Appendices:

When States Crack Down on Human Rights Defenders

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Appendix A: Summary statistics

Table A1: Summary statistics, sample size based on model 1B

	N	Mean	Stand. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Number of restrictions	2734	1,28	3,38	0,00	9,00
PTS	2734	2,57	1,20	1,00	5,00
Latent human rights abuses score	2593	-0,44	1,45	-3,95	2,70
ICCPR	2734	0,91	0,28	0,00	1,00
CAT	2734	0,79	0,16	0,00	1,00
ICC	2210	0,50	0,50	0,00	1,00
Executive constraints	2734	4,94	2,04	1,00	7,00
Youth bulge	2734	1,83	3,09	9,75	25,88
Judicial independence	2734	0,60	0,29	0,00	1,00
Protest events (lag 1 year)	2734	0,73	0,90	0,00	4,09
Conflict year	2734	0,16	0,37	0,00	1,00
GDP (stand.)	2734	-0,09	0,99	-0,23	2,02
Population (stand.)	2734	0,00	0,86	-0,27	9,60

Appendix B: Inter-coder reliability: Agreement between two coders in stratified random sample (N=186)

Table B1: Inter-coder reliability scores

Variable	Sample size	Rate of agreement
Government responsiveness to human rights defenders	186	80.11%
All human rights defenders banned	186	97.31%
Some human rights defenders banned	186	93.01%
Activities restricted	186	94.62%
Restricted access to government facilities	186	92.47%
Restricted freedom of movement	186	95.16%
Restricted access to foreign funding	186	98.39%
Restricted access to domestic funding	186	95.70%
Difficulties in obtaining visa	186	94.09%
Visa denied for human rights defenders	186	96.24%
Problems registering as organization	186	94.62%
Government censoring publications	186	93.01%
Human rights defenders face harassment	186	85.48%
Human rights defenders arrested	186	92.47%
Surveillance of human rights defenders	186	88.17%
Killing of human rights defenders	186	98.39%
Co-optation of human rights defenders	186	95.16%
Allies of human rights defenders (OPEN QUESTION)	186	53.76%
Any shortcomings of national human rights institutions	186	83.33%
Government influence over national human rights institutions	186	79.03%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: NGO	186	77.96%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: INGO	186	77.42%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: NHRI	186	85.48%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: IGO	186	82.80%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: TU	186	82.80%
Status of restricted human rights defenders: CSO	186	82.80%

Appendix C: Cox proportional hazard models

Table C1: Cox proportional hazard models estimating the likelihood of ratifying a human rights or humanitarian law treaty conditional on current and past restrictions

	ICCPR		CAT	
VARIABLES	Model C1	Model C2	Model C3	Model C4
Restrictions	0.946	0.787*	0.957	0.907+
	(0.051)	(0.091)	(0.039)	(0.050)
Restr. (lag 1 year)	1.273	1.685	0.868	0.870
	(0.487)	(0.837)	(0.261)	(0.447)
Protest events	0.874	0.428+	1.401*	1.766**
	(0.193)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.372)
Executive constraints	1.303*	1.779*	0.999	0.947
	(0.167)	(0.452)	(0.072)	(0.101)
Youth bulges	4.315	12.404	0.037*	0.003**
	(11.097)	(60.205)	(0.053)	(0.006)
Judicial independence	0.725	0.936	0.760	0.597*
	(0.172)	(0.291)	(0.142)	(0.129)
Conflict year	0.590	0.287+	0.612	0.670
	(0.319)	(0.207)	(0.283)	(0.333)
GDP (stand.)	0.853	0.529	0.879	1.275
	(0.248)	(0.305)	(0.160)	(0.378)
Population (stand.)	0.879	0.893	0.823	0.827
	(0.117)	(0.175)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Observations	375	196	728	434
AIC	167	65.56	418.6	165.9
Log Likelihood	-74.52	-23.78	-200.3	-73.97

Notes: Robust seeform in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Coefficients smaller than 1 mean a lower risk of ratification. Models C2 and C4 are estimated for countries that score 3 or higher on the Political Terror Scale.

