

Introduction

In recent years, Initial Teacher Education¹ (ITE) in England has experienced significant changes in its funding, organisation, form, structure and content. Some of these changes are the direct result of policy reforms by the government, designed to change the way in which student teachers are educated, however, these recent reforms are only a small part of the story and current ITE reforms need to be seen within a wider social, political and economic setting (Apple 2001). The government has responded to the teacher shortage in England by deregulating the sector and introducing increasing market mechanisms in an effort to recruit more teachers. Neoliberal policies have sought to deal with the recruitment crisis by reworking the public sector to mimic aspects of the private sector. This can be seen through the deregulation of routes into teaching, incentivising and marketing particular training programmes, outsourcing aspects of training to the private sector and structuring recruitment for teachers in ways which sets providers in competition with one another.

Such reforms were intended firstly to ensure that schools, as key stakeholders, were given more control over the recruitment and training process and secondly to address the recruitment crisis by attracting more graduates to the profession. Arguably, employment-based teacher training has achieved the former goal, however, teacher recruitment remains in crisis and findings suggest that these reforms, rather than solving recruitment problems, are creating complex and unequal playing fields for both providers and applicants (Bathmaker, Ingram, and Waller 2013), which may be contributing to the continued crisis and excluding potentially talented teachers from the profession.

This paper will use Bourdieu's field theory to examine this policy context, with specific reference to the diversification of routes and the increase in school-led routes, in order to

¹ ITE will be used to refer to the preparation of pre-service teachers, but the term Initial Teacher Training or ITT is frequently used in the sector and the literature to mean the something similar.

understand how this is affecting power relations between the various providers in the field.

By using a Bourdieusian critical policy approach, this paper will explore the emerging hierarchy in the field of ITE and the role of capital in shaping who dominates the field.

This paper draws on research from 24 semi-structured interviews of individuals who occupied, or had previously occupied, leadership roles in ITE, at the time of the data collection (2017-18), in both school and university settings. The context for this research was England and therefore this paper is referring to policy and the field of ITE in England, yet the implications of these findings contribute to broader international debates around neo-liberal education systems (Ball 2012) and the marketisation of higher education (Naidoo, Shankar, and Veer 2011, Naidoo and Williams 2014) and in similar national contexts, such as the USA, where teacher education is constructed as a ‘policy problem’ (Cochran-Smith 2008).

The next section will outline the theoretical and conceptual frame that will be used in this paper to analyse the positions and trajectories of the agents operating in the field of ITE.

Following this, the paper will set out an overview of the policy landscape in England within the field of ITE, detailing the various agents and the ways in which they, and ITE, have been affected by the reforms. Next, the findings will show the struggle over capital at the time of data collection and finally how this struggle has led to an emerging hierarchy of different types of agents in the field.

Field Theory and Capital in ITE

Using Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) theoretical and methodological frame to make sense of the current field of ITE, universities and schools are conceptualised as ‘agents’ working in the field who use different forms of capital to improve their position and trajectory in the field of ITE. A field is a site of constant struggle where the competition for capital and what is defined as capital is always at stake. The government reforms acting on

the field at this time influenced the hierarchical relations between agents as some routes, such as school-led via School Direct² (DfE 2011), were favoured over university-led routes. For Bourdieu, capital represents assets that are unevenly distributed amongst agents competing within any given field. Agents use their capital, albeit in different forms, to maintain or improve their position in the field. In times of stability, most agents engage in field maintenance, which means that they accept the power relations in place and collude in the rules of the game or doxa. However, when the field undergoes a period of change, the accepted power relations and forms of capital can be challenged.

