

Extended carbon footprint and emission transfer of world regions: With both primary and intermediate inputs into account

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Abstract

By combining the latest statistics for the global economy in 2015, this study as a continuation of our previous work ([Wu et al., 2020](#)) investigates the extended carbon footprint of world regions and the emission transfer via commodity trade, by including both primary and intermediate inputs into consideration. The extended carbon footprint of the United States is revealed to be one and a half times as much as that of China, while this ratio is accounted as three quarters in our previous work, due to that final consumption takes a much larger share of the gross domestic product in the United States

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compared to the situation in China. CO₂ emissions embodied in the primary inputs of the world economy are calculated to be equivalent to 42% of the emissions embodied in the genuine final consumption, highlighting the key role of capital goods in reallocating global carbon emissions. Moreover, emission transfer related with international commodity trade is explored, and the carbon trade links between major economies such as the United States, China, European Union, Russia, India and Japan are discussed in detail. In particular, the geographic and sectoral profiles for the carbon trade of the United States and China as two distinct economies are illustrated. It is revealed that Asia Pacific holds responsible for approximately half of the United States' carbon imports as well as China's carbon exports. Meanwhile, transport industry is taking up around one third of the United States' carbon exports while heavy and light industries totally dominate China's carbon exports. The outcome of this work may be supportive for providing more inclusive information regarding the establishment of global warming regimes, and may help us seek more informed policy choices and trade measures in global trade negotiations.

Keywords: Extended carbon footprint, emission transfer, primary inputs, trade patterns, latest statistics

1. Introduction

Widely believed as the main source accountable for anthropogenic climate change, carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning have been a top fo-

cus worldwide ([Friedlingstein et al., 2010](#); [Davis et al., 2011](#)). According to international energy agency ([IEA, 2019](#)), global CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel burning have increased by over 50% during the last 25 years, from 20521 million tons in 1990 to 32840 million tons in 2017. In a globally collaborative effort to curb CO₂ emissions, developed and developing countries are encouraged to share “common but differentiated responsibilities”, as raised in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). A question is thus raised: By what accounting rule does the differentiation of responsibilities abide? This question has been to some extent addressed by International Panel on Climate Change ([IPCC, 2006](#)), regulating that the national carbon account should take inclusion of the carbon emissions and removals occurring in the sovereign territory of a country. Such accounting manner is called as territorial-based accounting in existing literature. Territorial-based accounting framework uses an onsite perspective to construct the carbon profile of nations, and it can be admitted that it is fully supportive to curbing emissions from the side of onsite carbon emitters.

Final-demand-based accounting as a parallel framework to territorial-based accounting focuses on the carbon footprint of a country/region and apportions the directly released emissions to those final products by treating final users’ demand as the driving force of the economy ([Feng et al., 2013, 2015](#)). From the side of final users, this accounting framework seeks to quantify the emissions induced by final users’ demand and emphasizes the role of international trade in reallocating carbon emissions between regions through

27 the world’s supply chain. According to [Caldeira and Davis \(2011\)](#), researches
 28 on emission transfer between regions under the final-demand-driven principle
 29 are to some extent opened up by [Peters and Hertwich \(2008\)](#), with the reve-
 30 lation that Annex B (developed) countries in Kyoto Protocol turn out to be
 31 net carbon importers. A number of global studies on carbon leakage through
 32 international commodity trade have afterwards encountered a blossom by
 33 sticking to the same accounting principle ([Davis and Caldeira, 2010](#); [Guan](#)
 34 [et al., 2008](#); [Meng et al., 2016, 2018](#); [Shao et al., 2018](#)). For example, [Davis](#)
 35 [et al. \(2011\)](#) looked into the whole supply chain of embedded carbon emis-
 36 sions in 2004, reflecting that the international exchange of products holds re-
 37 sponsible for 23% of global carbon emissions. Parallel to final-demand-based
 38 accounting, income-based accounting represents another kind of allocation
 39 ideology in dealing with a country/region’s carbon footprint, by taking in-
 40 come beneficiaries as the economy’s driver. [Liang et al. \(2017\)](#) constructed
 41 the income-based carbon profile for world regions, supported by the global
 42 multi-region input-output database. Meanwhile, household-consumption-
 43 and total-consumption-based accountings are emerging as two alternative
 44 frameworks for carbon emission assignment, with the household consump-
 45 tion and the total final consumption respectively identified as the genuine
 46 driver of the economy to be apportioned the emissions ([Chen et al., 2019](#); [Wu](#)
 47 [et al., 2019b](#)). The accounting frameworks, no matter final-demand-, income-
 48 , household-consumption-, total consumption-, or sales-based accountings
 49 reported in existing literatures ([Kanemoto et al., 2012](#)), could be catego-

50 rized into the division of normative economics that reflects different opin-
51 ions on which agents shall take the responsibility for the emissions directly
52 discharged. For instance, [Marques et al. \(2012\)](#) compared three kinds of
53 frameworks for carbon responsibility allocation, including production-based
54 responsibility, consumption-based responsibility and income-based responsi-
55 bility. The results show that different allocation schemes may produce quite
56 different carbon budgets for a nation, which could be very useful in building
57 up the carbon profile of a nation from various perspectives that complement
58 each other, as also pointed out by [Caldeira and Davis \(2011\)](#). In the mean-
59 while, nevertheless, it is observed that while these accounting schemes try
60 to capture different single segment of the world economy by a point-to-point
61 linkage between direct carbon emissions and the specific agent chosen, not
62 too much attention has been directed to the objective description of how
63 the emissions travel along the intricate global supply chain in context of the
64 segmentation of production activities ([Chen et al., 2019](#)).

65 With the world economy being turned into an economic entity, the spa-
66 tial splitting-up of the production chain is witnessed ([Mi et al., 2017](#); [Zhang](#)
67 [et al., 2017](#)). The phenomenon as follows is highly probable: the extraction
68 of fossil resources occurs in Region A; they are then exported to Region B
69 and burned to support production of intermediate goods; the intermediate
70 goods are further exported to Region C for reprocessing into finished prod-
71 ucts, which are ultimately exported to Region D to satisfy the needs of its
72 local consumers. Taking iPhone (one of the best-selling products all over

the world) for instance, a question might be asked: Where is an iPhone made? Neither is correct to say that iPhone is “made in China” nor “made in the United States”. The answer might be “everywhere”, or “made on the globe” ([Apple, 2018](#); [Macworld, 2017](#)). The apple company outsources the manufacturing and assembly of the materials and components to more than 200 major manufacturers distributed worldwide, such as the Japan Display and Sharp, Samsung and LG Display in South Korea, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), Foxconn and Pegatron in China, Bosch in Germany, etc. With such an intricate supply chain being formed, the global trade picture takes a different shape compared to old times when traded goods on the international markets are mainly finished products. Nowadays, semi-manufactured and re-exported products almost dominate the international trade market, the trade volume of which nearly doubles that of the products traded for final users’ demand, as stated by [Johnson and Noguera \(2012\)](#). Correspondingly, the carbon emissions directly emitted in the production processes will be embodied in the products and then circulate with primary and semi-finished products along the global supply chains before departing from the economic system. Therefore, apart from the point-to-point assignment between direct emissions and the specific agents as adopted in normative accounting schemes, it is also important to give an objective description of the whole process of how carbon flows move along the global supply chain via international trade.

