Drivers of Political Participation:
Are Prospective Migrants Different?

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Abstract:

We investigate the drivers of political participation in six East European transition economies, with high level of out-migration. We test for the existence of distinctive patterns of behaviours between prospective migrants and stayers. Our objective is to identify whether prospective migrants differ systematically from the rest of the population, before they migrate, in terms of their engagement with specific modes of political participation, namely voting and protesting. We find that individuals planning to migrate are nearly always more politically active than those planning to stay, when it comes to taking part in different forms of protest, but they are less likely to vote. We also find that differences are less marked in countries with higher levels of political repression. Interestingly, prospective migrants also tend to be more embedded in social networks (as captured through group membership), but they do not mobilise these links any differently than stayers when it comes to political participation.

Keywords: migration, political participation, voting, selection

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1   Introduction and motivation

In recent years, many researchers have attempted to explain the relationship between political participation and migration, by focusing on individual or household-level data. Historically, the focus was mostly on the political participation of migrants in their receiving communities (see e.g. Lien, 1994; Bilodeau, 2008), expending on aspects of cultural integration and assimilation. But in recent years, a greater emphasis has been put on the sending communities instead.

Indeed, a number of empirical studies have investigated the political participation of returnees, or the impact of diasporas on political processes at home, through financing of campaign or direct political actions, or even through social norms diffusion. For example, Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) investigated the role of migrants abroad on the political beliefs and behaviour of friends and family in Mexico. They explored three different ways through which migrants could have an influence: (i) returns, (ii) direct communication with friends and family left in Mexico and (iii) diffuse communication through "informant networks" in high migration communities. They then concluded that migrants indeed influenced domestic political participation and beliefs through these channels. In recent years, channels 2 and 3 in particular have generated a fast-growing literature around so called "social remittances" - i.e. the transmission back home of views and ideas that are prevalent in the receiving communities, with further studies evidencing the existence of such social remittances focusing on migrants from Moldova, or Western Africa for example (see Barsbai et al., 2017; Batista et al., 2019)[2].

But despite this broadening of the field, a gap remains in our understanding of the links between political participation and migration. Indeed, few surveys follow migrants in their migration journey, as well as those they left behind, making it difficult to account for the impact of selection into migration on political participation at home, before social remittances can even exist. At the same time, there is an established literature, relying on macro data, case studies and narratives, suggesting a strong potential impact of migration on political processes at home, mostly through the selection of the migrant group. Indeed, migration has long been presented as a decompression valve in relatively undemocratic and contested regimes, where voluntary or forced migration of the political opposition essentially leads to a reduction in political voice domestically (Hirschman, 1993). But at the same time, groups moving out can free up space for others to express their concerns or can provide support for their views from abroad, in which case migration could bolster voice (Kapur, 2014).

In this paper, we thus propose to fill some of the gaps in this literature by documenting differences in political participation prior to migration in a number of high emigration countries. We thus explore the relationship between intention to migrate and political participation in six former-communist transition economies, namely Kazakhstan, Moldova, North Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine and Tajikistan using secondary data. Our objective is to document whether prospective migrants from these countries differ from the rest of the population in terms of their political involvement, and the key drivers behind their political participation. Our contribution is thus to document potential differences between migrants and

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[2] For a recent extensive review of the social remittances literature see Ivlevs (2021).

those left behind in their political behaviour prior to a migration episode. Evidence on this is currently missing from the literature.

To do so we build on a well-established literature on the drivers of political participation, focusing on the resources typically mobilised for political participation to occur (e.g. Verba et al., 1995). We also focus on a number of transition countries, which are relatively recent and imperfect democracies, and thus where political participation is likely to be more volatile and less entrenched. Our countries of interests are also characterised by high levels of emigration.

2   Conceptual framework

2.1   Exit-Voice

Our exploration builds on the framework first proposed by Hirschman (1970) of "Exit, Voice and Loyalty". Initially developed to discuss the relationship between a firm and its customers, Hirschman's framework has proved popular with migration scholars interested in the interplay between migration and outcomes relating to policy or party choices, involvement in political life or degree of political freedom (Kapur, 2014).

Indeed, it intuitively formalises the options faced by citizens to either express their views, so that they can try to shape the political context in which they live, or walk out and move to a country that suits them better: i.e. they have a "voice" or "exit" strategy. This framework was more recently revisited and expanded by Kapur (2014) to better reflect the range of options offered to citizens as potential migrants. Following this framework, migration can influence political participation in the country of origin through four channels:

- the 'absentee channel': selective migration withdraws from the electorate those most likely to advocate democratic practices and leads to a reduction in 'voice';
- the 'prospect channel': opening borders for migration ('exit options') increases the bargaining power of potential migrants and can lead to an increase in 'voice';
- the 'return channel': return migrants transfer norms and political attitudes acquired in democratic societies upon their return home.
- And finally, the 'diaspora channel', as added by Kapur (2014) which capture the influence of migrants, currently abroad on domestic politics.

If the framework is conceptually sound and quite popular with researchers, there are some important limitations preventing a direct test of its implications on micro-level data. Most importantly longitudinal data following individuals and their families and relatives, before they migrate and then keeping track of both migrants and those left-behind, is still mostly lacking. In addition, when appropriate data is available, the importance of these channels can be quantified as correlations, but the absence of counterfactual can make it difficult to assess their exact causal impact.

However, a large body of micro-level empirical work has still developed in recent years. This recent literature has tended to focus more specifically on the impact of returnees and "social

remittances" and thus has essentially tested only channels 4 and 3[3], exploring how having a family member abroad (or recent returnee) impacted on the voting and values of who had stayed behind.

While the early literature presented mostly correlations, a number of recent work has focus on establishing more credibly causal relationships. In particular, in more sophisticated implementations, the issue of self-selection into migration and return had to be addressed either explicitly in a system of equations capturing selection (for an example relating to job market outcomes see e.g. Wahba, 2015), or through experiments and/or instrumentation (e.g. Batista and Vicente, 2011).

In contexts where these approaches cannot be implemented credibly, a descriptive analysis of differences in patterns of behaviour in different groups (e.g. prospective migrants vs. non-migrants or families with a migrant abroad versus families without) can still provide an interesting picture, and help discuss the interplay between migration and political activity. Importantly, this underscores the importance of self-selection and the need to develop a sound understanding of who the migrants are and how they differ from the rest of the population, to understand their likely impact.

Here we thus propose to focus on the two first channels in the framework presented in Kapur (2014), to investigate the extent to which prospective migrants differ from the rest of the population in terms of their political participation before they actually migrate. Because our analyses focus on the political participation of prospective migrants relative to stayers, we are providing insights into the second channel discussed by Kapur, i.e. the "prospect channel". However, we note that these prospective migrants are also "absentee-to-be", hence their activism will be lost if/when they put their plans to migrate into action. We also note that our analyses will only provide correlational information, but in a context of missing evidence overall, it seems important to document these correlations to better understand the interplay between political participation and migration starting with clear stylised facts. We also conduct our analyses in six countries characterised by high levels of out-migration, and important differences in political and economic contexts, allowing for some discussions of these stylised facts in comparative perspective.

