

## **Mafias and anti-mafias: a social capital approach**

*Giulio Marini*

*Living means taking sides. Those who really live cannot help being a citizen and a partisan. Indifference and apathy are parasitism, perversion, not life. I also hate the indifferent because of that: because their whimpering of eternally innocent ones annoys me. I make each one liable: how they have tackled with the task that life has given and gives them every day, what have they done, and especially, what they have not done.*

Antonio Gramsci


### **Mafia. A problem of definition**

Many times the study of mafia, or, better to say, mafias' clan, is approached by scholars and not-scientific community (journalists, opinion leaders, common people) as a particular kind of clans that are very powerful not just in terms of economic affairs, violence and corruption, but even in terms of bonds, ties and social relations. They are powerful, intrinsically powerful even for the knowing whom factor. Since the 80s of last century (dalla Chiesa 2010) a pivotal truth emerged as one of the key features of the nature of mafias: power is conveyed and directly attributed by the external social context to mafias' inner network (clans). As a result their social networks with exterior world are very important. Before that period it was much more difficult to accept any role of any kind of indifferent part of societies, and even the role of abettors was underestimated. More recently a stronger debate in term of scientific soundness (Sciarrone 2009) let the role of social capital emerge and to what extent different kind of ties generate the conditions for having mafias' presence. If we assume the importance of ties among clans and other societal parts, and the relevance of strength attributed – regardless the actual awareness or goodwill – as true, these assumptions let possible to skip any further analyses about the networks of families such as *cosche*, *'ndrine*, or whatever in order to focus on external connections.

Even the same criminal acts that are perpetrated by mafiosi can be assumed as not necessarily useful in order to understand the nature and the role of the social actions they enact. In any case it is assumed here that any analyses of the crimes *in se* and their criminal assets cannot foster the critical assumption that let the mafias be themselves and not just organized crime: *mafias can survive only in a context that uses them and where (a part of) that context makes be used by mafias*. As a result some relevant social actors – even though not so numerous and although much more numerous than the only members and affiliated to the families – make enact what we are used to listen to as mafias. As a matter of fact many part of society and social everyday dynamics let them exist with several

sort of reciprocal advantages in a context of asymmetric relationships. In some cases these relations are searched; in other cases they are not wanted, or even avoided. In other cases the advantages and fellowships are direct, in much more cases are indirect. What is at stake is money, usually as a mean to sustain a plot of power, so that power is typically the sole end of lives that are much more miserable than movies and common sense can let imagine. As Pietro Grasso, the former magistrate active since the times of Maxiprocesso and currently President of the Italian Senate, recently described and explained in public and educational lessons, several concentric spheres, and different roles, are to be noted and highlighted.

Fig. 1. Structure of Mafias and their context



Source: Pietro Grasso, *Lezioni di Mafia*, (Rai Storia, First lesson<sup>1</sup>, 17 September 2012) Modified.

Despite this description by Grasso, the concentric sets are not comprehensive as a metaphor. As he himself affirms bonds between sets and groups cannot be analyzed easily and – at least of Sicilian mafia – a stiff hierarchical structure let understand that the inner part, like the inner leaves of an artichoke<sup>2</sup>, is more protected. This protection occurs meanwhile it exercises power against the other more exterior parts. All parts of general society will suffer this presence, especially the lower classes. At the same time the lower classes will be the most biased from this presence since practices like ›*la semana*‹<sup>3</sup> mystify the mafias as a kind of ›Robin Hood agency‹ whose mission is to foster a substitute welfare, though through perverse fund raising. In addition mafias prevent indirectly the rise of middle classes with negative consequences for the democratic life.

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.raistoria.rai.it/articoli/lezioni-di-mafia-la-cupola/16763/default.aspx>.

<sup>2</sup> *Cosca* in Sicilian dialect means the set of leaves of an artichoke: the more you get inside, the more the leaves are tied and compelling compressed one on another.

<sup>3</sup> The “week [wage]” or weekly lamp sum on request by unemployed is a milieu of social control by mafia in poor areas where usually they are based.