Appendix D: Estimation in restricted sample after 2000

Table D1. Negative binomial model of restrictions testing ICCPR ratification, 2001-2014

VARIABLES	Model D1	Model D2	Model D3	Model D4
PTS	0.043	-0.115		
	(0.088)	(0.139)		
ICCPR	-0.315	-1.022*	-0.062	-0.294
	(0.297)	(0.457)	(0.170)	(0.211)
ICCPR * PTS	0.096	0.284*		
	(0.091)	(0.144)		
Latent human rights abuses score			0.719**	0.154
			(0.137)	(0.181)
ICCPR * Latent abuses			0.026	0.522**
			(0.143)	(0.182)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.073*		0.041
		(0.032)		(0.035)
Executive constraints		-0.106**		-0.080*
		(0.031)		(0.034)
Youth bulge		1.863**		1.541*
		(0.550)		(0.608)
Independent judiciary		-0.522**		-0.490**
		(0.080)		(0.082)
Conflict year		0.143		0.023
		(0.094)		(0.103)
GDP (stand.)		0.102		0.260*
		(0.102)		(0.105)
Population (stand.)		0.259**		0.145*
		(0.055)		(0.059)
Constant	0.198	-4.841**	0.394*	-4.097*
	(0.290)	(1.664)	(0.173)	(1.795)
Observations	2,157	1,920	2,042	1,782
Deviance	2516	1389	1714	1118

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table D2. Negative binomial model of restrictions testing CAT ratification, 2001-2014

VARIABLES	Model D5	Model D6	Model D7	Model D8
PTS	0.107**	-0.066		
	(0.037)	(0.096)		
CAT	-1.845**	-0.877*	0.026	-0.145
	(0.182)	(0.354)	(0.062)	(0.156)
PTS * CAT	0.554**	0.263*		
	(0.046)	(0.103)		
Latent human rights abuses score			0.188**	0.175
			(0.033)	(0.128)
Latent abuses * CAT			0.034	0.550**
			(0.037)	(0.135)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.071*		0.037
		(0.032)		(0.036)
Executive constraints		-0.121**		-0.103**
		(0.031)		(0.034)
Youth bulge		1.855**		1.558*
		(0.551)		(0.615)
Independent judiciary		-0.513**		-0.479**
		(0.080)		(0.082)
Conflict year		0.169+		0.058
		(0.095)		(0.105)
GDP (stand.)		0.132		0.318**
		(0.101)		(0.105)
Population (stand.)		0.265**		0.167**
		(0.055)		(0.059)
Constant	-1.326**	-4.958**	-0.612**	-4.142*
	(0.146)	(1.651)	(0.061)	(1.814)
Observations	2,872	1,920	2,042	1,782
Deviance	3934	1377	1927	1111

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Appendix E: Negative binomial models pooled and with random effects

Table E1: Negative binomial model with cluster-robust standard errors

	Model E1	Model E2	Model E3	Model E4
PTS	0.095		0.089	
	(0.144)		(0.093)	
ICCPR	-1.160*	-0.234		
	(0.482)	(0.156)		
PTS * ICCPR	0.320*			
	(0.149)			
Latent human rights abuses score		0.184		0.178
		(0.156)		(0.111)
Latent abuses * ICCPR		0.364*		
		(0.160)		
CAT			-1.019**	0.067
			(0.387)	(0.135)
PTS * CAT			0.372**	
			(0.105)	
Latent abuses * CAT				0.420**
				(0.116)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.092+	0.045	0.072	0.023
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Executive constraints	-0.171**	-0.143**	-0.201**	-0.174**
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Independent judiciary	-0.397**	-0.394**	-0.375**	-0.374**
	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.075)	(0.079)
Youth bulge	1.797**	1.663**	1.870**	1.775**
	(0.528)	(0.575)	(0.518)	(0.558)
Conflict year	0.183	0.051	0.211	0.086
	(0.160)	(0.168)	(0.151)	(0.162)
GDP (stand.)	0.287**	0.328**	0.317**	0.364**
	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Population (stand.)	0.213**	0.180**	0.250**	0.221**
	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.049)
Constant	-4.898**	-4.251*	-5.158**	-4.641**
	(1.629)	(1.659)	(1.584)	(1.656)
Observations	2,732	2,596	2,732	2,596
Log Likelihood	-3488	-3250	-3473	-3229

