion of categories of the understanding by arriving at the idea of mind having *abstract, a priori* structures that he terms 'primordial images' or 'archetypes':

> For what Kant proved for logical thinking holds good for the psyche over a still wider range. At the beginning, the psyche is no more a tabula rasa than is the mind (the province of thought). To be sure the concrete contents are lacking, but the contents - possibilities are given a priori through the inherited and preformed functional disposition. The psyche is simply the product of brain-functioning throughout our whole ancestral line, a precipitate of the adaptation-efforts and experiences of the phylogenetic succession. Hence the newly-born brain or function-system is an ancient instrument, prepared for quite definite ends; it is not merely a passive, apperceptive instrument, but is also in active command of experience outside itself, forcing certain

> conclusions or judgments. These adjustments are not merely accidental or arbitrary happenings, but adhere to strictly preformed conditions, which are not transmitted, as are perception-contents, through experience, but are a priori conditions of apprehension. They are ideas ante rem, form-determinants, basic lines engraven a priori, assigning a definite formation to the stuff of experience; so that we may regard them as *images* (as Plato also conceived them), as schemata as it were, or inherited function - possibilities, which, moreover, exclude other possibilities, or, at all events, restrict them to a great extent. This explains why even fantasy, the freest activity of the mind, can never roam in the infinite (albeit, so the poet senses it), but remains bound to the preformed possibilities, *the primordial images or archetypes*. (Jung 1923:377-378).

It is interesting to note that Jung had provided first indications of this linkage in the *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido* in the following quote:

> Let us transfer this reasoning, as Kant has already done, to psychology. Then necessarily we must come to the same result. Just as traces of memory long since fallen below the threshold of consciousness are accessible in the unconscious, so too there are certain very fine subliminal combinations of the future, which are of the greatest significance for future happenings in so far as the future is conditioned by our own psychology. (Jung 1912/1916).

In 1918, in his 'The Role of the Unconscious, Jung had already drawn an explicit connection between his 'a priori conditions for fantasy-production' and Kantian categories (Jung 1918/1964). As Shamdasani has argued, Jung's conceptualisation of the primordial images as analogous to Kantian categories in terms of function 'gave the theory of the former a philosophical lineage, and hence legitimacy' and 'through this assimilation, the primordial image took on some of what Jung took to be the attributes of Kant's categories' (Shamdasani 2003:236). Shamdasani also notes that Jung's concept of an archetype was a *synthesis* of Kant's theory of categories and 'organic memory theory' (Shamdasani 2003:236). As Shamdasani notes, however, this meant that 'the concept was an unstable compound', since there was a logical incompatibility between Kant's categories that could not be derived from experience (being *a priori*) and Richard Semon's engrams, 'which were built up through repeated experiences, were not innate categories' (Shamdasani 2003.:236). Indeed, as Shamdasani notes, several other key concepts of Jung—the unconscious, the collective unconscious, and the Self—are intended to be 'negative borderline

concepts', analogous to Kant's noumena, which again, would be contradictory. [131] De Voogd had previously noted this difficulty:

> In Jung's hand, however, the same phenomenon-noumenon dichotomy is given a twist inasmuch as Jung urges upon us the phenomenal reality of psychic manifestations. In Kantian terms this amounts to nothing less than an invitation to regard the phenomenally unreal as the phenomenally real: I believe we do well to bear this in mind as we observe Jung appearing to be at cross-purposes with himself, insisting on the one hand that psychic manifestations are real and on the other 'only psychic'. A further consequence is that the transcendentally noumenal in Jung's work cannot help sounding like the 'real thing' (as against its 'merely psychic' manifestations). (de Voogd 1984:222).

There is then the question of whether Jung misread Kant or deliberately misinterpreted Kant. As Shamdasani suggests, the latter is a more likely possibility, given that Jung admitted having cited authors, whose ideas he considered to be similar enough to his own, without drawing clear distinctions between them (Shamdasani 2003:237).

To go back to the discussion of subjectivity and objectivity in relation to Kant's categories and Jung's primordial images, it is easy to draw a parallel between the two ideas in this context, especially if one considers this reading of Kant by de Voogd:

> However, so Kant continues, we cannot speak of the – or a – world apart from our cognitive experience since to do so is self-contradictory. We can however speak of our perceptual judgments and of their categorial arrangement and we can say that the objectivity of human knowledge is in the last analysis its subjectivity since the 'subject within me' [...], that is, the *a priori* part of my cognitive faculty does not differ from the 'subject within all of us' no matter how much all of us may differ as individuals. (de Voogd 1984:217).

In Jung's psychology, the primordial images—*abstract, a priori* structures of the collective unconscious—contrast with the *subjective* psychological type that deals

[131] Subsequently, for example, in a letter written in 1932, Jung referred to Kant's notion of the noumenon to explain his notion of the collective unconscious: in the sense that both are 'negative borderline concepts' (Jung 1932/2015:91). However, Jung states that this 'cannot prevent us from framing ... hypotheses about its possible nature as though it were an object of human experience' (Jung 1932/2015:91).What is different, though, is that 'we do not know whether the unconscious *an sich* is unlimited, whether it is experienceable in part or not at all'—hence that there is a possibility it is 'absolute', or 'inexperienceable' (Jung 1932/2015:91).

with one's default experience of reality. One could then also draw the following parallel between Kant's ideas and Jung's psychological application of them: one starts with the default, habitual experience of phenomenal reality (for Jung, the psychological type) and then arrives at the state of abstract, *a priori* structures that are *universal* (for Jung, the primordial images). Whilst, in Kant's philosophy, the filter (the category) is the objectivity-granting element, for Jung, the filter (the psychological type) is the initial stage of the process of achieving objectivity. From Jung's perspective, then, to achieve objectivity, one needs to overcome one's type through individuation, by integrating the unconscious, with the collective unconscious and its primordial images. Hence, we can see how Jung *re-imagined* Kant's ideas, drawing on them to conceptualise different elements of his typology—in particular, *different features of Kant's categories were used to conceptualise the notions of psychological types and primordial images*.

To re-iterate, whilst I have not aimed to argue that Jung was a Kantian in the strict sense, as the contradictions are evident, Jung's reading of Kant clearly informed his conceptualisation of his theory of psychological types. What is more, from Jung's perspective, he was *expanding* Kant's epistemology by *updating* it, using what he saw as advances in psychology since Kant's time.

Kant's solution

However, from Jung's perspective, Kant's project—including his redefinition of objectivity—would still be considered fundamentally one-sided. With his philosophy, Kant was aiming to bridge the gap between empiricism and rationalism and in doing so produced his own dichotomies, such as analytic/synthetic, as discussed earlier in this chapter. While Jung does not explicitly criticise Kant's solution to the problem of opposites in *Psychological Types*, it follows that it would still be regarded as fundamentally intellectual, or rational and, hence, still one-sided.

To fully understand this, we need to go back to Jung's discussion of the ontological argument. There Jung, having contrasted St. Anselm's 'esse in intellectu' and 'esse in res'—the 'idea' and 'thing'—and introduced the notion of 'esse in anima', he writes,

> But between 'intellectus' and 'res' there is still "anima", and this "esse in anima" makes the entire ontological argument superfluous. Kant himself in his *Critique of Practical* Reason attempted on a large scale to make a philosophical estimate of the "esse in anima". There he introduces God as a postulate of practical reasoning proceeding from the a priori recognition of "respect for moral law necessarily directed towards the highest good, and the supposition or inference therefrom of the objective of the same." (Jung 1923:61).

Jung refers to Kant's discussion in the second *Critique* in the section 'The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason' of Book II (Kant 1788/1998). Andrews Reath summarises his argument as follows:

> Kant argues that the moral law generates a duty to do all we can to bring about the highest good in the world, which he specifies as a state of affairs in which all agents have achieved virtue and happiness is distributed in accordance with virtue…The only way in which we can conceive of the highest good as a real possibility is by assuming the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as a moral author of the universe who has ordered the laws of nature to support the possibility of moral ends. Thus a "need of pure practical reason" licenses us to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. (Reath 2015: xxx-xxxi).

In the second *Critique*, then, Kant puts forward the idea of a 'postulate' that is attached to the moral law: we must postulate the existence of God and immortality in order for us to be able to be moral and aspire towards the highest good.[132]

Jung then sees Kant's project overall as an attempt to provide a solution to the problem of opposites that acknowledged the limitations of the intellect. However, being a philosopher—with his notions of 'pure' and 'practical' reason—Kant was still working within the province of the intellect, making his project still fundamentally intellectual, rational, one-sided. As de Voogd puts it,

[132] Subsequently, in his letter to Paul Maag in 1933, Jung provides a brief discussion of Kant and religion, in the broader context of his own treatment of religion, with reference to *Psychological Types* (Jung 1933/2015:123). He writes that whilst Kant had often been regarded as an atheist, this constituted a 'regrettable error (Jung 1933/2015:123). Jung makes a distinction between 'criticism of the concept of God' on the one hand and 'belief in God' on the other hand (Jung 1933/2015:123).When it comes to his own views on religion, Jung writes that if one were to 'submit the epistemological statements in [his] *Psychological Types* to a well-disposed examination', one could understand Jung's philosophical position—according to which 'nothing is further from [his] mind than to deny the contents of religious experience' (Jung 1933/2015:123).

> It is important here to realize that Kant's objection to transcendent metaphysics is – in Jungian terms – a thinking man's objection to the thinking function overstepping its boundaries by creating, out of the blue and under cover of faulty reasoning, a concrete, literal, non-spatiotemporal world literally peopled by literal entities. It is equally important to realize that the introduction of God as a 'postulate of practical reason' is once again the thinking function at work, but now in self-corrective fashion. (De Voogd 1984:223-224).[133]

Hence, when it comes to Kant's project, from the perspective of Jung's epistemology in *Psychological Types*, it was, on the one hand, a step forward, as it recognised the boundaries of reason and, thus, redefined what achieving 'objectivity' meant with the notion of synthetic *a priori* conditions of possibility of knowledge, or the categories. However, on Jung's view, living in the eighteenth century, Kant was unable to grasp the fundamentally psychological nature of reason itself—the fact that it *could* overcome its one-sidedness and integrate its opposite, the 'irrational', through the process of individuation, granting it a fuller picture of reality, and thus redefining 'objectivity', once again.

