Jehiel, P;
Lamy, L;
(2018)
A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis.
Journal of Political Economy
, 126
(2)
pp. 735-760.
10.1086/696273.
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Abstract
We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how they value the various local public goods once located, and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mechanism to attract citizens. It is shown in quasi-linear environments that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare. Interpretations and limitations of the result are discussed.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1086/696273 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1086/696273 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10046367 |
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