Embodiment accounting as a positive accounting framework follows the

logic of positive economics (which settles questions of “what it is” instead of “what ought to be”), which could objectively clarify the whole circulating paths of carbon flows along the supply chains and formulate the associated carbon footprint of a nation/region. The history of embodiment accounting method could be traced back to 1970s when [Herendeen \(1973, 1978\)](#) raised a conservation model of embodied energy to explore the circulation of energy use flows related with value flows. This method has enjoyed an extensive application to quantifying the carbon footprint of produced goods or services, and to tracking the associated carbon transfer at global ([Chen and Chen, 2011](#)), national ([Zhang et al., 2018](#)) as well as urban ([Li et al., 2018](#)) dimensions. It is noticed that [Chen and Chen \(2011\)](#) estimated the global carbon footprint and tracked the emission transfer between supra-national entities by dividing the world economy into three coalitions, namely G7, BRIC and the rest of the world. A subsequent study by [Wu et al. \(2020\)](#) moved a further step to probe into the international transfer of carbon flows in 2012 by differentiating intermediate and final trades, which revealed that carbon flows associated with intermediate products amount to a quantity much larger than those associated with final products.

The above-mentioned studies, by means of a positive accounting manner, contribute greatly to broadening our knowledge on carbon footprint of a country/region as well as on how carbon emissions are embodied in the manufactured goods and then travel along the world’s value chains via trade before leaving out the economy to the society through final demand. It is observed

that emissions embodied in the products used as final demand are regarded to take a departure from the economic system and no longer have any interaction with the economy in these studies. The truth is that, nevertheless, the products used for final demand may serve not only the consumptive purposes like household and government consumption, but also non-consumptive purposes like fixed capital formation. According to the concept of circular economy, the capital goods are to be going back into the economy as primary inputs and supporting the generation of goods and services (Bullard and Herendeen, 1975b; Wu et al., 2018). As a result, it seems to be reasonable that only the emissions embodied in those commodities used for genuine consumptive purposes are parting from the economic network and should be taken as the carbon footprint of a nation/region; emissions embodied in the large number of capital goods are to be taking a step into the economy as the social feedback. Recent works started to pay attention to the carbon feedback associated with capital goods by allocating carbon emissions embodied in capital goods to genuine final consumption. For instance, Södersten et al. (2018) endogenized capital in global multi-region input-output models and explored carbon footprints of some world regions. Cadarso et al. (2016) raised a concept of ‘whole carbon footprint’ and measured tourism’s carbon footprint by taking consideration of both the consumption and investment of tourism sector. Chen et al. (2018) proposed a dynamic model to calculate global carbon footprints, by including capital stock change into consumption-based accounting of greenhouse gas emissions. Generally speaking, for some robust

142 developing economies such as China, fixed capital formation holds a much
143 bigger share of domestic final demand compared to the developed economies
144 such as the United States. Therefore, if we include the social feedback and
145 take the genuine final consumption instead of final demand as the sink of car-
146 bon emissions embodied in global supply chains, those economies with a high
147 level of final consumption may turn out to have a larger carbon footprint. It
148 is also noticed that these previous studies mostly focus on the responsibility
149 allocation to final consumption with capital endogenized into multi-region
150 input-output models, while less attention is paid to the circulating process of
151 carbon flows via intermediate and final commodity trades along the supply
152 chains of the world economy.

153 By an extension of the content of a previous work ([Wu et al., 2020](#)), this
154 study seeks to utilize the latest statistics and analyze the extended carbon
155 footprint of world regions, by directing enough attention to the intermediate
156 feedback and social feedback. It should be noted that the term of extended
157 carbon footprint is adopted in this paper to differentiate from the normal
158 concept of carbon footprint. The picture on how carbon flows circulate in
159 the global supply chains through commodity exchanges and afterwards sink
160 into the products working for genuine consumptive purposes is depicted. The
161 most recent statistics available for the world economy in 2015 are adopted
162 to provide the latest empirical evidence. The transfer of carbon flows be-
163 tween world regions via international exchange of both intermediate and
164 final products is illustrated, with the trade patterns of some main economies

discussed. Details of carbon imports and exports for typical economies are also analyzed on sectoral and spatial dimensions. Policy implications are formulated to support effective measures in balancing economic growth and carbon emission mitigation.

2. Methodology

2.1. Embodiment accounting

Embodiment accounting originated from embodied energy accounting, which firstly appeared in an academic report by [Herendeen \(1973\)](#) as a supporting tool to explore the energy use of the United States economy and was then widely adopted to quantify the energy cost of goods or services ([Bullard and Herendeen, 1975a](#)). Later, by integrating the embodiment theory of systems ecology ([Odum, 1983](#)) into the energy balance model ([Herendeen, 1973, 1978](#)), Chen and his colleagues gave a generalization of embodied energy accounting to embodiment accounting of ecological elements, such as energy ([Chen and Wu, 2017](#)), water ([Wu et al., 2019a](#)) land ([Wu et al., 2018](#)), carbon emissions ([Chen and Chen, 2011](#)), mercury emissions ([Li et al., 2017](#)), exergy ([Chen et al., 2010](#)), etc. In our previous works, an embodiment accounting model supported by global multi-region input-output table has been established ([Chen and Chen, 2011; Wu et al., 2020](#)). For an economic sector within the world economy, the biophysical balance of carbon flows has been constructed in previous works as follows: the CO₂ emissions embodied in the sectoral output are in magnitude equal to the onsite CO₂ emissions

187 of the economic sector plus the emissions embodied in intermediate inputs
188 from all economic sectors into this sector. While the onsite CO₂ emissions of
189 the economic sector could be treated as emissions released into the environ-
190 mental system, those embodied in intermediate inputs are internal feedbacks
191 within the economy. Whereas, emissions embodied in the primary inputs
192 have not been taken into consideration. For a sector’s outputs, they are ei-
193 ther used as inputs into economic sectors to facilitate production, or used
194 as final demand to satisfy the needs of final consumers. In the global multi-
195 region input-output table, the sub-categories under final demand are house-
196 hold consumption, consumption of non-profit institutions serving households,
197 government consumption, fixed capital formation, and inventory change &
198 valuables acquisition. Products that are used to satisfy household consump-
199 tion, non-profit institutions’ consumption, and government consumption are
200 “consumed” and do not further go back into the economic system. While
201 for the products used as fixed capital formation, inventory change and valu-
202 ables acquisition, they are generally referred to as “capital good” and do not
203 represent the end of the economic chains. They are bound to re-enter the
204 economic system (in the form of primary inputs) as the support from the
205 society to promote producing activities.