To illustrate Hirschman's Exit and Voice framework further, and its relevance to our case studies, we can examine Hirschman's own discussion of exit and voice in the context of post-1989 Germany. Indeed, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Hirschman (1993) proposed a detailed analysis of the interplay between exit and voice in the case of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In this paper, Hirschman recognises that in his early interpretation of his own exit and voice framework, exit and voice were antagonistic, stating that when exit was possible, voice would not develop. However, that wasn't the story in the GDR until 1988, where the impossibility of exit (true or fantasised) meant that political protest was close to non-existent in the country. At the same time, when the apparatus of oppression of the state (and the Soviet Union) appeared to falter, the forces of both exit and voice were unleashed jointly, leading in 1989 to a complementary role of both, culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall and, soon after, to the German reunification. In summary, and as depicted in Figure 1, the way exit and voice interact is important to understand political participation, but depending on the context, they

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[3] These are the 2 channels investigated for example in the paper by Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) that we have discussed earlier.

can be either complements (with no voice/no exit pre-1989 and then voice/exit appearing jointly in 1989) or substitutes (as in Hirschman, 1970) each other.


Figure 1: The interplay between exit, voice and political change

In the context of our case-study countries, both exit and voice should have become more of an option from the early 1990s, as in most cases, the fall of the Berlin Wall has marked the start of a period of economic and political liberalisation in these countries. However, progress has been very uneven, as we will discuss in Section 3 below.

2.2   Political participation

The drivers of political participation have been heavily studied in political science, and a number of stylised facts are now well established. It is usually recognised that political participation is costly, and thus requires access to specific resources (Brady et al., 1995). These resources can be money or time, but also education or social ties - i.e. resources that can reduce the cost of acquiring and processing the information required to understand and participate in the political debate. Similarly, factors likely to increase the returns of political participation, such as perceived efficacy, will also impact on the level of political participation. It is thus generally expected that male, better educated, wealthier individuals (Gallego, 2010), but also those who are engaged in the social community, and are of higher social classes are likely to participate more in different types of political actions (Putnam, 2001). This thus implies a vicious circle, whereby socially disadvantaged and isolated groups are also politically under-represented (Verba et al., 2003). Even though the early evidence on this focused on advanced democracies, more recent research has confirmed these biases in newer democracies too (see e.g. Marien et al., 2010).

Grievance theory however contend that it is the more marginalised groups that will engaged in protest and less institutionalised forms of political participation, leading to a better representation of different social groups in these types of activities (see Marien et al., 2010). Taking part in a demonstration, signing a petition or boycotting specific products are examples of non-institutionalised forms of political participation that are usually assumed to be driven by dissatisfaction and are thus likely to be a relatively more common form of participation among marginalised groups, compared to more institutionalised activities, including (and

maybe especially) voting. Interestingly, Marien et al. (2010) also note that in less democratic contexts (measured through Freedom House - political freedom indicator), both institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of participation are repressed. Further to this, the differences between low-resource and high-resource groups[4] in terms of likelihood of participation in institutionalised and non-institutionalised political activities also tend to be reduced in less democratic environments. In Central and Eastern Europe specifically, Hooghe and Quintelier (2014) comment that unstable and emerging democracies tend to see lower levels of political participation than stable democracies, and that this holds for all forms of political participation. They also demonstrate that current quality of government measures (i.e. bad governance and corruption) are more important in explaining low participation than past experience with authoritarian rule in the region.

2.3 Hypotheses

Consistently with the literature presented above, we thus formulate three testable hypotheses. Firstly, consistently with Hirschman's early intuition, we will posit that in context where both voice and exit have recently become available, prospective migrants will be more politically active than stayers. Secondly, we will also posit that migrants will be more likely to protest than vote – thus adopting forms of political participation that are more relevant to expressing discontent. Intuitively, this is because migration is likely to be at least partly caused by some form of grievances, and thus prospective migrants should be more likely to take part in protest-related political activities.

Finally, based on key insights from Marien et al. (2010) and on Hirschman's analysis of the GDR (1993), we will also posit that the differences between migrants and non-migrants will be less pronounced in less democratic contexts. We can summarise these, as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Prospective migrants are less likely to vote than those not planning to migrate.

Hypothesis 2: Prospective migrants are more likely to protest than those not planning to migrate.

Corollary: The difference between migrant and non-migrant will be less pronounced in non-free context.

3 Context and data

3.1 Data source and countries investigated

We test these hypotheses on a set of six post-communist economies, namely: Kazakhstan, Moldova, North Macedonia, Serbia, Tajikistan and Ukraine. These countries represent an interesting case-study setting, thanks to their common past and recent experience of

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[4] They specifically focus on individuals with low education and low interest in politics.

transformation away from a centrally planned economy with an authoritarian political regime and towards greater levels of political and economic liberalisation. Since the 1990s, they have experienced very different democratic transition, leading to contrasting outcomes and they have also seen dramatic increases of emigration rates, starting from virtually no emigration under communist times. Key indices reflecting their characteristics at the time the data used in our analyses were collected can be found in Table 1 below.

We use data from a large cross-country survey conducted in 2009 in these six transition economies by the UNDP as part of a project entitled: "Beyond Transition: From Exclusion towards Inclusive Human Development in the ECIS Region". As we are interested here in political participation, we could have restricted our analysis to focus on the four countries surveyed that were considered as free or partly free at the time of the data collection, more specifically, Moldova and North Macedonia, which were both classified as "partly free" countries by Freedom House in 2009, and Serbia and Ukraine as two politically free transition economies (see Table 1). However, we decided to also report results for the 2 unfree countries surveyed, namely Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, as interesting contrasting examples. Between 2,700 and 2,400 households were surveyed in each of these countries.

Besides the level of political freedom afforded to the population, Table 1 also presents some basic statistics to describe the relevant contexts. Our countries of interest are post-communist states, which have emerged either from the collapse of the Soviet Unions or the breakdown of Yugoslavia. They have therefore started in the 1990s a process of transformation away from central planning towards market economies.