The forces that can be enlisted in these struggles and the orientation given to them, be it conservative or subversive, depend on what might be called the “exchange rate” (or “conversion rate”) that obtains among the different forms of capital, in other words, on the very thing that these strategies aim to preserve or transform (principally through the defense or criticism of representations of the different forms of capital and their legitimacy). (Bourdieu 1998, 265)

At the time of the data collection, the field of ITE was undergoing rapid change as the government introduced reforms to try and deal with the teacher recruitment crisis. Arguably the ‘exchange rate’ for capital was under negotiation. This was a critical period for investigating capital in ITE as the power struggles were and, to some extent, still are being played out in the field. In other words, the competitive strategies that agents use determine ‘the relative value and magnitude of the different forms of power that can be wielded in the different fields, or if you will, power over the different forms of power or the capital granting

² School Direct is a school-led training route, which often involves collaboration with university partners depending on the level of qualification the school offers trainees. The School Direct route is offered as either a salaried route, which is more like a graduate training programme, learning to teach as you work as a salaried teacher or as a tuition fee route, which means that the student teacher pays fees and as such is not an employee of the school but a student learning to teach. In some cases a postgraduate certificate in education (PGCE) is gained on School Direct routes. In all cases the trainee will obtain Qualified Teacher Status (QTS), which is, in effect, a license to teach.

power over the capital’ (Bourdieu 1998, 265). So, capital is understood, in this context, as the assets that the agent can use to negotiate their position in the field of ITE.

Bourdieu rarely provided definitions for his concepts, instead arguing that it is ‘the field which is primary and must be the focus of research’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 107).

Therefore in order to determine what functions as capital in ITE, a literature review of policy in ITE in England was conducted to gain an understanding of the historical, social and political context to the field, to inform what factors affect capital in the field of ITE. The following factors were identified as important for schools: Ofsted³ rating, size of school alliance or trust, academy status⁴, ‘Teaching School’⁵ status, School Centred Initial Teacher Training (SCITT)⁶ status, fee-paying or state-funded. These factors acted as capital in the field as they could be used in the ‘ITE game’ to attract students to their ITE programmes. In the case of universities: Ofsted rating remained important, Russell Group⁷ status, Research Excellence Framework (REF)⁸ score and the size of scale of their involvement in ITE. These factors could be used in the ITE game to directly or indirectly attract students to their ITE programmes and would support their maintenance or expansion in the field. Whilst these were outward facing examples of capital, identifying capital was an iterative process.

Thematic analysis of the qualitative data in each interview helped to show how these factors

³ Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills. Ofsted inspects services providing education and skills for learners of all ages and services that care for children and young people. Providers are graded as ‘Outstanding’, ‘Good’, ‘Requires Improvement’ or ‘Inadequate’

⁴ Schools that are funded directly by central government, not a local authority.

⁵ Teaching Schools are those judged to be ‘Good’ or ‘Outstanding’ by Ofsted. They partner with other schools to take a lead role in training and developing teachers, leading ITE routes, such as School Direct.

⁶ A teacher training route which is designed and delivered by groups of neighbouring schools and colleges and has the power to award Qualified Teacher Status (QTS). They may collaborate with universities to offer a PGCE alongside QTS, but not all do.

⁷ A group of 24 research-intensive universities in the UK who are committed to maintaining world-class research and excellence in teaching and learning.

⁸ The REF is a review process undertaken by HE research funding bodies to provide accountability for public investment in research and produce evidence of the benefits of this investment, to benchmark universities and inform the allocation of funding for research.

and others translated into power in practice, what kind of power and how much power. This was achieved by identifying and coding what kind of factors were supporting agents' ability to expand, reduce or maintain their engagement in ITE. In this way, capital is identified and analysed both through the data as it reveals what forms of capital institutions providing ITE have but also by analysing the logic of the field.

There is thus a sort of hermeneutic circle: in order to construct the field, one must identify the forms of specific capital that operate within it, and to construct the forms of specific capital one must know the specific logic of the field. There is an endless to and fro movement in the research process that is quite lengthy and arduous.

(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p108)

Building on Bourdieu's framework, this paper will reveal the forms of capital institutions providing ITE have and how they use that capital, particularly during a time of competitive struggle, to negotiate their position. Specifically, how reputation and status, networks and alliances, agency and strategies are used to determine their differential position and trajectory in the field and ultimately resulting in four characterisations of agents in the field; dominant, emergent, declining and resistant.