206 Therefore, an embodiment accounting model supported by global multi-
207 region input-output table is further developed on basis of the one raised
208 in our previous studies ([Chen and Chen, 2011](#); [Wu et al., 2020](#)), following
209 the biophysical balance of carbon cost regulating that the inputs equal the

210 outputs in terms of carbon emissions. In this newly-raised model, carbon
 211 emissions embodied in the primary inputs, i.e. external feedback from the
 212 society into the economy, are taken into account. The balance of carbon
 213 flows for one economic sector is established as follows: the CO₂ emissions
 214 embodied in the sectoral output maintains a balance with the onsite CO₂
 215 emissions of the sector plus the CO₂ emissions embodied in intermediate in-
 216 puts into this sector and those embodied in primary inputs into this sector.
 217 CO₂ emission intensity of a sector's output, defined as the amount of CO₂
 218 that is emitted directly and indirectly to yield per monetary unit of a sector's
 219 output, could be then obtained by dividing the CO₂ emissions embodied in
 220 a sector's output by the total monetary cost of a sector's output. The CO₂
 221 emission intensity defined here is applicable to all the products manufactured
 222 by the sector, whether they are used as intermediate inputs or as final de-
 223 mand. Meanwhile, products used as household consumption, consumption of
 224 non-profit institutions serving households and government consumption are
 225 regarded as carbon sinks that ultimately depart from the economic system.

226 2.2. Algorithm

227 The algorithm for the new embodiment accounting model is established in
 228 this section. The world economy is modelled as a m -region, n -sector network.
 229 The balance of carbon flows for sector i in region s is given in Figure 1.

230 As witnessed, e_i^s is the onsite CO₂ emissions by sector i in region s ; p_i^s is
 231 the primary inputs denoted by the society into sector i in region s ; q_{ji}^{ts} is the




Figure 1: The balance of carbon flows through an industrial sector in the economy

232 intermediate inputs from sector j in region t into sector i in region s ; o_i^s is
 233 the sectoral output of sector i in region s ; q_{ij}^{st} denotes the goods or services
 234 produced by sector i in region s that are used as intermediate inputs into
 235 sector j in region t ; f_{iC}^{st} represents the goods or services that are produced
 236 by sector i in region s and used as household consumption, consumption
 237 of non-profit institutions serving households or government consumption in
 238 region t ; f_{iR}^{st} represents the goods or services that are produced by sector
 239 i in region s and used as the rest of final demand (inventory change, fixed
 240 capital formation, etc.) in region t ; ϵ_{pi}^s represents the CO₂ emission intensity
 241 of primary inputs of sector i in region s ; ϵ_i^s represents the CO₂ emission
 242 intensity of goods or services produced by sector i in region s ; ϵ_j^t represents
 243 the CO₂ emission intensity of goods or services produced by sector j in region
 244 t . The balance of carbon flows through sector i in region s could be expressed

245 as:

$$e_i^s + \varepsilon_{pi}^s p_i^s + \sum_{t=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \varepsilon_j^t q_{ji}^{ts} = \varepsilon_i^s o_i^s. \quad (1)$$

246 The matrix notion of Eq. (1) is written as:

$$E + \varepsilon_p \hat{P} + \varepsilon Q = \varepsilon \hat{O}, \quad (2)$$

247 where $E = [e_i^s]_{1 \times mn}$; $P = [p_i^s]_{1 \times mn}$; \hat{P} is the $mn \times mn$ diagonal matrix for P ;
 248 $Q = [q_{ji}^{ts}]_{mn \times mn}$; $\varepsilon = [\varepsilon_i^s]_{1 \times mn}$; $\varepsilon_p = [\varepsilon_{pi}^s]_{1 \times mn}$; $O = [o_i^s]_{1 \times mn}$; \hat{O} is the $mn \times mn$
 249 diagonal matrix for O . Besides, the global multi-region input-output table
 250 is static, which assumes that the world economy remains stationary. This
 251 could be regarded as a most fundamental assumption of the input-output
 252 table since it was firstly raised by [Leontief \(1936\)](#). For the steady economy,
 253 the economic flows in a given time remain circular. Meanwhile, the embodied
 254 carbon emission flows in a given time remain circular and balanced. The ex-
 255 ternal feedback from the society to the economic system is therefore supposed
 256 to maintain the balance at any time. The relationship between final demand
 257 and primary inputs in the input-output table could be depicted by the social-
 258 economic matrix ([Hanson and Robinson, 1991](#); [Stone, 1973](#)). Whereas, due
 259 to the availability and high level of data requirement of the social-economic
 260 matrix of the global multi-region input-output account, the primary inputs
 261 are not distinguished by sectoral belonging and have an identical CO₂ inten-
 262 sity, ε_{pa} . This also conforms to the homogenous assumption that serves a
 263 fundamental norm hidden behind the input-output table. Therefore, apart

264 from Eq. (1), another balance equation may be established as:

$$\varepsilon_{pc} \sum_{s=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^s = \sum_{s=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{t=1}^m \varepsilon_i^s f_{iR}^{st}. \quad (3)$$

265 The matrix notion of Eq. (3) could be written as:

$$\varepsilon_{pc} P_{sum} = \varepsilon F_R, \quad (4)$$

266 where P_{sum} is the aggregated amount of primary inputs; F_R represents the
 267 $mn \times 1$ column matrix for the rest of final demand. Solving Eq. (2) and Eq.
 268 (4) yields:

$$\varepsilon = E(\hat{O} - Q - \frac{1}{P_{sum}} F_R P)^{-1}. \quad (5)$$

269 Eq. (5) could also been reduced to a common form as:

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon &= E\hat{O}^{-1}(\hat{O}\hat{O}^{-1} - Q\hat{O}^{-1} - \frac{1}{P_{sum}} F_R P\hat{O}^{-1})^{-1} = \\ &e(I - A - \frac{1}{P_{sum}} F_R P\hat{O}^{-1})^{-1} = e(I - B)^{-1} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

270 when we define $B = A + \frac{1}{P_{sum}} F_R P\hat{O}^{-1}$, in which A represents the coefficient
 271 matrix for intermediate production requirements; $\frac{1}{P_{sum}} F_R P\hat{O}^{-1}$ stands for
 272 the feedback associated with capital goods; e is the direct emission multiplier
 273 representing the direct emissions corresponding to per unit output of each
 274 industry.

