1 # INTRODUCTION TO THE FORUM

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3 # Wartime Globalization in Asia, 1937–1945, Conflicted Connections and Convergences

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11 Given war's propensity for trampling over and demolishing borders—
12 its literal, one might even say primordial, function as a motor
13 of deterritorialization and reterritorialization[1]—the scant scholarly
14 attention paid to it as a globalizing force remains surprising. An
15 extensive body of literature has responded to the complex role of
16 globalization in the making, as well as the supposed unmaking, of
17 conflict. Liberal economists and political theorists, in an intellectual
18 lineage that dates back to the writings of the European Enlightenment,
19 have made bold claims about global economic integration and
20 the emergence of a 'capitalist peace'.[2] Critics of their arguments
21 have pointed to the Western imperial violence which, from the

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[1] A. Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy'. *Theory, Culture & Society,* vol. 7, 1990, pp. 295–310; A. Appadurai, *Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization*, 8th print, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2008.

[2] E. Weede, 'Globalization: creative destruction and the prospect of capitalist peace' in *Globalization and armed conflict*, G. Schneider, K. Barbieri and N. P. Gleditsch (eds), Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland, 2003, pp. 311–324. Also see E. Weede, 'The diffusion of prosperity and peace through globalization'. *The Independent Review*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2004, pp. 165–186; T. L. Friedman, *The lexus and the olive tree: understanding globalization*, rev. ed., Anchor Books, New York, 2000; F. Fukuyama, *The end of history and the last man*, Avon Books, New York, 1992.

mid-eighteenth century on, cleared the ground (and perhaps, more importantly, the seas) to make way for the so-called 'free' market world economy, a process which established several of those fundamental worldwide inequalities that have been perpetuated to this day.[3] The hard evidence of a more recent past makes a mockery of the presumption held by some that global capitalist enterprises such as Starbucks and McDonalds might bring about some kind of Big Mac and Frappuccino-mediated universal fraternity.[4] Critical observers of globalization during the 'Noughties' (2000–2010) now recognize it as both one of the most interconnected decades in world history, and also one of the bloodiest.[5]

However, the idea that wars—in particular, the twentieth century's two world wars—in themselves produced forms of intensified globalization (just as they disrupted and demolished pre-existing forms) has yet to find its place in a field largely characterized, as one scholar has put it, by its 'pacific tendencies'.[6] Historians, especially, have remained quiet on the matter, even as more of them take up a self-consciously global perspective in their work. There is no doubt that the study of the two world wars has, in one sense, gone global. Important work has established how far the military and civilian experiences of the First World War stretched out beyond Europe and the United States; it has advanced the view that the origins of the Second World War can be found in the stresses and strains of the 'global food economy'.[7] At the same time, the discipline of history in general has yet to grapple with what David Bell, in a critical review of a major global history writing effort, labels the 'most direct form of "global connection" imaginable'—that is, 'military conquest'.[8]

Students coming to the history of nineteenth and twentieth century globalization might therefore be forgiven for imagining that it was in fact what happened *before* and *in between* major international conflicts

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[3] T. Barkawi, 'Connection and constitution: locating war and culture in globalization studies'. *Globalizations*, vol. 1, no. 2, 2004, pp. 155–170.

[4] J. Grey, *False dawn: the delusions of global capitalism*, The New Press, New York, 1998.

[5] P. van Houwelingen, 'Walls, war and globalization: Editorial for the special issue: globalisation and war'. *Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies,* vol. 2, 2010, pp. 4–10.

[6] Barkawi, 'Connection and constitution', p. 156.

[7] L. Collingham, *The taste of war: World War Two and the battle for food*, Allen Lane, London, 2011.

[8] D. A. Bell, 'This is what happens when historians overuse the idea of the network' in *New Republic*, vol. 25, October 2013, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114709/world-connecting-reviewed-historians-overuse-network-metaphor, [accessed 10 October 2017].