The Policy Landscape – Understanding the Field of ITE

Deregulation

ITE in England straddles two public sector institutions, schools and HE, and therefore the effects of the neoliberal movement and policy change in education are arguably magnified within this field. HE in England, like in many other capitalist western societies (Naidoo 2003), has experienced the impact of neoliberalism (Furlong 2013, Marginson and Considine 2000, Maringe and Gibbs 2008). One key characteristic of neoliberalism is deregulation and *light* regulation, which has also impacted the field of ITE.

ITE has seen a significant shift towards deregulation in recent year creating a new market and new conditions. In 2015, it was estimated that in the UK there were more than 900 providers of ITE (UCAS 2015) as policy reforms were increasingly encouraging schools, instead of universities, to lead ITE through SCITTs and School Direct. Teach First⁹ another feature of deregulation, led by a charity, created another level of competition. Ball and Junemann (2012) describe how recent governments have created a new form of ‘network governance’, which relies on interdependent organisations delivering services. Teach First is funded by private providers, such as Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Barclays Capital, Canary Wharf Group and Credit Suisse. This form of exogenous privatisation (Hatcher 1999), which introduces private businesses into the field of ITE is a clear example of how economic capital can be used to shift the power relations in the field meaning that some agents will be better funded than others. Increased network governance in ITE creates opportunities for those individuals with high levels of social capital to make these informal but powerful alliances.

Teach First has contracts with universities to deliver aspects of their ITE programmes, similarly schools contract out to universities to deliver aspects of school-led routes. The winning of such contracts is outwardly based on market principles, but on closer examination, we increasingly see evidence of ‘network governance’ (Ball and Junemann 2012) in education policy. For example, Teach First and Multi-Academy Trusts or MATs¹⁰ are ‘embedded between the communities of government and business and the complex ‘post-political’ social relationships now being mobilised around philanthropic solutions’ (Ball and Junemann 2012, 114). Ball (2008) argues that this kind of policy technology is characteristic

⁹An employment-based route into teaching, which offers graduates a two year postgraduate diploma in education (PGDE) which is achieved alongside ‘on the job’ training, in which the trainee is both an employee of the school and also a university student with an affiliated university.

¹⁰ Groups of schools who are in partnership with one another. They receive funding directly from the government and make their own financial decisions. They often share policies, approaches, organisation, share expertise etc. They can range from small networks of 5-6 to extensive national networks in excess of 40. They are often run on business lines and may use a branding and marketing to promote themselves.

of a privatised public sector. MATs and Teach First, with support from the government, are able to change the dynamics of the field as they increase share of their market. The introduction of multiple providers of ITE shows how the sector has become increasingly deregulated in recent years, yet the state maintains some control through light regulation.

Light regulation and student teacher recruitment

Approximately one year prior to the start of the data collection, The National College of Teaching and Leadership (NCTL), responsible for monitoring and controlling ITE at that time, piloted a new recruitment policy for ITE for 2016-17. This policy meant that rather than using a centrally planned allocation of places, as was previously the case, providers were free 'to recruit (subject to a limited number of controls) as many trainees as they feel they need – until the overall system has recruited sufficient trainees' (NCTL 2015, 3).

This policy highlights the tension between an apparently decentralised system with centralised control. In one way, this reflects the classical liberal agenda to deregulate and liberalise local markets (Hayek 1945), promoting choice and competition between providers. At the same time the invisible arm of the state, can be seen to *lightly* engineer the market, this is the neoliberal agenda (Buchanan 1975), creating a quasi-market. This *light* regulation was created through controls, the NCTL identified four controls that it reserved the right to use to avoid over-recruitment. These controls were by subject, route, organisation and location. The control by route and organisation gives a clear indication of the government's agenda to promote the school-led ITE routes, which had priority over university-led ITE (NCTL 2015). The government retained the right to control how many students were recruited by providers depending on the teacher training programme or route that they offered and the provider themselves (some were privileged over others and could recruit more).