275 With the CO₂ emission intensity derived, CO₂ emissions embodied in

each economic flow within the world economy could be obtained. CO₂ emissions that sink into region s , namely those embodied in the genuine final consumption (EEC) in region s , could be established as:

$$EEC^s = \sum_{t=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \varepsilon_j^t f_{jC}^{ts}. \quad (7)$$

The extended carbon footprint of region s , defined as the total CO₂ emissions induced by final consumption of region s , can be obtained by summing those embodied in final consumption of region s and the onsite carbon emissions coming from final consumption activities (Ω) of region s , which are expressed as:

$$ECF^s = EEC^s + \Omega^s. \quad (8)$$

Meanwhile, the territorial-based carbon emissions (TBE) of region s could be established as:

$$TBE^s = \sum_{i=1}^n e_i^s + \Omega^s. \quad (9)$$

CO₂ emissions embodied in trade contain those embodied in intermediate trade and those in final trade. CO₂ emissions related with intermediate imports and those related with intermediate exports of region s are respectively denoted as:

$$EII^s = \sum_{t=1(t \neq s)}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \sum_{i=1}^n \varepsilon_j^t q_{ji}^{ts}, \quad (10)$$

290 and

$$EIE^s = \sum_{t=1(t \neq s)}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \sum_{i=1}^n \varepsilon_i^s q_{ij}^{st}. \quad (11)$$

291 Meanwhile, CO₂ emissions related with final imports and those related
292 with final exports of Region s are respectively denoted as:

$$EFI^s = \sum_{t=1(t \neq s)}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \varepsilon_j^t f_j^{ts}, \quad (12)$$

293 and

$$EFE^s = \sum_{t=1(t \neq s)}^m \sum_{i=1}^n \varepsilon_i^s f_i^{st}. \quad (13)$$

294 Therefore, CO₂ emissions related with the total imports and those related
295 with the total exports of Region s are respectively denoted as:

$$ETI^s = EII^s + EFI^s, \quad (14)$$

296 and

$$ETE^s = EIE^s + EFE^s. \quad (15)$$

297 Besides, carbon emissions related with intermediate trade balance and
298 those with final trade balance of Region s , respectively denoted by net in-
299 termediate imports and net final imports of Region s , could be expressed as:

300

$$EITB^s = EII^s - EIE^s, \quad (16)$$

301 and

$$EFTB^s = EFI^s - EFE^s. \quad (17)$$

302 2.3. Data sources

303 The global multi-region input-output table for the world economy in 2015
304 comes from Eora database, which offers a time series of global input-output
305 tables from 1990 to 2015 (Lenzen et al., 2012, 2013). Compared to other
306 input-output accounts provided by world input-output database (Timmer
307 et al., 2015), GTAP (Andrew and Peters, 2013), and Exiobase (Tukker et al.,
308 2013), the multi-region input-output table for the world economy in 2015
309 coming from Eora is by far the most recent statistics available. Within
310 the table, the world is deemed to comprise 189 nations/regions and each
311 nation/region is constituted by 26 economic sectors. Detailed information
312 on the nations/regions and economic industries encapsulated could be re-
313 ferred to SI-A and SI-B in the supporting information. With regard to data
314 from CO₂ emissions, this study locates the emphasis specifically on carbon
315 emissions coming from fuel combustion, which are adopted from the envi-
316 ronmental satellite account by Eora database that is well matched with the
317 corresponding economic sectors covered in the global input-output account.

318 3. Results

319 3.1. The extended carbon footprint of world regions

320 Figure 2 presents the top twenty regions in terms of carbon footprint
321 extended. The extended carbon footprint of the United States reaches an

amount of 7091.79 million tons, ranking the first place. Several other leading regions of carbon footprint extended are mainland China (4586.89 million tons), Japan (1932.29 million tons), India (1949.96 million tons), Russia (1436.04 million tons), Germany (1165.56 million tons), the United Kingdom (1021.70 million tons), France (796.21 million tons), Canada (693.93 million tons) and Italy (690.89 million tons). As seen, the extended carbon footprint of the United States is 1.5 times as much as that of Mainland China; nevertheless, this ratio is accounted as 0.75 in our previous work. The primary reason is that the United States will be apportioned much more CO₂ emissions when the social feedback related with capital goods is accounted, since final consumption takes a much larger share of the gross domestic product in the United States (around 80%) compared to the situation in China (less than 50% for the past decade). Differing from our previous study where a nation/region's carbon footprint is taken as the emissions embedded in the commodities for final demand, this study takes those commodities for final consumption as the carbon sink; therefore only part of the carbon emissions related with China's final demand could be considered as sinking into the society and those emissions related with capital goods will be circulating within the economy. Moreover, the CO₂ emissions embodied in the whole primary inputs of the world economy are calculated as 12871 million tons and are equivalent to 42% of the emissions embodied in the genuine final consumption, accenting the significant role of capital goods in reallocating global carbon emissions.

345 The territorial-based carbon emissions of the regions mentioned above
 346 are also depicted in Figure 2, which takes a different shape compared to the
 347 picture for the extended carbon footprint of world regions. As seen, mainland
 348 China takes the leading position in territorial-based CO₂ emissions, with the
 349 amount up to 8879.70 million tons. For the United States, while its carbon
 350 footprint extended is one and a half times as much as that of mainland China,
 351 its territorial-based CO₂ emissions are only 68.94% that of mainland China.
 352 For Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, their territorial-
 353 based CO₂ emissions are in magnitude 68.02%, 79.78%, 57.76%, 57.58% and
 354 70.69% of the extended carbon footprint, respectively. While for India and
 355 Russia, this ratio is calculated to be 1.52 and 1.34.




