

The Testimony of Space: Sites of Memory and Violence in Peru's Internal Armed Conflict



By Daniel Willis

UCL Institute of the Americas

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I, Daniel Willis, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Abstract

This thesis seeks to contribute to knowledge on Peru's internal armed conflict (1980-2000), in which the insurgent group Shining Path attempted to destroy and replace the existing Peruvian state, by analysing the key themes of violence, culture and memory through the lens of space. By deploying this spatial analysis, the thesis demonstrates that insurgent and state violence were shaped by the politics and production of space, that cultural responses to the conflict have articulated spatialised understandings of violence and the Peruvian nation, and that commemorative sites exist within a broader geography of memory (or commemorative "city-text") which can support or challenge memory narratives in unintended ways.

Whereas previous literature on the Peruvian conflict, by Carlos Iván Degregori, Nelson Manrique and Peru's *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación*, has emphasised the fundamentalist nature of Shining Path's Maoist ideology, this thesis highlights the ways in which party militants interpreted this ideology in their own way and adapted it to local realities. I also argue that counterinsurgent violence was premised upon a spatialised understanding of Peruvian society which conflated indigeneity with Leftist radicalism. Using a broadly Foucauldian framework, I argue that the state created spaces of exception in order to eliminate political and biopolitical enemies.

In approaching cultural responses to the conflict, I use the work of Butler on grievability to argue that the perceived non-grievability of insurgents and indigenous communities has been produced by the vast (and to some extent imagined) cultural distances which exist between Peru's disparate communities. I also tie these issues of grievability to post-conflict memory practice, arguing that commemorative sites have not only been shaped by spatialised understanding of the conflict and by two distinct memory narratives in Peru, but also by the politics and production of urban space in which each of these sites has been created.

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List of abbreviations

AFADDEVIG:	Asociación de Familiares de Presos Políticos, Desaparecidos y Víctimas de Genocidio
ANFASEP:	Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú
APRA:	Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
APRODEH:	Asociación pro Derechos Humanos
CGTP:	Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú
CIDH:	Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos
CPHEP:	Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú
CVR:	Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación
DINCOTE:	Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo
ELN:	Ejército de Liberación Nacional
GEIN:	Grupo Especial de Inteligencia del Perú
INPE:	Instituto Nacional Penitenciario
IU:	Izquierda Unida
LUM:	Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusión Social
MHVRE:	Monumento en Honor a la Verdad para la Reconciliación y la Esperanza
MIR:	Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario
MOVADEF:	Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales
MRTA:	Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru
PCP:	Partido Comunista del Perú
PCP-SL:	Partido Comunista del Perú – Sendero Luminoso
SIN:	Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional del Perú
<i>Sinchi:</i>	Agent of the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional del Perú

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The Testimony of Space: Sites of Memory and Violence in Peru's Internal Armed Conflict

The *Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusión Social* (LUM), inaugurated in Lima in December 2015, can be viewed as the archetypal space of memory. As a memory museum whose creation was recommended by the *Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (CVR), the site acts as a space in which the history of Peru's internal armed conflict (1980-2000) is exhibited, in which memory practice and truth-telling are made possible, and which aims to act as a contact zone for Peru's diverse communities for the purposes of ongoing reconciliation. Yet a reading of the museum's spatiality also reveals (perhaps unintended) characteristics and consequences of the project.

For example, the museum exhibits representations of the geographies of violence perpetrated during the conflict, with references to violence conducted in Lima, in the Andean highlands, and in the Amazonian jungle. In this way, LUM replicates nineteenth century depictions of Peruvian geography which constructed knowledge about national space from the perspective of the capital, dividing the country into *la costa* (the coast), *la sierra* (the highlands), and *la selva* (the jungle).¹ Moreover, LUM exists within its own spatial context; simultaneously located in a middle-class region of Lima largely protected from the violence, and within view of the island El Frontón (one of the sites of the infamous 1986 prison massacres). In these ways, whilst a spatial analysis of the museum demonstrates how space has been used as a mechanism for memory and reconciliation, this reading also points to contradictions and inconsistencies between LUM's stated goals and its spatiality.

¹ Benjamin Orlove, 'Putting Race in Its Place: Order in Colonial and Postcolonial Peruvian Geography', *Social Research*, 60:2 (1993), pp.301-336 (p.325).

An appreciation of the importance of emplacement, locale, national geography, and the production and representation of space has, I believe, the potential to significantly contribute to understandings of the internal conflict. This includes an understanding of the many ways in which space can produce political violence, how space shapes the aftermath of violence in culture, and how individual commemorative sites exist also in a broader landscape of memory.

Almost twenty-five years on from the capture and imprisonment of Abimael Guzmán, and nearly fifteen years since the publication of the CVR's *Informe Final*, the legacies of the Shining Path insurgency which engulfed Peru in the last two decades of the twentieth century remains an unresolved issue for many communities, while for others it is an episode of history best consigned to the past. However, whilst literature on the conflict over the past thirty years has utilised a wide range of theoretical and methodological approaches from many different academic fields, little attention has been paid to the spatiality of the conflict. This oversight ought to be rectified, not only because the internal armed conflict can be better understood through a spatial approach, but because representations of geography have contributed significantly to ideas about what constitutes Peru as a modern nation. For this reason, this dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the current literature from which a rigorously spatial approach to Peru's internal conflict, and its afterlife, is missing.

Early studies by North American scholars (commonly referred to as "Senderologists") such as Cynthia McClintock and David Palmer interpreted the conflict as a peasant-led rebellion in the context of subsistence crises and the failure of governmental reforms in Ayacucho.² Partly in reaction to this early literature, a second historiographical phase, heavily influenced by the work of Carlos Iván Degregori,

² Cynthia McClintock, 'Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso', *World Politics*, 37 (1984); David Scott Palmer, 'Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso', *Comparative Politics*, 18:2 (1986), pp.127-46.

emphasised the role of “provincial *mestizos* with a higher-than-average education” in Shining Path’s ranks, and used Shining Path’s “all-powerful” Maoist ideology as a primary explanatory factor for its “astonishing violence”.³ The response of the Peruvian state to Shining Path violence, including the role played by peasants in the defeat of the insurgents, also came under greater focus before the publication of the *Informe Final*.⁴

The publication of the CVR’s report in 2003 is in this sense a pivotal moment in which a particular interpretation of the conflict, criticising both insurgent and state violence, has become to some degree institutionalised (while still being heavily contested by some).⁵ To a large extent, the CVR’s arguments agree broadly with the emphasis of Degregori (also a member of the Comisión) and others on Shining Path ideology and the key role of the peasantry in resisting the insurgents. Important studies since 2003 have focused on issues of cultural responses to violence, memory narratives of the conflict, and a range of localised case studies which add further complexity to the existing literature.⁶ Yet despite these significant contributions, this literature continues to lack a cohesive explanation of how the conflict was indelibly shaped by spatial processes, an explanation which would highlight underlying similarities between diverse case studies and demonstrate how geographically differentiated experiences of violence have produced distinct artistic responses and memory narratives in the aftermath of the conflict. In particular, it remains to be understood how both the Shining Path insurgency and the Peruvian state’s counterinsurgency operation were processes

³ Carlos Iván Degregori, *How Difficult it is to be God: Shining Path’s Politics of War in Peru, 1980-1999* (London, 2012), pp.159-71.

⁴ Carlos Iván Degregori, ‘Harvesting Storms: Peasant *Rondas* and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso’ in (Steve J. Stern ed.), *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995* (London, 1998), pp.128-157.

⁵ Established in 2001 by Peru’s transitional government, after the downfall of Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian regime, the CVR was charged with producing a report into the human rights abuses perpetrated by insurgents and state agents during the internal armed conflict. Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, *Informe Final* (Lima, 2003).

⁶ Jo-Marie Burt, *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: Silencing Civil Society* (Basingstoke, 2007); Víctor Vich, *Poéticas del duelo: Ensayos sobre arte, memoria y violencia política en el Perú* (Lima, 2015); Cynthia Milton (ed.), *Art from a Fractured Past: Memory and Truth Telling in Post-Shining Path Peru* (Durham, 2014); Jaymie Heilman, *Before the Shining Path: Politics in Rural Ayacucho, 1895-1980* (Stanford, 2010); Ponciano del Pino, *En nombre del gobierno: El Perú y Uchuraccay: un siglo de política campesina* (Lima, 2017); Miguel La Serna, *The Corner of the Living: Ayacucho on the Eve of the Shining Path Insurgency* (Chapel Hill, 2012); Theidon, Kimberley. *Intimate Enemies: Violence and Reconciliation in Peru* (Philadelphia, 2012).

constructed through the local politics of space, the actions of diverse social agents, and discourses about geography and the Peruvian nation.

Geography and space have rarely been absent in these interpretations of Peru's conflict, yet they are rarely explicit in this literature either. For example, the *Informe Final* highlights a geographical dimension to the violence, stating that 40% of the victims of violence came from Ayacucho with another 45% coming from five other departments (Huancavelica, San Martín, Huánuco, Junín and Apurímac), but the report explains this as a result of the socioeconomic status rather than as a product of geography.⁷ Similarly, studies of Andean communities by McClintock and Isbell have been criticised, by Orin Starn and Poole and Renique, for having omitted concepts of space from their analysis and of treating the region as temporally and historically separate from the rest of Peru.⁸ In both of these cases, space has been presented by McClintock and Isbell only as the location in which events occurred, rather than a defining element of the narrative. Conversely, when geographical approaches have been deployed, such as Puente's argument that Shining Path violence was shaped by the "intersection of drought and increasingly militarized sociopolitical conflict", they have often focused on peasant participation in the conflict, and not the spatiality of the counterinsurgency operation or post-conflict memory practice.⁹

In part, then, my aim is to reassess the existing history of the Peruvian conflict through the lens of space, to make explicit that which is currently implicit (or deliberately hidden), and to give answers as to why space has remained silent in historical narratives of the conflict for so long. Beyond this, however, my aim is also to

⁷ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. VIII, p.316.

⁸ Orin Starn, 'Missing the Revolution: Anthropologists and the War in Peru', *Cultural Anthropology*, 6:1 (1991), pp.63-91; Deborah Poole and Gerardo Renique, 'The New Chroniclers of Peru: US Scholars and Their 'Shining Path' of Peasant Rebellion', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 10:2 (1991), pp.133-191.

⁹ Javier Puente, 'Making Peru's Sendero Luminoso: The Mega Niño of 1982-1983', *Age of Revolutions*

[<https://ageofrevolutions.com/2017/03/29/making-perus-sendero-luminoso-the-geography-ecology-of-civil-war/>, accessed 19 July 2017].

argue the positive case for how a spatial analysis of the conflict can contribute knowledge, and create new lines of enquiry, for understanding violence, culture and memory in Peru over the last forty years and beyond.

My research will focus on a spatial analysis of the internal armed conflict in three ways. Firstly, I will examine the ways in which violence was produced by spatial contexts, locally regionally and nationally, and assess how particular forms of violence reconstituted spatial structures of state power and governance. Secondly, I will approach how the spatiality of this violence has been understood culturally, and what this means for intersecting categories of class and race which are themselves constituted by space. Finally, I will address memories of the internal conflict, highlight where these have been produced, and assess the significance of geography's role in memory practices. I will also pay particular attention to how the perspectives and memories of key participants in the conflict, including peasant communities and *Senderistas*, have to some extent been rendered invisible by homogenising narratives about violence constructed from a singular geographical perspective.

Contribution(s) to knowledge

The two dominant and competing interpretations of Peru's internal armed conflict can be loosely understood as the heroic military narrative and the human rights narrative which has been promoted by organisations such as the *Asociación pro Derechos Humanos* (APRODEH) and, arguably, the CVR.¹⁰ The military narrative positions the armed forces as defenders of the Peruvian nation against the threat of terrorism. Emphasising the need to protect national security, representatives of the military and

¹⁰ There are, however, tensions within each of these broad narratives, particularly between supporters of the former President Alberto Fujimori and members of the armed forces and police. Although each broadly subscribes to this state-military narrative, they assign different levels of importance to the role of Fujimori, the armed forces and the police in defeating insurgent groups.

state have represented human rights abuses committed by state agents as excesses and errors, but not as a systematic practice. By contrast, the human rights narrative argues that state practices of violence were indeed systematic and excessive, but were nonetheless a response to the armed struggle launched by Shining Path in 1980. It is worth pointing out that Shining Path also have their own heroic narratives of the *guerra popular* but, as will be discussed, these memories of the conflict have not received sufficient attention or been fully understood, neither by scholars nor in Peruvian society.

The positioning of these two dominant narratives, which sees “the immediate and fundamental cause of the unleashing of the internal armed conflict [to be] PCP-SL’s decision to start the armed struggle against the Peruvian State”, is, however, problematic.¹¹ For instance, both narratives accept the manner in which Shining Path leaders positioned themselves as instigators of the conflict, and as a political entity which was separate from previous radical movements in Ayacucho and across the Andes. As discussed in Chapter 1, however, many of Shining Path’s rank-and-file interpreted the group within the context of local politics and previous radical movements. Furthermore, Rénique has argued that these previous movements constituted a tradition of radicalism in Ayacucho during the decades preceding the internal conflict.¹² For this reason, it is essential that the conflict is interpreted alongside ongoing power struggles and radical movements from the 1950s onwards, in which different radical groups came to prominence at different times. My interpretation of Peru’s conflict, therefore, sees the roots of the violence of the 1980s in the unresolved conflicts of earlier decades, which I interpret as being deeply tied to the local politics and production of space.

¹¹ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VIII*, p.317.

¹² José Luis Rénique, *Incendiar la pradera: un ensayo sobre la revolución en el Perú* (Lima, 2015).

Furthermore, the Peruvian state's response to this new iteration of an *ayacuchano* radical tradition was not simply defensive, but an assertion of state power after the 1969 Agrarian Reform had loosened the grip on local politics held by *gamonales*.¹³ This use of state violence, I believe, was supported by a racialized cultural framework which positioned Andean communities as dangerously radical, anti-modern, and backwards.¹⁴ In particular, this framework rests upon an imagined geography which understands power, wealth and modernity in Peru to be located on the coast (specifically in Lima) and poverty, violence and indigeneity in the Andean (and to some extent the Amazonian) regions of the country's interior. Importantly, this imagined cultural geography had severe consequences for how the counterinsurgency operation was conducted, acting as the foundation for a very real geography of differentiated modes of governance in which forms of sovereign and governmental power were exercised in a spatially-contingent manner (the operation in the *sierra* and *selva* representing the violent exercise of sovereignty).¹⁵

In the years during and since the conflict, memories of the mobilisations of peasant communities (both in co-operation with and against Shining Path) have challenged representations of the indigenous population as passive, vulnerable and helpless. However, in other ways this cultural geography has been strengthened in forms of cultural production and memory which have conflated Peru's interior with violence and radicalism. Because of this, memories of the conflict have been used to both justify and challenge the further cultural and political exclusion of indigenous communities.

¹³ *Gamonal* is a term used to refer to local powerholders in Andean regions who, prior to the Agrarian Reform, acted as representatives of the Peruvian state and oligarchy in a semi-formal or informal capacity.

¹⁴ Examples of this cultural framework will be discussed throughout this thesis, but a particularly pertinent example of this type of representation of the Andes can be seen in the anthropological report produced by the Vargas Llosa Commission into the murder of eight journalists in Uchuraccay in 1983. Juan Ossio and Fernando Fuenzalida, 'Informe antropológico: la comunidad de Uchuraccay y la región iquichana' in (Mario Vargas Llosa, Mario Castro Arenas and Abraham Guzum Figueroa eds.), *Informe de la Comisión Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay* (Lima, 1983), pp.53-77.

¹⁵ See below section on "Spatial practice" for discussion of Foucault's formulation of sovereign and governmental power.

I therefore see my contributions to knowledge as being focused around the three key themes of violence, culture and memory, each of which are viewed through the lens of space. Specifically, I will demonstrate that:

- i) The conflict reflected a battle between competing projects of statecraft, articulated by Shining Path and by the Peruvian state and armed forces, which were rooted in the local politics and production of space in Andean and Amazonian regions, the relationship between Peru's capital and provinces, and the nation's historical socio-spatial structure.
- ii) Cultural production in response to the conflict is implicitly spatial and premised upon racialised cultural ideas about geography. The imaginative construction of space is central to the interpretations of violence and forms of memory privileged in each cultural artefact, often revealing the inherent beliefs, assumptions and prejudices of cultural producers.
- iii) Public space and sites of memory in Peru today act as discursive battlegrounds in which competing visions of the Peruvian nation are articulated, and contribute to the construction of a geography of memory across national space. In particular, I believe that the conflict has produced sites of memory which challenge the cultural power and central role of the military in the Peruvian nation (which, as Milton argues, is highly visible in "urban beautification and [the] planning" of public space).¹⁶ However, this should be not as a linear progression from military impunity to accountability, as there are numerous examples of state intervention into sites which are critical of the state's role in the internal armed conflict.

¹⁶ Cynthia Milton, *Conflicted Memory: Military Cultural Interventions and the Human Rights Era in Peru* (Madison, forthcoming 2018), Conclusion, p.4.

Furthermore, many other sites have been established in order to reassert the military's cultural power.

I will also engage with the existing literature on Peru's internal armed conflict along these lines. As highlighted above, this literature has evolved from early depictions of Shining Path as a peasant-led rebellion sparked by subsistence crises to interpretations, developed particularly by Degregori and the CVR, which emphasise the insurgents' Maoist ideology, fundamentalist character and party leadership (drawn primarily from the provincial middle-class) as explanatory factors for Shining Path violence.¹⁷ Whilst the work of Degregori and the CVR are important for my research, I will also engage closely with a more recent body of historical research, by Heilman, Aroni, Del Pino, Rénique and La Serna (among others), which has re-asserted the importance of peasant agency, local conflicts, and histories of radicalism across the Andes, arguing that Shining Path were not a monolithic, homogenous entity as previously depicted.¹⁸ This range of scholarship has aimed to contextualise the conflict historically in terms of previous conflicts, forms of radical mobilisation, and state repression in the Andes, whilst also crucially highlighting the different local circumstances, tensions and histories across the region which shaped both Shining Path and state violence in different ways.

This thesis is also in dialogue with important literature on cultural responses to the internal armed conflict. This literature has been produced from a range of disciplinary approaches (including art history, cultural history, and language studies) and includes key contributions by Cynthia Milton, Víctor Vich and Anne Lambright on the various

¹⁷ Cynthia McClintock, 'Why Peasants Rebel'; Carlos Iván Degregori, *Ayacucho 1969-1979: El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso* (Lima, 1991); Degregori, *How Difficult it is to be God*; CVR, *Informe Final*.

¹⁸ Heilman, *Before the Shining Path*; Renzo Aroni, *De Víctimas y Ciudadanos: Memorias de la Violencia Política en Comunidades de la Cuenca del Río Pampas* (Lima, 2012); del Pino, *En nombre del gobierno*; Luis Rénique, *Incendiar la pradera*; La Serna, *The Corner of the Living*.

memory narratives constructed in Peruvian cinema, literature and visual art.¹⁹ However, whereas these previous studies have highlighted the representation of a number of complex themes in relation to the conflict (including social and racial exclusion, guilt and mental illness, peasant identity, and sexual violence among others), I will focus on the role which space and geography play in the construction of these narratives.

Similarly, there is a growing body of studies relating to transitional justice and post-conflict memory in Peru which has analysed individual sites of memory (such as the Museo de la Memoria in Huamanga), controversies about memory (including the controversy surrounding *El ojo que llora*) and the role of testimony in the construction of memory narratives.²⁰ Significant contributions to this literature have also been made by Milton's research into the post-conflict memories constructed by members of the armed forces and agents of the state, and by Saona who has examined how memories of a traumatic past can be transmitted to post-conflict generations.²¹ Whilst engaging closely with this literature I will seek to emphasise how memory narratives have been supported and contested by the production of space, and argue that these individual sites are inextricable from a deeper geography of memory which represents the interconnections between sites and previous commemorations of bygone eras.

There are also, however, more practical and policy-based outcomes which can be read from this research. McDowell and Braniff, for example, have argued that the "the significance of memory, memorialisation and commemoration and their interconnections with space...often receives insufficient attention not just in the

¹⁹ Milton (ed.), *Art from a Fractured Past*; Vich, *Poéticas del duelo*; Anne Lambricht, *Andean Truths: Transitional Justice, Ethnicity, and Cultural Production in Post-Shining Path Peru* (Liverpool, 2015).

²⁰ Joseph Feldman, 'Exhibiting Conflict: History and Politics at the Museo de la Memoria de ANFASEP in Ayacucho, Peru', *Anthropological Quarterly*, 85:2 (2012), pp.487-518; Paulo Drinot, 'For whom the eye cries: memory, monumentality, and the ontologies of violence in Peru', *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies*, 18:1 (2009), pp.15-32; Cynthia Milton, 'Defacing memory: (un)tying Peru's memory knots', *Memory Studies*, 4:2, (2011), pp.190-205; Francesca Denegri and Alexandra Hibbett (eds.), *Dando Cuenta: Estudios sobre el testimonio de la violencia política en el Perú (1980-2000)* (Lima, 2016).

²¹ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*; Margarita Saona, *Memory Matters in Transitional Peru* (Basingstoke, 2014).

literature but in peace processes themselves”.²² While a large degree of this project works with theoretical understandings of violence, space and memory, my work will also focus heavily on the politics of space and commemorative practice, and how these factors have come to shape (perhaps even weaken) processes of reconciliation and transitional justice in Peru. In particular, I will argue that the spatial logics of some of the commemorative projects analysed later suggest a superficial understanding of the benefits of reconciliation, a failure to deal with ingrained cultural racism in Peru, and attitudes towards truth and reconciliation which appear largely instrumental rather than transformative.

In Chapters 2 and 5 of this thesis, I briefly touch upon the widespread nature of sexual violence and violence against indigenous women in relation to my overall thesis. There are, however, several other avenues down which I could have explored the important relationship between space and gender in Peru. Understanding the construction of gendered identities, and their intersections with race and indigeneity, is crucial to the internal conflict, in part because sexual violence was perpetrated by both Shining Path and MRTA insurgent groups, and by the Peruvian armed forces and police, in a widespread manner.²³ An analysis which viewed gender and sexual violence through the lens of space, perhaps by highlighting the gendered spaces in which such violence took place (e.g. the home, the military base, urban space as a site of violence) could well reveal the political and cultural values which underpinned it and why sexual violence was so widespread.²⁴

²² Sara McDowell and Maire Braniff, *Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes* (Basingstoke, 2014), p.6.

²³ This intersection between gender and indigeneity has been analysed by, among others, Marisol de la Cadena and Jelke Boesten, who has also provided a detailed analysis of sexual violence in Peru during the conflict and in times of peace. Marisol de la Cadena, ‘Las mujeres son más indias: etnicidad y género en una comunidad del Cuzco’, *Revista Isis Internacional*, 16 (1992), pp.25-45; Jelke Boesten, *Intersecting Inequalities: Women and Social Policy in Peru, 1990–2000* (University Park, 2010).

²⁴ For example, Cathy McIlwaine’s research has analysed the impact of globalisation on gender-based violence in the global South. Cathy McIlwaine, ‘Urbanization and gender-based violence: exploring the paradoxes in the global South’, *Environment and Urbanization*, 25:1 (2013), pp.65-79.

It is also important to consider the political agency and gendered cultural of key female participants in the internal conflict, including María Elena Moyano, members of ANFASEP, Elena Iparraguirre and other female Shining Path and MRTA militants. Often, the agency of these figures has been downplayed, their stories have been told through a series of gendered tropes (represented simply as mothers, or helpless victims) of they have been represented in a distinctly negative way because of the way in which they have subverted traditional gender roles (particularly in the case of female insurgents). This thesis will touch on the stories of Moyano, Iparaguirre and ANFASEP in places. However, for the purposes of this project I have decided to focus a more detailed analysis on the relationship between space and race, and therefore have not included a more thorough discussion of the role of gender in Peru's internal armed conflict. Nonetheless, gender is not entirely absent from the following chapters and I hope to return to the ideas discussed above in more detail in my future work.

Formulating a Lefebvrian spatial analysis

Space has undergone a significant exploration as a category of analysis by social scientists, geographers and historians since the 1974 publication of Henri Lefebvre's *La production de l'espace*. Lefebvre's key argument is to highlight that space is both dialectically produced by, and productive of, societies:

“The spatial practice of a society secretes that society's space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it. From the analytic standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space.”²⁵

²⁵ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford, 1991), p.38.

Rather than acting as “nothing more than the locus of social relations”, space, he continues, undergoes a productive process in which it is defined, designed and constructed in accordance with the ideologies of its creator. Space is therefore produced in order to construct a particular type of society.²⁶

Furthermore, Lefebvre argues in favour of a conceptual triad for understanding the production of space which is made up of three distinct elements, around which I will base my spatial analysis in this project:

- i) *Spatial practice* – This refers to the spatial organisation and dynamics of a society which, Lefebvre argues, can be read *backwards* to illuminate the ideologies, assumptions and practices of those in power, and *forwards*, to determine the type of society which they will produce.
- ii) *Representations of space* – Lefebvre continues by arguing that the production of space is closely linked to the production of knowledge and the coded aesthetics of spatial practice. Whilst Lefebvre’s representations of space refer primarily to functional artefacts such as maps, blueprints and urban plans, I have (for reasons outlined below) expanded this factor to incorporate cultural representations of space, particularly the imagined forms of geography present in works of literature, cinema and visual art.
- iii) *Representational spaces (or spaces of representation)* – Spaces of representation are described by Lefebvre as those in which “complex symbolisms” and narratives about society are laid bare. In this sense, spaces of representation can be understood to be spaces which act as intense battlegrounds in which competing projects of nationhood, statecraft and social reproduction take place. For the purposes of this

²⁶ Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p.11.

study, I believe that this category can incorporate the sites of memory produced in response to Peru's internal conflict, as well as to the broader urban landscape which offers a window onto the cultural aesthetics and spatial practice of a given society.²⁷

The conceptual triad outlined above therefore forms the basis of my project and provides the foundation upon which both my theoretical and methodological frameworks are premised. In each chapter, I will approach each of my case studies through the lens of spatial practice, representations of space and spaces of representation in order to decipher the physical, cultural and representational spaces of Peru's internal conflict.

In order to do so, however, I believe that it is necessary to adapt Lefebvre's triad to Peruvian conditions by also incorporating ideas from a range of scholars of political violence, spatial practice and Peruvian society into my theoretical framework.

i) Spatial practice

My analysis of the spatial practice of the Peruvian state will take place within what could broadly be considered a Foucauldian framework. Foucault uses the plague as a real and metaphorical explanation for why states practice forms of spatial exclusion, and attempt to prevent the contagion of populations with diseases of the medical kind, as well as those more political and societal in nature.²⁸ He also makes the distinction between apparently pre-modern societies in which sovereign power is exercised, and thus contagion is prevented through a form of vengeful violence, and modern societies

²⁷ Ibid., p.33.

²⁸ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York, 1997), p.216.

in which disciplinary mechanisms produce obedient populations through pastoral, governmental means without having to resort to this violence.²⁹

Foucault's narrative of a modern transition from sovereignty to governmentality has, however, been challenged as being over simplistic and for representing governmental mechanisms as monolithic and homogenous.³⁰ Agamben, for example, has used the concept of exception to argue that forms of sovereign and governmental power are often deployed simultaneously by states against different populations. Whilst governmental power is preserved for populations considered to have "value", sovereign power is used in order to exclude and punish other individuals and populations who are reduced to "bare life".³¹ Furthermore, whilst the distinctions made by Foucault and Agamben represent sovereignty as an essentially violent form of power (whilst governmentality is presented as being pastoral, disciplinary and technical in nature), I also understand violence in the terms set out by Žižek in his argument about objective (systemic or structural) violence which refers to the "more subtle forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination and exploitation".³² In this sense, mechanisms of power which could be interpreted to be technocratic governmental in nature, such as management of the economy, healthcare and education, can also be seen to have a violent nature and to also function as mechanisms for exclusion. This argument in particular will be expanded upon in Chapter 5 where I argue that forms of neoliberal restructuring, price stabilisation measures, and a government programme of forced sterilisations, represented the exercise of punitive, sovereign power against indigenous communities.

²⁹ Ibid..

³⁰ These criticisms, related to Foucault's work in *Discipline and Punish* and genealogical approach to history, include (but are not limited to) a lack of geographical differentiation or context, overemphasis on clear breaks and a lack of attention to continuities between the periods he establishes, an overemphasis on the significance of how prisons operate in theory as opposed to in practice. For more on criticisms of Foucault, see José Guilherme Merquior, *Foucault (2nd Edn.)* (London, 1991), pp.85-107; Michael Ignatieff, 'State, Civil Society and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent Social Histories of Punishment', *Crime and Justice*, 3 (1981), pp. 153-192.

³¹ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, 1995), p.142.

³² Slavoj Žižek, *Violence: Six Sideway Reflections* (London, 2009), p.10.

Whilst these Foucauldian and Agambenian ideas about power are implicitly spatial, Aihwa Ong has argued explicitly that such practices of governmental and sovereign are not exercised monolithically or homogeneously, but are instead applied in an uneven and geographically contingent manner. Ong's work draws on the work of Castel who argues that the "differential modes of treatment of populations" are exercised in order to make particular regions and populations profitable for global capital and exclude those which are not.³³ Ong builds on this by outlining the concept of graduated sovereignty, a system in which states direct sovereign, disciplinary forms of power against populations in "production zones", whilst forms of governmental, pastoral and "individualising" power are prioritised for populations in other zones, often the economic and ethnic elite of a given state.³⁴ Thus, in the type of states described by Ong which combine an authoritarian political outlook with liberal economic doctrine, elite populations enjoy preferential treatment which, to draw on the work of Mbembe, not only provides them with a privileged economic position but also makes them less vulnerable to state violence and death.³⁵ As will be seen throughout this study, this framework, based primarily on the work of a group of scholars working broadly in a Foucauldian tradition, is immensely useful for understanding Peru's historical socio-spatial structure and for analysing the internal conflict.

The language Ong uses to describe geographically graduated sovereignty and the differential distribution of state practices of power is also significant because it is reminiscent of the language used by Judith Butler to describe her ideas about grievability. Butler argues that:

³³ Robert Castel, 'From Dangerousness to Risk' in (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter M. Miller eds.), *The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality: with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault* (London, 1991), pp.281-98 (p.294).

³⁴ Aihwa Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty* (London, 2006), pp.75-79.

³⁵ Mbembe's argument concerning "necropolitics" states that "the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die", and is also based heavily on the work of Foucault and Agamben regarding sovereignty and biopower. See Achille Mbembe, 'Necropolitics', *Public Culture*, 15:1 (2003), pp.11-40 (p.11).

*“Forms of racism instituted and active at the level of perception tend to produce iconic versions of populations who are eminently grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable. The differential distribution of grievability across populations has implications for why and when we feel politically consequential affective dispositions such as horror, guilt, righteous sadism, loss, and indifference”.*³⁶

From this argument it is possible to deduce two key elements. Firstly that, racist values in society shape differential emotive reactions to violence and can act as an underlying framework for how violence perpetrated against different communities is perceived. Secondly, that if we combine the ideas of Ong and Butler, then the differential distribution in the exercise of governmental and sovereign power by the state can be seen to be supported by an underlying geography of grievability.

Sovereign power, then, is enacted against target populations who are deemed to be non-grievable. Grievable populations are, by contrast, protected from the large degree of state violence enacted through the logic of sovereignty. This argument has direct relevance to the Peruvian case where victims of violence (perpetrated by Shining Path and by state agents) were predominantly from indigenous communities, and where “the tragedy suffered by the populations of rural Peru, the Andean and jungle regions... was neither felt nor taken on as its own by the rest of the country”.³⁷ For these reasons, my arguments about governmental and sovereign power throughout this thesis will be framed with reference to grievability.³⁸

³⁶ Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* (London, 2009), p.24.

³⁷ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VIII*, p.316.

³⁸ Similar theoretical frameworks which utilise the work of Foucault and Butler have been deployed previously to analyse Peruvian social formations in the work of Drinot and Boesten. See Paulo Drinot, ‘The Meaning of Alan García: Sovereignty and Governmentality in Neoliberal Peru’, *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies*, 20:2 (2011), pp.179-95; Paulo Drinot, ‘Foucault in the Land of the Incas: Sovereignty and Governmentality in Neoliberal Peru’ in (Paulo Drinot ed.), *Peru in Theory* (Basingstoke,

ii) Representations of space

Cultural responses to Peru's internal conflict are, necessarily, grounded in representations of the geography in which violence was perpetrated. However, I will argue that how these spaces are culturally represented is never a simple recreation of geographical reality, but a re-imagining of space which draws attention to (and renders invisible) particular regions, constructs and demolishes imagined boundaries, and enlarges or compresses distance. In short, cultural representations of space become a highly ideological activity which reveals the inherent beliefs, assumptions and prejudices of cultural producers.

Firstly, it is important to highlight that Butler's argument concerning the differential distribution of grievability can apply to cultural responses to violence. The case studies, illustrative incidents and emblematic episodes of violence selected by cultural producers (as well as by museographers, scholars and the CVR) reveal the forms of violence which individuals or groups wish to prioritise in their narrative. Throughout my analysis of cultural artefacts, I will highlight the issue of grievability and draw attention to the particular forms, perpetrators and victims of violence which cultural producers have prioritised in their work.

My readings of cultural responses to violence will also deal critically with how geography is represented in relation to narratives of civilisation and modernity, in part influenced by Doreen Massey and Edward Soja who have advocated for greater understanding of the heterogeneity of space.³⁹ To achieve this I will deploy the concept of imagined geographies, first elucidated by Edward Said in his work on Orientalism.

2014), pp.167-89; Jelke Boesten, 'Inequality, Normative Violence, and Livable Life: Judith Butler and Peruvian Reality' in (Paulo Drinot ed.), *Peru in Theory* (Basingstoke, 2014), pp.217-43.

³⁹ Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London, 2005), p.5; Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London, 1989), p.89.

Imaginative geographies produce ideas and narratives about different spaces, in a process which layers meaning onto whole nations and regions, constructing boundaries between civilization on one side and savagery on the other. In effect, imaginative geographies establish a homogenised idea, or construction, of space to mask its true nuances and heterogeneous reality.



Figure 1. A map of Peru, indicating three natural regions.

Fig. 1: Peru's "natural" regions. Orlove, 'Putting Race in its Place', p.319.

Said's work has previously been transplanted into a Peruvian context by Orin Starn who argues that North American anthropologists based in Peru in the 1970s represented a discourse of "Andeanism". Andeanism, Starn argues, is an academic discourse which "dichotomizes between the Occidental, coastal, urban, and *mestizo* and the non-Western, highland, rural, and indigenous; it then essentializes the highland side of the equation".⁴⁰ Poole and Renique have supported this argument, stressing that the pre-

⁴⁰ Starn, 'Missing the Revolution', p.66.

eminence of US scholars in producing knowledge on Peru's internal conflict in the early 1990s is reminiscent of colonial practices in which "truth [about Peru] was produced by outsiders, who bolstered their claims to scientific authority by citing each other's texts and theories".⁴¹ What we can deduce from these arguments is that not only has knowledge about Peru been produced from outside of the country, but also that knowledge about the internal conflict, which took place predominantly in Peru's Andean and Amazonian departments, has been produced in the capital. I believe that it is also possible to see these Andeanising, tendencies in cultural representations of Peru's conflict, and that forms of imaginative geography are ever-present in these representations because they are produced predominantly from outside the spaces which they seek to explain to their audience.

Understanding imagined geographies in relation to Peru is even more important because of pre-existing cultural traditions which have constructed Peruvian geography and racial categories as mutually constitutive. Cecilia Méndez argues that, in the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, "the term Indian came to be intrinsically associated with the *sierra*, and the word *serrano* acquired a marked derogative connotation".⁴² This argument is corroborated by Orlove who suggests that the emergence of scientific geographical discourse in Republican Peru crystallised the idea that not only did the Indians live in the Andes, but that the Andes was the place of the Indians.⁴³ Orlove is here referring to the creation of a spatial discourse which could be used to talk about race. In his own words: "The spatialisation of the Indian became a way to speak safely of race in an era of citizenship: the overt topic could be the integration of the highlands into the nation, while the subtext continued to be Peru's Indian problem".⁴⁴

⁴¹ Poole and Renique, 'The New Chroniclers of Peru', p.174.

⁴² Cecilia Méndez 'De indio a serrano: nociones de raza y geografía en el Perú (siglos XVIII-XXI)', *Histórica* (2011), pp.53-102 (p.53).

⁴³ Orlove, 'Putting Race in Its Place', p.325.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p.328.

Similarly, de la Cadena argues that “encrusted in geography, the cultural construction of race in Peru assumed, and continues to assume, that *serranos* are inferior to *costeños*”. She also identifies a change around 1940 when class replaced race as the primary category for analysis but highlights that, in talking about class, intellectuals continued to talk about race implicitly.⁴⁵ Thus, terms like *serranito* were part of a euphemistic language which openly talked about space in place of race. It should not, however, be assumed that the use of class to talk about race was limited to conservative elements of society. As Drinot highlights, even progressives ultimately saw industrialisation as a way of assimilating the indigenous labour force into the Peruvian state, and in doing so remove the Indian as an obstacle to modernity.⁴⁶

In my analyses of cultural responses to political violence, therefore, I will pay particular attention to how space, race and geography are represented, how they are constructed to facilitate the narrative, and how they are associated with particular characters and violent acts. Through this approach, I will highlight the existence of imaginative geographies, Andeanising tendencies and spatial discourses in responses to Peru’s internal conflict.

iii) Spaces of representation

In formulating an approach to memory and the relation that, as a cultural practice, it holds with space and its production, I have taken into account the work of Nora on *lieux de mémoire* as places where “memory crystallises and secretes itself”.⁴⁷ Nora’s work highlighted a wide range of spaces, symbols and cultural artefacts which act as repositories for historical discourses and symbolisms. Legg, however, has argued that

⁴⁵ Marisol de la Cadena, ‘From Race to Class: Insurgent Intellectuals *de provincial* in Peru, 1910-1970’ in (Steve J. Stern ed.), *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995* (London, 1998), pp.22-59 (p.23-4).

⁴⁶ Paulo Drinot, *The Allure of Labour: Workers, Race, and the Making of the Peruvian State* (London, 2011), p.49.

⁴⁷ Pierre Nora, ‘Between memory and history: les lieux de mémoire’, *Representations*, 26:7 (1989), pp.7-24 (p.7).

Nora's approach to memory is too limited, and argues that memory is also embodied in forms of cultural practice and performance.⁴⁸ As a result, my understanding of what constitutes sites of memory and memory practice is not limited to traditional sites of memory (such as monuments, memorials and museums), but attempts to incorporate performative commemorative ceremonies, acts of civil disobedience, acts of individual remembrance and elements of urban planning which contribute to the commemorative city-text.

Public monuments and memorials are, however, perhaps the most discussed spaces of memory and ought not to be ignored. Although many choose to represent the names of victims along with an abstract design, memorials vary greatly in design and examples such as Germany's vanishing Holocaust monuments, the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington and Lima's *El ojo que llora* show that they often use innovative, and controversial, forms of space to construct narrative meaning. Jay Winter argues that war memorials should also be seen as spaces onto which individual memories can be projected and consolidated into a wider sense of collective mourning. For instance, he highlights Edwin Lutyens' abstract design of the London Cenotaph and its "simple and ecumenical character", arguing that the monument does not impose a narrative of memory onto the public, but creates an empty space which they can fill with their own interpretations or experiences of violence.⁴⁹ Sites of memory, he states, are "places where groups of people engage in public activity through which they express a collective shared knowledge...of the past, on which a group's sense of unity and individuality is based".⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Stephen Legg, 'Contesting and surviving memory: space, nation, and nostalgia in Les Lieux de Mémoire', *Environment and Planning D*, 23 (2005), pp.481-504 (p.500).

⁴⁹ Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (London, 2006), p.142.

⁵⁰ Jay Winter, 'Sites of Memory' in (Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz eds.), *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates* (New York, 2010), pp.312-24 (p.312).

In doing so, he builds upon the work of Maurice Halbwachs and Jan and Aleida Assmann on collective memory.⁵¹ However, Winter's emphasis is placed upon the opportunities allowed by sites of memory for collective remembrance to take place. Similarly, Legg has argued in favour of the need for memorials and monuments to be understood alongside performative remembrance ceremonies and grassroots initiatives which create their own meanings and use sites of memory to develop more pluralistic forms of memory narratives practice.⁵²

Whilst the work of these scholars is certainly useful for understanding the manner in which memory narratives are represented, crystallised and performed at sites of memory, I believe it is also necessary to explicitly analyse the spatiality of each given site. By spatiality, I refer to (among other things) the site's construction or architecture, its emplacement in a particular neighbourhood or city, and how the site interacts with its surroundings. In this sense, the work of Dwyer and Alderman has been particularly useful, as they have proposed a framework for analysing memorial landscapes and assessing the spatiality of sites of memory to understand how they may function as a form of text, arena, and performance. The framework they outline is premised upon three sets of questions which attempt to take into account signposting, site layout, on-site commercial activities, transport and access, performative ceremonies and emplacement when analysing the significance of a given site.⁵³ I have selected this framework not simply because it is convincing and useful in a theoretical sense, but because it also allows me to use space as a lens through which it is possible to see consistencies between practices of violence, culture, and memory. For example, Delacroix's study of two versions of the *El ojo que llora* memorial (in Lima and

⁵¹ Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, 'Collective Memory and Cultural Identity', *New German Critique* (1995), pp.125-133.

⁵² Legg, 'Contesting and surviving memory', p.483.

⁵³ Owen J. Dwyer and Derek H. Alderman, 'Memorial landscapes: analytic questions and metaphors', *GeoJournal*, 73:3 (2008), pp.165-178 (pp.170-5).

Llinque, Apurímac) reveals memory discourses which are both centralising and Andeanist, dichotomising peasant communities into simplified and racialised categories of passive victim and savage perpetrator.⁵⁴

There are also important ways in which literature on sites of memory in Peru has contributed to a transnational historiography on conflict, space and memory. In particular, I believe that the Peruvian case offers a range of interesting perspectives on how memory narratives can be shaped by geographical context, and how they can become inscribed into the landscape. Palonen has outlined the need to understand traditional sites of memory within a broader commemorative city-text, a collection of sites in urban space which contribute to understandings of a shared cultural heritage. The city-text, Palonen argues, is a contested “site of politicking” in which, “through the act of naming and replacing political symbols, people are engaged in political acts that invest objects and sites with positive and negative connotations”.⁵⁵ In Palonen’s work, sites of memory are not considered only to be commemorative statues, memorials and museums, but also streets, parks, and public spaces named after political, historical, and often military figures from a nation’s past. Although Palonen is also careful to make a distinction between this commemorative city-text and the urban landscape in general, I would argue that both form part of an inescapable spatial context in which sites of memory are rarely, but ought to be, understood. As a result, when discussing sites of memory, I will aim to not only analyse the memory narratives which they represent, but also highlight the significance of the streets and neighbourhoods in which they are located, the businesses and infrastructure which operate nearby, and the communities which live around them.

⁵⁴ Dorothee Delacroix, ‘«Somos peruanos y limpios»: Discursos y prácticas en torno al monumento *El Ojo que Llora* de Llinque, Apurímac’, *Bulletin de l’Institut français d’études andines*, 43:2 (2014), pp.227-44 (p.230).

⁵⁵ Emilia Palonen, ‘The city-text in post-communist Budapest: Street names, memorials and the politics of commemoration’, *GeoJournal*, 73 (2008), pp.219-30 (p.220).

Whilst my work aims to add to this transnational literature on sites of memory and collective remembrance, I also aim to insert my work within a body of recent research on memory practice in Latin America. The work of Jelin and Stern on the politics of memory in Latin America has been highly influential in shaping debates on the link between memory and political resistance to state violence.⁵⁶ More recently, however, Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo's volume *Space and the Memories of Violence* has drawn together a broad range of scholarship linking the politics of space, culture and memory in Turkey, Germany and Cambodia as well as from the Southern Cone of Latin America.⁵⁷ This scholarship has broadly sought to reassert the territoriality of memory practice and has highlighted the role which memory has to play in ongoing political projects and struggles. Using this literature, I will argue that forms of memory practice produced in Peru have been influenced heavily by transnational trends for the development of post-conflict memory initiatives, studies of memory, and experiences of truth and reconciliation processes elsewhere in Latin American and around the globe. Whilst these influences have enabled the proliferation of memory projects and museums across Peru, they also place limitations on the ability of each project to engage with an audience outside of the memory activist community, and to represent a period of conflict which should be understood primarily within its own national context (as opposed to being subsumed into narratives about dictatorships in the Southern Cone).

When considering the different actors who have worked, often in collaboration with other, to produce scholarly publications, cultural artefacts and commemorative sites in post-conflict Peru, Jelin's concept of "memory entrepreneurs" is useful.⁵⁸ Memory entrepreneurs produce a diverse range of memory works which vary in form, audience

⁵⁶ Elizabeth Jelin, *Los trabajos de la memoria* (Madrid, 2002); Steve J. Stern, *Battling for Hearts and Minds: Memory Struggles in Pinochet's Chile, 1973–1988* (Durham, 2006).

⁵⁷ Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo (eds.), *Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception* (Basingstoke, 2014).

⁵⁸ Jelin, *Los trabajos de la memoria*, pp.48-9.

and subject matter, yet the majority appear to share a broad understanding of the Peruvian conflict which is critical of both insurgent and state violence.⁵⁹ As Bilbija and Payne argue, memory entrepreneurs act within a memory market and, although “profit is assumed”, that profit is likely to provide a “side benefit to the ultimate goal of building a human rights culture”.⁶⁰

At times in the current literature on post-conflict Peru, reference is made to a nebulous human rights community which clearly incorporates human rights organisations such as APRODEH, COMISEDH and the *Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos* (CNDDHH), but which also negates or leaves unclear the role of scholars, artists, and other civil society activists. This artistic-academic-activist group has significant connections to the human rights community, with many individuals holding positions which cross these institutional and disciplinary boundaries. In a similar way to Stern’s representation of the human rights community in Chile, this community in Peru has very often acted in a cohesive and collaborative manner in order to promote human rights, and the work of the CVR, in Peru.⁶¹ In order to describe them accurately, therefore, I have chosen to use my own term - “memory activists”. Memory activist is a term which combines the memory work inherent in Jelin’s memory entrepreneurs whilst also alluding to this community’s mobilisation in favour of human rights in key legal cases and landmark trials. However, I believe the term also offers a broader perspective on the ways in which this group deploys memory which encompasses a range of scholarly works, artistic products and commemorative projects which articulated a shared vision of the internal conflict. In this way, this community uses post-conflict memory as a subject around which multiple forms of activism against

⁵⁹ For a detailed analysis of memory producers who eschew this narrative and instead produce “counter memories” which reflect the narrative of the Peruvian state and armed forces, see Milton, *Conflicted Memory*.

⁶⁰ Ksenija Bilbija and Leigh A. Payne, ‘Time is Money: The Memory Market in Latin America’ in (Leigh A Payne and Ksenija Bilbija eds.), *Accounting for Violence: Marketing Memory in Latin America* (Durham, 2011), pp.1-40 (p.12).

⁶¹ Stern, *Battling for Hearts and Minds*.

state violence and corruption, and in favour of contemporary political projects, can be articulated.

Furthermore, these memory activists also use their work to make significant contributions to the urban landscape. Again, Palonen's concept of the "commemorative city-text" articulates a vision of the urban landscape in which micro-commemorations (such as the changing of street names, erecting of statues, naming of parks) are enacted to articulate political positions. Although memory activists have not generally been involved in these kind of planning decisions, they have carved out their own element of the urban landscape by, as Bilbija and Payne describe in other contexts, producing several sites in their own human rights-based memordscape.⁶² The circuit of sites in Lima included LUM, the Yuyanapaq photography exhibition, and *El ojo que llora* monument, and in the national context also includes the Museo de la Memoria in Huamanga, Yalpana Wasi – Lugar de la Memoria in Huancayo, and *El ojo que llora* in Llinque. As I discuss throughout the thesis, these new sites are significant new and original contributions to the existing city-text of Lima which has been built upon a romanticised vision of a patriarchal and militarised Peruvian Republic. However, as the memordscape which has been constructed by memory activists exists within the wider context of the commemorative city-text, post-conflict memordscapes are limited by the existing range of commemorations in Lima's urban landscape and must compete with the existing city-text; in terms of the vision of the Peruvian nation they articulate, but also to some extent for land, funding and visitors. While I will use Palonen's terminology of the commemorative city-text throughout this thesis, therefore, it is important to also recognise that memory activists have their own circuit of significant

⁶² Bilbija and Payne, 'Time is Money', p.11.

spaces and sites around which their own commemorations and mobilisations are focused.

It is also important to clarify here the reasons why I have predominantly chosen to deploy the terminology of “space” throughout this thesis whilst, for the most part, eschewing any mention of “place”. In part, this is to avoid the apparent interchangeability with which “place” and “space” appear to have been used since the so-called spatial turn.⁶³ Where geographers such as John Agnew and Tim Cresswell have argued that place is fundamentally made up of location, locale, and sense of place, I have privileged the terms emplacement and neighbourhood / district (over location / locale) and have made efforts to describe how architecture, design and history contribute to particular narratives in certain spaces.⁶⁴ I have preferred these terms not only because I believe they describe these fundamentals of spatiality more efficiently and distinctly, but also because the language of space has a greater potential to refer to the fluid, ever-changing, constantly reproduced nature of space, as opposed to place.

For example, Cresswell makes the case that place often refers to the “fixed, objective co-ordinates on the Earth's surface”.⁶⁵ Levey, in her research on commemorative sites in Argentina and Uruguay which builds on Cresswell's arguments, contends that commemoration is “essentially concerned with place-making”, and references Jelin's assertion that commemoration is the process by which “space becomes a place”.⁶⁶ In these formulations, place appears fixed and imbued with

⁶³ This interchangeability is also raised by Leif Jerram, ‘Space: A Useless Category for Historical Analysis?’, *History and Theory*, 52 (October 2013), pp.400-419 (p.403).

⁶⁴ J.A. Agnew, *Place and politics: the geographical mediation of state and society* (London, 1987); Tim Cresswell, *Place: A Short Introduction* (Oxford, 2004), p.7.

⁶⁵ Cresswell, *Place*, p.7.

⁶⁶ Cara Levey, *Fragile Memory, Shifting Impunity: Commemoration and Contestation in Post-Dictatorship Argentina and Uruguay* (Oxford, 2016), p.25.

meaning, while space is fluid and meaningless. In other words, place is *somewhere*, whilst space is *nowhere*.

The apparent emptiness of spaces which are not places, however, seems problematic. Whilst the aforementioned analyses which have mobilised the language of place have contributed invaluable knowledge to literature in a vast range of areas, not least the literature on memory in Latin America, questions ought to be asked about this relationship between space and place. Does place-making significantly alter the relationship of “places” with the “space” around them? Are spaces not assigned meaning continuously by their own production, thus always acting as places? Is place-making opposed to the production of space, and can the two come into conflict, producing unforeseen consequences and challenging the meanings assigned to place during place-making? When asking these questions, it becomes quickly clear that places are not defined by their spatiality at all, but are often assigned particular meanings by their producers or by the public. These meanings, however, have the potential to be contradicted or challenged by the spatiality of the site (as will be discussed later with reference to numerous examples).

For this reason, and because my attention in this thesis is fundamentally geared towards the production and characteristics of space, I see all places as spaces under continuous renewal, and have privileged language about space (with particular distinctions) as a result.⁶⁷ I have not dismissed “place” completely from my research, and at certain points do describe a “sense of place” in particular scenarios. It should be noted, however, that this sense of place is not fixed in location, but is a particular spatio-temporal moment under constant reconstruction.

⁶⁷ In a similar way, Jerram argues in favour of “space” being used to refer to “the particular proximate disposition of things in relation to one another” and for “place” to refer to “the values, beliefs, codes, and practices that surround a particular location, whether that location is real or imagined—for example...the ways the Cenotaph in London comes to carry meanings of mourning, nation, monarchy”. Jerram, ‘Space’, p.404.

Violence, culture and memory: a methodological approach

As should be clear from the theoretical framework outlined above, while my spatial analysis has been developed primarily to investigate the Peruvian conflict and its afterlife through the lens of space, it will also allow me to approach the three key themes of violence, culture and memory, as well as the consistencies and links between them. Because of this, the methodology I have deployed in support of my theoretical framework and the sources I have mobilised within this thesis have broadly been shaped by these three key themes.

In dealing with violence, my work largely seeks to reinterpret episodes of violence, many of them already well-known in the context of the Peruvian conflict, through the lens of space and spatial practice. As such, the source that I predominantly use for dealing with violence is the CVR's *Informe Final*. This document (available in-full online) contains a number of "representative histories" of violence during the conflict, as well as a large number of investigated cases and analyses of the roles of different institutions, populations and insurgent groups.⁶⁸ I have supplemented my research with the *Informe Final* with time in the CVR archives in the building of the Defensoría del Pueblo in Lima, examining working documents, collected testimonies and press cuttings which formulated the basis of what is said in the *Informe Final*, but which in many cases provide extra details on particular cases.

When analysing cultural responses to the Peruvian conflict, I have selected a range of artefacts from cinema (*La boca del lobo*, *Tarata*), literature (*Los rendidos*, *La hora azul*) and visual art (Shining Path murals). In each case, I have selected artefacts which

⁶⁸ The online index of the *Informe Final* refers to these cases as "historias representativas de la violencia". Elsewhere in the report and CVR archive they are also referred to as "caso emblemáticos" (when discussing human rights abuses by the state) or "estudios en profundidad" (referring to the cases investigated in depth by the CVR. CVR, *Informe Final*, 'Índice de Contenido General' [<http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php>, accessed 23 March 2017]; CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. I, p.67.

most clearly represent spatialised understandings of the conflict, representing either “Andeanist” representations of violence (as discussed in Chapter 2) or perspectives which seek to challenge associations between the Peruvian interior, indigeneity and violence (analysed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5). These are the sources which I will read through the second element in my theoretical framework, which focuses on key issues of grievability, imagined geographies and the cultural construction of race and ethnicity. In some cases I have analysed cultural artefacts which have not previously been studied in the literature on the internal armed conflict, whilst in other cases I have analysed sources which have formed a key part of previous analyses. The reason I have done this is because I believe my spatial analytical framework offers fresh insight on these sources and highlights elements of the narrative, characterisation and structure which have not previously been commented on. In approaching these sources, I have adopted a simple textual (or cinematic) analysis to highlight the elements of the source which resonate with my framework, which are related to the study of space and, therefore, may have previously been overlooked.

When analysing memory, I have chosen to broaden my scope beyond memory museums and commemorative monuments (although these are certainly analysed in detail in this thesis) to also study forms of commemorative performance, symbolic disobedience and elements from the urban landscape. This element of my methodology is, arguably, the most explicitly spatial of the three as it focuses intently on reading space in Peru as it is today as a means for understanding the violence of the conflict years.

Finally, I have supplemented each of these elements with information and arguments from a number of face-to-face interviews conducted with academics, artists and activists in Peru in 2015-2016. Whilst in Peru on a six-month fieldwork trip to conduct research

for this project, I conducted twenty-two interviews (of 20-75 minutes in length) with a range of scholars, artists and activists across Peru, many of whom could be considered to be “memory activists”.⁶⁹ Whilst the conversations I had were immensely useful for locating useful sources, finding out small details about the internal armed conflict and building my academic networks, the primary reason I conducted these interviews was to present my interpretation of Peru’s recent history (and arguments about space and race) to an audience whose own work was strongly tied to the conflict. By doing so, I aimed to challenge these memory activists to think critically about the way in which space may, implicitly or explicitly, have influenced their own work. However, I also wanted to be challenged by my interviewees to think critically about the theoretical framework I was presenting, about how to construct an original, engaging and accurate analysis of the conflict, and how to incorporate some of the wide range of voices who had been, so far, occluded from the existing interdisciplinary literature on the conflict.

Throughout this process, it was important to take into account a range of considerations related to ethics and positionality (my own and of the interviewees). In particular, I was very conscious of my own positionality as a white, English male conducting research in Latin America and participating in interviews with female participants and people of indigenous descent. In order to overcome any potential barriers between myself and interviewees as a result of these considerations, my aim was to be as accommodating as possible to the people I met with, travelling across Lima, to Huancayo and Huamanga to a place of their choosing (often a university building, busy café or office). I informed my interviewees of the nature of the project prior to meeting by sending a formal invitation and information sheet (both approved as part of my application for ethical approval for the research project), written in Spanish,

⁶⁹ For a full list of the interviews conducted see Appendix 1.

via email. Throughout the process of arranging and conducting these interviews, I aimed to make the process as transparent as possible, and kept in mind my own position as researcher and the interviewee's position as expert. As such, the interviews were focused around hearing the knowledge, opinions and criticisms of each interviewee on a subject which was clearly important to them. I felt throughout this process that such an approach was successful in establishing commonalities and a good relationship between myself and each participant.

In most cases, I had been introduced to interviewees by other interviewees and memory activists in Peru, and as such met the criteria set out by Sands, Bourjolly and Roer-Strier for "involving key informants" in cross-cultural research interviews.⁷⁰ I also aimed to develop a rapport with interviewees so that our conversation could develop in a natural, relaxed manner which was, for the most part, led by the interviewee. I prepared between eight and twelve open-ended questions related to my work, the interviewee's work and the internal conflict prior to each interview, but often amended this structure throughout the interview to follow up on specific points and allow a more natural conversation. The large majority of the interviews were conducted in Spanish, and were only continued in English when it was made clear by the interviewee (unprompted) that this was preferable. I recorded each interview on two electronic devices and transcribed them over a period of several months.⁷¹ The analysis which I conducted was primarily text-based, reading through the transcripts primarily to highlight where interviewees had spoken about the relationships between space, race and violence, whilst also making note of any important details about the conflict or useful quotes from interviewees to integrate into my work. As will become clear

⁷⁰ R.G. Sands, J.N. Bourjolly and D. Roer-Strier, 'Crossing Cultural Barriers in Research Interviewing', *Qualitative Social Work*, 6:3 (2007), pp.353-372 (p.368).

⁷¹ Most participants told me, again unprompted, that they did not need to see the interview transcript but would like to see the final version of my thesis. Prior to my examination, I sent all participants a final version of the thesis in English, highlighting page numbers relevant to our conversation and their own work. Where I had quoted any element of our interview, I also included this quote from the Spanish transcript for their verification.

throughout this thesis, I have incorporated several quotes and interesting points from these interviews throughout.

Memory has often been articulated as a political imperative in the present to avoid repeating the mistakes, and crimes, of the past. Whilst the Holocaust in Germany remains in some ways the paradigmatic example for why it is necessary for societies to remember, numerous periods of authoritarian rule and violent state repression in Latin America's Southern Cone have unleashed a wave of memory practices and studies in recent years. On the one hand, the forms of memory produced in response to these examples have been conducted under the logic of "*Nunca Más*" or "*Para que no se repita*".⁷² Memory in this sense is deployed as a historical lesson, so that future generations will know not to make the same mistakes. There has also been a strong procedural element to memory, in which memory practice has emerged as a mechanism for opposing state impunity, building support for state accountability for violence, and for challenging official, top-down histories of the past in which the violence of the state (and / or other actors) is denied and hidden.

Although these understandings of memory are certainly valuable and have contributed a great deal to the process of truth and reconciliation in Peru, especially in engendering accountability for state actors, the understanding of memory I deploy in this thesis rests more on the importance of competing cultural understandings of the past. Levey, drawing on the work of Holocaust scholar James Young, argues that memory encompasses a range of overlapping individual and "collected" versions of the past, but is a process which is continually reconstructed in the present within the context

⁷² *Nunca Más* is the report by Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People, published in 1986. *Para que no se repita* is a phrase used in Peru, particularly by human rights organisations such as ANFASEP.

of numerous social, political and cultural frameworks.⁷³ This formulation moves away from previous understandings based on the work of Halbwachs, which describes the idea of “collective memory”, to appreciate the myriad heterogeneous versions of history which compete for recognition and validation in the present. This collection of memories ought to also encompass institutional memories which seek to attest to (or obfuscate) the role played by state institutions, political organisations and civil society groups in episodes of violence.⁷⁴ Furthermore, as argued by Stern and del Pino, these memories rarely exist harmoniously alongside each other, but are articulated as part of wider struggles and battles for recognition, identity and justice.⁷⁵

The associations I make in this thesis between how political violence was perpetrated and colonial, Andeanist modes of thought takes a lead from the work of Simon Springer. Springer argues that “at base, Orientalism is a form of paranoia that feeds on cartographies of fear by producing ‘our world’ negatively through the construction of a perverse ‘Other’”. He continues by arguing that violence is often bound up in virulent forms of imaginative geography, and that, whilst violence ought to be understood as fundamentally related to cultural practice, that “the grounds on which some insist on affixing and bounding violence so firmly to *particular* places in articulating a ‘culture of violence’ argument are inherently unstable”.⁷⁶ When analysing acts of political violence in Peru’s internal conflict and cultural representations of violence, therefore, I will be particularly attentive to how particular episodes or artefacts

⁷³ Levey, *Fragile Memory, Shifting Impunity*, pp.16-21.

⁷⁴ Such an approach is represented by Milton’s book manuscript on military memories of the Peruvian conflict, and by Ayala and Zúñiga’s research on memories of the Peruvian Navy. Milton, *Conflicted Memory*; Henry Ayala Abril and Antonio José Zúñiga Romero, ‘Entre el recuerdo y el olvido: Memorias de infantes de la Marina de guerra del Perú sobre su participación en el conflicto armado interno’ in (Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú ed.), *II Concurso de Investigación en Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario: Compilación de textos ganadores* (Lima, 2015), pp.9-41.

⁷⁵ Stern, *Battling for Hearts and Minds*; Ponciano del Pino, ‘Memorias para el reconocimiento’ in (Carlos Iván Degregori, Tamia Portugal Teillier, Gabriel Salazar Borja and Renzo Aroni Sulca eds.), *No hay mañana sin ayer: Batallas por la memoria y consolidación democrática en el Perú* (Lima, 2015), pp.11-23 (p.17).

⁷⁶ Simon Springer, ‘Violence Sits in Places? Cultural Practice, Neoliberal Rationalism, and Virulent Imaginative Geographies’, *Political Geography*, 30 (2011), pp.90-98 (p.90, 93).

can be understood to be based upon forms of imaginative geography and Andeanist discourse.

My use of cultural artefacts for dissecting discourses about memory and violence in Peru also takes a lead from the work of Cynthia Milton. Milton's key works in this context include *Art from a Fractured Past* (a collected volume of essays on violence, culture and memory in Peru's internal conflict) and *Conflicted Memory* (a book manuscript which analyses military memories of the conflict and forms of cultural power held by the Peruvian military).⁷⁷ As will be clear, Milton's work has been highly influential for this thesis, not only in terms of methodology but also in the way that she has tied particular forms of military memory to projects of nation-building in Peru in the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The ideas of Springer and Milton will therefore be deployed in a manner that is complementary to my theoretical framework, and have shaped my methodological approach by encouraging direct attention to factors of violence, culture and memory, around which I have structured each chapter with sections devoted to each of these three factors in relation to each case study.

Outline of thesis structure

This thesis will make distinct arguments about how the politics and production of space influenced both insurgent and state violence in different regions during the conflict. Because of this, the thesis will revolve around four case study chapters which deal with: Shining Path violence in the interior; counterinsurgent violence in the interior; insurgent violence in Lima; and counterinsurgent violence in Lima. Chapter 5 will deal specifically with the spatialisation of structural violence during Peru's neoliberal revolution. Separating my analyses of insurgent and state violence, and of violence in

⁷⁷ Milton (ed.), *Art from a Fractured Past*; Milton, *Conflicted Memory*.

the interior and violence in Lima, will allow me to highlight how Shining Path and the Peruvian state embarked upon geographically contingent strategies in which the violent practices they utilised (including assassinations, bombings and sabotage on the one hand, mass reprisals, torture and disappearances on the other) were deployed in different regions. Each chapter is structured in such a way that the themes of violence, culture and memory will be assessed (through analyses of a selection of cultural artefacts and forms of memory practice) alongside each case study.

The first of these chapters will focus on a spatial analysis of Shining Path, incorporating their genesis, doctrine, and the forms of violence they perpetrated across Andean and Amazonian regions throughout the internal conflict. This analysis will demonstrate that Shining Path can, and ought to, be seen not solely as a product of external forces (such as revolutionary Marxism and the Cold War) but a syncretic phenomenon produced by transnational ideas about global revolution and the local politics of space in Peru. This local politics of space, which I will refer to as a tradition of Andean radicalism, includes the coalition of Leftist radicals and peasant movements which emerged (across many Andean departments but particularly in Ayacucho) during the middle of the twentieth century, and which has been identified by Heilman and Rénique (among others).⁷⁸ Using the Lucanamarca massacre as a case study, the 1983 reprisal conducted by Shining Path which resulted in the deaths of almost 70 *campesinos*, I will argue that this moment represented the collapse of the coalition between radical Leftists and the peasant population in Ayacucho. However, by extending my analysis beyond the violence of the internal conflict to incorporate Shining Path's cultural production and forms of memory practice, I will argue that it is

⁷⁸ I use the term Andean radicalism deliberately as this broad tradition, encompassing a range of different movements and groups, in general tended to articulate variations on the "Andean utopia" as described by Flores Galindo. See Alberto Flores Galindo, *Buscando un inca: identidad y utopía en los Andes* (Lima, 1986); Heilman, *Before the Shining Path*; José Luis Rénique, 'La utopía andina hoy: un comentario a *Buscando un Inca*', *Debate Agrario*, 2 (1988), pp.131-45.

possible to see a continuation of the values of Andean radicalism. Whilst Shining Path *cadres* often subverted the doctrine of their party leaders and moulded revolutionary ideas to their own local histories and surroundings, memory activists have continued to articulate non-violent projects for change which are rooted in grassroots mobilisation and addressing geographical imbalances in Peru's socio-spatial structure. As such, the work of memory activists (such as ANFASEP and Apoyo Para Paz) in Ayacucho today continues to draw on memories of past mobilisations and a tradition of Andean radicalism (albeit a tradition which rejects the violence perpetrated by Shining Path). The consistent factor in each of these discussions is an analysis of the local politics of space and place in Ayacucho, and I will highlight how the tradition of Andean radicalism came to shape violence, culture and memory (in relation to Shining Path) in important ways.

Chapter 2 will address the issue of space in relation to the counterinsurgency operation conducted by the Peruvian state and armed forces in the interior. Whilst also articulating the counterinsurgency operation as a response to local politics and Andean radicalism, I will argue that the violence perpetrated by state agents represented the exercise of sovereign power, conducted against communities which were deemed to have become infected by radicalism. Using detention centres created by the armed forces, including Cuartel Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada, I will use concepts of sovereign power, exception, and graduated sovereignty (from Foucault, Agamben and Ong) to argue that state violence was conducted under the logic of exception and exclusion, and that the creation of Emergency Zones, which in effect extended localised spaces of exception to cover whole regions, represents a form of spatialised graduated sovereignty and the differential management of populations by the Peruvian state.

Furthermore, I will argue that this practice is not only heavily contingent on geography, but intensely racialised, a product of the intellectual traditions of the Peruvian armed forces, and textured by Peru's historical socio-spatial structure. The subsequent analysis of military cultural production and memory practice in the aftermath of the conflict will highlight forms of cultural production and memory practice where this racialised, intellectual cultural framework has been reinforced, and others where the military's heroic narratives of the conflict have been challenged.

