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GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
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Future Trends and Scenarios

REPORT

No Leverage Without Authority? Comparing the Effectiveness of International Organizations Across GLOBE Issue Areas

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Summary

Do International Organizations (IOs) actually help address global problems? This question is of major concern for global governance scholars and policymakers, yet few existing studies review issues of effectiveness across a range of different issue areas. This report generates comparative insights on IO performance across all the domains included in the GLOBE project, namely climate change, development, finance, investment, migration, security, and trade. Based on a detailed GLOBE expert survey, we consider how key IOs in these issue areas perform across three different measures of effectiveness: constitutive effectiveness, compliance, and goal achievement. We also investigate causal claims on effectiveness, exploring how IO institutional design – and in particular measures of authority – influence their ability to shape policy outcomes. Taking stock of the distribution of authority across issue areas and policy functions, we ask whether highly formalized, deeply constraining institutional arrangements have a consistently stronger impact on state behavior or whether less formalized institutions with fewer discretionary powers can also contribute to the effective implementation of internationally coordinated policies. Finally, we identify key cross-cutting challenges for global governance effectiveness, including political conflict and politicization, concerns related to legitimacy and representation, and growing problem complexity.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction 5
2. Conceptualizing Institutional Effectiveness: A Literature Review 7
3. Distribution of IO Authority: Insights from Previous GLOBE Research.....12
4. Cross-Domain GLOBE Expert Survey on IO Effectiveness 16
5. GLOBE Effectiveness Surveys: Overview of Findings 18
5.1. Constitutive Effectiveness, Compliance and Goal Attainment.....18
5.2. Implications of Institutional Design for IO Effectiveness.....23
5.3. Key Cross-Cutting Challenges to IO Effectiveness.....33
6. Conclusion 39
References.....42
Appendix 50
Appendix I: GLOBE Effectiveness Questionnaire.....50
Appendix II: Distribution of Authority per Policy Function 56
Appendix III: Key Challenges to IO Effectiveness 57

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Grant agreement number 822654

List of Abbreviations

AIIB: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU: African Union
BIS: Bank for International Settlements
CBDR-RC: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
EU: European Union
IAD: International Authority Database
ICSID: International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
IMF: International Monetary Fund
IO: International Organization
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P5: Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council
R2P: Responsibility to Protect
SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SGDs: Sustainable Development Goals
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC: UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
WB: World Bank
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO: World Trade Organization

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1. Introduction

Do international organizations (IOs) deliver on their stated goals? Why are some IOs more effective than others at changing state behavior? What are the greatest challenges to IO effectiveness? And how might we enhance the ability of IOs to address pressing global problems? While these questions have informed global governance scholarship from the very start, they may be more relevant today than ever before. There is a growing sense that "[g]lobal governance is not working" (Coen and Pegram 2015, p. 417); that international cooperation through legacy institutions is faltering "when we need it most" (Hale, Held and Young 2013). Yet, despite the pressing need to better understand these challenges and explore ways forward, few existing studies review IO effectiveness across a wide range of different issue areas.

This report responds to this research gap by providing a comparative overview of IO performance across all GLOBE issue areas, namely climate change, development, finance, investment, migration, security, and trade. It combines conceptual insights from a vast scholarship on institutional effectiveness with empirical insight generated through previous GLOBE research, including data on authority patterns in global governance (Deliverable 7.1). Building on a comprehensive GLOBE expert survey, we explore how IOs perform along different conceptualization of effectiveness (constitutive capacity, compliance, and goal attainment). We also investigate causal claims on effectiveness, exploring how institutional design influences IOs' ability to shape policy outcomes, with a particular focus on the level of authority they exercise across different policy functions. Finally, we look at the most important barriers to IO effectiveness, with a view to identifying cross-cutting trends.

We find that IOs have been most effective in their role as facilitators, enabling states to find agreement on shared norms, goals, policies, and rules. However, when it comes to turning such output into concrete outcomes – that is, changing state behavior in a way that is conducive to solving global problems – they face significant obstacles. These obstacles include a lack of authority across policy functions geared towards implementation, notably compliance monitoring and enforcement. Even where IOs are able to leverage conditionality or (threat of) sanctions, these instruments rely on support by powerful states and do not consistently deliver outcomes in line with global policy goals. Survey results also reflect widely shared concerns that IO effectiveness has decreased, at least in some issue areas, as broad-based consensus has become more elusive.

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We also consider the implications of changing governance realities for IO effectiveness. In some issue areas, the lack of a highly authoritative 'core' institution has resulted in highly fragmented regimes or 'regime complexes' (Keohane and Victor 2011), encompassing a diverse array of governance arrangements that are often informal and do not display clear hierarchies. While such fragmentation poses serious challenges to the effectiveness of some IOs, others have been able to reaffirm their focality as central 'nodes' within a messy governance landscape and experimented with new pathways of influence. Notably, facilitative orchestration has allowed some IOs to enlist intermediaries – including non-governmental organizations or private sector actors – that are better placed to fulfill specific policy functions and/or induce behavioral change in line with global goals.

Despite the diversity of issues and institutions under investigation, survey results point to several key cross-cutting challenges for IO effectiveness. These include growing levels of politicization and political conflict, issues of legitimacy and representation, and problem complexity. In combination, these challenges appear to undermine the performance even of relatively authoritative IOs that have historically seen high levels of effectiveness, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus, while authority – whether de jure or de facto – is an important element of effectiveness, it must be placed in context, and alongside other factors, including problem structure, power distribution and legitimacy.

We begin this paper with a review of the scholarship on IO performance and the different conceptualizations of institutional effectiveness that have emerged from this literature. We then present data on the distribution of IO authority, drawing on the International Authority Database (IAD), developed at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, as well as previous GLOBE mapping papers. This data provides important background for the subsequent analysis as it demonstrates significant variation between IOs with regard to their ability to act autonomously and make binding decisions. After briefly introducing our methodological approach, we then present the results of our expert survey, including assessments of IO performance across issue areas, reflections on institutional design, and a discussion of the main underlying challenges to IO effectiveness. We summarize key findings in the conclusion, which highlights cross-cutting pressures and constraints while also emphasizing that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing IO effectiveness.

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2. Conceptualizing Institutional Effectiveness: A Literature Review

This section reviews the scholarship on the effectiveness of international institutions, identifying central assumptions, findings, and methodological challenges. We introduce three dominant conceptualizations of IO effectiveness – constitutive effectiveness, compliance, and goal attainment – that provide an analytical grid to assess the performance of institutions included in the GLOBE project. We also address a central question of effectiveness research, namely whether high levels of formalization and de jure authority are necessary ingredients for IO effectiveness. This question is of significant relevance for many of the IOs reviewed in this paper, as they are situated in increasingly fragmented regime complexes, populated by a plethora of diverse, often highly informal, governance arrangements.

The early literature on international cooperation sought to argue and empirically demonstrate that institutionalized cooperation between states can be a rational choice (Axelrod 1981; Keohane 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985). Treating international institutions as a dependent variable, institutionalists showed that states will invest resources to create formal regimes when they help to sustain cooperation. Through mutual monitoring, the leveling of informational asymmetries, and the reduction of transaction costs, international institutions can help overcome collective action problems and realize future larger payoffs for cooperating states. By constraining themselves through institutions, states could also constrain others and thereby achieve more beneficial outcomes, even under the unfavorable conditions of international anarchy (Keohane 1984).

While not disputing key theoretical assumptions, realists raised serious doubts about the effect of institutions on state behavior (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994). They argued that power ultimately trumps international law, with institutions being little more than the embodiment of (hegemonic) state interests and preferences. How then could institutions have an independent effect on inter-state affairs, especially in the ‘high politics’ domain of international peace and security? Indeed, and putting the polemic aside, the functionalist theory of institutions (Keohane 1984) presents an important analytical challenge for the study of institutional effects. If institutions are a function of state interests, what is their independent effect on policy outcomes? Would state interests not be a sufficient explanation for state behavior?

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Motivated in part by realist criticism, the institutionalist research agenda has turned its focus on institutions as independent variables to explain various international outcomes. Broadly speaking, empirical studies have used three distinct conceptualizations of effectiveness to measure institutional effects. First, many scholars have focused on the role of IOs as facilitators of agreement between member states, assessing their performance in terms of their ability to produce shared norms, goals, policies, rules, or knowledge frames (Gutner and Thompson 2010; Lall 2017; Tallberg et al. 2016). While output does not determine outcome, it is a readily observable metric and a necessary precondition for IOs to realize their policy objectives. In this paper, we conceptualize this performance measure as **constitutive effectiveness**. At the most basic level, constitutive effectiveness refers to IOs' ability to "identify the players, assign roles to them, and lay down the general rules of the game governing the social practices in which they engage" (Young 2021, p. 57). While all IOs must demonstrate a certain level of constitutive effectiveness to ensure their survival, a key question is whether institutionalization through IOs can move norms, goals, policies, and rules beyond the lowest common denominator. Constitutive effectiveness is also essential to IO focality, that is, the degree to which it is seen as occupying a leadership position within a given issue area (Abbott et al. 2015).

Second, a significant part of the institutionalist literature focuses on state **compliance** with international rules across a variety of issue areas (see, for example Mitchell 1994; Simmons 1998, 2002). This conceptualization of IO effectiveness focuses on the degree to which states conform to prescribed behavior and stick to their international commitments. In seeking to explain why self-interested states might comply with international law, scholars have pointed to direct incentives that materially alter state incentives, including coercive sanctions (Martin 1992), but also 'softer' mechanisms, such as reputation and reciprocal non-compliance (Guzman 2008) or socialization effects (Jinks and Goodman 2004). However, while compliance is an important element of institutional effectiveness, it is not a sufficient condition. Despite significant advances (Simmons and Hopkins 2005), isolating institutional effects from their conditions of creation, in particular state interests and power, continues to present a major methodological challenge. Where IOs simply institutionalize prevailing norms and practices, compliance tells us little about their ability to effectively induce behavioral change. Thus, as Simmons (1998, p. 78) notes, it is entirely possible that "a poorly designed agreement could achieve high levels of compliance without much impact on the phenomenon of concern."