Figure 2: The extended carbon footprint and territorial-based emissions of twenty world regions




Figure 3: Sectors' contributions to the EEC of the top five regions

Figure 3 presents the sectoral contributions to CO₂ emissions embodied in the products used as final consumption (EEC) for the top five regions in terms of carbon footprint extended. As witnessed, Sector 23 (Education, Health and Other Services) is revealed as the largest contributor to the EEC of mainland China, Japan and Russia, which respectively share 17.18%, 20.64%, 20.69% of their total emissions. This reveals the tremendous requirements of educational and medical services required by the consumers in these three regions, which have induced great quantities of CO₂ emissions. For India, the leading sector is Sector 19 (Transport) sharing 36.03% of its EEC, and Sector 1 (Agriculture) accounts for 10.63% of India's EEC. As for mainland China, agriculture is accountable for 7.74% of its EEC. As revealed,

367 agriculture industry remains an important contributor to CO₂ emissions of
 368 these two developing nations, which is partly attributed to their long agri-
 369 cultural traditions. While for the United States and Japan, this ratio is less
 370 than 1%. Service sectors, such as Public Administration sector, Financial In-
 371 termediation & Business Activities sector and Transport sector, remain the
 372 pillar industries of the two developed nations, altogether dedicating to over
 373 50% of their EEC.




Figure 4: The extended carbon footprint per capita for the twenty regions

374 Demonstrated in Figure 4 is the extended carbon footprint per capita
 375 for the twenty regions mentioned above. The extended carbon footprint per
 376 capita for the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany
 377 and France are respectively 22.06 tons, 15.10 tons, 15.62 tons, 19.30 tons,

14.18 tons and 12.35 tons, while the world average level is only 6.49 tons. In comparison, the extended carbon footprint per capita for mainland China, India and Brazil are respectively 3.37 tons, 1.14 tons, 3.30 tons, which are in magnitude one half, one fifth, and one half of the world average. As observed, though mainland China takes the leading place in terms of territorial-based carbon emissions and the second place in terms of carbon footprint extended, its extended carbon footprint per capita is only one-sixth of that of the United States, and one-fifth of that of Japan. This tells the wide gap between the development between mainland China and the developed economies.

3.2. *CO₂ emissions related with trade*

This section presents the carbon imports and exports associated with commodity trade, with the calculated results presented in SI-C. As reflected in Figure 5, the prominent carbon importers are the United States, mainland China, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, South Korea, Hong Kong, Italy and Netherlands, with the import volume of CO₂ emissions up to 1936.98 million tons, 1108.23 million tons, 1075.80 million tons, 851.34 million tons, 615.85 million tons, 555.88 million tons, 490.09 million tons, 474.56 million tons, 461.76 million tons, and 402.01 million tons. Meanwhile, the United States maintains the first place in both intermediate and final carbon imports. Regarding mainland China, its final carbon imports are only 210.76 million tons, which are only a quarter of those for the United States (815.58 million tons). This has reflected the comparatively lower consumption level

400 in China, which mainly serves as a factory absorbing intermediate commo-
 401 ties from all over the world to promote local manufacturing activities. It is
 402 worth noticing that Hong Kong is prominent in final carbon imports, whose
 403 carbon import volume of final commodities approaches that of Germany and
 404 the United Kingdom, and also exceeds mainland China. Besides, the ratio of
 405 intermediate carbon imports to final carbon imports for the United States,
 406 Japan and the United Kingdom are respectively 1.37, 1.85 and 1.21, while
 407 that for mainland China, Germany and South Korea are respectively 4.25,
 408 3.02 and 3.39.




Figure 5: Carbon emissions embodied in the import trade

409 As for carbon exports associated with commodity trade that are presented
 410 in Figure 6, mainland China takes up the dominant position, with the carbon




Figure 6: Carbon emissions embodied in the export trade

411 export volume amounting to 2306.78 million tons. The United States and
 412 Germany are the second-tier regions as demonstrated in Figure 6, whose CO₂
 413 exports reach 1219.53 million tons and 1121.41 million tons. It is noticed that
 414 CO₂ exports of the United States and Germany are approximate to each
 415 other, which are less than half of those of mainland China. Russia, Japan
 416 and India are the third-tier regions, whose CO₂ exports are around half of
 417 those for the United States and less than a quarter of those for mainland
 418 China. The ratios of intermediate CO₂ exports to final CO₂ exports for
 419 mainland China, the United States, Germany, Russia, South Korea, Japan,
 420 and India are respectively 1.49, 2.03, 1.78, 6.90, 3.42, 1.71 and 1.59.

421 Illustrated in Figure 7 is the carbon trade balance for selected economies.




Figure 7: Carbon trade balance of selected regions

422 Regarding total trade balance, mainland China, Russia, India, Taiwan and
 423 South Africa remain the five leading net exporters, whose trade deficits of
 424 CO₂ emissions respectively reach 1198.54 million tons, 293.63 million tons,
 425 254.93 million tons, 141.58 million tons and 90.13 million tons. In the mean-
 426 while, the five leading net importers of CO₂ emissions are the United States,
 427 Hong Kong, Japan, the United Kingdom and France, whose trade surpluses
 428 of CO₂ emissions are respectively 717.44 million tons, 310.35 million tons,
 429 297.73 million tons, 227.05 million tons and 122.99 million tons. The carbon
 430 trade surplus of the United States is in magnitude the summation of that of
 431 Hong Kong, Japan, the United Kingdom and France. The carbon trade im-
 432 balance of mainland China is around one and a half times as much as that of

433 the United States, and over four times as much as that of Japan and Russia.
 434 In addition, the final trade deficit of CO₂ emissions for mainland China is
 435 around one and a half times as much as its intermediate trade deficit. This
 436 ratio is 0.73 for India and 0.94 for Taiwan. While for Russia, its final trade
 437 imbalance of CO₂ emissions is in magnitude around 2% of its intermediate
 438 trade imbalance, revealing the highly imbalanced local industrial structure.
 439 For the United States, the amount of its carbon surplus in intermediate trade
 440 is approximate to its carbon surplus in final trade. Similar circumstances are
 441 observed for Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. For Japan, its carbon
 442 surplus in intermediate trade doubles its carbon surplus associated with final
 443 commodities traded.