This scheme brings to a further problem of definition: which is the total society or community actually affected? The presence of mafias can be seen in a community like a town or a peripheral area of a big city in the south of Italy, or even in some part of central or northern Italy. Presences are scattered in other countries, typically wherever there are big Italian communities. It can be a wide and geographically transversal presence, such as in an economic sector affected by mafias: cocaine, gambling, construction industry and its satellite activities as a brief list of examples. In the second sort of presence it is not even relevant if the business is led within legality frames or not (grey paths are nonetheless definitely convenient for them, as they play with subtle manners). In all cases the presence of mafia toward any kind of other social actors makes all shape others' behavior. Much more differently from general crimes, not affiliated people and even totally external people are directly affected by this presence. The more the mafias are able to be hidden, alluring or given for granted (and so forth its presence can be underestimated and or misunderstood, with the result that to some extent mafias get legitimated or at least tolerated), the more this presence is to be defined as ›mafia‹ instead of ›(organized) crime‹. On the other hand, the more it is mafia and not just organized crime, the more it is dangerous. This double passage can be even considered an explanation for the following one, which is accredited in Italian literature, both not scientific and scientific: the more the silence by public opinion upon mafias, the more the strength of mafias. Mafia as a result does not happen only when it is on newspapers because a murder or a kidnap happen, or a boss is jailed. Mafias, much farer than crimes, can be defined as a social context that assume the threat by mafias as overwhelming, constant and pervasive. Mafias imply that the main social context can recognize through codes of any kind, especially informal and tacit, that the threat of violence can turn into violence under very specific and strict conditions. Letting a metaphor emerge, as it was told in a focus group, to live a city of Calabria in a highly dense 'ndrine area, the lives of not affiliated can be very safe, like in a hole of an hurricane<sup>4</sup>. Even though this is true for violence since common thieves may murder, in mafia's context all the universe (a whole town, or all the economic sector such night clubs, where prostitution and trafficking are widespread) is involved. In this tacit relation some people can get advantages and somebody else may just try to live or decide to live as the mob wouldn't be there. Somebody else of course will pay a price, for instance in terms of *pizzo* or in any case in terms of liberty since the liberal freedoms are the main key clashing features with mafias presence. The general price that everybody will pay, even those who get concrete and pragmatic advantages, is in fact freedom, dignity and the assurance that –

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<sup>4</sup> It is essential by the way to add that the main result of this discussion was about happiness: none of the attending persons, all active somehow against the mafias, declared that that kind of safe and ›troubleless‹ life could ever be happy.

regardless and despite the crimes and imperfections of laws and their implementation – people deny to themselves the application of liberal state. Descriptions of these stories remind to pre-modern asset, or in the Manzoni's historical novel, set in northern Italy but surprisingly close to actual mafias of late XIX century (Mosca 1900) or nowadays. Therefore in a context where mafias are present all social actors are involved and nobody can escape to embody a different role in this sort of bigger picture, no matter if the role might be passive or indifferent.

The same mafias' members from their point of view, as stated by Paolo Borsellino through the memories of his sister Rita:

»know perfectly who can influence and who can restrain. If they realize that a person will not be influenced nor restrained, they simply stop themselves. Only whether they realize that that kind of person who cannot be corrupted nor involved in any case can, or is about to, play an opposing role to them and their interests, they simply eliminate him or her.«<sup>5</sup>

A possible, preliminary definition of mafias may be the following: mafias can exist only if a large part of a world (a town, an urban area, an economic sector, a professional community etc.) is affected by the threat of its violence *and* the main victims accept this presence as regular in order to suspend – at least in daily life – the realization of violence *with eventually possible* contingent illegal advantages. As a matter of fact, this argument is coherent with the juridical definition of mafioso criminal act by the Italian Penal Code, article 416bis, third paragraph:

»L'associazione è di tipo mafioso quando coloro che ne fanno parte si avvalgono della forza di intimidazione del vincolo associativo e della condizione di assoggettamento e di omertà che ne deriva per commettere delitti, per acquisire in modo diretto o indiretto la gestione o comunque il controllo di attività economiche, di concessioni, di autorizzazioni, appalti e servizi pubblici o per realizzare profitti o vantaggi ingiusti per sé o per altri.«

The emphasis upon code of silence (*omertà*) and the general distrust over societal foundations are therefore to be furthermore investigated.