Conclusion

To sum up, this chapter has explored the connections between Kant's philosophy and Jung's theory of psychological types, as outlined in *Psychological Types*. We have seen that Kant's project in the *Critique of Pure Reason* goes against the empiricist idea of 'pure observation' and the premise that our cognition conforms to objects—according to Kant, it is the other way around—what he famously termed the Copernican revolution in philosophy. At the heart of Kant's philosophy is the idea of synthetic *a priori* statements, which he saw as constituting the fundamental nature of judgements in metaphysics.

The chapter has shown that Kant's philosophy informed different aspects of Jung's epistemology underlying his theory of psychological types. Firstly, Jung also rejects

[133] See also de Voogd (1984) for a detailed discussion of her two interpretations of Jung's *esse in anima* in relation to Kant (as well as the difficulties that arise with them): one as 'a switch from pure reason to practical reason' and the other one as 'a radical departure from reason, proof and postulate to fantasy and fantasy images' (de Voogd 1984:223).

the notion of 'pure observation' and argues that science can provide us with merely 'abbreviations' of reality. His notion of a psychological type implies that different people see reality differently: that it *presents* or *appears* to them in different ways, to use a more Schopenhauerian language. Hence, I have argued that Jung provides a psychological formulation of Kant's work by synthesising Kant's philosophical notion of perceiving reality *subjectively* through a certain filter (for Kant, these are the *objectively valid* categories) and the Jamesian (also Nietzschean and so on) idea that people have fundamental psychological differences and see the world *subjectively* in the sense of the 'personal equation'—resulting *in a double subjectivity*. Both Kant and Jung redefine what it means to achieve objectivity and I have shown how Jung used Kant's philosophy as a *basic framework* for this, while further expanding *and re-imagining it in psychological terms*—thus, from Jung's perspective, removing it from a purely abstract, intellectual discussion. Hence, this chapter serves as a case study for both the history of applied Kantianism as well as the history and philosophy of science: Jung's reformulation of the scientific method borrows from Kant's reformulation of metaphysics.

Jung's relationship with Kant's philosophy, as well as Schopenhauer's philosophy, also offers insights into the interconnections between the histories of philosophy and psychology—namely, with regard to the distinction between the subject and the object. As there was no independent science of psychology in Kant's time, psychological questions were fundamentally intertwined with philosophical ones. As stated in the previous chapter, Schopenhauer's philosophy constituted a step towards the reframing of the philosophical discussion in psychological terms, with its emphasis on the 'subject' rather than the 'object'. Jung's goal was then to develop the *science of the subject,* one that would incorporate the philosophical insights gained from the philosophers that we have looked at in this thesis, as well as resolve the fundamental problem that they posed. It was *through this science of the subject that* Jung was seeking to determine *the nature of objectivity*.

As regards Kant's solution to the problem of opposites, Kant's philosophy constitutes an important step towards the solution by acknowledging and outlining the boundaries of reason—albeit *using reason*, which made it still rational, and therefore, one-sided, according to Jung. At the same time, Jung believed that this was precisely due to the constraints presented by the time period within which Kant

was working—namely, lack of *psychological knowledge*. Hence, with his project in *Psychological Types*, Jung believed himself to be merely *expanding Kant's thought*, or *modernising* it, rather than completely reformulating it.

CHAPTER VI. JUNG AND THE CLASSICAL AND MEDIEVAL THOUGHT: THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS, OR TYPES AS 'REAL' AND 'NOT REAL'

Introduction

The final chapter of this thesis is going to look at the first chapter of Jung's *Psychological Types*, titled 'The Problem of Types in the History of Classical and Medieval Thought'. It will be shown that here Jung introduces the key concepts of his theory of psychological types, as well as his view of psychology as a science and an epistemology. With regard to the former, I show that Jung illustrates the key dichotomy in his *Psychological Types*—of 'introversion' and 'extraversion'—through his analysis of the numerous debates in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. These included *religious* conflicts—such as the different responses to Gnosticism by Tertullian and Origen—and, most crucially, the *philosophical* 'problem of universals', or the 'realism and nominalism' debate. It is also significant that the first chapter of *Psychological Types* provides insight into Jung's *initial* conceptualisation of 'introversion' and 'extraversion', where the former combines what Jung terms the 'thinking' and 'intuition' types later in the book, whereas the latter combines the 'sensation' and 'feeling' types.[134] Secondly, in this chapter Jung also describes the notion of psychological 'one-sidedness' and the idea of 'compensation', where one moves to the other extreme psychological standpoint. Finally, and most importantly, Jung introduces the idea of 'fantasy', a key element of his ontology that is responsible for the reconciliation of the opposites.

With regard to Jung's epistemology, his views on the nature and *method* of psychology and science in general, the first chapter of *Psychological Types* is significant as it is here where Jung first outlines his view of philosophical positions as

[134] This is to be seen as a continuation of his line of thinking in his early conceptualisation of psychological types, as evident in his correspondence with Hans Schmid-Guisan in 1915 and 1916, and his work titled *The Psychology of The Unconscious Processes*, published in 1917, where he did not yet have the concept of 'psychological functions', distinct from 'function attitudes'.
For Jung's early use of 'introversion' and 'extraversion', see also 'Introduction' in Beebe and Falzeder (2013).

fundamentally being psychological attitudes—a key idea in Jamesian pragmatism, as we have seen before. I am going to show that Jung's discussion of the problem of universals can serve the purpose of also describing his approach to his own typology. In particular, Jung's psychological types are not to be seen either from the realist or nominalist perspective, but, in a sense, from an intermediate standpoint, which in practice implies that while the types are *generalisations* or *abstractions* (contra the nominalists), they are not *universals* (like Plato's Ideas or Forms): since, for Jung, a psychological typology cannot account for all the numerous individual differences, it is impossible to provide precise descriptions of the types themselves.

Review of Arguments in Secondary Literature

With regard to the secondary literature on Jung and classical and medieval thought, much has been written specifically on Jung's relationship with Gnosticism, noting his enthusiastic engagement with Gnostic materials throughout his life.[135] However, Leon Schlamm, for instance, has argued that 'Jung's preoccupation with the parallels between Gnostic and modern clinical materials should be construed, therefore, not as evidence that he was a Gnostic [...] but rather as a vehicle for carrying his own modern psychological research into the individuation process forward' (Schlamm 2014). In *Psychological Types* as well, Jung makes several references to Gnosticism. In Chapter V ('The Problem of Types in Poetry'), which we examined earlier in the context of 'visionary works', Jung refers to Gnosticism in his discussion of 'symbols', but when it comes to the conceptualisation of his psychological typology in particular, an important discussion in the book is that of Tertullian's and Origen's *reactions* to Gnosticism in Chapter I, 'The Problem of Types in the History of Classical and Medieval Thought'. Marilyn Nagy, for example, in her *Philosophical Issues in The Psychology of C.G. Jung*, argued that '[j]ust as Tertullian and Origen sacrificed their most developed, superior functions for an even higher religious value, so must a psychological epistemology (my term, not Jung's) always be ready to sacrifice its conscious standpoint for something even greater' (Nagy 1991:78). This thesis has expanded on this view of Jung's typology as an epistemology, by arguing

[135] For instance, see Segal (1987, 1992), Ribi (2013, 2019), Schlamm (2014).

that this recognition of 'psychological one-sidedness' at the heart of the 'personal equation' implies a redefinition of the scientific method for psychology as well as science in general. Furthermore, the close examination of Jung's discussion of Tertullian's and Origen's reactions to Gnosticism is important for understanding the evolution of Jung's typology *within Psychological Types*, from the first chapter to the last—as pointed out earlier, the book is internally inconsistent, since Jung appears to have written it sequentially for the most part, without necessarily going back and editing the chapters after completing it.

Research on the other areas explored in this chapter, such as, Jung's discussion of scholasticism and, in particular, the problem of universals and its implications for his typology—is lacking in secondary literature.[136]

Jung Reads Classical and Medieval Philosophy

In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung explains that his father started teaching him Latin when he was six years old (Jung 1962/1989:43). He recalls how, in his school years, he would go through the books in the library of his father—who was a pastor—reading 'whatever [he] could on God, the Trinity, spirit, consciousness' (Jung 1962/1989:42). While Jung immersed himself in religious literature—which, as we shall see, was of key importance in Chapter I of *Psychological Types*—there were no philosophical works in his father's library, since, Jung notes, 'they were suspect because they thought' (Jung 1962/1989:61). There was, however, the second edition of Wilhelm Traugott Krug's *General Dictionary of the Philosophical Sciences* (1832). Evidently, Jung became interested in theological debates from a young age. He found himself questioning philosophers' contention that 'God is an idea, a kind of arbitrary assumption which they can engender or not', while, for Jung, 'it [was] perfectly clear that He exists, as plain as a brick that falls on your head' (Jung 1962/1989:62). In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung also noted that he was disappointed that philosophers did not concern themselves with the 'dark deeds of God' (Jung

[136] Nagy summarises the whole discussion in 'The Problem of Types in the History of Classical and Medieval Thought' (Nagy 1991:75). Paul Bishop and Alfred Ribi have provided summaries of Jung's discussion of the problem of universals (Bishop 2009b:110; Ribi 2019:49).

1962/1989:62). Jung points out that, while these 'constituted a problem which, [he] gathered, was rather a hard one for the theologians', philosophers, according to Jung, 'had apparently never heard of it' (Jung 1962/1989:62).