In this new policy context schools and universities had to compete with one another, for a share in the market, some were unable to maintain their position. There were early warnings that under the new liberalised recruitment system ‘schools could lose out on high-quality NQTs¹¹ next year’ (The Guardian, 21 January, 2015). High Ofsted ratings became an increasingly important asset for providers, meaning those with lower ratings were unable to withstand the competition. For example, London South Bank University and the University of St Mark and St John lost all their core PGCE places¹² in the 2014-15 allocation, due to poor Ofsted ratings. (Elmes 2013). Given warnings over teacher shortages, such a recruitment system carried significant risks.

A second problem with this recruitment system was that quantity was valued over quality as the system became more competitive than ever. As David Spendlove argued in his blog (17 October 2015), ‘the reality is this is not a model that rewards diligence in recruitment – it rewards speed in processing applicants. Dither and the pool of places available to you gets smaller.’ This new policy was described by Husbands (2016) as ‘a tragedy of the commons’ in which the common resource (potential teachers) is depleted as organisations work to serve their own interests, rather than work towards the common good. The changes in policy were creating changes in the field of ITE with those universities lacking in the necessary capital being forced out of the system and new agents, in the form of schools and school alliances, taking their places.

The allocation model introduced for the 2016-2017 academic year (NCTL 2015), was widely acknowledged by ITE providers as problematic and in response NCTL modified the process for the following years, by removing some of the caps and through ‘the introduction of multi-

¹¹ Newly Qualified Teachers

¹² ‘Core’ PGCE places refers to university-led PGCE places, rather than any school-led routes. These were places allocated to the university by the NCTL and allowed universities to recruit students for these courses.

year allocations for the best performing ITT providers' (NCTL 2016, 5). Whilst, there was general recognition that the removal of the capping system was helpful for providers, the rewarding of the 'best' providers, largely determined by the Ofsted score, a form of institutionalised cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986), had become a critical asset within the field of ITE.

To summarise, deregulation and light regulation increased competition between ITE providers, which has led to significant problems in recruiting the best students as providers are increasingly forced to work against each other, using their capital in different ways to weather the policy storm and shape the hierarchical relations between agents.

Monitoring and accountability

There is a significant body of literature and research around accountability measures in the school sector (Ball 1997, Gleeson and Husbands 2004, Perryman 2006, Poulson 1998, Wilcox and Gray 1996) and as HE has similarly become increasingly subject to accountability measures, research in this area has also grown. (Blackmore 2004, Scott and Brown 2009, Jones-Devitt and Samiei 2011, Morley 2008). One outcome of neoliberal reforms in HE is the emergence of the 'entrepreneurial university' (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004) leading some to argue that HE has been transformed from recipients of public funding trusted to serve a constituency, to corporations setting out to generate income (Henkel 2005, McGettigan 2013), with strong accountability measures.

Ofsted ratings, one of the accountability measures used by NCTL (2015) to determine ITE allocations, is used to measure the quality of provision. Yet interestingly university-led ITE has generally fared well in such measures with 47% of Universities gaining 'outstanding' and 94% 'good', better than those that were school-led (Ofsted 2011). However, as Pachler notes (2012), this evidence seems to have been overlooked when reviewing the White Paper 'The

Importance of Teaching' (DfE 2010), which concludes that there is a need for improvement in teacher training and a greater shift towards school-led training routes. Furthermore the government recommendations in response to the Carter Review (2015) also devalue the HE-led PGCE when they say 'we would like applicants to understand that QTS is the essential component, of ITT and that a PGCE is an optional academic qualification.' (DfE 2015, 6). Such undermining of the role of the university in the ITE field has led to universities having to strategise in different ways so that they could survive the reforms.

So far, this paper has provided some insight into the logic and conditions of the field at the time of the data collection, revealing the instability, uncertainty and competitive conditions that agents were operating under and crucially helps us to begin to understand what acts as capital in the field of ITE. The following will first explore the methodological approach before discussing how agents responded to these conditions in order to maintain or improve their position in the field through the exploitation of the different forms of capital.