My third chapter will deal specifically with violence perpetrated by Shining Path in Lima, an analysis which revolves around the case study of the Tarata bombing in 1992. Rather than seeing this as an exceptional or isolated incident, I aim to contextualise the bombing within Shining Path's revolutionary strategy, a strategy which was understood by the party leadership in intensely spatial terms. However, I will also argue that the Tarata bombing has, in some forms of cultural production and memory practice, come to be seen as representative of experiences of violence in the capital which renders invisible many of the other forms of violence perpetrated against the communities of Lima's *barriadas*. Furthermore, the bombing has been used as the impetus for a shift in geographical imaginings of the conflict, allowing residents of the capital's middle-class suburbs to be repositioned as victims. In this sense, I use Tarata as a case which not only demonstrates important arguments about violent practice, but also about the nature of cultural representations of the conflict and forms of memory practice which are constructed from a distinct geographical position in order to support a particular narrative.

Chapter 4 returns to an analysis of violence perpetrated by state agents in the conflict, this time the 1986 massacre of over 250 prisoners in the El Frontón, Lurigancho and Santa Bárbara prisons. In this chapter, I will argue that the forms of

sovereign power deployed by the Peruvian state and armed forces in the interior (discussed in Chapter 2) came to be increasingly deployed in the capital as the conflict progressed. Therefore, whilst a system of graduated sovereignty and spatialised exception was established by the Peruvian state in the 1983-5 period, from 1985 onwards Lima also began to suffer the exercise of sovereign power from which it had previously been protected. This represented a shift in the geography of graduated sovereignty which had previously denoted only provincial departments as regions suitable for this form of state power. When turning to the forms of cultural production and memory practice produced in response to the massacres, I will highlight that *Senderista* memories of the conflict have largely been suppressed, or ignored, because Shining Path members are not considerable to be grievable in Peruvian society. In part, this condition of non-grievability can be read as a product of the violence waged by Shining Path against the civilian population during the internal conflict, but it can also be seen in the intellectual traditions of the Peruvian state and military. In particular, the use of violence to exclude, and eliminate, political opposition has precedents in the imprisonment of *Apristas* on El Frontón in the 1930s, and in the 1932 Chan Chan massacre in which over 50 *Apristas* were summarily executed. Because of these factors, I will argue that there are deep historical roots to the forms of state violence perpetrated during the conflict, and that they are premised upon a cultural framework which understood the exclusion of political opponents in spatial terms.

The fifth and final chapter will continue with a similar approach, yet, rather than dealing with a singular instance of violence, will be based upon analysis of structural violence during Peru's neoliberal revolution. I will use this case study to demonstrate continuities between the impacts of economic restructuring and the forms of physical state violence perpetrated in the 1980s and in Fujimori's Peru in the 1990s.

Furthermore, I will highlight how the the neoliberal regime which was created by

Alberto Fujimori in this period had its roots in the exclusionary state violence of the 1980s and earlier. I will frame this argument with an analysis of how cultural responses to the 1997 hostage crisis have acted as an important moment around which forms of cultural production and memory practice have crystallised in order to support military narratives of the conflict, and Peru's neoliberal order, as a whole. Whilst many of the discussed forms of memory practice have challenged this heroic narrative and presented alternative interpretations of state violence, I will argue that they have also fundamentally failed, in many ways, to challenge the underlying cultural framework which dictates Peru's historical socio-spatial structure and provides the basis for a long history of exclusionary state violence.

Selection of case studies and objects of study

The cases which make up each of these five chapters have been carefully selected according to the following criteria. Because the focus of my thesis is, largely, to reinterpret existing data and knowledge through the lens of space, I have selected cases which could be broadly assumed to be emblematic cases from Peru's conflict, all of which are featured as individual case studies in the CVR's *Informe Final*, and around which particular memory narratives (which fall distinctly into either the military or human rights-based memory camp) have been formulated. To some extent, then, my aim is to continue to use these cases as paradigmatic episodes of violence which are able to explain instances of violence suffered by other communities throughout the conflict. Chapters 1 and 3 deal with the logics of insurgent violence during the conflict through two cases which demonstrate the use of different strategies (such as bombings, *retiradas*, infiltration of civil society), in different regions (in the interior and in Lima) at different stages of the conflict (Shining Path's mobilisation in the Andes and Amazon

in the 1980s, and encroachment into Lima 1985-92).⁷⁹ Similarly, Chapters 2 and 4 use their case studies to demonstrate how the state used torture, disappearances and mass reprisals to tackle insurgency, predominantly in the interior at first but increasingly in Lima after 1985. In Chapter 5, I argue that the logics of counterinsurgency came to shape Peru's neoliberal revolution after 1990 and the forms of structural violence which it embodied. However, emblematic case studies can never be completely sufficient to describe the panoply of experiences of violence during the internal armed conflict, and so I have provided comparative examples (and drawn attention to the weaknesses of particular emblematic cases) where appropriate.

My selection of cultural artefacts and memory projects in support of my case study chapters follows a similar logic. Firstly, I have attempted to use, where possible, sources which deal directly with the episodes of violence referenced in the chapter. Where this was not possible, I have selected sources which deal with similar ideas and themes, an approach which has allowed me to conduct a consistent level of analysis across violence, culture and memory within each chapter. I have paid particular attention to artefacts and memory projects which I believe push memory debates and representations of violence beyond the current historiographical framework which is dominated by military-based and human rights-based memory narratives. However, I have also made distinct efforts to incorporate these narratives into my analysis through important selected examples. In this scenario, the artefacts discussed are intended to be broadly illustrative of discourses in culture and memory, rather than dealing with all of the sources readily available.

I have also been careful to ensure that a range of geographical perspectives are represented in my selection of case studies, cultural artefacts and forms of memory

⁷⁹ The *retiradas* were a practice whereby Shining Path forced Andean communities to “withdraw” from their villages to more isolated areas where they could be watched more closely by the insurgents (and where the insurgents could avoid military reprisals).

practice. In part, as referenced above, this is in response to Soja and Massey's arguments about the construction of narratives and the heterogeneity of space. The spaces in which these case studies occur are not vacuums but socially-produced, porous containers of historical-spatial trajectories which mould and influence future events in their own unique ways. This notion has the potential to drastically alter understandings of the internal conflict from one periodisation of political violence (or terrorism, or state violence, or civil war) to an appreciation of the myriad contemporaneous trajectories which constituted the process of the conflict.⁸⁰

It is also, however, a response to, and an attempt to avoid, the present historiographical situation in which narratives of the internal conflict have predominantly been constructed from the Peruvian capital, with the result that the discursive space in which Andean peasant communities and *Senderistas* can tell their stories about the internal conflict is limited. Although the publication of the CVR's *Informe Final* has certainly opened up the range of spaces and forms of memory which are considered acceptable discourse on violence, the power to construct narratives and explanations of the conflict still resides in Lima. For this reason, whilst not providing an antidote to this situation, I have attempted to engage with forms of testimony from peasant communities, cultural artefacts produced in the Andes, interviews with scholars and activists in Huamanga and Huancayo, and forms of memory practice in Ayacucho and Junín where relevant.

⁸⁰ Doreen Massey quoted in David Featherstone, Sophie Bond and Joe Painter, "'Stories so far': A conversation with Doreen Massey" in (David Featherstone and Joe Painter eds.), *Spatial Politics* (Chichester, 2013), pp.253-66 (p.264).

Chapter 1: Space and the Shining Path

In this chapter, I will develop a spatial analysis of Shining Path and its position within the historiography of political violence in Peru. I will do this firstly by analysing descriptions of space in Shining Path ideology and propaganda, demonstrating that while Shining Path had a tactical appreciation of local geography, the party's leadership preferred to derive their political programme from Maoist ideology rather than from the local circumstances of Ayacucho department. Previous scholarship by Carlos Iván Degregori and Nelson Manrique has similarly emphasised Shining Path's Maoist ideology and organisational structure, arguing that instead of deriving a nuanced programme for change from the social contours of the space around them, Shining Path ideologues instead attempted to transplant Chinese Maoism into Peru, using spatial metaphors to describe how they would erase the State and produce their own to rise in its place.⁸¹ In short, they argue that Shining Path believed that Peru could be wiped blank and made into a vacuum to be filled by a mobilised, class-conscious peasantry, an approach which was ignorant to the needs, or indeed existence, of those it was supposed to serve.

However, this existing scholarship has tended to downplay, and at times overlook, the ability of party *cadres* to use, and at times subvert, the party's ideology to engage in their own local battles, eliminating unpopular local officials and rival families. In order to demonstrate this, I will also explore the differences between space in "Gonzalo Thought" and in works by other *ayacuchano* radicals, arguing that whilst the party leadership's appreciation of Andean history was fairly superficial, there were numerous radical movements, local conflicts and smaller rebellions which pre-dated Shining Path

⁸¹ Degregori, *Ayacucho 1969-1979*; Nelson Manrique, 'Pensamiento, acción y base política del movimiento Sendero Luminoso: La guerra y las primeras respuestas de los comuneros (1964-1983)' in (Anne Pérotin-Dumon ed.), *Historizar el pasado vivo en América Latina* [<http://www.historizarelpasadovivo.cl/downloads/manrique.pdf>, accessed 17 June 2017].

and constituted a complex tradition of revolution in the South-Central region of the Peruvian Andes.

Using the spatial theoretical framework outlined in the introduction, I will argue that the existence of antagonism between the *ayacuchano* population and the Peruvian state contributed to a distinct sense of place in the region. By this, I refer to a radical, local political culture produced by a history of systemic, or structural, state violence and local efforts to engage in resistance.⁸² However, it is crucial, as Springer argues, to differentiate between narratives which characterise the Andes as naturally or inherently violent, in which violence is “produced by the frenzied depravity of savage or pathological minds”, and those which see the emplacement of violence as the product of diverse agencies, socio-spatial structures and long-standing historical tensions.⁸³

Following this, I will examine the case of Lucanamarca, Shining Path’s most infamous and barbaric act of violence, with reference to archival documents and the *Informe Final* of the CVR. Through this analysis, I will argue that it is important to understand Lucanamarca as a result of Shining Path’s spatialised military strategy which aimed to establish a territorial core of support in Ayacucho, and demonstrate that peasant communities shaped this strategy through support and resistance. The massacre marked a new phase in Shining Path military strategy in which the insurgents not only targeted military patrols and local officials, but increasingly perpetrated reprisals against peasant communities. Lucanamarca therefore acted as a powerful demonstration of Shining Path’s spatial conceptualisation of proletarian revolution, in which old societies would be wiped clean for the creation of “New” power. Furthermore, this analysis demonstrates the far more ephemeral nature of Shining Path’s presence in the region

⁸² See also Rénique, *Incendiar la pradera*.

⁸³ Springer, ‘Violence sits in places’, p.93.

and raises questions of any narrative which represents the party as an all-powerful, monolithic, inherently barbaric organisation with peasants as their passive victims.

I have chosen Lucanamarca as a suitable case study through which to analyse Shining Path violence because it is often held up as an emblematic episode of violence during the internal conflict. For example: Lucanamarca was one of the first four case studies put on display by LUM in Lima after its inauguration; it is one of twenty-three “representative histories of violence” in the index of the CVR’s *Informe Final*; and a documentary on the effects of the massacre in the community today was released in 2008, based on material collected during the CVR investigations.⁸⁴ In this sense, there is already plenty of excellent material on the case which I will re-evaluate through my theoretical framework. However, whilst I recognise that certain cases of violence do appear emblematic of wider patterns during the conflict, I will also assess why particular episodes have come to be redefined as representative cases (i.e. localised events used to stand in for wider experiences of violence), which forms of violence are privileged or rendered invisible by such cases, and what their existence says about memory practices of the conflict as a whole. In doing so, I will draw comparisons with other episodes of Shining Path violence in order to highlight differences and similarities with Lucanamarca, and determine the extent to which this case can be said to be representative of wider experiences.

Finally, I will explore the way in which Shining Path’s relationship with peasant communities and Andean radicalism has been represented in forms of cultural production and memory practice produced in response to the conflict. On the one hand this includes forms of Shining Path cultural production such as pamphlets and murals. On the other, I will work with representations of Shining Path violence in the Museo de

⁸⁴ *Lucanamarca*, dir. by Carlos Cárdenas Tovar and Héctor Gálvez (TV Cultura, 2008).

la Memoria in Huamanga. This site is of particular interest to me because the Museo represents a spatialised understanding of the internal conflict. I will argue that this memory museum has attempted to identify Shining Path more strongly with responses to structural violence from peasant communities, and in doing so articulate a narrative of Peruvian society which has its roots in traditions of Andean radicalism.

Through this analysis, it is possible to see that Shining Path's association with Andean communities is far clearer in *Senderista* cultural production and Andean sites of memory than in the documents produced by the party leadership. This suggests that location can be an important factor for determining the memory narrative which a given site produces. It is necessary to ask, in these cases, if memory narratives which highlight issues of structural violence and the radical political culture and traditions which produced Shining Path are only able to be created in the Andean communities which have experienced those same histories.

Throughout this chapter, I will also aim to challenge a certain linguistic orthodoxy which exists around Shining Path violence in certain sectors of Peruvian society to this day. Numerous times whilst discussing my fieldwork informally with *limeños*, my euphemistic use of “the internal conflict”, “the violence in the ‘80s” or “the civil war” to describe my subject area was corrected: “Ah, the terrorism you mean!”. But terrorism as a term is highly problematic. It has been used frequently by the Peruvian press, politicians, and even the CVR (who, also euphemistically, denounce the “terrorist characteristics” and “terrorist character of [Shining Path] actions”) to denounce the insurgents as irrationally violent and, as Žižek highlights, characterise them as pathological anachronisms, resistant to modernity and progress.⁸⁵ It was also (and still

⁸⁵ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VIII*, pp.317-9; Slavoj Žižek, *Living in the End Times* (London, 2011), p.395.

is) a term widely deployed by the Peruvian armed forces to justify massive human rights abuses against the civilian population, and to vilify migrants displaced by the ongoing violence.⁸⁶ The unease with which the CVR refers to terrorism, therefore, is derived partly from the term's usage by the armed forces, and so its use in the *Informe Final* is mostly limited to references to bombings and blackouts as terrorist acts designed to create widespread fear.

Although in many ways the meanings of these terms overlap, I will use the terms insurgent or insurgency when describing Shining Path, instead of language about terrorism or guerrillas (a term which, it could be argued, accepts too readily the heroic language deployed by Shining Path about their own actions). The term insurgent is by no means neutral, but I believe that it best describes Shining Path's position of aiming to create a popular, ideological uprising against an established state, whilst being flexible enough to argue that the group were an insurgent movement who, in particular times and spaces, used terrorism and guerrilla warfare tactics to achieve their goals.

Furthermore, to refer to Shining Path as terrorists, or the more colloquial "*terruco*", reflects a particular perspective on the violence of the conflict. For example, Burt has highlighted that, during the Fujimori era in the 1990s, all forms of political opposition to the regime were regularly denounced as terrorists, whilst Oliart has also highlighted that this association had echoes in the wider population who continued to repudiate Leftist candidates throughout the 1990s.⁸⁷ As Aguirre argues, use of *terruco* as an insult "contributed decisively to the stigmatisation of sectors of the Peruvian population, including human rights activists, families of detainees and victims of violence, and people of indigenous descent in general".⁸⁸ Use of these terms therefore amounts to the

⁸⁶ ANFASEP, *¿Hasta Cuándo tu Silencio?: Testimonios de Dolor y Coraje* (Lima, 2015), p.23.

⁸⁷ Jo-Marie Burt, "Quien habla es terrorista": The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori's Peru', *Latin American Research Review*, 41:3 (2006), pp.32-62 (p.34); Patricia Oliart, 'Alberto Fujimori: "The Man Peru Needed?"' in (Steve J. Stern ed.) *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995* (London, 1998), pp.411-24 (p.422).

⁸⁸ Carlos Aguirre, 'Terruco de m...: Insulto y estigma en la guerra sucia peruana', *Histórica*, 35:1 (2011), pp.103-39 (p.103).

conflation of political and biopolitical enemies, with the archetypal terrorist viewed as both Leftist and indigenous.⁸⁹ In this chapter, therefore, I will therefore avoid the use of terminology which refers to Shining Path solely as terrorists, and make reference to the complex array of violent practices they engaged in outside of Lima.⁹⁰

Space in Shining Path ideology

To understand the revolutionary and military tactics of Shining Path, it is vital to understand how the party's leadership conceived of the space in which they existed, attempted to reshape that space through armed insurgency, and tried to use space to create a new form of state and society in Peru. Previous scholarship on Shining Path, represented in the conclusions of the CVR and in the work of Degregori, has emphasised the “fundamentalist” ideology of the group as a driving force behind the violence perpetrated by the group during the conflict.⁹¹ Firstly, I will aim to build on this work by arguing that Shining Path's attempt to impose their Maoist doctrine upon Andean communities is representative of a particularly colonial mode of thought, in which ideas or policies which have worked in one country are mapped onto another without appreciation of its specific local circumstances. However, I also believe that previous scholarship has placed too much emphasis on Shining Path's ideology, and has paid insufficient attention to how local circumstances, peasant communities and party *cadres* shaped Shining Path from outside and in.

Officially speaking, orthodox Maoist doctrine formed the basis of “Gonzalo Thought”.⁹² The party leadership saw themselves as the vanguard of the Peruvian

⁸⁹ Drinot has previously highlighted how political and biopolitical enemies were conflated in the discourse of anti-communism deployed by Alan García during his second Presidency in Peru (2006-2011). See Drinot, ‘The Meaning of Alan García’, p.187.

⁹⁰ Shining Path violence in the capital is dealt with in Chapter 3: ‘Tarata and the intensification of violence in Lima’.

⁹¹ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VIII*, p.317; Degregori, *Ayacucho 1969-1979*, p.181.

⁹² “Gonzalo Thought” is a term used to describe Abimael Guzmán's own brand of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism, the official ideology of Shining Path as far as the party leadership was concerned. Comrade Gonzalo was Guzmán's *nom de guerre*.

revolution within the context of global Marxist struggle, and believed that Guzmán's ideology represented "the application of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism to the conditions of the Peruvian revolution".⁹³ The aim of this doctrine was to "represent the proletariat and unite with the poor peasantry, the destiny of the revolution depends on their mobilisation".⁹⁴ In party documents, there are almost no references to José Carlos Mariátegui (except to mention that he was the original Peruvian Communist Party founder), whilst Marx, Lenin, Mao and Guzmán are exclusively cited as influences (particularly the latter two), and a range of other Leftist leaders or groups (including Gorbachev, Castro, Izquierda Unida, PCP-Patria Roja) are denounced as revisionists.⁹⁵

Quite often in existing literature on the internal conflict, including in the *Informe Final*, "Gonzalo Thought" is represented as the only factor necessary for explaining Shining Path violence. Manrique, for example, argues that "violence became an absolute virtue" in Shining Path ideology whilst the CVR argues that the insurgents' "fundamentalist ideology and totalitarian organization" manipulated peasant communities into a revolutionary mass for their own purposes.⁹⁶ Yet such interpretations risk creating circular arguments in which ideology exists for its own sake, and occludes the extent to which Shining Path mobilised spatial metaphors regularly in their propaganda, and to which geography was central to the party leadership's conceptualisation of how a Peruvian version of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolution would unfold. The party strategy was to:

*"transform Peruvian society through a Democratic Revolution,
developing the Popular War...that follows the path to encircle the*

⁹³ PCP-SL, 'Sobre la ideología, el Marxismo-Leninismo-Maoismo, como punto de partida para hacer la Guerra Popular', in (PCP-SL ed.), *¡Viva el Maoismo! ¡Abajo el Revisionismo!* (Lima, 1988), pp.81-84 (p.84).

⁹⁴ PCP-SL, *Breves notas aclaratorias acerca de los tergiversados hechos de Lucanamarca en la Guerra Popular del Perú* (Lima, 2006), p.3.

⁹⁵ PCP-SL, 'Sobre el Marxismo-Leninismo-Maoismo', in (PCP-SL ed.), *¡Viva el Maoismo! ¡Abajo el Revisionismo!* (Lima, 1986), pp.93-110 (p.109).

⁹⁶ Manrique, 'Pensamiento, acción y base política del movimiento Sendero Luminoso'; CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VIII*, p.317.

*cities from the countryside, create revolutionary bases of support,
destroying the old State”.*⁹⁷

These beliefs were transmitted through the party’s hierarchical structure to the lower ranks and reinforced through adherence to rigid customs and rules. Young bands of *Senderistas* would patrol the *puna* (a grassland region of the central Andean highlands, located roughly 3000-3500m above sea level) singing:

“In the final battle we will defeat fascism.

Down with imperialism! Down!...

Conquering the bases we will make that new State,

constructing the future with our blood...

We are the initiators of the peoples’ war,

forming detachments, carrying out actions.

Gonzalo brought the light,

taking from Marx, Lenin, and Mao

*he forged the purest steel.”*⁹⁸

In Shining Path doctrine, the peasantry were idealised as a proletariat awaiting class consciousness. As will be seen later in discussions of Shining Path cultural production, such as Elena Iparraguirre’s poem *En mi pueblo*, indigeneity is not something to be preserved but something to be erased in order for Peru’s lower classes to be able to become a mobilised proletarian class. That being said, Shining Path’s cultural production was diverse and many of the party’s murals, paintings and songs do depict indigenous faces and voices. This disparity suggests that Shining Path *cadres*

⁹⁷ PCP-SL, *Breves notas aclaratorias acerca de los tergiversados hechos de Lucanamarca en la Guerra Popular del Perú*, pp.7-8.

⁹⁸ Gavilán, *When Rains Became Floods*, pp.10-26.

interpreted party ideology in their own ways, and that rather than simply accepting “Gonzalo Thought” as their guiding message, they looked for different ways in which Maoism could be applied to Peruvian, and their own local, conditions.

The ideology of the Shining Path leadership, however, built upon the pre-existing and widely held belief that there were Two Perus; one modern (located in *la costa*) and one ancient (in the *la sierra*). This construction of Peruvian geography, which has existed since the early Republican period, relies upon an imaginative geography which, based on the work of Said, can be defined as the “invention and construction of geographical space beyond a physical territory, which constructs boundaries around our very consciousness and attitudes, often by inattention to or the obscuring of local realities”.⁹⁹ This imaginative geography is regularly mobilised to justify a range of dubious political positions, including the more conservative, fatalistic assertion that the existence of Two Perus is somehow a natural phenomenon (and therefore it is not worth attempting to right the social wrongs that are a result of it), as well as more liberal, exoticising discourses which highlight the plight of Peru’s indigenous, mountain-dwelling population whilst at the same time lumping them together into a homogenised mass.

To some extent, Shining Path’s interpretation of the Two Perus reversed previous constructions by locating Old power in the coast and New power in the highlands. Nonetheless, “Gonzalo Thought” relied on a homogenising geographical imagination by locating these oppositional elements in the cities and in the countryside, and attempted to mobilise frustration at the social and cultural divides implied by the idea of Two Perus. Not only was Peru’s socio-spatial structure identified as a symptom of the

⁹⁹ Méndez, ‘De indio a serrano’, p.58. This idea is particularly developed in Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London, 1978); Quote taken from Karen M. Morin, ‘Edward W. Said’ in (Phil Hubbard and Rob Kitchin eds.), *Key Thinkers on Space and Place* (London, 2011), pp.337-344 (p.339).

“dictatorship of landowners and the big bourgeoisie”, but it was identified as something that must be overcome as part of the process of a Democratic Revolution.¹⁰⁰

Whilst rhetorically useful, the idea of Two Perus fails to reflect the reality of daily life and the local histories of the *ayacuchano* communities in which Shining Path garnered most support. That Abimael Guzmán coupled this simplistic spatial discourse with rigid Maoist doctrine, an ideology borrowed from elsewhere and transplanted onto Peru, demonstrates how inattentive to the politics of space Shining Path really were.

However, there were more subtle analyses of Peruvian geography and social relations available. *Ayacucho: Hambre y Esperanza* by Antonio Díaz Martínez, for example, develops a critique of Peruvian society in similar terms to Shining Path by highlighting the role of *latifundista* landowners and the country’s “obsolete colonial structure” in enforcing poverty on the communities of Ayacucho.¹⁰¹ Through a series of chapters based on his travels to the different provinces of the department, Díaz traces the historical roots of armed rebellion through to 1980, highlighting the numerous contradictions and failures of Velasco’s Agrarian Reform.¹⁰² As Starn argues, Díaz’s identification of the shared experiences and frustrations of disparate communities across Ayacucho allowed him to envisage seeds of rebellion years before the emergence of Shining Path.¹⁰³ Díaz Martínez’s argument does make reference to Mao Zedong and Karl Marx, but also to historians of Peru such as Klarén and Flores Galindo.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, he discusses phenomena such as *gamonalismo*, the forced displacement of peasants, peasant mobilisation in the *sierra* (highlighting cases in Puno, Huanta and

¹⁰⁰ PCP-SL, *Breves notas aclaratorias acerca de los tergiversados hechos de Lucanamarca en la Guerra Popular del Perú*, p.8.

¹⁰¹ Antonio Díaz Martínez, *Ayacucho: Hambre y Esperanza* (Lima, 1985), p.33.

¹⁰² Díaz Martínez, *Ayacucho*, p.196.

¹⁰³ Starn, ‘Missing the Revolution’, p.74.

¹⁰⁴ Díaz Martínez, *Ayacucho*, p.180.

Cusco) and ties the political situation he witnessed in Ayacucho in 1969 back to earlier peasant movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, whilst the terminology and conclusions of Díaz are similar to those used by the party (Díaz Martínez was later a key figure in Shining Path), his analysis is grounded in the local histories of communities across the Andes.

In a similar fashion, *Los ilegítimos* by Hildebrando Pérez Huaranca uses a family metaphor to describe Andean communities as the illegitimate children of the Peruvian state, cast aside and forgotten.¹⁰⁶ As with Díaz Martínez's work, *Los ilegítimos* reflected the atmosphere of antagonism in Ayacucho in the decades preceding the conflict and, in doing so, contributed to a sense of place in which Ayacucho would be the centre of the revolution, albeit one which was based upon local concerns and experiences. Both Díaz Martínez and Pérez Huaranca can therefore be seen to divert somewhat from the strict Maoist doctrine of "Gonzalo Thought" and instead represent a more syncretic approach to Shining Path mobilisation in which Maoist ideas are more thoroughly adapted to *ayacuchano* and Peruvian history.

In Peruvian literature, there was also an established tradition of *indigenista* writers who demonstrated increasing optimism about the future of the Peruvian nation if greater cultural integration was achieved between the Creole coast and the indigenous *sierra*. This optimism was demonstrated by Mariátegui, but it arguably culminated in the work of José María Arguedas who, according to Archibald, demonstrated the existence of numerous projects of modernity in the twentieth century which came to shape the Andean world in different ways.¹⁰⁷ Yet, despite the clear potential for discourses such as these to be integrated into a truly syncretic form of Peruvian Marxism, they were

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp.180-6.

¹⁰⁶ Hildebrando Pérez Huaranca, *Los ilegítimos* (Huamanga, 2015).

¹⁰⁷ Priscilla Archibald, *Imagining Modernity in the Andes* (Plymouth, 2011), p.16.

anathema to Abimael Guzmán. This is particularly reminiscent of Tyner's argument about Cambodia, insofar as both the Khmer Rouge and Shining Path saw the communities around them as obstacles to their Revolutions. For the Revolution to succeed, Andean space had to be wiped clean and the old society had to be destroyed.¹⁰⁸

Yet, as del Pino argues, this totalising ideology was not necessarily consistent throughout the party's rank and file and "becomes more flexible as one descends from the pinnacle towards the social base".¹⁰⁹ While many in the party leadership preferred to take doctrinal and cultural cues from Mao's Cultural Revolution, Shining Path *cadres* tended to interpret these teachings in relation to their own backgrounds. As Ritter has highlighted, these practices produced interesting cultural results. Although Shining Path militants often showed a great degree of antipathy towards Andean culture and banned folkloric customs in numerous villages, party *cadres* also blended their ideological outlook with folkloric musical forms, creating revolutionary songs in the style of Andean *huaynos*. Many *Senderistas*, Ritter argues, therefore saw themselves both as militants and as active members of their own communities.¹¹⁰ Because of this, party *cadres* took their cues on how to act from two distinct cultural spaces: Mao's China (transmitted to them through the party leadership) and their own villages and towns.

Shining Path's official doctrine, on the other hand, was always outwards-looking. Although it was ostensibly an application of orthodox Maoism to Peruvian conditions, and as Rothwell argues there was a degree of "domestication" of Maoist ideology, the party ideologues demonstrated an obsessive tendency to refer to a pantheon of international Marxist figures rather than intellectuals from their own country. Party documents often wished eternal glory upon Mao and argued that, despite his death, "his

¹⁰⁸ James A. Tyner, *The Killing of Cambodia: Geography, Genocide and the Unmaking of Space* (Abingdon, 2016), p.169.

¹⁰⁹ Ponciano del Pino, 'Family, culture and "revolution": everyday life with Sendero Luminoso' in (Steve J. Stern ed.) *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995* (London, 1998), pp. 158-92 (p.159).

¹¹⁰ Jonathan Ritter, 'Siren Songs: Ritual and Revolution in the Peruvian Andes', *British Journal of Ethnomusicology*, 11:1 (2002), pp.9-42 (pp.27-8).

ideas and actions live on in the working class”.¹¹¹ Of particular importance were translations of Mao’s speeches and poems when he talked of removing the mountains (referring to imperialism and feudalism) in order allow for the creation of a fairer society.¹¹² This idea is particularly illustrative as Shining Path leaders tended to interpret the mountains, and the peasants who were historically associated with them as *serranos*, as obstacles to progress and a modern proletariat. Shining Path’s leaders did not seek to create a peasant-led revolution (arguably because most of the party’s leaders were from the provincial middle-class) and aimed to control the organisation of indigenous communities themselves. In following this strategy, they failed to truly adapt Maoist thought to Peruvian reality.

Building on the work of Degregori, Portocarrero argues that the fundamentalist character of “Gonzalo Thought”, Shining Path’s obsession with Maoist doctrine and political texts from China and the Soviet Union, reflect a distinctly religious nature in the insurgents’ beliefs. In this interpretation, young militants wholeheartedly accepted Guzmán’s simplified version of Marxism because it offered them a form of redemption from their excluded position in Peruvian society.¹¹³ However, this argument appears to underestimate the degree to which militants interpreted “Gonzalo Thought” alongside their own personal and local communal histories, and perhaps overstates how readily they accepted party doctrine. Rothwell argues, for example, that the *peruanificación* of Maoism was more clearly visible in the application of Maoist strategy by party *cadres* who were required to adapt Mao’s military strategy to the Andean *puna*.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ PCP-SL, ‘¡Gloria eterna al presidente Mao Tsetung!: Gran Maestro del Proletariado Internacional de los Pueblos Oprimidos y de la Revolución Mundial (1976)’, in (ed. PCP-SL), *¡Viva el Maoismo! ¡Abajo el Revisionismo!* (Lima, 1988), pp.41-46 (p.46).

¹¹² Mao Zedong, ‘Retorno a las Montañas Ching kang (1965)’ in (ed. PCP-SL), *¡Viva el Maoismo! ¡Abajo el Revisionismo!* (Lima, 1988), p.9; Mao Zedong, ‘El Viejo tonto que removió las montañas’ in (ed. PCP-SL), *¡Viva el Maoismo! ¡Abajo el Revisionismo!* (Lima, 1988), pp.17-22.

¹¹³ Gonzalo Portocarrero, *Profetas del odio: Raíces culturales y líderes de Sendero Luminoso* (Lima, 2012), pp.12-13.

¹¹⁴ Matthew D. Rothwell, *Transpacific Revolutionaries: The Chinese Revolution in Latin America* (London, 2013), p.69.

The party leadership was almost blind to the ways in which their militants adapted ideas to make sense to their own lives, or connected Marxist ideas to previous revolutionary movements in Ayacucho and other Andean departments. Whilst writers such as Díaz Martínez and Pérez Huaranca demonstrate the existence of a radical political culture rooted in the realities of life in the Peruvian interior, Shining Path *cadres* would demonstrate the continuities between radicalism, folkloric traditions and communal conflicts and their militancy in the 1980s. Local memories of previous insurgencies and radical mobilisations are therefore vital for understanding the nature of Shining Path's actions. That is, because they produced the rank-and-file *Senderistas* who formed detachments, and carried out actions, on the party leadership's behalf.

A tradition of Andean radicalism?

In order to comprehend why *cadres* and peasant communities initially supported Shining Path in the 1980s, it is vital to understand the numerous forms of radical mobilisation which existed in Ayacucho, and across the Andes, in the preceding decades. These included the insurgencies led by the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN) and *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario* (MIR), student protests, and the mobilisation of the teachers' union *Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú* (SUTEP).

The ELN and MIR insurgencies of the early and mid-1960s aimed to recreate the Cuban Revolution in Peru. The operations of the ELN were focused around Junín and Ayacucho, and the MIR created three revolutionary fronts in the north, central and south of the Peruvian Andes. Ultimately, both movements were shortlived and were defeated by the Peruvian military in 1965. These experiences would have a significant impact on

the internal armed conflict, however, as Shining Path aimed to avoid the mistakes of these previous movements.¹¹⁵

These groups, however, were not the only people who suspected that the Andes, and Ayacucho department in particular, might be ripe for revolution. Vich, for example, describes a “situation of profound antagonism between the peasant population and the Peruvian State”, in which *ayacuchano* communities became increasingly resistant to police harassment, endemic poverty and the unpopular educational reforms which led to the Huanta rebellion in 1969 (in which Abimael Guzmán was arrested).¹¹⁶ In 1971, as Heilman demonstrates, peasants mobilised from communities across Ayacucho in order to voice their frustrations against abusive district authorities.¹¹⁷ And throughout the 1970s, SUTEP became increasingly radical whilst agitating for reform. That SUTEP’s local leaders would turn towards a Maoist doctrine and eventually become Shining Path militants highlights, for Heilman, an important element of continuity between 1970s activism and mobilisation in support of Shining Path at the beginning of the conflict.¹¹⁸

Popular mobilisation persisted despite the reforms of the Leftist Velasco military government, including the Agrarian Reform which allowed limited sectors of the peasantry to own and work their own land whilst continuing to exclude the majority.¹¹⁹ Yet these reforms were not the starting point of antagonism between Ayacucho and the state; they were simply another example of the state’s failure to create effective, progressive policy on behalf of the peasant population.¹²⁰ Furthermore, the patterns of

¹¹⁵ The Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru would later be formed out of the remnants of the MIR.

¹¹⁶ Vich, *Poéticas del duelo*, p.37.

¹¹⁷ Wilson describes SUTEP as being controlled by the Maoist group PCP-Patria Roja and highlights their involvement in strikes throughout the 1970s, particularly those in 1979 which were “critical events utilised by Shining Path to recruit far more widely”. Heilman, *Before the Shining Path*, p.150. Fiona Wilson, ‘Transcending Race? Schoolteachers and Political Militancy in Andean Peru, 1970–2000’, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 39 (2007), pp.719–46 (p.729).

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.175.

¹¹⁹ Anna Cant, “‘Land for Those Who Work It’: A Visual Analysis of Agrarian Reform Posters in Velasco’s Peru”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 44:1 (2012), pp.1–37 (p.7).

¹²⁰ Dorais has also demonstrated the significant opposition to the reforms articulated by the two dominant Maoist groups, PCP-Bandera Roja and PCP-Patria Roja. Geneviève Dorais, ‘Les Ennemis de Mes Ennemis Sont Mes Ennemis: Regard Sur L’émergence de la Gauche Radicale Péruvienne Dans la Foulée des Réformes Velasquistes (1969–1980)’, *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 36:71 (2011), pp.197–233.

political tensions visible across Ayacucho department in this period can also be seen elsewhere across the Andean interior. For example, Meza Salcedo has highlighted the numerous inter- and intra-communal conflicts which existed in the community of Tíclacayán, Cerro de Pasco in the 1970s. These disputes were partly produced by inter-generational conflicts and the differing economic fortunes of families as a result of the Agrarian Reform, and would later re-emerge as peasants used Shining Path as a vehicle for promoting their own localised causes and eliminating their rivals.¹²¹

Using a Lefebvrian understanding of power and spatial practice, I argue that the situation of antagonism as described by Vich and Meza Salcedo was created by local resistance to the exercise of hegemony by the Peruvian state over the Andean region. A similar argument is made by Flores Galindo in his description of the “Andean utopia” which he argues is both a form of historical memory which idealises Peru’s Incan past, as well as a call to action to for successive movements to create a more equal society.¹²² However, whereas Flores Galindo emphasises the cultural aspects of the Andean utopia, I believe it is essential to highlight how the concept inspired a very local form of resistance to Peru’s historical socio-spatial structure. For young militants in Ayacucho, inspiration for supporting Shining Path came not so much from ideas about an idealistic Incan past, but from the recent memories and stories of conflicts in previous decades.

Space was not a passive factor in these conflicts, but a mechanism used to maintain forms of governmental control. However, I also argue that this resistance against hegemony existed because Andean radicals created new ideas about how space and land could be used as a mechanism to create a new society. The conflict between these two projects contributed a distinct sense of place in many communities; a distinct feeling

¹²¹ Américo David Meza Salcedo, ‘Memorias e identidades en conflicto: el sentido del recuerdo y del olvido en las comunidades rurales de Cerro de Pasco a principios del siglo XXI’ (Tesis doctoral: PUCP, 2014), p.179.

¹²² Flores Galindo, *Buscando un inca*.

that Ayacucho was ripe for rebellion which can be felt in the writings of Díaz Martínez and Pérez Huaranca. This sense of communal resistance persists in many ways to this day, but it was particularly strong in the 1970s and early years of the internal conflict.

Case study: Lucanamarca

The murder of 69 *campesinos* in the ranching community Lucanamarca, in the Huancasancos province of Ayacucho, is one of the earliest and most brutal reprisals carried out by Shining Path against the peasant communities of the Andes. The *Informe Final* states that “the study of the Lucanamarca massacre is important because it marks the beginning of the policy of massive repression by Sendero Luminoso on the national political level”.¹²³ However, this was not an isolated incident and the massacre exists in a pattern of community resistance to Shining Path and subsequent reprisals which would have been familiar to villages across the Andes, but particularly in Ayacucho, during the early years of the conflict. Having initially demonstrated support for Shining Path, the communities of Huancasancos were encouraged by the military to repel their invaders, and as a result suffered brutal revenge at the hands of the insurgents. At the same time, it is important to highlight that the armed forces conducted reprisals of their own. Because of this interplay between the actions of the military, Lucanamarca community and Shining Path, I have selected the Lucanamarca massacre as a moment through which it is possible to understand wider experiences of community organisation and retribution in the internal armed conflict.

¹²³ CVR, *Tm. V*, p.51.

i) Lucanamarca

The early years of the internal conflict saw Sendero Luminoso attempt to establish control over the northern reaches of Ayacucho department, and areas of Apurímac and Huancavelica. Kent argues that the insurgents were moving between a primary phase of guerrilla warfare, in which they focused on attacking government outposts and individual assassinations, and a secondary phase, in which they established a territorial core of support. Control over the Caracha river region of Ayacucho, incorporating Sacsamarca and Lucanamarca, was central to this strategy.¹²⁴ In particular, the isolated geography and terrain of the region, as well as the perceived higher levels of wealth in the Huancasancos region, made the area an important strategic zone for Shining Path.¹²⁵ The local Colegio Los Andes had also been an important centre for *Senderismo* in the years preceding the conflict. Professors who had trained in Huamanga were central in setting up Comités Populares and becoming local guerrilla leaders.¹²⁶ Shining Path aimed to manipulate local tensions, turning younger generations against local elites.¹²⁷ This strategy included the assassination of *gamonalillos* (wealthier peasants) and local powerholders in the main plaza of the community and the redistribution of property amongst the peasants.¹²⁸ These acts conformed to Shining Path's belief that the bloodletting of local powerholders (particularly when demonstrated in significant communal spaces) would act as a foundational moment of violence for their new society and mobilise the peasantry to their cause.

¹²⁴ Robert B. Kent, 'Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru', *Geographical Review*, 83:4 (1993), pp.441-454 (p.441).

¹²⁵ CVR, *Lucanamarca: Una terca esperanza* (Lima, 2003), p.1.

¹²⁶ CVR, *Violencia política en la provincial de Huancasancos: los casos de Lucanamarca, Sancos y Sacsamarca* (Ayacucho, 2002), p.2.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.11.

¹²⁸ COMISEDH, *Informe de COMISEDH para la Comisión de la Verdad Y Reconciliación sobre la masacre senderista del 3 de abril de 1983 en Santiago de Lucanamarca: Antecedentes, Hechos, Víctimas, Fosas, Sobrevivientes, y Testigos* (Lima, 2002), p.4.



Fig. 2: Map of Ayacucho department [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayacucho_Region].

As a result, violence intensified across Huancasancos from 1982 but the insurgents initially met with little resistance. Flores Galindo argues that, in order to counter this, the military increased their presence in Huanta and Uchuraccay whilst also taking part in forms of “psychological warfare” to turn peasants against Shining Path.¹²⁹ Encouraged by the military, the first roots of peasant resistance to Shining Path began to appear in 1983 when seven *Senderistas* were assassinated in Huaychao and Macabamba in January, shortly before peasants in Uchuraccay killed eight *limeño* journalists who they suspected of being Shining Path members.¹³⁰ The combination of military propaganda, the systematic abuses of Shining Path against the peasant population and the demonstration by the armed forces that little or no punishment would be given for

¹²⁹ Flores Galindo, *Buscando un inca*, p.237.

¹³⁰ Del Pino, *En nombre del gobierno*, pp.43-94.

the execution of suspected terrorists (as highlighted in the Uchuraccay case) were effective in persuading other communities to resist the insurgents.

On top of this, the *comuneros* of Lucanamarca were particularly enraged that Shining Path forbade them from negotiating prices for their own produce, and so they agreed (with the authorities of Saccsamarca and Huancasancos) to prepare the *ronda campesina* to capture the local *Senderista* leader Olegario Curitomay.¹³¹ In February and March, ten *Senderistas* were killed and another seven were captured in the towns of Saccsamarca and Lucanamarca. Finally, on March 22 1983, a group of *comuneros* captured Curitomay and took him to the town square. Curitomay was surrounded by villagers and attacked with stones and axes, set on fire and then shot dead. In the testimony given to the CVR, it was the death of Curitomay which, for most witnesses, created Shining Path's desire for vengeance against the population of Lucanamarca.¹³²

In the early hours of Sunday April 3, a column of around sixty *Senderistas* armed with axes, machetes, knives and guns launched a series of attacks on hamlets and villages in the Huancasancos region, culminating in an attack on Lucanamarca. The column first came upon a group of twenty men, women and children in Yanacollpa who were locked inside a building and slaughtered them. The column then marched to Lucanamarca, killing a further eight people on the way, and arrived in the village around 4pm. The insurgent leaders called upon the Lucanamarca villagers not to flee, claiming that they were only there to hold an assembly in the village square.¹³³ Many villagers did attempt to leave, but a large group were conducted towards the square where all adult males were killed against the church wall. Testimonies given to the CVR then state that a young boy, named Epifanio Quispe Tacas, prevented a second group of

¹³¹ COMISEDH, *Informe de COMISEDH sobre la masacre senderista en Santiago de Lucanamarca*, p.7.

¹³² CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. IV*, p.44.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p.44-7.

comuneros from being executed by shouting from the church tower that he could see the military approaching Lucanamarca. At this point, the column left the town, but not before looting and burning several key buildings and shops.¹³⁴ In total, sixty-nine men, women and children were killed in the district of Santiago de Lucanamarca throughout the day.

Full responsibility for the attack on Lucanamarca was accepted by Abimael Guzmán, who confirmed to the CVR that the massacre had been planned by the Central Committee of the Shining Path. Other important Sendero leaders, including Elena Iparraguirre, Osman Morote and Martha Huatay, admitted knowledge of and responsibility for the attack, but peasants who gave testimony pinned full responsibility for the attack on Hildebrando Pérez Huaranca, a local *mestizo* teacher wearing military uniform (and author of *Los ilegítimos*), for organising and planning the reprisal at the local level.¹³⁵

The massacre is described by the CVR as “a milestone in the so-called ‘popular war’, the first of the massive and indiscriminate massacres which began to characterise the actions of Shining Path and converted them into the bloodiest seditious group in Latin American history”.¹³⁶ However, Lucanamarca must also be understood as an act of intimidation and retaliation by Shining Path amidst a battle for local supremacy. To the party, it appeared that the initial support they had received was on the wane and that Ayacucho communities needed reminding of who they should really be supporting. Speaking later about the incident, Abimael Guzmán stated that “[when] confronted with the use of armed bands and reactionary military action, we responded decisively with

¹³⁴ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. IV*, p.48.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.45. It has since been claimed by Pérez’s family that there are inconsistencies in the evidence given to the CVR and that only one witness, who had previously claimed to not be at Lucanamarca on the day of the attack, could confirm that the teacher was there. Niko Velita, ‘Verdades y mentiras sobre Hildebrando Pérez Huaranca’, *La Primera Digital*, 19 August 2012 [http://www.diariolaprimera.peru.com/online/cultura/verdades-y-mentiras-sobre-hildebrando-perez-huaranca_118149.html].

¹³⁶ CVR, *Hatun Willakuy: Versión Abreviada del Informe Final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (Lima, 2004), p.133.

one action: Lucanamarca... The principal thing was to make [the peasants] understand that we are a hard bone to chew and that we are ready to do anything".¹³⁷ However, the party has more recently described the massacre as an excess, whilst continuing to frame Lucanamarca within the context of a battle between themselves and the Armed Forces:

*"Here is the political significance [of Lucanamarca]: the suspension and breaking of the use and formation of rondas, plans that [the Armed Forces] had to postpone. The negative aspect: the excess, the military extremism that never has been a general policy of the Peruvian Communist Party."*¹³⁸

It was a moment in which all of the rage which Shining Path had articulated and directed against the state was suddenly and devastatingly turned back upon the communities on behalf of whom the popular war was ostensibly being fought. What Shining Path could not come to terms with was that in some cases communities were voluntarily forming *rondas campesinas*, and that in others the Armed Forces were more effective at bargaining or coercing the *campesinos* into forming patrols, and so they lashed out. To paraphrase Žižek, this was a dramatic and impotent *passage à l'acte* which "avoided the real enemy".¹³⁹ Shining Path's attempt to erase the State was in ruins, the Popular War rendered impotent by its failure to grasp local reality and articulate opposition to local problems as previous movements had done in the past. And so the party turned on the communities who had rejected them, misconstruing them as the real enemies of the revolution, failing to understand that peasant populations had their own agency and distinct perspective on mobilisation which existed outside of Shining Path's dichotomous understanding of Old and New power. In fact, in the case

¹³⁷ Abimael Guzmán quoted in Degregori, *How Difficult It Is to Be God*, p.22.

¹³⁸ PCP-SL, *Breves notas aclaratorias acerca de los tergiversados hechos de Lucanamarca en la Guerra Popular del Perú*, p.74.

¹³⁹ Žižek, *Violence*, p.176-7.

of Lucanamarca, the real counterrevolutionaries were *Senderistas* because, having witnessed the failure of their Popular War to mobilise the peasantry, they internalised and acted upon the same violent racism which had been demonstrated to them by decades of bureaucratic abuse. Not eradicating *gamonalismo*, but reproducing it.

ii) New frontiers of violence: Shining Path in the *selva*

In order to demonstrate the ways in which local politics shaped Shining Path strategy under a very different set of circumstances, it is necessary to explore the party's expansion into the *selva central* from 1987 onwards. The geography of this period is highly important as Shining Path, having begun to expand their operations into the jungle from 1983, came to dominate Alto Huallaga, the Río Ene and Satipo province, whilst the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) retained a strong presence in Oxapampa, Valle de Perené and Chanchamayo. The Asháninka communities of Gran Pajonal, however, rejected the attempted incursions of Shining Path altogether.¹⁴⁰ In the Alto Huallaga, Cáceres and Río Ene regions, Shining Path also embarked upon a co-operative arrangement with drug traffickers (particularly members of the Medellín cartel) whilst also acting as “protectors” of the local population from the abuses of state forces and the Medellín traffickers. The insurgents’ “*convivencia*” with the traffickers was a marriage of convenience in this time as the two parties shared

¹⁴⁰ Oscar Espinoza and Leslie Villapolo, *La violencia política y los pueblos indígenas en la selva central: Informe preliminar*. Lima, Defensoría del Pueblo, SR-39-00.Coordinación de Investigaciones. Estudios en Profundidad.040408 Impacto de la violencia política en la selva central.

resources to protect themselves from state forces, but the insurgents also assassinated many cartel members who resisted their right to rule.¹⁴¹



Fig. 3: Map of Junín department [http://fotosdeculturas.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/mapa-del-departamento-de-junin.html].

The incursion of Shining Path into Satipo province caused massive displacement of indigenous Asháninka and Nomatsiguenga communities as they scrambled to escape insurgent violence. In the *selva*, Shining Path continued to assassinate local powerholders and opponents, but also took on a much more aggressive strategy of land-grabbing by burning indigenous settlements, forcing participation in *escuelas populares* and enslaving parts of the population.¹⁴² Whilst the MRTA similarly participated in the assassination of local authorities (including the assassination of Asháninka leader Alejandro Calderón which ultimately led to the MRTA's expulsion from Oxapampa by the *Ejército Asháninka* in 1990), they directed a lesser degree of violence against the civilian population which led to some areas passing from PCP-SL to MRTA control.¹⁴³ Nonetheless, the disruption to indigenous communities caused by both groups was enormous, replicating the same violations, enslavement, destruction and racial

¹⁴¹ Centro Amazónico de Antropología y Aplicación Práctica, *Violencia y narcotráfico en la amazonía* (Lima, 1992), p.48.

¹⁴² Espinoza and Villapolo, 'Satipo Province', *La violencia política y los pueblos indígenas en la selva central*.

¹⁴³ 'Provincia de Chanchamayo', *Ibid.*

hierarchies that had been demonstrated during the rubber boom in the region in the early twentieth century.

The presence of Shining Path and the MRTA in the *selva central* must also be understood within the context of the colonisation of the jungle by peasants from mountain regions which had been occurring increasingly over the past century. To the community elders of the *selva*, the insurgents represented a continuation of this practice in which their lands had been encroached upon with regularity. Espinoza and Villapolo have argued that “the relationship of the subversive groups with the Asháninka reproduced the same type of discriminatory relationship that exists between the *mestizo* colonists of Andean origin and the indigenous communities of the region”.¹⁴⁴ During the conflict, but also to this day, Asháninka communities in the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM) have been routinely harassed and displaced by an association of colonists, drug traffickers and Shining Path who “systematically invade indigenous lands in order to grow coca”. As Santos-Granero and Barclay highlight, however, these recent confrontations ought to be seen in a far broader context of violence against indigenous peoples in the *selva central* in which Andean colonisers, capitalist enterprises and state agencies have routinely encroached upon Asháninka lands for decades (if not longer).¹⁴⁵

This dynamic added another level of complexity into the political situation in the *selva* because, as *rondas nativas* and the *Ejército Asháninka* were formed, their struggle was marked by territoriality and the cultural identity of indigenous groups. Asháninka patrols distinguished heavily between *nosháninka* (“brother”), *chori* (“colonist”) and *kichóncari* (“guerrilla”) and whilst they struggled continuously against brutal Shining

¹⁴⁴ ‘Proposiciones’, *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Fernando Santos-Granero and Frederica Barclay, ‘Bundles, Stampers, and Flying Gringos: Native Perceptions of Capitalist Violence in Peruvian Amazonia’, *Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology*, 16:1 (2011), pp.143-67 (p.149).

Path violence, they also took violent revenge on colonist communities who they perceived as being equally responsible for indigenous deterritorialisation over the preceding decades.¹⁴⁶ However, as Villapolo argues, indigenous memories of this period continue to contain huge silences over the activities, and widespread human rights abuses, of the *rondas nativas* against the insurgents and colonist population. In part, this serves to represent themselves as hapless victims rather than as active participants in violence, whilst also obscuring the initial support of some communities for Shining Path.¹⁴⁷

Shining Path's presence in the *selva central* conforms to Kent's arguments about the insurgents' territorial expansion, insofar as they expanded along strategically important routes from Ayacucho into the jungle, developed a patron-clientele relationship with coca-growers and created *escuelas populares* to develop territorial bases of support.¹⁴⁸ To a large extent, it has been the development of these bases of support in jungle and rainforest areas which has frustrated the total eradication of Shining Path to this day. However, it is also clear that the local conditions of the *selva*, and complex of interplay of competing ethnic identities and indigenous organisations, highly influenced the temporary alliances made by Shining Path and the forms of violence they employed. It is therefore vital that Shining Path's incursion into the *selva* is not represented as some kind of essentialised, *Heart of Darkness*-like episode of depravity, nor that it is ignored in historiography as Greene argues has been so often the case.¹⁴⁹ Instead, the *selva central* must be understood as a collection of spaces produced both by highly modern conflicts (including the attacks on coca-growers by the Peruvian government with

¹⁴⁶ Leslie Villapolo Herrera, 'Senderos del desengaño: construcción de memorias, identidades, colectivas, y proyectos de future en una comunidad Asháninka' in (Ponciano del Pino and Elizabeth Jelin eds.), *Luchas locales, comunidades e identidades* (Madrid, 2005), pp.145-74 (p.157).

¹⁴⁷ Villapolo, 'Senderos del desengaño', p.154.

¹⁴⁸ Kent, 'Geographical Dimensions of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru', p.449.

¹⁴⁹ Shane Greene, 'Getting over the Andes: The Geo-Eco Politics of Indigenous Movements in Peru's 21st Century Inca Empire', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 38 (2006), pp.327-354 (p.331).

support from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency), complex geography and dynamic local politics with numerous important powerholders. The political violence perpetrated by Shining Path in the *selva central*, therefore, was not simply a product of the insurgents' ideology, but also of this complex set of local circumstances.

iii) A “representative” history?¹⁵⁰

Given these examples, to what extent can Lucanamarca be called emblematic? Del Pino has highlighted the insufficiency of the national experience to stand in for the array of localised experiences of violence from the conflict, each shaped by the social contours of each community.¹⁵¹ Writing in 2004, he argued that the cases such as Uchuraccay, which for many represented a kind of ethnic Indian violence against white and *mestizo* journalists, had silenced and obscured other cases like Lucanamarca where it was the peasant population who were the victims. However, in the years since, Lucanamarca has become a highly discussed and represented case, having been selected as an emblematic case of violence by the CVR and LUM. Whilst this is no guarantee that the significance of Lucanamarca is understood by large sectors of the population, del Pino's analysis that “considers individuals and local communities as places of analysis” must be re-applied, raising the possibility that the overrepresentation of Lucanamarca may now be silencing other experiences of violence.¹⁵² Given this, it is essential that we attempt to problematize and de-emblematize Lucanamarca in order to understand its true significance.

¹⁵⁰ This term is used by the CVR to describe twenty-three case studies selected for detailed analysis in Volume V of the *Informe Final*. There are a further seventy-three “investigated cases” in Volume VII, while other volumes outline a more thematic approach to understanding the conflict. See CVR, ‘Table of Contents’ [<http://cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/index.php>, accessed 6 February 2017].

¹⁵¹ Ponciano del Pino, ‘Violencia, memoria e imaginación: Uchuraccay y Lucanamarca en la violencia política en el Perú’, *Boletín IFP*, 1:7 (2004), pp.11-13 (p.12).

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p.13.

For a start, despite being held up as an emblematic example of insurgent violence, it is one of few examples of mass, collective violence perpetrated by Shining Path against civilians, as the insurgents often targeted local authorities and powerholders, the police force and military patrols. When considered alongside the numerous atrocities perpetrated by state agents and *rondas campesinas* in Accomarca, Putis, state prisons, and Cuartel Los Cabitos in Ayacucho (as discussed in Chapter 2), among others, mass reprisal appears to be a tactic which was not particularly expressive of Shining Path ideology, but one which was deployed by all sides during the conflict (and predominantly by state agents). In this sense, mass reprisal as a form of Shining Path violence must be understood alongside other practices (for example, *retiradas* and the execution of local officials) which were focused on constructing a New state in spaces where the vestiges of Old power had been eliminated. This was, fundamentally, Shining Path's spatial practice, which ought to be understood as being distinct from the spatial practice of counterinsurgency violence (analysed in Chapter 2).

Furthermore, the events in Lucanamarca after the massacre are also very rarely discussed. For example, the 2002 *Comisión de Derechos Humanos* (COMISEDH) report to the CVR states that “after the massacre by Shining Path came the *sinchis* that robbed them, raped the women and assassinated many people”.¹⁵³ In the years that followed, numerous assassinations and disappearances were carried out in Huancasancos district by both Shining Path and the armed forces. However, these events, as well as the murder of Olegario Curitomay, have become divorced from official accounts of the massacre. As Almeida argues, this process had led to the solidification of Lucanamarca as an emblematic case of Shining Path violence, an image

¹⁵³ COMISEDH, *Informe de COMISEDH sobre la masacre en Santiago de Lucanamarca*, p.15.

which has been reinforced through the way in which testimonies related to it have been collected and represented.¹⁵⁴

In no way is this argument designed to excuse the violent actions of Shining Path; nor does it intend to hide the equally heinous, pervasive and systemic forms of violence, such as the enslavement of Asháninka communities, that the group perpetrated in the *selva central*. Instead, the intention of this analysis is to highlight the insufficiency of certain emblematic cases to stand in for a panoply of experiences. In the case of Lucanamarca, the massacre has become an event around which narratives of Shining Path violence have crystallised to the point that other memories of violence have been obscured from the community's history. The construction of Lucanamarca as an emblematic case also places a false emphasis on the rationale and aesthetics of mass reprisal as somehow representative of all Shining Path violence. As Žižek argues, this kind of construction of violent narratives is an “ideological action *par excellence*”, the reasons for which can be located in the particular aesthetics of violence in the narrative which have been preserved.¹⁵⁵ By building narratives of the internal armed conflict from the perspective of Lucanamarca, Shining Path violence is emphasised, counterinsurgent violence is legitimated (and to some extent rendered invisible), and the position of Andean peasants as helpless victims is reinforced.

In a similar way, Koc-Menard argues that the construction of the community of Chungui as an emblematic case of Shining Path violence by the CVR has allowed the communities of the district to represent themselves as passive victims of violence and to

¹⁵⁴ To an extent, legal proceedings have also contributed to the construction of “emblematic” moments of violence. For example, survivors of Lucanamarca spoke at Guzmán's 2004 trial, whilst Guzmán and Iparaguire were tried again in 2014 for the bombing of Calle Tarata in 1992. With reference to transitional justice in Argentina and Uruguay, Levey has argued that landmark cases such as these not only set precedents for future cases, but have the potential to contribute to broader shifts from impunity to accountability in post-conflict societies. Claudia Almeida Goshi, ‘Entre sombras y silencios: los testimonios acerca de las muertes de Marcian Huancahuari y Olegario Curitomay’ in in (Francesca Denegri and Alexandra Hibbett eds.), *Dando Cuenta: Estudios sobre el testimonio de la violencia política en el Perú (1980-2000)* (Lima, 2016), pp.239-64 (p.262); Levey, *Fragile Memory, Shifting Impunity*, p.84.

¹⁵⁵ Žižek, *Violence*, p.174.

hide their own participation with the insurgents.¹⁵⁶ Perhaps most telling, however, is the below statement by COMISEDH to the CVR in 2003:

*“On the theme of clandestine graves in general, the immense majority were created by members of the armed forces and the balance of forensic anthropological interventions of the CVR would appear to be slanted...the graves of Lucanamarca would have an important impact on public opinion...it affirms [the CVR’s] position of equilibrium and objectivity in your investigation”.*¹⁵⁷

Concern over balance is highly common in approaches to the truth and reconciliation process in Peru, yet this quote specifically highlights the potential for Lucanamarca to be given greater prominence as an emblematic case in order to deflect criticism of the methods of the CVR. Human rights organisations and memory initiatives, beset on all sides by a hostile right-wing press, state institutions and the problems of securing financing for their projects, constantly attempt to walk a tightrope between criticising violence perpetrated by agents of the state and violence perpetrated by Shining Path and the MRTA. As part of this balancing act, Lucanamarca is regularly held up as an unsurpassable example of Shining Path brutality, without which the case for the extreme violence of the Peruvian state would be even more difficult to justify. As Almeida argues, it is an emblematic case because it was committed by *Senderistas*, and not by members of the armed forces.¹⁵⁸

It would be wrong to suggest that it was the CVR’s intention to establish equilibrium between different violent actors in the conflict, particularly when the *Informe Final*

¹⁵⁶ Nathalie Koc-Menard, ‘Sufrimiento humano y representación de víctimas: El caso de Chungui en la posguerra peruana’, *Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Études Andines*, 43:2 (2014), pp.209-226 (p.216).

¹⁵⁷ Lima, Defensoría del Pueblo, Unidad de Investigaciones y Antropológicas Forenses.1003. Equipo de Investigaciones. 100304. Lucanamarca.Tm 3.158

¹⁵⁸ Almeida, ‘Entre sombras y silencios’, p.241.

makes great efforts to highlight the diverse non-fatal, societal and psychological impacts of political violence, or to argue that Shining Path violence has been exaggerated to justify state violence. Nonetheless, from this we can conclude that the construction of Lucanamarca as an emblematic case of violence is highly problematic. The idea of Lucanamarca, in essence, is to highlight the victimisation of the peasant population at the hands of Shining Path in order to suggest that it is representative of systematic violence when, in fact, it is one of many forms of violence deployed by the insurgents, against an array of victims, on the basis of complex (and at times competing) logics of violence. In the words of Ramírez, “the macrostory of the CVR constructed from the point of departure of Lucanamarca...generated a new national narrative that not only maintains the bloody image of Shining Path, but allows Andean peasants...to pass as victims”.¹⁵⁹ The mobilisation of this discourse also silences the voices of many other communities, in the *sierra* but particularly in the *selva*, who suffered intensely during this period. This focus, as Greene argues, has had the effect of conflating Andeanness with ideas about poverty, victimisation, suffering and indigeneity; categories which, rightly or wrongly, apply just as easily to indigenous communities in the Amazon but which are silenced in the context of the conflict.¹⁶⁰ Thus, rather than highlighting the importance of Lucanamarca in an emblematic or illustrative sense, it is important that the heterogeneity of experiences of the conflict across different locations is recognised and that the case is considered as only one element of the wider spatio-temporal trajectory of Shining Path.

¹⁵⁹ Rafael Ramírez Mendoza, ‘Una lectura crítica de la memoria emblemática de la CVR desde los testimonios de las massacre de Lucanamarca’ in (Francesca Denegri and Alexandra Hibbett eds.), *Dando Cuenta: Estudios sobre el testimonio de la violencia política en el Perú (1980-2000)* (Lima, 2016), pp.213-38 (p.214).

¹⁶⁰ Greene, ‘Getting Over the Andes’, p.327.

iv) The geographies of Shining Path violence

To appreciate these numerous trajectories of violence, it is worth returning to the CVR's *Informe Final* which states that:

*“the most probable figure for victims who died in the violence is 69,280 individuals... More than 40 percent of the deaths and disappearances reported to the CVR are concentrated in the Andean department of Ayacucho. These victims taken together with those documented by the CVR in the departments of Junín, Huánuco, Huancavelica, Apurímac and San Martín, add up to 85 percent of the victims.”*¹⁶¹

Taken together, the six departments mentioned here highlight the concentration of victims in mountainous areas as well as in the jungles regions of Junín and San Martín. In short, the CVR immediately creates a geography in which the conflict took place, and from which it derives later conclusions about Shining Path violence, the human rights abuses of the counterinsurgency operation and why the scale of the violence was so widely underestimated in Peru for so long. However, each of these departments was also affected by violence more heavily at differing stages of the conflict. For example, whilst high percentages of deaths and disappearances in Ayacucho and Huancavelica occurred between 1980 and 1986, San Martín, Junín and Ucayali suffered more violence between 1985 and 1990 after Shining Path had moved into jungle areas, whilst violence in Lima-Callao increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s.¹⁶²

What this suggests is, as opposed to ever coming close to encircling Lima, Shining Path's activities during the conflict fall into three spatio-temporal stages. Whilst the

¹⁶¹ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. VIII, pp.315-6.

¹⁶² Instituto Defensa Legal, *Huancavelica: Una compilación del Informe Final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación* (Lima, 2005), p.129.

group's presence in Lima will be dealt with in later chapters, above are outlined several examples of the insurgents' incursions into communities in the northern half of Ayacucho department in the early 1980s, and of their expansion northwards into the *selva central* later in the decade (at the same time they expanded south-east into Apurímac, with operations in Cusco and Puno to a lesser extent). This strategy does not point towards the logic of sporadic terrorist violence, but an attempt to build a revolutionary core from which to develop further actions. This strategy failed, however, because of the rejection of the insurgents by many of the communities they had planned to rely on.

The geography of Shining Path was therefore dictated by a series of pre-existing, interlocking geographies which, in many ways, the insurgents benefitted from and acted upon as party *cadres* were themselves a product of the same spatial practices. Intercommunal disputes, agrarian reform, and a series of ethnic identities which came to denote *Senderistas* as colonisers, not liberators, all came to shape the progression of the party along the Andean *cordillera*.

Therefore, Shining Path's initiation of the armed conflict provided impetus for the remilitarisation of pre-existing conflicts and grievances in each of these regions, a situation further exacerbated by the actions of state forces, *rondas campesinas*, the MRTA, and narcotraffickers. Whilst to denounce Shining Path violence in this context is correct, it is vital to also criticise and denounce the multiple levels of educational, ethnic and economic structural violence which shapes the communities where the insurgents gained initial levels of support. Although the CVR highlights numerous overlapping factors likely to be shared by victims (categories such as peasant, indigenous, Quechua-speaking, illiterate, poor, Andean) and identifies the spaces where violence was concentrated, it fails to identify space as both productive of those

categories and of the violence which took place. However, it is important to also recognise, as Pereyra argues, “the political, calculating, negotiating capacity of the peasant populations”, which was also highly productive of geographies of violence.¹⁶³

This highlights the pivotal and difficult position held by the CVR. The aim of the Commission was to make Peruvians aware of the scale of violence that had occurred in the *sierra*; in short, its job was to create discourse about violence. However, in the opening of up discussions about violence in the Andes, the CVR also appears to have reinforced many stereotypes about the poverty and exclusion of Andean communities, using an array of problematic and constructed categories to create an image of the archetypal “victim”. The effect of this is to create a further category of the Andean victim, reinforcing the constructed discursive distance between the capital and the *sierra*, and failing to identify that discursive distance as a factor which also contributed to the production of violence. In this sense, the CVR report shares characteristics with the *indigenista* literature of the early twentieth century, the purpose of which, in the words of Kristal, was to “inform an urban public of a little-understood reality”.¹⁶⁴

Discourses and imagined geographies about Shining Path violence are, however, by no means limited to the CVR, as constructions of Peruvian geography are central to how Shining Path conceived of themselves, how cultural producers have understood Shining Path, and how memory projects in Peru have tried to represent the insurgents in the context of the internal conflict. In particular, cultural artefacts produced by *Senderistas* themselves provide an illuminating view of the competing geographies and social spaces which informed the decisions of Shining Path’s leadership. However, as will be seen below, a diverse array of cultural artefacts also suggest that party *cadres* were far

¹⁶³ Nelson Pereyra Chávez. ‘Interview in-person’ (Huamanga, 2016).

¹⁶⁴ Efraín Kristal, *The Andes Viewed from the City: Literary and Political Discourse of the Indian in Peru, 1848-1930* (New York, 1987), p.217.

more inclined to draw on traditions of Andean radicalism and peasant mobilisation than the provincial middle-class who were the party's leaders.