Table 1: Country characteristics

	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan	Moldova	Macedonia	Serbia	Ukraine
Freedom score[a]	Not Free	Not Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Free	Free
- Overall score	5.5	5.5	4	3	2.5	2.5
- Civil liberties	5	5	4	3	2	2
- Political rights	6	6	4	3	3	3
Progress in reforms[b]						
- First stage	11.7	11	12.3	12.6	11.7	12
- Second stage	7	6	7.3	8.3	7	7.6
Emigration rate[c] (stock)	23.6	11.2	21.5	21.9	18	14.4
GDP[d] (PPP per capita)	15,112.25	2,018.79	3,326.73	10'827.92	12,108.22	8,298.32

Sources:

(a) Freedom House – country reports 2009. The Freedom score is the average of the civil liberties and political rights scores. All scores are from 1 to 7, with 1 "totally free" to 7 "totally unfree".
(b) EBRD transition indicators – 2009 scores. Frist stage reform scores are the sum of the indicators for small-scale privatisation, and internal and external price liberalisation. Second stage reform scores are the sum of the indicators for large-scale privatisation, enterprise governance and competition policies. Each sub-component of our aggregated scores is rated from 1 (conditions typical of a centralised economy) and 4.3 (conditions typical of an advanced market economy). Our aggregate scores can thus take values from 3 to 12.9.
(c) Stock of emigrants as percentage of the total population in 2010, from the World Bank Migrations and Remittances Factbook, 2011.
(d) Calculated from Penn World Table (PWT9.1) using Real GDP expenditure-based PPP (in 2011$) and population size.

Their progress in that area can be measured using the Transition indicators produced by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on a yearly basis. Here we report two aggregate indexes reflecting their progress. First, we report an indicator of progress in "1st stage reforms", that is to say internal and external price liberalisation and small-scale privatisation (i.e. the basic reforms aiming at restoring prices as a vector of information and regenerating private property and small-scale enterprises). Second, we present an indicator of progress in "2nd stage reforms", that is to say, the more complex reforms required to reform state-owned enterprises and create a framework for enterprise governance and restructuring (for a discussion of the process and the relevance of these indicators, see Douarin and Mickiewicz, 2017). Both these indicators will range from 3 to 12.9, with 3 reflecting a situation still in line with a centrally planned economy and 12.9 reflecting the situation in a "typical" advanced market economy. To put these scores into perspective, we can look at Estonia and Poland, two of the most advanced reformers in the Eastern Europe. In 2009, they had scores of 12.9 and 11.4 for Estonia and 12.9 and 10.3 for Poland in 2009 for their first and second stage reforms respectively.

We thus can see that all countries have made good progress in liberalisation and small-scale privatisation, but are lagging behind with their "2nd stage reforms". Macedonia appears as relatively more advanced in terms of economic reforms overall, but the country remains politically partly free only; while Serbia is slightly less advance in terms of economic reforms but is classified as free. In spite of this, these countries differ widely in terms of their economic development, as measured through their GDP per capita (Feenstra et al., 2015), with Moldova lagging behind at $3,300 per capita and Serbia with roughly 4 times as much per inhabitants. GDP per capita is even higher in Kazakhstan, thanks to an abundance of natural resources. Finally, we also report the current stock of emigrants as a percentage of the total of population to give a sense of the level of emigration that these countries have experienced in recent decades. We note that worldwide the stock of emigrant as a percentage of the total population was 3.2 in 2010, 3.2 in low income countries and 2,7 in middle income countries.

Overall, we thus have a set of countries which has experienced rather varied post-communist outcomes, with relative progress in economic liberalisation everywhere, but unequal economic development. More economic reforms are still needed everywhere. Outmigration is important and political freedom unequally available.

Our aim is to investigate whether prospective migrants differ from the rest of the population in terms of their propensity to partake in political activities. Let us describe here the variables we are going to use in our analyses.

3.2   Dependent variables: forms of political participation

We propose to investigate different forms of political participation. We will first focus on voting, before looking into an index of "protest-type" activities including protest, contacting a politician, signing a petition and complaining to a third-party agency.

Voting is a standard form of political participation and it is thus useful to investigate whether the prospect of migration is associated with a different propensity to vote. At the same time, it

might be described as a ritualised form of civic engagement, which is conducted by habit or with minimal engagement with political debates. It is thus informative to also investigate other forms of participation. It is common practice in the literature to investigate political participation focusing on a broad range of behaviours and actions.

We thus also discuss other forms of participation that are more protest-oriented, or about expressing a dissatisfaction. In our dataset, respondents were asked to report if they had in the last 12 months, taken part in protest, signed a petition, complained to an independent body or contacted a politician. While the 2 first activities can be described as less institutionalised, none of these 4 forms of political participation is very common among our respondents, and investigating them independently may thus be problematic. When a behaviour is not common, it is harder to credibly identify key drivers, due to purely statistical issues. We thus take the step to construct an aggregate index of protest activities[5], by creating a dummy equal to 1 if a respondent has taken part in at least 1 of these 4 activities in the last 12 months, and 0 otherwise. In robustness checks, we will also look at an indicator taking value 1 if a respondent has either protested signed a petition, or complained to an independent body and 0 otherwise. This second indicator thus excludes contacting a politician or civil servant, to reduce concerns that this could be associated with bribery or corruption, rather than translating a more desirable engagement with political issues. Table 2 below provides a few key descriptive statistics on these variables.

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[5] A principal component analysis confirms that it is meaningful to do, as the only component created with an eigen value above 1 (at 2.08 to be precise) charges all 4 activities positively and with values of 0.45 or more. We note that contact charges at 0.45, while the 3 other variables do charge with higher values.

Table 2: Political participation

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N	KZ mean	TJ mean	MD mean	MK mean	RS mean	UA mean
Voted last election	0.77	0.42	0	1	14,891	0.67	0.73	0.84	0.82	0.71	0.84
Aggregated indexes:											
- All protest & contact	0.15	0.36	0	1	15,901	0.08	0.19	0.15	0.22	0.12	0.14
- All protest	0.11	0.31	0	1	15,901	0.05	0.14	0.11	0.17	0.09	0.09
Individual activities											
- Protest	0.04	0.20	0	1	15,619	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.06
- Petition	0.05	0.21	0	1	15,560	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.05
- Complaint	0.03	0.18	0	1	15,533	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06
- Contact	0.07	0.26	0	1	15,654	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.10
Any group	0.34	0.47	0	1	14,397	0.24	0.30	0.39	0.46	0.36	0.29

Source: Authors' calculations

Table 3: Migrations

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N	KZ mean	TJ mean	MD mean	MK mean	RS mean	UA mean
Planned to migrate	0.25	0.43	0	1	15,116	0.13	0.30	0.36	0.32	0.22	0.15
Past migrations:											
- returnee in the household	0.09	0.28	0	1	15,334	0.02	0.13	0.18	0.08	0.08	0.04
- receiving remittances	0.12	0.33	0	1	15,901	0.02	0.30	0.26	0.08	0.05	0.03

Source: Authors' calculations

3.3 Migration plans and other covariates

3.3.1 Key variable of interest

Our central objective is to investigate differences between prospective migrants and others in the population in their political participation. Our main independent variable of interest is thus a dummy indicating whether the respondent is planning to migrate. We use self-reported intention to migrate in the near future. Intentions are routinely investigated in migration studies (Papapanagos and Sanfey, 2001; or Castaldo et al., 2007) and have been shown to strongly correlate with actual migration (DeJong, 2000), as planning is indeed a first step towards migration.