### **Concepts about mafias: what kind of ties and bonds?**

According to scientific literature, many are the possible sort of ties that can describe specific activities of mafias. In this paragraph an attempt to analyze a bunch of concepts is faced with the

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<sup>5</sup> Borsellino 2006: 88.

synthetic purpose to understand what is similar and what does not fit with single concepts. The following discussion is aimed to highlight some of the implications present in table 1.

Table 1 around here

*Lobbying and legal power.* The study of mafias in a macro perspective tells a story of people and structures that have been hung on the State and have had with it collusive ties. The main clans could have not survived without several forms of subsidies that they have been able to grasp in illegal ways, such as in public tenders. These practices are so governance-laden that the common credo about a lack of political power is not completely true. More precisely the overload of informal and illegal rules about who-can-do-what blocks the bureaucratic system and makes it appear very inefficient and affected by profligacy. Actually, nothing get wasted and even though the general game is far from be a Pareto optimum (La Spina, 2008), what is got is placed in a very careful way. The question therefore is if mafias are a state within a state, a mere lobby for its friends, or something else. Charles Tilly to this regard affirms that:

»If one mafia network managed to extend its control over all Sicily, all concerned would begin to describe its actions as “public” rather than “private”, the national government would have to come to terms with it, outsiders and insiders alike would begin to treat its chief as the legitimate authority.«<sup>6</sup>

The mafiosi associations try to keep established sort of parallel proto-states, whose legacy is actual, but even insufficient to have turned into legal power for the so called ›monopoly of power‹.

It should be added that forms of agreements and negotiations during the changing phases between legal power in pre-modern society and legal power in modern society happened. The aims of mafias have never ceased to admit legal power as an impossible achievement and, at the same time, something to be fought. As a result, the actual historical events let emerge hybrid and perverse situations of ›hand and glove‹. In those situations the control of formal and official truth about single tragic events, reputations and general social control, have always been reckoned critical by mafias’ families.

As a result this kind of patronage mechanism is surprisingly similar with what mafias have done since their very beginning. However these bonds and affiliations are far from being a way to exercise democracy, like in lobbying activities in a modern democracy.

*Secrecy.* Secrecy has been perfectly described by Simmel (1906). Despite general descriptions of secret societies, mafias – as declared in the first paragraph – need strictly to have some kind of

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<sup>6</sup> Tilly 1974: XXIII.

compliance with not affiliated members. Simmel says that »*The additional trait is that the person deceived is held in misconception about the true intention of the person who tells the lie*«<sup>7</sup>. In mafias contexts the deceived is at the same time a liar. Many times the person lies to himself or herself in a quite unconscious way. Recent events like the internationally known disorders in Rosarno (Calabria) in 2010 let the watcher of journalists' reports understand that the whole community, even those who are neither affiliated nor abettors, are devoted to some code of silence. Vilification is therefore a pass partout to keep secret something that is known by people who shouldn't know because they don't belong to the secret society: the clan. This kind of ›community in the society‹ with a core engine of distributing benefits and terror nested inside the community let the mafias context more complex than ordinary secret society.

*Freedom of association.* Associations basically are in Toqueville's definition a way to fulfill common interests in a context that is somehow hostile to the same community. The example of the pilgrims conquering and founding a new nation in the name of Christianity is given: they build a church as far as they have a common end and this common end does not spoil anybody. In this assumption, as already discussed (Marini, 2011), my attention was paid to understand the dynamic in anti-mafia associations, first of all the anti-racket ones. Even though these latter associations are in a ›coping with‹ situation, the condition they are fighting together is not nature or external factors but the same social context. It is not just the clans, but social context made by ordinary people who usually denied cooperation and even in some cases mere sympathy during a funeral too. Moreover, mafias "associations" are not clubs that can be joined freely. Even some pseudo-scholars from time to time try to give honorability to these aggregations, but the first term that better can describe its origin is maybe ›tribe‹, since blood ties are the key points of these organizations.