Shining Path's cultural production

An analysis of the body of Shining Path cultural production on the internal conflict is shaped by diversity in the type of sources currently available, and limited by an awareness that any such understanding is only indicative of the wider array of documents, artworks and songs produced by the group which are now lost or hidden. That being said, the below analysis takes into account a range of documents and artefacts produced by Shining Path which covers official party documents, tracts and pamphlets, forms of cultural production sympathetic to the Communist and Maoist ideals of the party leadership, and alternative interpretations of Shining Path which place greater emphasis on the party's Peruvian and Andean roots.

Gorriti's analysis of *New Democracy*, a Shining Path publication which focused on outlining party ideology and its links to Chinese Maoism, suggests that Guzmán's "creative, yet rigorous adaptation of Marxism" thoroughly adopted Marxist symbols and language, referencing the writings of Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao.¹⁶⁵ Documents written by Guzmán and the party to intervene in matters relating to the Peruvian conflict were prefaced by histories of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Paris Commune and the USSR, all considered to be part of the "global proletarian revolution".¹⁶⁶ In this, Shining Path were not alone, having emerged from a splintered Peruvian Left which was highly factional but which also shared many characteristics across its spectrum. One pamphlet published sometime between 1986 and 1988, for example, contains a number of poems

¹⁶⁵ Gustavo Gorriti, *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru* (Durham, 1999), p.122.

¹⁶⁶ PCP-SL, *Sobre campaña de rectificación con "¡Elecciones No! ¡Guerra popular, sí!"* (Lima, 1991), pp.6-8.

and articles by Mao followed by articles by Shining Path and PCP-Bandera Roja on how to apply the lessons of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism to the popular war in Peru and to the global revolution.¹⁶⁷

As suggested earlier, these ideological tracts reflect the political views of the party leadership. Although the Marxist ideas outlined in them are discussed with reference to Peruvian circumstances past and present, they give the impression that party leaders took greater inspiration for their *guerra popular* from their trips to China than they did from the poverty and social exclusion suffered by the peasant communities who would fill their rank-and-file. This is supported by Rothwell who states that “Mao’s criticisms of Peng Dehuai in the wake of the Great Leap Forward had a more direct bearing on the nature of Shining Path peasant organising in Ayacucho than did the writings of Peruvian communist founding father José Carlos Mariátegui” and that “the top leadership of Shining Path and many other pro-Chinese communists from competing organisations travelled to China and studied Maoism there. Not unlike Catholic priests taking special classes in Rome”.¹⁶⁸

This tendency to take influence from China is reflected to some extent in Shining Path’s cultural production in which Mao’s ideas and image (particularly in murals, discussed below) and Communist symbolism are deployed regularly. Take, for example, the poem *En mi pueblo* by imprisoned *Senderista* Elena Iparraguirre. This nostalgic remembering of the initiation of Shining Path’s armed struggle distinctly places the insurgents within a Peruvian context, yet Iparraguirre deploys Marxist symbols and ideas, specifically that the peasantry had to disappear as a class in order to mobilise as the proletariat. The poem plays on the numerous meanings of *pueblo* in the context of the conflict, standing in simultaneously for an Andean community, the Peruvian nation,

¹⁶⁷ PCP-SL (ed.), *¡Viva el Maoismo!*.

¹⁶⁸ Rothwell, *Transpacific Revolutionaries*, p.49.

and most importantly for Iparraguirre, the masses. She deploys romanticised language about peasant communities, describing women “with their big vicuña eyes” washing clothes in the river, “the elders that talk of yesterday”, the animals and livestock in the community and the mountains and fields of the *pueblo*. The peasants are presented as the stoic heroes, survivors of the conflict between “the malevolent and the guerrillas”.

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Yet it is in her description of the antagonism between the community and the outside world where Iparraguirre makes important statements about the conflict. She describes when “there was war to free yourself of the mountains that weigh upon your shoulders”. And, at the culmination of the poem:

“Many times they killed these people

Many times more they created combatants and rebels...

Happy, alert, vigilant

The masses remain in the town

With their sickles and hammers.”¹⁷⁰

This rather ambiguous ending hints at the possibility of future conflict as the now mobilised peasants wait patiently for the germination of a new generation of rebels to re-open this seemingly eternal struggle between the Andean *pueblo* and the State. However, there is also suggestion that, as a result of their defeat, the peasants must remain in their community, that they were unable to free themselves of the *sierra*. This point is vital because it demonstrates Shining Path’s belief that, to become a modern proletariat, the peasantry must leave their communities, cease being *serranos*, and

¹⁶⁹ Elena Iparraguirre Reveredo, *En mi pueblo* (Lima, 2003), pp.9-10.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p.11.

transform themselves into a revolutionary class (whilst in the process erasing themselves from society).

Iparraguirre was a high-ranking member of Shining Path for many years and fully integrated into the party leadership, and so her work can arguably be said to be more reflective of party doctrine rather than of the ways in which that doctrine was interpreted by rank-and-file. Other forms of Shining Path cultural production, on the other hand, demonstrate a degree of cultural syncretism and show how party militants integrated both Maoist ideology and Andean cultural forms, and imagery from Andean society, into their cultural expression. Ritter, for instance, argues that performances of revolutionary music “themselves were rarely transparent statements of propaganda by the guerrillas... nor were they organic expressions of peasant rebelliousness and support for the revolution”.¹⁷¹ In a similar vein, Vich highlights that the 1970 song *Flor de retama* about the 1969 student protests in Huanta, composed by Ricardo Dolorier and later popularised by Martina Portocarrero, was formerly considered a *Senderista* song which “to listen to in private or sing in public was a risky and dangerous act”.¹⁷² Now, however, Vich proposes that the song has been converted into “a symbol of *ayacuchana* identity and an agent of memory that resignifies the present”.¹⁷³ As with many of the songs analysed by Ritter, *Flor de retama* was not directly composed by Shining Path, but these songs did act as performances of both political and local cultural identity. Because of this, revolutionary songs can be seen as important cultural artefact which were not simply representative of Shining Path doctrine, but which allowed *cadres* and those with Shining Path sympathies to adapt the party’s Maoist outlook to their own surroundings.

¹⁷¹ Ritter, ‘Siren Songs’, p.38.

¹⁷² Vich, *Poéticas del duelo*, p.22. Milton has also highlighted how, on the evening when the CVR handed the *Informe Final* to the community of Ayacucho, the gathered crowd repeatedly requested that performers on-stage sang *Flor de retama*. Cynthia Milton, ‘Public Spaces for the Discussion of Peru’s Recent Past’, *Antípoda*, 5 (2007), pp.143-68 (p.154).

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.29.

Music and revolutionary songs were not the only way in which Shining Path attempted to use cultural production to promote their doctrine among peasant communities. *Senderistas* also used theatre, graffiti and public murals to mobilise support in Andean villages and in Lima's *barriadas*. These practices themselves had historical precedents. For instance, Buntinx has demonstrated how *Aprista* political prisoners in the 1930s and the *Senderistas* imprisoned on El Frontón in the 1980s both used murals, painting and drawings to articulate their experiences and recreate their time in incarceration as a heroic period.¹⁷⁴ In a similar vein, Heilman's history of twentieth century politics in Ayacucho shows that *Apristas*, radical teachers' and students' movements, and later *Senderistas*, also used graffiti as a key means of disseminating their propaganda.¹⁷⁵ Muralists may also have taken inspiration from the political posters produced following the 1959 Cuban Revolution and by the Velasco military government in Peru which, Cant argues, "broadened the possibilities of what posters could achieve" by using varied artistic styles to transmit simple political messages.¹⁷⁶

Even in the years since the conflict, revolutionary art remains an important form of propaganda for the members of the *Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales* (MOVADEF) who publicise art by Shining Path prisoners on their website, as well as a video of the creation of a MOVADEF mural in Buenos Aires and adverts for an arts and crafts workshop.¹⁷⁷ In 2014, Interior Minister Daniel Urresti intervened when an arts exhibition, entitled *En tu nombre*, was opened by the *Asociación de Familiares de Presos Políticos, Desaparecidos y Víctimas de Genocidio* (AFADEVIG – an organisation which appears to campaign on similar issues to

¹⁷⁴ Gustavo Buntinx, 'Su cuerpo es un isla en escombros' in (Gustavo Buntinx and Víctor Vich eds.), *El Frontón: Demasiado pronto / demasiado tarde* (Lima, 2014), pp.12-53.

¹⁷⁵ Heilman, *Before the Shining Path*, p.76, 175-6.

¹⁷⁶ Cant, 'Land for Those Who Work It', p.140. See also Manuel Luis Valenzuela Marroquín, *El teatro de la guerra. La violencia política de Sendero Luminoso a través de su teatro* (Lima, 2009).

¹⁷⁷ MOVADEF, 'Arte del pueblo' [<http://www.movadef.net/musica/arte>, accessed 16 February 2017].

MOVADEF with similar website content) which displayed artwork by *Senderista* prisoners.¹⁷⁸

Unfortunately, given the transient nature of graffiti and the desires of many communities around Peru to hide the influence that Shining Path may once had in their locale, it is difficult to assess *Senderista* graffiti and murals in anything close to entirety. There are, however, a number of images of Shining Path murals available which were produced by imprisoned *Senderistas* during the conflict. Of the three murals included below, the first relies most on Communist imagery.¹⁷⁹ In this case, Abimael Guzmán presides over an *escuela militar*, addressing a group of recruits. Guzmán is surrounded by pictures of Marx, Lenin and Mao, asserting his position as the so-called Fourth Sword of Marxism, and the mural uses various shades of red and yellow (the colours used in the flags of the USSR and China) as well as the hammer and sickle to reaffirm



Fig. 4: Painting produced by Shining Path militants
[<http://www.brasil.indymedia.org/es/blue/2008/10/431069.shtml>].

¹⁷⁸ Images of the exhibition and artwork involved can be seen at 'En tu nombre' [<http://expoentunombre.blogspot.co.uk/>], accessed 23 July 2017]; *La República.pe*, 'Daniel Urresti intervino exposición de pinturas de Sendero Luminoso', 26 December 2014 [<http://larepublica.pe/26-12-2014/daniel-urresti-intervino-exposicion-de-pinturas-de-sendero-luminoso>], accessed 16 February 2017].

¹⁷⁹ All images from CMI Brasil, 'Pinturas revolucionárias do PCP (Sendero Luminoso)' [<http://www.brasil.indymedia.org/es/blue/2008/10/431069.shtml>], accessed 15 February 2017].

Shining Path's ties to global Marxism.¹⁸⁰ The recruits themselves appear to be ethnically-mixed as they are represented with various dark skin tones, perhaps a reference to Shining Path's Peruvian and predominantly indigenous *cadres*. However, the inclusion of a white-faced figure in overalls at the back of the group could be a subtle reference to Soviet socialist realism, and green flatcaps (of the type often worn by Mao) are being worn by all of the recruits. In this sense, the mural highlights both elements of Shining Path's cultural background, but places the influences of global Communist figures at the forefront.

Other murals, however, make greater reference to Shining Path's syncretic cultural heritage and diverse racial background. Here, the colours red and yellow are again dominant, the hammer and sickle flag is being waved, and the artist has included the quote from Mao that "power is born from the rifle". However, the figures depicted this time do not appear as uniform soldiers, but as mobilised peasants wearing typical




Fig. 5: Painting produced by Shining Path militants #2
[\[http://www.brasil.indymedia.org/es/blue/2008/10/431069.shtml\]](http://www.brasil.indymedia.org/es/blue/2008/10/431069.shtml).

¹⁸⁰ Interestingly, Josef Stalin was often represented as the fourth great Marxist thinker in the late 1930s, after Marx, Engels and Lenin. See Anita Pisch, *The Personality Cult of Stalin in Soviet Posters, 1929–1953: Archetypes, Inventions and Fabrications, Vol. 1* (PhD thesis: Australian National University, 2014), p.186.

Andean dress. Noticeably, the woman have braided hair, and some of the peasants appear to be holding *huaracas*, or slings. Most importantly the image is framed by snowy peaks in the background, most likely representative of the Andes (but also reminiscent of the snow-covered volcanoes Misti and Pichu Pichu near Guzmán's hometown Arequipa).




Fig. 6: Painting produced by Shining Path militants #3
[\[http://www.brasil.indymedia.org/es/blue/2008/10/431069.shtml\]](http://www.brasil.indymedia.org/es/blue/2008/10/431069.shtml).

Finally, the image above. This time the hammer and sickle is not upon a red and yellow flag, but painted onto a wall. The three diminutive figures are again represented in fairly typical Andean dress, and rather than being the passive recipients of a lecture they are the active agents, two painting graffiti on the wall and one on the lookout. And of course, the phrase which appears first in the image is not a quote from Mao but

“*Pueblo peruano*”. As with Iparraguirre’s poem, the use of *pueblo* refers here not only to the population, but to the masses who have the power to carry Shining Path to power. Taken together, these last two images suggest that Shining Path’s influence is far more diffuse than simply representing an application of Maoism to Peruvian life. The artwork analysed here, while by no means conclusive, suggests that party *cadres* were far more inclined to represent Shining Path’s peasant background, alongside Marxist language and imagery, to transmit their propaganda.

Thus, by analysing revolutionary songs and murals, it is possible to see that the *Senderista* leadership’s preference for Maoist ideas was not able to outweigh the ideas of their militants, and that Shining Path was a phenomenon produced by different social spaces; revolutionary China and the radical peasant communities of the Andes. Shining Path’s cultural artefacts are an important space in which this syncretism is clearly, and perhaps most clearly, on view.

Today, it is difficult to assess the extent to which there are any lasting connections or sympathies between peasant communities and Shining Path. Milton’s analysis of the *Rescate por la memoria* artistic contests, held in Ayacucho and Huancavelica (2003-4), for example, highlights the common trope of peasant communities as passive victims caught between two fires during the internal conflict. Peasant communities not only represent themselves as distant from Shining Path in order to avoid punishment, Milton argues, but also to interpret themselves as victims “worthy of sympathy (and perhaps recognition and reparations)”.¹⁸¹ The above analysis of Shining Path’s cultural production from the conflict, however, does suggest that party *cadres* saw deep ties

¹⁸¹ Cynthia Milton, ‘Images of Truth: Rescuing Memories of Peru’s Internal War through Testimonial Art’ in (Cynthia Milton ed.), *Art from a Fractured Past: Memory and Truth-Telling in Post-Shining Path Peru* (London, 2014), pp.37-74 (p.61).

between their peasant communities and Shining Path mobilisation. Whilst the party leadership were heavily influenced by their experiences in China and the tracts they read written by Mao and Guzmán, Shining Path militants appeared less concerned with applying Maoism to Peruvian conditions and more with adapting it to their own histories of mobilisation, creating an Andeanised version of Maoism which continued to assert the ability of peasants to shape their own future.

These representations of space therefore allow us to more deeply understand, and perhaps recuperate, the Andean nature of Shining Path mobilisation. Given that many of these artefacts have now disappeared, however, or have been suppressed to silence debate about previous connections to Shining Path, it is important to consider how this relationship between Andean communities and Shining Path has been remembered and how it shapes memories of the conflict today. In order to do this, it is important not only to consider cultural representations of space, but the commemorative spaces of representation (or sites of memory) designed to remember the conflict and the initiation of Shining Path's armed struggle.

For this reason, I will now analyse a site of memory which deals with the internal conflict to highlight how the Andean roots of Shining Path have been represented. As I have argued, Shining Path violence was always shaped by a range of specific, local circumstances which constituted the local politics of space and reflected a degree of syncretism between Maoist ideology and Andean political reality. The localised memory narratives created at the Museo de la Memoria, discussed below, also reflect this syncretism because it has been developed from a particular geographical perspective, with close attention to the history and politics of Ayacucho. In this sense, whereas other museums such as LUM (in Lima) have located violence in the 1980-2000 period, sites of memory constructed in the Andes (of which the Museo de la Memoria is

a key example) have tended to represent past violence as part of a continuous battle between local communities and the state, involving issues of inequality and social exclusion which are unresolved to this day. By reclaiming this radical, local factor in the emergence of Shining Path, the Museo de la Memoria frames the political violence of the 1980s as a discursive battleground from which a non-violent resistance to the political violence of the state, and of Shining Path, can re-emerge.

Spaces for Remembering the Shining Path

During and since the years of the internal conflict, Shining Path militants have themselves attempted to develop memory practices from their own perspectives and to represent their position in their so-called popular war. As highlighted above, this has often involved the development of cultural production to commemorate particular events or provide (often romanticised) artistic and intellectual commentary on the reasons for the initiation of the conflict. As Feinstein highlights, there is also a visible crossover between the language and imagery deployed in *Senderista* pamphlets and in the public marches in memory of the 1986 prison massacres, which “highlighted Shining Path symbols and mythology”.¹⁸² In many ways, the same language and symbolism has been deployed more recently by Shining Path’s political wing MOVADEF. Anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric are common throughout the group’s newspaper, *Amnistía General*, which provides commentary on contemporary Peruvian politics whilst also promoting commemorative events and marches (such as the International Day of the Political Prisoner), campaigning for the release of Abimael Guzmán and printing memories, testimonies and poems about the internal conflict.¹⁸³ In

¹⁸² Tamara Feinstein, ‘Competing Visions of the 1986 Lima Prison Massacres: Memory and the Politics of War in Peru’, *A Contracorriente*, 11:3 (2014), pp.1-40 (p.11).

¹⁸³ MOVADEF, ‘Día Internacional del Preso Político’, *Amnistía General*, May 2011.

these ways, *Senderistas* have used political organisation and cultural production to develop a degree of memory practice about Shining Path within limited political and discursive space.

The possibility of developing this memory practice further, however, has been restricted by the 2012 Ley de Negacionismo which made illegal any act considered to be “expressing approval for, justifying, denying or minimising” acts of terrorism and the impact of Shining Path and MRTA violence upon Peru.¹⁸⁴ In this sense, the Peruvian law takes its lead from a number of European countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, which have banned Holocaust denial. Aside from the quite problematic comparison of Shining Path violence with the Holocaust (a comparison which, in itself, negates the human rights abuses and political violence perpetrated by the Peruvian state), the Ley de Negacionismo has formalised a situation in which space for debate about Shining Path memories was already socially restricted. In September 2016, a controversy erupted when the Peruvian press discovered that a mausoleum had been built in northern Lima for *Senderista* militants who died during the 1986 prison massacres, and that commemorative marches had been held in their memory. President Kuczynski stated that the bodies should be removed and the mausoleum closed, and a complaint was filed that such an act constituted an apology for terrorism (although it was not upheld on the grounds that the dead ought to be allowed to be buried in accordance with their own wishes).¹⁸⁵

Such events demonstrate the limitations imposed upon Shining Path memory practice in Peru today. However, although Shining Path memories themselves have often been excluded from museums and memorials for the conflict, there are a number

¹⁸⁴ Human Rights Watch, ‘Peru: Reject “Terrorism Denial” Law’, 9 April 2012 [<https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/09/peru-reject-terrorism-denial-law>, accessed 14 February 2017].

¹⁸⁵ ‘El controvertido mausoleo de Sendero Luminoso que crearon en Perú’, *BBC Mundo*, 29 September 2016 [<http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-37513361>, accessed 13 February 2017].

of sites which contextualise the emergence of the insurgent group. Because of this, Shining Path's history is still commemorated in public space in Peru. Although these representations of the party are far from sympathetic, their efforts to provide a critique of state and societal violence alongside their critique of Shining Path make each site stand out as important places in which the localised historical context of the armed struggle is itself commemorated.

The site of memory I have chosen to explore in this section is the Museo de la Memoria in Huamanga.¹⁸⁶ Understanding the internal logics of this memory museum is vital to this chapter on Shining Path violence, because, I believe, the Museo de la Memoria represents a spatialised understanding of the internal conflict. As argued earlier, Shining Path initially gained a lot of support from communities by building upon traditions of Andean radicalism and militancy, a tradition which the party leadership in some ways tried to move away from, but which party *cadres* identified with more clearly. This tradition, however, has been erased from narratives of the conflict which depict Shining Path as a singularly violent and monolithic organisation. In my following analysis of the Museo, therefore, I aim not only aim to explore how this site contributes to contemporary memory practice, but also how it reflects the history and perspectives of Ayacucho. In doing so, I believe the Museo attempts to recuperate local traditions of radical self-organisation and represent a political project which is opposed to both state and Shining Path violence.

The Museo de la Memoria in Huamanga is a museum created by the *Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú*

¹⁸⁶ Another good example of a memory museum in Peru which has produced a spatialised understanding of the internal conflict in Peru is the Yalpana Wasi museum in Huancayo, Junín, which explores the history of colonialism in the Peruvian Amazon and Andes, global and national intellectual traditions, and a depiction of systemic, societal violence as explanatory factors for the internal conflict.

(ANFASEP). Formed in 1983, ANFASEP has held an important place in the political and communal life of Huamanga throughout the period of violence. The group organised soup kitchens, held vigils, led peace marches and called attention to the impact of violence on Ayacucho, despite being regularly denounced as a terrorist organisation by Presidents García and Fujimori.¹⁸⁷ The museum is on the second floor of the ANFASEP offices, a few blocks outside of the bustling and rapidly changing city centre of Huamanga. It is decorated on the outside by graphically violent murals, and the subject matter inside is in a similar vein. The displays include a map of violent events in the Ayacucho region, photographs of the disappeared, representations of violence through local forms of art such as *retablos*, and depictions of graves with photographs of the exhumations of victims. At S/.2 (roughly equivalent to £0.40 in 2016), entry is highly affordable for most and includes a guided tour around the small museum space. One mural towards the end of the tour shows two Death-like figures in a red and a green shroud facing each other, to represent the atrocities committed by Shining Path and the armed forces, with six *retablos* on either side of the mural depicting more specific acts of violence. Although the displays are interpreted on the visitor's behalf by the tour guide, time is allowed for guests to take pictures and walk around the museum by themselves and look at displays in more detail. There is also a shop located in the museum which sells books and DVDs related to the conflict (such as a collection of victims' testimonies and the abbreviated version of the CVR's *Informe Final*) among other items, with proceeds going towards the funding of the museum and other ANFASEP activities.

To fully understand the significance of this site, I believe it is important to apply Dwyer and Alderman's triple framework for analysing memory sites as forms of text,

¹⁸⁷ Feldman, 'Exhibiting Conflict', p.492.

arena, and performance.¹⁸⁸ Using the framework for approaching the site as a text, two clear factors are evident in the Museo's space. Firstly, the museum heavily contrasts the barbaric acts of Shining Path and the military with the individuality of the victims and the disappeared, and a highly graphic use of violence suggests a total rejection of violence as a means for social change. There is little effort made to contextualise violence or its perpetrators; the emphasis is instead placed with its effects on its victims. In this sense, the curation of the museum supports Weissert's argument that the exhibition not only provides evidence that violence was perpetrated, but also elucidates a victim-centred demand for recognition from the Peruvian state.¹⁸⁹

Secondly, the centrality of ANFASEP itself to the museum's narrative about political violence is heavily demonstrated by the museum's space. Most important in this context is a wall covered in photos of ANFASEP members and of their disappeared loved ones. This display highlights the victimisation of the local community during the conflict, but also the possibility of resilience through organisation and of positive change through non-violent means. In many ways the museum is undoubtedly *for* ANFASEP itself; it is a space where members can see photos of their loved ones, tell others of their experiences and benefit from the proceeds of the museum to fund their community projects. Reading the space of the site as an arena, or space for performance of memory, supports these conclusions, as well as adding a third.

On my visit to the museum to meet with the current President of ANFASEP Adelina García, our discussion was interrupted by two moments highly emblematic of ANFASEP's overall goals; the first was a brief delay whilst García spoke with a local woman about her experiences, and the second was the arrival of a class of

¹⁸⁸ Dwyer and Alderman, 'Memorial landscapes'.

¹⁸⁹ Markus Weissert, 'Memories of Violence, Dreams of Development: Memorialisation Initiatives in the Peruvian Andes' (PhD Thesis: Freien Universität Berlin, 2015), p.219.

schoolchildren for a lesson on why ANFASEP existed. The building is in this way a pivotal space, in which memories of the past can be described by their protagonists and heard by younger generations. In García's own words:

*“The younger generation don't know how this violence happened. Then they come, see, and reflect so that they don't repeat this violence again. We have thought in these terms and implemented them. It's a small thing but we are the same people, we have suffered, we have testimonies, photos of our families. Therefore [the museum] has lots of significance for us.”*¹⁹⁰

Although overwhelmingly positive and nonviolent, ANFASEP's approach is nonetheless considered controversial in many ways. For example, in 2015 *Fujimorista* congressman Carlos Tubino criticised one of the displays for “showing the Armed Forces as violators of the human rights of peasants. It is a strong and severe image which ought not to be exhibited”.¹⁹¹ Whilst the museum exists as a way of teaching the lessons of the past so they are not repeated, many see it as the reopening of old wounds, funded by an organisation committed to criticising the state. Although ANFASEP still sees a high degree of participation with its activities, remembering violence remains anathema to parts of the local population and in terms of importance the museum is relegated below sites from the pre-Incan, Colonial and Republican eras by tourist agencies and tourists alike.¹⁹² The museum's criticism of all forms of violence and display of shared responsibility between Shining Path and the armed forces also goes

¹⁹⁰ Adelina García, 'Interview in-person' (Ayacucho, 2016).

¹⁹¹ Carlos Tubino quoted in 'Congresistas critican esta escultura en museo de Ayacucho', *El Comercio*, 6 April 2015, [<http://elcomercio.pe/peru/ayacucho/congresistas-critican-esta-escultura-museo-memoria-ayacucho-noticia-1802250>].

¹⁹² For example, the Museo de la Memoria is ranked “#10 of 25 things to do in Ayacucho” by TripAdvisor [https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Attractions-g316041-Activities-Ayacucho_Ayacucho_Region.html, 6th June 2016].

against more widely accepted narratives that position the insurgents as primary aggressors in the conflict.

However, as Legg argues, this criticism highlights the difficulty of conflating sites of memory with ideas about national collective memory. In part, this is because of the influence of a transnational trend for truth commissions, transitional justice and museums of memory in the wake of violence (in Argentina, Rwanda, South Africa and the Balkans, to name only a few examples) which can tend to locate responsibility for violence with the state.¹⁹³ The Museo de la Memoria supports this argument, being influenced by transnational ideas about the use of museums as a means of creating social justice, whilst also being highly local in its outlook. It is important, therefore, to emphasise that the museum is not simply a site of memory (i.e. a site in which narratives of memory are displayed), but a site *for* memory (a site in which an array of memories are actively practiced for other ends).

As Feldman argues, the Museo de la Memoria exudes a kind of discursive independence and rebelliousness from more widely accepted memory discourses in Peru.¹⁹⁴ Even whilst it is impossible to outline something close to an official narrative of violence in Peru since the publication of the CVR's *Informe Final*, ANFASEP's approach stands separately because of the organisation's use of memory practice to constantly remake *ayacuchano* society, and bring progressive change to Peru more generally. In this sense, it is possible to understand the Museo's interpretation of the conflict and its consequences as a distinctly spatialised memory narrative.

The importance of this local perspective can also be seen in the visit of Verónica Mendoza (the Presidential candidate for Leftist coalition Frente Amplio) to ANFASEP

¹⁹³ Legg, 'Contesting and surviving memory', p.500.

¹⁹⁴ Feldman, 'Exhibiting Conflict', p.510.

during the 2016 election campaign, ANFASEP's development of the Santuario de la Memoria at La Hoyada (discussed in the next chapter), and the creation of a temporary museum of memory in the streets of Huamanga in 2015.¹⁹⁵ Each of these projects and meetings demonstrate, and are designed to reinforce, the importance of ANFASEP's position, not just as victims of violence, but as local community organisers aiming to address the social inequalities present in Peru's historical-spatial structure. The organisation's memory practice is to highlight the suffering of the region in the past, and to utilise these memories as a tool for creating social justice in the future.

The particular aesthetics of this space, therefore, suggest that the past is neither static nor dead. There is a particular politics of place involved in ANFASEP's activities which in itself is deeply tied to the forms of memory displayed in the Museo de la Memoria. ANFASEP is therefore a contemporary example of trends of *ayacuchano* radicalism and mobilisation which can also be seen in the radical movements of the 1960s and in the development of Shining Path (to a lesser extent). However, as with these previous movements, it is vital to see ANFASEP not simply as an expression of a non-Western, un-modern, indigenous cosmic vision, but as the product of Peru's uneven socio-spatial structure and the political violence which erupted as a result of it. From this perspective, space acts not only as a mechanism for reproducing society, but also as a technology which reproduces narratives about society too.

The museum's critique of political violence therefore uses space to articulate a distinctly spatialised understanding of the internal conflict, premised primarily upon the highlighting that the factors which produced Shining Path were rooted in the Andean and Amazonian *pueblo*. As will be seen through analyses of other spatialised understandings of the conflict in the next chapter and throughout this dissertation, this

¹⁹⁵ Apoyo Para La Paz, 'Museo Itinerante estrenado en el Centro Histórico de Ayacucho' [<http://ayacucho.memoria.website/museo-itinerante-estrenado-en-el-centro-historico-de-ayacucho/>].

perspective is in itself a form of knowledge produced from a particular geographical perspective, and it is possible to see how interpretations of the conflict differ depending on where the individual or group producing the narrative is culturally located.

The spatial aesthetics of Shining Path violence

Throughout this chapter, I have built upon pre-existing interpretations which position Shining Path not as the development of a new outcrop of revolutionary Marxism in the international context of the Cold War, but as the appropriation of Maoist ideas by a localised group of *ayacuchano* radicals frustrated by the failures of previous movements to produce social change. However, whereas previous interpretations have placed a large degree of emphasis on “Gonzalo Thought” as an explanatory factor for Shining Path violence, I have highlighted some of the ways in which this ideology was locally interpreted, modified and even subverted in the actions and cultural production of party *cadres*. In this interpretation, Shining Path was intrinsically produced by the radical atmosphere of Ayacucho which contained a fundamentally spatialised understanding of where revolution would come from and how it should be conducted.

In this context, Shining Path ideology was a pessimist reaction to the defeat of previous groups such as the MIR and ELN in the 1960s, and to the slow, contradictory reforms of the Velasco government. This pessimism highly affected the provincial middle-class who had been part of a brief regional consensus with peasant movements which attempted to use ideas of Andean utopianism to allow the South-Central Andes to overcome its historical poverty, isolation and underdevelopment. The response of those elites was to appropriate a more violent, more destructive set of ideas to achieve their goals.

However, there was also a highly ideological form of epistemological violence which took place in this moment. In discussing Stalinism in 1930s Russia, Žižek argues that the purges represented an inversion of ideological violence which became necessary to deny the authentic revolutionary past of the project and allow Stalinism to maintain power, in essence revolutionising itself.¹⁹⁶ This is the point of departure for “Gonzalo Thought”; an ideology which took Andean radicalism to the next stage of extreme, ultra-violence, whilst at the same denying the party’s roots in traditions of *ayacuchano* politics and Andean rebellion. In this sense, Shining Path was not just, in the words of Flores Galindo, a “nightmarish version of the Andean utopia”, but a nightmarish inversion of the Andean utopia.¹⁹⁷

From the point at which Guzmán and his followers began to employ violent repression and reprisals, the temporary alliance that had existed between Leftist intellectuals and peasant communities in the 1960s fell apart, and communities instead followed a more complex strategy of negotiation between the insurgents and the armed forces. This perspective on the conflict challenges the idea that peasant communities were passive victims to violence, caught between two fires. Instead, the rise of radical movements in the 1960s, Shining Path and the formation of *rondas campesinas* can all be seen as the results of a series of negotiations made by the peasant population with various local powerholders. According to Nelson Pereyra Chávez:

“from the moment these communities opposed the hacendados and supported the insurgents, they developed a political strategy which was present in the ‘70s and ‘80s when they decide whether to support

¹⁹⁶ Žižek, *Violence*, p.178.

¹⁹⁷ Flores Galindo, *Buscando un Inca*, p.81. In a similar vein, Mallon has argued that the alliance between Leftist activists and indigenous communities in Andahuaylas in the 1970s was “superficial and fragile at best, and...broke apart quickly when faced with repression and state cooptation”, a case that would be a “shining omen” for Shining Path’s turn against the peasant population in the 1980s. Florencia Mallon, ‘Chronicle of a Path Foretold? Velasco’s Revolution, Vanguardia Revolucionaria, and “Shining Omens” in the Indigenous Communities of Andahuaylas’ in (Steve J. Stern ed.), *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995* (London, 1998), pp.84-121 (p.113).

*or reject Shining Path...and this strategy has not been revealed by the social sciences, nor by the CVR, much less by the press”.*¹⁹⁸

In this context, Shining Path violence appears not as a crisis in the tradition of Peruvian Marxism, but as a crisis in the relationship between *ayacuchano* radicals and local communities in which both sides turned their pessimism and frustrations at previous failures into a violent rage at the other party.

Whitehead’s argument that violence can be construed as a form of cultural performance, the rationale and aesthetics of which are derived from the local histories and cultures of the space in which they take place, is useful in two ways here.¹⁹⁹ Firstly, peasant responses to Shining Path, and the actions of the peasants who supported the insurgents as *cadres*, can be interpreted as a performance of the long-standing tradition of independence and self-defence in these communities; a tradition which existed fresh in the memory after the land seizures and armed rebellions of the 1960s. Secondly, in responding to peasant resistance and in their incursions into the jungle, Shining Path reproduced the racial hierarchies which exist in Peruvian society through violent domination, and in effect reinforced the racist values which contribute to Peru’s socio-spatial structure. It is also essential to understand the Andean nature that many instances of violence took on; not in the sense that peasants acted as prototypes of the Indian savage, but that their support for, or rejection of, Shining Path was rooted in the localised politics of everyday life. The complexities and localised nature of this violence are, however, hidden when represented in the media on the national and global scale and, as Whitehead argues, become compressed into simplified narratives of primordial savagery and terrorism.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Nelson Pereyra Chávez, ‘Interview in-person’ (Huamanga, 2016).

¹⁹⁹ Neil L. Whitehead, ‘On the Poetics of Violence’ in (Neil L. Whitehead ed.), *Violence* (Oxford, 2004), pp.55-78 (p.75).

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.74.

In this context, Lucanamarca is almost a pre-emptive declaration of victory by Shining Path's central command, trying to do away with communities who had been their engine of revolution before the revolution has even taken place. Indigenous participation with Shining Path has, in this way, been denied by all sides. A spatial analysis therefore not only allows us to understand how violence was produced by geography and local circumstances, but, as Soja argues, is necessary to recover and appreciate the simultaneity of numerous contributing factors, whilst avoiding the construction of deterministic linear narratives.²⁰¹

Shining Path represented a degree of syncretism between Western and Maoist ideas about political violence and the ability and desire of Andean communities to control the land and remake the world around them. This agency persists today in the activities of ANFASEP and Apoyo Para La Paz (an organisation based in Huamanga which works closely with ANFASEP), and in continued support for Leftist movements which appear to share similar political priorities and concerns. The results from the first round of the 2016 Presidential Elections demonstrate this. Despite a concerted media campaign to depict her as a threat to national security and "terrorist" sympathiser, Verónica Mendoza and Frente Amplio won the majority of departments affected most heavily by the conflict, including Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurímac, Cusco and Puno.²⁰² When I discussed this with Yuber Alarcón of Apoyo Para La Paz, he argued that there was still a strong desire to build a new society, saying that:

"They tell us that those who think differently: they are Leftists, they are terrorists...It has stigmatized both this sector of the population... [but] it's not necessarily only Leftists who have voted for Verónica,

²⁰¹ Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*, p.22.

²⁰² It is worth noting that, in both 2006 and 2011, these departments overwhelmingly voted for the ostensibly left-wing nationalist (and also retired Lieutenant Colonel) Ollanta Humala, who won the Presidency in 2011.

no. In our country there is a change. There is a change in the mentality of Peruvians, there is a change in the social structures of our country."²⁰³

What Alarcón's words tell us is that Peruvian geography is not only continuing to produce spatialised understandings of Peruvian society, including new articulations of the Andean utopia, but has also produced spatialised memory narratives which continue to shape regional and local politics today. From a *limeño* perspective, the conflict can be neatly bracketed into the 1980-2000 period (and in many cases is limited to 1980-1992). In Ayacucho, Junín and other departments greatly affected by the violence, however, the conflict is interpreted in a far broader and more continuous manner, involving issues which are unresolved to this day. Whilst this analysis has shown that Shining Path was a phenomenon produced by the local politics of Ayacucho, therefore, it is also possible to see Andean sites of memory as representative of spatialised understandings of the conflict which are equally produced from a local perspective.

²⁰³ Yuber Alarcón, 'Interview in-person' (Ayacucho, 2016).

Chapter 2: Space and the counterinsurgency operation

In this chapter, I will explore how the logic of counterinsurgency violence was derived from a particular spatial logic, based upon a colonial mode of thought which positioned Peru's interior as an unruly colony in need of subjugation, or (re)conquest, by the Peruvian state. I will demonstrate this firstly by analysing the detention centres established by the armed forces as part of their counterrevolutionary strategy. The exclusionary spatial logic of detention centres, which acted as small, localised spaces of exception, was tied to a far wider practice of suspending human rights and the rule of law in the so-called Emergency Zones in order to exterminate Shining Path. In effect, the exception was extended to whole departments of the Peruvian Andes and Amazon.

The military's actions collectively punished communities and reinforced pre-existing racial hierarchies; this much is already known from the CVR.²⁰⁴ However, I will argue that these reprisals were not simply excesses and abuses, but that this collective punishment was central to the logic of the counterinsurgency operation. This is because the Peruvian armed forces had come to see the Andes, but particularly Ayacucho, as a radical space which continuously fomented rebellion. As Rénique highlights, the radical social movements in the *sierra* in the 1960s and 70s has led many to see the historical roots of the internal conflict (and of Shining Path's mobilisation) in the radical political traditions of earlier decades.²⁰⁵ In this sense, *ayacuchano* political culture represented an alliance between the Peruvian Left and indigenous communities; the two groups who had traditionally been constructed as internal enemies and obstacles to order and progress by the armed forces. Whilst Leftists, particularly Flores Galindo in his book *Buscando un Inca*, have interpreted these traditions of Andean radicalism in a

²⁰⁴ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VIII*, p.316.

²⁰⁵ Rénique, 'La utopía andina hoy', p.143.

positive light, for the Peruvian state and armed forces these social movements appeared as a dangerous rejection of state authority.

Because of this, the way in which the armed forces conducted their counterinsurgency operation was more reminiscent of the suppression of a colonial rebellion than of a state protecting its subjects. I will therefore argue that counterrevolutionary violence represented a form of bloodletting, a purge deemed necessary to clear the *sierra* of radical movements for decades and punish the communities who supported them. These practices relied heavily upon the extension and formalisation state power in the *sierra*, particularly through the establishment of numerous military bases and a network of *rondas campesinas*. However, the vengeful nature of the counterinsurgency operation also represents the exercise of sovereign power by the Peruvian state in the nation's interior, suggesting that forms of state power were differentially exercised in a geographically-contingent manner across Peru during this period.

Often it is noted that the human rights abuses perpetrated by agents of the Peruvian state occurred under different circumstances to those perpetrated in the Southern Cone because the Peruvian government was democratically elected. Throughout this chapter, I will draw on Foucauldian and Agambenian understandings of sovereign power to argue that state forces created numerous spaces of exception, inside which the democratic rule of law ceased to operate.²⁰⁶ In this scenario, spaces of exception are those in which human rights are no-longer guaranteed by the state, and in which the rule

²⁰⁶ The concept of "exception" has been developed by Giorgio Agamben who draws on the writings of Carl Schmitt, as well as ideas from Foucault and Heidegger. Although Agamben does not himself use the term "space of exception", in recent years scholars including Gregory and Stavrides have developed this approach further, identifying different institutions and global "black holes" as possible spaces of exception within national and transnational contexts. See Detlev Vagts, 'Carl Schmitt's Ultimate Emergency: The Night of the Long Knives', *The Germanic Review*, 87 (2012), pp.203-9; Agamben, *Homo Sacer*; Derek Gregory, 'The black flag: Guantánamo Bay and the space of exception', *Geografiska Annaler*, 88:B4 (2006), pp.405-27; Stavros Stavrides, 'Occupied Squares and the Urban "State of Exception": In, Against and Beyond the City of Enclaves' in (Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo eds.), *Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception* (Basingstoke, 2014), pp.231-243 (p.236).

of law is effectively suspended.²⁰⁷ These spaces existed at varying levels of scale, from detention centres such as Cuartel Los Cabitos to the *zonas rojas* (departments including Ayacucho, Apurímac, Huancavelica and many others which were placed under a state of emergency). In creating these spaces of exception, state forces made human rights geographically contingent, privileged in some regions but not in others. In effect, the rule of law was suspended across large swathes of the country, but this situation was created through legal frameworks. Some of the worst abuses, as will be outlined in Chapter 4, occurred after the election of Alan García who had promised to bring an end to the heavy-handed nature of the counterinsurgency operation. The reason that such atrocities were able to be conducted by a democratic regime, I will therefore argue, is that democratic governance had itself become spatially contingent. Furthermore, using Butler, I will argue that spaces of exception denoted the lives of those confined within them as valueless and non-grievable. Detainees in Peru's conflict were not just beyond the protection of the law; in many ways they were considered to be non-grievable, a construction which has implications for how *Senderista* perspectives are excluded from memory practice in Peru to this day.

As with Shining Path violence, I will also highlight how counterinsurgency operations were shaped by peasant communities. This is clearest in the case of Putis where there is evidence to suggest that peasants from Marccaraccay (a nearby village) encouraged the armed forces to eliminate their local rivals. The *rondas campesinas* also played an important role in repelling Shining Path, and were arguably pivotal in turning the tide against the insurgents. However, the role of the *rondas campesinas* is still central to historiography on the conflict whilst, as Portugal argues, the “positive contact” between peasant communities and Shining Path at the early stages of the

²⁰⁷ Stavrides, ‘Occupied Squares and the Urban “State of Exception”’, p.236.

conflict has largely been hidden by peasants, in part to “conserve the strategic image of the victim”.²⁰⁸

I will also analyse how the counterinsurgency operation has been represented in forms of cultural production produced by the Peruvian armed forces and representations of the counterinsurgency operation from Peruvian cinema. I will argue that many cultural representations of the conflict support the military’s attempts to exterminate Shining Path and dismiss human rights abuses as a necessary evil, a perspective shared by cultural artefacts produced by the armed forces themselves. Following this, I will discuss the sites of memory which have been created to reflect upon the armed forces’ counterinsurgency operation, including the Museo Chavín de Huántar in Lima and the Santuario de la Memoria in Huamanga. Although these analyses may appear tangential to the argument developed about state violence in the earlier parts of this chapter, these sites of memory are important artefacts for understanding how the historical spatialised understandings of the conflict which supported the state violence of the counterinsurgency operation have been replicated, and challenged, in memory narratives of the conflict. These sites help us to understand how Peruvian space was socially produced under particular ideological assumptions, and that this space, in turn, produced forms of violence and reinforced the same ideological beliefs which underpin its construction.

A brief history of Peru’s armed forces

When considering the internal conflict in Peru, it is important to remember, as has been highlighted previously, how and why the military’s intervention represented a distinctly

²⁰⁸ Tamia Portugal, ‘Memoria de la violencia en Putis a partir del testimonio de Gerardo Fernández’ in (Francesca Denegri and Alexandra Hibbett eds.), *Dando Cuenta: Estudios sobre el testimonio de la violencia política en el Perú (1980-2000)* (Lima, 2016), pp.265-82 (p.271).

Peruvian form of state violence (in contrast to other twentieth century experiences of state violence in the Southern Cone and globally). In order to understand this fully, it is necessary to first briefly outline the history of Peru's armed forces, their role in projects of nation-building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and how the character of the Peruvian army is distinct from other military forces in Latin America which have perpetrated seemingly similar episodes of counterinsurgent repression.

Throughout the twentieth century, the armed forces have held a distinct position in terms of Peruvian national identity, a position which is reinforced regularly through cultural practices and activities. For instance, Milton has argued that the names and images of patriarchal military heroes, such as Bolívar, San Martín, Sucre and Bolognesi, recur throughout Peru's urban landscapes, reflecting the armed forces' cultural power.²⁰⁹ In a similar way, the Guard Mounting ceremony at the Presidential Palace in Lima's Plaza des Armas (every noon, with mounted displays on selected Sundays) is a proud display of military tradition and prowess, popular with Peruvians and foreign tourists alike. Whilst such instances by no means suggest that support for the military is universal among Peruvians, it does reflect a form of cultural power wielded by the military and state agents to reinforce their own central position as elite, masculine leaders of the nation.

The Peruvian army even has its own military journal (the *Revista Militar del Perú*, founded in 1897) and *Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú* (CPHEP) which produces reports on historical events.²¹⁰ In particular, the CPHEP demonstrates a preference for events from the nineteenth century, or more recent events (such as the 1997 Operación de Huántar) which might be broadly assumed to be less controversial

²⁰⁹ Later in this thesis, I explore the naming of major streets, boulevards and public parks in Peru more thoroughly. This analysis builds on the work of Palonen on the commemorative city-text, and is also echoed in Milton's manuscript. Palonen, 'The city-text in post-communist Budapest'; Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, Conclusion, p.5.

²¹⁰ Milton and Toche have both also analysed the *Revista Militar* and work of the CPHEP. See Milton, *Conflicted Memory*; Eduardo Toche Medrano, *Guerra y democracia: Los militares peruanos y la construcción nacional* (Lima, 2008).

than the numerous militarily-backed *coups d'état* or counterinsurgency operations in the Peruvian interior in the twentieth century. In fact, the period covered by the CPHEP's current five volumes of *The General History of the Peruvian Army* ends in 1899.²¹¹ This bias for the events and heroes of the nineteenth century is not, perhaps, surprising, given that it allows the military to present themselves as heroes of Peruvian Independence and Republicanism. Many of the military's interventions in the past one hundred years or so have been more difficult to present as heroic, however, and perhaps are sufficiently distant within the scope of collective memory to be re-interpreted as such.

That being said, the military's interventions in Peruvian politics in the nineteenth century were, of course, not confined to the heroic defences of Peruvian democracy and Independence often represented in military parades. Despite Peru's humiliating defeat and invasion by Chile, however, the War of the Pacific nonetheless remains an important moment in Peruvian military history, from which a number of heroes are still remembered (such as Admiral Miguel Grau who died during the Battle of Angamos in 1879).²¹² In part, this is because the military interpreted the War as a failure of civilian leadership, and Loveman argues that the War's legacy was to bequeath Peru "another generation of militarism".²¹³ This is supported by Masterson, who states that "if the War with Chile gave Peru its greatest martyr heroes, it also fostered decades of frustration and demonstrated that *caudillismo* was a poor substitute for military professionalism".²¹⁴ The War of the Pacific therefore persuaded the Peruvian military not only that they ought to be continuously politically active to safeguard the nation and their interests, but that they would also have to modernise, professionalise, and take

²¹¹ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, p.12.

²¹² In the Peruvian army's official account, the internal armed conflict is described as the "second-most tragic episode" in the history of the Peruvian Republic after the War of the Pacific. This stands in contrast to the CVR's assertion that the conflict was the most "intense, extensive and prolonged episode of violence in the entire history of the Republic". Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú, *En honor a la verdad: Versión del Ejército sobre su participación en la defensa del sistema democrático contra las organizaciones terroristas* (Lima, 2010), p.7; CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VIII*, p.315.

²¹³ Brian Loveman, *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington, 1999), p.58.

²¹⁴ Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America*, p.25.

influence from Europe on how to organise the armed forces for the purposes of the Peruvian nation-state.

The first two decades of the twentieth century are described by Jorge Basadre as the “Aristocratic Republic”, a period in which military control over the state receded, to an extent, and the Partido Civil predominated in government.²¹⁵ However, as the century progressed, the military demonstrated a regular willingness to take action against perceived threats to social order. In particular, Milton highlights the regimes of Augusto B. Leguía (1919-1930), Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro (1930-1931), and Manuel Odría (1948-1950) as key times when the Peruvian army intervened to safeguard its political and economic interests through *coups d'état*, but these are only three examples of the 52 of Peru’s Presidents (out of 74) from a military background, suggesting a far more pervasive level of influence over Peruvian politics.²¹⁶ As Milton notes, this led Toche to argue that, throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth century, the Peruvian armed forces developed a sense of “military anti-politics” in which the military saw themselves, and not civilian politicians, as the only state agents capable of governing, protecting law and order, and achieving modernity and progress for the Peruvian nation.²¹⁷ Similarly, Villanueva argues that, from Leguía’s Presidency onwards, Peruvian militarism came to not only refer to specific military (or military-backed) governments, but to “military influence in a nation’s politics and to the use of the military as a tool for capturing and maintaining power”.²¹⁸

As Milton argues, this project would lead the military to identify two distinct internal enemies who represented barriers to Peruvian order and progress. Whilst the

²¹⁵ Jorge Basadre Grohmann, *Historia de la República del Perú (1822-1933)* (Lima, 2005), “La república aristocrática (1895-1919)”.

²¹⁶ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, p.9.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*; Toche, *Guerra y democracia*, p.18.

²¹⁸ Victor Villanueva, ‘The Military in Peruvian Politics, 1919-45’ in (Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies eds.), *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America* (Wilmington, 197), pp.92-101 (p.93).

indigenous populations of the Andes and Amazon could, from the military's perspective, be civilised, Leftist subversives were identified as a threat which must be eliminated (a position which would later map comfortably onto Cold War ideas which saw the Peruvian Left as Soviet or Chinese provocateurs).²¹⁹ As both Milton and Toche highlight, this belief was violently demonstrated through the military's suppression of the 1932 Trujillo uprising, in which over 50 *Apristas* were summarily executed in the pre-Columbian ruins of Chan Chan, a moment from whence on the image of the subversive was routinely deployed by the military to justify violence.²²⁰ However, the military's conflation of indigeneity and Leftism had a spatial corollary. Whilst indigeneity as a category was historically associated with the Peruvian interior, the military's experiences in combatting the MIR and ELN (among others) in the *sierra* in the 1960 reinforced the belief that the Andes was also insurgent territory.

It is important to also recognise the radical turn which Peruvian military thought took in the 1950s and 1960s. As Cant highlights, the *Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas* (GRFA, 1968-80) tried to incorporate forms of popular mobilisation and use agrarian reform and economic development as tools for guaranteeing security, influenced by teaching at the *Centro de Altos Estudios Militares* (CAEM, a military academy established in 1950) and experiences of fighting the *Guevarista* MIR in 1965.²²¹ The Leftist nature of the Velasco regime has been called into question and it is often represented as a cynical move to co-opt the wave of revolutionary insurgent and peasant movements which emerged from the Andes in the 1960s. Cant, however, has argued that the GRFA's agrarian reform was "driven by a long-term change in military priorities", and that attempts to foster popular mobilisation demonstrate the regime's

²¹⁹ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, pp.35-8.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.11. Toche, *Guerra y democracia*, p.89.

²²¹ Cant, 'Land for Those Who Work It', p.5; Dirk Kruijt, 'Exercises in State Terrorism: the Counter-insurgency Campaigns in Guatemala and Peru' in (Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt eds.), *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America* (London, 1999), pp.33-62 (p.34). See also Jan Lust, *La lucha revolucionaria: Perú, 1958-1967* (Barcelona, 2013).

willingness to limit state power in favour of civic society to some extent.²²² This is supported who by Kruijt who argues that Velasco's programme was widely supported in the military, particularly by a generation of military radicals (or "Young Turks") who believed in the need for structural change, achieved through a combination "anti-subversive and developmental activities".²²³

However, the power of the military radicals came to an abrupt end after the 1975 coup within the GRFA which installed Francisco Morales Bermúdez as President. Despite Morales' apparent position as a compromising successor to Velasco between the radical and conservative factions of the military, he "made a complete about face from Left to Right... a mere year later Morales was the leader of a classical dictatorship... a repressive military regime which recalled the days of Odría and Sánchez Cerro".²²⁴

At the start of the internal conflict, therefore, Masterson argues that conservatives within the Peruvian military had regained the upper hand and that there was "a backlash against armed forces' officers who voice similar progressive views".²²⁵ This is corroborated by Hurtado who argues that, by 1980 "the word 'revolution' had acquired threatening meanings and had become associated with a group of people, the Shining Path, and with a specific region in Peru, the highlands".²²⁶ However, Hurtado has also argued that this image of the military, and particularly of the Peruvian army, is complicated by the "army's spatial distribution" which meant that it not only had a rank-and-file composed primarily of young indigenous men, but also offered legitimate avenues for social mobility through its officer ranks.²²⁷

²²² Cant, 'Land for Those Who Work It', pp.6, 32.

²²³ Dirk Kruijt, *Revolution by Decree: Peru, 1968-75* (Amsterdam, 1994), pp.31-44.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.163.

²²⁵ Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America* p.283.

²²⁶ Lourdes Hurtado, 'Velasco, Nationalist Rhetoric, and Military Culture in Cold War Peru' in (Carlos Aguirre and Paulo Drinot eds.), *The Peculiar Revolution: Rethinking the Peruvian Experiment, 1968-1975* (Austin, 2017), pp.171-96 (p.191).

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.178.

In this sense, Peruvian military thought was influenced by two competing elements: one which saw indigenous communities as obstacles to progress, and another which took a more benevolent, paternalistic view and saw the armed forces as potential agents for progress on behalf of the indigenous population. It is therefore important to see this conflation of the indigenous population and Leftist insurgents as a partial return, in military ideology, to the counterrevolutionary and oligarchic traditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, this position was also complicated by a more paternalistic military approach to indigenous communities, and the predominantly indigenous composition of the Peruvian army.

The spatial logics of counterrevolutionary violence

In order to understand the true nature of the counterinsurgency operation conducted by agents of the Peruvian state, it is necessary to consider several instances of violence with differing logics or aesthetics of violence simultaneously. In this chapter, I will therefore examine the military detention centres Cuartel Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada in Ayacucho, alongside instances of mass reprisal such as those perpetrated at Putis.

The detention centre Cuartel N° 51, known as Los Cabitos, was located in the heart of Huamanga. The base was established as the headquarters of the Political-Military Command of Ayacucho under General Roberto Clemente Noel Moral at the beginning of 1983. Between 1983 and 1985, the CVR states it has evidence that the human rights of 136 persons were violated at the centre, through kidnapping, torture, detention, disappearance and assassination. However, as Yuber Alarcón highlights, Los Cabitos was used by the military until almost 1997, during which time:

*“the training field was used as a clandestine cemetery where people who were detained, tortured in the barracks, then executed, were buried in mass graves. They built a furnace in the 1985 to remove the bodies from the pits and burn them to destroy all evidence. And this oven and this space continued burying bodies even until ‘93, ‘94, when there were still disappearances the Ayacucho region”.*²²⁸

La Casa Rosada was another military location in the city of Huamanga used by the armed forces to detain and torture numerous people according to victims’ testimonies, although its existence was routinely denied by military officials during interviews with the CVR.²²⁹ This makes analysis of the difference between the two spaces difficult, but the evidence from victims’ testimonies suggests that they were both used for detentions, beatings and interrogations, located half a kilometre away from each other in the city centre.²³⁰

Many testimonies in the archives of the CVR relating to Los Cabitos follow a similar pattern, in which soldiers would arrive in the night and bundle people into military vehicles before taking them to the base. Don Tedosio Borda Quispe, for example, states how his son Jesús was taken during the night (he believed because of a false accusation by a neighbour) and disappeared inside the base.²³¹ Olga Gutiérrez Quispe’s testimony in the *Informe Final* tells how she and her husband were taken separately to be interrogated at Los Cabitos where she was brutally beaten and tortured.²³² Adelina García (president of ANFASEP) told the CVR how the military came to her house at night and violently detained her husband Zósimo Tenorio Prado,

²²⁸ Yuber Alarcón, ‘Interview in-person’ (Huamanga, 2016).

²²⁹ CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. Lima, 19 June 2003. ‘Declaración testimonial grabada del Coronel EP (r) José Carlos Bertarelli.

²³⁰ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. VII, p.71-80.

²³¹ CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. Lima. ‘Declaración testimonial grabada del Don Tedosio Borda Quispe’.

²³² CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. VII, p.73.

beating her unconscious with the butts of their rifles as they left. As the *Informe Final* notes, these detentions were made without judicial order, or participation from any organisation involved in the legal procedure of detentions such as the public prosecutor. Further testimony from a former intelligence officer describes the use of torture and interrogation rooms in Los Cabitos where specialists taught the police how to torture detainees, whilst detainee Edgar Timoteo Noriega Ascue has described being tortured with electricity and hung from a helicopter during flight.²³³ Another classified witness refers to being tortured in La Casa Rosada where he was hung from a pulley for a minute, beaten regularly, submerged in a cylinder of water and urinated on by soldiers.²³⁴ Lurgio Gavilán, a former *Senderista* who later joined the army and was stationed at Los Cabitos, also makes reference in his memoir to a similar building known as Los Gatos which was operated by the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional del Perú (SIN). Gavilán noticed a number of detainees on his arrival at the base but in the morning they were gone, leading him to conclude that “they took them to the ovens”.²³⁵ It was not until August 2017 when military personnel were charged with crimes relating to Los Cabitos. Humberto Bari Orbegoso Talavera (head of Los Cabitos) and Pedro Paz Avendaño (head of intelligence at La Casa Rosada) were sentenced to thirty and twenty-three years in prison (respectively) for the deaths of fifty-three people during the conflict.²³⁶

One particular interview with Lieutenant Paz Avendaño describes the numerous forms of torture used by the armed forces:

²³³ *Ibid.*, p.82-3.

²³⁴ CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. Ayacucho, 25 de febrero del 2003. Declaración testimonial reservada No.045-2003-CVR.

²³⁵ Gavilán, *When Rains Became Floods*, p.53. See also Ricardo Uceda, *Muerte en el Pentagonito: Los cementerios secretos del Ejército peruano* (Lima, 2004).

²³⁶ *La República*, ‘Los Cabitos: Estas fueron las sentencias que recibieron los acusados’ [<http://larepublica.pe/politica/1075115-los-cabitos-pj-dicta-sentencia-esta-tarde-contra-militares-por-las-53-victimas>], accessed 24 August 2017].

“For example, you would give them breakfast at five in the morning, lunch at seven and dinner at nine, and then change the temperature, keep them in the dark a day or two days, or put on music four or five hours continuously and they come out mad and tell you everything.”²³⁷

Avendaño’s interview also illustrates an attitude common among the military when confronted about their actions during the war as the two exchanges below demonstrate:

“CVR: Where happened to the people after you had interrogated them?”

PPA: We handed them directly over to the police.

CVR: Did they sign for them? Shouldn’t they have copies of these documents?”

PPA: There should be, but I retired in 1987....

CVR: Do you not think this is a type of excess? In 1983, speaking of nothing more.

PPA: In war, there are no excesses...Do you believe that the army went to Ayacucho because they were assassins? All of them were good men who were prepared with one mentality: to defend the country. When they killed one, two or ten, they believed they were doing something good for their country. They were not bad, they were not assassins, they were doing the job given by your government to the army and to the navy”.²³⁸

²³⁷ CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. Lima, 8 July 2003. ‘Declaración testimonial grabada del Teniente Coronel EP (r) Pedro Paz Avendaño’.

²³⁸ ‘Declaración testimonial grabada del Teniente Coronel EP (r) Pedro Paz Avendaño’.

The first exchange is one of countless examples of obfuscation by military personnel in relation to Los Cabitos. Although Avendaño readily admits to interrogating and torturing detainees, he tries to claim that they would then have been passed on to the police, and even then provides excuses as to why there would be no record of this. This is typical of military responses to the CVR in which respondents absolve themselves of all knowledge of, and responsibility for, the actions of superiors, inferiors, other organisations of the counterinsurgency operation. Memories of record-keeping practices are particularly vague.

The exchange about Los Cabitos which follows it, however, elucidates a more consistent narrative about how state agents viewed their own actions during the conflict. Avendaño argues that the armed forces were good men given a bad job to do by politicians, governors and judges. As far as he sees it, there are no excesses in war, suggesting that he sees war as a state of exception. This is highly relevant to the case of Los Cabitos because it shows that agents of the counterinsurgency operation saw themselves as being above the law and believed in their own narrative of being saviours of the nation. Whilst the real enemies were always the insurgents, the military maintained real grievances with the political classes in Lima whom they perceived to be afraid to get their hands dirty. Thus, Los Cabitos was an open secret hidden in plain sight. Although the killings and disappearances couldn't be justified legally and would be officially denied, the military relied on fear and impunity to protect them from punishment for their brazen kidnappings.

i) Space(s) of exception

Agamben argues that spaces of exception are created through the declaration of a state of emergency which allows the suspension of law, erasing the legal status of individuals and leaving them:

*“neither as prisoners nor persons accused, but simply ‘detainees’, they are the object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention that is indefinite not only in the temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight”.*²³⁹

A space of exception can refer to either the region / nation in which law has been suspended (in this case Ayacucho) or the space of detention where the suspension of human rights is complete. The detainees, or target populations, in this scenario are reduced to a state of bare, or precarious, life. Butler’s work on precarious and grievable life argues:

*“The precarity of life imposes an obligation upon us. We have to ask about the conditions under which it becomes possible to apprehend a life or set of lives as precarious... Only under conditions in which the loss would matter does the value of the life appear”.*²⁴⁰

In this sense, the lives of detainees in spaces of exception are deemed to be valueless, non-grievable, and are considered not to matter. In this way, spaces of exception are produced by, and are also productive of, differential notions of which lives are valuable and ought to be grieved. Furthermore, as Gregory has highlighted, with reference to Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisons, these spaces are produced

²³⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (London, 2005), pp.3-4.

²⁴⁰ Butler, *Frames of War*, pp.2-15.

by a series of overlapping spatialities, insofar as Camp X-Ray is both under the control of the United States but outside of its legal frameworks, its existence relying on the suspension of national and transnational laws such as the Geneva Convention.²⁴¹

It was the use of such legal frameworks to create a state of emergency in numerous departments which allowed for widespread human rights abuses on a regional scale. The declaration of a state of emergency in Ayacucho in 1981 allowed the *sinchis* to perpetrate numerous atrocities which “caused great resentment and distanced the population”. After the establishment of the Political-Military Command in the department, all police forces and intelligence operatives came under the command of General Noel and human rights violations increased as the military operation advanced.²⁴² In particular, the CVR highlights how:

*“the first institutional turning point in the abdication of democratic responsibility by the government was the creation, by legal device, of the Political-Military commands...In zones declared to be in a state of emergency they assumed power for both the military and political conduction of the counterinsurgency struggle”.*²⁴³

In this sense, it is possible to understand that the declaration of a state of emergency placed Ayacucho department under a state of exception, whilst at the same time creating Los Cabitos as a space of exception. The human rights abuses perpetrated at Los Cabitos should therefore be seen as part of the same mechanism of the state’s exercise of power, not as errors or excesses. The very function of Los Cabitos is the exercise of sovereign power. The declaration of a state of emergency therefore was, in this way, a mechanism for making Peruvian democracy geographically contingent. In the words of

²⁴¹ Gregory, ‘The black flag’, p.408.

²⁴² CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VIII*, p.322.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.327.

Stavrides, “exception is established in the name of the law, order is broken in order to be saved”.²⁴⁴

Calveiro argues that the existence of “black holes” such as Los Cabitos or Guantánamo Bay are created within, and supported by, legal frameworks in order to control the dangerous Other, putting them under extreme stress and isolation before making them cease to exist.²⁴⁵ The evidence from the CVR therefore suggests that the declaration of states of emergency amounted to the abdication of Peruvian democracy. Successive governments under the leadership of Belaúnde, García and Fujimori allowed the military to rule with impunity over large swathes of the country and human rights abuses committed by the counterinsurgency operation were, in effect, legalised. Yet, as Tamayo argues, such frameworks also relied on a “doctrine of national security that was linked to an engrained creole racism that was the axis of this strategy [of indiscriminate repression]”.²⁴⁶ In this sense, the forms of state power deployed by the armed forces not only represented a vengeful form of sovereignty, but a distinctly colonial mode of thought predicated upon racist ideas about the threat of indigenous communities to national order and progress. To fully understand the implications of this spatialised practice of governance, it is important to identify which communities it targeted and why.

In this context, Los Cabitos can remind us of Foucault’s writings on internment and hospitalisation as forms of treating, whilst simultaneously excluding, the mad and diseased. As Elden highlights, in Foucault’s writings: “The opening of the Hôpital Général... was a social mechanism for the control of the city, for the establishment of a homogenous world. The venereally diseased and the insane were held in the same place

²⁴⁴ Stavrides, ‘Occupied Squares and the Urban “State of Exception”’, p.236.

²⁴⁵ Pilar Calveiro, ‘Spatialities of Exception’ in (Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo eds.), *Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception* (Basingstoke, 2014), pp.205-18.

²⁴⁶ Ana María Tamayo, ‘ANFASEP y la lucha por la memoria de sus desaparecidos (1983-2000)’ in (Carlos Iván Degregori and Elizabeth Jelin eds.), *Jamás Tan Cerca, Arremetió lo Lejos: memoria y violencia política en el Perú* (Lima, 2003), pp.95-134 (p.97).

of enclosure, stigmatised and punished”.²⁴⁷ In the context of Peru’s internal conflict, the detention centre was a space for the exclusion of parts of society deemed to be diseased or dangerous, in this case *Senderistas*. If innocent people got killed as part of the cure, then that was no matter as long as it stopped the contagion from spreading. This medical logic to state violence can be seen in Franco’s Spain and Pinochet’s Chile among many other examples, where Leftists were not only exterminated *en masse* but their culture, music, poetry and art were also destroyed or banned. These acts are not solely concerned with winning the war against an enemy; they are about remaking society through violent social engineering and excluding sectors who stand to oppose it.

As highlighted by the CVR, the proliferation of these programmes across Latin America during the latter decades of the twentieth century was no coincidence, but was highly influenced by the foreign policy and counterinsurgency strategies of the United States in the context of the Cold War. The United States’ strategy of assisting “low-intensity conflict” in support of friendly foreign governments, the CVR argues, had a significant impact on the strategies of the intelligence services in Peru, encouraged the militarisation of the conflict and led to blanket reprisals against communities aimed at wiping out Shining Path’s bases of support.²⁴⁸ However, in the Peruvian case it is important to remember that Leftist radicalism in the Andes was indivisible from the perceived problem of indigenous integration, meaning that both political and ethnic identities came to be diagnosed as undesirable.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, the Peruvian armed forces’ willingness to deploy violence against Leftist insurgents had a much longer tradition which predated the Cold War, as highlighted above.

²⁴⁷ Stuart Elden, *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Project of a Spatial History* (London, 2001), p.126.

²⁴⁸ CVR, *Hatun Willakuy*, pp.285-9.

²⁴⁹ On the conflation of political and biopolitical enemies by Alan García during his second Presidency (2006-2011), see Drinot, ‘The Meaning of Alan García’, p.187.

ii) Extending the space of exception

Whilst Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada are perhaps the most infamous examples of this violence, they are representative of a much wider practice of extrajudicial executions which occurred predominantly in military bases, but which also extended into other spaces. These include: the Navy base created at the Estadio de Huanta where journalist Jaime Ayala was disappeared in 1984; the military base at Totos (Cangallo province) where 14 peasants were executed as part of a larger campaign of forced disappearances; and the Huamanga General Hospital where three people accused of terrorism were assassinated by the police in 1982.²⁵⁰ Although it would be incorrect to suggest that the Huamanga hospital became a space of exception in the way that military bases were, this case is indicative of the way in which public spaces came to be militarised during the conflict and the counterinsurgency operation increasingly acted with impunity across the department. Public spaces such as the Estadio de Huanta, local hospital and streets of Huamanga suddenly became dangerous. In this sense, whilst we can talk about specific, localised spaces of exception, the wider effects of their existence were for military repression to pervade the spatial fabric of the entire department of Ayacucho.