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table E2: Country-specific random effects negative binomial model

	Model E5	Model E6	Model E7	Model E8
PTS	-0.030		0.011	
	(0.075)		(0.052)	
ICCPR	-0.478+	-0.027		
	(0.258)	(0.099)		
PTS * ICCPR	0.158*			
	(0.078)			
Latent human rights abuses score		0.003		0.005
		(0.104)		(0.072)
Latent abuses * ICCPR		0.162		
		(0.103)		
CAT			-0.120	0.271**
			(0.207)	(0.090)
PTS * CAT			0.134*	
			(0.058)	
Latent abuses * CAT				0.241**
				(0.075)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.061*	0.056*	0.055*	0.048+
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Executive constraints	-0.041*	-0.039+	-0.063**	-0.061**
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Independent judiciary	-0.302**	-0.298**	-0.311**	-0.320**
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Youth bulge	1.802**	2.247**	1.850**	2.303**
	(0.289)	(0.321)	(0.289)	(0.319)
Conflict year	-0.041	-0.035	-0.050	-0.069
	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.066)
GDP (stand.)	0.452**	0.451**	0.392**	0.410**
	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.093)	(0.095)
Population (stand.)	0.251**	0.255**	0.250**	0.244**
	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.088)	(0.087)
Constant	-4.911**	-4.296*	-4.279**	-3.655*
	(1.630)	(1.674)	(1.513)	(1.705)
Observations	2,736	2,600	2,736	2,600
Log Likelihood	-3491	-3254	-3445	-3221

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Appendix F: Combined indicator for ratification of any treaty and count of treaties

Table F1. Negative binomial model of restrictions, testing the effect of the combined treaty measures

	Binary treaty measure		Count of treaties	
VARIABLES	Model F1	Model F2	Model F3	Model F4
PTS	-0.045		-0.045	
	(0.039)		(0.032)	
Any treaty ratified	-0.619**	-0.074		
	(0.138)	(0.066)		
PTS * Any treaty	0.198**			
	(0.041)			
Latent human rights abuses score		0.050		-0.029
		(0.058)		(0.041)
Latent abuses * Any treaty		0.156**		
		(0.058)		
Count of treaties			-0.217**	-0.010
			(0.067)	(0.032)
PTS * Count of treaties			0.088**	
			(0.018)	
Latent abuses * Count of treaties				0.125**
				(0.026)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.008	0.023**	0.031**	0.014
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Executive constraints	-0.056**	-0.026**	-0.056**	-0.040**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Independent judiciary	-0.128**	-0.125**	-0.092**	-0.099**
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Youth bulge	0.531**	0.729**	1.056**	0.708**
	(0.144)	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.185)
Conflict year	0.031*	-0.075**	0.027	-0.033
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.024)
GDP (stand.)	0.094**	0.093**	0.077**	0.120**
	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.032)
Population (stand.)	0.061**	0.060**	0.075**	0.079**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Constant	-2.003**	-2.782**	-3.599**	-2.644**
	(0.447)	(0.459)	(0.491)	(0.551)
Observations	2,730	2,593	2,730	2,593
Deviance	2152	1980	2149	1936

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Appendix G: Model for the V-dem scale of government-sponsored repression of civil society

Table G1. Ordinal logit model on the V-Dem ordinal measure of repression of civil society