that is significant—that globalization was a process historically bookended by these conflicts and confined to periods of, by comparison, relative 'capitalist peace', until the moment when it sprang forth—rejuvenated—following the thawing of the Cold War. Alternatively, from their reading of *A world connecting*, the mammoth joint-authored effort of which Bell is critical, these same students might adduce, as he puts it, that 'even the World Wars actually did surprisingly little to disrupt the long-term growth of global connections and networking'[9]—that, in effect, the onward forces of globalization carried on regardless despite such cataclysmic disruption.[10] Emily S. Rosenberg, the editor of *A world connecting*, writes in her introduction that: 'Even as World War One temporarily disrupted networks of trade, finance, and personal bonds, it highlighted the world's accelerating connectedness.' Charles S. Maier, another eminent contributor to this volume, posits that those writing global history, while accepting the First World War as a dramatic moment which 'structures . . . our moral narrative', need to 'keep a different tempo and follow long-term processes'. Dirk Hoerder, through his discussion of migration, is the only contributing author to specifically identify the two world wars as distinct motors of globalization. Yet, he spends less than a dozen pages (which include maps) examining this topic, in a book that stretches to over 1,100 pages.[11]

In contrast, the articles presented here eschew the argument that the world wars 'did surprisingly little to disrupt the long-term growth of global connections and networking'. Rather, they uphold the twentieth century's two major global conflicts as unprecedented points of historical rupture and critical junctures in the history of the region's social, political, and economic transformation. They also appreciate that just as one might write a history of global wartime

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[9] Ibid. See furthermore, E. Rosenberg (ed.), *A world connecting, 1870–1945*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2012.

[10] Recent research has seen more focus on wartime globalization during the First World War in parts of the globe less directly affected by the battles, especially works which have looked at the globalization of radical anticolonial networks. See M. Ramnath, *Haj to utopia: how the Ghadar movement chartered global radicalism and attempted to overthrow the British empire*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2011; T. Harper, 'Singapore, 1915, and the birth of the Asian underground'. *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 47, no. 6, 2013, pp. 1782–1811; H. Streets-Salter, 'The local was global: the Singapore Mutiny of 1915'. *Journal of World History*, vol. 24, no. 3, 2013, pp. 539–576.

[11] Rosenberg, 'Introduction', pp. 12–13, C. S. Maier, 'Leviathan 2.0: inventing modern statehood', pp. 40–41, and Dirk Hoerder, 'Migrations and belongings', pp. 554–561, 568–572, in *A World Connecting*, Rosenberg (ed.).

convergences and connections, an equally valid enterprise would be to write the history of global wartime disruptions and displacements, as the historian Sandra Barkhof and literature specialist Angel K. Smith have recently done. Both these authors depict the twentieth century's world wars as having unleashed worldwide processes of disconnection and alienation, as soldiers and civilians were forcibly dispersed to places far away from home and nation.[12]

What our contributors instead seek to provide is a more nuanced appreciation of the historical ruptures generated by global conflict, through their exploration of the distinctive forms of transnational convergence and connection which sprang from a specific wartime context. Each article, in its own way, explores the border-crossing traffic of people, information, ideologies, aid, and even political performance, for which the war in Asia of 1937–1945 was directly responsible—notwithstanding the chaos it wrought. Together, these articles expand on the arguments made by Tarak Barkawi who, in his study of the mobilization and transportation of the British Indian Army, and of the United States Army's more recent campaigns in Vietnam and Iraq, has sought to depict the way in which war 'constituted' new global connections.[13]

But this Forum also raises the question of whether such wartime connections—which typically developed rapidly, and were more-often-than-not fragile, punctuated, and temporary—can be adequately conceptualized through the current language of globalization still in vogue. When writing histories of globalization, scholars typically resort to notions of webs, flows, circuits, and circulations which assume some degree of permanence through the longer term social, economic, and political processes which produce them. As Maier in *A world connecting* seems to assume, globalization is a process which possesses a 'different tempo' and so demands that the historian adopt a long-term historical lens that looks beyond major points of historical rupture.

Yet in the violent and haphazard context of global war, when population movements were sudden, frequently one way and coerced, when the 'flow' of knowledge might have been censored, and vital networks of information abruptly cut, is such a perspective either useful or appropriate? Do we instead need to identify the emergence of a more intense, frenetic, and unstructured globalization during

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[12] S. Barkhof and A. K. Smith, *War and displacement in the twentieth century: global conflicts*, Routledge, London, 2014, See, in particular, the introduction, pp. 1–18.
[13] Barkawi, 'Connection and constitution'.

118 wartime, as the points at either end of the lines of communication
119 shifted from location to location, in frantic manoeuvres designed to
120 re-establish essential routes of supply? The articles in this Forum, it is
121 hoped, make some case for answering this question in the affirmative.