Jung notes that in his school years, between his sixteenth and nineteenth years, he read an introduction to philosophy and discovered that 'many of [his] intuitions had historical analogues' (Jung 1962/1989:68). He became interested in the philosophies of 'Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Plato, despite the long-windedness of Socratic argumentation' (Jung 1962/1989:68). Whilst he saw their ideas as 'beautiful and academic, like pictures in a gallery', he also found them 'somewhat remote' (Jung 1962/1989:68). He notes that he only felt the 'breath of life' in the thought of Meister Eckhart, albeit adding: 'not that I understood him' (Jung 1962/1989:68). Aristotle's and St. Thomas' thought seemed to him 'more lifeless than a desert' (Jung 1962/1989:69). Already in his school years Jung recognised the importance of experience when it came to proving beliefs: to Jung, these philosophers seemed 'like people who knew by hearsay that elephants existed, but had never seen one, and were now trying to prove by arguments that on logical grounds such animals must exist and must be constituted as in fact they are' (Jung 1962/1989:69). As we can see, these criticisms of 'traditional' philosophy are in line with Jung's subsequent admiration of James' pragmatist philosophy.

As for Gnosticism in particular, whilst Jung stated that he was not a Gnostic, there are numerous references to Gnosticism in his works. As Schlamm points out, his 'interest in Gnosticism arose as early as 1909, through his discovery that they were apparently the first thinkers to concern themselves with the numinous contents of the collective unconscious' (Schlamm 2014). In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung notes that he studied Gnosticism in detail between 1918 and 1926, 'for [the Gnostics] too had been confronted with the primal world of the unconscious and had dealt with its contents' (Jung 1962/1989:200). Jung then notes that there was a historical linkage between Gnosticism and—through alchemy, with its basis in medieval philosophy—the 'modern psychology of the unconscious' (Jung 1962/1989:201).

Before we proceed any further, it is essential to note that, even though this chapter deals with Jung's discussion of both classical and medieval thought in *Psychological Types*, the transition between these two historical periods was a *psychologically*

important one for Jung. In Chapter V of *Psychological Types*, Jung associates the birth of modern individualism with the medieval period in the context of his discussion of 'visionary' works—namely, Goethe's *Faust* and Dante Alighieri's *Divina Commedia*—in relation to the idea that the 'service of woman' symbolised the 'service of the soul' (Jung 1923:272).[137] On Jung's account, individualism began in the Middle Ages 'with the service of woman, thereby effecting a most important reinforcement of man's soul as a psychological factor; since service of woman means service of the soul' (Jung 1923:272). On Jung's account, this development of individualism was, in turn, crucial for the history of science, as he links it with the birth of 'objective science' in Chapter I of *Psychological Types*. According to Jung, '[t]he further we go back into history the more we see personality disappearing beneath the wrappings of collectivity' and, what is more, 'if we go right down to primitive psychology, we find absolutely no trace of the idea of the individual' (Jung 1923:18). He points out that '[i]t is no wonder, therefore, that the earlier all-powerful collective attitude almost entirely prevented an objective psychological estimation of individual differences, and forbade any general scientific objectification of individual psychological processes' (Jung 1923:18). According to Jung, '[i]t was owing to this very lack of psychological thinking that knowledge became 'psychologized', *i.e.* crowded with projected psychology' (Jung 1923:18). Thus, Jung concludes that '[t]he development of individuality, with the resulting psychological differentiation of man, goes hand in hand with a depsychologizing of objective science' (Jung 1923:18). Hence, Jung also notes that 'objective psychology' was of recent development and that 'the works of the ancients are full of psychology, but only little of it can be described as objective psychology' (Jung 1923:15). This manifested in 'an almost exclusive biological appreciation of their fellow men' in Antiquity, which contrasted with the 'metaphysical' one in the Middle Ages (Jung 1923:15).[138]

[137] As Jung points out in *Psychological Types*, '[t]he Service of God is the Christian principle which reconciles the opposites; with Buddhism it is service of the Self (self-development); while the principle of solution suggested by Goethe and Spitteler is service of the soul symbolized in the *service of woman'* (Jung 1923:272).
For a detailed exploration of the significance of Dante's *Divina Commedia* for Jung's psychology, see Priviero (2021).
[138] Thus, Jung regarded the ancient theory of the four temperaments as 'hardly a psychological typification, since the temperaments are scarcely more than psycho-physiological complexions' (Jung 1923:18).

Hence, on Jung's account, the classical period was characterised by the prevalence of the *collective* attitude, whereas the medieval period was associated with the birth of *individualism*, and, as a consequence, of *science*, as it was understood in Jung's time.

Introversion and Extraversion: The Abstract and the Concrete

In the first section of this chapter, I am going to look at Jung's conceptualisation of extraversion—the psychological tendency to orientate oneself towards the object, and introversion—the psychological orientation towards the subject, in the first chapter of *Psychological Types*. We shall see that Jung initially characterised extraversion as *concrete* and *feeling*-based and introversion as *abstract* and *thinking*-based—these, as we have seen, and as Jung describes in the 'Introduction', subsequently evolve to become separate 'functions' ('sensation', 'feeling', 'intuition', 'thinking'), each capable of having an extraverted or introverted 'attitude' or orientation. We shall see that Jung's conception of introversion and extraversion in the first chapter of *Psychological Types* (where he effectively equates introversion with thinking and intuition and extraversion with feeling and sensation) is an elaboration on the version detailed in his correspondence with Hans Schmid-Guisan in 1915-1916 (where, as noted previously, he equated extraversion with feeling and introversion with thinking), as well as in his work titled *The Psychology of The Unconscious Processes: Being a Survey of the Modern Theory and Method of Analytical Psychology*, published in 1917.[139] [140]In the latter work, Jung also equated introversion with thinking and extraversion with feeling: '[i]n the one type the fundamental function is feeling, and in the other it is thought' and '[t]he one feels his way into the object, the other thinks about it' (Jung 1917/1920f). This meant that '[t]he one adapts himself to his surroundings by feeling, thinking coming later; whilst

[139] The latter appears in the second edition of the *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* (1917/1920f).

[140] Indeed, in Chapter II of *Psychological Types* (titled 'Schiller's Ideas Upon The Type Problem') Jung himself states: 'I would request the reader, who perhaps may have been led by my earlier publications to identify feeling with extraversion and thinking with introversion, to be good enough to bear in mind the definitions furnished in the last chapter' (Jung 1923:89). He then explains that there are four function types (thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition), each of which can be introverted and extraverted (Jung 1923:89). Hence, in this case, Jung does go back to Chapter II to make this clarification after writing Chapter XI, 'Definitions'—which, however, he does not do in Chapter I.

the other adapts himself by means of thought, preceded by understanding' (1917/1920f).

Whilst all of the different historical conflicts described in the first chapter of *Psychological Types* are to do with the general psychological dichotomy of extraversion and introversion, in this section I am going to specifically look at Jung's discussions of the theological disputes of the early Christian church and the problem of transubstantiation: *i.e.* those to do with the different conceptualisations of the nature of Jesus Christ, who was seen, on the one hand, as primarily human (of corporeal nature), and, on the other hand, as primarily divine (of spiritual nature).

In Chapter I of *Psychological Types,* Jung draws a parallel between a number of different conflicts in the history of Christianity, arguing that all of these appear to have been based on the distinction between the *concrete* and the *abstract*—which, for Jung, is a manifestation of the psychological conflict between extraversion and introversion respectively: 'Again, in this controversy one can easily recognise those basic elements which we have already met with in the disputes commented upon earlier, namely, the abstract standpoint that is averse from any intercourse with the concrete object and the concretistic, that is, turned to the object' (Jung 1923:35).

Jung gives several examples of theological conflicts, showing that they were all fundamentally based on the opposition between the concrete and the abstract with regard to their conceptions of Christ. Jung starts with the conflict between the Ebionites and the Docetists. The former, or Jewish Christians, 'who in this respect were probably identical with the primitive Christians generally, believed in the exclusive humanity of Christ and held him to be the son of Mary and Joseph, only subsequently receiving his consecration through the Holy Ghost' (Jung 1923:30). Jung then points out that '[t]he Ebionites are, therefore, upon this point diametrically opposed to the Docetists' (Jung 1923:30). The conflict re-emerged in the great Arian controversy: 'When we examine more closely the history of the great Arian controversy concerning Homoousia and Homoiousia (the complete identity as against the essential similarity of Christ with God), it certainly seems to us that the formula of Homoiousia definitely lays the accent upon the sensuous and humanly perceptible, in contrast to the purely conceptual and abstract standpoint of

Homoousia' (Jung 1923:30).[141] And then, there was the conflict between the Monophysites and Dyophysites: 'In the same way it would appear to us, as though the revolt of the Monophysites (who upheld the absolute one-ness of the nature of Christ) against the Dyophysitic formula of the Council of Chalcedon (which upheld the inseparable duality of Christ, namely his *human* and *divine* nature fashioned in one body) once more asserted the standpoint of the abstract and unimaginable as opposed to the sensuous and natural viewpoint of the Dyophysitic formula' (Jung 1923:30-31).

Another example of a historical dispute within the history of Christianity that Jung links with the opposition between the abstract and the concrete is the 'problem of transubstantiation'. The doctrine of transubstantiation, advanced in the middle of the ninth century by the Abbot Paschasius Radbertus, was 'the view that the wine and holy wafer become transformed in the Communion into the actual blood and body of Christ' (Jung 1923:34). This view 'became a dogma, according to which the transformation is accomplished "vere, realiter, substantialiter"("in truth, in reality, in substance"); although the "accidentals" preserve their outer aspect of bread and wine, they are substantially the flesh and the blood of Christ' (Jung 1923:34). Jung sees the doctrine of transubstantiation—being *concretistic* and *sensory*—as a product of extraversion, and contrasts it with the opposing point of view, advanced by the monk Ratramnus and, most notably, by Scotus Erigena, whom Jung refers to as 'one of the great philosophers and daring thinkers of the early Middle Ages' (Jung 1923:34). Jung writes of the philosopher: 'Scotus Erigena, to whom true philosophy was also true religion, was no blind follower of authority and the 'once accepted'; because, unlike the majority of his age, he could himself think' (Jung 1923:34). This was because '[h]e set reason above authority, very unseasonably perhaps but in a way that assured him of the recognition of the later centuries' (Jung 1923:34). Erigena's take on the problem was, thus, as follows: he believed that 'the Communion [was] merely a commemoration of that Last Supper which Jesus celebrated with his disciples; a view in which the reasonable man of every age will, moreover, participate' (Jung 1923:34).

