

**Problematizing the concept of 'experience' in educational contexts: the case
of school-based teacher training and school inspection**

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
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Declaration

I, Jeffrey Pocock, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Signed:



Jeffrey Pocock

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Abstract

In educational contexts, 'experience' is a term that features prominently. Much time and money is invested in educational policies, initiatives, and organisations seeking the validation of 'experience'. In educational contexts the term 'experience', however, suffers from neglect and rather than serving to illuminate acts typically to gloss over the various contexts where the term is foregrounded. This glossing over with the term 'experience' in educational contexts means that insufficient attention is being paid to their character, conditions, and potential. In an attempt to address this neglect, I draw in the main in the thesis on the works of Alasdair MacIntyre and John McDowell. With their assistance, I reconsider school-based teacher training and school inspection, two educational contexts where the term 'experience' is especially prominent in its use. MacIntyre's writings, especially his related, pregnant, teleological notion of a practice, help to shed much needed light on the interdependent and mutually shaping features and preconditions of educational contexts that feature the term 'experience'. Complementing MacIntyre's thinking, McDowell's work is drawn on to challenge our taken-for-granted notions of 'experience' as it features in educational contexts and provides a basis upon which we might better consider its interworkings with the crucial capacity of judgement. As a way of drawing out more of the depth and detail of educational contexts, the concept of 'experience' is not rejected in the discussion that follows. It is argued, however, that current understanding of what the term 'experience' involves demands more careful appreciation. By bringing to the surface more of what lies beneath use of the elusive concept of 'experience', as it figures in educational contexts, the thesis aim is then to caution the reader against an easy and quick use of the term.

Impact Statement

This research, problematising the use of the term 'experience' in educational contexts, could have the following impact: It addresses a fruitful area for further research in the philosophy of education and provides tentative impetus for further scholarship in the area of 'experience'; In its application to Education Studies, it provides an alternative focus to the technical effectiveness and 'What Works' approaches, one emphasising the importance of character and the conditions in which practice takes place. This research serves as encouragement for focus on the term 'experience' and its use in other areas beyond Education Studies. The term is regularly used in relation to professionalism so by emphasising the neglect of the term 'experience' and suggesting theoretical resources that could be fruitful in overcoming this neglect, the thesis opens further possibilities for self-reflection in various professions. The thesis can complement existing empirical work, stressing the significance of practice by highlighting presuppositions that require further examination and suggesting theoretical resources that point to areas of neglect.

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“Experience, the best of teachers” (Arnold, 1862, p.359)

“Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes” (Wilde, 1997, p.520)

“Everything is an experience” (Heidegger, 1971, p.79)

“Experience [...] is a limited word” (Williams, 1995, p.172)

Introduction: Problematising ‘Experience’

The term ‘experience’ is used widely and frequently in education as it is in everyday life.¹ According to one large body of research of general English texts, the term ‘experience’ is used to a similar degree of frequency as ‘learning’ and more frequently than other, more familiar educational vocabulary such as ‘teach’ or ‘test’.² A great deal of resources are also invested in educational policies and organisations concerned with ‘experience’ and a lot is carried by the term.

Universities in the UK and US, for instance, are now commonly judged according to “student (life-cycle) experience” indicators and metrics (student satisfaction, course continuation, employment outcomes) and have invested heavily in new buildings, facilities, and support services. An impressive amount of funding is currently being enjoyed by so-called *What Works* evidence-based education research. Much of the rationale for this kind of education research stems from the belief that the judgements of what works in the classroom derived from “professional experience” are inferior to the findings about classroom effectiveness established in randomised-controlled trials (RCTs). Applicants to teacher training in England are encouraged to seek out “school experience” to help with the success of their applications. The applicants who cannot secure this “school experience” are at a disadvantage. Educators may also be deemed suitable or not for a promotion or a better paid job due to the nature and extent of their ‘experience’.

Acknowledgement of the Problem of ‘Experience’

Among the educational literature there is some acknowledgement of the significance of the term ‘experience’ in these various educational contexts. Among educationalists there is also some acknowledgement that in educational contexts the term warrants, but currently is not subjected to, closer scrutiny and theorisation. In

¹ The origins of ‘experience’ can be traced back to the Indo-European root of *per- meaning ‘to cross, pass’ (Beekes, 2010, p.1163). In ancient Greek, for example, the word peirō (πείρω) meant to spit (as in meat), stud, pierce, run or cleave a way through and peira (πείρα) meant a trial, plan, proof, test, assault, enterprise, attempt or undertaking. ‘Spear’ and ‘pirate’ are derivatives of these uses in ancient Greek, but so too ‘experiment’, ‘expert’ and ‘expertise’. In ancient Greek, the *per- root is also found in *empeiria*, later translated into English as ‘experience’, and from which are derived the related English terms ‘empiricism’, and ‘empirical’.

² According to the New General Service List (NGSL), for example, which draws on the Cambridge English Corpus, ‘experience’ is one of the more “core high frequency vocabulary words” in English (Browne, Culligan, & Phillips, 2020).

the case of teacher training, for example, Viv Ellis and Janet Orchard (2014, p.1) recognise that 'experience' is "weakly conceptualised", and typically understood solely in terms of classroom time served (See also Field & Latta, 2001; Ellis, 2010). In a series of writings, such as Thorburn (2018) and Thorburn and Steven Stolz (2017), Malcolm Thorburn has drawn attention to the weak way in which the term 'experience' as found, in particular, in physical and outdoor education, is conceptualised.³ In the context of higher education, Peter Scott (2014) has written of college and university "student experience" that its meaning is "unclear".

My thesis argument is that indeed in educational contexts, the term 'experience' is all too often applied without proper attention and conceptualisation. Typically, the term 'experience' features in education in a similar way and with a similar kind of guidance and insight that 'nice', 'good', 'bad', and other common but vague expressions do. This relative inattention and under-theorisation of the term 'experience', recognised by some educationalists, is despite the term's frequency and prominence, and despite the investment in policies and practices foregrounding 'experience'. Furthermore, the effect of this functioning of 'experience' in educational contexts is to mask their richness, complexity, limitations, and potential. In particular, insufficient attention is being paid to the preconditions informing the contexts that foreground 'experience', and within which we may develop our capacities and qualities, and insufficient attention is currently paid to the presuppositions impoverishing our understanding of the term. For such a prominent term as 'experience' in educational contexts, this relative lack of scrutiny, exploration, and unpacking is jarring and contemporary usage is in urgent need of closer attention.

School-Based Teacher Training and School Inspection

Various educational contexts, featuring 'experience', could be selected for the purpose of illuminating the all too commonly underappreciated functioning of the term currently. The thesis will, however, for reasons of space, topicality, and exemplification, focus specifically only on two.

³ See also Malcolm Thorburn and Steven Stolz (2019) and Thorburn (2020) for accounts relevant to education and schooling, more broadly.

One educational context premised on the importance of 'experience' to be critically explored in the thesis is school-based teacher training. Described more fully in chapter one, school-based training of teachers in the UK and US - School-Centred Initial Teacher Training (*SCITTs*), 'fast-track' routes, residencies - comes in various guises. However, all routes typically seek validation through and because of 'experience'. One particularly prominent functioning of the term in this context currently is students seen as requiring sufficient amounts of 'experience' for training purposes.

The other context to illustrate my thesis argument regarding the overstretched, underappreciated use of 'experience' currently in education is school inspection. School inspection also takes various forms, and its operations too are often premised on 'experience'. 'Experience' here can be seen typically as functioning as a resume/CV credential, as proof of what inspectors are capable of. Yet the term also features as something informing good inspection judgement and being drawn upon somehow in the making of such judgement.

Two Current Resources on 'Experience'

Martin Jay's 'Songs of Experience' (2005)

One further aim of the thesis is to suggest resources with which to attempt to more finely explore, unpack, and scrutinise use of the term 'experience' than is typical currently in educational contexts. There are two works, in the English language, Martin Jay's 'Songs of Experience' (2005), and Marianne Janack's 'What We Mean by Experience' (2012), which for this purpose immediately stand out. Although not in relation to education specifically, these two significant works have already attempted the difficult task of engaging with the notion of 'experience'. These two works offer us a more acute sense of the potential but also challenges involved in use of the term 'experience', contrasting starkly with, commonly underappreciated, usage in education. A number of thinkers to be drawn upon in the thesis, not least John McDowell in Janack (2012), also feature prominently in these two works.⁴

⁴ Janack (2012, esp pp.128-144) draws a good deal on McDowell's work.

In 'Songs of Experience' (2005), Jay explores what he, drawing on William Blake (1789/1794), metaphorically calls 'songs' (2005, p.1) about the term 'experience'. "Experience,' it turns out," Jay (2005, p.1) writes, "is a signifier that unleashes remarkable emotion in many who put special emphasis on it in their thought." What, though, Jay (2005) wonders, is motivating these different emotive responses?

As well as providing an account of why various figures have been drawn to it, in mapping the concept of 'experience' over time and in different contexts, Jay (2005) underscores the difficulty in engaging with the term. So, for instance, Jay divides his discussion into thematic chapters, with each individual chapter describing the use of 'experience' within specific "traditions", "disciplines", or "modalities" (Epistemology, Religion, Art, Politics, History). Within each of these "traditions", however, exist further divisions, Jay explains. In fact, Jay (2005) argues, "multiple denotations and connotations" (p.4), which sometimes overlap each other, and "often contradictory" (p.3), characterise these different "traditions" of 'experience'.

In other chapters, Jay highlights more "totalizing" notions of 'experience' ("whether dialectical, pragmatist, phenomenological, or poststructuralist", 2005, p.5). Jay's critique of these "totalizing" notions, such as "poststructuralist analysts of discourse and apparatuses of power" (2005, p.3), also, forewarns us in education of the challenge involved in usage of the term 'experience'. This is because, Jay explains, such "totalizing" notions do not serve understanding of what is involved in 'experience' well. Despite the totalizing effort, 'experience' cannot, he argues, ultimately be served by just one overarching conceptualisation. The term 'experience' is too ubiquitous for this, Jay argues, denoting and connoting things, "over time and in different contexts", and which "no totalizing account can hope to do justice to" (2005, p.4).⁵

While Jay (2005) is a resource that problematises understanding of what is involved in the term 'experience', and can serve as a warning to tread carefully in its scrutiny, his writing also reminds us why it should be subjected to closer scrutiny. The term is

⁵ In the literature on 'experience' he maps, Jay also draws our attention to the crisis that 'experience' is said to be in (See Chapter 8. Lamenting the Crisis of Experience: Benjamin and Adorno). The 'experience in crisis' theme is something visible, for example, in Giorgio Agamben's writing on the usage of 'experience', considered in chapter three. This theme of crisis is in stark contrast to the seemingly unquestioning faith widely and frequently placed in 'experience' in educational contexts.

ubiquitous and so unavoidable (Jay, 2005, p.4). Jay also suggests a way ahead for those looking to place the term's usage under scrutiny, advocating a selective approach, "to avoid being overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem" (Jay, 2005, p.4). In particular, Jay alerts us to how 'experience', with various "meanings" that have a "powerful [...] effect" (2005, p.3), is often specific to, and so not generic across, contexts. In fact, this emphasis on context is of a kind with the writings on 'experience', in particular, of William James and John Dewey, writers to be explored in chapter three. Unlike Dewey, Jay does not write specifically about what is involved in the use of 'experience' in education. Yet while Jay does not focus on education per se, his disclosure of the plurality of meaning invested in 'experience' is however a foretaste of the specifics attached to its meaning and use in educational contexts. This disclosure of plurality is also further warning against presuming those involved in education are fully attentive to what is involved in the term 'experience' and what it is being employed to capture in educational contexts. As with Dewey and other writers, Jay's disclosing of how 'experience' is wielded in different contexts also further belies its typical taken-for-granted use in education.

Marianne Janack's 'What We Mean by Experience' (2012)

Jay (2005) draws our attention to how the term 'experience' is all too often used quickly without sufficient attention to what is involved in it, for example, either what is presupposed in its use or what might need to be presupposed. This is a tendency with use of the term 'experience' found commonly in educational contexts that, as we shall see, the thesis aims to expose and address.

This sentiment, that 'experience' involves more than is typically attended to, also informs Janack's 'What We Mean by Experience' (2012). This is along with Jay (2005) the other noteworthy work of recent times in English specifically concerned with the term 'experience'.

Like Jay, Janack recognises both the plurality ("the term seems to have as many definitions as there are people", 2012, p.ix), and also problematic nature of the meanings invested in 'experience'. In her book, Janack's concern is, however, less broad than Jay (2005). Janack (2012) focuses on what is involved in use of the term 'experience' in one specific context (philosophy) albeit a context with broader significance.

Janack's main intention is to address a specific problem with 'experience', the so-called problem of the authority of experience, as found in the context of philosophy although a problem with everyday implications. The problem Janack focuses on involves first-person accounts of 'experience' of the world, agency (intentionality), and objectivity. How, she wonders, can first-person accounts of 'experience', and agency, be integrated convincingly with a more impersonal and so more objective stance?

By authority or appeal to 'experience', Janack (2012) would appear to have at least two different interpretations in mind. One is whether, and if so, how, 'experience' has "any authority to confirm or undermine our worldviews, theories, or value commitments?" (Janack, 2012, p.1). This interpretation of 'authority' is, for instance, evocative of the issues concerning 'experience' that McDowell's writings explore and that are considered especially in chapters nine and ten. The other understanding of authority of experience Janack (2012) reveals is the familiar use of 'experience' distinguishing expert from layman. This is an understanding of 'experience' equated with study and learning, and an understanding especially relevant to school inspection. As Janack reminds us, it is often simply assumed that as "a learning process, leading to the accumulation of know-how and the refinement of judgement" (2012, p.5), 'experience' provides an expert with authority that a layman, without such 'experience', cannot have. A virtuoso, such as a talented musician or wine connoisseur, for example, is often assumed to have cultivated abilities and insights born of and refined by 'experience' (Janack, 2012, p.5).⁶ This second interpretation of the authority of 'experience' gives rise to similar questions to the first, however. How, Janack wonders, can we distinguish statements and judgements of the world born of "refined experience of the world" (2012, p.5) from those that are 'unrefined', prefigured, or biased?

One approach to the question of how 'experience' acquires legitimate authority is to argue that it does its confirming or undermining through the world having a "say" about the "acceptability of our theories" (Janack, 2012, p.1). An alternative response to the question of how our judgements are determined, 'authorised', by experience

⁶ "[I]n some instances," she explains, "[experience] gains authority because it is grounded in a process of education and discernment that characterise connoisseurship and virtuosity" (Janack, 2012, p.5).

is, Janack (2012) explains, a common reductivism, a response that sees 'experience' in the either/or, binary terms of anti-foundationalism or the linguistic turn.⁷ Janack (2012) proposes her own 'intertwined' model for how we might better grasp how judgements are informed by 'experience' but not dictated by it. Janack's alternative, 'intertwined' model, she argues, means 'experience' is neither reduced solely to discourse nor to stimuli. It instead brings culture and nature together.

While philosophical and longstanding in empiricism and philosophy of mind, the kind of questions about 'experience', authority, agency, objectivity, expertise and judgement, their interplay, and the types of response Janack (2012) reveals, are not solely for rarefied academic debate. In educational contexts, for example, there are various practitioners, such as in school inspection, one of two contexts to be explored at length in the thesis, deriving a great deal of their authority from the cachet of 'experience'. In fact, connoisseurship, which Janack (2012) interchanges with 'expert' and 'virtuoso', is a common way of conceptualising school inspecting and inspectors in the Education Studies literature (See, for example, Maw, 1994, p.9; Maclure, 1998, p.530; Campbell & Husbands, 2000, p.46; Learmonth, 2000, p.13). Yet how exactly are the judgements of supposed experts, 'connoisseurs', such as school inspectors, or school-based teacher trainers, for that matter, determined by 'experience'? And how can we tell whether these judgements have been determined by the *right* kind of "refined" experience? These are crucial questions with direct, practical relevance for contexts, policies, and approaches in education. These are questions with the resources of Alasdair MacIntyre and McDowell, in particular, and their sensitivity to the conditions fostering the right 'experience', the thesis will be addressing.

As Jay (2005), Janack (2012) also argues that the term 'experience' is more difficult and more is involved in it than is typically assumed in its use. This in turn underscores my more specific concern that in educational contexts use of the term tends to be too quick and liberal, acting to gloss over issues and details of crucial significance, not least the conditions of 'experience' within which we and the context can flourish. Where primarily Jay (2005) alerts us to the plurality, and, at times,

⁷ Broadly speaking, anti-foundationalists reject the existence or possibility of there being any secure foundation or basis for thought, truth or knowledge. The so-called linguistic turn specifically foregrounds language and its usage as being crucial to understanding human activities.

contradictoriness invested in use of the term 'experience', Janack's work, however, alerts us to the possibility that there are problems with how we use the term within a particular context. Nevertheless, both Jay and Janack's writings serve to impress on the reader how 'experience' in educational contexts, for example, is unlikely to be as straightforward or predictable as assumed. These two books also serve as a warning regarding the likely difficulties facing those taking on this task of unearthing more about the use of and challenges posed by the term 'experience'.

Philosophical Resources on the Problem of 'Experience'

These two more recent works, Jay (2005) and Janack (2012), provide a good foretaste of what the thesis argues. Their writings warn us that what is at stake in use of the term 'experience' is likely to be less straightforward and more complex than is seemingly appreciated in educational contexts. Any mismatch between what usage of the term involves and what is currently and commonly understood by the term's usage ought to concern us especially given what hangs on the term as regards to educational policy and practice. The shift to school-based teacher training and the longevity of school inspection, for example, has huge ramifications for education stakeholders and the wider public.

As we shall see in more detail, it is indeed in more philosophical resources, such as Jay (2005) and Janack (2012), where we find the widest and deepest discussion of the term 'experience' and of challenges usage of the term poses. Unlike in education, among philosophers, the complexity inherent in use of the term is in fact widely acknowledged. To Michael Oakeshott, for instance, "'Experience', of all the words in the philosophic vocabulary, is the most difficult to manage" (1933, p.9). As a concept, it is "one of the most obscure we have", writes Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004, p.341). To Joseph Dunne it is "notoriously obscure", and "a kind of philosophical abyss in which other concepts are more likely to become lost or blurred rather than clarified" (1997, pp.280-281). To some modern philosophers the term is so plagued by difficulty that we are best to do without it completely. For Richard Rorty, for example, 'experience' was along with 'representation', the "[t]wo master ideas of Enlightenment philosophy" (Brandom, 2011, p.197). These "master ideas" were, however, seen, by Rorty, as "setting us on an ineluctable path to the bottomless abyss" we now confront (Brandom, 2011, p.197). In fact, for Rorty,

'experience' was "so thoroughly contaminated by and infected with disastrous collateral commitments as to be forever entangled with them" (Brandom, 2011, p.197). Rorty, "despaired of the project of producing sanitized, hygienic successors" (Brandom, 2011, p.197) so he recommended that these "master ideas" were destroyed. "The only safe way to treat these leper's rags," Rorty argued, "is to burn them" (Brandom, 2011, p.197). One writer to feature prominently in the thesis is McDowell. Yet while praising his exploration of the term 'experience', McDowell's contemporary Robert Brandom warns against the reader doing the same ("I still want to say: Kids, do not try this at home. This man is a professional. If you try, it will end in tears", 2011, p.197).⁸ Similarly, Brandom himself resists the term ("[e]xperience' is not one of my words", 2000, p.205n7). For Brandom, the term 'experience' was, "too burdened by noxious baggage to be worth trying to recruit for serious explanatory and expressive work in philosophy" (2011, p.197).

Among academic disciplines it is philosophers who appear to have devoted the most time and effort to getting to grips with the meaning and use of the term 'experience'. This is even if some philosophers claim to resist the term altogether. The fact that philosophers, indeed eminent philosophers, regard the term 'experience' as so challenging and problematic does though serve as a stark warning to those who take on the term expecting it to serve as a proxy for complete ideas. It also serves as another timely lesson to those in education seeking to profit from use of the term 'experience' without using it more attentively. In educational contexts a great deal is hanging on the term and it is inescapably present in various educational contexts, approaches and policies of importance. While philosophers of 'experience' warn of its dangers, as we shall see in chapter three, these same thinkers can often be found seeking to reveal more of its intricacies and depth. The concerns of various philosophers do serve, though, as a necessary reminder that any exploration of the term is fraught with difficulty and not one to be taken lightly.

⁸ To Brandom (2011, p.197), as regards to 'experience', we are shown by McDowell, "how to hop sure-footedly along the very edge of the precipice, with the confidence and insouciance of a mountain goat." McDowell avoids, "the sirenlike temptations of the deep" (Brandom, 2011, p.197).

‘Practice’

Theories of and writings on or drawing upon the concept of ‘practice’, not least MacIntyre’s work that features strongly in this thesis, provide another rich resource with which in the thesis to better consider the term ‘experience’. A so-called ‘practice turn’ (Schatzki, 2001) has been a feature of various disciplines, including education, and it has not been uncommon in Education Studies to consider schools, teaching and professional training through the application of the concept of ‘practice’.⁹

As part of this ‘turn’ is ‘practice theory’, which among other things has been applied to professional learning, and to teacher education (Mattsson *et al.*, 2011). The ‘practice theorist’ sees everyday, ordinary ‘practices’ and their production, remaking and reproduction, as central to human life and its development, and so the key to understanding it and us.¹⁰ This is rather than seeing human activity in terms of lone, rational, self-interested, utility-maximising, abstracted individuals, as transcendental collective, social structures, systems, or in terms of function or role-fulfilling.

Broadly speaking, theorists of practice see human lives as constituted by an interconnected assemblage, array, “constellation” (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002), “aggregations” (Nicolini & Monteiro, 2016, p.110), of purposeful, collaborative activities.¹¹ According to ‘practice theory’, each ‘practice’ is comprised of an enabling but also constraining fabric or layout of interworking elements. The productive elements identified, i.e. ‘represented’ (Nicolini & Monteiro, 2016), and emphasised, include a common language, shared, contextualised ways of understanding and

⁹ See, for example, the special issue of the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* (Vol. 37, No. 2, 2003), Stephen Kemmis (2005), Bill Green (2009), Paul Hager (2011), Hager *et al.* (2012), and Peter Grootenboer *et al.* (2017).

¹⁰ The field has developed to such an extent that ‘first generation’ (Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1979; Lave and Wenger, 1991) and ‘second generation’ (Schatzki, 2002; Gherardi, 2006; Reckwitz, 2002; Shove, Pantzar, & Watson, 2012; Kemmis *et al.* 2014) practice theorists are now identified (Hui *et al.* 2016, p.1). Hui *et al.* (2016, p.2) state too that the field of ‘practice theories’ also includes ‘practice-based studies’ such as MacIntyre (2007 [1981]).

¹¹ As regards to education, Kemmis *et al.* (2014, p.50), for example, refer to a “complex of education practices.” “[T]he total nexus of interconnected human practices,” is also highlighted in the literature and referred to as a “field of practices” (Schatzki, 2001, p.11).

'know-how' ('knowing how to go on', Wittgenstein, 2001), group roles, rules, norms, and accountability, and routine, ritualised behaviours.¹²

The thread weaving the fundamental fabric of a 'practice' together is the implicit, internal purpose or *telos*.¹³ It is the *telos* that orientates the practice, guiding practitioners' sense of what they should be doing.¹⁴ Pursuing even if not realising this "telic" purpose is regarded (MacIntyre, 2007), also, as a process of transformation in the 'practice theory' literature.

These 'overlapping' (Hager & Halliday, 2006), interconnected human activities, 'practices', "where human life transpires" (Buch & Schatzki, 2018, p.4), do not necessarily interact harmoniously or without tension nor act in isolation without consequences for others interconnected with them. They are also locally grounded and temporally and spatially situated, evolving, and so neither permanent nor fixed.

'Practices' are also material and object-mediated, 'object-centred and integrated' (Knorr-Cetina, 1997; 2001). Much of the preconditional fabric of a practice is tacit, embodied, "bodily-inscribed", and habituated. This fabric is enacted, reproduced, and revealed by members, and transmitted between older and newer participants *in* and *through* practice rather than necessarily taught or learnt in an explicit or straightforward formal sense.¹⁵ Individuals as elements in a practice are acknowledged but seen as 'carrying', and 'carrying out' (Reckwitz, 2002), a practice, and with their actions, choices, agency, intentions, and cognition, given meaning and made possible through and because of practices. Equally, it is the practice that relies on members for sustenance, not existing beyond those who comprise and act *for* it.

¹² In addition, Joseph Rouse (2015; 2018), for example, argues that practices should be seen as evolutionary-biological niche constructions, which respond and adapt to, but also meaningfully shape, transform, and pass on, their environment.

¹³ For Mervi Kaukko *et al.* (2020, p.4), for example, "practices are composed of sayings, doings, and relating that hang together in a distinctive project (or end/telos)."

¹⁴ One apparent area of difference in the literature here is that for some (MacIntyre, 2007) the *telos* is intrinsic to and so specific to an individual practice. For others in this literature (Blue & Spurling, 2016, p.31), on the other hand, "[t]elos/ teleology, the future dimension of practice...is not an inherent aspect of an individual practice itself, but a product of interacting, changing and metamorphosing complexes of practices."

¹⁵ For Stephen Billett (2017, pp.81-83), for example, mimetic, personally-mediated learning of what was experienced in practice, "through processes of observation, imitation, practice and action" (Downey, cited in Billett, 2017, p.81), has been crucial to the sustenance of occupational practices. The formalised mediation by others in the learning of 'practice', i.e. "being taught" (Billett, 2017, p.81), should not therefore be overplayed. For Billett, also, mimetic learning should now be more broadly understood as multi-sensory, "intra-psychological", and 'inter- and intra-personal' (2017, pp.82-83).

Themes and issues raised by 'practice theories' are then, for example, the ways that transformation of individual participant and practice does or does not happen, the nature and extent of agency in this process, ensuring transformation can happen, the nature of the process by which the 'practice' is passed from current to new practitioners, and from generation to generation, and the nature ('suffusing', 'threading through', Hui *et al.* 2016) of the interconnection between, and influence of, practices on each other.

The overall message with 'practice theory' literature is that those participating in, being 'initiated' into, our everyday, common human practices are therefore not entering a void without overriding purpose or meaning. Instead, participants are enculturated into a pre-existing, predetermined, structured but potentially life-changing, empowering, and complex activity featuring an entangled arrangement or layout of interdependent, interplaying features anchored to and channelled by an overall purpose.

The concept of and writings on 'practice', such as MacIntyre's, then provide a convenient, fruitful resource with which to attempt a drawing out of more of the complexity, multi-facetedness, and interconnectedness inherent in educational contexts but that all too often use of 'experience' tends to skate over. Also, the terms 'practice' and 'experience' are often used together ("practical experience") and interchangeably, not least in prominent and relevant discussions of teacher education and the crucial role and meaning of 'experience' such as Deborah Britzman (2003).¹⁶ When the term 'experience' is applied in education to refer to what will be gained in a practical situation, there is also commonly already an implicit sense that 'experience' takes the form of a practice. That is, in educational contexts 'experience' is often assumed to be structured, pre-determined, collective, but not wholly manifest or predictable in nature.¹⁷

¹⁶ Britzman (2003, p.3) argues, "trying to teach is deeply unsettling and conflictive because experience itself - what is called in this present study, "practice"- is a paradox, an unanticipated social relation, and a problem of interpretation."

¹⁷ While not something explored in this thesis, the term 'experience' can be seen as synonymous too with the 'practice' of the so-called theory-practice divide in teacher education and training.

MacIntyre and McDowell

There exist various writings in the literature on 'experience' and on 'practice' that might be drawn upon. However, to attempt to expose and address the limits in common tendencies in our thinking regarding 'experience' in educational contexts in this thesis, I propose and draw mainly on the writings of two thinkers, MacIntyre and McDowell.

MacIntyre

To paint a more nuanced and detailed picture of the conditions conducive to a rich 'experience', and within which our responsiveness to reasons and other capacities and qualities develop, I draw in large part on MacIntyre's provocative and suggestive "telic" conceptualisation of 'practice' (2007 [1981]; 1991; 1994).¹⁸ To MacIntyre, "telic" practices involve the standards and pursuit of 'excellence'. The successful pursuit of this ultimate end of all practices results in the realisation of internal goods ("goods of excellence", MacIntyre, 1988), possession of which signify our self-transformation and flourishing.¹⁹ Coming to realise the internal goods of a practice through pursuit of its "standards of excellence" (MacIntyre, 2007) is in effect for a practitioner to become someone else.²⁰ With this potential for self-transformation that figures centrally in MacIntyre's work we are therefore alerted to the potentially life-changing nature of an educational 'experience' such as becoming a teacher. Indeed, it is not untypical for transformation to be seen as crucial to the whole process of teacher training and education. As considered in the thesis, in educational contexts

¹⁸ MacIntyre first introduces 'practice' in a 1970 review of three books on Higher Education. However, it is in 'After Virtue' (2007, esp. pp.187-191), his best-known work, where his concept of practice is first truly developed and defended. In a well-known passage from this classic text, practices are described as:

[A]ny coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (MacIntyre, 2007, p.187)

¹⁹ As will be discussed in chapter four, internal goods of excellence are the achievement of a shared, collective end intrinsic and specific to a practice. For Knight (2008), for example, this is the primary reason for practices. That is, "rules are necessary to a practice, but what is more essential are the goals or goods that give point and purpose to those rules" (Knight, 2008, p.317).

²⁰ Considered at length in chapters four and six of the thesis, these historical standards MacIntyre describes embody what it means to succeed or fail in pursuit of these goods. In fact, practices are an essential vehicle for the sustenance and transmission of these and other 'rules', norms, and traditions.

such as school-based routes into teaching, however, the potentially life-transformative aspect of such an 'experience', the preconditions for it and the question of how best to prepare and manage such a profound change, is in the relevant literature all too often neglected currently.

MacIntyrean practices contribute in other ways to human flourishing as realisation of their specific ends contributes in turn to progress toward realisation of our ultimate human end.²¹ Without an opportunity to realise the shared goods of various practices, our efforts to realise our final end are therefore, according to MacIntyre, badly if not irreparably curtailed. What MacIntyre discloses here is that through the 'experience' of our shared, purposeful practices we can become better human beings not simply better practitioners. Again, this aspect of a MacIntyrean practice is not typically a main concern of educational contexts drawing significantly on the term 'experience'. Typically, the overriding concern here is for practitioners to be technically effective in their role.

Similarly, realisation of the goods that only a practice provides, its internal goods, contributes not only to individual development, according to MacIntyre, but also to the sustenance and growth both of our families and the wider community.²² As MacIntyre shows us, a practitioner, aside from productivity, can be excellent in other ways, such as in the interplay with other practices and wider society. Different aspects of our 'experience' are according to what MacIntyre argues not, in other words, detached from one another. MacIntyre's writings on 'practice' therefore alert us to the success or failure of one area of 'experience' having likely ramifications for other areas of it, and so alert stakeholders in education to the need to pay close attention to this too.

MacIntyre's notion of 'practice' allows us, also, to begin to contest the not uncommon view of 'experience' in education that it, or what it offers, is guaranteed or straightforward. For example, the internal goods of excellence, offered by MacIntyrean practices, and sign of self-transformation, are realised *only* by those

²¹ That is to say, "human beings have an end towards which they are directed by reason of their specific nature" (MacIntyre, 2007, p.xi).

²² So, for example, "the interdependence of the members of the fishing crew [...] will extend to an interdependence of the families of crew members and [...] to the whole society of a fishing village" (MacIntyre, 1994, p.285).

who have been nourished and supported by and within the right 'experience'. As considered in chapters six and seven, what according to MacIntyre matters for the realisation of internal goods is among other things a disposition to the virtues. Also important is access to other necessary interconnected and interplaying preconditions, such as favourable, broader socio-moral traditions.²³

MacIntyre then encourages us to see educational 'experience' as shared, structured, purposeful and rich in potential, but also dependent for success on certain interdependent and mutually shaping preconditions being at play. What MacIntyre encourages us to see here in 'experience' is, therefore, in contrast with the rather superficial way that 'experience' tends typically to be appreciated in educational contexts. Typically in educational contexts, only a few 'technical' elements, such as a mentor with knowledge of lesson planning and classroom management techniques, are emphasised as needing to be in place for 'experience' to be a success.²⁴

MacIntyre's writings on 'practice' then help to illuminate some of the 'internal' and 'external' challenges today facing those who wish either to provide or access an 'experience' in a rich and transformative sense.

McDowell and the Interplay between 'Experience' and Judgement

With MacIntyre's "telic" notion of 'practice', and their various interdependent and interworking elements, we can therefore begin to more appropriately articulate the more complex, more demanding and potentially more rewarding, collaborative, structured nature of aspects of our 'experience', educational or otherwise. A further, related and significant assumption about 'experience' common in educational contexts is that it somehow leads to the development of our capacities, especially the human capacity for sophisticated judgement. The interplay between 'experience' and judgement and its benefits are celebrated, for example, in school inspection, the other educational context covered in the thesis to come, and seen as pivotal to

²³ A further necessary precondition is a supportive institutional environment. Indeed, motivating MacIntyre's initial employment of the term 'practice' (MacIntyre, 1970) was a desire to distinguish their history and structure from the history and structure of the institution 'bearing' it (1970, p.562). This means (Knight, 2007, p.145) that a practice could continue even when the institution bearing it was replaced.

²⁴ MacIntyre does not regard society, and our 'social experience', as *necessarily* comprised of and conducive to practices. Informing his writing on practice is a concern with their current marginalisation, and especially with "social orders in which practice-based relationships have been marginalized" (1991, p.72; 2007, pp.227-228).

inspection's self-image and credibility. As considered in the section above, how this interplay between 'experience' and our capacities such as judgement ought to be understood is, however, a complex, contentious question, and one running, for example, through the discussion in Janack (2012)

The other main source of writings to be drawn upon in relation to use of the term 'experience' in educational contexts in the thesis is McDowell. He will be drawn upon primarily as a resource to help critically illuminate this putative and widely valued interplay between 'experience' and judgement. While MacIntyre also writes about the interplay between 'experience' and judgement, it is McDowell who explores this more finely. Indeed, as a philosopher McDowell has opened up a territory which enables us to begin thinking about 'experience' in a vastly different way to that which we presuppose in our everyday usage. What makes McDowell's work difficult to appreciate is that he ostensibly is engaged with the whole philosophical tradition in relation to epistemology and philosophy of mind. He is taking issue with contemporary assumptions about these positions which he argues lead to 'curable' anxieties about how thought can ever be in touch with the world.

McDowell's thinking is considered, in this thesis, to be complementary to MacIntyre's. Both, for example, connect development of human beings and their flourishing to what we can reasonably understand as 'experience'. McDowell too recognises the significance of practices ("communal practices", 2009, p.172) for our development.²⁵

It is recognised also that McDowell is being employed in non-McDowellian ways, in ways that are not in keeping with the 'quietism', like Ludwig Wittgenstein, he is associated with. Yet this is not to deny the benefits of drawing on his work and arguments. To specifically open up educational issues, David Bakhurst (2011; 2015; 2018), for example, draws on McDowellian thinking, especially regarding our

²⁵ McDowell (2009) does not elaborate at length as to how "communal practice" ought to be construed. In an earlier work, however, McDowell argues that "a framework of communal practices" was to Wittgenstein where meaning and understanding were to be situated (1984, p.342). According to McDowell here, Wittgenstein (PI §198, §202; RFM VI-31) is arguing that if it is seen as a custom, practice, or institution we have been initiated into, an act can be both nothing more than "a 'blind' reaction to a situation," and so not an act mediated by an interpretation we have been trained in, but also be a case of following a rule. This Wittgensteinian motif, rule-following as initiation into customary practices, is also a prominent theme in MacIntyre's conception of practice. See MacIntyre (1992), for example.

initiation into the space of reasons through the acquisition of language. Bakhurst is taking McDowell's work into a domain that is not typically McDowellian; yet he still goes to the heart of McDowell's endeavours and operates in their spirit.²⁶

In fact, both the work of MacIntyre and McDowell, both of whom are engaged in philosophical argument within particular traditions of enquiry, are being directed into areas completely unfamiliar or unusual, that of school-based teacher training and school inspection. Yet, due to their rich, 'practice'-inflected discussion that relates to the concept of 'experience', they both offer resources that can be drawn upon to help to shine a light on all too common usage of the term in educational contexts. While it may have no immediate connection to either of these two contexts, McDowell and MacIntyre provide resources allowing us to begin to see both just how problematic some of our taken-for-granted presuppositions about 'experience', in education, for example, are, and what else, not least the preconditions necessary for a rich 'experience', we may be guilty of overlooking.

Summary of Chapters

In the thesis I aim to show how the term 'experience' in these two educational contexts, school-based teacher training and school inspection, is used in a way that exceeds its current treatment in the literature. Without deeper and more critical scrutiny, usage of the term 'experience' in effect acts as a convenient gloss over the complexity, richness and potential of these consequential contexts. I propose MacIntyre's and McDowell's writings, in particular, as ideal resources with which we might begin to address this excess.

I begin by exploring and highlighting in the school-based route and school inspection literature where and how the term 'experience' features. Chapter one considers school-based teacher training specifically. It covers the three main types of school-based training route. One major aim of these routes is, in authentic, real-life classroom situations for technical skill, possessed by "experienced" school staff, to be transmitted to and practised by the trainee. Albeit much less so, other elements,

²⁶ Bakhurst (2011, p.10) also questions the extent of McDowell's quietism. Bakhurst is not of the view, for example, that having acknowledged "the importance of *Bildung*", McDowell wishes for philosophers to "simply step aside and leave it for the psychologist, linguist and cognitive scientist to make good on the notion". Regarding McDowell's quietism, see also Bakhurst (2011, p.20n18).

such as values and tacit knowledge, featuring prominently as key preconditions of a rich 'experience' in the thesis discussion, are also explored in the literature on school-based routes.

In chapter two I provide a review of school inspection and how 'experience' typically functions in this second educational context. We will see that 'experience' is differentiated in various ways. 'Experience' is seen as especially critical to school inspection, however, because it enhances the credibility of the judgements of school inspectors. It is argued that in the inspection literature precisely how judgement and 'experience' interplay is underexplored, with a great deal presupposed and left unpacked. The closest we come to a deeper and substantive theory is in the inspector-as-connoisseur area of the inspection literature, also reviewed.

In chapter three I review of a number of writers who have been drawn to the term 'experience'. What Aristotle, John Locke, James, Dewey, Oakeshott, and others reveal is not without connection to what is identifiable about 'experience' in the literature on school-based teacher routes and school inspection. These writers, however, offer more critical, careful appreciation of these areas of apparent commonality. These writers, also, impress on the reader quite how complex, uncertain, and unpredictable the term is, and, most crucially, draw our attention to the transformative potential of contexts where the term 'experience' is used as well as to the conditions conducive to any transformation.

In chapter four I begin to try and refine and extend this literature on 'experience' with the closely related concept of 'practice', focusing first on the latter's sharp sense of the necessary and guiding *telos* of all shared, collaborative human activities. I first review and compare the two most influential "telic" versions of 'practice' currently in Education Studies, that of MacIntyre and of Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger. For clarification I then review critical literature on MacIntyre's "telic" notion of 'practice'. I also propose MacIntyre's as the richer of the two and the more fitting with educational contexts, not least with teacher training, because of its more uncompromising, intrinsic quality.

In chapter five, MacIntyre's writings, in particular, are drawn upon to disclose more about the potentially self-transformative consequences of an educational 'experience', such as school-based teacher training. While it is uncommon for

school-based routes or school inspection to be regarded explicitly as self-transformative of new recruits, this possibility of self-transformation is suggested by “telic” concepts of ‘practice’. More specifically, I explore the different aspects to any putative self-transformation through a MacIntyrean practice, such as the transmutation of and liberation from previous desires, the facilitating of creativity, and radical changes in identity. There is some indication that these things are seen as significant in the literature on school-based teacher training and school inspection. However, they are not apparently associated with the type of transformation that pursuit of the *telos* of a shared human activity such as learning to teach in a school or school inspection offers.

In chapters six and seven I continue with extending understanding of what we mean by ‘experience’ in educational contexts with the closely related but more pregnant term ‘practice’. In particular, I consider some of the productive, preconditional elements that comprise the interwoven and interworking fabric of a ‘practice’ in which there is the possibility of flourishing and transformation.

In chapter six I draw on MacIntyre’s writings to make visible and discuss the nature and significance for a rich ‘experience’ and self-transformation of the traditions that permeate a ‘practice’. MacIntyre has in mind two kinds of tradition. One is the traditions of excellence embodied in a ‘practice’. The other is the socio-moral traditions a ‘practice’ is operating in. Both are crucial preconditions for self-transformation. Neither of these, however, are paid sufficient attention to in the literature as being integral to the flourishing of school-based teacher trainee or school inspector.

Chapter seven acknowledges that both school-based teacher training routes and school inspection appreciate the difference particular kinds of participants can have on the success of the ‘experience’. Neither would appear to be of the view that just anyone is suitable for a position as mentor or new recruit. However, MacIntyre’s writings on ‘practice’ in particular reveal both the stronger demands on and tougher expectations of mentors and students. These writings also serve as a reminder, where the literature on school-based routes or school inspection does not, that the relationships that an individual brings to an ‘experience’ are significant and may make the difference between successful transformation or not.

In chapter eight I defend, with Joseph Dunne's writings, teaching's 'right' to be known as a practice in MacIntyre's sense of the term. In the thesis, the connection between the concepts of 'practice' and 'experience' is explored, with it argued that the term 'practice' allows us to more richly and granularly consider the notion of 'experience' as it relates to education. Yet it is here in this chapter that teaching qua 'practice' becomes an issue. This is because in MacIntyre's sense, teaching is not a practice. If teaching is not a practice in MacIntyre's sense of the concept, then teacher training will likely not be either. If teacher training is not in fact anything like a 'practice' in MacIntyre's sense, then this undermines the concept's use as a means of unearthing more of the richness, complexity, and potential of school-based route 'experience'. To defend teaching and so teacher training's right to be a MacIntyrean 'practice', I draw on the writings of MacIntyre's contemporary Dunne. Dunne provides a convincing account of why teaching and teacher training deserve to be seen as a 'practice' in MacIntyre's sense. With 'shared ethos', 'practical discourse', and 'effective history', in particular, Dunne provides further insight into the conditions that foster and support a rich 'experience', and also provides further nuance and depth to the literature on 'practice', and so to how we appreciate an 'experience' such as learning to teach in a school and school inspection.

In chapter nine I redirect my primary focus to the presuppositions in use of the term 'experience' in the context of school inspection, another educational context where 'experience' features prominently, but where what this entails and potentially offers is insufficiently attended to. In response, in particular, to the under-theorisation of the pivotal interplay of judgement and 'experience' in the inspection literature, I propose and review relevant material in McDowell's writings. With these I attempt to show how we can think more appropriately about school inspection 'experience', and especially about the interplay between inspector 'experience' and judgement. I first revisit McDowell's critique of *Givenness*, which he contends is a prevalent presupposition regarding our engagement with the world. I review his dismissal of 'coherentism', a response found primarily in the philosophical literature but with hints of commonality in the inspection context. To illuminate the school inspection context, I then draw upon McDowell's 'naturalised platonism', concept of second nature (*Bildung*), space of reasons, "communal practice", and his dissolving of the urge to set spontaneity and receptivity apart.

In chapter ten I review the necessary preconditions for good judgement through 'practical experience' McDowell, and, to a lesser extent, MacIntyre are sensitive to, and juxtapose these with the school inspection literature. For McDowell and especially MacIntyre there are no guarantees that initiation into practices will work and self-transformation will happen. For McDowell, the "hold of dogma" or "social subservience" act to blind us to reasons that we might otherwise see through the 'experience' of second nature, initiation into the space of reasons, and language. McDowell also reminds us that even if we have our eyes open to rational requirements, we may not be able to action them.

In the conclusion, I summarise the key strands to the argument of the thesis that while featuring heavily, 'experience' is all too often poorly conceived in educational contexts and underserves these contexts as a result. I then underline why I believe 'experience' is such an important topic for closer scrutiny and provide some possible directions for future research and enquiry.

A Final Word about Theoretical Positioning and Method

Before moving to the first chapter of the thesis, I end this introductory chapter with some final comments about theoretical and methodological positions taken and assumed. Firstly, both MacIntyre and McDowell (Dunne, 2014, p.502; Derry, 2013, p.224), for example, are regarded as engaging in philosophical anthropology. Informing the thesis similarly is a philosophical anthropology. Broadly put, this means a philosophy rooted in human nature, rooted in the study of humans in situ, as they are. This 'philosophy of actuality' is opposed to an understanding of humans in abstraction, detached from their material existence and social and historical relationships.²⁷

My exploration of the neglect of 'experience' has taken a predominantly philosophical focus. In the course of conducting and writing up my research, I have, however, touched on various writings, writings in different traditions, and writings in traditions other than philosophy. Even though their writings are situated in socio-cultural theory, the writings of Lave and Wenger and their concept of 'communities of

²⁷ Another noted thinker associated with philosophical anthropology (Hacker, 2007; Padilla Gálvez, 2010) is Wittgenstein, who leading 'practice theorist' Theodore R. Schatzki calls "a philosopher of actuality, who has much to say about how human life actually works" (1996, p.57).

practice', for example, have served to tease out things from educational contexts that 'experience' skates over.

While mainly philosophical in focus, this is not to deny also that there are many other avenues that could equally well be pursued to offer insight into neglect of the term 'experience'. There are, for example, more practical or praxis-orientated enquiries carried out in real-world contexts that could prove fruitful in this regard.

The thesis is also meant, at the very least in spirit, to be "dialectical", not "eristic".²⁸ That is, I attempt to bring into conversation various forms of thinking, with each contribution to be heard in its own voice. Each contributor is, however, compelled to speak about these two different educational contexts, school-based training routes and school inspection, which 'experience' acts to narrow if not silence completely. As Dunne (1997, p.21) explains, "the voice of none of them is distorted or falsified, while at the same time each one is disciplined by the conversation itself."

This is in large part also a thesis about meaning. The issue of what meaning consists in is not at all a simple matter. When we examine a term it is unclear on what basis we can assess its meaning. 'Representationalism' is one common approach to meaning. However, recent work that is in line with Wittgenstein, and other authors, such as G.W.F. Hegel, Rorty and Brandom, contest a representationalist paradigm. The great difficulty with the tenability of representation can account for why grasping 'experience' is more difficult than it might be assumed. The term 'experience' is difficult precisely because even if often it is assumed to be, meaning is not representational. If a term such as 'experience' were represented by something, we could attribute a clear meaning to it. There would be no ambiguity. Yet we cannot. Informing this thesis throughout is the belief that the whole question of meaning is indeed not representationalist. The meaning of 'experience' and other terms will

²⁸ Dunne (1997, p.24) explains that:

The eristic spirit in which, all the better to show one's own superiority, one tried to trip up the partner had no place in dialectic. To the contrary, truth was best served by making as good a case for the other's position as one could—if possible a better case, even, than he had made himself. In the end, then, one saw that it commanded one's assent; *or*, one's dissent, having been earned with greater exertion, was all the more illuminating.

instead be understood as playing their part in accordance to the rules directing them.

As Peregrin argues:

[M]eaning is not a thing stood for by an expression (as representationalists would have it), and nor is it, in fact, a thing at all – it is rather a role the expression assumes vis-à-vis the rules that govern it. (2013, pp.1091-1092)

These “rules that govern it” are socio-historical, “theoretical and political” (Nicolini & Monteiro, 2016, p.6), contextualised, and dynamic. The meaning of any word, in other words, ‘experience’ or another, is how it functions vis-à-vis its specific, contextualised rules (“let the use *teach* you the meaning”, Wittgenstein, PI, p.212), rules that draw their impetus and direction from shared, customary practice (“a form of life”, Wittgenstein, OC, §358).²⁹

If terms, such as ‘experience’, are in fact used normatively like this, and not solely representationally, then it follows that the same word can therefore mean very different things depending on context-specific rules. ‘Experience’ in school-based teacher training can then potentially mean something very different to how it is used in the context of school inspection. This is a potentiality that the thesis is prepared for and sensitive to.

If meaning is rule-governed rather than representational, it follows also that how a term is used is the way that it ought to be used. There can in effect be neither good nor bad usage per se. This thesis will therefore not be intending to criticise for misusing the term those using the term ‘experience’ in an everyday sense or in specific contexts.

The type of problem regarding language and meaning that the thesis involves itself in is not that people are using terms such as ‘experience’ incorrectly (and so need correcting). The problem that the thesis discloses is that when we use terms such as ‘experience’ we often credit more than we have actually explored and thought about. This is not an issue in everyday life, where we talk about having this or that ‘experience’, for example. Yet it is a source of concern when the term ‘experience’, for instance, is being used prominently in high-stakes evaluations of schools or in

²⁹ On the contested meaning of ‘practice’ in Wittgenstein’s writings see Johannessen (1988).

teacher education policies and practices. The problem that the thesis attempts to lay bare then is the underappreciated, underserving although still consequential usage of terms like 'experience' not their misuse per se.

Lastly, resources brought into conversation in this thesis are from a variety of fields. Nevertheless, this thesis is intended primarily to be a contribution to the field of the philosophy of education.

Chapter 1: School-Based Routes Into Teaching

Two educational contexts, school-based teaching and school inspection, are employed in the thesis to illustrate my argument that while prominent and much lauded, the term ‘experience’ in fact acts as a gloss over these contexts.

The first context foregrounding ‘experience’ to be illuminated in this chapter is school-based teacher training. In what follows, I first provide a short review and some insights into the nature of school-based teacher training.³⁰ This will provide a brief overview of some of the main school-based teacher training routes. I then attempt to piece together an account of ‘experience’ as employed in this context. This piecing together provides the foil for the chapters to come.

1.1 Three School-Based Routes Into Teaching

The first contextual use of the term ‘experience’ in education to be considered is that of school-based routes into teaching. These so-called practical or alternative routes into teaching have grown markedly and globally in recent years.³¹ In England, for example, school-led routes (‘partnerships’), rather than ‘traditional’ university-led ones, now comprise two-thirds of all routes (OFSTED, 2019a, p.12). This has been accompanied in England by an increase in school-based route trainees. In 2016/17, for example, *School Direct* trainees – a school-based training route - comprised roughly half of all trainee teachers seeking Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) (NEU, 2017, p.2). This is an evolving area, also, with new types of school-based teacher training courses regularly emerging.

These routes are not without controversy. They have received widespread support, but also condemnation, both from outside and within teaching, schools, and education (Bullock & Russell, 2010; Darling-Hammond, 2006; Hagger & McIntyre

³⁰ A number of useful reviews of these different routes can be found in the literature (e.g. Schneider, 2018).

³¹ According to Ken Zeichner (2014, p.257), for example, “throughout the world, in various ways and to varying degrees, there has been an explosion of effort to move more of the preparation of teachers to schools.” See also National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (2010), Mattson, Eilertson, and Rorrison (2011), and Burn and Mutton (2013).

2006; Ure, Gough, & Newton, 2009; Valencia *et al.*, 2009; Dyson, Plunkett & McCluskey, 2015).

1.1.1 School-Centred Initial Teacher Training (SCITT)

One example of a school-based route into teaching in England, where the emphasis has been on 'experience', is *School-Centred Initial Teacher Training (SCITT)*. These (Hargreaves, 1998, p.38) originated in the early 1990s, and there are currently 170 across the country (DfE, 2017a, p.11; OFSTED, 2019a, p.5).

SCITTs in England are typically school networks running solely school-based or school-led ITT partnership courses. Many offer the chance to study towards a PGCE and/or Master's-level credits. Some SCITTs offer their own government-approved programmes. Others offer school-led so-called *School Direct* programmes.³²

Typically, the SCITT trainee is in the school from the very first day, but not teaching a class of their own until they have qualified. Until that point, trainees are supposedly only very gradually introduced to teaching. They begin simply with observing and helping with classes. Later they are then given responsibility for parts of lessons, whole lessons and lastly, the planning and teaching of their own lessons.

Assessment for Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) in England is commonly by evidencing the 'Teachers' Standards' (2011) through devices such as classroom observation, a regular (e.g. weekly) reflective journal (e.g. on pupil progress, teaching technique), portfolio of work (e.g. lesson plans, schemes of work, assessment of pupils' work, resources, data), and written assignments.³³ Those school-based route trainees in England paying fees and pursuing the Postgraduate Certificate in Education (PGCE) option also attend university lectures and complete coursework (e.g. 6000-word assignment).

³² These have been either funded by tuition fees, with the potential support of a training bursary or scholarship for eligible candidates, or, for applicants with three or more years of work experience, a salary has been available (DfE, 2017b).

³³ There are two parts to the 2011 iteration of the *UK Government's* 'Teachers' Standards'. Part 1 'Teaching' and Part 2 'Personal and Professional Conduct'. Part 1 comprises the following: "high expectations which inspire, motivate and challenge pupils", "good progress and outcomes by pupils", "good subject and curriculum knowledge", "well structured lessons", "teaching to respond to the strengths and needs of all pupils", "accurate and productive use of assessment", "good and safe learning environment", and "wider professional responsibilities". Part 2 describes the "high standards of personal and professional conduct" expected of teachers.

1.1.2 'Accelerated' Routes

Another example of teacher preparation routes that valorise 'experience', but where closer scrutiny of the term is warranted, is so-called fast-track programmes. These are programmes such as those forming the global network of 38 or so 'elite' *Teach For All* (TFA) teacher accreditation programmes, and the related *TNTP Teaching Fellows* (*NYC Teaching Fellows*, *Michigan Teaching Corps*) in the US.³⁴ *Teach For America* (1989 -), and *Teach First* in the UK (2002-), for example, one of the largest graduate recruiters in the UK, both form part of the *Teach For All* network.³⁵ These 'accelerated' routes are not school-led programmes like *SCITTs*. These 'fast-track' programmes are run by outside agencies, and with a proportion of the funding coming from private sources.³⁶ Unlike with other school-based route participants, 'fast-track' route recruits do not spend a year or more preparing for teaching.³⁷ There are additional days of ongoing training and support from university tutors, school and subject mentors and programme representatives. However, 'fast-track' recruits are placed on a near-full teaching load in schools almost immediately. Other routes into teaching in England, such as *Now Teach*, focused on career changers, have drawn influence from this 'accelerated' model. In fact, the 'fast-track' influence is visible in recruitment and training innovations across the professions.³⁸

³⁴ In contrast to "traditional teacher preparation", where there is insufficient focus on "hands-on skill-building", the "innovative training" of *TNTP Teaching Fellows* (2015), we are told, centres on "actual teaching experience" and the "focused practice" of "core skills".

³⁵ Of the total number of postgraduate new entrants on school-led routes (14,780) in the academic year 2017 to 2018, *Teach First* comprised 1,300 (DfE, 2017a, p.4). In 2019 this number had risen to 1,735 (Whittaker, 2019).

³⁶ In 2015, for example, 64% of *Teach For America* funding was raised privately (Teach For America, 2016, p.2). For *Teach First*, the proportion of government-related funding is much greater, with only £9 million of the £60 million received in 2014/15, for example, coming from other sources (Teach First, 2016c, p.21).

³⁷ *Teach First* in England hold a 'Summer Institute', where, for five or so weeks, their new recruits spend time in the local area as well as at a week-long mass gathering, conference-type event (Teach First, 2016b). At *Teach For America's* similar 5-7 week residential institute, "most corps members teach two or more hours each day observed by experienced teachers" (Teach For America, 2015a). This incorporates whole-class and small-group teaching. In these *TFA* summer camps the onus is said to be on "foundational" or "gateway" knowledge and skills on how to manage a class, for example, and gaining some understanding of the local communities where recruit schools are to be found (Teach For America, 2015a).

³⁸ The 'accelerated' model is, for example, visible in medicine (Take the Fight, 2015), nursing (Ford, 2017), social work (Frontline, 2017; Think Ahead, 2017), the police (Police Now, 2017), the prison service (Unlocked Graduates, 2017), law (Just For Kids Law, 2017), local planning (Donnelly, 2015) and the clergy (Sherwood, 2015).

This influence underscores my argument that ‘experience’ plays an important legitimising and motivational role in common educational discourse. The wider influence of ‘accelerated’ routes, featuring ‘experience’, also underscores my argument that there is a great deal at stake with the term ‘experience’. What then is required is closer scrutiny of the term’s functioning in educational contexts and more careful illumination, in particular, of the preconditions informing ‘experience’, and presuppositions of the term’s use.

1.1.3 Residency Programmes

Critical responses to ‘fast-track’ routes such as *TFA* form much of the backdrop to rival, residency-based teacher preparation programmes.³⁹ These ‘third-way’ routes into teaching aim to improve upon ‘early entry’ routes, such as *Teach For America*, or *The New Teacher Project Teaching Fellows*. ‘Fast-track’, ‘early-entry’ routes, residency route advocates (Guha, Hyler, & Darling-Hammond, 2016) argue, rely too heavily on experiential learning, “learning by doing”. On such routes, it is argued, there is little in the way of theoretical support or opportunity to observe and acquire best practice while supervised closely by experts. Residencies are associated with clinical practice and approaches to training found in medicine. Commonly, and under close supervision, trainee doctors work with patients and apply what they have learnt. Residencies for teachers are similarly motivated. According to the *National Center for Teacher Residencies* (2015), teacher-residency programmes combine a full-year of class fieldwork supervision with classes, workshops, meetings, and coursework leading to a Master’s degree. Unlike ‘fast-track’ recruits, residents are not from the outset expected to teach their own class. Instead, residents are placed in the classes of their mentors, often in “teaching schools”. Residents can accrue up to 900 hours of ‘experience’. This, it is argued, is 10 times that of other alternative-certification programmes such as *TFA*, and 300 hours or so more than ‘traditional’ university or teacher college routes. Residency mentoring may also continue after qualification for a year or longer.⁴⁰ On some programmes residents are also expected to learn in depth from, support and involve themselves in, the communities

³⁹ In total, in the US there are said (Sparks, 2017) to be about 50 or so residency programmes, each producing from five to 100 teachers per year.

⁴⁰ Boston’s teacher-residency program, for instance, was initially a four-year program including a year of residency and three of mentoring (Sparks, 2017).

that their schools serve.⁴¹ Others (e.g. *San Francisco Teacher Residency*) conduct modelled medical-like "rounds" to focus on particular student groups, such as "juvenile-justice schools", and to discuss and plan approaches to this kind of teaching.

1.2 Why School-Based Routes

The argument of the thesis is that the term 'experience' and what it involves is typically neglected in educational contexts. As a consequence, the conditions that inform and foster the 'experience' and within which desirable qualities and capacities can emerge, and presuppositions in our understanding of the term, are neglected also.

As we shall see in the case of the three different school-based routes reviewed above, neglect does not mean that there is no appreciation whatsoever of what the term involves. However, before highlighting in the school-based route literature what is typically seen as involved in the highly-valued 'experience' of school-based routes, it is worth stressing and elaborating a little on the many perceived benefits of school-based teacher training, foregrounding 'experience', identifiable in this literature. This chapter section adds to my argument that term warrants more thorough appreciation than it currently receives as there is a lot riding on the term 'experience' in educational contexts such as these. In fact, these routes into teaching are regarded as a panacea for all manner of ills (Carney, 2003, p.415).