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Therefore, another strand of scholarship focuses on whether IOs actually contribute to the achievement of global policy goals (Keohane and Martin 2003; Przeworski 2004). This conceptualization of effectiveness as **goal attainment** necessarily involves some counterfactual reasoning, asking whether a particular outcome would have occurred without an international institution or regime (Underdal 1992). For example, from this perspective, we may ask whether the International Monetary Fund (IMF) fosters economic growth (Przeworkski and Vreeland 2000), whether UN peacekeeping missions reduce violence (Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2020), whether human rights treaties improve conditions on the ground (Lupu 2015), or whether the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) helps to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann and Lupu 2016). These are vital questions, yet, attributing observed changes to international institutions is methodologically difficult. While some studies have been able to take advantage of natural 'experiments' to explore the impact of IOs on final outcomes (Hyde 2007), most assessments of IO goal attainment rely on engaging with counterfactual scenarios, whereby speculative judgement can be minimized but not eliminated through systematic analysis and/or modelling (Helm and Sprinz 2000).

We argue that these different conceptualizations of IO effectiveness – constitutive effectiveness, compliance, and goal attainment – are complementary rather than conflicting. For example, while compliance is not a sufficient explanation for goal attainment, it is often a necessary condition. Similarly, constitutive effectiveness alone does not guarantee a change in state behavior, yet, if IO norms, goals, policies, and rules reflect nothing but the lowest possible ambition, formal compliance and goal attainment are largely meaningless. For this reason, this paper addresses all three elements of IO effectiveness.

The existing body of qualitative and quantitative institutionalist research has demonstrated that institutions can, under the right conditions, produce ambitious outputs, induce compliance, and contribute to the attainment of global goals. Building on strong theoretical foundations (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Abbott et al. 2000; Abbott and Snidal 1998), the field now increasingly turns its focus on the relationship between institutional design and effectiveness. That is, does the variation in institutions' formal (or informal) setup condition the ways in which they affect state behavior? The implication of this turn-of-focus is that scholars increasingly compare IOs or treaties to each other in order to capture variation in institutional design that might be consequential for effectiveness. Such

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comparison has usually focused on institutions within the same issue domain, such as human rights (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse 2015) or the environment (Wettestad 1999). In contrast, this paper constitutes an attempt to compare IO design and performance across a diverse set of issue areas. While the findings of any such comparison must be treated with caution – given radically different problem structures and actor constellations – it can produce valuable, if tentative, cross-cutting insights into IO effectiveness and its drivers. Within the scope of this review, we pay particular attention to one important variation in institutional setup, namely the degree of authority afforded to IOs across different policy functions.

Early conceptual and theoretical contributions have highlighted the importance of strong or deep institutional provisions to constrain state policies (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Fearon 1998). This suggests that, unless institutions deeply limit states' discretion, we should not expect them to alter their behavior. For example, states would have little reason to stick to the NPT, if the treaty regime cannot ensure them of others' compliance with it (Coe and Vaynman 2015). As we explore below, such 'deepening' of institutional design usually implies an increase in discretionary authority of IOs. More precisely, IOs may enjoy different levels of authority across different policy functions. To investigate this claim further, we draw on a large body of literature on public policy, first pioneered by Laswell (1956), which conceptualizes the policymaking processes as a fluid cycle of functions. For our purposes, we follow Zürn, Tokhi and Binder (2021) in distinguishing between seven key IO policy functions: agenda setting, rule making, compliance and performance monitoring, norm interpretation and dispute settlement, enforcement, and knowledge generation (for further explanation, see box below). For example, greater discretion with regard to rule making may allow IOs to push for higher levels of legalization, which increases the costs of violation and may also exert a normative 'compliance pull' (Abbott and Snidal 2000). In turn, IOs that enjoy a degree of authority with regard to enforcement may be able to discourage or correct deviant state behavior through sanctions. As we explore below, the authority and performance of IOs varies significantly across policy functions and IOs tend to enjoy more discretionary power at the 'beginning' of the policy cycle, when global policy agendas take shape. Importantly, while the seven policy functions listed above are useful heuristic devises to examine if, when, and how an IO may influence policy outcomes, in reality, policy stages do not necessarily follow a linear consecutive order and not all IOs engage in the same policy functions.

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A key question is whether the growth of less formalized and less authoritative institutional arrangements in some areas of global governance will undermine international efforts to coordinate state behavior or not. For example, the global governance landscape for finance or climate change is now characterized by a plethora of overlapping formal and informal intergovernmental organizations, advisory boards, transnational networks, private governance arrangements, and public-private partnerships (Levi-Faur and Blumsack 2019; Coen et al. 2019). Recent contributions emphasize that such arrangements are not necessarily less capable of inducing behavioral change (Voeten 2019; Abbott and Faude 2020). Lall (2017), for example, argues that the performance of IOs depends on their de facto, and not de jure autonomy from states, which is crucially shaped by the relations between IO officials and state as well as sub-state actors. In this context, recent research has pointed to new ways in which IOs may effectuate change by 'orchestrating' intermediaries, thus inducing change without engaging in formal, prescriptive regulation and direct enforcement (Abbott et al. 2015). We pick up these issues further below, when reviewing the results of the GLOBE expert survey. First, however, we provide some background on the distribution of authority across IOs and issue areas.

Key IO Policy Functions:

- *Agenda setting:* determining which policy proposals are included or excluded for debate and deliberation
- *Rule making:* translating policy proposals into substantive obligations or guidance for state parties
- *Compliance monitoring:* collecting and assessing information on state parties' compliance and performance
- *Norm interpretation:* passing judgments in case of disagreement over specific institutional norms or efforts to solve intra-state disputes (dispute settlement)
- *Enforcement:* imposing sanctions on non-compliant state parties
- *Evaluation:* assessing the IO's own performance and developing proposals to improve its internal workings
- *Knowledge generation:* collecting, processing, evaluating, and disseminating knowledge pertaining to the substantive governance problem the IO is tasked to address.

For a more extensive discussion, please refer to Zürn, Tokhi and Binder (2021).

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3. Distribution of IO Authority: Insights from Previous GLOBE Research

Recent contributions suggest that the institutional design of IOs is consequential for their effectiveness. The baseline expectation in much of the literature is that IOs with more 'bite' are more likely to make a difference than organizations that lack intrusive powers. Yet, IOs vary widely in their institutional set-up and thus in their capacity to autonomously influence state behavior through binding policies and rules. Their authority, defined as the right to make binding decisions and competent judgments (Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012), varies not only across different organizations, but also more generally across substantive issue areas of world politics. To better understand the distribution of IO authority and its potential implications for IO effectiveness across a range of policy domains, we leverage GLOBE research that has produced important insights on these questions.

We first discuss quantitative data on IO authority as presented in Deliverable 7.1 and drawing on Zürn, Tokhi and Binder (2021). We complement this descriptive assessment with qualitative evidence on IOs and issue areas from the GLOBE mapping papers. Together, these sources provide us with the necessary background for mapping and understanding the distribution of IO authority and its implications for effectiveness, both across thematic issue areas and organizations.

Figure 1 plots the average authority of IOs across four issue areas. We draw on a representative sample of 34 IOs from the International Authority Database (IAD) (Zürn, Tokhi and Binder 2021). The issue areas are broadly defined. 'Economy', for example, includes trade and development, commodity, agricultural, and financial organizations. The issue area 'Human Rights' covers all IOs that protect and promote lives and livelihoods, including cultural, environmental, or knowledge-generating organizations (e.g. OECD). General purpose organizations, such as the United Nations, fall under the 'Multi-Issue' category. Finally, organizations with a mandate in regional or global security are summarized under the issue area 'Security'.

Using the IAD sample and sampling weights, we estimate the average level of authority that IOs have per issue area. A clear pattern emerges: multi-issue IOs, such as the European Union, the United Nations, or the African Union, are the most authoritative ones, meaning that they have most regulatory leeway over states. This is consistent with findings from the literature that organizations with a broad policy scope will also tend to be more

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institutionalized and authoritative than IOs with narrow policy mandates (Hooghe and Marks 2015). Economic IOs closely follow multi-issue organizations in terms of their level of authority. Indeed, the difference between the estimated authority of multi-issue and economic IOs is not significant (the 95% confidence intervals overlap), which suggests that economic IOs wield similar levels of authority as general purpose organizations. It is therefore hardly surprising that most research on IO effectiveness has centered on powerful economic organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank, establishing in many cases the behavior-changing effects of these IO. Unlike multi-issue and economic IOs, security and human rights organizations have below-average authority levels. Most security organizations remain firmly under the control of states, for example through unanimity voting (NATO). Moreover, norm adjudication and policy design are rarely delegated to IO secretariats. Finally, human rights IOs have the lowest level of IO authority. Notwithstanding some exceptions (International Criminal Court), most organizations in this issue area lack robust monitoring, enforcement, or rule-setting competences that could meaningfully constrain state behavior. This resonates well with existing comparative studies that have emphasized the relatively weak design of human rights institutions (Koremenos 2016; Posner 2014; Dai 2007).