[141] According to Mark J. Edwards, Origen was 'the first Christian to speak of three "hypostases" in the Trinity and to use the term homoousios (though only by analogy) of the relation between the second of these hypostases and the first' (Edwards 2022).

Jung also provides the example of the so-called Pelagian controversy, involving St Augustine, drawing a distinction between *thinking*, on the one hand, and *feeling* on the other hand. He states that St Augustine was in many ways 'not unlike Tertullian'—whom, as we shall see in the following section, he regarded as an introvert and a thinker. Jung points out that, for St Augustine, '[o]ver against the fact of original sin there stood [...] the redeeming grace of God, with the institution of the church ordained by His grace to administer the means of salvation' (Jung 1923:32). However, '[i]n this conception the value of man stands very low', for '[h]e is really nothing but a miserable rejected creature, who is delivered over to the devil under all circumstances, unless through the medium of the church, the sole means of salvation, he is made a participator of the divine grace' (Jung 1923:32). This meant that 'to a greater or less degree, not only man's value but also his moral freedom and self-government crumbled away; as a result, the value and importance of the church as an idea was so much the more enhanced, corresponding to the expressed programme in the Augustinian civitas Dei' (Jung 1923:32). On the other hand, there was the view advocated by the British monk Pelagius and his pupil Caelestius, with which 'springing ever anew, rises the feeling of the freedom and moral value of man; it is a feeling that will not long endure suppression whether by inspection however searching, or logic however keen' (Jung 1923:32-33).

Hence, as is evident from the discussion above, in Chapter I of *Psychological Types*, Jung is drawing a contrast between the abstract, conceptual and thinking-based standpoint—which for his early conceptualisation of types, implied an orientation towards the subject, *i.e.* introversion—and the concrete, sensory and feeling-based standpoint—implying an orientation towards the object, *i.e.* extraversion.[142] Another key insight from this section of Jung's chapter is the idea of 'incommensurability' of the two psychological attitudes: 'We may, however, learn from this example, that the thought of the introvert is incommensurable [inkommensurabel] with the thought of the extravert, since the two thought-forms, as regards their determinants, are wholly and fundamentally different' (Jung 1923:36). This idea of 'incommensurability' relates to the notion of 'one-sidedness', meaning that it is impossible to 'translate'

[142] Jung also adds here that the thinking of the introvert might be termed 'sensible' [vernünftig] (different from Jung's 'rational'), whilst the thinking of the extravert— 'programmatical' [programmatish] (Jung 1923:36). Jung subsequently drops this dichotomy in *Psychological Types*, not developing it any further.

between the two types, or reduce one type to the other, as they are *complete* opposites. The notion of one-sidedness will be explored in greater detail in the following section of this chapter.

Psychological One-Sidedness and The Notion of Compensation

In this section, I am going to look at Jung's further conceptualisation of his psychological types in the first chapter of *Psychological Types*—namely, the psychological tendency to overcome 'one-sidedness', or to 'compensate' for it. As we shall see, for Jung, this can manifest in the tendency to move towards the opposite of one's default psychological attitude—to the other extreme, thereby failing to actually *resolve* the conflict of opposites. Jung introduces this notion of compensation in his chapter through the discussion of two Church fathers, Tertullian (c. 155 – c. 220) and Origen (c. 185 – c. 254)—the former being an example of the introverted type and the latter of the extraverted type.[143] Jung demonstrates their psychologies through the stories of how the two Church fathers reacted to the Gnostic movement. Jung bases his discussion of these two figures mainly on Wolfgang Schultz's *Dokumente Der Gnosis*, as well as on primary sources and on Adolf von Harnack's *History of Dogma* (Schultz 1910; Harnack 1886).

Gnosticism is a term that is used to describe a loosely organised collection of religious and philosophical ideas that originated in the first century AD, emphasising the role of personal spiritual knowledge, or 'gnosis'. As Edward Moore and John D. Turner point out, the term 'Gnosticism' was coined by Henry More in the seventeenth century to describe the heresy of Thyatira (Moore and Turner 2000:174). Similarly to Jung, Frederick Copleston, for instance, describes the reaction of Tertullian, as well as of Irenaeus and Hippolytus, as one that treated Gnosticism as a 'heretical speculative system', due to the fact that it combined Oriental and Christian elements with Greek philosophy (Copleston 1962:25). On the other hand, Origen's reaction, representing Catechetical School at Alexandria, could

[143] Tertullian was among the subjects discussed at the Zurich Psychoanalytical Society in 1916 (Minutes of the Zurich Psychoanalytical Society).

be described as characterised by 'the effort to construct a non-heretical 'gnosis', a Christian theologico-philosophical system' (Copleston 1962:26).[144]

Jung describes Tertullian's default psychological attitude as 'introverted'—which, as we have seen, at this stage he conflates with thinking and intuition. As such, according to Jung, in an attempt to overcome his psychological one-sidedness, Tertullian subsequently moves to the other extreme, which manifested in his reaction to Gnosis. Jung explains: 'That psychological process of development which we term the *Christian* led him to the sacrifice, the amputation, of the most valuable function, a mythical idea which is also contained in the great and exemplary symbol of the sacrifice of the Son of God' (Jung 1923:22). In the case of Tertullian, '[h]is most valuable organ was the intellect, including that clear discernment of which it was the instrument' (Jung 1923:22-23). Jung describes this phenomenon as the 'sacrificium intellectus', through which the 'way of purely intellectual development was forbidden him; it forced him to recognize the irrational *dynamis* of his soul as the foundation of his being' (Jung 1923:23). According to Jung, '[t]he intellectuality of the Gnosis, its specifically rational coinage of the dynamic phenomena of the soul, must necessarily have been odious to him [Tertullian], for that was just the way he had to forsake, in order to recognize the principle of feeling' (Jung 1923:22-23). Tertullian's transition to the extraverted side, hence, implied a move towards extreme *concretisation*, which, on Jung's account, would explain Tertullian's claim that everything was fundamentally corporeal:

> Since, however, it [the soul], must needs have something through which it exists. If it has something, it must be its body [corpus eius]. Everything which exists is a bodily substance *sui generis*. Nothing lacks bodily existence but that which is not-existent (Tertullian quoted in Hillar 2012:177).[145]

It is interesting that Jung's account of Tertullian's reaction to Gnosticism—namely, the transition from 'thinking' to 'feeling'—can be seen as opposing the view of some

[144] The question of Origen's relation to Gnosticism is a disputed topic among historians. Edwards, for instance, points out, that '[i]n contrast to the Gnostics […] who held that our world is the residue of a rupture or fall within the Godhead, Origen maintains that a single God is the creator of both the intellectual and the material cosmos' (Edwards 2022).

[145] Copleston summaries the different stances on Tertullian, stating that, 'many writers have concluded from these statements that Tertullian maintained a materialistic doctrine and held God to be really a material being', whilst 'some […] have suggested that by 'body' Tertullian often meant simply substance and that when he attributes materiality to God, he is really simply attributing substantiality to God' (Copleston 1962:24).

modern scholars, according to which Tertullian 'was not so much anti-philosophical or anti-rational, but that he developed a philosophy based on revelation; he did not separate faith and reason, but developed a reason based on faith' (Trigg 2004:22). On this view, Tertullian, instead of being 'one-sided' in Jung's terms, actually succeeded in integrating the two sides of the dichotomy.

According to Jung, Origen, on the other hand, was a representative of the extraverted attitude—here conflated with sensation and feeling: 'His basic orientation is towards the object; this shows itself in his conscientious consideration of objective facts and their conditions; it is also revealed in the formulation of that supreme principle: amor et visio Dei' (Jung 192325). As such, Origen was naturally orientated towards the concrete and the corporeal: 'The Christian process of development encountered in Origen a type whose bed-rock foundation is the relation to the object; a type that has ever symbolically expressed itself in sexuality; which also accounts for the fact that there even exist to-day certain theories which reduce every essential function of the soul down to sexuality' (Jung 1923:25). On Jung's account, '[c]astration [was] therefore the adequate expression of the sacrifice of the most valuable function' (Jung 1923:25).[146] Hence, Origen transitions from the extraverted attitude to the introverted attitude, with its emphasis on thinking and the abstract. This, on Jung's account, then, would accommodate his views on the nature of God, whom he believed to be purely *spiritual*, or *incorporeal* and also equated with '[Platonic] *nous* or intellect' (Edwards 2022). Mark J. Edwards has argued, however, that with his account of God 'Origen speaks not only for the Platonists but for all the Greek apologists of the church: the prevalent thought of his time (and perhaps of ours) required that if God is to be invisible, immutable, eternal, omnipresent, and irresistible in power he must not be confined to one place or composed of labile matter' (Edwards 2022).

Thus, according to Jung, Origen commits a 'sacrificium phalli', in contrast with Tertullian's 'sacrificium intellectus', because 'the Christian process demands a complete abolition of the sensual hold upon the object' or, in other words 'the sacrifice of the hitherto most valuable function, the dearest possession, the strongest

[146] Joseph Trigg writes on this topic:
'It seems that Origen's youthful ascetic enthusiasm led him to follow what he then took to be a counsel of self-castration in Matthew 19:12. Eusebius tells us that Origen later regretted the act, and in his Commentary on Matthew he explicitly repudiated any such interpretation' (Trigg, 1998:14).

instinct' (Jung 1923:25). Jung then proceeds to further explain the process of the formation of psychological one-sidedness (or, in other words, of a *psychological type*) in the first place and this subsequent tendency to compensate for it, metaphorically termed as 'amputation' or sacrifice, as follows:

> One man is rather more gifted here, another there; or, again, adaptation to the early environment of childhood may demand either relatively more restraint and reflection or relatively more sympathy and participation, according to the nature of the parents and other circumstances. Thereby a certain preferential attitude is automatically moulded, which results in different types. In so far then as every man, as a relatively stable being, possesses all the basic psychological functions, it would be a psychological necessity with a view to perfect adaptation that he should also employ them in equal measure. For there must be a reason why there are different ways of psychological adaptation: evidently one alone is not sufficient, since the object seems to be only partially comprehended when, for example, it is either merely thought or merely felt. Through a onesided (typical) attitude there remains a deficit in the resulting psychological adaptation, which accumulates during the course of life; from this deficiency a derangement of adaptation develops, which forces the subject towards a compensation. But the compensation [Compensation] can be obtained only by means of *amputation* [Abschneidung] (sacrifice [Opfer]) of the hitherto one-sided [einseitigen] attitude. Thereby a temporary heaping up of energy results and an overflow into channels hitherto not consciously used though already existing unconsciously. The adaptation deficit, which is the causa efficiens of the process of conversion, becomes subjectively perceived as a vague sense of dissatisfaction. (Jung 1923:28).