*Labour market, welfare, endorsements and patronage.* Jobs are a pivotal scarce resource in southern Italy. Money and services of any kind (included an emergency in hospitals in some cases) are traditionally critical in some contexts. The above mentioned services in kind and monetary subsidies that the mafias guarantee, especially to the lower classes, are often a spoiling dynamic of the labour market. Many other troubles are a derivation of lack of worthiness in tenders and in competitive exams.

The crime-driven-keynesisms produces, as can be imagined, much more perverse outcomes to the real welfare state and its often alleged excessive state aids. First of all mafias' networks are intrinsically asymmetric in terms of acquaintances: the more a person is closer, the more it will be able to be awarded with the resource at stake. This condition is not correlated at all with merits and eligibility criteria. These asymmetric relations usually make real persons in need without funds. For

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<sup>7</sup> Simmel 1907: 445.

instance a real blind person could remain unemployed and a false one could get a job reserved for handicapped people if the latter is ›endorsed‹. In the long run, and in 90s of XX century the long run was already very visible in Italian macroeconomy, the general welfare state gets spoiled. This system based on personal ties and on the pursuit of bypassing rules trigger and reinforce blackmailing dynamics, letting the game of secrecy inescapable.

The tie between the labour market, the distortion of welfare state and the power enacted by the mafias' social capital is therefore manifest, even though mafia's studies (nor labour studies) haven't underlined this issue so much. The essence of mafias to this regard can be summed up by a famous quote by Frankie Coppola who replied to a requested definition of mafia with a sort of riddle. »In a competition exam for an important position three persons apply: a smart and worthy, an endorsed, and a stupid. Mafia happens when the stupid gets the job«<sup>8</sup>. The link between nepotism and mafias is not too simple to be clarified. Meritocracy would imply the selection of the best person for a certain position. The other two are however very different though wrong. The ›Italian endorsement‹ (*raccomandazione*), a person who exercises nepotism in order to have his/her trusted person in a position, implies the strength of one's reputation and power regardless the actual worthiness of the endorsed candidate. The main point in this case is the affiliation to a formal or informal network of people. Moreover the status could be ascribed or performance-attributed even although in the latter case loyalty (political party, unions, and the like) is more important than skills. The emphasis upon the idle and stupid person is important because, as it is said commonly, »a stupid will obey even without any clue of performing it«. In order to have incapable persons in some key roles is nonetheless a leverage-by-out work that mafias have to foster in order to survive. The widespread terror exercised by mafias obviously plays a role in this accomplishment.

*Political party.* Mafias have their logic, strategies and aim of development in a context where consensus is prior to any other resources. Considering the crucial role of political elections, no matters if local or national, this phenomenon looks like political parties. Moreover mafias, as stated as a definition, use the contexts and let be used as a tool. This aspect in political game is particularly fitting. Additionally the specific key role of this indispensable social capital needed by any relevant boss to exercise his power can be briefly analyzed.

The function of political brokerage is connected with the character of the *faccendiere* (*wheeler-dealer*; entrepreneur-broker)<sup>9</sup>. In a social capitalism based on Keynesian model of public spending and huge public investment in infrastructures, taking control of economy vectors tends to equal taking control of not transparent mechanisms. To control tenders and rationales implies to

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<sup>8</sup> Stille 2007: 129.

<sup>9</sup> Barbagallo 2010: 147.

manipulate officials – who often represent in a proportional way the parties in the so called ›partitocratic model‹ –, and this system implies an overall assumption of political exchange. From the point of view of mafias the exchange is political since it is used to increase the power syndicate and to guarantee altered access to funding and labour market. In this circle the role of social consensus mediated by ›pork-barrelling‹ is crucial. These dynamics have been recently found out even in northern Italy<sup>10</sup>. To this regard mafias are not political parties, but may work as shadow political references.

However a particular version of mafias, Corleone's, can be analyzed as a peculiar case of quasi-party. According to Luciano Violante's opinion, especially Cosa Nostra showed to have the capability to influence national politics as it were a political party<sup>11</sup>. This accredited results are nowadays clear, but at the end of the first republic these evidence were not already at their final judgment. However the allegations were enough to let the first 50 years of Italian republic collapse. As widely recognized, brokerages between mafias and politics did not cease: new patterns of mediations were established with the second republic. Cosa Nostra and the leadership by Corleonesi definitely don't equal all mafias' patterns.