122 ## A global history of the war in Asia: framing the regional

123 Why focus specifically on Asia during the Second World War? The
124 three articles in this Forum examine a region and a period where it
125 might fairly be observed that much has already been done to highlight
126 border-crossing connections, without this research having explicitly
127 defined itself as part of a wider history of the globalization effort.
128 Chris Bayly and Tim Harper's pivotal two-volume history of the war
129 in British Asia and its aftermath purports, from its opening chapter,
130 to trace the connections that ran along what they have termed the
131 'great crescent' linking India with Burma, Malaya, and Singapore.
132 Especially in their first instalment, which chronicles the 'forgotten
133 armies' that moved across this arena, they provide the first attempt at
134 a coherent transnational account of the interconnected experience of
135 the Second World War across these territories.[14] Our understanding of
136 the massive regional movements of Asian civilians during this conflict
137 owes much to the research of historians such as Sunil Amrith, who
138 has addressed Indian migration between Southeast and South Asia,
139 and Paul Kratoska, who has edited an important volume on labour
140 migration within Japan's wartime empire.[15] Tracing another form
141 of wartime mobility, Ernest Koh has recovered the engagement of
142 overseas Chinese of Singapore with China during the Second Sino-
143 Japanese War, which culminated in their contributions—of funds,
144 machinery, and personnel—to the 'Burma Road' from Lashio to Kun-
145 ming, a new supply line intended to relieve China's nationalist forces.[16]
146   Nonetheless, in their willingness to surmount the boundaries by
147 which other works abide, these works remain striking exceptions.

[14] C. A. Bayly and T. Harper, *Forgotten armies: the fall of British Asia, 1941–1945*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2006.

[15] S. Amrith, *Migration and diaspora in modern Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011; P. H. Kratoska, *Asian labour in the wartime Japanese empire: unknown histories*, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2005.

[16] E. Koh, *Diaspora at war: the Chinese of Singapore between empire and nation, 1937–1945*, Brill, Leiden, 2013. See also C. Twomey and E. Koh (eds), *The Pacific War: aftermaths, remembrance and culture*, Routledge, Abingdon, 2015.

Undoubtedly, major studies of the Second World War in Asia have now begun at last to 'globalize' the study of a subject long defined by its pervasive Eurocentricism.[17] In the process, these works have raised historiographical questions about the conflict's origins and its temporal identity. For the most part, however, they still take the nation-state as their principal framework of analysis, or, if they venture beyond it, adopt a lens circumscribed by the boundaries of modern area studies.[18] The effect has been to drive a conceptual wedge through the northern, southern, and eastern parts of war-torn Asia, which the conflict itself did not necessarily generate, and which ignores the historical experience of wartime globalization which spilled across these imaginary divides.

This limitation is especially evident in the body of literature devoted to Japan's wartime Asian empire. For some decades, historians have regarded Japan's Southeast and Northeast Asian colonial territories as discrete and distinct spheres, in an apparent reinforcement of the earlier administrative logic of Tokyo's imperial officials. Duus, Myer, and Peattie's *Japan's wartime empire, 1931–45* has at least moved things forward from the original volume in the series, which 'set aside' Southeast Asia as a separate imperial arena that was deserving of study in its own right. Yet this latest offering still conforms to an area studies structure even as it strives to provide a broader historical coverage. Japan's *Nanyo* annexations are examined in a separate section, which follows one devoted to Japan's Northeast Asian empire, with the result that the possibility for new understandings about the integrated and interrelated history of these administrative units is nullified.[19] Other studies likewise underline a degree of Southeast Asian exceptionalism in the history of the Japanese empire, at the

[17] H. Liebau et al. (eds), *The world in world wars: experiences, perceptions and perspectives from Africa and Asia*, Brill, Leiden, 2010.

[18] For China, see, for example, R. Mitter, *China's war with Japan, 1937–1945: the struggle for survival*, Penguin, London, 2013; D. Lary, *The Chinese people at war: human suffering and social transformation, 1937–1945*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010; S. R. MacKinnon, D. Lary and E. F. Vogel (eds), *China at war: regions of China, 1937–1945*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007; D. Lary and S. R. MacKinnon (eds), *Scars of war: the impact of warfare on modern China*, UBC Press, Vancouver, 2001. Even superior works, such as MacKinnon's on wartime Wuhan, include only the briefest of analyses of the transnational links and significance of the city. See S. R. MacKinnon, *Wuhan, 1938: war, refugees, and the making of modern China*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2008.