For Jung, then, as we have seen, 'in the Christian process, the original type has actually become reversed: Tertullian, the acute thinker, becomes the man of feeling, while Origen becomes the scholar and loses himself in the intellect' (Jung 1923:26-27). It is important to note that Jung is careful to remark on the seemingly more logical or biological (perhaps more 'scientific') explanation of Tertullian's and Origen's stories—that perhaps there was no transition from the one psychological extreme to the other, that the former was indeed an extravert and the latter an introvert by default: 'Logically, of course, it is quite easy to reverse the state of affairs and to say that Tertullian had always been the man of feeling and Origen the intellectual' (Jung 1923:27). Jung writes further: 'Disregarding the fact that the difference of type is not done away with by this procedure, but exists as before, the

reversed point of view has still to be explained; how comes it that Tertullian saw his most dangerous enemy in the intellect, while Origen in sexuality?' (Jung 1923:27). Hence, '[o]ne could say they were both deceived, and one could advance the fatal result of both lives by way of argument' (Jung 1923:27). However, '[o]ne must assume, if that were the case, that both had sacrificed the less important thing, and thus to a certain extent both had made a bargain with fate' (Jung 1923:27). Whilst Jung states that this view 'contains a principle of recognizable validity' he believes that there is something meaningful missing in that account and that his notion of compensation, resulting in the switching of the psychological attitude to the opposite one, appeared to be the plausible explanation: 'I am, however, of opinion that the depreciatory method of explanation, notwithstanding the unmistakable relief which the ordinary human being feels in dragging down something great, is not under all circumstances the correct one, even though it may appear to be very "biological"' (Jung 1923:27).

This idea of compensation as an attempt to overcome one's psychological one-sidedness, on Jung's account, is a failed one, as it only takes one to the other extreme, without thereby doing away with psychological one-sidedness. On Jung's view, then, the history of philosophy is a manifestation of precisely this phenomenon: the tension between idealistic and materialistic philosophies perpetually superseding each other, with unsatisfactory attempts at their reconciliation in between. As we shall see in the next section of this chapter, Jung puts forward his notion of 'fantasy'—a key element of his ontology—to outline his take on the solution to the problem of opposites.

The Mechanism for the Solution to the Problem of Opposites: Fantasy

The first chapter of Jung's *Psychological Types* is particularly significant with regard to introducing a key element of Jung's theory of psychological types that enables the possibility of the union of opposites—the notion of 'fantasy' [Phantasie]. We have seen in the previous chapters—in Jung's discussion of Kant, Schopenhauer, and others—how Jung reformulates philosophical positions in *psychological* terms,

stating that philosophers were doomed in their attempt to provide philosophical (*i.e.,* intellectual, or *rational*) solutions. For Jung, since the problem was ultimately psychological, so was the solution—in particular, it was found in 'fantasy'. As Jung puts it, 'in fantasy alone are both mechanisms united' (Jung 1923:69; translation modified).[147] Jung describes fantasy as follows:

> This peculiar activity of the psyche, which can be explained neither as a reflexive reaction to sense-stimuli nor as an executive organ of eternal ideas is, like every vital process, a perpetually creative act. Each new day reality is created by the psyche. The only expression I can use for this activity is *fantasy*. Fantasy is just as much feeling as thought; it is intuitive just as much as sensational. There are no psychic functions which in fantasy are not inextricably inter-related with the other psychic functions. At one time it appears primordial, at another as the latest and most daring product of gathered knowledge. Fantasy, therefore, appears to me as the clearest expression of the specific psychic activity. Before everything it is the creative activity whence issue the solutions to all answerable questions; it is the mother of all possibilities, in which too the inner and the outer worlds, like all psychological antitheses, are joined in living union. Fantasy it was and ever is which fashions the bridge between the irreconcilable claims of object and subject, of extraversion and introversion. (Jung 1923:69; translation modified).

However, as Jung points out, 'fantasy for the most part is a product of the unconscious' (Jung 1923:69; translation modified). It is characterised by being 'essentially involuntary' and 'inherently opposed to conscious contents' (Jung 1923:69-70). Thus, Jung points out that '[t]he relation of the individual to his fantasy is very largely conditioned by his relation to the unconscious in general, and this in its turn is peculiarly influenced by the spirit of the age' (Jung 1923:70; translation modified). As we have seen previously in this thesis, the works that Jung regarded as 'visionary' were 'special' for their ability to access the collective unconscious.[148] The *mechanism* that is then actually responsible for the reconciliation of opposites is Jung's notion of fantasy.

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[147] One could draw a parallel between Schopenhauer's metaphysical notion of the 'will' and Jung's psychological notion of 'fantasy': just like, for Schopenhauer, everything is an objectification of the will, so, for Jung, everything (that is *psychological*) is fundamentally fantasy—and as we have seen, according to Jung, both philosophy and science *are* psychological at heart.

[148] As stated previously, the main discussion on the nature of the reconciliation of the problem of opposites in *Psychological Types* is discussed by Jung in 'The Problem of Types in Poetry', which we have previously looked at in Chapter III of this thesis.

What is more, here Jung also states that '[in] inverse ratio to the degree of prevailing rationalism will the individual be more or less disposed to have dealings with the unconscious and its products' (Jung 1923:70). As we have seen before, for Jung, in order to resolve the problem of the personal equation, one needed to resolve the problem of opposites through the integration of their psychological opposite in the unconscious—in other words, to achieve individuation. Thus, in a society where rationalism prevails, individuals are less likely to access the unconscious and, hence, less likely to individuate, which meant that the problem of the personal equation, the problem of *subjectivity* in psychology and science in general, remained unresolved. Therefore, the engagement with repressed 'irrational' elements in the collective unconscious through 'fantasy' was an important step towards the resolution of the problem of opposites, and, consequently, the resolution of the problem of the personal equation, which leads to the achievement of objectivity in a new sense.

Hence, Jung argues that the problem of opposites needs a solution that does not take one from one extreme to the other, but manages to arrive at the intermediate, balanced state, and it is through fantasy that it is possible to achieve this state. Tertullian and Origen's move to the other extreme to compensate for their one-sidedness, as we have seen, does not resolve the conflict of opposites, but merely restates it. For Jung, the conflict can only be resolved when the two opposites are united and, as a result of this union, a new, higher, third is created: 'When Faust exclaims "feeling is everything", he is expressing merely the antithesis to the intellect, and therefore only reaches the other extreme; he does not achieve that totality of life and of his own psyche in which feeling and thought are joined in a third and higher principle [in einem höhern Dritten vereinigt]' (Jung 1923:76). According to Jung, '[t]his higher third […] can be understood as a practical goal or as the fantasy which creates the goal' (Jung 1923:76-77). He writes on fantasy further:

> This aim of totality can be recognized neither by the science, whose end is in itself, nor by feeling, which lacks the faculty of vision belonging to thought. The one must lend itself as auxiliary to the other, yet the contrast between them is so great that we need a bridge. This bridge is already given us in creative fantasy. It is not born of either, for it is the mother of both – nay, further, it is pregnant with the child, that final aim which reconciles the opposites. If psychology remains only a science, we do not reach life – we merely serve the absolute aim of science. (Jung 1923:77).

On Jung's view, as psychology recognises and integrates the 'irrational', it would no longer belong in the realm of intellectualistic science. But, for Jung, science itself was fundamentally psychological—the product of the 'intellect' or rationality, and as such was fundamentally one-sided: '[s]cience under all circumstances is an affair of the intellect, and the other psychological functions are submitted to it in the form of objects' (Jung 1923:76). It follows, then, on Jung's account, science *could* and *should* integrate its opposite, the 'irrational', through psychology. And this can be achieved through fantasy, the above described 'creative' psychological activity.

Jung describes the notion of fantasy in the context of his discussion of the opposition between realism and nominalism. In the following section, we shall see that Jung views this philosophical conflict as another example of the opposition between 'introversion' and 'extraversion'.

The Nominalism and Realism Debate

In this section I am going to look at Jung's discussion of the problem of universals—also known as the nominalism-realism debate—in the first chapter of *Psychological Types*.[149] According to Jung, it was the greatest debate in the classical and medieval thought: 'The Holy Communion controversy of the ninth century was merely the anacrusis of a much greater strife that for centuries severed the minds of men and embraced immeasurable consequences' (Jung 1923:37). On Jung's account, nominalism is seen as a manifestation of the psychological tendency to orientate oneself towards the object—extraversion (here, as we have seen, conflated with sensation and feeling)—which then leads one to treat objects as individuals and concepts as mere labels without any general, or *abstract* meaning—as there are no actual abstractions, or generalities behind the labels. Realism, or universalism, on the other hand, is seen as a manifestation of introversion (here conflated with intuition and thinking): it does presuppose a belief in the reality of abstract entities or generalities (universals) and in that our concepts correspond, or *genuinely refer*, to those entities.

[149] The problem of universals translates to the question of 'natural kinds', which has been an important topic in the philosophy of science. For a general discussion, see Bird and Tobin (2022).