Figure 1: *Estimated average issue-area authority in 2013. The horizontal dotted line indicates estimated average population authority of IOs.*



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The averages presented above describe a general tendency of IO authority per issue area. However, within each issue area, there is also important variation across organizations. To further inspect this pattern, we plot in Figure 2 the authority of IOs that overlap with the issue areas covered by GLOBE.

Figure 2: *Distribution of authority in selected IOs from GLOBE mapping papers. Mean authority in the last five years of our data set (2009-2013). Dotted horizontal line indicates the estimated population average of authority. Highlighted bars (black) indicate IOs covered by survey responses.*



While the overlap of IOs included in the International Authority Database (IAD) and GLOBE issue areas is not perfect, the data is consistent with much of the qualitative evidence from the GLOBE mapping papers. Concerning global finance, both the IAD and Levi-Faur and Blumsack (2019) identify the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and IMF as important formal intergovernmental organizations in the area of international finance, while also highlighting stark differences in authority levels between these two institutions. Notwithstanding its high formal authority, the IMF is not the central 'supervisor' of the highly fragmented global financial system. In turn, the very modest authority of the BIS, which acts as a facilitator of informal meetings, reflects the increasing informalization of global governance in this domain.

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The World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are the most important formal organizations in global trade and development (Marx et al. 2019). Their authority is considerably above the average level of IO authority (horizontal dotted line). Part of their formal authority springs from qualified majority voting (WB) and robust dispute settlement provisions (WTO). Nonetheless, their high authority levels and their ensuing impact on states provokes contestation by state and non-state actors alike. Marx et al. 2019 show that both institutions' effectiveness and legitimacy are challenged externally by civil society actors and internally by powerful and rising member states.

With respect to overlapping security organizations – NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – all score below average in Figure 2. Even if we were to count the UN as a security-only organization, this average would still be below the one for trade and development organizations. That security IOs have low authority reflects the fact that states prefer to maintain control over security-related matters. As Sanchez Cobaleda et al. 2019 show, the consensus-based decision making in NATO, for example, led to paralyzing debates about its funding. Due to its weak formal authority, the OSCE is a soft security IO, focusing on dialogue about conflict prevention rather than on robust peacekeeping operations (Sánchez Cobaleda et al. 2019). Indeed, the authority of the OSCE is confined to election monitoring (Hyde 2007), rather than security cooperation between states.

Finally, the multi-issue IOs in Figure 2 relate to various GLOBE issue areas. Most notably, the UN is not only a central security organization, but also a crucial hub in global climate governance (Coen et al. 2019). The UN is a good example for unequal distribution of authority within an organization and across its different policy tasks. While the UN Security Council (UNSC) can adopt directly legally binding decisions per (qualified) majority voting on issues concerning international peace and security, the considerable authority of the UN in this area is not transferred to environmental matters. These are often delegated within the IO to specialized bodies or conventions, such as UN Environment or the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Often, these subsidiary bodies and related organizations have lower delegated formal authority than their parent organization. For example, the UNFCCC's secretariat depends to a considerable extent on member states and lacks enforcement mechanisms (Coen et al. 2019).

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4. Cross-Domain GLOBE Expert Survey on IO Effectiveness

The preceding discussion has emphasized the great diversity of IOs, their varying levels of authority, and general trends in the exercise of authority across issue areas. Importantly, the example of the United Nations shows that while for certain matters IOs are equipped with high levels of authority (international peace and security), the same IO does not necessarily have the same competences in other issue areas (environment). More generally, while some IOs under investigation are placed at the apex of relatively centralized international regimes with considerable powers over member states, others form part of highly fragmented regime complexes, characterized by a "patchwork of international institutions" that are only partially organized hierarchically and differ in terms of mandate, membership, and scope (Bierman et al. 2009, p. 16). For example, global climate governance has gradually shifted from a mono-centric regime – with the UNFCCC as its core – towards a polycentric regime complex with multiple centers of authority and pathways of influence, encompassing formal IOs, informal multilateral 'clubs', regional organizations, as well as transnational networks and private governance arrangements (Coen, Kreienkamp and Pegram 2020). Hierarchical coordination is even more elusive in the highly fragmented international investment regime, which lacks a central institutional core. In contrast, the international security regime remains comparatively integrated, with activities to protect peace and security centrally anchored at the UNSC (but not necessarily beyond the UNSC).

The examination of the data as well as the qualitative evidence suggest that the formal design of organizations is as diverse as their thematic scope. This is puzzling. If states make rational choices when setting up international institutions, we may expect that form follows function (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001). More precisely, given the significant externalities that transboundary cooperation problems create for states and societies (e.g., security, economy, or climate change), we may expect IOs to be equipped with substantial degrees of authority and regulatory bite (Zürn 2018; Hooghe, Lenz and Marks 2019). However, this is rarely the case, raising important questions about the conditions under which international institutions can influence state behavior and contribute to the attainment of their goals.

To better understand the status of and conditions for IO effectiveness, we designed a small survey, aimed at gathering in-depth insights from GLOBE experts on current trends, challenges, and future prospects for IO performance. The survey covers the whole range of

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GLOBE issue areas: climate change (Survey I), development (Survey II), finance (Survey III), investment (Survey IV), migration (Survey V), security (Survey VI), and trade (Survey VII). It was filled out by GLOBE Work Package leaders and their respective teams. As such, we were able to tap into a small but committed pool of experts, all of whom bring extensive expertise on their surveyed issue areas and IOs.

The survey was structured around three sets of questions. The first set concerned the evaluation of IO effectiveness. Specifically, we asked respondents to identify the two most important formal IOs in their respective issue area and then provide an assessment of how these IOs perform with respect to the three dimensions of effectiveness introduced above: generating normative and regulatory consensus (constitutive effectiveness); ensuring member states stick to their international obligations (compliance); and actually achieving their stated policy goals (goal attainment).

The second set of questions aimed to evaluate the implications of institutional design for IO effectiveness, with a particular focus on the varying degrees of authority that IOs exercise across the seven key policy functions introduced above: agenda setting, rule making, compliance and performance monitoring, norm interpretation and dispute settlement, enforcement, and knowledge generation. We asked respondents to rate these policy functions in order of their relative importance for effectiveness, focusing on the IO that they consider to be most authoritative in their respective issue area. We also asked which specific design features are particularly conducive to goal attainment and where respondents see need for improvement to ensure policy functions are performed effectively.

Finally, the third part of the survey focused on the main underlying challenges that threaten to undermine IO effectiveness, including those stemming from organizations' institutional set-up as well as those reflecting larger political trends. This question was deliberately framed in an open-ended manner to avoid predisposed interpretations. Answers were later qualitatively coded to highlight common trends and patterns (see Appendix III).

The full survey is included in Appendix I of this report. We received detailed responses from all the GLOBE partners leading on domain-specific Work Packages, allowing us to identify key differences and commonalities across issue areas. These findings are discussed in the next section.

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5. GLOBE Effectiveness Surveys: Overview of Findings

This report segment discusses the findings from the GLOBE expert survey in light of the preceding reflections on IO effectiveness and authority. Broadly following the structure of the survey, it is divided in three separate parts. Section 5.1. provides an overview of IO effectiveness across the three dimensions introduced above: constitutive effectiveness, compliance, and goal attainment. While we observe significant variations in performance across these three dimensions as well as across IOs, serious gaps in effectiveness are evident in almost every issue area and, in some domains, these gaps are growing further over time. Section 5.2. drills down into more specific data on institutional design and its implications for effectiveness. In assessing the policy functions and design features that are key to effective IO functioning, we highlight commonalities across issue areas – such as the importance of agenda setting and rule making to ensure IO focality and continued relevance – but also the futility of one-size-fits-all design solutions. Finally, section 5.3 focuses on key challenges to IO effectiveness identified by survey respondents. Here, we find that many IOs face the same underlying drivers of inertia, contestation, and ineffectiveness, including conflicting state interests and power asymmetries, concerns over legitimacy, and growing problem complexity.

5.1. Constitutive Effectiveness, Compliance and Goal Attainment

This section identifies broad trends across issue areas with regard to IO effectiveness, based on assessments and examples provided in the first part of the GLOBE expert survey. We explore IO performance in terms of constitutive effectiveness (ability to generate shared norms, goals, and social practices), compliance (ability to monitor state behavior and enforce international rules), and goal attainment (ability to contribute to the actual achievement of stated policy goals). We conclude this section with reflections on cross-cutting changes in governance context and their implications for IO effectiveness.

Constitutive effectiveness

Many of the IOs included in the survey have seen notable successes with regard to generating normative consensus, yet, when it comes to the practical interpretation of principles and the implementation of concrete rules, they face significant barriers to effectiveness. As such, our survey findings corroborate Keohane's (1982, p. 480)

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observation that, "[i]n general, international organizations are better at facilitating agreement among governments than at instituting rules or enforcing them on governments."

For example, in global climate governance, the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' (CBDR-RC) that emerged out of negotiations under the UNFCCC is a widely accepted normative guideline, acknowledging that richer and high-emitting countries must lead global efforts to mitigate global warming. However, in practice, diverging interpretations of this norm have stymied collective action (Survey I). Similarly, in international security, the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) has emerged as an important normative yardstick for interventions, reflecting a high-level "political commitment to end the worst forms of violence and persecution" (UN n.a.). Yet, R2P has had "limited practical success in altering state behavior" (Survey VI) and the application of this principle has been selective and often highly controversial. In the area of development, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have "been very successful in shaping the global agenda […] and creating a general consensus on global development norms" (Survey II). Still, successful implementation of the ambitious SDG agenda has proven challenging as it requires unprecedented cross-sectoral collaboration between a multitude of stakeholders and, crucially, the effective transposition of global development objectives into national legislation and policies (Georgeson and Maslin 2018).