Methodology and data collection

In the *Logic of Practice* (1990) Bourdieu argues that the divide between the objective and the subjective deemphasises the role of practice, which should be the object of study. Without a clear focus on the *modus operandi* (the practice) then researchers fall into the trap of objectivism which hypostasizes relations by 'treating them as realities already constituted outside the history of the group' (Bourdieu 1990, p52) or subjectivism which 'is quite incapable of giving an account of the necessity of the social world' (ibid p52). The logic of practice is socially and historically constituted, as such it is arbitrary not rational, action is simply based on an awareness of the field.

The methodological approach adopted in this research is that, what can be seen and measured is practice, in this case the practice of the individual and the practice of the institution. By

trying to understand practices the research hopes to uncover what acts as capital in the field and how it is used. That said, the data only reveals what the interviewee provides as an account of practice, raising the issue of validity. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) argue that rigorous researchers are consciously quality controlling the whole research process. In this case, it was the interviewers' role to continuously check for credibility, plausibility, and trustworthiness of the findings through asking follow up questions, asking for examples of situations cited and probe further where possible. This was made possible through the use of semi-structured interviews and an interviewer who knew the field and the policy context.

The sample consisted of 12 interviewees from school-led ITE providers and 12 interviewees from university-led ITE providers. The piloting of the questions allowed for the development of a more valid and aligned research design and clearly indicated that the interviewees needed to have some or had some role in leading ITE in their institution. In terms of sampling and recruiting participants it became clear through the trial interviews that there was a need to adopt a maximum variation purposive sampling approach (Seidman 2013). This entails handpicking cases to be included in the sample because they meet the specific needs of the research questions and then including the maximum range of variation within that sample that is feasible. This is a non-probability sample, which means that the researcher is targeting a particular group of participants, whilst there is no attempt to gather a fully representative group, there is an attempt to gather a good range of variation within that group so that some generalisations can be made. In the case of this research this meant including institutions who had varying assets, as outlined below.

Of the 12 interviewees from universities, four were Russell Group, six were Post-1992 universities and the other two were neither. Five were graded as 'outstanding', six as 'good' and one had a mixed 'good' and 'outstanding' grade by Ofsted. The 2014 scores for the REF in education were extremely varied. The size of ITE provision (in terms of students enrolled

on ITE courses) ranged from four small (up to 200 students), four medium (up to 500 students) and three large (over 500 students). The school interviewees included six graded 'outstanding', three were 'good', two were 'requires improvement' and one was unassigned. There were two community schools, three traditional academies, three MATs, one independent school, one selective and two faith schools. In addition to these characteristics, two were part of SCITTs and two were designated 'Teaching Schools'.

The research question below was investigated through the use of 24 semi-structured interviews, most were face to face but some were conducted via an audio or video call. All were recorded and transcribed.

How does the capital that an institution holds affect its position in the field and how do institutions try and improve their position?

The coding was an iterative process using both a priori codes that were identified in the literature and empirical codes, which were developed inductively from the data. For example, a priori codes included Ofsted, league tables and networks, whereas the empirical codes which were identified and developed through analysing what seemed to be affecting the degree of power an agent had, included marketing and word of mouth. The analysis helped to uncover what forms of capital were valued in the field and how capital was used to survive the challenging policy context. The findings will be discussed in the next section with selected quotations to illustrate capital identified through the coding process.

Findings

Reputation and Status

One of the strongest themes in the data relates to the status or reputation of the agent. This took many forms and included reputation from word of mouth, position in league tables and Ofsted ratings. The interviewees recognised the importance of reputation and how that

reputation was built. The most common way that this was expressed was through Ofsted ratings and it was clear that all agents in the field of ITE recognised Ofsted as part of the field of power with high Ofsted ratings acted as capital. The two quotations below clearly show how this form of capital, which might be seen as institutionalised cultural capital, affects an agent's position in the field of ITE but also how this form of capital relates to economic capital in terms of students numbers through the multi-year allocations.