The declaration of states of emergency across numerous Andean departments therefore allowed for both the creation of spaces of exception on the local level and the much wider militarisation of almost the entire region. As is explored in more detail below, the effect of this was to create a new imaginative geography in which the entire Andean region became criminalised as a singular *zona roja*.

Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada demonstrated the extreme levels of authoritarian repression the Peruvian armed forces were willing to embark upon in order to exterminate the Leftist insurgency in Huamanga. In rural areas of the department,

²⁵⁰ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. VII, p.119; p.34; p.15.

however, their strategy was dependent on the installation of military bases and formation of *rondas campesinas* in order to expand their intelligence gathering into the *puna* and tackle Shining Path on their own terrain.²⁵¹ Therefore, whilst the use of detention centres by agents of the Peruvian state was reminiscent of Southern Cone violence, different models must be found to explain how they behaved outside of Huamanga.

With the democratic rule of law suspended and communities at the mercy of the military, state agents acted in a manner more reminiscent of an invading army. With violent practices rooted in racial hierarchies and colonial ideas about civilisation and barbarism, the *ayacuchano* population was perceived as an external, existential threat to modern Peru and became the target of the counterinsurgency operation (as opposed to collateral damage). The military's lack of initial awareness or preparation for conflict had put them on the back foot but, faced with an enemy which they were unable to understand, they reverted to increasingly brutal reprisals.

This was the tragic lesson learned by the residents of Putis in Huanta province where over 100 peasants were extrajudicially executed by state agents as a form of collective punishment for alleged support for Shining Path. Before the massacre, four peasants from the nearby village of Marccaraccay visited the newly-installed military base in Putis district, and told the soldiers that the peasants in Putis were supporting Shining Path.²⁵² The reasons for this remain unclear but documents from the CVR files show a list of 45 peasants from Cayramayo who were beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform, the large majority of whom also appear in the list of victims.²⁵³ There is also extensive

²⁵¹ This strategy began in earnest on the last day of 1982 when Ayacucho was placed under a state of Emergency, and in the early months of 1983 when a military base was established in Totos and the Navy infantry established a base in Huanta (among others). The CVR asserts that the first *rondas campesinas* were also formed in early 1983. CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. II*, p.437; *Tm. VII*, p.27.

²⁵² Artemio Sánchez Portocarrero, *Genocidio en los Andes, el silencio de los vivos y el grito de los muertos: testimonios de muertes en Putis y otras comunidades altoandinas y amazónicas* (Kyoto, 2015), p.16.

²⁵³ CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. 'Relación de campesinos calificados beneficiarios de Reforma Agraria del predio Cayramayo a favour el grupo campesino de Cayramayo'.

testimonial evidence that livestock from the district of Putis was sold back to the peasants of Marccaraccay after the massacre. The testimony of Aurelio Condoray Curo, for example, states that:

*“This massacre was perpetrated on the insinuation of members of the ronda campesina of Marccaraccay who had gone to the [military] base, carrying crates of beer on six mules, to convince the commander to kill the people and sell their livestock”.*²⁵⁴

Rogelio Cusichi Ricra, who was serving at the Putis base at the time of the massacre, also said that the massacre was perpetrated for “their livestock, their animals; they had cows, sheep, horses, mules, pigs, llamas and alpacas”.²⁵⁵ It is therefore highly likely that the *marccaraccayinos* targeted the residents of Putis because of longstanding grievances from the Agrarian Reform and a desire to take their livestock for themselves. Portugal has corroborated this hypothesis through the testimony of Gerardo Fernández who, she argues, places the greatest culpability for the massacre on the shoulders on those four peasants, known to him and the other residents of Putis, who went to the military base. This detail is central to the story of Putis and to the wider history of the conflict because, as Portugal highlights, it clearly challenges peasant-victim and soldier-perpetrator binaries, instead highlighting the role of peasants as key agents in violence with “distinct positions” and “possibilities of decision and action”.²⁵⁶

There are two key lessons which the case of Putis demonstrated about how the counterinsurgency operation was produced by space. Firstly, that peasant agency and the local politics of space had an important role in shaping how the counterinsurgency operation was enacted, just as they had in influencing Shining Path violence. Secondly,

²⁵⁴ CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. Lima, 10 June 2002. ‘Declaración testimonial del Aurelio Condoray Curo’, Testimonio 200919.

²⁵⁵ CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. ‘Declaración testimonial del Rogelio Cusichi Ricra’.

²⁵⁶ Portugal, ‘Memoria de la violencia en Putis a partir del testimonio de Gerardo Fernández’, p.267.

the case demonstrates the impunity with which state agents were able to perpetrate violence against the peasant population, in effect extending the localised state of exception (represented by spaces such as Los Cabitos) to cover whole regions. Putis is not an isolated case of mass violence perpetrated by the armed forces against sectors of society deemed to be dangerous. In Huancapi, the armed forces murdered a group of local teachers, but the involvement of state agents was hidden by blaming Shining Path for their deaths. In Accomarca, 62 members of the community (26 of them children) were assassinated by members of the armed forces under the “Plan Operativo Huancayoc”. As the CVR details, the focus of this plan was to destroy all subversive elements in Huancayoc in the district of Accomarca.²⁵⁷

During the conflict, reporting on such crimes was incredibly difficult because the military limited access to information by banning journalists from travelling to the emergency zones. Instead, many newspapers were fed information by the counterinsurgency operation which placed emphasis on Shining Path violence and ignored human rights violations by the military (or passed them off as terrorist atrocities). Despite this, there were numerous reports of military violence, particularly in the Left-wing newspaper *Diario de Marka* which denounced the death of eight journalists at Uchuraccay as a military conspiracy and denounced the “disguised *sinchis*” and “who commit all type of outrages and abuses including murder, looting and the rape of peasants”.²⁵⁸ Other publications such as *La República* and *Kausachum* also tried to hold the military to account through reports on the massacre at Socos (perpetrated by the Guardia Civil but passed off for a year as a Shining Path atrocity) and interviews with soldiers who confessed to participating in massacres and executing

²⁵⁷ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. VII, p.155-7.

²⁵⁸ *Diario de Marka*, ‘Linchamiento fue una conspiración’, 2 February 1983, p.5; *Diario de Marka*, ‘Estas pruebas son irrefutables’, 3 February 1983, p.3.

prisoners.²⁵⁹ The CVR has also confirmed that it received numerous testimonies suggesting links between the police and paramilitary death squads in many areas.²⁶⁰ Combined, these reports alluded to far wider practices of state violence and attempted to redefine the counterinsurgency operation as the *guerra sucia* (dirty war).²⁶¹ As with Shining Path violence, instances of massive collective violence were supported by a consistent practice of individual assassinations and smaller reprisals, reminiscent of the strategy of low-intensity conflict referred to earlier. The existence of such practices lends further credence to the argument that the Peruvian armed forces had come to see Andean communities as an insurgent population which had to be subdued.

The scale of the Putis and Accomarca massacres, and the frequency with which such events occurred, therefore illustrate the logic between episodes of mass violence and the disappearances at Los Cabitos. These massacres were not accidents, nor can they be dismissed as excesses. Put simply, they were an attempt to eliminate not just members of Shining Path, but any community who might consider providing resources or support to the insurgents. The massacres were conducted with the complicity of the entire state machinery from the police and military to the judiciary (criticised by the Interamerican Court of Human Rights for failing to investigate the Huancapi case).

iii) Geography, governmentality and sovereignty

In order to fully understand the spatial practice of the counterinsurgency operation, it is important to reconsider some of the, perhaps unintended, effects of the state's response to Shining Path. For instance, the conflict created a situation in which vast numbers of

²⁵⁹ *La República*, 'GC presos por matanza de Soccos', 1 September 1984, p.1; *Kausachum*, 'Nos obligan a matar', 16 June 1985, p.1.

²⁶⁰ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VIII*, p.331.

²⁶¹ In this context, it is also important to consider the case of Uchuraccay where state agents did not perpetrate the murders themselves, but contributed to an atmosphere in which the murders were possible through what Flores Galindo terms "psychological warfare". Flores Galindo, *Buscando un inca*, p.237.

Peruvians living in rural areas of the Andes and Amazon were displaced from their homes, either by Shining Path's practice of *retiradas* or by military reprisals. Between 1981 and 1993, the population of Huamanga grew by 65.2% whilst the rural population of Ayacucho department fell by 23%. In the same period, the population of Lima grew by 34.7%. The full impact of this displacement has yet to be fully understood, although in many ways it has exacerbated and accelerated the pre-existing trends of mass migration to the cities in the latter half of the twentieth century. However, the short-term effects for the displaced have been rising poverty, increased racial discrimination and the loss of social networks, whilst most cities have struggled to cope with the increased pressure on public services.²⁶² Alongside these factors it is also important to consider the drastic effects on peasant identity, deeply associated with community and the working of the land, or the thousands of others (particularly the Asháninka) who have been displaced from their land without moving into the city.

Peasant communities who had been perceived to be supportive of Shining Path were therefore disrupted and displaced as a result of counterinsurgent violence. Following Agamben and Ong, we can interpret this as the use of sovereign power in order to produce a productive, docile population. The effects of forced displacement are, in this sense, congruent and consistent with the aims of the counterinsurgency operation to not only eliminate Shining Path, but also to eliminate the local cultures of radicalism which had developed and reassert more centralised forms of state power in Ayacucho.

This scenario (and this dissertation in general) relies on a Foucauldian understanding of the state and culture in which, in the words of Gupta and Ferguson, “power relations permeate all levels of society...[with] a stress on the active practices of social agents, who never simply enact culture but reinterpret and reappropriate it in their own ways”.

²⁶² CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. VII, p.342.

Drawing on a diverse range of scholars, including Bourdieu, Gramsci, de Certeau and Massey, Gupta and Ferguson have also argued that this Foucauldian construction of the state must be understood alongside “spatially territorialised notions of culture” which incorporates “perceptions of [how] locality and community are discursively and historically constructed”.²⁶³

Through this Foucauldian lens, the displacement of communities from rural spaces to the city slums can be seen as a result of the acts of social agents performing particular cultural values. Indigenous populations who had been sprawled out across the Andes now found themselves concentrated on the peripheries of major towns and cities, their ties to the lands they had once called home broken. It is important to recognise that, in this scenario, displacement has not removed these communities from the margins of state power, but has instead forced them to exchange one form of marginality (in the *puna*) for another (in *barriadas* at the periphery of urban areas). To read this process through Ong’s work on spatialised sovereignty suggests that communities were displaced from regions in which sovereign, or informal power, has been deployed, into spaces where more formal state institutions and governmental mechanisms of power operate.²⁶⁴ In this sense, discourse which conflated indigenous communities with Shining Path can be seen to have contributed to the production of localities in which sovereign power was exercised and constructed a process of counterinsurgency in which the displacement of indigenous communities became prevalent.

Whilst Shining Path deliberately displaced communities (through their practice of *retiradas*) as a means of creating their model society, it is important to also understand displacement as a major symptom of the counterinsurgency strategy. The influence of

²⁶³ Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, ‘Culture, Power, Place: Ethnography at the End of an Era’ in (Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson eds.), *Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Cultural Anthropology* (London, 1997), pp.1-29 (p.5, p.6).

²⁶⁴ Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*, pp.75-79.

the hemispheric counterinsurgency strategy developed by the CIA (and taught as part of the Foreign Intelligence Assistance Program at the US Army Intelligence School which was attended by 898 Peruvian officers between 1980 and 1996) was to identify the rural communities (and to a lesser extent student communities) as the insurgents' base of support, and therefore as the enemy.²⁶⁵ Collective punishment and community reprisals therefore became a central part of the operation, but the most complete way to eliminate communities was for the survivors of such assaults to flee to the cities. The failure of state agents to protect communities, leaving them open to constant harassment by Shining Path and the military, heavily contributed to the decisions of many to leave their homes. That is not to say that the counterinsurgency operation created displacement through direct bureaucratic commission, but that it did so because it was inherently racist and represented a performance of pre-existing prejudices.

iv) Andeanist geographies and race

This racism was predicated upon a virulent imaginative geography in which the Andes, peasant communities and radicalism had become synonymous. Beliefs about race, geography and politics overlapped to construct *campesinos* as a dangerous internal enemy. Furthermore, in these formulations, indigeneity has often been represented as a source of violence in itself. The idea that ancient, barbaric cultural practices have persisted despite modernisation has been used as a means to explain why radical opposition to the state has so regularly found its inspiration in the Andean region.

This spatialised formulation of race and rebellion in Peru was not, however, limited to the Peruvian armed forces, and can also be identified in the infamous 1983 Vargas

²⁶⁵ CVR, *Hatun Willakuy*, p.288. Gerardo Rénique, "'People's War', 'Dirty War': Cold War Legacy and the End of History in Postwar Peru" in (Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph eds.), *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America's Long Cold War* (Durham, 2010), pp.309-337 (p.325).

Llosa commission report into the incident at Uchuraccay, which talks of the “world of traditional beliefs” in which the *iquichanos* live with “the magical powers of their *apus* and mountain gods”.²⁶⁶ However, not only has the seriousness of Ossio and Fuenzalida’s report since been called into question, but also the conclusions derived from it by Vargas Llosa.²⁶⁷ Cecilia Méndez concludes, in her book on the “myth and history” of the *iquichanos*, that “it is as if the authors [of the report] believed that the peasants of Uchuraccay not only preserved the past, but embodied it”.²⁶⁸ In making these claims, the report draws a dubious link between exoticised interpretations of local beliefs and customs, the pre-Hispanic past and violence in the present day, claims which were echoed in media reporting on Shining Path.

In a similar vein, a 1983 report in US magazine Newsweek (which was reproduced in *Diario de Marka*) referred to Shining Path as a “peculiar communist group whose favoured weapon is the *huaraca*, an ancestral Indian sling used for throwing dynamite...who take the Gang of Four, Khmer Rouge and Albania as their model”.²⁶⁹ Peruvian magazine *Cambio* explained that in “the heart of the Peruvian Andes – a fascinating mixture of imposing landscapes, ancestral indigenous cultures and the clear presence of old Spanish civilization – there exists a revolutionary movement which positions itself at the heart of global revolution”.²⁷⁰ The combination of these references to ancient practices, landscape, indigeneity and political violence are designed to create

²⁶⁶ Ossio and Fuenzalida, ‘Informe antropológico’, p.74.

²⁶⁷ For a discussion of the various criticisms of the Vargas Llosa commission report see Enrique Mayer, ‘Peru in Deep Trouble: Mario Vargas Llosa’s “Inquest in the Andes” Reexamined’, *Cultural Anthropology*, 6:4 (1991), pp. 466-504. Misha Kokotovic, ‘Mario Vargas Llosa Writes Of(f) the Native: Modernity and Cultural Heterogeneity in Peru’, *Revista Canadiense de Estudios Hispánicos*, 25:3 (2001), pp.445-467 (p.449). Vargas Llosa has also been heavily critical of what he appears to perceive to be the excessively ideological *indigenista* works of Jose María Arguedas. See Mario Vargas Llosa, *La utopía arcaica: José María Arguedas y las ficciones del indigenismo* (Madrid, 2011).

²⁶⁸ Cecilia Méndez, *El poder del nombre, o la construcción de identidades étnicas y nacionales en el Perú: Mito e historia de los iquichanos* (Lima, 2002), p.10.

²⁶⁹ Barry Cane, quoted in *Diario de Marka*, ‘Friamente, los sinchis mataron a 3 campesinos’, 6 February 1983, p.3.

²⁷⁰ *Cambio*, ‘Guerra en los Andes: Sendero Luminoso, el peor desafío a la democracia Peruana’, 16 June 1983.

a highly effective imaginative geography, with an approach very similar to that which Starn has criticised North American Senderologists of adopting.²⁷¹

In short, it is to conflate simplistic ideas about the ancient, poor, backward Andes with language about Leftist revolutionaries in order to characterise highly modern, Western forms of political violence as representative of a hidden ethnic barbarism. The affixing of violence to a particular region and culture is, as Springer argues, inherently unstable because, whilst violence is certainly tied up in the social production of space, the heterogeneity and porosity of space make such an imaginative geography a highly contestable construct.²⁷² However, by characterising regions and cultures as violent, Othered spaces, these racialised discourses provide justification for violent intervention. In short, they create a colonial fantasy in which civilisation and savagery become monolithic, geographically constructed opposites on a collision course. Civilisation's only hope, in this scenario, is to become barbaric in order to eliminate the Other. This vision is, at best, a clumsy reading of cultural history, whilst at worst provides justification for the wholesale eradication of indigenous communities on the basis that they are supposedly doomed to history in any case.²⁷³

Thus, imagined geographies become a self-serving justification for state violence directed against communities already suffering from the geographically uneven effects of economic development and state projects. For this reason, it is possible to assert that a form of ingrained cultural racism formed the basis of counterinsurgency strategy in the Peruvian conflict. This argument is supported by Roberto Ayala, a historian from Ayacucho.²⁷⁴ When I interviewed Roberto in 2016, he articulated a position very similar

²⁷¹ Starn, 'Missing the Revolution', p.66.

²⁷² Springer, 'Violence sits in places?', p.93.

²⁷³ Kokotovic, 'Mario Vargas Llosa Writes Of(f) the Native', p.449.

²⁷⁴ Roberto Ayala Huaytalla (ed.), *Entre la región y la nación: nuevas aproximaciones a la historia ayacuchana y peruana* (Lima, 2013).

to that of the CVR with regards to the relationship between violence and racism in Peru, arguing that:

*“Racism played a very important role in the internal armed conflict. The armed forces behaved in that way, dehumanised the people [in the Andes], disappeared them and tortured them, or disappeared whole communities like in Accomarca and Putis.”*²⁷⁵

The way in which the counterinsurgency operation was conducted was perhaps the most physical representation possible of this idea; it was, as with Shining Path violence, a performance of cultural values. Colombo’s research regarding the Argentinian counterinsurgency operation against the Monteneros during the Dirty War is useful in this sense, as she argues that the Argentine military focused on depopulating the Tucumán *monte* which was perceived to be the where the insurgency was “territorialised”.²⁷⁶ In a similar way, the Peruvian military’s denotation of *zonas rojas* attempted to imaginatively “locate” Shining Path in particular spaces. Yet, rather than targeting actual Shining Path patrols (which the military struggled to locate in a real sense) in the difficult to traverse *puna* and cloudforest regions, they instead “located” Shining Path presence in indigenous communities, perceived to be supportive of the group and representative of their cultural difference. Thus, this locating, or territorialising, of Shining Path in indigenous communities, and also across the Peruvian interior more generally, acted as the foundation for the geography of sovereign power exercised during the counterinsurgency campaign.

This is the context in which Los Cabitos and the communal reprisals ought to be seen. Firstly, Los Cabitos and the establishment of Emergency Zones can be understood

²⁷⁵ Roberto Ayala Huaytalla, ‘Interview in-person’ (Huamanga, 2016).

²⁷⁶ Pamela Colombo, ‘Spaces of Confrontation and Defeat: The Spatial Dispossession of the Revolution in Tucumán, Argentina’ in (Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo eds.), *Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception* (Basingstoke, 2014), pp.48-60 (p.51).

as mechanisms for the governance of space, intended in the first instance to combat the very real insurgent threat posed by Shining Path (and elsewhere by the MRTA). Once these spaces of exception were established and all recourse to accountability and human rights was cut off, however, the counterinsurgency became increasingly shaped by cultural values and the performance of racial hierarchies. As a result, the state's counterinsurgency operation came to represent the exercise of a vengeful sovereign power predicated upon discriminatory ideas about space and race, and in doing so produced a less-radical, more-docile population over wider areas of the Andes.

Given the above argument that the counterinsurgency operation was a performance of cultural values about race, politics and geography, it is important to understand further how this performance has been represented culturally since the conflict. Such an analysis not only reveals some of the beliefs that predicated violence, but also the ways in which narratives about the same violence have been subsequently used to justify the same beliefs.

The counterinsurgency operation in cultural production

As with the analysis of Shining Path violence in the previous chapter, I will now explore the counterinsurgency operation through an analysis of the cultural responses produced by the armed forces, as well as by cultural producers working on the subject of state violence. That is because, following the work of Lefebvre, Springer and Whitehead, it is possible to understand political violence as both productive of, and produced by social space, a phenomenon “whose poetics derive from the sociocultural histories and relational geographies of the locale”.²⁷⁷ In this sense, violence can be understood to be produced by the same cultural frameworks which produce social

²⁷⁷ Springer, ‘Violence sits in places’; Whitehead, ‘On the Poetics of Violence’, p.75.

space, and to understand why violence is perpetrated in distinct ways it is necessary to also interrogate that same cultural framework.

Cultural artefacts produced by the Peruvian armed forces are, I believe, a window into this framework and the way in which the military interpret the aesthetics of their own violence. Importantly, however, cultural artefacts produced about the counterinsurgency operation (by those not in the military) represent a range of different cultural values which either support the military's heroic narrative or challenge it. In the following analysis, however, I will particularly draw attention to the forms of memories produced by state agents in order to interpret how they understood the violence they themselves perpetrated.

i) Space and the cultural frameworks of counterinsurgency

One form of cultural production that is particularly relevant to military memories of the conflict is the testimonial book, many of which have been produced by army officers to present their experiences of the conflict. Milton has analysed a range of these books in her work on counter memories, arguing that figures from the armed forces have attempted to “counter through cultural means human rights memories of the past with their own... [and] challenge the CVR's supposed monopoly on truth... by arguing that the authors have a fuller, less biased, and more direct experience...[of the] *verdadera verdad* (the real truth)”.²⁷⁸ Items representative of this trend include *Ayacucho: testimonio de un soldado* by General Clemente Noel Moral (who was in charge of the counterinsurgency operation in Ayacucho from 1982 to 1984), and *En honor a la verdad*, an alternative truth report to that of the CVR produced by the CPHEP.

²⁷⁸ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, p.38.

The CPHEP's account is shaped by a spatialised understanding of the internal armed conflict, and the actors who participated in it, in two important ways. Firstly, *En honor a la verdad* uses spatial terms to outline the armed forces' counterinsurgent strategy. The report begins by depicting the *sierra* as a space where "there is no state" and where "Shining Path and the MRTA tried to fill the vacuum" caused by the absence of the state.²⁷⁹ These supposedly empty spaces were then, during the course of the conflict, filled by the creation of military bases in Huancayo, Huamanga, Cusco, Totos, La Merced, Jauja and Puchari.²⁸⁰ This formulation of the counterinsurgency operation renders invisible the informal manifestations of state power and forms of structural violence which shape the Peruvian interior, creating a scenario in which the Peruvian state and military share no responsibility in the origins of the conflict because they were simply "absent".²⁸¹ The installation of military bases, establishment of Political-Military Commands and creation of states of exception are, under this logic, justified by the need to direct operations and control territory in the interior.²⁸²

In this sense, counterinsurgency strategy appears to be as concerned with the filling of supposed political vacuums with formal state power and the assertion of military authority. In August 1984, for example, General Huamán Centeno held a ceremony in which 8,000 *campesinos* from communities across Ayacucho swore allegiance to the Peruvian flag.²⁸³ Similarly, the report details the military's intervention in universities, including the installation of bases in the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería and Universidad Nacional del Central Huancayo, as part of a strategy to "re-establish the principle of authority".²⁸⁴ Military strategy in these

²⁷⁹ CPHEP, *En honor a la verdad*, pp.7-8.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.48.

²⁸¹ Deborah Poole, 'Between Threat and Guarantee Justice and Community in the Margins of the Peruvian State' in (Veena Das and Deborah Poole eds.), *Anthropology in the Margins of the State: Comparative Ethnographies* (London, 2004), pp.35-65.

²⁸² CPHEP, *En honor a la verdad*, p.38.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.57.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.236.

cases was not to tackle Shining Path head on, but to punitively reassert authority over the communities perceived to be supporting them.

Secondly, *En honor a la verdad* makes space central to its narrative about the genesis of Shining Path (and to a lesser extent about the MRTA). The report gives a detailed history of the party (which it refers to as *Organización Terrorista – Sendero Luminoso*) from early roots in the 1920s, through numerous splits in the 1960s until the Shining Path faction emerged in 1971. Particular effort is made by the CPHEP to highlight the foreign ideological influences on Shining Path’s leaders, with the report going into detail on the Sino-Soviet split which, it argues, led Peruvian Maoists to adopt the strategy of armed struggle for “the conquest of power and establishment of communism”.²⁸⁵ Later, the report devotes a whole page (in a separately boxed, unreferenced section) to theories of “foreign conspiracy” in relation to insurgent activity. While acknowledging a lack of detailed evidence, the report nonetheless cites numerous claims (from figures such as President Belaúnde) that Shining Path and the MRTA were receiving support from Marxist groups based in Chile and Argentina.²⁸⁶ In these cases, the CPHEP develops its spatialised narrative of the internal conflict further by depicting Shining Path and the MRTA as foreign terrorists who occupied spaces from which the state was absent in the interior. Rather than understanding the conflict as a bloody civil war precipitated by systemic inequality and cultural divides across Peru, this formulation represents the conflict as an invasion by foreign Marxists, legitimating the state’s response through the context of national security and sovereignty.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p.24.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p.43.

The narrative of the internal armed conflict deployed in *En honor a la verdad* is also reflected in *Ayacucho: testimonio de un soldado*. In particular, Noel deploys Cold War rhetoric to evoke the spectre of communism, arguing that the armed forces were required to tackle the “enemies and traitors to our nation” and “eliminate the negative effects of subversive propaganda”.²⁸⁷ As Toche highlights, Noel makes great efforts to evoke the figure of the “communist savage”; a figure who is ideologically constructed to exist outside of the (imagined) “national community” and aims to spread the “virus of class struggle”.²⁸⁸ In this sense, Toche is correct to assert that the armed forces’ practice of mass reprisals was underpinned by an anti-Leftist doctrine of counterinsurgency which was a major feature of Peruvian military thought in the twentieth century, shaping the military’s violent response to APRA, the insurgencies of the 1960s, and later to Shining Path.²⁸⁹ However, this doctrine was also premised upon a distinctly geographical imagining of insurgency which saw communism as coming from *elsewhere*, and therefore as an Othered, external force, rather than as a product of Peruvian society.

That such a logic can be deployed in attempts to justify waves of exterminatory violence against Leftist organisation almost goes without saying. Latin American and global history in the twentieth century is littered with examples of this reactionary tradition which, arguably, extends at least as far back as the suppression of the Paris Commune during the *Semaine sanglante*. For instance, Winn has argued with reference to Chile that “this demonizing of the ‘foreign’ underscores the importance of international factors... the *junta* would use the fabricated threat of Cuban intervention to justify its own counterrevolutionary violence”.²⁹⁰ In many of these examples as well,

²⁸⁷ Roberto Clemente Noel Moral, *Ayacucho: testimonio de un soldado* (Lima, 1989), p.12.

²⁸⁸ Toche, *Guerra y democracia*, pp.231-2; Noel, *Ayacucho*, p.21.

²⁸⁹ Toche, *Guerra y democracia*, p.231.

²⁹⁰ Peter Winn, ‘The Furies of the Andes: Violence and Terror in the Chilean Revolution and Counterrevolution’ in (Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph eds.), *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War* (Durham, 2010), pp.239-75 (p.271).

the medical logic of preventing contagion and limiting the disease of “red politics” is evoked in support of the nation.²⁹¹ What makes the context of the Peruvian internal conflict particularly distinct, however, is that this countersubversive doctrine was mapped onto an imagined geography of the nation which was already intensely racialised. Thus, this perspective leads to a conflation in military doctrine between communist traitors and indigenous communities who might become infected by foreign ideologies. In this way, the anti-subversive traditions of Peruvian military thought highlighted above can be seen to be consistent in the forms of memory practice produced by the armed forces in the aftermath of the conflict.

In contrast to the account produced by Noel, Pizarro Romero has highlighted the testimonies of around 30 lower-ranking state actors in the CVR which challenge the heroic narrative established by the armed forces.²⁹² These memories, in which policemen and soldiers express regret for their actions, or question the necessity of the human rights abuses and reprisals conducted by the armed forces, are represented to some extent in *Memorias de un soldado desconocido* (“Memories of an unknown soldier”). This memoir (translated into English as *When Rains Became Floods: A Child Soldier's Story*), by former soldier, *Senderista* and priest (and now anthropologist) Lurgio Gavilán, demonstrates that the Peruvian military did not necessarily act as a homogenous group, but that there are examples of dissent within the rank-and-file which have also come to shape the way in which soldiers and state agents remember the conflict on a personal level.

²⁹¹ For a discussion of the *Semaine sanglante* see Richard D.E. Burton, *Blood in the City: Violence and Revelation in Paris, 1789-1945* (New York, 2001), p.145. For examples of counterrevolutionary violence in Latin America see Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph (eds.), *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America's Long Cold War* (Durham, 2010).

²⁹² Javier Pizarro Romero, ‘La construcción de la identidad en los testimonios de los expolicías y exmilitares recogidos por la Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación’ in (Francesca Denegri and Alexandra Hibbett eds.), *Dando Cuenta: Estudios sobre el testimonio de la violencia política en el Perú (1980-2000)* (Lima, 2016), pp.307-30 (p.312).

Gavilán's experiences with the military began when he was captured by a military patrol on Apu Razuhuillca and his life was spared by the patrol's lieutenant (against the protests of the local *ronda campesina* who had been engaged in constant battle with Gavilán's *Senderista* column).²⁹³ For a number of years, Gavilán remained at the military base at Huanta, and his memoir suggests that he came to think of the military like a family with brotherly comrades and a paternal lieutenant as a "father"²⁹⁴. Given that the beginning of the memoir highlights Gavilán's time as a *Senderista* and the violence which he himself took part in, it is possible to see the testimony as not overtly anti-military in character, but one that calls into question the complex nature of defining victims and perpetrators of violence.

Nonetheless, several of Gavilán's memories stand in direct contrast with the armed forces' heroic salvation narrative of the counterinsurgency operation. He details the large numbers of *charlis* (prostitutes) who would visit the base once a week, and who were raped by the soldiers, as well as female prisoners at the base who were raped and then executed outside.²⁹⁵ Gavilán also tells the story of Claudio, a nineteen year-old boy who, like him, was a captured *Senderista* whose life was spared, in Claudio's case in order to perform intelligence work for the military. According to Gavilán, Claudio died under suspicious circumstances and, although it was said that Shining Path killed Claudio, Gavilán suspected he had been killed by the intelligence services.²⁹⁶ Gavilán also recounts one instance when:

"The members of the patrol called the central base to say they were being ambushed by Shining Path...The Shining Path prisoners were dead, I had already seen them at the barracks. They would place

²⁹³ Gavilán, *When Rains Became Floods*, p.39.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.51.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.48-51. On sexual violence during the internal conflict, see Jelke Boesten, *Sexual Violence during War and Peace: Gender, Power, and Post-Conflict Justice in Peru* (New York, 2014).

²⁹⁶ Gavilán, *When Rains Became Floods*, p.52-3.

homemade bombs in their hands and strew their bodies around here and there. There were about twenty dead Shining Path members lying around. They put rifles in their hands too. The public prosecutor took some notes... The truth is the whole scene was fabricated in order to eliminate the Shining Path guerrillas. It had happened before.”²⁹⁷

In these descriptions, Gavilán questions the military’s official narrative of the conflict by highlighting the excessive forms of violence conducted by the armed forces against vulnerable individuals (*charlis*, prisoners, young recruits), as well as their attempts to deliberately misrepresent the extrajudicial executions they conducted.

In 1993 Gavilán left the army despite having risen to the rank of sergeant. He left in order to become a Franciscan priest having been, to some extent, mentally defeated by the military’s brutal violence and aiming to “do something for those who had nothing, for my countrymen we had so brutally mistreated, stealing from them and raping their women”.²⁹⁸ In this sense, Gavilán deconstructs the mythical representation of the armed forces as defenders of the people and Peruvian nation, instead representing them as a force which perpetrates violence which is comparable to that of Shining Path in scale and brutality. When I spoke with him in 2016, Gavilán described Ayacucho, and the Andean *cordillera*, as regions which had suffered a particular “type of violence which maintains [the power] of the state”. In this sense, Gavilán inserts his criticism of the armed forces into a wider criticism of political and structural violence which incorporates criticism of *Senderista* violence and the political and economic exclusion of *campesino* communities. Because of this, his memoir is not representative of the majority of military memories of the counterinsurgency operation, but instead seeks to

²⁹⁷ Ibid., p.52.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., p.64

challenge the Peruvian armed forces' official narrative of the internal conflict from the perspective a former soldier (and perpetrator of state violence).²⁹⁹

An analysis of the relationship between the counterinsurgency operation and cultural production, however, ought not to be confined to cultural artefacts produced by state agents, but must also incorporate artefacts produced about the counterinsurgency operation by civilians. Extending my analysis in this way allows me to assess the extent to which the military's salvation narrative has been taken on and reflected by cultural producers in Peru. In the following section, therefore, I focus on an analysis of the complex ways in which Peruvian cinema reflects the counterinsurgency operation.

ii) Cinema and the counterinsurgency operation

Cinema is a particularly useful medium through which to analyse discourses about political violence in Peru for several reasons. There are a wealth of sources from which to choose, both from established directors such as Francisco Lombardi and from younger documentary filmmakers, some of whom have worked closely with memory projects such as the CVR and LUM.³⁰⁰ Through translations and subtitles, film as a medium is able to cut across language barriers whilst retaining some of the orality of indigenous languages in a way that literature cannot. Many of the elements which are considered when producing and editing cinematic narratives, such as location, shot, and framing, are also inherently spatial but can be played with by directors. In essence,

²⁹⁹ As Milton argues, however, Gavilán's account is far closer to, and more representative of, the experiences of many rank-and-file soldiers during the conflict, including some who gave testimony to the CVR. Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, p.7. See also Chapter 3.

³⁰⁰ Also worthy of mention here is *La casa rosada*, dir. by ayacuchano filmmaker Palito Ortega (Andina Compañía Cinematográfica, 2016) and the documentary *Te saludan Los Cabitos*, dir. by Luis Cintora (Proyecto Sociales Ahora o Nunca, 2015). Both films focus on counterinsurgency violence in Huamanga, and how the conflict was shaped by the local politics and culture of Ayacucho including the role of the detention centres Cuartel Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada. Because they do not focus as such on counterinsurgency from the perspective of the military, I have chosen not to include a more detailed discussion of them in this dissertation.

filmmakers have freedom to create a sense of space, geography and the locale within their own work.

La boca del lobo (“The Lion’s Den”) is the Lombardi film which deals with Shining Path most directly. Vitín Luna is a soldier in a battalion which has taken control of Chuspi, a small town in an Andean emergency zone which has been “laid waste” by Shining Path.³⁰¹ The army in Chuspi are faced with an overwhelming tide of insurgent violence until the arrival of Lieutenant Iván Roca who begins to combat the insurgents with increasingly violent methods. Luna is ultimately forced into a choice between two, equally violent prospects: strict obedience to Roca’s project of collective punishment to annihilate Shining Path, or stepping out of line at the risk of punishment. The complex moral choices faced by Luna are in this way shown to be somehow representative of the counterinsurgency operation, whilst Shining Path violence (such as the appearance of several corpses with a sign reading “So die the informers and traitors of the population”) appears simplistically barbaric, savage and without rationale. By falling back on this false dichotomy, Lombardi’s film appears to fall within the classic narrative that the armed forces were highly conscious of their role in the deepening cycle of violence, but that they were forced into increasingly abusive habits by the encroaching threat of Shining Path violence and the existence of numerous ‘bad apples’ who committed a limited number of excesses and mistakes. Such an interpretation is centred on the assertion that Shining Path were ultimately the primary aggressors in the conflict and that, whilst military abuses certainly existed, they were the exception rather than the rule. However, whilst the main narrative of the film does appear to humanise the majority of the soldiers, there is another reading of *La boca del lobo* possible which is deeply tied to ideas about race and space.

³⁰¹ *La boca del lobo*, dir. by Francisco Lombardi (Inca Films S.A., 1988).

Durand argues that *La boca del lobo* ultimately represents the military as defenders of the nation driven to abuses by the violence of Shining Path and the inaction of the political powers situated in Lima. In this sense, they see themselves as doing the dirty work required of them by the state. However, Durand also argues that Lombardi suggests the military detest the Andean world, as the soldiers show a complete distaste for Andean food and music, and a total “disidentification” with the communities they are supposed to protect.³⁰² This theme is apparent throughout the film, particularly in an early scene when soldiers raid a local workshop, smashing the delicate *retablos* (an Andean handicraft) made by the owner. For Lombardi, this disparagement of local culture demonstrates that the soldiers sent to the *sierra* are not simply corrupted by excessive Generals, but also by racist beliefs they hold themselves.



Fig. 7: *La boca del lobo* (Francisco Lombardi, 1989).

However, the narrative structure of the film also establishes a form of ethnic hierarchy which could be seen as problematic. Towards the film’s culmination, in the most distressing sequence, Luna and the other soldiers are ordered to execute a group of

³⁰² David Durand, ‘Una “máquina mutiladora”: el discurso del Ejército peruano durante el conflicto interno armado’ in (Francesca Denegri and Alexandra Hibbett eds.), *Dando Cuenta: Estudios sobre el testimonio de la violencia política en el Perú (1980-2000)* (Lima, 2016), pp.333-352 (p.337).

detained peasants. Although Luna appears not to fire, the other soldiers do whilst yelling with fury in the same way as their General. What this suggests is that whilst many of the soldiers are complex, humanised characters, on some level there is a profound racial hierarchy central to the counterinsurgency operation which supersedes the soldiers' humanity. Whilst they may sympathise or pity the peasant communities that they terrorise, they continue to do so under orders from their Creole superior. Even when Luna refuses to kill a survivor, he does not protect the man or attack Roca but simply refuse the order. This is central to the hierarchy set up in *La boca del lobo*. In this hierarchy, the Andean community are cast as victims, worthy of our pity but not represented as particularly complex characters, whilst their possible links to Shining Path are not explored in great detail. The sound of the wind in footage of the Andes is a common feature and can be seen as a way of signalling the harshness of the landscape and tragic events which have happened there, linking the suffering of the community to the landscape in another form of imaginative geography.



Fig. 8: *La boca del lobo* (Francisco Lombardi, 1989).

At the climax of the film, Luna challenges Roca to play Russian roulette with him of the film (the first five chambers are empty before Roca orders Luna to kill him with the last bullet, but he refuses), yet here is no right of reply for the indigenous community around them; they remain silent and excluded from the centrepiece of the film.³⁰³ In this sense, both Luna and Roca retain agency in the narrative whilst the victims, the peasants, do not.

La boca del lobo is therefore, in many ways, sensitive to race relations in Peru. However, whilst illustrating the effects of racial hierarchy on the counterinsurgency operation, the same hierarchy shapes the internal structure of the film's narrative. It is Luna, the *mestizo*, humanised soldier, who is the protagonist and hero of the story, whilst peasant communities continue to appear as archetypal victims. However, it is also important to consider the timing of the film. Whilst films about the conflict in Peru since 2003 have had to address the question as to whether they are for or against the conclusions of the *Informe Final*, films in pre-CVR Peru were created at a time when understandings of the conflict were very different. Because of this, *La boca del lobo* was arguably ahead of its time in its unheroic characterisation of military leaders, and criticism of its narrative should be understood within this context.

There are also a number of films on the conflict which continue to rely on highly simplified narratives and stereotypical characters which continue to retain currency in Peruvian society. Of these, Rocío Lladó's *Vidas paralelas* is one of the worst culprits, a semi-blockbuster action movie which, Milton argues, represents *Senderistas* as barbaric

³⁰³ The inclusion of the Russian roulette seen may well be a reference to *The Deer Hunter* dir. by Michael Cimino (Universal Pictures, 1978). *The Deer Hunter* is widely considered a classic America war film about the dehumanising effects of violence during the Vietnam War.

hedonists and hides the abuses of the Armed Forces.³⁰⁴ Shining Path violence is depicted by Lladó as the physical demonstration of an exoticised, ever-present Otherness in Peru, a representation which compresses complexity and roots its aesthetics in vague, homogenised depictions of the Andes (also exoticised, also savage, also Othered). In this sense, in the words of Springer, the film represents a “caricatured” vision of the Andes which attempts to “affix” notions of violence and characteristics of the Other to the Peruvian interior.³⁰⁵ Decoding such representations of the conflict is therefore essential for understanding how cultural producers conceive of political violence as either an issue of highly subjective, visible, terrorist violence, or something that is more structural in nature, permeating the social and spatial fabric of the entire nation.

As highlighted, these representations of the counterinsurgency operation reiterate the military’s heroic narrative about their own role in the conflict. Furthermore, the way in which violence is depicted, in which language is used, or in which individuals and communities are represented in each cultural artefact, gives clues as to how the producer envisions violence, society, and the purposes of cultural memory. In particular, I have aimed to highlight that the forms of social and racial exclusion inherent to military violence during the internal conflict have been replicated in forms of cultural production which depict Peru as a nation struggling to cope with a racialized, colonial battle between the civilised centre and the savage periphery. Of course, some filmmakers, such as Palito Ortega from Ayacucho, have also eschewed these representations, attempting to articulate visions of the conflict which challenge the official military narrative, and in doing so the military’s cultural power which positions itself at the centre of the Peruvian nation.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ *Vidas paralelas*, dir. by Rocío Lladó (J.C. Entertainment, 2008); Cynthia Milton, ‘Parallel Lies? Peru’s Cultural Memory Battles Go International’, *e-Misférica*, 7:2 (2011) [<http://hemisphericinstitute.org/hemi/en/e-misferica-72/milton>, accessed 20 July 2017].

³⁰⁵ Springer, ‘Violence sits in places’, p.93.

³⁰⁶ See Ponciano del Pino, ‘Ayacuchano Cinema and the Filming of Violence: Interview with Palito Ortega Matute’ in (Cynthia Milton ed.), *Art from a Fractured Past: Memory and Truth-Telling in Post-Shining Path Peru* (London, 2014), pp.153-75.

However, in order to fully understand what Milton refers to as the soft cultural power of the Peruvian military, and to engage with a broader scope of their intervention into post-conflict memory practice, it is also necessary to examine how the armed forces have used public space as an arena for “what we might consider careful curations to evoke a shared glorious past”.³⁰⁷ In a similar way to how the armed forces have developed forms of cultural production and testimony, military figures have also replicated memory practices traditionally used by human rights activists, such as memory museums, as a means to challenge the conclusions of the CVR, establish military memories within memory discourse and support the heroic narrative of the counterinsurgency operation. These forms of military memory practice have also attempted to establish their own spatialised understandings of the conflict. By locating didactic memory projects in military institutions in Lima, the spatiality of these projects reflects a narrative of the conflict in which Shining Path, an external Other, initiated political violence by attacking a unitary and solidary Peruvian nation.

Commemorating the counterinsurgency operation

Assessing the degree to which the military’s counterinsurgency operation is commemorated, or remembered in public space in Peru is not a straightforward task. On the one hand, as Milton has highlighted, there are the forms of commemoration designed by the armed forces themselves, including the monument to fallen soldiers at El Pentagonito barracks in Lima and the Museo del Ejército Contemporáneo Chavín de Huántar in Chorrillos, Lima, which commemorates the 1996-7 hostage crisis and re-taking of the Japanese ambassador’s residence by the military.³⁰⁸ Although the Museo Chavín de Huántar is designed to represent a relatively isolated incident in the final

³⁰⁷ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, Conclusion, p.5.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapter 5.

stages of the internal conflict, it nonetheless represents a distinct effort by the Peruvian armed forces to enshrine their heroic narratives of the counterinsurgency operation in space.

In contrast to these sites, there are those which directly oppose the military's heroic narrative. Of these, the Santuario de la Memoria developed by ANFASEP on the site of a clandestine graveyard next to the former site of Cuartel Los Cabitos is notable because of the way in which the site highlights, through its very existence, the systematic nature of human rights abuses perpetrated by state agents. Understanding the narratives evoked by these sites is crucial for determining the significance of the Peruvian military's memory work and how it contributes to the production of space (and spatial narratives) in Peru today.

i) Military memories in public space

Milton has pointed to the annual recreation of the Chavín de Huántar operation at the Museo Chavín de Huántar in Chorrillos as an example of the prevalence of “counter memory” in Peru. Recreations of the operation serve to celebrate the heroism and daring of the armed forces, thus prioritising their memories over those of the *emerretistas* who died in the crisis. In the same military base as the museum also stands the Monumento al Valor Militar where commemorative ceremonies are still held every 22 April to commemorate the day of the operation. A re-enactment of the operation can be seen in Martha-Cecilia Dietrich's documentary *Entre memorias*: the laying of an explosive charge on the replica of the Ambassador's residence, the entry of the counterinsurgent commando unit into the building, punctuated by gunfire and loud explosions, and eventually the hostages being removed from the building to applause from the audience. After the demonstration, families take photographs next to the large, smouldering hole

blown in the wall by the commandos' explosive charge. The documentary also shows a speech made at the site by a man who declares:

*“Today we can feel proud, despite what we read in the papers, [in] this example, this glorious page in our history, and in our commandos who proved the quality of our Peruvian army, of our officials and soldiers, we are proud!”*³⁰⁹

This speech articulates very well the memory narrative represented by the re-enactment and the museum, in which the armed forces are depicted as heroic figures who defeated the MRTA and Shining Path through ingenuity and bravery. Apparently absent from the re-enactments are the executions of insurgents, who remain silenced.

As Milton argues, “the re-enacted Operation points to a desire to simulate what the Armed Forces remember as having taken place and to relive this triumphant moment”³¹⁰. In fact, the recreations serve a dual purpose insofar as they also recreate, perform, and elicit the possibility and fear of violence before reiterating the role of the military and Fujimori as saviours. These memories of violence are highly ideological, primarily evoked in order to silence other memories of the conflict which would highlight the human rights abuses carried out by state actors.

Counter-memory narratives also hinder the ongoing process of reconciliation, and their evocation by key political figures and Presidential candidates (including Alan García and Keiko Fujimori) continues to make the completion of projects linked to reconciliation less likely. These projects, including the payment of reparations to victims of violence, developmental projects designed to alleviate poverty and low levels of education in rural areas, and the creation of LUM, were established by the CVR to be

³⁰⁹ *Entre memorias*, dir. by Martha-Cecilia Dietrich (Granada Centre for Visual Anthropology, 2015).

³¹⁰ Cynthia Milton, ‘Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru’s era of transitional justice’, *Memory Studies*, 8:3 (2015), pp.361-78 (p.372).

fundamental elements of the wider process of reconciliation by reducing socioeconomic exclusion in Peru and preventing further violence.

Fujimorismo still hold a central place in narratives of the conflict as Peru's salvation. The re-enactments of the Operación serve to promote this narrative and prevent the armed forces from being criticised, and prosecuted, for being perpetrators of violence in the same way that Shining Path and MRTA members have been. However, it is also important to recognise that Milton has highlighted a tension between the *Fujimorista* "salvation" memory narrative and the military and police force's "heroic" narrative of their own role in the conflict.³¹¹ Although both positions take a similar perspective on the conflict and are highly opposed to the conclusions of the CVR, tensions have arisen in the post-Fujimori years about the emphasis which *Fujimoristas* have placed on the former President's personal role in the pacification of Shining Path which has sidelined, to a degree, the role of the police and armed forces. Whilst the annual anniversary of the Operación remains an important moment for *Fujimorismo* and its key representatives, Keiko and Kenji Fujimori, who use it to legitimise their own political future's as well as their father's past, it is also a moment which highlights ongoing tensions about the *Fujimorista* memory narrative.³¹² Similarly, Ayala and Zúñiga have highlighted the tensions which exist between the official "institutional memory" of the Peruvian Navy and the daily experiences and recollections of the marine infantry which, they argue, illustrates the human character of the infantry without excusing all of their actions. Because of this, it is important to remember, as with Shining Path militants, that many state actors were not simply perpetrators, but also human agents making complex decisions, and sometimes victims.³¹³

³¹¹ See Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, pp.19-20.

³¹² For example, see 'Mineros de Chavín de Huántar Llegan a Congreso por sus Derechos', *Manifiesto*, 12 May 2017 [<http://manifiesto.net.pe/2017/05/12/mineros-de-chavin-de-huantar-llegan-a-congreso-por-sus-derechos/>], accessed 16 June 2017].

³¹³ Henry Ayala Abril and Antonio José Zúñiga Romero, 'Entre el recuerdo y el olvido: Memorias de infantes de la Marina de guerra del Perú sobre su participación en el conflicto armado interno' in (Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la

Broadly speaking, however, counter memory narratives have been deployed to support the actions of the military. As the same speaker states later in *Entre memorias*: “Being here with our families, and especially our children who need to know what terrorism means, so they fight for democracy and the freedom we deserve”. He then leads the crowd in an increasingly loud chant of “Long live Peru!”. This demonstrates the way in which this counter-memory narrative is being intertwined with a form of militarised nationalism. The foundational idea of this outlook is that Peru, as a unitary and solidary nation, was attacked by terrorists and plunged into chaos until the arrival of Alberto Fujimori who allowed the military to get on with their job. Needless to say, such an outlook obscures the plethora of social, racial and cultural conflicts and contradictions which also contributed to the conflict, and completely disregards any suggestion that the military engaged in human rights abuses. That is because, to reference Butler again, the lives of insurgents are not deemed to be grievable. They are a population whose annihilation, for many Peruvians, prompts little affective disposition other than indifference, and so the violence exercised by state agents is seen as unproblematic in this memory narrative. This point is central to understanding the importance of cultural representation and memory narratives to the production of exclusionary state violence. As highlighted above in the analysis of Los Cabitos (and discussed later with reference to the 1986 prison massacres in Chapter 4), counterinsurgent forces perpetrated moments of physical, subjective, exclusionary violence. The counter-memory narratives which continue to assert that insurgents were not deserving of life, on the other hand, act as forms of discursive, objective, exclusionary violence, providing the justification for (and making possible) further acts of subjective exclusionary violence in the future.

Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú ed.), *II Concurso de Investigación en Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario: Compilación de textos ganadores* (Lima, 2015), pp.9-41 (p.36).

The non-grievability of insurgents also demonstrates a broader point about the extent to which grievability was determined by race on both sides of the conflict, and the extent to which the contributions of indigenous populations to both Shining Path's *guerra popular* and its ultimate demise have been included (or occluded) in memory narratives and historical interpretations. The rank-and-file of the Peruvian military, for example, are predominantly young men from indigenous backgrounds and suffer racial exclusion, yet despite the heroic narratives of the role of the military, indigenous soldiers have never been at the forefront of this narrative (nor have they considered to be eminently grievable).³¹⁴ Similarly, whilst initial peasant support for Shining Path, and the contributions of the *rondas campesinas* to Shining Path's defeat, have been increasingly recognised in scholarly literature on the conflict, the role of other groups such as the *Ejército Asháninka* is yet to be fully recognised.³¹⁵ In this sense, despite *Fujimorista* and military narratives which emphasise the role of state agents, and to a lesser extent peasant communities, in the defeat of Shining Path, indigenous participants in the counterinsurgency operation remain almost as non-grievable as insurgents.

It is also important to highlight how forms of commemoration related to counter-memory narratives, including the DINCOTE (Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo) museum for police and military actors and the Chavín de Huántar re-enactments, are based upon different uses of space to memorials (including *El ojo que llora*) and museums dedicated to victims of violence perpetrated by, amongst others, the police and armed forces (such as the Museo de la Memoria in Ayacucho). For one thing, Milton's analysis of the DINCOTE museum highlights that it is not possible to visit the site without advance notice, extensive documentation and a guided tour with a member

³¹⁴ Hurtado, 'Velasco, Nationalist Rhetoric, and Military Culture in Cold War Peru', p.179.

³¹⁵ See del Pino, *En nombre del gobierno*; Mario Fumerton, *From victims to heroes: Peasant counter-rebellion and civil war in Ayacucho, Peru (1980-2000)* (Amsterdam, 2003).

of the national police.³¹⁶ This tells us that the National Police are acting as gatekeepers to the narratives of memory constructed within the museum. Because they are very careful about who is allowed into the museum and for what purposes, and provide a guide to explain the exhibits, Milton argues that these gatekeepers are able to limit interpretations of the displays to those which fit into their own narratives of the conflict.

Likewise, the army museum is difficult to access, involves a structured and non-participatory performance of memory, and presents its memory narrative fully-formed rather as something which becomes defined through an ongoing process of education and sharing of testimonies. In this sense, as Milton argues, while the armed forces have appeared to adopt the mechanism of human rights-based memory activists, including memory museum and monuments, to reflect their own narratives, the manner in which these mechanisms have been deployed reveals a different set of assumptions and prejudices as to why memory practice is necessary.³¹⁷

ii) Countering military memories in spaces of violence

In contrast to this, I believe it is also important to consider the sites of testimony which stand in direct opposition to the military's heroic narrative, and which are testimony to the forms of exclusionary violence practiced by the armed forces. For the reasons discussed earlier in this chapter, Cuartel Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada are highly important objects for study in relation to military violence, but I have also chosen to analyse them in order to understand how those violent practices have been remembered, or forgotten, in the present.

³¹⁶ Milton, 'Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru's era of transitional justice', p.365.

³¹⁷ Ibid., p.375.

The two detention centres were created during a state of emergency and, since the end of the state of emergency, the two have in many ways been forgotten in the historiography of the conflict. Whilst museums such as the Museo de la Memoria and LUM can be seen as attempts to enshrine particular narratives of the conflict in public space, insufficient attention has been paid to how sites of trauma can also act as sites of memory. As discussed below, Los Cabitos has now been partially converted into a site of memory by ANFASEP, but La Casa Rosada remains privately-owned, forgotten in Huamanga and in the history of state violence. Therefore, whilst the interplay of space and memory in Peru has been partially explored through museums of memory, a deeper understanding of the geography of memory (encompassing the interplay between space, violence and memory in sites of violence) has yet to be fully explored. I will therefore argue below that Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada have come to represent exceptional forms of state violence and that only through their development as sites of memory can they be fully recuperated as central cases of violence perpetrated by the counterinsurgency operation. Initiatives such as the Santuario de la Memoria therefore not only represent a localised, grassroots approach to memory practice, but also constitute an attempt to integrate a wider array of experiences of violence perpetrated by state agents into more widely-accepted, mainstream narratives of the conflict.

The idea of the Santuario de la Memoria is to create a centre for memories of the human rights abuses committed in Ayacucho department during the internal conflict, whilst preserving elements of Los Cabitos including the mass graves and incinerator. Situated on La Hoyada, the training field at the side of the former military base, ANFASEP aim to create a public space for reconciliation between Peruvians, whilst also promoting “the Quechua language, Andean cosmovision, and traditional and

contemporary *ayacuchano* culture”. Original plans for the site included a site museum, photography exhibit, “Forest of Memory”, sculptures and art related to memory, a multifunctional events space known as the “Casa de la Reconciliación”, and an exhibit to the disappeared.³¹⁸ Through these plans, they have attempted to maintain a sense of place by incorporating elements of the former military base, whilst re-characterising La Hoyada as a site of memory, reconciliation and education. Ultimately, the project is about reclaiming space from the shadow of violence, to bring life back to Ayacucho without denying what has happened.

The site resembles a large cemetery with plots dug into the ground where ANFASEP members place flowers and remove rubbish. This is crucial because it means that, whilst there are plans to make the Santuario a site of memory in a historical sense, it is still also very much a place for the remembrance of the dead and the disappeared. In this sense the Santuario perhaps has more in common with the Cementerio Nueva Esperanza in Southern Lima than with the Museo de la Memoria. It is a space which families can visit to mourn for their loved ones without fear of reprisal or shame. For this reason, the site is not simply a museum but also a sanctuary, a safe space for the living as much as it is for the dead.

The project is also indivisible from ANFASEP’s continuing work to find and identify the disappeared in Ayacucho. The disappeared continue to hold a huge place in *ayacuchano* memories of the conflict, representative of the many hidden secrets and deficit of state responsibility for the widespread militarisation of the conflict. ANFASEP have campaigned tirelessly for the Law for the Search of Disappeared Persons which gives greater impetus to the ongoing search for the remains of over 15,000 disappeared persons (whilst the CVR stated that roughly 38% of the disappeared

³¹⁸ ANFASEP, *¿Hasta Cuándo Tu Silencio?*, p.60-1.

were in Ayacucho, there are also large proportions in Huanuco and Junín).³¹⁹ As Adelina García describes, this search is central to the work of ANFASEP's identity:

*“Our struggle is to seek the truth and the many people still missing... We have a value, we are not like objects they can sell... We are, and until now always have been, fighting. Many people tell us “they victimised you so much” but no, we are not only victims. Our families, until this moment, we don't know where they are... This is our struggle.”*³²⁰

This demonstrates the way in which the disappeared maintain a very real presence in *ayacuchano* politics and culture, calling into question the ways in which the conflict has been periodised. As viewed from the capital, the violence and its effects appear to be consigned to the twentieth century. In Ayacucho, and across other Andean departments, however, there is a sense that the conflict was part of an ongoing and unending struggle between the local community and state forces.³²¹ The disappeared are a legacy, a constant reminder that systemic violence was deployed on a massive scale across this region (and to a certain extent, continues to be).

The Santuario is therefore deemed to be a sacred space in which the disappeared can be mourned for, talked about and remembered; in many ways, it is a space in which they are brought back to life. In being a site for both reflection and organisation, the Santuario allows ANFASEP to continue to develop their own narratives of the conflict by literally building a positive space of remembrance on top of the former military site. The intention is not to hide the history of what took place there, but to reclaim the space

³¹⁹ CVR, *Informe Final*, An. V, p.15; Washington Office on Latin America, ‘Organizaciones Internacionales Urgen Promulgación de la Ley de Búsqueda de Personas Desaparecidas en Perú’ [http://www.wola.org/es/noticias/organizaciones_internacionales_urgen_promulgacion_de_la_ley_de_busqueda_de_personas_desa_par], accessed 11 July 2016].

³²⁰ Adelina García, ‘Interview in-person’ (Huamanga, 2016).

³²¹ As referenced elsewhere, this tension between representatives of the state and *ayacuchano* communities is also apparent in Heilman, *Before the Shining Path*, La Serna, *The Corner of the Living*, and del Pino, *En nombre del gobierno*.

for themselves, for the community of Ayacucho, and for the families of the disappeared. So, whilst the content itself may in many ways not be explicitly spatial, I argue that the methodology of such sites of memory is highly influenced by desires to understand political violence from a wider range of political and geographical perspectives. They elucidate spatialised understandings of the internal conflict in order to construct memory narratives about the Andes, but also to produce memory work from the Andes too.

For this reason, ANFASEP act as important memory activists who have heavily influenced memory discourse locally, regionally and to an extent nationally. However, whilst ANFASEP's activities are certainly similar to those seen in LUM or organised by APRODEH, activities which use post-conflict memory as a means of supporting claims for human rights and articulating social and political positions, ANFASEP's memory work is also indivisible from their social organisation, both during and after the conflict, with all such profits reinvested back into their community programmes. Therefore, whilst they do act in cohesion with Peru's memory activist community and contribute to Peru's post-conflict memoryscape, the inherent spatiality of ANFASEP's own memory narrative means that their projects exist in a highly-localised memory circuit, in opposition to both the touristic memoryscape established in Lima, and Peru's traditional touristic circuit of pre-Pizarrian museums and colonial architecture.

Importantly too, however, the Santuario de la Memoria highlights the highly contested nature of public space as a battleground for narratives of the conflict. Whilst the Peruvian armed forces have certainly wielded a degree of cultural power by instigating their own memory projects, and have also influenced other projects including LUM to some extent, memory activists such as ANFASEP have used their

own projects to resist the military's heroic narrative.³²² In doing so, they not only challenge the military's version of the internal conflict, but also their long-standing traditional image as heroes and protectors of the Peruvian nation. As discussed above, the spatiality of these sites of memory reflects the different prejudices and beliefs as to the purposes of memory practice in general. Whilst ANFASEP's project reflects a grassroots and more egalitarian approach to commemoration, the sites created by the armed forces reflect the hierarchical, conservative and exclusionary outlook. This outlook, as highlighted at the beginning of the chapter, has been central to the development of a culture of military authoritarianism in the Peruvian armed forces since the nineteenth century, and also shaped the exclusionary practices of violence which were central to how the counterinsurgency operation was conducted.

iii) Invisible military violence in Huamanga's city-text

However, these sites still do not tell the whole story in terms of the sites where counterinsurgency violence was deployed. Whilst the progress of the Santuario de la Memoria offers cause for optimism in the development of commemorative practice, there are clearly limits to the extent to which sites of violence in Ayacucho can be recuperated for the purposes of memory practice. Some of these limits are logistical, whilst others are put in place by those in Ayacucho who reject the need for remembrance. Nelson Pereyra Chávez told me an anecdote which highlights the problems of officially recognising an array of sites of violence in a city which is increasingly oriented towards the tourism industry:

³²² The influence of the armed forces in shaping the production of LUM was discussed in several of the informal discussions and interviews which I conducted whilst on research trips to Lima, particularly by Juan Carlos Burga (as discussed in the section on LUM in Chapter 5). For a more detailed analysis of military intervention in LUM see Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, p.

*“In 2005 there was a group of enthusiastic youths who made works about memory, and one of these was to produce a map with commemorative marks of many different sites, acts committed by Shining Path and by the armed forces... They produced this map and distributed it to tourists during Holy Week. Scandal! The...tourist guides and owners of the tourist agencies, the hotel chains and everyone involved in the tourism industry, saying that these things should not be done because they frighten tourists”.*³²³

From this, we can discern that there is a hidden, obscured geography of sites of violence and memory in the streets of Huamanga. As Lambright argues, in this sense the Holy Week festivities “underscore a national culture of silence, a collective amnesia, an unvoiced mandate to forget the atrocities that had marked the region”.³²⁴ Many of these sites will never be opened up to the public, never pointed out to tourists and will never have a plaque put outside of them to say what happened here. Los Cabbitos is, rightfully, a space that has come to be representative of brutal, systemic, repressive state violence, yet it is only one location amongst a vast array of sites where agents of the counterinsurgency operation perpetrated human rights abuses with impunity. The Estadio de Huanta remains a public space used for different events, although it does have a plaque for the memory of Jaime Ayala, the journalist who was disappeared there in 1984. La Casa Rosada is, apparently, privately-owned, but very little is known about it. Only its colour and a vague location are found in testimonies given to the CVR. Likewise, the decommissioned bases at Putis and Totos and Huamanga General Hospital are now either abandoned or function as before the conflict.

³²³ Nelson Pereyra Chávez, ‘Interview in-person’ (Huamanga, 2016). The group which Pereyra refers to was called Ama Qunqanapaq (Quechua: “so as not to forget”), and the incident with the *Mapa de la memoria* is described in detail in Lambright, *Andean Truths*, pp.1-2.

³²⁴ Lambright, *Andean Truths*, p.1.

This raises important questions about the relationship between Peru's tragic past and the built environment in the country's cities. Violence permeated the streets of Huamanga for almost two decades, yet that reality is quickly disappearing in a city that is looking to modernise and is changing rapidly. How then to represent the impact of past violence in the present, and to determine the degree to which such episodes should be allowed to interrupt public space, challenging current perceptions about society and state violence? Without projects to highlight sites of violence in Huamanga, tourists will be delivered to the same museums on Inca and pre-Inca cultures, shown around the same colonial churches, and taken to the same artisanal markets to buy *retablos* and other local handicrafts. To a large extent, many locals (particularly business owners) may see this as the version of their city that ought to be remembered. Why focus on the tragic past when there is plenty of money to be made from the hordes of Semana Santa tourists, money that can be invested locally? Yet there are also many institutions and individuals who benefit from the silencing of the past, who don't want their secrets uncovered.

Huamanga's main plaza is a beautiful site, particularly in the early morning as the sun rises behind the mountains. The seventeenth-century Catedral Basílica Santa María dominates one corner of the square, and a statue of General Antonio José de Sucre atop his horse sits in the plaza's centre. Sucre is a war hero from Peru's War for Independence, having been Lieutenant to Simón Bolívar and leader of the Patriot forces at the 1824 Battle of Ayacucho. Taken together, these two figures, of Sucre and the Cathedral, represent the image of Ayacucho and Peru that is promoted by tourist agencies to the outside world, that of a modern Republic with a benign history of European colonialism. To read the plaza as if it were a text, then, tells us that these moments in history have a privileged place in *ayacuchano* identity, a point corroborated by many of the surrounding street names which take inspiration from other significant

dates and names from the war for Peruvian independence.³²⁵ There is, however, a small plaque on one side of the square which reads:

*“To the Peruvian victims of the longest and most painful period of violence ever suffered in our country, so that the process which we have initiated may bring us towards justice and lasting peace.
Ayacucho, 29 August 2003. Truth and Reconciliation Commission”.*

It is not a huge plaque, but it is at least something, a sign that something has happened here at a time when memories of what happened in Huamanga, and all over Peru, are disappearing into the fabric of the city. Perhaps this is what reconciliation looks like. Perhaps, when the dead are buried and those who remember them are gone, this is how a community moves on. Hopefully, the work of ANFASEP at the Santuario de la Memoria will encourage young *ayacuchanos* and tourists alike to learn about the region’s tragic past and pay tribute to those who lost their lives. Unfortunately, it seems that there are still too many untold stories, too many people still missing, and many sites of violence yet to be recuperated for the past to be forgotten just yet. This is the challenge that faces memory activists today: how to enshrine the tragic past in public space and to say simply, to paraphrase Montalbetti, that “something happened here”.³²⁶

³²⁵ Streets named after Sucre, José de San Martín, Francisco Pizarro and Miguel Grau (an admiral during the War of the Pacific) are all within three blocks of the plaza, as are the Jr. 28 de Julio (the date of San Martín’s declaration of Peruvian independence in 1821) and Jr. 2 de Mayo (Battle of Callao). These are common street names in most Peruvian cities, however many Andean cities also contain references to Incan history with streets named Manco Capac, Cusco, and Avenida los Incas, as is the case in Huamanga. This approach to the city as a text is further developed in later chapters drawing on Palonen, ‘The city-text in post-communist Budapest’.

³²⁶ See Montalbetti on Calle Tarata in Miraflores (which is also discussed in Chapter 3). Mario Montalbetti, ‘El lugar del arte y el lugar de la memoria’ in (Juan Andrés Bresciano ed.), *La memoria histórica y sus configuraciones temáticas: una aproximación interdisciplinaria* (Montevideo, 2013), pp.243-56 (p.252).



Fig. 9: Plaque in Huamanga dedicated to the CVR (Author's photograph).

Conclusion

Huamanga's city-text tells us several important things about the commemoration of violence perpetrated by state agents, and about the nature of the violence of the counterinsurgency operation on the whole. For a start, it is clear that even for one of the cities most affected by both Shining Path and military violence during the internal conflict, the issue of historical memory is not one which the majority of the community wish to engage with. For some the issues and memories at hand are too painful to remember, but others have no desire to remember a violent past when there is the potential of a bright economic future to focus on instead. There also remains the very real threat, as Lurgio Gavilán highlighted, that projects which seek to re-open the old

wounds of Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada will be denounced, perhaps even criminalised, as “terrorist apologism”, a stigma which continues to be attached to ANFASEP to this day.³²⁷

This situation is, to some extent, representative of Peru as a whole. In the period since the publication of the CVR’s *Informe Final* and its controversial criticisms of the armed forces, Peru largely has sustained high levels of economic growth which have, perhaps, limited greater criticism of the role of the Peruvian state and armed forces in the years of violence. Although a human rights memory narrative has emerged in these years, as well as numerous forms of cultural production that heavily criticise the counterinsurgency operation in the interior, this trend has been built upon the work of a community of memory activists whose wider public influence, despite the production of numerous works and projects which challenge state narratives of violence, remains limited in some sectors of society.