We present key descriptive statistics in Table 3 above. All countries taken together, 25% of the respondents report planning to migrate in the near future, however there are important variations between countries, roughly reflecting the actual migration experience of this countries. For example, 30% of respondents are planning to migrate in Moldova and Macedonia, which are also the countries with the largest migrant stock currently abroad. We also report that having a returnee in the household or receiving remittances is rather common, especially in Moldova and Tajikistan, the two less economically developed countries in our sample, where limited economic opportunities at home encourage migration to supplement income.

3.3.2 Resources

Political participation and its drivers are commonly studied by political scientists. There are thus a number of established stylised facts to guide an investigation of the drivers behind the likelihood of voting or protesting. An influential frame of analysis was in particular contributed by Verba et al. (1995) in which they hypothesised that political participation requires key resources that one could mobilise to formulate, express and test their views. These resources would include time, money (as captured through socio-economic characteristics) but also civic skills that can be gained through voluntary community engagement.

Individual demographic characteristics should first be controlled for, as education, income, age and gender have commonly been found to correlate with political actions (including in studies focusing specifically on protest: e.g. Norris, 2006). Generally speaking older, wealthier, better educated and male respondents are more likely to be politically active, albeit with some differences across countries (e.g. Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007).

These will enter our main regressions, along with other typical household-level controls including whether the household lives in urban or rural area, marital status, and religious and ethnic background. We will also account for regional-level fixed effects.

Additional drivers will then be added sequentially to further assess the robustness of the relationship between migration plan and political participation, to the inclusion of variables capturing the values and social capital of respondents.

3.3.3   Attitudes towards political process and institutional trust

In a supplementary specification, we will include perceived political efficacy. Perceived political efficacy translates the degree to which a citizen believes his voice will be heard by local representative. Political participation will be hindered if citizens believe their actions will have no effect, but protest can be bolstered through the frustration of not being heard. We will include two variables here, one measuring satisfaction with local representation and one focusing on national representation.

To further account for the perceived institutional context, we will also include a variable measuring the respondent's trust in institutions (as trust in the judiciary) and a variable reporting the perceived frequency of corruption.

Overall, these variables capture the degree of satisfaction of respondents with their political representation and perceived institutional quality. If prospective migrants systematically differ from the rest of the population on their assessment of these concepts, this will affect the relationship between migration and political participation.

3.3.4   Other impacts of migration and social capital

In recognition of the possible role played by past migrations, or current social remittances, in shaping political participation of the relevant households, we will also control for whether the household of a respondent includes some returnees and currently reports receiving remittances. It is important to note indeed, that prospective migrants are often found in households with previous experience of migration. Thus, differences in political behaviour could reflect a change of attitudes following migration rather than preceding it. In the extant literature, the presence of returnees in the household (transmitting values and beliefs from their previous place of migration) or of family members abroad sending "social remittances" home has been shown to matter for political participation among the remaining members of the household (e.g. Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow, 2010).

Finally, an additional control will be added to focus on the social capital of respondents (as argued by Coleman, 1988 for example). Indeed, it is widely recognised that one's social context has a strong impact on political participation, and in particular being a member of local associations and being more trusting are thought to be reliable drivers of political participation. This is sometimes referred to as the "mobilisation model", as respondents are seen as more politically active because of their increased social exchange. This argument goes back to Putnam (1993, 2001) and reflects the fact that group membership is relevant to whether and how people engage with the public debate and exchange views, they are thus often associated with higher levels of voting and other forms of political participation. In the case of migrants however, for whom networking may be primarily a way to facilitate migration, group membership might have a different significance.

4 Empirical strategy

Using data from the Social Exclusion Survey we estimate, for each country, models of the following type:

$$Political\ participation_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Emigration\ plans_i + X_i' * \gamma + \varphi_c + \varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

Where political participation and emigration plan are measured as discussed above and X_i is the vector of other characteristics predicting political participation. φ_c represents regional fixed effects, which capture relevant contextual variables which are fixed within a given geographical area and can impact on migration intentions and decisions to take part in different types of political activities.

We do not pull the data to estimate average relationship for all six countries at once, as we are interested in country-specific relationships, rather than average patterns. This is justified by the fact that six countries are not sufficient to claim that an average stylised fact can have any external validity, and because differences between countries are likely to be more enlightening here.

We introduce our control variables sequentially, in groups reflecting sets of potential drivers defined consistently with the groupings presented in section 3.3. This sequential inclusion allows us to identify how each addition affects the significance of migration plans, and thus potentially mediating the impact of prospective migration on the type of political participation considered.

5 Results

5.1 Unconditional correlations (baseline specification)

From Table 2 above, we note that migrants appear to vote less and protest more in all 6 countries. In the regression tables which are presented in full in appendix, we first include regressions controlling for migration plans and regional fixed effects only (specification 1 in all tables). These confirm an interesting pattern whereby prospective are significantly less likely to vote in all countries, when only regions are controlled for. While migrants are significantly more likely to take part in protest of any forms in Moldova, Macedonia and Serbia only, i.e. only in countries that are at least partly free (with the exception of Ukraine). These correlations seem thus to confirm that when repression is not strong, exit and voice are likely complements, if voice is taken as reflected in diverse forms of protest, in our case, protest, petition, complaining and contacting policy-makers.

5.2 Estimations (adding controls)

Adding regressors sequentially will shade more lights on these relationships. In the rest of the paper, we will discuss results from different specifications, with full regression tables with all specifications included in Appendix. We include here an abridged table of results only (Table 4 below), focusing on specification 2 only (i.e. a specification with prospective migrants and all socio-economic controls as described in section 3.3.2). Table 4 thus allows us to comment on the extent to which prospective migrants differ from others, given their socio-economic status – i.e. controlling for information that is typically available from individual or household surveys, and information that can explain economic migration. The regressors added in subsequent specifications are about less typically observed (and less relevant to economic migrations) controls relating to values, social capital and past migration experience – which can be interesting mediator of the role of migration on political activities.

We will discuss these results below focusing on pairs of countries with similar level of political freedom. Overall, we note that differences in voting behaviour disappear as controls are added, hence specific observable characteristics of prospective migrants explain their different propensity to vote. For protest politics, prospective migrants are generally more likely to participate than the rest of the population, and when the difference is statistically significant, it is fairly robust to changes in specification (see discussion of Serbia and Macedonia below).

5.2.1 Kazakhstan and Tajikistan

As the two non-free countries in our sample, political participation is likely to reflect more complex decision making from citizens, who are unlikely to believe that their voice is truly heard, and are likely to face significantly different calculations in their decisions to take any of the protest-forms of activities we are focusing on. With this caveat in mind, the results for these two countries are thus more presented as an interesting comparison points for the rest of the countries covered by the survey.