1.2.1 Cost-Effectiveness – Training and Employment

Take lower training and employment costs. These are two interrelated reasons for school-based routes, and the 'experience', identifiable in the literature. It is seen as one major advantage of school-based routes that they provide an effective means of 'accelerating' the training process.⁴² School-based recruits are also available to

⁴¹ "[C]ommunities," are seen (UCLA, 2017), "as rich sources of knowledge, culture and hope for our students [...] valuable assets, rather than obstacles to overcome".

⁴² The desire to 'fast-track' professional training has been imported into other areas of public service. In social work, for example, *Think Ahead* provides "accelerated learning and experience in an intensive environment, so we provide thorough support for participants" (2017). Other related, school-based courses in maths and physics - so-called Accelerated Courses - are even more explicitly premised on 'accelerating' the training. These courses, "typically take two terms, meaning you could secure a teaching job sooner than on other programmes" (DfE, 2018a).

teach earlier than their more traditional counterparts. In England, *SCITT* training, for example, is an “opportunity to learn ‘on the job’” and so “benefit from working and learning every day in a school and getting an immediate insight into what teaching involves” (DfE, 2015). At *School Direct* schools in England, trainees are “immediately putting their new skills into practice.”⁴³ Upon completion of the initial summer training course, *Teach First* recruits, “head straight to the front of the class, putting skills and experience to work from day one as a salaried teacher” (Teach First, 2017b). In the case of *Teach First*, in particular, their recruits start working as unqualified teachers immediately, and so “more productive by effectively providing up to an additional year’s worth of teaching” (Hill, 2012, p.25).⁴⁴ With lower salaries, pensions and health insurance costs, younger teachers of the kind recruited to ‘fast-track’ routes, in particular, are also less of a drain on school finances.

1.2.2 Cachet – Recruitment

School-based routes into teaching are also explicitly aimed at addressing widely recognised teacher shortages, not least in specific locations and contexts (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.72). The idea seems to be that the hands-on, practical element, ‘practical ‘experience’, is more appealing to would-be teachers than taught programmes at a university. A shorter training period, as is promised especially by ‘fast-track’ routes into teaching, means trainees can be in positions sooner, and sooner than traditional routes spread over a year. The speed with which recruits can be in the classroom teaching is especially appealing to governments and schools if there are recruitment concerns. It is also not unappealing to potential recruits, especially to recruits who have bills and debts such as student loans to repay.

⁴³ The technical skills *Teach First* recruits in England are encouraged to acquire are also valued in large part as they are apparently time-efficient (“At every turn, we’ve asked: will this save you time and improve your impact on learning? Our low-effort, high-impact strategies let you quickly and easily tap into our collective experience”, Kirby, 2013a, p.2).

⁴⁴ As a result, “a Teach First teacher could cost a school up to £4,282 less than a trainee employed through the GTP and £1,389 less than employing a teacher trained through a standard PGCE” (Hill, 2012, p.25). With *Teach First*, there however are higher initial costs including a placement fee, and so considering finite resources in England and elsewhere, rather than university education departments and teacher-training colleges producing their hundreds annually, whether ‘accelerated’ routes are more cost-efficient per individual recruit each year is a key question.

The 'quality' of teacher being recruited is another ostensible target of some of these routes. Part of the background to this is that a more 'elite' demographic has in recent years been entering teaching in the UK and USA in steadily decreasing numbers. In England, *Teach First*, for example, seeks to increase, "the pool of beginner teachers by attracting high-calibre graduates who may otherwise not have considered teaching" (Elliott, 2018, p.265). *Teach For America* promotional material and its various marketing and recruitment efforts at universities and colleges are indeed meant to be as appealing as possible to a younger, more educated demographic.⁴⁵ There is the internship-like feel of the two-year commitment, for example, and in *TFA*-route marketing, use of alumni stories. The selectivity of these programmes is underlined by the supposed rigour of the selection process, and also the higher than typical, highly competitive entrance requirements.⁴⁶ This selectivity can be seen as acting to underpin the 'elite' cachet of 'fast-track' routes, and so helping to recruit more of this kind of demographic. Once the 'fast-track' commitment, 'experience', ends, there is also the promise of a successful career in management or politics, where 'accelerated' recruits can continue to work for social change by drawing upon their school 'experience'.⁴⁷ 'Accelerated' programmes, perhaps unsurprisingly, are indeed seen as being more selective than more established routes (Blumenreich & Gupta, 2015).

A related selling point of 'alternative' school-based routes, and it would seem their offer of 'experience', is the promise to develop in recruits potentially lucrative, transferable skills. "Teach First," we are informed (Teach First, 2015a), for example, "develops leaders" and they promise would-be recruits that "[t]he advanced leadership skills and behaviours" developed on the programme, "will have a lasting impact on your own future too" and "will transfer directly to leadership roles in any sector." As part of this are the 'survival skills' recruits will develop through the school 'experience'. Being ready to face and overcome challenges and pressurised

⁴⁵ *Teach For America*, for example, writes David Labaree (2010, p.54), "has staked out a position for itself as the Harvard of teacher preparation programs, which is both very exclusive and very rewarding."

⁴⁶ For example, *Teach First* in England has long sought recruits with a 2:1 degree classification, which is higher typically than the entrance requirements for other routes.

⁴⁷ The *Teach First* recruits that move out of teaching into other fields, a majority within 3 years, go onto argue for reform, "advocating for change through their roles in business, the third sector and government" (Teach First, 2016a).

environments of a school is a particularly strong and recurring expectation and promise of all *TFA*-type routes into the professions.⁴⁸ Recruits will be able to learn fast, ‘think on their feet’, solve problems, and not just survive but be resilient, inspire and thrive.⁴⁹ Future employers would appear to regard the fact that their skills are transferable highly, furthermore. For the professional services multinational *Accenture* (2016), for example, it is recognised “that graduates who can engage, stimulate and inspire in the classroom can handle pretty much any situation.” For them, *Teach First* gave its recruits “the opportunity to give something back as well as build the skills we value – such as leadership and the ability to handle a variety of challenging situations.”⁵⁰

Like ‘fast-track’ routes, the aim with ‘third-way’ residency programmes has also been to address specific recruitment gaps. This has included recruiting more ethnically diverse teachers, for specific fields, especially STEM and special education, and recruiting specifically for rural schools (e.g. *University of New Hampshire's Rural Teacher Residency*). Again, accentuating the term ‘experience’ and exploiting its ostensible appeal to particularly desirable potential recruits forms part of this recruitment drive. Unlike ‘accelerated’ programmes, and rather than providing trainees with a ‘career launch-pad’ and ‘experience’ attractive to graduate recruiters, residency routes are, by contrast, especially looking to retain staff for the long-term, addressing “the primary cause of shortages [...] the ‘leaky bucket’ of teacher turnover” (Guha, Hyler, & Darling-Hammond, 2016, p.2). This is why, for example, residencies highlight expert, early-career mentoring. This is also why in return for a commitment of three or more years different residency programmes provide financial support of up to \$4,000 a semester.

⁴⁸ Consider also: “Tackle real-world challenges that will shape you as a leader” (*Teach For America*); “Every day you will face new challenges and will have to come up with considered, effective and appropriate solutions in response” (*Teach First*); “We need to know that you understand the demands of such a career and are up for the challenge.” (*Police Now*), “Think Ahead follows Teach First and Frontline in attracting new talent into challenging but rewarding public sector careers.” (*Think Ahead*).

⁴⁹ *Teach First* recruits in England, for example, “will need to be hungry for a challenge, using patience and endless energy to persevere through the difficult times. When faced with obstacles you will need to be tenacious and versatile and maintain a positive mindset” (*Teach First*, 2015b).

⁵⁰ For *Accenture's* rival, *PricewaterhouseCoopers* (2018), “*Teach First* looks for proven leaders and strong communicators who have the resources, resilience and self-awareness to be at their best in challenging situations”.

1.2.3 Greater Control - On-The-Job Training and Workplace Learning

In this section we are reviewing the myriad reasons underlying the investment in school-based routes currently. This review reinforces my argument that there is a lot at stake with these routes, and so with their foregrounding of the term ‘experience’, but a foregrounding which in the literature is insufficiently attended to.

The motivation behind school-based routes, with their onus on ‘experience’, is also evocative of the reasons proposed for on-the-job training and workplace learning more broadly. Indeed, this area has seen renewed emphasis globally over recent years and school-based routes should be seen as indicative of this trend. This emphasis on workplace learning is evident in the UK, for example, in changes to course offerings at universities and in the reviving of ‘apprenticeships’ by education providers and employers.⁵¹ A practical component to training, if not wholly practice-based necessarily, is thought to provide employers with employees that possess the exact technical skills required.

Paid less attention if considered at all with ‘grow-your-own’ practice-based education and training is, however, for example, the character of the person being provided with a new skillset. This is one precondition of a transformative ‘experience’, of the kind a school-based route or school inspection potentially offers, that needs closer consideration and will be considered especially in chapters seven and eight of the thesis.

1.2.4 The Failure of the Current System

Different kinds of entrants into teaching, not least those attracted to learning to teach ‘hands-on’ in schools, helps to further another apparent aim of school-based routes, where in the literature the term ‘experience’ is prominent. This additional aim is to inject some “fresh” thinking, energy and enthusiasm into school systems considered deficient in them (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.4). Even if only for a limited period of time, with a different kind of recruit, one that they ‘grow’ themselves, schools, we are told, can “engage students and re-invigorate existing staff” (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.88).

⁵¹ Related school-based teacher training innovations in England are the ‘earn-while-you-learn’ Teaching Apprenticeship (UCAS, 2018) and ‘Degree Apprenticeships’ (HEFCE, 2017).

This onus on “fresh ideas” (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.4), which a different kind of demographic into teaching can introduce, is especially pronounced in the literature relevant to ‘elite’, ‘accelerated’ routes.⁵² At England’s *Teach First*, for instance, a so-called Innovation Unit was established “to find and nurture other great ideas for solutions to the problem of educational inequality” (Teach First, 2017a). An annual Innovation Award, and various other *Teach First* events and resources, seek also to nurture new solutions to ‘educational inequality’ (Teach First, 2017a).

At *Teach First* in England a more recent focus has been on ‘career changers’, those seeking a new career, and who comprise roughly a third of their new recruits (Teach First, 2018). These, too, are valued for ‘fresh thinking’ i.e. for “the different perspectives and experiences [they] bring to teaching” (Teach First, 2018). More mature recruits, with “fresh ideas”, are also the primary target in the UK of *Now Teach* (2020b), which draws much from the ‘fast-track’ training model. This particular ‘accelerated’ programme seeks to recruit ‘career changers’ who would not normally have considered teaching in the past (Now Teach, 2020a) but who, because of their prior achievements, are thought to, “bring wisdom, experience of the world, perspective and careers advice.”

1.2.5 Educational Inequality and The Status Quo

Also informing *TFA*-type routes, in particular, is the claim that ‘educational inequality’, i.e. “the current educational system in which students’ socioeconomic backgrounds predict their educational outcomes and opportunities in life,” has lingered for far too long and that the ‘status quo’ is largely to blame (Villanueva Beard, 2013). ‘Status quo’ means those who defend this situation, and those who stand in the way of ‘reform’.⁵³ By default, this phrase ‘status quo’ in effect suggests

⁵² This kind of rationale is also evident at ‘accelerated’ routes into other professions. We are told that *Unlocked* was, for instance,

[E]stablished with the explicit aim of attracting high-calibre graduate talent to work in the UK prison service and inject new ideas, insights and energy into the rehabilitation of prisons: to lead subtle changes on the inside that deliver huge benefits on the outside

Police Now, also, as described by one journalist, “focuses in particular on the recruitment of women and minorities, looking to diversify a corps often derided as ‘male, pale and stale.’” (Rao, 2017).

⁵³ That is:

any part of the education system prior to ‘accelerated’ routes. Indeed, when *TFA* and other school-based routes into teaching declare themselves antagonistic to the status quo, ‘status quo’ can quite reasonably be read as meaning more experienced senior or veteran teachers.⁵⁴ Since their inception decades ago, *TFA* programmes have been premised upon addressing what they argue is a lack of quality teaching. By implication poor teaching means current teachers, trained through universities and colleges, and supposedly trained in theories divorced from pressing reality. If this implication is correct, then teachers are in effect held responsible for persistent trends in educational disadvantage. What is required to address educational disadvantage, so the conclusion of ‘accelerated’ routes would appear to be, are alternatively trained teachers, trained in schools and benefiting from school-based ‘experience’. Once again a perception like this in educational contexts, where certain groups may be vilified, underlines why paying closer attention to ‘experience’, and contexts that exploit the term, is a pressing need in Education Studies.

1.2.6 Politics

One last ingredient in the rationale for school-based routes, where there is emphasis of the term ‘experience’, is politics. While not without interest on the so-called education *Left*, especially among those seeking a more praxis-orientated form of teacher training, where theory and practice are more tightly integrated, especially significant in the emergence and success of school-based routes in England, for example, has been the politics of the education *Right* (Hagger & McIntyre, 2006, p.12, 16). As early as 1972 in England (Bridges, 1995, p.65), the Conservative Party, with its James Report (DES, p.11), was arguing that training of teachers be based in schools, not universities or colleges. More recently, Conservative Party Education Secretary (2010–2014) Michael Gove, was decrying ‘The Blob’ (“They are all

[T]hose who aren’t outraged by the fact that low-income children lag far behind their more affluent peers, even though we know something else is possible...those who dismiss the real and measurable progress we’re seeing in good traditional public and charter schools simply because of ideological opposition to a particular model of school reform...those who spend more time criticizing those who are working to tackle this deeply entrenched problem than they do working for positive change. (Villanueva Beard, 2013)

⁵⁴ *TFA*, and prominent *TFA* alumni, such as former Chancellor of District of Columbia Public Schools (2007 to 2010) Michelle Rhee, are linked with rhetoric against - and efforts to undermine - teaching unions. This includes supporting typically non-unionized charter schools. Unions defend pay and conditions for teachers that historically reward them for their years of experience (e.g. seniority pay, pensions) but that add pressure to school finances.

academics who have helped run the university departments of education responsible for developing curricula and teacher training courses”, 2013) and its pernicious influence on among other things the training of teachers.⁵⁵ Similarly, two decades before, Conservative Prime Minister John Major was telling his 1992 Party Conference:

I also want reform of teacher training. Let us return to basic subject teaching, not courses in the theory of education. Primary teachers should teach children to read, not waste their time on the politics of gender, race and class. (Major, 1992)

Other Conservative Party reforms in England (e.g. local management of schools (LMS) in 1988) have also encouraged schools to take more responsibility for teacher training and development (Bridges, 1995, p.66). The Conservatives in England in 1992 made it an expectation that schools would partner with universities and colleges. It was also made a requirement of primary and secondary teacher training that it include a school-based component.⁵⁶ Again while not an idea without supporters on the *Left*, since assuming power in 2010 the Conservatives in England are also responsible for and have explicitly encouraged the diversification and expansion of routes such as in England *Teach First* and *School Direct*. In fact, both earlier (Lawlor, 1990; O’Keefe, 1990; O’Hear, 1988; Hargreaves, 1998) and later vocal proponents of school-based routes (Freedman, Lipson & Hargreaves, 2008) have tended to be allied to the *Right*. It just so happens also that diverting public funds meant for university departments, *Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Schools (HMI)*, and *Local Education Authorities (LEAs)* (Bridges, 1995, p.66), to schools to ‘grow their own’ teachers also promises a reduction in the influence of bodies that are regarded by the *Right* as bastions of the *Left* and of “egalitarian, inclusivist, progressive, and multicultural” (Hagger & McIntyre, 2006, p.12) thinking.

⁵⁵ More nominally left-wing party politicians in England, however, have also been critical of those elements in education, “so obsessed with ‘critique’, so out of touch with reality that they churn out findings which no-one with the slightest common sense could take seriously” (Blunkett, 1999, in Pring, 2004, p.77).

⁵⁶ For secondary-school PGCE trainees in England, for example, this has typically meant 24 weeks on-site (full-time) and 18 weeks (part-time).

1.3 Why ‘Experience’

I have so far identified three different types of school-based route into teaching. Each type relies heavily on a notion of school-based ‘experience’. To support one strand to my thesis argument, that ‘experience’ ought to be paid more attention to as educational contexts drawing from the term’s value are highly consequential, I have reviewed various reasons why such routes are seen as valuable. Such routes promise to address all kinds of concerns, not least the type of person being recruited into teaching. They may assess trainees in slightly different ways and offer different benefits to them. However, uniting the different routes is promotion and validation of their different approaches in large part through the cachet of the term ‘experience’.

1.3.1 Learn ‘Techniques That Work’

The question that warrants closer and deeper attention, however, is what precisely ‘experience’ as offered by these different programmes consists in. What exactly is meant by ‘experience’? As none of these school-based routes into teaching unpack in anywhere like sufficient detail what ‘experience’ involves, we are left to do more of the exploration and excavation work ourselves. Considering what is potentially riding on the term ‘experience’, as outlined in the above section, this inattention and need for further work is striking.

It would be unfair to conclude from the school-based route literature that there is no sense of what their ‘experience’ involves, however. Undoubtedly, the school-based route literature can be read as in particular stating that the acquisition of good techniques and skills for in and around the classroom is one major expectation of such routes. In fact, one big promise on practical routes into teaching is that trainees will acquire and practise technical skills. These are ‘effective’ (‘tried-and-tested’, ‘ready-to-use’, proven, ‘high-impact’, ‘high-quality’) techniques and skills, also known as ‘high-leverage’ or core (‘best’, ‘good’) practices or practical techniques and skills.⁵⁷ These skills and practices are typically in areas such as managing the classroom and behaviour, lesson planning, formative assessment, personalisation and differentiation, using information and communications technology (ICT), data

⁵⁷ The White Paper (DfE, 2010) setting out the *UK Government* education reform plans, and which stresses the importance of learning to teach in schools, for example, writes repeatedly of “core teaching skills” (p.9), “practical teaching skills” (p.19), and “key teaching skills” (p.20).

use, teaching techniques, and responding to pupils with English as an Additional Language (EAL) and with Special Educational Needs (SEN).

1.3.2 Real-Life Practice Opportunities

One major claim in the literature is then that a school-based route ‘experience’ is an ‘experience’ where it is assumed a trainee can acquire the skills and knowledge to do the job of teaching well. This is certainly regarded as a positive attribute of school-based route ‘experience’.

A related benefit of school-based route ‘experience’ identifiable in the literature is trainees having an opportunity to practise what they learn.⁵⁸ On *School Direct* programmes run in England’s schools, for example, opportunities are created to practise key techniques and skills. The ultimate aim of residency routes, similarly, is providing trainees, “a year-long, in-school ‘residency’” so as to “practice and hone their skills and knowledge alongside an effective teacher in a high-need classroom” (NCTR, 2015).

1.3.3 Learn from Those Actually Doing the Job

A third supposed and interrelated advantage of ‘experience’ is that trainees are provided an opportunity to learn, primarily technical skills, from “experienced” teaching staff who have done and are still doing the job in question. So, for example, in England *SCITTs* promise to, “provide practical, hands-on teacher training, delivered by experienced, practising teachers based in their own school or a school in their network” (DfE, 2015).⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Definitions of ‘experience’ are associated closely with practising. Wierzbicka (2010, p.36) tells us that Samuel Johnson (1755) gave two definitions of ‘experience’ in his famous dictionary, “1. Practice; frequent trial. 2. Knowledge gained by trial and practice”, both suggesting practising.”

⁵⁹ This onus on learning from those doing the job might be thought as implying that learning from those not now doing the job is problematic. By implication this means teacher educator and trainers in university department and teacher colleges. This fits with what was observed above that the diverting public funds away from university education departments and teacher training colleges may be thought a way for reducing their influence. In fact, in the US, for example, there has long been:

[S]kepticism toward university-based pedagogical training, professors of education, and a pedagogical knowledge base other than what could be learned through experience. (Rogers, 2009, p.369)

1.3.4 Values and Wisdom

So far in this chapter section it has been argued that from the school-based route literature it is possible to conclude at least something about the 'experience' such routes provide. Closer scrutiny of the literature reveals that a major expectation of the 'experience' these routes offer is the acquisition from "experienced" others, and practising of, technical knowledge. As we shall see below not all stakeholders in school-based route 'experience' reduce it mainly to acquisition and practise of techniques and skills. Yet, the fact that this rather limited, instrumental view is apparently the dominant one ought to concern us. It also contrasts starkly with the resources of MacIntyre, McDowell and others the thesis brings into conversation. These writers are sensitive to other, and crucially, sensitive to other, *more important* conditions of an 'experience', such as learning to teach in a school, than acquiring technical skills.

Even if a technical view of the school-based route 'experience' is indeed the major one, there are, then, other, more important conditions of such activities deserving of attention. This is something that MacIntyre's writings are especially sensitive to. There is, in other words, an urgent need to pay more attention to what these contexts are doing in the name of 'experience'.

While less visible in the school-based route literature, there are some that do identify other important elements of the 'experience' more akin to what MacIntyre and others disclose. As well as emphasising "skills" (managing and organising classrooms, starting and ending lessons, planning and preparing work for pupils), Toni Beardon *et al.* (1995, p.85), for instance, also foreground in the school-based 'experience' the importance of "values" and "wisdom".⁶⁰ Indeed, there are many working in teacher education who will regard the school-based 'experience' as benefitting from and also enabling cultivation of these characteristics.

⁶⁰ However, "skills", it is explained (Beardon *et al.*, 1995), must take priority, and only after gaining mastery of and so confidence in them should the teacher begin to question the underlining values of skill-based, technical approaches to teaching. Reflection comes after initial training in technique, in other words. That teacher training through universities has prioritised values over practical effectiveness is in fact a criticism made explicitly in the literature advocating school-based teacher training (Hagger and McIntyre, 2006, p.10).

1.3.5 Practical, Working Know-How

Moral qualities and wise judgement will then feature in the thesis as one element that requires closer attention if the true potential of educational ‘experience’ is to be realised. Others in the school-based route literature bring out at greater length the tacit nature of the knowledge and skills that are to be acquired by school-based route trainees in and through their ‘experience’. This will also feature in the thesis as a key characteristic of a productive and rich educational ‘experience’. The academic literature supportive of school-based routes, Hazel Hagger and Donald McIntyre (2006), for example, discloses the invaluable working knowledge, what they call ‘professional craft knowledge’, fostered by ‘experience’. This “knowledge in use” is born of working ‘experience’, “largely” tacit, “embedded” in the everyday practice of the experienced (Hagger & McIntyre, 2006, p.37), individually and situationally specific (2006, p.34), and rarely articulated.⁶¹ This then is practical knowledge reminiscent of that which Oakeshott (1991) identifies as necessary to crafts and arts, considered in chapters three and six of the thesis. This type of ‘experience’, contextual and practical knowledge of what works, is the type of thing involved in the ‘experience’ that functions in school-based teacher training. It is something that future inspectors with their years of “successful experience” can also be reasonably thought to be recruited for.

1.3.6 Prior Biography

In this section of the chapter it is being argued that the main motivation for school-based route ‘experience’ is apparently the acquisition and practise of technical skills acquired on-site from “experienced” staff. The resources of MacIntyre and McDowell in particular, as we shall see in the thesis, are sensitive to other, and other more important conditions of an ‘experience’ such as that offered by such routes. What MacIntyre and McDowell, and others, identify is much closer to the acquisition of values, cultivation of wisdom, and tacit ‘know-how’ which while less apparent, the school-based route ‘experience’ is also described as involving.

⁶¹ In fact, for Hagger and McIntyre, “teaching expertise is so subtle, so complex, so individual and so context-related that it can only adequately be understood in relation to particular practice, not in general” (2006, p.33).

One last interesting and more critical aspect of the school-based route literature, specifically on the meaning of 'experience', is found in Ellis and Orchard (2014). What they propose is also more in fitting with the kind of 'experience' the resources drawn into conversation in the thesis are sensitive to. Ellis and Orchard (2014) propose Britzman (1986; 2003) as a means of enriching our understanding of what is involved in the 'experience' characteristic of such routes. This is because, for Britzman, the role of biography and especially prior schooling in the 'experience' of teacher trainees is crucial (1986, p.452). Trainees who gain a biographical understanding of their "social relationships" and how these determine their ways of thinking and acting can then, Britzman (1986, p.453) argues, begin moving beyond unfavourable "social forces".

As considered in chapter three, it is possible to see Britzman's thinking as being allied to if not informed by Charles Taylor's writing (1989) on and objections to the 'punctual self'. This is criticism of the idea that we can detach ourselves from our prior 'experience' when judging new ones. That is, this is the idea that we somehow float free of the background frameworks that in fact constitute the way we are and think, and what we do. For Taylor, and others such as MacIntyre and McDowell, and for those in the school-based route literature seen as relevant to the term 'experience', such as Britzman, this type of Lockean detachment is implausible. It follows that if we are to shed more light on the use of 'experience' and make efforts to better harness the potential of contexts that feature the term, we must take into fuller consideration the constitutive forces Britzman alludes to.

There are then in the relevant literature voices identifying other elements to technique and its mastery involved in the 'experience' of school-based routes into teaching. These are however very much in a minority, and typically what these other voices identify is commonly outweighed by more technical concerns. As will be shown in the thesis, there are other conditions conducive to a flourishing 'experience', not least their overriding purpose, or *telos*, and other conditions we ought to be more concerned with.

1.4 Doing Justice to ‘Experience’?

Part of my thesis argument is that a great deal is carried by the term ‘experience’ in thinking regarding educational funding, policy, and politics. The term ‘experience’ as found in literature describing and championing school-based routes into teaching features in a number of ways, but predominantly in a technical sense. It is used to refer to the primarily technical knowledge and skills to be acquired by the recruit, the ‘real-life’ school environment where recruits are to practise, and possessing what trainees need, it refers to “experienced” staff somehow imparting what they know. Albeit less prominent, there is mention of values and wisdom and tacit working knowledge also comprising this ‘experience’. Ellis and Orchard (2014) also underscore through Britzman (1986; 2003) the importance of prior experience, schooling, and relationships, for example, to successful teacher training.

Nevertheless, the acquisition of technical skills is seemingly the major reason why school-based route ‘experience’ is seen as invaluable. This is primarily why, for example, “experienced” staff are regarded as crucial to the school-based ‘experience’. If mentioned at all, other elements to school-based route ‘experience’, values, wisdom and implicit practical ‘know-how’, for example, are mentioned but pale in significance compared to ‘tried-and-tested’ techniques and ‘effective’ skills. In this sense, the understanding in the school-based route literature of what ‘experience’ involves, and especially the conditions conducive to a productive and transformative one, is very different to the sense of ‘experience’ consideration in the thesis of the writings of MacIntyre, McDowell, and others, provides.

This chapter has intended to illustrate my argument that, as in the case of school-based routes, insufficient attention in educational contexts is being paid to the pivotal term ‘experience’. This inattention ought to concern us considering the investment and status such routes currently enjoy. Also key to my argument is that inattention to ‘experience’ means that the conditions for a successful one are being neglected. Reviewing available literature it is apparent that the primary motivation for school-based route ‘experience’ concerns acquiring ‘effective’ technical skills. The trainee is to practise and put into practice in authentic classroom situations ‘tried-and-tested’ techniques in, for example, classroom and behaviour management. As the various

writers to be drawn on in the thesis to come help us to see, however, this is not the only condition of an 'experience', such as learning to teach in a school, which is important. Nor indeed is it the most important. While insufficiently spelt out, the school-based route literature does reveal some awareness of the other elements and facets acquired through and key to the 'experience'. That said, it is apparent from publicity and marketing material, in particular, that school-based training 'experience' is especially about 'tried-and-tested' techniques and their acquisition rather than say values and tacit 'know-how', for example. Other key and consequential features of a productive educational 'experience' to be discussed in the thesis, such as a *telos* or the self-transformation pursuing the *telos* potentially offers, are not paid the same attention if at all.

Chapter 2: School Inspection, 'Experience' and Judgement

As we saw in the previous chapter, school-based routes into teaching are one educational context where 'experience' is foregrounded. A review of the relevant literature tells us that apparently there are a myriad number of reasons why school-based routes, and their 'experience', are lauded and the recipient of significant sums of public and private investment. An especially prominent expectation of the 'experience' of school-based routes would appear to be staff somehow passing on to trainees their knowledge of 'tried and tested' techniques and trainees gaining invaluable 'experience' of practising in situ. Other reasons for school-based route 'experience', such as the passing on of moral qualities or practical 'know-how', are also acknowledged in the literature, but this would appear the minority view.

Based on the relevant literature, technical skills, and their acquisition from "experienced" staff on site in a school, would appear paramount for school-based routes. There will be some who will at least instinctively accept that there is more to school-based 'experience' than this. What else 'experience' is comprised of and how its various features interplay are matters that to address will require drawing on other literature, the writings of MacIntyre on 'practice', which are much more sensitive to the type of questions the concept of 'experience' begs.

The second educational context to be employed in the thesis is school inspection. Here 'experience' is regarded in the main as a means by which something desired, a capacity for judgement, is acquired and cultivated. Here too the term 'experience' features prominently, but here again there is a lack of appreciation of the conditions informing a successful, transformative 'experience', and as with the school-based route literature, there is on the whole insufficient depth to the literature that does recognise them. Insufficient attention is paid also to the presuppositions of the typical understanding in the school inspection context of 'experience', especially vis-à-vis judgement and their interplay.

In what follows below I firstly provide the reader with a brief overview of school inspection. This is in order to give some background context and underpins the argument for the discussion to come. I do so in part by drawing upon various commentators, some with first-hand experience as inspectors. This should also provide those readers without knowledge of school inspection with some necessary

background.⁶² As in the last chapter on school-based teacher training, this overview will be followed with a critical summary of how ‘experience’ appears in the relevant inspection literature. We will see that the interlinking with judgement is especially fundamental. We will see that in contrast to school-based route literature, and to the use of ‘experience’ there, the inspection literature hints at a more sophisticated grasp in the school inspection context of what is involved in use of the term. However, as with the school-based route literature, important questions and issues regarding ‘experience’, not least its supposed interplay with judgement, and the conditions most conducive to development of this, are lacking in proper consideration.

2.1 What is School Inspection?

It is one strand of my thesis argument that ‘experience’ is a key term in educational contexts and the term has long featured in descriptions of the inspectorate and inspectors.⁶³ Inspection, not least in England, has in fact long been an established feature of education systems.⁶⁴ The last twenty years or so in particular have, however, been witness to significant growth in inspection services in the UK and globally, and the duties of existing inspectorates have been widened. The current inspectorate in England is the *Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (OFSTED)*. Established in 1992, but with a widening remit since 2000, *OFSTED* inspects and regulates various services, such as schools, state-funded and some independent, initial teacher training providers, further education institutions and programmes, apprenticeships providers, and childcare, adoption and fostering agencies. *OFSTED* carries out hundreds of inspections and regulatory visits throughout England, publishes the results, and reports to the UK *Houses of*

⁶² This may prove especially helpful to nationals of countries where there is evidence of the type of English inspection regime being established or piloted. See, for example, Sharma (2019) and Sawchuk (2014).

⁶³ So, for example, “[i]nspections rely on the professional expertise and experience of the inspection team” (NAO, 2018, p.39), or inspection is “the process of direct observation and its grounding in the knowledge and experience of inspectors” (Clarke & Baxter, 2014, p.485).

⁶⁴ In fact, even before the creation in 1839 of *OFSTED*’s predecessor, *Her Majesty’s Inspectorate (HMI)*, church schools in England had long been inspected (‘visited’) (See Edmonds, 1962, Ch.1), and there were the non-denominational *British and Foreign School Society (BFSS)* and *National Society Church of England* school inspectors.

Parliament.⁶⁵ In 2018 *OFSTED*'s inspection remit required the employment of approximately 170 more senior, *HMI* inspectors and approximately 1,470 contracted *OFSTED* inspectors (e.g. headteachers, deputy heads, education consultants, former headteachers) (NAO, 2018).⁶⁶ Inspection services have various purposes, but are in the main concerned with attaining value from the use of government funds.⁶⁷ Which part of government (e.g. local, district, regional, central) is responsible for inspection, the extent of private sector involvement, who sets the criteria and standards by which inspections are carried out, and also the destination and use of the data that is collected, can all vary. The growth in inspection has not been without financial cost.⁶⁸ Inspection is also not without controversy, a cause of significant stress and worry and much maligned.⁶⁹

In England the all-important inspection results are made public in the form of an inspection report. *OFSTED* school reports, for example, are (2018) concerned with offering a view on, 'judging', a variety of areas such as student achievement, student well-being, teaching quality, school management, and health and safety. Different overall *OFSTED* inspection grades, published in its reports, have different consequences for the inspected provider.⁷⁰ The report can often contribute to further

⁶⁵ There were over 6000 (6,079) school inspections in 2017-18.

⁶⁶ In spring 2018, *OFSTED* employed 1,770 full-time staff, with 660 based in its 8 regional offices (NAO, 2018, p.17).

⁶⁷ That is:

[T]he basic reason for the continuation of school inspection...has remained the same: if the State spends money on education, or on anything else, it has the right to see that that money is spent in a manner of which it approves. (Bone, 1968, p.248)

⁶⁸ According to the National Audit Office (2018, p.15), it cost £44 million alone to inspect state-funded schools in 2017-18 (29% of *OFSTED*'s total spend).

⁶⁹ One prominent theme in the inspection literature is the retelling of traumatic experiences at the hands of inspection and the serious impact it has had on those inspected and those with stakes in the process. There are numerous stories of careers being ruined at the hands of England's school inspectorate in the education press, in particular. See, for example, Dorothy Lepkowska (2014), Mary Bousted (2015), and Colin Harris (2017).

⁷⁰ According to *OFSTED* (2018b), a school requiring improvement (Grade 3) means it may be monitored further "although this will not normally apply to a school that has been judged as requires improvement for the first time" (p.32). There will, however, be a re-inspection in less than three years, "usually within 30 months". A school judged to be 'inadequate' overall (Grade 4) is either deemed to have serious weaknesses or placed in special measures. State schools or pupil referral units of "a formal category of concern" are to be academised. 'Academisation' refers to the current policy in England of handing control over locally run schools to private organisations while continuing to fund them through taxation. Academies and so-called free schools are the UK version of US charter schools. If already academies, any funding agreement with the DfE may be ended and there maybe 'rebrokering' to another academy trust. Academies with "serious weaknesses", or in special measures,

rewards (e.g. greater autonomy) or sanctions (e.g. change of structure, school closure) for the school depending on the result of the evaluation.

2.2 Why ‘Experience’

There is then a lot at stake with school inspection. Considering what is at stake, this supports my argument that use of the term in key educational contexts, such as school inspection, warrants close attention.

2.2.1 Training and Development

As stated above, the concept of ‘experience’ has long featured in descriptions of the inspectorate and inspectors. It would appear to feature in two main ways.

One reason, paralleling the motivation for school-based routes, why ‘experience’ is valued in the inspection context is for the purpose of training and development. It is “experienced” staff who help to train up new inspectors just as intended with school-based routes and teacher trainees. In the case of contracted, team inspectors for Social Care at *OFSTED* (*OFSTED*, 2018a. p.3), for example, alongside “regular briefings and updates via eLearning activities” and “regular framework training consisting of preparatory reading and face-to-face training,” the “majority of face to face training will take place alongside [experienced] *HMI*.”⁷¹ In England inspection is in fact fairly unique among professions. This is because unlike other professions typically, to become an inspector in England requires no formal qualifications. Becoming an inspector has long been characterised by work-based learning where you train with and under the supervision of someone of ‘experience’ and learn on the job. For example, *OFSTED* Inspectors currently, “receive support and coaching from

but not rebrokered, will be monitored by *OFSTED* and re-inspected in around 30 months. Academies judged to have serious weaknesses, which are not rebrokered, will be subject to monitoring by *OFSTED*. They will normally be re-inspected within 30 months of the inspection in which they were judged to have serious weaknesses.

⁷¹ Social Care *HMIs* are:

[E]xperienced social care professionals with the skills needed to observe and report objectively on practice, standards and outcomes for children, and the capacity to analyse and make sound judgements on the basis of evidence gathered during inspection activity. (*OFSTED*, 2018a, p.1)

'buddy' HMI" (OFSTED, 2015a).⁷² Again, this is evocative of use of 'experience' in the school-based route context, where trainees learn 'on-the-job' under "experienced" supervision. Inspection training of the kind characteristic of *OFSTED* in England also finds parallels in other countries. In Sweden, for example, "an experienced inspector" mentors new recruits, and accompanies them on school visits (Skolinspektionen, 2009, p.24).

One key reason for the valorisation of 'experience' in the school inspection context identifiable in the relevant literature is inspector training and development. With regards to this, discussion within and of school inspectorate in England has also regularly turned to secondment. Secondment is desired to a large extent because of the importance of 'experience'. Speaking in England in March 2019, for example, *Her Majesty's Chief Inspector (HMCI)*, Amanda Spielman, announced plans for a new 'middle leader secondment' programme at *OFSTED* (Spielman & OFSTED, 2019). These year-long secondments would recruit school managers in return for "their expertise and up to date experiences of running a school" (Spielman & OFSTED, 2019). *OFSTED* in return would share its training and development and improve its recruitment. Also at *OFSTED*, new positions have been similarly created that have allowed temporary placements in England's inspectorate. The part- or full-time Assistant Inspector positions of the past, for example, meant the release from a school of their staff for a period of several days or more per term. *OFSTED* has also sought to introduce secondment in specific areas such as Social Care, with the aim of bringing in "up to date experiences" (Spielman & OFSTED, 2019).⁷³

⁷² This type of training would appear to have also been the case in England pre-*OFSTED*. E.L. Edmonds (1962, p.177), for instance, describes how new recruits began "by learning from their older colleagues, partly by precept, chiefly by example, often by listening." Training consisted in part of observation practice, whereby a training inspector was attached to a more experienced colleague for a period of time. To Edmonds, this had been customary for a hundred years. Blackie (1970, p.37) writes of the two-year probationary period for new inspectors, during which they were placed under the supervision of "an experienced colleague". Pauline Perry (in de Waal, 2008, p.43) writes, similarly, of "a well-structured induction into the methodology of the work and traditions of *HMI* through several months of training and mentoring."

⁷³ The relevant literature tells us that secondment for inspection has also long been intended in England if not practised. For example, a 1943 *UK Government* report (the Norwood Report, p.52) saw:

[N]o reason why men and women of experience, who have risen, for instance, to the control of their department in a Secondary School, should not become valuable recruits to the Inspectorate without loss of initial salary or pension rights.

2.2.2 Inspecting Work

Certainly, 'experience' and especially the 'experienced', are integral to inspector training. Secondment, which is premised upon the value of 'experience', has also long been supported at England's inspectorate.⁷⁴

It is, however, part of my thesis argument that what 'experience' in educational contexts such as school inspection involves is insufficiently attended to. As with school-based routes, it is possible to quite clearly identify in the school inspection literature underlying reasons why 'experience' is desired. As also with school-based routes, the reasons why school inspection, foregrounding 'experience', is seemingly desired support one strand to my thesis argument that the term deserves closer scrutiny because it plays such a pivotal role in educational contexts.

In the case of school inspection, it would appear from examining the relevant literature that above all 'experience' is used in order to legitimise the inspection process, and provide the inspectorate, and inspectors, with credibility ("credibility will derive from the inspector's experience and knowledge", Audit Commission, cited in Boyne, Day, & Walker, 2002, p.1199). 'Experience' would seem to be regarded as especially crucial, as "[s]killed and credible inspectors are the *single most important* feature of a successful inspection service" (Audit Commission, cited in Boyne, Day, & Walker, 2002, p.1199, my italics).

While not immediately obvious, it might also be assumed that the need to secure, maintain, and enhance credibility accounts for the various *types* of 'experience', such as teaching experience, described in the literature as desired of inspectors. In

⁷⁴ What has been different in the past, however, is that secondment was to work both ways. That is, secondment was both in and out of the inspectorate in England ("a two-way street"). For example, the Education and Science Select Committee of 1968, "recommended that recruitment to *HMI* should draw from a wider field and that inspectors should have the opportunity of secondment to teaching posts" (Dunford, 1998, p.77). We see this bidirectional idea of secondment in Denis Lawton and Peter Gordon (1987, p.125), who explain that the "[i]nterchange between *HMI*, schools and LEAs has been recommended by official inquiries from time to time" (e.g. Norwood Report, 1943, p.52). However, they add, that while interchanging Department for Education and *HMI* personnel was possible, it "is not very common" although "[t]here is some evidence, on the other hand, of the Office wishing to gain experience in the workings of the educational system" (Lawton & Gordon, 1987, p.124). This outsourcing of inspection staff was in existence in the 1990s, "in order to maintain and develop the range of expertise available within the Inspectorate," and "at any one time some Inspectors are seconded to outside bodies to gain experience in industry, commerce, teacher training institutions, LEAs and other settings" (HMI, 1990, p.5)

contrast perhaps to the school-based route context, there would seem then to be awareness within inspection of the need not just for inspectors to have some kind of 'experience', whatever that may be, but to have specific kinds of 'experience'. In particular, teaching experience has long been expected of, and for many to be a school inspector should necessitate having been, a school teacher.⁷⁵ *OFSTED* inspectors in England today must hold Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) and have at least five years teaching experience (OFSTED, 2017b, p.6). This policy has also meant an end in England to the employment of the potentially hundreds of inspectors without QTS (and so without teaching experience).⁷⁶ The importance of drawing inspectors from the teaching profession is illustrated by other changes also. *OFSTED* putting an end by mid-2015 to its prior flagship policy of employing 'lay inspectors', for example, is one such change.⁷⁷

It is now mandatory that inspectors have teaching experience, and has increasingly been the norm for inspectors to have teaching experience. Teaching experience has also long been a feature of *OFSTED*'s identity and notions of good practice. This accounts in part for why 'experience' is seen as legitimising the inspectorate in England. Yet in England it has not always been by intentional design nor always formally stated official policy that teaching experience be required. Also, it is apparently not seen as a requirement of becoming *Chief Inspector (HMCI)*, with the current *HMCI*, Amanda Spielman, having no 'experience' of school teaching at all.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ For example, "it is necessary to recruit inspectors who combine teaching ability and a wide range of experience with appropriate qualifications mirroring those of the best teachers in their field" (HMI, 1970, p.10).

⁷⁶ In 2015, the *Times Educational Supplement* reported that Head of Quality at *OFSTED*, Sir Robin Boshier, had explained that, "an "initial sift" of additional inspectors took out about 500 who lacked the relevant qualifications or leadership experience, or did not possess qualified teacher status" (cited in Roberts, 2015, p.10).

⁷⁷ These were inspectors, "without personal experience in the management of any school or the provision of education in any school (otherwise than as a governor or in any other voluntary capacity)" (Education (Schools) Act 1992, p.17). Lay inspectors are currently still employed by *Estyn*, the Welsh inspectorate.

⁷⁸ Back at the very beginning of the school inspectorate in England in the mid-19th century, "few in the Committee of Council would have considered this at all necessary" (Edmonds, 1962, p.48) and "[i]t was not thought to be a requirement of those first inspectors that they should have taught or had experience of schools they were to inspect" (Brighouse, in Brighouse & Moon, 1995, p.5). Take Rev John Allen and Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, the very first *HMIs* to be appointed in December 1839, for example. Both Oxford University educated, Rev John Allen, "had spent two years as a master in a proprietary school in Pimlico and three years as Examining Chaplain to Bishop Otter of Chichester; he was to inspect Church of England schools." The other, Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, appointed for the British schools, however, while a member of the Central Society of Education, was not a teacher

While there would seem to have been a reluctance to formalise this, and teaching ‘experience’ is not regarded essential for the head of *OFSTED*, ‘experience’, especially teaching ‘experience’, is crucial to the reputation of inspectors and inspecting in England. Other types of ‘experience’ aside from teaching are now also seen as crucial to being a good inspector. If not clearly stated, presumably this is also to underpin inspection’s credibility. For example, *HMI* inspectors must possess a “minimum of five years’ leadership experience at a senior level (2nd or 3rd tier) in education provision” (*OFSTED*, 2017a, p.4). *OFSTED* inspectors, employed on a contractual basis, similarly, must also have, “previous experience of leading good or better provision” (*OFSTED*, 2017b, p.2).⁷⁹ The ‘experience’ sought by *OFSTED* in its inspectors must also be in an area of relevance (i.e. “minimum of two years’ successful and substantial management experience in the relevant area”, 2017b, p.6), and the teaching experience must have been “successful” (i.e. “a minimum of five years’ successful teaching experience within the relevant remit”, 2017b, p.6), and varied (i.e. “experience gained from more than one institution”, 2017b, p.6). Also crucial for an *OFSTED* inspector is that their ‘experience’ is up-to-date.⁸⁰

For credibility purposes, the need for England’s inspectors to possess the ‘right’ experience was to emerge as a concern of external criticism very early in its history. When it is perceived that inspectors do not have these right types of ‘experience’,

but a barrister” (Dunford, 1998, p.3). Consider other early inspectors such as Matthew Arnold. This “most famous of inspectors” (Cullingford, ed, 1999, p. 57), appointed one of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Schools in 1851, in 1870 becoming Senior Inspector of Schools and in 1884 Chief Inspector, “came to his work not only devoid of all professional training, and with only a very minimum of teaching experience, but even without any particular desire for, or interest in educational work.” Another famous inspector of the 19th century was writer and poet AP Graves (1846-1931). He had perhaps more experience than most, but not much: “What were my qualifications for such a post?,” he asked himself:

Few and slender. I had taught some of my father’s farm lads reading, writing and arithmetic of an evening. I had coached a couple of undergraduates at my University, and had taught a class of girls Latin for Mrs. Peter Taylor’s London Institute.

⁷⁹ This use of ‘experience’ is also identifiable in *HMI* ‘pen portraits’ (*OFSTED*, 2013). Of the many *HMI*s whose portraits are painted, one director (p.3) has “11 years of leadership experience as a deputy headteacher and as a head of department in a secondary school”

⁸⁰ That the experience is not up-to-date remains a concern today. Responding to a Parliamentary Committee (HoC, 2015, p.3) question (“You have no concerns around the loss of people who may have been inspectors over a considerable period and that experience being lost?”), former *HMCI* Wilshaw’s reply was that, “we have made a conscious decision that we want more serving leaders on the inspection workforce, or people who have contemporaneous experience of what schools look like.”

their credibility is called into question, and done so very publicly.⁸¹ For example, one criticism has long been that too few inspectors have “recent and relevant experience of the types of settings they inspect, which diminishes the organisation’s credibility” (HoC Education Committee, 2011, p.4).⁸²

It seems that in the inspection context then there is an appreciation not only of the importance of ‘experience’, but the importance of specific types of ‘experience. It is however part of my thesis argument that what ‘experience’ involves in educational contexts warrants closer attention as currently treatment is typically superficial and question-begging. A case in point is school inspection. Here, in particular, we must be told more about what exactly it is about this ‘experience’ that makes it so creditworthy. Also, other forms of experience we might think are crucial are seemingly not regarded as absolutely necessary at *OFSTED*, the school inspectorate in England. What is seemingly not required of inspectors in England, in particular, is that they have prior inspection experience per se in order to become an inspector.⁸³ All training it appears will be provided on-the-job. Post-recruitment accumulated and collected “inspection experience”, as in how best to inspect and as a justification for how inspections are conducted, is valued.⁸⁴ Yet this is not expected of inspectors *prior to* joining England’s inspectorate. This missing expectation contrasts with other countries, where this prior kind of inspector experience is a requirement.⁸⁵ Nor in England do the heads of *OFSTED*, *Her Majesty’s Chief Inspectors*, *HMCIs*, need to have been inspectors (as in the case again of Amanda Spielman the current *HMCi*).

⁸¹ “One of the complaints that was made in the teachers’ magazines was that these inspectors had no experience of elementary education,” writes John Dunford in his study of the ‘HMI of Schools in England and Wales, 1860-1870’ (1980, p.36).

⁸² See, also, Pippa Allen-Kinross (2019).

⁸³ It is not part of *OFSTED*’s application criteria, for example.

⁸⁴ In the May 2019 School Inspection Handbook, for example, we are told that, “[i]nspection experience, including our pilots for this framework, shows that this helps both leaders and inspectors build stronger professional relationships” (*OFSTED*, 2019b, p.17), and “[o]ur experience from piloting...shows that this is the part of preparation that school leaders and inspectors often find to be the most helpful and constructive” (*OFSTED*, 2019b, p.18). Also, it is claimed that when assessing for ‘impact’ of education, among other things, “[i]nspection experience and research” tells them “[a] well-constructed, well-taught curriculum” is crucial (*OFSTED*, 2019b, p.46).

⁸⁵ In the German state of Saxony, for instance, a minimum of 5 years working as a teacher is required as well as knowledge and experience in the field of methodology, didactics, advising and special knowledge and, crucially, practical experience in the area of school evaluation (*SBI*, 2008, p.22).

The fact that inspectors in England do not require prior ‘experience’ of inspecting leaves the question begging. We are not told why England’s inspectors do not require relevant inspecting ‘experience’. As considered in the section below, it could be because as with school-based trainees, the ‘experience’ is provided to new inspectors during training. Another reason, especially in the case of *HMCI* appointments, could be that it is hoped that appointees from outside teaching and schools will bring invaluable experience from elsewhere. What that entails for any consideration of use of the term ‘experience’ is not spelt out. Whatever the reason, the missing answers to these and other questions are exposed when we begin to probe a little deeper beneath the surface of contexts such as school inspection that draw cachet from use of the term ‘experience’. This strengthens my argument in the thesis that use of the concept of ‘experience’ in educational contexts such as inspection is all too often vague and requiring deeper theorisation, which, as I attempt to demonstrate in the thesis, drawing upon the literature on ‘experience’, and the closely related term ‘practice’, can help to address.

2.3 Experience and Judgement

As explored above, ‘experience’ is valued especially because it enhances the credibility of inspection. It would appear that, in particular, ‘experience’ is especially valued because it enhances credibility of the judgements inspectors make. This link, between ‘experience’ and judgement, is identifiable in the relevant literature. Inspectors employed directly by *OFSTED*, *HMIs*, for example, are “experienced professionals [...] with the capacity to analyse and make sound judgements” (*OFSTED*, 2017a, p.1). The link between ‘experience’ and good inspection judgement is also recognised in the secondary literature.⁸⁶

However, underlining my thesis argument that ‘experience’ acts to gloss over the depth, complexity, and preconditions of educational contexts that foreground the term, the nature of the relationship between experience and judgment is, perhaps unsurprisingly, insufficiently unpacked in the relevant literature. The link between

⁸⁶ Inspection “is a matter for the professional judgement of the inspector, exercising his or her experience, guided by grade descriptors” (Matthews *et al.*, 1998, p.170). Similarly, the pre-*OFSTED HMI* (Maclure, 2000, p.327), “was wrapped up in the idea of professional judgement, refined by experience”.

judgement and experience is not unpacked in *OFSTED*'s key document, the 'School Inspection Handbook' (OFSTED, 2018b), for example. We are told that inspection judgement as described explicitly in the 'Handbook' is to be made on the basis of the evidence ("OFSTED will take a range of evidence into account when making judgements", OFSTED, 2018b, p.14), as well as on the basis of activities, and criteria (OFSTED, 2018b).⁸⁷ However, it is also stated (OFSTED, 2018b) that the aim of the criteria and the official literature (e.g. the 'Handbook') is only to guide the inspector, with the hope that, "[i]nspectors will exercise their professional judgement" (OFSTED, 2018b, p.5). This can be read as meaning inspectors will judge in light of their experience as well as or in combination with evidence, stated policies and procedures.⁸⁸ This, however, is as far as the literature relevant to inspection extends.

2.3.1 Experienced and Independent Judgement

It would also appear from the relevant literature that these inspection judgements that interplay with 'experience' can be, should, and, indeed, are independent (i.e. open-minded, unbiased).⁸⁹ In fact, this idea of 'detachment' is at the heart of the type of "professional judgement" the exercise of which is expected of inspectors in England (OFSTED, 2018b, p.5). Summing up this onus on experienced judgements in the inspection literature that are somehow independent is encapsulated in the oft-repeated phrase "without fear or favour". In June 2018, the current head of *OFSTED*, Amanda Spielman, for example, stated that, "[o]ur job is to report without fear or

⁸⁷ Evidence to be gathered for the final inspection judgement (NAO, 2018, p.37) includes data (e.g. progress, attainment, attendance), school records and policies, safeguarding information, lesson and non-lesson observation, reviewing pupils' class and homework reviews, discussions with senior staff, teachers governors, and conversations with pupils and parents.

⁸⁸ This is reminiscent of the kind of 'informed connoisseurship' that Jim Campbell and Chris Husbands (2000, p.46) see as the work of *OFSTED* inspectors – a theme to be discussed in depth below.

⁸⁹ For former *HMI* Wilshaw (ASCL 2014), for example, "[i]nspectors deal in detachment". For another former Chief Inspector of Schools, Perry, "the people doing the inspection must go in with genuinely open minds and inspect with the school, not do things to it from outside" (HoC, Nov, 2010). Similarly, we are told how pre-*OFSTED HMI* "was wrapped up in the idea of professional judgement, refined by experience and deepened by the shared wisdom of colleagues, applied without prejudice or dogma". To Edmonds, an inspector had "the privileges and the responsibilities of independence" (Edmonds, 1962, p.177). *HMI* were said to have approached "schools with something like an open mind (Maclure, 2000, p.327). Being an inspector was about reporting what they saw "without imposing their own or someone else's orthodoxy" (Maclure, 2000, p.322). For Browne (1979) writing of *HMI* at the time, "[t]he basic principle has always been close observation exercised with an open mind by persons with appropriate experience and a framework of relevant principles" (cited in Dunford, 1998, p.101-2). The *HMI* of the late 1970s, for example, Browne explains, "were not imposing set standards but engaged in open-minded inspection and reporting" (in Maclure, 2000, p.273). To one commentator on *HMI*, moreover, "[p]erhaps the most remarkable part of the history of the Inspectorate [...] was the way in which it preserved its professional independence" (Dunford, 1998, p.ix).

favour on the quality of education as we see it in these areas.” Former *HMCIs* have also employed the phrase.⁹⁰ Decades earlier too it was written (HMI, 1983, p.3) that the inspectorate in England had an “obligation to report what is found without fear or favour”.⁹¹

2.4 Inspectors as Connoisseurs

There is then an appreciation in the literature relevant to England’s inspectorate that ‘experience’ is important to good inspection. Specific types of ‘experience’ are seemingly regarded in this literature as being important to good inspection, also, and, in particular, the right ‘experience’ fosters, or at least somehow interplays with, a capacity for good, independent judgement. This is not merely judgement per se, but instead *independent* judgement. Judgement of this more detached type is seen as emanating from or perhaps merely interacting with specific types of ‘experience’. However, we are not provided with deeper insight into how this is understood to work, nor into the conditions that are conducive or detrimental to it. It is simply assumed that this is the case. This presumption again is illustrative of my argument that what is involved in contexts of education where use of ‘experience’ is prominent is underappreciated and under-theorised. Given how much is carried by the term for inspection credibility and given the ramifications of an inspection result for school stakeholders, this is a context like school-based routes into teaching where what ‘experience’ involves warrants much closer scrutiny and richer illumination.

⁹⁰ Take Wilshaw, for example (Wilshaw & OFSTED, 2014). *OFSTED*, he proclaimed to the audience, “will be proud of its independence, reporting without fear or favour, no matter what the type of school” and:

OFSTED will inspect schools and colleges without fear or favour. Whatever the institution, however low its reputation or prominent its profile, we will judge it in exactly the same way as any other school. I can give you this assurance without hesitation.

In its 2015 evidence to Parliament on RSCs, meanwhile, *OFSTED* wrote that, “care is always taken to protect the independence of OFSTED and ensure that this coordination does not in any way undermine its ability to inspect objectively and without fear or favour” (OFSTED, 2015b).

⁹¹ Earlier than this, one former senior inspector (Edmonds, 1962, pp.179-180) writes that, “[t]o be fully effective, an inspector must be free to give an honest appraisal, without fear or favour, of all he sees and hears.” Others in the inspection literature also deploy the term. According to one writer on inspection:

OFSTED’s role should then be to stand between the Government on the one hand and individual institutions on the other, reporting without fear or favour, on the performance of not only the institutions, but of Government policy. (Dunford, 2011, p.55)

Historically, a common way of describing inspectors in the literature has been as “connoisseurs”. In this literature too ‘experience’, as well as ‘judgement’, and ‘credibility’, feature prominently.⁹² To one former inspector, James Learmonth (2000, p.13), for example:

Inspectors have won (or lost) their respect and credibility through what has been referred to as a 'connoisseur' role - the idea that a skilled and widely-experienced practitioner is the best person to make judgements.⁹³

Considering this historically common way of understanding what inspectors do, it might, therefore, be expected that understanding of the interplay between inspection judgement and ‘experience’ is informed and so in some way illuminated further by this kind of connoisseurship model. The inspection-as-connoisseurship literature would then be a resource to further probe for any detail regarding the question of ‘experience’ and inspection especially its supposedly beneficial intertwining with ‘judgement’.

Unfortunately, the inspection-as-connoisseurship literature only really hints at a richer picture of how inspection ‘experience’ and judgement interoperate and what preconditions inform and support this. Such judgements are said to ‘emerge’, be ‘built up’, or ‘refined’, for example, by ‘experience’.⁹⁴ How this ‘emerging’, ‘building up’, or ‘refinement’ happens, for example, or what the conditions or what the obstacles are, is left relatively untouched. To better appreciate the issues and

⁹² To Joakim Lindgren (2014), for example, inspections “offer a space for professional deliberation and learning in the connoisseurship tradition,” (p.70). Similarly, *HMI* inspection was a model of connoisseurship (Norton Grubb, 1999, p.72).

⁹³ For Learmonth (2000, p.13), the notion of inspectors as connoisseurs is associated most closely with Elliot Eisner (1985).

⁹⁴ Regarding *OFSTED* inspectors, Campbell and Husbands (2000, p.46), for example, write of the persistence of a model of ‘informed connoisseurship’, which is characterised not by formal criteria but by experienced, “mature” judgement. In fact, they write, “the exercise of such judgements itself depends on the assumption that the inspectors themselves are equipped through their experience, training and sagacity, to deploy ‘informed connoisseurship’.” Janet Maw (1994, p.9) writes of the *HMIs* of old, and their “‘educational connoisseurship’ model of evaluation”, the building up of judgements and refining them, “on a basis of experience, rather like wine-tasting!” To Maclure, pre-*OFSTED HMI* inspectors “approached schools and teaching as an art form to be appraised by connoisseurs...out of whose experience emerged judgements of quality” (1998, p.530). These former *HMI* inspectors “were connoisseurs of schools, using judgement educated by experience and collective wisdom, to look at schools in the round and make their assessments of good and not so good practice” (Maclure, 2000, p.322). In this sense, an inspector “was more like a music critic than an analytical chemist. Judgement were formed from all the inspector saw and sensed as well as from the evidence presenting itself in objective form” (Maclure, 2000, p.272).

processes involved in the interplay between judgement and experience of the kind expected of inspectors, we must therefore seek the help of other resources, not least the writings of MacIntyre and of McDowell.