In other issue areas, IOs have struggled to produce ambitious normative commitment in the first place. For instance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the only agency mandated to provide refugee protection on the global level, has not been a leading voice on many of the most important normative developments in this domain (Survey V). In many issue areas, increasing political polarization, often linked to questions of legitimacy and representation, poses challenges to constitutive effectiveness, including for IOs that exercise comparatively high levels of formal authority. The World Bank, for example, has been criticized for promoting Western-centric development models that reflect the values of high-income, non-borrowing countries, which control the majority of votes, thus failing to respond effectively to the needs and priorities of borrowing countries (Survey II). In international security, the contested legitimacy of the UNSC – whose membership structure is widely regarded as irreconcilable with current geopolitical realities – poses a challenge to constitutive effectiveness (Survey VI). In the trade and climate change regimes, divisions between advanced, emerging and developing economies have marred

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negotiations, making it more difficult to generate consensus on goals, principles and rules.

While such divisions are long-standing, they have come to the fore in the wake of global power shifts, which have seen emerging economies gain weight and influence on the international stage and demanding a greater role in global governance institutions. In some cases, this has contributed to the fragmentation of international regimes through the creation of alternative institutions, a prominent example being the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It is important to note, however, that polarization does not play out exclusively along familiar 'North-South' / 'East-West' divides. In the case of the WTO, for example, "major world trade powers have also backpedaled on key principles of trade liberalization" (Survey VII), often in response to domestic politicization.

Compliance

In terms of effectively inducing compliance, there are significant differences between the IOs included in the GLOBE expert survey, corresponding perhaps most clearly with variations in authority. Since authoritative IOs are more likely to be able to monitor compliance and use conditionality or (threat of) sanctions to influence state action, we may expect them to be more effective at inducing compliance. However, the survey results also raise important caveats regarding the effective use of such tools. For example, the application of sanctions to protect international peace and security hinges on agreement by UNSC members, including all of the P5, who often have highly divergent political priorities. In addition, in the absence of a standing international force, the implementation of UNSC mandates is dependent on states willing to intervene militarily ('coalitions of the willing') or contribute troops to peacekeeping operations. In the case of the WTO, the gradual breakdown of the Appellate Body has significantly reduced its ability to effectively induce compliance (Survey VII). In turn, the World Bank's has only little sway over non-borrowing countries and is facing increasing competition from alternative institutions offering development financing with fewer strings attached (Survey II).

Importantly, the relevance of compliance as a measure of IO effectiveness varies across issue areas and IOs. Not all IOs lay out in their constitutive treaties substantive binding commitments for state parties. For example, the work of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) work focuses primarily on agenda-setting and the coordination of specific projects that "focus more on partnership and support rather than inducing compliance" (Survey II). Similarly, the classic understanding of compliance is not of

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relevance for the work of the BIS, which focuses on fostering cooperation between central banks. This is also true for the IPCC, whose mission does not go beyond compiling scientific assessments of climate change. In the case of the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement embodies only procedural requirements and a strictly 'facilitative' approach to compliance, with a focus on catalyzing rather than compelling climate action. Earlier experiences with compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, which enshrined legally binding emissions reduction commitments for a limited number of states, suggest that compliance alone is an insufficient indicator of effectiveness in climate governance, where high ambition and broad-based participation is key to goal attainment. Thus, findings from the survey suggest that focusing on state compliance alone is not enough for understanding the effects of IOs on state behavior.

Goal attainment

Across issue areas, goal attainment is the measure of effectiveness that is most difficult to assess. While it is usually relatively straightforward to compare stated goals and real-world outcomes, making a direct connection between IO activity and changing state (or non-state) behavior is conceptually and methodologically challenging. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the survey results suggest that expert-based IOs whose primary focus is not on changing state behavior and/or whose policy functions are very limited – such as the IPCC, the BIS, or the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) – are more effective in terms of achieving their stated goals. Number and congruity of members may also affect an IO's ability to achieve stated goals, with smaller IOs that reflect a high level of 'like-mindedness' – such as NATO – facing fewer cooperation and coordination problems. That does not, however, imply a straightforward connection between IO size and effectiveness. Most of the issue areas under investigation require broad-based global collaboration to effectively solve problems (see Hooghe and Marks 2015). As noted above, such collaboration is also essential to ensure that responses are perceived as legitimate and do not encounter resistance. A large membership base may also increase the long-term resilience of an IO, ensuring that a sufficient number of stakeholders remains interested in keeping the institution 'alive' (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2021).

In virtually all issue areas under assessment, IOs must navigate this tension between broad-based support and effective implementation of ambitious responses. Notably, some IOs have seen their effectiveness decrease as broad-based support has become more elusive.

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For example, survey respondents note that UNHCR's effectiveness with respect to refugee protection "has declined over time" (Survey V). Similarly, the WTO, which has historically been very effective at reaching stated goals, is facing backlash on several fronts, significantly reducing its ability to make and implement trade rules. Interestingly, some of this backlash is rooted in the perception that international institutions have been too effective. In the case of the WTO's dispute settlement system, high levels of effectiveness "appears to have been a primary reason for the opposition to this mechanism by major trading powers, especially the United States, which found itself forced to comply with adverse rulings" (Survey VII). This points to perhaps the biggest challenge to IO effectiveness, namely that states, especially the most powerful, may not have an interest in creating effective institutions if this means constraining their own ability to act. As Guzman (2013, p. 999) argues, "states have been reluctant to give IOs the authority necessary to make progress on important global issues," careful to restrict their ability to develop, like Frankenstein's monster, an autonomous life of their own.

If IOs' ability to reach stated goals is in fact decreasing, at least in some domains, we need to develop a better understanding of what drives such loss of effectiveness. Contextual changes already mentioned above include global power shifts, intensifying politicization of global issues, and heightened concerns over legitimacy and representation. In addition, observers have pointed to growing overlap and interdependence between issue domains, which necessitates integrative governance approaches and augmented efforts to avoid ripple effects and unintended consequences. Climate change, for instance, is a monumental challenge requiring "a massive restructuring of socio-economic systems on several levels simultaneously" (Survey I), with inevitable implications for other areas of global governance, such as trade and investment. Failure to address it effectively will have even greater implications, increasing global pressures in areas such as migration, security and development. In some cases, previously relatively independent regimes are interacting so intensively that they can best be described as a 'regime complex' (Raustalia and Victor 2004; Alter and Meunier 2009), as evidenced, for example by the gradual 'convergence' of international economic law in trade and investment (Puig 2014). The emergence of regime complexes poses a key challenge "because they can generate new, or amplify existing, political conflicts among states navigating non-integrated governance systems with diverse, and sometimes contradictory, rules, norms, and policy goals" (Margulis 2021, p. 872).

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This messy global governance reality is also characterized by an increasingly heterogeneous set of players, including non-state and sub-state actors, operating across governance levels to influence, formulate, monitor, or implement global rules and policies, often through relatively informal, 'networked' forms of governance (Jordan and Schout 2006; Sørensen and Torfing 2007; Kahler 2016). There is growing recognition that, in order to effectively deliver on some of the most urgent global challenges, governance efforts must go beyond inter-state cooperation. Addressing climate change and promoting sustainable development, for example, requires the successful coordination of action across multiple levels of governance and by a variety of stakeholders. In the area of international security, formerly centered on interstate war, problems such as terrorism or WMD proliferation by non-state actors have proven difficult to address with legacy toolkits, designed to hold states accountable. In the domains of finance and investment, private actor such as banks and investors have always played a prominent role. The pluralization of global governance actors and mechanisms does not necessarily imply an evaporation of IO authority, however, it calls into question clear-cut distinctions between national, sub-national, supra-national and transnational governance.

For some, this problem reality calls for a "shift from a focus on 'compliance' and 'effectiveness' to 'influence'," recognizing that global governance may produce change through multiple interacting pathways, not all of which are (directly) aimed at changing state behavior (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, p. 586). Such pathways may also serve to enhance the de facto autonomy of IOs, even where states are reluctant to relinquish formal competencies (Lall 2017). We provide some reflections on alternative modes of influence, specifically orchestration, in the next section. We also pick up some of the larger underlying trends, referred to above, in section 5.3 which focused on the most pressing cross-cutting challenges to IO effectiveness.

5.2. Implications of Institutional Design for IO Effectiveness

How does institutional design affect an IO's ability to influence the behavior of states and which policy functions and design features are particularly conducive to effectiveness? In this section, we first assess the relative contributions of different policy functions to IO effectiveness across issue areas. In doing so, we take into account the aggregate scores assigned to specific policy functions by all respondents (Figure 3) as well as the

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disaggregated data that reveals important variations between issue areas (Figure 4). We then compare our findings with data from the International Authority Database, asking whether policy functions in which IOs exercise greater authority are ranked higher in terms of their relative importance for overall institutional effectiveness. Finally, we discuss how specific design features contribute to the performance of vital policy functions and how their effectiveness might be enhanced.

Figure 3: *Relative importance of existing policy functions for IO effectiveness: total scores across policy areas*



As shown in Figure 3, survey findings indicate that rule making, compliance monitoring and agenda setting are the most highly ranked policy functions across issue areas, in terms of their relative contribution to IO effectiveness. These functions are related to an IO's ability to shape global policy agendas, enshrine rules and policies in international law, and monitor their implementation. It is perhaps unsurprising that these three policy functions score particularly highly in the surveys. After all, agenda setting is key to the formulation of ambitious global goals, which provide important yardsticks for IO effectiveness. Rule making allows IOs to turn these goals into binding commitments, without which we would expect IOs to have little, if any, impact on state behavior. Finally, compliance monitoring is essential to draw conclusions on IO effectiveness and can be important to ensure that states stick to their commitments, even in the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms, provided that

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non-compliance comes with substantial reputational costs (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Young 1992; Keohane 1984).