[19] R. H. Myers and M. R. Peattie, *The Japanese colonial empire, 1895–1945*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984. See, in particular, the Preface, p. 9, on the editors' decision to 'set aside' Southeast Asia. P. Duus et al., *The Japanese wartime empire,*

expense of a discussion of the connections which embedded it within a common imperial edifice.[20] One notable exception is Kratoska's aforementioned edited volume on wartime labour. Another is Michael Baskett's study of transnational film culture in an imperial Japan that had become mobilized for war. This latter work paves the way for future efforts by arguing for the creation of a 'mass audience linked together by filmic discourses' in which film representations and their circulation became official tools of Japan's 'pan-Asianism' project.[21]

Of course, writing a history of wartime globalization in Asia is no simple task. Basic challenges of scale, expertise, and language proficiency readily explain the geographical frames that have been applied in existing historical enquiries. Moving beyond these frames demands a familiarity with an often overwhelming collection of distinctive political, social, and economic contexts. It frequently requires the integration of a degree of interdisciplinary and specialist area knowledge that is only achievable through scholarly collaboration. By the same token, it is hardly a given that every form of border-crossing wartime connection necessitates us dispensing with existing geographical units of historical enquiry. Kenneth J. Ruoff's enlightening examination of Japanese wartime tourism to Manchukuo and China during the 1937–1945 conflict is a case in point. It reveals that war heritage did not wait for peace to become a powerful source of inter-regional exchange; rather, the Japanese state consciously promoted such tourism to foster a popular and physical engagement of its subjects with their imperial patrimony. Although similar tours to Southeast Asian parts of the empire may well have also developed had the war in the Pacific not turned against the Japanese from late 1942, the scope of Ruoff's study is determined by the reality that the passage of the conflict did not take this turn.[22]

1931–45, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010; K. Hack and T. Rettig (eds), *Colonial armies in Southeast Asia*, Routledge, London, 2006.

[20] K. Goto, *Tensions of empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the colonial and postcolonial world*, Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio, 2003. Literary wartime circulations brought about by the 1937–1945 conflict are considered in K. L. Thornber, *Empire of texts in motion: Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese transculturations of Japanese literature*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2003. She, however, places her focus on East Asia alone.

[21] M. Baskett, *The attractive empire: transnational film culture in imperial Japan*, Hawai'i University Press, Honolulu, 2008.

[22] K. Ruoff, 'Japanese tourism to Mukden, Nanjing and Qufu, 1938–1943'. *Japanese Review*, vol. 27, 2014, pp. 171–200.

206 The historiographical problems arise when these frames of
207 reference become confining conceptual compartments, which limit
208 our understanding of wartime forces and mechanisms. If any event in
209 the history of Asia brought home the reality that life (and death) in one
210 part of the region had become linked to places elsewhere and far away,
211 then the war of 1937–1945 was undoubtedly it. For historians to avoid
212 the study of the global interconnections which this conflict produced,
213 because they lure the nation-state or the area studies specialists
214 among them over the border into an alien country, means losing
215 sight of those key transnational actors, those (often newly formed)
216 supranational contexts, and those intense border-crossing movements
217 and interdependencies which arose from the war and determined the
218 way it unfolded. A narrower historical lens might ensure that the story
219 remains clear and focused. It will still only hint at the myriad ways
220 in which the same story's protagonists fought, imagined, experienced,
221 and determined the outcome of this conflict beyond the geographical
222 boundaries that it so readily altered or obliterated.

223 Having said this, this Forum does not intend to make a sacrificial
224 offering of the local, the national or 'the area' at the altar of the pan-
225 Asian and the global. It is hardly our intention to inspire historians to
226 ditch their conceptual baggage and their robes of specialist expertise,
227 so that they can run headlong and unencumbered after wartime
228 connections which take them ever further away from the place where
229 they started. The global frame employed here is not one that aspires
230 to provide global coverage. Rather, we take as our starting point the
231 study of globalization as involving the investigation of transnational
232 phenomena that manifest themselves in 'the movement of people,
233 goods, and knowledge beyond the boundaries of collectives, as defined
234 by their political or ethnic affiliation'.[23] We furthermore seek to make
235 the (one might say obvious) case that wartime processes that had an
236 impact in Asia were 'constructed in [this very] movement between
237 places, sites, and regions'.[24]