Before concluding this chapter, there is one further issue to raise about any link seen in the inspection literature between good judgement and 'experience'. School inspection today typically involves inspectors visiting schools and judging them in accordance with a formalised, standardised procedure and set criteria. The procedure, criteria and evidence for *OFSTED* inspection in England, for example, are explicitly set out in the 'School Inspection Handbook'.⁹⁵ *Prima facie* there is then something of a contradiction. We have 'experience' being desired because it lends credibility to judgement but the same 'experience' seemingly being insufficient and as a result judgement having to be orchestrated by official procedure and criteria. This apparent paradox is not unlike the context of school-based routes into teaching, where 'experience' is lauded not apparently for itself primarily, but for its instrumental role as conduit between trainee and 'tried-and-tested' technique. The existence of formalised protocols for inspection also raises doubts about the possibility of being independent in judgement. This can be doubted even if the idea is for the inspection professional to be merely "guided" by these things.⁹⁶ How formalised procedure and criteria and 'experienced judgement' can be reconciled is also significant given how much in the context of school inspection is hanging on the terms 'experience' and

⁹⁵ The 'Handbook' has undergone numerous revisions since 1992 and revisions that are discussed and pored over by schools. The April 2018 *OFSTED* 'Handbook' (*OFSTED*, 2018b) breaks down how schools will be inspected into three parts: before, during and after the inspection. There is also an evaluation schedule, with the different areas to be inspected - 'Overall effectiveness: the quality and standards of education' (p.38); 'Effectiveness of leadership and management' (p.42); 'Quality of teaching, learning and assessment' (p.49); 'Personal development, behaviour and welfare' (p.55); 'Outcomes for pupils' (p.58) – the different grades - 'Outstanding' (1), 'Good' (2), 'Requires Improvement' (3), to 'Inadequate' (4) – and the different "grade descriptors". An *OFSTED* inspection award of Outstanding (1) for 'Overall effectiveness' (*OFSTED*, 2018b, p.41), for example, has the following "descriptor":

- The quality of teaching, learning and assessment is outstanding.
- All other key judgements are likely to be outstanding. In exceptional circumstances one of the key judgements may be good, as long as there is convincing evidence that the school is improving this area rapidly and securely towards outstanding.
- The school's thoughtful and wide-ranging promotion of pupils' spiritual, moral, social and cultural development and their physical well-being enables pupils to thrive.
- Safeguarding is effective.

⁹⁶ England's current inspectorate declares, for example, that it wants its inspectors to exercise "professional judgement" (*OFSTED*, 2018b, p.5), and not simply follow the explicit inspection guidelines and checklists.

'judgement'. What is then required in the chapters that follow is not only an attempt at a more developed way of understanding how judgement "without fear and favour" and 'experience' interplay. Also required is a more developed way of understanding how 'experience' leads to good, open-minded inspection judgement in light of the type of formal inspection procedure and criteria *OFSTED* in England is subjected to.

The chapter considered various ways that the concept of 'experience' functions in the context of inspection. As was shown, 'experience' can, in particular, be understood as underpinning the credibility of inspection judgement. 'Experience' is also seen as central to how inspectors are trained and developed. As with school-based route literature, there is though apparently much being assumed and regarded as self-evident in use of the term 'experience' in the context of inspection. It is assumed, for example, that 'experience' leads to, or as a minimum, has a positive influence on judgement as exercised by inspectors. Yet the relevant literature would appear to tell us little about how this is actually thought to happen, and what preconditions aid this interplay. Given the impact an inspection can have, this lacuna is something that cries out for deeper scrutiny.

Chapter 3: What Literature Regarding ‘Experience’ Tells Us

In the previous chapter, school inspection was shown to be an educational context where the concept of ‘experience’ is prominent, but where questions about what this entails are left hanging. While judgement and ‘experience’ are seen to interplay profitably in the school inspection literature, there is little indication of how this actually works.

We can find this apparent lack of scrutiny of the concept of ‘experience’, in school inspection, in a similar case of inattention in school-based teacher training routes. Here too we are invited to see ‘experience’ in a positive light, embodying technical effectiveness in skills passed on and reflecting the quality of context enabling the development of trainee teachers. This issue of lack of attention to the detail of what experience consists in, is not diminished by references to wisdom, morality, and tacit ‘know-how’. Despite references to such terms there are rarely more than hints at a way forward. The discussion in the thesis of MacIntyre’s writings on ‘practice’, and those of Dunne in chapter eight, will begin to bring out some of the issues concerning ‘experience’ that the literature on school-based routes is inattentive to. However an initial step in the direction of opening up what more might need to be addressed can be illuminated by the literature on ‘experience’ reviewed critically in this chapter.

3.1 Jay & Janack

We can make a start with opening up some of the issues arising from the use of the term ‘experience’ in educational contexts by exploring literature that focuses specifically on the use and meaning of the term ‘experience’. The literature on ‘experience’ considered here helps to suggest the move to the concept of ‘practice’ in the thesis.

As reviewed briefly in the thesis introduction, two recent works, Jay (2005) and Janack (2012), have already provided a helpful foretaste of themes and issues facing those attempting to get to better grips with what is and what is not involved in use of ‘experience’. These two works also have different significance for my thesis argument.

With Jay (2005) we can draw out some of the various contradictory uses specific to context characterising the term 'experience'. This is significant for my thesis argument as it strongly suggests the 'experience' at play in the contexts of school-based teacher training and school inspection is both diverse but also specific to these different contexts. Were we to assume this, it would imply that the 'experience' of becoming and being a school inspector or school-based teacher trainee would be unique to the context of school inspecting and learning to teach in a school. This in turn suggests that to better understand the 'experience' of school inspecting or school-based teacher training requires some first-hand 'experience' of these contexts. Indeed, a similar point regarding the need to gain first-hand 'experience' of a shared human activity in order to realise its true worth is made by MacIntyre in respect to 'practice' in chapter four.

Janack (2012) alerts us to other specific contexts that are interesting but also to difficult and long-running questions, which will be addressed, regarding 'experience'. This suggestion, of there being thorny questions at the heart of specific contexts where 'experience' is at play, is in contrast to the rather unproblematic and assumed sense of the term 'experience' featuring in the school based route and school inspection literature. Such questions include fine-grained issues, for example if there are a variety of elements to the school-based 'experience', how do they interplay or what is it about teaching or leadership 'experience' per se that makes it valuable for school inspecting?

However, there are also more fundamental questions about whether there are necessary preconditions to 'experience' if a school-based route 'experience' is to fulfil its claims to prepare trainee teachers for the profession.

3.2 The Classical Greeks

Typically works foregrounding or scrutinising the term 'experience', such as Jay (2005) or Janack (2012), cite Dewey's writings on the term. Of all philosophers, it is indeed perhaps Dewey in modern times who is most associated with the term 'experience'.⁹⁷ Dewey specifically wrote at length and throughout his long career

⁹⁷ The key Deweyan text on 'experience' is perhaps 'Experience and Nature' (1929) but it is also tackled in other full works, such as 'Art as Experience' (1934), 'Experience and Education' (1938),

about the term, what it involves, and what it offers. He did so also in light of issues that educational contexts, schools and teaching, raise. Indeed, Dewey (1938) wrote of how experience and education are intimately connected and how a convincing approach to education requires a convincing philosophy of experience.

While recognising that it was often taken to be “self-explanatory” (1938, p.25), Dewey regarded the term ‘experience’ to be more problematic than was commonly held to be the case. One way that Dewey’s writings help to underline this underappreciated problematic in use of the term ‘experience’ is with his chronological history of the term.⁹⁸ If this history may be a little dated and inaccurate, it does serve as a very useful heuristic device, explaining why it would still be drawn upon by writers on ‘experience’ today. As we shall see, each of the three periods Dewey identifies is characterised by distinct ways of employing the term ‘experience’. This alerts us to how the term ‘experience’ is used in a plurality of ways and alerts us also to what is involved in the term being understood in different ways if understood at all. As we shall also see, the problematic nature of the term, underappreciated if acknowledged at all in educational contexts, is further underscored by the fact that within the periods Dewey describes, other contrasting, critical, alternative uses of the term ‘experience’ are often present.

In short, then, as Dewey explains, the term ‘experience’ is used variously between and within periods of history. It is neither fixed nor singular in its use, and as we shall see, these various uses do not fade over time but survive and live on. If approaches to ‘experience’ originate at particular times in history but do not necessarily cease to exist once a new period begins, this serves as a warning to those who employ the term ‘experience’, that their use of the term may not be understood in the way intended. Awareness of the term’s historically-conditioned plurality in meaning is not, however, a feature of the literature on these contexts.

‘Freedom and Culture’ (1989), and various papers, including ‘The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism’ (1905), ‘Pure Experience and Reality: A Disclaimer’ (1907), ‘An Empirical Survey of Empiricisms’ (1935), and ‘Nature in Experience’ (1940).

⁹⁸ This history of the term ‘experience’, and what it involves, for Dewey, spans three distinct periods. The first, and, for Dewey, “the most important and influential” (1935, p.3), began in the classical Greek period and lasted until the 1600s. A second period followed, continuing until the 1800s. A third period was in Dewey’s time of the publication in the 1930s and so still developing. While Dewey’s historical account has and can be challenged (See, for example, Jay, 2005, pp.14-17), this does not need to detract from for the purposes of the thesis the more important implication that ‘experience’ involves greater variety and complexity in use than is typically assumed.

The first of Dewey's periods in use of 'experience' showing us its multi-faceted, historical, and complex character is that of the classical Greek era. Dewey writes that to the classical Greeks, 'experience' was commonly understood as involving the "accumulated information of the past" (1935, p.4). This 'experience' was information embodied in common-sense heuristics and standardised rules-of-thumb.⁹⁹ These "matter-of-fact generalizations" (Dewey, 1934, p.4) explained in light of particular circumstances how to do and make things and predicted events, and were transmitted to new generations through apprenticeship in various arts and crafts.

To the Greeks, as understood by Dewey, 'experience' therefore concerned what was useful, it was associated with action and practice, practical thinking, and involved custom and habit.¹⁰⁰ This is significant as it bears a striking resemblance to the practical "craft" knowledge (Hagger & McIntyre, 2006) and customary 'know-how' "experienced" teachers or inspectors are supposed to possess and supposedly passed on to trainees through mentoring and being on-site in a school for training or inspecting.

The significance of this customary, practical, and tacit aspect to the 'experience' understood by classical Greek literature for how we can better understand the 'experience' of school-based routes and school inspection is underlined by its further social aspect. According to the ancient Greeks, Dewey explains, this generalised 'experience' was assumed also to be social. That is, for Dewey, Aristotle, for example, can be read as suggesting such empirical knowledge embodied in generalised rules-of-thumb is acquired in large part through education and upbringing.¹⁰¹ The term 'experience' functions for Aristotle, according to Dewey, therefore, in a way that would appear to involve the knowledge deriving from our

⁹⁹ "Thus," Dewey writes, "experience comes to consist of standardized ways of action and a standardized body of beliefs, expectations, materials, and techniques" (1935, p.6).

¹⁰⁰ "It was a collective memory or funded deposit of the past" Dewey (1935, p.5) writes.

¹⁰¹ According to Dewey's account, for Aristotle reason is the necessary result of different developmental stages beginning with sensory experience, moving to perception, next to memory or imagination, and finishing with their "consolidation or organisation" in 'experience' and empirical knowledge. Reason, for Aristotle, Dewey (1935, p.8) explains:

[H]ad to pass through the stage of experience so that even a scientist, dealing with demonstrable and rational matters, would, as a matter of his own development and education, need the preparation of an empirical stage.

socialisation, and our own personal journeys, as well as our biological make-up and capacities.¹⁰²

This association between socialisation and 'experience' parallels the onus in both school-based route and school inspection on recruiting particular people rather than simply welcoming anyone who expresses an interest in teaching or inspecting. Only people of particular 'experience' are recruited to be teachers or inspectors and a crucial part of this is that the 'experience' they have gained prior to applying to become one is of the right kind.

One question the thesis has already raised, however, and one that the school-based route or school inspection literature and Dewey's summary of the classical Greek association between socialisation and 'experience' insufficiently addresses, is what it is about this social upbringing that is especially beneficial or impoverished. We may all agree that education and upbringing are crucial in myriad ways, but what exactly is it about this that makes an 'experience' worthwhile or not? If there are various factors or elements that need to be at play to make education, family, and training 'experience' formative in a positive way, then how do these best or not interconnect and interplay? What more is necessary to appreciate given that in school-based teacher training or school inspection so much is at stake? Not only is 'experience' not problematised but these are questions that are not attended to in the school-based route or school inspection literature. However, as will be discussed in what follows these are questions that MacIntyre's writings in particular can help us better illuminate.

This type of customary, craft knowledge embedded in and derived from social life Dewey discusses is helpful in thinking about the 'experience' characteristic of school-based routes into teaching and school inspection. Yet while lauded by ancient Greeks, it was not at that time, according to Dewey, without its critics. As now, partly this degree of disdain of experiential knowledge was, for Dewey (1935, p.10), due to the term's association with practice, to what worked in practical terms, as this implied mundanity and the utilitarian (Dewey, 1935, p.10). A further classical Greek criticism

¹⁰² For Aristotle (Dewey, 1935, p.8), although "there was no original, separate and independent rational intuition," the "dependence of rational insight upon experience is not in any way logical or epistemological." It is "biological", "biographical" and "pedagogical".

of practical, shared, empirical 'know-how', and one with relevance for educational contexts, however, was its supposed lack of explanatory power. Dewey explains that for Plato, for example, empirical, everyday knowledge was inferior to knowledge that could tell us about reasons and why something did or did not happen. As Dewey (1935, p.10) explains, this was because while everyday heuristics might have led to accurate predictions, these were effectively only opinions arrived at accidentally. Common sense generalisations fostered by 'experience' provided no explanation of why predictions came true.¹⁰³ These empirical generalisations did not tell the ancients anything about causes or why something did or did not happen.

Crucially, this ranking of types of knowledge, with explanatory knowledge superior to practical, shared 'know-how', is one that Dewey argued persisted in his own era and informed the modern divide, for Dewey, between 'experience' and science. As noted in the thesis introduction, this ranking of types of knowledge is visible too in educational contexts, such as in the tussle between the claims of evidence-based, *What Works* research vis-à-vis 'professional experience'. This is a tussle also with resonance for the contexts being drawn upon in the thesis to illustrate my argument that the term 'experience' is lacking in proper scrutiny and appreciation. The ranking of different types of knowledge, with explanatory science placed above practical 'know-how', can be said to feature prominently in debates and reforms concerning teacher training and school inspection. This again illustrates part of my thesis argument that 'experience' is a crucial term that deserves closer attention than it receives now.

Despite the lower epistemological ranking, there was for the ancient Greeks Dewey describes, however, knowledge for which 'experience' was primary and essential. In fact, Dewey explains, for Aristotle, for instance, there were types of knowledge – of “social, political and moral matters” - that *only* 'experience', and its interplay with judgement, could provide (1935, p.7). This assumption regarding the necessity of 'experience' for particular types of judgements is perhaps at the background of the

¹⁰³ “It is well illustrated,” explains Dewey (1935, pp.3-4), “in the story that James tells in his *Psychology of the brakeman in the old-fashioned railway car*.” This “old-fashioned railway car” filled with stove smoke while at the station. In response to passenger complaint, the reply of the brakeman was simply, “Well, it will stop just as soon as the train starts.” When asked why, the brakeman responded: “It always does.”

school inspection literature link between professional judgement and ‘experience’. This is not spelt out, however, illustrating my argument that what ‘experience’ entails is paid scant attention in contexts of education where the term plays a prominent role.

The necessary, beneficial interplay between ‘experience’ and cultivated judgement in these “matters” is perhaps implied by the onus in the school inspection literature on professional judgement. It is an interplay evoked especially by Aristotle’s conceptualisation of *phronesis*. For Aristotle, *phronesis* (prudence, practical judgement or intelligence, situational perception, sensitivity or insight) is a refined, ethically informed, practical, and necessarily situated kind of master (“architectonic”, Reeve, 1992, p.76) capacity for judgement, cultivated in and with the right kind of ‘experience’. It was this capacity for prudent, practical judgement fostered by the appropriate ‘experience’ Aristotle argued political leaders required to govern well. The assumed and necessary interplay between ‘experience’ and good judgement recognisable, for example, in Aristotle’s writings is one identifiable in educational contexts. As already noted in chapter two, school inspection literature refers to inspectors exercising professional judgement. The school inspection literature only hints at a developed sense of what this entails, however. Resources informed by Aristotle, especially those provided by McDowell, enrich understanding of the functioning, potential, and nuances of, this kind of interplay. These resources will be explored critically, especially in the inspection context, in chapters nine and ten to come.

According to Dewey’s history of the term ‘experience’, as the ancients saw it, then, ‘experience’ was the practical knowledge passed down to us of how to make and do things and that helped us to make useful predictions. ‘Experience’, and only it, furthermore, was thought to involve the furnishing of good judgement in the areas of morality, society, and politics. While crucial to these “matters”, what ‘experience’ offered was also seen as limited, however. It was not thought to offer explanatory knowledge of the kind science today is known for. This ancient Greek understanding of what ‘experience’ does, and does not, involve, and its limitations, is not unfamiliar today. Nor have these apparent limitations with ‘experience’ stopped those in various

educational contexts, such as school-based routes into teaching and school inspection, from seeking to capitalise on the term.

3.3 John Locke

Neither the rise of Christianity nor the medieval period following the end of the classical era, for Dewey, sees any further significant contribution towards our understanding of what is involved in 'experience'.¹⁰⁴ With the 17th century English intellectual Locke there is, however, according to Dewey, a perceptible shift in what was understood as being involved in use of the term 'experience'. In fact, Dewey regards Locke's Enlightenment writings as signifying a distinct second period in the history of the term 'experience'. As will be seen, Locke's so-called empiricist approach to 'experience' is still regarded as influential with this influence said to prevail today. While not a topic for discussion in this thesis, it could in fact be reasonably argued that Aristotle and Locke provide the two main but rival traditions for understanding 'experience' today. Locke is therefore significant as a resource with which we might think more sensitively about how 'experience' and judgement interplay. This is a question of particular significance for school inspection, where this interplay would appear to serve as a primary reason for the emphasis on 'experience' in its literature. It is also important to devote some significant space to outlining Locke's type of thinking as it will reappear as a foil in McDowell's more nuanced approach to the functioning of the term 'experience' vis-à-vis judgement considered especially in chapters nine and ten.

Locke is able to provide a resource with which to think more closely about the interplay of 'experience' and judgement. His writings serve also as resource with which we might reconsider the value of the type of customary, habitual 'experience' "experienced" school and inspectorate staff pass on. This is because while Locke recognises that 'experience' can involve customary, habitual kinds of empirical knowledge, he too identifies limitations in what is involved in the term. For Locke, inherited ideas, no matter how customary or long-established, require testing via

¹⁰⁴ For Dear (2006), for instance, also, this was a period dominated by Aristotelian Scholasticism, and 'experience', therefore, was still seen as involving common and familiar kinds of empirical knowledge that the axioms of "astronomy, plants, and optics" were rooted in. This was 'experience', "of universal behaviors rather than particulars: The sun *always* rises in the east; acorns *always* (barring accidents) grow into oak trees" (Dear, 2006, p.109).

observation.¹⁰⁵ This is why Locke was suspicious of the type of principle, for instance, we acquire from those that care for us (“doctrines that have been derived from no better original than the superstition of a nurse”) or acquire simply from those older than us (“the authority of an old woman”) (*Essay* I.II.23).¹⁰⁶ Thus Locke rejected what he called innate ideas, “[p]rinciples supposed innate because we do not remember when we began to hold them” (*Essay* I.II.23).

Locke problematises the role that inherited customs and traditions have in our thinking and the undue faith placed in them. This counterposes Lockean thinking to ways of working that abide by previous, accepted practice qua previous, accepted practice. We can apply Lockean thinking to school-based teacher training or school inspection. Here it is hoped that “experienced” staff pass on their practical knowledge on to new recruits. However, Locke encourages us to raise questions about this practical knowledge. For instance, is this knowledge simply a way of doing something that has been inherited uncritically from the past? Or is it knowledge of how to do something that has been put to the test? Should we be satisfied if it is only the former?

Locke did not, however, seek to reject what the term ‘experience’ involved completely. He saw value in personal observational ‘experience’, “direct, first-hand, personal contact with nature” (Dewey, 1935, p.13), and considered below, in the kind of *de novo* personal experience that Oakeshott later problematised. It was this kind of ‘experience’, for Locke, according to Dewey, that through observational test enabled an individual to assess the claims of supposed truths, “innate ideas”. In taking this approach regarding what is involved in use of ‘experience’ as Dewey describes it, Locke then would appear to have gone further than those ancients who had also criticised what was involved in the customary, habitual sense of the term. For them, experiential knowledge was flawed, Dewey explains, but not because it

¹⁰⁵ Dewey (1935) does not explicitly state that Locke regarded ‘experience’ as requiring testing of the more modern, controlled and formalised kind although, as a student of chemist Robert Boyle, for instance, he was certainly knowledgeable for his generation about nascent experimental science (Walmsley, 2003).

¹⁰⁶ “Locke”, Dewey (1935, p.13) writes, “held that a large part of so-called innate ideas, especially in the realm of morals, were in fact picked up from grandparents and nursemaids in early childhood.” Because for Locke these “innate ideas” were acquired at such a young age, we according to Locke forget their original source and, “we suppose they have always been in the mind, implanted in its very constitution” (Dewey, 1935, p.13).

had not been tested per se, but because it lacked explanatory power (Plato). As Dewey describes it, for Locke, however, 'experience' only functions as something of true value if it has been tested via observation. This approach to observational 'experience' is significant because it is more than reminiscent of the underlying workings of school inspection, where even today schools are still visited to gain a first-hand, more reliable impression of their quality.

Also, while visible in Aristotle's writings, it is Locke who is perhaps most synonymous with a further feature of 'experience' still pervasive in use of the term today. This is the supposedly necessarily sensory nature of direct observational experience and the knowledge it provides.¹⁰⁷ This further feature is also of great significance for educational contexts, school inspection, which draw credibility from it. This so-called sensory empiricism is why, as noted already, Locke is regarded as especially central to modern thinking about what is involved in use of 'experience'. In her study of 'experience', Wierzbicka (2010), for example, argues that Lockean empiricism, British sensory empiricism, remains all-pervasive in our presuppositions regarding the term even today. That is:

The idea articulated and defended at length by Locke that 'knowledge is ultimately dependent on the senses' (Woolhouse 1988, 73) lives on in Anglo culture and in the English language. (Wierzbicka, 2010, p.10)

Indeed, she adds, "Locke's idea that 'knowledge is ultimately dependent on the senses' has been so widely accepted that it is often presented as a scientific truism" (Wierzbicka, 2010, p.10).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ "Aristotle's writings stress repeatedly the importance of sense experience in the creation of reliable knowledge of the world," argues, for example, Dear (2006, p.106).

¹⁰⁸ Wierzbicka (2010, p.31) argues 'experience' and the historical development of Anglo culture are closely linked i.e. "the semantic history of *experience* is linked with important developments in Anglo culture and Anglo ways of thinking." In fact, Wierzbicka (2010) in effect argues that 'experience' is *specific to* national language. Other literature exploring 'experience' tells us that 'experience' is translatable into a plurality of words in German, for example. "In German," writes Jay (2005, p.11), "*Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung* are both translated by the one English word, but have come to imply very different notions of experience." Into German (p.37), or into Russian (p.36), however, 'experience' is in fact "untranslatable" Wierzbicka (2010, p.31) insists. That is:

[E]xperience plays a vital role in English speakers' ways of thinking and provides a prism through which they interpret the world [...] reflects a characteristically Anglo perspective on

Directly implied by Locke's sensory empiricism is Locke's apparent suggestion that 'experience' could somehow be escaped from and assessed from outside. This is a suggestion of particular relevance to the question of how judgement can be both independent, and so fair and non-subjective, and informed by 'experience'. If we recall from chapter two, the possibility of independent but experienced judgement is something that school inspection in England prides itself on. Similarly, Oakeshott (1991), for example, writes of the Rationalist in politics, who espouses Lockean-type thinking, that, "[a]t bottom he stands for independence of mind on all occasions, for thought free from obligation to any authority" (p.1).¹⁰⁹ For Taylor (1989), also, Locke is paradigmatic of the modern notion of the 'punctual' or 'neutral' self. The idea of a 'punctual' self that Locke's thinking epitomised is, for Taylor, especially characterised by disengagement from prior 'experience' as well as objectification and rational, procedural, instrumental control.¹¹⁰ This Lockean-type of self is not a self whose thoughts and actions are necessarily and unavoidably constituted by 'experience' involving history, language and community, therefore, or by "past thought and culture" (Taylor, 1989, p.ix). For Taylor, the modern self, identifiable in Locke, "is defined in abstraction from any constitutive concerns" and "[i]ts only constitutive property is self-awareness" (1989, p.49). In effect, Taylor argues, this means that in Locke 'experience' is fixed so as to nullify its power as "a source of bewitchment and error." Rather than be misled by "the ordinary bent of our experience," Taylor (1989, p.163) explains, a 'neutral' self supposedly allows us to be removed from it.¹¹¹

Were it possible, something that writers like Taylor reject, this Lockean removal, 'withdrawal', from 'experience' would afford us an impartial, advantageous vantage

the world and on human life. This is why the word *experience* is often untranslatable (without distortion) into other languages, even European languages.

¹⁰⁹ This "mental attitude" of the Rationalist, explains Oakeshott (1991, p.6), is both sceptical and optimistic. Firstly, "there is no opinion, no habit, no belief, nothing so firmly rooted or so widely held that he hesitates to question it and to judge it by what he calls his 'reason'" (Oakeshott (1991, p.6). Secondly, "the Rationalist never doubts the power of his 'reason'" (Oakeshott, 1991, p.6).

¹¹⁰ Oakeshott (1991, p.2) writes similarly of the mind of the Rationalist as, "at best, a finely-tempered, neutral instrument," detached ('cut off', 1991, p.3) from the more customary knowledge of society. The mind of the Rationalist, "has no atmosphere, no changes of season and temperature; his intellectual processes, so far as possible, are insulated from all external influence and go on in the void" and "believes, of course, in the open mind, the mind free from prejudice and its relic, habit" (Oakeshott, 1991, p.3).

¹¹¹ Not everyone agrees with the picture of Locke painted by Taylor. Grant (2012), for example, challenges this view of Locke as "imagining an individual who is sufficiently reasonable to be without prejudice or to overcome prejudice" (p.627).

point ('a bird's-eye view') from where 'experience' could be reassessed and concluded from objectively. As we have seen already in chapter two, this issue of detached objectivity features in educational contexts, not least in the context of school inspection, where the issue and its supposed possibility is central to inspection's self-image and reputation.¹¹² As we have also seen, however, the question of objectivity and especially how to make independent, non-biased, valid judgements is one too that troubles inspectorates. In particular, issues with this should be seen in large part accounting at the school inspectorate in England, *OFSTED*, for example, for the increasing formalisation, codification, and standardisation of its processes, and the growing pressure on it to generate 'hard data' and produce evidence through 'research'.

It is perhaps not surprising that the issue of objectivity and valid judgement troubles school inspection considering longstanding criticism in the literature of Locke's valorisation of personal, detached 'experience' understood in sensory observational terms still prevalent even today. For Taylor, for example, the 'punctual self' that Locke did much to encourage belief and confidence in was erroneous because it was impossibly a self free of everything bar self-awareness.¹¹³ The Lockean self was characterised neither by "constitutive concerns" (Taylor, 1989, p.49) nor by identity in a proper sense. Locke's self was in other words free of any background moral framework. For Taylor ("living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency", 1989, p.27), and similarly for others featuring prominently in the thesis, such as MacIntyre and McDowell, however, the shared backgrounds we are born into, and go onto necessarily and inescapably imbibe, prefigure us and how we think and act.¹¹⁴ More crucially, for these writers this shared, constitutive, pre-existing layout is the *precondition* for, our beliefs, judgements, opinions and responses, and identity. Issues with the Lockean idea of detachment from prior,

¹¹² That is, "without fear or favour" school inspectors of 'experience' will and can judge schools ("evaluate objectively, be impartial and inspect without fear or favour", OFSTED, 2020).

¹¹³ This portrayal of "the modern individual has spawned an erroneous understanding of the self" (Taylor, 1989, p.49).

¹¹⁴ For example, MacIntyre (2007) famously describes humans as the "story telling animal" i.e. "[w]e enter human society [...] with one or more imputed characters- roles into which we have been drafted - and we have to learn what they are..." (p.216). For McDowell, traditions, like common law, are both authoritative over us and dependent on us for sustenance ("unfolding", 1999, p.192). See also Gadamer (2004) on 'experience' and its very close and productive interplay with jurisprudence, and prejudice and prejudgement.

constitutive experience, raise at least one immediate, crucial question for school inspection and other educational contexts drawing value for judgement and other capacities from 'experience'. One question is *how* a school inspector can be understood to judge 'objectively' if, as Taylor and others argue an individual, such as an inspector, is already inescapably prefigured by prior 'experience'. If it proves impossible to see how an inspector can be both above 'experience' in judgement and informed and fostered by this same 'experience', then this poses a real problem for inspection. If these two things cannot be adequately reconciled, it calls into question the credibility of inspectors and inspection drawn from its claims of experience-informed objectivity and independence.¹¹⁵ As will be shown later in the thesis, the writings of McDowell, in particular, will be proposed as a resource with which we might make a start at addressing this thorny problem.

With his disclosing of what is involved in use of 'experience' as he saw it, and especially with his differentiation between better and worse 'experience', Locke's writings had, according to Dewey, other quite dramatic effects. This is significant because it underlines part of my thesis argument that the concept of 'experience' is an important one, and deserving of much closer scrutiny. In particular, if the conditions and precursors to foster appropriate contexts of experience are absent, then there is no protection against an impoverished or distorted experience. For example, Locke's empiricism was most useful "as a dissolvent of tradition and doctrine" (Dewey, 1935, p.18). It also had the effect, however, of promoting education and reason, "once the corruption that comes from bad institutions, political and ecclesiastical, had been done away with" (1935, p.17). Indeed, Lockean 'experience' has very radical consequences as Oakeshott (1991), for example, appreciates. In particular, Locke's valorisation of personal but objectively assessable 'experience' and discrediting of customary and traditional 'experience' had the effect of problematizing the fact of some wielding power "arbitrarily" (Dewey, 1935, p.13) simply because of untested, "innate ideas" passed down the generations.

Locke's approach to 'experience' according to Dewey was to have dramatic consequences. It is then crucial in contrast to the typical way it is treated in

¹¹⁵ In fact, as seen in chapter two, inspecting in England is accused of being biased, a tool of middle-class privilege, for example.

educational contexts that the term is not taken lightly and subjected to proper and careful scrutiny. Indeed, Dewey writes of Lockean empiricism as an antidote to outdated thinking and reactionary institutions (“against various influential forms of superstitious dogmatism and arbitrary political authority”, 1935, p.16). This rejection of established power based on convention qua convention identifiable in Locke’s writings appears also elsewhere in the literature relevant to the term ‘experience’. Again, here too the potentially serious consequences but also importance of scrutinising use of ‘experience’ and what it involves is underscored. Lockean iconoclasm is, for instance, visible in the type of thinking Edmund Burke (1999) is famous for protesting against. Burke is a key figure in the history of those focused on exploring and defending what is involved in more traditional, inherited types of ‘experience’.¹¹⁶ In his famous defence of accumulated tradition and the institutions embodying it, Burke particularly had in mind the kind of iconoclastic thinking associated with the Enlightenment, and the protests in the French Revolution against the *ancien regime* (i.e. against the monarchy, the privileges of the nobility, the political power of the Catholic Church).

Iconoclastic sentiment, echoing Locke’s rejection of inherited ‘experience’, custom and tradition, is also evident today in educational contexts exploiting the cachet of the term ‘experience’. As already highlighted in chapter one, with ‘fast-track’ routes into teaching, for example, the promise of school-based training ‘experience’ is among other things regarded as a necessary weapon against the status quo and vested interests. Similarly, informing the work of the school inspectorate in England is the suspicion of “producer interest” (“OFSTED was created to challenge the producer interest”, Woodhead, 2002, p.102). That is, inspectors are needed to go into schools because teachers, school leaders, and the educational establishment, ‘The Blob’ (Bennett, 1988), are inherently self-interested and cannot be fully trusted to provide a true account of what they do. Inspection can be understood in effect as

¹¹⁶ For Burke, invaluable experience was embodied in the institutions and customs that had evolved over time. This collective wisdom was far greater than that available to one person alone. This emphasis on the experience of the past as embodied in tradition explained why he so opposed Thomas Paine, and the Jacobins, during the French Revolution for they, with their abstract principles and natural rights, appeared to Burke as wanting to do away completely with the collective experience passed down and accumulated through the generations and replace it with something untried and untested. As shown in the section below, Oakeshott also values the use of ‘experience’ in this Burkean sense.

being the kind of test of established authority and tradition by observational experience Locke advocated.

3.4 William James

If this second period of the term 'experience' is dominated by Locke, Dewey's third distinct period in the history of the term 'experience' is marked by James. James writes directly and at length about the meaning of 'experience'. James' writings about 'experience' are relevant for educational contexts such as school-based teacher training and school inspection in a number of ways. For example, one of James' best known works today is 'The Varieties of Religious Experience' (1902) and this study is significant for the purposes of the thesis. It serves as encouragement to others to delve deeper into what is involved in 'experience' in a specific context. It also serves to reinforce the overall argument of the thesis that typical understanding of what the term involves is lacking. James' focus on religious experience is also an example of his overall desire to take the "lived experience" of ordinary people as a proper, serious focus of study. As Dewey following him, James championed an "ecumenical approach to experience" (Janack, 2012, p.9), with various types of experience, such as religious experience (James, 1902), not ruled out for consideration aprioristically. The significance here is then that James encourages us to subject the term 'experience' irrespective of context to scrutiny. School-based teacher training or school inspection, educational context or not, wherever the term 'experience' is found we should feel we can try and illuminate its deeper and more complex workings.

Like Locke, James was also an exponent of empiricism, but sought to improve upon and so distance his own approach to that of Locke. This is significant for educational contexts as it suggests that the term and understanding of what it involves has the potential to change. So, it is not only that we ought given its crucial importance and suggestiveness to better scrutinise the term's use and what it involves. As part of this we ought to at least think it possible that its use and what it involves have changed over time. If there has been an evolution in the term's employment and functioning, this implies rival and conflicting uses at play at the same time.

One of his criticisms of Lockean empiricism, a criticism considered in the introductory chapter of the thesis, is one that anticipates the kind of approach taken by Janack

(2012) as regards the problem of the authority of experience. This criticism levelled by James was that Lockean empiricism unnecessarily divided up our 'experience'. Consequently, a thing was divided from the person thinking about it, the objective divided from the subjective, content from consciousness. Any distinction between these things was for James, however, no more than a convenient heuristic. What is in fact involved in 'experience' was, by contrast, according to James, "double-barrelled" (1912, p.10), which meant together both thing and thinker, objective and subjective, content and consciousness.¹¹⁷ This is a further question regarding 'experience' the literature on school-based routes and school inspection that foreground the term is seemingly inattentive to.

A further objection to Locke's type of empiricism, for James (1912), was its rejection of first-hand experience of conjunctive relations, such as causation or similarity. With James' so-called Radical Empiricism (James, 1912), by contrast, nothing extra was required to link experiences together. Causal or comparative relations, for example, were not merely something somehow added later as Locke argued; our experiences already contained these and other so-called connective relations. In contrast to Locke's empiricism, for James, causation or similarity were experienced first-hand too, and are, "as 'real' as anything else in the system" (1912, p.42).¹¹⁸ Again, this is not a question that either school-based route or school inspection literature address, but one that if a Lockean approach to 'experience' is assumed must be.

For James, Lockean-type empiricism did therefore not go far enough; it needed to be Radical. James was also critical of the detachment, the 'birds-eye view', of Lockean empiricism. This is a detachment which is especially reminiscent of the independent, "without fear or favour" promise made by school inspectorates, OFSTED in England, in its judgements of education providers. Like Taylor and others argued many decades later, James regarded new 'experience' as encountered by an agent not from a position of neutral detachment, but from a position already and unavoidably laden with prefiguring, constitutive meaning and memory. It is this prior meaning and

¹¹⁷ So, for example, James (1904, p.480) argues, in a particular context an 'experience' can be "a knower, of a state of mind, of 'consciousness'", yet in another context this 'experience' can be "the part of a thing known, of an objective 'content'".

¹¹⁸ James' approach to empiricism, he argued, meant there was then no need for idealist 'solutions', such as "transexperiential agents of unification" (1912, p.43), substances, or Absolute Mind, for the question of how experiences link together.

memory, prior 'experience', that contribute greatly to what a person is attentive to, a key faculty for James.

The mind, James (1890) argues, is characterised in particular by an attentiveness to some experiences but not to others.¹¹⁹ So, for example, we do not just hear thunder alone, discrete and separate (James, 1890, p.240). With thunder, we are aware of the silence being broken and the contrast this creates. The faculty of attentiveness, James wrote, is informed by prior 'experience', and so can and should be improved by education. In fact, he writes, "[a]n education which should improve this faculty would be *the education par excellence*" (James, 1890, p.424). Here James is underlining how mental capacities could, in the classical Greek sense Dewey describes, and shown above, be cultivated by socialisation and upbringing. Locke and other writers, however, are:

[B]ent on showing how the higher faculties of the mind are pure products of 'experience'; and experience is supposed to be of something simply *given*.
(James, 1890, p.402)

To James, therefore, also, what we are attentive to is not simply and passively impressed on us as brute input. This is also a presupposition featuring prominently as a target of criticism in Janack's writings, considered in the thesis introduction, and featuring similarly as a target of criticism in chapters nine and ten below featuring McDowell. This idea of brute input, of the *Given*, is also one that would appear presumed in the literature on school-based teacher training. Here we are told trainees are to receive all that the 'experience' of being situated in a school offers. As has been noted, the earlier 'experience' a trainee brings with them would appear from the literature at least to not be a significant factor. As others, such as James, argue this is necessarily and unavoidably not the case, however. The 'experience' that trainees unavoidably bring with them to an educational context must therefore be taken into account for such an 'experience' to be a success. Furthermore, as McDowell also underscores, meaning is not *Given* or unambiguous. What is experienced, according to McDowell, is already 'conceptual'. Unlike other lifeforms,

¹¹⁹ "Millions of items of the outward order are present to my senses," James (1890, pp.402-403) explains, "which never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no *interest* for me. *My experience is what I agree to attend to*. Only those items which I *notice* shape my mind."

according to McDowell, humans are not in touch with the world as a result of responding to a bare *Given*, but rather come to experience through their activities and purposes within an already existing space of reasons.

While James was concerned with ensuring that people do not reject ordinary, everyday experience, he, like Locke, did not seemingly completely trust 'experience' qua 'experience'. Like Locke, James argued that something should not be thought valuable simply because of its origin ("the value of ideas is independent of their origin", Dewey, 1935, p.20). James was against looking at the origin of something, an idea, in particular, rooted in longstanding customary 'experience', because it will supposedly shed light on what it means.

For James, however, it was crucial to think of application and use, and what comes out of it. It was therefore not so much just about testing of 'experience' for James. For James, according to Dewey, testing meant experimentation, but, additionally, what matters also is whether you can use something, an idea, in a productive way or not. James's testing of 'experience' was about the uses, an idea, for example, generates and how viable these were in our (scientific) practices. That is, "the whole point of James's philosophy is that the value of ideas [...] is a matter of their outcome as they are used in directing new observation and new experiment" (Dewey, 1935, pp.20-21). Here James' thinking contrasts with the kind of technical approach to 'experience' in school-based routes and to the training of school inspectors. This is because unlike what would appear to be primary in these two contexts rather than a site where predetermined and fixed techniques and procedures are to be acquired, for James 'experience', technical skills or something else, is to be tested to discover its value. If James' type of argument prevailed, then we might think it more likely that school-based route trainees would be urged not simply to acquire 'tried-and-tested' techniques. We might think it more likely that they were expected to acquire them but also put such techniques to the test themselves, and if not useful, to discard them.

3.5 John Dewey

With James we reach the last of the writers Dewey employs to tell his three-part history of the term 'experience'. Dewey's significance as a prominent figure in the literature on 'experience' should also not be underestimated. Indeed, with Dewey we have one writer on 'experience' who specifically focuses critically on the 'experience'

characteristic of education in his time and who proposes something he believes better in response.

Dewey's specific focus on educational 'experience' is unsurprising. Dewey was a trained teacher as well as an educational reformer and campaigner. For decades now, Dewey's writings have been especially influential in education. He of course was not concerned with contemporary usage of 'experience' in relation to teacher education or inspection. He was therefore not concerned specifically with how the term has come to refer to a significant part of teacher training or inspecting. Nevertheless, as will be shown, Dewey's writings on 'experience' are another taste of the relatively underappreciated challenge the term poses, in general but also and especially in education.

It is worth noting that the insights of other 'philosophers of experience', such as Locke, have also long informed educational contexts.¹²⁰ For example, Dewey (1935, p.16) tells us that Lockean empiricism has been employed to emphasise the importance, indeed 'omnipotence', of education in the modern period. According to Dewey, the Lockean belief in "a passive, empty mind" in turn fed into French ideas, of Claude-Adrien Helvétius regarding education and the possibility of forming desirable types of minds and characters through control of "impressions, sensations, observations" and "especially by controlling associations that are formed with pleasure and pain" (Dewey, 1935, pp.16-17). The same kind of thinking is, for Dewey (1935, p.17), later adopted and expanded to the law and legislative procedure by Jeremy Bentham. Bentham is significant because Benthamite thinking can be strongly linked (Perryman, 2006; 2009) with and to school inspection, the second of the educational contexts where 'experience' is prominent to be scrutinised in the thesis.¹²¹

There is then a close, perhaps symbiotic, relationship between thinking about the concept of 'experience' and approaches to education going back centuries. In noteworthy writings particular understanding of the former informs the latter.

¹²⁰ "John Locke," writes Peter Gay, "was the founder of the Enlightenment in education as in much else" (1964, p.1)

¹²¹ The belief that our upbringing can and should mould our sense of pleasure and pain in particular ways is traceable back to before Aristotle (1104b10-13), however.

Understanding use of 'experience' in these writings can help us to better understand approaches to education, educational contexts, and educational practices that are still prevalent today.

In drawing on a specific concept of 'experience' and employing this in writings on education, Dewey was then adopting an approach already taken by previous 'philosophers of 'experience'. This is an approach that can be said to still have great significance today. Dewey was also greatly indebted to James, so it is unsurprising that this influence is demonstrated in Dewey's writings.¹²²

Similar to James, Dewey's writings underscore a complexity in use of the term 'experience' that raises important questions. Yet these are questions that educational contexts, such as school-based teacher training or school inspection, where 'experience' is prominent, do not do enough to address. Like James, what 'experience' involved was, for Dewey (1929), for example, diverse and wide-ranging. Just as with James, this "common experience of mankind" is also the "double-barrelled" (James, 1912, p.7) kind, both, for example, "the subject-matter experienced and the operations and states of experiencing." Like James, Dewey (1896; 1929) regarded our experiencing as active and selective, not passive and brutishly determined. Dewey, also a fallibilist regarding truth, advocated putting 'experience' to the test, too, not simply valorising it qua 'experience' (1989).

For our purposes, where Dewey also adds significantly to the literature on what the term 'experience' involves is his problematisation of 'experience' in an educational context and his proposed alternative. As he saw it, more traditional forms of education, which Dewey writing at the beginning of the 20th century was critiquing, lacked a proper grasp of what 'experience' required. It was not that pupils in Dewey's era lacked anything that could be called experiences. Rather, for Dewey, it was that education was not providing the *right* experiences and this, implicit in my thesis argument, was because what 'experience' involved was poorly understood.

One problem with the educational 'experience' of Dewey's time, was, he explains, that it was alien to the student 'experience'. This issue has particular significance today for contexts such as school-based teacher training or school inspection, That

¹²² In fact, "he owed a special debt to James" (Campbell, 2019, p.12).

is, Dewey (1997, p.19) argues, “subject-matter, the methods of learning and of behaving are foreign to the existing capacities of the young.” The result of this for Dewey was these were, “beyond the reach of the experience the young learners already possess” (1997, p.19). This meant learners were prevented from actively participating in and so positively benefitting from their own learning (“forbids much active participation by pupils in the development of what is taught”, Dewey, 1997, p.19).

The question this raises for educational contexts today is whether the ‘experience’ they provide is also alien to their ‘experience’. The warning in Dewey’s writings is that if this is the case, then trainees will neither properly participate nor benefit fully from what they learn. According to what Dewey tells us, the school-based or school inspection ‘experience’ must at the very least be within the ‘experience’ of the trainees already. One way to try and do this would be to co-create training courses. This would allow prospective trainees an opportunity to communicate their ‘experience’ to course creators. While this co-creation may happen, it is not a feature of school-based teacher training or school inspection emphasised in the literature.

Another problem regarding the functioning at the time of ‘experience’ in education was to Dewey its disconnectedness. Disconnected experiences, while satisfying in their own right, were “not linked cumulatively to one another” (1997, p.26). This meant the ‘dissipation’ of energy and “scatterbrained” (Dewey, 1997, p.26) learners, unable to benefit from experiences in the future.¹²³ The “mis-educative” (Dewey, 1997, p.25) experiences of his era failed young people, Dewey argued. They were unconnected to each other and simply something to passively receive.¹²⁴ At that time, education, for Dewey, was therefore guilty of being “static” (1997, p.19) and so “mis-educative” (p.25). Such “mis-educative” (Dewey, 1997, p.25) experiences, Dewey explains, arrested, restricted, distorted or narrowed the growth or field of further experience.

¹²³ To Dewey (1997, p.27), it was the teacher’s role to address this and provide experiences that were “more than immediately enjoyable since they promote having desirable future experiences.”

¹²⁴ As Brandom (2011, p.6) puts it about Dewey’s approach, “[e]xperience is *work* [...] something *done* rather than something that merely *happens* – a process.”

Again, according to what Dewey writes, to enhance an educational context we ought therefore to connect together the different 'experiences' that comprise them. Distinct inspecting or teacher training 'experiences' would therefore hopefully accumulate progressively, with one feeding into the next.

For Dewey, education was not capitalising on 'experience' in particular because it was not cultivating "self-control" through the right kind of participation and stimulus.¹²⁵ Especially problematic educationally were disconnected experiences, where "talk of selfcontrol" (1997, p.26) was misplaced. This idea of self-control being cultivated through 'experience' is significant because this is not typically regarded as being a primary reason for school-based route 'experience', for example. The primary reason here being instead to acquire technical effectiveness in management of the classroom or behaviour, for instance.

"Mis-educative" experiences, as Dewey (1997, p.25) labels them, also, resulted in "callousness", insensitivity, unresponsiveness, encouraged "a slack and careless attitude" and landed pupils in unhelpful grooves and ruts (1997, pp.25-26). This is significant because here Dewey is underlining the interplay, emphasised by the classical Greeks, between a desirable character, and character traits, and the right kind of 'experience'. This is an interplay emphasised by those drawing upon the classical Greeks today, such as Gadamer, MacIntyre, Dunne, and McDowell. It is however not apparently emphasised in educational contexts such as school-based routes into teaching or school inspection.

Dewey is then another key figure in the literature on what 'experience' involves. Dewey is especially noteworthy because he is also a major figure in the study of education, and tackles usage of the term 'experience' in this specific context. In fact, he like no other in the literature argues that there is a lot at stake regarding 'experience' and what in educational contexts it involves. 'Experience', poorly conceived, according to Dewey, harms students. The experiences of traditional education as he saw it were simply one-off events with no connection with experiences to come nor any connection with the outside lives of students. Such experiences did not assist the young with engagement with new experiences. This

¹²⁵ Education's "ideal aim" is the "creation of power of self-control" (Dewey, 1997, p.44).

idea of not all experiences being nourishing appears elsewhere in the literature on or relevant to 'experience', especially in Gadamer (2004) or Dunne (1997), and an idea to feature in the thesis. With the odd exception, this more nuanced approach is not characteristic of either the school-based route literature or school inspection literature, where 'experience' is typically seen as a good thing.

So far we have reviewed various complete writings devoted explicitly and specifically to the term 'experience'. These have disclosed to us a greater variety, depth and complexity in how the term is used than is typically appreciated. This has been highly significant in a number of varied and important ways for my thesis argument that 'experience' warrants closer attention in educational contexts, school-based routes and school inspection, than is typical currently. Paying closer attention would reveal that what is *Given* is already conceptual, that traditions matter, that the history of how things are situated is relevant, that particular conditions may be required, and that the orientation of existing practitioners matter.

Also in the literature are other instructive and insightful albeit shorter papers, chapters, and passages of text relevant to 'experience', again showing that the term involves more than is typically appreciated. These too are of great significance for educational contexts employing the term 'experience' prominently and seeking to benefit from its cachet.

3.6 Giorgio Agamben and the Loss of 'Experience'

Giorgio Agamben (1993, p.23), for example, laments the loss of a sense of 'experience' as a process of maturation. Agamben's insight is significant for my thesis argument. It underscores my point that 'experience' as employed today in educational contexts is impoverished and inattentive to the richer and more complex nature of what the term involves we find in the literature. This earlier sense of 'experience', Agamben explains, "was to advance the individual towards maturity" (1993, p.26). Here 'experience' functioned as a thing that could be completed, as well as being possible to possess. This contrasts with the common, prevalent sense of 'experience' today that it is only possible to "undergo" (Agamben, 1993, p.23). 'Experience' now features for Agamben (1993, p.26) as "something

incomplete...never to have: nothing other, therefore, than the infinite process of knowledge.”

For Agamben (1993, p.26), as soon as ‘experience’ was ‘subjectified’ by science, that is, “once experience was referred instead to the subject of science,” it meant it could never achieve maturity, but only grow its knowledge. ‘Experience’, in other words, after the subjectification of science could for Agamben never be complete. Unlike others in the ‘experience’ literature - Dewey, for example - Agamben then would appear to regard the influence of science as regards to ‘experience’ somewhat more negatively. Science, for Agamben, would appear to have accompanied the loss of an important use of ‘experience’.

In fact, to Agamben, it would appear that ‘experience’ is not now possible. That is:

[T]he question of experience can be approached nowadays only with an acknowledgement that it is no longer accessible to us. For just as modern man has been deprived of his biography, his experience has likewise been expropriated. (Agamben, 1993, p.13)

This can be contrasted with the proud employment of the concept ‘experience’ in educational contexts, such as school-based teacher training or school inspection. Here ‘experience’ is certainly regarded as being possible. In fact, in these contexts there would appear to be an overriding but mistaken assumption that the right ‘experience’ is pretty much guaranteed.

Agamben emphasises the inaccessibility today of ‘experience’ in its more classical sense. This finite but achievable sense is one that the employment of ‘experience’ in educational contexts, such as school-based teacher training and school inspection, would seemingly run counter to. This impossibility of ‘experience’ in the classical sense is something we can also illuminate with the difference in German between *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis*. Unlike *Erfahrung* (Davey, 2013, p.74), which is the type of ‘experience’ Agamben laments the loss of:

Erlebnis is touristic in nature. Foreign places are visited, exotic dishes consumed...because they are regarded as sites to be seen and ‘collected’. Such a traveller neither changes in outlook nor sensitivity but just becomes heavier with accumulated new sensations.

This “touristic” (Davey, 2013, p.74), accumulative sense of ‘experience’ also evokes the common complaint of ‘fast-track’ route recruits that they understand, or are encouraged to understand, teaching as a ‘stepping stone’ to something else. On ‘fast-track’ routes only a short two-year commitment is required of the recruit and their retention rates compare unfavourably with other routes into teaching (Hitchcock, Laycock, & Sundorph, 2017, p.66n388). Seen like this, as *Erlebnis*, the ‘fast-track’ route ‘experience’ is, in other words, one merely to be consumed, to be seen and collected like a pebble on a beach, rather than, as *Erfahrung*, to be anything more substantive, permanent, and transformative.

3.7 L.A. Paul and Transformative Experience

The transformative potential of an ‘experience’ is something that L.A. Paul alerts us to. In so doing Paul also unearths more about ‘experience’ than is typically given credit today, in school-based teacher training and school inspection, where the term ‘experience’ features.

Transformative experiences, according to Paul (Paul & Bloom, 2015), are “becoming a parent, discovering a new faith, emigrating to a new country, or fighting in a war.” Such experiences are wholly transformative, “both radically new to you and changes you in a deep and fundamental way” (Paul, 2014, p.1). That is, a truly transformative experience, “is both epistemically and personally transformative” (Paul, 2015, p.2). An epistemically transformative experience (Paul, 2015, pp.1-2) is one, “that teaches you something you could not have learned without having that kind of experience.” Such an experience, Paul (2015, p.1) argues, “gives you new abilities to imagine, recognize, and cognitively model possible future experiences of that kind.” Epistemically transformative experiences contrast with experiences that are personally transformative. These fundamentally and deeply change us as individuals, such as, “by changing your core personal preferences [...] the way you understand your desires, your defining intrinsic properties, or your self-perspective” (Paul, 2015, pp.1-2).

Paul brings to light a profound, transformative sense of ‘experience’ not always recognised today in contexts where the term is wielded, such as educational ones. Paul’s insight is in contrast to those who see ‘experience’ solely as an accumulation of stuff or moments, for instance, and the kind of ‘experience’ explored above that

Agamben would appear to object to. Some experiences, Paul reminds us, change us in irreversibly dramatic ways that change how we are and see the world and others. The possibility of transformative human 'experience' is something we are, also, alerted to in the writings on 'practice', prominent in the thesis, of MacIntyre and others. The notion of 'experience' he and other various writers encourage us to recognise is 'experience' with the power to wholly change who we are and what we think and do.

This kind of comprehensive transformative potential of an 'experience' would appear highly relevant to the kind of 'experience' featuring in school-based teacher training routes or in school inspection. Becoming and being a teacher or school inspector is not easy and these roles place great demands that can require major changes in lifestyles and relationships. They also expose you to situations that you would not be able to foresee and these situations can be life-changing. However, any transformative possibility is, as we shall see in chapter five, in particular, relatively unattended to in the relevant literature. Viewing 'experience' in educational contexts as potentially transformative like this, and as a result arguing that more attention should be paid to the likely consequences of being transformed, is, however, a key part of the thesis to come.

3.8 Michael Oakeshott and the Neglect of 'Experience'

One last figure in the literature on and relevant to 'experience' to be introduced is Oakeshott. Oakeshott's writings are significant for my thesis argument and for the two contexts, school-based teacher training and school inspection in a number of ways. For example, early on in his academic career Oakeshott recognised both the difficulty in using the term 'experience' and the term's plurality.¹²⁶ As opposed to one unitary mode, Oakeshott (1933), for example, writes about different 'modes' of 'experience', which constitute different kinds of inquiry and knowing that shape how the world is seen and understood.¹²⁷ This underlines the point made by other writers, Dewey, that the term 'experience' should not to be taken lightly and needs to be

¹²⁶ "'Experience', of all the words in the philosophic vocabulary, is the most difficult to manage," Oakeshott contends (1933, p.9).

¹²⁷ For Oakeshott, "a mode of experience is a form of experience, it is a world of ideas" (1933, p.74), "a homogeneous but abstract world of ideas" (1933, p.75).

treated with sufficient respect and care. It is also a point with significance for those contexts in education seeking to profit from use of the term,

Of special note and significance for the thesis, however, is what Oakeshott (1991) discloses of relevance to the term 'experience' in current educational contexts. Here, as others are in the literature on 'experience', Oakeshott is critical of the prevailing sense of the term of his age and wishes to restore a sense of it all too often overshadowed. What he first identifies and criticises over half a century ago is, however, an approach to 'experience' that is helpful for thinking about use of 'experience' in today's educational contexts.

More specifically, Oakeshott (1991) is critical of the rise of so-called Rationalism in politics and other areas such as education. To supporters of this so-called Rationalism, 'experience' of the past, as embodied in traditions, custom, achievements over generations, and "habits of behaviour", have no value per se. We have seen with Dewey's historical writings on 'experience' that empirical knowledge was for the ancient Greeks not simply personal; it was also embedded in and derived from social life and customary behaviour. Oakeshott is also sympathetic to this kind of view. However, to the Rationalist the accumulated, collective, inherited sense of 'experience' is only of value if it is the Rationalist's own and, moreover, reduced by technical analysis to a set of abstract, speculative principles. For the Rationalist, as described by Oakeshott, unless personal, and individualised, 'experience' of the past, "experience of the race" (1991, p.7), is an obstacle to overcome. The Rationalist believes all such customary behaviour and inherited wisdom that is absorbed from others and that accumulates over time should be reinvented and habit-formation is to be avoided. 'Experience' is not to be left uncertain or complex, not appreciated as it is.¹²⁸ 'Experience' for the Rationalist ideally is not the kind of 'experience' therefore that formally and explicitly educates, not something we are initiated and enculturated into.

What Oakeshott writes here about the Rationalist rejection of 'experience' is of significance for educational contexts. The Rationalist would appear to eschew the type of 'experience' that school inspection values, the 'experience' that professional

¹²⁸ Rationalists, in other words, "never get a square meal of experience" (Oakeshott, 1991, p.26).

judgement is supposedly in a productive relationship with. It is not only that the Rationalist acts to replace one approach to 'experience' with another albeit inferior one, however. Without the type of 'experience' the Rationalist rejects human activities are in effect according to Oakeshott's thinking rendered impossible. The habit and custom Oakeshott (1991) regards as 'experience', under Rationalism superseded by a personally reinvented, codified kind, is for Oakeshott an inescapable component of any human activity. The explicit, formalised and technical knowledge beloved of the Rationalist, and akin today to teacher training standards or inspection frameworks in England, is for Oakeshott certainly one form of knowledge required of "[e]very science, every art, every practical activity" (1991, p.12). Nevertheless, this technical knowledge is "inseparable" (Oakeshott, 1991, p.12) from a practical kind of knowledge or 'know-how' embodied in habits of behaviour, tradition, and custom. In other words, for Oakeshott, "there is no knowledge which is not 'know how'" (1991, pp.13-14). Those activities (Oakeshott, 1991, p.13) dealing with the leadership and management of men, "such as medicine, industrial management, diplomacy, and the art of military command", where men are the working material are especially, "pre-eminently", illustrative of this necessarily dual aspect to knowledge. It is not therefore a case for Oakeshott of one or the other kind of knowledge being taught and learnt. To succeed in any human activity (e.g. cooking, the arts, painting, music, poetry, science, religion, politics) in fact requires knowledge of both the technical and the practical.¹²⁹

For Oakeshott (1991, p.26) while necessary this practical 'know-how' is not something rigidly fixed or complete, but rather, "adaptable and never quite fixed or finished". It may then appear imprecise, unreliable, uncertain, "of being a matter of opinion, of probability rather than truth" (Oakeshott, 1991, p.15). However, practical 'know-how' is still fundamentally important to success in crucial human activities.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ To Oakeshott, no one seriously believes good cooking is possible merely from reading a cook book. "In a practical art, such as cookery," he (Oakeshott, 1991, pp.12-13) writes:

[N]obody supposes that the knowledge that belongs to the good cook is confined to what is or may be written down in the cookery book; technique and what I have called practical knowledge combine to make skill in cookery wherever it exists

¹³⁰ In fact, for Oakeshott (1991), those who rely on the 'abridged', 'vulgarised' version of 'experience' (p.30) characteristic of Rationalism in their activities, arts and sciences, find when it fails that it is necessary to rely on "general experience of the world" (pp.35-36). This is still, however, inferior to the

What Oakeshott writes can be drawn upon to enrich the writings of Hagger and McIntyre and many others in teacher education who highlight the practical craft knowledge of experienced teachers. It would also appear to chime with the kind of knowledge school-based routes into teaching promise will be acquired through their 'experience'.