Figure 4: *Relative importance of existing policy functions for IO effectiveness: scores assigned to particular issue areas*



As Figure 4 shows, not all IOs are tasked with the full range of policy functions, from agenda setting through to enforcement. Investment is a case in point, with the most authoritative IO in this area, the ICSID, focused primarily on dispute settlement and only peripherally engaging in other policy functions. In contrast, some IOs have additional functions that do not fit neatly into the classic IO 'policy cycle'. For example, much of the World Bank's work is focused on designing and implementing issue- and location-specific projects, rather than setting and enforcing global rules. Similarly, UNHCR engages in direct service provision, by offering aid and in-country protection to refugees and displaced persons.

Other policy functions also have relatively high aggregate scores, yet this is mainly due to their particular importance for certain IOs (see Figure 4).[1] Notably, norm interpretation – the authoritative resolution of conflicts over the specific meaning of norms and the settlement of disputes between states – is key to the effective functioning of ICSID and the WTO. Both IOs have highly institutionalized, dedicated adjudicative bodies. The WTO's

[1] For more information, see Appendix II, which provides an overview of how formal authority is distributed across policy functions for IOs that are included in both, the IAD and the GLOBE expert survey.

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dispute settlement mechanism, sometimes referred to as the organization's "jewel in the crown," has in some instances effectively replaced rule making in the context of stagnant political negotiations, though this has eventually contributed to its own gridlock (Creamer 2019). In the case of ICSID, norm interpretation is the principal policy function of the IO. Similarly, knowledge generation is of particular importance to only two surveyed IOs, namely UNHCR and the World Bank. The generation of substantive knowledge and expertise is key to the effectiveness of these organizations, in part because they engage, in contrast to other IOs, in service provision and the implementation of concrete projects. Knowledge production is also relatively more important for the work of the BIS, whose core mission explicitly includes knowledge sharing and the production for in-depth analyses. For other IOs, this policy function is either less consequential for their effectiveness or performed primarily by other dedicated institutions in the same issue area (e.g. the IPCC in the case of climate change).

The two policy functions with the lowest aggregate scores in terms of their importance for IO effectiveness are evaluation and enforcement. Evaluation – the review of the IO's internal operations in order to improve its functioning – is considered less vital to IO goal achievement, likely because it is largely an ex-post exercise. The relatively low ranking of enforcement is striking, given that horizontal enforcement has traditionally been thought of as "the core of international relations," and the principle mechanism to change the cost-benefit calculations of states (Moravscik 2012, p. 96). However, considering that most of the IOs included in the survey do not boast credible enforcement mechanisms, this finding is perhaps less surprising. As the disaggregated data shows, enforcement is of more (if still modest) importance for the few IOs (UNSC, WTO, and World Bank) that can use coercive mechanisms or financial leverage to ensure compliance. Yet, the majority of the surveyed IOs rely on more subtle and facilitative mechanisms to induce behavioral change and/or do not lay out binding commitments in the first place.

We briefly contrast the survey responses with data from the International Authority Database (IAD), bearing in mind that there is only partial overlap between surveyed IOs. Figure 5 plots the average authority per policy functions for the 34 IOs in the IAD sample. Interestingly, this data appears broadly consistent with expert assessments from our survey. In other words, functions in which IOs exercise substantial levels of formal authority, namely agenda setting, rule making and norm interpretation, are also seen as particularly important to

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ensure IO effectiveness. Notably, these three functions offer the greatest opportunity for IOs to "make their mark" on the purpose and functioning of the regime in question. For most other policy functions, formal authority levels also roughly correspond with expert assessments of their relative importance, including knowledge generation (moderate), evaluation (low) and enforcement (low). The biggest difference between the two datasets is in the area of compliance monitoring, which is seen as an important contributor to effectiveness by survey respondents even though average levels of formal authority across this policy function are low. A possible explanation is that even 'soft' mechanisms of compliance monitoring, such as regular reporting requirements or IO assessments of collective progress, are seen as important drivers of effectiveness, if they encourage socialization and learning processes or encourage domestic constituencies to apply pressure on their governments.

Figure 5: *Average authority exercised by IOs across policy functions, based on IAD data*



AS = agenda setting; RM = rule making; MO = (compliance) monitoring; NI = norm interpretation; EN = enforcement; EV = evaluation; KG = knowledge generation

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The survey results also provide insights on existing institutional design features that boost IO effectiveness, i.e. the specific processes, mechanisms and structures that enhance IO authority in one or more of the policy functions discussed above (see Table 1 below). In light of the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that many survey responses emphasize the importance of focality and/or independent decision-making or standard-setting powers. Focality, "an organization's position as an acknowledged governance leader" (Abbott and Hale 2014, p. 204) in a particular issue area, is key to its ability to engage in effective agenda setting and rule making. A lack of focality is likely to severely reduce the effectiveness of IOs, especially those operating in a highly fragmented governance context, and may also encourage further fragmentation. Focality is supported by design features such as strong mandate prerogatives (the UNSC being a prime example) and decision-making structures that deliver outcomes without compromising legitimacy (something that has emerged as a key challenge for several IOs, notably the WTO). The agenda setting and rule making capacity of IOs may also be enhanced through consistent leadership by high-level individuals or bodies within the organization, including those whose formal authority is relatively constrained. For example, in the migration regime, the Executive Committee of the Program of the UNHCR has historically played an important role in consensus-building through its 'soft law' conclusions, although its relevance has declined in recent years.

Beyond agenda setting and rule making, other policy functions are also supported by specific design features. For example, the power to impose legal sanctions or apply conditionality to the receipt of benefits is a key institutional feature for the three IOs in the sample that have been delegated enforcement authority by states (UNSC, WTO and the World Bank). In turn, dispute settlement and adjudication mechanisms are of particular importance to IOs whose mandates have a particular focus on norm interpretation (ICSID and the WTO). In the absence of standing dispute settlement mechanisms, other IOs (such as BIS) engage in norm interpretation in less formalized ways. Regular reporting requirements are an important element of compliance monitoring, however, only few IOs (e.g. the UNSC and some of the institutions focused on WMD non-proliferation) enjoy formal powers of investigation. In contrast, in the climate domain, compliance monitoring has been essentially replaced by transparency, with the Paris Agreement relying primarily on states' self-assessments and facilitative expert reviews to build trust and promote effective implementation (Slaugher 2015). For some IOs (e.g. the World Bank), access to country-level reports and data is also essential for knowledge generation, which in turn is an

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important prerequisite for the design and implementation of specific projects.

Across all policy functions, mechanisms to galvanize sufficient financial resources and safeguards to ensure institutional independence can be important drivers of effectiveness. Access to reliable funding "has long been recognized [as] critical to the evolution of IOs and to the realization of their global policy ambition" (Goetz and Patz 2017, p. 5). In our sample, financial resources are of particular concern for IOs that engage in project implementation and service provision (the World Bank and UNHCR) as well as the UN's operations in the field of international security, particularly those related to peacekeeping. Another cross-cutting design feature that stands out from survey responses is orchestration. Orchestration can be broadly defined as "a process whereby states or intergovernmental organizations initiate, guide, broaden, and strengthen transnational governance by non-state and/or sub-state actors" (Hale and Roger 2014, pp. 60-61). Representing a mix of "top down" and "bottom up" governance approaches, orchestration neither fits neatly into the classic IO policy cycle, which is primarily aimed at changing state behavior, nor does it reflect transnational efforts that emerge, diffuse and operate completely independently of intergovernmental institutions. It can perhaps best be understood as an effort by focal IOs to catalyze broad-based action by a variety of actors in line with globally defined governance priorities (Abbott and Snidal 2010). To be effective orchestrators, IOs must have sufficient focality and autonomy, whether legal or de facto, however, they do not necessarily need high levels of formal authority in terms of their ability to issue binding decisions (Hale and Roger 2014). For example, the UNFCCC has been able to engage in facilitative orchestration despite its narrowly circumscribed mandate (Hickmann et al. 2021). Orchestration could also help strengthen global migration governance, with IOs in this area acting as brokers or "wingmen" of multi-sector alliances (Thouez 2019).