Figure 8: Sectoral shares for the intermediate carbon imports and exports of prominent carbon importing and exporting regions in intermediate commodity trade

444 Presented in Figure 8 are the sectoral shares for the intermediate carbon
 445 imports and exports of the prominent carbon importers and exporters in
 446 intermediate commodity trade. Particulars of the sectoral aggregation are
 447 given in the supporting information, SI-B. It is seen that heavy industry is
 448 the largest dedicator to both intermediate carbon imports and exports. For
 449 the United States, Japan, Hong Kong and mainland China, heavy industry
 450 is accountable for 58.54%, 44.30%, 56.49% and 68.92% of their total interme-
 451 diate carbon imports, respectively. For intermediate carbon exports, heavy
 452 industry is accountable for 69.30%, 44.22%, 63.96%, 38.04% and 48.68% for
 453 those of mainland China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia and the United States,
 454 respectively. It is worth emphasizing that mining & electricity industry is
 455 taking up 43.23% of Russia’s intermediate carbon exports, mainly due to
 456 Russia’s exceedingly high reliance on oil and natural gas exports. Besides,
 457 mining & electricity industry is accountable for around one-tenth and one-
 458 fifth of the total intermediate carbon imports of the United States and Japan.
 459 Severely deficient of energy resources, Japan has to resort to commodity trade
 460 to import large quantities of energy products. Meanwhile, it is worth noticing
 461 that transport industry is accountable for around one-tenth and one quar-
 462 ter of the intermediate carbon imports and exports for the United States,
 463 respectively.

464 Illustrated in Figure 9 are the sectoral shares for the final carbon imports
 465 and exports of the prominent carbon importing and exporting regions in fi-
 466 nal commodity trade. For the United States, while heavy industry and light




Figure 9: Sectoral shares for the final carbon imports and exports of prominent carbon importing and exporting regions in final commodity trade


467 industry are the most contributive factors to its final carbon imports (respec-
 468 tively sharing 58.25% and 31.59%), heavy industry and transport industry
 469 are the prominent dedicators to the United States' final carbon exports (re-
 470 spectively sharing 42.91% and 33.82%). For Germany as a prominent carbon
 471 exporter in final commodity trade, CO₂ emissions embedded in its exported
 472 heavy industry commodities are around six times as much as those embedded
 473 in its exported light industry commodities. Regarding mainland China acting
 474 as the largest carbon exporter in final commodity trade, this ratio is around
 475 1.25, implying that mainland China specializes in both heavy industry and
 476 light industry commodities in the global market. For Japan, heavy industry,
 477 light industry and transport industry are the pillar contributors to its final

478 carbon imports, which are sharing 33.38%, 32.98% and 20.73%, respectively.
479 It is also observed that the United Kingdom exhibits an analogical trend to
480 Japan.


481 3.3. Carbon transfer between major economies with intertwined trade links

482 To formulate the carbon transfer between regions with interconnected
483 trade links, the 189 regions are sorted into 15 aggregated regions, as seen in
484 Figure 10(a) that depicts the links between the 15 regions in intermediate
485 carbon trade. The arc length of each region is a manifestation of its export
486 volume of intermediate commodities, while the chord linking two economies
487 provides the knowledge of their export volume to each other.

488 Among these fifteen regions China is illustrated as the largest carbon ex-
489 porter in intermediate commodity trade, with the followers being EU27 and
490 the United States. The main destinations of China's intermediate carbon
491 outflows are EU27, the United States, ASEAN and Japan, which respec-
492 tively receive 405.32 million tons, 234.76 million tons, 172.00 million tons
493 and 143.40 million tons. China also gains considerable intermediate imports
494 from EU27, Japan, ASEAN and South Korea. Regarding EU27, its interme-
495 diate carbon outflows mainly go to USA, China and other Europe & Eurasia.
496 Besides, EU27 is a leading carbon receiver in intermediate commodity trade.
497 Of EU's total intermediate CO₂ imports, 23.64% of them come from China,
498 15.58% coming from Russia, 11.47% coming from other Europe & Eurasia,
499 11.42% coming from the United States, etc. Regarding USA, it acquires in-



(a)



(b)

Figure 10: Carbon links between the 15 regions in (a) intermediate commodity trade and (b) final commodity trade


500 intermediate CO₂ imports from EU27, Canada, and China, which respectively
501 takes up 16.03%, 15.68% and 21.54% of the total. For Russia, EU27 is the
502 leading recipient of its intermediate CO₂ exports, which is accountable for
503 over half of the total. For South Korea, the biggest market for its interme-
504 diate CO₂ exports is China, accountable for 48.00%.

505 Presented in Figure 10(b) are the trade links of the 15 economies in final
506 trade of CO₂ emissions. The picture is to some degree analogical to that
507 for intermediate CO₂ trade. For China acting as the prominent net CO₂
508 exporter in final commodity trade, its CO₂ outflows to EU27, the United
509 States, ASEAN and Japan are respectively 190.30 million tons, 261.56 mil-
510 lion tons, 63.16 million tons and 118.09 million tons. For Japan, while it
511 absorbs abundant final CO₂ imports, it delivers an extensive amount of CO₂
512 emissions to USA, EU27 and South Korea. Canada is revealed to be a no-
513 table carbon exporter in final commodity trade, four thirds of whose exported
514 CO₂ emissions in final trade enter the United States.


515 Figure 11(a) presents the prominent CO₂ flows related with net interme-
516 diate trade on the world map. China is the largest net CO₂ exporter, while
517 EU27 is the prominent net CO₂ importer in intermediate commodity trade.
518 The most notable net intermediate flow of CO₂ emissions is demonstrated to
519 be that from China to EU27 amounting to 237.39 million tons, followed by
520 that from Russia to EU27 amounting to 215.86 million tons, and that from
521 China to USA amounting to 155.01 million tons. Meanwhile, it is reflected
522 that China has a CO₂ deficit in intermediate commodity trade with almost

all its trading partners except for some regions such as South Korea and Russia. China absorbs a net intermediate inflow of 82.41 million tons of CO₂ emissions from South Korea and 45.43 million tons from Russia. Regarding EU27, apart from China and Russia being its net importing markets of CO₂ emissions, Africa and India are revealed to obtain a carbon deficit of 132.32 million tons and 50.06 million tons of CO₂ emissions in intermediate commodity trade with EU27. Regarding South Korea, the most remarkable net intermediate inflow of CO₂ emissions into this region is that from Middle East while the prominent net intermediate outflow of CO₂ emissions from South Korea goes to China. For Japan, it appears to acquire a CO₂ surplus with all its trade partners.