The analysis in this chapter has drawn heavily on the work of this human rights-based memory camp, but has also departed from it in important ways. Instead of inserting counterinsurgent violence into a wider critique of societal and insurgent violence which aims to define perpetrators and which is equally critical of all violent actors, I have drawn attention to the specific characteristics of the violence perpetrated by Peruvian state agents in this period. In particular, I have argued that state violence in the Peruvian interior can be understood as a form of vengeful, sovereign state power, directed in an exclusionary manner against target populations deemed to be internal enemies. Although there is, of course, an element of Cold War logic (and contemporaneous comparative examples from Latin America and beyond) to the way in which this violence was directed against Leftist groups, I have also highlighted how this

³²⁷ Lurgio Gavilán, ‘Interview in-person’ (Huamanga, 2016).

violence fits into the older ideological traditions within the Peruvian military (particularly from the 1880-1950 period) and how it took on a distinctly racial form because of the military's understanding of indigenous communities as obstacles to Peruvian order and progress. As highlighted by Hurtado, however, this conflation of indigeneity with dangerous radicalism was not a continuous feature of the military's outlook. During the 1960s, the Peruvian army "presented a more racially and ethnically diverse composition than the other military branches", whilst during the Velasco years the armed forces positioned themselves as agents of social justice on behalf of the indigenous population.³²⁸ The return of democracy in 1980, however, marked not only the end of the GRFA's project in statecraft, but also the end of a period in which the Peruvian military had aimed to act as agents of progressive radicalism.

As with Shining Path violence, I have also demonstrated how the counterinsurgency operation's underlying cultural framework, which I understand as an underlying explanatory factor for state violence, has remained consistent in some forms of cultural production and sites of memory produced in response to state violence, whilst in others it has been challenged. In this sense, I have aimed to draw attention to the ways in which such cultural frameworks are reproduced through time and space, and how a failure to challenge them more fully could precipitate further violence in the future.

These twin analyses of Shining Path and military violence have, however, so far been limited to violence perpetrated in Andean and Amazonian departments during the conflict. In the coming chapters, I will now move on to similar analyses of Shining Path and state violence in Lima, and how these developed in different ways throughout the 1980s and 1990s. I have separated these analyses in this geographical manner in part because different forms of violence were deployed by both the state and by Shining

³²⁸ Hurtado, 'Velasco, Nationalist Rhetoric, and Military Culture in Cold War Peru', p.179.

Path in different regions during the conflict, highlighting further the importance of understanding the conflict from different geographical perspectives. In Chapter 4 and 5, however, it will also allow me to demonstrate how the exclusionary logics of state violence and sovereign power deployed in the Peruvian interior were increasingly demonstrated, as the conflict progressed, in areas of the capital as well.

Chapter 3: Violence in the capital

The 1992 bombing of a wealthy, suburban district in Lima remains to this day a highly emblematic moment in the capital's experiences of political violence. Shining Path perpetrated the attack when they were ostensibly at their most threatening to the Peruvian state, yet within three months the majority of their leadership had been captured. The images of destroyed buildings in Miraflores evoked not only the impact of violence, but a new type of proximate fear for Lima's middle-class during a phase when Shining Path increasingly targeted the city. Although Peru had increasingly witnessed the transfer of governmental authority to its armed forces during the 1980s, it was this intensification of violence which provoked the final breakdown of democracy when President Fujimori dissolved Congress in 1992, and gave even greater powers to the military to deal with the insurgency. Therefore, the bombing symbolises the end of the Shining Path insurgency for many Peruvians, while for others it represents the beginning of a new phase of authoritarian rule across the nation.

Arguably one of the CVR's most significant contributions to understandings of the conflict was to argue that the "moderately educated urban sector" of the Peruvian population, particularly residents of Lima's wealthier districts, had been so concerned about the encroachment of Shining Path violence upon the capital that they were indifferent to the militarisation of the conflict, and resulting deaths of thousands of their compatriots, in the interior of the country.³²⁹ The *Informe Final* argues that this indifference was a result of the "the veiled racism and scornful attitudes that persist in Peruvian society almost two centuries after its birth as a Republic".³³⁰

³²⁹ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. VIII, p.328.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.316.

As I argued in the previous chapter, this tells us that there exists in Peru a “differential distribution of grievability across populations” which constructs Lima’s population as eminently grievable when compared with indigenous communities in the interior. Because of this, responses to episodes such as Tarata are shaped by affective responses including horror and loss, whereas responses to violence in the interior have been characterised by ignorance or indifference.³³¹ The publication of the *Informe Final* was therefore a significant step in the re-characterisation of the internal conflict, not simply as a series of terrorist-style attacks on Lima and subsequent pacification by the armed forces, but as a highly complex period of violence which took place predominantly in the rural departments, with predominantly rural victims. In this context, it is necessary to re-evaluate the significance of Tarata in the wider narrative of the conflict, to highlight the highly political nature of its commemoration, and to assess how and why memories of violence crystallise around particular events (whilst silencing or forgetting others).

This cultural geography of grievability also has implications for how safe, dangerous and well protected different regions appear to be. The state’s inability, and to some extent unwillingness, to respond quickly to the threat of Shining Path in this sense exposed the rural, indigenous population exposed to a greater risk of violence and death.³³² Experiences of Shining Path violence in Lima during the 1980s and early 1990s, however, appear to subvert this assumed cultural geography. For instance, Greene describes the 1986 prison massacres as a moment when “that great geographic and immeasurable symbolic distance that separates coastal Lima from highland Peru was definitively breached”.³³³ However, whilst Lima did experience many forms of disruption and violence throughout the 1980s, much of it was confined to working-class

³³¹ Butler, *Frames of War*, p.24.

³³² Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’.

³³³ Shane Greene, *Punk and Revolution: Seven More Interpretations of Peruvian Reality* (Durham, 2016), p.53.

districts and the *barriadas* at the edge of the city with little major impact on middle-class areas. Tarata, then, represented another important moment in which this cultural geography of safety was transgressed even more dramatically. As will be shown, this has shaped memory narratives about the bombing and about Shining Path violence in Lima in important ways, reflecting the differential distribution of grievability across Lima's landscape, and across Peru as a whole.

During the conflict, this geography acted as a framework which guided the responses of government figures, opposition politicians, military officers, journalists and the wider public to instances of Shining Path violence. In the post-conflict period, this geography has led to a historiographical focus on particular emblematic moments of Shining Path violence which fit into broader narratives in which the insurgents were the primary aggressors in the conflict with the armed forces as defenders of the nation. The CVR's challenge to this geography of grievability has opened up discursive space for an array of accounts which challenge this narrative and instead highlight the victimisation of Andean and Amazonian communities. There is still a need, however, for Peru's urban populations to engage with testimonies and cultural artefacts of the conflict produced by indigenous communities about their own experiences. Not only do such accounts simultaneously assert the grievability of all Peruvians and the active role of indigenous communities in shaping the conflict, they will also facilitate a challenge to the ignorance (highlighted by the CVR) which has characterised relations between Peru's capital and interior for so long.

The violence which did take place in Lima is, nonetheless, vital for understanding the different ways in which Shining Path operated in different regions and how narratives of the violence have come to be constructed from differing (and often competing) geographical perspectives. In this chapter, I will therefore analyse the logic

and aesthetics of the violence perpetrated by Shining Path and the counterinsurgency operation in Lima between 1980 and 1992. Firstly, I will assess the ways in which Shining Path made their presence felt for the urban population by creating recurrent blackouts, committing acts of robbery and vandalism and performing targeted assassinations throughout the 1980s. One of the most infamous of those assassinations was the murder of Maria Elena Moyano, a community leader from southern Lima, during Shining Path's attempts to consolidate their influence in the Villa El Salvador district.

Following this I will discuss the bombing of Calle Tarata, arguing that this episode has come to dominate some accounts of the conflict which highlight the bombing as an emblematic case of Shining Path terrorism. However, I will argue that the bombing is not only exceptional in terms of the wider conflict, but also in terms of the way in which the conflict was enacted in Lima. For instance, it was one of few instances of violence in Lima's "residential" (i.e. middle-class and whiter) districts compared to a sustained campaign of sabotage, bombings and assassinations by Shining Path in working-class districts and the *barriadas* (alongside widespread harassment and violence conducted by the police). Greene has highlighted that, because of this, experiences of violence in Lima in came to be refracted through racial and class divides, themselves reflected in the capital's geography.³³⁴ As a result, the Tarata bombing did subvert an imagined form of Lima's geography in which it was assumed that residential districts such as Miraflores and San Isidro were protected from the pathologies (poverty, indigeneity, Shining Path) which had produced violence.

It is also important to highlight that this subversion of the spatial dimension to safety was temporary and rare. As necessary counterpoints to the Tarata bombing, therefore, I

³³⁴ Greene, *Punk and Revolution*, pp.63-65.

will briefly discuss the counterinsurgency massacres at Barrios Altos and La Cantuta. These instances of violence reflect working-class narratives of when and how violence entered into Lima, and are themselves deeply tied to memories of political violence in Peru and the way in which different issues, including amnesties for state agents and the imprisonment of Alberto Fujimori, are considered in the present.

As with previous chapters, these analyses of instances of violence will be followed by an examination of the ways in which *limeño* experiences of the conflict have been culturally represented. In particular, I believe it is important to highlight which instances of violence have been deemed to be emblematic or representative cases, and to discern how the city's geography features (or is absent) in these narratives. To this end, the film *Tarata*, by Fabrizio Aguilar, is worthy of consideration. I have chosen to explore how Aguilar's film works as a cultural artefact which deals directly with the bombing and with the issue of how to represent the many narratives surrounding the incident. Using this film, I argue that it is possible to conceive of a cultural geography of the conflict in which middle-class and working-class communities suffered violence in different periods, and understood its causes in different ways.

Of course, contributions to this geography of the conflict are not only made culturally but can also be made in space itself. For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus on two sites; the monument to the victims of the Tarata bombing and the Monumento en Honor a la Verdad para la Reconciliación y la Esperanza (MHVRE from hereon in). I have chosen to deal with these sites in particular because, in contrast to earlier chapters where I have dealt with the intentional uses of museographical space to develop memory narratives, the history of the sites discussed in this chapter also demonstrates the conflicts, challenges and unintentional issues of spatiality faced by commemorative projects. There are also interesting contrasts to be seen between

projects which have emerged from, and to some extent can be seen as representative of, local government initiatives and privately-funded artistic projects. In particular, the Calle Tarata (rebuilt since the bombing and seamlessly re-integrated into the fashionable, tourist-friendly Miraflores locale) and the MHVRE (a monument in the Villa María del Triunfo district of southern Lima to honour the members of Andean communities who migrated to the district as a result of the conflict) present interesting contrasts in their approaches to memory practice and use of space. Whereas the Tarata monument is in one of Lima's wealthiest districts, the MHVRE is in one of the poorest; while Tarata focuses on a singular episode of brutal violence, the MHVRE is designed to commemorate the longer-term effects of violence; and whilst there appears very little connection between the Tarata monument and the effect of, or memories of violence, the MHVRE is located in a space where many people vividly remember the conflict, and where the effects of poverty, displacement and violence are on full display.

Through the comparison of these two sites, I will argue that particular narratives of violence have been preserved not only in culture in Peruvian society, but have also been enshrined in space at important junctures in the development of memory narratives. The Tarata monument, for example, was erected in 1994 during the pre-CVR Fujimori era, and the MHVRE was erected in 2007 (and then destroyed in 2010) amid ongoing battles for memory and accountability in post-CVR Peru. Because of this, analysing the two sites together as part of the *limeño* city-text does not reveal a static and fixed image of memory, but reveals the overlapping memory narratives which have been produced in space at different times.

However, focusing only on conventional sites of memory, such as museums or monuments, presents the possibility of understanding only a fraction of the spaces which have been used to practice forms of memory and commemoration. That is

because many memory activists, due to the political suppression of the Fujimori period and controversial nature of such projects in the present, have instead attempted to interrupt public space with projects and demonstrations. For instance, *Lava la bandera* was a public demonstration against the Fujimori regime in Lima's Plaza des Armas, whilst Karen Bernedo's project *Tránsito a la memoria* involved printing the faces of the disappeared on the back of city bus tickets.³³⁵

Not only do such initiatives overcome the problems of finding and funding an exhibition space in which to hold an event, they thrust the politics of memory into the spaces of everyday life. In order to fully outline and understand the meaning of a geography of memory in Lima (and more widely in Peru), it will be vital to incorporate these non-conventional sites of memory; everyday sites imbued with new meaning by memory practice. Furthermore, the existence of such sites ties Peru into a wider global geography of commemorative practice. Peru's memory activist community appears to be influenced by anti- or counter- memorial trends from Germany and Argentina whilst, as Feldman argues, the commemoration and memorialisation of trauma links Peru not just to many of its South American neighbours, but also to Hiroshima, Robben Island, Auschwitz.³³⁶ In some ways these previous initiatives have provided a template for the way in which Peru has commemorated its conflict, but in others Peruvians have diverted from the plan and created new forms of commemorative practice.

In short, the aim of this chapter is to reassess the narratives surrounding the violence in the Peruvian capital through an analysis of particular episodes of violence, cultural production surrounding those episodes, and the memory practices and forms of commemoration which have attempted to enshrine or contest those cultural narratives in public space. This approach will highlight the differences between violence in the

³³⁵ Discussions of both can be found in Vich, *Poéticas del duelo*, pp.166-72, pp.264-69.

³³⁶ Feldman, 'Exhibiting conflict', p.489.

capital and the violence which was perpetrated in the Andes, and will again argue against the crystallisation of violent narratives around particular emblematic events which betray the priorities and prejudices of Peruvian society. Yet, rather than dismissing the violence which was inflicted upon Lima as insignificant in comparison with the huge death toll in the Andes, it is important to firstly understand the ways in which the populations of Lima's disparate districts encountered violence, and how Shining Path made their presence in the capital felt.

Shining Path's urban strategy

Although 1992 was one of the bloodiest years of the conflict in Lima, the capital's population had experienced Shining Path actions in a number of ways during the first decade of violence. Infamously, in 1980, *Senderistas* announced themselves to the Peruvian population by hanging dead dogs, with a message cursing the organiser of China's market-driven reforms Deng Xiaoping, from lampposts in cities across the country. With limited knowledge of the group or their obscure references to Chinese history, the Lima population initially paid little attention to Shining Path and saw their actions, as Gorriti describes, as "not only...like political anachronisms, but fringe nuttiness".³³⁷ It was not long, however, until Shining Path embarked on a concerted campaign of blackouts, assassinations and robberies. Such actions were never intended to begin wresting territorial control of the capital in the way that *Senderistas* did in the *sierra* by creating *zonas liberadas*. Far more vastly outnumbered against a better-organised police force in the capital, the party instead focused on limited attacks which, although not as lethal in terms of death toll, would strike fear into the hearts of the urban classes through their frequency and proximity. As highlighted by the CVR, Lima

³³⁷ Gorriti, *The Shining Path*, p.78.

also became an important space in which Shining Path could gain maximum attention for their actions, creating wider publicity for the group which served effectively as a call to arms for sympathisers and which contributed further to the “climate of terror and insecurity”.³³⁸

From early 1982 onwards, the party focused on disrupting the capital and attacking its infrastructure. These actions included (but were by no means limited to): the destruction of the Bayer industrial plant, the sabotage of transmission towers causing a citywide blackout across Lima, car bombings near the Presidential palace, and the bombing of the offices of Acción Popular (party of the ruling President Belaúnde). International newspapers such as the *Chicago Tribune* reported the lurid details of how Marxist guerrillas had blown up 1,196 of the country’s 5,000 high-voltage transmission towers during the 1980s, contributing to the \$15bn of damage attributed to political violence between 1980 and 1988.³³⁹ During the visit of Pope John Paul II to Lima in 1985, Shining Path bombed a power station which caused power outages across most of the city whilst “bonfires in the shape of a hammer and sickle” could be seen burning on nearby hillsides.³⁴⁰

The blackouts were a highly effective method for creating a kind of collective sense of fear and paranoia across the city. Perpetrated frequently enough to demonstrate the powerlessness of the government to stop them, their regularity also convinced many that Shining Path had infiltrated the national grid.³⁴¹ Hiatt argues that these blackouts are essential for understanding how residents of the capital experienced the presence of Shining Path, suggesting that the loss of light and disruption of household appliances

³³⁸ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. V*, p.339.

³³⁹ *Chicago Tribune*, ‘Peru’s Power Pylons under Attack’, 11 March 1990 [http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-03-11/news/9001200840_1_shining-path-blackouts-power-outages, accessed 17 August 2016].

³⁴⁰ *Chicago Tribune*, ‘Pontiff Is Unhurt in Rebel Blackout’, 5 February 1985 [http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-02-05/news/8501070734_1_latin-american-pilgrimage-lima-bombing, accessed 17 August 2016].

³⁴¹ *Chicago Tribune*, ‘Peru’s Power Pylons under Attack’.

made the conflict feel intensely proximate, creating a societal level of unease that the country was at the edge of chaos.³⁴² Furthermore, Hiatt has also suggested that the blackouts had important social effects, reshaping the lives of *limeños* as they negotiated the outages and taking an impact on the interactions between families, neighbours and communities.³⁴³

For example, Rossana Díaz Costa's 2014 film *Viaje a Tombuctú* depicts the family of Anita, one of the film's protagonists, huddled around their dinner table listening nervously to news of bombings around Lima, before her father leaves to go to work despite the protests of his wife.³⁴⁴ In this way the blackouts can be seen as not only having an effect in terms of disruption; they also forced Lima's population to internalise the reality of the internal conflict and learn how to negotiate the conflict in their day-to-day lives. This was essential to the insurgents' strategy, by creating fear and making it appear that the group was far more powerful than they actually were (which arguably also concentrated the attention of the capital's population on the events taking place close to them, rather than on what was happening in the country's interior).

Between 1985 and 1988, Shining Path began to develop their position in the Lima Metropolitan area more thoroughly, a period which the CVR describes as "the transition towards the siege of the city".³⁴⁵ During this period, Shining Path attempted to further split the Peruvian Left and garner more support by targeting Leftist and social democratic politicians, whilst also targeting military officials. These attacks included the assassinations of César López Silva and Rodrigo Franco of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), Eriberto Arroyo Mío and Abelardo Ludeña Luque of Izquierda Unida (IU), trade union officials including Saúl Cantoral, general secretary

³⁴² Willie Hiatt, 'Attacking Power in Peru: Blackouts, Technology, and Shining Path Violence', presented at American Historical Association (New York, 2015).

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ *Viaje a Tombuctú*, dir. by Rossana Díaz Costa (Tombuktú Films, 2014).

³⁴⁵ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm.V, p.412.

of the miners' union, and Rear Admiral Carlos Ponce and Vice-Admiral Jeronimo Cafferata.³⁴⁶ These assassinations were strategically important for Shining Path in order to maintain their presence in the national media, eliminate Leftist rivals who rejected the party's violence, and create a sense of chaos in the capital. That the assassination of well known-politicians and high-ranking Navy officers could be perpetrated in the centre of Peru's political power suggested that the state had truly lost control of the insurgency.

By the beginning of 1991, Abimael Guzmán and the Shining Path Central Committee believed that their armed struggle had reached a stage of "strategic equilibrium".³⁴⁷ This referred to Shining Path's improved ability to wage war more or less equally against the armed forces on a number of fronts. As a result, the insurgents intensified their strategy in Lima and between January and July of 1992, thirty-seven car bombs were detonated by Shining Path in the capital, resulting in fifty mortalities. However, as Burt argues, the term also referred to a turning point in the party's geographical strategy whereby, from this point onwards, they attempted to exert greater political (if not territorial) control over the city's *barriadas*.³⁴⁸

Whilst Shining Path violence took many of the headlines, the backdrop to these events was a far deeper struggle for control of Lima's slums. Between the 1940s and 1981 the population of Lima grew from 660,000 to 4,835,000 (an increase from 9.4% to 27.2% as a proportion of the national population).³⁴⁹ This longstanding trend was exacerbated by the Agrarian Reform of 1969 and the violence of the 1980s, and saw new districts spring up around the outskirts of the capital. The population of these *Pueblos Jóvenes*

³⁴⁶ Ibid., p.415.

³⁴⁷ John Crabtree, *Peru under Garcia: An Opportunity Lost* (Basingstoke, 1992), p.205.

³⁴⁸ Burt, *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru*, p.97.

³⁴⁹ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. V, p.400.

(*barriadas*, or slums) rose from 316,000 in 1961 to over 1.5m in 1981, representing over a third of Lima's entire population.³⁵⁰ Communities in San Juan de Lurigancho, San Martín de Porres and Callao (to the north of Lima), Ate Vitarte (east), and Villa María del Triunfo and Villa El Salvador (to the south) are characterised by high levels of poverty, self-made housing, high levels of informal economic activity and a dire lack of public investment, but often demonstrate a strong level of self-organisation and civil society to secure basic infrastructure such as electricity, water and phone lines.

To Shining Path, these communities represented the best method by which to infiltrate the capital due to their ready-made political structures and a population which was both ignored by the existing state and considered to be “less modern” and more indigenous than the populations at Lima's centre.³⁵¹ Traditionally those political structures had been dominated by the legal Left but, as Feinstein argues, the disintegration of IU had a devastating impact on the Peruvian Left's electoral results and organisation in the *barriadas*, leaving civil society groups increasingly vulnerable to attack or infiltration by Shining Path.³⁵² Furthermore, as Smith has argued, some of Lima's outer districts also had great strategic importance for Shining Path; Ate Vitarte, for example, was the “chokepoint for Lima's water and electrical supplies”, has a concentration of thermal and hydroelectric plants, and maintained crucial transport links with the countryside.³⁵³ It was the party's attempt to gain control of Villa El Salvador, however, which prompted one of the most important urban struggles of the conflict.

In the 1980s, Villa El Salvador was a model district of Leftist politics, grassroots self-organisation and community planning which represented “a viable alternative to a

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Rosemary Thorp and Maritza Paredes, *Ethnicity and the Persistence of Inequality: The Case of Peru* (New York, 2010), p.35.

³⁵² Tamara Feinstein, ‘How the Left Was Lost: Remembering Izquierda Unida and the Legacies of Political Violence in Peru’ (P.h.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2013), p.313.

³⁵³ Michael L. Smith, ‘Shining Path's Urban Strategy: Ate Vitarte’ in (David Scott Palmer ed.), *The Shining Path of Peru* (London, 1992), pp.127-148 (p.128).

neglectful state” on the local level.³⁵⁴ The largest district in Lima’s southern cone, Villa El Salvador, Feinstein describes, was “forged in popular mobilization” in 1971 after the Velasco regime offered land to migrant families and squatters who had participated in land invasions in other areas of Lima, and the district maintained a tradition of radical Leftist mobilisation into the 1990s.³⁵⁵ In this, Villa El Salvador was not alone. As Stokes highlights, in 1983 ten of the eleven poorest districts in Lima elected mayors from IU and “the Left won the mayorship of all lower-class districts for at least part of the 1980s”, including three consecutive terms in Independencia.³⁵⁶ These Leftist traditions represented both an opportunity and a challenge to Shining Path, as strong civil society represented an alternative, peaceful form of mobilisation for each district.

However, throughout the 1980s the Peruvian Left’s ideological outlook and organisational structures became increasingly refracted through the conditions and stresses of the internal conflict. Whilst the traditional (Leninist or *moscovita*) Peruvian Communist Party maintained strong links to trade unions and the Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP), the legal Left’s more radical organisations, the Partido Unificado Mariateguista (PUM) and Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria (UNIR), lost members to the MRTA and Shining Path respectively, particularly after IU’s poor results in the 1986 municipal elections and the coalition’s collapse into two factions in 1989.³⁵⁷ This collapse of Leftist coalition, Zapata argues, not only left militants in the *barriadas* divided and dispirited, but also limited their ability to resist

³⁵⁴ Jo-Marie Burt, ‘Shining Path and the “Decisive Battle” in Lima’s *Barriadas*: The Case of Villa El Salvador’ in (Steve J. Stern ed.), *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995* (London, 1998), pp.267-306 (p.268).

³⁵⁵ Feinstein, ‘How the Left was Lost’, p.316.

³⁵⁶ Stokes’ research provides important historical context on the relationship between the Peruvian left, grassroots organisation and Lima’s *barriadas*. Susan Stokes, *Cultures in Conflict: Social Movements and the State in Peru* (London, 1995), p.49. See also Kenneth Roberts, *Deepening Democracy?: The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru* (Stanford, 1998), pp.201-68; Henry Dietz, *Urban Poverty Political Participation, and the State: Lima, 1970-1990* (Pittsburgh, 1998).

³⁵⁷ Antonio Zapata Velasco, *Sociedad y poder local: la comunidad de Villa El Salvador, 1971-96* (Lima, 1996), pp.243-4.

Shining Path's ambitions and left them as "easy prey" to agents of violence on both sides of the conflict.³⁵⁸

One major obstacle to Shining Path's infiltration of Villa El Salvador, however, remained. María Elena Moyano was a community activist of Afro-Peruvian descent who was elected President of the *Federación Popular de Mujeres de Villa El Salvador* in 1984, at the age of 25. During her tenure, the federation obtained resources for several community programmes including the organisation of *Comedores populares* (soup kitchens), the *Vaso de leche* programme which provided milk to schoolchildren, as well as other committees for health and education.³⁵⁹ In 1990, Moyano was elected deputy mayor of Villa El Salvador, and she was part of a generation of young activists working hard to provide basic infrastructure and necessities to their communities during a time of economic crisis, whilst also forming an obstacle to Shining Path's progress in the capital.³⁶⁰

Realising the popular appeal of activists like Moyano, and their potential to draw support away from Shining Path, the party began to target civil society more forcefully and assassinated a number of activists throughout 1991. These included Juana López León (co-ordinator of the *Vaso de leche* programme in Callao), Doraliza Espejo Márquez (San Juan de Lurigancho) and Fortunato Collazos Crispín and Alfredo Aguirre Beraún (San Juan de Miraflores).³⁶¹ Such figures infuriated the insurgents because they suffered greatly from the socioeconomic and ethnic structuring of Peruvian society, yet still they resisted their call to arms. Moyano was an exemplary figure of this attitude and so, in February 1992 after attending a peace march in Villa El Salvador, she too was murdered by Shining Path. Afterwards, *Senderistas* blew up her body with dynamite in

³⁵⁸ Ibid., p.246.

³⁵⁹ Olga Rodríguez Ulloa, 'Artist Archives: Experimentation in Peruvian Art about the Memory of the Armed Conflict', *E-misférica*, 9:1-2 (2012), [http://hemisphericinstitute.org/hemi/en/e-misferica-91/rodriguezulloa, accessed 18 August 2016].

³⁶⁰ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm.VII, p.611.

³⁶¹ Ibid., p.612.

a warning to other civil society leaders not to organise against their popular war. As Rodríguez describes:

“for Sendero Luminoso, any kind of civic organization represented a threat against its ideas and practices, which is why the terrorists took revenge against her body, blowing it to pieces in order to impede her burial by family members and hinder her peace in the afterlife”.³⁶²

Moyano’s murder sparked an outpouring of emotion in Villa El Salvador and, although Shining Path moved to replace murdered activists with their own sympathisers, there appeared the possibility that civil society would be able to resist the party with such a strong backlash against their actions.³⁶³ At the same time President Alberto Fujimori enacted his *autogolpe* (or self-coup) in April 1992. The *autogolpe*, in which Fujimori dissolved Congress and suspended the constitution, allowed the President to strike a deal with the military allowing them greater freedom in the counterinsurgency operation whilst also ensuring that harsh economic reforms could continue without opposition.³⁶⁴ Ultimately, as Burt highlights, the coup caused a setback to attempts to form a joint offensive against Shining Path, which would have combined the state’s political opposition with a strong popular resistance from trade unions and civil society.³⁶⁵ Whilst on the one hand Fujimori had consolidated the counterinsurgency operation and given the military unprecedented power to deal with Shining Path, on the other he had weakened one of the last remaining obstacles to the group taking greater control of the *barriadas*. For this reason, the *autogolpe* can also be seen as a politically-motivated attempt to consolidate the power of the populist Right at

³⁶² Rodríguez, ‘Artist Archives’.

³⁶³ Moyano’s death is still remembered today, particular in Villa El Salvador. Peruvian artist Natalia Iguñiz commemorated Moyano’s death in a number of *limeño* districts by printing images from *La República* and placing them on walls and lampposts for the communities to remember her. See Rodríguez, ‘Artist Archives’. For a collection of Moyano’s own writing see Diana Miloslavich Túpac, *The Autobiography of María Elena Moyano: The Life and Death of a Peruvian Activist* (Miami, 2000).

³⁶⁴ Burt, *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru*, p.163.

³⁶⁵ Burt, ‘Shining Path and the “Decisive Battle” in Lima’s *Barriadas*’, p.294.

the expense of the Leftist political parties, organisations and members of civil society who had successfully organised to resist Shining Path in the *barriadas* for a number of years.

These cases exemplify the ways in which the types of violence perpetrated by Shining Path, and the level of response from both state agents and the national media, were highly contingent upon the geography in which they took place. Although Shining Path's generalised strategy was to encircle the capital by taking control of key regions, in reality the party practiced different strategies in Lima and in the rest of the country at different times.

Firstly, it is important to recognise that many of the group's actions across the country shared a symbolic characteristic which was to demonstrate the fragility of existing state structures by disrupting them as dramatically and frequently as possible. In the words of Heath-Kelly, this type of violence "refuses the given inscription of the world through practices of re-inscription".³⁶⁶ In Lima, Shining Path's attacks on the electrical grid, control of prisons and assassinations of high-ranking state agents made a mockery of the state's ability to function. At a time when strategic equilibrium had not been achieved, the party command focused on these symbolic acts which created huge fear in the urban population, but which also made it appear that they had a far greater capacity for conducting intelligence and military operations than was ever the case. The assassinations of civil society leaders are particularly interesting in this context because, whilst they were still highly symbolic of Shining Path's attitude towards any opposition, they also fulfilled a strategic function by creating space which could be filled by party sympathisers. In this sense, they represent a turning point at which Shining Path ceased

³⁶⁶ Charlotte Heath-Kelly, *Politics of Violence: Militancy, International Politics, Killing in the Name* (Oxon, 2013), p.17.

to simply disrupt state function, and attempted to infiltrate the structures of civil society as a means of replicating and replacing the state.

This turning point had already occurred in the Peruvian highlands at a much earlier stage of the conflict. As La Serna highlights, the initiation of Shining Path's *lucha armada* in Chuschi was followed by over 200 "guerrilla acts", in 1980 alone, designed to "raise awareness of the insurgency".³⁶⁷ Heilman's research on Ayacucho department prior to 1980 also demonstrates the efforts of Shining Path militants to agitate in teacher and student strikes, particularly in 1977-8 in the province of Cangallo.³⁶⁸ As would later happen in Lima, these actions allowed Shining Path to develop their local networks and articulate forms of symbolic resistance to the Peruvian state. As Gorriti's discussion of Shining Path military thought shows, however, the insurgents' activity increased with more substantial actions (such as the attack on Ayacucho prison) throughout 1982 and between 1983 and 1986 the party moved into a new phase of territorial expansion in which it strategically aimed to "conquer support bases" across Ayacucho department.³⁶⁹ During this phase, Shining Path regularly assassinated local mayors and officials in *ayacuchano* towns, as they would later do in Lima's shantytowns. This highlights a form of geography implicit in Shining Path's military strategy in which Ayacucho department acted as an important laboratory for the development of *Senderista* military thought which would later be applied to other highland departments, *the selva central*, and the outskirts of Lima itself. It is from this perspective that we must try to understand the bombing of Calle Tarata. By picking apart the logics of the different forms of violence deployed by the group in different spaces, it will be possible to assess the

³⁶⁷ La Serna, *The Corner of the Living*, p.142.

³⁶⁸ Heilman, *Before the Shining Path*, p.175.

³⁶⁹ Gorriti, *The Shining Path*, pp.234-6.

symbolic and strategic significance of the attack for its perpetrators, as well as its victims.

The bombing of Calle Tarata

In the afternoon of 16 July 1992, Shining Path carried out a series of attacks in Lima against police stations in San Gabriel, José Carlos Mariátegui and Nueva Esperanza, and in the district of Villa María del Triunfo, in order to disperse the city's police forces. At the same time, *Senderistas* moved two cars into Miraflores and parked them near the Banco de Crédito offices, before later moving them onto the Calle Tarata.³⁷⁰ At 9:20pm, the car bomb was detonated, killing 25 people and wounding 155.³⁷¹ In addition, the blast destroyed or damaged 63 parked cars, 183 homes and 400 businesses including the newly-built, five star Hotel las Américas, and a number of financial institutions such as Supermercado Mass, Continental, Interbanc, and Crédito. The calculated cost of the damages amounted to \$3.12m.³⁷² The international community condemned the bombing as “dramatic pictures of a smoking building in ruins and tens of bloodied people who were evacuated” were relayed around the world.³⁷³

The local response to the bombing represented a level of state-community co-operation which was near impossible to achieve in the *barriadas*. As CVR documents attest to, there was extensive co-ordination between residents, the police, local hospitals, and planners in the wake of the bombing to assist in the reconstruction. Medicine and clothing were sourced for survivors whilst the district's *Serenazgo* provided security.³⁷⁴

³⁷⁰ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VII*, p.663.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.661.

³⁷² *Ibid.*, p.664.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.667. See also Edgardo Alzamora García, *Tarata, respuesta a una locura: el testimonio real* (Lima, 1994).

³⁷⁴ The *Serenazgo* are described by Kruijt and Koonings as “the district police made up of self-armed metropolitan inhabitants. These are the armed middle-class, protecting their belongings, functioning as a complement to the capital's police forces”. Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings, ‘Introduction: Violence and Fear in Latin America’ in (Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt eds.), *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America* (London, 1999), pp.1-30 (p.15).

Building ruins were cleaned up, structural analysis performed on those still standing, and residents organised to collect donations, liaise with the authorities and set up a women's committee.³⁷⁵ On 19 July, the *Marcha por la Paz* was organised locally by the Municipality of Miraflores in memory of the victims. Such concern over the area's reconstruction in the midst of a raging conflict reflects not only the threat to financial institutions posed by Shining Path. It also demonstrated that the bombing had shaken cultural understandings of which spaces could be effected by violence, subverting the imagined geography which located violence in the city's periphery.

These actions reveal an imbalance in the responses by the *limeño* population to violence which was proximate, and to violence which appeared distant. As Žižek argues, there is a great hypocrisy in “tolerating the abstract-anonymous killing of thousands, while condemning individual cases of the violations of human rights”.³⁷⁶ The almost instant international condemnation of the bombing reflected this hypocrisy, but it could also be seen, as the CVR argues:

*“in certain sectors of society who until then had been distant to the subversive violence in the Andes and jungle...The feeling that Shining Path had entered Lima, and that there was no limit to their destructive action, was perceived with greater clarity”.*³⁷⁷

This reveals how Lima, and particularly districts such as Miraflores, had come to be imaginatively reconstructed as the heart of the nation (i.e. that violence elsewhere was undesirable, but violence in Miraflores appeared to be politically and culturally unacceptable). Moreover, this perspective renders invisible other instances of Shining Path violence which had taken place in Lima's *barriadas*. Whilst those bombings and

³⁷⁵ Lima, Defensoría del Pueblo, Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales y Antropológicas Forenses.1003. Equipo de Investigaciones.100369.Tarata.I del Tm.LSCO-529-01.000263.

³⁷⁶ Žižek, *Violence*, p.38.

³⁷⁷ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VII*, p.667.

assassinations were relatively proximate, the social, ethnic cultural distance between the slums and Miraflores means that they are often forgotten by politicians, scholars and cultural producers in their representations of Shining Path violence in the capital.

The very idea of Miraflores or Lima being, geographically, at the heart of the Peruvian nation is of course complete nonsense, yet the bombing appeared to provoke a wave of paranoia which further blinded *limeños* to what was occurring in the interior. This was the imagined geography of security which permeated the outlook of many Peruvians. As outlined earlier, the Andes and Amazon were culturally constructed as places of danger, existing on the fringes of civilisation, a highly racialised perception of geography in which indigenous communities and the spaces which they inhabited were represented as exotic and violent, the antithesis to the supposedly whiter, more civilised capital. The migration and displacement of communities from Peru's interior to Lima added a new dimension to this imagined geography, in which the capital was dangerously encircled; not just by terrorists, but by predominantly indigenous populations which, as Thorp and Paredes highlight, were considered to be "less urban", "less occidental" and "less modern".³⁷⁸ This geography of security dictated that violence took place in the Andes or in the slums because these spaces were violent anyway; but the incursion of violence into districts like Miraflores and San Isidro was an unacceptable transgression of this cardinal spatial rule.

Despite breaking this rule, Tarata (in a similar way to Lucanamarca) has been constructed as an emblematic episode of violence. Although the location, and middle-class status of the victims, makes Tarata appear as an exceptional case, certain narratives of the conflict privileged the Tarata bombing as a pivotal moment because it

³⁷⁸ Thorp and Paredes, *Ethnicity and the Persistence of Inequality*, p.35.

has both the highest death toll of any Shining Path bombing and because it appeared to spark other events and processes.

Within two months of the bombing Abimael Guzmán and a number of important Shining Path leaders were arrested (and party archives detailing members, operations and organisational structure across the country were confiscated), effectively bringing Shining Path's campaign in Lima to an end. Yet the idea that Tarata brought about the end of the conflict must be challenged, not least because it contains numerous inaccuracies (as detailed below). The centrality of Tarata to narratives of the conflict must be challenged because it reinforces the myth that Fujimori's *autogolpe* and repressive policies were directly responsible for the pacification of Shining Path. This is crucial because Fujimori's attempts to grant amnesty to state agents guilty of human rights abuses, as well as more recent calls for Fujimori's own sentence to be quashed, have been framed in the terms that state agents in the military-government command structure faced difficult choices and, in a time of crisis, prioritised the human rights of civilians over those of the *Senderistas*. Challenging the mythology of Tarata, however, will demonstrate that Fujimori's post-coup repression was not solely targeted at Shining Path, but also victimised specific civilian communities deemed to be political enemies of his regime.

The mythology of Tarata

The narrative articulated by Fujimori and his administration during the 1990s was that the President's *autogolpe*, for better or for worse, brought Peru's twin crises of violence and hyperinflation to an end. The pacification myth, as it is often called, emphasises Fujimori's personal role in pacifying Shining Path, and draws legitimacy from the idea that the bombing of Miraflores crossed a line which ultimately prompted the end of the

insurgency. This perception of the conflict has persisted in Peruvian mass media and society today, acting as an important source of support for *Fujimorista* politicians (particularly Keiko Fujimori, her brother Kenji, and their party Fuerza Popular).

Burt has highlighted that the intensification of violence in Lima in the early 1990s and the deepening economic crisis were major factors behind the emergence of “a new coalition of technocratic state elites, the armed forces, and the domestic business elite [which] sought to reconstitute the state”.³⁷⁹ The Tarata bombing was a worrying episode of symbolic violence for this coalition as it directly targeted banks and financial institutions. However, Burt also argues that this coalition of vested interests gave Fujimori the extra-congressional allies which he needed in order to enact the *autogolpe*, well in advance of the bombing, as elites moved to protect their assets and reorder the Peruvian state. This reorganisation gave the military greater control over the counterinsurgency operation and greater impunity with regards to human rights abuses, but also reflected the desires of the finance community to remodel the Peruvian economy to suit their own interests. It is therefore important to see the reorganisation of the state as a process that was synchronous with, and given further political justification by, the Tarata bombing, rather than being a direct result of it.

The idea that the *autogolpe* directly led to the capture of Guzmán has also been challenged. The role of the Grupo Especial de Inteligencia del Perú (GEIN), including Benedicto Jiménez, Marco Miyashiro, Ana-Cecilia Garzón Pérez and Julio Becerra, in capturing Guzmán has become increasingly clear since Fujimori’s downfall. GEIN ran an operation to find Guzmán for a number of years, eventually tracking him down through discarded boxes of psoriasis medication found in Lima’s San Borja district.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁹ Burt, *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru*, p.16.

³⁸⁰ An account of the operation, with comments from Garzón Pérez and Becerra, is available from BBC Radio 4, ‘Witness: The capture of Abimael Guzmán’, 16 September 2016 [<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p047881w>, accessed 17 January 2017]. This story is also loosely recreated in Nicholas Shakespeare’s *The Dancer Upstairs* (London, 1995).

Fujimori, on the other hand, maintained his support for the Grupo Colina death squad which participated in, so-called, low-intensity conflict which was perpetrated by intelligence officers in the Andes. Montesinos, director of the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional del Perú (SIN), persistently interfered in GEIN's operation, ordering them to instead provide their intelligence to him and Grupo Colina. Because of this, journalist Claudia Cisneros refers to the idea that Fujimori was directly responsible for Guzmán's capture as "the most trafficked lie of *Fujimorismo*", arguing that many deaths, and perhaps even the Tarata bombing, could have been prevented had GEIN been appropriately supported from the beginning.³⁸¹

1992 also saw increased state violence in the capital, including the case of La Cantuta; the murder of a university professor and nine students by the Grupo Colina in response to the Tarata bombing. Vich describes this intensification of violence by Fujimori after the *autogolpe* as "an agreement to radicalise the dirty war through a strategy which was inherited from the worst years of the 1980s; responding to *Senderista* violence with an even greater terror perpetrated by the state itself".³⁸² The Grupo Colina also perpetrated other massacres including the murder of fifteen partygoers in the Barrios Altos district of Lima and the killing of nine *campesinos* in the Santa province of Ancash to the north of Lima. Because such abuses occurred during the same period in which Shining Path intensified violence in the capital, they can to some extent be seen as a reshaping of the geographies of security and exercise of sovereign power. As Shining Path attacked Lima more concertedly, the state responded by increasingly directing violence against populations, which had hitherto avoided such abuses, with impunity (although some

³⁸¹ Claudia Cisneros, 'La mentira más traficada del fujimorismo', *La República*, 7 September 2012 [http://larepublica.pe/columnistas/de-centro-radical/la-mentira-mas-trafficada-del-fujimorismo-07-09-2012, accessed 23 August 2016].

³⁸² Vich, *Poéticas del duelo*, p.61.

members of the Grupo Colina were imprisoned for the La Cantuta case, they would later be freed by the President's Amnesty Law).³⁸³ However, it is important to recognise that the victims in each case were the same groups who had been targeted elsewhere; students, *campesinos*, and the residents of poorer districts at the margins of the city.³⁸⁴ Furthermore, the students in question at La Cantuta were training to be teachers, a profession which had strong associations with Shining Path since the group's early mobilisation in Ayacucho in the 1970s and demands for education reform in the 1960s. The massacre therefore presented state agents with a unique opportunity to enact revenge on a group whom they perceived to be partly responsible for the emergence of Shining Path and the initiation of the internal conflict.

The La Cantuta massacre should not, therefore, be treated simply as an over-exuberant strike back against Shining Path in the wake of the Tarata bombing. Instead, the massacre must be understood as part of a wider state strategy to enforce violent repression on political opponents. In effect, the government response was to meet Shining Path's symbolic violence with episodes of equally symbolic violence against target communities. The exercise of sovereign power which emanated from Cuartel Los Cabitos in Huamanga was now being replicated in Lima; most tragically, this strategy was completely inept at keeping Shining Path at bay. Not only did the state fail to cooperate with civil society leaders and offer them greater support to bolster their resistance against Shining Path, political repression after the *autogolpe* destroyed any chance of communities organising themselves against the group and violence persisted in the capital for a number of years as a result.

³⁸³ Human Rights Watch, 'Questions and Answers Regarding Peru's Criminal Prosecution of Fujimori', 2001 [<http://www.hrw.org/legacy/background/america/peru-qna-1030.htm>, accessed 23 August 2016]; Burt, *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru*, p.203.

³⁸⁴ In Santa (located in Chimbote, Ancash department) the CVR also found that the Grupo Colina had acted upon a desire for personal vengeance against the *campesinos* who had organised a local march. CVR, *Informe Final, Tm.VII*, p.576.

The deaths of twenty-five people in the Tarata bombing should by no means be forgotten; nor should those stories be submerged by the huge death toll and sheer weight of human tragedy experienced throughout the conflict. However, it is one thing to commemorate those deaths, and another thing entirely to use them as part of a mythology which justifies brutal authoritarianism, human rights abuses, and vindictive reprisals against vulnerable communities. The *Marcha por la Paz*, during which Peruvian flags were flown from the broken buildings on Tarata, and veneration of Vanesa (a young girl who lost her leg in the attack, referred to as “the angel’s smile”), reflect some of the ways in which this memory practice was developed in the immediate aftermath of the bombing.³⁸⁵ Likewise, on the 24th anniversary of Guzmán’s capture in 2016, state officials and families of the victims of Shining Path violence marched from the Ministerio de Justicia to Calle Tarata with candles and white flowers, an action reminiscent of the 1992 *Marcha por la Paz*. When speaking to the press, Marisol Pérez Tello (Minister for Justice) stated that “the only enemy that Peru has is terrorism”.³⁸⁶ This highlights the way in which Tarata is not simply remembered as a tragic event in Lima. As Connerton highlights, social memory and commemorative actions are essentially performative, and so the marches in commemoration of Tarata act as important reminders of the spectre of Shining Path violence, whilst also reinforcing the centrality of Tarata to particular narratives of the conflict.³⁸⁷ It seems clear, however, that the bombing did not directly lead to the pacification of Shining Path, and that subsequent massacres were not reprisals targeted at insurgents but part of a concerted strategy to annihilate political opponents of the Fujimori regime.

³⁸⁵ CVR. Lima. Tarata. SCO-529-01.000263. Vanesa Quiroga has often been described as “the symbolic child” of the attack and has spoken at commemorative events for the bombing in Miraflores. See YouTube, ‘Niña Símbolo Tarata y Museo de la Memoria’ [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=beiE06TizTs>, accessed 24 January 2017].

³⁸⁶ LaConexiónUSA.com, ‘Marchan en Lima en el 24 aniversario de la captura del fundador de Sendero Luminoso’, 13 September 2016 [http://www.laconexionusa.com/noticias/20160913370667_lc37066713.asp, accessed 19 January 2017].

³⁸⁷ Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge, 1989), p.14.

Having attempted to remove Tarata from this mythology and delocate it from the political uses of its memory in the current section, I will now set out to relocate the event within a context which reflects more accurately the logic behind this episode of violence. As with previous chapters, I will examine the ways in which the Tarata bombing has been represented in Peruvian culture.

Representations of violence in the city

The purpose of this section will be to analyse how Shining Path violence in Lima has been culturally represented through Fabrizio Aguilar's film *Tarata*.³⁸⁸ I argue that the bombing broke with spatialized cultural understandings of where political violence in Peru was expected to occur. Through his film, however, Aguilar challenges the idea that such a cultural geography of violence should exist in the first place, and highlights how these spatialized cultural understandings contribute to an Othering of violence. In doing so, I will work with a Lefebvrian framework which understands analyses the direct relationship between representations of space (in Peruvian cinema) and the social production of space (which has created Peru's uneven historical socio-spatial structure).³⁸⁹ I will also argue that the cultural geography of violence depicted in *Tarata* gives value to populations, denoting their assumed grievability and their vulnerability to death, again highlighting the relevant ideas of Butler and Mbembe.

Tarata is a 2009 which deals with the bombing from the perspective of a local family including Daniel (a professor at a local university) and his wife Claudia (who sells make-up in order to afford her lavish *miraflores* lifestyle). The family encounter the conflict in a remote sense by seeing violence on the television news but, as the

³⁸⁸ *Tarata*, dir. by Fabrizio Aguilar (Luna Llena Films, 2009).

³⁸⁹ Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p.33.

conflict becomes more proximate, Claudia increasingly treats Rosa (her housemaid) and Roger (Rosa's son) with a sense of paranoia and disdain. When Roger disappears, Claudia tries to keep Rosa's problems at an arm's length even while she is visibly distressed. This representation of the relationship between a middle-class woman and her *empleada* ("domestic servant") is not accidental. Radcliffe has argued that the "ethnic and class distinctions between the two are usually significant and remain so in the course of employment", and that the maintenance of these distinctions in middle-class homes serves as a useful metaphor for the limited integration of indigenous communities into the Peruvian nation.³⁹⁰ Furthermore, Drinot has argued that the conflation between indigeneity and insurgency during the years of the conflict meant that "many white middle-class Peruvians began to suspect, and certainly to fear, that their *empleadas* were *Senderistas*".³⁹¹

In this way, Aguilar represents Claudia, and *miraflores* more generally, as being emblematic of the indifference criticised by the CVR, particularly because they appear to view domestic servants and Lima's lower classes as potentially violent, ethnically Other, and living in a distant reality. As a result of Claudia's relationship with her family, which becomes increasingly strained, her daughter Gabriela tries to run away from home. It is not, therefore, violence which tears the family apart in Aguilar's narrative, but a combination of Claudia's behaviour and the harsh treatment of Daniel by the police. From this perspective, we can interpret the film as a statement that greater co-operation between the communities of Lima was necessary to face up to their shared threat of violence. Whilst the film alludes to the human cost of the bombing, it also

³⁹⁰ S. A. Radcliffe, 'Ethnicity, patriarchy, and incorporation into the nation: female migrants as domestic servants in Peru', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (1990), pp.379-393 (p.380).

³⁹¹ Drinot, 'The Meaning of Alan García', p.188.

outlines the other forms of damage done by the ignorance of Claudia (and by extension residents of Miraflores more generally) to the plight of their fellow Peruvians.

Furthermore, Claudia appears to believe strongly in a cultural geography of violence. It initially appears ridiculous that the conflict should affect her life in Miraflores, and Claudia characterises outsiders to her world as potential vehicles for violence (i.e. she does not necessarily see Rosa as personally violent but as a vehicle for *Senderista* violence). Thus, it is her belief that she can avoid violence which separates her from Rosa, and it is only once that boundary is transgressed by the bombing that Claudia is able to feel empathy. Therefore, Aguilar uses the case of Tarata to demonstrate that Peru's middle-classes were blinded to the full scale of violence for so long not simply because they could not see it, but because of the fear that violence would transgress its assumed boundaries and come to affect their lives as well. The film is successful in demonstrating that the response of Peru's urban middle-classes understandings of the conflict were conditioned by how and where they came into contact with violence, which in 1992 was increasingly proximate and impacting their daily lives. Rather than producing a sympathetic response to the plight of Andean communities suffering similar atrocities, Shining Path violence in Lima also had the potential to sharpen attitudes against indigenous, Othered migrants who were seen to be acting as vehicles for *Senderista* violence.

Tarata, therefore, attempts to challenge the mythology of the bombing and resists the urge to overemphasise its importance. Whilst previous other representations of the conflict have constructed a cultural geography of violence which denotes certain spaces as violent and dangerous and others as non-violent, safe and secure, Aguilar's *Tarata* ultimately supports Springer's argument that such ideas are inherently unstable and

fragile.³⁹² He achieves this by referring to the wider societal context which produces violence across all geographies, and the porosity of such cultural geographies which violence is able to transcend. Alberto Durant's film *Coraje*, which details the life of Maria Elena Moyano and the battle for control of Villa El Salvador and Lima's *barriadas*, achieves a similar feat.³⁹³ As Barrow argues, Durant depicts Moyano as a "flawed but admirable fighter for community benefits at a time of heightened social crisis...so as to emphasise the film's broader message of rejection of violence as the principal solution to the problems of Peru".³⁹⁴ Such work is important because it decentralises the struggle against Shining Path from Lima's wealthier districts and instead places emphasis on the importance of collective action and political participation in the capital's poorest neighbourhoods to reject the party's advances.

Furthermore, Springer argues that:

"it is only through a geographical imagination constructed on a parochial agenda, rooted in colonial modes of thought, and dislocated from the dynamic material underpinnings of place that a culture itself can be caricatured as violent".³⁹⁵

Tarata, in this context, attempts to construct a new geographical imagination in which violence (or its absence) is not affixed to particular spaces. Aguilar challenges a colonial mode of thought which depicts working-class and indigenous populations, and the spaces which they inhabit, as naturally violent. The film, then, not only represents an alternative perspective on the internal conflict. Cultural artefacts such as *Tarata* which resist the temptation to depict violence as inherent to a particular space act,

³⁹² For example, see *The Dancer Upstairs*, dir. by John Malkovich (Fox Searchlight Pictures, 2002), which depicts the conflict as an unnatural incursion of political violence into modern, urban space; Springer, 'Violence sits in places', p.93.

³⁹³ *Coraje*, dir. by Alberto Durant (Agua Dulce Films, 1999); Sarah Barrow, *Peruvian cinema, national identity and political violence 1988-2004* (PhD thesis: University of Sheffield, 2007), p.229-55.

³⁹⁴ Barrow, *Peruvian cinema, national identity and political violence*, p.233.

³⁹⁵ Springer, 'Violence sits in places', p.93.

intentionally or not, as a subversion of this internal colonialism upon which many narratives of political violence have been built.

We are therefore able to say that the Tarata bombing has been used as an emblematic case of violence which precludes other experiences of the conflict, an action which fundamentally employs a form of spatial politics by emphasising the effects of violence in one space over those in another. Cultural representations of the bombing which challenge this cultural geography of violence, including Tarata, exist, but are by no means dominant in Peruvian culture. However, as narratives of the conflict, cultural representations of the Tarata bombing also act as repositories of cultural memory. With this in mind, it is important to also examine the ways in which spaces, and particularly sites of memory, have been used to establish, reinforce, or contradict narratives of violence. This analysis is vital because memory activists have used space and memory as powerful tools for challenging state narratives about the past, and for encouraging collective action in the present.

Commemoration, as viewed from the capital

The study of museums and monuments is commonplace in many post-conflict societies, particularly those which have undergone transitional justice processes. With reference to periods of violence in Latin America, scholars such as Jelin, Schindel and Milton have demonstrated the validity and utility of studying such sites, and have analysed their form, substance and use of narrative to reveal the ideological underpinning which goes into constructing such spaces. However, Hite has also highlighted the emergence of counter-memorial projects and grassroots collective arts projects as important forms

of memory practice.³⁹⁶ Such projects are often produced by community groups at the intersection of political activism, the arts community and civil society and, Hite argues, attempt to “resist staid representations [of violence], unengaging narratives, and insular decision-making” in their projects.³⁹⁷ For these reasons, the below analysis of sites of memory in Lima incorporates a diverse array of projects which use space to construct narratives and make statements about political violence. Furthermore, I will point to the sometimes accidental spatiality of sites which shape their narratives in ways unintended to their creators, and highlight the ways in which memory activists have attempted to reinscribe public spaces with new meanings and cultural values.

The Tarata bombing is commemorated by a small monument and an annual ceremony of remembrance organised by the local council. The monument consists of a large stone, carved to represent the shape of a damaged building, which stands in the middle of a fountain on Calle Tarata. Wooden footpaths lead across the fountain, allowing visitors to read the inscriptions on either side:

“In memory of the victims of the terrorist attack of 16 July 1992”

“Solidarity promenade: a solidary and united Peru was born here.

Miraflores, 16 July, 1994”.

³⁹⁶ It should be noted that the term “counter-memorial” refers to commemorative projects which tend to be grassroots and collectively-funded, as opposed to official or state-led projects, and is not associated with the term “counter memory” used elsewhere in this thesis.

³⁹⁷ Katherine Hite, ‘Empathic Unsettling and the Outsider within Argentine Spaces of Memory’, *Memory Studies*, 8:1 (2015), pp.38-48 (p.39).

That the monument is open and free to access suggests that the memory practice which it engages in is being encouraged by the municipality, insofar as the site is not closed to the public, nor is a guide necessary to interpret the monument. Having said that, the site is more or less unpublicised in Miraflores and near invisible to tourists. It is not signposted, appears on none of the many walking tours of the district, nor on a number of maps produced to highlight local hotspots. This contradiction reveals tensions in the desires of different groups (the municipality government, local community, tourist agencies) to remember a site of violence and tragedy in a district which is marketed as a well-maintained, fashionable safe-haven for tourists in an otherwise chaotic and dangerous city.



Fig. 10: The Tarata monument (Author's photograph).

This tension is further reflected in the surroundings of the monument on Tarata. The street itself is now, like many in Miraflores, full of restaurants, cafes and hotels, including the popular Mama Olla and Café La Paz which serve a selection of Peruvian

cuisine, European-style food and artisanal beers from local breweries. These establishments are, arguably, a greater attraction to Calle Tarata for locals and tourists alike; Mama Olla, for example, ranks highly on Trip Advisor's list of restaurants in Lima, whilst there are also a number of local amenities on the street such as internet cafes and pharmacies.³⁹⁸ In short, the reconstruction of Tarata has been so complete that it puts the monument completely at odds with the idea of the street as a site of violence. This has led Montalbetti to argue that a reading of Tarata as a site suggests that "nothing happened here".³⁹⁹

Although the monument itself denotes the street as a site of violence, its function as a site of memory is therefore limited. Following Dwyer and Alderman's argument that the "spatial context" (including neighbourhood and surrounding commercial activities) are vital for reading memorial landscapes as text, we can also deduce that the surrounding environment of the monument is not designed to support the memory practice of the monument, but to make use of expensive Miraflores real-estate and develop business opportunities.⁴⁰⁰ These businesses represent the municipality of Miraflores as it wants to be seen; as a district open to entrepreneurs, foreign capital and tourists alike, and not as a site of political violence. Ultimately, however, such a representation of the site also limits the potential for uncomfortable political debate and self-criticism about the nature of the conflict, why Shining Path launched the armed struggle, and why Miraflores became a target for such symbolic acts of violence in the first place.

To only read the space of Tarata through the perspective of the monument, however, would be to give an incomplete picture of the memory practice which the site

³⁹⁸ Ranked #33 of 1894 of Restaurants in Lima, Trip Advisor [https://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Restaurant_Review-g294316-d2024500-Reviews-Mama_Olla_Restaurant-Lima_Lima_Region.html, accessed 29 August 2016].

³⁹⁹ Montalbetti, 'El lugar del arte y el lugar de la memoria', p.252.

⁴⁰⁰ Dwyer and Alderman, 'Memorial landscapes', p.170.

represents. As Saona argues, it is the annual ceremony (or “performative event”) which gives the monument meaning. She asserts that, whilst the street has recovered from the physical damage which was inflicted upon it, the commemoration ceremonies aim to “present the centrality of the district, not only in memorialising the victims, but in asserting its role in the nation”. Because the attack “finally brought war to the capital”, Saona argues that the bombing unified the Peruvian nation in a shared experience of violence.⁴⁰¹

The role of performative ceremonies in commemorative practice should certainly not be ignored, and it is clear that there are groups which continue to hold a desire to commemorate the bombing (particularly local residents and victims’ families who see Tarata as a landmark event when violence affected them personally for the first time).⁴⁰² Yet this particular form of memory practice, along with Saona’s description of it, raises uncomfortable questions. “A solidary and united Peru was born here”; “the centrality of the district...asserting its role in the nation”; “finally brought war to the capital”. These are phrases which do not refer to the individuality and suffering of victims, but which recast the conflict as an assault on the core of the nation by the periphery. This reading suggests that Peru became a united nation once Miraflores (and more importantly, the elite social sectors which the district represents) felt the impact of violence for the first time, and renders invisible the wave of political violence unleashed by Shining Path on the capital prior to Tarata (as well as over a decade of trauma, murders and disappearances experienced by communities outside of Lima). To assert that Tarata holds a central role in the “centralised imaginary of the nation” would appear to assign extra significance to instances of violence which took place in urban, middle- and upper-class, predominantly white and *mestizo* spaces over those episodes of violence

⁴⁰¹ Saona, *Memory Matters in Transitional Peru*, p.115.

⁴⁰² Legg argues, for example, that “social memory is maintained through objects and performances... [which] are not static but manipulated and updated with changing regimes”. Legg, ‘Contesting and surviving memory’, p.498.

which took place in Lima's *barriadas* and in provincial departments.⁴⁰³ In short, it represents the use of memory practice to reinforce the political and economic domination of Peru's elite, reinforcing a cultural framework which conflates provinciality, violence, barbarity and Otherness on the one hand, and centrality, security, civilisation and whiteness on the other. This is so significant, and so dangerous, because the words of the monument in effect assert that the cultural imagining of the Peruvian nation is born from cultural imaginings of the district of Miraflores, reasserting the right of the elite, Europeanised, non-indigenous classes to govern and dictate narratives of political violence in Peru.



Fig. 11: The MHVRE during a public event in 2007
[<http://jaimemiranda.com/works/monumento-en-honor-a-la-verdad-para-la-reconciliacion-y-la-esperanza>].

The MHVRE was a monument designed by the sculptor Jaime Miranda as part of a public bid award (although Miranda later had to source private funding to complete the project) for a memorial to the displaced victims of violence during the internal conflict,

⁴⁰³ Saona, *Memory Matters in Transitional Peru*, p.115.

situated in the middle of the Óvalo Nueva Esperanza where three of Lima's poorest districts meet: Villa María del Triunfo, Villa El Salvador and San Juan de Miraflores. Inaugurated in 2007, its design featured an uprooted tree (representing the communities uprooted from the Andes to the district of Villa María del Triunfo) held several metres above the ground by a steel frame. At the base of the structure was an octagon carved with the departments, towns and villages where locals had migrated from (now the sole surviving piece of the monument).

As on the Calle Tarata, numerous public ceremonies were held at the monument between 2007 and the monument's destruction in 2010. Prior to the inauguration, Miranda also held fundraising events for the sculpture which saw participation from the local population, community organisers and representatives of the Church. These events suggest that the local population felt at least some connection to the monument and were willing to engage in the memory practice which it represented. Furthermore, the monument didn't represent a single instance of historical violence but the shared experiences on which the community was founded. For this reason, although the MHVRE is deeply tied to the violent upheaval associated with Peru's internal conflict, it was also designed to act as a focal point for the district, both representing the foundational narrative of the community and acting as an arena in which the social memory of the community can be performed and reconstituted through annual ceremonies.

The circumstances regarding the monument's destruction are still rather unclear but, according to eyewitnesses who spoke with Miranda and Gustavo Buntinx afterwards, contractors destroyed the monument in the night under the orders of the municipal

government.⁴⁰⁴ As mentioned, the plaques engraved with the names of Andean towns have survived the demolition, but these are more or less invisible from the road. Although it is difficult to say for certain what the motives were, the destruction of MHVRE can be seen within the context of the battle for memory in the public space of Lima and Peru. Miranda argues that “by performing this action they were reinforcing... actually making evident that the monument was necessary. They made the symbol of the tree a stronger symbol, and included themselves in the history of the work.”⁴⁰⁵



Fig. 12: The remains of the MHVRE, 2016 (Author's photograph).

Numerous critics have reacted to the incident in a similar way, particularly Buntinx who has criticised the local authorities and argues that “in reality, what we are seeing is

⁴⁰⁴ Gustavo Buntinx, ‘Batallas por la memoria III: Municipalidad de VMT niega responsabilidad en destrucción del monumento a los desplazados por la violencia’, *Micromuseo*, 2010 [http://micromuseo-bitacora.blogspot.co.uk/2010_05_01_archive.html], accessed 9 August 2016].

⁴⁰⁵ Jaime Miranda, ‘Interview in-person’ (Lima, 2016).

how we are continuously losing fights for remembrance”.⁴⁰⁶ Rodrigo Quijano has also criticised the destruction, stating that:

*“The official attack and dismantling, conducted against [Miranda’s] will, is part of the long number of disagreements and conflicts about the place of the political sphere in local public space...in this fight for space and the inhabitants’ right to the city.”*⁴⁰⁷

For those familiar with post-conflict memory in Peru, this incident will be reminiscent of the 2007 attack on the *El ojo que llora* monument in the Jesús María district of Lima.⁴⁰⁸ Several intruders beat and tied up a municipal policeman guarding the site in the Campo de Marte, then threw paint over the monument and attacked it with sledgehammers. The bright orange colour of the paint used to deface the monument suggested a link to Alberto Fujimori who, only two days earlier, had been extradited from Chile to Peru to face trial for human rights abuses. Moreover, as Drinot highlights, the “attack on the monument was expressive of a desire to silence, indeed destroy, debate”.⁴⁰⁹

Martín León has also argued that the destruction of the MHVRE can similarly be seen as an attempt to silence the population of Villa María del Triunfo, pointing to the silence of “those who can no longer speak, of those who would no longer speak, but also those who never wanted or knew how to speak”.⁴¹⁰ In contrast with the Tarata monument then, which appears open to the public, the narrative represented by this site

⁴⁰⁶ Gustavo Buntinx, ‘[Video] Municipalidad de Villa María del Triunfo destruye monumento’, *La Mula*, 2010 [https://vimeo.com/110734685, accessed 9 August 2016].

⁴⁰⁷ Rodrigo Quijano, ‘Spaces of Remembrance / Spaces of Conflict’ (Lima, 2013) [http://jaimemiranda.com/works/monumento-en-honor-a-la-verdad-para-la-reconciliacion-y-la-esperanza, accessed 9 August 2016].

⁴⁰⁸ The MHVRE’s similar history to that of *El ojo que llora*, insofar as both have been attacked and damaged after their construction, means that a detailed discussion of both in this chapter is unwarranted, and so I have opted instead to focus primarily on the MHVRE as the history of this monument is comparatively unknown in the historiography of the conflict. For more on *El ojo que llora* see Drinot, ‘For whom the eye cries’; Milton, ‘Defacing memory’; Katherine Hite, “‘The Eye that Cries’: The Politics of Representing Victims in Contemporary Peru’, *A Contracorriente*, 5:1 (2007), pp.108-34.

⁴⁰⁹ Drinot, ‘For whom the eye cries’, p.16.

⁴¹⁰ Martín León G., ‘Noticias de un secuestro o la crónica de una muerte anunciada - el eucalipto del óvalo de la Esperanza’ (Lima, 2013) [http://jaimemiranda.com/works/monumento-en-honor-a-la-verdad-para-la-reconciliacion-y-la-esperanza, accessed 30 August 2016].

of memory has been silenced. Furthermore, its ability to act as an arena for the performative social memories of the local population has also been precluded, an action which diminishes the right of migrant communities to control public space and to create their own narratives of the internal conflict.

However, the relationship between the monument and the local population may not be so simple. When I visited Villa María del Triunfo with Jaime Miranda in 2016, we met a local author named Daniel Cienfuegos. Cienfuegos' opinions of the monument were less positive, and he criticised the symbolism of the uprooted tree as a macabre and unsettling image in a district which had seen recurrent Shining Path sabotage and assassinations during the conflict. Although he appeared to be unaware of the ceremonies which had occurred at the monument, he suggested that his reading of the structure was by shared by many friends in the local community. It is difficult to evaluate exactly how accurate Cienfuegos' assessment is, but his criticisms do allude to a possible tension between the numerous forms of memory practice in a country which is deeply culturally divided. For example, the Óvalo Nueva Esperanza is not far from the Cementerio De Nueva Esperanza, a sprawling site which is the largest cemetery in Lima. On All Saint's Day, many families visit the cemetery to take care of the graves, share food, sing, dance, and commemorate the lives of those interred, in a similar manner to the way in which the members of ANFASEP tend to the Santuario de la Memoria in Ayacucho. Because of this, Nueva Esperanza clearly functions as a site of memory for the local population in a way that is at odds with idea of a site of memory as a memorial, statue, or museum represented in transnational discourse on post-conflict memory.

The existence of such sites do not preclude the potential for sculptures or monuments to also contribute to memory practice in important ways. However, given

that, in many ways, the Peruvian conflict (and indeed many of Peru's social problems today) was predicated on forms cultural domination and resistance, and the tensions between a Europeanised elite and the indigenous poor, it is important to be sensitive to the possibility that projects which appear to be highly effective vessels for memory practice may be rejected completely by those who they are intended to represent, because they are constructed from an entirely different set of cultural values. For instance, *El ojo que llora* is a monument which has attracted a significant amount of scholarly attention from academics in Anglo-European institutions and which remains incredibly important for the human rights activism community in Lima, yet its significance in the wider public imaginary in Peru is questionable. Furthermore, the politics and aesthetics of monuments and memorials should not distract us from the more personal, family-based commemoration of individuals which takes place in cemeteries (which are, first and foremost, sites of memory).