	Model G1	Model G2	Model G3	Model G4
PTS	0.019		0.022	
	0.019		0.022	
Latent human rights abuses	(0.027)		(0.021)	
	-0.141	-0.096		
ICCPR	(0.110)	(0.072)		
	0.020			
PTS * ICCPR	(0.030)			
		0.148+		0.252**
Latent abuses * ICCPR		(0.081)		(0.057)
		0.174*		
CAT		(0.077)		
			-0.104	-0.043
PTS * CAT			(0.085)	(0.051)
			0.020	
Latent abuses * CAT			(0.024)	
				0.057
Protest events (lag 1 year)				(0.050)
	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004
Executive constraints	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
	-0.028**	-0.017	-0.028**	-0.015
Independent judiciary	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
	-0.485**	-0.476**	-0.486**	-0.464**
Youth bulge	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.041)
	0.717*	0.730*	0.709*	0.726*
Conflict year	(0.322)	(0.356)	(0.322)	(0.353)
	0.017	-0.007	0.018	-0.008
GDP (stand.)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.028)
	-0.094	0.022	-0.090	0.025
Population (stand.)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.084)
	0.048	0.000	0.050	-0.005
Constant	-3.765**	-3.730**	-3.782**	-3.753**
	(0.943)	(1.039)	(0.939)	(1.032)
Observations	2,922	2,781	2,922	2,781
Deviance	3030	2643	3052	2741

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Appendix H: Testing the effect of ICC membership

Beyond human rights treaties, the Rome Statute that sets up the ICC—and gives the court jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes occurring since July 1, 2002, and allows the ICC prosecutor to initiate investigations—imposes costs on individual leaders of states that commit severe human rights violations. Indeed, research shows that not only a guilty verdict but also investigations by the ICC impose reputational costs on governments with their domestic and international audiences and have a deterrent effect on human rights violations (Appel 2016).[1] As with human rights treaties, civil society plays a crucial monitoring and reporting role, exposing the responsibility of leaders for human rights violations and providing evidence in ICC investigations: "[l]ocal and international human rights NGOs will also arrive quickly [after atrocities occur] with the aim of establishing what happened and documenting the violations. [...] Human rights NGOs are likely to broadly share the goals of the ICC to combat impunity for gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law" (Human Rights First/Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 2004, 3). While some governments may sincerely ratify the Rome Statute and intend to use the ICC to credibly signal—both to the opposition and the broader public—their willingness to respect the human rights of political rivals (Simmons and Danner 2010), closer scrutiny provides little empirical support for this argument (Chapman and Chaudoin 2013). If not all states are sincere ratifiers of the ICC, it is also plausible that non-sincerely ratifying governments seek to circumvent investigations by the ICC by interfering with the monitoring of civil society organizations. For example, the Kenyan government leaders Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto launched a smear campaign against civil society organizations

[1] Appel (2016, 9-10) examines the Rome Statute's deterrent effect and argues: "Potential perpetrators can suffer international costs across all stages of ICC's involvement. The logic here is similar to work that focuses on how international actors and organizations can engage in naming/shaming and other forms of international coercion." Beyond the reputational effect, he points to third party sanctioning and the impact in reducing "the benefits accrued from international cooperation (i.e., foreign direct investment, military assistance, etc.)." See also Cronin-Furman 2013.

collaborating with the ICC prosecutor, with Ruto stating: "NGOs should stop interfering with government matters, writing letters to their donors abroad to support the ICC intervention and compiling reports about post-election violence. It is none of their business" (HRW 2013, par. 12 in Wood 2016, 536). That is, governments that continue to commit severe human rights violation and have ratified the Rome Statute may have an incentive to impose restrictions on civil society organizations and silence those that could give testimony at the ICC.