Nonetheless the rise of a new bourgeois does not look as a futuristic perspective. Some new bourgeois seems more the explanation of the élite circulation in the last decades of the Italian history. For instance, main steps of this rise have been decided by whoever took advantages of the ›narco-lire‹ profits of the Sicilians and may have become surreptitiously big entrepreneurs firstly, and influent political actor later. In these processes the brokerage of deviated free-masons has a role.

*Amoral familism and civickness.* Amoral familism is a very fortunate expression that still now depicts southern Italy's attitudes. The question of civickness is particularly intertwined with it, since the lack of diffused trust is assumed as an explanation of the low performances of bureaucracies whose causes should be found out in different historical roots between the different Italian macro-regions. This sort of anthropological factor is very intriguing. Since XIX century the first attempts, for instance by Pitrè, were focused on attitudes description. Gaetano Mosca expresses as follows:

»The mafioso's mood, or better to say the spirit of mafia, can be described in few words. It is based on reckoning a sign of weakness or cowardice the act of claiming to official and legal justice such as police or tribunals. [...] That would be blocked by a false sense of honor and personal dignity if the suffered crime or tort was committed openly and in a shameless way. The Mafioso shows to don't fear the revenge nor the

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<sup>10</sup> Enzo Ciconte reports (2011: 129) that "the attorney Pietro Trivi has been elected due to the fact that Chiriaco would have paid out to a nurse 2000€ 'with the end to buy the electoral consensus whose total was around of 150 votes'". As a result, even in the north of Italy the average pro-capite cost of a single vote is particularly cheap: 13,33€.

<sup>11</sup> Violante 1994: 37.



grudge and not the enmity that his act would have generated. Since the harasser does not take care or bad relations, the victim is induced to show to be tougher.<sup>12</sup>

Banfield, some decades later, analyzed the same dynamic, often based on *envy* among lower classes that fight themselves: »many people positively want to prevent others from getting ahead«<sup>13</sup>. It is remarkable to note that Gaetano Mosca was aware of the fact that being mafioso from an attitude point of view cannot be said like in a sort of sociological or psychological scale. To be or to be, to appear or not to appear mafioso by a Sicilian person will always be a relative question: »for a Sicilian a mafioso will be whoever from Sicily who will show to be a little more mafioso than him/her«<sup>14</sup>. This bright quote unveils an important fact: in the everyday strife for survival in a backward society to cheat a little more or a little earlier spoiling the supposed assumed rules of a modern society defines the act of being mafioso, meant even as successful, arrogant, smart, violent and hustler altogether. In such a way a world affected by mafia could be even described as a context where – following the prisoners' dilemma – only the first cheater survives at expenses of collectivity and, in the long run, damages himself too. However, it is still not clear how, under which conditions, and why the amoral familism investigated for instance in Lucania by Banfield (a not very mafias' affected territory) would turn into the rise of some mafia's clan.

### **Mafias and anti-mafias: a critical discussion and policy hints**

The Italian literature about the anti-mafia experiences is surprisingly poor. As stated by Antonio La Spina (2008) there is even a scarce interest by scientists upon how to describe different kind of policies. In this final paragraph attention is briefly paid upon different sort of anti-mafias. Before to talk about policies some description of "social" anti-mafias are necessary. Usually social antimafia refers to cultural struggle, often led in school or in public opinion. La Spina (2008) points out first of all repression as direct policy, and further sort of repression that can be defined as indirect. Besides this first distinction a wide space for sociological analysis is open, especially if social antimafia is taken into account. Following the developed argument, there is intrinsically social dimension made of cohesion and consensus reinforced and created by a system. Nando dalla Chiesa, son of "the General" Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa, known especially for his activism more than as an academic scholar is the only one to provide a typology.

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<sup>12</sup> Mosca 1900: 5-6.

<sup>13</sup> Banfield 1958: 18-19.

<sup>14</sup> Mosca 1900: 16 (italic in original version).