Space, therefore, does not act simply as a container for memory projects. The production of space, and battles over the rights to it, can reinforce or challenge pre-existing structures of cultural power. Commemorative projects can also resist pre-ordained prescriptions of power by interrupting the everyday function of such spaces and subverting their meanings in interesting ways. Hite has argued that, in particular, “Argentine memory sites are deeply enmeshed in creative ‘anti-museum’ and counter-memorial debates”, pointing to the work of German counter-memorial artist Horst Hoheisel in collaboration with Argentine artists and collective memory projects.⁴¹¹ In many ways these debates have taken inspiration from counter- or (anti-)memorial trends in Germany which include the vanishing “Monument against Fascism” at Hamburg created by Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz, and Jochen's creation, with the help of

⁴¹¹ Hite, ‘Empathic unsettlement’, p.39.

his own art students, of an invisible “Monument against Racism” in Saarbrücken. Young argues that Gerz’s work embodies the notion of the memorial as an interior space, a belief shared by Hoheisel who in 1995, submitted a proposal to a public competition for a “German national memorial to the murdered Jews of Europe” which involved blowing up the Brandenburg Tor, sprinkling the dust over where it once stood, and covering the remainder with granite slabs, so that destruction would be commemorated with destruction.⁴¹² Arguably, the Käthe Kollwitz memorial statues at the Vladslo German War Cemetery in Belgium and Neue Wache in Berlin also reflect non-conventional or anti-memorial commemorative tendencies.

Perhaps Peru has not yet seen the creation of an anti-monument in the vein of one of Gerz’s works, yet many Peruvian memory activists have clearly taken inspiration from these international trends in commemoration. Some have challenged traditional notions of what a museum is or can be, whilst others have turned to symbolic collective action as a means of commemorating the past. Again, there are international precedents for such actions. In Argentina, Jelin has highlighted the work of the Madres and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo who formed part of a broad social movement which articulated protest against the state, denounced human rights violations and have argued for the “vindication of the historical and collective memory struggling against oblivion”.⁴¹³ Likewise, from Turkey there is the example of the Saturday Mothers who, as Ahiska highlights, “since 1995 have been silently demonstrating by holding aloft photographs of their disappeared kin every Saturday in Galatasaray, Istanbul”.⁴¹⁴ Whilst such projects and movements have sometimes overlapped with national memory projects, or

⁴¹² James E. Young, ‘Germany’s vanishing Holocaust monuments’, Yad Vashem (Jerusalem, 1994) [http://www.gerz.fr/deb/put_file.html?ident=80035ed2e255acb1dd1b3ea680cf96a5, accessed 26 January 2017]; James E. Young, ‘Memory and Counter-Memory’, *Harvard Design Magazine*, 9 (1999), pp.1-10 (p.1).

⁴¹³ Elizabeth Jelin, ‘The Politics of Memory: The Human Rights Movements and the Construction of Democracy in Argentina’, *Latin American Perspectives*, 21:2 (1994), pp.38-58 (p.39).

⁴¹⁴ Meltem Ahiska, ‘Counter-Movement, Space and Politics: How the Saturday Mothers of Turkey Make Enforced Disappearances Visible’, in (Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo eds.), *Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception* (Basingstoke, 2014), pp.162-75 (p.162).

subsequently become institutionalised as part of a semi-official national rhetoric of memory, they have emerged from similar desires to provide a united front against state violence, to foster a collective and participatory environment of resistance, and to occupy public spaces as a means of opposing and commemorating violence.

In Peru, there have been a range of commemorative actions stemming from a similar perspective on memory and grassroots organisation. On the one hand, there have been the political protests in Lima's public spaces, including *Lava la bandera* ("Clean the flag", when Peruvians took to Lima's Plaza des Armas to symbolically wash Peruvian flags as a protest against the corruption of the Fujimori regime) and *Pon la basura en la basura* ("Put the rubbish in the rubbish", a project which involved throwing bags of rubbish with the face of Fujimori on the side at emblematic places of power such as the houses of key *Fujimoristas* and offices of television channels which colluded with the regime).⁴¹⁵ On the other, Vich refers to the work of memory activists working on projects related to the internal conflict. He draws a common link between political protest and the *Chalina de la esperanza*, a "powerful symbol against the disinterest of the Peruvian political class towards the families of the disappeared" which was eventually hung in the Plaza des Armas (and now in LUM).⁴¹⁶ Similarly, the collective Museo Itinerante Arte Por La Memoria is an "alternative and independent museum... a travelling museum installed in public space which collects art pieces related to the period of political violence" whose objective it is to "maintain a living memory of our recent past of violence through art".⁴¹⁷ These projects are important, Vich told me, because:

⁴¹⁵ Vich, *Poéticas del duelo*, pp.161-88, 261-288.

⁴¹⁶ Vich, *Poéticas del duelo*, p.285.

⁴¹⁷ 'Museo Itinerante Arte Por La Memoria' [<https://arteporlamemoria.wordpress.com/>, accessed 10 July 2017].

*“public space is a battle...so projects like Lava la bandera try to reappropriate public space and demonstrate the importance they have, like an agora, as a sign of the community, beyond political control, beyond the exclusion of capital.”*⁴¹⁸

Such projects are relevant to Tarata because they appear almost as the antithesis of everything that the Miraflores monument is. Whereas symbolic disobedience and protest attempt to use collective, grassroots organisation to encourage political participation, memory making, and the re-inscription of public space with new cultural values, the Tarata memorial is designed as a static statement of historical fact. Whilst it clearly holds a resonance with members of the local community, such commemoration does so within the framework provided by the municipality and state narratives of violence, which focus heavily on the suffering of individuals and the destruction caused by Shining Path violence.

Memory activists therefore not only make important statements about political violence and corruption, but about the rights of the population to the city space around them. The right to the city was an idea outlined first by Lefebvre, but has also been developed by David Harvey who describes it as:

*“far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city...the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization.”*⁴¹⁹

In this sense, memory activists organise against a much more fundamental aspect of the society which they critique by identifying spaces of power as sites of ideological struggle. By developing activism in these spaces, as well as by interrupting the space of

⁴¹⁸ Victor Vich, ‘Interview in-person’, (Lima, 2016).

⁴¹⁹ David Harvey, ‘The right to the city’, *New Left Review*, 53 (2008), pp.23–40 (p.23).

everyday life, memory activists attempt to challenge the pre-existing orthodoxies and ideologies attached to such spaces, and imbue them with new narratives about political violence, the function of public spaces, and the power of collective action.

However, the extent to which such projects can undermine the systems they purport to challenge is limited. Whilst often successful in achieving a degree of popular participation, many of these commemorative projects have emerged from an artistic community based in Lima whose members are an established part of the middle-class. Whilst political activism may make statements about the right to the city, it is unclear whether these demonstrations represent mobilisation in favour of Peru's indigenous communities, or if they simply aim to protect the political rights of Lima's established urban middle-class (and to some extent the emerging "*cholo*" middle-class).⁴²⁰ Because of this, such artistic commemorative projects are, whilst valuable, also limited by the privileged subject positions from which they are constructed (of which not all, but some, artists are unaware). They seek to speak both to and for the Peruvian nation, and their works therefore seem destined to remain representations of Peruvian reality constructed from the perspective of the capital. This does not invalidate such projects, but it does mean that the optimism for the future born out of them should be tempered by a recognition that the artist-public relationship in Peru remains emblematic of class and racial hierarchies, even while artists themselves may seek to challenge these norms.

Because of this, these interpretations of Peruvian politics and society, and the narratives they construct about the internal conflict, necessarily share characteristics with *indigenista* discourses which, Mariátegui argued, "cannot give us a rigorously accurate version of the Indian. It must idealise and stylize him".⁴²¹ Of course, not all of these projects aim to make statements about the nature of race or condition of

⁴²⁰ Drinot, 'The Meaning of Alan García', p.184.

⁴²¹ José Carlos Mariátegui, *Seven Essays on Peruvian Reality* (Austin, 1971), p.359.

indigenous communities in Peru, yet in seeking to make political statements about the internal conflict and processes which, arguably, their lives are removed from, memory activists are similarly limited by the extent to which they can accurately depict experiences of political violence. This is most apparent in the local opposition to Miranda's MHVRE, which saw the monument as an abstract and inappropriate art form for remembering the conflict. This is not to say that these projects are in any way useless, nor should they be disregarded. Instead, I argue that they reflect a distinctly urban perspective, meaning that they represent a political position which is inherently tied to, and constrained by, *limeño* society. Whilst the MHVRE and other projects therefore articulate important spatialised understandings of the internal conflict, it is also necessary to highlight their political contexts and limits too.

Conclusion

The analyses of these sites of memory point towards a significant conclusion in the idea of a geography of memory. In this geography, there are sites which can be described as open (in terms of access) which are easy for the public to visit; the Tarata monument and LUM fall into this category. On the other hand, there are also sites which are closed, unable to be accessed easily by the public (or which are destroyed); these include the MHVRE, *El ojo que llora*, and the island of El Frontón (discussed in the next chapter). The extent to which sites are open or closed can give us an indicator to the degree to which the narratives of political violence which they represent are acceptable or intolerable to the vested interests of Peruvian society; particularly by *Fujimoristas* and representatives of the Peruvian state who have intervened to limit the impact of projects which they do not support. However, as demonstrated with the Tarata monument, even those sites which are open to the public and which do not require a

guide to interpret the material on show can have the impact of their narrative limited in numerous ways, particularly by the way in which they interact with their surrounding environment or in which they are marketed to potential visitors.

On the other hand, grassroots organisation, artists and memory activists have found ways to subvert public space and interrupt everyday life with their own projects and narratives, giving new significance and meaning to spaces which would otherwise be thought of as mundane (the city bus) or representative of elite power (the Plaza des Armas). Yet these projects, whilst at times capable of producing intense, short-term resistance to political figures or programmes, also have a limited capacity to generate true social change (if, in fact, this is their aim at all). To some extent, these projects can be compared with the discourse of *indigenismo*, in so far as they represent the creation of narratives about the internal conflict both by and for an urban audience largely protected from wider experiences of violence.⁴²² With this in mind, it seems clear that forms of testimony and commemorative projects promoted by indigenous communities remain crucial in the further development of commemorative practice in Peru.

As Feldman has argued, narratives of violence and memorialisation discourses also become “localized and transformed in specific places and historical moments”, meaning that memory narratives are deeply tied to local populations and contribute to a cultural geography of memory.⁴²³ Through participation with memorialising discourses, communities are able to contribute their local perspective to what Feldman describes as the “national cacophony of memories”.⁴²⁴ In this way localised perspectives, supported by grassroots memory activists, raise optimism about resisting more centralised, state-

⁴²² Kristal, *The Andes Viewed from the City*, p.217.

⁴²³ Feldman, ‘Exhibiting conflict’, p.512.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.511.

driven narratives, but also face huge pressures to survive financially and conform politically.

Throughout this chapter, then, I have highlighted the symbolic power of the Tarata bombing for Shining Path. I have challenged some of the myths which exist about the bombing which support state narratives of violence. Furthermore, I have highlighted how cultural representations and commemorative sites have been produced in order to support or challenge narratives of the conflict in which the Tarta bombing remains central. In all of these cases, the production and politics of space are central to my arguments insofar as they gave Tarata symbolic significance, have been used to construct cultural narratives about violence, and shaped the narratives constructed at sites of memory.

Yet even with the array of memory projects that exist in Peru today, there remain certain topics which appear, to some degree, to be off-limits. These particular moments are red lines in memory discourse which cannot be crossed, because to challenge memories about these moments would be to challenge the values on which the Peruvian state has been reconstituted over the past 30 years. Furthermore, state agents have moved to close off the spaces in which they took place and have acted to produce their own memory discourses in order to head off potential revisionism of these events. One of these events is the 1997 hostage crisis in Lima, discussed in the final chapter in the context of the neoliberal reconstruction of the state by Fujimori. My analysis in the next chapter turns to another of these moments; namely, to the murder of over 250 prison inmates by state forces at the San Pedro prison in San Juan de Lurigancho, and on the prison island El Frontón.

Chapter 4: The prison massacres at El Frontón and Lurigancho

The prison massacres of 1986 are a highly underestimated case for understanding the logics of state violence during the internal conflict, whilst the potential for the prison island of El Frontón to be studied as a site of memory has been almost completely ignored. In part, this lack of attention is due to the large majority of the victims being prisoners accused of terrorist acts; their lives and memories have been deemed to be non-grievable because of their associations to Shining Path. Yet such a perspective is not only fragile because of the state's disastrous penal and counterterrorism policies (which detained hundreds of innocent Peruvians without evidence in prisons dominated by Shining Path, exposing them to the party's indoctrination). It also denies the possibility that Shining Path memories having something to offer the historiography of the conflict, and perhaps even contribute to the prevention of violence in the future.

This chapter will therefore be devoted to a spatial re-reading of El Frontón and the afterlife of the prison massacres in Peruvian society. In part, I will focus on the ways in which Shining Path developed their presence in prisons and took control of huge swathes of the state's penitentiary space. The party's ability to parade around their prison yards had a profound effect on the population of Lima, who saw television images of what a Shining Path state would look like being transmitted from only a few hundred metres off the capital's coastline. I will also explore the ways in which the state approached its own prison space, and argue that the abandonment of El Frontón to military (and later Shining Path) control amounted to the creation of a "space of exception". A space of exception, as Stavrides highlights, is a space in which individuals are removed from the protection for the state, their citizenship and human rights denied.⁴²⁵

⁴²⁵ Stavrides, 'Occupied Squares and the Urban "State of Exception"', p.236.

As with previous chapters, I will approach the prison massacres through a theoretical framework which utilises Foucault's theories of sovereign and governmental power and Agamben's work on spaces of exception.⁴²⁶ I will supplement this framework by engaging with Ong's concept of spatialised exercise of sovereignty and its links to a mode of neoliberal governance which aims to exclude populations resistant to market-driven reforms.⁴²⁷ Furthermore, I will also contextualise these ideas with research by Carlos Aguirre on the history of prisons in Peru in order to highlight a genealogy of El Frontón as a space of exception, and to draw comparisons between other spaces of exception established under the logics of counterinsurgency from around Latin America.⁴²⁸ These sites include Los Cabitos in Ayacucho, the Escuela Superior de Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA) in Buenos Aires and the Estadio Nacional Julio Martínez Prádanos in Santiago.⁴²⁹

The use of comparative literatures in this way offers the possibility of illuminating the extent to which repressive state practices have been replicated across Latin America, particularly those which have been followed by market-driven reforms. As a whole, this thesis aims to avoid sweeping continental conclusions about such episodes of history, and aims to contextualise the Peruvian case rather than seeing it as a simulacrum of Southern Cone experiences of violence. However, whilst Peru's unique historical context is doubtlessly crucial for understanding the conflict, the confluence of neoliberal reforms with official or *de facto* military rule in numerous Latin American states

⁴²⁶ See Footnote 206.

⁴²⁷ Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*.

⁴²⁸ Carlos Aguirre, *The Criminals of Lima and Their Worlds: The Prison Experience, 1850-1935* (London, 2005); Carlos Aguirre, 'Punishment and Extermination: The Massacre of Political Prisoners in Lima, Peru, June 1986', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 32:1 (2013), pp.193-216.

⁴²⁹ Each of these spaces functioned as a clandestine detention centre (CDC) during periods of political violence in Peru, Argentina and Chile respectively. Estela Schindel argues, with specific reference to ESMA, that CDCs can be classified as spaces of exception because they are "physically contiguous with the 'normal' urban fabric but juridically disentangled from it". Estela Schindel, 'Ghosts and compañeros: haunting stories and the quest for justice around Argentina's former terror sites', *Rethinking History*, 18:2 (2014), pp.244-264 (p.246).

towards the end of the twentieth century raises questions about why state practices in different scenarios shared such similarities.

Although the prison massacres have not been explored to a great extent through Peruvian cinema or literature, there are several key artistic works which deal with the logics and aesthetics of the violence enacted at El Frontón. Some of these artistic works are dealt with in *El Frontón: Demasiado pronto / Demasiado tarde*, part of Gustavo Buntinx's *Partes de guerra* series, including the photographs of Gladys Alvarado Jourde which I analyse below. These photographs explore the solemn ruins of El Frontón, detailing the shattered remains of the prison's structures with inscriptions by inmates still visible. Buntinx and Jourde explore the wider cultural significance of the massacres and how they have been represented in the post-conflict era. I will also analyse *Los rendidos* by José Carlos Agüero. As the son of two *Senderistas* who both died in detention in Peruvian state prisons, Agüero's perspective is invaluable in this context. *Los rendidos* is a thought-provoking meditation on violence, guilt, culpability and forgiveness which has challenged many beliefs about the truth and reconciliation process in Peru. I will include a discussion of it in this chapter in part because of the way in which it deals with the issue of incarceration, but also because it presents some stark conclusions about violence and memory which are of great importance to my thesis.

Finally, I will ask what it means for this site of violence to be considered a site of memory. El Frontón is by no means a site where commemorative practice takes place, but it is a space which draws out unresolved, competing narratives of Peru's conflict. The contradictions and tensions which exist in the island's history make it a highly evocative site, and so it is important to understand how it fits the city-text of Lima. As discussed previously, the city-text is the geography of memory which Lima (and other

urban landscapes in Peru) evokes through the way in which public spaces are constructed with reference to the past, how these spaces are accessible through public transport and other means, and how they interact with the built environment and other local buildings (public squares and parks, businesses, universities etc.). Palonen has expanded this idea to include statues, public artworks and street names, arguing that the city-text is a “site of politicking...deeply embedded in the everyday experience...[where] through the act of naming and replacing political symbols, people are engaged in political acts that invest objects and sites with positive and negative connotations”.⁴³⁰

This analysis will continue to elaborate on the argument developed in the last chapter which highlighted how public space in Lima, and across Peru, acts as a battleground in which memory narratives are continually contested. Numerous actors have attempted to inscribe their version of events into the capital’s city-text, while others have actively intervened to suppress remembrance and erase evidence of the conflict. At present, El Frontón is almost silent in this geography, but that has not prevented memory activists from trying to use its history to recuperate, and to some extent rehabilitate, hidden memories of Peruvian state violence. For example, Vich asks with reference to the island, “Why does the State impede its citizens from accessing a place that says something about their own history?”.⁴³¹ Through a spatial reading of El Frontón and its history, I hope to demonstrate that the island’s continuing state of ruin is symbolic of the ongoing exclusion of *Senderista* memory narratives from acceptable memory discourse in Peru.

⁴³⁰ Palonen, ‘The city-text in post-communist Budapest’, p.220.

⁴³¹ Vich, *Poéticas del duelo*, p.79

Background

Neither the executions of prisoners in 1986 nor the riots which preceded them can be understood outside of the context of the counter-terrorism strategy of successive Peruvian governments. The early years of the conflict saw the Belaúnde administration struggle to cope with the sudden pressure applied by Shining Path to the state's woefully inadequate defensive resources and disciplinary structures in the interior. As the CVR details, the group organised numerous prison breaks, including the escape of 78 *Senderistas* and 169 other inmates from Huamanga prison in March 1982.⁴³² The Commission's report also highlights how:

*“In the prison in Callao women paraded dressed in red and black... and at [Castro Castro prison] men and women once marched for an hour carrying a giant banner with the face of Abimael Guzmán.”*⁴³³

Coupled with dramatic overcrowding and poor record keeping in prisons, these actions highlighted the state's unpreparedness for the conflict, and demonstrated an almost total loss of control over internal prison space. As a result, large numbers of accused insurgents began to be sent to prisons in Lima.

Having been elected as President in 1985, Alan García attempted to devise a new counterinsurgency strategy which moved away from the human rights abuses committed under Belaúnde, and established the Comisión de Paz to intervene in cases of maltreatment (including internment without charge, drastic overcrowding, lack of basic resources and living conditions, and theft by prison guards) of detainees accused of terrorism.⁴³⁴ The effects of reform efforts were, however, limited. Despite numerous instances of rioting between 1983 and 1986 against the conditions prisoners were held

⁴³² CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. V, p.699.

⁴³³ For footage of Shining Path prison demonstrations see Fn.27 of this chapter on 'People of the Shining Path'. *Ibid.*, p.700.

⁴³⁴ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm.VII, p.737.

in, Human Rights Watch reported in 1992 that it was still the case that human rights were “systematically and constantly denied”.⁴³⁵

Neither the Instituto Nacional Penitenciario (INPE) nor the government could claim that such a situation was sustainable without the prospect of violence. There were seven cases of rioting in Lurigancho and El Frontón in 1985-6, as well as incidents at the Canto Grande and Chorrillos prisons in Lima, and at institutions in Arequipa, Cusco, Huánuco and Piura. In the majority of these cases, the protests were against poor food provision and a lack of sanitation in prisons, as well as against the slowness of the judicial system.⁴³⁶ Hostages were taken in many of these incidents, and when police tried to conduct a search at Lurigancho in October 1985, Shining Path “barricaded the entrance to their wing with cement blocks and burning mattresses and launched a variety of homemade weapons, wounding one officer and 20 inmates”. The result was the death of 30 inmates, with both the police and *Senderistas* accusing the other side of having conducted executions.⁴³⁷

It is worth noting briefly here how prison space was organised across Peruvian geography. After the breakouts in Ayacucho, the government decided to concentrate all accused insurgents in three prisons in Lima; Santa Bárbara, Lurigancho, and El Frontón. Shortly after, Miguel Castro Castro Prison (specifically designed for insurgents) was built in the district of San Juan de Lurigancho, although many women were sent to the women’s prison in Chorrillos. Whilst each of these prisons was in the area of the capital, they were located in its poorer districts (or in the case of El Frontón on an island

⁴³⁵ Americas Watch, *Peru Under Fire: Human Rights Since the Return to Democracy* (London, 1992), p.35.

⁴³⁶ Rolando Ames et al., *Informe al Congreso sobre los sucesos de los penales* (Lima, 1988), pp.25-7.

⁴³⁷ Feinstein, ‘Competing Visions of the 1986 Lima Prison Massacres’, p.7.

off the coast) as if to prevent contagion and reduce the proximity of the city's elite to the country's most feared prisoners.

To an extent, this policy reflects the type of spatial partitioning identified by Foucault as a feature of panopticism. Each prison was an “enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point”, so that the “plague” of *Senderismo* could be isolated, identified and treated in distinct areas of the city.⁴³⁸ In this sense, the state appeared to adhere to Foucault's principles for the governmental management of a population. The management of internal prison space, however, suggests otherwise. The dire conditions in which prisoners were kept reflected no desire to rehabilitate, but instead “a power that not only did not hesitate to exert itself directly on bodies, but was exalted and strengthened by its visible manifestations of power... a power that demonstrated not why it had to enforce its laws, but who were its enemies”.⁴³⁹ The power outlined by Foucault here is sovereign power, and its exercise over accused insurgents in state prisons demonstrated a desire for vengeance and a reassertion of the state authority. This suggests that the state did not just use the detention of insurgents to limit the scope of the ongoing conflict, but also to reassert its own right to rule and to visibly demonstrate its own power. As will be seen, this desire to assert authority was dramatically demonstrated in response to the prison riots of 1986.

This spatial partitioning of insurgents from society was also reflected in President García's increased deployment of Emergency Zones.⁴⁴⁰ As the *Informe Final* notes, the establishment of Emergency Zones (and their Political-Military Commands which placed all civilian authorities under military control) amounted to the “abdication of democratic responsibility”, and ultimately created an environment in which human

⁴³⁸ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p.197.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.57.

⁴⁴⁰ By 1987 more than 30 provinces across the nation were under a state of Emergency. Agustín Haya de la Torre, *El retorno de la barbarie: la matanza en los penales de Lima en 1986* (Lima, 1987), p.16.

rights abuses became common. Even prior to the massacres, therefore, it is possible to see García's increased use of Emergency Zones as a sign that the spatialised logics of the counterinsurgency operation would continue, with states of exception enabling the differential treatment of populations in different regions across the country.

This is particularly relevant to the case of El Frontón for two reasons. Firstly, because Lima came under a state of Emergency in 1985, thus enabling the military to conduct their operations with impunity in the capital. Secondly, because the prison island itself became, similar to Los Cabitos, a localised space of exception. El Frontón was a space which had no value, the population of which was not worth preserving, and so state agents effectively withdrew to a policy of containment instead focused on policing it from the outside. As will be seen, this policy proved to be a disastrous mistake, as it gifted Shining Path a significant platform from which they could continue their propaganda war against the state.

Shining Path incarcerated

Rather than being deterred by their incarceration, Shining Path used imprisonment as an opportunity and began to see the space around them as “centres of political action” from which they could recruit new members.⁴⁴¹ Prison space was also important for Shining Path as an arena in which they could perform their own version of self-organisation and statecraft, converting each institution into a space of propaganda and organisation for the ideological war they were conducting against the state.⁴⁴² In the words of Abimael Guzmán, the prisoners:

CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. V*, p.738.

⁴⁴² Haya de la Torre, *El retorno de la barbarie*, p.28.

“never bent the knee and continued to fight...and with fiery cheers they transformed the sordid dungeons of the decaying and rotten Peruvian State into shining trenches of combat”.⁴⁴³



Fig. 13: Shining Path inmates during a prison march. Still from *People of the Shining Path*.

As can be seen in footage from the *Dispatches* documentary *People of the Shining Path*, the party established control over their wings in El Frontón and Lurigancho in a more stable way than they were able to do in *ayacuchano* communities, allowing them to produce organisational structures and create a kind of model state according to their own ideology.⁴⁴⁴ The party marched through the prison with hammer and sickle flags, painted murals and displayed posters of Guzmán, and sang songs in praise of the Cultural Revolution. Agüero has also pointed to the party’s use of ceremonial clothing as a form of propaganda which formed a part of the “extreme cultural aggression” they directed against the state in this symbolic war.⁴⁴⁵

Whilst these factors allowed Shining Path to aesthetically redefine the internal space of the prison, the party also recreated its organisational structures in the management of

⁴⁴³ Abimael Guzmán, ‘Dar la vida por el partido y la revolución’ in (PCP-SL ed.), *¡Día de la Herocidad!: Tercer aniversario* (Lima, 1989), pp.3-4 (p.3).

⁴⁴⁴ *Dispatches*, ‘People of the Shining Path’, (Channel 4, 1992) [<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-HnH-MguEIU>, accessed 12 October 2016].

⁴⁴⁵ José Carlos Agüero, ‘Vestidos para morir: Sendero Luminoso en las prisiones a inicios de la década de los 90’, *Segunda piel* (2009), pp.20-23 (p.23).

the prison wing, controlling access to their domain, cooking their own food and carrying out ideological lessons for other inmates. Prisons therefore became a microcosm of the kind of state Shining Path would have created had they succeeded in their revolutionary project. Although the guerrillas never truly came close to recreating their prison utopias on a larger scale, these images remain shocking to this day because they represent a the doctrinaire and dogmatic reorganisation of society reminiscent of Mao's Cultural Revolution. This has led Boutron to state that Shining Path had "conquered prison space to serve their own interests".⁴⁴⁶ However, a large degree of responsibility for Shining Path's ability to organise must fall upon the state's organisation of prison space.

Prison management was chaotic and reflected the presence of "poorly paid guards and employees, corrupted authorities, and a general state of abandonment" which Aguirre argues generally characterised Peruvian prisons in the 1980s.⁴⁴⁷ Of course, Shining Path resisted attempts by prison staff to enforce greater authority upon them, including plans to control prison visits by issuing ID cards to inmates' families.⁴⁴⁸ However, Aguirre's work also demonstrates a much longer history of disorder and chaos in Peruvian prisons which reflects the low status they appear to have within the state's prioritisation of functions.

He describes how, between 1850 and 1930, attempts were made to modernise and reform the prison system but that a "despotic approach to punishment, one that emphasised revenge and deterrence over rehabilitation and reform" generally prevailed with the result that prisoners continued to be "treated like savage beasts" facing the persistent problems of overcrowding, poor sanitation and poor provision of resources.⁴⁴⁹ In this sense, the problems of prison management in Peru were not new to the 1980s,

⁴⁴⁶ Camille Boutron, 'El uso estratégico del espacio carcelario como elemento referencial de la construcción de identidades en conflicto en el Perú', *Bulletin de l'Institut française études andines*, 43:1 (2014), pp.31-51 (p.41).

⁴⁴⁷ Aguirre, 'Punishment and Extermination', p.199.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.198.

⁴⁴⁹ Aguirre, *The Criminals of Lima and Their Worlds*, p.86-7.

and it is perhaps more useful to understand the problems of prison management as being shaped by over a century of chronic underfunding and a lack of attention to persistent problems. The state's lack of control can be seen as a form of deliberately organised chaos, a product of the exclusionary ideas which informed approaches to the state's disciplinary function and which rejected the need for rehabilitation and reform to become central tenets in prison policy.

That these activities occurred “with knowledge and tolerance of the authorities” made the party's actions appear even more brazen to those on the outside.⁴⁵⁰ Shining Path were not simply enjoying their free time but, as Feinstein highlights, carrying on many of their activities with greater freedom than they had experienced on the outside. The party created graphic re-enactments of their favourite assassinations, organised “Cultural Thursdays” (which acted as recruitment meetings), and even planned some of their operations from inside the walls of Lurigancho and El Frontón.⁴⁵¹ Shining Path had resignified prison space, changing it from a site symbolic of their defeat to a space in which they could perform small-scale versions of the state which they wanted to create in Peru.

Ultimately, however, Shining Path's development of this symbolic war made them more vulnerable in the long run. The group, which was almost impossible to locate in the Andean *puna*, now had a visible and conspicuous presence in urban space. Furthermore, whilst the riots which took place prior to 1986 challenged the state's ability to manage their prisons, Shining Path's use of clothing, evocative images and demonstrations (alluding to a dogmatic, foreign ideology) challenged the Peruvian state's right to rule. These actions therefore represented both a conspicuous affront to the state, and a territorialisation of Shining Path which located the party in a specific

⁴⁵⁰ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm.VII*, p.738.

⁴⁵¹ Feinstein, ‘Competing Visions of the 1986 Lima Prison Massacre’, p.7.

space. Understanding the massacres in this wider military context of the conflict is crucial. As the Ames Commission would later argue, there was a “profound motivation” for the state to “confront the prison riots in the same terms that they had come to confront Shining Path actions in the Emergency Zones of the South-Central *sierra*”.⁴⁵²

18 June 1986

On 18 June 1986, Shining Path prisoners initiated three days of riots in the El Frontón, Lurigancho and Santa Bárbara prisons. The CVR states that the rioters, motivated by awful living conditions and the government’s attempts to move them to the new Canto Grande prison, took members of the Republican Guard and INPE staff hostage. The inmates also released a list of demands which included recognition of their status as political prisoners, the cessation of interventions by the Navy into El Frontón and the closure of Canto Grande. However, the demands also reflected numerous day-to-day concerns of the prisoners, including the provision of sufficient clothing and food, repair of the lighting and water systems, guarantees for the protection of the accused’s families, and the speeding up of judicial processes.⁴⁵³

After the failure of the Comisión de Paz to resolve the situation, García ordered the armed forces to suppress the uprisings. At Santa Bárbara, three prison staff were taken hostage, but the prison was quickly retaken with only two fatalities. At Lurigancho, there was a sustained stand-off between inmates and the army. A plan was devised by Coronel Cabezas which, the CVR argues, “put in grave risk the lives of the hostage, the inmates, and of the Republican Guard”.⁴⁵⁴ Nonetheless, the army retook the *Pabellón Industrial* and, after an assault by the military, many of the inmates surrendered. Shortly

⁴⁵² Ames et al., *Informe al Congreso sobre los sucesos de los penales*, p.246.

⁴⁵³ PCP-SL, ‘Pliego Unico Demandas de los prisioneros de guerra de las luminosas trincheras de combate del Frontón, Lurigancho y Callao’ [<http://www.pagina-libre.org/MPP-A/Textos/Presos/Pliego86.html>, accessed 1st October 2016].

⁴⁵⁴ CVR, *Informe Final*, Tm. VII, p.755.

after, a large number of the surrendered prisoners were extrajudicially executed under the orders of Cabezas. In total, 124 prisoners died at Lurigancho.

The Navy took a day longer to subdue the uprising at El Frontón. The island fortress briefly sheltered the prisoners and gave them a vantage point, but the Navy responded with mortar shelling. The walls of the infamous *Pabellón Azul* were destroyed but many *Senderistas* survived the night until reinforcements arrived from the army and Republican Guard. The rioters eventually surrendered to the armed forces, but over seventy were extrajudicially executed by the Navy after their surrender, some having been tortured.⁴⁵⁵ In total, there were 118 deaths in El Frontón.

The existing literature depicts the massacres as an episode which demonstrated the increasing impunity with which the armed forces acted during the conflict. Senator Rolando Ames was commissioned by the government to investigate the deaths in the wake of negative public reaction to the large death toll. The commission found that the three key factors which produced the massacres were García's own decisions to meet the riots with violent reprisal, the militarised climate created by the state's counterinsurgency operation, and the assumption that the states of Emergency superseded the human rights guaranteed by the Peruvian constitution.⁴⁵⁶ The Commission also found numerous Army and Navy officers guilty of crimes against human life, including Coronel Cabezas of the Republican Guard, General Máximo Martínez Lira and General Rabanal from the army (all at Lurigancho), and the Commander of the Navy Infantry and his subordinates (El Frontón).⁴⁵⁷ However, when

⁴⁵⁵ Enrique Obando, 'Civil-Military Relations in Peru, 1980-1996: How to Control and Coopt the Military (and the consequences of doing so)' in (Steve J. Stern ed.), *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995* (London, 1998), pp.385-410 (p.391).

⁴⁵⁶ Ames et al. *Informe al Congreso sobre los sucesos de los penales*, p.305.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.304.

Rabanal was indicted for murder the military demanded that the trial be awarded to the military courts. As a result of the subsequent trial, Cabezas was sentenced to fifteen years in prison yet, as Human Rights Watch highlights, Rabanal and Martínez Lira (the two highest authorities at Lurigancho on the day of the massacre) were only charged with negligence (Cabezas and numerous others were also released after the 1995 Law of Amnesty).⁴⁵⁸

García was quick to distance himself from responsibility, blaming the massacres on an overzealous police force and denying any personal responsibility for the deaths.⁴⁵⁹ Whether or not García had a personal role in commanding the suppression of the riots, Burt argues that the failure of the President to impose civilian authority upon the armed forces, and the armed forces' reciprocal mistrust of civilian elites, created a situation in which the military was able to act with violent impunity. The executions offered a very public demonstration of how far the armed forces would go to stop the chaos from spreading. Similar abuses of power increased sharply after 1986 when the government's counterinsurgency policy reverted to the previous hard-line approach.⁴⁶⁰

For this reason, the massacres also need to be understood in the context of the state's reassertion of sovereign power which simultaneously reflects the breakdown of the state's disciplinary and governmental functions. Vich believes that the destruction of El Frontón was a "powerful sign of the tragedy of the Peruvian state...an extremely weak state that, in response to its own weakness, could only respond with a kind of suicidal, extreme violence".⁴⁶¹ Vich's argument here refers to the prison as an important symbol of state function. It therefore follows that if the state cannot even manage its own disciplinary structures, and feels compelled to destroy its own prisons, then its exercise

⁴⁵⁸ Americas Watch, *Peru under Fire*, p.31.

⁴⁵⁹ Feinstein, 'Competing Visions of the 1986 Lima Prison Massacres', p.10.

⁴⁶⁰ Burt, *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru*, p.63.

⁴⁶¹ Víctor Vich, 'Interview in-person' (Lima, 2016).

of legal power has failed at a very fundamental level. Ultimately, the state was propped up by a moment of brutal violence; a vengeful demonstration of a sovereign power which “asserted itself as an armed power whose functions of maintaining order were not entirely unconnected with the functions of war...[which] sought a renewal of its effect in the spectacle of its individual manifestations”.⁴⁶²

This violent practice can partly be seen as an attempt to tackle the increasing visibility of Shining Path around Lima, developed through their political activities inside the prison walls. It also betrays a preoccupation to defend the capital from a conflict which was “previously relegated to the remote Andean highlands in the pages of the national press” but “violently exploded onto the Lima stage” during the riots.⁴⁶³ Whilst fear in Lima was growing about the continued threat of Shining Path (a fear encouraged through the regular blackouts and assassinations perpetrated by the group), the prisons became a priority for the state as a space in which they could forcefully assert their authority, and vengeance, on the insurgents.

There have been a number of scholarly studies which represent the massacres as a moment which refracts competing memory narratives of the conflict. Drinot argues that “two understandings of the responsibilities and culpabilities of the violent and non-violent actors” have produced two broad memory narratives in relation to the internal conflict. One of these interpretations prioritises the heroism of the armed forces in suppressing the Shining Path insurgency, whilst the other reinterprets the armed forces as major perpetrators of human rights abuses which must be criticised and dissected simultaneously with the actions of Shining Path.⁴⁶⁴ Likewise, Feinstein argues that

⁴⁶² Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p.57.

⁴⁶³ Feinstein, ‘Competing Visions of the 1986 Lima Prison Massacres’, p.2.

⁴⁶⁴ Drinot, ‘For whom the eye cries’, p.25.

analysis of the events of 1986 has led to “not only very different interpretations of the massacres themselves, but also very different interpretations of the civil conflict that had torn the country apart”.⁴⁶⁵ Whilst the massacres have been represented in the Peruvian media as a necessary end to the chaos unleashed by Shining Path on Lima’s prisons, those in the human rights-based memory camp have instead highlighted the mistakes made by the government in creating such dire living conditions for prisoners and allowing Shining Path to take control.⁴⁶⁶ Gorriti for instance, has highlighted the dire living conditions inside the prisons whilst also criticising the state for ceding control of prison space to Shining Path.⁴⁶⁷ In this sense, for the human rights memory camp the massacres represent two major failures of the Peruvian state during the conflict; the failure to protect human rights, and the failure to limit further violence. Because of this, the massacres are remembered as a means of criticising the state and attempting to guarantee human rights in the present.

From the perspective of the armed forces, the prison massacres are not an episode which fit very well into their overarching narrative of the conflict. The deaths of over 250 surrendered prisoners is difficult to explain away as a necessary step for the salvation of the nation. As Milton describes, the museum curated by DINCOTE based on the perspectives of the police and armed forces during the conflict exhibits over 1000 objects which belonged to prisoners in El Frontón, Lurigancho and Santa Bárbara with almost no mention of the massacres which took place there.⁴⁶⁸ This particular way of telling events emphasises the heroism and ingenuity of the armed forces over the brutality and disregard for human rights demonstrated in other scenarios. Salomón Lerner, the head of the CVR, argues that:

⁴⁶⁵ Feinstein, ‘Competing Visions of the 1986 Lima Prison Massacres’, p.3.

⁴⁶⁶ Aguirre, ‘Punishment and Extermination’, p.209.

⁴⁶⁷ Gorriti, *The Shining Path*, p.244.

⁴⁶⁸ Milton, ‘Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru’s era of transitional justice’, p.366.

“this is the false argument that the military wield... Do not look in the rearview mirror, do not open old wounds. The question is whether the wounds have healed. I think they are still open”.⁴⁶⁹

One perspective which is missing from the both memory camps, however, is that of Shining Path members. Whilst human rights activists and the non-revolutionary Left identify some *Senderistas* as victims of military massacres, they ultimately interpret the violence of the internal conflict as damaging to the whole of Peru and therefore are simultaneously critical of Shining Path and military violence. As Feinstein argues, however, Shining Path commemorate the fallen prisoners of 1986 as heroes whose deaths demonstrate the need for the revolution to continue.⁴⁷⁰ In the foreword of a document entitled *¡Día de la Herocidad!*, published for the third anniversary of the massacres, Abimael Guzmán commemorated those who died at El Frontón and Lurigancho, arguing that they had laid bare the genocidal nature of the Peruvian state and that the prisoners “continue winning battles beyond their death”.⁴⁷¹ The rest of the document is an illustrated account of the riots and their subsequent pacification in the context of the conflict, in which the Shining Path prisoners are depicted heroically, shouting “this is a triumph of President Gonzalo...Honour and glory to comrades and fallen combatants! Long live President Gonzalo! Long live the Peruvian Communist Party!”.⁴⁷² For Shining Path, the massacres represented a “grand moral triumph” as the military’s repressive violence had been exposed, and because the state had been goaded into engaging the insurgents on their own terms, as an opposing army rather than as terrorists.⁴⁷³ For these reasons, El Frontón holds an important place in Shining Path memories and was used as a rallying cry for future operations. Although, as Aguirre

⁴⁶⁹ Salomón Lerner, ‘Interview in-person’ (Lima, 2016).

⁴⁷⁰ Feinstein, ‘Competing Visions of the 1986 Lima Prison Massacres’, p.36.

⁴⁷¹ Guzmán, ‘Dar la vida por al partido y la revolución’, p.4.

⁴⁷² PCP-SL, *¡Día de la Herocidad!*, p.70.

⁴⁷³ Guzmán, ‘Dar la vida por al partido y la revolución’, p.4.

highlights, the massacres did not prompt any sympathy for the insurgents in public opinion, they did give Shining Path cohesion and “reinforced their mystique”.⁴⁷⁴

Remembering the massacres in this way also represented an important way for the Maoist group to further demonstrate the distance between themselves and the democratic Left, a position they emphasised on the first anniversary of the massacres by opposing a march organised by Izquierda Unida, describing it as an “opportunist march that seeks to traffic with our dead”.⁴⁷⁵ The importance of prison space to Shining Path’s construction of their own identity would continue after 1986. Almost all Shining Path prisoners were moved to Canto Grande but, despite their earlier protests, *Senderistas* continued to enjoy better conditions than other prisoners by recreating the forms of organisation they had maintained in other prisons, enforcing discipline, conducting ideological lessons and being allowed to receive a portion of their food raw so they could cook it themselves.⁴⁷⁶ The MRTA also took advantage of the state’s struggle to organise its prisons when 47 of its members (including their leader Víctor Polay) escaped from Castro Castro in 1990. The memories of these groups focus on their time in prison, as *Apristas* do to this day, because they represent rare moments in which party members were actually able to act out their political fantasies and self-organise, making incarceration crucial in the development of their political identities.

However, whilst these narratives of human rights abuses, heroic soldiers and heroic revolutionaries are certainly diverse and central to understandings of the massacres, little work has been done to spatialise the massacres or to assert the role which prison space had to play in producing the massacres. In the next section, I will argue that the way in which Peruvian state prisons were managed during the conflict can give us key

⁴⁷⁴ Aguirre, ‘Punishment and Extermination’, p.214.

⁴⁷⁵ Feinstein, ‘Competing Visions of the 1986 Lima Prison Massacres’ p.19.

⁴⁷⁶ Americas Watch, *Peru under Fire*, p.37.

insights into the wider forms of geographically contingent power exercised by the Peruvian state and armed forces. From this perspective, El Frontón and Lurigancho can be seen as microcosms of the internal conflict which was simultaneously being played out on the national scale.

Spaces and geographies of exception

The events which transpired at El Frontón and Lurigancho, and the conditions which existed in them prior to the massacres, support the claim that Peruvian prisons during the conflict acted as spaces of exception. Calveiro has traced a lineage in the existence of spaces of exception from the concentration camps of the Second World War, to the detention centres and public buildings used during the periods of dictatorship in Chile and Argentina, to the “black holes” of the 21st century.⁴⁷⁷ Spaces of exception are designed as tools of biopolitical control because they spatially separate undesirable elements from the body politic, under the logic that this will exorcise violence or dangerous ideologies from a given society. Agamben argues that they are vacant spaces characterised by the “emptiness of law”, and Gregory has highlighted how Guantánamo Bay has often been described as being “beyond the reach” or “outside” the rule of national and international law.⁴⁷⁸

However, this interpretation has been critiqued by Calveiro who argues that spaces of exception and global black holes are created in an international context which “does not recognise any sort of outside”.⁴⁷⁹ Whilst individuals reduced to bare life inside spaces of exception are to an extent physically emplaced outside of the protection of the state, spaces of exception themselves are created and supported by legal frameworks

⁴⁷⁷ Calveiro, ‘Spatialities of Exception’, p.206.

⁴⁷⁸ Agamben, *State of Exception*, p.6; Gregory, ‘The black flag’, p.408.

⁴⁷⁹ Calveiro, ‘Spatialities of exception’, p.216.

including the state of Emergency. Although the space of exception facilitates the exclusion of individuals, it should not be seen as an exception in itself but an example of precisely how disciplinary law is designed to function.

It is also necessary to ask why the state would manage, and ultimately destroy, its own prison space in this way, for which I believe the work of Colombo is highly valuable. The confinement of large numbers of accused insurgents in prisons, combined with the political activities which Shining Path embarked upon inside, produced the idea of prisons as subversive spaces, or as *the* spaces of Shining Path. In turn, this created the impression that this previously elusive enemy could at least be located in one place. Colombo, with reference to the Tucumán *monte* during Argentina's military dictatorship, argues that this means "that the enemy could be territorialised, and thus rendered visible and tangible, so making it possible for it to be annihilated".⁴⁸⁰ Given that Shining Path and the MRTA were territorialised in this way (not only in prison space but in regions of the *sierra* and *selva* as well) it makes sense to analyse prison space not simply as a feature of the state's overall disciplinary structure but as a key arena in which the state conducted the counterinsurgency operation and exercised a specific type of power over those accused of insurgency.

It is important to ask, at this juncture, why El Frontón functioned like a space of exception in the manner of ESMA or Nazi concentration camps, rather than simply as a prison. The Ames Commission argued that whilst a state of emergency and Emergency Zones could be created through legal frameworks, their creation increasingly gave an active role to the military and formalised the suspension of guaranteed citizenship rights.⁴⁸¹ The report also asserted that the Peruvian state failed to comply with international and constitutional law which continued to guarantee human rights during a

⁴⁸⁰ Colombo, 'Spaces of Confrontation and Defeat', p.51.

⁴⁸¹ Ames et al. *Informe al Congreso sobre los sucesos de los penales*, p.241.

state of emergency.⁴⁸² In this context, it is possible to see that whilst there were legal frameworks which allowed the creation of Emergency Zones, the armed forces went beyond what was permitted in such cases. This, I believe, constitutes a state of exception in which the counterinsurgency operation responded to the prison riots within the logics and context of the ongoing war, rather than within the context of peacetime discipline. This situation was given a veneer of legality because of its creation through legal frameworks, but these frameworks did not give any structure to the way in which the armed forces were supposed to act. Successive governments simply abdicated power to the military, allowing them to conduct violent reprisals and exercise forms of sovereign power on behalf of the state.

In this sense, whilst prison space was in itself not exceptional, the way in which it was managed by the military was. Furthermore, the goal of this repressive mechanism is, Calveiro argues, the “extermination of the Other who is unremittingly excluded and eliminated, whether s/he represents a real threat or is subject to a pre-emptive course of action”.⁴⁸³ This Other which the state was trying to segregate, contain, and eliminate was nominally Shining Path militants, yet the way in which state agents conducted their operations meant that the profile of those suspected of being insurgents was highly racialised. What this suggests, then, is that prison spaces which could usually expect to form part of the normal disciplinary function of the state were now being used as a means of repression, not only against *Senderistas* but against the indigenous ethnic community which was perceived to support them. As described in Chapter 2, prisons were not the only spaces of exception established during the conflict as the detention centres Los Cabitos and La Casa Rosada were used as sites for arbitrary detentions, torture and disappearances in Huamanga. The forms of counterinsurgent violence

⁴⁸² Ibid., p.313.

⁴⁸³ Calveiro, ‘Spatialities of Exception’, p.218.

conducted from these sites were also shaped by exclusionary logics which disproportionately victimised the indigenous population.

These prisons and spaces of exception also reflect the exercise of different forms of state power. Prisons are highlighted by Foucault as being central to the exercise of governmental power and the practice of biopolitics, arguing that modern states segregate these undesirables from the rest of the population and try to rehabilitate them through practices and institutions (*dispositif*, or apparatus). To some extent, this is corroborated by Aguirre who states that incarceration had become the most common form of judicial punishment in Peru by the mid-nineteenth century whilst the death penalty was enforced less and branding was legally abolished.⁴⁸⁴ Furthermore, as Foucault highlights, this practice is premised upon the same medical logic of containment which hospitals and quarantine are based on:

*“The plagues as a form, at once real and imaginary, of disorder had as its medical and political correlative discipline. Behind the disciplinary mechanisms can be read the haunting memory of ‘contagions’, of the plague, of rebellions”.*⁴⁸⁵

By isolating a disease (in this case *Senderismo*) spatially, and by separating its carriers from the healthy population, the hope is that the diseased can be cured and reintegrated into society. The same logic underpins the prisons as a disciplinary institution, and both hospital and prison space are organised spatially (with numerous wards / wings and rooms / cells to isolate the patient / prisoner further) to reflect this.

However, this logic did not appear to function during the conflict as internal divisions of prison space were not maintained and Shining Path were allowed to wield

⁴⁸⁴ Aguirre, *The Criminals of Lima and Their Worlds*, p.85.

⁴⁸⁵ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p.198.

their influence, amassing more supporters through proselytising and coercion. This meant that many inmates who took part in the prison yard marches, joined in with the riots and, ultimately, were killed during the armed forces' recapture of the prisons had not necessarily been *Senderistas* before. Instead they had been turned into party *cadres* through their prison experiences, an essential failure of the function of prisons as a means of containment and isolation. This should be considered a major failure of governmental policy and state function during the conflict. As Vich argues, that “the state cannot manage a jail, they cannot even manage a jail well, [this is] incredible”.⁴⁸⁶

Yet, it may be more productive not to view this situation as a failure, but as being representative of a longer history of attitudes towards, and status of, prisons in Peru. As referenced earlier, Aguirre has argued that between 1850 and 1930 approaches to incarceration were shaped by a desire to punishment rather than to reform, “if not always in the official discourse, certainly in the perception and behaviour of prison experts”.⁴⁸⁷ The evidence from the CVR suggests that these attitudes largely prevailed in the 1980s, as long before the 1986 riots there were severe failures in the infrastructure of prison space and provision of food to inmates, to the extent that the state was in severe breach of prisoners' human rights. According to the CVR, these conditions amounted to “the absence of the minimum conditions of life” in Peruvian state prisons.⁴⁸⁸ Prisoners were not treated as a manageable population, but as an expendable mass of non-valued, non-grievable life. They lived in a state which Agamben refers to as *homo sacer*, the reduction of individuals to “bare life”.⁴⁸⁹ This state of exception and exclusion was not simply a product a failure to provide provisions or certain standards

⁴⁸⁶ Victor Vich, 'Interview in-person' (Lima, 2016).

⁴⁸⁷ Aguirre, *The Criminals of Lima and Their Worlds*, p.85.

⁴⁸⁸ CVR, *Informe Final, Tm. VII*, p.738

⁴⁸⁹ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p.7.

of hygiene, but was entirely reflective of attitudes towards the disciplinary function of prisons in Peru at the time.

Aguirre argues that reformers in nineteenth-century Peru believed that the modernisation of Peruvian penal justice was central to projects of liberal state formation.⁴⁹⁰ In reality, however, punitive discourses of prison management persisted well into the twentieth century and a balance was always struck to some extent between reform and punishment. This describes a more nuanced perspective on the state and the penitentiary which is perhaps more realistic for describing the nature of prisons in Peru, despite Foucauldian narratives of progress towards governmentality which have suggested otherwise. However, whilst impulses towards the deployment of sovereign and governmental power through the carceral system may well have fluctuated since its inception, particular political situations and acute crises appear to have pushed the debate towards one side or the other. In 1980s Peru, in the context of ongoing insurgency, the discourse of prison management appears to have been heavily weighted towards the punishment and exclusion of insurgents through the exercise of sovereign state power.

Furthermore, Agamben argues that sovereign power uses exclusionary techniques to produce a population which is manageable through biopolitical mechanisms; like severing a diseased limb in order to treat an otherwise healthy patient.⁴⁹¹ This suggests that, in its responses to Shining Path and the MRTA, the state produced spaces in which insurgents were isolated and eliminated in order to preserve a docile population which it saw as suitable for a modern nation-state. In a Lefebvrian sense, the state used space as a technology for producing a particular type of population from which undesirable

⁴⁹⁰ Carlos Aguirre, 'The Lima Penitentiary and the Modernisation of Criminal Justice in Nineteenth-Century Peru' in (Ricardo D. Salvatore and Carlos Aguirre eds.), *The Birth of the Penitentiary in Latin America: Essays on Criminology, Prison Reform, and Social Control, 1830-1940* (Austin, 1996), pp.44-77 (p.67).

⁴⁹¹ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, p.6.

elements were excluded. As has been argued earlier in this thesis and by Drinot, however, the production of this biopolitical population was also highly racialised project which focuses on:

“the micro-management of sectors of the population in ways that express racialized understandings of the ontological capacity of different population groups to contribute to, and indeed be subjects of, projects of ‘improvement’ and national ‘progress’ more generally”.⁴⁹²

This supports Agamben’s argument that sovereignty and governmentality can coexist in modern societies, and that sovereign power is exercised as a way of producing a biopolitical population through exclusion. From this perspective, it is possible to further challenge the idea of the counterinsurgency operation as simply a reaction to the threat of political violence. The methods of the operation reflected a reconstitution of the population as a biopolitical body, which was conducted alongside other reconstitutions of Peruvian society (including Fujimori’s later economic shock programmes and self-coup discussed in Chapter 5, and the attacks on civil society by both state agents and insurgent groups). These microrevolutions were only possible through foundational moments of violence such as the prison massacres.

Furthermore, this form of governance has been enacted through a distinctly neoliberal rationale. As Ong argues, neoliberalism is:

“Often discussed as an economic doctrine with a negative relation to state power, a market ideology that aims to limit the scope and activity of governing. But neoliberalism can also be conceptualised... [to be] reconfiguring relationships between governing and the

⁴⁹² Drinot, ‘The Meaning of Alan García’, p.186.

governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty and territoriality".⁴⁹³

This depiction of a neoliberal mode of governance contests the idea that neoliberalism is an ideology grounded solely in individual and market-based freedoms. Instead, it implies that neoliberal projects are necessarily founded on forms of exclusion in order to produce a docile society in which market-driven reforms can be applied. In particular, Ong describes this exclusion as “spatialising practices of sovereignty” (i.e. exactly the kind of process outlined above).⁴⁹⁴ In this context, the spatialised application of sovereignty acts as a foundational moment of violence upon which the neoliberal order is premised.

It is important to note that the distinct economic and political rationalities of neoliberalism outlined above were not initially deployed simultaneously in Peru. This is particularly pertinent in the middle phase of the conflict when Alan García’s APRA government were pursuing a heterodox economic policy.⁴⁹⁵ Perhaps without the simultaneous deployment of market-drive reforms, the categorisation of the García Presidency of neoliberal is somewhat meaningless, given that the criteria for establishing its neoliberal character is in fact the authoritarian application of sovereign power.

However, the purpose of this argument is to draw links between the García administration’s approach to counterinsurgency with the forms of power deployed by other Latin American states in the final three decades of the twentieth century, and particularly to highlight how the roots of Fujimori’s later neoliberal authoritarianism were visible during García’s Presidency. Wendy Brown has argued that neoliberalism

⁴⁹³ Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*, p.3.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.18.

⁴⁹⁵ Manuel Pastor Jr. and Carol Wise, ‘Peruvian Economy in the 1980s: From Orthodoxy to Heterodoxy and Back’, *Latin American Research Review*, 27:2 (1992), pp.83-117.

has often been “compatible with, and sometimes even productive of, authoritarian, despotic, paramilitaristic and corrupt state forms”.⁴⁹⁶ The evidence from the García era suggests that these state forms are not always produced by Friedmanite doctrine or reforms. Instead it demonstrates that both the political and economic components of neoliberal governance can be seen as reflections of deeper exclusionary beliefs present in the worldview of those who chose to pursue a market-led reorganisation of society.

In this context, Peru’s turn toward authoritarianism and neoliberalism in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s appears contradictory. However, it is also reminiscent of, and perhaps suggests a re-emergence of, the tendencies highlighted by Mallon in reference to nineteenth-century state projects in Peru, which focused on liberal trade policies and a centralised, repressive state.⁴⁹⁷ This description, however, is particularly pertinent to the Fujimori period, and will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter.

Although each period of violence took place within starkly differing contexts with different social groups as victims, there are comparisons to be drawn between Peru’s internal conflict, the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, the military dictatorship in Argentina, and Bolivia’s period of dictatorship and economic reform in the 1980s. Although the timings of economic reforms and repressive violence vary, in each case sovereignty was enacted upon resistant populations prior to the rolling back of the state and introduction of market rationality to numerous areas of society. That is not to say that Peruvian conflict should be viewed as part of some kind of international neoliberal conspiracy promoted by the US government under a Cold War mentality. Instead, the purpose is to highlight the forms of governance deployed across different nations and to

⁴⁹⁶ Wendy Brown, *Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics* (Princeton, 2005), p.38.

⁴⁹⁷ Florencia Mallon, ‘Economic Liberalism: Where We Are and Where We Need to Go’ in (Joseph Love and Nils Jacobsen eds.), *Guiding the Invisible Hand: Economic Liberalism and the State in Latin American History* (New York, 1988), pp.177-86 (p.184).

highlight the common forms of power, deployed in most cases by elite-military political alliances, used to reconstitute the state.

The way in which the Peruvian state and armed forces conducted their counterinsurgency operation, through a spatialised gradation of sovereignty, reflects this neoliberal mode of governance which has also been witnessed in the emergence of the counterrevolutionary New Right across Latin America. As Grandin argues, in the second half of the twentieth century “conservatism as a world-view moved from an instinctual defence of the status hierarchy to a more contrived, self-conscious ideology” which was not only distinctly anticommunist, but patriarchal, Catholic and opposed to social change.⁴⁹⁸ Therefore, in response to the radical Leftist revolutions proposed by Shining Path and the MRTA, and in many ways to earlier forms of social revolution articulated by radicals in the 1960s (and to some extent co-opted by the Velasco military government), the Peruvian state used the internal conflict as a means of revolutionising itself and reconstituting society to suit its needs. As will be discussed in the final chapter, this project was continued by Alberto Fujimori, but has also been sustained and developed since his downfall.

The above argument highlights the ways in which space has been used as a mechanism or technology of power by the Peruvian state. To continue with my Lefebvrian tripartite approach to the production of these spaces, however, it is also necessary to analyse how these spaces have been produced on the representational level. To do this, I will now engage with several forms of cultural production and testimonial art which deal with the history of Peruvian state prisons and the events at El Frontón and Lurigancho; in this sense, they are representations of space. In doing so, I will

⁴⁹⁸ Greg Grandin, ‘Living in Revolutionary Time: Coming to Terms with the Violence of Latin America’s Long Cold War’ in (Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph eds.), *A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War* (Durham, 2010), pp.1-44 (p.25).

attempt to unpick elements of the cultural framework which allows such moments of repressive violence to take place. I will also highlight the ways in which cultural producers have challenged the exclusionary logics applied both to those detained in the prisons, and to their memories which continue to be systematically repressed and excluded in the years since the conflict.

The prison massacres in Peruvian art

The following cultural artefacts have been chosen not only because they have something to say about prisons, or the prison massacres, but because they have something to say about the ways in which space produces ideas about the people who exist in them. In the case of prisons, this often means some kind of castigation, or the assumption of guilt of anyone who is in, or has been in, prison space. The case of El Frontón adds another dimension to this, however, insofar the state's obliteration of its own island fortress didn't just function as a way of killing more *Senderistas*, but as a way of symbolically reasserting the state's power over a space which had been re-produced (to some extent) by Shining Path as a shining combat trench. The subsequent destruction of the prison therefore acts on a symbolic level too, as an attempt to obliterate Shining Path and any evidence of their existence from history.

In this sense, I have chosen to deal with the works of Jourde and Agüero because they distinctly give evidence that *something happened* on the island. Through the production of these cultural artefacts, they act as interlocutors in wider debates about memory by attempting to represent experiences which have been collectively forgotten. In doing so, I believe these artefacts reflect import debates about grievability by representing silenced and forgotten narratives. They challenge the idea of El Frontón as

an abandoned, lifeless island of little significance by recreating the lives which were lived and lost there.⁴⁹⁹

The 1986 prison massacres demonstrated that the military saw no value in the lives of the prisoners or of *Senderistas*. This is supported by Aguirre's argument that the demonization of Shining Path members and sympathisers in government and media reports of the conflict was successful because of:

“the (real or attributed) ethnic background of most Shining Path members and suspects, who were seen as indigenous or serranos (people from the highlands) and, thus, dangerous, deceitful, and undeserving”.⁵⁰⁰

Furthermore, I believe that the absence of Shining Path memories and lack of attention to the massacres in the conflict's historiography reflects the continuing success of this demonization and that these lives are still considered non-grievable. Little has been done (culturally, politically or historiographically) to posthumously ascribe value to the prisoners, and so the logics of governance which precipitated the massacres have not been challenged. Whilst these cultural artefacts do not directly represent Shining Path memories, they treat the massacres in such a way that gives value to *Senderista* perspectives and, in doing so, they challenge the “perception of most Peruvians –and

⁴⁹⁹ There are, of course, other cultural artefacts on the subject of the prison massacres which I will not deal with in this chapter. Of these, Daniel Alarcón's short stories about the conflict and Peruvian prisons (which suggests that the deaths of inmates at Lurigancho were non-grievable because the prisoners were predominantly from poor communities such as San Juan de Lurigancho), the representation of the massacres in the comics about the internal conflict produced by Jesús Cossio, and Alberto Durant's film *Alias: 'La Gringa'* are worth mentioning for the attempts they have been made to bring the story of the prison massacres to a wider audience. Daniel Alarcón has written about a number of short stories about the experiences of prisoners detained on charges of terrorism in Lurigancho and El Frontón before the riots, making reference to Shining Path's control of prison wings. Alarcón also refers to the perception of prisoners' lives as non-grievable, stating that “Someone, at the very highest level of government, decided that none of it was worth anything. Not the lives of the hostages, not the lives of the *terrucos* or the rioting thieves”. ‘Flood’ in Daniel Alarcón, *War by Candlelight* (London, 2005), p.15. See also Daniel Alarcón, ‘Collectors’, *The New Yorker*, 29 July 2013 [<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/07/29/collectors-3>, accessed 10 December 2016]; Jesús Cossio, *Barbarie: Violencia política en el Perú, 1985-1990* (Lima, 2015); *Alias: 'La Gringa'*, dir. by Alberto Durant (Perfo Studio, 1991).

⁵⁰⁰ Aguirre, ‘Punishment and Extermination’, p.203.

certainly that of state administrators – [that the massacres] did not really resonate as a real, regrettable tragedy”.⁵⁰¹

i) Gladys Alvarado Jourde’s photographs of EL Frontón

Gustavo Buntinx describes El Frontón as “today, a liminal space where geography and history intermingle”, and this theme is central to the photographs of Gladys Alvarado Jourde.⁵⁰² These photographs take us not only to a moment which is temporally distant, but into a space to which access is heavily limited by the Peruvian state. Jourde herself employed a local fisherman to take her across the narrow stretch of water between Lima and El Frontón.



Fig. 14: Hammer and sickle. Photograph by Gladys Alvarado Jourde, *El Frontón* (Buntinx and Vich eds).

One of her photographs shows an image which is evocative of the past, not only for Peruvians but for many across the world. A large hammer and sickle can be seen inscribed upon a stone wall, framed by the sky and rubble. The symbol, however, has

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., p.215.

⁵⁰² Buntinx, ‘Su cuerpo es un isla en escombros’, p.44.

been deliberately erased, seemingly scratched out in order to remove evidence of Shining Path's presence on El Frontón in a symbolic recreation of the massacre. Ironically, whoever was tasked with erasing the hammer and sickle has only endeavoured to scratch out the paint with the effect that the shape of the symbol can still be seen in a blurred grey form. This photograph stands in for the experience of the massacres as a whole, in which by trying to erase Shining Path, the state has only managed to inscribe them further into history. This represents the continuation of the symbolic battle waged by Shining Path against the state during their time in incarceration.




Fig. 15: Walkway. Photograph by Gladys Alvarado Jourde, *El Frontón* (Buntinx and Vich eds).

Vich argues that the photos “point to the failure of the national state and make visible the ruins of our memory”.⁵⁰³ His argument is tied to the ridiculousness of a state which not only loses control of its own prisons, but then feels compelled to bomb and destroy them. But the photos also present the island as the past resurgent, forcing itself into the present, and lingering off the coast of Lima like an open wound. In this sense,

⁵⁰³ Vich, *Poéticas del duelo*, p.94.

Jourde represents the island as an active memory, or, to borrow a phrase from Steve Stern, as “memory knot”; in this case referring to “the specific physical remains or places that [demand] attention to memory”.⁵⁰⁴ She achieves this by juxtaposing images of the past with those of the present, the dead with the living, the peaceful with the violent. The circling birds overhead are seen in contrast with the guano droppings which cake the shattered prison walls. Shining Path slogans and graffiti on these walls appear to speak through time, but the bullet holes which surround them allude them to the tragic demise of their authors. Perhaps most evocatively, the clear blue sky sits above a dark, turbulent sea.



Fig. 16: Final. Photograph by Gladys Alvarado Jourde, *El Frontón* (Buntinx and Vich eds).

Ultimately, however, the collection shows the total desertion of the island, its emptiness of life, and the island’s isolation, close to being swallowed by the Pacific with the Lima coast nowhere in sight. This demonstrates that the past cannot be recovered, but that it has the potential to interrupt the present. As Vich argues, the photographs reflect “the absolute tension between the present and the past, appearing as

⁵⁰⁴ Steve J. Stern, *Reckoning with Pinochet: The Memory Question in Democratic Chile, 1989-2006* (London, 2010), p.4.

a register of a dramatic act that we have repressed”.⁵⁰⁵ An important element of this tension, however, is that Jourde’s work tells us definitively that *something happened* at El Frontón. The trips she made to the island and the photographs she took to document them show the real evidence of the violence which took place there in unique way. That is not to say that the evidence of the Ames Commission or CVR is not just as important for understanding the massacres, but that these sources represent events which happened in the past without being able to show how those events continue to take shape in the present. Her contribution goes beyond documentation in this sense; it places us as spectators within the geography of the island, transporting us temporally and spatially so that we are more able to understand the complexity of what happened there.

ii) The memoirs of José Carlos Agüero

Los rendidos is part testimony, part essay, part meditation on the prison massacres, the internal conflict, and those involved. As with Lurgio Gavilán’s *Memorias de un soldado desconocido*, it offers valuable insight into the perspectives of those who, although not involved in the central command of Shining Path, at least had a personal connection to the group. In the case of *Los rendidos*, the parents of the author José Carlos Agüero were both Shining Path militants who were extrajudicially executed by state agents; his father at El Frontón, his mother after the riots at Canto Grande in 1992. Agüero’s memoir focuses on complicity, guilt and forgiveness after episodes of political violence, and highlights the stigma attached to him through the memory of his parents.

The first two chapters of *Los rendidos* deal with the nature of stigma and guilt, themes which continue throughout the book. Agüero refers to the worry of neighbours

⁵⁰⁵ Vich, ‘Un hueco en el presente’ in (Gustavo Buntinx and Víctor Vich eds.), *El Frontón: Demasiado pronto / demasiado tarde* (Lima, 2014), pp.54-63 (p.57).

or friends finding out about where his parents were, and that he too will be socially castigated because of his parents' legacy. He also has to deal with a kind of internal shame which partially manifests itself in response to students and Leftists who continued to defend Shining Path actions: "You are required to accept that members of your family, your dearest friends, your inner circle, committed acts that brought death". Yet even these troubles are almost irrelevant, he argues, because the type of shame he feels is "not shame sustained in emotions...it is an institution that implies the renunciation of pride, the creation of myths, and the security of a familiar heritage".⁵⁰⁶ In short, Agüero is talking about a kind of socially-enforced shame which he suffers as a result of being the son of *Senderistas*. This is significant, insofar as it points to another way in which Shining Path militants and those who died in the prison massacres are excluded from society, their memories and perspectives deemed unworthy of being heard.