We indeed find support for the claim that state leaders tend to impose more restrictions on civil society groups when they commit physical integrity rights violations and are a party to the Rome Statute. The analyses for the conditional effect of ICC membership excludes states that currently experience armed conflict (242 country-year observations). In war-torn states, ratifying governments may expect to escape international criticism for human rights abuses because they can either blame them on insurgents or frame them as necessary anti-insurgency measures. As such, we expect that war-torn ICC-ratifying states are less likely to cover up their abuses by imposing restrictions on civil society.[2] If we include war-torn states (or sincere ratifiers) in the sample, the results are less strong but still in line with our argument (see analyses below). In Table H1, the interaction terms between ICC membership and our measures for physical integrity rights violations—the PTS and Fariss's latent human rights abuses scores—have positive and significant coefficients across all models. Figure H1, based on Model H2, reveals that, all else equal, states that ratify the Rome Statute use fewer restrictions against civil society organizations unless they commit severe physical integrity rights violations (score 4 or 5 on the PTS). As is the case with the human rights treaties, restrictions increase with physical integrity rights violations if the government has ratified the Rome Statute. For states that are not members of the ICC,

[2] Simmons and Danner (2010) suggest that war-torn non-democracies seek to credibly signal their sincere intent to improve human rights and to persuade the armed opposition to lay down their weapons. This possibility—though empirically less plausible (see Chapman and Chaudoin 2013)—may also dampen the effect of ICC ratification on restrictions against civil society among ICC-ratifying states.

physical integrity rights violations do not significantly increase or decrease the predicted number of restrictions. As Figure H2 illustrates, the marginal effect of the PTS is only significant and positive for ICC member states. Figure H3 shows that ratification of the Rome Statute decreases restrictions on civil society organizations for states that are unlikely to kill and torture their citizens. Yet, and in line with our argument, the ratification of the Rome Statute by states that frequently resort to the use of killing and torture—that is, states that have something to hide—tends to increase the number of restrictions.

Figure H1. Predicted number of restrictions (ICC)



Figure H2. Marginal effect of PTS



Figure H3. Marginal effect of ICC



Table H1. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society, testing the impact of Rome Statute ratification that created the ICC, 2002-2014

	PTS		**Fariss**	
VARIABLES	Model H1	Model H2	Model H3	Model H4
PTS	0.031*	0.081		
	(0.016)	(0.069)		
ICC member	-0.936**	-1.588**	-0.525**	-0.820**
	(0.129)	(0.316)	(0.065)	(0.137)
PTS * ICC	0.125**	0.226*		
	(0.036)	(0.096)		
Latent human rights abuses score			0.116**	0.347**
			(0.020)	(0.101)
Latent abuses * ICC			0.254**	0.412**
			(0.044)	(0.127)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.058		0.018
		(0.039)		(0.040)
Independent judiciary		-0.460**		-0.431**
		(0.079)		(0.083)
Executive constraints		-0.105**		-0.073*
		(0.034)		(0.036)
Youth bulge		1.265*		1.155+
		(0.545)		(0.624)
Conflict year		0.136		0.011
		(0.110)		(0.116)
GDP (stand.)		0.059		0.200+
		(0.098)		(0.106)
Population (stand.)		0.193**		0.124*
		(0.052)		(0.057)
Constant	-0.484**	-3.400*	-0.414**	-2.834
	(0.057)	(1.606)	(0.028)	(1.829)
Observations	2,078	1,788	1,945	1,650
Deviance	1834	1121	1500	953.4

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

In Table H2, we present the results for the analyses with the sample that includes war-torn states. The predicted count of restrictions still significantly increases restrictions in states that commit sincere human rights abuses (see Figure H4 and H5). This finding supports our argument. However, as shown in Figure H6, the marginal effect of ICC membership is now significantly negative for both human rights-abiding states (PTS low) and human rights-abusing states (PTS high). Although, the "protection" effect of the ICC for civil society

organizations is still much smaller (only half the size) in human rights-abusing regimes. This trend again supports our argument.