Table 1: Design features considered particularly conducive to IO goal attainment

	Design features	**Corresponding policy function**
Climate: UNFCCC	Regular reporting requirements	Compliance monitoring
	Ambition ratcheting	Agenda setting
	Orchestration	Cross-cutting (catalyzing)
	Focality	Agenda setting / rule making

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Development: World Bank	Mechanisms to ensure sufficient funding	Cross-cutting
	Independence to design new projects based on past experience and learning	Agenda-setting/ rule making/ knowledge generation
	Regular reporting requirements / access to information	Compliance monitoring / knowledge generation
	Powers to impose legal sanctions (conditionality)	Enforcement
Finance: BIS	Standard-setting powers	Agenda setting / rule making / knowledge generation
	Mechanisms for norm interpretation	Norm interpretation
Investment: ICSID	Dispute settlement and adjudication mechanisms	Norm interpretation
Migration: UNHCR	Mechanisms to ensure funding	Cross-cutting
	Safeguards to ensure independence	Cross-cutting
	Orchestration	Cross-cutting (catalyzing)
	ExComm (focality)	Agenda setting / rule making
Security: UN	Mandate prerogatives	Agenda setting / rule making
	Powers to impose legal sanctions	Enforcement
	Mechanisms to ensure sufficient funding	Cross-cutting
	Regular reporting requirements / formal powers of investigation	Compliance
Trade: WTO	Dispute settlement and adjudication mechanisms	Norm interpretation
	Powers to impose legal sanctions	Enforcement
	Decision-making structures (focality)	Agenda setting / rule making

Finally, the survey results allow us to present some reflections on how IO effectiveness could be improved. Figure 6 plots the aggregate number of responses for each existing policy function considered in need of further strengthening. Overall, the data suggests that there is room for improvement across almost all policy functions and IOs. Norm interpretation ranks particularly high, perhaps reflecting the increased need to respond to norm ambiguity and plurality in a post-hegemonic world order (Linsenmaier, Schmidt and Spandler 2021). Agenda setting, rule making and compliance monitoring also rank high, corresponding with their high perceived importance for IO effectiveness. Interestingly,

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evaluation is also considered in need of improvement by most respondents, despite the fact that this policy function does not rank high in terms of its relative importance for effectiveness. However, as the IAD data reveals, states appear to be particularly reluctant to endow IOs with the right to review intra-institutional processes and develop recommendations for change, suggesting that there is much room for improvement of this policy function. Taken together, survey responses imply that, in most issue areas, effectiveness could be increased by granting IOs more leeway when initializing and adopting rules and policies, passing judgments on conflicts over norms, collecting and assessing compliance-relevant information, and reviewing their own internal functioning. Knowledge generation stands out as the only policy function not widely considered in need of improvement, likely because it is not a core activity for the majority of sampled IOs. Enforcement also does not rank highly, however, as discussed above, this could be due to the fact that few IOs have been delegated credible enforcement powers in the first place.

Figure 6: *Number of mentions: Existing policy functions in need of further improvement to enhance effectiveness*



Indeed, a closer look at the survey responses suggests that, in many issue areas, there is a gap between what is desirable and what is realistically feasible in terms of enhancing the 'policing' functions of IOs. Stronger enforcement mechanisms could hypothetically improve

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effectiveness in a number of issue areas, however, in practice, enhancing IO's enforcement capacity in these domains would be politically highly contentious and extremely difficult, if not impossible, to realize. In climate change governance, for example, there has been much concern that the absence of any kind of penalty under the Paris Agreement's facilitative pledge-and-review system will encourage free-riding, delivering nothing but "appealing promises and renewed victory statements" that serve "only to prolong the waiting game" (Gollier and Jean Tirole 2015, p. 1). However, the need to ensure broad-based participation made it politically impossible to produce an agreement with more 'bite.'

Interestingly, enforcement deficits are a concern even for those IOs that have relatively high levels of formal authority in this area. Sanctions are not always applied consistently, sometimes as a direct result of institutional design, as exemplified by the use (and abuse) of P-5 veto powers in the UNSC. In addition, empirical evidence suggests that sanctions are not always effective, even when they impose significant costs on the targeted state, and may even end up strengthening recalcitrant regimes (Mayall 1984). In the area of development finance, enhanced monitoring and enforcement of the conditions imposed on borrower/grantee states could theoretically increase effectiveness, however, this would be highly contentious, especially in the context of diverging development priorities, and might ultimately undermine the relevance of the World Bank. In the case of the WTO, effective retaliative sanctioning (or threat thereof) is reliant on the dispute settlement mechanism, whose functioning has been undermined by increasing political conflict. We reflect on some of these underlying tensions and challenges in the following section.

In concluding our observations on institutional design, data from the surveys and the International Authority Database suggests that IOs can make a greater difference at the 'start' of the policy process, when initiating and adopting global goals, norms, rules and policies, rather than towards the 'end' of the policy process, when the focus shifts towards implementation, enforcement and review. Attempts to strengthen enforcement are highly contentious, given its implications for sovereignty. In the absence of credible 'policing' mechanisms, surveys point to possible alternative pathways towards effectiveness, such as enhancing the transparency of national efforts (facilitative compliance monitoring), orchestration, or moving towards more inclusive agenda-setting and decision-making processes that would enhance the legitimacy, and hence acceptance, of globally defined goals and rules. Survey results also suggest that there is no 'one size fits all' blueprint for

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institutional design. For example, while standing dispute settlement mechanisms are essential for the effectiveness of some IOs, the lack of such mechanism is not necessarily a concern for others. In theoretical terms, survey results lend some support to arguments about effectiveness that emphasize alternative pathways towards compliance, beyond top-down enforcement, including those focused on reputational concerns (Keohane 1984), knowledge generation and learning (Haas 1989) or pressure from domestic constituencies (Dai 2005).

5.3. Key Cross-Cutting Challenges to IO Effectiveness

Although the governance context in which IOs are operating varies significantly across issue domains, survey responses enable us to identify a number of key cross-cutting barriers to greater effectiveness. This section of the survey was deliberately framed in an exploratory manner, asking participants about "the most important overall challenges" to IO effectiveness in their respective issue area. Answers were later coded to identify common themes (see Appendix III). Below, we provide brief reflections and examples for each of these themes. As shown in Figure 6, political conflict, legitimacy concerns and challenging problem structures stand out as the most prevalent sources of inertia and ineffectiveness.

Figure 6: *Key challenges facing IOs, ranked according to number of mentions across survey responses (qualitative coding of responses available in Appendix III)*



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Political conflict

As Hurd (2021, p. 12) reminds us, "[a]ll substantive political decisions have their winners and losers, and 'governance' exercised through global institutions is no different." States seek to advance their own interests through IOs. Where these interests broadly align, IOs are more likely to produce shared goals, norms, and rules and drive effective domestic implementation. However, where state interests are antagonistic, IOs might find themselves paralyzed in disagreement. The UNSC, for example, whose ability to act is constrained by the parochial interests of the veto-wielding P-5, has repeatedly found itself deadlocked, even in the face of mass atrocities, resulting in a global system that can perhaps best be described as offering selective security rather than collective security (Roberts 2016). In other words, the legal powers of IOs are embedded in political context, which in turn is informed by global power dynamics.

Such tensions between the spirit of international law and the reality of international politics are not new. However, they have arguably grown in some issue areas, for instance trade. Once seen as a relatively depoliticized "technocrats' domain" (Reich 2005, p. 800), trade policy has become "highly contentious" as "the global consensus on ever greater trade liberalization has been eroding in recent decades" (Survey VII). Similarly, migration has seen higher levels of politicization as the debate has shifted "towards the securitization of this topic" (Survey V). Even the IPCC – an IO with a relatively narrow mandate focused on the provision of expert assessments – has seen greater levels of politicization, evident, for example, in the pushback against its influential special report on global warming of 1.5 °C (McGrath 2018) and intense state-led lobbying efforts to weaken recommendations in its Sixth Assessment Report (Vinter 2021). Beyond such issue area-specific observations, we also witness a broader trend of IO politicization, manifesting itself in contestation of multilateral institutions – especially those that boast relatively high levels of authority – by states and other actors, including domestic constituencies (Zürn 2018).

Legitimacy

Legitimacy – "the belief that an IO's authority is appropriately exercised" (Tallberg and Zürn 2019) – is an important prerequisite for institutional effectiveness that also features prominently in the surveys. In terms of constitutive effectiveness, legitimacy ensures that states respect the underlying 'rules of the game' and are willing to sign up to new agreements and ambitious goals. Legitimacy is also key to compliance, especially where

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IOs rely primarily on normative and reputational pressures to ensure that states stick to their international commitments. Even for IOs with relatively high levels of formal authority and the ability to use coercive mechanisms to induce compliance, such as the UNSC or the WTO, legitimacy is essential. If authority is perceived as illegitimate and inappropriately exercised, it is likely to invite contestation and may ultimately prompt states to withdraw from IOs, undermine them from within, and/or seek membership in alternative institutions.

Broadly speaking, institutional legitimacy derives from two sources, procedure (input or throughput) and performance (output), that are often mutually reinforcing (Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg 2019). In a context of growing multipolarity, procedural concerns – in particular those related to fair and equitable decision-making – have come to the fore, with important implications for legitimacy, especially for IOs where certain states enjoy institutionalised influence in decision-making (e.g. veto powers) and/or ideational influence (a disproportionate ability to shape the IO's underlying values) (Johnson 2011). The World Bank's weighted voting system, for example, is seen to favor the US and other advanced economies, who also exercise significant ideational influence over what kind of development models the Bank promotes (Survey II). In the case of the UNSC, "[c]oncerns about procedural deficits of the Security Council clearly dominate and inform the overall negative assessment of that body by UN member states" (Binder and Heupel 2015, p. 247). Procedural asymmetries may even affect the legitimacy of expert-centric IOs, albeit to a lesser degree. For example, the BIS and the BCBS have been criticized for their "small, exclusive membership circle" (Levi-Faur and Blumsack 2019) and club-like governance structures (Westermeier 2018) whereas the IPCC has faced "criticism regarding its geographical and disciplinary make-up" (Survey I). Beyond procedure, IOs might derive legitimacy as a result of their performance, both in terms of policy objectives achieved and their perceived fairness. For example, in climate governance, negotiation outcomes are judged not only on their overall ambition but also on the 'appropriateness' of state parties' contributions, an issue that has proven particularly thorny.

Problem structure

As insights from public policy research suggest, correct problem definition is essential, helping us pose relevant questions to guide the selection of governance instruments (Peters 2005). Regime scholars, too, have acknowledged that problem structure is key to studying the effectiveness of international institutions, not only because institutional performance

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might vary depending on the 'difficulty' of the underlying problem but also because problem framing influences how institutions are designed and how we define 'success' (Mitchell 2006). In other words, understanding the types of problems we are facing helps us assess whether existing institutions are actually geared towards addressing them.