**Tab. 2 The niches of antimafias in the system of relevant mafias' features**

	<i>Legitimation</i>	<i>Material Invisibility</i>	<i>Conceptual invisibility</i>	<i>Expansion</i>	<i>Impunity</i>
<i>Economic</i>	Addiopizzo   cooperative companies for confiscation goods			Code of ethic of firms   Entrepreneurs   Unionists	Antiracket associations
<i>Social</i>	Movement by students	Local Associations			
<i>Political</i>				Antimafia movements	Parliament
<i>Institutional</i>			Antimafia Committees	Mayors   Policy makers   Prefects	Magistrates   Police officers
<i>Cultural</i>	Schools   best seller books   Cinema, theater   Television	Radio Aut   I Siciliani   critical journalism			
<i>Morale</i>	“Ammazzateci tutti”   Priests	Libera   Movements of victims and their relatives			Movements that enter into a civil lawsuit

Source: dalla Chiesa 2010: 285.

The mere list of anti-mafia dimensions and concrete historical attempts let emerge new unwritten and critical patterns. Nonetheless the above mentioned experiences, thought quite numerous and various, are nested in a kind of fluctuation and cyclic process in history. This *squeezbox* feature is explained by wrong and proficient steps made by both the legal and criminal sides, and it is even expression of sudden reactions against mafias. Therefore – due to resilient paths that bring usually to new patterns dominated by mafias' clans, even though with different combination of social capitals based on the same ingredients – phases of normalizations are restored through *omertà*, general distrust, collusions.

First of all antimafia legislation needs to become aware of the fact that antimafia movements are usually semi-spontaneous and heterogeneous social aggregations. Moreover, antimafia movements do not even represent a reliable indicator of the mafia presence. The first steps of the presence of mafia – whatever the genesis might be (Sciarrone, 2009; Varese, 2011) – are characterized by a total invisibility, which becomes even more effective because of the denial to recognize such a presence in a specific system. Among the other a proof of this attitude of denial (that can be interested or disinterested) is attested by some local actors, as the *Relazione Figurelli* witnesses as an example: this explains that the establishing of some dangerous clans, like the Morabito-Bruzzaniti-Palomara, has been favored by the lack of civic virtues of the political-bureaucratic

system<sup>15</sup>. Additionally, members of the different antimafia movements are not necessarily part of the same common group, and do not always show collaboration or mutuality: an historical example may be the famous and harsh public quarrel between Leonardo Sciascia and Nando dalla Chiesa in the 80s. Nowadays different points of view and interests show by no means analogous of even increased conflicts.

The situation above described is made more complex by the fact that the existence of specific policies – whose rationale implies public reputation and financial funds, even huge amount in some sporadic occasions – can create the ground also for perverse and/or very conflictive developments within the antimafias. For example, in the case of anti-racket associations, such perverse developments are represented by the case of establishment of local associations whose effectiveness in terms of reports to police can be pretty low. In the worst of the cases, antimafia can become even a strategy of communication that can be useful for local electoral purposes.

The study on antimafia associations, specifically focused on the two phenomena of anti-racket and anti-usury associations of second level<sup>16</sup>, clearly shows the plurality of actors and strategies of action. For this reason, it is worth to speak about antimafias, using the plural form. The biggest issue related to this plurality is not constituted by the different opinions, ideologies, or by geographical distances. One of the causes of the low efficacy of these associations has to be searched in the lack of integration and cooperation. This can be explained by the different positions concerning the strategies of action; nonetheless different pragmatic positions that come from participating to competitive tenders may bring to different ideological patterns.

For this reasons a more synergic approach by policy makers may help. To this regard it can helpful to paraphrase Tano Grasso when he speaks about »keeping the wall high [after a successful report about extortion]«. It is surely essential to keep going after a victory, because such a victory could be partial or provisory, because of subsequent changes in the *modus operandi* of the clans. Other reasons may follow, since a clan must not show to give up, first of all. However, it is crucial to understand which are the ›borders‹ of this wall. From a sociological point of view, which is different from the point of view of law, it is to be suggested the fact that the wall can be *concave*<sup>17</sup> with respect to one's own self. The first case is the fulfilling case of anti-racket associations developed by Grasso: the small group that accomplished a good level of *reciprocal internal and external trust*<sup>18</sup>, after a long preparatory work which is not only about clues and papers, can protect

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<sup>15</sup> Massari 2001: 30.