Figure 11(b) presents the prominent CO₂ flows related with net final trade on the world map. The largest net CO₂ flow in final commodity trade is that from China to USA reaching 228.30 million tons, followed by that from China to EU27 reaching 108.41 million tons and that from China to Japan reaching 76.39 million tons. As seen, China appears to serve the world market in final commodity trade, which is reflected to acquire a carbon deficit with all of its trade companions. For USA, it is reflected to get a prominent carbon surplus in final commodity trade. A net CO₂ emission inflow of 63.65 million in final trade occurs from EU27 to the United States, suggesting the environmental welfare received by USA from EU27. Besides, USA neighbors, including Canada and other North America, contribute remarkably to the United States' carbon surplus in final commodity trade, whose net CO₂ ex-



(a)



(b)

Figure 11: Prominent CO₂ flows related with (a) net intermediate commodity trade and (b) net final commodity trade

ports in final trade to the United States reach 54.69 million tons and 38.31 million tons, respectively. Regarding EU27, it is proved to be a net CO₂ exporter in final commodity trade. The major destinations of its net final exports of CO₂ emissions are USA, other Europe & Eurasia, South & Central America, Middle East and Africa.

4. Discussion

4.1. Trade patterns

The trade patterns for major economies are analyzed on the economic and also the biophysical dimensions. Presented in Figure 12 are the monetary and CO₂ emission trade balances for some selected economies. The quantum of trade for an economy is reflected by the size of the related sphere. For mainland China, it is reflected to get an economic surplus of 369.92 billion dollars in commodity trade and a CO₂ emission deficit of 1198.54 million tons. Germany is also reflected to be in the fourth quadrant in the rectangle coordinate. While Germany's economic surplus in commodity trade is larger than that of mainland China, its carbon emission deficit is only 45.61 million tons, which is only around one-twenty-sixth of that for mainland China. This has revealed the different characters played by these two prominent exporters in the international market. Mainland China is on the downstream low-value chain while Germany is on the upstream high-value chain of global trade market. Therefore, mainland China manufactures an extensive number of commodities with low value at the cost of intensive fuel consumption and

568 carbon emissions, while Germany obtains a remarkable amount of monetary
569 revenues by delivering the commodities with high value abroad and in the
570 meanwhile offsets its carbon emission trade deficit by importing a great many
571 commodities with low value from emerging markets. In this way, Germany
572 realizes the maximization of economic profits at the low cost of environmental
573 degradation.




Figure 12: Monetary and carbon trade balances for major economies

574 For the developed economies including the United States, Hong Kong and
575 the United Kingdom, they get an economic deficit and a carbon emission sur-
576 plus in international commodity trade. These economies get a large quantity
577 of products from abroad for the consumption of domestic citizens, thus get-
578 ting an economic deficit in trade but absorbing the environment welfare by
579 shifting the CO₂ emissions to other nations. For Japan, France, Italy and

580 Netherland, they are recipients of net currency and CO₂ emission inflows.
581 These economies are prominent importers and also exporters in the global
582 market. For instance, Japan owns a reputation for the electronic products
583 and automobiles; France is famous for their renowned commodities including
584 automobiles (Renault, Peugeot, Citroen, etc.), high-end clothing and make-
585 up (Pierre Cardin, Chanel, LV, DIOR, etc.); Netherland owns a reputation
586 for the high-end agricultural products. It is due to this that they acquire an
587 economic surplus in global trading market. Besides, they import plenty of
588 intermediate and consumer products from mainland China and India, conse-
589 quently transferring the environmental burden to the developing economies
590 via commodity trade. For India locating in the third quadrant of the rectan-
591 gle coordinate, it gets an economic deficit and also a carbon emission deficit
592 in commodity trade.

593 Presented in Figure 13 are the trade patterns for selected economies in
594 intermediate carbon trade and final carbon trade. The United States, the
595 United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Japan and France feature a CO₂ emission
596 surplus in intermediate and final commodity trade. Regarding Germany,
597 Netherland, Canada and Italy, they are reflected to get a CO₂ emission sur-
598 plus in intermediate commodity trade and a CO₂ emission deficit in final
599 commodity trade. They combine their comparative advantages to acquire the
600 economic benefits, by utilizing the global supply chain to provide them the
601 materials and other intermediate products at low price for further processing
602 in domestic industries, and delivering a large quantity of final commodities

603 to foreign regions.




Figure 13: Carbon balances for major economies in intermediate and final commodity trades

604 Regarding mainland China and India, they get a CO₂ emission deficit
605 in intermediate and final commodity trades. The CO₂ emission deficits for
606 mainland China in intermediate and final commodity trades are respectively
607 483.92 million tons and 714.61 million tons. As seen, mainland China's final
608 carbon trade imbalance outpaces its intermediate carbon trade imbalance
609 by around half. Therefore, on one hand, mainland China delivers a large
610 quantity of intermediate commodities to developed economies for further
611 processing, thus getting a remarkable CO₂ emission deficit in intermediate
612 commodity trade. On other hand, mainland China is also the prominent
613 supplier of final commodities with low value. In the short term, mainland
614 China may experience an economic boom, as proved by the unprecedented

615 economic growth in the past thirty years. While at the same time, this is
616 not a sustainable way. The increasingly severe environmental and climate
617 problems, such as water scarcity, soaring CO₂ emissions and haze, are ha-
618 rassing the domestic citizens as well as the government. In recent years,
619 the central government of China came to attach importance to this problem
620 and adjust the economic structure from a carbon-intensive, and low-value
621 manufacturing-oriented economy to a green and service-oriented economy.
622 It is raised in the national report that mainland China is going to deepen
623 the structural reforms from the supply side and consolidate the development
624 of advanced manufacturing and modern service industries, thus making the
625 domestic industries climb from the downstream chain with low value to up-
626 stream supply chain with high value in the global market (Xi, 2017).


627 Regarding Russia and Saudi Arabia, they get a CO₂ emission deficit in
628 intermediate commodity trade and a CO₂ emission surplus in final trade. The
629 intermediate carbon trade imbalance is respectively over one hundred times
630 and around five times as much as its final carbon trade imbalance for Russia
631 and Saudi Arabia, respectively. Energy products such as oil and natural gas,
632 dominate the export trade of these two nations. Especially, Russia relies
633 on exporting energy products in exchange of the consumer goods needed by
634 domestic citizens, thus resulting in the tremendous CO₂ emission deficit in
635 intermediate commodity trade. The unbalanced economic structure may be a
636 hidden problem for Russia. The downfall of oil price could be a catastrophe
637 for Russia's economy. This has to some extent implied the unsustainable

638 trend of Russia's trade patterns.