Oakeshott also helps to shine further light on how the fundamentally important but neglected implicit kind of knowledge he is sensitive to is acquired. This also has resonance for the 'experience' of becoming a teacher in a school, or training to be a school inspector. Tacit 'know-how' formed of habits and customs and acquired through and with 'experience' of a practical activity can, he argues, only be "imparted and acquired" (Oakeshott, 1991, p.15). This other necessary kind of practical knowledge Oakeshott (1991, p.15) argues we have lost sight of cannot be taught or learnt per se. This knowledge persists only in practice, "in taste or connoisseurship" (Oakeshott, 1991, p.15), and so its acquisition is only through "continuous contact with one who is perpetually practising it" (1991, p.15). This "continuous contact" could be seen as illuminating how school-based teacher trainees and school inspectors are trained under the supervision of a mentor or tutor.

For Oakeshott, exemplary of this implicit form of learning is the apprenticeship model, which itself underpinned the "family tradition" (1991, p.39) of transmission of knowledge he celebrates.¹³¹ Various writers on the primary conceptual vehicle for the thesis, 'practice', and writers to feature prominently in the thesis, such as MacIntyre, and Lave and Wenger, are also drawn to the idea of apprenticeship. At the heart of apprenticeship is what we may call tacit learning and 'experience'. Educated in this more implicit, and more time-consuming 'apprenticeship' way, a pupil, Oakeshott argues, also only later comes to see what he has learnt, and "the pupil [...] discovers himself to have acquired also another sort of knowledge than merely technical knowledge" (1991, p.15). Through "continuous contact" the novice comes, moreover, to recognise that something has been acquired, but "without it

inherited 'experience' embodied in traditions and habits of behaviour formed, reformed, and imbibed over generations.

¹³¹ The families Oakeshott (1991) refers to embodied ("preserved") a rich fund of knowledge and over a number of generations ("two or three") this was passed down ("transmitted") in a way akin to an apprenticeship, and passed on to a good extent unconsciously and through practice.

ever having been precisely imparted and often without being able to say precisely what it is" (Oakeshott, 1991, p.11). Again, this can be seen as illuminating what goes on in the 'experience' of becoming a teacher in a school and an inspector undergoing training while visiting schools.

An important implication of Oakeshott's discussion' is learning of things of value does not, contra James or Dewey, only happen actively via testing and the weeding out of bad 'experience'. According to what Oakeshott is apparently suggesting, learning good things can happen simply through being around others and without any explicit, intentional, pedagogical input. This again would place Oakeshott's writings close to the promise of school-based teacher training routes in that the 'experience' provided will produce quality new teachers. MacIntyre's and McDowell's writings, drawn on most in the thesis, however, problematise any expectation that processes of initiation into practical knowledge are as straightforward.

Oakeshott writings also serve as a reminder of the once long assumed inextricable link between 'experience' and being a good professional.¹³² This is the richer kind of 'experience', including upbringing and education, that Aristotle described as being essential to good judgement, *phronesis*, and that modern writers on 'experience' and phronetic, situationally-sensitive, background- and character-driven judgement, such as Gadamer (2004) and Dunne (1997, 2005; Dunne & Pendlebury, 2003), explore and refine. This is a link between 'experience' and judgement to feature strongly in school inspection, where the exercise of professional judgement is regarded as being one key component of being an inspector.

Modern weakening of this formerly watertight link between 'experience' and good professional judgement has been accompanied by the emergence of what Oakeshott calls Rationalism. It is also of a pair with what others including Dunne, Donald Schön (1983) and others refer to similarly as technical or instrumental rationality (also known variously as techno-managerial rationality, technoscience, or technicism). Technical rationality is an alternative, supposedly superior, "practitioner-proof" (Dunne, 2005, p.375) way of working, rooted in the application of 'effective' techniques and procedures, "law-like generalisations" (MacIntyre, 2007, p.77), and

¹³² In fact, writes Ben Bradley (2009, p.65), "[t]here was a time when few would have doubted that experience was crucial to professional practice."

an evidence-base drawn often from psychological theory. It is a way of working established through strict methods of experimental and statistical investigation of ideas, intuitions, and hypotheses and adhering to explicit, formalised principles and standards. If 'experience' counts at all, according to this alternative 'technical imaginary', and not unlike what James, Dewey, and Locke appear to advocate, it counts only if empirically, i.e. experimentally, validated (Bradley, 2009, p.68). This 'technicist' alternative is found globally across many professional disciplines today, not least in education and health and medicine, and has informed developments in public sector professions such as *New Public Management (NPM)*, discussed in chapter six, and *What Works* evidence-based practice and research, described in the thesis introduction.

Oakeshott's writings related to 'experience' illustrate the inseparability not just of technical and practical knowledge, but also the inseparability of personal, and collective, customary 'experience'. His writings remind us of the historical, 'historicised', and so necessarily and unavoidably limited sense of 'experience', but a sense the so-called technical imaginary promises to overcome. In the literature on the meaning of 'experience', and considered at greater length in chapter eight, Gadamer (2004), similarly, writes in contrast to technical reason of "historically effected consciousness" (p.351), and that "[g]enuine experience is experience of one's own historicity" (p.351). For a writer such as Gadamer this 'historical effectedness' is both inescapable and highly significant. Yet its determining and pivotal role in our lives is, by contrast, relatively unattended to in educational contexts, school-based teacher training or school inspection, that feature the term 'experience' (Cf. Britzman, 1986; 2003).

For Gadamer (2004), however, the "perfectly experienced" (p.351) know full well "the finitude and limitedness" (p.356) of our "historical reality", of our plans and predictions, and so learn to be humble, and to be open to future ones and what they might teach us ("the experienced person acquires a new openness to new experiences", Gadamer, 2004, p.351). With Gadamer and others we then also see how 'experience' more carefully understood teaches us the right lessons and so builds character, which in turn benefits us and those around us. These wider benefits are yet further reason why 'experience' in educational contexts like the kind offered

when training to teach in a school or when becoming and being a school inspector should be paid closer attention. The 'experience' has more than simply significance for the trainee.

3.9 Bias & Limitations

Before concluding this chapter on writings on or relevant to the term 'experience', it is important to recognise its biases and so limitation. This literature can take discussion of the term 'experience' far beyond what appears in the literature on educational contexts. Yet it must be acknowledged that most of the writers are White, European or North American, and male. Given its ubiquity, it is very likely that this kind of 'white privilege', and hetero-normativity, informs the 'experience' described in the school inspection and school-based route literature. Even the very search for sources with which to illuminate the term 'experience', the algorithms and research processes enabling this search, are also very likely normed in such inequitable ways. The writings of white Western males related to 'experience' offer a valuable resource that would be self-defeating to ignore. However, this bias towards certain voices is problematic because among other things it means the silence of other voices, and so limits what we see as 'experience'. There is a rich vein of work available through the work of Feminist writers, for example, which could provide significant resources to develop the argument about the neglect of experience further and in other dimensions not considered here. This silencing of other voices should therefore be borne in mind as the thesis argument develops.

To conclude this chapter, the literature on school-based routes into teaching and school inspection offer some taste of what the term 'experience' as it features in educational contexts involves. However, this pales in significance compared with the literature specifically exploring use of the term introduced in this chapter. For one thing, the 'experience' literature reviewed above is more sensitive to how 'experience' is diverse in meaning but also specific to context. Yet this is no more than implied by the differing uses of 'experience' in school-based routes and school inspection. Similarly, where the literature on these two contexts does not, the literature on 'experience' emphasises the socio-historical situatedness of the concept. This literature suggests that each of these contexts has pressing issues

and questions requiring addressing. However, issues with 'experience' are also not a typical feature of the literature on school-based routes or school inspection. The 'experience' literature also underlines the integral role played by approaches to 'experience' in influential, still pervasive, and, at times, iconoclastic thinking about education and its institutions. The 'experience' literature reminds us that approaches to education can be understood through approaches to 'experience'. The literature on 'experience' also reminds us that 'experience', understanding what it involves, and so hopefully harnessing its potential, is not only associated with better education, but also better living and societies. 'Experience' and its impact stretches beyond the school and trainee.

If nothing else, however, the 'experience' literature raises numerous questions that the literature on school-based routes or school inspection pays insufficient attention to. So, for example, there is recognition in this literature of some elements that the literature on 'experience' underscores, the tacit, practical, customary nature of the knowledge 'experience' provides. Yet how are these communicated between 'master' and 'novice', and communicated well? How do the various elements that the literature discloses to us as being part of an 'experience' interplay? If it is believed that 'experience' furnishes a capacity for *independent* judgement, how is this possible when to some we cannot escape our historical and historicised selves?

There are other questions for educational context foregrounding 'experience'. Has the 'experience' provided by school-based routes and inspectorates been devised in collaboration with and in light of the 'experience' of trainees? Does their respective 'experience' interconnect and lead to other experiences? If not, why not? Is it because stand-alone, "disconnected" events are preferred? While educational contexts confidently promise a successful 'experience', the literature on 'experience' raises the prospect that an 'experience' in its fullest sense is not even possible under modern conditions. The 'experience' literature impresses on us further that 'experience' is at least potentially wholly transformative. This raises the question of whether educational contexts that draw much from the cachet of 'experience' are prepared for the potential consequences of any transformation. What provision and support is in place for those whose entire world-view may change after the 'experience' of becoming a teacher or inspector?

Chapter 4: The *Telos* of Educational ‘Experience’ and the Concept of ‘Practice’

In the contexts of school-based teacher training and school inspection, a key aim of ‘experience’ is to pass on desirable, pre-determined techniques and capacities. For school inspectorates, OFSTED, ‘experience’ is especially crucial for its positive and productive interplay with professional judgement. This is a capacity the possession and exercise of which is a necessary requirement to being an inspector. It is not just any ‘experience’ that counts for the acquisition of technical skills or judgement, but *school* ‘experience’. In fact, in the case of school inspection, it is not just school ‘experience’ that would appear to count for this acquisition. Specific *types* of ‘experience’ gained in or through a school, teaching and leadership ‘experience’, are crucial.

The school-based route and school inspection literature provide some hints at what it is that makes ‘experience’ quite so valuable. However, this is in stark contrast to the insights of and depth to the ‘experience’ literature reviewed in chapter three. This literature on or related to ‘experience’ illuminates a variety of crucial elements that are either neglected completely in the literature on educational contexts or paid insufficient attention. According to the literature specifically on the concept of ‘experience’ reminds us that the term’s use is nuanced and context-specific. It tells us that what the term ‘experience’ involves is not, as all too often assumed in educational contexts, straightforward or self-evident. The ‘experience’ literature tells us that the term is synonymous with habit, custom, and tradition (Dewey; Oakeshott), and integral to wise, seasoned judgement (Aristotle) and to being a good professional (Oakeshott; Gadamer; Schon; Dunne). This literature also, and where the literature on school-based routes and school inspection does not, underscores the transformative potential of different kinds of ‘experience’ (Paul). For some in the literature on or relevant to the concept of ‘experience’ (Oakeshott) its potential requires no more than close and sustained interaction over time to be realised. For others in the ‘experience’ literature (Dewey; James; Gadamer) its true value derives from how it is made use of or tested. In stark contrast with what we also commonly find in educational contexts, we are reminded of the historical and historically constituting as well as finite nature of ‘experience’ (Gadamer; MacIntyre; Taylor). Finally, to some in the literature (Agamben) ‘experience’ in its richest sense is

something that is under serious threat if possible at all today. This last insight is also in stark contrast to the promise and expectation currently invested in the term in educational contexts.

This literature specific to the meaning and use of 'experience' also raises a number of pressing questions. These are questions that typically the literature on educational contexts foregrounding 'experience' does no more than hint an answer at.

Considering the impact school inspection, and also school-based teacher training, can have on people's lives and futures, the insufficient attention paid to pressing questions such as these is a concern. For example, is it the school 'experience' that counts or particular kinds of school 'experience' that does? How exactly do 'experience' and judgement, a capacity so fundamental to being an inspector, interplay? If there is a necessary tacit and customary element to the 'experience' trainee teachers and inspectors encounter, how is this transferred to them? If, as Locke would appear to suggest, we can somehow detach our judgement from 'experience', how should England's school inspectorate, where this Lockean type of view is visible, respond to its rejection (Taylor, 1989)? If 'experience' is of true value only when tested, then how should educational contexts, school-based routes, where only acquisition through practise is seemingly expected, respond? If transformation through an educational 'experience' is indeed possible, what preparations are or should be in place to help with the impact a transformation may have?

4.1 *Telos* and the Concept of 'Practice'

The literature on 'experience' has helped to build up a much richer and complex picture of what in educational contexts it involves. What is found in this literature is in contrast to the lack of detail we find in the literature on educational contexts, school-based routes and school inspection, where 'experience' features prominently.

However, to extend and enrich the discussion further the thesis now moves onto the concept of 'practice'.

This move to the concept of 'practice' is primarily because, and as explored below, an inescapable and primary feature of a collective activity is its overall purpose or *telos*. The *telos*, or ultimate end, of an activity such as training to teach in a school or

school inspecting, provides necessary focus and a sense of what should be done. It is also key to integrating all the various activities and conditions informing and characterising these and other educational contexts. Despite its key role, this guiding, sense-giving, and interconnecting notion of *telos* is not sufficiently attended to in the literature on these and other educational contexts, where ‘experience’ features. This suggests participants may be looking elsewhere for direction and a sense of what they should do. In turn this suggests confusion if not conflict about what this direction and sense of an educational context should be. Inattention to the *telos* of educational contexts also suggests that the features the *telos* interweaves are doing so despite rather than because of what is understood teleologically. This runs the risk of the various preconditional elements comprising a healthy and successful educational ‘experience’ working poorly together if working together at all.

School-based teacher training and school inspection are both highly impactful contexts. It is therefore crucial that the *telos* is attended to as much as possible so these issues can be avoided or at least minimised. Their respective *teloi* does not feature strongly in the literature relevant to these contexts. The notion of *telos* is not without recognition in writings of those who explore the use and meaning of ‘experience’ reviewed in the last chapter, however. Aristotle is especially synonymous in the history of philosophy with the notion of *telos*. All the same, the literature on the closely related concept of ‘practice’ provides a particularly well-developed and nuanced resource with which to illuminate the teleological character of educational contexts. There are various ‘practice theories’ that might be regarded as ideal resources with which to consider the ‘experience’, and so teleological nature, of school-based teacher training and school inspection. The teleological conceptualisations of ‘practice’ found especially in the writings of MacIntyre as well as the ‘community of practice’ described by Lave and Wenger are two especially influential “telic” approaches in the Education Studies literature. I therefore begin this chapter by describing and comparing the ‘practice’ of MacIntyre and the ‘community of practice’ described by Lave and Wenger. Through a review of the relevant critical literature I seek also to clarify MacIntyre’s approach. I finish by defending MacIntyre’s account as especially illuminating of the *telos* that guides, interconnects, and provides sense of what participants in educational contexts should do.

4.2 MacIntyrean 'Practice'

MacIntyre introduces 'practice' in 'After Virtue' (2007, esp. pp.187-191), his best-known work and some years before Lave and Wenger's 'community of practice'. For MacIntyre (1994, p.286), 'practices' as he identifies them are found within all cultures. Games of football and chess, architecture, farming, physics, chemistry and biology, work of historians, painting and music, are all practices. Practices comprise the creation and maintaining of communities, "of human communities - of households, cities, nations", and of families ("the making and sustaining of family life", MacIntyre, 2007, p.188). Practices are not, however, activities such as tic-tac-toe, "throwing a football with skill", laying bricks or "[p]lanting turnips" (MacIntyre, 2007, p.187). While schools can be the location of various practices (MacIntyre, 2016 p.38, 49), quite controversially, and as will be discussed in chapter eight, teaching (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002) is not one of them either.

For MacIntyre, 'practices' such as these are teleological. Where MacIntyre is especially enlightening is his argument that in all practices there is, however, more than one overall end. In fact, MacIntyre's conception of the term 'practice' alerts us to two ends ("a double end", 2016, p.50).

The first of the two ends MacIntyre identifies in a 'practice' are of the more "literal" (Higgins, 2011, p.56) kind. These are explicit ends such as, for example, the scoring of a goal in football, the catch a fishing trawler seeks out at sea, or, as regard to this thesis, the acquisition of 'tried-and-tested' classroom techniques and inspection procedure and protocols.

For MacIntyre, there is, however, as well as this "literal" purpose, a second, more superior, but more implicit and intangible kind of end driving a 'practice'. This other, non-literal end is, importantly, more enriching and rewarding also. In fact, it is this other end that is for MacIntyre the real point of a 'practice' and the end that the other less important aims and goals therefore defer to and hang on.

With this other, additional and more fundamental purpose, MacIntyre's notion of 'practice' serves to complicate things further. It complicates, in particular, any suggestion that the end of educational contexts is solely or primarily about acquiring the right techniques and procedures and protocols. The other "higher order" end that

MacIntyre emphasises, more specifically, is the end of *excellence*. That is, “each practice has literal aims which structure the activity and a vision of complete excellence which gives practitioners reasons for acting” (Higgins, 2011, p.57). Among other things, this *telos* of excellence is specific to each context.¹³³ These guiding “excellences of a craft” (MacIntyre, 1994, p.284), are also not fixed, but continually produced, and reproduced (“ongoing”, MacIntyre, 2007, p.273).¹³⁴ In part, ‘practices’ are, therefore, “modes of activity” generating “new ends and new conceptions of ends” (MacIntyre, 2007, p.273).

There are then two ends at play with any MacIntyrean ‘practice’, a “literal” one and a more implicit and more important one commensurate with ‘excellence’. A fishing crew (MacIntyre, 1994, p. 284), for example, has one “literal” end to catch fish, but trawler fishing is never solely or primarily about catching fish. It is also about catching fish, “in a manner consonant with the excellences of the craft” (MacIntyre, 1994, p. 284).¹³⁵

We can assume that at least some participants and stakeholders in educational contexts where ‘experience’ is foregrounded, see these contexts as more than solely about techniques, systems, and procedures. We can reasonably assume also that at least some participants in these contexts are focused on excellence and see this in terms specific to the context too. Those participating in these educational contexts will then at least implicitly be pursuing a plurality of ends. As one of those ends we can assume also that a context-specific kind of excellence is being pursued by at least some. As MacIntyre argues, however, where secondary aims of a ‘practice’ dominate or possess too much importance, it means energy and resources are misallocated. At its most serious this misdirection of resources threatens the very existence of the ‘practice’ itself.

¹³³ “Every craft”, MacIntyre explains, “is informed by some conception of a finally perfected work which serves as the shared *telos* of that craft” (1990, p. 64).

¹³⁴ This ongoing, evolving sense of excellence is for MacIntyre (2007, p.189) inherent in the verb ‘to excel’.

¹³⁵ See also:

The physician’s ends are to restore to health this particular set of patients and to become or remain an excellent physician. The portrait painter’s ends are to capture what is unique in this particular face and to extend her or his powers as a painter. (MacIntyre, 2016, p.50)

For MacIntyre, the superior and ultimate end of excellence of a 'practice' is embodied in standards, "standards of excellence" (MacIntyre, 2007), defined by the *telos* of each practice. As ends shift and evolve, it follows that in healthy practices conceptions of excellence also change and so advance beyond current standards of excellence, such as "when Turner transformed the seascape in painting or W. G. Grace advanced the art of batting in cricket in a quite new way" (MacIntyre, 2007, p.191).¹³⁶

As regards to 'standards' in educational contexts, this is a very familiar term. There is certainly an emphasis in school-based training route literature on classroom performance and on upholding the standards of the profession, such as those embodied in the 'Teachers' Standards' in England (DfE, 2011). There does not appear to be the same kind of explicit standards per se for school inspectors in England, for example. There is a code of conduct for inspections, however, which among other things requires "inspectors to uphold the highest professional standards in their work" (OFSTED, 2020). There exists also OFSTED's own "internal policies and procedures on expected standards of behaviour and conduct, and the Civil Service code" (OFSTED, 2020).

Just as the *telos* of excellence, MacIntyre's "standards of excellence" are defined from within a practice. This contrast with the standards found in the contexts of school-based routes and school inspection. For instance, the standards expected of teachers in England, the so-called 'Teachers' Standards' (2011), are by the *Department for Education (DfE)* and *UK Government* imposed ultimately from outside. If this is the case, and seen as a MacIntyrean 'practice', then this externalising of standards is problematic. For it raises the prospect of school-based training routes having different standards of excellence, one sense defined from within, the other from outside. The potential risk here is that these different standards exist in parallel and at worst are in conflict with each other. Having rival standards, according to MacIntyre's thinking, would then jeopardise the pursuit of the true end of a 'practice'. As we shall see below, undermining this pursuit would jeopardise the

¹³⁶ Other examples given of such standards are "Bartok's last quartets" or "good pitching" in baseball. We might think the songs of The Beatles or the Fosbury Flop in athletics, for instance, are similar benchmarks.

realisation of internal goods, for MacIntyre goods through which human transformation is made possible.

As noted already, then, the pursuit of excellence through the standards of a practice leads for MacIntyre to the realisation of so-called internal goods of excellence. These are not “goods of excellence” (MacIntyre, 1988) in any general sense, but rather in a sense specific to the practice. So, he explains, “to be excellent in achieving the goods of this or that particular practice is to be good qua member of a fishing crew or qua mother of a family or qua chess player or soccer player” (MacIntyre, 1999, p.66). “Goods of excellence”, more precisely, are excellence in the product or performance that represents perfection vis-à-vis a practice as well as excelling in the way of a life as a member of a practice (MacIntyre, 2007, pp.189-190).

As excellence comprises the more fundamental end or *telos* of every practice (2016, p.50, 131), it follows that the internal goods the standards of a practice help you to realise are of a “higher order” (MacIntyre, 2016). So important are these internal goods of excellence, according to MacIntyre, that even where the more “literal” purposes of a practice are not being realised, a practice can still be successful, at least in the short term. That is to say, internal goods of excellence have intrinsic value, and so “goods that are to be valued as ends worth pursuing for their own sake” (MacIntyre, 1999, p.66). Indeed, it is the intrinsic value of such excellences that, for example, keep a fishing crew together when times are harsh and catch low (MacIntyre, 1994, p.285).

With “goods of excellence” MacIntyre therefore underlines why the “literal” aims of a practice do not and should not dictate the achievement of “excellences of the craft” (Cf. Miller, 1994, p.251). This primarily intrinsic value in a practice has some very interesting ramifications for educational contexts. It means that it does not necessarily matter, at least not immediately, that trainee teachers are not qualifying or school inspectors or inspections failing somehow. It would not matter that these more “literal” aims were not being achieved were these educational contexts pursuing the more important and sustaining end of “excellence”. This primarily intrinsic view we find in MacIntyre’s notion of a ‘practice’ is not in keeping with how educational contexts are often understood, however. An ‘experience’ such as teacher training in schools, for example, is premised on the expectation of successful

completion and progression of trainees into teaching roles. In fact, a route would eventually likely lose its funding without achievement of these more explicit indicators of success. Questions will soon be raised similarly if inspectors cannot be trained up successfully or inspections rendered problematic. This not uncontroversial position of MacIntyre's vis-à-vis the "literal" and internal ends of a practice will be considered further in the section below. At the very least, what MacIntyre's writings do here, however, is problematise the assumption that collective educational 'experience' should be driven solely by explicit outcomes or targets.

Intrinsic in nature, MacIntyrean goods or ends of excellence are also determined by and from within the practice, not imposed from outside. They are discoverable only from inside – internal to - the practice and not specified in advance. As MacIntyre explains, "it is only in and through those activities that we arrive at more adequate ideas of how to think about those ends and of how to be guided by them" (2016, p.50). These are 'excellences' only truly known, in other words, through "experience" (MacIntyre, 1994, p.284). This again raises interesting questions and contrasts with the explicitness with which educational contexts will typically be judged, especially by government and any other funders. It also serves as a reminder that those with 'experience' of an educational context may well know best what value it offers, not those outside it.

The internal, intrinsic goods that are realised through pursuit of excellence in a 'practice' are, among other things, also common and cooperative goods. MacIntyre (2017), for instance, contrasts internal goods of excellence with the example of catching and eating of fish at a riverside by ourselves. MacIntyre in fact has a particular sense of common, cooperative good in mind. Internal "excellences" are not just the type of goods we cooperate with others to achieve but enjoy as individuals such as (MacIntyre, 2017) working on each other's gardens. Internal goods of excellence (e.g. playing violin in an orchestra, "the founding and carrying forward of a school, a hospital or an art gallery", MacIntyre, 2007, p.151) are the goods achieved *only* through cooperation and that are enjoyed *only* in common.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ Other examples of common ends provided are:

One of MacIntyre's other key claims regarding the ultimate, internal ends of a 'practice' is then that this "higher order" end is of benefit to all participants in common and realised *only* through collective endeavour. This key claim is one that also serves as a stark reminder of what is overlooked in the literature on school-based routes and school inspection, where 'experience' features prominently. What we come to appreciate through internal goods of excellence is then neither common-only nor individual-only goods. There is also a good, a "higher order" internal good, which serves as the common-cum-individual aim of a practice, which needs to be realised collectively or not at all.¹³⁸ It is not that something like the individual good is rejected completely by MacIntyre. Through participation in a practice we come, however, to seek both the common *and* individual good. Through practices we are directed to what is both good for others *and* ourselves (MacIntyre, 1999, p.162).¹³⁹

With this MacIntyre alerts us to a "higher" sense of common good that many today will have lost sight of. This is not least in educational contexts where 'experience' is prominent, such as school-based routes and school inspection. With this reminder

[T]he statement of the elegant, significant, and difficult proof in mathematics, the harvesting of a crop of perfect vegetables and the renewal of the soil each year under unfavourable conditions in farming, the insightful performance by an orchestra of work too often taken for granted, say, Mozart's clarinet music, and so on. (MacIntyre, 2016, p.50)

¹³⁸ MacIntyre draws a number of other distinctions to clarify what is meant by internal goods of excellence. These internal goods are not *the* common good, for example. An internal good of a practice is not the good of us all as a whole. Other distinctions drawn by MacIntyre between internal goods of excellence and other conceptions of goods include that between internal, common goods and the 'maximum' good - MacIntyre does not subscribe to any form of utilitarianism (e.g. the idea that "the maximum pleasure and absence of pain provides a *telos*" (MacIntyre, 2007, p.62) – and the distinction between internal goods and consumer goods. Consumer goods are goods the market and its agencies want others to have (MacIntyre, 2016, p.109, p.122). Consumer goods as opposed to internal goods of excellence are the incidental benefits we gain from a typical working life, where practices are marginalised, and where work is merely a means to an end and not open to the achievement and enjoyment of internal goods (MacIntyre, 2007, pp.227-228). Unlike consumer goods, internal goods cannot be possessed either. MacIntyre's goods are not objects, or what he calls "external goods", such as money or status. You cannot go to an internal goods' shop and buy them over the counter, for example.

¹³⁹ For MacIntyre, the common either/or distinction between altruism and egoism is therefore too simplistic:

Adam Smith's contrast between self-interested market behavior on the one hand and altruistic, benevolent behavior on the other, obscures from view just those types of activity in which the goods to be achieved are neither mine-rather-than-others' nor others'-rather-than-mine, but instead are goods that can only be mine insofar as they are also those of others, that are genuinely common goods. (MacIntyre, 1999, p.119)

he also alerts us to an edifying sense of mutuality, interdependency and community that again is not commonly foregrounded in these educational contexts.

Before moving on, it is important to state lastly that MacIntyre does not reject the explicit acquisition of technique as a goal of a practice. As we have seen, this is one primary goal of school-based routes into teaching 'experience' and the training that new inspectors undergo. Indeed, for MacIntyre no practice can survive without technique. Techniques, "human powers", he writes, are essential to all practices ("every practice does require the exercise of technical skills", MacIntyre, 2007, p.193), and at times technical skills are to be savoured in their own right ("on occasion...valued or enjoyed for their own sake", MacIntyre, 2007, p.193). In fact, techniques can exist without practices (MacIntyre, 2007, p.193), but not vice versa.

However, while no outright rejection, for MacIntyre the acquisition of techniques is not the *primary* goal at all of a 'practice'. Techniques are, according to MacIntyre, merely instruments by which from within a practice we come to realise "higher-order" common goods. Technical skills are, in other words, means-only goods (MacIntyre, 1999, p.66). As Higgins notes about MacIntyre's conceptualisation of a practice, "[t]he apprenticeship to a practice differs from a purely technical training in that it involves [...] self-overcoming. Not only are skills being added" (2011, p.185). This downplaying of the acquisition of technical skills contrasts especially with this apparent emphasis on school-based routes, where this would appear to be a major if not only priority.

4.3 Critical Writings on the Ends of a MacIntyrean 'Practice'

MacIntyre's concept of a 'practice' reminds us that collective educational contexts are guided by an ultimate end or *telos*. Without an overriding purpose, participants would have little sense if any of what they are to do and how they are to do it. For MacIntyre, while there are likely various ends of a 'practice', some more obvious than others, their ultimate goal is the pursuit of excellence. Indeed, while problematic in the long-term, it is pursuit of internally defined excellence through achievement of its standards, and the goods this offers, that can sustain a 'practice'. This is even if more explicit outcomes, likely imposed from outside, are not being achieved. What is also significant about MacIntyre's conceptualisation of 'practice' is that he regards the internal goods that they help to realise as common and collective in a very strong

sense. These are not goods even that are created collectively but enjoyed individually. The mutual and independent sense of community that this understanding of good suggests is again not matched by what we typically find in educational contexts where 'experience' features.

MacIntyre's concept of 'practice', with an ultimate and overriding *telos* at its heart, provides a rich and complex picture of an 'experience'. This richness and complexity is not matched by what is found in either the school-based route or school inspection literature. This illustrates my argument that while foregrounded, the term 'experience' in educational contexts, and what it involves, is insufficiently attended to. Considering what is at stake with school-based teacher training and school inspection, for example, this neglect is in need of addressing.

There are a number of critiques of MacIntyre's approach to ends of practices, however, many of which MacIntyre has responded to. What follows below is a review of some of the more relevant critiques and MacIntyre's responses. This will prove instructive and help to further clarify his position and further underscore the importance but also neglect in the school-based and school inspection literature of the richer, guiding, intrinsic, and interconnecting "telic" sense of an 'experience' we can gain through the lens of 'practice'.

A particularly provocative critique of MacIntyre's conceptualisation of a 'practice' is Miller (1994). Miller (1994) takes issue, in particular, with MacIntyre's approach to 'excellence' as it relates to 'practice'. Miller distinguishes 'self-contained' practices (e.g. games) from 'purposive' practices (e.g. farming, medicine, architecture, physics). The former are "luxury items" (Miller, 1994, p.252) characterised solely by achievement and contemplation of internal goods of excellence. The internal goods of 'purposive' practices, on the other hand, are "constituted" externally. That is, the "excellences" of 'purposive' practices, such as, "attractive buildings, the production of food for the community" (Miller, 1994, p.250), or "curing the sick" (Miller, 1994, p.251), are judged - and for Miller, crucially, should be judged - by outside measures and outsiders to the practices. 'Purposive' practices that are not judged in this 'external' way are "deformed" (Miller, 1994, p.251).

Higgins (2011, pp.69-71) is another who takes issue with how according to MacIntyre 'excellence' of a 'practice' is judged. Higgins distinguishes between four

different types of practice - autonomous, client-dependent, client-centered, and communicative – where the role of those outside the practice in defining, appreciating, and pursuing internal goods, differs.¹⁴⁰ Autonomous practices, firstly, are reminiscent of Miller’s ‘self-contained’ ones, and characterised by degrees of ‘self-enclosure’. So, for example, being a monk or climbing mountains are practices that do not require any meaningful input from outsiders in pursuit of its internal goods of excellence. With client-dependent practices, however, although non-participant, the client does contribute to the judgement about whether excellence has been achieved or not. Higgins writes, for instance, of an architect who fails in her work if a new home is uninhabitable or aesthetically displeasing. In client-centered practices, by contrast, goods of excellence are co-constructed and achieved in the client (e.g. a doctor and patient). The fourth type of practice Higgins lists is the communicative kind. Here the practitioner (e.g. journalist, sculptor, athlete) must both serve other practitioners and outside audiences (e.g. the fans).¹⁴¹

Other critics – Smith (2003), for example – raise similar objections to MacIntyre’s ‘practice’ and its internal understanding of ‘excellence’. Writing of the “purposiveness” of Higher Education, for example, Smith (2003, p.315) argues that:

[S]omething seems missing from the picture if the students do not learn, if the books and articles written by academics remain unread because there is no ongoing debate to which they contribute or new debate which they instigate.

With his notion of a ‘practice’, MacIntyre’s loosening’ of “excellences” and visions of perfection from external evaluation has clearly proven controversial. As noted above, one response to this line of criticism (MacIntyre, 1994) has been to make visible the two different purposes of a practice and emphasise how the “excellences” of a practice can be realised and enjoyed without there being any end-product as such.

¹⁴⁰ For Higgins, there is in fact oblique acknowledgement by MacIntyre of this ‘externalist’ objection:

[W]hen he says that we should recognise one of his points about practices ‘as we are all familiar with it already in our actual lives, whether we are painters or physicists or quarterbacks or indeed just lovers of good painting or first-rate experiments or a well-thrown pass’. (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 191)

¹⁴¹ “There are of course comedians’ comedians,” for example, Higgins (2011, p.70) writes, “but a comedian who never made audiences laugh would not be much of a comedian.”

Although not economically viable in the long run, MacIntyre (1994, p.285) argues that as long as the good of a life of practice is being pursued ‘excellence’ can be achieved. This is even if there has been no demonstrable ‘product’ or ‘performance’ through the practice.¹⁴² Teacher trainers or inspector mentors should by what MacIntyre is arguing then continue to have collective confidence in the excellence of what they do irrespective of the ‘external’ failures of their recruits to, for example, complete their training.

MacIntyre’s consideration of a practice, a concept which can help us to add further coherence, richness and nuance to the ‘experience’ of educational contexts, also reminds us of the important contribution a practitioner makes to the life of the practice simply by being in role (MacIntyre, 1994, p.285). This mutually beneficial contribution to the collective good is all too easy to overlook if we become too preoccupied with individualised target-led development or external results or rewards. School-based route trainees, in particular, are often contributing to lessons and pupil development from the outset of their training. The positive contribution made by having ‘fast-track’ recruits in schools earlier than with other teacher training routes is underlined in the literature (Hill, 2012). We might also see this contribution in a MacIntyrean sense, as contributing to the overall running, and so ‘excellence’, of a school.

What MacIntyre writes by way of clarification does not then mean that the “excellences” practices help to sustain totally exclude a role for input from outside participants. ‘Practices’ cannot survive long-term without the endorsement, and especially financial support, external stakeholders provide. However, MacIntyrean ‘practice’ serves as a salutary warning. Our shared, meaning-giving activities lose their impetus and are placed in jeopardy if their “excellences” are seen only or primarily as *conditional upon* the approval of another person or some kind of external measure. In returning to pre-modern society for inspiration, MacIntyre is reminding us of a way of understanding ‘performance’ that does not depend on explicit performance indicators or consumer feedback, for example.

¹⁴² This is an argument Aristotle (*Rhet* 1.1.1355b10-14) is associated with. See also Dunne (1997, p.266n96), and his attribution of this same argument – “it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health” – to Gadamer.

To repeat, then, seen in MacIntyrean terms, teacher training, school-based or not, and school inspection, has to be about more than just any existing formalised standards or metrics. If this 'experience' is to be worthwhile, with a healthy and sustainable future, it must also be about the inherent 'excellence' of the practice itself. If this is overlooked, then so are the resources and support required to sustain and further 'excellence' and without this, a shared human, purposeful activity, such as learning to teach in a school or becoming and being an inspector, at best cannot progress and at worst will cease to exist at all.

In addition, we ought to tread carefully so that we avoid misrepresenting what MacIntyre is doing with the notion of 'practice'. By drawing out distinctions between types of practice and their specific aims, we risk over-specifying and so establishing too detailed, overly reductive and restrictive, a notion of 'practice'. MacIntyre's intention with 'practice' is more theoretical, abstract, and inclusive.¹⁴³ Indeed, practices "generate their own criteria" and therefore only from inside a practice do we truly appreciate its internal ends and "excellences" (Higgins, 2011, p.80). In effect, we fall into the same kind of trap MacIntyre warns against in his stressing the internal nature of the ends of a practice if we cannot resist expecting them to reach explicit goals.¹⁴⁴ Imposing goals and their assessment from the outside means among other

¹⁴³ It is this inclusivity and abstraction that has also exercised a number of MacIntyre's critics. For Hager (2011), for example, MacIntyre fails to clarify the criteria for inclusion into a practice and this means more general practices (e.g. farming) are being conflated with more specific activities (e.g. arable, pastoral farming) that practices include. Dunne (2005, p.369) identifies further types of practice supposedly overlooked by MacIntyre. These are "activities [...] neither performative (since they issue in a result that endures after the activity) nor productive (since this result is not a 'product' formed out of prior material)". For Dunne, sea navigation or military strategy, aiming at safe passage or success in battle, are examples neither of the productive one nor the other performative type of practice. For Dunne, there are also human activities where the end in sight is a change only to one participant as there is, for example, with the recipient of nursing, psychotherapy, or teaching. For Aristotle, according to Dunne, there were also "master practices", such as politics, or education, focused not on a specific good but on good more generally. Dunne also contrasts MacIntyre's inclusive approach with that of Aristotle's *praxis*. For Aristotle, Dunne (2005, p.368) explains, a *praxis* has internal ends to achieve, "as the end of dancing transpires in the very performance, or the virtue of an act transpires in the brave or just act itself." *Poiesis*, on the other hand, captures for Aristotle practices where the ends are external, such as "a well-designed building or a person restored to health endure after the activities of the architect or the medic". With MacIntyre, on the other hand, Dunne (2005) explains, both 'performative' (e.g. dancing, fluteplaying) and 'productive' activities (e.g. architecture, weaving) coalesce under 'practice'.

¹⁴⁴ MacIntyre is on record as being very reluctant to specify too much by tradition (1988, p.10), another of his key concepts, hoping to let examples speak for it, and so we can think this reservation applies to 'practice' also. Although MacIntyre (1991, p.71) declares that in 'After Virtue' he had only offered "a general characterization of practices" and "a great deal more" needed to be articulated, it is perhaps telling that his example of what needed to be done in the future was a concern with

things diverting valuable, finite resources away from the true end of a practice and this runs the risk of endangering the very thing ultimately that makes participation worthwhile. As we shall cover in chapters five and eight, this onus on allowing practices to create their own criteria iteratively and internally, and for participants to come to see and realise these through and with ‘experience’, is out of step with organisations such as *Teach First* or *OFSTED*, where explicit corporate mission and vision are heralded and imposed.

4.4 Lave and Wenger’s ‘Community of Practice’

In chapter five we move on to examine in more detail the transformation that realising internal goods of excellence through a MacIntyrean ‘practice’ can potentially offer. Before making this move, this last section of chapter four will bring into the thesis conversation Lave and Wenger’s concept of ‘communities of practice’ (1991). Among other things, this will reveal a further interesting and for educational contexts highly significant nuance to MacIntyre’s notion of ‘practice’. It will also reinforce the thesis argument that if seen through the lens of ‘practice’, the ‘experience’ of educational contexts is far more complex, nuanced and profitable than the relevant literature would appear to suggest.

Lave and Wenger’s notion of ‘communities of practice’ (1991) is a hugely influential, also teleological conceptualisation of ‘practice’ in Education Studies (See Horn 2005, and Horn & Little, 2010, for example). Unlike apparently with MacIntyre’s notion, the concept of a ‘community of practice’ has, by contrast, also already been applied to school-based teacher training ‘experience’.¹⁴⁵ In fact, among many teacher education researchers, the ‘community of practice’ notion is regarded (Sim, 2006; Nguyen, 2019) as a model for school-based trainee experience. ‘Communities of practice’ is, for example, a “powerful” and “versatile conceptual framework” (Nguyen,

illuminating the inner workings of practices, such as the application of evaluative and normative concepts, and not a call for a clearer and more specific typology of different practices and their aims as such.

¹⁴⁵ It has also been applied suggestively to school inspection by Baxter (2017b). For Baxter (2017b, p.267), “the work of Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger permits investigation of inspector learning as part of a community of practice.”

2019, p.27), for professional, on-site trainee teacher experience (“teaching practice, placement, practicum, or school-based field experience”, Nguyen, 2019, p.24).¹⁴⁶

One major commonality between MacIntyre’s ‘practice’ and Lave and Wenger’s ‘communities of practice’ is their teleology. This teleological element is as with MacIntyre’s notion of ‘practice’ also apparent in at least two different senses. For Lave and Wenger as well as for MacIntyre practices therefore have a plurality of ends.

Firstly, ‘communities of practice’ unite around a common endeavour or goal. They are, “groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do” (Wenger-Trayner & Wenger-Trayner, 2015). ‘Communities of practice’ (Wenger-Trayner & Wenger-Trayner, 2015) are orientated especially to specific, common, *learning* goals. Examples of the common, learning goals characteristic of ‘communities of practice’ include:

[A] tribe learning to survive, a band of artists seeking new forms of expression, a group of engineers working on similar problems, a clique of pupils defining their identity in the school, a network of surgeons exploring novel techniques, a gathering of first-time managers helping each other cope. (Wenger-Trayner & Wenger-Trayner, 2015)

We might identify some parallels between the orientation to common learning goals (Wenger-Trayner & Wenger-Trayner, 2015) and the training of new teachers in a school or doing the job of inspecting. A potential difference here though perhaps is that learning would appear to be characteristic of all participants focused on this goal in a ‘community of practice’ as described in this quotation. By contrast not all those involved in the ‘experience’ of learning to teach in a school or becoming and being and inspector are learning per se. At most there are degrees of learning, with novices learning much more than the mentors, for example, novices are being guided by. Also an apparent difference is that this ‘learning goal’, according to the theory of ‘communities of practice’, is not to be understood in a top-down, explicit,

¹⁴⁶ For Nguyen (2019, p.2), “[w]hile traditional models emphasise individual preservice teachers and individual classrooms, the learning communities model expects preservice teachers to work collaboratively”. See, also, for example, the writings of Rosie Le Cornu (2010, 2016; Le Cornu & Ewing, 2008; White, Bloomfield, & Le Cornu, 2010).

formalised sense. A “*telos* of learning” (Lave, 1996, p.162) is not “a vista of educational goals set by societal, cultural authorities.” Just as with the ends of excellence characteristic of a MacIntyrean practice, its *telos* of learning is formed, shaped and modified from within a ‘community’. This internalised shaping and refashioning of its *telos* contrasts with the need to ensure a steady supply of new teachers, for example, a primary motivation for school-based routes.

A further apparent contrast between the ends of ‘communities of practice’ and the ‘experience’ of school-based routes or school inspection is self-transformation, the second, overriding *telos* of ‘communities of practice’. This theme of transformation through the ‘experience’ of a ‘practice’ is visible in MacIntyre’s concept also and will be considered especially in chapters five and six of the thesis. For Lave, a ‘community of practice’ is about the “trajectories of learners as they change” (Lave, 1996, p.156).¹⁴⁷ This end of change of a ‘community of practice’ is, moreover, substantive, something ontological, and, most significantly, about being and becoming something different. The ‘experience’ of a ‘community of practice’ is “a process of becoming – to become a certain person or, conversely, to avoid becoming a certain person” (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p.215). In this sense, apprentice tailors or lawyers (Lave, 1996, p.157), for example, are neither merely learning sewing nor gaining more abstract knowledge or achieving greater specialisation in a skill. Rather, the “*telos* of learning” here, and in the other cases of apprenticeship that Lave and Wenger are so taken by, is about:

[B]ecoming a respected, practicing participant among other [participants], becoming so imbued with the practice that masters become part of the everyday life of the [community of practice]. (Lave, 1996, p.157)

Seen as a ‘community of practice’, school-based teacher training and school inspection ‘experience’ is revealed to have much more dramatic and richer consequences. This is more than simply qualifying as a teacher or inspector with a certificate and some techniques and knowledge of procedure and protocol. New teachers and inspectors are in pursuit of their learning goal becoming part of

¹⁴⁷ “*Telos*”, Lave explains, is, “a direction of movement or change of learning (*not* the same as goal directed activity)” (1996, p.156).

something else. They are becoming “imbued” with the communal life that constitutes a ‘community of practice’.

Another way of expressing the profound change on offer through a ‘community of practice’ is through the notion of identity. In fact, for Wenger, identity and learning are inseparable (“[t]hey are aspects of the same phenomenon”, 1991, p.115). For Lave (1996, p.157), the “*telos* of learning” characteristic of ‘communities of practice’, characterised by becoming and transformation, means that identities, “identities in practice”, are formed.

This second, self-transformative goal of a ‘community of practice’ is especially bound up with the idea of ‘learning as legitimate peripheral participation’ (LPP) (Lave & Wenger, 1991). With learning as legitimate peripheral participation we can see again how profound participation in a ‘community of practice’ can potentially be. As they work together on a task, learning as legitimate peripheral participation helps to illuminate the interactions and interrelations of practitioners of varying levels of ‘experience’. It also discloses how these novices, “journeyfolk”, and “old-timers” (Lave & Wenger, 1991), grow and mature in their interactions and interrelations with each other. Learning as legitimate peripheral participation discloses, in particular, how, beginning with peripheral tasks and activities, participants in a ‘community of practice’ are transformed. This is as they come to assume a more central role, with greater responsibility and more important tasks.

A ‘community of practice’ is then characterised by a learning goal and a more substantive, more fundamental goal of self-transformation. Learning via a ‘community of practice’ is both about learning together in a group but also about a transformation of the who and what. That is, it is about a transformation of “who we are and what we can do” (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p.215), as we do it. Learning through a practice is not simply about skill- or information accumulation, “[i]t is not just the acquisition of memories, habits, and skills,” for it is also about transformation and identity-formation (Wenger, 1998, p.96).

What, Lave and Wenger tell us about ‘practices’ reminds us, again, that there is much more to the ‘experience’ than technical skills and their acquisition. Their concept serves as a reminder also that the potential effects of being transformed through the ‘experience’ may well be dramatic. These effects should be recognised

and discussions had regarding how best to help those undergoing the effects of transformation cope. This need but also its absence from the relevant literature underlines my argument that the concept of ‘experience’, and what it involves, warrants closer scrutiny. This is not least considering the possible impact not doing so may have on the success of the ‘experience’ of educational contexts such as school-based routes and inspection.

In the next chapter we will move on to exploring the notion of self-transformation that their respective notions of ‘practice’ help to underscore. Lave and Wenger’s notion of a practice, however, can also serve by way of contrast as means by which we tease out one further, crucial emphasis from MacIntyre’s notion of a practice. This is a nuance especially fitting with educational contexts such as teacher training. If we recall, ‘communities of practice’ are about collectively learning to do something and being transformed in the process. A ‘community of practice’ is not emphasised, however, as being about the kind of ‘excellence’ that MacIntyre regards as being fundamental to a ‘practice’. This ‘excellence’ is insufficiently attended to if at all in educational contexts foregrounding ‘experience’ such as school-based route teacher training and school inspection. That is, less emphasised with ‘communities of practice’ is the necessity of pursuing the excellence of a product or performance or the excellence of being a member of a practice per se. In fact, ‘communities of practice’, such as that of the claims-processors Wenger (1998, p.196) describes, raise the possibility of engaging in a shared human activity solely for what MacIntyre (2007) refers to as ‘external goods’ and doing so without concern with the consequences of doing this for the activity.¹⁴⁸ This instrumentalised engagement may be where there is gain solely of financial reward even if the activity is disliked (‘begrudged’). It may be where practitioners may not be fully ‘invested’ in it, or where there is no cultivation of anything like “goods of excellence”.¹⁴⁹ MacIntyre (2007, p.227) does also recognise that this kind of instrumentally advantageous but

¹⁴⁸ MacIntyre contrasts internal goods to prestige, status, money and other so-called external goods related only contingently to a practice, and achievable in ways other than through any one practice (2007, pp. 175–178).

¹⁴⁹ For Hager and Halliday (2006, p.195) Wenger (1998) ‘romanticises’ the life of claims processors. According to Hager and Halliday, they appear, “somehow satisfied with their distributive lot in life [...] content to gain recognition through their part in the negotiation of micro aspects of practice, such as where to put the pile of claims forms, and so on.” For the claims process, there is, they add (Hager & Halliday, 2006, p.195), apparently, “[n]o need to worry about deep senses of injustice over a communal cup of coffee!”

intrinsically restricted kind of work is common (“the kind of work done by the vast majority of the inhabitants of the modern world cannot be understood in terms of the nature of a practice with goods internal to itself”). For MacIntyre, however, an activity regarded solely or used only in instrumental terms is not a ‘practice’ proper.

Lave and Wenger are likely to sympathise with MacIntyre’s strong position regarding the overriding intrinsic value of a ‘practice’, but do not emphasise it as he does. Indeed, and as already noted, in MacIntyrean terms any purely instrumentalised practical activity has a precarious future. Participants who see a shared group activity only in an instrumentalised sense will likely leave if, for instance, they stop winning (e.g. chess) or making money (e.g. fishing crew).¹⁵⁰ If too many people leave, the practice cannot survive and its transformational potential is lost. Where instrumentalising types of participants remain alongside those who see a ‘practice’ in intrinsic terms, if they do not contribute in the right way to the pursuit of ‘excellence’, then the pursuit of its good and the self-transformation this promises, becomes much harder to facilitate.

This last substantial difference in emphasis between the respective conceptualisations of practice of MacIntyre and Lave and Wenger help to draw out is relevant to, and reminds us of something crucial about, the ‘experience’ of becoming a teacher or an inspector. Becoming, for example, a teacher is the most apparent end of school-based teacher training ‘experience’. However, becoming a teacher and teaching itself are not typically seen as activities, which like in Wenger’s example of claim processors at a large American insurance company (1998, p.45), a participant might detach from in order merely to earn a salary.¹⁵¹ Indeed, we would not want someone teaching children or training to teach them *only* doing it so that they can pay their mortgage, buy a car, or go on exotic holidays. At the very least, we want and expect teachers and teacher educators, as well as inspectors, to care about the good of pupils and students and do so for their own sake, not do so because it is their job to do so.

¹⁵⁰ This is if management has not already forced them to quit (MacIntyre, 1994, p.285).

¹⁵¹ In numerous studies of why teachers decide to quit the profession a low salary is typically neither the only reason nor the primary one necessarily. See, for example, Foster (2019) and Ingersoll *et al.* (2018).

MacIntyre (1985) recognises that the initial motivation to participate in an activity may well be satisfaction of individual desires and needs, such as earning money. Through initiation into a practice, this, however, is hopefully to be disciplined and transformed, with the participant coming to seek and realise superior internal goods of excellence. In this way, novices through a practice, “learn to act for the sake of such goods rather than from the motives which may have led to their initial participation” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.240). We might also think then that this could well be the case for those learning to teach in a school or becoming and being inspectors. They may very well initially apply to be teachers and inspectors because of the financial benefits but grow to see that the activity offers something greater albeit more intangible. Whether this is intended is however something that the relevant literature does not elaborate upon.

For MacIntyre (1985, p.242) it is not inconceivable either that “some institutionalised enterprises”, such as farming, are comprised of both people working with others for the sake only of internal goods and “rational calculators”, who, “on a cost-benefit basis”, work only to earn a wage for themselves even if collaborating with others. MacIntyre then recognises that shared human activities are complex, with some if not all pursuing what he would describe as “goods of excellence”. Again, this may reasonably be assumed to be the case on school-based routes and in school inspectorates, with a variety of participants aiming at a variety of goods, intrinsic as well as external.

Significantly for educational contexts, MacIntyre’s ‘intrinsic’ emphasis with his notion of ‘practice’ is then some way off the emphasis on being able to burnish a CV promised by the promotional material of ‘fast-track’ routes into teaching, for example. If we approach teaching or inspecting in a MacIntyrean sense, trainees who at the successful end of their training ‘experience’, at the very worst, still see teaching or inspecting only as a way of earning money and bettering themselves financially, may have qualified but only in a one-sided, impoverished and potentially damaging sense. If the kinds of conditions of an ‘experience’ considered in this thesis are favourable, however, any ‘fast-tracked’ trainees, for example, initially attracted to teaching solely because of its benefit to a career elsewhere, for instance, may very

well, according to MacIntyre's notion of 'practice', come to see teaching's intrinsic value as the priority and sacrifice for its sake their earlier career ambitions.

The aim of this chapter has been to employ the notions of practice conceptualised by MacIntyre and by Lave and Wenger to draw out the teleological sense of, and its implications for, an educational 'experience', but a sense which is insufficiently attended to in the school-based teacher training route and school inspection literature. Both MacIntyre and Lave and Wenger argue that practices have a plurality of ends. For MacIntyre, practices are characterised by the pursuit of financial rewards or status, but he regards the ultimate aim of practices to be excellence, in both product and performance and in the life of a practitioner. The goods realised through its pursuit are realised by and beneficial to all members, intrinsic, common, and learnt through 'experience' and, as we shall discuss further in the thesis, when the conditions are favourable. These internal goods and their pursuit and realisation can at least in the short-term alone satisfy and sustain a practice. Lave and Wenger's 'communities of practice' are also characterised by a dual *telos*, that of learning and of self-transformation. Where MacIntyre, in contrast with Lave and Wenger's concept, is especially helpful for my thesis argument that 'experience' and its nuances and complexities are not being paid sufficient attention, is in reminding us that those participating in a practice for pragmatic or financial reasons, only to draw a salary, for example, put the practice and the more meaningful, longer-lasting, and socially beneficial rewards it offers at great risk.

In what follows next, I explore the potential for self-transformation that achieving the "higher order" ends of a MacIntyrean practice, for example, is thought to make possible. Paul (2014; 2015a; 2015b) in chapter three has already alerted us to self-transformation as being a potential of particular types of 'experience'. Lave and Wenger also regard self-transformation as integral to the functioning of 'communities of practice'. As will be shown, however, while alerted to it by MacIntyre and others, the self-transformative nature of the 'experience' is lacking in attention in the relevant literature on school-based teacher training and on school inspection. As will be argued, paying insufficient attention to self-transformation as a feature, for instance, of the 'experience' of school-based routes is problematic, not least because it means

the true life-changing and developmental potential of such an 'experience' is being neglected. If self-transformation were to somehow happen unintentionally in and through the school-based route 'experience', something that cannot be ruled out, then the potential impact of such a dramatic change on a trainee and their existing relationships, considered in chapter seven, is also likely being badly and worryingly overlooked. Overlooking this has possibly serious repercussions for the individual, for their relationships, and for the educational context in question.

Chapter 5: Self-Transformation and 'Experience'

In the previous chapter, I explained that the 'experience' of a common, collective human activity, such as learning to teach in a school, should for fuller illumination and insight be understood as a practice and so above all teleologically. While recognising that they have a plurality of ends, for theories of practice, such as MacIntyre's, the ultimate *telos* of a practice is internal and intrinsic. It is in fact something realised only from and through inside 'experience'. It is crucial to work towards trying to appreciate as best as possible the ultimately intrinsic, internal end of a practice. It is upon and with this that all other ends are ordered and hung on, and it provides guidance and a sense of what should be done. Also, it is through the ultimate end of a practice that the interdependent and mutually shaping elements comprising a practice weave together. So, not seeing, for example, the 'experience' of learning to teach in a school in its overriding intrinsic, collective, "telic" sense runs the risk of the 'experience' faltering if being developmental at all. Not seeing the school-based or school inspection 'experience' in terms of an intrinsic, internal *telos* means less or not important ends, and their pursuit, are identified as primary. This raises the possibility of valuable, but finite resources being squandered on elements less or not at all important to the viability and health of the school-based route or school inspection 'experience'. Having the wrong goal of an 'experience' in sight will also mean that the consequences of the true intrinsic aim of an 'experience' such as training to teach in a school or being a good inspector, will be neglected if not unattended to completely. Not having these potential consequences in view runs the risk of not being fully prepared if at all for them.

If we accept a teleological, practice-inflected reading of school-based route and school inspection 'experience', one very profound potential of it is to be both deeply and permanently self-transformative. Many who have been through teacher training, in particular, will acknowledge that becoming a teacher is a profoundly transformative 'experience'. Transformation as a potential of certain 'experience' (Paul, 2014; 2015a; 2015b) is something that has been identified in the writings specific to the term 'experience' and something that writers on the closely related term 'practice', not least MacIntyre and Lave and Wenger, also recognise. As we shall see, however, the self-transformative potential of an 'experience' like the

school-based training one is another crucial feature seemingly overlooked in the relevant literature. To give insufficient attention to this feature of such an ‘experience’ is to risk failing to harness its power but risks also not preparing for its potentially dramatic impact and ensuring as best as possible that such a self-transformation is not reversed or impeded and can take place at all. Even without deliberate understanding of educational ‘experience’ such as that found in the school-based teacher training and school inspection literature in an intrinsic teleological sense, self-transformation may still happen. However, if it does, it does so either by luck or by accident, depends on the resources available to the individual undergoing it, and does so not because of the conscious intentions of stakeholders in the ‘experience’. What is required of those involved in the running of an ‘experience’ such as learning to teach in a school is at least some appreciation of and so preparedness for this self-transformation given what such a transition may well mean for the person undergoing it.

This discussion of the self-transformative potential of an ‘experience’ such as school-based teacher training and school inspection will be split into a number of chapters. In this chapter, we shall unpack more of what the type of self-transformation we are alerted to by MacIntyre, in particular, can be said to comprise and compare this with what we can find in the school-based route and school inspection literature. In the next chapters we will consider the ‘historical’ means by which self-transformation, for MacIntyre, usually takes place, ‘traditions’, and what obstacles and impediments there may be to this process.

Concepts of practice that feature in the Education Studies literature, not least MacIntyre’s concept and Lave and Wenger’s ‘community of practice’, can be read as foregrounding the possibility of self-transformation. As MacIntyre writes, “those engaged in [a practice] transform themselves and educate themselves through their own self-transformative activity” (1994, p.231). In fact, self-transformation is what MacIntyrean practices are fundamentally about (“apprenticeship to a practice [...]

aims at nothing less than self-transformation”, Higgins 2011, p.64).¹⁵² As noted, self-transformation is regarded as fundamental to other conceptualisations of practice, such as Lave and Wenger’s ‘community of practice’, mentioned so far in the thesis. Learning via apprenticeship to a ‘community of practice’ is a transformation of the ‘who’ and ‘what’, i.e. of the “who we are and what we can do” (Wenger, 1998, p.215). Learning this way is, in other words, “a process of becoming – to become a certain person” (Wenger, 1998, p.215).¹⁵³ Underscoring the capacity for fostering self-transformation characteristic of a “telic” practice, MacIntyre, and others, write repeatedly of ‘initiation’ into practices (“learning is a process of initiation into practices”, Kemmis *et al.* 2014, p.59). Initiation is also synonymous with a self-transformative understanding of education (Luntley, 2010).¹⁵⁴

5.1 The Theme of Transformation, School-Based Routes into Teaching and School Inspection

There is some recognition in the more critical school-based teacher training literature that self-transformation is not only a possibility of the ‘experience’ but in fact an inevitability. Writers on ‘experience’ in teacher education (e.g. Britzman) cited by those who regard the term as lacking proper conceptualisation (Ellis & Orchard, 2014) highlight the potential for self-transformation. “Learning to teach—like teaching itself—is always,” Britzman explains, “the process of becoming: a time of formation and transformation, of scrutiny into what one is doing, and who one can become” (2003, p.31). Self-transformation is also a theme in the literature on ‘experience’ reviewed in the first chapter. As already noted in chapter three, Paul (2014; 2015a; 2015b) makes us aware of various experiences that can be said to be

¹⁵² For McLaughlin (2003, p.345), also, self-transformation is one of the key elements of a MacIntyrean practice.