Table H2. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society, testing the impact of Rome Statute ratification that created the ICC, 2002-2014, including states in armed conflict

	PTS		**Fariss**	
VARIABLES	Model H1	Model H2	Model H3	Model H4
PTS	0.065**	0.016		
	(0.023)	(0.022)		
ICC member	-2.477**	-1.280**	-0.530**	-0.324**
	(0.197)	(0.164)	(0.069)	(0.077)
PTS * ICC	0.598**	0.304**		
	(0.048)	(0.038)		
Latent human rights abuses score			0.155**	0.167**
			(0.030)	(0.041)
Latent abuses * ICC			0.272**	0.296**
			(0.049)	(0.055)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.007		-0.010
		(0.012)		(0.010)
Independent judiciary		-0.043**		-0.205**
		(0.016)		(0.022)
Executive constraints		-0.094**		-0.041**
		(0.013)		(0.013)
Youth bulge		-0.025		0.338+
		(0.220)		(0.188)
Conflict year		--		--
GDP (stand.)		-0.027		0.001
		(0.038)		(0.037)
Population (stand.)		0.031**		0.015
		(0.009)		(0.011)
Constant	-0.606**	-0.180	-0.406**	-1.613**
	(0.075)	(0.644)	(0.031)	(0.571)
Observations	1,772	1,537	1,636	1,417
Deviance	1458	1037	1257	896.8

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Figure H4. Predicted number of restrictions (ICC)



Figure H5. Marginal effect of PTS



Figure H6. Marginal effect of ICC



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CHAPMAN, TERRENCE L., and STEPHEN CHAUDOIN. 2013. Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court. *International Studies Quarterly* 57 (2): 400–409.

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SIMMONS, BETH. A., and ALLISON DANNER. 2010. Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court. *International Organization* 64 (2): 225–256.

Appendix J: Comparison between our data, V-Dem and CIRI






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Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)
Burundi
Cambodia (Kampuchea)
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem
CIRI
Our data


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Congo
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Costa Rica
Ivory Coast
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Djibouti
Dominican Republic
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El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Guinea
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Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Indonesia
Iran (Persia)
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Kenya
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Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Laos
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2008 2010 2012 2014
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia (Former Yugoslavia)
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
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Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2008 2009 2010
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Malaysia
Maldives
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Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2008 2009 2010
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Nepal
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Nicaragua
Niger
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Norway
Oman
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Paraguay
Peru
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Rumania
Russia (Soviet Union)
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Singapore
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
South Sudan
Spain
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Sudan
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2011 2012 2013 2014
V-Dem CIRI Our data


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Swaziland
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Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
V-Dem CIRI Our data


Timor-Leste
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam, Republic of
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
V-Dem
CIRI
Our data

Appendix K: Analyses include states where civil society is officially banned

Table K1. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society including states where civil society is officially banned

VARIABLES	Model K1	Model K2	Model K3	Model K4
PTS	-0.006		-0.011	
	(0.015)		(0.015)	
ICCPR	-0.205**	-0.175**		
	(0.063)	(0.032)		
PTS * ICCPR	0.044*			
	(0.018)			
Latent human rights abuses score		-0.001		0.014
		(0.028)		(0.026)
Latent abuses * ICCPR		0.092**		
		(0.028)		
CAT			-0.617**	-0.065*
			(0.067)	(0.033)
PTS * CAT			0.184**	
			(0.018)	
Latent abuses * CAT				0.114**
				(0.029)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.003	0.000	-0.006	-0.026**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Executive constraints	-0.048**	-0.052**	-0.081**	-0.046**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Youth bulge	0.351*	0.502**	0.372**	0.489**
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.068)	(0.121)
Independent judiciary	-0.081**	-0.062**	-0.089**	-0.070**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Conflict year	0.009	-0.010	0.012	0.012
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.019)
GDP (stand.)	0.060*	0.066**	0.105**	0.101**
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.024)
Population (stand.)	0.034**	0.028**	0.045**	0.051**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Constant	-1.369**	-1.708**	-1.372**	-1.793**
	(0.411)	(0.414)	(0.214)	(0.362)
Observations	2,924	2,782	2,924	2,782
Deviance	2852	2500	2737	2608

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Appendix L: Endogenous treatment models for ICCPR and CAT