238 Most importantly, this Forum attempts to provide a rooted
239 understanding of border-crossing wartime connections in which a
240 global perspective is drawn upon to better inform our understanding

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[23] This follows Osterhammel's conceptualization of transnational history. For the German original, see J. Osterhammel, 'Globalgeschichte', in *Geschichte: ein Grundkurs*, H.-J. Goertz (ed.), 3rd rev. ed., Rowohlt, Reinbek, 2007, p. 596.

[24] I. Hofmeyr in C. A. Bayly et al., 'AHR conversation: on transnational history'. *American Historical Review*, vol. 111, no. 5, 2006, p. 1444.

241 of place, whether that place be the 'area' of area studies approaches,
242 or the nation, or the smaller locality. Cities, too, although our
243 contributors do not discuss them directly, provide fine examples of
244 the impact of frenetic wartime globalization, as indicated by the rapid
245 transformation of China's nationalist capitals of Wuhan and then
246 Chongqing. The British writer Christopher Isherwood, who in the
247 company of the poet W. H. Auden visited Wuhan in 1938, remarked
248 that the city was 'the real capital of wartime China', a place the
249 two men would rather be 'than anywhere else on earth'. In his diary,
250 Isherwood wrote of the 'consulates, warehouses, offices, and banks;
251 British and American drug stores, cinemas, churches, clubs'. He also
252 noted that:

253 there is a good lending library, a Y.M.C.A [Young Men's Christian
254 Association], a red-light street of cafes—Mary's, the Navy Bar, the Last
255 Chance … All kinds of people live in this town—Chiang Kai-shek, Agnes
256 Smedley, Chou Enlai; generals, ambassadors, journalists, foreign naval
257 officers, soldiers of fortune, airmen, missionaries, spies. Hidden here are
258 all the clues which would enable an expert, if he could only find them, to
259 predict the events of the next fifty years.[25]

260 Wuhan, as a cosmopolitan metropolis that had developed quickly
261 (so Isherwood comprehended it) into a centre of global history,
262 inevitably also became the focus of international media attention.
263 Foreign correspondents and documentary film-makers flocked to the
264 city to record its defence. Robert Capa, 'Mr *Life* magazine' himself,
265 arrived in Wuhan to visually document its resistance efforts, having
266 just covered the Spanish Civil War.[26] The sudden internationalization
267 of wartime Wuhan in turn impacted on the patriotic activism of those
268 who congregated there. On 8 March 1938, International Women's
269 Day, female Chinese activists in Wuhan twinned the sacrificial role
270 played by Spanish women in their patriotic defence of the besieged
271 city of Madrid with their own brave efforts. The activist Shi Liang,
272 for example, passionately called upon her female compatriots to
273 match the actions of their political sisters thousands of miles away
274 in Europe.[27]

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[25] Isherwood quoted in MacKinnon, *Wuhan, 1938*, pp. 97–98.
[26] See Capa's work in *Life,* 16 May and 17 October 1938. Capa photographed the city between March and September 1938. For the full range of these photographs, see the online archive maintained by Magnum Photos, the studio which Capa co-founded: http://www.magnumphotos.com, [accessed 10 October 2017].
[27] L. Shi, 'Jinnian samba jinianzhong de teshu renwu' ['The special task for this year's 8 March ceremony], *Xinhua Daily*, 8 March 1938.

Especially following Wuhan's fall, Chongqing, the capital of Chiang Kai-shek's retreating government, likewise became a suddenly globalized metropolis, transforming, as Li Danke has observed, 'from a regional centre to an internationally known wartime capital'.[28] Connected with the outside world through newly added airlines and international telephone services, as well as through the strategically pivotal Dianmian Road—the overland route through Yunnan to Burma which enabled the Allies to continue supplying Chiang's Guomindang forces—the city emerged as the communications hub of Free China.[29]

The contributions

To capture wartime globalization in Asia, the three articles collected here adopt what might be considered a decidedly non-macro approach. Each is grounded in the study of a single incident, a single life story or group of connected life stories: the Indian war correspondent who travelled along the 'great crescent' from India down to Java; the Indian medical mission to war-torn China; the Italian fascist propaganda mission to Japan and its newly acquired East Asian territories. In each of these studies, a global frame means taking the wartime history of the modern-day Asian nation-state out of itself—whether that nation be (in our case) India, China or Japan—in order to then return it to itself, with what is hoped is an enhanced understanding of the way wartime convergences and connections impacted upon it.