¹⁵³ This potential for self-transformation was drawn from their research on apprenticeships and in particular how different types of apprenticeships all showed “the transformative possibilities of being and becoming complex, full cultural-historical participants in the world” (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p.32).

¹⁵⁴ For MacIntyre, we “are initiated into a variety of practices at home, at school, in the workplace” (2016, p.38). What is essential for MacIntyre (2016, p.173) with school children, for instance, is that they, “come to understand themselves [...] as [...] being initiated into a range of literary, mathematical, scientific, musical, and athletic practices.” Wenger writes of “newcomers” to a ‘community of practice’ that they are “initiated” into it (1998, p.103). Other ‘practice’ writers also write of initiation. See, also, Oakeshott (1991, p.7), Thomas Kuhn (1996, p.5) and Pierre Bourdieu (1990, p.68), for instance. The transformation Luntley (2010) discusses is in the context of education in general, not of the trainee teacher in schools per se, but the point still stands that by using ‘initiation’ MacIntyre can be understood as suggesting transformation.

transformative. Transformative experiences are “both radically new” and alter us “in a deep and fundamental way” (Paul, 2014, p.1), and what such experiences teach and do to us is not knowable in advance. Paul (2014; 2015a; 2015b) does not explore ‘practice’ per se, but does exemplify transformative experiences with cases – choosing to be a doctor, joining the army, taking up a new religion - that might be seen as examples of ‘practices’.

This literature aside, however, and as we shall see, on the whole, there is little if any sustained emphasis or discussion in the school-based teacher training route or school inspection literature on *self*-transformation. The self-transformative potential of such an ‘experience’ teleological accounts of practice provide a sense of therefore contrasts starkly with its neglect we typically find in the literature on school-based routes and school inspection. This apparent neglect is highly problematic if transformation does indeed occur. This is because it suggests these routes and inspectorates are ill-prepared for the potentially dramatic consequences of transformation for the individual, their relationships, and wider community.

In respect of transformation, what *does* appear to count to those responsible for school-based route training ‘experience’, in particular, is a different type of transformation, the transformation of other things (e.g. pupil lives, schools, communities).¹⁵⁵ Take *Teach First* in the UK, for example, where of their five core values, one is ‘Transformational Change’.¹⁵⁶ *Teach First* is concerned with transformation, of schools, and the life chances of thousands of low-income young people. *Teach For America (TFA)* in the US aims to be “life-changing for children and transforming for our country”, transformational of cities, schools, “educational landscapes”, and the teaching profession. Transformation of a sort is crucial at residency programmes, too. The *San Francisco Teacher Residency (SFTR)* in the US, for example, “offers aspiring educators the opportunity to help transform lives and communities in San Francisco through the teaching profession” (2017). At the *Dallas Teacher Residency (DTR)*, similarly, they are looking to “recruit talented

¹⁵⁵ One exception to this is the *TNTP Teaching Fellows*: “We transform accomplished professionals and college graduates into excellent teachers” (TNTP Teaching Fellows, 2015).

¹⁵⁶ *Teach For America* (2017a) explain that their, “five core values are transformational change, team, leadership, respect and humility, and diversity. They are the foundation of our culture at Teach For America.”

college graduates and career changers that have the WILL and DESIRE to transform urban education through teaching” (2017). While not something explicit in the ‘Teachers’ Standards’ (2011), which all school-based routes in England must adhere to, *SCITTs* too talk of their transformative qualities.¹⁵⁷

As I have been emphasising, this lack of acknowledgement of the potential for radical personal change in contrast to other more ‘external’ things is concerning. This is not least because the likely impact of being self-transformed can be seen as profound and irreversible. It is, therefore, the responsibility of educational contexts featuring ‘experience’ to have the right support in place to help those undergoing such a transformation. This issue is explored further with discussion of the virtue of care in chapter eight.

Of course, we might infer from the operation and features, for example, of school-based routes that they are transformative of the trainee all the same and this at the very least is implicitly understood even if no real attempt is made explicitly to emphasise it. For it might be argued, for example, that in effect *Teach First* in England, for example, is transformative of the candidate even if this is not made explicit. It is a ‘Leadership Development Programme’, in particular, and if it intends to be developmental, it is not unreasonable by extension to understand it as transformative too. It might be thought, for example, that *Teach First* transforms trainees through the cultivation of their transferable “skills for success.”¹⁵⁸ We might think it transformative for creating the conditions for the acquisition of these skills and for transforming trainees into ‘future leaders’.¹⁵⁹ It might also be thought transformative of *Teach First* recruit views and assumptions about educational

¹⁵⁷ *The Brook Learning Trust (BLT) SCITT*, for example, recognises “the power of education to transform lives and communities” (2017), at another, *Teach Kent and Sussex*, they are “passionate about providing training for teachers that transforms the opportunities young people have: “Great teachers are never forgotten. They transform lives and make futures brighter” (2017). At a further *SCITT, South Bromsgrove High Teaching School*, meanwhile, there is a belief, “that outstanding teaching has the power to transform young people’s lives” (2017).

¹⁵⁸ For example: “From communication and presentation skills to negotiation, time management, empathy and conflict resolution, the skills you’ll develop on the LDP will transfer directly to leadership roles in any sector” (Milkround.com, 2018).

¹⁵⁹ *Teach First*, we are told, “develops leaders” and they promise would-be recruits that “advanced leadership skills and behaviours” developed on the *Leadership Development Programme* “will have a lasting impact” (Teach First job advertisement, 2018). Also: “Resilience, problem solving, leadership, effective communication – they all help you to make a real impact. And Teach First could equip you with the skills for success, no matter where your career takes you.”

issues by exposing them to the reality of systemic inequalities and disadvantaged lives (See, for example, Conn, Lovison & Mo, 2020). We might think school inspection secondment and mentoring are similarly meant through their association with 'development' to be transformative in some sense.¹⁶⁰

All the same, it would appear that in the school-based and school inspection literature there is a lack of sensitivity to the more profound and dramatic possibility of self-transformation through their 'experience'. This is despite what we might infer from the emphasis on 'development' in the relevant literature. In the case of school-based routes, the transformation of other things takes priority. This is not to say that self-transformation does not occur despite its neglect. Nevertheless, if self-transformation does indeed occur through the 'experience' of these contexts, it occurs seemingly without intentional support or awareness. Again, it is not that self-transformation cannot or will not happen anyway. However, not more closely attending to this potential and insufficiently attending to the nature of it and what can be done in an effort to make the process work more smoothly and efficiently, leaves much to chance. This neglect makes nurturing and preparing for any such self-transformation unintended, a by-product of something else at best. This neglect also places great demands on the resources an individual teacher trainee or new inspector may or may not be able to draw upon.

5.2 Self-Transformation of What? *Erfahrung* and L.A. Paul

If we show greater sensitivity to the potential for self-transformation suggested by teleological accounts of human activities then one question this raises is what the self-transformation comprises in. What is it in or about us that we might think transformed through such an 'experience'? This is an important question if, for example, we wish to do our best to support and nurture this transformation and if we wish to harness it to inform and improve an 'experience' such as learning to teach in a school.

We can make a start at trying to disclose more of what the self-transformation on offer through 'experience', understood as a 'practice', is comprised of firstly by

¹⁶⁰ See, for example, OFSTED (2008, p.44), where secondment is labelled a "valuable developmental tool".

returning to the literature on 'experience'. For example, we might assume that being transformed potentially by an 'experience' such as learning to teach in a school is more than the sense of the term associated with the German *Erlebnis*. This is a 'touristic', instantaneously gratifying but fleeting sense of the term 'experience'. The self-transformative potential of an 'experience' such as learning to teach in a school a teleological approach to 'practice' implies means by contrast something much more like *Erfahrung*, the other sense of 'experience' in German. To paraphrase Davey (2013, p.74), *Erfahrung* is not touristic in nature, this type of experience is not a product for consumption, but instead, and, more meaningfully, outlooks and sensitivity, our viewpoints and cognitive capacities, are changed, and changed permanently. It then follows that an educational 'experience', such as learning to teach in a school, understood as something akin to *Erfahrung*, would mean a radical and permanent shift in views and beliefs.

With the 'experience' literature we might assume something else also about the type of self-transformation teleological accounts of 'practice' suggest are a feature of educational contexts. That is, an 'experience' such as that characteristic of school-based routes or school inspection can be seen as a self-transformation beyond the type of *epistemically* transformative experience that Paul (2014) describes. The type of self-transformation concepts of 'practice' suggest are not simply about knowing something for the first time. What these concepts suggest is the kind of self-transformation where the world comes to be seen differently. This is a kind of transformation more akin, therefore, to the *personally* transformative experiences, Paul (2014) describes. This is an 'experience' that fundamentally and deeply changes our individual preferences, desires, view of self.

Paul also reminds us that transformative 'experience' and their consequences cannot be fully predictable. While radical change can be expected, the nature of this change must remain to a necessary extent unknown. Our sense of it must remain in general terms. As Oakeshott (1991) argues about initiation into the tacit know-how that occupations and professions necessarily embody, if known at all, this is transformation that is known largely retrospectively. This lack of predictability contrasts with the promises regarding career advancement made by school-based routes and the school inspectorate for those who undergo their training 'experience'.

In this section we have returned to resources on ‘experience’ reviewed in chapter three. This was to help with thinking more deeply about what the kind of self-transformation on offer potentially through school-based routes or school inspection comprises. In particular, it has been argued that the self-transformative kind of ‘experience’ suggested by “telic” concepts of ‘practice’ can be anticipated with the notion of *Erfahrung*, rather than *Erlebnis*. It can also be prefigured with Paul’s account of a *personally* not only *epistemically* transformative experience (2014). This is the type of transformation where our prior beliefs and cherished assumptions are radically altered and where we come to value, judge, and understand the world in completely different ways.

5.3 Self-Transformation of What? A MacIntyrean Response

5.3.1 Desires

While necessarily unpredictable, it is possible with writings on ‘experience’ to disclose something of what it is we might think a self-transformative ‘experience’ actually transforms. MacIntyre’s writings, however, provide an especially rich resource with which to more closely investigate these consequences of self-transformation. These are consequences we might think a real possibility through school-based route and school inspection ‘experience’, but which are not sufficiently attended to currently in their literature.

The key transformation via initiation into a ‘practice’ according to MacIntyre’s conceptualisation is of a participant’s desires. As he explains about the journey in and through a practice, “[w]hat agents want for and from themselves and for and from others is no longer what it was” (MacIntyre, 2016, p.132). This transformation, education or redirection of desire, is a crucial difference between practices and activities that are not (MacIntyre, 2016, p.88).

Regarding desire, what needs to be achieved by the apprentice to a practice, MacIntyre writes, is, in other words, a transformation of their “motivational set” (1999, p.87). A transformation of their “motivational set” means “external reasons” for thinking and acting now become “internal” ones. It means their original desire for something, and seeking to satisfy this desire simply because it is desired, shifts. It also means that the agent comes to desire something for its intrinsic value, as

something worthy of desire alone, and so comes to desire something, “just because and insofar as it is a desire for what it is good and best [...] to desire” (MacIntyre, 1999, p.87).

To have desires reshaped is not for MacIntyre to be indoctrinated or brainwashed, however. It is to have inferior, “untutored” wants and needs refashioned into something better and more rewarding. More precisely, through practices we come to desire what is *proper* (MacIntyre, 2016, p.87). Practices educate us to distinguish what is real from what is apparent, and teach us to seek the former rather than the latter. Practices educate us to distinguish, “between objects of desire that agents have good reason to pursue and objects of desire that need to be set aside if excellence is to be achieved” (MacIntyre, 2016, p.131).¹⁶¹ For MacIntyre, and as considered in the previous chapter, ‘proper’ objects of desire are the internal and common goods of excellence that a practice offers its members an opportunity to realise and develop.

5.3.2 Rational Capacities

MacIntyre shows us with his discussion of desire one characteristic that comprises the transformation initiation into a ‘practice’ promises. Also transformed according to MacIntyre’s “telic” approach to a practice are the capacities involving these new desires, not least the capacity to recognise them. Initiation into a practice, as MacIntyre conceives it, is not only to acquire and enjoy the internal, common “goods of excellence”. It is in effect to acquire certain rational capacities. In particular, we acquire and develop a capacity to *judge* “goods of excellence” internal to a practice. It is through (MacIntyre, 2016 p.32) our apprenticeship to and initiation into practices, “at home, at school, in the workplace,” that we come, “to recognize goods internal to each practice”. In fact, it is a condition of participation in a MacIntyrean practice that this happens for, “the would-be practitioner must also grow out of ways of thinking and judging in order to participate in the practice” (Higgins, 2011, p.185). An individual who cannot come to see *proper* desires through the discipline provided by participation in a ‘practice’, among other things, lacks maturity (MacIntyre, 2016,

¹⁶¹ This educating and redirecting of desires is, MacIntyre (2016, p.38) explains, more than reminiscent of Aristotle’s conceptualisation (*NE* Bk VI) of the capacity of *prohairesis* or “rational wanting”. *Prohairesis* is “desire informed by reason or as reason informed by desire” (*NE*1139b4–5).

p.75), and cannot be reasoned with (2006, p.32). If anything, this last argument underlines if it needs to be the importance and urgency of placing the term 'experience' under closer scrutiny. For if understood as a 'practice', being unable to or unwilling to realise "higher-order" desires through a 'practice' and its resources for MacIntyre implies citizens without the capacity for being reasonable. Without this, we might think social cohesion and progress suffers.

5.3.3 Freedom

As MacIntyre sees it, through entering and participating in a practice our desires and capacities, especially our capacity for judgement, is transformed. Entering and participating in a practice we come to see what is proper and with this we among other things are better able to reason with others. As these are desires that all reasonable people would recognise, we are also less likely to encounter conflict when we try to satisfy them. We are also not beholden to immature, inferior desires that once motivated us.

This acquiring of judgement of our prior desires through a self-transformative 'experience' is as MacIntyre describes it then also liberating. It means in particular to be able to stand back and take a critical, evaluative stance of our desires (MacIntyre, 1999, p.54, p.72). This ability to judge our desires born of and fostered by practices means in effect to gain freedom (MacIntyre, 1999, p.84) and our independence (MacIntyre, 1999, p.85) from our prior desires (MacIntyre, 1999, p.85).¹⁶²

5.3.4 Creativity

Again, if seen as a MacIntyrean 'practice', liberation from prior desires and cultivation of freedom underscores the need to more carefully consider the concept of 'experience' as it features in educational contexts. There is more at stake with the 'experience' of learning to teach in a school or school inspection than merely acquiring techniques and knowledge of procedure and protocol.

¹⁶² We see similar tones in what Gadamer writes about the sense of taste. To Gadamer (2004, p.33-34), taste is "something like a sense" and "[t]he mark of good taste is being able to stand back from ourselves and our private preferences." As "mode of knowing," therefore, "taste, in its essential nature, is not private but a social phenomenon of the first order." This means, for example, that as "mode of knowing" taste "can even counter the private inclinations of the individual like a court of law, in the name of a universality that it intends and represents." In fact, Gadamer argues, our taste can reject what personally we may like.

This necessity is further underlined by the fact that also acquired as part of liberation through a 'practice' is a capacity for creativity and creative insight. In fact, by being properly initiated into a MacIntyrean practice, a practitioner is able to make improvements to the practice and contribute to its progress. This is because initiation into a practice leads to "a certain kind of knowing how" (MacIntyre, 1990, p.127). It is this 'know-how' that identifies areas where, as we shall see in chapter six on the traditions that all practices embody, the 'excellence' that practices pursue can be advanced. Without the know-how that being properly initiated into a 'practice' provides, there is little chance if any of a 'practice' progressing.

5.3.5 Identity

Also crucial, lastly, to what ought to be understood by self-transformation through a MacIntyrean practice, lastly, is the potential for transformation of identity. This again has significance for educational contexts featuring the closely related term 'experience, school-based routes into teaching or school inspection. For MacIntyre, practices, and the relationships that constitute them, are constitutive of human identities (2016, p.175). Our lives, he explains, are structured like a story (MacIntyre, 2016, p.241) and so MacIntyrean identities are "characters in enacted narratives" (2007, p.217).

Lave and Wenger also regard practices as "transformative" and see this as interlinked with identity. For example, they write (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p.47), the "socio-cultural transformation" (1991, p.49) through 'communities of practice' is ultimately about identity. For Wenger, "learning transforms who we are and what we can do, it is an experience of identity" (1998, p. 215). That is, through 'communities of practice':

The *person* has been correspondingly transformed into a practitioner, a newcomer becoming an old-timer, whose changing knowledge, skill, and discourse are part of a developing identity. (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p.122, emphasis in original)

Our sense of self and identity are thought commonly to be crucial to our well-being and personal confidence. If seen as a 'practice', this further aspect to the character of being transformed through a collective educational 'experience' then also warrants close attention.

5.4 Features of Self-Transformation in the School-Based Initial Teacher Training Route and School Inspection Literature

As has been argued, if we consider both the school-based teacher training route and school inspection 'experience' as a teleological 'practice', then this overriding "telic" aspect suggests the possibility of self-transformation. To begin the discussion of self-transformation and what it can be thought to comprise we have looked back to chapter three and the difference between *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis* and between personally and epistemically transformative experience (Paul). It was argued that an 'experience' such as learning to teach in a school ought to be seen more as *Erfahrung* and personally transformative, as it was an 'experience' that had the potential to radically albeit unpredictably overhaul a trainee's worldview, understanding and judgement, values, and identity.

MacIntyre's writings on 'practice' have extended this suggestion of self-transformation through 'experience'. His writings suggest that a participant in a 'practice' comes to desire different, "higher order" things, 'goods'. In the process, a participant gains their freedom from prior, inferior wants and needs. This liberation fosters a capacity for judgement and creativity, in turn. In fact, and, overall, an individual through a 'practice' has their whole identity transformed as MacIntyre, and also Lave and Wenger's writings on 'communities of practice', both underline.

This raises important questions about the 'experience' of educational contexts. Does the school-based route or school inspection literature discuss or show any awareness of the features of self-transformation the literature on 'experience' or MacIntyre disclose? Is there any indication in this literature that desire, judgement, freedom, creativity, identity or similar are seen as being transformed? Even if unacknowledged, can we not see anything in the 'experience' of school-based routes or school inspection acting either as proxy or implying such features of self-transformation?

5.4.1 Desire, School-Based Initial Teacher Training, and School Inspection

For MacIntyre, desire is transformed through the right 'experience', understood as a 'practice', but "desire" does not feature prominently in either the school-based route

or school inspection literature. The explicit aim of both school-based routes and school inspection is seemingly not to create better needs and wants per se.

Implicitly, however, the aims of both could possibly be said to be about desire of a sort. In the case of ‘fast-track’ routes into teaching, this would appear especially to be a desire to achieve for pupils a higher test score. *TFA* (2010), for example, defines the end of teaching to be “academic achievement” (e.g. p.2) i.e. “we define and measure our teachers’ success in terms of how much their students learn.”¹⁶³ Other school-based routes, so-called residency programmes (Guha, Hyler, & Darling-Hammond, 2016), also associate good teaching with the meeting of externally set, explicit targets, such as improved test results.¹⁶⁴

While certainly a desire of a kind, it would though be stretching it here to regard this emphasis on boosting test scores as “higher order” in MacIntyre’s sense. We cannot therefore regard the onus on raising test scores as indicative of some awareness in the ‘fast-track’ context that the ‘experience’ is somehow self-transformative in a more fundamental sense.

As noted in the previous chapter, school-based routes into teaching also operate in line with official “standards”. The *UK Government*, for example, demands that all routes in England, school-based or not, work to national ‘Teachers’ Standards’ (2011).¹⁶⁵ These standards are not as such expected of a trainee prior to beginning their school-based route ‘experience’ and to develop through the ‘experience’. Here then at least we might again think there is more of the sense of being transformed into desires that MacIntyre in particular regards as a feature of self-transformation through a practice. However, again, these ‘Standards’ are standards imposed from outside rather than revealed and imbibed from within, and so, as considered in chapter four and six, quite different from what MacIntyre means with his “standards of excellence”.

¹⁶³ Champions of tried-and-tested techniques, such as Doug Lemov, associated with school-based routes are equally concerned with ‘closing the academic achievement gap’ (2015, p.32).

¹⁶⁴ Their comparative ‘effectiveness’ to non-school-based training is one way that ‘hands-on’ routes promote themselves on-line. See, for example, *Teach For America* (2015b).

¹⁶⁵ “The Teachers’ Standards must be used by initial teacher training (ITT) providers to assess when trainees can be recommended for qualified teacher status” (DfE, 2014).

Similarly with school inspection, there is a lack of attention paid to the type of transformation of desire MacIntyre identifies as a sign of self-transformation through a 'practice'. School inspection is commonly regarded as being about raising standards.¹⁶⁶ By raising standards is meant to a significant extent academic achievement i.e. raising test scores. In the case of school inspection in England, there is, certainly, the expectation that schools and other education providers are in specific cases being inspected for other reasons. One good example is safeguarding. It then follows that inspection in England, for example, is not only or always about test scores. Inspecting of early years education and social care, if that is part of an inspectorate's remit, such as at *OFSTED*, will likely not be focused primarily on academic achievement if at all either. That said, unlike MacIntyre's understanding of the true ends of our collective activities, these other inspectorate goals are externally mandated. Unlike with MacIntyre's internal goods of excellence, these externally mandated purposes are not realised from within the context of inspection. If not realised from within, they do not offer the chance of self-transformation as MacIntyre understands it.

Even if not about MacIntyrean self-transformation per se, there is still something desirable about transforming schools, communities and the lives of pupils, promised in 'accelerated' route literature. We are told in the 'accelerated' route literature that they hope through their activities to benefit wider societal interests (e.g. "address educational inequality", "improve social mobility", *Teach For All*). As noted in the section above, it is part of the benefit of realising internal goods to MacIntyre that they and our growing maturity (2016, p.75), and reasonableness (2006, p.32), benefit the wider community.

While admirable, the ambitions of 'accelerated' routes into teaching like this, however, are both explicit and pre-existing. Unlike MacIntyrean internal goods of excellence, they are a predetermined aim of the school-based route 'experience', and one not realised through the 'experience' and transformed *into* as such. It may well be that trainees are initiated on 'accelerated' routes into such altruistic desires.

¹⁶⁶ "I am proud to work for Ofsted. Being an HMI gives me the opportunity to make a contribution to standards of education nationally" writes one inspector at the school inspectorate in England (OFSTED, 2021). "[H]elping to raise education standards across a wide range of providers," writes another (OFSTED, 2021).

Yet as likely they are expected to already have these desires for transforming others before starting their training.

5.4.2 Judgement, School-Based Initial Teacher Training, and School Inspection

It is then at best unclear if transformation of desire is an intended outcome or expectation of school-based route or school inspection 'experience'. There is a lack of explicit consideration if any of this sign of self-transformation as MacIntyre understands it. This suggests a lack of understanding of the potentially dramatic consequences of being transformed by the type of 'experience' we might regard as characteristic of school-based routes and school inspection.

What about judgement that is said also to be a feature of self-transformation through a "telic" practice? Does this not feature in the school-based route or school inspection literature and so at least some recognition that they have a sense of the type of change participants will undergo?

Judgement, and related terms, are certainly present in the school-based route literature. *Teach For America* (2010), for example, explain that the best teachers, like "strong leaders", possess "good judgment, especially when it is required while they are in the classroom". In light of ever-changing contexts, *Teach For America* 'corps members', for instance, have to make numerous rapid judgements (TFA, 2010, p.151). They have to adapt their plans, "adjust course as called for by the reality around them to ensure the objective is met" (TFA, 2010, p.150).¹⁶⁷ Good judgement (TFA, 2010, p.188) is informed by evidence and evaluated according to progress measures and student outcomes.¹⁶⁸ Good judgement (TFA, 2010, pp.148-9) is an ability to combine the available data and intuitions under time and resource constraints.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ *Teach First* participant material would appear to refer only obliquely to judgement (e.g. "suggestions" (Kirby, 2013a); "all English teachers must find their own path" (Kirby, 2013b, p.3).

¹⁶⁸ Good teachers, we are told, "[j]udge the value of their effort by its impact on student progress" (TFA, 2010, p.224). In the case of "less effective teachers", they are inclined to, "[j]udge the value of their effort by the number of hours they work" (TFA, 2010, p.224).

¹⁶⁹ That is,

Like other strong leaders, they know that good judgment, especially when it is required while they are in the classroom, requires 'the ability to combine hard data, questionable data and intuitive guesses to arrive at a conclusion that events prove to be correct.'

School-based routes also recognise the value in acquiring a reflective capacity and we might for argument's sake see this also as interchangeable with at least some of the kind of judgement in MacIntyre's writings we can see as indicative of self-transformation. At *TFA* (2010, p.275), for instance, the training of teachers is "infused" with reflection, and discussion of it draws on well-known academic literature on the subject (i.e. Kolb, 1983). More specifically, *TFA* teachers are made to reflect 'cyclically' on "student learning data, instructional practices, and emotional experiences" (2010, p.275).

Yet, while judgement does feature in the school-based route literature, not least the reflective kind, it is not the phronetic, prudent capacity for judgement that "telic" writers, such as MacIntyre, emphasise. The point of this reflection appears ultimately to be to appreciate the relation between action and results, so that future improvements can be made.¹⁷⁰ Reflection here is not to be ethically informed, and situationally sensitive in the sense of *phronesis* lauded by MacIntyre, as discussed in chapter six, and by others such as Joseph Dunne, considered in chapter eight.

There is then clear recognition of the importance of 'judgement', and reflective judgement, in school-based route literature, where 'experience' features prominently. What school-based route literature emphasises with it is, however, distinctly different to the type of judgement, born of a shared, collaborative pursuit of 'excellence' through a 'practice', such as MacIntyre's, and signifying transformation of prior desires. This is because school-based route literature encourages us to assume such routes are typically interested in cultivating a capacity for *pragmatic* judgements of technical effectiveness. There is not the same emphasis if any on transformation through 'experience' of judgements of desires or on the superseding of inferior wants and desires. Neither judgement nor a capacity for reflection is commonly described in the school-based route literature either in any way especially resembling the recognition of *internal* goods. Instead, school-based route judgement and reflection would at best appear to be about performance according to the meeting of explicit targets, and the effectiveness of and adjustments to techniques in meeting them. Moreover, the type of judgement described in the literature on school-based routes is

¹⁷⁰ "This cyclical reflective process, grounded in student results, serves the dual purposes of fueling ongoing learning and solving real problems", it is explained (*TFA*, 2010, p.275).

not the situational and ethical kind of judgement, *phronesis*, associated with Aristotle. The ideal of the school-based route is apparently not the *phronimos* but instead more likely the pragmatist.

Other related and important questions warrant sharper focus in the school-based literature. For example, is any desired capacity of trainees, be it judgement or another, assumed already to be in place and deployed already formed? Or are such capacities to be cultivated through the type of training 'experience' in a way more aligned with, for instance, the tenor of MacIntyre's concept of 'practice'? This lack of focus suggests that at best it remains undecided whether a capacity for judgement is transformed through the 'experience' offered by school-based routes or to be displayed as is. The capacity for judgement that "telic" concepts of practice underscore, however, and one that school-based routes and school inspection, foregrounding 'experience', should be more attentive to, is one that is shaped and reshaped in and through the 'experience'.

The same question of how 'experience' and judgement interplay arises in the context of school inspection, too. There is in fact a very strong link in the school inspection literature between judgement and 'experience'. This was noted in chapter two, and will be explored at greater length in chapters nine and ten. 'Experience' is regarded as enhancing the credibility of inspection, and in particular enhancing the credibility of inspector judgements. However, despite the perception of its value, what the inspection literature pays insufficient to is the question of how exactly this judgement is fostered by 'experience' or not. As will be considered in chapters nine and ten, this is where McDowell's writings prove especially illuminating. The literature relevant to school inspection needs to consider more how precisely any putative interplay between 'experience' and inspection/inspector judgement actually works.

Considering this, it is then unsurprising that there is little to say also in the inspection literature about whether judgement fostered by and in school inspection 'experience' is seen in terms of self-transformation or not. As is part of my thesis argument, this kind of oversight regarding the term 'experience' ought to concern us. For one thing, being inspected has potentially serious consequences for staff, pupils, and a community. If claims are made regarding the value of 'experience' to school inspection, then such claims warrant close scrutiny. Also, if understood in terms of a

'practice', the insufficient attention paid to 'experience' is a very real concern. This is because of the potentially dramatic impact for the person, their relationships, and the wider community, being transformed through such an educational 'experience', may have.

5.4.3 School-Based Initial Teacher Training, School Inspection, and Freedom

As highlighted in writings on the closely related concept of practice, in this chapter we are exploring what self-transformation through an educational 'experience' may mean and what some of its main features could be said to be. As already noted, through initiation into practices one thing, according to MacIntyre, we acquire are "higher order" desires. To acquire such refined, proper desires, is also to acquire independence from our prior, unrefined desires. Is there, then, any indication in the school-based route literature, for example, that this is how the 'experience' is understood? Even if there is little to suggest that an acquisition of "higher order" desires is how the 'experience' is understood, is there any recognition that trainees at least leave old needs and wants behind and so in some sense are liberated from them?

Certainly, independence of a kind is recognised as crucial in the school-based route literature. For example, according to *TFA* (2010, p.10) judgement is something 'good' teachers are able to "suspend". It is explained this "ability to suspend judgement" (TFA, 2010, p.10) is especially important given the threat to teachers of being judgemental (2010, p.79, 166, 167, 215) and of unconscious biases influencing judgements.¹⁷¹ Good teachers are acutely self-aware, they "*Know thyself*" (TFA, 2010, p.189), and are free of harmful prejudices.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ Such teachers

[H]ave the ability to identify moments when they might be unfairly judging someone's competence, commitment, effort level, or way of doing things and to suspend judgment so that they can check their biases and ensure their interpretation of tough situations is objective and productive. (TFA, 2010, p.10; see also pp.68-69)

¹⁷² That is:

We all have individual insecurities, discomforts, assumptions, and biases that can affect our teaching effectiveness. To accurately judge the importance of various causes of problems, our judgments must include consideration of all those internal factors. (TFA, 2010, p.189)

There is at least some recognition then in the school-based route literature of the need to judge freely, free of corrupting influences, as much as possible. In the school-based literature, however, more attention should be paid to the question of whether this capacity to detach ourselves from potential prejudices is a result or not of participating in the school-based 'experience'. Indeed, if such detachment is thought possible, then how should school-based routes respond to the closely related type of criticism (Taylor, 1989) levelled at Locke? That is, how if at all should they respond to the charge that detachment is not only impossible but were it possible, wholly undesirable? School-based routes also regard their 'experience' as an efficacious means especially of instilling novel and new 'techniques that work'. In doing this, we might wish to argue that school-based 'experience' is seen, at least implicitly, as liberation from outdated ways of doing things and thinking.¹⁷³ This learning of technical skills could perhaps be seen as liberation from previous desires, specifically desires to teach in a particular way. However, it is more difficult to see the acquisition of tried-and-tested' techniques in MacIntyrean terms of the replacement of prior desires with "higher order" goods, which signal self-transformation. Teaching to a formula or checklist is not typically seen as 'excellence' in the kind of sense MacIntyre has in mind, either in terms of a product or performance, or in terms of being a member of the teaching profession. Commonly, these techniques are seen primarily as a way of instilling confidence and supporting novice teachers so they survive the early days of their 'experience'.

As has already been noted in chapter two, school inspection values an independent kind of judgement interplaying with 'experience'. At *OFSTED* in England, for example, judgements that interplay with 'experience' are to be open-minded, and unbiased. Indeed, this 'detachment' is central to the idea of "professional judgement" expected of inspectors in England (*OFSTED*, 2018b, p.5). This detached sense of judgement interplaying with 'experience' is synonymous with the phrase "without fear

¹⁷³ In a more general work on expertise associable with these 'hands-on' routes (Lemov, Woolway, & Yezzi, 2012), where repetitive practice of technique is described as transformative ("the transformative power of practice" (p.2), it is claimed that practice in "tried and tested" techniques, or school-approved, 'common-sense' practices can be liberating. That is, by building up, and mastering such skills, these skills and their deployment can be 'automated' (Lemov, Woolway, & Yezzi, 2012, p.35). By automating skills, focus can then switch to other things, and our "active cognition" can be freed "to engage with other important tasks." The liberation, here, however, would appear to be from the technique only.

or favour” used repeatedly by *HMCIs*, for example. From the school inspection literature, however, how this capacity for *independent* judgement develops and what role if any ‘experience’ plays is insufficiently attended to. McDowell’s writings are brought to bear on these questions in chapter nine and ten. The question then of whether the detachment so desired of school inspectors is the result of any kind of transformative ‘experience’ is also left pretty much unanswered in the relevant literature.

5.4.4 School-Based Initial Teacher Training, School Inspection, and Creativity

As well as new desires, and capacity to stand back and judge their old ones, initiation into a MacIntyrean ‘practice’ also sparks creativity. Does this figure at all in the literature on school-based routes or school inspection? If so, this could be taken as some indication that the potentially dramatic change an ‘experience’ such as training to teach in a school or becoming and being an inspector offers, in this case, the sparking of creativity, is appreciated at the very least implicitly in some way.

It is true, and as considered in chapter one, that one of the hopes for school-based routes has been to inject “fresh ideas” into the education system. Part of the rationale for ‘fast-track’ training routes, for instance, has been the “fresh” thinking that their ‘elite’ recruits bring to an education system supposedly deficient in them (Muijs, Chapman, & Armstrong, 2014). ‘Innovation’, a related term to creativity, is also prominent in school-based route literature, and this ‘innovation’ is explicitly linked to ‘experience’.¹⁷⁴ Even if only indirectly this injection of fresh thinking and championing of innovation could possibly be regarded as some kind of sign of the ‘experience’ of training to be a teacher in a school being in effect regarded in some way as self-transformative.

An injection of “fresh ideas” into schools is, therefore, clearly an aim of school-based route recruitment strategy. In this respect there might appear parallels between this strategy and MacIntyre’s theory of ‘practice’, for example. However, the injection of “fresh” thinking is to happen largely through recruiting into schools trainees with

¹⁷⁴ At *Teach First* in England, for instance, and as noted in chapter one, there is the so-called Innovation Unit and annual Innovation Award. This ‘accelerated’ route reports, moreover, that “a growing number” of teachers are making use of their classroom experience in aid of the development of “new ideas to change the reality of education in the UK” (2017a).

experience of business, and science and technology, in particular. The creativity if we can call it that is to be injected into the school-based route ‘experience’ this way, therefore, comes from outside. It does not emerge from inside the school-based route as realising internal goods and standards of excellence does for MacIntyre.

It has also been a common criticism of such routes that they do not in fact provide the right conditions for creativity and innovation. This is despite the declared and explicit hope if not expectation that recruits will generate ideas from their school-based ‘experience’. This lack of provision underpins one key strand to my thesis argument that we ought to more thoroughly scrutinise and illuminate the contexts behind our use of the term ‘experience’. This is because by not doing so, and by not considering carefully the possible obstacles to and preconditions for it, we run the risk of not harnessing its potential. In this case, this is the potential for creativity and fresh thinking.

There is thought to be, for example, a danger in school-based learning that teacher trainees become “blindly apprenticed to existing practice (however bad that is)” (Pring, 2013, p.19). More specifically, Daniel Muijs, Chris Chapman, and Paul Armstrong (2014) argue of *Teach First* in England that the challenging circumstances of a school for its recruits may make it harder to innovate. So while innovation is a declared aim of such routes, because of their oppressive working situation, trainees resort to more conservative approaches.¹⁷⁵ For others (Zeichner, 2012) ‘hands-on’ routes into teaching that place a large onus on gaining experience of ‘tried-and-tested’ technique hamper creative teaching. Such an emphasis undermines use of teacher judgement and cultivation and exercise of their ability to adjust teaching to fit ever-changing student need and working contexts (Zeichner, 2012, p.379). The all-powerful accountability climate in many schools, also, may be a hindrance to creativity. School-based route trainees are also learning their trade in pressurised climates in England, the US and other countries focused on standardised test achievement and test preparation. Yet this climate has, “severely

¹⁷⁵ School-based route proponents might respond in MacIntyrean terms that it is institutions (e.g. school, central government) hampering development of powers of innovation, not the practice ,or ‘experience’ understood in this sense, per se. While not discussed in the thesis, institutions are also according to MacIntyre a precondition of successful practices.

undermined teachers' creativity, threatened their autonomy, hurt their morale, and decreased their ability to differentiate instruction" (Fang, 2013, p.238).

Injecting some fresh thinking, "up to date experiences", is also why secondment, considered in chapter two, has been favoured by school inspectorates. Again, whether with the imposition of frameworks, criteria and other forms of working, it is possible for an inspector to be creative, at least in the sense of straying from official guidance if the context demands it, and even if they have the insight to see that this is required, is not a question addressed sufficiently in the inspection literature. In fact, the suggestion in the literature on school inspection is that, if there is any, the exercise of inspector creativity ensures at best that formal devices and processes work (Lindgren, 2014; 2015), and only here the prior 'experience' of an inspector ("their "tacit" basis for judgment", Lindgren, 2015, p.72) is at play.¹⁷⁶ However, we are not told in the inspection literature whether this pragmatic kind of creativity is seen as emblematic of any transformation, and whether, even if possessed by those of 'experience', this capacity is formed through 'experience' or not.

5.4.5 School-Based Initial Teacher Training, School Inspection, and Identity

As with creativity and fresh ideas, educational contexts employing the term 'experience' prominently, such as school-based routes, are also clearly concerned in their literature with identity. Again, here there is some ostensible overlap between features of self-transformation the literature on "telic" practices draws our attention to and what is described in the school-based literature. In fact, one benefit seen by school leaders in training teachers in schools is that trainees can be moulded, "to the ethos of the school" (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.7). This adoption of a school identity contrasts with school inspection, however, where in the name of objectivity and independence the opposite would seemingly be more desirable.

It has been noted in chapter one that recruitment concerns are also one motivation for school-based routes. Whether candidates will fit with the school ethos is an

¹⁷⁶ In a study of the Swedish inspectorate, Lindgren (2014, p.82) describes how the formalised, explicit inspection guidance is 'bent' "to create space for and address aspects of the local pedagogical realities of schooling that they hold as important." It is especially "experienced inspectors with educational backgrounds" who do this type of "decoupling", and this "manipulation and adjustment of rigid models in relation to the realities of schooling" is a key component of what inspecting is (Lindgren, 2014, p.82).

important concern and by 'growing their own', schools can also see if this fit is going to be possible (CooperGibson Research, 2019, pp.26-27). This onus on ethos and moulding in the image of a school could be construed as being about school-based recruit identity and transformation of it. Recruitment concerns are also a reason for secondment at school inspectorates, and perhaps, albeit less explicitly, secondment allows the trying out of a seconded person to see if they fit with what an inspectorate does.

In line with this onus on identity, there is also, and in apparent contrast with *OFSTED*'s current practices, for example, a concerted effort to promote an esprit de corps on school-based routes. On 'accelerated' school-based routes, for instance, a good deal is made of the programme 'mission' and 'vision' ("You will need to show passion for *Teach First*, our vision and mission", 2010, p.273).¹⁷⁷ In fact, this kind of loud and bold messaging of routes such as *Teach First* is identified as one crucial reason why candidates choose them.¹⁷⁸ Once their stint at teaching, 'time in the corps', is over, the 'fast-track' recruit can opt for 'ambassadorship' and connect with the "ambassador community" alumni network. Here the alumnus can continue to connect with a network of others like them. This opportunity for networking and forging relationships for the future is also regarded by 'fast-track' participants as an appealing trait of their programmes (Elliott, 2018, pp.269-270). Although not described in those terms, the 'Teachers' Standards' (2011) are also a vision and mission of sorts, and one for all teachers and trainees in England to maintain, "within and outside school" (p.14). The code of conduct for *OFSTED* inspectors (2020), also, refers to the expectation that inspectors will "uphold and demonstrate Ofsted's values at all times". Again, this could be understood as related to identity, so

¹⁷⁷ *Teach First* (2021) declares its mission to be "Building a fair education for all." In 2019 this mission was "Equality through Education" (Teach First, 2019b). The stated mission of *TFA* (2017), is, "working for justice and opportunity for all. We are committed to profound systemic change, because we know equity begins with education." For critics, however:

TFA members do not work in service of public education [...] They work in service of a corporate reform agenda that rids communities of veteran teachers, privatizes public schools, and forces a corporatized, data-driven culture upon unique low-income communities with unique dynamics and unique challenges. (Michna, quoted in Goldstein, 2014, p.196)

¹⁷⁸ For *Teach First* trainees, and newly-qualified teachers, "the content of the route's promotional material had resonated with their wish to work in a profession that contributed towards local communities and supporting disadvantaged young people" (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.32; See also Elliott, 2018, pp.268-269).

understood as indication of self-transformation being expected at least implicitly by school inspection 'experience'.

Both the "telic" conceptualisations of practice and the school-based route and seemingly, albeit to a lesser extent, the school inspection literature emphasise identity and related terms. However, the kind of corporate vision and culture instilled, for example, in school-based teacher training recruits is not emphasised as being a sign of self-transformation. The corporate visions, like those of *Teach First* or *Teach For America*, are also more akin to business cultures imposed from the top down. Albeit not perhaps fully comprehensible initially, these school-based route visions are very made explicit and foregrounded from the start.

The question of narrative and seeing the recruit as a "story-telling animal" (2007, p.216), as MacIntyre regards identity, also, is not typically a feature of these 'visions' or 'strategies'. As considered in chapter four, those transformed by a MacIntyrean practice have realised its traditions of excellence gradually from within. Similarly, the "story-telling animal" that MacIntyre describes must uncover the stories that their own specific character tells if they wish to understand how others do or do not understand them. From this self-knowledge they can live better lives. If 'identity work' through school-based route or school inspection 'experience' is to be understood in these MacIntyrean narrative terms, then the identity acquired is to be realised only later. The identity MacIntyre emphasises is not explicitly predefined top-down by others, unlike with business cultures and the corporate strategies adopted by some school-based routes and *OFSTED* in England.¹⁷⁹

The theme of identity then also features in the school-based training route and school inspection literature. Yet identity is another sign of self-transformation highlighted in writings on 'practice', where the question of how and, indeed, if at all, it interplays with 'experience' is left hanging. Considering what a transformation of identity may mean for a person, their relationships, and their communities, this is yet further reason why 'experience' in educational contexts, what it entails and offers potentially, must be given fuller consideration.

¹⁷⁹ While not apparently promoting a corporate brand of identity per se currently, *OFSTED* has in the past done so, and now has a corporate strategy ('Ofsted strategy 2017–22', *OFSTED*, 2017c) with three underpinning values" (p.11).

In this chapter, I have highlighted and argued for the possibility of self-transformation through a 'practice' and so through an 'experience' such as that characteristic of school-based routes into teaching and school inspection. A self-transformative 'experience' of this kind is one more akin to *Erfahrung* in German, less to *Erlebnis*, and closer to the personally, rather than epistemically, transformative experience described by Paul (2014; 2015a; 2015b). Self-transformation as described in the writings of MacIntyre, in particular, means transformation of a participant's desires, a capacity for freedom and creativity, more cultivated judgement, and a radical shift in identity. Self-transformation of trainees is not emphasised explicitly in the school-based route literature, for example, and at best only hinted at inadvertently. This lack of consideration is problematic if, as has been argued so far, the school-based route and school inspection 'experience' ought to be understood as a 'practice'. If insufficiently attended to, their consequences are less likely to be prepared for. There are less likely to be measures in place to prepare their trainees for any potential self-transformation, with all the potential damage this causes them and the relationships that trainees are in. Any desirable features of this self-transformation, the creative insights that can arise, if they emerge at all, do so in spite, not because, of any deliberate attention to 'experience'. If understood as a 'practice', MacIntyre's writings also draw attention to another wider reason for more carefully and critically scrutinising an educational 'experience' such as learning to teach in a school or becoming a school inspector. This is his contention that those who cannot realise "higher order" goods, a sign of self-transformation, lack maturity and reasonableness. This in turn impacts on the wider community in which they reside. If understood as a 'practice', the significance of not paying 'experience' closer attention then reaches beyond its immediate confines.

Chapter 6: The Traditions of Educational 'Experience'

In the last chapter there was lengthy consideration of what it is we might think comprises the type of self-transformation being initiated into a 'practice' offers. This is not a question attended to sufficiently in the literature on either school-based routes into teaching or school inspection. As a result, discussion drew in part on the literature on 'experience', but especially on MacIntyre's writings regarding the closely related concept of 'practice'. According to MacIntyre's writings, there is necessarily an element of unpredictability and it not possible to say what will emerge definitively in any more than general terms. However, it is possible to say that self-transformation through a 'practice' entails a number of interrelated things. Through participation in a 'practice' we can expect a relinquishing of prior, but inferior desires, for newer, "higher order" ones. We can expect the cultivation of the capacity to judge and reflect upon different goods. We can expect the cultivation of a capacity for independent, detached thinking. We can expect our creative capacities to develop, and most fundamentally, expect our identities to radically change. These expectations are highly significant for educational contexts that seek the validation of the term 'experience'. For at the very least MacIntyre's insights suggest becoming a teacher or school inspector is about more than simply acquiring a few techniques and knowledge of procedures and systems. The kind of outcomes MacIntyre points to should impress on key stakeholders in these and other contexts foregrounding 'experience' quite how impactful these contexts are. Most crucially, perhaps, they should inform the support and guidance they offer. Coming to see the world differently, to have different wants and needs, and to emerge with a new identity, as MacIntyre describes the development that occurs through a 'practice', will place great pressure, in particular, on the personal resources, relationships, and character, of the individual experiencing the transformation. Seen as a 'practice', in educational contexts, such as school-based routes and school inspection, there must therefore be more consideration of the right support that needs to be in place if and when an individual goes through such a transformation. This supports my argument that there is more at stake with the term 'experience' in educational contexts than is typically given attention and what is at stake needs greater focus than is currently provided.

If we recall, this focus on self-transformation through a 'practice' and what it entails followed from the adoption of 'practice' to illuminate the 'experience' of educational contexts. The 'experience' literature anticipates much of what is found in writings on the closely related term 'practice', not least the kind of 'traditions' that will be discussed in the chapter to come. However, because of the "telic" dimension of 'practices', it is writings on this concept that prove an especially fertile and stimulating resource.

Part of my argument is that for self-transformation to take place through and within a collective educational 'experience', such as learning to teach in a school or school inspection, the right preconditions need to be in place. As discussed in chapter four, one key preconditional ingredient identified in the literature on the closely related term 'practice' is a *telos*. This provides the activity and its participants with a shared sense of purpose and a sense of what should be done. Another key ingredient in the interwoven fabric of a shared teleological practice, and so, for the purposes of this thesis, a key ingredient in an educational context foregrounding the term 'experience', is, however, tradition.

'Tradition' can be understood in different ways, but in terms of a school and a school inspectorate two main ways are the traditions of the school and inspectorate itself and the traditions of the wider society and community that the school and inspectorate is immersed in. If understood as a "telic" practice both of these kinds of 'tradition' are crucial to the potential of the 'experience' of school-based route teaching and school inspection.

If 'tradition' is a key precondition of 'experience', it then follows that being inattentive to tradition jeopardises both the chances of the 'experience' being a success, and the chances of self-transformation through it. As is argued in the thesis, this is because being inattentive means at best a superficial treatment. Resources are more likely to be diverted elsewhere, and the question of how best to try and harness the customs and traditions of a school and an inspectorate in order to enable the full development of a participant will likely not be fully considered if at all. In particular, if it is a key precondition of an educational 'experience', without attention to tradition, any self-transformation that does occur, occurs at best incidentally. Inattention to

tradition as with other conditions of 'experience' in educational contexts such as school-based routes and school inspection makes transformation work ever more reliant on among other things the already stretched personal and social resources of the individual undergoing the 'experience'.

This is not to say that all those working in or researching school-based teacher training or school inspection fail to acknowledge the existence or indeed the importance of customary and traditional elements. However, the overall emphasis of school-based routes and of school inspectorates such as *OFSTED* is elsewhere and if acknowledged, the traditions are not commonly seen as elements in a richer and potentially transformative interwoven, interplaying fabric of 'experience'.

6.1. Internal Traditions of Excellence

MacIntyre has an especially acute sense of the conditions of a rich 'experience' within which human flourishing and transformation is possible. One powerful example of this sense at play is his writing on the traditions that practices embody. In fact, for MacIntyre, all practices, and so their members, embody traditions.¹⁸⁰

More specifically, the traditions practices embody are for MacIntyre their historical "standards of excellence" (2007, p.187). As already considered in chapter four, these traditions of excellence are their evolving standards of achievement, or standards of excellent achievement (MacIntyre, 1988, p.31). They are "a stock of maxims" that embody the "best" yet achieved as it is understood from within a practice at that time. That is, "standards of excellence" are "the present established maxims", the 'best so far' prior achievements of a practice definitive of "perfection" (MacIntyre, 1988, p.31).

The traditions MacIntyre regards practices as embodying are not therefore simply customary, ritualised ways of doing things, such as wearing a particular outfit or using an archaic language, preserved for posterity by enthusiasts. These standards are not relics of the past upheld simply because they are relics of the past. These are traditions that embody the latest know-how and understanding.

¹⁸⁰ Practices by definition, MacIntyre explains, "always have histories", "often through many generations" (2007, p.221).

For MacIntyre, such traditions of excellence are especially important. This is because MacIntyre can be read as suggesting that it is primarily through the traditions that all practices embody that a participant achieves self-transformation (“to be adequately initiated into a craft is to be adequately initiated into a tradition,” MacIntyre, 1990, p.128). Neglecting the traditions of a practice then runs the risk of limiting, or even preventing, the potential for self-transformation a rich ‘experience’, seen as a goal-focused, structured, and shared practice, offers.

Risking the possibility of self-transformation by neglecting the traditions of a ‘practice’ is one crucial reason why if understood also as a practice the major focus on technique in the literature on school-based teacher training and school inspection, where ‘experience’ also features, is concerning. In short, and as is argued in the thesis, neglecting ‘experience’, and its preconditional elements, such as tradition, in particular, is to neglect human potential.

Another related reason why for MacIntyre the existence and sustenance of traditions internal to a practice are so crucial is that the *progress* of a practice is dependent on progress in its traditions. If we recall from chapter four, it is a feature of “higher order” ends of excellence characteristic of all MacIntyrean practices that they are not rigidly fixed, but evolving (“ongoing”, MacIntyre, 2007, p.273). It is by working and striving from *within* a tradition (“the outcome of a competition to excel”, MacIntyre, 2007, p.190) that progress in “goods of excellence” is made. To work and strive from within a tradition, and for progress within the tradition to be made, is to learn its “standards of excellence”. More precisely, what development in traditions requires is that participants acquire what is necessary to perform in the tradition first before coming potentially to realise where the tradition may be modified, developed, and improved (MacIntyre, 1988).

“Standards of excellence” are not therefore rigidly and permanently fixed if a practice is healthy (MacIntyre, 2007, p.191). What MacIntyre argues here again supports my thesis argument that there is a lot more at stake with the term ‘experience’ than is commonly attended to. In this case, the ability of a shared human activity to improve through initiation into its traditions, and the insights this hopefully provokes, is at stake.

One example MacIntyre (2007, p.189) provides of traditions of excellence, and their evolution, are developments in European portrait painting from the late middle ages to the eighteenth century. In medieval times, MacIntyre explains, the face was 'iconic' and painters aimed at excellence in this. Whether the face resembled a saint or not was not an issue. Developments in portrait painting, however, meant that a representative likeness of people could now be better produced. Fifteenth century naturalism ("The heavy eyelids, the coifed hair, the lines around the mouth", MacIntyre, 2007, p.189), for example, attempted to represent the person. Later in the seventeenth century Rembrandt attempted to combine the iconographic and naturalist approaches ("the naturalistic portrait is now rendered as an icon, but an icon of a new and hitherto inconceivable kind", MacIntyre, 2007, p.189).

Schools, similarly, can also be said to embody traditions of excellence in at least some kind of sense. A Victorian school from the late nineteenth-century looks and feels markedly different in many different aspects to a typical school in the 1960s and to the schools of today, and these changes have at least in part been in the name of doing things better. The same can be thought of school inspectorates. In England, for example, as a replacement for the previous inspectorate, *HMI*, *OFSTED* was intended to be a major improvement. *OFSTED*, also, is both said to have been informed by previous practice and an attempt in part at least to learn from the lessons of the past. The crucial 'School Inspection Handbook', for example, "was the pre-1992 HMI's last bequest to OFSTED, a gift carried over by those HMI who went on to set up the new organisation" (Maclure, 2000, p.314). As Stuart Maclure (2000, p.314) explains:

Things which HMI took as implicit as part of a tradition going back generations, had to be made explicit in these pages [...] but much of the content was a direct reflection of traditional HMI thinking.¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ For Sally Twite *HMI*, the new *OFSTED* 'Framework' was also drawing on the past and so another example of where inspection in England is being developed in at least the name of improvement if not excellence per se. Twite reports that the 'Framework', "in effect drew on HMI expertise developed and refined over ten to fifteen years" (Maclure, 2000, p.316-317). Developments in the so-called Notes of Visit, "HMI's bread-and-butter record", and numerical grading (Maclure, 2000, p.272), and in the production of inspection criteria (Maclure, 2000, pp.273-277), are also said in the literature to be a continuation albeit made public and visible of earlier HMI inspecting practice.

6.1.1 Standards of Excellence and the Tacit

As MacIntyre encourages us to see, then, without paying sufficient, deliberate attention to the traditions of a shared, teleological human activity, school-based route teacher training or school inspection, then it is less likely if at all to make any progress. More concerning perhaps, and again supporting my thesis argument, is the suggestion in MacIntyre's writings (1990, p.128) that without being initiated into the traditions of a 'practice', flourishing and transformation within it are put at risk.

MacIntyre also emphasises how the traditions of 'excellence' that a practice ideally embodies are not wholly explicit. This inescapable tacit element to their traditions raises important questions for a 'practice' and so if understood as a 'practice', for an 'experience' such as learning to teach in a school or becoming and being a school inspector. It raises the likelihood that not only the designated mentor but all of the various people interacting with a trainee teacher or inspector could potentially play some role in the 'experience'. It ought to encourage stakeholders in school-based routes and school inspection to also consider the types of conditions amenable to acquisition of the tacit. This is rather than the overridingly primary focus on the explicit and how best to transmit this to trainees that would currently appear to be the case.

So, for instance, some of MacIntyre's examples of historical but evolving "standards of excellence" - the achievements of painters and composers (Turner's painting, Bartok's quartets) (2007, p.191) or those standards learnt for the piano or violin (1999, p.89) - are explicit, but not all are. His are also standards embodied in a practitioners' customary way of doing things, and so in the traditions which all practices have (MacIntyre, 1990, pp.127-128). MacIntyre writes also of the expert being the measure herself ("she or he is in her or his own actions the standard or criterion", 2006, p.15).

The likely tacit dimension in the traditions that comprise a practice described by MacIntyre, and that provide opportunity for both self-transformation and progress in a practice, is identifiable and underlined elsewhere in the literature on 'practice' and 'experience'. For Wenger, for example, a 'community of practice' encompasses:

[A]ll the implicit relations, tacit conventions, subtle cues, untold rules of thumb, recognisable intuitions, specific perceptions, well-tuned sensitivities, embodied understandings, underlying assumptions, and shared world views. (1998, p. 47).

The majority of these different resources, Wenger (1998, p. 47) adds, are unarticulated, “yet they are unmistakable signs of membership in communities of practice.”¹⁸²

Oakeshott (1991) also makes a similar point albeit more strongly regarding the tacit nature of what is acquired in a shared human activity. For it is his argument that *any* explicit technique is reliant on at least some customary knowledge. If we recall from chapter three, the explicit, formalised and technical knowledge beloved of the Rationalist, and akin today to teacher training standards or inspection frameworks, is for Oakeshott one form of knowledge required of “[e]very science, every art, every practical activity” (1991, p.12). The other form required is a more implicit, practical kind of knowledge, or ‘know-how’. Crucially, technical knowledge can be explicitly formulated into “rules, principles, directions, maxims [...] propositions” and written down (Oakeshott, 1991, p.14), but practical knowledge cannot. Normally, Oakeshott (1991, p.15) explains, this other practical knowledge finds expression in custom or tradition, “in taste or connoisseurship,” or just “in practice.” Such knowledge equates, for example, to the “artistry” of a pianist, the “style” and “insight” of a chess player, to:

[T]he sort of judgement which tells [a scientist] when his technique is leading him astray and the connoisseurship which enables him to distinguish the profitable from the unprofitable directions to explore. (Oakeshott, 1991, p.15)

As noted in chapter three, Oakeshott recognised that the explicit form of knowledge is regarded commonly as preferable to practical ‘know-how’, but he recognised too that both forms are necessary. It is not therefore a case of teaching or learning just

¹⁸² In practices, we are also initiated into the ‘tricks of the trade’ (how to speak to aggressive members of the public, how to save on photocopying credits), and into the processes and customary ways things work. There are also those helpful pieces of advice that save time and effort such as where to find the correct folder in the computer systems, how to use the email facility on the photocopier, and how to work the coffee machine, for example. These things are also not necessarily made explicit. Knowing this type of thing, however, is important and contributory to a healthy and productive ‘practice’.

one or the other type of knowledge. In fact, and with obvious relevance to teacher training or school inspecting, to succeed in any human activity (e.g. cooking, the arts, painting, music, poetry, science, religion, politics) possession is required of both. For Oakeshott, this is especially the case in activities dealing with the leadership and management of men (Oakeshott, 1991, p.13).¹⁸³

Oakeshott's stronger suggestion, however, is that not only are these two forms of knowledge, the technical and the practical, essential for success in shared, potentially transformative human activities. These two forms of knowledge are necessarily intertwined and so indivisible. As he explains, technical knowledge is "inseparable" (Oakeshott, 1991, p.12) from the more implicit, tacit, and practical kind of knowledge or know-how embodied in habits of behaviour, tradition, and custom. In other words, "there is no knowledge which is not 'know how'" (Oakeshott, 1991, pp.13-14).

As well as MacIntyre, then, a variety of writers central to the exploration of the term 'experience' in the literature and to the concept of 'practice' can shine a light on the necessary and inescapable tacit dimension to the traditions of our shared human activities, such as learning to teach in a school and school inspection.¹⁸⁴ For Oakeshott it is not only that there are explicit and implicit forms of knowledge. It is rather that the two are "inseparable" (Oakeshott, 1991, p.12). If, as MacIntyre, we regard the traditions of a practice as being crucial for self-transformation and progress of a practice, if both are desired, and if we view the 'experience' of learning to teach in a school and becoming and being an inspector as a 'practice', then largely and unavoidably implicit traditions internal to the 'experience' must be given more serious consideration.