There is little of the book which deals specifically with the prison massacres or with the details of the conflict, but it does attempt to investigate the nature of culpability and innocence which is central to any understanding of what happened at El Frontón. Agüero's parents, he says, were not innocents, they were Shining Path militant who contributed to the conflict and the damage done to Peruvian society.⁵⁰⁷ This does not, however, preclude their rights for their story to be told, nor for their children to grieve for them. Agüero's shame stems from a desire to grieve for his parents which he feels the need to suppress due to the assertion of others that his parents' lives are non-grievable, and not worth remembering.

This right to bear witness may seem abstract, but it is central to how we understand the prison massacres. The state's actions at El Frontón and Lurigancho were not just a

⁵⁰⁶ José Carlos Agüero, *Los rendidos: Sobre el don de perdonar* (Lima, 2015), p.24.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.67.

suppression of the riots but an attack on the rights of *Senderistas* to exist, an impulse which is replicated in the stigma which castigates prisoners as terrorists deserving of death and a form of non-grievable life. In a television interview, Agüero argued that his work was not designed to pardon his parents, but to contextualise their actions:

*“What do we gain saying that they were characters outside of history, as if they were pathological beings, diseased, simply "terrorists"? I think they were not. They were complex beings who had complex motivations, wrong without doubt, but they cannot be reduced to evil beings that we must destroy”.*⁵⁰⁸

The above quote states what much of *Los rendidos* alludes to; the complexity of morality in situations of violence and the necessity of testimony and debate to allow forgiveness to occur. The testimonies laid out in *Los rendidos* and the photographs of Gladys Jourde, therefore, are absolutely pivotal for reconciliation in Peru and for challenging the impunity with which state violence was perpetrated. Each of them, in a different way, posthumously ascribes value to the lives that were lost during the conflict, making the statement that these lives are grievable, and to some extent beginning the grieving process by giving testimony and telling their story. These artefacts reach out from the past and state: we were here, we exist, and have the right to be remembered.

The recuperation, and to some extent the rehabilitation, of these memories is increasingly becoming a focus for scholarly attention. The above examples are a handful of the ways in which artists with varying methods have tried to represent narratives and give testimony of the prison massacres. There is another important

⁵⁰⁸ José Carlos Agüero quoted in ‘José Carlos Agüero: “Los Rendidos” es una historia de amor’, *La Mula*, 7 July 2015 [<https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2015/07/07/jose-carlos-aguero-sobre-los-rendidos/jorgepaucar/>, accessed 2 October 2016].

feature of this testimony, however, which is the testimony of space. What does El Frontón tell us itself, as a site of violence, and now necessarily as a site of memory? Efforts to understand this question have been limited by the state's desire to prevent access to the island, to some extent preventing an engagement with its history. There have, however, been numerous attempts to assess what this island means in the trajectory of the internal conflict, how it reflects the long-standing practices of the Peruvian state, and how it reveals which forms of memory are privileged in Peruvian society and which continue to be repressed.

Between the nation and the landscape

It is important here to recognise the difference between the significance of El Frontón as a site of memory and the cultural production which has focused on retelling narratives and testimonies of what occurred on the island. Whilst in the previous section I dealt with representations of space (i.e. how El Frontón has formed part of cultural geography which castigates those who died there), this section will focus on the island as a space of representation. By that, I mean that the continued silence and emptiness of El Frontón has something to say in itself. The spatiality of the island has an aesthetic and a political meaning from which it is possible to draw wider implications about the conflict and memory as a whole. In this sense I will draw on Lefebvre's outline of representational spaces as "embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life".⁵⁰⁹ Through this analysis, I will argue that whilst it is important to recognise what happened there, that the "there" or "where" of the prison massacres is equally important for grasping their full significance.

⁵⁰⁹ Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p.33.

The idea of El Frontón as an important site of memory has been developed by Gustavo Buntinx. Of paramount importance is Buntinx's concept of the "*poéticas del resto*"; the poetics of the remains. On his website *Micromuseo*, which acts as an online repository for a diverse range of memory projects and artworks relating to the Peruvian conflict, Buntinx outlines his manifesto for the *poéticas del resto*:

"The contemplation of the ruin is already a mark of time

In some sense sensitive to our Peruvian present.

Ruins that are too present:

fragments of a not remote or immediate past,

whose greatest tragedy dates back twenty-five years

but which we still inhabit as a personal memory...

The result is the poéticas del resto".⁵¹⁰

The *poéticas del resto* is an attempt to understand the relationship between materiality and memory. Mandolessi argues, with reference to literature from post-dictatorship Argentina, that it is possible to conceive of a "materiality of absence...in which the affective experience of absence is inscribed into a space".⁵¹¹ The bullet holes, etched symbols and slogans and destroyed buildings of El Frontón form a part of this materiality. However, as discussed earlier, access to the island is prohibited by the government, and although we have Jourde's photographs as a key documentation of what the island looks like now, her own experiences in struggling to find anyone willing to take her to the island confirm that access is severely limited. As a site of memory, El

⁵¹⁰ Gustavo Buntinx, 'POÉTICAS DEL RESTO II: MELANCOLÍAS DE LA VIOLENCIA EN LA OBRA DE GIANCARLO SCAGLIA Y MAYA WATANABE', *Micromuseo* [<http://micromuseo.org.pe/rutas/poeticasdelresto-ii/sinopsis.html>, accessed 3 October 2016].

⁵¹¹ Silvana Mandolessi, 'Haunted Houses, Horror-Literature and the Space of Memory in Post-Dictatorship Argentine Literature' in (Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo eds.), *Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception* (Basingstoke, 2014), pp.150-61 (p.156).

Frontón is therefore a closed space, one that invites no contemplation of its significance and which precludes the possibility of commemorative practice taking place there.⁵¹² This makes analysis of the island beyond Jourde's work difficult, and although effort has been made in this thesis to make distinctions between representations of space and spaces of representation, her photographs necessarily straddles this divide as a key form of documentation.

Nonetheless, the island also inhabits another spatiality, another geography, which has particular significance. Looming off the coast of Lima like a spectre of the past, impossible to see through the murky *garúa* (a low-lying cloud which descends on Lima like a fog) in winter months, yet re-emerging unexpectedly at other times, the island is a part of Peruvian history which will not go away. As Buntinx says, the past is all too present. This invites the question as to whether El Frontón ever really enters into the consciousness of the tourists and locals who jog along, take lunch in, or go paragliding from the Malecón which runs atop the cliffs of Miraflores' Costa Verde. This area stretches from close to the popular Larcomar shopping centre along the cliff top to LUM at the northern boundary of Miraflores, and has been dotted with well-kept green spaces. One of the parks is named after Miguel Grau (a Peruvian Admiral during the War of the Pacific) and another after Antonio Raimondi (a Peruvian-Italian scientist and geographer from the nineteenth century), whilst the Parque del Amor is a popular site for young locals and tourists alike to watch the sun set over the Pacific. Each of these parks have statues, sculptures and plaques which commemorate figures from nineteenth century Peruvian society and culture, including those mentioned above.

⁵¹² Ironically, another massacre of Shining Path prisoners was at the centre of a controversy about commemoration. In 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (CIDH) ruled that the Peruvian state should apologise for the death of 41 inmates who died at the hands of state agents at Castro Castro prison in 1992. The CIDH also ruled that the victims must be commemorated individually in the *El ojo que llora* monument in Lima, a decision which caused a huge controversy in Peru in which the idea that *Senderista* lives were non-grievable was articulated by numerous scholars, politicians and public figures. Interestingly, the presence of a stone commemorating the death of "more than 200" [sic] at El Frontón at *El ojo que llora* has not garnered much attention. For details on the polemic surrounding the CIDH ruling, see Drinot, 'For whom the eye cries'.

In this sense, there is a clear disconnect between the image of Peru presented to visitors to the Malecón and the recent history of state violence represented by El Frontón, obscured but still often visible from the cliff top. This recalls Schindel's argument about *porteños*' relationship to the Río de la Plata in Buenos Aires, the river into which numerous detainees were dumped after being disappeared by state agents during the period of military dictatorship. Schindel argues that the river "as an abjected space, carries remembrance of those whom the criminal state had excluded from the national community", but also points to the ways in which urban development has made the river difficult to access, separating *porteños* from the water and the possibility of engaging with the memories which exist there.⁵¹³

Although Palonen makes efforts to distinguish between the "commemorative city-text" (which incorporates statues, street names and museum among other things) and the "broader symbolic urban landscape", I believe that viewing El Frontón within the context of the urban landscape of Lima's coast is a productive line to pursue.⁵¹⁴ Whilst El Frontón remains an abjected, restricted space whose closure to the public precludes many forms of active engagement with the site's history, the forms of urban planning and limited commemorative practice which have been enacted on the Costa Verde have reshaped the coastal area as an attractive site for tourists and middle-class communities alike.

Although not a dominant or particularly vocal element of this planning, the commemoration of figures from the 19th century promotes limited engagement with a nostalgic view of the Peruvian Republic as opposed to more complex and troubling

⁵¹³ Estela Schindel, 'A Limitless Grave, Memory and Abjection of the Río de la Plata' in (Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo eds.), *Space and the Memories of Violence: Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception* (Basingstoke, 2014), pp.188-201 (p.199).

⁵¹⁴ Palonen, 'The city-text in post-communist Budapest', p.219.

periods from Peru's more recent history.⁵¹⁵ Whilst the ruin and closure of El Frontón restricts debate and precludes the possibility of Shining Path memories being represented and commemorated in the site, this process is to some extent supported by narratives of Peruvian history represented symbolically in Lima's urban landscape.

Furthermore, it is useful to think of the island within the context of Gordillo's distinction between "ruins" and "rubble". Whilst there are numerous *huacas* dotted across Lima (not to mention the vast array of Incan and pre-Incan sites in the Andean interior and along Peru's coast) which are walled off, protected and preserved for tourists as sites of "transcendental importance", the destroyed prison fortress of a not distant past is disregarded as rubble. In the words of Gordillo, this points to a fetishization of one type of ruin, likely on the grounds that it represents a past which is both uncontroversial and lucrative for the tourism industry, and the dismissal and closure of another site which has had far greater political consequences for the lives of modern Peruvians.⁵¹⁶ A more contemporary comparison of sites with similar functions would be between El Frontón and Robben Island; both are testament to forms of state violence and exclusion, but the former represents the hidden and restricted nature of this history while in the latter it has become a commodified part of the tourism industry and powerful image of collective history and national identity. Viewing El Frontón through this perspective, then, demonstrates the intersection of space and memory beyond the immediate context of the commemorative city-text, and instead provides an appreciation of how the overlapping geographies of urban planning, the tourism industry and commemoration feed into a far broader geography of memory.

⁵¹⁵ Majluf has also identified a wave of public sculptures in mid-nineteenth century Lima which she argues attempted to "create and mould a collective memory and national spatiality". Elements of this expansion are still highly visible in central Lima and continue to greatly outnumber public artworks related to the internal conflict. Natalia Majluf, *Escultura y espacio público. Lima, 1850-1879* (Lima, 1994), p.38.

⁵¹⁶ Gastón R. Gordillo, *Rubble: the Afterlife of Destruction* (Durham, 2014), p.256.

These processes are rarely one-way however, and often these projects can themselves be contested by other actors who reject the memory narratives they appear to embody (such as the attacks on *El ojo que llora* and the MHVRE). These battles are not simply about how to commemorate history and competing versions of events. They are about assigning value to the lives of different agents of history, asserting that it is their perspectives which should be remembered, that their lives are grievable, and that their memories ought to be reflected in the nation's outlook on the past.

How these memories translate into space is deeply important. Earlier in this chapter I argued that it was not simply the sovereign power of elites or state agents to assign value to populations, but that this value was deeply inscribed in the nation's historical socio-spatial structure, and that spaces which had been governed by sovereign rule were more likely to reflect the characteristics which encouraged the further exercise of sovereign power (including poverty, radicalism and resistance to the state). In this context, ongoing memory battles which re-inscribe spaces with new meaning do not simply contest interpretations of the past, but are also deliberately articulated as political projects for the future. By contesting the impunity with which state agents acted, not just in times of violence but also through policies which have harmed particular populations in a more structural manner, memory activists aim to break the cycle in which space produces violence and violence, in turn, produces space.

Unfortunately, however, the scope of these projects is still highly limited. To some extent as well there is a degree of apathy about challenging the past among sectors of the Peruvian population who have seen genuine economic improvements in their lives since the turn of the century. Because of this, even if El Frontón were more accessible, it is unlikely that many Peruvians would want to engage with the site, particularly given the continued castigation of *Senderistas*. For now, the island remains a silent presence

of Lima's shores where, in the same way that Montalbetti has described the town of Uchuraccay, there is an "emptiness impossible to mark, and there this emptiness has been maintained as emptiness".⁵¹⁷

Buntinx has also explored the idea of El Frontón as an island of diverse memories which reflected important points in Peru's past. The ruins of the prison, overgrown and covered in bird droppings, as can be seen in Jourde's photographs, represent for Buntinx "an accumulation of cultural and natural remains that transfigure geography. The often traumatic relationship between nation and landscape".⁵¹⁸ Not only is the history of the prison massacres distilled in images of the island, but so is a longer history of the exclusion by the state of Leftist political organisations. As Aguirre highlights, when around 2000 *Apristas* were imprisoned during the 1930s, many referred to El Frontón as




Fig. 17: Drawings of Julio Adilberto Godínez, imprisoned in El Frontón for associations to the 1932 Trujillo uprising. Buntinx, 'Su cuerpo es un isla en escombros' p.19.

⁵¹⁷ Although many *uchuraccayños* returned to their village in 1993 after having previously abandoned it, they settled at the margins of their old community away from the site of the death of eight journalists. Montalbetti, 'El lugar del arte y el lugar de la memoria', p.66.

⁵¹⁸ Buntinx, 'Su cuerpo es un isla en escombros', p.37.

the place of greatest torture and suffering, an experience which contributed significantly to APRA's vision of prisoners as revolutionary heroes.⁵¹⁹ Fernando Belaúnde Terry and Hugo Blanco were also imprisoned on the island during the decades preceding the conflict.

Buntinx explores this history of power and exclusion through the aesthetic and symbolic qualities of the island, where the violence of the Peruvian state is made visible and, through photographic comparisons, it is possible to see an overlapping of experiences from APRA to Shining Path. However, that these histories now lie on top of each other in the same space demonstrates a more important point about memory. That is, for all of the photographs and artistic representations of the prison massacres, it is quite possible, highly likely even, that the history which the ruins allude to will be forgotten, and that the island will stand in wait for the next generation of political opponents of the state to be sent there. In this sense, the ghostly figure of El Frontón is not just reaching out from the recent past of Peru's internal conflict, but from a longer trajectory in which the state has cyclically and consistently reconstituted itself and Peru's political landscape through acts of exclusionary violence. Because of this, Buntinx refer to El Frontón as:

*“like the ruin of the great modern, modernist dream of the Peruvian republic...El Frontón was to be the model jail, the modern jail. Soon, however, it became Devil's Island, so it was called, a place of terrible suffering. And to me it is so eloquent that El Frontón was bombed by the same state that built it”.*⁵²⁰

In this context, the modernist dream can be seen as a project of nation-building designed to overcome some of Peru's longstanding problems and contradictions, and

⁵¹⁹ Carlos Aguirre, 'Hombres y rejas. El APRA en prisión, 1932-1945', *Bulletin de l'Institut français d'études andines*, 43:1 (2014), pp.7-30 (p.12).

⁵²⁰ Gustavo Buntinx, 'Interview in-person' (Lima, 2016).

one that is built to last through modern, governmental approaches to society rather than being sustained through punitive violence. Shining Path and the internal conflict, however, demonstrate the resistance to this dream, and ultimately its failure to create a state which responds to such resistance with anything else than militarised sovereign power. For this reason, the island is a space which is testimony to the forms of power exercised by the Peruvian state; neither as excess nor as error, but as part of a practice to periodically exclude undesirable elements of society and ideological enemies.

Yet, if this is true of El Frontón, then is it not also true of Los Cabitos, Putis and Ayacucho department, which were all governed under the logics of the Emergency Zone and acted as spaces of exception? Furthermore, these spaces exist within overlapping geographies of previous attempts by the Peruvian state and its elites to remake the Andes in accordance with their own priorities, and to develop the Peruvian interior into a productive engine for their own version of modernity.⁵²¹ These are, to borrow words from Gordillo again, the “real ruins” of the Peruvian state which “elites cannot bear to confront”.⁵²² The relationship between nation and landscape, marked in geography.

Then there are Lucanamarca, Chungui and Tarata, spaces which have already been considered in this thesis but which form part of an alternative geography of power. As Shining Path looked to assert the power of their New state, they too marked the landscape. And Peru’s *selva central*, today a region synonymous with narcotrafficking, is a space which stands testimony to the forms of power which both Shining Path and the state practised upon it. Each of these examples stands as testimony to political

⁵²¹ See Mark Carey, *In the Shadow of Melting Glaciers: Climate Change and Andean Society* (Oxford, 2010); Willie Hiatt, *The Rarified Air of the Modern: Airplanes and Technological Modernity in the Andes* (Oxford, 2016).

⁵²² Gordillo, *Rubble*, p.256.

violence, spaces which have been physically, socially and imaginatively produced by these experiences.

The testimony of space cannot, therefore, be limited to forms of commemorative practice such as museums and monuments, although certainly these spaces have value for the ways in which they enshrine narratives about the past in public space. The materiality of sites of violence, however, inscribes those experiences into the landscape. Of course, these marks can be erased, silenced, and built over. In other cases, they are simply forgotten, left overgrown and unvisited. Nevertheless, they exist as part of a geography of memory in which the past is continually interrupting the present. This history is not one of individual moments or isolated incidents, but complex, wide-ranging processes of power and statecraft.

In this way, violence emphatically contributes to the production of space; not simply in a physical way, but by marking victims and perpetrators with experiences which shape their relationship with the landscape. As Feinstein argues, El Frontón and Lurigancho continue to shape the memories and identities of distinct actors; not just their victims or Shining Path supporters, but members of the armed forces, *Apristas*, and members of the non-revolutionary Left who continue to see the importance of the prison massacres in the trajectory of the conflict.

Conclusion

First and foremost, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates the importance of understanding Peruvian state prisons as exclusionary spaces of exception. Using the work of Foucault, Agamben and Ong, I have argued that this spatialized exercise of power over a sector of the population represents both a form of sovereign power practised in order to produce a biopolitical population, and a feature of the neoliberal

form of governance which has been practiced in Peru since the beginning of the conflict. A full analysis of how this form of governance developed in the 1990s, and how it formed a major part of Alberto Fujimori's reconstitution of the Peruvian state, is continued in the next chapter. This will also focus on the way in which this neoliberal project has been seen in highly racial terms in Peru, encompassing diverse issues including drug trafficking, extractive industries and forced sterilisations. As will be shown, this project is deeply tied to the relationship between the Peruvian nation-state and its geography.

As has been argued, the creation of Emergency Zones during the conflict also reflects the dual forms of governance and power exercised over different populations, in different spaces, for different purposes. Whereas exclusionary violence and sovereign power have often been used to enact political vengeance on opponents of the state and indigenous communities, governmentality as a practice remains a preserve to be enjoyed by the nation's elite. These differentiated approaches to the governance of different populations are tied to Peru's historical socio-spatial structure, and for this reason it is difficult to argue that this practice is representative of a wholly new form of neoliberal governance. The idea of a mitigated liberal order, in which liberty (that is, a limited amount of social and economic freedom, or the freedom to live as part of a governmentally managed population) is a preserve for elites whilst the rest suffer the exercise of sovereign power, has arguably been central to the Peruvian Republic since its inception. However, there have also been distinct periods in which the Peruvian state has attempted to incorporate different populations into its governmental project (most notably under the Velasco military government which created SUTEP and SINAMOS in order to bring grassroots social movements and teachers' unions under state structures). The beginnings of Peru's neoliberal turn in the 1980s can therefore be seen as a return to the highly differentiated, spatially contingent, division of sovereign and

governmental power. From this perspective, the conflict was an incredibly important period during which the state was distinctly reconstituted.

This chapter has also referred to other ways in which the idea of Peruvian state prisons, and particularly El Frontón, have been produced over time through representations of space (such as *Los rendidos* and the photos of Gladys Alvarado Jourde) and the exploration of El Frontón as a space of representation (particularly in the work of Gustavo Buntinx). In particular, it has been important to use the island as a focal point around which it is possible to expand notions of exactly what constitutes a space of memory. The ruins of El Frontón, as with the abandoned village of Uchuraccay and the graveyard behind Los Cabitos (now the Santuario de la Memoria) tell us stories about history which are inscribed into space. These spaces refer to a past which today seems distant, but which remains all too visible in the landscape. The production of these spaces is by no means limited to the traumatic and violent events which occurred over the past 37 years, but to a much wider history in which communities, institutions, and the landscape are continually renewed and reconstituted.

Today, therefore, the island of El Frontón is a space which gives testimony to the forms of power deployed by the Peruvian state during the internal conflict, as well as over a longer period of the twentieth century. However, whilst this deployment of power may have had old historical roots, it was highly suited to the economic shock programmes that were being encouraged across Latin America in this period. In the words of Orlando Letelier, the Chilean economist and *allendista* politician who was assassinated in the United States under the orders of General Pinochet, “repression for the majorities and economic freedom for small privileged groups are two sides of the same coin”.⁵²³ In particular, it is possible to see an overlap between the previously

⁵²³ Orlando Letelier, ‘The ‘Chicago Boys’ in Chile: Economic Freedom’s Awful Toll’, Reprinted at *The Nation*, 21 September 2016 [<https://www.thenation.com/article/the-chicago-boys-in-chile-economic-freedoms-awful-toll/>, accessed 22 September 2016].

mentioned geography of power and the new economic geographies created by neoliberal economic policies. As the Andes was increasingly seen as the space which could potentially drive huge growth in Peru's economy, particularly through the extraction of natural resources, sovereign power has been increasingly exercised in the region in order to suppress dissent and remove obstacles to further mining projects. The internal conflict played a crucial role in turning the Peruvian state back towards this differentiated exercise of power and, as a result, the post-conflict period has seen a continuation of repressive policies in the *sierra* with the goal of completing the conquest of the Andes for economic gain, whilst securing the power of an elitist liberal order.

Chapter 5: Memory in Peru's neoliberal order

In previous chapters, I have analysed an emblematic episode of violence through the lens of my spatial framework, and have argued that representations of these episodes in forms of cultural production and memory practice have reflected, and also challenged, the exclusionary logics and spatialized understandings of Peruvian society which precipitated these episodes. In doing so, I have highlighted how memory activists such as ANFASEP, as well as representatives of the Peruvian armed forces and state, have embarked upon forms of memory-making and have contributed to the commemorative city-text of Lima and Huamanga through the creation of sites such as the Museo de la Memoria, MHVRE, and the Museo Chavín de Huántar.

For the purposes of this chapter, I will deploy a slightly different approach by analysing the forms of systemic, structural violence which have been produced in Peru as a result of the neoliberal restructuring begun by Alberto Fujimori, and which has been continued by his successors (drawn from, ostensibly, across the political spectrum). Whilst the roots of this period of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism can be seen, as discussed in the previous chapter, during the 1980s, the neoliberal order established by Fujimori in the 1990s can be seen as a project which resulted in the further marginalisation of indigenous communities in Andean and Amazonian regions, and of the communities in Lima's *barriadas*. However, I will develop this argument further by highlighting how the construction of this neoliberal order has emerged from, and been supported by, particular narratives of Peru's internal armed conflict. In opposition to these narratives, I will argue that other post-conflict memories have been developed not only to articulate versions of the past, but also in

order to challenge this neoliberal order and the cultural frameworks which support it, and to promote a more transformative process of truth and reconciliation.⁵²⁴

In order to do so, I believe is important to revisit the issue of counter memory in this chapter, and in particular the Operación Chavín de Huántar which provided inspiration for the military museum (discussed in Chapter 2) of the same name. Milton has studied the Museo Chavín de Huántar as part of a broader military production of a cultural counter memory which is “both counter-intuitive and to counter ‘victim-oriented’ memories”.⁵²⁵ The Chavín de Huántar museum represents a salvation narrative of Peru’s conflict in which heroic state agents delivered the country to safety from the hands of rampant terrorist groups. However, whereas Milton has sought to highlight the heterogeneity of counter memory and locate a range of cultural artefacts produced by state agents in a broader spectrum of memory practice, I will argue that counter memory narratives (such as the armed forces’ salvation narrative) have been deployed in order to legitimate the neoliberal revolution prompted by Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s.

I will also view the project of counter memory within the context of other competing memory narratives of the conflict which have challenged Peru’s social and racial hierarchies as well as the military’s version of events. Through analyses of cultural artefacts, such as Alonso Cueto’s *La hora azul* (2005) and the production of *la novela de la violencia* in post-CVR Peru, I will argue that spatialized understandings of the internal armed conflict have been constructed in particular memory narratives which understand transformative economic justice and cultural exchange between Peru’s disparate communities as important factors for the prevention of future violence.

⁵²⁴ For a discussion of the origins and key themes of transformative justice see Paul Gready, Jelke Boesten, Gordon Crawford, and Polly Wilding. ‘Transformative Justice – A Concept Note’ [https://wun.ac.uk/files/transformative_justice_-_concept_note_web_version.pdf], accessed 16 August 2017].

⁵²⁵ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, pp.36-7.

Outside of these cultural artefacts, I will also identify where such narratives have been enshrined in public spaces such as LUM and the Casa Yuyachkani theatre, arguing that the spatiality of these sites is central to understanding the narratives they aim to produce.⁵²⁶ However, as in previous chapters, I will also argue that a spatial understanding of post-conflict memory in Peru cannot simply be limited to commemorative or performative sites such as these, but must also take into account the forms of commemoration and memory practice which exist in the urban landscape and Lima's commemorative city-text. This approach, I believe, will reveal a greater array of public and cultural spaces which act as battlegrounds for memory narratives, and as arenas for broader ideas about nationhood, modernity and society in Peru.

In dealing with this final period of structural violence from the conflict, I will again employ the same theoretical framework to develop my spatial analysis. This framework is based upon Lefebvre's aforementioned conceptual triad of physical space, representations of space and representational spaces. I believe this approach is particularly expedient because of the "interplay between culture and transitional justice" identified by Milton, who argues that both human rights advocates and pro-military apologists have produced cultural and museological responses to the conflict.⁵²⁷ An understanding, therefore, of how violence, culture and memory have been produced in space is, I believe, a particularly productive way to approach Peru's internal conflict.

In the first part of my analysis, which focuses on violence and the production of physical space, I will again engage with the work of Agamben and Ong in order to draw

⁵²⁶ Another important site of cultural memory which has already been extensively analysed and which I will not discuss in detail here is the Yuyanapaq photography exhibition in Lima. See Kaitlin M. Murphy 'What the Past Will Be: Curating Memory in Peru's Yuyanapaq: Para Recordar', *Human Rights Review*, 16:1 (2015), pp.23-38; Deborah Poole and Isaias Rojas Pérez, 'Memories of Reconciliation: Photography and Memory in Postwar Peru', *e-misférica*, 7:2 (2010) [<http://hemisphericinstitute.org/hemi/en/e-misferica-72>, accessed 19 January 2017].

⁵²⁷ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, Conclusion, p.7.

links between spatial practices of power and Fujimori's reconstituted neoliberal order after 1990. When dealing with cultural representations of space articulated by memory and counter memory producers, I will again deploy a Lefebvrian approach alongside Butler's concept of grievable lives. I will also return to Nora's work on *lieux de memoire* and the frameworks proposed by Dwyer and Alderman for dissecting several sites of memory in Lima as forms of text, arena and performance.⁵²⁸ Furthermore, I will expand my analysis outside of individual sites, looking at how sites of memory interact with each other and the city around them, arguing for the existence of a geography of memory and city-text in Lima which must be approached holistically to be properly understood. I believe that the specific context of the Peruvian conflict means that each of these sites necessarily says something and contributes towards the production of space and geography, whilst also representing a form of spatial production in themselves. Many responses to the conflict, whether cultural artefacts or sites of memory, are articulated as a response to the CVR's conclusion that a disproportionate number of the conflict's victims came from rural departments of the nation's interior. This is what renders the specific context of the Peruvian conflict, and what makes sites of memory in Peru necessarily narratives *of* space, as well as narratives *in* space.

From this perspective it is possible to understand a chain of events, from early military operations in the Andes to the 1986 prison massacres to the Operación Chavín de Huántar, as a cycle in which space is produced and re-produced by violent acts and discourses of grievability. Because of this, I believe Cueto's *La hora azul* is an important counterpoint to the salvation narratives promoted by state agents. This is because Cueto's narrative stands in direct contrast to the military narrative which

⁵²⁸ Nora, 'Between Memory and History'; Dwyer and Alderman, 'Memorial landscapes'.

attempts to justify the impunity with which state violence was perpetrated. He does this by attempting to actively reproduce and resignify Lima's urban geography and give it new meaning, rather than acting as a simplistic template of poverty and wealth, danger and safety. In this sense, Cueto's narrative of state violence and the levels of responsibility attached to different violent actors during the conflict is constructed in opposition to the heroic military narratives established in places such as the Museo Chavín de Huántar.

The sites of memory I will discuss in detail are the LUM and the Casa Yuyachkani theatre. I have chosen to deal with these sites because I believe that the narratives they establish also stand in direct contrast with the commemorations of Operación Chavín de Huántar (as discussed in Chapter 2). Both sites act as physical spaces in which human rights abuses perpetrated by the state are laid bare, and in which the cultural frameworks and discourses which supported such abuses are thoroughly challenged. In this way, they are linked to *La hora azul* by articulating a form of truth and reconciliation which is critical of state violence and systemic inequality in Peru. Furthermore, each site deploys spatialized understandings of the conflict and of reconciliation, engaging with ideas about Peru's historical spatial structure and encouraging cultural exchange across social boundaries, as a means of generating transformative justice. In each case, therefore, I will perform my analysis through attention to the spatiality, content, and performative significance of each site. I will take into consideration their emplacement and construction, alongside their function as arenas for memory, in order to make conclusions about their significance and ability to elucidate ideas about the conflict.

Post-conflict? Peru, 1992-97

Firstly, it is necessary to very briefly establish the context of the ongoing internal conflict in which Fujimori's neoliberal revolution took place. That is because the *Fujimorista* state was, at this time, already engaged in the development of particular narratives about the internal armed conflict and the pacification of insurgent groups, despite the ongoing activities of Shining Path and the MRTA, at a time when political opposition was heavily suppressed. This means that the narratives and memory practice developed by state agents and *Fujimoristas* took a significant level of precedence in the public domain over narratives which were more critical of the role of the Peruvian state and armed forces (which certainly existed in the 1990s but which would not gain prominence until after the 2003 publication of the *Informe Final*).

The capture of Abimael Guzmán in 1992, along with a host of Shining Path leaders and important documents detailing party information and strategy, precipitated a sharp decline in the group's activity, but by no means brought it to an end. Between August 1992 and May 1994, there were 63 acts of sabotage perpetrated by the group in Lima, including the use of explosives and incendiary material against private property and financial institutions. Many of these episodes occurred in the districts of El Agustino and La Victoria, but they also occurred in San Juan de Lurigancho, San Martín de Porres, San Juan de Miraflores and San Borja. In addition to this there were 17 acts of "guerrilla combat" which included robberies and attacks on foreign businesses and banks, and ten assassinations.⁵²⁹ These assassinations included members of civil society in El Agustino, local businessmen, and the Lieutenant Governor of Villa María del

⁵²⁹ Lima, Defensoría del Pueblo, Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales y Antropológicas Forenses.1003. Equipo de Investigaciones.100369.Tarata.I del Tm.I.SCO-529-01.000303.

Triunfo.⁵³⁰ In many respects, therefore, Shining Path continued in the same pattern of targeted symbolic violence in Lima which had existed prior to Guzmán's capture.

During this period, the MRTA insurgent group was attempting to develop their own activities further. After numerous failures in the late 1980s, Meza Bazán argues, the MRTA attempted to adapt to the changing political situation in Peru and reinvigorated their mobilisation in cities and universities.⁵³¹ The group also favoured the use of strategic kidnappings, largely for the purposes of extortion, and between 1984 and 1996 they developed this technique "from isolated actions into a systematic practice".⁵³² However, the MRTA's operations were also severely diminished as a result of Fujimori's re-intensified counterinsurgency programme and their leader, Víctor Polay Campos, was captured in 1992, a few months before Guzmán. Despite continuing Shining Path and MRTA activities, therefore, between 1992 and 1997 Peru appeared to enjoy a period of relative respite from political violence.

This peace was broken by what would loosely come to be known as the Japanese embassy hostage crisis. The hostage situation began during an event at the residence of the Japanese ambassador to Peru, Morihisa Aoki, on 17 December 1996 when the MRTA took around 600 people, including government officials, magistrates of the Supreme Court and officers from the police and armed forces, hostage. They then communicated their demands to the police outside by freeing one hostage, stating that they would leave the residence on the condition that:

- A. Imprisoned members of the MRTA (numbering 458 at the time) were released.

⁵³⁰ Lima, Defensoría del Pueblo, Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales y Antropológicas Forenses.1003. Equipo de Investigaciones.100369.Tarata.I del Tm.LSCO-529-01.000334..

⁵³¹ Mario Miguel Meza Bazán, 'El Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) y las fuentes de la revolución en América Latina' (Tesis Doctoral – El Colegio de México, 2012), p.305.

⁵³² CVR, *Hatun Willakuy*, p.190.

B. Significant changes were made to government economic policy, reversing President Fujimori's neoliberal shock programme.

C. The guerrillas in the ambassador's residence were given safe passage to the central jungle.

D. That the government pay a "war tax" to the MRTA.⁵³³

As Meza Bazán highlights, the most important of these demands was clearly the release of MRTA prisoners as among those incarcerated were many important MRTA leaders.⁵³⁴ However, the group's demand for the reversal of government economic policy was an important secondary demand, particularly as Víctor Polay later stated that the MRTA's failure to represent an alternative to both neoliberalism and Shining Path violence was his greatest regret.⁵³⁵ Ultimately, the crisis persisted for so long because of both sides' refusal to back down on the issue of the release of MRTA prisoners, but the group's reference to neoliberal policy in their demands and targeting of elites, who were seen as the agents of neoliberalism, should not be ignored.

A long process of unsuccessful negotiations took place between the guerrillas and Fujimori's emergency cabinet, represented by Domingo Palermo (the Minister for Education). Meanwhile, however, the armed forces had been digging tunnels as part of a rescue plan for the hostages which was practised at a replica of the ambassador's residence in the Chorrillos military base.⁵³⁶ The Operación Chavín de Huántar, named after one of Peru's most ancient archaeological sites, began around 3pm on 22 April. Soon after, the hostages crept along a tiled patio to the team of waiting soldiers who subsequently signalled the operation's success after only half an hour.⁵³⁷ All 14

⁵³³ CVR, *Hatun Willakuy*, p.190.

⁵³⁴ Meza Bazán, 'El Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru', p.390.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.344.

⁵³⁶ CVR. Unidad de Investigaciones Especiales. Lima. SCO-495-001. 'Manifestación de Augusto Jaime Patiño'.

⁵³⁷ Milton, 'Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru's era of transitional justice', p.370.

members of the MRTA in the Embassy died during the assault, but only two soldiers and one hostage lost their lives, with eight hostages wounded.

The official account given by the military stated that the rebels were killed by gunfire during the operation. However, as Milton argues:

*“It was this unequal ratio of survivors and dead that makes the operation Chavín de Huántar difficult to present as clearly heroic for it raises the question of whether the kidnappers had been extrajudicially executed”.*⁵³⁸

This crisis, combined with the continued (although limited) activities of Shining Path, as well as the repression meted out by the Fujimori regime to political opponents and members of civil society, highlight the limitations of terming Peru in this period as a post-conflict society. However, alongside the continuation of these forms of physical, subjective violence, was a simultaneous process of neoliberal restructuring which would form the basis of Peruvian society after Fujimori’s own downfall, and which exists to this day. This restructuring would be reliant on the development and dissemination of a narrative of the conflict in which Fujimori pacified insurgent groups in 1992, but which continued to evoke their threat in order to provide legitimacy for authoritarian rule and the suppression of political opposition. As will be seen, many of these narratives would later revolve around representations of the 1997 Japanese embassy crisis.

***Fujimorismo* and post-1990 Peruvian neoliberalism**

Although it would, perhaps, be going a step too far to make the case for the Embassy residence representing a space of exception, in the way that this thesis has already done

⁵³⁸ Ibid., p.370.

for Los Cabitos and El Frontón (among others), the manner in which the Operación was conducted reflects similar themes with previous episodes of state violence: the escalation to a military solution to the crisis; extrajudicial executions; and the apparent impunity with which violence was conducted. Although it did not take place in a localised space of exception, the operation (which put the lives of soldiers and hostages at risk for the sake of Fujimori's approval ratings) did exist within a generalised atmosphere of impunity which had, since the President's *autogolpe*, become the norm in Peru. Agamben describes how, in this type of environment:

“The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that—while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally— nevertheless still claims to be applying the law”.⁵³⁹

In the context of the internal conflict, this moment perhaps represents the true Andeanisation of *limeño* space. The generalised practice of violent impunity established in the Andean and Amazonian Emergency Zones of the 1980s was, under Fujimori's neoliberal regime, brought to Lima. The Operación Chavín de Huántar is indicative of this, as are the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres (discussed in Chapter 3), in the sense that the violent exercise of sovereign power (by the will of the President and armed forces alone) had now become the general rule.

The immediate roots of this generalised state of exception stemmed from the García and Belaúnde governments which created numerous Emergency Zones, abdicated democratic power to the armed forces and contributed significantly to the militarisation of the conflict. In this sense, Fujimori's rule was little different, except that military

⁵³⁹ Agamben, *State of Exception*, p.87.

control of the Peruvian state was now formalised. This adds a further dimension to the discussion of how well the Peruvian conflict can be compared with Southern Cone experiences of dictatorship and state violence. Whereas in Argentina and Chile the *coups d'état* signalled the beginning of an intense period of state violence, the Peruvian conflict was a drawn out process in which the state was reconstituted as a sovereign military power whilst simultaneously reconstituting a biopolitical population through processes of exclusionary violence.

Springer has highlighted, with reference to Cambodia, how this type of sovereign military rule is a particular feature of neoliberal regimes which need state violence to suppress opposition to their unpopular economic reforms.⁵⁴⁰ With reference to the García government, this conception is potentially problematic as the economic policy of the first García administration was more balanced and heterodox. It is therefore important to remember Brown's distinction between neoliberalism as "liberalism's economic variant" (a doctrine of market-driven economic policies associated with Hayek, Friedman and the Chicago School) and as "a social analysis that, when deployed as a form of governmentality... involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action".⁵⁴¹ With Fujimori's 1990 reforms, the "Fujishock", however, orthodox neoliberal policy was also enacted in order to liberalise trade and tackle hyperinflation. In this sense, Fujimori could be seen as a true neoliberal; both in the sense that he adopted a set of liberalising economic policies driven by market-rationale, and by deploying neoliberalism's political rationale as a form of governmentality. Given the continuity in state practice of violence between the 1980s and 1990s, it is therefore important to assert that this neoliberalism contained an element of authoritarianism which is not derived from resistance to economic projects,

⁵⁴⁰ Simon Springer, *Cambodia's Neoliberal Order: Violence, authoritarianism, and the contestation of public space* (London, 2010), p.9.

⁵⁴¹ Brown, *Edgework*, p.39.

but which shares elements with the aforementioned political rationale of neoliberalism. In the case of Peru, this authoritarianism has deep roots in the country's racial hierarchies, and has regularly been deployed to support the power of Creole elites against movements for radical reform. To an extent, this suggests that an analysis of Peru through the lens of neoliberalism says more about how Peruvian society and state actors shaped neoliberal ideas to suit their own ends, than it does about how Peru was reshaped by transnational neoliberal trends.

i) Peru's neoliberal revolution

Having said that, there is no doubt that Fujimori deployed market-driven reforms simultaneously to his authoritarian project.⁵⁴² In July 1991, Fujimori enforced 126 Presidential decrees to reorganise the military, establish emergency powers and introduce an economic package of deregulation and austerity, decried by Burt as a foundational moment of violence which rebuilt Peru's political landscape.⁵⁴³ Economic reforms included public expenditure cuts, deregulation, a price stabilisation programme, and attempts to reform the tax system so that revenues could be collected from the large informal sector of the economy. Politically, the reforms led to a crackdown on the activities of trade unions, student societies and indigenous organisations.⁵⁴⁴

Despite the success of these policies in stemming hyperinflation, they also caused difficulties for Peru's poorest communities. Prices of numerous important goods rose dramatically immediately after the Fujishock: oil increased from \$0.13 to \$4.00 a barrel, the price of bread and milk tripled, and the price of newspapers and noodles

⁵⁴² As Stokes has highlighted, before he became President, Fujimori surrounded himself with neo-Keynesian advisors and actively campaigned against the neoliberal policies espoused by Mario Vargas Llosa in the run-up to the elections. The role of Hernando de Soto, a former advisor to Vargas Llosa, was "critical in precipitating the switch" and in pressuring Fujimori to adopt pro-market reforms. See Susan Stokes, 'Are Parties What's Wrong with Democracy in Latin America?', (International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, April 17-19, 1997).

⁵⁴³ Burt, *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru*, p.169.

⁵⁴⁴ Michel Chossudovsky, *The Globalization of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms* (London, 1997), p.206.

quadrupled.⁵⁴⁵ These effects were dismissed as the collateral damage of dealing with hyperinflation and economic crisis which were blamed on Alan García's APRA government. As I have previously argued, Fujimori deliberately deployed a rhetoric about the "twin fires" of hyperinflation and terrorism to conflate the crises the nation faced, in effect justifying his economic strategy through combined fears of Shining Path and hyperinflation.⁵⁴⁶ The myth, that Fujimori alone had pacified Shining Path, was convincingly put together and reiterated in mass media to the point, Carrión argues, that it both legitimised the Fujimori administration and shielded it from criticism for other areas of policy.⁵⁴⁷

Alternatively, however, these policies could be seen as an extension of the sovereign power deployed to produce a population suitable for neoliberal modernisation, appearing punitive rather than technocratic. In this sense, the "twin fires" model is reversed so that the rhetoric of economic modernisation is deployed to justify further forms of state violence. Whilst the sharp increase in food prices represented the more objective, structural form of this violence, its counterpart was the very subjective programme of forced sterilisation designed to drive down levels of poverty. In practice, the programme overwhelmingly sterilised women of indigenous backgrounds, putting their lives at risk. This was the case with Mamerita Mestanza who died in 1996, the same year in which the Reproductive Health and Family Planning Programme began, after a tubal ligation operation which she did not consent to.⁵⁴⁸

In this context, Denegri's concept of *gine sacra* is useful. *Gine sacra* is the feminine counterpart to Agamben's *homo sacer* who, Denegri argues, is twice excluded; firstly

⁵⁴⁵ 'Peru's Poorest Feel Hardship of Fujishock Austerity', *New York Times*, 11 August 1990

[<http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/12/world/peru-s-poor-feel-hardship-of-fuji-shock-austerity.html>, accessed 19 November 2016].

⁵⁴⁶ Daniel Willis, 'The Violent Andes: Crisis and Cultural Difference in Narratives of Peru's Internal Armed Conflict' (Master's Thesis – University of Manchester, 2013), p.17.

⁵⁴⁷ Julio F. Carrión, 'Public Opinion, Market Reforms and Democracy in Fujimori's Peru' in Daniel Castro (ed.), *Revolution and Revolutionaries: Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (Wilmington, 1999), pp.126-49 (p.133).

⁵⁴⁸ 'Forced sterilisation haunts Peruvian women decades on', *BBC*, 2 December 2015 [<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-34855804>, accessed 1 November 2016].

by the modern legal framework which places them outside of the state's protection, and secondly by their gendered position of subalternity.⁵⁴⁹ In this context, indigenous women are victimised as representatives of the wider indigenous population. The assumption inherent within the policy of forced sterilisations is that poverty is inextricably linked to the growth of the indigenous population. As Boesten has argued, existing intersectional inequalities of gender, race and class “made abuse in health services possible” and, alongside Malthusian notions about population control, led to “population policies that were...highly damaging and discriminative”, in effect reproducing those same inequalities in society.⁵⁵⁰ Sterilisations therefore emerged as a way of tackling poverty through the exercise of exclusionary sovereign power, on the basis of an underlying cultural framework which excludes indigenous communities and posits them as the antithesis to neoliberal modernity.

The way in which these reforms disproportionately affected the lives of poor and indigenous communities demonstrates, I would argue, another form of graduated sovereignty in which state power is punitively directed against particular populations. Whilst the Embassy crisis, and La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres, demonstrate the violent authoritarian elements of this project, the other side of the coin is an economic modernisation project which is equally violent and exclusionary.

ii) Free trade and sovereign power

Similar arguments have been made about this relationship between neoliberalism and authoritarianism in other cases. For example, the violence and economic restructuring

⁵⁴⁹ Marisol de la Cadena has argued that the intersectional construction of indigeneity in the Peruvian Andes is refracted through the lens of gender. Francesca Denegri, ‘Cariño en tiempos de paz y guerra: lenguaje amoroso y violencia sexual en el Perú’ in (Francesca Denegri and Alexandra Hibbett eds.), *Dando Cuenta: estudios sobre el testimonio de la violencia política en el Perú (1980-2000)* (Lima, 2016), pp.67-92 (p.81); de la Cadena, ‘Las mujeres son más indias’.

⁵⁵⁰ Boesten, *Intersecting Inequalities*, p.3-4.

conducted by General Pinochet in Chile, the Argentinian *junta*, and Víctor Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia are central to Naomi Klein's thesis in *The Shock Doctrine*, but Springer has also explored this argument in relation to Cambodia. It is worth noting that, particularly in the case of the Klein, the focus in these studies has been on the imposition of neoliberal policy on nations through institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (directed by politicians and economists from the United States). While such studies are useful, the idea that neoliberal ideas are delivered to such nations from abroad is given greater attention than the historical traditions of state practice which, in the Peruvian case, provides the basis for authoritarian rule. However, in Peru in particular, it is crucial to also consider that adopting Friedmanite policies was a strategic choice made by state actors in order to supplement and develop their pre-existing projects of statecraft – often already violent and authoritarian before the arrival of neoliberalism.

The possibility of this argument has perhaps been obscured by the timing of what Arce calls Peru's "vigorous economic revolution" at the beginning of the 1990s, which lends itself well to arguments that Fujimori was joining the post-Cold War order of free trade consensus.⁵⁵¹ In some aspects, this revolution, implemented by Fujimori but maintained by his successors Toledo, García and Humala, has appeared highly successful, with Peru maintaining high rates of growth into the new millennium (even returning to 10% after the 2008 global economic crisis). Drinot has argued that the expansion of access to credit has created "a new social stratification based primarily on patterns of consumption", facilitating a construction boom and the emergence of a new middle-class with indigenous ethnic roots.⁵⁵² However, the potential of this social mobility and reduction in poverty is limited in an economy geared towards providing

⁵⁵¹ Moisés Arce, 'The Sustainability of Economic Reform in a "Most Likely" Case: Peru', *Comparative Politics*, 35:3 (2003), pp.335-354 (p.336).

⁵⁵² Drinot, 'The Meaning of Alan García', p.184.

opportunities and profits to foreign finance, particularly due to the Peruvian economy's renewed reliance on resource extraction. Other critics have also argued that neoliberal economic reforms have created a political environment in which corruption is rife and where few Peruvians have genuine trust in politicians and policy-makers.⁵⁵³ Because of this, as with the *junta* in Argentina and Pinochet in Chile, the very real and tangible (although possibly short-term) benefits of these policies must be balanced against the political and economic systems which support them. While Peru's neoliberal revolution has ameliorated levels of poverty and provided many with new opportunities, it has also done so in a limited way which has simultaneously consolidated political and economic power in particular hands and left systemic, structural inequalities unchallenged.

The MRTA's Embassy attack was a symbolic challenge to the authoritarian neoliberalism of Fujimori outlined above. Whilst the release of MRTA prisoners was certainly their highest priority during the crisis, the insurgents had a proven history of using kidnapping as a strategic method of putting pressure on the state and, as Meza Bazán highlights, had planned a similar attack on Congress in the light of Fujimori's *autogolpe*.⁵⁵⁴ Furthermore, as opposed to other attacks by MRTA and Shining Path which sought to gain territorial control over (or inflict reprisals upon) poorer provincial communities, the Embassy attack put the elite of *limeño* society in the firing line, the same people who the insurgents associated with power and wealth.

Ironically, however, the lower levels of insurgent activity between 1992 and 1997 meant that Fujimori's grip on power was becoming increasingly strained, and so the Embassy crisis actually served to restore a temporary level of credibility to Fujimori's

⁵⁵³ Julio Carrión and Patricia Zárate, *Cultura política de la democracia en el Perú, 2008: El impacto de la gobernabilidad* (Lima, 2008).

⁵⁵⁴ Meza Bazán, 'El Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru', p.385.

neoliberal order. This was acknowledged by Fujimori himself with the promotions given to members of the commando unit involved in the Operación, a statement not only of his gratitude but of his recognition that the image of a brave and skilled military protecting the Peruvian nation was central to his own grip on power.⁵⁵⁵ Arce has argued, using survey data on Presidential approval ratings, that Peruvians continued to rank the “control of terrorism” as the most positive aspect of President Fujimori’s second term (from 1995 to 2000).⁵⁵⁶

The Fujimori administration, in collusion with a number of media outlets, also ensured that the spectre of violence was constantly evoked. As Conaghan has illustrated, Fujimori’s right-hand man Vladimiro Montesinos cultivated relationships with a number of television networks, radio stations and *prensa chicha* newspapers to ensure positive coverage for the government.⁵⁵⁷ Burt argues that the Fujimori regime “continued to fan the flames of fear” by warning of a resurgence in Shining Path or MRTA activity, which in turn inhibited the growth of civil society organisations who might be fearful of being associated with either group.⁵⁵⁸ Furthermore, Oliart proposes that “Peruvians aspirations had been reduced...to a guarantee of survival” with the Left appearing as “a potential threat to the peace that had been achieved”.⁵⁵⁹ From this perspective, the hostage crisis appeared to many Peruvians as a painful aftershock of the conflict, and a reminder that the potential for further violence had not fully evaporated.

Operación Chavín de Huántar took place within this context of evoking the threat of terrorism to justify and reinvigorate Fujimori’s stuttering rule. Only a few days before the mission, *La República* found the President to have an approval rating of only 35% with

⁵⁵⁵ Umberto Jara, *Secretos del túnel: Lima, Perú. 126 días de cautiverio en la residencia del embajador del Japón* (Lima, 2007), p.242.

⁵⁵⁶ Moisés Arce, ‘Political Violence and Presidential Approval in Peru’, *The Journal of Politics*, 65:2 (2003), pp.572-583, (p.582).

⁵⁵⁷ *Prensa chicha* refers to the sensationalist tabloid press in Peru. Catherine M. Conaghan, ‘Cashing in on Authoritarianism: Media Collusion in Fujimori’s Peru’, *Press/Politics*, 7:1 (2002), pp.115-25 (p.118). See also Juan Gargurevich Regal, *La Prensa Sensacionalista en el Perú* (Lima, 2000).

⁵⁵⁸ Burt, *Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru*, p.208.

⁵⁵⁹ Oliart, ‘Alberto Fujimori’, p.422.

52% disapproving of his regime.⁵⁶⁰ Four days later, the newspaper was able to report Fujimori's approval had jumped to 67%, with 92% of respondents agreeing that the operation was at least a partial success.⁵⁶¹ As the article would go on to suggest however, the increase in popularity provided only short-term benefits to the President and did not give him *carta blanca* to continue along the same path. Ultimately, the mobilisation of fear and suppression of insurgency was increasingly insufficient to paper over the cracks, contradictions and corruption of Fujimori's authoritarian rule. However, there remain great consistencies in the forms of governance deployed in the 1990s and in the post-Fujimori era. This is particularly apparent in what Brown calls the "political implications of neoliberal rationality" insofar as the "extending and disseminating [of] market values to all institutions and social action" have not been undone in the post-Fujimori era.⁵⁶² Whilst some of the most obvious corruption and generalised state of exception of the Fujimori-Montesinos regime have gone, the neoliberal rationality which underpinned them remains, and now takes the form of a graduated deployment of sovereignty designed to open up new spaces to capital investment and exploitation.

iii) Geographies of neoliberalism and modernity

This neoliberal rationality for governance has persisted despite ideological opposition from ostensibly Leftist Presidents, including Toledo, García and Humala. Vergara and Encinas have pointed to the growing power of technocratic elites to govern at the expense of politicians to explain this stability.⁵⁶³ In particular, there appears to be a desire among the political and technocratic class to avoid radically challenging a system

⁵⁶⁰ *La República*, 'Rechazan 52%, Aprueban 35%', 21 April 1997, p.1.

⁵⁶¹ *La República*, 'Incremento de la popularidad de Fujimori no significa carta blanca', 25 April 1997, p.3.

⁵⁶² Brown, *Edgework*, p.40.

⁵⁶³ Alberto Vergara and Daniel Encinas, 'Continuity by Surprise: Explaining Institutional Stability in Peru', *Latin American Research Review*, 51:1 (2016), pp.159-80 (p.161).

which has provided Peru with high levels of growth since the turn of the millennium, and to make the most of the country's abundant natural resources. This impulse has led to a drastic change in perceptions of the Andean and Amazonian regions; from spaces of political radicalism and instability to the engines of modern Peru's economic growth. The liberalisation of extractive industries and trade has opened up the *sierra* and *selva* to a new wave of investment from foreign capital which has reshaped the relationship between Lima and the provinces, as well as between peasant communities and the land around them. For example, Paerregaard, Stensrud and Andersen have highlighted the deregulation of water industries and introduction of water tariffs and licenses as an example of this new wave of neoliberalism, a process resisted by community leaders.⁵⁶⁴ Likewise, Bebbington has pointed to the large increase in capital investment in hydrocarbon extraction across Eastern and North-eastern Peru and the resistance that resource extraction has been met with by indigenous communities.⁵⁶⁵

In recent years, resistance to extractivism has become increasingly violent, with incidents including the *baguazo* in which 23 policemen and 10 civilians died during protests (a further 155 civilians were injured) and the death of three protesters at the Las Bambas mining project in Apurímac in 2015. These protests represent resistance to the neoliberal order established during the internal conflict which has attempted to rid Peru's provinces of political dissidents and promote investment in Amazonian and Andean departments. The violent suppression of these protests can be seen as a continuation of the practice of graduated sovereignty established during the conflict in which provincial populations were subject to punitive measures on a regular basis. The state uses these methods to refine its production of a biopolitical population, and

⁵⁶⁴ Karsten Paerregaard, Astrid Bredholt Stensrud and Astrid Oberborbeck Andersen, 'Water Citizenship: Negotiating Water Rights and Contesting Water Culture in the Peruvian Andes', *Latin American Research Review*, 51:1 (2016), pp.198-217 (p.213).

⁵⁶⁵ Anthony Bebbington, 'The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes?', *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 42:5 (2009), pp.12-20 (p.14).

reconstitutes itself through foundational moments of exclusionary violence. Often these actions are justified through narratives, particularly Alan García's evocation of *el perro del hortelano*, which attempt to mobilise fears of the unmodern, indigenous Other. This not only demonstrates the strength and persistence of the neoliberal order to have survived Fujimori's downfall, but also the continuity in modes of governance between the years of internal war and the present.

This can be further understood in the context of Ong's work on graduated sovereignty. Ong argues that in such a system, national economic territory is fragmented and workers and populations (often migrant or indigenous communities) in production zones are subjected to disciplinary modes of power, whilst foreigners and wealthier citizens are regulated through pastoral, governmental mode of care.⁵⁶⁶ In this context, both the counterinsurgency operation (a harrying of the south-central Andes and *selva central* to empty the region of political radicals) and suppression of indigenous resistance to extractivism (the exercise of state violence to remove the dog from the manger) can be understood as attempts to convert the Peruvian interior from *zonas rojas* into spaces attractive to investment from global capital.

Earlier in this thesis, representations of the Andes and Amazon as spaces of indigeneity and violence were discussed in reference to Edward Said's concept of imaginative geography, and the relationship of internal colonialism between the Peruvian capital and the nation's provinces which this representation implies. Throughout the twentieth century, Peruvian elites based in Lima, including military figures such as President Odría, embarked upon plans to make the Andes productive through investment in roads, hydroelectricity and infrastructure for the development of tourism.⁵⁶⁷ Similarly, Hiatt has highlighted earlier state interventions into the Andes

⁵⁶⁶ Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception*, p.79.

⁵⁶⁷ Carey, *In the Shadow of Melting Glaciers*, pp.67-120.

during the Leguía Presidency (1919-30) alongside attempts to use technology to engender modernity across the region, whilst further integrating Andean communities into the modern nation.⁵⁶⁸ In this sense, Peruvian elites have not always simply colonised the nation's interior, but have consistently tried to remake the region in their own image, and in accordance with their own priorities.

The *perro del hortelano* narrative and attempts to liberalise extractivism in the Andes and Amazon can in this sense be seen as a return to previous attempts to modernise the Andes and make the region productive through state intervention and the introduction of technology. These interventions are built upon an imaginative geography in which the Andean and Amazonian regions are seen as backwardness and poverty-stricken. However, such interventions, both earlier in the twentieth century and in post-conflict Peru, also sought to reconstruct this geography in order to develop the nation's interior into a new engine of Peruvian economic growth and modernisation.

In this context, the MRTA's taking of the ambassador's residence can be seen as a last desperate attempt to demonstrate the validity of their revolutionary method and resist the consolidation of this neoliberal order. As Meza Bazán highlights, the MRTA represented the end of an era in which revolutionary violence had been used across Latin America to effect social change.⁵⁶⁹ This brought them into direct conflict with the *Fujimorista* state, a phenomenon representative of a very different trend in which Latin American states deployed exclusionary state violence to entrench social hierarchies and elite power. Ultimately, the MRTA's attempts to oppose the policy, values and power of this system failed and the effects of their operation have been limited. The response by the Peruvian state, however, was a highly symbolic moment for the military constitution of the state, constructing the residence as an important symbolic space in the Fujimori

⁵⁶⁸ Hiatt, *The Rarified Air of the Modern*.

⁵⁶⁹ Meza Bazán, 'El Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru', p.416.

and post-Fujimori era. It also had important implications for how life is considered as grievable or non-grievable in Peru. The logical conclusion of this is distinction is visible today, consistently performed through the violent suppression of indigenous communities who resist the economic liberalisation of the Andes and Amazon. This application of state violence is legitimated by narratives of what has happened in the past, particularly by the *Fujimorista* salvation narrative and the forms of counter memory which exist to justify the Peruvian military's role as protectors of the state and as important, heroic figures in Peruvian national identity.

Competing cultural memories of the internal armed conflict

I will now turn to an analysis of how state narratives of insurgent violence, and opposing narratives of the internal conflict which are more critical of the state, are premised upon opposing cultural frameworks for understanding Peruvian society. As will be demonstrated, these frameworks are inherently spatial, denote the ability of different populations across geography to contribute to modern society, and either support or contest the continuation of Peru's neoliberal revolution.

In my discussion of state narratives of violence, I will consider the official account of the CPHEP of the Operación Chavín de Huántar. Milton has argued that the official historical report can be seen as an attempt to reflect the methods of traditional practitioners of memory and produce a riposte to the CVR's *Informe Final*.⁵⁷⁰ Similarly, the accounts of the crisis produced by Luis Giampietri and Samuel Matsuda Nishimura (both hostages during the crisis) are designed to represent victims' testimonies. As Milton asserts, these accounts are not false or fabricated, but are contorted in such a way

⁵⁷⁰ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, p.38. See also Chapter 2.

that is designed to cast doubt on the truth and objectivity of previous memory work.⁵⁷¹

In wielding this kind of soft, cultural, power, state agents have not only attempted to challenge criticisms of the role of the armed forces; they have attempted to challenge the nature of truth-telling itself, by demonstrating that every argument against the military can be matched by one in defence of them.

There is however, I believe, a fundamental weakness in this strategy and discourse. Whilst the organising principle of many memory projects across Latin America has been *Nunca Más* or *Para que no se repita* (i.e. they have aimed to remember the dead and prevent further violence), the organising principle of counter memory is to close down debate about the nature of victimhood and the possibility of grieving those who they see as ungrievable terrorists.⁵⁷² Counter memory supports the exercise of sovereign power by denoting spaces of civilisation and security in contrast to Othered spaces of violence and barbarism, associating the insurgency with Peru's indigenous population. In doing so, they allude to a "differential distribution of grievability across populations", contributing to the demarcation of "grievable" and non-grievable lives. This point is crucial to the study of the Embassy crisis as the MRTA members who were killed are (as with the victims of the 1986 prison massacres) still often represented as being deserving of their fate.⁵⁷³

Partially in response to military impunity, but also produced as a result of the discursive space for memory-making opened up by the CVR, Peru has seen a boom cultural and literary responses to the conflict since the publication of the *Informe Final*. Broadly speaking, these *películas* and *novelas de la violencia* are cultural artefacts which deal with the theme of memory in relation to Peru's internal conflict, but many

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.1.

⁵⁷² *Nunca Más* is the report by Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People, published in 1986. *Para que no se repita* is a phrase used by ANFASEP, particularly at their Museo de la Memoria in Huamanga.

⁵⁷³ Butler, *Frames of War*, p.24.

have also gone further to explore the country's underlying social and ethnic divisions which are often interpreted as having precipitated the violence.⁵⁷⁴ Because of this, these works are often assumed to be using the CVR's *Informe Final* as the basis for their interpretation of the conflict and, as Caballero argues, "aim to subvert the idea that only one version of the past exists".⁵⁷⁵

Asides from the numerous examples discussed in previous chapters here, some literary responses to the conflict include Santiago Roncagliolo's *Abril rojo* (2006), Julián Pérez Huaranca's *Retablo* (2004), and Gustavo Faverón Patriau's anthology *Toda la sangre* (2006); from cinema there is Claudia Llosa's *La teta asustada* (2009), Alejandro Legaspi's *La última noticia* (2016) and Palito Ortega's *La Casa Rosada* (2015). An analysis of any of these artefacts would reveal a slightly different conception of how the conflict should be remembered, who its victims were and what caused the violence, yet each stands apart from counter memory narratives by representing state agents as active participants in the conflict, capable of widespread crimes and human rights abuses. From this wealth of options, however, I have decided to deal with Alonso Cueto's *La hora azul* (2005).

I have decided to deal with this novel because I believe Cueto's narrative stands in direct contrast to the heroic military narratives of the internal conflict represented in memories of the Operación Chavín de Huántar. Furthermore, Cueto mobilises Lima's urban geography as a central element in his narrative, which has consequences for how violence and grievability are experienced throughout the novel. Because of this, I believe the novel is an important artefact for understanding how geography shapes post-

⁵⁷⁴ Over one hundred short stories and thirty novels were also produced about the internal conflict between 1986 and 2000. Mark R. Cox, 'El Perú: su narrativa y la violencia política desde 1980' in (Mark R. Cox ed.), *El cuento peruano en los años de violencia* (Lima, 2000), pp.9-14.

⁵⁷⁵ Carlos Arturo Caballero Medina, 'La novela de la violencia política en el Perú desde la noción de "revuelta": El caso de *Retablo* (2004)', VIII Congreso Internacional de Teoría y Crítica Literaria Orbis Tertius, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 7 de mayo 2012.

conflict Peruvian society, as well as for analysing the idea of *la novela de la violencia* in opposition to counter memory projects.

i) “Official” accounts of Operación Chavín de Huántar

The official account of the Operación, published by the Peruvian Army in 2010, aims to highlight the ingenuity of the operation through diagrams of the building and photographs of the replica created in Chorrillos.⁵⁷⁶ Numerous photos are included in the back of the report celebrating commandos and hostages. As the report highlights, there was a generally positive international response to the rescue, and these photos (from which the dead insurgents are completely absent) demonstrate that the Operación was not only a successful military operation, but also a carefully-planned media exercise to re-establish Fujimori’s commitments to tackling so-called terrorism in Peru.⁵⁷⁷ The report also contains a brief analysis of the conflict from the army’s perspective and deals with potential criticisms of the rescue operation, but limits these to operational and procedural matters rather than a discussion of the extrajudicial executions which took place.⁵⁷⁸

The narrative produced in the army’s official account of the Operación reflects a similar perspective to that outlined previously (in Chapter 2) in traditions of Peruvian military thought and in the Peruvian army’s official account of the internal conflict, *En honor a la verdad*. In this formulation of the crisis, the MRTA are depicted as Peruvian representatives of international terrorism. A brief history of terrorism in the early part of the report draws somewhat tenuous associations between disparate groups (including the Judean Zealots, Klu Klux Klan, Croatian Ustaše and Irish Republican Army) as

⁵⁷⁶ Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú, *Operación de rescate de rehenes Chavín de Huántar: Versión oficial del Ejército del Perú* (Lima, 2010), pp.74-80.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.125.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.156.

examples of ideologically-motivated movements which have used violence for political ends.⁵⁷⁹ The report therefore attempts to delegitimise the MRTA by placing them within a global tradition of criminal and terrorist organisations, comparing the 1997 crisis to the taking of the Palacio de Justicia in Bogotá by the M19 insurgent group in 1985 (which resulted in 94 deaths) and the 1972 Munich massacre (17 deaths).⁵⁸⁰ Representing the hostage and the MRTA in this way reflects a clear attempt to depoliticise the insurgent group, and the political demands they made during the crisis, by depicting the MRTA as an external force, within a narrative of international terrorism and national security. In doing so, the CPHEP not only sought to reinforce what they saw as the ultimate morality of the Operación by asserting the non-grievability of the *emerretistas*, but also attempted to use memories of the crisis to delegitimate political opposition to Fujimori's neoliberal order.

Similar themes reoccur in two accounts of the crisis from individuals who were taken hostage by the MRTA. Luis Giampietri, a naval officer implicated in the 1986 prison massacres who was later Alan García's Vice President after the 2006 election, suggests in his account that the insurgents were more or less deserving of their fate, stating that the MRTA "had not achieved such a large military triumph to surrender meekly. They felt like winners and wanted to get a response of equal size".⁵⁸¹ Likewise, Samuel Matsuda Nishimura's day-by-day account of his time as a hostage ends with a description of how "the saviour commanders" gallantly enter the building and guarded the hostages whilst they escaped, killing the remaining insurgents in combat during the process.⁵⁸² In these accounts, there is little or no discussion of the morality of the soldiers' actions or of the legality of the extrajudicial executions which they perpetrated.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid., p.13.

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid., pp.26-29.

⁵⁸¹ Luis Giampietri, *Rehén por siempre: Operación Chavín de Huántar* (Lima, 2011), p.107.

⁵⁸² Samuel Matsuda Nishimura, *Rehenes en la sartén* (Lima, 2008), p.291.