Table L1. Endogenous treatment model for ICCPR ratification, 1994-2014

VARIABLES	Model L1: PTS			Model L2: Fariss		
	Selection: ICCPR ratified or not	Outcome restrictions: among ratifiers	Outcome restrictions: Among Non-ratifiers	Selection: ICCPR ratified or not	Outcome restrictions: among ratifiers	Outcome restrictions: Among Non-ratifiers
PTS	0.242***	0.421***	0.053			
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.184)			
Latent abuses score				0.162***	0.566***	0.386**
				(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.174)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	-0.002	0.047	-0.262*	-0.015	-0.008	-0.294**
	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.135)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.143)
Executive constraints	0.235***	-0.114***	-0.287**	0.225***	-0.097***	-0.229
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.124)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.148)
Youth bulge	-0.219	0.965***	0.754	-0.223	0.705**	0.967
	(0.289)	(0.254)	(1.028)	(0.298)	(0.277)	(1.015)
Independent judiciary	-0.055	-0.705***	-0.420**	-0.054	-0.667***	-0.399**
	(0.044)	(0.069)	(0.172)	(0.044)	(0.070)	(0.170)
Conflict year	-0.242**	0.068	0.204	-0.156	-0.061	-0.115
	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.344)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.338)
GDP (stand.)	-0.245***	0.109**	0.455***	-0.256***	0.157***	0.534***
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.146)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.159)
Population (stand.)	-0.300***	0.933***	1.043***	-0.299***	0.741***	0.697*
	(0.030)	(0.132)	(0.394)	(0.031)	(0.143)	(0.406)
IO memberships	0.031***			0.032***		
	(0.003)			(0.003)		
Constant	0.242***	0.421***	0.053	-0.815	-1.825**	-0.736
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.184)	(0.902)	(0.810)	(3.004)
Rho	0.486***		-0.060	0.431***		0.178
	(0.161)		(0.527)	(0.167)		(0.576)
Observations	2,904			2,763		

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table L2. Endogenous treatment model for CAT ratification, 1994-2014

VARIABLES	**Model L3: PTS**			**Model L4: Fariss**		
	Selection: CAT ratified or not	Outcome restrictions: among ratifiers	Outcome restrictions: Among Non-ratifiers	Selection: CAT ratified or not	Outcome restrictions: among ratifiers	Outcome restrictions: Among Non-ratifiers
PTS	0.043	0.431***	0.149*			
	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.079)			
Latent abuses score				-0.072*	0.600***	0.289***
				(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.090)
Protest events (lag 1 year)	0.102***	0.034	-0.077	0.111***	-0.035	-0.095
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.091)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.093)
Executive constraints	0.156***	-0.146***	-0.309***	0.135***	-0.115***	-0.319***
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.068)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.059)
Youth bulge	-2.412***	0.859***	0.440	-2.299***	0.562*	0.368
	(0.280)	(0.276)	(1.013)	(0.286)	(0.296)	(0.972)
Independent judiciary	-0.220***	-0.814***	-0.380***	-0.223***	-0.787***	-0.316**
	(0.040)	(0.076)	(0.127)	(0.041)	(0.079)	(0.128)
Conflict year	-0.158*	0.179	-0.126	-0.032	0.024	-0.277
	(0.087)	(0.115)	(0.215)	(0.091)	(0.121)	(0.213)
GDP (stand.)	-0.066	0.190***	0.375***	-0.098**	0.247***	0.413***
	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.092)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.095)
Population (stand.)	-0.164***	0.763***	1.187***	-0.148***	0.516***	1.027***
	(0.024)	(0.135)	(0.313)	(0.024)	(0.146)	(0.325)
IO memberships	0.026***			0.027***		
	(0.003)			(0.003)		
Constant	5.387***	-3.487***	0.067	5.122***	-1.345	0.813
	(0.820)	(0.763)	(3.050)	(0.849)	(0.841)	(3.002)
Rho	0.244		0.067	0.270*		0.021
	(0.154)		(0.402)	(0.158)		(0.384)
Observations	2,904			2,763		

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Figure L1: Effects: PTS * ICCPR