Jung defines nominalism as 'that school which asserted that the so-called universalia, namely the generic or universal concepts, such as beauty, goodness, animal, man, etc., are nothing but nomina (names) or words, derisively called "flatus vocis"' (Jung 1923:37). He also notes that '[d]espite its ecclesiastical association, nominalism is a sceptical current which denies that separate existence which is characteristic of the abstract' (Jung 1923:37). He further describes nominalism as 'a kind of scientific scepticism within a quite rigid dogmatism' since '[i]ts concept of reality necessarily coincides with the sensuous reality of things; it is the individuality of things which represents the real as opposed to the abstract idea' (Jung 1923:38). On the other hand, Jung defines realism as the position that 'affirms the existence of the universalia ante rem, namely, that the universal concepts have existence in themselves after the manner of the Platonic ideas' (Jung 1923:38). Hence, it 'transfers the accent of reality to the abstract, the idea, the universal, which it places ante rem (before the thing)' (Jung 1923:38).[150]

Jung then proceeds to examine the conflict in Antiquity, comparing the philosophies of Plato and the Platonists on the one hand, and those of the Cynics (Antisthenes) and Megarians (Stilpon of Megara) on the other hand (Jung 1923:38). To explain and analyse the debate, Jung refers to Theodor Gomperz, an Austrian philosopher, and his conceptualisation of the problem of 'inherency and predication' (Gomperz 1893/1901-2). Jung writes, that, '[w]hen, for instance, we speak of "warm" and "cold", we speak of "warm" and "cold" things, to which "warm" and "cold" as attributes, predicates, or assertions respectively belong' (Jung 1923:41). He explains then that '[f]rom a plurality of similar cases we abstract the concepts of "warmth" and "coldness", with which also we immediately connect or associate something concrete' (Jung 1923:41). Hence, these notions of 'warmth' and 'coldness', and other abstractions of similar kind, 'are to us something real, because of the perseveration of perception in the abstraction' (Jung 1923:41). We could also think of a 'higher grade generic concept', such as 'temperature': as Jung points out, 'its "thingness" (das Dinghafte) is still readily perceptible to us, so that, in spite of a certain diminution in its sensuous definiteness, it has renounced none of its representability' (Jung 1923:41). However, '[i]f we further ascend to a still higher generic concept, viz.

[150] On problem of universals, see Armstrong (1978), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2000), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005).

“energy”, the character of “thingness” quite disappears, and with it, to a certain degree, goes the quality of representability’ (Jung 1923:41). At this level, it becomes difficult to point out whether such abstractions are ‘purely conceptual or abstract’ or ‘something real’ (Jung 1923:41).

Jung then relates the nominalist versus realist debate to the psychological conflict between extraversion and introversion respectively, suggesting that both are fundamentally *one-sided* and create a mythology of their own, unable to gain a full picture of reality. This means that ‘[w]hen, therefore, the nominalist calls to the realist: "You are dreaming—you think you are dealing with things, but in reality you are only fighting verbal chimeras”, the realist can answer the nominalist in precisely the same words; for neither is the nominalist concerned with things in themselves but with words, which he sets in the place of things’ (Jung 1923:46). However, as fundamentally psychological, ‘both forms of judgement are justifiable as both are present in every man’ (Jung 1923: 47-48). To show this, Jung provides the example of (otherwise nominalist) Euclid of Megara’s all-unity principle, which naturally strived to overcome his one-sidedness. Euclid of Megara ‘linked together the Eleatic principle of the "existing" with the "good", so that for him the "existing" and the "good" were identical’ and ‘[a]gainst which there stood only the "nonexisting evil"’ (Jung 1923:48). Jung then writes that ‘[t]his optimistic “all-oneness”, is, of course nothing but a generic concept of the highest order, one that directly embraces the existing, but at the same time contravenes all evidence, and this in a much higher degree than the Platonic ideas’ (Jung 1923:48). For Jung, ‘[w]ith this concept Euclid created a compensation to the critical disintegration of the constructive judgment into mere word things’ (Jung 1923:48). He adds that ‘[t]his all-in-one principle is so remote and so vague that it utterly fails to express the conformity of things; it is no type at all, but rather the product of a desire for a unity that shall comprehend the disordered multitude of individual things’ (Jung 1923:48). Jung notes that ‘[the desire for such a unity urges itself upon all who pay allegiance to an extreme nominalism, in so far as there is an effort to emerge from the negatively critical attitude’ (Jung 1923:48).

Jung’s hinting at the solution in the following section where he provides a criticism of both the realists and the nominalists. On the one hand, Jung appears to agree with the nominalist criticism of the fact that language, words, can tell us something about

objects, *objective nature of reality*. He quotes Eubulides' (the pupil of Euclid of Megara) paradoxes, such as the Horns Paradox: 'What you have not lost, thou still have, you have not lost horns, therefore you have horns' (Jung 1923:44). Jung then states that '[i]t could be convincingly proved by this method that absolute verbal significance was a delusion' (Jung 1923:44). However, on the other hand, Jung disagrees with the nominalists that this implies that one cannot infer generalities from similarities between objects, despite being unable to provide exact descriptions of those generalities. Jung writes that 'generic concepts cease to be merely nomina when similarities or conformities of things are designated by them' (Jung 1923:45). Jung writes that '[s]uch conformities actually exist, hence the generic concept also corresponds with reality' (Jung 1923:45). Ultimately, the problem 'lies neither in the concept nor in the idea but in its verbal expression, which obviously under no circumstances renders either the thing adequately or the conformity of things' (Jung 1923:45). Hence, Jung appears to agree with the realists that generalities do exist, but also agree with the nominalists that it is impossible to pin them down, provide exact descriptions of them due to the 'impotence of language' (Jung 1923:45).

It becomes evident later in the first chapter of *Psychological Types* that Jung bases his position on the problem of universals on that of Peter Abelard (c. 1079 – 1142), a French scholastic philosopher. According to Jung, the closest to the solution to the problem of universals happened not in Antiquity but in the Middle Ages. From Jung's perspective, Abelard's philosophical position attempted to achieve an intermediate standpoint between realism and nominalism as follows:

> From nominalism Abelard takes the truth that the universalia are words, in the sense that they are intellectual conventions expressed by language; furthermore, he takes from it the truth that a thing in reality is not universal but always something particular, and that substance in reality is never a universal but an individual fact. From Realism Abelard takes the truth that 'genera' and 'species' are combinations of individual facts and things on the ground of their indubitable similarity. (Jung 1923:63).

Jung refers to Abelard's position as an instance of conceptualism, the idea that universals are created in the *mind*: 'this is to be understood as a function which comprises the individual objects *perceived*, classifies them into genera and species upon the basis of their similarity, and thus reduces their absolute multiplicity to a

relative unity' (Jung 1923:63, italics added).[151] Hence, '[h]owever unquestionable multiplicity and diversity may be, the existence of similarities, which by means of the concept makes fusion possible, is equally beyond dispute' (Jung 1923:63). Indeed, Jung's description of Abelard's solution as a mediatory standpoint is in line with the way it is described in some of the secondary literature on Abelard. As Anthony Kenny puts it, for instance: '[o]n the one hand, he [Abelard] said it was absurd to say that Adam and Peter had nothing in common other than the word 'human'; the noun applied to each of them in virtue of their likeness to each other, which was something objective' and, '[o]n the other hand, it is absurd to say that there is a substantial entity, the human species, which is present in its entirety in each and every individual; this would imply that Socrates must be identical with Plato and that he must be in two places at the same time' (Kenny 2005:125). Nevertheless, '[a] resemblance is not a substantial thing like a horse or a cabbage, and only individual things exist' (Kenny 2005:125).

However, as was the case with the previous philosophers we have looked at in this thesis, Jung *expands on* Abelard's solution to the problem of universals and *reformulates it in psychological* terms—having reformulated the problem of universals itself as a *psychological* problem. Hence, Jung regards Abelard's approach as fundamentally 'one-sided', seeing it as fundamentally *conceptual*, intellectual or *rational* in psychological terms. He writes, that 'if in the opposition between nominalism and realism it were merely a question of logical-intellectual arrangement, it would be incomprehensible why no terminal conclusion other than a paradox is possible' (Jung 1923:67). However, 'since it is a question of a psychological opposition, a one-sided intellectual formulation must end in paradox' (Jung 1923:67). With regard to Abelard's solution, Jung concludes that '[the logico-intellectual expression is absolutely incapable, even in the form of the sermo, of providing that mediatory formula which can do justice to the real natures of the two opposing psychological attitudes, for it is wholly derived from the side of the abstract and is completely lacking in the recognition of concrete reality' (Jung 1923:67-68).

[151] Scholars debate whether Abelard was a conceptualist or moderate nominalist. In *Psychological Types*, Jung states that it would be incorrect to consider Abelard a nominalist since 'the universale was to him [Abelard] a greater reality than a vox' (Jung 1923:66). However, Peter King and Andrew Arlig, for instance, consider Abelard's philosophy to be 'the first great example of nominalism in the Western tradition' (King and Arlig 2018).

It is precisely after his discussion of Abelard's attempt at a reconciliation that he introduces the notion of fantasy in *Psychological Types* as the mechanism responsible for the solution of the problem of opposition in the form of a 'third intermediate standpoint' (Jung 1923:68). Jung also notes that, although still present, 'the opposites are no longer so widely sundered as in Abelard's time' (Jung 1923:65). The reason for this is that now 'we have a psychology, a mediatory science; which alone is capable of uniting idea and thing, without doing violence either to the one or to the other' (Jung 1923:65). In other words, between our concepts ('esse in intellectu') and reality ('esse in re'), there is psychology ('esse in anima')—and, crucially, fantasy. Thus, Jung proposes a *psychological* (and, therefore, *epistemological*) solution to the *metaphysical* problem of universals.

In the last section of this chapter, we shall see that, in addition to serving as another example of the dichotomy of extraversion and introversion, Jung's discussion of the problem of universals can also help us understand Jung's own approach to his typology: psychological types, as descriptions of certain epistemological standpoints themselves, are not to be treated from either a realist or nominalist perspective, but from a third, intermediate standpoint.