There is a growing sense that global problems have become "harder," overwhelming the capacity of existing governance mechanisms (Hale, Held and Young 2013), and, in some cases, so complex that they fundamentally undermine the logic of the post-war multilateral order (Kreienkamp and Pegram 2020). Climate change – a "super wicked problem" (Levin et al. 2012) with multiple interrelated causes and no one-size-fits-all solution – is an emblematic example. Addressing it effectively will require not just intergovernmental agreement but systemic change, driven by multiple actors across multiple sectors and levels of government, all within a rapidly shrinking time frame (Survey I). Similarly, "development governance occurs at a variety of levels from international organizations to small villages and is conducted by a wide range of different actors – from international and regional development banks, to states, non-governmental organizations, and business actors" (Survey II). In this domain, problem complexity, coupled with competing state interests, has also produced normative ambiguity, resulting in competing models of development and a lack of adequate progress indicators. In other issue areas, complexity is rearing its head in the form of 'new' and emergent problems, such as terrorism and other 'networked' security threats (Avant and Westerwinter 2016), or regulatory overlap and interaction, such as the "spaghetti bowl" of preferential trade agreements (Kloewer 2016).

Institutional capacity and finance

A lack of institutional capacity may reflect both, states' reluctance to delegate formal authority to IOs and/or their hesitancy to provide IOs with the resources necessary to effectively execute the policy functions in which they do enjoy a reasonable degree of formal authority. As Heldt and Schmidtke (2017, p. 51) note, "IOs' power to shape global governance outcomes is clearly contingent on their financial and staff capabilities" and, where such capabilities are high, they can be strategically employed to further increase IO authority. Of course, IO's resource needs are dependent on the scope of their work. IOs that directly engage in service provision, project implementation or costly enforcement activities are likely to require substantial resources to be effective. For example, "[t]he UN's operations in the field of security, particularly those related to peacekeeping, require a great

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deal of funding for their effective continuation" (Survey VI). While some IOs suffer from chronic underfunding, others may experience acute funding impasses, due to unforeseen events or because key states seek major funding cuts. In response, many IOs have adopted increasingly sophisticated strategies to raise budgets, often actively encouraging greater diversification of resources and funding mechanisms (Goetz and Patz 2017). While this has helped shine a light on existing capacity gaps, it has also raised concerns over the budget transparency of IOs and its implications for institutional effectiveness (Moloney and Stoycheva 2017).

Fragmentation and lack of central authority

Growing regime fragmentation is a feature of several of the surveyed issue domains. Yet, it appears to be particularly consequential for effectiveness where there is no authoritative IO to act as a central 'node.' Notably, the international regulation of both finance and investment is highly decentralized and fragmented, and IOs in this space have few formal powers. Global financial governance is highly "polycentric," relying primarily on voluntary standard-setting and market discipline to induce change (Survey III). In turn, "[t]he international protection of foreign investment is governed by more than 3000 bilateral state-to-state agreements, with only a few plurilateral agreements of limited geographical or substantive scope, […] and a handful of multilateral fora" (Survey IV). However, fragmentation does not appear to be equally detrimental to effectiveness across issue areas. For example, in the climate space, the "UNFCCC has struggled but ultimately succeeded to keep its position as the key node in an increasingly polycentric global climate governance system" (Survey I). Indeed, some have argued that the 2015 Paris Agreement is making "virtues" out of polycentricity and fragmentation (Hale 2017, p. 190), enabling a variety of 'bottom up' responses by a multitude of actors. This is in line with broader claims about the "creative" potential of fragmentation in a context of complex interdependence (Acharya 2016). Thus, the long-term implications of regime fragmentation for IO effectiveness remain contested and may well look very different from issue area to issue area, depending on problem structure and institutional context.

Tension between ambition and broad-based consensus

As highlighted above, many of the IOs under investigation face a fundamental tension between ensuring broad-based consensus on the one hand and ambitious commitments on the other, i.e. commitments that go beyond what governments would have done anyway.

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For some scholars, this tension is essentially unresolvable. According to Underdal's (1980) "law of the least ambitious program," international agreements are inevitably constrained by the level of commitment displayed by the least enthusiastic parties. In practice, however, this law does not always hold, for example where other powerful states are willing and able to use carrots (or sticks) to entice reluctant parties (Victor 2006) or where unanimity is not required for decision-making (Hovi and Sprinz 2006).

It is perhaps not surprising that concerns over the tension between ambition and consensus feature particularly prominently in the UNFCCC and WTO, both of which operate on the basis of the consensus principle. While this means that these IOs may face less contestation over procedural legitimacy, finding agreement becomes harder, especially in light of growing complexity and politization. In the case of the UNFCCC, states have tried to find a way around this dilemma in the Paris Agreement by substituting binding substantive commitments with procedural obligations designed to 'nudge' states towards greater ambition over time. In the case of the WTO, reform suggestions include moving towards some form of majoritarian or weighted voting, or, alternatively, to embrace "differentiated integration" that would allow states to move ahead at different speeds on specific issues (Survey VII).

Internal culture

Most of the challenges identified above are rooted in conflicting state interests, power asymmetries and/or the complexity of global problem structures, rather than the internal workings of IOs themselves. In our survey, internal culture is explicitly mentioned as a barrier to IO effectiveness only once, namely in the context of global migration governance; however, it is likely that bureaucratic "pathologies" play at least a secondary role in explaining effectiveness shortcomings in other domains as well (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; 2004). In the case of UNHCR, survey respondents (Survey V) note that internal culture "is characterized by a lack of learning, deference to seniors (telling managers what they want to hear, rather than what is actually happening on the ground), and deference to states (which impedes holding them to account)." Others have explored how opaque bureaucratic structures at UNHCR create obstacles for refugees seeking to obtain humanitarian aid and access to resettlement (Ozkul and Jarrous 2021). Going forward, a burgeoning body of research on international public administrations (e.g. Bauer, Knill and Eckhard 2017; Biermann and Siebenhüner 2009; Eckhard and Ege 2016; Ege 2020;

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Trondal, Marcussen and Larsson 2010) could provide important insights on the implications of administrative styles and leadership cultures for IO effectiveness.

6. Conclusion

This paper has sought to shed light on the constraints and possibilities international institutions face when initiating, designing, and implementing global policies. To date, few existing studies have reviewed issues of effectiveness across a range of diverse issue areas, with much of the relevant literature focused on environmental IOs. By assessing IO performance across the whole range of GLOBE issue areas – climate change, development, finance, investment, migration, security, and trade – this paper aims to respond to this research gap. In doing so, we were able to draw on the combined expertise of GLOBE team members, all of whom bring in-depth knowledge of the institutions in their respective domains. Specifically, we designed a detailed survey on IO effectiveness, gathering not just information on IO performance across multiple dimensions but also the implications of institutional design as well as the key underlying challenges that threaten to undermine IOs' ability to deliver. We were also able build on previous GLOBE Deliverables and, in particular, the International Authority Database (IAD) developed by the WZB.

While the findings presented here must be interpreted cautiously, given the small size of the survey, they provide important clues as to the factors that facilitate or impede IO effectiveness, also highlighting priorities for future research. Overall, we find that IOs tend to be most effective early in the policy cycle, when initiating and facilitating agreement on global goals, norms, and rules. States generally appear willing to delegate substantive levels of authority to IOs during these "constitutive" stages of the policy processes (agenda setting and rule making). In contrast, only few IOs are endowed with meaningful monitoring and enforcement powers; "far more commonly, international institutions are left to find more subtle ways of to cajole or induce compliance from their members" (Hurd 2021, p. 1). Evidence from the surveys also suggests that coercive powers, where they have been granted, are not always applied consistently to hold states to account. Consequently, many IOs have a relatively successful track record with regard to constitutive effectiveness – generating consensus on the normative principles and goals underpinning global collaboration – but struggle to translate this into tangible collective action.

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While this observation applies across most issue areas, survey results also remind us to be careful when drawing generalized conclusions on IO institutional design. Some policy functions and design features – for instance those related to knowledge generation and dispute settlement – are far more important for some IOs than for others. Indeed, not all IOs are active across the full policy cycle and not all IO functions are directly aimed at changing state behavior. IOs also differ in terms of their capacity to adapt a changing governance context, marked by power shifts, regime fragmentation, institutional overlap, and the rise of less formalized governance arrangements. Thus, while the proliferation and diversification of actors and mechanisms poses serious threats to the effectiveness of some IOs, it may provide opportunities for others. In the domain of climate change, for example, catalytic experimentation by a plurality of state and non-state actors has gained traction as a promising new form of governance (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018), especially where IOs are able to 'orchestrate' such contributions. However, while it provides a promising alternative governance pathway, orchestration is not necessarily more effective than delegation (Abbott et al. 2016), nor is it always normatively desirable (Bäckstrand and Kuyper 2017), and more research is needed to determine when, where and how it can boost IO performance.

Notwithstanding important differences between the IOs included in the survey, we have been able to identify a few cross-cutting challenges that impede institutional effectiveness across most issue areas. These include political conflict and growing politicization, concerns over IO legitimacy and representation, and the expansion and complexification of global problems. These challenges are interrelated and not easily resolved. For example, because complex problems are evolving and ambiguous, they are likely to increase political conflict. In turn, efforts to reduce political conflict through institutional reform – e.g. by introducing majority voting – is likely to heighten concerns over legitimacy and representation. The relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness is particularly interesting, since these two attributes can be mutually reinforcing but also mutually constraining (Sommerer and Agné 2018). Without sufficient legitimacy, IOs are arguably less able to engage in effective problem solving. In turn, a lack of effective output is likely to further decrease legitimacy. We will investigate this tension further in the context of GLOBE Deliverable 7.4.