Ofsted, we got a grade two, which is very frustrating because you wanted that grade one, which would give you that certainty, perhaps, of numbers and figures but it's not coming. (Post-1992 university, 'Good' Ofsted rating)

So, you know, we haven't been inspected recently. I'm sure we will be very soon. But we have for a number of years been an outstanding provider. And we wanted also to align ourselves with an outstanding HEI. And we know, obviously, of the reputation of X. And again, I think that's probably, that's something we obviously put in our recruitment material. (SCITT, 'Outstanding' Ofsted rating)

Beyond Ofsted, other forms of reputation and status acted as capital in the field, for example positions in league tables, which often supported the good reputation of an agent, which led to schools or school alliances wanting to partner with certain universities as this would not only boost their own status but would mean that they would attract the best graduates and ultimately prospective employee teachers. Schools and universities often described how Ofsted ratings and lower reputational status more generally limited their ability to participate fully in ITE. Universities described how they had been forced to close courses as they were not awarded allocations and schools described being excluded from partnerships due to poor Ofsted ratings. The data also revealed that these partnerships between universities and schools, in most cases were really valued by both schools and universities and the policy

context had damaged that relationship, suggesting that the competitive environment served to damage previously collaborative partnerships. One school interviewee expressed this strongly in the quote below.

I think that violence has been done to the universities system and I use that word, I think it is really sad actually... all across the country there are small lead schools that used to have really rich relationships with a university further down the road. You know some academic who worked really hard with mentors in a school down a village lane somewhere, that's really amazing that that could happen that still happens but it's harder to make that happen now because the guy's no longer employed by the university – the programme closed. (Community School, 'Requires Improvement' Ofsted rating).

Networks and alliances

Networking and connections with particular groups was an important aspect of how agents improved their position. This was because some agents had both the knowledge of how and who to network with to improve their position and others were in a position to network because of their status and connections. For schools and SCITTs, these networks consisted of relationships with other schools in the alliance or trust. For more isolated schools, such as community schools, their networks were often the universities that they worked with. In the case of the universities, there was a larger field of networks that they belonged to. These included, research networks, subject associations, ITT groups including regional groups run by NCTL (although these have now ceased with the closure of NCTL), Department for Education (DfE) consultancy forums, Ofsted stakeholder group, MillionPlus¹³ ITT Group and the Russell Group ITT group. The findings show that the more networked agents (schools in

¹³ MillionPlus is an association for modern universities in the UK.

particular) were, the more power they had to improve their position and vice versa, illustrated in the following quotation.

I think increasingly in a sort of atomised academised system that there's a lot of pressures to have local networks and the rise of kind of MATs. And, you know we are being strongly encouraged to form a multi-academy trust with other Catholic academies in the area. Even though, you know, the head teacher here may not necessarily want to do that. (Academy School, 'Outstanding' Ofsted rating)

The influence and rise of MATs as big competitors in the market led more isolated schools to network and collaborate in order to survive the policy context. For those schools who were unable to network, largely because they were community schools run by local authorities and not trusts or alliances, their ability to participate in ITE was declining.

Agency

Agency was another important way in which interviewees talked about the degree of power they had to influence policy in the field. It should be noted here that interviewees were only providing their impression of agency, the reality may have been different. Most interviewees from universities reported that they were invited to attend policy networking groups at the Department for Education (DfE) but did not feel that they were actually being consulted or listened to. The quotation below represents how this lack of agency was expressed by one of the interviewees.

They don't really listen. Even when they say they are listening, they go and do something else that's quite mad. You know, they did that madness over the allocation model last year... This year I was more hopeful, and then they decided to cut the bursary for primary! Where is the network of information telling them that there isn't a problem with places for primary? Who is listening to the schools? Let alone

listening to us as providers, so agency, I don't think they really listen to us at all.

(Post-1992 university, 'Good' Ofsted rating).

Similarly, in the interviews with the individuals from schools and small alliances there was no evidence to suggest that they had any agency in influencing policy or any opportunity to even provide feedback, except in the case of the MAT interview. In this case, the interviewee was clear that the MAT did have agency.

It's a big network. Well, not only just that, you get invited to go and sit on groups at the DfE. (MAT, 'Outstanding' Ofsted rating).

This evidence of the government favouring and consulting with the large school-led ITE providers such as MATs can be seen as a part of the agenda to marginalise the role of universities in ITE (Ball 2017), suggesting that the competition is not a level playing field, with some providers having more leverage than others.