Figure L2: Effects: Fariss * ICCPR



Figure L3: Effects: PTS * CAT



Figure L4: Effects: Fariss * CAT



Appendix M: Lag of abuses and treaty measures

We propose that governments may use pre-emptive restrictions on civil society organizations in order to hide prospective abuses. Therefore, we measure abuses and restrictions contemporaneously. We also propose that government may use restrictions in order to cover up abuses that have already occurred. This possibility is tested in the analyses below. We find that lagged measures of human rights abuses (PTS and Fariss's latent human rights abuses scores) and lagged measures of treaty ratification, all else equal, predict restrictions. Yet, there is one exception. The interaction between CAT ratification and PTS is still positive but no longer significant at conventional levels. In comparison to contemporaneous measures used in the main analysis, the effects sizes of abuses and treaty ratification on restrictions are not significantly different. Overall, we conclude that governments tend to use both pre-emptive and retrospective measures to silence the monitoring civil society activists.

Table M1. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society, using one year lags of PTS and ICCPR ratification

VARIABLES	**PTS**		**Fariss**	
	Model M1A	Model M1B	Model M2A	Model M2B
PTS (lag 1 year)	0.103+	-0.052+		
	(0.053)	(0.030)		
ICCPR (lag 1 year)	-0.020	-0.309**	-0.054	-0.073
	(0.194)	(0.104)	(0.051)	(0.049)
PTS (lag 1 year) * ICCPR (lag 1 year)	-0.005	0.109**		
	(0.057)	(0.032)		
Latent abuses scores (lag 1 year)			0.172**	0.077+
			(0.039)	(0.047)
Latent abuses (lag 1 yr) * ICCPR (lag 1 yr)			0.027	0.141**
			(0.041)	(0.047)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.033**		0.045**
		(0.009)		(0.008)
Executive constraints		-0.026*		-0.032**
		(0.010)		(0.009)
Youth bulge		0.792**		0.704**
		(0.192)		(0.167)
Independent judiciary		-0.123**		-0.136**
		(0.014)		(0.012)
Conflict year		0.026		-0.041*
		(0.020)		(0.018)
GDP (stand.)		0.045		0.096**
		(0.034)		(0.030)
Population (stand.)		0.057**		0.067**
		(0.009)		(0.006)
Constant	-0.166	-2.900**	-0.613**	-2.766**
	(0.192)	(0.574)	(0.051)	(0.492)
Observations	2,998	2,730	3,143	2,593
Deviance	3378	2301	2941	1982

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.

Table M2. Negative binomial model of restrictions against civil society, using one year lags of PTS and CAT ratification

VARIABLES	PTS		Fariss	
	Model M3A	Model M3B	Model M4A	Model M4B
PTS (lag 1 year)	0.121**	0.051		
	(0.042)	(0.065)		
CAT (lag 1 year)	0.107	-0.108	0.112	0.164
	(0.162)	(0.252)	(0.102)	(0.123)
PTS (lag 1 year) * CAT (lag 1 year)	-0.025	0.105		
	(0.048)	(0.074)		
Latent abuses scores (lag 1 year)			0.637**	0.315**
			(0.085)	(0.110)
Latent abuses (lag 1 yr) * ICCPR (lag 1 yr)			0.024	0.269*
			(0.093)	(0.117)
Protest events (lag 1 year)		0.067*		0.041
		(0.029)		(0.031)
Executive constraints		-0.113**		-0.103**
		(0.028)		(0.030)
Youth bulge		1.866**		1.747**
		(0.530)		(0.571)
Independent judiciary		-0.491**		-0.471**
		(0.072)		(0.073)
Conflict year		0.142+		0.052
		(0.082)		(0.090)
GDP (stand.)		0.095		0.249**
		(0.092)		(0.094)
Population (stand.)		0.346**		0.252**
		(0.062)		(0.065)
Constant	-0.254	-5.715**	0.029	-5.135**
	(0.159)	(1.569)	(0.104)	(1.678)
Observations	2,870	2,553	2,831	2,480
Deviance	3239	1830	2321	1572

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1.