As this paper has shown, the effectiveness of IOs is constrained by a range of factors, including low levels of authority across policy functions, especially those related to

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compliance monitoring and enforcement. IOs are more than faithful servants of their masters, yet their ability to induce behavioral change in states is carefully circumscribed. Thus, IOs must engage in the "art of the possible" (Keohane 1982), using their comparatively strong agenda-setting powers and multiple pathways of influence to pursue their mission and contribute to the attainment of globally defined goals.

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Appendix

Appendix I: GLOBE Effectiveness Questionnaire

This is a template of the survey that was distributed to GLOBE work package leaders to assess IO effectiveness across policy areas.

Before you begin the survey, please specify your issue area:

☐ Climate change
☐ Development
☐ Finance
☐ Investment
☐ Migration
☐ Security
☐ Trade

1. Please identify two key formal or informal international organizations (IOs) in your issue area and list their main policy goals (indicating source statute):

	Name of IO	Key policy objective(s)
1.		
2.		

Conceptualizing IO Effectiveness:

There are various approaches to defining and empirically assessing effective IO performance. A central question for a growing number of effectiveness scholars is whether IOs **actually change state (or non-state) behaviour in a way that contributes to the achievement of their policy goals.** Put simply, do international organizations actually make a difference? This necessarily involves some counterfactual reasoning: Are we seeing a change in behaviour that contributes to the achievement of stated policy goals and that would likely not have occurred in the absence of this IO? While this is clearly an important question, the process through which IOs influence the behaviour of rule-takers, directly or indirectly, is often long, complex and difficult to assess.

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Therefore, others have considered policy outcome as a proxy for effectiveness. This conceptualisation of effectiveness focuses on **the degree to which an IO is able to influence the global agenda, bring together different stakeholders, and generate consensus on norms, goals and rules**. The degree of ambition reflected in norms, goals and rules is also important to gauge effectiveness. Does institutionalisation through the IO move norms, goals and rules beyond the lowest common denominator? While such output in itself can be considered a reflection of IO effectiveness ("constitutive effectiveness"), it does not deliver insights on whether states follow up on their commitments.

Thus, another group of institutionalist scholars has framed IO effectiveness primarily in terms of their **ability to monitor and enforce compliance with international rules**. The work of these scholars has helped illuminate the institutional effects of IOs, yet compliance alone does not fully capture whether multilateral institutions actually induce a change in state behaviour that would not have otherwise occurred.

Because all three conceptualisations of IO effectiveness (goal attainment, constitutive effectiveness, and compliance) raise difficult theoretical and methodological challenges, in this inquiry, we consider them in combination.

For more information, please refer to the enclosed executive summary.

2. **Goal attainment:** How well are the two IOs identified above doing in terms of achieving their stated policy goals? Please expand below, starting with the IO you consider most effective in terms of goal attainment.

	Name of IO	Assessed performance in terms of goal attainment
1.		
2.		

Additional comments (e.g. on how goal attainment differs across multilateral agreements concluded under the mandate of the IOs above):

3. **Constitutive effectiveness:** How well are these two IOs doing in terms of generating consensus on (ambitious) shared norms, goals and rules? Please expand below, starting with the IO you consider most effective in terms of constitutive effectiveness.

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	Name of IO	Assessed performance in terms of goal attainment
1.		
2.		

Additional comments (e.g. on the tension between ambition and broad-based consensus):

4. **Compliance:** How well are these two IOs doing in terms of monitoring and enforcing rule compliance? Please expand below, starting with the IO you consider most effective in terms of inducing compliance.

	Name of IO	Assessed performance in terms of goal attainment
1.		
2.		

Additional comments (e.g. on how compliance outcomes differ across multilateral agreements concluded under the mandate of the IOs above):

Conceptualizing IO authority:

IO authority has two dimensions: autonomy and bindingness. Thus, it reflects both the degree of independence an IO enjoys in decision making and the extent to which its decisions can limit state discretion.

IOs may exercise authority across different policy functions, including (but not necessarily limited to):

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- **Agenda setting**: determining which policy proposals are included or excluded for debate and deliberation
- **Rule making**: translating policy proposals into substantive obligations or guidance for state parties
- **Compliance monitoring**: collecting and assessing information on state parties' compliance and performance
- **Norm interpretation**: passing judgments in case of disagreement over specific institutional norms or efforts to solve intra-state disputes (dispute settlement)
- **Enforcement**: imposing sanctions on non-compliant state parties
- **Evaluation**: assessing the IO's own performance and developing proposals to improve its internal workings
- **Knowledge generation**: collecting, processing, evaluating, and disseminating knowledge pertaining to the substantive governance problem the IO is tasked to address

How much authority an IO exercises across these policy functions is dependent on specific **institutional design features**, i.e. the processes, mechanisms and structures that allow the IO to perform authority across the policy functions listed above. These may include (but are not limited to):

- Mechanisms to ensure sufficient funding
- Safeguards to ensure independence
- Mandate prerogatives
- Regular reporting requirements
- Formal powers of investigation
- Powers to impose legal sanctions
- Dispute settlement and adjudication mechanisms
- Possibilities of engaging transnational actors in monitoring and other policy functions ("orchestration")

More general design features, such as size and structure of an IO, may also affect how much authority it enjoys across functions.

More information is contained in the enclosed executive summary. For a more extensive discussion, please refer to Zürn, M., Tokhi, A. and Binder, M. (2021). The International Authority Database. *Global Policy*. DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12971.

5. Pick the IO which you consider most authoritative in your issue area. For this IO, rank the following **policy functions** in order of their importance for IO effectiveness, from 1 (most important) to 7 (least important).). For policy functions that the IO does not currently perform, choose n/a. See above for further information on policy functions.

   Name of IO:

   Ranking of policy functions:

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- Agenda setting Choose an item.
- Rule making Choose an item.
- Compliance monitoring Choose an item.
- Evaluation Choose an item.
- Enforcement (sanctioning) Choose an item.
- Norm interpretation (dispute settlement) Choose an item.
- Knowledge generation Choose an item.

Is there another policy function that is important to effectiveness of this particular IO? If so, what is it and how highly would you rank it in terms of importance?

Additional comments:

6. For the same IO, which existing **design features** are particularly conducive to goal attainment? Please list up to five design features in order of importance. These may include design features listed in the box above or others that you consider important.

	Design feature	Further explanation
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

Additional comments:

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7. Again, for the same IO, which existing **policy function(s)** would need further improvement to enhance effectiveness in your view? Please choose from the below (1 = policy function needs enhancement, 0 = policy function is sufficient as it is).

    - Agenda setting Choose an item.
    - Rule making Choose an item.
    - Compliance monitoring Choose an item.
    - Evaluation Choose an item.
    - Enforcement (sanctioning) Choose an item.
    - Norm interpretation (dispute settlement) Choose an item.
    - Knowledge generation Choose an item.

If you could pick just one **policy function** that most requires improvement to enhance effectiveness of the IO, which one would it be and why? Which particular **design features** could help improve this function?

8. In your opinion, what are the most important overall challenges to effectiveness of IOs in your issue area?

9. Please provide a general abstract (up to 500 words) laying out the current state of IO effectiveness in your issue area.

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Appendix II: Distribution of Authority per Policy Function

This figure is based on data from the International Authority Database and shows the distribution of authority per policy function for those IOs that are also included in the GLOBE expert survey.



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Appendix III: Key Challenges to IO Effectiveness

This table includes coded responses from the GLOBE expert service, outlining the most important overall challenges to effectiveness across issue areas.

	Most important overall challenges to effectiveness	**Category coding**
Climate: UNFCCC	Tension between ambitious, enforceable goals vs. broad-based participation (incl. all major emitters)	Ambition vs. broad-based consensus / Political conflict & politization
	Tension between effectiveness and considerations of equity, fairness and justice	Legitimacy & representation / Institutional capacity & finance
	Complexity	Problem structure
Development: World Bank	Competing models of development	Problem structure / political conflict & politization
	A focus on economic development at times at the expense of sustainable development	Problem structure / political conflict & politization
	Outsized influence of certain member states (particularly advanced economies)	Legitimacy & representation
	Inadequate indicators of development	Problem structure
Finance: BIS	Inclusiveness of non-western states interests (dominance of experts from advanced economies)	Legitimacy & representation
	Inclusiveness of social and consumer organizations	Legitimacy & representation
	Increasing risk analysis to cover social impact and climate change issues	Problem structure
	Regime fragmentation	Fragmentation & lack of central authority
	Lack of formal authority and legitimacy	Fragmentation & lack of central authority
Investment:	Fragmentation and lack of authoritative IO	Fragmentation & lack of

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ICSID	to form central core of the regime	central authority
Migration: UNHCR	A generally hostile and increasingly restrictive international environment vis-à-vis migration, particularly asylum/refugee protection agendas	Political conflict & politization
	Insufficient mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance with international laws and norms	Institutional capacity & finance
	UNHCR internal culture, which is characterized by a lack of learning, deference to seniors, and deference to states	Internal culture
Security: UN	Political disagreements and divergent national agendas	Political conflict & politization / legitimacy & representation
	Fast-changing nature of security threats and military material	Problem structure
	Operational constraints such as interoperability and funding challenges	Institutional capacity & finance
Trade: WTO	High politicization and contentiousness of trade policy	Political conflict & politization
	Tension between ambition and consensus in rule-making	Ambition vs. broad-based consensus / legitimacy & representation
	High economic stakes of trade rules	Political conflict & politization

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