In 'The transnational mission of an Indian war correspondent: P. R. S. Mani in Southeast Asia, 1944–1946', Heather Goodall (with additional material from Mark R. Frost) provides an insider's view of the border-crossing experiences of Indian troops in British service as they were mobilized and then deployed in Manipur, Burma, and Indonesia. By juxtaposing the official dispatches, private diary entries, and later recollections produced by Captain P. R. S. Mani, a British Indian Army Public Relations officer, this article reveals

[28] Li Danke, *Echoes of Chongqing: women in wartime China*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 2010, pp. 12–14.

[29] Ibid.

how the production of wartime propaganda and the establishment of transnational wartime communications became open to nationalist subversion and appropriation. Mani embarked on his transnational journey with a mission to move Indian servicemen from the margins of the British public relations machine to the centre. He also used his position as a producer of official military information to further his own patriotic agenda, secretly establishing contact with fellow Indian nationalist in the diaspora, not to mention (eventually) with fellow anti-colonial Asian freedom fighters. After the war, Mani recorded the striking dilemmas with which he and his fellow Indian soldiers were faced as they became the military enforcers of British interests overseas, while they simultaneously received news of the anti-colonial movement in their homeland. Goodall chooses the costly Battle of Surabaya in late 1945 to poignantly illustrate this. Her analysis shows how the under-researched movement of information through Asian wartime journalism impacted on the political landscape of the region, shaping the way its non-European participants viewed their involvement in the conflict in increasingly pan-Asian terms.

That transnational associations and connections were not merely severed with the outbreak of all-out war in China, but strengthened and realigned in manifold ways, is illustrated by Maria Framke's article '"We must send a gift worthy of India and the Congress!" War and political humanitarianism in late colonial South Asia'. It examines the Indian medical mission sent by the Indian National Congress (INC) to China in 1938 in support of the Nationalist government. Framke delineates how the organization of this mission gave expression to a new climate of national protest and growing internationalism in India. By dispatching it, the INC joined in a global effort that protested against Japanese aggressions. The Congress also drew upon certain pan-Asian ideas that had long circulated in India and had developed in exchange with pan-Asian thinkers situated throughout the region. Furthermore, Framke stresses that the mission also enabled the INC to appear as if it was performing on an international stage as an independent government of India, unbound by British rule. She therefore argues that the INC used this transnational humanitarian mission as a political tool in its arsenal of instruments for anti-colonial emancipation. Like Goodall, Framke ultimately shows how the forces of wartime globalization—which brought Indian doctors to China—meant that India's freedom struggle played out on an international stage.

The third and final article in this Forum, Daniel Hedinger's 'The spectacle of global fascism: The Italian Blackshirt mission to Japan's

347 Asian empire' bridges the Asian and European theatres of war.
348 Hedinger draws on the Japanese wartime media that followed and
349 reported on the Italian 'Missione del Partito Nazionale Fascista',
350 which, in the spring of 1938, journeyed through the Japanese
351 empire, visiting China, Korea, Manchukuo, and Japan itself. Not
352 only, in Japanese hands, did the Mission's voyage become a pan-
353 Asian propaganda trip which emphasized Japan's alleged success in
354 uniting Asia, it contributed to a reassessment of Japan in Italy as
355 a 'modern' and powerful international player and the reversal of
356 a racialized discourse that had previously denounced Japan's East
357 Asian expansionism. Importantly, Hedinger shows that this new way
358 of conducting diplomacy through cultural means generated a much
359 stronger popular consciousness of the Axis alliance in Japan than
360 is often postulated. On the one hand, the Italian Missione enabled
361 Japanese publicists to globalize their public's conception of the war
362 in China. Simultaneously, this visit allowed the Japanese media to
363 localize the Tokyo-Rome-Berlin alliance as something tangible and
364 visceral at a domestic level, giving it a recognizably pan-Asian face.
365 Hedinger concludes that late-1930s Axis diplomacy and ideology can
366 be viewed neither in isolation nor understood by simply scrutinizing
367 local-level fascist activities. It is only through a global lens that the
368 powerful transnational forces that were at play during the war in Asia
369 reveal themselves.