In Kazakhstan, prospective migrants are not more likely to vote or to protest than the rest of the population, at least as shown in any specification with at least a minimum set of controls. In this authoritarian context, prospective migration is not associated with any notable differences in political involvement, and the likelihood of protesting is in fact very low, making it difficult to identify any credible drivers of protest in our sample.

Table 4: Prospective migration and political participation:

	Hypothesised sign	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan	Moldova	Macedonia	Serbia	Ukraine
Voted last election	-	0.014 (0.033)	-0.017** (0.005)	-0.054 (0.034)	-0.038** (0.015)	-0.076 (0.049)	-0.068* (0.031)
Protest (any protest and contact)	+	0.019 (0.020)	0.026 (0.016)	0.029 (0.013)	0.094*** (0.024)	0.088** (0.034)	0.031 (0.022)

Source: Extracted from Tables A1 to A12 in Appendix.

Each cell is a regression, only the coefficient for prospective migrants is reported, other controls are: gender, age, married, education (as: primary – reference category, secondary, tertiary), ethnic majority, religious majority, settlement size (as rural – reference category, small town, bigger city, capital) and regional fixed effects.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Tajikistan, respondents are both more likely to vote and protest than in Kazakhstan (see Table 2). Focusing on voting, prospective migrants are significantly less likely to vote than the rest of the population, in specifications 1 and 2. This means that as long as we control only for socio-economic characteristics, prospective migrants are less engaged than what the "resource model" of political participation would predict. The significance disappears as soon as we control for the views held by these migrants on institutional quality and levels of representations. It is thus possible that these values mediate the role of migration on voting behaviour, i.e. it might because they have a different assessment of their political context that prospective migrants have a different propensity to vote. However, over half of the sample refused to answer these questions, leading to an important selection bias for our specifications 3 to 5, putting this interpretation in doubt. The same can said for protest activities, where we report that prospective migration is significantly positively associated with protesting but only once values are controlled for, but again here the reduction in sample size associated with controlling for these values makes it difficult to reach a firm interpretation.

Overall, this seems to show that prospective migrants are not markedly different from the rest of the population in their protest activities in these more autocratic countries, where in any case political participation is constrained by external factors.

5.2.2   Moldova and Macedonia

For our two "partly free" case studies, we can also note some similarity in results. In Moldova, prospective migrants are significantly less likely to vote than the rest of the population, however the difference becomes insignificant once we control for socio-economic characteristics. We also find that prospective migrants are more likely to protest, but again this difference disappear once we control for socio-economic characteristics. Overall this implies that migrants typically come from socio-economic groups that are typically voting a bit les and protesting a bit more, irrespective of migration plans. Interestingly, we also find that past migration history (i.e. returnee or remittances) is associated with a little bit less voting and a little bit more protesting. This is to some extend consistent with Barsbai et al. (2017) as they explain that selection into migration as mostly driven by economic consideration, and then present evidence that family members left-behind are likely to become more liberal due to social remittances.

In North Macedonia, the difference in the propensity to vote of prospective migrants versus stayers becomes progressively less significant as we add regressors. While in specification 1 and 2, prospective migrants are found to have a lower propensity to vote, this difference is barely significant at 10% once we add values (specification 3). However, as discussed in the case of Tajikistan the number of observations entering the regression also goes down very rapidly as we add controls. Interestingly, prospective migrants are always more likely to protest, even in our most extensive specifications. It also appears that the propensity to protest is not driven by past migration, on the contrary we find that when there are returnees in the household the likelihood of protest is slightly dampened.

Overall, these partly democratic countries thus show markedly different patterns. While in Moldova prospective migrants do not seem to differ much from others in their political

behaviour, return migration and social remittances might increase political engagement. In North Macedonia, prospective migrants are less likely to vote and more likely to protest than the rest of the population (possibly at least partly because they have a different assessment of their political environment compared to others in the population), but past migration history slightly dampen the likelihood of protesting.

5.2.3 Serbia and Ukraine

Finally, looking at our two most free countries at the time where the survey was collected (i.e. 2009/10), Serbia and Ukraine, we again find two contrasting set of results. Indeed, in Serbia, prospective migrants are less likely to vote than the rest of the population, but the difference becomes insignificant once we control for socio-economic characteristics. However, prospective migrants are also more likely to take part in all forms of political protest, with the difference with the rest of the population remaining significant in all specifications, if much weaker once we control for values and past migration history. In other words, in Serbia prospective migrants are not less likely to vote, but they have a greater propensity to take part in protest, which is not mediated away by values or past migration.

Contrastingly, in Ukraine, prospective migrants are not more likely to protest and may be slightly less likely to vote but this relationship is sensitive to specification changes.

6   Discussion and conclusions

Overall, our analyses reveal a complicated picture where in nearly all fee or partly free countries analysed, prospective migrants differ from the rest of the population in some aspects of political participation, when only socio-economic characteristics are controlled for. This seems to suggest that prospective migrants are not only selected on credible drivers of economic migration (i.e. socio-economic characteristics), instead they are also selected on their propensity to engage with political processes. Sometimes they vote less (Ukraine), sometimes they protest more (Serbia), sometimes they do both (Macedonia). The exception to this is Moldova, the poorest countries in our sample and also a country with very strong aspirations to migrate in the populations – perhaps a context where economic drivers are thus overwhelmingly dominant. In non-free countries, we find less differences between prospective migrants and non-migrants, consistently with Marien et al. (2010) but also Hirschman's discussion of the GDR case (1993).

This broad-brush summary of results is important for two key reasons. Firstly, it documents important differences between migrants and non-migrants, prior to migration, that are important to our understanding of the dynamic relationship between migration and political liberalisation. Indeed, many studies have argued that returnees or migrants currently abroad could have an impact on liberalisation back home as they bring back or remit new ideas and values. However, few studies have explicitly discussed differences in political views prior to migration, and when they have, the discussion has often been hypothetical, thus not presenting

concrete evidence of these likely differences. The empirical illustration reported here is thus important.

Second, our varied case-studies and large set of controls allow us to further demonstrate how varied the situation can be, with prospective migrants showing quite diverse patterns of behaviours compared to the broader population in our different case-study countries. Of particular importance here is the fact that in studies using data where past political behaviour is unobservable, conceptualising migration as driven by economic opportunity only might be misleading. Indeed, in some countries but not in others, values relevant to political participation are likely to complement economic motives in driving migration.