<sup>16</sup> It is referred here with the term "second level" the umbrella associations that may bother more single little associations. The two or three main umbrella associations represents a very big part of all anti-mafia experiences.

<sup>17</sup> Concave is a self-surrounding situation, like being in a corner of a boxing ring; convex would be putting the opponent (mafias) on a corner.

<sup>18</sup> Grasso 2010: 313-315.

itself. As a consequence, this wall can isolate and sign the few people who make a denounce and rebel themselves to respect of a bigger part of society or community that remains outside. On the other hand, the wall could be *convex* from the point of view of people who are engaged in this fight. The mentioned example of the wall of anti-racket can really be impermeable to any form of illegality. Thus this condition in fact is essential for all the people sincerely engaged. Since single antimafia experiences, both volunteer and funded, can be effective only if they are partial (convex in the example) in the general struggle against mafias, to reach up *convexity* the sum of more tools ought to be promoted. On the other side the convex wall would be characterized by the ability to marginalize mafiosi and corrupted and colluded people. Marginalization would even avoid potential criminal inducements by people who could be tempted. As widely described, and as it widely emerges both from scientific and non-scientific literature, the problem of the marginalization of antimafia, so to overcome mafias by the collectivity, even with symbolic acts, is very important. Massive and not extemporaneous movements are however not simple to be achieved as history taught (Santino 2009).

Very rarely this aim is underlined, and this also because an obvious consequence when fighting against mafia is the emergence of one's own security. One of the few cases where at least one part of a community understood the necessity of ›becoming concave‹, and consequently to deny the consensus to mafia, is the extraordinary story of Rita Atria. Renate Siebert<sup>19</sup> reminds that the women from Partanna and Castelvetro, in 1993, expressed the following passage on the local newspaper *Mezzocielo*: »We must marginalize mafiosi, and not the opposite. Rita forgive us because we ignored you«.

After an analysis of the phenomenon of mafia, here only briefly reported and described, it is possible to state that the objective discussed above (the marginalization of mafia) is essential to start a new and effective phase in the fight against mafia. If from one side mafia has always taken advantage of the consensus it has, on the other hand the more a phenomenon, or a movement, has been a massive one, the more it has been extemporaneous (the period of the *Fasci siciliani* is probably the only exception even though it ended). The current attempts on the issue of mobilizing people are still far from being fully met. Even when such attempts are effective, they are local, or very specific, as it is for the case with of *responsible use* of the confiscated real estates and businesses.

The work of education and involvement of the youngest generations, known as social antimafia, seems to lose strength as far as it becomes a collective effort. It could be reasonably assumed that there is a relation between the number of people involved and the ability to ›build a wall‹ against

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<sup>19</sup> Siebert 1997: 141.

mafia. Very similarly, a problem of governance is to be faced at the current state of the art, as it could even help to propose new norms against corruption, usury, and other specific topics in addition to the working one such as the anti-racket.

For sure, considerations about the ›in-between zones‹ between mafia *strictu sensu* (clans and their affiliated) and society that colludes with mafia, are currently quite developed. Culture and practices, the attention towards public administration, the world of the liberal professions and of the consumerism, which involve the entire population, give room to the hope that there may exist a breadth of valid instruments to address the issue of the struggle to the mafia presence.

The most serious problem emerging from empirical evidence and from a simple observation of the press releases of these last years (especially after the birth of the *Comitato Paolo Giaccone*<sup>20</sup>), is the complete block of the professional registers face to a direct attack to their own corporations. The general legalist assumption usually prevails over the claim to expel professionals who allegedly were in affairs with clans and were declared so by tribunals, even though not yet with the definitive judgment. The protection for one's own safety and impunity, from the professionals community point of view, constitutes still today a contradictory element toward the call for severe proof of moral conduct. A quick demonstration of the lack of cooperation between the world of professions and justice is provided by the following simple consideration. From April 2006 it is possible, thanks to an EU directive upon anti-laundering, to report to the *Ufficio Italiano Cambi* cases of suspicious financial transactions. Amadore<sup>21</sup> states that, in three years, this Office received only 238 reports. As a result, if it is sure that repression and indirect repression is the first weapon, it is clear too that civil society and public opinion play a role and a mix of all these forces ought to be propelled.