The legacies of wartime globalization?

371 Collectively, the contributions in this Forum show that the 1937–
372 1945 war in Asia drove up the fever curve of a type of globalization
373 which brought into play new border-crossing connections, just as it
374 destroyed and disrupted others. These articles, although they focus
375 on different locales across Asia, help us better understand the critical
376 role of war in the intensified transnational movement of information,
377 of ideologies, and of people. Yet, we may still ask what exactly were
378 the long-term historical impacts of these sudden, often febrile, and
379 frequently impermanent, global wartime movements?
380   As the articles in this Forum begin to show, the answer to this
381 question is complex and far from uniform. In the case of India, the
382 wartime convergences and connections that connected Indian patriots
383 with other Asian freedom fighters in Malaya and especially Indonesia
384 generated a sense of pan-Asian solidarity that reached its climax with

385 India's independence in 1947, an event celebrated by anti-colonial
386 nationalists across the region. The Bandung Conference in Indonesia
387 in 1955, which Prime Minister Nehru attended, might be cited
388 as evidence that such solidarity survived decolonization. However,
389 the partition of India and the emergence of Pakistan impacted on
390 India's relationship with Indonesia, diluting the sense of transnational
391 sympathy and solidarity that the Second World War had made possible.

392 Meanwhile, Sino-Indian exchanges, which had experienced a new
393 lease of life through wartime humanitarian links, cooled with the
394 increasing ideological rifts that began to divide the region as the Cold
395 War progressed, and eventually hit freezing point with the Chinese-
396 Indian border war of 1962. Nevertheless, some lingering Sino-Indian
397 legacies of wartime globalization were still evident after this. Today,
398 the participants in the Indian medical mission of 1938 continue to
399 be evoked by China's communist leaders today as the epitome of
400 exemplary Sino-Indian ties.[30]

401 In other cases, the transnational mobility which the war generated
402 came to a swift and grinding halt soon after hostilities formally
403 ceased. China's suddenly globalized cities of Wuhan and Chongqing
404 became, along with the rest of the country, effectively sealed off from
405 most of the world by the Revolution of 1949, which followed the
406 recommencement in 1946 of the country's civil war. Post-war Japan,
407 under official American occupation until 1952, also experienced a
408 period of what we might term rapid 'de-globalization'. Japanese
409 expatriates were expelled from its former East Asian empire and
410 flocked back to the homeland in their millions. Movements into and
411 out of the country were closely controlled until as late as 1964, when
412 the Tokyo Olympics of that year signalled (for many contemporaries)
413 Japan's return to the international community.

414 Finally, if we take a step back, and at last adopt a macro-perspective,
415 we find that the ways in which the war in Asia enabled and stimulated
416 rapid forms of globalization was contingent on the direction in which
417 far-off other parts of the world were simultaneously moving. The
418 way in which the Second World War unfolded in the region, and
419 the global connections it generated, were heavily determined by
420 the arrival, the retreat, the return, and then the final departure of

[30] Press Trust of India, 'Xi Jinping keeps tradition alive, meets family of Dr Dwarkanath Kotnis', *The Indian Express*, 19 September 2014, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/xi-jinping-keeps-tradition-alive-meets-family-of-dr-dwarkanath-kotnis, [accessed 10 October 2017].

421 extra-Asian armed forces. When London and Washington decided
422 that these foreign armies should decamp and depart, whole systems of
423 global transportation and communication, along with entire networks
424 of supply went with them. So too, typically, did the newspapers, radio
425 stations, and war correspondents that had sustained the information
426 flows binding this region of the world to others.

427 This reality—that the end of global conflict could generate its own
428 *post-global* moment—reminds us once more of the temporal limits of
429 the globalizing processes that originated within it, or were accelerated
430 by it. Indeed, by rooting certain transnational convergences and
431 connections in conflicted times, we become as much aware of their
432 erratic and short-lived peculiarities as of their lasting legacies.
433 However, these comparatively short lifespans do not make wartime
434 globalization a less important subject for historical study. Rather,
435 it is hoped that the articles in this Forum show the long overdue
436 recognition that this phenomenon demands within the broader study
437 of global and transnational history, not only for Asia but also beyond
438 it.