With this in mind, some have for example attempted to evaluate what the turn-out might have been without migration, in high emigration contexts. Focusing on 10 new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe, Kostelka (2017) reports a reduction in turnout of around 2.1 percentage-point on average, following mass emigration triggered by the EU freedom of movement policy. However, these calculations were implicitly based on the assumption that emigrants would have had the same propensity to vote as those left-behind, had they not migrated (but explicitly recognising that external voting is not sufficient to maintain participation while abroad). Our results however illustrate that prospective migrants are often not like the rest of the population, and while in our sample, they tend to vote less, they could also vote more. But beyond voting, they can credibly be among the most vocal before they actually exit, by engaging in activities that we have described as protest orientated (i.e. taking part in a protest, signing a petition, contacting a politician or civil servant and addressing a complaining through a third-party organisation). What Kapur (2014) labelled as the "prospect" and "absentee" channels are thus very likely to be important for political liberalisation – and key to our understanding of the true impact of social remittances.

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Table A1. Voting in Kazakhstan

VARIABLES	(1) Vote	(2) Vote	(3) Vote	(4) Vote	(5) Vote
Prospective migrant	-0.069**	0.014	0.014	0.018	0.017
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.044)
Male		-0.009	0.002	0.004	0.005
		(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Age		0.007***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married		0.079*	0.091**	0.090**	0.089**
		(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Secondary education		0.027	0.038	0.040	0.045
		(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Tertiary education		0.116***	0.127**	0.127**	0.127**
		(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Ethnic majority		0.026	0.019	0.018	0.028
		(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.076)
Religious majority		0.061	0.006	0.004	-0.007
		(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.070)
Small town		-0.048	-0.040	-0.037	-0.041
		(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.046)
Larger city		-0.103**	-0.104**	-0.101**	-0.111**
		(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.042)
Capital city		-0.060*	-0.013	-0.018	0.018
		(0.030)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.036)
Trust in judiciary			0.044	0.048	0.052
			(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Corruption			0.003	0.003	0.003
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National Representation			0.125***	0.126***	0.117***
			(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Local Representation			0.140***	0.140***	0.149***
			(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Returnee				-0.134	-0.130
				(0.112)	(0.109)
Remittances				-0.042	-0.034
				(0.041)	(0.050)
Group membership					0.031
					(0.031)
Constant	0.629***	0.262***	0.098*	0.100*	0.070
	(0.006)	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.045)
Observations	2,436	2,429	1,735	1,731	1,708
R-squared	0.060	0.141	0.216	0.219	0.223
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2. Protesting in Kazakhstan (All protest and contact)

VARIABLES	(1) Protest	(2) Protest	(3) Protest	(4) Protest	(5) Protest
Prospective migrant	0.009	0.019	0.019	0.020	0.019
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Male		-0.003	-0.011	-0.013	-0.014
		(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Age		0.001*	0.001	0.001*	0.001**
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Married		-0.009	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004
		(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Secondary education		-0.001	0.006	0.005	-0.002
		(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Tertiary education		0.025	0.038	0.037	0.021
		(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Ethnic majority		-0.007	-0.005	-0.005	0.001
		(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)
Religious majority		0.005	0.010	0.011	0.007
		(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.027)
Small town		0.004	0.013	0.014	0.015
		(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Larger city		-0.028	-0.015	-0.015	-0.018
		(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Capital city		0.069	0.061	0.064*	0.056
		(0.063)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)
Trust in judiciary			-0.008	-0.011	-0.015
			(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Corruption			0.002*	0.002*	0.002
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National Representation			0.041**	0.041**	0.040**
			(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Local Representation			-0.004	-0.005	-0.004
			(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Returnee				0.038	0.041
				(0.050)	(0.051)
Remittances				-0.017	-0.022
				(0.047)	(0.047)
Group membership					0.056*
					(0.028)
Constant	0.072***	0.023	-0.002	-0.002	-0.011
	(0.005)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Observations	2,595	2,586	1,798	1,793	1,768
R-squared	0.025	0.032	0.040	0.041	0.047
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3. Voting in Tajikistan

VARIABLES	(1) Vote	(2) Vote	(3) Vote	(4) Vote	(5) Vote
Prospective migrant	-0.050***	-0.017**	0.006	0.032	0.021
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.036)
Male		0.008	-0.005	0.007	0.003
		(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Age		0.008***	0.008***	0.008***	0.008***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married		0.197***	0.216***	0.220***	0.210***
		(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Secondary education		0.031	0.008	0.007	0.006
		(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Tertiary education		0.143***	0.099*	0.091*	0.080
		(0.030)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Ethnic majority		0.006	-0.016	-0.017	-0.024
		(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Religious majority		0.144	0.206	0.200	0.210
		(0.086)	(0.172)	(0.184)	(0.183)
Small town		-0.050**	-0.044	-0.044	-0.041**
		(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.012)
Larger city		0.060	0.006	-0.006	-0.039
		(0.069)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.083)
Capital city		-0.378*	-0.746***	-0.767***	-0.784***
		(0.154)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.063)
Trust in judiciary			0.018	0.016	0.009
			(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.054)
Corruption			-0.002	-0.001	-0.002
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National Representation			0.147**	0.146**	0.127**
			(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.029)
Local Representation			0.049*	0.050*	0.074*
			(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.027)
Returnee				-0.084**	-0.084**
				(0.023)	(0.025)
Remittances				-0.025	-0.034
				(0.024)	(0.025)
Group membership					0.063
					(0.052)
Constant	0.530***	0.290	0.518**	0.538**	0.559**
	(0.003)	(0.202)	(0.143)	(0.149)	(0.150)
Observations	2,217	2,212	1,176	1,170	1,114
R-squared	0.035	0.164	0.237	0.240	0.241
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4. Protesting in Tajikistan (All protest and contact)

VARIABLES	(1) Protest	(2) Protest	(3) Protest	(4) Protest	(5) Protest
Prospective migrant	0.016	0.026	0.052**	0.069***	0.031
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.018)
Male		-0.012	-0.063***	-0.052***	-0.048***
		(0.030)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age		0.002**	0.003**	0.003**	0.002**
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married		0.002	-0.012	-0.006	-0.017
		(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Secondary education		0.005	0.031*	0.032	0.036
		(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Tertiary education		0.052	0.094**	0.085*	0.100
		(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.055)
Ethnic majority		0.030	0.029	0.030	0.027
		(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.021)
Religious majority		-0.044**	-0.022	-0.034	-0.027
		(0.013)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Small town		-0.010	0.010	0.016	0.020
		(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.047)
Larger city		0.125	0.066	0.070	0.028
		(0.122)	(0.148)	(0.150)	(0.121)
Capital city		0.199	0.088	0.063	0.074
		(0.141)	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.087)
Trust in judiciary			-0.050	-0.049	-0.062
			(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.047)
Corruption			0.003	0.003	0.001
			(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
National Representation			0.092**	0.087**	0.048**
			(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.013)
Local Representation			-0.095***	-0.088***	-0.053***
			(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.008)
Returnee				-0.072*	-0.031
				(0.031)	(0.019)
Remittances				0.018	0.025
				(0.024)	(0.029)
Group membership					0.025
					(0.041)
Constant	0.059***	-0.210	-0.144	-0.119	-0.101
	(0.006)	(0.146)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.101)
Observations	2,494	2,486	1,288	1,281	1,220
R-squared	0.027	0.047	0.085	0.091	0.072
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5. Voting in Moldova