These representations of the operation support the myth that Fujimori and the Peruvian military were the nation's saviours from terrorism by celebrating the actions of the commandos, and contribute to the denotation of the insurgents' lives as non-grievable by depicting them as violent enemies of the state. As was discussed with reference to Carrión earlier, this myth laid the cultural foundation for Fujimori's neoliberal order to such an extent that once the threat of insurgency appeared to be diminished, his approval ratings fell dramatically. However, the myth has also outlasted Fujimori's Presidency and continues to be evoked to defend the role of the armed forces during the conflict, contributing to the creation of counter memory narratives. As Milton has highlighted, Giampietri's account was written during Alan García's second Presidency, at a time when the President appeared keen to undo the work of the CVR by instituting new amnesty laws and frustrating the development of what would eventually become LUM.⁵⁸³

In this context, the international attention which Giampietri's account received (including two print runs in Spanish and an English translation with the dramatic title *41 Seconds to Freedom: An Insider's Account of the Lima Hostage Crisis*) appeared to provide support to the Peruvian state's narrative of the internal conflict as the defence of national security from the threat of terrorism. To this day the images of the rescue operation are highly symbolic and central to the claims of *Fujimorismo* to be the only doctrine under which Peru is safe from insurgency. For example, numerous similar short documentaries and collections of video footage are available on YouTube including one, entitled 'Operacion Comando Chavin de Huantar' [sic], uploaded by the

⁵⁸³ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, Chapter 1.

user ‘Fujimori2016’, an account for the recent Presidential campaign of Keiko Fujimori.⁵⁸⁴

ii) *La novela de la violencia: La hora azul*

Since Fujimori’s downfall and Peru’s transition back to democracy, this myth has been distinctly challenged. The publication of the CVR’s *Informe Final* acted as a pivotal cultural moment after which criticism of the military was to some degree institutionalised. Post-CVR Peru has also seen the production of a diverse range of cultural responses which articulate severe criticisms of the armed forces and attempted to represent subaltern perspectives on state and insurgent violence. As an example of this memory narrative trend, which stands in direct contrast to *Fujimorista* and military narratives of the conflict, I will now discuss Alonso Cueto’s *La hora azul* (“The Blue Hour”). As referred to earlier, I believe that the memory narrative established by Cueto in the novel, and the particular symbols and images he deploys during its course, directly oppose the cultural frameworks of *Fujimorista* neoliberalism.

In some respects, *La hora azul* has come to be seen as an emblematic cultural response to the internal armed conflict, standing alongside other post-CVR artefacts such as *La teta asustada*, *Abril rojo* by Santiago Roncagliolo and Julio Ortega’s novella *Adiós Ayacucho*.⁵⁸⁵ The novel was released just two years after the publication of the *Informe Final*, and Cueto himself told me that:

“when the book came out it was called the novel of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which I had no problem with because I

⁵⁸⁴ ‘Operacion Comando Chavin de Huantar (Documental Completo)’, YouTube [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wzgr-1PjR7E, accessed 11 January 2017].

⁵⁸⁵ *La teta asustada* has received significant recognition both in Peru and internationally, and won the Golden Bear Award at the Berlin Film Festival in 2009. *Abril rojo* has been translated into English and won the Spanish-language Alfaguara Novel Prize in 2006. *Adiós Ayacucho* has been adapted to theatre and widely performed by the Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani (discussed further below).

admire the work of the commission, but...it was a criticism for many people I think".⁵⁸⁶

The novel's narrative is, arguably, structured in such a way that it does not only reflect the uncovering of a history of military violence, but achieves this from the perspective of a middle-class protagonist who has previously been ignorant to the atrocities of Peru's recent history, as well as to the social conditions which precipitated the conflict. Because of this, *La hora azul* represents another distinct feature of *la novela de la violencia* by encouraging a degree of self-criticism on the part of Peru's middle- and upper-classes.

Through letters left to him by his recently deceased mother, Adrián Ormache learns that, during the conflict, his father (also deceased) systematically violated the women who had been detained in the military base at Huanta, Ayacucho, where he was an officer.⁵⁸⁷ During this time, Adrián's father fell in love with Miriam, a woman detained at the base, developing a brief relationship with her before Miriam escaped. As the novel progresses, Adrián develops a keen interest in tracking Miriam down, apparently out of a sense of guilt, and eventually falls in love with her. Later on it transpires that Miriam has a son who Adrián tries to help, believing that he is his step-brother.

Read one way, the novel appears to be moving towards the redemption of Ormache (and, by extension, of Lima's wealthier classes) as he attempts to learn more about Miriam's family in San Juan de Lurigancho and thus challenge his own previous ignorance. In particular, this narrative is supported by the way in which Cueto references Lima within the novel; Ormache is a lawyer who goes out for business lunches in Miraflores and San Isidro, enjoying the high life, whilst Miriam's family

⁵⁸⁶ Alonso Cueto, 'Interview in-person' (Lima, 2015).

⁵⁸⁷ Alonso Cueto, *The Blue Hour* (London, 2012), pp.42-44.

work hard to survive in the city's slums.⁵⁸⁸ By transgressing this social geography, Ormache appears to break an important socio-spatial boundary and demonstrates an apparent willingness to sacrifice personal prestige (by visiting San Juan de Lurigancho) in order to support Miriam and his son. In Cueto's words:

"I said that [the novel] was a fairytale told backwards, because in a fairytale what happens is that people live in a normal reality and they are brought into a magic world, where in this case he lives in a magic world and he is brought into reality ... The fact that he goes to San Juan de Lurigancho is just like breaking all the rules, because people in Miraflores never go there".⁵⁸⁹

Transgressing Lima's internal geography, which Cueto deliberately interprets as a barrier to the process of reconciliation, is certainly an important element of the novel. In this sense, it is not enough for Ormache to simply discover his father's abuses; he must also redeem himself and banish his ignorance through these journeys to San Juan de Lurigancho. Cueto is here deploying a particular form of imaginative geography, a common depiction of Lima's landscape which his audience will either know well or can grasp from his depiction of well-off and poor neighbourhoods. As Lefebvre argues, however, these abstract conceptualisations of space play an active role in how space is produced, planned and lived in.⁵⁹⁰ And so, to transgress Peru's social structures in his narrative, Cueto first transgresses this conceptualisation of *limeño* space.

Through this method, not only does Cueto importantly dismiss the notion of the heroic military office in Ormache's father, but elucidates a spatial dimension to memory narratives. To believe in the Fujimori myth, and to live in Lima's wealthier districts, is

⁵⁸⁸ Cueto, *The Blue Hour*, p.59; p.156.

⁵⁸⁹ Alonso Cueto, 'Interview in-person' (Lima, 2016).

⁵⁹⁰ Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p.40.

depicted as living in a fantasy which is able to persist because of the lack of direct experiences of violence of the population. In this way, Cueto produces another form of city-text in which his characters can be read through their associations to different neighbourhoods and their abilities to transgress their borders. It would, however, be a highly simplistic reading to say that Ormache's transgression of this boundary is completely altruistic or successful, and this point is challenged later by the novel itself.⁵⁹¹

This is demonstrated during a passage when Ormache states that he cannot undo the deeper socioeconomic and cultural factors which separate his life from Miriam's, nor would he want to.⁵⁹² In this sense, Ormache represents only a partial acceptance of the conclusions of the CVR; allowing for a degree of accountability for violence without accepting the need for developmental reparations or transformative justice programmes. As Ubilluz argues, Ormache reinforces the socio-spatial distance between his and Miriam's family by refusing to invite her son to his house, and appears incapable of "subverting the implicit laws of a 'Republic without citizens'".⁵⁹³ This suggests that, after Miriam's death, Ormache is already reconstructing the boundaries around him and easing himself back into his old life. In doing so, he is reconstructing his own amnesia by suppressing what he knows. This has deep implications for the novel's narrative, as it suggests that without deeper transformative processes, both Ormache's retribution and Peru's reconciliation are only superficial.

That is not to say, however, that he has not changed. Ormache's visits to San Juan de Lurigancho are, as Cueto says, not journeys into fantasy, but out of fantasy into the

⁵⁹¹ For instance, Ormache is also represented as suppressing a deep internal rage which makes him potentially capable of violent acts. There is also the very real possibility that he threatens to, or actually does, kill Miriam, although Cueto deliberately makes this ambiguous. Cueto, *The Blue Hour*, p.6.

⁵⁹² Cueto, *The Blue Hour*, p.282.

⁵⁹³ Juan Carlos Ubilluz, 'El fantasma de la nación cercada' in (Juan Carlos Ubilluz, Alexandra Hibbett and Victor Vich eds.), *Contra el sueño de los justos: la literatura peruana ante la violencia política* (Lima, 2009), pp.19-85 (p.41).

real world. By the end of the novel he seems deeply unsettled by his experiences and Cueto appears to suggest that he is beginning to question the reality of his middle-class life in San Isidro. Unlike the narrative of Vargas Llosa's *Lituma en los Andes* which articulates the exposition of an ancient, barbaric violence in the *sierra*, *La hora azul* raises more questions about the reality of middle-class *limeño* experience and gives Ormache an insight into the tensions and violence which lie beneath the surface of his everyday life.

Ubilluz, Hibbett and Vich have argued that an incapacity to effect substantive change is not limited to Ormache, however, but is also inherent in Cueto's decision to make Ormache the protagonist of the novel, an act which they argue acts as a form of symbolic violence against Peru's subaltern communities.⁵⁹⁴ Lambright has supported this argument, suggesting that it is representative of many post-conflict novels which have reproduced tropes about indigenous cultures and have been shaped by the demands of a global, Western audience.⁵⁹⁵ These criticisms are certainly valid, and are supported by the novel's own conclusion in which the status quo persists. However, whilst Cueto may not use his narrative to construct an image of radical change, he does hold a mirror up to the fantasy in which Lima's elites exist, and offers a glimpse of how the social and economic violence of neoliberal Peru could be challenged and undermined. Furthermore, he represents Ormache (and by extension himself, and Lima's middle-class communities) as incapable of effecting such change by themselves, as the breaking of these boundaries is represented as only being achievable through greater co-operation and cultural exchange between Westernised national elites and indigenous communities.

⁵⁹⁴ Juan Carlos Ubilluz, Alexandra Hibbett and Víctor Vich, 'Introducción: Violentando el silencio' in (Juan Carlos Ubilluz, Alexandra Hibbett and Víctor Vich eds.), *Contra el sueño de los justos: la literatura peruana ante la violencia política* (Lima, 2009), pp.9-18.

⁵⁹⁵ Lambright, *Andean Truths*, pp.30-32.

This, arguably, is the greater conclusion of *La hora azul*, and where it best reflects the realities of post-conflict Peru. Whilst violence has been recognised through the work of the CVR, there has been a wider social amnesia reconstructed around the conclusions made by the commission on the social and racial dimensions to the violence. The Fujimori pacification myth has been rigorously challenged, although it is still persistent and popular among many Peruvians. However, an even more pervasive fantasy remains; the fantasy that Peru's socio-spatial hierarchies are natural, and that they can continue to exist without the prospect of further violence.

La hora azul does not represent a utopic vision of truth and reconciliation, but instead aims to detail deeply violent acts committed by state agents, and the forms of social cultural domination which support them. Such a narrative is crucial in Peru, however, because it stands in direct opposition to the continuation of neoliberal practices which may deepen structural inequality, and to the obfuscation of the more transformative aspects of the *Informe Final*. Cueto is also careful not to make concrete conclusions about the future, but develops a sense of ambiguity throughout the novel which encourages readers to question the fantasy of Peru's elite neoliberal order. In doing so, he promotes forms of non-hierarchical cultural exchange as a means, Vich argues, of "building a different national consciousness" in which middle- and upper-class *limeños* take a greater degree of responsibility for their roles in creating a society in which the internal armed conflict was possible.⁵⁹⁶ The memories and inherited guilt from the past which Cueto represents in his novel therefore act as imperatives in the present to embark upon a path towards a more transformative process of truth and reconciliation and reconstruct Peruvian society along more equitable lines.

⁵⁹⁶ Víctor Vich, 'Violencia, culpa y repetición: La hora azul de Alonso Cueto' in (Juan Carlos Ubilluz, Alexandra Hibbett and Víctor Vich eds.), *Contra el sueño de los justos: la literatura peruana ante la violencia política* (Lima, 2009), pp.233-46 (p.234).

Against impunity? The Lugar de la Memoria and Casa Yuyachkani

As previously discussed (in Chapter 2), commemorative sites have been produced in Lima and Huamanga which reflect the narratives established by both the Peruvian armed forces and by human rights organisations. In this section, I will delve further into the array of commemorative sites which have been produced in Lima and which contribute to the capital's commemorative city-text. However, in this case I will demonstrate how each site has been, to some extent, produced in opposition to the systemic inequalities and military impunity which Peruvian neoliberalism has come to represent, and assess how successful each site is in achieving its goals. In particular, I will establish how the narratives constructed in each site have been shaped, at times unintentionally, by the spatiality of each site and the politics of space which provides the foundations for Lima's geography of memory.

LUM is a highly emblematic space for memories of the conflict and its creation is deeply tied to the work of the CVR. That alone would make it an important object for study, as the museum is in some ways seen as a national site of memory designed to reflect all experiences of violence, but the criticisms the museum has received also reveal ongoing tensions in how the conflict is remembered. As will be seen, the museum's curators have been accused of not going far enough in their criticisms of the military, and of curating an exhibition which is (but should not be) acceptable to state and military figures who broadly agree with counter memory narratives.

I will also go beyond my analysis of LUM, which functions as a traditional, text-based site of memory, to explore how memory narratives have increasingly been interwoven into more participatory and performative forms of memory practice. These include the creation of the Santuario de la Memoria in Huamanga (analysed in Chapter

2), the staging of numerous political demonstrations against state violence and impunity, and the work of the Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani. Yuyachkani are a theatre group who have been making highly political works of theatre for over 45 years, and who performed during the CVR's public hearings in Huanta and Huamanga (2002-3).⁵⁹⁷ By exploring the spatiality of their works as well as the spatiality of their theatre space, the Casa Yuyachkani, I will draw comparisons between the ways in which memory narratives are produced in museums and theatres in Lima, and make conclusions about the extent to which these have reshaped public discourse and challenged Peru's neoliberal order. I have chosen to use Yuyachkani as a case study not only because they are a pre-eminent theatre group in Peru, but because through their works they actively seek to make statements about the importance of memory, ethnic plurality and gender relations for understanding Peru's past and future. By comparison with LUM, Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani have regularly been denounced as terrorist sympathisers for being too critical of the military and Fujimori in the conflict. In this sense, it is useful to view the memory narrative of the Casa Yuyachkani in direct contrast to that represented by the Museo Chavín de Huántar, at the other end of the memory spectrum, with LUM somewhere in between.⁵⁹⁸

In doing so, I will be using an approach outlined by Nora's work on *lieux de memoire* which expands the analysis of sites of memory beyond traditional spaces such as museum and monuments, highlighting how modern nation-states are themselves

⁵⁹⁷ Lambright, *Andean Truths*, pp.88-106.

⁵⁹⁸ The cultural significance of Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani has previously been analysed by a range of scholars from theatre and literary studies, most notably by Diana Taylor who has identified Yuyachkani as important performers of a form of cultural memory designed to contest versions of the past. Others, including Peruvian anthropologist Rodrigo Montoya, have focused on the significance of Yuyachkani to broader historical processes such as ethnic integration and post-conflict transitional justice. Whilst this work has doubtlessly contributed to an extensive and diverse literature on the group, for the purposes of this chapter I will primarily draw on the work of Taylor and Cynthia Garza in order to develop my spatial analysis. Diana Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing cultural memory in the Americas* (Durham, 2003), pp.190-211; Rodrigo Montoya, 'El teatro quechua como lugar de reflexion sobre la historia y la politica', *Revista de Crítica Literaria Latinoamericana*, 19:37 (1993), pp.223-241; Francine A'ness, 'Resisting Amnesia: Yuyachkani, Performance, and the Postwar Reconstruction of Peru', *Theatre Journal*, 56:3 (2004), pp.395-414; Cynthia M. Garza, 'Colliding with Memory: Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani's *Sin título, técnica mixta*' in (Cynthia Milton ed.), *Art from a Fractured Past: Memory and Truth Telling in Post-Shining Path Peru* (London, 2014), pp.197-215.

constructed through projects of memory.⁵⁹⁹ The complex intersection of memory, art and performance at LUM and Yuyachkani, and during political protests and street demonstrations, make each of these sites important representational spaces which produce not only shared forms of cultural memory, but also related ideas about the national community and nation-state.

The story of LUM from inception to inauguration has been a long, and often torturous, journey. Despite the need for such a museum being established in the conclusions of the CVR's *Informe Final*, it took over 12 years for the museum to be fully completed and opened. During this time, Alan García rejected a \$2m donation from the German government for the construction of LUM, then performed a swift U-turn after public pressure spearheaded by Mario Vargas Llosa. Furthermore, since 2015 Denise Ledgard and Guillermo Nugent have both been removed as Directors of LUM after interventions by Peru's culture ministry. Such controversies have not (yet) halted the project, but have highlighted the ways in which LUM represents a highly political battleground for the different memory narratives which exist in Peru today.

These battles have been continued in debates over the design and content of LUM. Salomón Lerner, President of the CVR, believes that the museum "does not fulfil the desires of its donors nor reflect what honestly happened".⁶⁰⁰ For Lerner, the fact that Aldo Mariátegui, a passionate critic of the Peruvian Left and the political antithesis to his great-uncle José Carlos, stated that the museum had "decaffeinated the subject a little, even for people as hypercritical as me" demonstrates that the museum does not go far enough to replicate the conclusions of the CVR.⁶⁰¹ Víctor Vich, a key participant in

⁵⁹⁹ Nora, 'Between Memory and History', p.12.

⁶⁰⁰ Salomón Lerner, 'Interview in-person', (Lima, 2016).

⁶⁰¹ 'Mariátegui en su Laberinto', *Caretas*, 7 January 2016 [http://www.actualidadambiental.pe/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2418-CARETAS.pdf, accessed 2 November 2016].

the content of the museum, counters this by accepting that the museum is, ultimately, a state institution, but argues that the discourse which it articulates is one of self-criticism, intended to criticise Shining Path and the MRTA, as well as perpetrators of violence in Peruvian society and from the state. Vich also sees public engagement as the key to the project, arguing that it should be mandatory for schools to visit LUM.⁶⁰²

Many other criticisms of LUM, however, stem from elements of the museum's spatiality. For one, Montalbetti has criticised the emplacement of the museum, stating that:

*“If there was one place in which we could consecrate memories of the years of terrorism in Peru, what would it be? Probably the first that passes into our minds is Ayacucho, or more specifically Uchuraccay, Lucanamarca...Tarata as well. But the Commission chose Lima, the limits between the affluent districts San Isidro and Miraflores...a beautiful landscape, the gastronomic cordon, a zone for tourists and cafés...the Commission seems to want to say that LUM ought to be part of Lima's tourist circuit”.*⁶⁰³

The idea of fostering a national sense of collective responsibility for, and memory of, the conflict may seem like an unachievable goal, but human rights activists and memory practitioners have nonetheless articulated concerns that narratives of the conflict should not be provincialized, lest this lead to their own work being completely ignored by a *limeño* audience. These concerns can also be seen in the presentation of the CVR's *Informe Final*, which also worried about the possible “*ayacuchanización*” of the report.⁶⁰⁴ However, Montalbetti argues that making the museum a tourist attraction

⁶⁰² Víctor Vich, ‘Interview in-person’ (Lima, 2016).

⁶⁰³ Montalbetti, ‘El lugar del arte y el lugar de la memoria’, p.65.

⁶⁰⁴ CVR. Núcleo de Informe Final. SC0-141-01. ‘Esbozo de estructura y comentarios como contribución al Informe Final’. 2002.

leads only to the “banalisation of experience through tourist commercialisation”, further excluding Peruvians from their own history and memory practice.⁶⁰⁵ Sastre Díaz has argued that the forms of narration and visual forms of memory deployed by LUM represent, instead, the *limeñización* of Peruvian memory narratives, constructed by and for the capital’s population.⁶⁰⁶ Furthermore, LUM’s location is not only representative of affluence, but of a particularly fashionable part of Lima which is associated with elites enjoying expensive lunches together. The problem for the curators and museographers of LUM is that, whilst they may not be at the centre of this world, they are now associated with it, and appear to share a convivial relationship with the state forces who they are supposed to criticise.

There is also a certain architectural and spatial logic inherent in the design of the museum, which requires visitors to descend down a long flight of stairs to the entrance, then progress gradually up throughout the museum space, floor by floor, until they can exit at the top of the building to be confronted with a view of the ocean. Two things are particularly worth nothing about this; firstly, that the architecture represents an oversimplified narrative in which Peru has emerged from its own violent past and, presumably, dealt with the conditions which precipitated crisis in the first place. Such an interpretation is not only clearly inaccurate, but occludes the possibility of further debate and support for developmental funds designed to assist the process of transformative justice. Secondly, as one leaves the museum and walks onto the concourse between the cliffs of Miraflores, in plain sight (on a clear day, at least) is the island of El Frontón. The prison massacres are referenced in very little detail inside the museum, and the building’s architecture appears to suggest that there is nothing to worry about in reference to the island, no ongoing memory debates, no cause for

⁶⁰⁵ Montalbeti, ‘El lugar del arte y el lugar de la memoria’, p.66.

⁶⁰⁶ Camila Fernanda Sastre Díaz, ‘Tensiones, polémicas, y debates: el museo “Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusión Social” en el Perú post-violencia política’ (Tesis de Magister - Universidad de Chile, 2010), p.162.

concern over the massacres perpetrated by the state. Combined, these elements make for an uncomfortable reading of the spatiality of LUM, making it appear as a symbol of ignorance to the deeper underlying socioeconomic issues and pervasive forms of state violence which precipitated violence and which persist in Peru today.

That being said, clear efforts have been made by the curatorial team to work under the restrictions placed on them (by the architecture of the site and the involvement of state institutions) and use the museum's content to create a space in which subaltern stories can be told and heard, most likely to audiences who have never heard them before. The ground floor houses a room of video testimonies from a diverse range of people (including José Carlos Agüero, author of *Los rendidos*) and four emblematic episodes of violence including the incident and subsequent reprisals at Uchuraccay, the massacre of peasants at Putis, and two studies of Asháninka communities highlighting violence perpetrated by insurgents and the armed forces. The aim and effect of this is to contextualise the conflict's different forms, perpetrators and victims of violence, creating a narrative in which the Shining Path began its insurgency and the armed forces responded brutally. The second floor tackles a number of convergent themes linked to the conflict, including the response of the state, the disappeared, and the cultural and academic responses to the conflict which have become a central part of Peruvian culture over the past thirty years. Visitors are invited to peruse the displays as they see fit, the antithesis to the Museo Chavín de Huántar in which memory is presented fully formed to non-participating guests.⁶⁰⁷

Deliberate attempts have also been made to subvert the linear progression created by the architects throughout the museum. As Ponciano del Pino told me, the curators attempted to interrupt this pathway by drawing visitors into slightly disjointed displays,

⁶⁰⁷ Milton has also argued that her experience visiting the DINCOTE museum was directed by her guide, a Colonel in the National Police. Milton, 'Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru's era of transitional justice', p.365.

forcing them to walk back and forth at times, and with windows in the floor allowing visitors to look back down to the rooms below. Although this slightly disrupts the visitors' experience, the intention, as del Pino highlights, is to challenge the simplified, linear narrative of violence created through the building's architectural design.⁶⁰⁸

The efforts taken to demonstrate how violence affected everyone in Peruvian society arguably detract from the representation of the ways in which violence specifically affected indigenous communities. Very few of the displays (asides from one *retablo* on the second floor and one video playing on loop as visitors exit the museum) are of an Andean character, or reflects Andean culture. As Sastre Díaz alludes to, this creates the unfortunate effect of making the *retablo* appear as a quirky, exotic item, thus reinforcing its position as an example of subaltern culture.⁶⁰⁹ This suggests that, at the very least, there is little prospect of the *ayacuchanización* of LUM, while at worst there is possibility that the museum's form may actually reinforce pre-existing cultural hierarchies.

The redeeming quality of the site, however, is its focus on being a centre of participation in memory which offers the possibility of all sectors of Peruvian society coming to LUM to continuously give testimony, share experiences, and remake narratives of memory together. LUM regularly holds public events, including film screenings, political discussions, and presentations about other memory projects (such as the Quipu project which collects the testimonies of women who underwent forced sterilisation), designed to encourage participation with its subject matter.⁶¹⁰ Visits to the museum for schools and Andean or Amazonian communities have been arranged regularly, and perhaps most importantly, LUM now houses its own *Centro de*

⁶⁰⁸ Ponciano del Pino, 'Interview in-person' (Lima, 2016).

⁶⁰⁹ Sastre Díaz, 'Tensiones, polémicas, y debates', p.162.

⁶¹⁰ For more on the Quipu Project see <https://interactive.quipu-project.com/#/en/quipu/intro>.

Documentación e Investigación, both in the museum building and online. This repository of physical and digitised documents relating to the CVR, victim's testimonies, videos and journals related to Peru's internal conflict is an invaluable source for academics and researchers in Peru, with the intention that the availability of these documents online will democratise memory practice, encouraging others to engage in investigation into their own histories or wider experiences of the conflict.

However, the dismissal of Guillermo Nugent as Director of LUM in 2017 demonstrated the extent to which such sites are not simply produced as part of an ever-growing trend of memory practice, but are constantly involved in memory struggles and battles over the interpretation of history. Nugent left LUM after Francesco Petrozzi, a *Fujimorista* Congressman and former musician, Tweeted that he agreed with the idea that "LUM is full of hatred against *Fujimorismo*" and, as such, was failing in its brief as a site of reconciliation.⁶¹¹ The comment was, in part, a response to the inauguration three days earlier of a new temporary exhibition in LUM entitled *Resistencia visual 1992*, curated by Karen Bernedo, which exhibited artistic responses to episodes of violence from the year 1992 (including acts perpetrated by insurgents and state agents). Subsequently, Petrozzi complained to the Minister for Culture, Salvador Del Solar, who met with Nugent, a result of which was the latter's departure from LUM. These events sparked a polemic with a range of figures from the memory activist community, including Jorge Villacorta, Gustavo Buntinx and Víctor Vich, arguing against state intervention into memory practice and in favour of LUM's autonomy.⁶¹²

⁶¹¹ *La República*, 'Denuncian presiones contra muestra artística en el LUM tras renuncia de su director', 19 August 2017 [<http://larepublica.pe/politica/1075999-denuncian-presunta-censura-a-muestra-artistica-en-el-lum-tras-renuncia-de-su-director>, accessed 23 August 2017]

⁶¹² *El Comercio*, 'Lugar de la Memoria: "Resistencia visual 1992" - Reflexiones en torno a la polémica', 22 August 2017 [<http://elcomercio.pe/luces/arte/lugar-memoria-resistencia-visual-1992-polemica-partir-ano-trance-noticia-452152>, accessed 23 August 2017]; Víctor Vich, 'Crisis en el LUM, crisis en el Ministerio de Cultura', *La Mula*, 21 August 2017 [<https://victorvich.lamula.pe/2017/08/21/crisis-en-el-lum-crisis-en-el-ministerio-de-cultura/victorvich/>, accessed 23 August 2017].

At the time of writing, this polemic is ongoing and *Resistencia visual 1992* remains open to the public. However, these events demonstrate that representatives of *Fujimorismo*, the Peruvian state, and Peruvian armed forces are more than willing to intervene to limit the impact of memory projects and institutions which they perceive to be critical of the state's role in the internal armed conflict. At times, interventions have taken a more soft-touch approach with more subtle adjustments to the curation of LUM's permanent exhibit, with pressure exerted through LUM's Comisión Alto Nivel.⁶¹³ At others, as with the destruction of the MHVRE and the attacks on *El ojo que llora* (discussed in Chapter 3), interventions have been more direct. This means that it is both reductive and short-sighted to understand the impact of memory through the content of individual sites alone. Instead, sites which commemorate the internal armed conflict must be understood as part of a geography of memory which is continually contested and reconstructed, and in which memory narratives of Peru's recent past must fight for prominence against other historical narratives (of Independence, the Peruvian Republic, and its War with Chile) which are often assumed to constitute the nation's common heritage.

The Casa Yuyachkani is located in the *limeño* district Magdalena del Mar, a bohemian and reasonably affluent area up the coast from San Isidro and Miraflores. Visitors can pass through an enclosed garden to the box office at the front of the building, then into several anterooms around the theatre space including a café and a shop which sells recordings of Yuyachkani plays, posters, and books on Peruvian art

⁶¹³ For example, the museographer Juan Carlos Burga referred to the minute details involved in planning the 'Sala de los desaparecidos', for which he was asked to move a photo of a victim of state violence so that it would not be the first photo which visitors would see as they approach at a particular angle. Juan Carlos Burga, 'Interview in-person' (Lima, 2016). See also the chapter on LUM in Milton, *Conflicted Memory*.

and history. Immediately before the theatre entrance is a mural of the Peruvian flag with the message:

“Memory needs anchors: places and dates, monuments, commemorations, rituals, sensory stimuli - a smell, a sound, a picture - can trigger memories and emotions.”



Fig. 18: Actress Teresa Ralli in front of the mural at Casa Yuyachkani
[<https://redaccion.lamula.pe/media/uploads/55e4f669-3a3a-49c1-b642-2a303ba10da8.jpg>].

Visitors are then invited into a final antechamber. For their production of *Sin Título - Técnica Mixta* in 2015/16, visitors were allowed to explore two selections of photographs, newspapers and books relating to the Shining Path and MRTA insurgencies on the one side, and Peru's nineteenth century war with Chile, the War of the Pacific, on the other. Finally, the guests were led into the open theatre space for the production, a highly innovative and non-traditional form of theatre which aims to make statements about memory and draw comparisons between Peru's experiences of violence in the War of the Pacific and the internal conflict.

Casa Yuyachkani is fundamentally a business, and its internal space and location in a fairly well-off neighbourhood reflects the success and the prominence which the group

has been able to achieve. However, there is also, of course, an element of performance integrated into the space. For *Sin título*, the seating had been removed from the main theatre space and visitors could move freely around the room, witnessing the performance from different angles or focusing on different aspects being performed simultaneously, whilst there was also extensive material on walls and screens for visitors to engage with. This kind of space actively encourages visitors to participate in the performance and to assemble their own experiences of the production from the way in which they interact with the space around them. As director Miguel Rubio describes, the aim is to “prepare the space to create an experience that engages all participants in the event”, so that performers and attendees become part of the same performance of a common memory.⁶¹⁴ Not only is this done in the main theatre hall, but is continued outside with the anteroom collections of wartime paraphernalia, photographs of previous productions, and the shop selling materials related to Yuyachkani and the internal conflict.

As Taylor highlights, the term *Yuyachkani* is also central to this idea, a Quechua word which loosely translates as “I am remembering”, but which also “signals embodied knowledge and memory and blurs the line between thinking subjects and the subjects of thought”.⁶¹⁵ The internal space of the Casa Yuyachkani, as well as the open plan theatre space, is deliberately constructed to blur the lines between performers and spectators, making guests active participants in and performers of cultural memory. There are also, in the words of Dwyer and Alderman, signs of ongoing activism and commemorative rituals which tie the performances in the theatre space into a wider project of collective remembrance and political activism.⁶¹⁶ This is crucial, as it suggests that visitors to Casa Yuyachkani are not invited as spectators to a constructed

⁶¹⁴ Miguel Rubio Zapata, *El cuerpo ausente: Performance política* (2006), p.51.

⁶¹⁵ Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*, p.191.

⁶¹⁶ Dwyer and Alderman, ‘Landscape memory’, p.174.

representation of the past, but as participants in an ongoing performative process of memory. Because of this, Taylor argues that the group's work represents neither the commodification nor the desecration of memory, but a representation of the violence designed to encourage guests to recognise their own role in "an ongoing history of repression which, directly or indirectly, implicates them".⁶¹⁷

Although it shares the themes of absence, violence and memory with other works by Yuyachkani, *Sin título* stands out as a meditation on the nature of memory and nationhood, in which, Rubio states, the group return to the body, memory, dramaturgy and space as the media for their message.⁶¹⁸ As Garza describes, numerous figures, photographs and objects representing Peru's past (including War with Chile, the internal conflict, and the Fujimori era) are assembled in the performance space allowing visitors and actors alike to engage with them, a jumble of artefacts which "make up the country's past, its incomplete nationhood".⁶¹⁹ Whilst it is difficult to argue that there any distinct conclusions made in the play, this established link between moments of history and the weakness of the Peruvian nation is a theme which runs throughout. In this way, is reminiscent of previous Yuyachkani works (including *Adiós Ayacucho*, *Rosa Cuchillo* and *Antígona*) which, Lambright argues, represent the Peruvian nation as a "mutilated, dismembered, [or] displaced" body.⁶²⁰

Towards the play's end, two large puppet-like figures with the faces of Alberto Fujimori and Vladimiro Montesinos come to life and parade around the room whilst Monopoly money is thrown around the room by another character. This is in direct reference to the well-known corruption of the Fujimori regime. A lesser known element of Fujimori's reign is the issue of forced sterilisations; this is represented in *Sin título*

⁶¹⁷ Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*, p.211.

⁶¹⁸ Rubio, *El cuerpo ausente*, p.59.

⁶¹⁹ Garza, 'Colliding with Memory', p.205.

⁶²⁰ Lambright, *Andean Truths*, p.88.

when two women appear on rolling stages, one dressed in traditional Andean clothing, the other in the garments of the Asháninka. Both characters open up their clothing to reveal narratives written underneath; the Asháninka woman who lost her baby after being abused by Shining Path *cadres* in her village, the Andean woman a victim of forced sterilisation.

There are many more elements to *Sin título* worthy of mention, too many to discuss in detail here.⁶²¹ What I hope to demonstrate from this brief outline is that whilst Yuyachkani deliberately break down boundaries of space to create a participatory form of remembrance in their works, these plays also involve distinct representations of space which have consequences for the memory narratives the plays represent. As Garza argues:

“the plays Yuyachkani produced during the Shining Path era argued that such violence was not new; rather they highlighted the long-standing systemic inequities that the Andean and Amazonian populations had suffered by calling on Andean myths, customs, and the firsthand testimonies of survivors and witnesses”.⁶²²

In this sense, the Yuyachkani project is based on a similar argument to that of *La hora azul*, insofar as it highlights uneven geographies of power and wealth as a distinct weakness of the Peruvian nation, suggesting that greater parity and cultural exchange between peoples and places is needed for to break its historical cycles of violence.

It should also be noted, however, that Yuyachkani do not limit themselves to performing only in their own theatre in an affluent neighbourhood, but actively participate in public engagement and take their performances around Peru. They

⁶²¹ For greater detail on *Sin título* see Garza, ‘Colliding with memory’.

⁶²² *Ibid.*, p.200.

conduct performances and theatre classes across the country's provinces, including in Junín, Huancavelica and Ayacucho. These performances are, as Taylor highlights, part of the way in which the group attempt to engage directly with *mestizo* and indigenous populations and “introduces itself as a product of a history of ethnic coexistence”.⁶²³ Likewise, Garza has highlighted the way in which members of the group have learned Quechua, researched Andean and Amazonian dances and mask-making traditions, and performed in open-air markets, the steps of government buildings and street corners to reinforce their commitment to “socially-engaged theatre”.⁶²⁴ Ahead of the 2016 Presidential Elections, Yuyachkani also participated in the *Keiko ¡no va!* March in central Lima against the candidacy of Keiko Fujimori, taking with them the puppets of Alberto Fujimori and Montesinos used in *Sin título*; another way in which the line between Yuyachkani's performances and their collaborative political activities are continuously blurred.

Whilst incredibly significant individually, it is worth highlighting what these sites of memory tell us collectively, with the purpose of further exploring an analysis of Lima as a city-text of memory. Whilst the Museo Chavín de Huántar, Casa Yuyachkani and LUM all appear as significant sites to those working on the subject of memory and culture in Peru, each space has only a limited engagement with the wider *limeño* and Peruvian population. There are clear contrasts between the ways in which LUM appears as part of Lima's tourist circuit, Casa Yuyachkani is open to the public but preferred by middle-class families with Leftist sympathies, and how, when I attempted to visit the Museo Chavín de Huántar in 2016, I was told it was closed to foreign visitors without express permission from their embassy. On some level, this is representative of memory

⁶²³ Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*, p.192.

⁶²⁴ Garza, 'Colliding with memory', p.198.

politics on the whole in Peru, in which numerous competing narratives are simultaneously expressed, but within a community with which wider public engagement is limited.

As mentioned, both the Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani and LUM have made efforts to promote public engagement by encouraging visitors from the Andean interior or going there themselves to perform. Yet the Casa Yuyachkani is on a back street in an affluent neighbourhood, likewise LUM is hidden from the busy Avenida del Ejército and for those who live in Lima's outer districts would likely only be glimpsed in passing from the passing bus. Neither will draw in curious passers-by, and require participants to know what they are taking part in beforehand. Whilst clear efforts have been made to transcend this, both are ultimately spaces produced by the memory activist community who, within the wider context of Peruvian society, hold relatively elite positions. As such, both spaces are produced by and for a cultural elite, and face inherent limitations in their projects to transform narratives about society because of this. As referred to earlier, Peru's impressive economic growth and the emergence of a *cholo* middle-class in the last decade may arguably have contributed to a degree of apathy towards projects which challenge interpretations of the past and the existing political order.

Outside of these spaces, and other sites referred to in this thesis, there are many other battlegrounds across Lima, and Peru, in which memory conflicts are being continually waged. If we borrow Palonen's approach to the city-text through the medium of street names, Lima reveals a distinct cultural preference for military heroes and former Presidents.⁶²⁵ Major streets include the Avenida del Ejército, Bolívar, Sucre and Miguel Grau. References to the Republican period and War of the Pacific are also fairly frequent, with a limited scope for names from Peru's Inca past (a tradition

⁶²⁵ Palonen, 'The city-text in post-communist Budapest', p.222.

represented far more strongly in the street names of Cusco, Huamanga and other Andean towns).⁶²⁶ Milton also highlights the large boulevards named after Bolognesi, Miró Quesada and Pardo, and the statue erected to Andrés Cáceres in San Isidro in 1986, as a form of “soft” cultural power wielded by the military. By reshaping urban space, she argues, the Peruvian military (and its supporters in national and local government) has attempted to use the *limeño* cityscape as the basis for constructing its own version of a common national heritage and identity.⁶²⁷

LUM and Casa Yuyachkani are, in a very important way, the antithesis to the construction of this image. Furthermore, the memory activists who have taken part in these projects have deliberately attempted to create spaces in which criticism of, and opposition to, Peruvian neoliberalism can be fostered, articulated, and undermined through forms of memory practice and cultural exchange. However, the memory narratives these sites evoke are also overwhelmed by a relentlessly articulated form of militarised nationalism which is reinforced so regularly throughout Lima’s city-text that even military losses (such as the War with Chile) and those who presided over them are remembered. Peru’s more recent history, incorporating not only the conflict but most of the twentieth-century, is dramatically underrepresented in this city-text, but even some sites which do engage with the conflict (like the Chavín de Huántar and DINCOTE museums) contribute to the purposeful veneration of military and police heroes.⁶²⁸

The politics and production of these spaces have implications beyond histories of the internal armed conflict. These are sites in which cultural values and frameworks are reconstructed continuously, producing new visions for what a future Peru should look

⁶²⁶ The predominance of military and political figures in street names is also reflected in the stops along major bus and metro routes across Lima. Although there are a myriad of different routes which the *micro* and *combi* buses can take, a typical southeast-northwest route would travel along roads dedicated to former Presidents Benavides, Pardo and Salaverry, as well as the Avenida del Ejército and Avenida La Marina. The War of the Pacific is specifically commemorated through streets and parks dedicated to Admiral Miguel Grau and the battle of Angamos (where Grau died), as well as through the production of a popular board game called *Guerra en el Pacífico: El Juego de Mesa*.

⁶²⁷ Milton, *Conflicted Memory*, Conclusion, p.5.

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapter 5; Milton, ‘Curating memories of armed state actors in Peru’s era of transitional justice’.

like. For example, Vich has argued that class and racial hierarchies are reinforced through daily spatial practice in Peruvian society; particularly through the existence of VIP boxes at theatres and segregated spaces at public beaches, with fewer “contact zones” which allow for social and cultural exchange.⁶²⁹ I do not think it is too much of an assumption, on the part of the curatorial team at least, to say that many of those working at LUM would dearly love to maintain the museum space as an important contact zone, not just between competing experiences and narratives of the conflict but for Peruvians of varying social groups to meet as well. At present, it is difficult to argue that this has been achieved. However, it is not inconceivable that, with great attention paid to the museum’s educational activities, and function as an arena for both public engagement and research, LUM will become an important contact zone in the future. If it does, then it will be a highly symbolic space capable of affecting important cultural changes in Peruvian society.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed important forms of continuity in the history of Peru’s internal conflict; the consistent exercise of an authoritarian and spatially contingent graduated sovereignty by both democratic (Belaúnde and García) and dictatorial (Fujimori) regimes, and the persistence of a *Fujimorista* neoliberal order in Peru in the post conflict period. The Operación Chavín de Huántar is an important moment in this trajectory, as it is often seen as the apogee of *Fujimorismo*, temporarily reinvigorating the President’s approval ratings before the regime collapsed in disgrace in 2000. However, as can be seen in the Peruvian Army’s official account of the Operación, the

⁶²⁹ Victor Vich, ‘The violence of the VIP box: Culture and Class in Peru’, *ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America* (2014), [<http://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/violence-vip-boxes>, accessed 8 November 2016].

forms of governance and cultural values which made the extrajudicial executions of the Operación possible continue to be practised and celebrated in Peruvian society today. Instances of state violence deployed to protect this neoliberal order, notably against indigenous groups contesting the liberalisation of extractive industries in the Andes and Amazon, are supported through a narrative of the conflict which continues to depict the armed forces as heroes and political dissidents as potential terrorists.

Resistance to this narrative, and to the impunity which it enables, has grown considerably since the publication of the CVR's *Informe Final*, and has not only challenged the human rights abuses perpetrated by the military but also the cultural frameworks which support them. In *La hora azul*, LUM and the Casa Yuyachkani, the themes of transgressing the boundaries of historical spatial structure, fostering dialogue and generating cultural exchange are central to the projects of reconciliation which each articulates. That is because each project articulates spatialised understandings of the conflict, recognising spatial structures not only as a component of Peru's neoliberal order, but as a persistent historical feature which has undermined the consolidation of the Peruvian nation.

However, the way in which these cultural projects have challenged this framework have been inconsistent and have many inherent limitations. One of those limitations is the elite nature of many commemorative and artistic projects, constructed in and from the perspective of the capital. Both LUM and Grupo Cultural Yuyachkani have, like Adrián Ormache, attempted to transgress these traditional cultural boundaries in their own way: by incorporating elements of Andean culture, by encouraging visits from diverse communities, and by taking their projects to departments outside of Lima themselves. Even so, the extent to which the Peruvian public *en masse* see memory and commemorative projects as a means to reconciliation and future progress is still highly

contestable. The very real economic gains made by sectors of the population have reduced incentives to challenge accounts of the past. Particularly when these gains are seen as being a direct result of Peru's neoliberal revolution, and that revolution has been deliberately associated with the pacification of Shining Path and the MRTA, appetites for revising the history of the latter are to some extent limited by the benefits provided by the former.

In each chapter of this thesis I have aimed to demonstrate the ways in which violence, power and projects of statecraft take form over space, and at times rely heavily on spatial technologies to take effect. I have examined how cultural representations of space have supported or challenged narratives about those types of violence and power, and have discussed in detail how these narratives have themselves become enshrined in forms of space anew. Across the breadth of this thesis, there is the outline of a somewhat cyclical narrative in which it is argued that Peru's internal conflict was produced by space, but has also reproduced hierarchies and narratives across space in such a way that future conflict is completely possible.

However, there are also distinct changes which have taken place over the period of the conflict, and over the last five chapters, which are demonstrated by the evidence presented above. Whilst by no means linear or complete processes, I believe firstly that the evidence demonstrates that Peru's internal conflict was a period in which state power was dramatically reconstituted across Peruvian geography. The use of Emergency Zones and spaces of exception to tackle Shining Path in the Andes in the early years of the conflict gradually spread across the whole country, even to Lima. The violence deployed by the state was aimed at taming radicalism, a harrying of the Peruvian interior which progressed towards the coast in order to deal with political dissidents from the non-violent Left and assumed enemies in Lima's *barriadas*. In

effect, this process achieved what the Spanish *conquistadores* never quite managed to do; to conquer the Andes and consolidate the colonial connection between Lima and Peru's interior.

Furthermore, cultural responses to the conflict have reshaped the way in which Peruvian geography is represented in important ways. The social structures of Peruvian society are increasingly represented as a national weakness in response to the conflict, but the spatialised nature of these structures is specifically identified as a feature which is neither natural nor permanent, but a construction which ought to be challenged and transgressed. Finally, the conflict has produced a new geography of memory which will challenge the prominence of the Wars for Independence and War of the Pacific in Peru's historical memory.

Conclusion

Between late 2016 and early 2017, Peru was reinserted into the global imaginary among a series of political and economic developments, and crises, which seemed destined to shape the country's immediate future. The election of Donald Trump to the US Presidency appeared to leave the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade deal which President Kuczynski had been a vocal supporter of, dead in the water. The Brazilian Petrobras corruption scandal found its way across the Amazon to implicate former President Alejandro Toledo. In March 2017, amid an ongoing crisis in sustainable water provision, additional rainfall created by El Niño propagated devastating landslides across the country, killing scores of people and prompting the national government to declare a state of emergency in hundreds of districts in Lima, Trujillo and along coastal and Andean regions.⁶³⁰ And in August of the same year, in the same month that Guillermo Nugent was dismissed as Director of LUM and Peruvian courts finally convicted military personnel for the abuses perpetrated at Los Cabitos, huge teachers' strikes erupted again in Ayacucho, and in Cusco.

These examples are a handful among many contemporary issues in Peru which are deeply tied to the politics and production of space. The VRAEM, for another example, has been under a state of emergency for over three decades (with a short respite in 2016 after the capture of several Shining Path leaders) and is an area heavily shaped by narco-trafficking. Although ties between Shining Path and narco-traffickers appear to have deepened in recent years, accusations have also been levelled against the military

⁶³⁰ Reuters, 'Floods and landslides kill scores in Peru', 18 March 2017 [<http://www.reuters.com/news/picture/floods-landslides-spread-havoc-in-peru?articleId=USRTX31FTN>, accessed 27 March 2017].

and police of collaborating with drug cartels, fuelling depictions of the VRAEM as a lawless, chaotic space.⁶³¹

Although a very different type of collaboration, the Peruvian state has also openly supported the Camisea project, operated by Royal Dutch Shell, despite concerns that gas extraction in Amazonian regions has prompted forced contact with remote tribes and caused “recurring epidemics of acute respiratory infections and severe diarrhoea and regular deaths”.⁶³² The recent extraction boom in Peru also has uncomfortable parallels with the rubber boom in the early twentieth century in terms of its impact on the local population, and both industries have demonstrated that the limits of what is possible in Peru, politically, economically and ethically, are heavily contingent on geography.⁶³³ Peru’s jungle regions continue to represent spaces where sovereign power is exercised by the state, either directed against Shining Path remnants or against groups resistant to resource extraction as seen in the *baguazo* in 2009.⁶³⁴

Furthermore the devastating effects of landslides is deeply related to the swathes of self-built housing which sit at the periphery of more or less every urban center in Peru. Mass migration to urban areas has taken place with negligible state planning to organise new communities or provide infrastructure. This phenomenon is by no means restricted to Lima, but the capital’s fragmented political geography (with forty three districts governed by forty three mayors, each collecting tax individually) is highly indicative of how urban planning has not been fully utilised as a tool by the Peruvian state to intervene in broader problems. Of course, migration from the Andes to the coast also

⁶³¹ *La Mula*, ‘Ejército remueve a jefes militares por denuncia de Panorama sobre corrupción en el VRAEM’, 17 July 2016 [<https://redaccion.lamula.pe/2016/07/17/ejercito-remueve-a-jefes-militares-por-denuncia-de-panorama-sobre-irregularidades-en-el-vraem/redaccionmulera/>], accessed 27 March 2017].

⁶³² *The Guardian*, ‘Pioneer gas project in Latin America fails indigenous peoples’, 3 June 2016 [<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/andes-to-the-amazon/2016/jun/02/pioneer-gas-latin-america-indigenous-peoples>], 27 March 2017].

⁶³³ Issues of memory, violence and indigenous identity in the *selva central* were recently explored in a temporary exhibition on the rubber boom at LUM entitled *Memorias del Caucho: Revelaciones del Bosque Humano*, 30 March – 30 July 2017. Several workshops on indigenous art were also held throughout the period in which the exhibition was open. For an emotive representation of the effects of the rubber boom, see also Mario Vargas Llosa, *The Dream of the Celt* (London, 2010).

⁶³⁴ See Bebbington, ‘The New Extraction’, p.12.

has a highly racialised character, and the decisions of indigenous communities to move to Lima are deeply rooted in the country's historical socio-spatial structure. Over ninety years after it was raised by Mariátegui, the problem of the land is still alive and well in Peru.

These are just a handful of examples of the contradictions of Peruvian space and society, many of which were exacerbated during the internal conflict and which remain unresolved to this day. However, while the internal armed conflict is rarely discussed within the context of these broader societal issues, the processes, forms of violence and attitudes towards state governance which I have discussed in this thesis have clear implications for how Peru could approach such problems in the future. Furthermore, the issue of space and its production are deeply linked to each of these crises which, to some extent, are the product of the continuation of spatialised forms of governance demonstrated during the conflict, and which have persisted since. In this sense, a spatial approach to the internal conflict in Peru is not only a useful means by which to understand this violent period in the country's history, but also as a lens for understanding contemporary Peruvian society.

I believe that this dissertation has contributed to the current literature, which has previously emphasised the importance of Shining Path ideology and ingrained cultural racism for explaining insurgent and state violence, by asserting the importance of spatialised understandings of the conflict. Not only did Shining Path articulate such spatialised understandings in their military strategy and cultural production, but the Peruvian state's counterinsurgency operation also reflected imagined geographies which acted as the foundation for spatialised exercise of state power. I have also drawn on pre-existing scholarship on sovereignty and grievability in post-conflict Peru to argue that these concepts can improve our understandings of the conflict itself, explaining both the

spatialised manner in which violence was perpetrated and the differentiated level of responses which individual instances of violence have provoked. This idea is not only important for introducing a spatialised understanding of sovereignty and grievability into the literature of the internal conflict, but also for demonstrating a link between forms of violence, affective responses, and cultural representations. Furthermore, I have contributed to the existing literature on memory in Peru, by highlighting the spatialised nature of memory practice in Peru's national geography and urban landscapes. Space, in this dissertation, is not simply the location in which memory projects are created or performed, but an active participant in giving meaning to (and limiting the effects of) such projects, a technology which has been deployed to reproduce cultural narratives about Peruvian society throughout the twentieth century and beyond. In this reading, memory cannot be limited to a handful of post-CVR projects (such as LUM or *El ojo que llora*) but exists within a landscape of competing narratives about what constitutes the Peruvian national; politically, spatially and racially.

These contributions to literature are further supported by a range of significant findings from my research. Given that I have presented arguments about violence, culture and memory in relation to each case study in this thesis, I will now present the findings of my research as to how each of these individual elements can be viewed across the duration of the conflict, and in Peru today.

i) Space and violence

It would be gratuitous, perhaps grotesque, to suggest that the internal conflict represents only continuities from early decades in terms of the relationship between space and violence, and this is certainly not my aim. However, I think it is useful to think of the conflict as a period in which deep tensions and pervasive forms of structural violence,

rooted in space and landscape, came to be converted into almost two decades of physical violence perpetrated by state agents, insurgents, peasant communities, and the indigenous communities of the *selva central*. That so many different groups engaged in violence suggests, in my interpretation, that the politics of space prompted groups to participate in violence in a number of different ways.

Firstly, as discussed at length, the existence of a tradition of Andean radicalism meant that political violence had been imagined as a valid, and successful, means through which to achieve social change. Despite the focus of Shining Path's leadership on Maoist doctrine, the party was doubtlessly shaped by the local politics of space which had produced earlier insurgent movements, an influence which is present in the cultural production of party *cadres*. In it is therefore important to place Shining Path within a context of ongoing struggle between Andean communities and the Peruvian state, a struggle shaped at different times by numerous forms of subjective physical violence, as well as by forms of objective structural violence and cultural exclusion. In this way, I have found Shining Path to be a product of the spatial structure of Peruvian politics and society.

The conflict also provided many peasant communities with fresh opportunities to rid themselves of local rivals and officials. Although studies conducted across Ayacucho, Cerro de Pasco and the *selva central* reveal similar patterns, it is difficult to generalise as to exactly why diverse communities reacted in the way that they did, other than to suggest that Shining Path were also used as a vehicle by peasant communities to act on long-held grievances. Similarly, indigenous groups in the *selva central* took the opportunity to conduct violence against Andean *colonos* who had encroached upon their lands for almost a century. The violence of the conflict was therefore conducted for an array of disparate, sometimes contradictory reasons. Because of this, broader narratives

about terrorism and state violence must be framed by the acknowledgment that many violent actors did not seek to participate in grand struggles but instead acted upon the politics of their own locale. This interpretation challenges previous interpretations, which have emphasised the Shining Path's ideology and organisational capacity, by arguing that the local production of space had a far greater impact on the internal conflict than narratives of global revolution.

It is also apparent that Emergency Zones, clandestine detention centres and systematic human rights abuses conducted against the civilian population all represented, and contributed to, the spatialisation and extreme militarisation of Peruvian society during the 1980s and 1990s. State violence in particular was deployed in accordance with a geography of the differential exercise of sovereign and governmental powers. Whilst this geography of sovereignty and governmentality exists in peacetime too, the militarisation of the conflict made the differences between how the state governed in Emergency Zones in the interior and elsewhere particularly stark. In this sense, where current literature tends to rely on the CVR's description of ingrained cultural racism as an explanation for state violence, I have argued that this violence is better understood in the context of the production of biopolitical bodies and the differentiated exercise of sovereign and governmental power. Through this argument, state violence can be understood as a process which is intensely spatialised, and by extension also racialised.

There are also, of course, examples of structural violence which can be understood in a similar way. Chapter 5 highlighted how *Fujimorista* policies in the 1990s, including economic reform and forced sterilisation, represented a continuation of state violence against target communities, albeit through very different means. The mining and resource extraction industries have brought further problems, and arguably forms of

structural violence, to Andean and Amazonian communities, including with the aforementioned Camisea project. Numerous protests erupted at the Tía María mining project in Arequipa between 2015-6, during which Verónica Mendoza argued that “where there is the greatest exploitation of natural resources there has not necessarily been the greatest development, and on the other hand with [mining] has come corruption”.⁶³⁵ In this sentence we can see that the forms of structural violence which characterised these regions, and which to a degree precipitated the internal conflict, have persisted to this day and are creating new social conflicts.

There has also been further violent suppression by state forces, with two major examples of conflict between state forces and protesters in Bagua (2009) and the Las Bambas mining project in Arequipa (2016). There are direct comparisons here to be drawn, if not with the state’s response to Shining Path, then certainly with the suppression of earlier Andean resistance such as the 1969 Huanta student protests. Either through inability or unwillingness, the state has not resolved the tensions and contradictions of Peruvian space which precipitated the internal conflict. The suppression of anti-mining protests, far more than the murky, seemingly never-ending struggle to eliminate Shining Path in the VRAEM, appears as a repetition of the logic of state violence seen in the internal conflict, and as the continuation of a system of spatialised graduated sovereignty for the differential governance of populations in Peru to this day.

ii) Space and culture

This thesis has examined the relationship between space and culture largely by highlighting the existence of a cultural framework in which space and race are

⁶³⁵ Verónica Mendoza, quoted in “Cateriano ha entrado con el pie en alto”, *Somos*, 18 April 2015.

perceived to be mutually constitutive in Peru, a framework which has arguably informed cultural producers in the country since Independence. I have contributed to the existing literature by arguing that many cultural responses to the internal conflict have built on pre-existing racial categories and spatialised understandings of Peruvian society to shape their narratives and ascribe differentiated levels of grievability to different populations. Throughout my five case study chapters, I have highlighted how this framework has shaped the violence of the internal conflict alongside the concept of the differential distribution of grievability across populations. However, in order to assess the significance of the internal conflict for the relationship between culture and space in Peru, it is necessary to ask the following questions. To what extent has the cultural framework of space and race changed, or remained consistent, during and after the internal conflict? Also, in what ways have cultural responses to the conflict continued to reflect this framework, and in what ways have they aimed to challenge it?

As is clear from many of the artefacts studied in this thesis, many cultural responses to the conflict have repeated similar tropes, narratives and caricatures which depict indigenous communities in an essentialised manner, representative of a residual ancient violence in Peru. Insurgent groups have often been depicted as a barbaric, unknowable force, whilst those responses which focus on violence perpetrated in Lima highlight the continued grievability of the capital's populations, despite the knowledge that the majority of victims were from rural areas.

Although there have been many representations of indigenous communities as victims of violence during the conflict, in many ways peasants remain one-dimensional figures. As highlighted in *La boca del lobo*, peasants act only as victims or perpetrators of violence, not as complex characters who are central to the narrative. The work of the CVR has been vital for highlighting the victimisation of peasant communities during the

conflict, and peasant communities have to some degree represented themselves as victims in order to avoid accusations of being associated with Shining Path (and perhaps also to attract reparations). However, I would argue that this relatively new understanding of indigenous populations as victims has not produced a corresponding change in the perceived grievability of these populations. That is because the category of indigenous victim has been understood in a highly simplified manner, in a way which occludes the complex political choices and forms of mobilisation which peasants participated in before, during and after the conflict.

Furthermore, indigenous victimhood has been understood alongside other assumed characteristics which have traditionally constructed indigenous communities as relics of Peru's ancient past: poverty, helplessness, illiteracy etc. Whilst it is true that poverty, illiteracy and vulnerability to disease and death do persist in many regions in Peru's interior, and are highlighted as having a strong correlation with the likelihood of being a victim of violence by the CVR, the cultural conflation between the two fails to recognise, or wilfully ignores, the numerous forms of peasant mobilisation past and present, or the many attempts of peasant communities to take control of their own destinies. In short, rather than being simply represented as brutal Indian savages, Peru's indigenous communities are represented as poor, helpless Indians in need of saving from other Indian savages. Whilst this dichotomous construction of indigeneity is not entirely new, the internal conflict has allowed for a whole array of cultural responses in which these portrayals are prevalent. So, while the imagined cultural geography of Peru is slightly different, this change is not entirely helpful as it continues to rely on essentialising assumptions about race, nature and poverty. As such, indigenous populations remain non-grievable, as their position of victim corresponds to persistent racial hierarchies which are represented still in the country's physical and cultural geography.

In this context, it is also useful to consider how violence in the *selva* during the conflict has been represented. As Greene has highlighted, indigeneity in Peru has historically been associated with Andean peasant communities, with the effect that indigenous communities of Amazonian regions have either been treated as native tribes, or assumed not to exist at all.⁶³⁶ To some extent, the violence conducted against the Asháninka has drawn greater attention to communities in the jungle, and there have been a range of post-conflict developmental initiatives created by Presidents Paniagua and Toledo which have attempted to address the Amazonian region.⁶³⁷ Nonetheless, cultural representations of the conflict continue to focus on Andean peasants as principal victims of the conflict, and whilst there have been certainly attempts to challenge this through memory practice (particularly by LUM, the Museo de la Memoria and Yuyachkani) the *selva central* continues to be represented in only a peripheral manner in geographical constructions of the conflict. Whilst there is plenty of evidence from this period in Peru's history (for example, from the mobilisation of the *rondas nativas* and *Ejército Asháninka*) to challenge existing ideas about indigeneity and geography, cultural representations of the conflict are yet to reflect the complexity and reality of the period in a way which would substantially alter understandings of the nation's cultural geography.

That being said, there have been significant contributions from cultural producers such as Alonso Cueto, Yuyachkani and Fabrizio Aguilar. Throughout my research I have found that these cultural responses do not simply replicate the conclusions of the CVR, but use spatialised understandings of the internal conflict and contemporary Peruvian society to represent Peru's cultural geography as a barrier to the process of reconciliation and to the consolidation of the Peruvian nation. Each of these artists has

⁶³⁶ Greene, 'Getting Over the Andes', p.337.

⁶³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.349.

deliberately represented geographical barriers and boundaries in their works, which are also then transgressed in order to facilitate greater cultural exchange and understanding between communities. These works highlight that cultural producers are not blind to the issues of geography and race in Peru. It also suggests that, combined with the work of the CVR, cultural responses to violence have the ability to encourage further transgression of these boundaries. As discussed below, forms of memory practice also have a crucial role to play in challenging these structures of culture, race and space which continue to exist in Peru.

iii) Space and memory

As has been outlined earlier, the internal conflict in Peru has prompted a range of new memory practices in response, from memory museums and memorials to forms of performance and commemorative ceremonies. Beyond these sites, the conflict has also been inscribed into the landscape in a number of ways, leaving ruins and displacing communities so that the geography of Peru is quite literally not what it was before. However, memory is associated not just with specific events, but also with ideas about a nation's history and its future. In this sense, while many of these practices are new, they take place within the context of a wider geography of memory which, I have found, still heavily favours a patriarchal and militaristic image of the Peruvian nation. This geography of memory has not remained static, nor has it progressed in a linear fashion. Instead, it has been continually reconstructed through a number of direct interventions (eg. against the MHVRE, *El ojo que llora*, and LUM) and cultural factors (lack of funding for projects, lack of engagement, the ongoing exclusion of *Senderista* memories) which demonstrate both the state's desire to limit interpretations of the past and a wider societal reluctance to engage with memories of the internal conflict.

Because of this, I believe that my contributions of the concept of the city-text to the existing literature on post-conflict memory in Peru is highly valuable for demonstrating the limits placed on contemporary memory projects.

Perhaps the most suiting example to discuss in this context is LUM (analysed in detail in the last chapter) which embodies a number of contradictions and tensions in terms of its relationship to space. The creation of LUM is undoubtedly part of an attempt to institutionalise a particular narrative of violence in Peru and to create a site which will not only function as a museum, but as a national monument to the conflict. In this sense there is certainly a centralising tendency involved in the museum project, but this has emerged as a distinct response to the CVR's assertion that the violence of Andean and Amazonian Peru was not felt by residents of the capital. Much of this thesis has highlighted how experiences of violence in the interior and in Lima were distinctly different during the conflict; the work of LUM in this light is to bring *limeños* into contact with histories of violence to which they were previously ignorant. Furthermore, not only is this element of the project understood by the museographers and academics involved with LUM, but appears to be accepted by communities who experienced violence themselves. Before LUM's inauguration, one survivor of violence stated that:

*“It would be illogical if we didn't have a major national initiative, because to say that these things happened only in Apurímac or in Ayacucho, or only in the departments which suffered the most, would be wrong”.*⁶³⁸

In this sense, memories of the conflict exhibited in LUM create the possibility of the symbolic incorporation of indigenous communities into the nation. That experiences of

⁶³⁸ Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos. *Criterios Básicos para un Espacio de Conmemoración de la Violencia en el Perú: La centralidad de los derechos de las víctimas* (Lima, 2012), p.27.

violence from Andean and Amazonian regions, much of it perpetrated by state agents, is now on display in something like a national monument is, on symbolic level, a huge step in terms of how indigenous communities are considered as participants in the modern Peruvian nation.

Undoubtedly, however, there are important symbolic limitations to the project (in addition to the political limitations imposed upon LUM by interventions from the Culture Ministry). Whilst it is certainly possible that the forms of positive cultural exchange promoted by Alonso Cueto and Yuyachkani as possible remedies to Peru's racial hierarchies could take place within LUM, they would not do so within a vacuum but within a space which is designed by and for the communities of the capital. There is a risk that the sharing of testimonies and cultural practices will continue to take place within a hierarchical relationship between coastal residents on the one hand and Andean and Amazonian communities on the other. Whilst certainly there are some grounds for optimism about the museum, it is also important to recognise that the spatial context in which it is located, as discussed earlier, is to some degree inescapable, and places limits on the extent to which it can lay the foundations for radical change.

To take the museum solely on face value, to read it as a text, is to see its many limitations. However, it ought to be remembered that even today the museum's work takes place within a political context which is still highly restrictive and in which one could potentially press criminal charges for acts considered to be terrorist apologism. Furthermore, for it to be possible for LUM to achieve a kind of symbolic integration of indigenous communities, there would need to be a continuously high level of public engagement with the site, its content and the events which are held there. As highlighted previously, there is certainly a feeling among sectors of society that it is unhelpful to dwell on the past, a feeling which appears to some extent to be enhanced by the

country's recent economic fortunes. For these reasons, rather than seeing LUM as a panacea to racial hierarchies, or as a project which will radically subvert the existing geography of memory which exists in Lima today, I believe that it is enough at this point to hope that the museum acts as a starting point from which, as happened with the CVR, further physical and cultural spaces are opened up for the reassessment of Peru's past which encourage communal and performative forms of memory, and which eschew prescriptions of what can and ought to be remembered.

Final remarks

The aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate that a spatial reading of Peru's internal armed conflict can contribute numerous new perspectives on this period of the country's history, as well as fresh ideas through which to interpret Peruvian society past and present. Whilst building on previous research which I consider to be implicitly spatial, or to have applied a spatial analysis to Peru in different contexts, I have aimed to provide a more rigorously spatial framework to the issues present in the historiography of the internal conflict, whilst also dealing closely with the key themes of violence, culture and memory. This has been a highly productive line of analysis which, I believe, has challenged some narratives of the conflict, supported others, and contributed new knowledge to an already diverse historiographical field.

As is also hopefully clear, however, this project is by no means designed as a conclusive approach to space and Peru's internal conflict, and the research undertaken here has produced many new lines of enquiry for applying a spatial analysis to Peruvian history and society in the future. Beyond the memory museums, public streets and *plazas des armas*, there is a world of spaces, places and contact zones not studied here in which ethnic categories, class hierarchies and cultural values are performed and

reconstituted on a daily basis. Busy marketplaces, crowded buses, public beaches, football pitches, cafes and churches are all important spaces which can reveal a myriad things about Peruvian society.

Yet the focus of this thesis has been to apply a spatial analysis to the history of the internal conflict, precisely because of the CVR's assertion that so many Peruvians did not notice the widespread victimisation of their compatriots, or simply did not care. This is a phenomenon which many have grappled with and which, in the current literature, is framed within discussions of ingrained cultural racism, yet how exactly this shaped the processes of the conflict has remained quite vague. By highlighting how the internal conflict was shaped by space, how violence was produced by and productive of cultural ideas, and how constructions of space are central to many memory projects, I hope to have demonstrated how these social and cultural distances work in practice in Peru, and to have highlighted possibilities as to how a more transformative process of truth and reconciliation might take place.

Appendix 1: Full list of interviewees

Ayala, Roberto. Lima, April 2016.
Alarcón, Yuber. Huamanga, April 2016.
Bernedo, Karen. Lima, February 2016.
Buntinx, Gustavo. Lima, April 2016.
Burga, Juan Carlos. Lima, March 2016.
Cueto, Alonso. Lima, Nov 2015.
del Pino, Ponciano. Lima, April 2016.
García, Adelina. Huamanga, March 2016.
Gálvez, Héctor. Lima, February 2016.
Gavilán, Lurgio. Huamanga, April 2016.
Hibbett, Alexandra. Lima, March 2016.
Iguñiz, Natalia. Lima, January 2016.
Lerner, Salomón, Lima, March 2016.
López, Felipe. Huamanga, April 2016.
Meza, Américo. Huancayo, March 2016.
Miranda, Jaime. Lima, March 2016.
Montalbetti, Mario. Lima, February 2016.
Otta, Eliana. Lima, February 2016.
Panfichi, Aldo. Lima, March 2016.
Pereyra, Nelson. Huamanga, March 2016.
Rubio, Miguel. Lima, April 2016.
Vich, Víctor. Lima, February 2016.

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