Strategies

For those agents unable to wield their capital gained through status, reputation, networks or size, a different approach was needed to try to improve their position and this was often shown through having the knowledge and the skills to strategise and innovate what might be regarded as cultural capital. An agent's ability to innovate and strategise, in a potentially volatile or threatening policy context, is dependent on the knowledge and skills that they have to adapt. In the case of schools, the main reason for involvement and increasing involvement in ITE is recruitment. For schools then, it appeared that the most obvious way to strategise in relation to ITE was to look for ways to increase numbers. There are clearly a whole range of differing ways to do this, including gaining different status, such as becoming SCITTs or Teaching Schools, allying with other local Teaching Schools who could feed them trainees via School Direct, taking on Teach First participants and working with multiple universities

to increase the number of student teachers that they had in school. In the case of the 12 schools that were interviewed, there were five that were not Teaching Schools, SCITTs or MATs and it is these five who are of interest, as their means to innovate and strategise was largely limited by their isolated position. Two schools used their knowledge of the system to find opportunities to increase their involvement. One became a host for School Direct trainees and also SCITT placements with a local alliance. The other, without any means to network with local schools formed a closer partnership with a university and created a School Direct programme. Unfortunately their ability to stay a lead school in this arrangement was taken away when they received a 'Requires Improvement' Ofsted rating.

Two of the schools started working with Teach First and took participants from this programme when previously they had worked with PGCE students. Whilst four of the schools looked for ways to form a partnership that might bolster their position in the field, the fifth school did not respond with any particular strategy and talked of declining numbers after a poor Ofsted rating. All five of these schools struggled to maintain or increase their involvement in ITE but the more successful were those with the institutionalised cultural capital to navigate the policy context. This was demonstrated through having the knowledge and skills needed in the field of ITE to gain certain titles or affiliations which symbolise competence and status in the field and therefore attract more student teachers, for example, having the knowledge and skills to set themselves up as a lead school for a School Direct Programme. As already described, the data reveals that one of the strongest credentials that an agent has is a high Ofsted rating, which in many cases was the form of institutionalised capital which seemed to dictate their position in the field. Interviewees talked about their ability to 'play the Ofsted game' demonstrating their awareness of the field and how to gain this status symbol.

Universities had different mechanisms for innovation at their disposal and hence their response to the conditions of the field was very different to that of schools. Some universities were forced into closing courses and reducing the size of their provision. Of the 12 cases of universities there emerged three main responses, which can be interpreted as strategies.

The three larger providers adopted a policy of economies of scale to their approach and embraced a whole range of different routes on offer, including School Direct, SCITTs, Assessment Only¹⁴, Teach First and some supported Troops to Teachers¹⁵. This approach is exemplified in the following quotation.

...whatever was proposed or demanded by government, we did it and we did it with great energy and enthusiasm. And I think strategically that was the right thing to do at that time in many ways. Because we know that universities were under enormous threat. And if we didn't co-operate with government, who knows what the consequences could have been? (Russell Group university, 'Outstanding' Ofsted rating).

Two of the providers, who were Russell Group universities and both scoring highly in the REF, made a deliberate decision not to respond to the policy context and did not innovate. Their responses in the interviews suggest that they could rely on their reputation as a means to withstand the pressure from the policy, one describing it as 'confidence' to withstand or resist the policy.

Two of the smaller providers who had less capital in terms of Ofsted and research status and less economic capital in terms of size had to close some of their provision. The way in which

¹⁴ This route is often suitable for those individuals who are already working as unqualified teachers and need to gain QTS only, there is no postgraduate study or qualification attached to this route.

¹⁵ This route offers a non-graduate route into teaching for ex-service personnel to qualify as a teacher and leads to an undergraduate degree and QTS.

this closure was expressed in interview was very different to the two cases above who had *chosen* to restrict provision to PGCE, instead these closures were experienced with regret as they were not closed through choice and described themselves as ‘victims’ of the system.