VARIABLES	(1) Vote	(2) Vote	(3) Vote	(4) Vote	(5) Vote
Prospective migrant	-0.086*	-0.054	-0.052	-0.027	-0.028
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Male		0.016	-0.004	0.007	0.008
		(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Age		0.003***	0.002***	0.002**	0.002***
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Married		0.014	0.007	0.014	0.019
		(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Secondary education		0.065*	0.057	0.060	0.058
		(0.023)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Tertiary education		0.118***	0.112**	0.110**	0.098*
		(0.015)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Ethnic majority		0.005	-0.001	-0.010	-0.010
		(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Religious majority		0.087	0.102	0.106	0.111
		(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.066)
Small town		-0.036	0.002	-0.016	-0.016
		(0.017)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Larger city		0.005	0.001	-0.006	-0.009
		(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Capital city		-0.009	0.026	0.008	0.011
		(0.006)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Trust in judiciary			0.025	0.018	0.015
			(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Corruption			-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National Representation			0.076*	0.068*	0.066*
			(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Local Representation			0.050**	0.056**	0.058***
			(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Returnee				-0.119**	-0.114**
				(0.027)	(0.028)
Remittances				0.004	0.004
				(0.008)	(0.007)
Group membership					0.036**
					(0.009)
Constant	0.861***	0.572***	0.505***	0.534***	0.499***
	(0.014)	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.079)
Observations	2,501	2,493	1,728	1,721	1,697
R-squared	0.013	0.039	0.066	0.081	0.082
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6. Protesting in Moldova (All protest and contact)

VARIABLES	(1) Protest	(2) Protest	(3) Protest	(4) Protest	(5) Protest
Prospective migrant	0.037*	0.029	0.020	0.002	-0.016
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Male		0.042*	0.029	0.026	0.021
		(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Age		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001**
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Married		-0.016	-0.017	-0.023	0.001
		(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Secondary education		0.051*	0.063**	0.059**	0.049**
		(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Tertiary education		0.144***	0.160**	0.162**	0.115
		(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.061)
Ethnic majority		0.025	0.011	0.010	0.020*
		(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.006)
Religious majority		0.001	0.055	0.053	0.069**
		(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.018)
Small town		-0.125*	-0.140	-0.126	-0.113
		(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.071)
Larger city		0.009	-0.004	-0.001	-0.010
		(0.044)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Capital city		-0.052	-0.086*	-0.075*	-0.057
		(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.036)
Trust in judiciary			-0.046	-0.045	-0.050
			(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Corruption			0.000	0.000	0.000
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National Representation			0.004	0.012	0.011
			(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.030)
Local Representation			0.081*	0.075*	0.055**
			(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.017)
Returnee				0.064	0.084*
				(0.039)	(0.033)
Remittances				0.046*	0.039*
				(0.015)	(0.014)
Group membership					0.152**
					(0.026)
Constant	0.179***	0.126*	0.124	0.103	-0.025
	(0.007)	(0.044)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.048)
Observations	2,663	2,650	1,816	1,808	1,782
R-squared	0.008	0.031	0.054	0.061	0.091
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A7. Voting in Macedonia

VARIABLES	(1) Vote	(2) Vote	(3) Vote	(4) Vote	(5) Vote
Prospective migrant	-0.029**	-0.038**	-0.016*	-0.006	-0.012
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Male		0.000	-0.018	-0.010	-0.015
		(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.026)
Age		-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married		0.079**	0.075**	0.084**	0.096**
		(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.031)
Secondary education		0.060**	0.042**	0.043**	0.043*
		(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Tertiary education		0.095**	0.079***	0.081***	0.075***
		(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Ethnic majority		-0.026	0.013	0.005	-0.034
		(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.091)
Religious majority		0.109*	0.022	0.024	0.055
		(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.075)
Small town		0.034	0.052**	0.019	0.016
		(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Larger city		-0.051	-0.022	-0.032	-0.029
		(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.040)
Capital city		-0.033***	-0.038***	-0.032***	-0.031***
		(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Trust in judiciary			-0.023	-0.014	-0.017
			(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Corruption			-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
National Representation			0.037**	0.042**	0.041**
			(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Local Representation			0.140***	0.140***	0.145***
			(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Returnee				-0.090	-0.099
				(0.065)	(0.065)
Remittances				-0.035	-0.040
				(0.050)	(0.054)
Group membership					0.034
					(0.035)
Constant	0.821***	0.688***	0.705***	0.676***	0.654***
	(0.003)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.047)
Observations	2,379	1,940	1,482	1,399	1,336
R-squared	0.009	0.041	0.075	0.085	0.093
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A8. Protesting in Macedonia (All protest and contact)

VARIABLES	(1) Protest	(2) Protest	(3) Protest	(4) Protest	(5) Protest
Prospective migrant	0.124***	0.094***	0.132***	0.136***	0.114***
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Male		0.052**	0.054	0.064*	0.039
		(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.026)
Age		-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married		-0.020	-0.018	-0.017	0.021
		(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.031)
Secondary education		0.099***	0.098**	0.100*	0.083*
		(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.037)
Tertiary education		0.199***	0.188**	0.185**	0.122
		(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.070)
Ethnic majority		0.075	0.040	0.031	0.034
		(0.076)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.093)
Religious majority		-0.095	-0.092	-0.099	-0.097
		(0.073)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.108)
Small town		-0.019	-0.006	0.001	-0.012
		(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Larger city		0.042	0.041	0.051	0.043
		(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.031)
Capital city		-0.105***	-0.077***	-0.074***	-0.056***
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Trust in judiciary			-0.029	-0.031	-0.046*
			(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Corruption			-0.001	0.000	0.000
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National Representation			0.031	0.038	0.036
			(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.053)
Local Representation			0.081	0.076	0.059
			(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Returnee				-0.068*	-0.077**
				(0.032)	(0.026)
Remittances				-0.056**	-0.057**
				(0.023)	(0.023)
Group membership					0.187***
					(0.028)
Constant	0.202***	0.251***	0.229***	0.219***	0.086
	(0.006)	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Observations	2,462	1,989	1,511	1,426	1,363
R-squared	0.038	0.081	0.104	0.110	0.150
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A9. Voting in Serbia