Jung's Solution: Typology as an Epistemological Method and Objectivity as a Higher Third

Interestingly, the problem of universals is also relevant to psychology itself, and specifically the question of psychological types: are psychological types to be conceived of as universals? Jung applies the problem of universals to psychological types, as follows:

> When the type (generic concept) suppresses the individual thing to a shadow, then the type, the idea, has won to reality. When the value of the individual thing abolishes the type (generic concept), anarchic disintegration is at work. Both positions are extreme and unfair, but they make a contrasting picture whose clear outlines leave nothing to be desired, and whose very exaggeration brings into relief certain traits, which, albeit in milder and therefore more concealed forms, also adhere to the nature of the

> introverted and extraverted type, even when personalities are concerned in whom personal apprehension is not pushed into the foreground. (Jung 1923:51).

Hence, Jung's position regarding the nominalists and the realists—his partial agreement with each side—is applicable to his understanding of his own theory of psychological types, or his epistemology underlying his theory of types. In his lecture 'Psychological Types' delivered at the International Congress of Education in Territet, Switzertland, in 1923, he states the following: 'One can never give a description of a type, no matter how complete, that would apply to more than one individual, despite the fact that in some ways it aptly characterises thousands of others. Conformity is one side of a man, uniqueness is the other' (Jung 1923/1971). This means that in practice psychological types are *generalisations* (realist perspective) that are, at the same time, impossible to clearly define as they are unable to account for all the individual characteristics of people (nominalist perspective). From this perspective, then, they are neither 'real' nor 'not real'. We could also link this with the discussion in the previous chapter—Jung's reception of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Critique of Practical Reason* in relation to the concept of 'God'. In a letter in 1941, Jung reaffirms his epistemological basis in Kant's philosophy by stating that 'an assertion doesn't posit its object': 'So when I say "God" I am speaking exclusively of assertions that don't posit their object' (Jung 1941/2015:453). He adds: 'About God himself I have asserted nothing, because according to my premise nothing whatever can be asserted about God himself' (Jung 1941/2015:453). In a Kantian manner, we could say that Jung does not 'posit' the existence of types. For Jung, types are an *epistemological tool*: a 'critical apparatus' that is supposed to account for the typical 'personal equations' and, eventually, help overcome them.

Ultimately, the first chapter of *Psychological Types* is significant for establishing Jung's general philosophy of psychology: the nature of psychological knowledge and what it means for psychology to be a science. Indeed, this is essentially the first thing that Jung does in *Psychological Types*.[152] He criticises the idea of objective, or purely empirical psychology and discusses the notion of the 'personal equation'. Ultimately, science itself, as being fundamentally based on the philosophy of empiricism, is nothing but a psychological attitude: '[h]owever scientifically such generalizations

[152] Quotes from this discussion were mainly provided in the first chapter of this thesis—on Jung and James.

may be advanced, it must not be forgotten that science is not the *summa* of life, that it is indeed only one of the psychological attitudes, only one of the forms of human thought' (Jung 1923:55). It is also in this chapter where Jung establishes the idea that one can get to 'objectivity' by first accepting the fundamentally subjective nature of knowledge and understanding and recognising one's psychological lens, or 'bias'.

In this thesis, we have seen how Jung was inspired by James to use his psychological typology as an *epistemological method*. The idea of a 'higher third' standpoint that one arrives at through 'fantasy', which Jung introduces in the discussion of the nominalism and realism debate, is an addition to Jamesian pragmatism. As we have seen previously, Jung had described pragmatism on its own as 'business-like', or lacking in creativity, as it only recognises the (logical) irreconcilability of views, without providing an actual *solution*, a way of reconciling the opposites that results in a 'creation'. From this perspective, psychological typology itself, being this epistemological tool for Jung that is used to achieve objectivity in the form of a 'higher third' standpoint: one recognises one's psychological bias, identifies the opposite of one's psychological bias and then integrates it, thereby solving the problem of opposites.

Conclusion

To sum up, the final section of this thesis has looked at Jung's discussion in the chapter titled 'The Type Problem in the History of Classical and Medieval Thought', the first chapter *in Psychological Types*. Firstly, by looking at Jung's discussion of the various historical theological disputes, I have shown that Jung's initial conception of introversion combined intuition and thinking, while extraversion combined sensation and feeling. Subsequently, as is evident in the introduction to *Psychological Types*, these become 'psychological functions' (intuition, sensation, thinking and feeling), all of which can have either one of the psychological attitudes—introversion and extraversion. After that, I have illustrated how Jung introduces the notion of compensation as a result of psychological one-sidedness through his treatment of Tertullian's and Origen's personalities. In addition to this, we have looked at Jung's notion of fantasy, which he regarded as the psychological activity

that enabled one to reconcile the opposites and achieve unity in the form of a higher third.

Secondly, the discussion in this chapter offers perspectives into the philosophical problem of universals, or the realism and nominalism debate, in general and in psychology in particular—the nature of what could be described as 'psychological kinds'. Whilst Jung views it as yet another manifestation of the psychological problem of opposites, I have argued that Jung's discussion of the problem of universals is also helpful for understanding the nature of his own typology. On this view, psychological types themselves are actually generalisations or abstractions based on the similarities between certain individuals (contra nominalism); yet, at the same time, they are impossible to pin down, as it is not possible for a generalisation to account for all of the individual differences (contra realism). From this perspective, then, psychological types as generalisations, being at the basis of philosophical positions, are of special importance from a pragmatist perspective. They are 'instruments' towards achieving objectivity: one recognises one's psychological bias and then reconciles it with one's conflicting attitude, through fantasy, resulting in a higher third, an intermediate standpoint between the opposites. This was then Jung's *epistemological method* for resolving the problem of opposites and, as a result, the problem of the personal equation in psychology as well as science in general. For Jung, psychology was the 'mediatory science': through it, intellectualistic science was able to accommodate the irrational ways of knowing and thus achieve objectivity in a revised sense.

CONCLUSION

Intellectual History of Jung

This doctoral thesis has carried out a scholarly study of Carl Gustav Jung's *Psychological Types* by providing an intellectual history of Jung's work with a particular focus on its philosophical aspects. This thesis has sought to reconstruct Jung's thinking process in the book by closely examining it in relation to the philosophical works that he used to conceptualise his psychological typology. It has traced the evolution of his theory, from his early formulations in 1913 to the publication of *Psychological Types* in 1921, as well as *within* the book itself. In particular, we have seen that Jung's initial dichotomy of introversion and extraversion was transformed into eight distinct psychological types—as a result of which the meaning of introversion and extraversion was narrowed down to two 'function attitudes'.

Subsequently, Jung continued working on his psychological typology, providing further clarifications of his theory. In a lecture in 1923, elaborating on the point already made in *Psychological Types*, Jung emphasises the fact that his typology was not the only possible one—thus again highlighting his commitment to pragmatism and pluralism: 'Any other psychological criterion could serve just as well as a classifier, although, in my view, no other possess so great a practical significance' (Jung 1923/1971:523). In his 1928 lecture, he further clarifies this point by likening his four function types (thinking, feeling, sensation, intuition) with the four points of the compass: 'they are just as arbitrary and just as indispensable (Jung 1928/1971:541). Here, once again, he highlights the importance of the epistemological aspect of his work: 'I value the type theory for the objective reason that it provides a system of comparison and orientation which makes possible something that has long been lacking, a critical psychology' (Jung 1928/1971:541). Finally, in his paper published in 1936, titled 'Psychological Typology', Jung elaborates on his notion of 'critical psychology', explaining that 'it is a critical tool for the research worker, who needs definite points of view and guidelines if he is to reduce the chaotic profusion of individual differences to any kind of order' (Jung

1936/1971:555). Most notably, Jung states that his typology is 'an essential means for determining the 'personal equation' of the practicing psychologist' (Jung 1936/1971:555).[153]

This thesis has investigated Jung's conceptualisation of typology as a 'critical apparatus', or a 'conceptual scheme', as Jung himself subsequently described it—in other words, as an epistemological tool, rather than merely a description of characters, or a characterology, which, as we have seen, he believed to be a misrepresentation of his work. The epistemology that Jung develops in *Psychological Types* remains largely unchanged throughout Jung's career and provides a prime view into his works. The notions of overcoming one-sidedness and of incorporating the irrational underpin Jung's subsequent work—for example, his work on synchronicity.[154]

Having synthesised William James' pragmatism with his reading of Immanuel Kant's philosophy (as well as the other philosophical accounts tackled in this thesis) Jung was able to argue in 1943 that he was a 'scientist' who did not 'posit the unconscious', which, nevertheless, he argued, constituted 'a *nomen* which covers empirical facts that can be verified at any time' (Jung 1943/2015:329). The same could be said of other psychological concepts that he developed, including Jung's *psychological types* themselves. Jung's epistemological project in *Psychological Types* allowed him to redefine the goals of science to account for the 'personal equation' *through which empirical data was interpreted*, which meant that, for Jung, empiricism on its own provided a naïve account of science, or, in other words, 'missed the point'. From his discussion of the problem of universals, it follows that, for Jung, (scientific) realism was also naïve with its view that the terms of scientific theories needed to 'posit' (or, in other words 'genuinely refer' to) 'real' entities.

This thesis has carried out an interdisciplinary study of Jung's work offering perspectives into a range of subject areas, most notably, the history of psychology, philosophy of science, and history of philosophy—in itself presenting a case for the

[153] In 1935 and 1936, Jung also delivered lectures at ETH Zurich on psychological typology, which, however, offered a 'basic introduction' to his theory developed in *Psychological Types*, rather than an elaboration of it (Falzeder, Liebscher, and Shamdasani in Jung 2022: xii).
[154] See, for instance, 'On the nature of the psyche' and 'Synchronicity: an acasual connecting principle' (Jung 1947/1969, 1952/1973). In secondary literature, connections have also been drawn between the work of Jung and that of the physicist Wolfgang Pauli, which can be further explored in light of the research presented in this thesis (Main 2014).

integrated history and philosophy of science, as well as history and philosophy of psychology, as we shall see below.

Jung and History of Philosophy

This thesis has located Jung's work in the context of the history of philosophy by looking at the different philosophical theories that formed elements of Jung's psychological typology, demonstrating the manner in which he *conceptualised* it as an epistemological tool, or a revised scientific method. We have seen that a key theme shared by most of these philosophers was one of reformulating what it meant to achieve objective knowledge—a task that Jung takes up in his *Psychological Types,* seeking to expand on their contributions.