One question this seemingly inescapable and crucial tacit dimension to the resources of a shared human activity such as learning to teach in a school or becoming and being an inspector raises is what school-based routes and school inspectorates

¹⁸³ See Oakeshott (1991, pp.12-13).

¹⁸⁴ Writings on practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991) lead school inspection researchers to similar conclusions. For example, Baxter (2017b, p.268) stresses the importance of discovering, "how much of their working practices derive from tacit knowledge." For Baxter (2017b, p.268), in fact, "there is ample evidence to suggest that much of what inspectors do is tacit—and that successful inspection largely rests on this type of knowledge in order to achieve basic functionality." On the tacit knowledge of school inspecting see also Lindgren (2014; 2015) and Ozga (2014).

should do to best ensure the conditions in which a teacher trainee or inspector can become responsive to tacit knowledge. While perhaps the exception, this is in fact the kind of question that has been addressed explicitly in the literature on school-based routes. Hagger and McIntyre, prominent champions of school-based teacher training teaching, for example, refer to teaching expertise as “professional craft knowledge” (2006, p.33). By this, they mean teaching expertise is knowledge that is “embedded” and “largely tacit” (Hagger & McIntyre, 2006, p.34). Hagger and McIntyre also argue that “professional craft knowledge” must be made explicit, and so be formally taught, if it is to help the trainee teacher. Tacit know-how of “experienced” teachers cannot be left unsaid if it is to benefit others, Hagger and McIntyre claim. While difficult to achieve, making practical ‘know-how’ explicit can happen but only through “critical examination” (Hagger & McIntyre, 2006, p.57).

Treatment of this question of how to communicate tacit, customary knowledge and understanding is not a primary focus in the school-based route or school inspection literature. It is, however, identifiable in Oakeshott’s writings, for example. Neglect of this question in the school-based route and inspection literature lends further support to my thesis argument. That is, key questions regarding the nature, complexity, and preconditions of collective educational ‘experience’ are insufficiently attended to. Unlike school-based route advocates Hagger and McIntyre, who do consider the question, Oakeshott does not appear to believe tacit, customary, ‘craft’ knowledge can be made explicit or indeed should. As highlighted in chapter three, it is Oakeshott’s argument that this other necessary kind of practical knowledge argues we have lost sight of (Oakeshott, 1991, p.15) cannot be taught or learnt at all in the formal sense of the term. This tacit knowledge persists only in practice, “in taste or connoisseurship” (Oakeshott, 1991, p.15). As habitual, customary knowledge, acquired through and with ‘experience’ of a practical activity, implicit, tacit knowledge, “can neither be taught nor learned, but only imparted and acquired” (Oakeshott, 1991, p.15).

As tacit ‘know-how’ cannot be communicated explicitly, it then follows, for Oakeshott, that acquisition of tacit ‘know-how’ is only through “continuous contact with one who is perpetually practising it” (1991, p.15). This underscoring by Oakeshott of ongoing interaction with a more experienced other is reminiscent of both school-based

teacher training and the way school inspectors are still trained today. This kind of assumption regarding “continuous contact” is in the literature on school inspection, for example, linked also explicitly to the passing on of traditions (“traditions of HMI”, Perry, in de Waal, 2008, p.43).

For Oakeshott, exemplary of this implicit, “continuous contact” form of learning is the apprenticeship model, which itself underpinned the “family tradition” (1991, p.39) of transmission of knowledge he celebrates.¹⁸⁵ Various writers featuring in the thesis, such as MacIntyre, and Lave and Wenger, are also drawn to the idea of apprenticeship, with what we may call tacit learning and ‘experience’ at its heart. While what it implies and its precise nature and workings are not attended to sufficiently in their literature, this is a model of learning that is evoked by both school-based routes and school inspection. Here the emphasis is on being and becoming a teacher and inspector through being assigned in-situ to a more “experienced” member of staff for a limited but significant period of time.

As noted in chapter three, this less explicit, but more time-intensive way of being educated, Oakeshott (1991, p.15) argues, means an ‘apprentice’ will only later grow cognisant of having learnt something. Moreover, the ‘apprentice’ will grow to discover that they have learnt something other than technical knowledge (Oakeshott, 1991, p.15). In fact, through the “continuous contact” afforded by an ‘apprenticeship’, while the pupil will grow to see that something has been learnt, this will not have been explicitly communicated nor will the pupil be able to say exactly what it is they have learnt (Oakeshott, 1991, p.11). This contrasts in particular with the explicit target-like nature of the standards all teacher trainees in England, for example, work towards on their routes, school-based or not. Here trainees are told explicitly from the outset what they are going to learn. Seen as a MacIntyrean practice, novices will hopefully if all conditions are favourable come over time to realise internal goods of excellence that initially were not recognisable. Oakeshott’s notion of “continuous contact” is also relevant here. It can help to further illuminate how a participant in a MacIntyrean practice comes to realise the internal goods of excellence of a practice over time from within.

¹⁸⁵ The families Oakeshott (1991) refers to embodied (“preserved”) a rich fund of knowledge and over a number of generations (“two or three”) this was passed down (“transmitted”) in a way akin to an apprenticeship, and passed on to a good extent unconsciously and through practice.

This issue of how to transmit tacit knowledge is one that follows from paying greater attention to the traditions that shared human activities all and inescapably embody. Such attention to tradition is not currently sufficient in educational contexts foregrounding 'experience', such as school-based teacher training or school inspection. Understood as a 'practice' in MacIntyre's sense, traditions they embody serve to transform a participant and advance 'excellence'. These traditions unavoidably include an important tacit element, and to some, such as Oakeshott, there can be no explicit, technical knowledge, of the kind emphasised, for example, on school-based routes, without a tacit element to it. One question that is insufficiently attended to in the school-based route and school inspection literature for any shared, collective, and "telic" 'experience', is then how best to transmit this tacit 'know-how'. For Hagger and McIntyre in the school-based route literature an effort must be made to make expert tacit knowledge more explicit. For Oakeshott, by contrast, the transmitting of tacit knowledge can only happen by close contact. This leads him and others to the idea of apprenticeships, with a more experienced master overseeing and modelling the role for a novice. Both school-based routes and school inspectorates evoke something similar with their emphasis on mentorship and on-the-job training. Yet questions regarding how best and what conditions are best to support the transmission of tacit 'know-how' to novices, for example, are largely unattended to. Given what is at stake with such educational contexts, where the term 'experience' features prominently, and given the potential for and impact of flourishing and transformation through them if seen as a 'practice', these are questions that deserve closer scrutiny.

6.2 "Larger" Traditions

Writers on 'experience' and on 'practice' underscore the tacit nature of the traditions shared human activities embody, enact, and reproduce. Traditions, for MacIntyre, in part mean those "standards of excellence", not always explicit, embodied in a 'practice'. These traditions and initiation into them are crucial for without them the suggestion is that a flourishing and transformation 'experience' are much less likely if possible at all. If flourishing and transformation are desired, then a crucial concern of key stakeholders in educational contexts where 'experience' features should be the historical standards that a 'practice' embodies.

By tradition, MacIntyre, however, also means the “larger” socio-moral traditions of an era. These “larger” traditions are also a key ingredient in the health and success of a ‘practice’. If understood as a ‘practice’, they are then a key ingredient in the health and success of an ‘experience’ such as learning to teach in a school or school inspecting. What MacIntyre identifies here with these second kind of “larger” traditions also serves as powerful reminder. It serves to remind us that these contexts and their ‘experience’ are not detached from the wider socio-historical conditions that they are necessarily interconnected with. Paying closer attention to ‘experience’ if understood as a ‘practice’ would then also mean paying more attention to the wider context outside. Again, however, these second kinds of traditions that MacIntyre is sensitive to are insufficiently attended to in educational contexts, school-based routes and school inspection, which feature ‘experience’. If not attended to sufficiently, it suggests that the influence of the wider context on the ‘experience’ is not being attended to properly either.

These “larger” traditions are especially crucial for MacIntyre as they determine the nature of an era’s values, and possession of the right values enables transformation. For MacIntyre, the moral qualities that help to enable transformation are specifically the virtues, “qualities of mind and character” (MacIntyre, 2007, p.151), such as honesty, courage and justice. More precisely, the possibility of transformation through a MacIntyrean practice is more likely if participants cultivate a *disposition towards* these virtues (MacIntyre, 2016, p.50). That is, through practices we become disposed to, for example, “the risk-taking and patience of courage, justice in assigning tasks and praise, the temperateness required for discipline, the cheerful wit of an amiable will” (MacIntyre, 1999, p.92).

According to MacIntyre, transformation through a ‘practice’ is, therefore, only partly a result of their internal, historical “standards of excellence”. As important are the socio-moral traditions that a practice is situated in and infused with, and especially important is the specific tradition that offers possession of the virtues.

There are also at least two reasons why, according to MacIntyre, self-transformation and realisation of internal goods through traditions of a ‘practice’ is impossible without virtuous character. Firstly, with a disposition to the virtues we see the goods at play in specific circumstances. Only by cultivating a virtuous disposition can we

then come to realise the superior goods practices provide.¹⁸⁶ With the virtues we recognise:

[W]hat goods are at stake in this or that particular situation and what the threats to them are and to find in those goods premises for an argument whose conclusion will be a just action. (MacIntyre, 1999, p.92)

The virtues therefore enable the realisation of a practice's internal goods, goods defining the specific end of a practice, and goods, "which cannot be identified with, constructed out of, or derived from the wants and needs of the participants" (MacIntyre, 1985, p.242).¹⁸⁷ These are the goods possession of which signifies self-transformation. Even if committed to excellence, without a tradition offering possession of the virtues we cannot therefore achieve the "higher order", internal goods that signify our self-transformation.

A second reason why MacIntyre argues a virtuous character is necessary is because it is crucial to the relationships comprising a practice, and without which there can be no self-transformation and no 'real' goods achieved or enjoyed.¹⁸⁸ As MacIntyre (2007, p.258) explains:

To cut oneself off from shared activity [...] to isolate oneself from the communities which find their point and purpose in such activities, will be to debar oneself from finding any good outside of oneself.

Being disposed to the virtues, especially courage, justice, and honesty (MacIntyre, 2007, p.191), therefore makes it possible to achieve shared internal ends of 'excellence' with others. Courage, for example, is, according to MacIntyre, necessary to relationships underpinning practices because without it, "the care and concern for individuals, communities and causes which is so crucial to so much in practices" (2007, p.192), falters. To genuinely care and be concerned for someone or

¹⁸⁶ In fact, we must *first* cultivate this disposition before such goods can be achieved (MacIntyre, 1985, p.241).

¹⁸⁷ These are not virtues, therefore, because they enable satisfaction of individual wants and needs (MacIntyre, 1985, p.241).

¹⁸⁸ "Every practice," MacIntyre writes (2007, p.191), "requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in it."

something, or some belief, means to be willing to be harmed or endangered in its name. Practices, then, demand on occasion, “the taking of self-endangering and even achievement-endangering risks” (MacIntyre, 2007, p.193). Also important to the relationships underpinning and sustaining a ‘practice’ is honesty. The type of self-knowledge that informs our judgements benefits from the frank corrective appraisals of others (MacIntyre, 1999, pp.94-95). With the right relationships underpinned by disposition to the virtues the right kind of honest and open deliberation is possible (MacIntyre, 1999, p.95). Through deliberation we come to learn if our judgements are aligned with excellence (MacIntyre, 1990, p.62). From others we therefore come to know ourselves and our limitations better. Better self-knowledge through practical dialogue therefore means better judgements, and better judgements mean a better contribution to the practice and what it offers. This also includes “self-deliberation”. That is, the virtues, especially honesty, also make it possible to deliberate with ourselves as well as with others (MacIntyre, 1999, p.97). This is important because we are not always to trust other people’s judgements (MacIntyre, 1999, p.75). For MacIntyre, we can only know ourselves better through deliberation with others, however, if we are in a good, virtuous relationship with ourselves. The virtues of integrity and constancy (MacIntyre, 2016, p.313) are also crucial for maintaining the relationships necessary to practices and what they offer. Integrity is a bulwark against changing commitments to suit the situation, and constancy a reliable commitment over time. The perception of another’s integrity and constancy of character is especially crucial for favourable relationships. Without this (MacIntyre, 2007, p.203), relationships essential to healthy, self-transformative practices suffer from the effects of arbitrariness and capriciousness.

For MacIntyre, then, a virtuous disposition enables in and through a ‘practice’ realisation of internal goods and also the kind of relationships conducive to deliberation over the best way to realise and enjoy these goods. Possessed of a disposition to the virtues means, in addition, (MacIntyre, 2006, p.15), to also be in possession of the overriding virtue of *phronesis*, and, as noted in chapter three, the master virtue which Aristotle is most closely associated with.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁹ Among other things, *phronimoi* also have a cultivated sense of what problems a novice may face and also offer the right support for an aspirant to ‘find their feet’ (Dunne, 1997, p.370).

Virtues and the right character are, therefore, crucial to the life of a 'practice'. It is only with a virtuous character that members of 'practices' can realise "higher order" goods. The virtues enable the kind of phronetic, situational insight that helps us to see such goods, and they enable participants to engage with each other in ways that sustain and foster a 'practice'. Without the virtues, there in effect are no practices. It is the virtues that ensure the participants in a 'practice' can interact effectively in the common and self-transformative pursuit of 'excellence' through historical standards, and pass these and other traditions on. This is further reason why the larger socio-moral traditions MacIntyre describes are so important and why they should be paid close attention in educational contexts, where the term 'experience' is often prominent.

The thesis will move next to consider what extent "larger" traditions of this kind feature in the contexts of school-based routes and school inspection. However, there is one last reason for greater reflection in the school-based route and school inspection literature on socio-moral traditions informing their 'experience'. This is because these broader traditions define the ideal archetype embodying the era's moral qualities and characteristics. Archetypes in fact play a crucial role as they act to legitimate a tradition (MacIntyre, 2007, p.29).

Take the dominant form of socio-moral tradition today, which for MacIntyre is "liberal or bureaucratic individualism" (2007, p.225).¹⁹⁰ For 'bureaucratic individualism', crucial qualities are objectivity, efficiency and profit, rigorous method- and rule-following, training in skills and technique, data analysis, and evidence-based decision-making. The ideal types of "liberal or bureaucratic individualism", according to MacIntyre, are the rich aesthete, the manager ("bureaucratic expert"), and the therapist.¹⁹¹ These archetypes therefore act to legitimate 'bureaucratic individualism'.

¹⁹⁰ Examples of earlier "larger" socio-moral traditions include the Homeric, Aristotelian, New Testament, Jane Austen, and Utilitarian traditions (MacIntyre, 2007, *passim*).

¹⁹¹ The "rich aesthete" is shorn of social or personal relationships, and looking only to manipulate others in order to satisfy personal ambitions. Both the "manager" and "therapist" (MacIntyre, 2007, p.30) treat "ends as given, as outside his scope; his concern is with technique, with effectiveness." The former is concerned with, "transforming raw materials into final products, unskilled labor into skilled labor, investment into profits." The therapist's concern is also transformation, but the transformation of "neurotic symptoms into directed energy, maladjusted individuals into well-adjusted ones."

This issue of archetype is then further reason why MacIntyre highlights and discusses these broader forms of tradition and so further reason why educational contexts, such as school-based teacher training and school inspection, must pay closer attention to preconditions of 'experience' such as tradition. They offer values and motivating ideals or archetypes that may or may not help a practice to survive and succeed. This raises a number of questions for a 'practice' and for an 'experience' seen this way. A practice may even be minded to attempt to negate the influence of a "larger" tradition were it, its values, and archetypes, seen as a threat.

6.2.1 "Larger" Traditions, School-Based Routes Into Teaching, and School Inspection

For MacIntyre, there are two kinds of tradition that are crucial to a 'practice', and to understanding an 'experience' when understood as this closely related, teleological term. One is the historical standard of excellence that a 'practice' embodies. The other type of tradition informing a 'practice' is a "larger" socio-moral kind. A plurality of these can exist at the one time. These different "larger" traditions promote particular types of values and ideals, values and ideals that may or may not be conducive to a 'practice'. MacIntyre underscores the importance of the virtues, especially courage, honesty, and justice, provided by the type of "larger" tradition of in his writings. This is because they enable the realisation of internal goods of a 'practice' and facilitate the relationships that underlie them. They also help the development of *phronesis*, practical judgement.

The question then is there any sign that school-based routes or school inspectorates recognise the preconditional role played by this second type of "larger" socio-moral tradition MacIntyre is sensitive to? This is a key question for a 'practice', and for the closely related term 'experience'. A practice is less likely to progress and a member less likely to be transformed if the traditions embodied are not understood sufficiently or the "larger" environment of traditions is unsupportive or even hostile.

The qualities and archetypes of the 'bureaucratic-individualist' tradition, which MacIntyre sees as dominant today, for example, are especially evident in *OFSTED* literature, and suggested by *OFSTED*'s close links with *New Public Management* (*NPM*) thinking. *NPM* is an umbrella term for a particular approach to the administration of public services that emerged in the 1980s, perhaps most

vociferously in England. *NPM* is among other things characterised by championing of explicit standards, processes, frameworks and criteria, as well as marketisation and privatisation of public services, evidence and numerical data, and values such as efficiency and accountability. In fact, “OFSTED could have been invented to provide a case study in the new public management” (Cole & John, 2012, p.86) and “[i]nspection - at least in this OFSTED version - thus embodies and enacts the core virtues of New Public Management” (Grek & Lindgren, 2014).¹⁹² *OFSTED* personnel and their supporters have also gone on to usher in similar reforms elsewhere in public service provision.¹⁹³

These kinds of bureaucratic-cum-managerial qualities and the traditions that foster and sustain them, identified as dominant today by MacIntyre, are perhaps unsurprisingly also visible in school-based route literature. There are strong parallels, for instance, between *Teach For America's* ‘Leader’ (2010) and the “manager” MacIntyre describes (2007, p.30).¹⁹⁴ The ‘bureaucratic-individualist’ tradition

¹⁹² Former Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Schools (*HMCI*) (1981-1986) Pauline Perry, for example, explains that *OFSTED* was regarded as a means of improving accountability, and that prior to *OFSTED*, “the institutions and authorities responsible for the education of our young people...were virtually unaccountable” (1995, p.39). This accountability was to be achieved, for example, through publication of clear and concise reports and of transparent and relevant data.

¹⁹³ Consider for example, the *Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU)* set up in 2001. The *PMDU* was established and set up by Sir Michael Barber, former education academic, *McKinsey & Co.* consultant, business executive, and ex-head of the *Office for Students (OfS)*, the university regulator in England. The aim of the *PMDU* was to improve public services (e.g. health, education, crime, transportation) by establishing transparent targets (e.g. reducing wait times for routine operations, boosting literacy among 11 year olds, improving the punctuality of trains), clearly defined “delivery plans” as to how such targets were going to be met, and ensuring regular monitoring of progress through data collection and analysis. Richard Page-Jones, who “rapidly became one of the leading influences in the Delivery Unit” (Barber, 2007, p.150), was recruited in 2001 by Barber from *OFSTED* into the *PMDU* as he was an expert in inspection but also in review process design. It was Page-Jones who designed the much-heralded review process of data, review teams, hypothesis-testing, “delivery chains” and reports for Barber’s *Unit* and for public service management in England and Wales.

¹⁹⁴ According to *TFA*:

Teaching As Leadership reveals that teachers who are successful at closing the achievement gap do exactly what all great leaders do when they face seemingly insurmountable odds: they set big goals, invest their organization (students) in working hard to achieve those goals, plan purposefully, execute effectively, continuously increase their effectiveness, and work relentlessly toward their objective of closing the achievement gap for their students. (TFA, 2010, p.xiii)

See also: “the dedication and leadership of a great teacher, who inspires a child to work towards the future they want” (Teach First, 2019a); “Building a movement of leaders in classrooms, schools and across society to end educational inequality” (*Teach First* Twitter page, 2018); “The programme offers a two-year, paid position in a school where you’ll build the skills and experience to become leaders in all sectors of society” (DfE, 2018b).

MacIntyre (2007) describes is evident also in school-based route literature onus on techniques and skills. The 'tried-and-tested' technical skills of these routes are of a kind with the generic, 'effective' and 'efficient' skills employed by modern managers MacIntyre (2007) describes. The personal qualities, 'competencies', demanded of 'fast-tracked' recruits, meanwhile, resemble qualities 'The Manager' and 'The Therapist' ideals embody and legitimise.¹⁹⁵ The added enticement to 'accelerated' route recruits of a career elsewhere after a stint teaching is evocative of MacIntyre's "rich aesthete", who manipulates others to achieve personal ambitions.

It is a feature of MacIntyre's argument that a number of "larger" socio-moral traditions can operate simultaneously. While seemingly not so evident in the literature on school inspectorates, there are indeed traces of other socio-moral traditions in the literature on school-based routes into teaching. Take, for instance, elements of the familiar and longstanding ideal of a teacher as altruistic self-sacrificer or saintly martyr (Higgins, 2011, p.1).¹⁹⁶ 'Fast-track' route participants, in particular, are on a "crusade for justice" (Friedrich *et al.*, 2015, p.5), are on a 'noble' mission (Price & McConney, 2013, p.106) as well as furthering their career and networking opportunities.¹⁹⁷ Found also in the school-based route literature is a pragmatic, non-political entrepreneurial ethic rooted in self-responsibility, creativity/innovation, emotional resilience and positive thinking (Ecclestone, 2012; Jerome & Kisby, 2020). In particular, the promotional literature suggests 'accelerated' route recruits are expected to revel in the "challenge" in joining them no matter how onerous or unsettling the 'experience' is for them personally. Any 'pain' suffered on the 'fast-track' programme is supposedly worthwhile, it would appear. If a

¹⁹⁵ We can also identify the imprint of 'bureaucratic-individualism' in references to the importance of 'resilience' and a 'positive growth mindset' on these 'accelerated' programmes.

¹⁹⁶ This view of teaching as a 'noble calling', where a teacher is dedicated primarily to serving students is rooted in a broader Christian tradition. Kevin Burke and Avner Segall (2015), for example, link the charitable and noble image of teaching to the Christian teacher-as-saviour and teacher-as-martyr genres. According to R.W. Rich (cited in Gardner, 1993, p.24n8), in England back in the mid-19th century, teaching was being envisioned as a 'self-sacrificing mission'. Also, 'fast-track' *Teach For All* programmes (Rogers, 2009, p.349) evolved in part out of the "teaching as 'missionary' work [...] teaching as service" motivations of the earlier *National Teacher Corps* (1965-1981) in the United States. Further missionary zeal is evident in nineteenth century forerunners to the *Teacher Corps* (See Goldstein, 2014, pp.34-35).

¹⁹⁷ The teacher-as-saviour image associable with *Teach For America* and other 'accelerated' routes is also one objection to them in the critical literature (Brewer & DeMarrais, 2015, *passim*). The 'Teachers' Standards' that comprise much of the objectives of school-based routes in England, similarly, expect teachers to, "make the education of their pupils *their first concern*" (2011, p.10, *my italics*).

recruit can rise to the 'accelerated' route challenge, then the reward is "making a difference", "overcoming disadvantage", "effecting positive change", "opening the doors of opportunity", "unlocking potential", and "empowering", 'motivating', as well as "inspiring the next generation". If 'fast-track' recruits do manage to "challenge the impossible", their success story also sees them accrue 'human capital' and 'added value'.¹⁹⁸ This makes the surviving 'fast-track' route trainees more employable and better prepared for the 'flexibility' and competition of the marketplace if they decide to switch careers from teaching to something more lucrative.

Viewing the school-based route or school inspection 'experience' as a "telic" 'practice' raises issues it is worth stakeholders considering. One issue worthy of consideration is whether qualities, characteristics, and archetypes derived from "larger" socio-moral traditions help or hinder a collective 'experience' and what it potentially offers. If they hinder, then efforts could be made to reduce or eliminate this. If a help, then efforts might be made to enhance and support this help. Take a tradition, as with 'bureaucratic-individualism', for example, that foregrounds the individual, and narrows focus to the explicit acquisition of technique. Given MacIntyre's argument, this tradition is less likely to be conducive to progress and self-transformation than, for example, a tradition steeped in Aristotelian virtue and focused on 'excellence'. It would then be in the interest of educational contexts seeking 'experience' in this richer sense to act to minimise the impact of 'bureaucratic individualism'. The contemporary tradition advocating self-sacrifice and postponement of personal reward, reminiscent of the tenor of 'fast-track' school-based route literature also evokes something of the "liberal or bureaucratic individualism" MacIntyre argues dominant today. Yet, in MacIntyrean terms, this would also be problematic. What is required for flourishing and transformation through a MacIntyrean practice, and an 'experience' understood this way, is a tradition that encourages a desire for collective growth and the common-cum-

¹⁹⁸ It is clear, however, that not all 'fast-track' route recruits do manage to 'overcome the odds'. For example:

Teach First beginner teachers have reported feeling overwhelmed and incapable of doing what they were tasked to do. They do not identify as the heroes they are expected to be, but instead feel that the mission is impossible (Ness, 2004; Rice *et al.*, 2015). (Elliott, 2018, p.271)

individual good. What is not conducive to this requirement is a tradition that encourages the sacrifice of some for others or personal sacrifice for the greater good.

For MacIntyre there are two main kinds of tradition that pervade and sustain a 'practice'. If educational contexts that feature 'experience' regard themselves this way, then what these traditions entail and how best to harness their potential ought to be carefully considered. The traditions of a 'practice', according to MacIntyre, are the traditions of excellence it embodies, but also the "larger" socio-moral traditions it is situated in. The former kind of tradition, necessarily tacit in part, and found in a healthy, competitive 'practice' striving for 'excellence', evolves and changes. Without being immersed in and coming to possess the traditions of excellence of a 'practice' it cannot progress and there can be no personal self-transformation. The latter, broader type of tradition MacIntyre is sensitive to are those ideally that transmit and sustain the moral qualities, i.e. the virtues. These inform and sustain the relationships undergirding a 'practice' and allow for the realisation of internal goods of excellence. The school-based teacher training route 'experience' and the 'experience' of becoming and being a school inspector can both be seen as an embodiment of and pervaded by traditions. Stakeholders in these contexts may well appreciate their historical nature. Yet consideration of 'tradition' in anything like MacIntyre's rich sense of the term is not a primary focus of either the school-based route or school inspection literature. This further historical and customary aspect of an 'experience' we might think characteristic of school-based routes and school inspection, however, also deserves closer attention. This is considering what is potentially at stake for our development and that of the wider community if not able to access traditions of excellence, or if impeded by the wrong traditions.

Chapter 7: The Participants in Educational 'Experience'

MacIntyre's "telic" concept of 'practice' alerts us also to the traditions that they necessarily embody and are situated in. We can assume that an 'experience' characteristic of school-based routes and school inspection is informed by traditions. Traditions, the historical standards of excellence of a 'practice' and the "larger" socio-moral traditions a 'practice' is embedded in, are vital for MacIntyre. They are the means by which practices, and the relationships that comprise them, are sustained and progress, and they provide one of the preconditions for self-transformation. 'Tradition' is also a focus of consideration in the literature specific to the term 'experience' (Oakeshott). Despite their crucial importance, there is, however, very little to suggest that the traditions that MacIntyre and others are sensitive to concern educational contexts where 'experience' features. This suggests again that what is at stake in and through their 'experience' is typically not being appreciated in its fullest and most pregnant sense.

In the chapter to come I again with MacIntyre's writings, in particular, consider another key ingredient of an 'experience' such as school-based routes and school inspection, the participants. However, while in the case of 'tradition' there is an apparent lack of attention in the literature, with participants another issue arises. This leads to a broader point about the use of 'experience' in educational contexts. For, as there is with participants, there may well be a good deal of recognition in the relevant literature of key conditions within which an 'experience' may be productive and fruitful. However, these conditions may not be sufficiently appreciated nor understood in quite the best way. My argument here is then not so much that questions of 'participants' are seemingly neglected, as with tradition, but rather that treatment is insufficiently attentive to what is stake.

7.1 Teachers

One key person in an educational context where 'experience' features, which the literature relevant to these contexts does discuss, but which the literature does not appear to be sufficiently sensitive to, is the teacher (master, tutor, mentor). In school-based routes, for example, "experienced" people ("teachers", "colleagues") are

central to the training up of new recruits. Especially crucial to the school-based route 'experience' is the mentor.¹⁹⁹ Residency routes are especially concerned that their residents are supervised closely by a mentor and over a year or more only gradually introduced to teaching. With school inspection, there is also a great onus on the role of 'experienced' mentors ("buddy' HMI", OFSTED, 2015a; See also Perry, in de Waal, 2008, p.43, and Skolinspektionen, 2009, p.24).

What is described here could be said to fit with the 'practical' resources, MacIntyre's, being employed in the thesis to illuminate the 'experience' of school-based routes and school inspection. Not unexpectedly, for example, one key requirement identified by MacIntyre as being necessary for transformation through a practice is also a teacher (master). Such people transform the novice into someone who will be able to perform and judge well (MacIntyre, 1988, p.31). For fellow exponent of 'practice', Dunne (1997, p.370), teachers are important to a successful 'experience' because only some experiences are "educative".²⁰⁰ A trainee teacher will not gain proficiency merely by "trying his hand" in classrooms; "left to himself, he may be only reinforcing bad habits" (Dunne, 1997, p.370).²⁰¹

With their onus on the mentor, in particular, therefore, neither school-based routes into teaching nor school inspection in England would appear either to be arguing for self-discovery. Becoming a teacher or an inspector would appear to be typically regarded as requiring the input of designated others. In contrast to what may be assumed, use of the term 'experience' on school-based routes, for example, does not explicitly involve teacher trainees teaching themselves (Cf. Bridges, 1995). Whether in the form of a tutor or mentor, all routes, school-based or not, and school inspection, place at the centre of the initiation process a more knowledgeable other.

¹⁹⁹ In 2019 research, 'Schools' Experiences of Hosting Trainees and Employing Newly Qualified Teachers', for instance, it was found in England irrespective of school-based route, "interview participants consistently and frequently cited the school-based mentor as the most critical factor for success" (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.38).

²⁰⁰ That is to say:

[I]t is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so there would have been no need of a teacher. (Aristotle, cited in Dunne, 1997, p.370)

²⁰¹ In fact, argues Bradley (2009, p.65), "it is a commonplace observation that people have experiences from which they repeatedly do not learn."

This onus on being instructed by others is paralleled by what we find in the 'practice' literature (MacIntyre; Dunne).

7.1.1 'Role Model' Mentors

The question this onus on the teacher or mentor in the literature of educational contexts featuring the term 'experience' raises is what exactly mentors and such like pass on and what kind of characteristics and abilities they should possess. Aside from being 'experienced', this question is not explored substantially in the school inspection literature. The school-based route literature does reveal more, however, about what being an experienced mentor means although again there is more to reveal as will be shown especially with MacIntyre's writings.

School-based route mentors in England, for example, know what makes "high-quality teaching in a variety of contexts" and "support trainees in meeting the Teachers' Standards" (DfE, 2016, p.7). According to the school-based route literature, mentors should above all, however, be role models.

To be a role model in the context of school-based routes appears to mean possessing the right characteristics and being able to model how to do things well (CooperGibson Research, 2019, pp.21-22). Mentors (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.41) need, for example, to be "approachable, nurturing, open to sharing ideas and engaging with colleagues" and willing to do and committed to mentoring.²⁰² As well as dealing with "difficult conversations", and being patient with trainees, mentors must also be able to "demonstrate outstanding practice" (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.41).²⁰³ In the 'National Standards for school-based initial teacher training (ITT) mentors' in England (DfE, 2016), we are told (p.7), similarly, that mentors must be "a suitably-experienced teacher", with knowledge of "course structure, assignments and paperwork", as well as being able to, "deconstruct and articulate their practice [...] to coach and [...] support and assess trainee teachers effectively".

²⁰² How committed is a good question. *CooperGibson Research* (2019, p.42) tell us also that some school-based training mentors were doing it for personal development, not necessarily commitment to the role per se.

²⁰³ For Hagger and MacIntyre (2006), as well as providing practice and feedback, school-based teacher training mentors should model what is required ("The school-based educator has the enormous advantage of being able not only to explain to student teachers what they need to do but also to show them", p.52).

Also, according to these 'Mentor Standards', "[e]ffective mentors are outstanding teachers and subject experts, who are also skilled in explaining their own practice" (DfE, 2016, p.7).

As regards to communicating their practice, we know also from chapter one that "experienced staff", presumably tutors and mentors, will on school-based routes need to possess, and so be experienced in, the techniques to be instilled in trainees. School-based route mentors in England (DfE, 2016, p.7), for example, should have "relevant experience and skills in behaviour management." They also, "monitor performance, and help develop their teaching practice and effective classroom management strategies" (DfE, 2016, p.8). We might reasonably assume this onus on possessing technical skills ready to pass on is also the case with expectations of school inspecting mentors.

In those writings on 'practice' sensitive to the conditions informing a transformative shared human 'experience', there is also recognition of the key role played by technique and skills. However, as considered in chapter four, unlike with the literature on school-based routes and school inspection, technical skills, are not the priority for 'practice' writers such as MacIntyre. In MacIntyrean terms it is then not that this area is wholly neglected per se in the school inspection or school-based route literature. Nor is it that it is insufficiently attended to in the literature. Rather it is that this technical element of a productive 'experience' is over-emphasised. Over-emphasis on technique like this presents a number of problems, not least diverting badly needed but finite resources away from other necessary preconditions for a potentially transformative 'experience'.

For MacIntyre, it is certainly the case that no practice can survive without technique. As noted in chapter four, techniques, "human powers", are essential to all practices ("every practice does require the exercise of technical skills", MacIntyre, 2007, p.193), and teachers must be pedagogically proficient. They must employ methods tailored to the practice.²⁰⁴ For MacIntyre, however, technical skills are also simply

²⁰⁴ Smeyers and Burbules (2006, pp.447-448), similarly, write of the methods involved in a practice being specific to each practice. "In learning to play the piano," they write, "one may have to practice certain boring and repetitive drills that are in no way 'musical,' but that are essential to learning how to produce musical sounds," and at "many cooking schools, novices do nothing but chop vegetables at the prep table." There is a danger, they add, that if not treated with care, excessive practice of

one part of the means to realise the greater reward of internal, intrinsic, common “goods of excellence”, with which comes self-transformation. A ‘practice’ is a site of much greater and richer reward than technical skills and the role of teacher is to ensure as best as possible that this greater reward can be realised. For writers on ‘practice’, such as MacIntyre, technical skills do not therefore determine the ultimate aim of a ‘practice’ nor should they.

7.1.2 Moral Qualities

As role models, as well as demonstrating and articulating how things should be done, there is certainly and unsurprisingly a further concern, for instance, in England in the ‘Mentor Standards’ (Standard 1, DfE, 2016, p.10), with mentors possessing certain desirable qualities. It would seem to be the role of the mentor, also, to ‘teach’ the right qualities. In England, according to Mentor Standard 3 (‘Professionalism’), for example, mentors “induct” trainees into the “norms and values” of the profession, “helping them to understand the importance of the role and responsibilities of teachers in society” (DfE, 2016, p.10). This includes encouraging trainee participation in school life, ensuring they understand the school’s position in the community, and supporting development of “the highest standards of professional and personal conduct.”²⁰⁵

One area emphasised in England’s ‘Mentor Standards’ as being especially crucial for mentors vis-à-vis moral qualities is relationships. Mentors on school-based routes in England are, for example, to enable “trusting relationships” and empathy with the trainee undergoing the ‘experience’ (DfE, 2016, p.10). Such relationships, it is claimed, are facilitated by instilling “integrity, honesty and respect”, as well as by various “interpersonal skills”, and the mentor being “approachable” and available. Mentor Standard 2 (DfE, 2016, p.11) expects mentors to support trainees to create good relationships with their pupils. Mentor Standard 4, similarly, is concerned with

techniques will rob a practice of its enjoyment, perhaps killing off the motivation for participating completely.

²⁰⁵ Some mentors had experience of the route that they were mentoring trainees on, with trainees paired up with mentors for this reason (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.42). Pairing up trainees with mentors who had previously completed the same school-based route was seen as a good thing as, in particular, it meant empathy and understanding and so enhanced trainee support.

the development of relationships with training partners, working with them, for example, to moderate judgements (DfE, 2016, p.11).

Mentors on school-based routes in England, for example, are then seen as role models. As role models, it would appear they are meant to demonstrate good practice and to pass on moral qualities, qualities such as honesty and empathy, which facilitate good relationships between them and their mentee and also between mentee and pupils. We might think this additional kind of moral role is expected of mentors in school inspection. As we shall see, writers on 'practice', not least MacIntyre and Dunne, also appear to emphasise how important it is that those with responsibility for training possess both technical and moral qualities. In this sense, there is perhaps more here in commonality between school-based route and school inspection literature and the rich writings on the concept of 'practice', being used to illuminate the closely related concept of 'experience' found in various educational contexts, than in previous chapters.

The primary argument of this chapter is, however, not that 'experience' and what it entails and requires, if development through 'experience' may be productive and flourishing, is always neglected in the literature. Rather the argument of this chapter is that treatment of key ingredients in a transformative 'experience' are in the literature on school-based training routes and school inspection, for example, insufficiently appreciated. A case in point is the nature and requirements of being a teacher in a rich practice-inflected 'experience'.

For example, MacIntyre's 'teacher' does not only need to possess moral qualities. The teacher MacIntyre describes also needs to know how to *dispose* someone to virtue, "so that one becomes disposed in particular circumstances not only to act, but also to judge and to feel as the virtues require" (MacIntyre, 2006, pp.15-16). Teachers in a 'practice' must know how when the situation requires it, to dispose someone to be patient, even if bored, in silence and alone if necessary.²⁰⁶ Disposing

²⁰⁶ This for MacIntyre is made all the harder with the emergence of mobile technology. Students, he argues

[N]o longer understand how important it is to be silent, to be patient in silence. They no longer understand that knowing how to be and act in the company of others involves also knowing how to be and act when alone. (2012, p.5)

someone to the virtues is, however, not a declared requirement of the mentor as described, for example, in the school-based route literature. It is the role of MacIntyre's teacher, moreover, not only to cultivate qualities, but also to ensure that in future students are disposed to them. The question of how to dispose someone to virtue is also a contentious and long-running one. Even if, despite not being paid sufficient attention to, instilling a moral disposition is required of school-based route or school inspection mentors, how they are supposed to go about this warrants closer scrutiny than the question currently receives in the relevant literature.

There would appear to be an even more striking difference between the descriptions of mentoring in the school-based route and school inspection literature and that of the master in a 'practice'. This concerns the strength and demands of the moral qualities described as being essential to good teaching in MacIntyre's writings. According to MacIntyre (1999, p.89), for example, teachers at times have to be "ruthless". Some types of teaching (e.g. teaching of a musical instrument) require 'ruthlessly' rejecting a student of little talent. The ability to identify and exclude the talentless is a virtue of good teaching in specific cases, therefore (MacIntyre, 1999, p.89). 'Ruthlessness', cutting someone from a school-based route or school inspection because they simply do not have the talent for it, is not, however, a quality emphasised in the relevant literature. Indeed, teacher training schools are under significant pressure to make a success of their own training as so few recruits can be trained on-site at one time.

Another example of the greater strength and demands of MacIntyre's moral qualities is that teachers must for MacIntyre be ready to displease their students, who may be seeking entertainment and a relief from boredom, and must be prepared to take the long-term view rather than pandering to any immature desire for instant gratification among them (2012, p.5).²⁰⁷ This willingness to displease or upset a student, not least a trainee teacher or inspector, is also not something brought out in the relevant

²⁰⁷ For MacIntyre:

[A]lmost all worthwhile learning requires patience with what must at first appear tedious and boring and a willingness to engage in activities the point of which will only be grasped later on [...] So the teacher who sets her or himself to be entertaining does students a disservice, but is likely to receive highly favorable teaching evaluations. (2012, p.5)

literature explicitly as being a quality required although, again, we might think this quality required nevertheless.

Being ruthless and being ready to displease trainees are qualities required of teachers that MacIntyre's writings are sensitive to, but which the literature on school-based routes or school inspection pays less attention. Another apparent difference between any moral teaching that the school-based route or school inspector mentor is expected to do and the stronger and more demanding expectations placed on a teacher in a 'practice' is that prior to entering one a practitioner may also have cultivated vices and it is the responsibility of the teacher to 're-educate' those disposed to vice (MacIntyre, 2007, p.180).²⁰⁸ It might be implicit in the school-based route or school inspection literature that this re-educating will occur, but it is not brought out.

What, lastly, is also not emphasised vis-à-vis moral qualities, again indicative of a gap in depth of appreciation between school-based route or inspection mentor and 'practice' teacher, is the desire for *phronesis*. As noted in chapters three and five, informed by the virtues and characterised by a situational sensitivity, *phronesis*, known also as practical judgement, prudence, or practical wisdom, is the overarching, 'master' virtue (Dunne & Pendlebury, 2003 p.210). In fact, for Dunne (1997, pp.369-370), "[t]he main aim of 'educational studies'" ought to be to develop the overriding, "architectonic" (Reeve, 1992, p.76) virtue of *phronesis*. For writers on 'practice', teacher trainers, or school inspectors, therefore, must have cultivated *phronesis* (Dunne, 1997, pp.370-371) and be able to teach trainees how to cultivate it themselves. By what writers on 'practice' tell us, it is then not enough even that mentors and other designated staff have, demonstrate, and can instil a disposition towards, particular moral qualities. They also need to be in possession of the overriding virtue of practical judgement, *phronesis*, so this can be cultivated in their students.

²⁰⁸ For MacIntyre, practices are places where vices can linger. "Vicious" or "mean-spirited" practitioners, however, depend on other members who possess virtue in order for the practice to survive. "Vicious" members are unable, however, to realise internal goods (MacIntyre (2007, p.193) and so be self-transformed.

Along with being ruthless, and being ready to displease and re-educate the immoral, needing to be phronetic is another much tougher requirement of a mentor/master/teacher in the 'practice' writings when compared with what is expected of school-based route mentors, for example. These more stringent expectations on 'masters' found in writings on 'practice', and indeed the challenge of meeting them, are not a primary feature of the literature on either school-based routes or school inspection. While they may well be seen as desirable, by not attending to these things leaves much to chance and to individual resources and effort. This is concerning if we wish for the transformation that an 'experience' potentially offers to be enjoyed by its participants.

7.2 Students

A second area of emphasis in the literature on school-based routes and school inspection regarding participants, and one found also in the writings on 'practice', is the student/trainee/novice. Specific school-based routes, in particular, appear to have their own ideal recruit in mind. The impression from the literature is that learning to teach in a school is seen as suited to particular types of people and not simply to anyone who applies. Candidates for school inspection roles are also told what they should possess and be able to demonstrate. However, what is found in this literature lacks the kind of depth and appreciation that is a feature of the writings of MacIntyre and others. This again suggests a need for more scrutiny and closer consideration of what it is that trainees require to succeed and flourish in the 'experience'.

The type of recruit enlisted into teacher training in England, for example, is overseen ultimately by the *UK Government*. To be a teacher in England, Maths and English qualifications are required and typically a degree. Also seen as desirable is experience of a school as a volunteer or similar. As explained in chapter one, part of the 'fast-track' funding remit has also been to recruit from more select universities and colleges as this demographic has not in recent years been choosing teaching in

sufficient numbers. *OFSTED*, the school inspectorate in England, similarly, has sought various qualifications and competencies from would-be inspectors.²⁰⁹

As with school-based route trainees and school inspection recruits, not just anyone will and can be receptive to an 'experience' understood as a 'practice'. Newcomers, writes MacIntyre, must, for example, possess the signs of genuine ability (1990, p.89). In this respect, at least, there is then perhaps a degree of commonality between what is required of entrants into school-based teacher training or school inspection and what MacIntyre and others describe as being essential of newcomers to a 'practice'. As with the approach to mentors, there is, however, a significant limit to the extent of this commonality. For MacIntyre, not only do entrants to a 'practice' require ability, they also need to be pursuing its end of excellence and be seeking out its internal goods. It is realisation of these goods that among other things signify self-transformation. As we saw in chapter four, these are not goods which are typically attended to in either the school-based route or school inspection literature. If we recall, it is crucial that a new entrant seeks out these internal goods of excellence as not doing so jeopardises the 'practice' itself. To not realise them may lead to the novice quitting the 'practice' and without members a 'practice' cannot survive. Remaining a participant but not contributing collectively to the pursuit of internal goods, similarly, undermines the pursuit of excellence undertaken by all.

7.2.1 Values and Virtues

This contrast in the extent of appreciation of what is required of participants between writings on 'practice' and the school-based route and school inspection literature is further illustrated by MacIntyre's emphasis on the virtues. More specifically, this contrast is illustrated by MacIntyre's emphasis that entrants to a practice must also at the very least in embryonic form possess a *disposition to the virtues*.²¹⁰ As explored in chapter six, these virtues are for MacIntyre sustained by a "larger" socio-moral tradition and embodied in and encouraged by specific archetypes. If novices do not possess this virtuous disposition, at least in nascent form, then, for instance,

²⁰⁹ *OFSTED* inspectors should, among other things, have at least "five years' successful teaching experience and two years' substantial management experience in their sector", and "education to degree level or equivalent" (2017b, pp.2-3)

²¹⁰ MacIntyre explains how it is possible to be virtuous in nascent form by drawing upon Plato's 'Meno' dialogue (1990, p.63).

the relationships essential for self-transformation through a 'practice' cannot be entered into. A virtuous disposition also means even when a particular virtue is not being exercised in the present it can be exercised if required by a later situation. A virtuous disposition is also a sign of good character, which remains even if again a specific virtue is not called for by an immediate situation. As we shall consider in chapter eight, a good character is for Dunne crucial when, as is the case with teaching, there is always an inevitable element of unpredictability.

Undeniably, in school-based route literature, where 'experience' features prominently, various qualities and values are underlined as being desirable in a novice teacher. The *Standards* employed by teacher training providers in England, for example, list a number of different "behaviour and attitudes" desired of trainees.²¹¹ *Teach First* in England list a number of "selection competencies" (Humility, Respect and Empathy, Interaction, Understanding and Motivation, Leadership, Planning and Organising, Problem solving, Resilience, and Self-evaluation) (2015).²¹² *Teach For America* (2010, p.273), similarly, list a range of qualities "predictive of corps member success" and on which selection is made.²¹³ We might even see some of what school-based routes regard as values in terms at least reminiscent of the virtues newcomers to a 'practice' are meant to have in nascent form a disposition to. The 'Teachers' Standards' in England, for instance, emphasise the importance of honesty and integrity (p.10), which for MacIntyre (1999, p.95), and as considered in the section below, help to sustain healthy relationships. With its 'Conduct during inspections' (OFSTED, 2016) and 'Our Values' (OFSTED,

²¹¹ This "behaviour and attitudes" includes upholding "public trust in the profession" and maintaining "high standards of ethics and behaviour, within and outside school" by "treating pupils with dignity, building relationships rooted in mutual respect, and at all times observing proper boundaries appropriate to a teacher's professional position", "having regard for the need to safeguard pupils' well-being, in accordance with statutory provisions", "showing tolerance of and respect for the rights of others", "not undermining fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect, and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs", "ensuring that personal beliefs are not expressed in ways which exploit pupils' vulnerability or might lead them to break the law."

²¹² As a "values-driven organisation", *Teach First* (2015b) explain, their values shape their culture and way of operating. These values, it is explained (Teach First, 2015b), "translate into" the various "selection competencies", which assess the likelihood of the recruit becoming "an impactful leader."

²¹³ These are: A record of past achievement: achieving ambitious, measurable results in academics, leadership, or work; Perseverance in the face of challenges; Strong critical thinking skills: making accurate connections between cause and effect and generating relevant solutions to problems; The ability to influence and motivate others; Organizational ability: planning well, meeting deadlines, and working efficiently; An understanding of Teach For America's vision and the desire to work relentlessly in pursuit of it; Respect for students and families in low-income communities.

2014, p.9), for instance, England's school inspectorate demonstrates an awareness at least of the importance of inspectors practising the right kinds of qualities and upholding the right kinds of values.²¹⁴

Nonetheless, as regards to school-based routes in England and its school inspectorate, possessing a *disposition to the virtues* is not emphasised. The cultivation of a *disposition to the virtues*, a more demanding requirement than just possessing moral qualities, is not seemingly regarded as critical to recruits into school-based training routes or into school inspection. Many of the qualities mentioned in the relevant literature are also difficult to regard as virtues in MacIntyre's sense *per se*. They are typically of other traditions, the qualities of management and bureaucracies, such as being objective, evidence-based and upholding confidentiality. Also, while at best these values parallel if not anticipate the virtues, at worst they conflict with and even override them completely. The primary and ultimate *intrinsic* worth of these qualities is also not emphasised as it is, for example, in MacIntyre's writings.²¹⁵ *Teach For America* (2010, p.24) recognise the importance for its recruits of self-esteem, persistence, and a love of learning, for example, but argue these develop best when aimed at academic success (i.e. such qualities "are most effectively developed through the pursuit of something difficult and valuable—academic achievement"). It is unlikely, given the onus on it throughout its literature, that the values identified by *Teach For America* would, also, be deemed valuable if they did not promote academic success.²¹⁶ In fact, it might be thought that these values, lauded by *TFA* are replaceable, ultimately. For if they do not lead to test success, what would be their point, it might be asked? MacIntyre's virtues, on the other hand, are irreplaceable, and cannot be superseded with others supposedly

²¹⁴ See also 'Conduct during Ofsted inspections' (OFSTED, 2020).

²¹⁵ This is why MacIntyre (2007, p.196) argues, for example, that virtues will likely interfere with pursuit of wealth and power.

²¹⁶ See also:

I have found that a child's self-perception and motivation are so intertwined with academic achievement that it is nearly impossible to address either one exclusively. For a student to make significant academic gains, they must internalize the desire to grow and develop the confidence to take academic risks. However, in order for a student to develop that intrinsic motivation and self-confidence, they must experience some success with academics. (Karen Fierst, *TFA* teacher, 2010, p.24)

better ones. MacIntyre's moral excellences, the virtues, are good in themselves irrespective of explicit, externalised end-result.²¹⁷

While perhaps reminiscent, the virtues MacIntyre describes are therefore by their very nature more powerful and demanding than the types of values school-based routes and school inspection expects of recruits. There is further illustration in MacIntyre's writings of this difference in values and what they expect. For example, during their apprenticeship to a 'practice' students must be able to learn what it is that teachers have to teach (MacIntyre, 1988, p.31), including the excellences of a craft (MacIntyre, 1994, p.284). Yet pupils must also *submit* to the rules for cooperation and to the rules that prescribe their individual role in a practice (MacIntyre, 1985, p.240). They must *subordinate* their individual needs and desires to the realisation of shared internal goods of a practice (MacIntyre, 1985, p.240). Students must be *devoted* to excellence (MacIntyre, 1994, p.285). These qualities of submission, subordination, and devotion, are also necessary, we might assume, if self-transformation is to occur.²¹⁸ In contrast to the demands placed on the novices to a 'practice' in respect of submission, subordination, and devotion, at most what is apparently emphasised and indeed expected, on school-based, 'accelerated' routes into teaching, for example, is, however, meeting their tough challenge through self-responsibility, creativity/innovation, emotional resilience and positive thinking (Ecclestone, 2012; Jerome & Kisby, 2020). Resilience, tenacity, drive, and determination, similarly, feature in job specifications in England for inspectors (OSTED, 2018, p.5). This further contrast again illustrates the argument in this chapter that even where there is some appreciation of the elements that comprise a successful and transformative 'experience', this appreciation could go much further.

7.2.2 "Multimembership"

Another area related to participants in an educational context, school-based routes and school inspection, not attended to closely if at all in the relevant literature, but

²¹⁷ Although now in a state of neglect, with "modernity" possessing no more than a fragmented understanding (MacIntyre, 2007), the quality of the virtues is timeless, intrinsic, and they remain beneficial to all.

²¹⁸ This raises the issue of consenting to something, self-transformation, in advance of knowing what it is exactly that is being consented to or doing the consenting retrospectively after being transformed. See Yacek (2020, esp. pp.262-265) for discussion of "transformative consent" in the context of education.

that MacIntyre and other writers on 'practice' are also sensitive to, is their inescapable and meaning-giving intersubjectivity. That is, in the 'practice theory' literature there is a stress on the part played by the different social groups and relationships that a person will be involved in prior to and through participating in a 'practice'. It is then recognised in various concepts and theories of 'practice' that they do not operate in isolation, but are instead interdependent and interplaying. This kind of interconnectedness can be thought to have great significance for an 'experience' offered by, and for the participants in, an educational context, such as learning to teach in a school.

The "multiplicity of human practices" is, for example, recognised by MacIntyre (2007, p.196). MacIntyre also considers what this means for his approach and, he concludes, we will very likely at some stage in our lives have to order our practices and their goods.²¹⁹ For MacIntyre (1999, p.66), it is in fact likely that some practices we come to join will have to be subordinated to others in order to achieve some kind of harmony between them. Indeed, for MacIntyre (1999, p.66), it may be better if the goods that some memberships provide, and implicitly here the 'practices' being participated in, are rejected altogether.

Lave and Wenger also highlight the key influence on our development of 'outside' relationships with other 'communities of practice' ("relations among persons, activity, and world, over time and in relation with other tangential and overlapping communities", 1991, p.98). In addition, Wenger explains, while 'apprentices' are involved in various communities simultaneously, "multimembership" (2012, p.6), they typically join different communities at different stages of their lives.

As also recognised by MacIntyre, for Lave and Wenger our "multimembership", and our ongoing movement within, between and out of 'communities of practice', is not straightforward, demanding identity and "reconciliation" work (Wenger, 1998).²²⁰

²¹⁹ At times, MacIntyre writes that we "may" (2007, p.201) have to order our goods, yet elsewhere that such ordering is "inescapable" (i.e. "the question 'Why should I do this rather than that?' becomes from an early age inescapable" (1999, p.67; See also 1998b, pp.140-141; 1998c, p.240, 248). MacIntyre (2016, p.261) also writes of interruptions to our daily routines, which provoke a reconsideration of them, the goods that motivate them, how they are ordered and, "whether that rank ordering stands in need of revision."

²²⁰ For Lave and Wenger, identities are "the nexus of multi-membership" reflecting the mutual recognition and acceptance of other members, but not belonging to any one community per se.

Reconciliation, writes Wenger, is about “finding ways to make our various forms of membership coexist” (1998, p.160) and a dynamic, innovative process of coexistence at the heart of being a person (1998, p.161). Reconciliation is also a social process, “weaving” individual memberships of communities of practice, and so “constantly creating bridges” between them and “across the landscape of practice” (Wenger, 1998, p.161). Finding a “livable identity” is an “art” (1998, p.41), Wenger explains, so something that improves with ‘experience’, but also something of varying degrees of difficulty. This difficulty is because practices do not necessarily exist in harmony (“the boundaries between the practices involved are not necessarily peaceful or collaborative”, Wenger, 2010, p.183). There are in fact “significant” (Wenger, 1998, p.160) challenges in the way of reconciling different community identities. A hospital doctor, for example, must reconcile the institutional and professional demands placed on them. A child going to school must reconcile family demands with school ones (Wenger, 1998, p.160). Reconciliation work does not always produce harmony or achieve an end-point, either, and tensions between community memberships may persist.

7.2.3 “Multimembership”, School-based Routes and School Inspection

Pre-existing and new relationships are undeniably a crucial factor in the success or not of a school-based training and school inspection ‘experience’. This aspect warrants close and careful scrutiny if the ‘experience’ they offer is to be transformative. There is, however, insufficient attention to and discussion of this in their literature, where at most it is typically only relationships with other staff and students in a school that are paid attention to.

As already noted earlier in the chapter, in school-based route literature the importance, for example, of forging “positive professional relationships”, and maintaining “good relationships with pupils” is referred to in England’s ‘Teachers’ Standards’ (p.12). In school-based route literature, reference to qualities being key to the upkeep of these relationships is also visible. Of *Teach First* “competencies”, ‘Humility, Respect, and Empathy’ are seen as crucial to fruitful and positive relationships. Another of these “competencies”, ‘Interaction’, is described as a

Identities are changeable and identity construction and reconstruction (i.e. “becoming a different person with respect to the possibilities enabled by these systems of relations” (1991, p.53) is ongoing.

capacity for “[c]ommunicating clearly whilst listening and responding appropriately” and being “a great team player.” With regards to school inspection, similarly, we are told in the code of conduct for inspections (OFSTED, 2020, p.1) of the importance, “that inspectors and providers establish and maintain a positive working relationship, based on courteous and professional behaviour” and in the job specifications (OFSTED, 2018a) that the expectation is that HMI, “build strong relationships” (p.6).

However, unlike, for example, the focus in the school-based route literature on relationships between students and mentors, and between trainees and pupils, there appears much less consideration of ‘external’ trainee relationships in the context of school-based routes and school inspection. Yet trainees and new inspectors will enter their training with established roles in their own families, in their local sports teams or church, in community groups and friendship circles. This is especially likely with more mature school-based route trainees, which are increasingly the recruitment target of such routes (e.g. *Teach First*), and with school inspector recruits with their years of school, subject, and leadership ‘experience’. The strength and type of relationships had within various groups a trainee will likely be a member of aside from their new role in a school will be a key factor in whether they succeed in their training. Some will have friends or family members who have been teachers or inspectors and so will be able to offer advantageous support. Others will not be so advantaged and go into their training without this. Intergroup relationships will be truly tested, especially if, and as considered in chapter five, a trainee’s whole belief-system and world-view is overhauled by the ‘experience’. As a necessary and inescapable part of the ‘experience’, these relationships require much more attention and support than, if the literature on school-based route and school inspection is indicative, they do currently.

The likely influence of our prior ‘experience’, especially other social group membership, is apparently not a major concern of either school-based routes or inspection. However, it is a topic of discussion in the more critical literature relevant to school-based routes. As already noted in chapter one, Britzman (1986; 2003), in particular, emphasises the importance of biography and especially prior schooling in the ‘experience’ of teacher trainees (1986, p.452). Trainees who gain a biographical understanding of their “social relationships” and how these determine their ways of

thinking and acting can then, she (Britzman, 1986, p.452) argues, begin moving beyond these “social forces”.

Admittedly, such “social forces”, and especially membership of other social groups, is likely recognised by at least some stakeholders as being at play in school-based route and school inspection ‘experience’.²²¹ The influence of this prior ‘experience’ on teacher trainees, and suggestions as to how trainees might better manage this, however, is not a primary focus of school-based route or inspection literature.

Inspectors will also be members of other practices, which may come into conflict and in the most serious cases have to be exited completely. School inspection has also regularly sought to recruit staff through secondment. It is hoped that seconded staff bring with them their ‘frontline’ insights and up-to-date ‘experience’ (Spielman & OFSTED, 2019), but also they bring with them their other social group memberships. As Wenger (1998), for example, suggests, the work of reconciling these other memberships with being an inspector would not appear straightforward or easy. Yet the effort or what form this may take does not appear to be grasped fully if recognised at all in the school inspection literature. This again leaves too much to chance and to the personal resources available to a trainee.