The third and final response from two of the other providers was one of innovation. In both cases the university adapted the provision to support the needs of the context in which they were working, either to suit the students or the partnership schools. One example was through providing a ‘suite’ of options for School Direct, where the school could opt in and out of certain university services and roles. Another, was to provide a basic PGCE with a ‘top up’ option. And another was to ‘franchise’ out a SCITT model. All of these sorts of innovations suggest a consumer-type approach (Tomlinson 2017) to the education model and an endogenous form of privatisation (Hatcher 1999), in which the HEI is selling a product or model to the school partners and the applicants. The strategic and innovative responses of the different agents in the field suggests another important form of institutionalised cultural capital, where agents look for ways to market themselves to their potential applicants. Such marketing mechanisms are the result of agents who know and can navigate the policy context, for example, through offering a suite of qualifications to attract applicants.

The role of capital in a dynamic field: positions and trajectories

The data examined in this paper clearly helps to uncover the power differentials that exist in the field of ITE and how agents can use their differing levels of capital to improve their position in the field. In his writing, Bourdieu (1998) (1984) has often mapped out the positions of agents within a given social space and this has been achieved through indicating the amount of different types of capital that they possess. For example, in *The State Nobility*, Bourdieu (1998) maps out the social space with different occupational categories, in which he

indicates +capital volume at the top and –capital volume at the bottom. In this way he is clearly signalling that the amount of capital determines position.

Those endowed with capital are able to maintain their position in social space (or in the structure of a given field, such as the artistic or scientific field) only at the cost of reconverting the forms of capital they hold into forms that are more profitable or more legitimate in the current state of the instruments of reproduction (Bourdieu 1998, 277).

This suggests that agents can exchange their capital in the field for types that are more profitable. Clearly having high amounts of all types of capital provides the most volume and therefore most power but those with less of one form of capital can better their position by working to legitimate another source of capital. For example an agent with a lower Ofsted rating can potentially use their network to improve their position. Or, an agent with a large provision of ITE can use this in place of their lower research status to better their position. In this way, the agents play the field of ITE, exchanging one form of capital for another.

The analysis presented here suggests that there are some emerging positions and trajectories of these agents dependent on how much, what type, and how they use the different types of capital that they possess. The following should not be read as a typology of agents in the field but more as some characterisations to help make sense of the relationship between capital and trajectories of agents in the field.

Dominant agents tend to be characterised by high capital volume, so this would include both symbolic and economic capital. In the case of schools, it seems that MATs tend to possess these characteristics and for universities these are often the large and medium sized providers with outstanding Ofsted ratings. These agents have tended to respond to the policy context

by adopting a position of embracing the differing routes and expanding their provision to protect themselves through scale.

Resistant agents tend to be characterised by high levels of symbolic capital, who might represent a more elite status in the field. They have less need to adapt to the policy as they can maintain their position based on their reputation and will attract applicants and trainees via their status. For universities this may represent the research-intensive universities and for schools this may be the independent sector and academically high achieving schools.

Emergent agents are likely to possess high levels of institutionalised cultural capital and will use their knowledge and skills of policy to improve their position in the field, as they look for ways to gain positions, titles and particular statuses acting as outward symbols of their authority in the field. They are likely to be innovative in their approach and use networks to support their trajectory where possible. For schools, this may include small academy alliances, and/or affiliations to SCITTs. For universities, these are often small to medium sized providers who may lack high Ofsted ratings and high research status but may know and understand how the system works.

Declining agents are characterised by low capital volume and those who have struggled to maintain their position in the ITE field, leading to course closure, in the case of universities, and lowered abilities to train and recruit future teachers in the case of schools. They are likely to be small providers, often isolated and may lack status in the field.

Capital is critical to understanding power in the field of ITE. A better understanding of how capital is distributed and legitimised provides us with important insight to begin to uncover which agents might be privileged over others. If some agents dominate and others are in decline we need to consider what this means for teacher recruitment and the profession more broadly. This paper has argued that the recent policy context in ITE in England has created

unfavourable conditions for the recruitment of teachers into the profession. The tension created by competition has favoured some providers over others, has led to provision closing down, has damaged partnership arrangements between schools and universities and potentially created the conditions for poorer quality provision.

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