VARIABLES	(1) Vote	(2) Vote	(3) Vote	(4) Vote	(5) Vote
Prospective migrant	-0.142**	-0.076	-0.076	-0.082	-0.108
	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.066)
Male		0.015	0.030	0.030	0.031
		(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Age		0.003*	0.002*	0.002*	0.004*
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Married		0.080***	0.065***	0.082***	0.054*
		(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.026)
Secondary education		0.025	-0.003	0.007	0.036
		(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Tertiary education		0.095*	0.063	0.071*	0.078*
		(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.036)
Ethnic majority		0.072	0.066	0.041	-0.013
		(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.071)
Religious majority		-0.087	-0.089	-0.054	0.029
		(0.070)	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.070)
Small town		0.000	-0.036	-0.026	-0.078
		(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.045)
Larger city		-0.007	-0.022	-0.013	-0.084***
		(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.015)
Capital city		0.094***	0.102***	0.087***	0.152***
		(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Trust in judiciary			0.070	0.057	0.011
			(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Corruption			-0.001	0.000	-0.002
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
National Representation			0.067	0.045	0.051
			(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Local Representation			0.160***	0.178***	0.142***
			(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.028)
Returnee				-0.000	-0.021
				(0.074)	(0.048)
Remittances				0.055	0.040
				(0.039)	(0.051)
Group membership					0.021
					(0.017)
Constant	0.734***	0.473***	0.412**	0.392**	0.319*
	(0.007)	(0.072)	(0.117)	(0.109)	(0.126)
Observations	2,199	2,096	1,563	1,400	994
R-squared	0.025	0.041	0.098	0.099	0.109
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A10. Protesting in Serbia (All protest and contact)

VARIABLES	(1) Protest	(2) Protest	(3) Protest	(4) Protest	(5) Protest
Prospective migrant	0.093**	0.088**	0.097*	0.089*	0.075*
	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.037)
Male		0.030**	0.026*	0.027	0.026
		(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Age		0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married		-0.010	-0.005	0.001	-0.011
		(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.017)
Secondary education		0.038*	0.037*	0.033	0.001
		(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.026)
Tertiary education		0.129**	0.117**	0.102**	0.002
		(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.055)
Ethnic majority		-0.045	-0.061	-0.070	-0.021
		(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.073)
Religious majority		0.026	0.034	0.045	0.045
		(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.076)
Small town		0.006	0.014	0.004	-0.029
		(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.032)
Larger city		0.026	0.047*	0.045*	-0.003
		(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.044)
Capital city		0.046***	0.077***	0.084***	0.061***
		(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Trust in judiciary			-0.050	-0.051	-0.056
			(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Corruption			0.005**	0.005**	0.004
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
National Representation			-0.023	-0.023	0.009
			(0.045)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Local Representation			0.076	0.092*	0.045
			(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.036)
Returnee				0.027	0.043
				(0.035)	(0.056)
Remittances				-0.002	-0.038
				(0.025)	(0.021)
Group membership					0.134*
					(0.058)
Constant	0.084***	-0.018	-0.057	-0.052	-0.027
	(0.005)	(0.042)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.052)
Observations	2,318	2,192	1,613	1,444	1,023
R-squared	0.024	0.039	0.076	0.084	0.121
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A11. Voting in Ukraine

VARIABLES	(1) Vote	(2) Vote	(3) Vote	(4) Vote	(5) Vote
Prospective migrant	-0.146***	-0.068*	-0.096**	-0.081	-0.073
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.049)
Male		-0.026	-0.027*	-0.020	-0.019
		(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Age		0.005***	0.003***	0.004***	0.003***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married		0.115***	0.108***	0.110***	0.108***
		(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Secondary education		0.089***	0.047	0.053	0.049
		(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.043)
Tertiary education		0.139***	0.092**	0.097**	0.099**
		(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Ethnic majority		-0.007	-0.029	-0.031	-0.026
		(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Religious majority		0.053**	0.046	0.049	0.042
		(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Small town		-0.030	0.007	0.010	0.012
		(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Larger city		-0.038	-0.054	-0.053	-0.041
		(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Capital city		0.046***	0.070***	0.057***	0.069***
		(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)
Trust in judiciary			0.030	0.030	0.033
			(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Corruption			-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
National Representation			0.057	0.050	0.050
			(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Local Representation			0.007	0.018	0.026
			(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Returnee				-0.138*	-0.167*
				(0.065)	(0.080)
Remittances				-0.042	-0.051
				(0.044)	(0.052)
Group membership					-0.043*
					(0.021)
Constant	0.899***	0.431***	0.528***	0.516***	0.524***
	(0.004)	(0.051)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.091)
Observations	2,451	2,416	1,313	1,305	1,259
R-squared	0.034	0.126	0.120	0.126	0.135
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A12. Protesting in Ukraine (All protest and contact)

VARIABLES	(1) Protest	(2) Protest	(3) Protest	(4) Protest	(5) Protest
Prospective migrant	0.028	0.031	0.057	0.055	0.036
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Male		-0.006	0.014	0.014	0.009
		(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Age		0.001***	0.002**	0.002**	0.003***
		(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married		0.001	-0.020	-0.022	0.001
		(0.012)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Secondary education		0.075**	0.095***	0.095***	0.098***
		(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Tertiary education		0.186***	0.203***	0.202***	0.181***
		(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.026)
Ethnic majority		0.007	0.029*	0.029*	0.016
		(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Religious majority		-0.042	-0.067*	-0.067*	-0.071*
		(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Small town		-0.023	-0.049	-0.047	-0.070
		(0.048)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Larger city		0.051*	0.036	0.039	0.013
		(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.039)
Capital city		0.012	0.056**	0.056**	0.055**
		(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Trust in judiciary			-0.011	-0.013	-0.030*
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Corruption			0.001	0.001	0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
National Representation			-0.015	-0.016	-0.010
			(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.038)
Local Representation			0.061	0.064*	0.058
			(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.037)
Returnee				-0.015	-0.020
				(0.045)	(0.036)
Remittances				-0.002	-0.010
				(0.054)	(0.057)
Group membership					0.182***
					(0.032)
Constant	0.090***	-0.062	-0.125	-0.122	-0.161**
	(0.003)	(0.046)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.071)
Observations	2,584	2,525	1,355	1,347	1,301
R-squared	0.019	0.059	0.081	0.083	0.129
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A13. Alternative measure of protesting (i.e. protest but not contact) – Abridged Table.

VARIABLES	(1) Protest 2	(2) Protest 2	(3) Protest 2	(4) Protest 2	(5) Protest 2
Kazakhstan					
Prospective migrant	0.019	0.020	0.008	0.008	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Tajikistan					
Prospective migrant	0.008	0.012	0.062***	0.074**	0.040**
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.014)
Moldova					
Prospective migrant	0.034**	0.027*	0.009	0.001	-0.015
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Macedonia					
Prospective migrant	0.115***	0.087***	0.111***	0.115***	0.094**
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.029)
Serbia					
Prospective migrant	0.076**	0.075**	0.066**	0.056*	0.040
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Ukraine					
Prospective migrants	0.009	0.016	0.023	0.022	0.027
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes:
Same specifications respectively as for model (1) to (5) in Tables A1 to A12, only one coefficient reported per regression, i.e. the coefficient for prospective migrant.