Unsurprisingly, school-based routes, school inspectorates, and writers on ‘practice’, identify mentors (masters, teachers, tutors) and novices (students, trainees, entrants) as key elements. All also are clearly concerned with recruiting and developing a particular kind of student and employing a particular kind of mentor. In identifying these elements as important, there is some apparent agreement between the focus in the school-based route and school inspection literature and in writings on ‘practice’ such as MacIntyre’s. Yet, with the types of qualities MacIntyre identifies, especially tough and ambitious demands are placed on both teacher and student. Members of a MacIntyrean practice must possess a disposition to the virtues, not just exercise them, and must be prepared to submit, subordinate, and devote

²²¹ In the case of school inspection, Baxter (2017b, p.268), for example, recognises that, “inspectors may well draw their identity and form their assumptions because of a greater affiliation with another community of practice” (See also in same volume, Moreton *et al.* 2017). For Baxter (2017b, p.268), however, “we need far greater exploration into how inspectors learn; which communities of practice they are most influenced by.”

themselves to its traditions. This perhaps extreme set of expectations is not apparently expected of school-based route trainees or inspectors. Also, all recognise the role played by relationships. Yet, unlike what is apparent both in the school-based route and school inspection literature, writings on 'practice' highlight the substantial and potentially difficult ongoing influence of and the demands placed on novices by outside relationships. How the school-based route recruit or new inspector manages the interworkings of their various social groups is a key issue. However, again, sufficient attention is neither paid to this in their literature or for that matter to the necessity to help novice teachers or inspectors address their 'intersubjectivity'. This last point is of particular concern if, as theories and concepts of 'practices' suggest, there is through an 'experience', such as that characteristic of school-based routes, the possibility of self-transformation. If such a dramatic change occurs in a participant's world-view, values, beliefs, and overall identity, then this wholesale transformation will very likely create tensions between them and their friends, partners, families, and associates. Such tensions will likely pose problems for their career and will likely need addressing and support with. As this chapter of the thesis has argued, therefore, it is not only that the literature on school-based routes into teaching or school inspection, where 'experience is foregrounded, would appear to completely overlook key features. They are also not sufficiently sensitive to what is at stake when these things *are* acknowledged.

Chapter 8: Is Teaching a Practice?

Features of a 'practice' we can think vital to school-based routes and school inspection 'experience' are being overlooked in their literature. Even when something similar *is* recognised in their literature, appreciation of these can be limited at best. A case in point here is what is thought essential about and characteristic of school-based training route or school inspection mentors and trainees. In the relevant literature, there is certainly acknowledgement of the need for participants to possess certain values, qualities, and capacities. However, in order to achieve the kind of transformation thought possible through a 'practice', teachers and students need more than what is described in the school-based route and school inspection literature. For example, mentors, "[t]eachers in general" (MacIntyre, 1999, p.89), must at times be ready to displease. For Dunne, mentors should preferably be in possession of *phronesis* and able to cultivate this in others. For MacIntyre, trainees must be disposed to the virtues, and ready to submit, subordinate, and devote themselves to the pursuit of excellence. The literature on 'practice' is also much more sensitive to the role that the relationships trainees and mentors have play in their 'experience'.

The literature on school-based teacher training and school inspection then compares poorly with the richness, complexity, and potential of the account of this type of 'experience' as found in closely related writings on 'practice'. At most the literature on school-based route and inspection identifies themes and features in common with theories of practice. Yet neither these themes nor features are fully developed or developed in a sense that appreciates their full significance. At worst, this literature fails to mention these conditions necessary for a flourishing and transformative 'experience' at all.

In the chapters to come next, I shall be scrutinising how 'experience' is said to interwork with our key capacity for judgement. This will be undertaken primarily in the school inspection context and will be attempted by again bringing into play theories of 'practice' as well as the closely related writings of McDowell. Before shifting direction like this, in this chapter I shall be continuing to focus primarily on the school-based route 'experience' but drawing upon the writings of Dunne. This will both reinforce but also draw out further interwoven and interplaying components of

the school-based teacher training ‘experience’ also seemingly neglected in the literature.

In this chapter I shall, however, also address a potentially serious issue with my choice of MacIntyre and his conceptualisation of a ‘practice’ with which to illuminate more of the ‘experience’ characteristic especially of school-based teacher training. Teaching and teacher training are very closely related, especially school-based teacher training. As noted in chapter one, ‘fast-track’ school-based routes, for example, have their recruits teaching from the very outset of their training so further blurring the difference between them. However, for MacIntyre, teaching is *not* a ‘practice’, suggesting he would not think teacher training a ‘practice’ either. If it is not a ‘practice’, then this would undermine use of MacIntyrean practice to illuminate training to teach. It would also undermine use of ‘practice’ to reveal more of the depth and detail to what is behind use of the term ‘experience’ in the school-based route context.

In what follows, I firstly review MacIntyre’s rejection of teaching’s right to be called a ‘practice’ as he conceptualises it. I then consider Dunne’s response to MacIntyre’s rejection. There are in fact various writers (Noddings, 2003; Fitzmaurice, 2010; Higgins, 2011) who have argued for teaching to be known as a practice. Not only does Dunne provide good reason to resist MacIntyre’s own argument, and do so in MacIntyre’s own terms, however, he also identifies in the virtue of care, openness and unpredictability, ‘effective history’, a shared ethos, and communal discourse, other interconnected and interoperating elements in the very fabric of a ‘practice’. These other intermeshing and preconditional elements, necessary to the sustenance and “telic” success of a practice, and emphasised by Dunne, help to reveal more of the tapestry of educational contexts foregrounding ‘experience’. These additional elements unearthed by Dunne, however, do not feature strongly if at all in literature on school-based routes or school inspection, where the term ‘experience’ is prominent.

8.1 Teaching is not a 'Practice'

While teachers involve themselves in various practices (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p.5), and “teaching is an ingredient in every practice”, for MacIntyre, “[t]eaching itself is not a practice” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p.8).²²² This is because teaching has no internal goods of its own and so, for MacIntyre, may not be considered a practice in its own right. Teaching is equated to “a set of skills and habits” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p.5) serving other practices.²²³ Teaching is an instrument, “it has no point and purpose except for the point and purpose of the activities to which it introduces students” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p.9). There are, for MacIntyre, no distinct common goods inherent to teaching. Neither the good of a life of practice nor the goods that a practice may produce are available for realisation and enjoyment by teachers qua teachers.

In order for teaching to be counted as a 'practice' in MacIntyre's sense, teachers should see themselves not as teachers of subjects, but, for example, as mathematicians, poets, or historians, conveying “craft and knowledge” to students. In fact, claims MacIntyre (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002), in the best schools, teachers facilitate student participation in activities as bona fide practitioners (e.g. as musicians, historians, poets, artists, mathematicians). Good schools, furthermore, are not only places of practical training and repetition, “laborious drills,” but are places of authentic, albeit lower key, achievements in subject disciplines (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p.9).²²⁴ Teachers should then aim for their students to be inside, but

²²² What MacIntyre writes is perhaps reminiscent of an ethos of teaching associated, unfairly or not, with independent, fee-paying schools. This is a culture of recruiting teachers primarily for their subject knowledge, aiming to instil this - and the right character - in the pupils.

²²³ For MacIntyre, it is wrong, for example, to see “philosophy of education as a distinct area of philosophical enquiry.” This is because, educational enquiries are “an important part of enquiries into the nature and goods of those activities into which we need to be initiated by education” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p.9).

²²⁴ Others follow MacIntyre's take on teaching. For example, Wain (2003) notes that MacIntyre's conception of teaching goes beyond school teaching per se and embraces the teaching taking place within all practices. In addition, Wain (2003) reiterates what MacIntyre claims about teaching not serving its own internal ends, “as would be the case in a practice, properly so called.” For Wain, the aim of teaching is to assist self-discovery, but nevertheless he concurs with MacIntyre that teaching ultimately serves other 'games'. To Hager (2011) also it is important to distinguish between 'generic practices', “a collective term for a set of related practices”, construction, farming, fishing, and education, for example, and 'specific activities', such as bricklaying, milking, and lobster potting, activities that are more specific to the practice. Crucially, while for Hager education is a 'generic practice' comprised of further practices, such as “pre-school education, primary education, secondary

also improve, a subject area. Any internal goods of excellence produced are the goods of these different practices, not of teaching per se.

For MacIntyre in the case of teaching, then, it lacks the internal goods of product and of a specific life that constitute a 'practice'. In other words, teaching, as MacIntyre understands it, is not a transformative 'experience', in which desires are transmuted, capacities for judgement and creativity fostered, and identities refashioned.

Becoming a teacher of *something* as a practitioner, however, does, for MacIntyre, have its internal goods and so offer the chance of transformation. By this he means practitioners (e.g. chess players, historians) of different fields of practice (e.g. chess, history) initiating new entrants into their practice as well as working to further the advancement of their subject.

8.2 Teaching as a 'Practice': Joseph Dunne

If teaching is not a 'practice', as MacIntyre contends, then this undermines the case for employing MacIntyre's notion to unearth more of the detail and complexity beneath the use of 'experience' as it features, for example, in the literature on school-based routes into teaching. Dunne (2002; 2003), however, takes issue with MacIntyre's account of teaching. In fact, for Dunne teaching is a practice, and is a practice in MacIntyre's own sense.²²⁵

As Dunne explains, teaching does in fact, for example, have its own internal goods, both product and of the life of teaching. Internal goods of teaching are, "well-educated students and everything in the activity of teachers that contributes to making them so" (Dunne, 2003, p.355). As with all practices, teaching is not judged on its end-results alone (Dunne, 1997, p.367). Teaching is judged also on means. Excellent performance understood through the lens of 'practice', furthermore, is for Dunne *inextricably* linked to how we act. The onus is on doing things the morally right way, on being a classroom practitioner that brings out the good in pupils in the

education, higher education, adult education, workplace education, and so on" (2011, p.558), teaching is considered an 'activity' that serves these and other practices (p.559).

²²⁵ Dunne sees MacIntyre's rejection of teaching as a 'practice' as "disconcerting" for philosophers of education (2002, p.7). Such philosophers, "heavily influenced" by MacIntyre, are also of the view "that teaching is *itself* a practice" in MacIntyre's sense of the term (Dunne, 2002, p.7).

right way, not just any way that 'works'.²²⁶ For Dunne (1997, p.367), judgement of a practice does not rest solely on what is made or produced. For Dunne, therefore, teaching ought not to be confused with making or producing as MacIntyre seems to do by equating teaching not with practices but with techniques serving other ends.²²⁷ The inextricableness of methods and ends in a practice means that even if the end-result of a practice is not achieved, a practice can still be judged as 'excellent' (Dunne, 1997, p.266n96).²²⁸ So, Dunne disagrees with MacIntyre about the internal goods of teaching and teaching's right to be called a practice. Yet both agree - MacIntyre (1994) with the example of fishing - that a practice per se can be good even if its produce is not achieved.

8.3 Care

Another key component of Dunne's response to MacIntyre's rejection of teaching as a practice (2002; 2003), and further reason why 'practice' is suitable as a resource with which to unearth more of the 'experience' of educational contexts such as school-based training routes and school inspection than is attended to currently in their literature, is the virtue of care that Dunne sees as integral to teaching.

What Dunne means by care here is care for the goods of a subject, and, in particular, for the good of pupils.²²⁹ A teacher without any care for students would in fact be "deficient", Dunne argues. Dunne acknowledges the interconnection between the virtue of care and other practices, such as in architecture. Yet teaching for Dunne

²²⁶ Unsurprisingly, Dunne (1997) is critical of instrumentalist and 'atomistic' approaches to teacher training that ignore the capacities and values (e.g. "an ability for independent thought and reflection, a habit of truthfulness, a sense of justice, a care for clarity and expressiveness in writing and speech" , p.6) teaching as a practice demands.

²²⁷ If we understand Dunne's view of teaching as a practice here as 'experience', then what he argues is at odds with a familiar conception of 'teaching experience' whereby teaching quality is judged by outcomes. See, for example, research into 'teacher effectiveness' and 'returns to experience' (e.g. Hanushek, 2014; Ladd & Sorensen, 2014), where teacher experience is defined in terms of years and quality teaching is defined as and measured by differences in test-scores.

²²⁸ Dunne provides the following reading of Aristotle (*Rhet* 1.1.1355b10-14), already highlighted in chapter four above, to emphasise this: If treated properly, a person who fails to respond to medical treatment is all the same still a person who has received excellent care. In short: good healthcare is not necessarily dependent on the sick being brought back to health.

²²⁹ As Dunne writes:

One might be very deeply immersed in the goods of subjects such as music or mathematics, while having little if any sense of what is involved in helping others in this way to make them their own. (2003, p.369)

is still, however, a “distinct” practice because of the crucial part played by ‘care’, especially care for pupils.²³⁰ The key skill in teaching of fitting the abilities of the students to subjects (Dunne, 2003) is guided by this care for subject and pupils, for example. The best teachers employ the right “learning aids” for the type and stage of student and judge when, “to push hard for mastery and when it is better to defer or deflect” (Dunne, 2003, p.355). For Dunne (1997; 2003), teaching, and care, is therefore about responding to different demands. At times, teaching is about “impassioned enthusiasm”, at other times, it is about “quiet empathy” (Dunne, 2003, p.368). On other occasions, it is about inspiration and emulation through modelling the right skills and disposition while at other times a teacher may reject this for its opposite.²³¹ Striking the right balance, “[f]inding the mean, as one might put it in Aristotelian terms” (Dunne, 2003, p.367), teachers must also do all the time and in many ways.²³² This sensitive balancing act requires care for students.

Despite MacIntyre’s rejection of teaching as a practice, recognition of the crucial importance of care, and its two facets, is for Dunne in fact identifiable in MacIntyre’s own writing. For example, Dunne explains, MacIntyre writes that, “[a]ll teaching requires some degree of care for the students qua students as well as for the subject-matter of the teaching” (1999, p. 89).²³³ Similarly, MacIntyre writes, it “is important not to go too far too fast [...] not to force on students questions that they may not yet be able to face” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002 p. 13). For Dunne this is just the type of question regularly facing teachers, and demanding that they are disposed to care.

According to Dunne, more generally, MacIntyre supports an approach to education where there is this distinction between care for student and care for subject. To

²³⁰ While Dunne does not elaborate on the acquisition of care, it might be though a potentiality of the Aristotelian type cultivated through practice. We can think also that this is another area where via initiation into a practice, we are transformed. That is, through this initiation, trainees go from care solely of self to care also for others.

²³¹ “One teacher in full flow, possessed by the cadences of a piece of literature or by the beauty of an experiment,” Dunne (2003, p.368) adds, “may be as commendable as another whose unobtrusive facilitation ensures that a group of students gain much from interaction and discussion with each other.”

²³² Teaching is, therefore, a practice closely resembling ‘technai of the kairos’ i.e. corresponding to “activities where opportunism, timing and improvisation are critical” (Dunne, 1997, pp. 253–261).

²³³ Dunne also cites the following from MacIntyre’s own writings: “Children, as every teacher knows, differ in how long they take to get it right. So one great educational need is for there always to be enough time for teachers to attend to students individually” (MacIntyre and Dunne, 2002, p. 5).

Dunne, MacIntyre also writes that the achievements in a subject are secondary to the good of the student, such as, for example, where MacIntyre (1988, p.105) writes that:

An education is a good education only insofar as the pursuit of the goods of the arts and of inquiry enable those individuals who engage in such activities to achieve their own goods.²³⁴

Dunne (2002) shows how teaching also fits neatly with other elements of a practice suggested in MacIntyre's work. Like other practices, teaching is, for instance, complex and co-operative, and has its own external goods (e.g. test scores, employability rates), with "winners and losers" (Dunne, 2002, p.7). For Dunne (2002), MacIntyrean practices are also 'working-life defining', and this is equally true of being a teacher.²³⁵ Teaching has its own "standards of excellence" ("in it we can surely recognise a spectrum of achievement from 'great' to 'abysmal'" Dunne, 2002, p.7). It has its own traditions (e.g. Plato, Cicero, Dewey, Paolo Freire), and it requires institutions and virtues to flourish. Teaching also develops and extends the powers of teachers, and those of students ("as Aristotle says in the *Metaphysics*, the act of teaching is in the learner", MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p.7).²³⁶

According to Dunne, and, for Dunne, according also to MacIntyre, teachers, and so teacher educators, must care for the student teacher as well as the subject. They must show flexibility, judgement, and sensitivity to their trainees *even if* this means neglect of the subjects being taught. Teaching, for both Dunne and seemingly after

²³⁴ The two aspects to care are brought together also for Dunne in what MacIntyre writes on progress in education. MacIntyre, Dunne explains, sees progress in education involving both the acquisition of skills and understanding, and the cultivation of individual goods. For Dunne, there is in addition what MacIntyre (1999) writes on parenting, which is "quite explicitly [...] an exercise in educative teaching."

²³⁵ For Dunne, "it is an office that can define a person's working life" and as testament to this, the words, "'the fifty or so years in which I have been a teacher' [...] have immediate weight" (2002, p.7).

²³⁶ One further argument Dunne produces relates to the consistency in the examples of practices MacIntyre offers. Dunne (2003) notes that for MacIntyre architecture is a paradigmatic practice, but, given its parallels to teaching, if architecture counts as a practice so, for Dunne, does teaching. So, for one thing, just as with MacIntyre's description of teaching, the end of architecture is found in the product, not the activity which creates them, i.e. "it 'is never more than a means' and 'is for the sake of something else'" (Dunne, 2003, p.354). Also, Dunne (2003, p.355) asks, if teaching only serves other ends, with architecture is there also not a "hierarchy of use", and is it not "intimately bound up with the goods of other practices"? That is, like the tanners who makes leather to be used by the harness-maker, but also the teacher, is not architecture serving other practices too? In particular, Dunne (2003, p.355) explains, it matters to architectural practice if a building is to be a home for a family, a place of work, "an office, a cathedral or a football stadium".

all MacIntyre, is then not simply about relaying the 'right' information to students, teacher trainee or not. It involves being fully responsive to who and what is being taught. This responsive ability to alter teaching method is rooted in the virtue of care, a quality that for Dunne especially characterises the practice of teaching. Care and its importance to teaching is not emphasised in the school-based route literature, or indeed in the school inspection writings. However, in line with what Dunne suggests it should be considered one necessary characteristic of a healthy mentor-mentee relationship and so of the 'experience' these contexts hope to provide.

8.3.1 Care and School-Based Routes Into Teaching: Working Conditions

The virtue of care Dunne emphasises is crucial to the transformative potential of an 'experience' characteristic of learning to teach in a school or inspecting. This virtue should therefore be taken into account by school-based route and school inspection stakeholders. Even if it was, however, there are questions to answer about the actual working conditions that the school-based route trainee, in particular, will likely encounter in their 'experience'. The reality of these working conditions can be seen as raising serious doubts about the extent to which the virtue of care could be realised. Not seeing an 'experience' as richly and complexly as possible means likely neglect therefore of elements, such as the virtue of care, conducive to self-transformation. Yet it also suggests neglect of the very conditions that make cultivation of elements like this even possible.

In fact, working conditions are an especially sensitive topic with regards to school-based teacher trainees as, if not always from the very beginning, they will likely be teaching much earlier than on more conventional university-based routes. School-based teacher training provider or not teaching is known to be one of the more stressful professions, however. This is commonly attributed to poor working conditions. Across the globe, the job of teaching now demands long hours, 'goodwill' overtime, and weekend working. It is widely accepted this is affecting the physical health and mental well-being of teachers. That retention of teachers is down in England and elsewhere, and turnover is up, is also telling.²³⁷ It is in this typically

²³⁷ See, for example, Ingersoll *et al.* (2018) and Foster (2019).

stress-ridden school environment that more than ever new people are being trained to teach and, seen in Dunne's terms, expected to be caring.

It is not unsurprising then that school-based route mentors also bemoan their working conditions. They speak of insufficient time and of encountering difficulties in balancing their other roles and responsibilities with mentoring duties. This, they argue, impacts negatively on the amount and quality of trainee support (CooperGibson Research, 2019, pp.50-51, pp.72-73), and, in other words, impacts negatively on the 'experience'. For example, school-based mentors typically can only complete their work and support the trainee if they do things like meetings and complete paperwork in their own time (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.72). Especially tricky to provide (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.51) are regular meetings, not least because mentors are being asked to cover classes when meetings with trainee teachers have been scheduled. Cover can be required when a school is understaffed, another strain on the health of the school 'experience'.

School-based routes acknowledge that training to teach is 'challenging' and to varying degrees will all claim to support their recruits' 'experience'. In fact, one major reason why trainees are provided with much-emphasised 'tried-and-tested' techniques is so that they survive this potentially volatile, unsettling environment. That said, all school-based routes, 'accelerated' or not, have been favoured in part because they are said to offer a more authentic and truer picture of school teaching and so acclimatise their recruits to existing working conditions.²³⁸ In a sense, therefore, it is because, not in spite, of the challenging working conditions now common in schools that school-based routes into teaching exist. Nevertheless, a more pressurised and difficult school environment is not typically regarded as amenable to good, caring teaching ('Teacher working conditions are student learning conditions'). Being pressed for time, and not being able to have meetings, in particular, is a huge problem for their development, and, seen in terms of a 'practice',

²³⁸ One primary school senior leader, talking about *School Direct* in England, explains (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.72) that:

[School-based ITT] works very well and you have a more realistic view of what being a teacher is like, you see the hours they are working, the challenges of dealing with parents. You see the whole package and find out more quickly if it's for you.

potential transformation, of a trainee and for the exercising of care on behalf of their mentors and tutors. It is hard to think, therefore, that typical working conditions, and such a strained 'experience', can currently be advantageous to becoming a good, caring teacher, and if this happens, it more likely happens in spite of the school environment, not because of it.

8.4 Openness and Unpredictability

As well as care, Dunne identifies further markers of a practice that for him teaching embodies, but which are not drawn out by MacIntyre explicitly as such. These also serve as further conditions of a fruitful, transformative 'experience' characteristic of educational contexts, such as learning to teach in a school, and which these contexts should pay close attention to.

For example, for Dunne, teaching always involves an openness, "open texture", and degree of unpredictability, "hazard of action" (1997). Here Dunne is drawing, in particular, on Hannah Arendt's writings, which see these elements of openness and risk as definitive of politics. For Arendt (Dunne, 1997, p.12), modern politics attempts erroneously to overcome these elements. Suppression of action in politics, in ways reminiscent of recent technical developments in England's school inspectorate, for instance, is attempted by following a rigid system of explicit technique, "a framework which [...] assures [...] stability, reliability, and predictability" (Dunne, 1997, p.12). For Arendt, this attempt to suppress 'action' in politics through adoption of a technical framework is all in vain, however. "[H]azardousness, open-endedness, and irreversibility" are inevitable and so inescapable in politics (Dunne, 1997, p.12). Teaching for Dunne is similarly risky and unpredictable. It too has been seduced by the false promise of technique, toolboxes, and the framework. This inevitable preconditional openness and unpredictability characteristic of an educational context, where 'experience' is prominent, such as school-based teacher training and school inspection, must then also be close paid attention to if the potential of such an 'experience' is to be exploited fully.

As a practice, the significance of this inevitable openness and unpredictability for teaching, for Dunne, is not that teaching must look to suppress it or resort to deployment of pre-conceived techniques, processes, or frameworks. Rather, in the inescapable midst of 'action' a teacher's character necessarily comes to the fore.

The capacity to be appropriately responsive and able to negotiate such “open texture” is central to becoming a teacher for Dunne (1997, p.379). A teacher is then for Dunne (1997, p.367) not someone who loyally follows the script, but someone whose character, “with its fusion of emotion and reason,” is always at play. A teacher’s character is always (Dunne, 1997, p.367) in question, “always ‘on the line’.” This is a test that cannot be avoided or addressed through implementation of a pre-packaged, ‘off-the-shelf’ toolkit. There is no fail-safe set of techniques to rely on.²³⁹

All human experience is for Dunne unavoidably a test of character, therefore. Human experience is about action, and the ‘happenings of action’, to paraphrase Arendt, are at their core unpredictable. Dunne envisions a teaching practice rooted in, and practitioners of character responsive to, this uncertainty and unpredictability. Learning to teach, and learning to be an inspector for that matter, therefore, should seek to cultivate the necessary character that the inevitable ‘hazardousness’ of the ‘experience’ in response demands.

For Dunne, the open and unpredictable nature of practice means that the character of the teacher is always on the line. This should not however be understood as suggesting the character of the *lone* individual will suffice, however. Nor, also, should it be understood as suggesting that individual technical effectiveness must be sought as a remedy. Rather the practical effectiveness, power, of a teacher in the midst of inescapable ‘action’ is, for Dunne (1997, p.367), derived interdependently i.e. “her own greatest effectiveness or ‘power’ is realized in moments not of manipulation but of inter-play”. As a practice, teaching’s ultimate power is in fact derived collectively, according to Dunne, and it is its collective experience not individual character or technical prowess that provides its most fertile resource.²⁴⁰

²³⁹ There can be no retreat into role, either, “no matter how much she strives to remain ‘in role’” (Dunne, 1997, p.367).

²⁴⁰ We also see how interdependency proves effective in what Dunne writes contra Rorty on ‘conversational truth’ (1997, p.23). Contrary to Rorty’s view, Dunne explains, participants in a conversation do have a “common concern”. The purpose of conversation is to draw this ‘commonality’ out, doing so through ‘interplay’, “through the interplay and fusing of, the differing idioms...that they each use to express it.” In drawing this out through interplay, an understanding that is “more truthful” is possible. Similarly for Gadamer, Dunne adds, “conversation remains the medium in which we search for truth.” With Rorty, however, “the truth of a position...simply is its ability to find a place in, and to further, an interesting conversation.”

As noted in chapter one and six, school-based routes, for example, also emphasise something of the unpredictable, 'challenging' nature of 'front-line' teaching, 'where no two days are alike'. As also considered earlier, they describe a training and working 'experience' demanding a particular type of person, able 'to think on their feet', 'cope with stress', and be 'resilient', for example. In chapters six and seven it was noted that school-based route literature includes reference to values, 'competencies' (*Teach First*), seen as crucial to success. These qualities do not appear too dissimilar to the type of moral qualities, such as "good temper, friendliness, love of truth, and ready-wittedness, as well as of the larger virtues of courage and justice", Dunne (1997, p.379) suggests teaching as a practice, and teachers of character, require.

As also considered in chapters one and six, however, it would appear that ultimately the expected outcome of various school-based routes is a trainee who has acquired and can successfully implement proven techniques to raise educational achievement. While not the case in all school-based route contexts, qualities cultivated in trainees if highlighted are especially valued above all because of their hoped-for impact on raising achievement.

In the school-based route literature, the overall impression is also that rather than collectively, 'experience' is something an individual produces and gains from. While there is in its literature repeated reference to "experienced" staff and the availability of "intensive support", school-based routes, especially 'fast-track' ones, promote and embody a strident form of 'heroic individualism' (La Londe *et al.*, 2015). Their 'hero' teacher must, for instance, be self-confident, enthusiastic, possess grit, and be resilient. The *personal* long-term career benefit of a period of school teaching promised by these routes is also indicative of the individualistic bent to these routes. This emphasis on individual 'experience' contrasts with Dunne's description of a teaching practice and its participants drawing their strength of character from the interplay and collective contribution of each of its parts.

8.5 "Effective History"

Dunne writes also of the key role played in our lives by personal history, i.e. biography or "effective history" (Dunne, 1997, p.367). This recognition of history's effect figures especially in the work of Gadamer, another key conversational partner

for Dunne (1997). As well as in a world of unknowns and risk, teaching, Dunne writes, operates in a context of “effective history”. This historical context is both individual and collective, and is a context “operating pre-judgmentally” (Dunne, 1997, p.367) and so prefiguring us. For Dunne, Gadamer teaches us how in relation to interpreting texts, but with import for understanding per se, it is misguided to view the interpreter as wholly detached from any text that is encountered. As was highlighted with Taylor and others in chapter three, this detached view is misguided because we bring with us previous experience, i.e. “[t]he interpreter is already formed by influences from the past” (Dunne, 1997, p.119). This ‘experience’ also includes something already of the text to be encountered. The interpreter is, in other words, “under the sway of what Gadamer calls ‘effective history’ (*Wirkungsgeschichte*)” (Dunne (1997, p.119). That is to say, the interpreter is informed by “the past as still active in present thought” (Dunne, 1997, p.119). These past influences are, furthermore, unavoidable and determining whether we recognise - or indeed accept – the ‘effectiveness of history’ or not. What counts for Gadamer is that we become aware of this ‘historical effectiveness’ as in so doing we achieve “effective-historical consciousness” (Dunne, 1997, p.119). In fact, for Gadamer - and as we saw in chapter five, for MacIntyre too - we should endeavour to unearth as much of this history as we can. Knowing what is active from our past in our thinking enables us to know ourselves and others better. It is, however, impossible to achieve absolute consciousness of it. Neither is it possible, “outside the conversations in which it is already operative,” (Dunne, 1997, p.119) to gain consciousness of it alone. The inescapably historical nature of teaching as a practice – as Dunne echoing Gadamer sees it - demands then that this historical quality and its ramifications as much as possible be recognised and harnessed.

School-based route literature, however, for example, must be as attentive as possible to the inescapable effects, “effective history”, of the past that Dunne, drawing on Gadamer, argues pre-determines what practitioners or students think and do. Other educationalists and teacher educators, such as Britzman (1986; 2003), considered especially in chapter one, are, at least, more appreciative of the important role played in our lives by prior personal history. Again, while perhaps not explicit, there will be school-based route personnel who recognise the influence, and potentially baleful influence, of a recruit’s history. Based on the available school-

based route literature, however, there is insufficient attention being paid to history's influence and so an underplaying of how becoming aware of historical pre-determination and being able to somehow work to modify it is potentially to an individual trainee's benefit.²⁴¹

8.6 Shared Ethos

A shared ethos, writes Dunne (1997, p.379), is also characteristic of and essential to a thriving practice, and so given their close relationship, to a successful 'experience' in educational contexts. In the case of teaching, this means for Dunne an ethos among staff that values and fosters the right virtues and qualities, such as justice, courage, good temper, friendliness, love of truth, and ready-wittedness. As discussed in the section above, these are the types of virtues and qualities of character demanded by the open-endedness and hazardousness of the practice of teaching. Indeed, Dunne adds:

Teachers can continue to bring these qualities to their teaching *only if* there is a shared ethos among their colleagues which prizes and sustains them. (1997, p.379, my italics)

Teaching as a practice for Dunne, therefore, goes far beyond introducing pupils to technique. Practices initiate trainees into a particular way of being and this way of being is sustained by the shared culture and thinking that the practice embodies and reproduces. As understood in light of 'practice', teaching and teacher training for Dunne then involve being assimilated into a common culture infused with the desirable qualities and habits specific to it. A 'proper' experience, as found in school-based teacher training or school inspection, is not sustainable without such an enabling and morally nourishing culture.

If, for example, we consider school-based routes in light of Dunne's emphasis on this key sustaining role played by the right culture, there are admittedly elements of their

²⁴¹ There is some explicit recognition of historical knowledge on 'accelerated' school-based routes. As some appear to see it, however, this is a history littered with mistakes and the abject failure of 'traditional' initial teacher education routes to raise levels of achievement for the most disadvantaged. This is explicit in *TFA's* critique of the 'status quo', for instance, noted in chapter one, and to a lesser extent perhaps in the supposedly chequered history of all previous routes as declared by "third-way" residency models.

'experience' suggestive of this. As noted in chapter five, one benefit seen by school leaders in training teachers in schools is that trainees can be moulded, "to the ethos of the school" (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.7). It has also been noted in chapter one that recruitment concerns are one motivation for school-based routes. Whether candidates will fit with the school ethos is an important factor in this and by 'growing their own', schools can also see if this fit is going to be possible (CooperGibson Research, 2019, pp.26-27). As we have also seen, on 'accelerated' school-based routes, in particular, a great deal is also made of the programme mission and vision (e.g. "You will need to show passion for *Teach First*, our vision and mission"; See also TFA, 2010, p.273). In fact, and as noted in chapter five (CooperGibson Research, 2019, p.32), the declared and laudable intentions of routes such as *Teach First* in England is identified as one reason why candidates choose them. Once their stint at teaching, 'time in the corps', is over, for the 'fast-track' recruit there is also 'ambassadorship' and the "ambassador community" alumni network. Here the alumnus can continue to connect with a network of others like them. The 'Teachers Standards' in England are also an embodiment of a vision and mission of sorts, and "within and outside school" (2011, p.14), one for all teachers and trainees to maintain.

This kind of school-based route 'ethos', or mission and vision, is, however, different to what Dunne is attempting to disclose to us with his emphasis on *shared ethos*. To Dunne, the shared ethos of a practice, whether teaching or something else, also sustains its necessary qualities. A *school* ethos of the kind found valorised in school-based route literature, on the other hand, is seemingly more concerned with ensuring candidates assimilate sufficiently and 'fit in'. It tells recruits what is expected and performance mechanisms assess how well they do. This is some distance from a recruit coming to embody qualities that are only known from and through an 'experience' and qualities that help a trainee navigate its inevitable unpredictability. 'Accelerated' school-based route ambassador networks, programme missions and visions, similarly, are far from what Dunne is highlighting with shared ethos. They, for example, are imposed top-down and from outside, and common components of 'corporate cultures' (Vainker & Bailey, 2018). These things are not ingredients in a 'school of virtue' where moral qualities are known from and instilled from within. The networks and missions of school-based routes are not necessarily intended to instil

moral character in recruits, either. Ambassadorial opportunities are, in large part, about networking and cementing advantageous links between participants. Mission and vision are about corporate image and reputation and about inspiring recruits and persuading them and others (funders, sponsors) of each route's organisational aspirations. These corporate cultures characteristic especially of 'fast-track' routes into teaching are premised ultimately on achieving explicit results. Both Dunne and MacIntyre's conceptions of a practice explicitly reject the primacy of this means of assessing value. The questions this rejection poses also warrant closer attention in the literature on school-based routes, school inspection, and other educational contexts featuring 'experience'.

8.7 Communal Discourse

One last important feature of a practice that Dunne underscores and that has significance for the 'experience' of educational contexts such as learning to teach in a school, and so one further feature that deserves close attention as a condition of a productive 'experience', is communal discourse. Dunne (1997, p.369) writes, for example, that teacher trainees must acquire a communal discourse with which to articulate and defend teaching. For Dunne, this language and understanding of it will facilitate dialogue and critique.²⁴² Acquisition of a shared discourse facilitates constructive debate about teacher training or education research, for example. Rather than simply consumers or objects of research conducted by 'experts', Dunne adds, trainees should come to see themselves as self-reflective research professionals.²⁴³ A fully reflective professional should then, through acquiring a conceptual discourse, be ready and able to reflect even, for example, on the value of teacher training and research itself. They ought not to be expected only to put into practice what the teacher training or research tells them either.

All training routes, practical or not, will introduce trainees to new terminology and concepts. Regarding education research, among school-based routes, 'fast-track' routes in England, for instance, actively promote the so-called *What Works*,

²⁴² For George Lindbeck (1984, p.34), who writes similarly about practices in the context of religion, language is enabling of and fosters capacities that cannot be actualised in any other way.

²⁴³ New 'practice' recruits should come to see themselves as, "members of a profession that reflects on itself with a higher degree of universality and explicitness".

evidence-based research agenda (e.g. 'Putting evidence to work: How can we help new teachers use research evidence to inform their teaching?', Teach First, 2017c). There is less indication of, for example, critical reflection on evidence-based research, randomised-controlled trials (RCTs), meta-analysis, and quantitative, statistical techniques, on 'fast-track' training routes. What is in evidence to be reflected on on these routes are whether studies meet the agreed standards of rigour or, more so, whether studies have utility in the classroom. In light of what Dunne's and other writings on 'practice' impress on us, for a richer 'experience' what needs further reflection upon on these routes, however, are the very presuppositions of this type of *What Works* research. For example, take the unavoidable uncertainty and unpredictability of practice Dunne describes and the character and phronetic qualities this "open texture" and "hazard of action" demand. Where, according to this, there inevitably and unavoidably will be uncertainties and a lack of guarantees, it might be asked how evidence-based research can ever hope to definitively establish what is effective. A trainee in Dunne's sense of practice will be provided a language with which such issues can be raised and critically debated whereas it appears 'accelerated' routes will not. As a condition of a richer 'experience', those potentially provided by educational contexts, such as learning to teach in a school or becoming and being an inspector, closer attention should then be paid to the acquisition of a communal discourse with which critical dialogue and reflection is fostered.

8.8 Practise

Teacher training should for Dunne also be focused more on practising and less on taught lectures on theory.²⁴⁴ While this may appear to evoke the type of motivation behind school-based routes, of course, an onus on the practical for Dunne (1997, p.369) does not mean a "narrowly pragmatic" approach to the training of teachers, however. What Dunne (1997) means by this onus on more practice is that student-teachers cultivate 'reflective intelligence', a capacity cultivated by both classroom experience *and* the conditions, including "well-equipped" (p.370) trainers, favourable

²⁴⁴ Drawing on Aristotle's position, Dunne (1997, p.290) adds:

[I]t is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these, no one would have even a prospect of becoming good [although] most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory [logos].

to reflection on this 'experience'. The study of education, in a broad and 'liberal' sense, for Dunne also helps to dispose trainees to this 'reflexivity'.²⁴⁵

Reflective and critical deliberation may well be seen by theorists of 'practice' as advantageous to teacher development. However, it is worth noting that a major criticism of school-based routes into teaching (Edwards, Gilroy & Hartley, 2002; Day, 2004; Ellis, 2007, 2010) is that their 'experience' is not conducive to this. For one critic of school-based routes, Richard Pring (2013), to become professionals trainees must participate in various intellectual activities ("critical enquiry, deliberation, questioning, speculation and research", p.19). For Pring these activities must be central not peripheral to teacher training and development. Such intellectual activities characteristic of professionals are only at the margins of school-based routes, it is argued, however.²⁴⁶ School-based trainees are then widely thought to lack the time and space to reflect on the implementation of ideas and the further thoughts this provokes, and lack the conditions in which challenges to practice are realistically possible. In particular, 'fast-tracked' trainees lack the thorough and frank exchange of opinions that being in a 'practice' proper – or the type of university based programme Pring argues for – provides.²⁴⁷

This chapter explored the MacIntyre-Dunne debate on whether teaching is a 'practice'. In so doing it revealed with Dunne's sensitivity to the conditions of teaching further facets informing a rich educational 'experience' insufficiently attended to in the literature on school-based routes into teaching and school inspection. Even if MacIntyre's argument were accepted, there is still something to learn by thinking about the idea of 'experience' in relation to education and in terms of 'practice'. MacIntyre would recognise that, for instance, the chemistry teacher has

²⁴⁵ This can explain why 'fast-track' routes, for instance, where there is little teacher education and recruits are teaching after only five or so weeks of basic training, do not have their recruits critically reflect on the presuppositions of research. To be able to reflect requires educated cultivation, not just practical experience, and this is something 'accelerated' trainees do not receive enough of if they receive it at all.

²⁴⁶ For Ellis (2010, p.106), school-based routes are grounded in knowledge-acquisition and transfer, not in "a participatory view of learning in the work-place and a socially systemic view of teachers' knowledge."

²⁴⁷ University-based (HEITT) routes, on the other hand, ensure "a critical tradition, a tradition which is indispensable where education rather than mere training is being fostered" (Pring, 2013, p.19).

the end of initiation into chemistry in their sights. However, Dunne's convincing argument for teaching to be understood as a 'practice' suggests we should be sensitive to the idea of thinking of 'experience' in the same terms. As well as reinforcing dimensions that have already been disclosed to some extent in this thesis, in defending his position, Dunne brings to light a number of additional interconnected and interoperating preconditional dimensions to a 'practice', and so to a richer understanding of collective educational 'experience'. These other, additional elements of a 'practice' – the virtue of care, a shared ethos, the importance of character in the face of uncertain 'action', 'effective history', a language for critical discussion – illuminate more about educational contexts use of the term 'experience' in educational contexts acts to conceal from view. If we wish for educational 'experience' that meets the conditions of a potentially transformative, "telic" 'practice', then these additional elements warrant more careful consideration.

Chapter 9: 'Experience' and Judgement

In chapter eight I addressed a potential issue with my choice of MacIntyre as a resource to illuminate more of the detail, complexity and possibility inherent in educational contexts featuring the term 'experience'. This issue is MacIntyre's controversial and lamented claim that teaching is not a 'practice'. MacIntyre's claim is persuasively rebutted by Dunne. Dunne's writings also disclose further crucial features of the 'experience' characteristic of school-based routes and other educational contexts, such as school inspection. These features are the virtue of care, openness and unpredictability, 'effective history', a shared ethos, and communal discourse for critical reflection and deliberation. These are features underappreciated if not neglected completely in their literature, however. Added to what was uncovered in previous chapters as also being a feature of the 'experience' of educational contexts, we now have a much richer picture of this 'experience' than when the thesis began. We also have a much sharper sense through MacIntyre's writings, in particular, that to overlook these and other qualities and elements to a transformative 'experience' has likely consequences. These are consequences not only for a trainee, but also for their relationships, and for the health and longevity of the context itself. Such neglect among other things runs the risk of squandering the transformative potential of the 'experience' but also leaves participants at the mercy of events and the extent of their own personal resources.

Seen through writings on 'practice', there is then much more to the school-based route and school inspection 'experience' than 'effective' techniques and skills, frameworks, handbooks, and criteria, and their seemingly straightforward and uncomplicated acquisition and application. Seen as participants of a 'practice', people do not become teachers or inspectors in this richer, more complex and more pregnant sense simply by being present in a school. Nor do they become teachers or inspectors simply by being placed with a designated mentor or tutor. There is much more to it than that.

Up to this point in the thesis the primary focus has been on the school-based route into teaching context. Now the thesis will shift more of its focus to school inspection, and, as considered in chapter two, especially its longstanding emphasis on and expectations regarding the valued and presumed productive interworkings of

'experience' and judgement. This is not to say that judgement cultivated in and through 'experience' ought not to be important to school-based routes into teaching, and why there would appear to be less emphasis if any in this context on cultivated judgement is an important question. However, judgement productively and positively interplaying with 'experience' is especially important to school inspection and so it provides an especially interesting context with which to add to my thesis argument that the term 'experience' and what it supposedly offers is being neglected, with potentially dramatic and serious consequences.

Whereas earlier in the thesis, the focus was primarily the underappreciation if not total inattention to the conditions informing educational 'experience', and within which valued qualities and capacities, for example, may develop, this chapter offers with McDowell a resource with which some common presuppositions that are likely attached to 'experience' in educational contexts can be exposed. The interrogation of presuppositions in our use of 'experience' is one further strand to my argument that this high-stakes term and what it involves is being neglected.

As will be shown and explored in the next two chapters an attempt to expose and unpick these presuppositions will be informed especially by the writings of McDowell. As we shall see, McDowell's writings can be drawn upon to help us both better theorise the interplay between 'experience' and 'judgement' and to ask interesting and important questions of it and contexts such as school inspection where these concepts and their interplay are significant.

As already noted in chapter two, there are some hints of attention paid in the inspection literature to these questions of 'experience' and judgement. In attempts to disclose more about the activities and work of inspectors, the concept of connoisseurship has frequently and long been adopted (Maw, 1994, p.9; Maclure, 1998, p.530; Campbell & Husbands, 2000, p.46; Learmonth, 2000, p.13). Here inspection judgement is said, for example, to be 'based on', 'equipped' or 'educated by' experience. However, this is only suggestive and the question of what exactly it means for inspector judgement to be 'based on', 'equipped', or 'educated' by experience remains largely unexplored. This inspection-as-connoisseur literature does no more than hint at a more sophisticated and coherent theory of the interplay between judgement and 'experience'.

While the inspector-as-connoisseur literature is suggestive, we need therefore to look elsewhere for resources to shine more light on the question of how inspector judgement interplays with 'experience'. This is a crucial question. As was noted in chapter two this assumed interplay can be seen to legitimate what school inspectorates currently do. If this interplay is shown to be at best assumed, then this raises questions about inspectorates relying on this assumed interplay for credibility.

As also already noted, this issue of the interplay between inspection judgement and 'experience', and how we might better appreciate this, in fact also instantiates a much deeper underlying philosophical question. This is the challenging question, identified in the introduction with Janack (2012), of how our cognitive capacities and world 'out there' interplay but do so in a way that accommodates both our capacity for free judgement and a proper role for 'experience'.²⁴⁸ This issue of how our minds are in contact with the world has been long debated in the interrelated areas of philosophy of mind and epistemology. The inspection literature in effect presupposes much about an issue which philosophically speaking is complex and contentious. Philosophical resources tackling the interworkings of 'experience' and judgement serve as to warn us of the difficulties in attempting to illuminate this issue. Equally, however, this philosophical literature provides an extensive resource with which to begin an attempt at badly-needed illumination of an issue that the inspection literature only superficially attends to.

9.1 Exploring School Inspection, 'Experience', and Judgement, Through MacIntyre's Philosophy

By drawing again on MacIntyre's writings we can begin to build up a deeper appreciation of school inspection 'experience', and especially its interplay with judgement. Judgement, informed by what we might see as 'experience', is integral to MacIntyre's writings. As we saw in chapter five, for example, MacIntyre regards one

²⁴⁸ If we recall, for Janack (2012, p.6), the questions are how exactly does 'experience' provide authority, and do so in a way that could be understood and trusted as fair and expert? How do we make a start at distinguishing between judgements that are unbiased and those that are not? To what extent, and how, is our putative know-how, born of experience, biased or not by ideology or world-view, "our upbringing, our theoretical commitments, our hopes or fears"?

key aspect of being transformed through and in a 'practice' as becoming able to stand back and judge prior desires. MacIntyre also in effect writes that becoming 'practised' in the right way is to cultivate character-based, background-informed phronetic situational judgement (MacIntyre, 2006, p.15), the sense of judgement associated with Aristotle in particular, as noted in chapter three, and as noted in chapter eight, the type of judgement emphasised by writers such as Dunne.

The specific question of how we, our thoughts and our actions, are in contact with the world, is a question which underlies the work of an inspector, for instance. Yet while his writings are suggestive, and while not neglected completely, this is a question that as is the case in the school inspection literature, is also left under-theorised in MacIntyre's writing, with MacIntyre leaving, "under-explored how it is that creatures [...] could be answerable in their thoughts and deeds to the world" (Smith, 2008, p.140). It is then helpful to consider a different aspect of the impoverished assumptions made of 'experience' by extending the discussion here into the details and examination of presuppositions evident in the work of McDowell.

9.2 Exploring School Inspection, 'Experience', and Judgement, Through McDowell's Philosophy

Considering its prominence in philosophy of mind and empiricism, as an alternative to MacIntyre there are a number of resources covering the workings of 'experience' and judgement that is assumed in the school inspection context worthy of consideration. One resource for illuminating more than is attended to in the literature on school inspection about the interplay of 'experience' and judgement is the writing of McDowell, a contemporary of MacIntyre, and someone who features prominently in Janack's 2012 discussion of the problem of the authority of experience, reviewed in the thesis introduction.

In particular, there is McDowell's critique of *Givenness*. A common preconception underpinning 'experience' is that it 'is a bare given' and this common sense understanding is not excluded from inspection. McDowell's critique of the common assumption of *Givenness* is central to his work, and is invaluable for helping us to problematise the term 'experience' as it features in educational contexts. In placing *Givenness* and other relevant ideas under scrutiny he offers resources to begin thinking about the concept of 'experience', and judgement, of the kind that features

so prominently in contexts such as school inspection, in a more complex and nuanced way.

McDowell can then help to illustrate the type of taken-for-granted assumptions often made about 'experience' in education that the thesis endeavours to lay bare.

McDowell can help us to shed light on the question of how inspection judgement can, for example, be based on or equipped by 'experience'. Of course, McDowell has no direct relation to these contexts and his discussion of 'experience' is at a level far removed from these areas. He is not writing about 'experience' at the same level as the 'experience' of school inspection. Nevertheless, McDowell's discussion, not least of *Givenness*, can help us to shed more light on how the term 'experience' functions in educational contexts such as inspection. It can also help us to see more vividly how 'experience' of educational contexts like this helps or not to foster judgement of the kind thought desirable in these contexts.

9.2.1 Myth of the Given

McDowell's question of how 'Mind and World' intertwine is therefore not directly related to the issues considered here. Yet it does raise issues that can be connected to concerns with the interrelated use of 'experience' and judgement in educational contexts. This is a question directly relevant to the issue of how inspector 'experience' and judgement can be understood to interplay, an interplay seen as both positive and vital in the inspection literature.

Central to McDowell's 'exorcism' of outdated ways of thinking about 'experience' and judgement is the *Myth of the Given (Givenness)*. *Givenness* is often a background assumption of approaches to the term 'experience'. As considered below, a case in point here is school inspection.

Coined by Wilfrid Sellars (1956, pp.298-9), the *Myth of the Given* is to characterise an episode solely by empirical description and to claim that this amounted to knowing. However, for Sellars, by contrast, the *Myth of the Given* in fact means that, "[i]n characterizing an episode or a state as that of *knowing*, we are not giving an

empirical description of that episode or state.”²⁴⁹ For Sellars (1997, p.76), what we are actually doing with the episode or state of *knowing* is in fact, “placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.”

As considered in chapter three, for one contemporary of both McDowell and MacIntyre, Taylor (2002, p.110), this mistaken notion of *Givenness*, “brute input”, can be identified in the writings of Locke, whose writings on ‘experience’ were also discussed earlier in chapter three.²⁵⁰ If we recall, Locke featured prominently in Dewey’s history of ‘experience’ summarised in this chapter. In chapter three it was noted too that as the key figure in British Empiricism, Locke’s influence on appreciation of ‘experience’ remains dominant today in Anglo culture and English language (Wierzbicka, 2010). Locke’s still pervasive thinking is then worth exploring further as an attempt is made with McDowell’s attack on *Givenness* to shed more light on the issue of how ‘experience’ may be understood to ‘equip’ judgement as expected of inspectors, in particular.

As noted in chapter three, Locke’s philosophy of mind and knowledge has two main elements: observation and sensation. Observational experience and sensory impressions, according to Locke, are characterised by ‘coerciveness’. They impinge on us, force themselves on us, “whether we like them or not” (Dewey, 1935, p.14), and we are merely passive in our reception of them. Our minds are unable to resist; they are little else than a *tabula rasa* or blank sheet of paper.²⁵¹ For Locke, there are therefore no innate ideas, no ideas we are born in possession of. The “simple ideas” that force themselves on us are in effect *Given*. What is not *Given*, however, is only

²⁴⁹ For Sellars (in McDowell, 2009, p.91), a variety of things have been regarded as *Given*: “sense contents, material objects, universals, propositions, real connections, first principles, even givenness itself.”

²⁵⁰ Descartes is another example of a writer taken by the notion of “brute input” identified by Taylor (2002). In fact, for Taylor, the notion of a brute *Given* features in every foundationalist epistemology. Foundationalism aims:

[T]o peel back all the layers of inference and interpretation, and get back to something genuinely prior to them all, a brute *Given*: then to build back up, checking all the links in the interpretive chain. Foundationalism involves the double move, stripping down to the unchallengeable, and building back up. (Taylor, 2002 p.109).

McDowell (2002, p.282) agrees with the association Taylor draws here between foundationalism and *Givenness*.

²⁵¹ For Sellars, similarly, the *Myth of the Given* is “the idea that the categorical structure of the world – if it has a categorical structure – imposes itself on the mind as a seal imposes itself on melted wax” (1981, p.12).

the combinations and relations between these basic ideas, which we impose. Our “simple ideas” are received passively but their combinations and interrelations are constructed by us (Cf. James, 1904).²⁵²

Were *Givenness*, as identifiable, for example, in Locke’s writings a true reflection of how our minds and the world interplay, it would mean ‘experience’ was operating *extraconceptually*. Part of its problem, for McDowell, is that if things were experienced extraconceptually, as *Given*, this would mean that experiences were received in a brute and causal manner. The *Given* then is “the idea that merely being impinged upon by a causal force originating in an object can constitute a cognitive status” (McDowell, 2008b, p.251). Experiences, things of experience, would therefore serve as unilateral causes of our thoughts, actions and judgements, but McDowell rejects this for its bald naturalism i.e. for not recognising our responsiveness to reasons, a responsiveness that may develop from within a shared, teleological ‘experience’.

We can bring to bear McDowell’s concerns with the unidirectionality of *Givenness* to the ‘experience’ and judgement of school inspection. If the *Given* as exemplified by Locke were not a myth, in terms of inspection we might assume that the inspection context provided inspectors with raw material on which to base their judgments. It would mean, at its most simple, that ‘experience’ of a school visit would involve the inspector receiving sensory input, understood as a causal process. After receipt of these basic ideas, the inspector would *then* use these bits of experience, this raw material, to build up a judgement.²⁵³ Constructing a judgement in these Lockean terms suggests among other things also a capacity for detachment from our experience, with no preconceptions expected to enter into the judgement.

²⁵² For Locke (1689, II.12), we manipulate these “simple ideas” in three different ways. We combine them into “complex ideas” (of substances and mode), we bring these ideas together but without uniting them, so seeing how they relate, and thirdly we produce general ideas through abstraction of particulars. “This shows man’s power, and its ways of operation, to be much the same in the material and intellectual world,” Locke explains. “For the materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy,” he argues, “all that man can do is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them.”

²⁵³ For Taylor (2002, p.110), “Locke argues for something of this [brute] sort in his metaphor of building materials.” This type of ‘construction-work’ begins “with things we just find lying around” (Taylor, 2002, p.110). That is, “[w]e start with simple ideas, as builders start with their given materials” (Taylor, 2002, p.110).

We might identify these strands to, and implications of, Lockean-type *Givenness* in some of what the current inspectorate in England, *OFSTED*, does. As described in chapter two, inspection judgement in England is something that is expected to be, and thought possible to be, made with an open-mind, impartially (“without fear or favour”). Using formalised procedure and criteria, *OFSTED* inspectors in England are expected to visit schools and other education providers to record what they see and hear in order to formulate their judgement. It is as though these inspectors work on their ‘experience’ *after* it has been received (or *Given*) and their receiving of what they see and hear is unaffected by previous ‘experience’.

Givenness, which Locke typifies, is therefore perhaps suggested by some of the context of school inspection where ‘experience’ and its interplay with judgement is a crucial feature. McDowell, however, explains that we do not have to be tempted by the common assumption of *Givenness*. McDowell challenges this received view of ‘experience’ and its interaction with our capacity for judgement. However it is regarded, *Givenness* is, for McDowell (2009b, p.91), a flawed way of attempting to capture how ‘experience’ and cognitive capacities, such as judgement, interplay and develop.

An issue with the capacity of the concept of *Givenness*, when helping to illuminate the interplay between ‘experience’ and judgement in the context of school inspection, is that it does not allow a strong claim for cognitive capacities such as judgement to be established. That is:

Having something *Given* to one would be being given something for knowledge without needing to have capacities that would be necessary for one to be able to get to know it. (McDowell, 2009, p.1)

For McDowell, in effect, were *Givenness* true, any capacities that we possessed would either be possessed at birth or if they were to develop, they would only develop biologically (“develop in ordinary biological maturation”, 2009, p.91). In other words, our conceptual capacities would not be potentialities whose development would be conditional on being acculturated or on the knowledge we acquired (McDowell, 2009, p.91). Conceptual capacities would not be formed through some form of cultivation or fostering as is presumed in the use of ‘equip’ or ‘educated’ in

the inspector-as-connoisseur literature, for instance. Instead, were *Givenness* the case, such capacities, according to McDowell, would either just be there or be the result of genes and internal biology. At the very most and were it true, the *Myth* would mean we only had some natural, given sensory propensities (McDowell, 2008b, p.250). As noted in chapter two, the inspection context is however premised on the positive interrelationship between ‘experience’ *and* judgement, not merely premised on the former.

This unravelling of the *Myth of the Given* is relevant for an understanding of inspection ‘experience’ and judgement. *Givenness* were it not a myth, would, for example, raise doubts about the necessity of advocating in inspection for the recruitment of inspectors who had acquired ‘experience’, and in and with this ‘experience’, cultivated cognitive capacities, such as judgement. This kind of cultivation, in the sense used by McDowell, if the *Myth* is present, may not happen. While there are inspectors who are wise and considered in their judgement, the presuppositions of the *Myth* undermine the very need for any inspectors who could judge in a richer sense at all. *Givenness* would mean at worst that an inspector’s judgement merely reacts passively to ‘experience’ though we might think this is not really judgement at all.²⁵⁴ The issue here again is that ‘experience’ is less straightforward than we take it to be and that our conceptual capacities are entangled with it in ways that suggest we ought to be aware and sensitive to. ‘Experience’ and our entanglement with it is in short therefore not just *Given*.

OFSTED seeks inspectors who can exercise “professional judgement” and so wants *prior* ‘experience’ to count in relation to the cultivation of this capacity for judgement. The underpinning assumption of *Givenness* leads, however, to an underestimation of what is involved in the development of capacities for judgement.

There is a further issue concerning *Givenness* relevant to inspection and other educational contexts, and to the putative interplay between ‘experience’ and

²⁵⁴ If *Givenness* were plausible the requirement that inspectors, for example, can judge fairly as long as they have full access to a provider is not unproblematic, however, in light of the epistemological assumptions upon which it is based. As is known, schools have long endeavoured to portray themselves in the right light come inspection time (even if that light is a little blinding to the truth). For example, schools have been accused of ensuring problem pupils are absent when inspectors are visiting (Garner, 2013).

judgement, which concerns McDowell, and which warrants closer attention in educational contexts. To presume *Givenness* is to assume that we are not always free to choose our beliefs, actions, and judgements. Were there non-conceptual brute, *Given* content, it would then follow that we could in effect be free of blame for our beliefs, actions, and judgements. Effectively, writes McDowell (1996, p.8), *Givenness* would offer 'exculpation' for what we say or do. That is, like a person moved from one place to another by a tornado (McDowell, 1996, p.8n7) our thoughts and actions would be, "exempt from blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in can be traced ultimately to brute force." Indeed, how could we be blamed if such things were not under our active, deliberate control?²⁵⁵

Were *Givenness* the case, inspectors, for example, could quite reasonably argue therefore that they were not responsible for misjudgements were they to happen.²⁵⁶ While there is longstanding criticism that inspectors are not held sufficiently accountable for what they do, an inspector free of *any* responsibility or blame is alien to the inspection context. Inspectors are seen as responsible for their work. We need then an understanding of 'experience' and its interplay with our capacity for judgement that ensures inspectors are fully taking responsibility for their actions and behaviour. As McDowell writes, and with relevance for school inspection, we need a use of 'experience' that justifies not just exculpates ("the idea of the *Given* offers exculpations where we wanted justifications", 1996, p.8).

McDowell does not reject all of what is assumed with *Givenness* and the interplay between 'experience' and judgement. He acknowledges, in particular, our passive contact with the world. Yet the *Myth of the Given*, for McDowell, is still simply that: a *Myth*. We do not simply passively receive input from the world without meaningfully and permanently engaging with it. Were 'experience' passively and unidirectionally received, as with *Givenness*, the responsibility and blame for our actions and judgements would lie elsewhere. This is not how actions and judgements are understood typically, however. We expect people, such as inspectors, to be

²⁵⁵ For McDowell, also, Wittgenstein's 'Private Language Argument' underlies why *Givenness* ought to be resisted (e.g. 1996, pp. 18-23). This shows why there are no private abstractions or concepts, only public ones. If public, deliverances of experience cannot be extraconceptual, which an assumption of *Givenness* demands.