639 *4.2. Geographic and sectoral profiles for carbon trade of distinct economies*

640 Geographic and sectoral profiles for the CO₂ emission imports and exports
641 of two distinct economies (USA and China) are presented here. Figure 14(a)
642 and Figure 14(b) respectively offer the information for USA's CO₂ emission
643 imports and exports. For USA, Asia & Pacific is the largest source region for
644 its CO₂ emission imports. Asia Pacific is accountable for around half of CO₂
645 emissions embodied in the United States' imported heavy industry prod-
646 ucts, half of those in the United States' imported light industry products,
647 and around 40% of those in the United States' imported transport services.
648 For North America as another crucial contributor to the United States' im-
649 ports, heavy industry commodities are accountable for around 60% of North
650 America's CO₂ emission exports to the United States. Regarding the CO₂
651 emissions embodied in the imported heavy industry products of the United
652 States, around 40% of them go to final demand in the United States; 36.68%
653 of them are delivered to heavy industry in the United States; 14.43% of them
654 flow to service industry in the United States, etc. With regard to the carbon
655 imports from light industry abroad, 68.45% of them are delivered to domestic
656 final demand; 16.07% of them are delivered to domestic light industry, etc.

657 As for USA's CO₂ emission exports, heavy industry, transport industry
658 and service industry are the largest three carriages driving its exports. For
659 carbon exports by the heavy industry of the United States, around 30%



(a)




(b)


Figure 14: Geographic and sectoral profiles for (a) CO₂ emission imports and (b) exports of USA

660 of them are taken in by North America, 30% received by Asia Pacific, one
661 quarter of them received by Europe & Eurasia, and one-tenth received by
662 South & Central America. With regard to the carbon exports by transport
663 industry of the United States, the two major recipients are Asia Pacific,
664 and Europe & Eurasia, manifesting the huge demand in these regions for
665 transport services provided by the United States. Meanwhile, for the CO₂
666 emission exports from the United States to Asia & Pacific, around one third
667 of them are delivered to final demand. This ratio turns out to be around
668 one quarter for those from the United States to Europe & Eurasia, around
669 one third for those from the United States to Asia & Pacific as well as North
670 America, and over 40% for those from the United States to Middle East as
671 well as those from the United States to Africa.

672 Illustrated in Figure 15(a) and Figure 15(b) is the information for CO₂
673 emission imports and exports of mainland China. As seen in Figure 15(a),
674 Asia & Pacific is responsible for around half of mainland China's total CO₂
675 emission imports. Meanwhile, heavy industry in foreign regions accounts for
676 70% of mainland China's total CO₂ emission imports. Asia Pacific dedicates
677 57.56% of the total imports from foreign heavy industry into mainland China,
678 followed by Europe & Eurasia dedicating 29.31%, etc. Meanwhile, 64.29% of
679 mainland China's CO₂ emission imports from foreign heavy industry enter
680 domestic heavy industry, while only 18.36% of them enter domestic final
681 demand. As seen in Figure 15(b), the three major recipients of carbon exports
682 by mainland China's heavy industry are Europe & Eurasia, Asia & Pacific,



(a)



(b)

Figure 15: Geographic and sectoral profiles for (a) CO₂ emission imports and (b) exports of mainland China

683 and North America. For the carbon exports from mainland China to Europe
684 & Eurasia, around one-third of them enter mainland China's final demand.
685 This ratio is revealed as 38.59% for those from mainland China to Asia &
686 Pacific, 49.12% for those from mainland China to North America, 46.51% for
687 those from mainland China to South & Central America, 54.21% for those
688 from mainland China to Africa, and 53.14% for those from mainland China
689 to Middle East.

690 5. Conclusions

691 Measuring and analysing the carbon emissions is a necessary step in the
692 way of dealing with climate change. For a comprehensive understanding of
693 the extended carbon footprint of world regions as well as the CO₂ emission
694 transfer in global commodity trade, this study adopts a systems multi-region
695 input-output approach with primary inputs into consideration and analyses
696 the CO₂ emissions for the world in 2015 on a collective nation (region) level
697 by utilizing the latest statistics.

698 The extended carbon footprint of the United States is revealed as one
699 and a half times as much as that of China, while this ratio is accounted as
700 three quarters in our previous work, which is due to that final consump-
701 tion takes a much larger share of the gross domestic product in the United
702 States compared to the situation in China. CO₂ emissions embodied in the
703 whole primary inputs of the world economy are calculated to be equivalent
704 to 42% of the emissions embodied in the genuine final consumption, high-

705 lighting the key role of capital goods in reallocating global carbon emissions.
706 Moreover, global commodity trade causes the displacement of an extensive
707 amount of carbon emissions around the world. For the interregional transfer
708 of CO₂ emissions, around 70% of the emissions are related with intermedi-
709 ate commodity trades, and only around 30% of them are related with final
710 commodity trades.

711 Results from this study indicate that regions tend to have different trade
712 patterns in intermediate and final commodity trades. The United States, the
713 United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Japan and France have a CO₂ emission surplus
714 in intermediate and final commodity trades, while Russia and Saudi Arabia
715 are characterized by a CO₂ emission deficit in intermediate commodity trade
716 but a CO₂ emission surplus in final commodity trade, as energy products
717 dominate the export of these two countries. Germany, Netherland, Canada
718 and Italy are characterized by a CO₂ emission surplus in intermediate com-
719 modity trade and a CO₂ emission deficit in final commodity trade, indicating
720 that these countries make well use of their status of being on the high end
721 of the global supply chain, importing low value-added materials from around
722 the world for further processing and then exporting high value-added final
723 commodities, and in turn capturing immense economical and environmen-
724 tal benefits. For mainland China and India, they are characterized by a
725 CO₂ emission deficit in both intermediate and final commodity trade. These
726 countries, especially mainland China, deliver a large quantity of intermediate
727 commodities to developed countries for further processing, and at the same

728 time export lots of final commodities to the world market, indicating that
729 these countries serve as mills and plants of the world. For eager emerging
730 developing economies, trade in intermediates and low value-added final goods
731 is often a first step into the world market, and a plank for these emerging
732 economies to integrate into the world economy. However, such growth pat-
733 tern is bound to induce major environmental problems, far beyond soaring
734 CO₂ emissions.

735 The interaction between international trade and climate change has major
736 implications for countries around the world. Identifying the trading struc-
737 tures of CO₂ emissions embodied in international trade is a further step to-
738 wards more inclusive information regarding the issue of the establishment of
739 global warming regimes, and may help us seek more informed policy choices
740 and trade measures in global trade negotiations.

741 **Acknowledgments**

742 This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation
743 of China (Grant No. 71904003).

744 **Additional Information**

745 **Declarations of Interest:** None

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