The thesis has demonstrated that from James, Jung borrowed the notion of the 'personal equation', his pragmatism as an initial standpoint, and, most importantly, the very idea of a psychological typology as an epistemological method. For Jung, psychology, and science in general, were fundamentally 'subjective' and, in order to account for the 'personal equations' of individuals, a certain epistemological tool was needed. Furthermore, we have seen that Jung adopts Henri Bergson's critique of intellectualism, which he re-frames as a critique of the hegemony of a particular psychological attitude: of rationality. For Jung, then, it was not a Bergsonian 'intuitive philosophy' that was needed in Western philosophy—but engagement with the 'irrational', which, according to Jung, only Friedrich Nietzsche managed to succeeded in. What is more, for Jung, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, as a visionary work, captured the solution to the problem of opposites in an act of self-creation, which Jung reformulated as the process of 'individuation'. Furthermore, we have seen that Arthur Schopenhauer's notion of the world as 'will' and 'presentation' helped Jung to conceptualise his psychological concepts of the 'unconscious,' the 'libido' and the 'primordial image' (or 'archetypes'). This thesis has also considered the parallels that can be drawn between Jung's conceptualisation of psychological types and that of Schopenhauer's four types of the principle of the sufficient reason. It is interesting to note that intellect ('thinking' for Jung and 'knowing' for Schopenhauer) is reduced to being only *one* of the four types in both systems. Crucially, this thesis has drawn a

parallel between Kant's 'pure concepts' and Jung's types—in the sense that both of them are filters that structure our experience of reality, which for Jung, meant a psychological reality. Jung, then, builds upon Kant's understanding of objectivity and *re-imagines* it in psychological terms.

When it comes to philosophy, then, for Jung, a central idea in his *Psychological Types* is that *philosophical* positions themselves, or arguments, are ultimately *psychological*. Hence, subsequently, in a letter to Arnold Künzli in 1943, Jung states that 'philosophy needs to learn that it is *made by human beings* and depends to an alarming degree on their psychic constitution' (Jung 1943/2015:331). Thus, his psychological typology constituted an *epistemology*.

Jung and History and Philosophy of Science and Psychology

This thesis has provided a comprehensive account of Jung's epistemology in his *Psychological Types*—in particular, with regard to Jung's views on the nature of psychology as a science, and on the nature of science in general—which can serve as a case study for the history and philosophy of science. Jung claimed to have developed his theory of psychological types based on empirical insights from his clinical research—as such, it was presented as 'scientific'. Subsequently, in his letter to Künzli in 1943, Jung states that his conception of science did not contradict with the one prevalent in Germany, England, America, and India, since it was by virtue of this conception that he 'was awarded degrees as a *scientist*' (Jung 1943/2015:329). In the letter, Jung wondered why his work did not 'satisfy the scientific and theoretical requirements of the Philosophical Faculty of Zurich' since he believed his work did not 'run counter to the nature of empirical science' (Jung 1943/2015:329).

Jung's theory of psychological types came to be used as a tool for Jung's psychology: in particular, as Jung himself pointed out, in order to describe the 'one-sidedness' of his patients' behaviour (Jung 2015:186). This thesis has shown that, for Jung, his theory of psychological types, as opposed to merely providing descriptions of different types of human character, was ultimately a method of dealing with an important problem in psychology—the 'problem of opposites'. From Jung's perspective, this problem, in turn, was fundamental to *science*. This was because,

according to Jung, the problem of opposites by its very nature transcended the borders of psychology and became part of science in general by manifesting itself as the personal equation. In this regard, Jung's typology served as his *reformulation of 'the personal equation'*. Hence, I have argued that Jung's theory of types provided an *epistemological* tool, or a new 'scientific method' for arriving at objectivity in a revised sense. On this view, Jung's take on the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science is as follows: a theory is 'pseudo-scientific' if it *does not* recognise the personal equation and aim to resolve it.

Furthermore, this thesis further clarifies what this revised notion of objectivity for science entailed in Jung's thought: in order to be 'objective', science needed to recognise the limitations of the 'rational'. Hence, as I have argued, with his psychology, Jung reformulated science to include what he termed the 'irrational'. And to achieve this, then, he required a new method—which he developed with his psychological typology. Interestingly, in 1945, Jung argues that the irrational is an evitable part of the scientific method, since by virtue of making *inductive* statements, science starts by collecting *perceptual* data, which in Jung's typological terms would include both 'sensation' and 'intuition':

> You also seem to overlook the fact that every assertion about something that is unknowable must of necessity be *antinomian* if it is to be true, also that natural data (e.g., the maximum density of water at 4° C.) are always *irrational*. Since scientific statements are inductive, starting as they do from irrational data, they are bound to be irrational in so far as they are descriptive. Only deductions are logical. (Jung 1945/2015:359-360).

In addition to this, the discussion of the 'problem of universals'—or the 'realism and nominalism debate'—in Jung's *Psychological Types* can be related to the general issue of classification in the philosophy of science. Furthermore, we have seen that when it comes to his own typological theory, it follows that, for Jung, his psychological types (as descriptions of epistemological approaches) are abstractions and generalisations that are, at the same time, not 'real' in the Platonic sense of the word. As they do not have 'essences', it is not possible to give an all-encompassing description of a psychological type that would account for all the individual differences between people. Rather, psychological types are 'real' in the 'pragmatist' sense: as instruments towards achieving 'objectivity'.

Pragmatism and pluralism are central to Jung's conceptualisation of his typology as a 'scientific method'. Jung's particular *implementation* of it as described in his *Psychological Types* is in itself *subjective*. Indeed, in *Psychological Types*, Jung provides the following caveat: ultimately, he describes the implementation of his method from the perspective of his own psychology, which, despite not being universally applicable, is still useful, from the pragmatist point of view. Hence, in the conclusion of *Psychological Types*, Jung writes: 'Through a consideration of the problem of typical attitudes, and the presentation of it in a certain form and outline, I aspire to guide my readers to a contemplation of this picture of the manifold possibilities of viewing life, in the knowledge of the almost infinite variations and gradations of individual psychology' (Jung 1923:621). This means that, for Jung, there still may be many other implementations of achieving objectivity in his sense—as long as they acknowledge Jung's general epistemological picture, namely, the personal equation and the problem of opposites.

> No one, I trust, will draw the conclusion from my description of the types that I believe the four or eight types which I describe to be the only ones that might occur. That would be a grave misconception, for I have no sort of doubt that the various attitudes one meets with can also be considered and classified from other points of view. (Jung 1923:621).

Hence, while Jung acknowledges the possibility of other typologies, the general epistemological picture he paints remains the same: the problem of the personal equation, or the problem of opposites, is a problem that needs to be resolved in psychology in order to ensure a higher order of objectivity. Thus, in a Jamesian fashion, Jung views typologies as tools. In particular, Jung saw typologies as epistemological tools or methods of resolving the problem of subjectivity and one-sidedness.

As we have seen, Jung's project in *Psychological Types* was fundamentally concerned with the nature of psychology as a science and its scientific method. It explored key topics in the philosophy of psychology—most notably, the notions of subjectivity and objectivity—as we have seen above. However, as stated at the beginning of this thesis, there has been a lack of discussion of the nature of psychological knowledge as a unique level of scientific explanation. Psychology has primarily been seen as a disjointed field, an umbrella term for a number of distinct

subject areas with different research programmes, with little discussion of what 'psychology' as a science actually means.

Historically this ambiguity has led to the reduction of the psychological level of explanation to the biological one—the latter seen to be providing a more 'stable' scientific ground. In his letter to professor Loewenthal in 1945, Jung argued against the reduction of psychological concepts to biological ones since if the former are 'traced back to their biological foundations they become so imprecise that they lose their psychological meaning' (Jung 1945/2015). However, William Bechtel, for instance, highlights the historical prevalence of reductionism, regarding the 'model of theory reduction' as the 'second legacy of mid-twentieth century philosophy of science' (the first legacy being 'mechanistic explanations' (Bechtel 2007:172). As he points out, '[o]n this traditional philosophical account of interlevel relations in science (Oppenheim & Putnam, 1958; Nagel, 1961) the laws of a higher-level science (e.g., psychology) are reduced by being derived from the laws of the lower-level science (e.g., neuroscience) together with bridge principles and boundary conditions …' (Bechtel 2007:172-173).

Nevertheless, the reduction of psychological properties to biological states has recently been recognised as a conceptual problem, both by philosophers of psychology and by psychiatrists as well—who treat it as an epistemological issue that has serious implications in clinical practice (Ghaemi 2003). In the philosophy of psychology, Ken Aizawa and Carl Gillet, for example, have argued in favour of the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience due to the multiple realization of psychological properties by lower-level biological realizers, having based their argument on the empirical research on colour vision. They have argued in favour of 'methodological rather than ontological autonomy', having shown that neuroscientists and psychologists in actual scientific practice 'choose not to eliminate and subtype higher level properties when faced with the discovery of differences in lower level realisers' and, hence, 'they have not postulated a myriad of distinct types of normal human colour vision each of which corresponds to a distinct set of realisers' (Aizawa and Gillet 2012:221).

This thesis, then, can serve as a historical case study in this wider project of the study of psychology as a separate level of scientific explanation in the history and philosophy of science. Jung's work tackled important philosophical issues in

psychology, such as the notions of subjectivity and objectivity, as well as what it means for psychology to be a science and have a scientific method to begin with, which have been generally underexplored in the philosophy of psychology. The discussion in this thesis relates to a number of current debates in the philosophy of science, such as the 'unity' and 'disunity of science', as well as serves as a case study for the history of pragmatism and of the critique of rationalism, locating Jung's work within the history of philosophy of science. For instance, we have seen that Jung's epistemological project anticipated Daston and Galison's view of the study of objectivity through the study of subjectivity—which suggested that the histories of objectivity and of the self were intimately connected. Hence, the questions that were tackled by Jung in *Psychological Types* in 1921 are still largely relevant one hundred years later.

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