To let conclude, the same history of mafia studies is interesting, since this was a big issue in post-unification Kingdom of Italy in late XIX century. The governments tried to inquiry the phenomenon of *brigantaggio* that remained peculiar in the South and the ›southern question‹ started to be a sort of ›game of the roles‹<sup>22</sup> since the very beginning even in politics. One of the most famous Italian sociologists and political scientist, Gaetano Mosca, actually depicted the mafias relation as a peculiar kind of social relation between the criminal and the victim who let the first be harasser (letting be used, or fooled). His descriptions of extortion dynamics that he made in northern Italy before 1900 is incredibly close to nowadays reports by magistrates, journalists and rescued victims

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<sup>20</sup> This Committee was born recently in Palermo and aim to change the “permissive” culture among many professionals (doctors, architects, engineers and so on). His leader Alessandro Cali has experienced an active sabotage against his mandate as president of the *Ordine degli Ingegneri di Palermo* since he was too much “innovative”, or – better to say – went against some traditional interests.

<sup>21</sup> Amadore 2009: 4.

<sup>22</sup> The most common version is as follows: Savoia family as invaders from one part, and south conditions as a socio-economic context dominated by Borboni's legacy and by anthropological backward systems on the other side.

(Mosca 1900) and couldn't be a better description in microsociology *à la* Goffman. His main metaphor of the Mafia as an old whore who winks and through experience finds the way to be attractive even though her actual appearance is maybe the best comprehensive image of this kind of phenomena.

An historical analysis is not possible here – nor the history of big events, nor the social history – especially due to background perspective. Nonetheless the sociological studies and the same anti-mafia experiences – being far from be unified, in a general agreement, stably popular and wholly effective – shed light over the importance of particular ties that cannot be sorted easily with the sociology classics. The feeble line between freedom and duty, such as in many other historical tragedies, is here at stake. After hundreds of homicides and decades of intertwined destiny of mafias with politics and political power, both in local and national contexts, it is known now that indifference is undoubtedly a guilty behavior.

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**Table 1.**

<i>Concept</i>	<i>by Whom</i>	<i>Similarities</i>	<i>Dissimilarities</i>
Patronage	Tilly	Networks exclude insiders from outsiders Bounding matters in delivering advantages	Affiliations are not full for abettors Lobbying is secret and illegal
Political party	Mosca, Michels	Elections are key moments Political roles, individual characters and organizations matter	Agreements are illegal and not-transparent Mafias can "only" have informal referent (ex c.p.p. 416 ter)
Circulation of élite	Mosca, Michels	Mafias played a role in overcoming the medioeval aristocracy	Mafias implies the denial of social change toward modern societies
Lobbying	Hirschman	Loyalty from one side, and Voice and Exit on the other explain the dynamics	the Framework of Civil Rights is neglected
Secret Society	Simmel	mafias are never manifest organizations/associations internal organization works like any other secret society	not-Mafia people "decide" to recognize the secret presence mafias need to stay in touch with "upper-world" and theirs under-world sparing partners
Gemeinschaft	Tönnies	Bonds are compulsory and none can get rid of some kind of "mutualness". "Wesenwille" can be seen.	Formal roles and kinship do not explain the mafias clan
Gesellschaft		Social classes explain the birth of mafias in "modern societies"	There's no particular "Kürwille", nor positive law at all in mafias' clans
Associationism	Tocqueville	anti-mafias as bottom-up associations to cope with something mafias are not associations at all	... but that "something" is the main its social context. To some extent they are anti-system actors anti-mafias associations barge in local society
Solidarity	Durkheim	"Mechanical S." explains the bonds in places/economic sectors where mafias live	"Organic S." is totally denied even though the world is a modern one. Even in high division of labour O.S. does not emerge
Amoral familism	Banfield	All is about distrust of public legal sphere	Mafias cannot be different from amoral familists; it is not true the viceversa.

Source: own elaboration