²⁵⁶ In fact, all stakeholders in education might well argue this.

responsible for their decisions, and a large part of this responsibility stems from their prior 'experience'.

9.2.2 Coherentism

Inspection is premised on the positive role played by 'experience' in the judgements of inspectors. As the inspection-as-connoisseur literature tells us, inspector judgement is 'based on', 'equipped', or, for example, 'educated by' experience. Also informing the inspection context is the assumption that 'experience' prior to becoming an inspector has fostered a refined capacity for judgement.

While 'experience' and judgement are closely connected in the inspection literature, the interplay and cultivation lacks proper theorisation. This key foundation of inspection work is therefore badly under-theorised. Being under-theorised means it more difficult to know what is at stake and how it might be improved, and leaves much to chance.

While writing neither about school inspection nor at the same level of 'experience' per se, McDowell's work provides a helpful resource with which this type of question so crucial to the inspection context can be illuminated. His discussion of the *Myth of the Given* has helped us to unpack more of the presuppositions characterising the school inspection context. This has helped us to dig further beneath the inspection context to reveal more vividly the type of interplay inspection assumes.

According to McDowell (1996), a typical alternative to the *Myth of Givenness* in philosophy of mind and epistemology is 'coherentism'. Coherentism plays a major albeit negative role in McDowell's own account of how our conceptual capacities interact with 'experience', so-called naturalised platonism. However, what McDowell reveals to us about coherentism also adds strength to my thesis argument that the term 'experience', and, for instance, how it interplays with judgement, is much more complicated and deserving of closer scrutiny than typical use currently in educational contexts such as school inspection would suggest.

McDowell exemplifies coherentism by explaining the position of Donald Davidson (1986). For McDowell, what Davidson describes is 'unconstrained coherentism' i.e.

“the thesis that there are no external rational constraints on exercises of spontaneity” (McDowell, 1996, p.143).²⁵⁷ What is distinctive about coherentism is that while ‘experience’ remains significant, with coherentism thought and understanding is not *justified* by ‘experience’. What we think, do, and say is, according to Davidson’s ‘unconstrained’ approach, justified only by other thoughts, actions, and remarks. While these things intertwine like links in a chain, this is without ‘experience’ playing a justificatory role.

Prima facie coherentism might appear a convincing way of describing what inspectors do. Unlike *Givenness*, coherentism incorporates scope for exercising some mental capacities in relation to ‘experience’, for example. Yet, for McDowell, coherentism is unable to “make sense of the bearing of thought on objective reality” (1996, p.23). In fact, while with *Givenness* the problem is that reality brutishly determines our thoughts and actions, with coherentism, by contrast, reality is in effect disconnected from thought and action altogether (McDowell, 1996, p.24). In McDowell’s terminology (1996, p.11), coherentism means that understanding spins “frictionless”. It renders cognition as something mysterious, ensuring we “find a mystery in the bearing of belief, or anything else, for instance appearing, on the empirical world” (McDowell, 1996, p.144). With coherentism, if reasons not ‘experience’ justify further reasons, it can then not capture more accurately what is meant by ‘experience’ fostering or informing the judgements, for example, of inspectors.

Although it is aware of the question of how we ought to regard the interplay between ‘experience’ and judgement, there are then fundamental issues with coherentism. The big issue is that while significant, for coherentism ‘experience’ ultimately has no *justificatory* role in our thoughts and actions. Were something like coherentism proposed, this would raise doubts about its potential as a way of construing the interplay of ‘experience’ and judgement so fundamental, for example, to the inspection context.

Inspector ‘experience’ of a school is meant to inform and justify inspector judgements as well as further cultivate their capacity for judgement. Yet coherentism

²⁵⁷ To McDowell (1996, p.137), Davidson is encouraged to take this position by what he finds in the work of W.V. Quine, who describes a ‘tribunal of experience’.

is unable to convincingly account for how this might work exactly. A further related issue, McDowell argues, is that the typical move from coherentism, once its problems are appreciated, is not on to a new alternative but back to *Givenness*. And vice versa. Coherentism is then the other end of the “interminable oscillation” that McDowell argues (1996, p.9) characterises the current discussion regarding our cognitive contact with the world. This oscillation underlies the problem facing those who may seek to more sophisticatedly understand how ‘experience’ gathered by inspectors, for instance, can be understood as made available to them without it unilaterally determining their judgements (*Givenness*) or having no truly meaningful informing role at all (coherentism).

McDowell also reveals then that our attempts to better illuminate the workings of ‘experience’ are beset by a tendency to revisit positions already held. This kind of oscillation between two unfavourable positions is also something that if such contexts are to display a more sensitive grasp of the term, needs closer attending to in educational contexts that draw cachet from the term ‘experience’.

It is the gap between our understanding and assumptions of what ‘experience’ consists in and what McDowell brings to our attention through his immanent critique that has such significant bearing on matters to do with teacher education and school inspection. For McDowell (1996, p.15, 24), the question then becomes how we better accommodate ‘experience’ with mental capacities such as judgement without swinging back and forth between ultimately unattractive positions. How do we finally stop swinging back and forth ‘intolerably’ between either the commonly assumed *Given* or the attractive but ultimately failed promise of an alternative such as coherentism?²⁵⁸

9.2.3 Naturalised Platonism

In response, McDowell urges us not to seek to construct further solutions to how the mind can be in contact (‘in touch’, 1996, p.xxii) with the world. Rather he seeks to

²⁵⁸ For example, McDowell (1996, p.23) asks how we might avoid the tendency:

[T]o fall into an intolerable oscillation: in one phase we are drawn to coherentism that cannot make sense of the bearing of thought on objective reality, and in the other phase we recoil into an appeal to the *Given*, which turns out to be useless.

make the urge, to ask such a question, go away. He looks to show us how the “obligation” to answer the question can be ‘disowned’ (McDowell, 1996, p.xxiii), and so how we can resist the temptation to oscillate from one extreme to the other. By making the question ‘go away’ his ‘exorcism’ is not a denial of the issue. Instead it is the expression that, crucially for the purposes of this thesis, more is involved in what we take to be ‘experience’ than we credit and that is attended to currently in the literature on educational contexts that feature ‘experience’ such as school-based routes into teaching and school inspection. In so doing, as MacIntyre, Lave and Wenger, and also Dunne do, McDowell further helps us to appreciate dimensions of ‘experience’ that are currently neglected.

McDowell’s ‘exorcising’ answer to the problem of ‘Mind and World’ is as already stated his ‘naturalised platonism’. If we recall from the introductory chapter, McDowell writes of our normal development as the acquisition of second nature (*Bildung*). As we acquire a second nature, we are also initiated into the so-called space of reasons. Through this our eyes are opened to reasons (1996, p.79, 82, 88), and we acquire and cultivate conceptual capacities.²⁵⁹

Crucial to our typical development as McDowell sees it is education and training, language, the traditions languages embody, and, also, “communal practices”. We come to recognise “rational requirements” through the “proper upbringing” participation in “communal practices” (McDowell, 2009, p.172) makes possible.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁹ According to McDowell, with ‘takings-in’ we also acquire the very possibility of judgement and thought itself. Experience is then not just something that we only judge or respond rationally to (2008a, p.3). As we acquire concepts, in other words, we acquire conceptual capacities, such as implication, probabilification, and other relations (1996, p.3), “capacities that belong to spontaneity, in operation” (1996, p.23), and conceptual capacities of which judgement is ‘paradigmatic’. Although not the only one, of the “exercises of the understanding” judgement is for McDowell “paradigmatic” (2009, p.46), it is “the paradigmatic mode of actualization of conceptual capacities” (2009, p.5), and “the one in terms of which we should understand the very idea of conceptual capacities” (2009, pp.5-6). Compare this with Locke’s writings on our mental capacities, which are innate and applied to experiences after experiences are received

²⁶⁰ As McDowell sees it:

[T]he capacity to recognize the requirements of reason, still seen as authoritative anyway, not owing their authoritativeness to their being recognized, is acquired by initiation into suitable communal practices, rather than being an endowment built, perhaps supernaturally, into the make-up of human beings as such [...] any actual take on what is a reason for what is a historically situated achievement, unintelligible except in the context of a community. (McDowell, 2009, p.107)

Indeed, “responsiveness to reasons”, and so coming to acquire “practical wisdom”, is, according to McDowell, “inseparable” from “communal practices” (2009, p.172).²⁶¹

This identification of a pivotal role in our normal development for practices is where McDowell can also be seen to complement MacIntyre and other conceptualisers of ‘practice’.²⁶² MacIntyre regards practices in a similar, preconditional, necessary, prescriptive and normative sense. Like MacIntyre, McDowell would also not regard practices as automatically good.²⁶³ What is required for a practice to be good is, for example, collaboration.²⁶⁴

For McDowell, acquisition of a second nature and initiation into practices delivers people of a “special kind, able to achieve standings in the space of reasons by...opening their eyes” (2009, p.287). In a way reminiscent of the stepping back from our rudimentary desires that MacIntyre describes, second nature and initiation into space of reasons is partly a growing self-awareness of our “natural motivational impulses” and a ‘stepping back’ from where our ‘first nature’ impulses can be rationally scrutinised (McDowell, 1998, p.185).²⁶⁵

Complementing this emphasis on “communal practices” and the space of reasons is McDowell’s core argument regarding empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Here, McDowell can be seen as supplementing thinking, such as MacIntyre’s, regarding the interplay between ‘experience’ and judgement.

²⁶¹ That is:

Responsiveness to reasons, the very idea of which is inseparable from the idea of communal practices, marks out a fully-fledged human individual as no longer a merely biological particular, but a being of a metaphysically new kind [...] To belong to this metaphysical kind is to be able to find one’s way around in the space of reasons. (McDowell, 2009, p.172)

²⁶² Knight (2007) argues that their respective conceptions of practice are “very different” (p.211), not least that, according to Knight, McDowell does not regard practices as leading to the realisation of internal goods.

²⁶³ MacIntyre (2007, p.200) recognises the possibility of evil practices.

²⁶⁴ If it were not collaborative, and novices initiated into tick box practices, the community could encourage scientism, for instance. A community, similarly, could facilitate the evil of a pogrom or Holocaust event.

²⁶⁵ Whether for McDowell this transformation is via transmutation of desires is an interesting question. According to Knight (2007), unlike for MacIntyre, for McDowell, as we acquire a second nature (*Bildung*), our first-nature desires are silenced and replaced (Knight, 2007, p.209). That is, the “onset of reason”, for McDowell, supersedes the authority of first, non-rational, animal nature. “Reason” for McDowell, according to Knight (2007), does not *transform* our desires, according to Knight, as it does for MacIntyre.

McDowell's core argument is that whereas the tendency commonly, as in a context such as school inspection, for example, is to detach 'experience' from judgement, we must in fact bring them together. That is to say, we must understand sensibility/receptivity and understanding/spontaneity as simultaneous. Experiences must be "states or occurrences that inextricably combine receptivity and spontaneity" (McDowell, 1996, p.24). Were this to happen, spontaneity, for example, would then already be at play in receptivity. Their cooperation would mean that, "understanding is already inextricably implicated in the deliverances of sensibility themselves" (McDowell, 1996, p.46).

The 'bringing-together' type of judgement McDowell describes, where sensory impressions are already conceptual, is judgement as "taking-in". These types of judgement of how the world is (McDowell, 1996, p.32) are "a kind of [...] judgement that typically discloses how things stand" (Blackburn, 2002, p.205). This type of judgement is therefore already at play in experience itself. It is not the type of judgement we normally think of where we stand back and judge based *on* experience. This means so-called conceptual content is "already at work in experiences themselves, not just in judgements based on them" (McDowell, 1996, p.24).²⁶⁶ We do not simply receive content which to judge and think about through "takings in". Judgement is both, "active exercise in judgement, and in the thinking that issues in judgement" (McDowell, 1996, p.12).²⁶⁷

A potential implication of McDowell's 'naturalised platonism' for the inspection context featuring the interplay of judgement and 'experience' is that judgement is operating *in* 'experience' not simply *on* 'experience'. Unlike with *Givenness*, therefore, our sensory impressions are, for McDowell, already conceptual. That is, our sensory impressions of the world possess conceptual content already (McDowell, 1996, p.18). In fact, we are normally in the space of reasons and have been initiated into it even if we do not realise it. For McDowell, 'experience' is a

²⁶⁶ While there is not the space to explore or attempt in some small way to contribute to the debate over McDowell's support for conceptual content, there are various people who reject the idea (Peacocke, 1998; Putnam, 2002).

²⁶⁷ What McDowell writes on judgement is to apply to both inner and outer senses, for "to give the impressions of "inner sense" the right role in justifying judgements, we need to conceive them, like the impressions of "outer sense", as themselves already possessing conceptual content" (1996, p.21).

'taking-in', not pieces of brute data waiting for constructive work. That is, 'experience' is already conceptualised, and so something already there for us.

Applied to the inspection context, what McDowell writes about 'takings-in' and conceptual content means concepts and conceptual capacities are already active in inspector 'experience' of a school. This means an inspector already has some sense of what will be revealed in and by a school. It also means that an inspector cannot be detached from their prior 'experience' considering future 'experience' is understood always from within 'experience'. McDowell's onus on the inescapable pre-determination of at least some of our sense and understanding of the world by and through prior 'experience' also acts to underline the similar insights of Gadamer, Taylor, MacIntyre, Dunne, Britzman, and various others present in the thesis. This is, however, not an insight attended to sufficiently in either the school-based route or school inspection literature, where 'experience' features.

McDowell's notions of conceptual content and 'taking in' also highlight the importance of employing inspectors with the right kind of 'experience'. What we see conceptually, the reasons we are opened to, is, according to McDowell, a function of our prior 'experience'. If regarded in terms of initiation into the space of reason, part of which is comprised of "communal practices", then *what* practices we are initiated into matters. With its desire for new inspectors with particular types of experience, *OFSTED* in England is clear about the importance of not just employing anyone of 'experience'. This contrasts with the typically generic way that 'experience' features in the school-based teacher training route literature. That said, *OFSTED* appear to have given less thought, however, to what it is that makes the various type of 'experience' identified in chapter two, such as *teaching* or *leadership*, quite so crucial.

Even though the school inspection literature makes much of inspectors exercising judgement somehow interplaying with 'experience', a good deal remains presupposed and demanding unpacking. In the inspection literature inspection has been compared to connoisseurship (Maw, 1994, p.9; Maclure, 1998, p.530; Campbell & Husbands, 2000, p.46; Learmonth, 2000, p.13). Here inspection judgement is said, for example, to be 'based on', 'equipped' or 'educated by'

experience. Although suggestive, these descriptions of the interplay between 'experience' and judgement offer little in terms of depth and critique. Philosophical resources can help us better capture the interplay between judgement and 'experience', and the cultivation of judgement and other capacities with 'experience'. In the school-based teacher training context, an attempt was made to show that writings on the concept of 'practice', especially MacIntyre's, could be employed to shed more light here. However, it is McDowell's related writings that have been adopted for illumination of school inspection. As potential approaches to the interplay between 'experience' and judgement, a type of interplay school inspection, for example, holds great store by, McDowell describes, but through exorcising their presuppositions, shows neither the *Myth of the Given* nor coherentism can do what they claim. The former fails because a cultivated sense of judgement is left redundant by brutishly understood 'experience', and the latter because 'experience' is left with no justificatory role whatsoever. McDowell reveals in our thinking a tendency also to oscillate between these two approaches rather than moving the question of 'experience' and its relationship to cognitive capacities such as judgement forward at all. McDowell's own exploration of issues of 'experience' and judgement well illustrate the difficulty that questions of 'experience' pose, and that educational contexts drawing much on 'experience', such as school inspection, under-explore and leave hanging. With his own 'naturalised platonism,' McDowell releases us from the grip of *Giverness* and coherentism, however. We can now resist having to see judgement as either brutishly determined by 'experience' (*Myth of the Given*) or 'experience' being only relevant to - but not justifying of - judgement (coherentism). As we acquire second nature (*Bildung*), we are according to McDowell initiated into the space of reasons, part of which is participation in "communal practices", and here we develop our conceptual capacities, such as judgement. For McDowell, through this "normal upbringing" we come to see the world aright. This complicates the picture assumed by inspection. On the one hand, this may be seen as unproblematic. Initiated into language, gone through *Bildung*, inspectors are in the space of reasons and so typically in a position to make a judgement, which their 'experience' can allow. On the other hand, what can be questioned here is how exactly 'experience' contributes to judgement, which is one reason why McDowell complements MacIntyre and discloses more about the other

dimensions, such as being initiated into a practice, involved in the relationship between 'Mind and World'. Where McDowell informs MacIntyre's thinking is his further argument that our judgements are already conceptual. To judge is not only to stand back and assess what is received. The receiving itself is already an exercise in judgement. This is judgement as "taking-in" and is an ability for the world to be revealed to us, 'experienced', as it stands (Blackburn, 2002, p.205). For McDowell, 'experience' is already prefigured for us, and so inspectors, to ruminate on. This does not mean that what we might recognise as judgement does stop here, however. For in line with what McDowell is informing us of, there is still the very real possibility of another level of reasoning or judgement. This is judgement such as when assessing, as an inspector, according to particular criteria, or thinking about how what is going on in a classroom is to the benefit of students. Not everyone, teachers nor inspectors, for example, will necessarily enjoy the 'right' preconditions to their prior 'experience' that open their eyes to reasons. McDowell's 'naturalised platonism' as we shall see in the next chapter does not then mean that all people, inspectors or teachers, see all reasons nor that people see any reasons at all necessarily.

Chapter 10: Preconditions and Problems of 'Experience' and Judgement

Prior to the last chapter, a number of necessary and interwoven features of the 'experience' of school-based teacher training and school inspection were considered. The preconditional features of this 'experience' were drawn from writings regarding the closely related term 'practice'. Such features include the sense-giving and guiding *telos*, the traditions of a 'practice' and of an era, and the character, expectations, and qualities, such as the virtue of care, of participants. The elements of this 'experience' also include an 'effective history', a shared ethos, and a communal discourse. Within and with this multi-layered, interwoven, but also open and unpredictable 'experience' desirable qualities and capacities may emerge and identities may change. This kind of transformative potential and the types of conditions necessary for it are insufficiently attended to in the literature on school-based routes and school inspection, however. Without properly attending to elements like this, ensuring the potential for transformation through 'experience' can be fulfilled is much harder to achieve. For its fulfilment participants are then left largely to draw on any available personal resources and on the nature and support of existing social relationships.

In the last chapter, a further aspect of the thesis argument concerning the worrying neglect in educational contexts of such a key term as 'experience' was with McDowell's writings considered. This further area concerning use of 'experience' in these contexts related to presuppositions in its use. That is, McDowell's writings allow us to reveal some of the greater complexity and nuance to 'experience' and its role in the formation and workings of our cognitive capacities, not least judgement. What he discloses helps us to see more of what is behind the use of the term 'experience' in contexts such as school inspection.

McDowell's work can therefore help to strengthen the thesis argument that the term 'experience', featuring prominently in educational contexts, is not being sufficiently attended to. This inattention ought to concern us considering the consequences of appreciation of the term, for example, for the use of public funds, or for different stakeholders in these contexts.

As has been explored in the previous chapter, McDowell problematises two different approaches to 'experience' and its interworking with judgement. One is *Givenness*,

and the other coherentism. McDowell also bemoans the tendency in contemporary thinking to swing pendulum-like from one of these two positions to the other.

In picking apart common misassumptions regarding 'experience' McDowell shows us, however, a way to dissolve rather than construct a response to these problems in our thinking. We do not have to persist with asking the same old questions regarding how judgement and 'experience' interplay because McDowell shows us why they can be relinquished.

With his 'naturalised platonism', McDowell shows us that a normal upbringing means to acquire a second nature (*Bildung*). As part of this acquisition of second nature, we are initiated into the space of reasons. A significant aspect of this initiation is our participation in "communal practices". Under normal circumstances, this initiation 'experience' means the cultivation of cognitive capacities such as judgement and the opening of our eyes to reasons. Through the acquisition of second nature and initiation into the space of reasons, practices, language, and tradition, we are then according to McDowell already in possession of conceptual capacities when we encounter new 'experience'. As with other authors, not least MacIntyre, McDowell's thinking also therefore underlines my thesis argument that having the appropriate formative 'experience' rather than just acquiring 'experience' per se is crucially important. Any judging is based on and drawing upon something far richer than simply receiving a brute *given* for, according to McDowell, judgement already has preconditions.

Along with MacIntyre, Dunne, and others, McDowell's writings then also alert us to the not insignificant difficulties attached to usage of 'experience', difficulties which typical insufficiently attentive use of 'experience' in education does not reflect. Whether our eyes, and those of inspectors, for example, are indeed opened to reasons, our capacity for reasoned judgement fostered, and so whether we are in a position to judge our 'experience' properly is, however, another important question. It is assumed in the literature that inspectors with experience of being teachers and leadership, for example, will see what is necessary. However, as writings on 'practice', such as MacIntyre's, have helped to show, in order for the 'experience' to foster the right capacities and characteristics, certain preconditions for 'experience' have to be met. In other words, credible inspectors are not simply produced by the

mere fact of having had any kind of 'experience' nor for that matter by having had prior 'experience' as teachers and as heads. Their prior 'experience' must have been of the right kind. That the conditions must provide the possibility to foster good judgement is an argument made also by McDowell. These issues are not sufficiently paid attention to in either the school-based route or school inspection literature, however.

What follows, then, and applied to the context of school inspection, is a recap of what MacIntyre's writings underscore, and one major part of my thesis argument, about the importance of preconditions and not simply 'experience' per se, and a discussion of what, similarly, McDowell's writings illuminate. This will help us to better appreciate the kind of 'experience' that makes it more likely to develop good inspectors and good inspection judgements, and illustrate again the importance of getting to better grips with this issue of formative 'experience' than is currently the case in educational contexts typically.

10.1 MacIntyrean Obstacles to Initiation into 'Practices'

As has already been noted in earlier chapters, for MacIntyre, coming to realise ('judge') the internal ends or "goods of excellence", which happen gradually through participation in a 'practice', and which signify self-transformation, are not guaranteed. There are various preconditions - initiation into traditions, the virtues, teachers and students of particular character and qualities, for instance - needed for the recognition of the "goods of excellence" of a 'practice' and the radical change in beliefs and identity this entails. As with school-based 'experience', these preconditional elements are either ignored in the school inspection literature completely or lacking sufficient attention. This leaves these contexts at risk of being underprepared for the possibility of self-transformation if it happens at all.

Take in England the approach of its school inspectorate to training and development, for instance. In order for the type of quality judgement MacIntyre describes emerging from or at least not being discouraged by their type of training, mentoring, and secondment, more is required in appreciation than simply being placed with a mentor and gaining first-hand 'experience' of inspections, which seems to be the common

view. What MacIntyre also reminds us of is that only certain practitioners rather than just anyone benefits most from the conditions a rich 'experience' is informed by and the potential such 'experience' offers. Simply having "experienced" people with new recruits, no matter how "experienced", does not then mean that the recruit will acquire all that needs to be acquired from them. The mentor has to be "experienced" in a way that provides possibility for this acquisition to have a better chance of happening. This leaves aside the question of whether or not 'school-based experience' does actually provide sufficient engagement with "experienced" teachers, as in a healthy practice-like 'experience', considering the resource constraints publicly funded schools operate under, noted in chapter eight.

Aside from mention of 'training and development', and the acquisition of knowledge of explicit systems and procedures, the kind of 'experience' acquired through mentoring and secondment at England's inspectorate, for example, is not explained in much detail in the relevant literature. Again, this illustrates the thesis argument that in educational contexts there is all too often an inattention to what is involved beneath use of 'experience'.

Despite insufficient attention in the inspection literature, this 'training and development', mentoring and secondment, will we can expect at least in part include the possibility of being initiated into the more tacit customs and 'know-how', considered in chapter six, and that an inspectorate will embody. The inspectorate in England, for instance, has been a fixture for nearly 200 years now and so it will embody at least some unspoken traditions of 'excellence' (MacIntyre) and the kind of 'shared repertoire', for example, that Wenger (1998) describes.²⁶⁸ This customary

²⁶⁸ In fact, and as already noted in chapter six, the long-established customs and traditions of *HMI* are said to have been codified into the explicit guidance found, for instance, today in *OFSTED's 'School Inspection Handbook'* (Maclure, 2000, p.314). For Twite *HMI*, the *OFSTED 'Framework'*:

[I]n effect drew on HMI expertise developed and refined over ten to fifteen years. Until the early 80s much HMI work had been implicit, an effect of osmosis, and development consisted largely of making explicit HMI principles and practice, basically the criteria for inspection and its practice. The thinking underlying the practice started to emerge in guidelines, in the booklets explaining HMI practice, in the development of a standard format for notes of visit, and in new forms of inspection, notably the short ('dipstick') inspection. These matters received much attention in the 80s so that when HMI were set the task of elaborating an inspection 'model' the work was quickly resolved and is basically still in place. (Maclure, 2000, pp.316-317)

knowledge is significant if it does exist at the English inspectorate, for instance, because, for MacIntyre, this provides some of the necessary conditions ripe for coming to see internal goods of excellence and for the self-transformation this signifies.

Regarding the virtues, also, if we recall MacIntyre regards these as crucial to sustaining and advancing a 'practice' but also to identifying "goods of excellence". With its 'Conduct during inspections' (OFSTED, 2016) and 'Our Values' (OFSTED, 2014, p.9), for instance, England's inspectorate is certainly aware, at the very least in a minimal prescriptive sense, of the need to practise certain moral qualities.

Whether this then means through an activity such as school inspection, there is the possibility of exercising and cultivating ('regenerating', MacIntyre, 2007, p.xv) the virtues and with it also the possibility of recognising a practice's internal goods, is another question, however. For example, and as already noted in chapter seven, many of the qualities mentioned in the *OFSTED* literature are not virtues in MacIntyre's sense per se. They are typically the qualities of management and bureaucracies, such as being objective, evidence-based and upholding confidentiality.

At best these values parallel the virtues, but at worst they may conflict with and even override them completely. Such a tension could be said to play in the fact that, as highlighted in chapter two, *OFSTED* in England continues to operate in its current iteration despite the well-documented and potentially grave consequences for careers and communities its verdicts can have. It is said in response that England's education system benefits from the type of 'tough love' handed out by *OFSTED*.²⁶⁹ However, any utilitarian, 'greater good' justification for the upheaval inspections can cause is in stark contrast to the necessarily overriding authority of the virtues in MacIntyre's strong, non-utilitarian sense.

²⁶⁹ While recognising the high-stakes nature of inspection, as well as "the pressure on OFSTED to get it right," ex-*HMCI*, Michael Wilshaw (ASCL, 2014), for example, also explains that, "inspections are necessarily tough – if they weren't rigorous they would soon lose credibility." Wilshaw adds that most inspections are not faulty, and, moreover, that "[h]earing bad news from our inspectors is hard. But, understandably, many people find it easier to shoot the messenger than take a long, hard look in the mirror."

Regarding the possibility of there being the type of conditions at *OFSTED* for an 'experience' conducive to the cultivation and sustenance of MacIntyrean virtues, we can also consider its code of conduct (OFSTED, 2016).²⁷⁰ Could this code and its content be equated with the type of conditions that a MacIntyrean practice provides for the chance of self-transformation and so mean such a transformation possible at England's inspectorate? Or is it likely that need of this code of conduct is indication that the type of 'experience' inspectors are having is unconducive to cultivation of the right moral qualities and dispositions? And if so, unconducive to development of the moral responsiveness indicative of self-transformation through realisation of internal goods of excellence? Undoubtedly, the vast majority of inspectors will act with probity. However, *OFSTED*'s code does suggest that the 'experience' that inspectors have acquired prior to beginning inspecting or indeed the 'experience' they go on to acquire as inspectors is not always morally nourishing or contributory towards self-transformation and human flourishing.

10.2 McDowell on the Preconditions for Judgement

This brief review of what was revealed earlier in the thesis then alerts us again to various conditions for good 'experience', without which, for example, the realisation of internal "goods of excellence" and self-transformation MacIntyre identifies are made much harder if not impossible. The resources of MacIntyre, and others, well illustrate the challenges in achieving desired outcomes, such as growing good inspectors, through 'experience'. These challenges are not, however, attended to sufficiently in the relevant inspection literature.

McDowell is drawn upon in this thesis in part to be complementary to what MacIntyre alerts us to regarding our potential capacity for development through practices and the barriers to it. As with MacIntyre, there is no guarantee that good judgement and so having our eyes opened to reasons in the way described by McDowell will develop. While our lives are already primed for second nature (*Bildung*) and so meaning at birth, our second-nature capacities (e.g. "commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, walking, eating, drinking, playing", Wittgenstein, cited by McDowell, 1996, p.95) are not destined to develop. These capacities are only

²⁷⁰ See also 'Conduct during Ofsted inspections' (OFSTED, 2020).

“propensities [...] not already possessed at birth, and not acquired in merely biological maturation” and so merely “potentialities”, which he argues, are acquired ‘normally’ through “education, habituation, or training” (McDowell, 2008b, p.220).

For McDowell, the ‘normal’ acquisition and development of conceptual capacities, such as judgement, in particular, is the result of initiation into language and tradition, or second nature (*Bildung*). The language we are exposed to is especially crucial, for McDowell, as it is language that gives us a cultural head-start and is “the central element” standing over us “as prior embodiment of mindedness, of the possibility of an orientation to the world” (McDowell, 1996, p.125).²⁷¹ Like MacIntyre, and as already explored in chapter nine, McDowell also sees practices (“communal practices”, 2009, p.172) as crucial in our rational, cognitive transformation.²⁷² As we acquire a second nature, we are initiated into, what McDowell, following Sellars, calls the space of reasons. An important part of this initiation is our participation in “communal practices”.

This onus on language in our proper development is also suggestive and relates to my contention in the thesis that trainee teachers or inspectors, for example, do not just work out what to do from ‘experience’ with what they currently possess. What is important, in other words, is the right ‘experience’, in this case a language to articulate their changing ‘experience’. New concepts will help to open their eyes to important ‘experience’. As Dunne contends, considered in chapter eight, a new set of concepts can also facilitate deliberation with mentors and other “experienced staff”. A bare notion of school ‘experience’ is, however, inadequate as it is only through initiation into the space of reasons and language appropriate for appreciating issues in the context of schooling that new teachers can perceive relevant issues in the first place.

²⁷¹ The “mindedness” and traditions embodied in these languages, and so in our conceptual capacities, such as our judgements, are not, for McDowell, rigidly fixed, however. They are the ongoing focus of reflective scrutiny by those that follows us, “subject to reflective modification by each generation that inherits it” (McDowell, 1996, p.126). McDowell (1996, p.126) argues a “standing obligation” characterises this inheritance, “a standing obligation to engage in critical reflection”.

²⁷² As McDowell writes, “[t]he capacity to recognize the requirements of reason [...] is acquired by initiation into suitable communal practices” (2009, p.107). “Responsiveness to reasons,” he adds, “is inseparable from the idea of communal practices” (McDowell, 2009, p.172).

As with MacIntyre on the preconditions for a healthy practice and successful initiation into them, what McDowell writes suggests too therefore that it is not technique or logical system that ought to occupy those hoping to produce good or better judgement. Rather what ought to occupy them is ensuring that the right preconditions for the development of powers of judgement, such as the right kind of language, are in place. Our power of judgement must be nourished with the right ingredients, that is to say.

10.2.1 Development and the Conditions of Cognitive Capacities

McDowell would argue that *normally* everyone develops cognitive capacities. Although ‘normally’ this development takes place, what McDowell writes elsewhere (Cf. ‘properly’, ‘decently’, 2009, p.41, p.170) does however hint at the prospect that there is perhaps nothing inevitable about the development of our capacity for judgement through second nature, the space of reason, and “communal practices”.²⁷³ We might think that inspectors by virtue of having become inspectors have developed ‘normally’. Yet, however, the issue also remains that the reasons inspectors encounter on and through their ‘experience’ may be insufficient in some way or even a detraction from the exercise of cultivated, reasoned judgement inspection prides itself on. Again, what McDowell serves as a reminder of is that ‘experience’ is at stake here when we consider the development and exercise of such capacities. The conditions of ‘experience’ may not necessarily be of the sort that will foster the development of virtues necessary for good judgement. McDowell reminds us is that a teacher or inspector, for example, does not *necessarily* acquire and sustain the right capacities through ‘experience’. The acquisition of judgement, in particular, cannot happen without having been party to the right preconditions for the development of such a capacity. This means that when we think about how qualities of judgement necessary to be an inspector are fostered, sustained, and refined we cannot, as the inspection literature is guilty of doing, pay insufficient attention to the conditions in which this is happening.

If second nature therefore does not always ‘work’ in its “normal” or “decent” sense (McDowell, 2009, p.170), it follows that there is no inevitability about being

²⁷³ Also, it is not just any upbringing, but instead, “a decent upbringing [that] initiates us into the relevant way of thinking” (McDowell, 1994, p.82).

transformed into rationally free agents that recognise “right” reasons through *Bildung* and the space of reasons. In a similar vein to MacIntyre’s writing on preconditions for self-transformation through practices, McDowell (1998, pp.196-197) writes elsewhere too that people do not always have their eyes open to “rational requirements”. Some may not have had the right ethical upbringing to gain exposure to the layout of the space for reasons. Our reasons (McDowell, 2009, p.169) might not be ‘genuine’, for example, he explains, and instead we may be taken by “supposed reasons” resting on (McDowell, 2009, p.170) “social subservience” or “hold of dogma”, for example.²⁷⁴ Even if potentially accessible, “right reason” is therefore not “capable of issuing commands to just anyone” (McDowell, 1998, p.197).²⁷⁵

McDowell also recognises that reasons may be genuine, and may be judged correctly, but our reasoned judgement may not be ‘actionable’. An oppressed minority while justified in its thinking by what its eyes have been opened to, is at the same time not fully free if unable to act on these reasons, he argues.²⁷⁶ McDowell explains, also, that rational freedom may exist but only in circumscribed areas.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁴ There is also the issue of “odd lighting conditions”, and similar, affecting what we ‘take in’ (McDowell, 2009, p.11).

²⁷⁵ For Bakhurst (2011, pp.90-91), McDowell is not suggesting that not having knowledge of the reasons we should have means we are guilty of subservience or beholden to strict belief (“I can think I have a reason to apologise when in fact no offence has been caused, or that the smoke in the kitchen is a reason to raise the alarm when in fact nothing is amiss”, Bakhurst, 2011, p.90). If on having the mistake brought to our attention, and we correct my thinking, then there is nothing, “awry with my ability to respond to reasons”. For Bakhurst, what McDowell is targeting is where the understanding is so “egregiously” mistaken that “reasons” do not truly explain away belief or action. Those “egregiously” mistaken also do not endeavour to make corrections or revisions to what is mistaken. The question, for McDowell, as Bakhurst argues, is to understand quite how someone could come to view things in this way. They, for example, might have been participants in a cult subject to brainwashing or immersed in an extremist political movement. This, for Bakhurst, appears to be what McDowell is referring to when writing about “social subservience” or “hold of dogma.”

²⁷⁶ McDowell asks:

Are we to suppose that members of downtrodden minorities, say, or those who oppress them, cannot have their empirical thinking rationally controlled by objects they perceive? No doubt restrictions on freedom to act can have effects on freedom of thought. But it would be absurd to claim that there is no thinking. (2009, p.200).

²⁷⁷ Drawing on Karl Marx’s conception of ‘wage slavery’, McDowell (1996, pp.117-119) presents a scenario where reasons may be genuine, rational freedom may take place, but *acting* on such freedom also absent, or if it does exist, ‘free acting’ possible only in circumscribed areas. “Man (the worker)” writes Marx, “only feels himself freely active in his animal functions of eating, drinking, and procreating, at most also in his dwelling and dress, and feels himself an animal in his human functions” (1844, cited in McDowell, 1996, pp. 137-8).

The kinds of limitations on ‘normal’ rational development McDowell discloses are not a primary focus of attention in the inspection literature. One nagging long-term issue of relevance in the context of inspection in England, and how ‘normal’ it is as a shared activity where reasons can be realised or acted upon, is, however, government interference.²⁷⁸ If government interference, or at least the fear of it, exists, this might mean those inspectors with conflicting reasons and ‘experience’ may for fear of retribution choose to remain silent. For example, there remains the suspicion that England’s inspectorate is a “political tool” and, such as with academisation (i.e. the policy of handing over the running of publicly owned schools to private enterprises), something exploited to enforce government policy.²⁷⁹ For one commentator, Anastasia de Waal (2006, p.ix), *OFSTED* in England is a “government lapdog” forcing “schools to comply with the latest and ever-changing fads from Whitehall.”²⁸⁰ For de Waal, there exists an “incestuous relationship” (2006, p.ix) between *OFSTED* and government, allowing the meaning of school quality to be determined ultimately by the *Department for Education (DfE)*. In the so-called Trojan Horse scandal in England, where Birmingham schools previously awarded an “Outstanding” inspection grade were re-inspected by *OFSTED* and found to be targeted by religious extremists, the inspectorate has since also been “accused of abandoning ‘objectivity and independence’” and appearing “to be motivated either by politics or self-publicity, or both” (Independent, 2014).²⁸¹ For Jacqueline Baxter (2014, p.1), the Trojan-Horse affair suggests since the 2010 Coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, the English inspectorate’s independence has

²⁷⁸ Dave Penman, general secretary of the *FDA*, the union representing senior personnel in *OFSTED*, for example, notes of the inspectorate that it is, “supposed to be independent of government yet, clearly, various voices and forces within government, will brief against what they’re doing or the people involved in it.” For Penman:

That undermines the independence of the inspection regime and damages its credibility among parents and teachers. School inspections have always been a political hot potato, with a lot of very strong ideological positions taken on all sides – but that creates a perfect storm around inspections. In the middle of it, all of the good work that inspectors do is lost. (Ratcliffe, 2014)

²⁷⁹ See, for example, Vaughan (2015).

²⁸⁰ At that time, this meant imposing a “New Labour monopoly.”

²⁸¹ See Wright (2014).

been “substantially compromised”, becoming “a mere tool of government to be used in order to wage its ideological battle on the English education system.”²⁸²

The issue that the supposedly close ties between government and inspectorate in England raises for the ‘normal’ operation of second nature, and having eyes opened to reason, is then the potential for this closeness to prevent inspectors from ‘actioning’ their ‘experience’ and reasons if this conflicts with government policy and philosophy. *UK Government* literature indeed recognises that questions can be raised about the extent of *OFSTED*’s independence, but has claimed by contrast that the lack of independence is working in the opposite way. The 2011 Education Committee report on *OFSTED* (p.17), for instance, repeats the 2010 White Paper (‘Importance of Teaching’, p.69) claim that, “in the past, *OFSTED* ‘has been required to focus too much on inspecting schools against government policies’.” It was so-called and supposed ‘producer interest’, moreover, that formed part of the explicit rationale for the scrapping of *HMI* and the creation of *OFSTED*.²⁸³ This fear of anti-Government, self-interested thinking in England motivating the creation of *OFSTED* is evidenced in particular by the introduction of lay members to inspections, a practice that continued until 2012.²⁸⁴ *OFSTED* has also been accused (Peal, 2014; Christodoulou, 2014) of imposing a particular teaching style favoured by the teaching community in its inspections.²⁸⁵ This supposedly ‘preferred’ teaching style is ‘child-

²⁸² The literature suggests greater politicisation began much earlier than *OFSTED*, however. According to Maclure (2000, p.324-5), for example, in the 1970s, *HMI* was turned “into a managed group of professionals whose work could be centrally coordinated and directed towards supplying answers to the questions thrown at them by ministers and officials.”

²⁸³ As Maclure (2000, p.324) explains, “HMI were (with rare exceptions) teachers turned inspectors and remained members of the profession within the Civil Service.” It is then probably inevitable that they were going to be accused of being “part of the ‘producer culture’ not guardians of the consumer interest” (Maclure, 2000, p.324) and so part of the problem, not the solution. The literature describes similar concerns over a century earlier. At the 1858 *Newcastle Commission*, which predated the professionally unpopular 1862 ‘Revised Code’, for example:

Few HMIs were called to give evidence and the Commission’s fieldwork was carried out, not by HMIs, whom the Commission’s members believed to be biased in favour of the existing system, but by assistant commissioners with little experience of elementary education. (Dunford, 1998, p.5)

²⁸⁴ Writing in the early days of England’s new inspectorate ex-*HMCI* Perry (1995, p.43), for example, thought the new lay inspector system would protect “inspectors from [...] professional ‘cosiness’.”

²⁸⁵ So, for example:

Teachers are accustomed to putting on ‘jazzy’ lessons, replete with group-work, role play and active learning in order to fulfil what has become widely acknowledged as the ‘OFSTED style’. So strong is the inspectorate’s reputation for favouring trendy teaching methods that the idea

centred', and 'progressive', and one supposedly all-pervasive in and wholly pernicious to schools. This attack on a supposed *OFSTED*-imposed teaching style pits England's inspectorate against those, often of the political Right, who value 'traditional' knowledge- or practitioner-based teaching methods.²⁸⁶

Also underlining the precarious nature of this hoped-for independence of the school inspectorate, of a kind with McDowell's warning about a person not being able to act on reasons even if recognised, is in England the appointment of and relationship between chief inspector (*HMCI*) and government ministers.²⁸⁷ Again, suspicions about this could be understood as undermining confidence in England's inspectorate's capacity to be an activity that allows inspecting to work 'normally' in McDowell's sense of the term to open eyes to and allow for the acting upon of reasons. Again, also, this is something that warrants closer attention than is currently the case in the school inspection literature, where 'experience' features prominently. Take, for instance, events surrounding the replacement of former chief inspector *HMCI* Michael Wilshaw, whose:

[P]ublic interventions on teacher shortages, school performance and discipline, as well as *OFSTED*'s willingness to criticise academy trusts, has made the *DfE* wary of candidates who enjoy the spotlight. (Adams, 2016)

As a Liberal Democrat source quoted in an earlier article (Adams, 2014) explained it, *UK Government* ministers and advisors were, "deeply disappointed by Michael Wilshaw's refusal to play ball." Wilshaw's replacement as *HMCI*, Amanda Spielman, was chosen because "[h]er objectivity and openness are important strengths" and

of putting on a 'chalk and talk' lesson or learning from a textbook with an *OFSTED* inspector in the room has become inconceivable within the teaching profession. (Peal, 2014, p.6)

For Daisy Christodoulou, meanwhile, "inspectors warn the teacher against giving too much direction. Teachers are warned not to talk too much and not to tell pupils things" (2014, p.31).

²⁸⁶ The education *Right*, in particular, as was noted in chapter one, is especially enamoured of school-based routes into teaching rather than more 'traditional' university-led ones.

²⁸⁷ For Pring, the undermining of its independence is a result of the *HMCI* being a political appointee. He writes of recent times that:

[T]here has been a transformation of her majesty's inspectors as a totally independent body to what is now *OFSTED*. This occurred 20 or so years ago, when the head of *OFSTED* became a political appointment.

seen as someone “able to come to objective conclusions based on what data and analysis actually show,” but appointed also in order to “generate fewer headlines than her predecessor” (Morgan, 2019).²⁸⁸

The overbearing influence of government on *HMCI* recruitment is nothing new in the context of school inspection in England. On 2nd April 1957, for example, it was announced that the then Senior Chief Inspector Martin Roseveare would retire. However, concerns began to emerge, and:

[I]t gradually became known within the Inspectorate that Roseveare had not resigned voluntarily and that he had, in effect, been dismissed by the Permanent Secretary. (Dunford, 1998, p.166)

One inspector of the time, F. T. Arnold (cited in Dunford, 1998, p.167), wrote as a result that:

[I]f the Permanent Secretary could get rid of HMIs as if they were any type of civil servant, ‘then all this talk about the independence of HMI is moonshine, and the sooner we all know it the better’.²⁸⁹

10.2.2 Working Conditions

As at any other educational ‘experience’, working conditions at an inspectorate, such as *OFSTED*, also have to be conducive for development and actioning of the type of cultivated, reasoned judgement that both McDowell and MacIntyre describe.

Concerns about the overall working environment at *OFSTED* have however been raised in the inspection literature. This also raises doubts about whether the school inspection ‘experience’ in England is conducive to ‘normal’ development and refinement of cognitive capacities in McDowell’s sense. Inspecting in England has been subjected to the same kind of changes that teaching has (See Maclure, 2000). These changes to working conditions are firmly rooted in *New Public Management*

²⁸⁸ Whether Spielman has assumed this more acquiescent role is, however, debatable. See, for example, Carr (2020).

²⁸⁹ For another later chief inspector, Chris Woodhead, and himself quoting Eric Bolton, a predecessor *HMCI*, “Never at any point in its history was *HMI* wholly or constitutionally independent of government.” “I’m meant to be independent of the Secretary of State,” Woodhead states, “But *OFSTED* is a government department, and the head of all government departments is the Prime Minister” (Hodges, 1996).

(*NPM*) thinking, considered in chapters three and six. Indeed, and as already also noted in chapter six, *OFSTED* is the quintessential *NPM* institution with its founding members carrying out similar reforms in other parts of government and public services in England. These various changes to working conditions at England's inspectorate have meant a greater workload, a more stressful working environment and significant turnover of staff.²⁹⁰ These kinds of reforms associated with *NPM* can be seen as making the 'experience' of becoming and working as an inspector less likely to be "normal" in the sense of initiation into the appropriate space of reasons and self-transformative. This is not least considering the more experienced staff required to pass on traditions and tacit 'know-how' and other elements are less likely to be in attendance.

As has been argued, 'experience' is a prominent term in the context of school inspection. In particular, it is regarded as fundamental to credible judgements, judgements that are also expected to be independent. To foster judgement, 'experience' must be of a form conducive to the expression and fostering of capacities, as both MacIntyre and McDowell alert us to. Judgement does not simply emerge from what might be called 'experience' as our *Bildung* is not necessarily "normal" (McDowell, 1994, p.84) or "proper" (McDowell, 1994, p.91). Even if development is as expected, it may not be possible for a person to act on their judgements or to do so without interference as the literature on *OFSTED* and *HMI* in England underlined. These are, however, also crucial issues related to 'experience' that are not attended to in the school inspection literature, which considering what is at stake with this context, ought to concern us greatly.

²⁹⁰ According to *NAO* (2018), for example, *OFSTED* inspection targets were not being met due to insufficient numbers of inspectors:

Turnover of HM inspectors improved in 2017-18 (19%, compared with 26% in 2016-17) but the rate still indicates a high level of churn in the workforce. One of the main reasons that HM inspectors give for leaving is workload. (*NAO*, 2018, p.8)

This was linked to changing working conditions:

[T]he introduction of short inspections had also made inspectors' jobs more about checking compliance and less about improvement and follow-up work. As a result, HM inspectors' work had become less varied and less satisfying for some inspectors. (*NAO*, 2018, p.35)

Thesis Conclusion

One can only hope in the course of the whole discussion to disclose the meanings which are attached to “experience” [...] and thus insensibly produce, if one is fortunate, a change in the significations previously attached. (Dewey, 1929, pp.1a-2a)

The central, overriding argument of the thesis is that the term ‘experience’ functions in educational contexts without the care and critical scrutiny and sensitivity such a prominent term warrants. School-based teacher training and school inspection are cases in point. What needs much more focus in educational contexts where ‘experience’ is foregrounded, are, more specifically, the various interplaying and mutually supporting conditions informing and fostering these contexts in their richest, transformative sense, and interrogation of the presuppositions that impoverish current understanding. Currently, these conditions, and their characteristics, informing ‘experience’, and the presuppositions permitting the impoverishment in our understanding, are in a state of relative neglect.

It is within these conditions that specific, structured, communal activities and their participants are supported and fostered and within these conditions that desirable qualities and capacities emerge. So, to neglect these conditions, is in effect to neglect the conditions for human development and flourishing. More closely examining the conditions of ‘experience’ in response to this neglect would mean paying closer attention to the guiding purpose, *telos*, of all shared, structured human activities. It would mean paying closer attention to their traditions and customs, and to the tacit ‘know-how’ such activities unavoidably embody. It would mean paying closer attention to the character and relationships of all participants, to their memberships of other social groups, to the wider community, and to their working environment. It would in short therefore mean challenging the assumed, taken-for-granted way things are currently done in educational contexts, such as school-based teacher training and school inspection, where ‘experience’ features prominently.

It was possible to identify a number of the preconditions of a rich and transformative ‘experience’ from the extant literature specific to ‘experience’. According to this literature, ‘experience’ is characterised by habit, custom, and tradition (Dewey;

Oakeshott), and these inform and help to support and foster the development of wisdom and cultivated judgement (Aristotle), and expertise and connoisseurship (Oakeshott; Gadamer; Schon; Dunne). However, it is writings on the related term 'practice', "the building-blocks of social phenomena" (Schatzki *et al.* 2001, p.10), and especially those of MacIntyre, as well as the related writings of McDowell, which in the thesis have been drawn upon most to support my argument regarding the neglect of 'experience' in educational contexts.

Both MacIntyre and McDowell have a very clear sense of the conditions that help to foster our transformation and both recognise in their writings that these conditions are not always properly attended to. Both MacIntyre and McDowell strengthen my thesis argument that 'experience' is a term suffering from relative neglect and because of this insufficient attention is currently paid to the composition and nature of the conditions that allow for a richer and more transformative 'experience'.

More specifically, with MacIntyre's writings on teleological 'practices', their internal goods and historical "standards of excellence", and the socio-moral traditions they are situated in, we are provided with various elements that contribute to conditions in which a person can flourish. His writings also pay closer attention to the nature of those with or without 'experience', master and novices, and the role such people play in human flourishing and as part of the conditions allowing for human flourishing. According to MacIntyre, we come to realise "higher order" goods through the virtues that a practice provides and sustains. Coming to realise "higher order" goods through acquisition of the virtues means also to be free of inferior ones and to be able to stand back and evaluate prior desires. Being able to guide others to this "higher" stage is, however, something that only those who have achieved through the virtues some degree of maturity vis-à-vis desires can do. It is then not only that those with the right character can better pursue their own flourishing but also that those of character can help others to.

McDowell similarly underscores the need to pay closer attention to the conditions that inform and create the possibility of cultivating good qualities and character. He, however, also exposes common, *Given* presuppositions in our thinking regarding 'experience', and especially its interplay with judgement. For McDowell, it is wrong to assume that we are somehow *given* our judgements rather than being opened to

them, and to the layout of the space of reasons, through language and the mindedness and traditions language embodies.

As with MacIntyre's, there is then, according to McDowell's writings also, much more to the cultivation of good judgement and being responsive to reasons in the right way than simply being provided with an opportunity to acquire some 'experience'. With McDowell as with MacIntyre the issue of the context in which practitioners develop, in particular, comes to the fore. Paying sufficient attention to the preconditions of a richer 'experience' that allows for flourishing and development, and so to the question of how best to create and sustain the conditions in which we may develop and flourish, is therefore crucial. It means the possibilities for self-transformation through the conditions 'experience' can offer are more likely to emerge. It may happen anyway, without more attention paid to the conditions of 'experience', but any transformation and its consequences are therefore more dependent for successful navigation on the personal resources and privileges of the individual participant.

Of course, for some there will be no need to engage with the type of critique my thesis encapsulates. They may claim the term 'experience' is already common sense, simply nothing to intellectualise. As outlined in the first two thesis chapters, however, the political nature of the term 'experience' in school-based route and school inspection literature at the very least suggests that leaving the term under-scrutinised suits some vested interests more than others, and favours some and not others. As 'practice theorists' Davide Nicolini and Pedro Monteiro (2016, p.6) similarly argue about 'practices', "they do not have a selfevident nature" and, "[s]ince representations always foreground certain elements and hide others, representing practice is a theoretical and political project."

Avenues for Further Research

The thesis has revealed a number of interesting areas potentially for further research. Further exploration of the term 'experience' would benefit from inquiry into the part institutions play in the preconditional fabric of an 'experience' such as that of school-based teacher training or school inspection. In fact, for MacIntyre, institutions are especially crucial ("no practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions", 2007, p.194). For MacIntyre institutions sustain practices by providing

them and practitioners with external goods (e.g. money, promotion), they distribute such goods, and also provide other essential support services (e.g. administrative, recruitment) that sustain practices. Institutions are also significant as they serve as educators in the virtues (“it is one of the tasks of parental authority to make children grow up so as to be virtuous adults”, MacIntyre, 2007, p.195). This means therefore that institutions must be operated according to the virtues (MacIntyre, 2007, p.195). Institutions are, however, according to MacIntyre, susceptible to “acquisitiveness” and “corrupting power”.²⁹¹ Institutions, MacIntyre argues, threaten to instrumentalise ‘practices’ to serve their own selfish ends (Knight, 2007, p.158). This threat is one reason why for MacIntyre the virtues are crucial to successful self-transformation (“[i]n this context the essential function of the virtues is clear”, 2007, p.194). This is also why without protection of the virtues, bad institutions cannot be so easily resisted (MacIntyre, 2007, p.194).

Future inquiry could also further consider the preconditional features in but also outside of an ‘experience’ seen as a ‘practice’ and the nature of their interconnectedness and interoperation. The intermeshing of practices and interplay between external and internal preconditional features is in the ‘practice theory’ literature explored through theories and concepts such as “nesting” (Hager & Halliday, 2006, p.180) “site ontology” (Schatzki, 2002, p.138), “bundles of practice and material arrangements” (Schatzki, 2015, p.15), “practice architectures” (Kemmis & Grootenboer, 2008), “mediating preconditions” (Kemmis, 2009, p.37) and “hanging together” (Kemmis *et al.* 2014, p.31).²⁹² These intermeshing, preconditional features for MacIntyre, for example, include institutions, as well as the broader socio-moral traditions, and other practices.

²⁹¹ “Institutionalised acquisitiveness” is, for MacIntyre, symptomatic of our age (“*Pleonexia* [...]is now the driving force of modern productive work”, 2007, p.226).

²⁹² In terms of education, for instance, “the individual is practising education within the discursive, material and social conditions of their site, but also the practice arrangements are being developed and changing as individuals collective (sic) engage in the learning and teaching practices” (Grootenboer *et al.* 2017, p.11). For Grootenboer *et al.* (2017, p.10) ‘practices’ and ‘practice architectures’ therefore ought to be attended to at the same time. Grootenboer *et al.* (2017, p.10) also underline how the “site-based conditions” that shape a practice are necessarily particular to it and so it therefore misguided, for example, to conceive of anything like ‘teaching’, or ‘best practice’ in teaching, in more than “very general” terms. “Education practice,” it is explained (Grootenboer *et al.* (2017, p.11), “is only understandable within the arrangements and conditions that enable and constrain it in its particular site.”

The thesis has aimed specifically to highlight the neglect of the term 'experience' in educational contexts. Further inquiry could build on the attention drawn to the significance of practices for any consideration of 'experience' by exploring in a site, such as a school, the likelihood and so nature of the initiation into a number of overlapping and interlocking practices (Hager & Halliday, 2006, p.180). For some (Grootenboer *et al.* 2014, p.12) it is necessary to do so, for, "in education it is pointless to consider particular practices in isolation from other practices." Teaching and training is, for example, "intimately and ecologically" associated with work- or classroom-based learning, for example (Grootenboer *et al.* 2014, p.12). Teaching might be seen as initiation into an interplaying, interdependent, and mutually shaping, subject groups, a year group, various different class groups, and into a school. Education might be seen as the "Education Complex" of student learning, teaching, professional learning, educational leadership and administration, and researching (Kemmis *et al.* 2014, p.51). These kinds of intermeshed conceptualisations of initiation could be said to be an 'experience' and their interworkings presents both further possibilities and challenges for research into usage of the term.

Despite the limited, more philosophical inquiry in this thesis, as 'experience' is a term featuring widely across education, across education there is then a pressing need to get to better grips with the term's functioning, limitations, and potential. As noted in the thesis introduction, 'experience' features, for example, in education research, both in the quantitative, *What Works* variety and in the more qualitative kind. *What Works* education research, in particular, is currently handsomely funded, for example, by the *UK Government*. In fact, we in England see *What Works* evidence-based research being celebrated and funded to the detriment of other forms of social and educational investigation. *What Works* in education is premised on the necessity yet insufficiency for classroom and school effectiveness of 'experience'. However, there would not appear to be the resources in *What Works* education research literature with which to appropriately account for this premise. It would appear that in this context, 'experience' is doing more than is justified given current exploration and thinking regarding the term.

Universities in the UK and US are judged increasingly now according to how well they foster and support “student experience”. Again, as noted in the introductory chapter, what precisely this “student experience” means is a moot point. This lack of clarity has not, however, stopped massive investment taking place in the name of “student experience”. This is also massive investment at a time when university student loan debts have continued to grow, and academic staff pay and working conditions have been in long-term decline.

A third example in education where ‘experience’ should be subject to closer scrutiny, also mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, involves applicants to teacher training in England, who are encouraged to seek out “school experience” to help with the success of their applications. The applicants who cannot secure this “school experience” are at a disadvantage. Yet what is “school experience” of this kind being employed to convey, what comprises and fosters it, and is anything being neglected in its presuppositions?

It is also not just in educational contexts where closer attention to the term ‘experience’ and the necessary elements in fostering a higher quality of experience seem pressing. We live in the midst of the so-called “experience economy” (Pine & Gilmore, 2011), or in fact, more recently, live, it is said, in the middle of the “transformation economy” (Pine & Gilmore, 2011, p.258). Yet where are the resources in this area theorising ‘experience’ deeply, coherently, and critically? Do these areas of research also not need resources with which to think more finely about this term and its preconditions and presuppositions? I hope I have shown that MacIntyre and McDowell are especially good avenues for this kind of work.

Consider also, lastly, the widely and long presupposed link between ‘experience’ and expertise in educational contexts. How does ‘experience’ cultivate expertise exactly? What if any are the preconditions for successful cultivation of expertise in and with ‘experience’? What if anything is being wrongly presupposed here? Again, the writings of MacIntyre and McDowell, and others considered in this thesis, can help us think through such questions.²⁹³

²⁹³ Others writing from within the Education Studies context that may also help here are Addis and Winch (2018).

Although a philosophical exploration of the term, the thesis begins to bring to the fore the issue of neglect regarding 'experience' and points in some potentially fruitful directions where there may be issues to attend to. This thesis has attempted to show how in some philosophical areas, and by relating to them to two illustrative cases, it would therefore be valuable to conduct some empirical research framed by the issues highlighted in this thesis. Empirical investigation could then examine more closely the productive and enriching conditions of 'experience' and other interconnected areas highlighted by the thesis.

Final Thoughts

Lastly, as Heidegger, Oakeshott, Rorty, Brandom and other philosophers and thinkers who have written about the term emphasise, 'experience' is a term the tackling of which should not be taken lightly. 'Experience' is, "difficult to manage" (Oakeshott, 1933, p.9), "one of the most obscure we have" (Gadamer, 2004, p.341), "a kind of philosophical abyss" (Dunne, 1997, pp.280-281). That being the case, even if it is, and proven very much to be, a most difficult area, this should not then mean the term's ongoing neglect in educational contexts. The term 'experience' is and will likely continue to play a central role in Education Studies and beyond, and it is far too prominent, too pregnant with nuance and complexity, and what it glosses over too rich in possibility, to be left alone. We must also continue to pay close attention to what is being done in the name of 'experience', and other terms, and continue to hold policymakers, policies, and institutions to account. Terms such as 'experience' are wielded to validate and legitimise policies and initiatives with potentially serious consequences for education, its participants, and wider society.

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